Načertanije

Rado Ljui
School of Philosophy University of Belgrade
Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

Abstract: A subject usually neglected in the historical work on Ilija Garaanins role as a statesman has been discussed. Attention has been drawn to the legal status of Serbia at the moment Garaanin entered civil service and how it changed during the thirty years of his political career (183767). The first part of the paper looks at his views against the background of three vitally important issues for Serbias legal status at the time: the constitutional issue, the issue of hereditary succession and the issue of internal independence. His views on the three issues reflect his understanding of the existing status of the Principality of Serbia. The second part of the paper looks at how he envisaged a future Serbian state. Its largest portion is naturally devoted to the ideas put forth in the Naertanije (1844), the first programme of nineteenth-century Serbias national and foreign policy. It also looks at Garaanins attempt, made through the Serbian representative at the Porte in the revolutionary year 1848, to achieve the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy with the Serbian United States (or a Serbian vice-kingdom) as a constituent state. Finally, attention has been paid to the creation of a Balkan alliance through agreements concluded by Balkan states. Keywords: Ilija Garaanin, Principality of Serbia, statehood, Ottoman Empire, Naertanije, foreign and national policy programme
The legal status of Serbia during Garaanins political career
The statehood of the Principality of Serbia was founded upon three types of legal documents: 1) international agreements; 2) Ottoman documents (firmans, berats and hatt-i sherifs); and 3) Serbias acts passed after she achieved internationally guaranteed autonomy within the Ottoman Empire in 1830, such as constitutions, laws, agreements, etc.1 Legal documents of the second type stemmed from the obligations the Ottoman Empire undertook under Russias pressure to protect Serbia. International agreements concerning the autonomy of Serbia will only be listed: the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), the Akkerman Convention with its Separate Act (1826), and the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). They paved the way to the restoration of Serbias statehood as a principality as much as the resulting Ottoman legal acts. It should be pointed out that Russia, through these agreements, had coerced
As a newly-created political entity Serbia had also been founded on the results of the uprisings of 1804 and 1815. For more, see R. Ljui, Istorija srpske dravnosti [History of Serbian Statehood], vol. II: Srbija i Crna Gora, novovekovne srpske drave [Serbia and Montenegro, Serb States of the Modern Age] (Novi Sad 2001).
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Ottoman Turkey into solving the Serbian question raised by the Serbian Revolution of 1804. Russia, from 1830 a guarantor of the internationally protected autonomy of the Serbian Principality, was instrumental in establishing modern Serbias institutions. The Ottoman Empire established Serbia as a vassal principality under the following legal acts: the so-called Eight firmans of 1815/6; the hatt-i sherifs of 1829, 1830 and 1833; the berat of 1830; the firman on free salt trade of 1835; the firman on the Princes release from Constantinople of 1835; the fermans on the flag and coat of arms of 1835 and 1839; the firman on establishing the Serbian Agency in Bucharest of 1835; the firman on trade of 1837; and the Concordat with the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople of 1831 with an appendage added in 1836. Towards the end of the first reign of Prince Milo Obrenovi (18151839), the Sublime Porte issued yet another hatt-i sherif to Serbia, which is known as the Turkish Constitution (1838). Under these acts, Serbia was granted the status of an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty. The Principality had its territory, its own administration from the highest (prince) to the lowest (village mayor) level, as well as some elements of statehood (flag, coat of arms, diplomatic representative at the Sublime Porte, agencies, consuls). To be added here are the acts issued by institutions of the Principality of Serbia bolstering Serbian statehood, such as decrees, decisions, regulations and the short-lived 1835 Presentation-Day (or Candlemas) Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav).2 The early process of statehood restoration culminated with the enactment of the Constitution of the Principality of Serbia in 1835, an action undertaken on the grounds of the rights obtained by the hatt-i sherifs on internal autonomy. By 1835 Serbia had obtained all rights of an autonomous state, with the exception of some further minor amendments that were effected by the end of Prince Milos first reign. But only a month after the 1835 Constitution was adopted Serbia was forced by both Russians and Ottomans to suspend it as too liberal. This was the first case that Serbia was unable to defend one of her basic rights conferred under the acts on autonomous self-government. Later that year, the Sublime Porte degraded yet another of the Principalitys vital rights: the firman on the Princes visit to the Sultan termed the Serbian ruler ba-knez, reducing him to the first among
Pregled meunarodnih ugovora i drugih akata od meunarodnopravnog znaaja za Srbiju od 1800 do 1918 [Overview of international agreements and other acts of international legal importance to Serbia from 1800 to 1918] (Belgrade 1953); M. Gavrilovi, Milo Obrenovi, vols. IIII (Belgrade 1908, 1909, 1912); R. Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (1830 1839) [Principality of Serbia 18301839] (Belgrade: Serban Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1986).
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R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood
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his peers. That was the reason why this firman was not made available to the public and remained hidden amongst Prince Milos confidential papers.3 Those were the results of the twenty years of Prince Milos policies towards the Ottoman Empire aimed at obtaining autonomy, if not independence, for Serbia. Therefore, it was in an autonomous but still dependent Serbia that Ilija Garaanin, a member of the next generation of Serbian notables, entered civil service. In the next thirty years (18371867) Garaanin grew into one of the most prominent Serbian politicians and statesmen. During the thirty years of his active political career, the obtained legal status of the Principality of Serbia at first was reduced, and then gradually re-established. The autonomous rights of Serbia were reduced under the Constitutionalist regime (18381858), with Garaanin as one of its pillars. The beginning of that process may be traced back to the last years of Prince Milos first reign, when an oligarchic opposition, which was to become known as Constitutionalists, sought to undermine the autocratic rule of Milo Obrenovi. Serbias autonomy was narrowed by the following acts: berats issued to Serbian Princes (Milan Obrenovi in 1839; Mihailo Obrenovi in 1839 and 1860; Aleksandar Karadjordjevi in 1842 and 1843; Milo Obrenovi in 1859); firmans: on the approval of the First Regency (1839); on sending a imperial commission to Serbia (1840); on the deposition of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi (1843); on the appointment of the Prince of Serbia (1843); on the Supreme Court (1844); and on regulating customs revenues (1845). The Sultans hatt-i sherif of 1853 neither impaired nor improved the legal status of the Principality. There were only three acts that strengthened the Principalitys legal status: the Treaty of Paris (1856), the firman on implementation of the Kanlidja Conference Protocol, and the firman on transferring six fortresses to Serbian control (1867). Under the first of these acts, Russian patronage was replaced with the joint guarantee of six Great Powers and any Ottoman armed intervention in Serbia without their consent was banned; under the second, the Ottoman Muslim population living within the walls of the six fortresses was to withdraw with the Ottoman garrisons, and the fortresses of Soko and Uice were to be demolished; under the third act, the fortified towns were to be eventually handed over to the Principality of Serbia.4 If two phases of the history of nineteenth-century Serbia are compared, that of 18151835, and that of 18371867 during which Ilija Garaanins pursued his political career it becomes clear that the former
Archives of Serbia (hereafter: AS), Belgrade, Mita Petrovi Collection (hereafter: MPC), 2343. 4 Other acts, such as trade and other agreements of the Sublime Porte, as well as acts passed by the Principality of Serbia, have not been taken into consideration.
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was a period of success in struggling for and obtaining autonomous rights, while the latter was marked by a laborious and often unsuccessful defence of those rights, which were consolidated, and not fully, only towards the end of that period. The first period was, therefore, the one of re-establishing the state and its institutions; the second was for the most part limited to its preservation. The first period may be described as the concluding stage of the Serbian Revolution started by the first uprising in 1804; the second, despite some stagnation, paved the way for a new foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, leading to full independence in 1878. Garaanins role in shaping that policy was of major importance. The period in which Garaanin was engaged in state affairs could be divided into two the Constitutionalist (18381858) and the Obrenovi second reign (18591867). The former was characterized by violations of the rights conferred upon the Principality of Serbia (with the exception of the 1856 Treaty of Paris), while the main characteristic of the latter was the exercise and further extension of those rights. Garaanins views on Serbias statehood in both periods will be looked at and an attempt will be made to answer the following questions: What was his judgement of the autonomy created by Prince Milo? What were his ideas for furthering Serbias statehood status? What did he, as a prominent Serbian statesman, accomplish in that regard? Under constant pressure to find solutions to numerous problems in Serbo-Ottoman relations, Garaanin obviously had to examine all legal documents that formed the basis of modern Serbian statehood. He left no writings specifically addressing these issues, but wrote about them while dealing with a particular problem in Serbias relations with the Sublime Porte. In order to be able to make viable proposals to the Ottoman side, Garaanin had to refer to various Ottoman firmans, hatt-i sherifs, berats or the Russo-Ottoman peace treaties. While studying these documents, Garaanin used to make notes and analyze their contents, without making general assessments either of a particular document or of the corpus of documents relevant to Serbias autonomy. Garaanins writings only rarely, if ever, describe Serbia as a modern nation-state of revolutionary origin. Only once, in a draft text, did he make a remark that the obtainment of these documents was backed by Serbian weapons, meaning that modern Serbia originated in a national revolution.5 Garaanin often invoked different legal documents or their particular provisions when he considered them as necessary during direct negotiations with the Sublime Porte.
AS, Belgrade, Ilija Garaanins Papers (hereafter: IGP), 855, 930.
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The Principality of Serbias constitutional situation provides a solid background for looking at her legal status. Serbia had been granted powers of self-government under the Sultans hatt-i sherifs of 1830 and 1833. When a rebellion (Miletina buna) against the autocratic rule of Prince Milo broke out in January 1835, the Princes enlightened secretary, Dimitrije Davidovi, assured the ruler that the autonomous rights conferred upon Serbia under the hatt-i sherifs included the right to proclaim her own constitution.6 Given that no major step had theretofore been taken in Serbia without the assent both of the Porte as the suzerain power and of Russia as the guarantor of Serbias autonomy, the passing of a constitution was bound to provoke a reaction both in Constantinople and in St. Petersburg. Promulgation in 1835 of the Presentation-Day Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav),7 without Russias and Ottoman Turkeys consent, was the last step towards Serbias full internal self-government and a step further in strengthening her semiindependent position. The Constitution, however, was promptly suspended under the joint pressure of Russia, Austria and Ottoman Turkey. Although the Constitution did not suit his autocratic style, Prince Milo stood up for it in order to thwart further Russian and Ottoman involvement in Serbias internal self-government.8 Unable to find common ground on the constitutional issue between 1835 and 1838, Prince Milo and the Constitutionalist opposition eventually agreed, at the suggestion of the British consul and with Ottoman approval, that a new Serbian constitution would be drafted in Constantinople. That turned out to be a significant error, which could not be rectified until 1869. Pursuant to the agreement reached between Russia, Ottoman Turkey and the Serbian deputation, in 1838 the Sublime Porte issued a fourth hatt-i sherif to Serbia, which is better known as the Turkish Constitution. This decree reduced some of the previously granted rights, such as designating Serbia a province instead of a principality, and authorizing the Porte to intervene in her internal affairs, in particular in the event of conflict between the Prince and the seventeen oligarchs appointed life members of the newly-created Council.9
The constitutional issue
J. ivanovi, Nekoliko primeanija na knjigu Slaveni u Turskoj od Kiprijana Roberta [A Few Notes on the book Slavs in Turkey by Cyprian Robert], Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije (1890), 63. 7 The text of the Constitution was drawn up by Dimitrije Davidovi. 8 For more, see R. Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (18301839), 148. 9 Ibid., 190191.
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The members of the Council, known as Constitutionalists, including the young and not yet very influential Ilija Garaanin, sacrificed some clearly defined autonomous rights in order to curb the autocratic rule of Prince Milo. If they wanted their struggle against the Prince to succeed, and they resolutely did, they needed support from both Russia and Ottoman Turkey, who in turn skilfully manipulated the growing discord among high-ranking Serbian politicians. While Prince Milo kept defending all the powers conferred upon Serbia and her ruler until his deposition in 1839, the Constitutionalists tended to criticize them even when there was no particular political justification for the criticism.10 The 1838 Turkish Constitution was formally in force for thirty years, coinciding with the thirty years of Garaanins active role in Serbian politics. Disputed even before its official proclamation in February 1839, the Constitution remained a source of misinterpretations and rivalries until it was replaced by the Regency Constitution in 1869. Not even the Constitutionalists under the First Regency (18391840) were satisfied with some its provisions and sought to negotiate their modification with the Sublime Porte. Apparently, their intention was to ensure modifications to the constitutional provisions that contradicted the Council Organization Act (1839) in order to enhance the powers of this body in relation to the powers vested in the Prince.11 The Constitutionalists were in particular criticized for their sympathetic attitude towards the Ottomans, but, as it has been noted, they acted out of purely political necessity, not out of conviction.12 Having left Serbia in the wake of a conflict with young Prince Mihailo Obrenovi (first reign 18391842), the Constitutionalists actively lobbied in Constantinople for firming up the powers of the Council as defined by the 1838 Constitution. Garaanins opinion on the constitutional issue is obvious from his correspondence with leading Constitutionalists. In his letter to another Constitutionalist Stojan Simi of 17 April 1841, he underlines that a new Council will bind the Prince to honour the Constitution sacredly and it will make sure that others honour it as well. Two years later, the Constitutionalist regime was established but not yet firmly, and Garaanin informs Stevan Knianin: Reports on the position of Serbia coming from all quarters cannot be more desirable than they are. They all say that we govern the people
For details, see ibid., 219220. R. Ljui, Pitanje dinastije u vreme Prvog namesnitva 18391840 [The dynastic issue during the First Regency 18391840], Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije 19 (1982), 139. 12 V. J. Vukovi, Srpska kriza u istonom pitanju (18421843) [Serbian Crisis in the Eastern Question 18421843] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1957), 43.
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well and by the Constitution, so we can be cock-a-hoop about it.13 As a representative of a political group that sought to consolidate its power, he had to advocate abidance by his countrys fundamental law as the source of basic political rights. In his major text on the foreign policy of Serbia, written in 1844 (Naertanije), Garaanin made no reference whatsoever to the legal documents on which modern Serbian statehood was founded. He merely noticed that restored Serbia had made a fortunate start and then referred to the firm foundations of the medieval Serbian empire, thereby completely disregarding the achievements of the previous generation (Karageorge and Milo Obrenovi). Garaanin saw the future Serbian state as being founded on the sacred historic right and its citizens as true heirs of our great [founding] fathers. The founding fathers he had in mind were those of medieval times. The heroes of the modern age were not eligible for his list because they were involved in a state-building process based on the natural right a national revolution. On the other hand, he believed that Serbs would fare better if their medieval empire were restored, with the Principality of Serbia as its core. He doubted that it could have a stable future unless it contained a seed of a future Serbian empire. Being a draft of Serbias foreign and national policy, the Naertanije made no mention of a constitution either. Obviously, the system of government of the future state that was supposed to grow into a renewed Serbian Empire was not an issue Garaanin considered as being of essential importance. Once firmly-seated in power, the Constitutionalists were not particularly interested in constitutional issues until the final years of their rule. From a period before Garaanin himself took interest in these issues comes a draft text on the Turkish Constitution he wrote in 1848. In the revolutionary year 1848, Garaanin was reluctant to consider any modification to the Constitution, which practically until yesterday was presented to the people as their holy of holies by all ministers. Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi, in his turn, at the National Assembly held on St Peters Day (Petrovska skuptina) in July 1848, stated that he would not allow any violation of the Constitution even if I have to relinquish princedom. As the relations between the Prince and the Council grew tense, mostly as a result of contradictions between the Constitution and the Council Organization Act, Garaanin addressed this topical question as well: although Serbs were entitled to pass a constitution of their own, the 1838 Constitution was granted by Ottoman Turkey backed by Imperial Russia. The involvement of the two
Prepiska Ilije Garaanina [Correspondence of Ilija Garaanin], ed. G. Jaki, vol. I: 18391849 (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1950), 20.
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great powers in this matter was the consequence of the Constitutionalists impatient striving to limit the power of the Prince. Garaanin admitted that it had been a very critical political mistake and [that] its rectification must be a matter of utmost priority. Such a huge mistake made out of necessity, he believed, must never be made again. Should it prove necessary, however, to modify the Council Organization Act and those provisions of the Constitution that hindered progress, Garaanin advised a gradual (bit by bit) process of rectifying past mistakes; and if that could not be done using the usual procedure, then the general assent of the people, who have the right to enact their own laws and regulations, would be required. The bottom line was not to allow Ottoman Turkey and Russia to interfere in the autonomous Principality of Serbias internal affairs.14 Garaanins political shift was obvious. He was not an unconditional defender of the Turkish Constitution any more. Now firmly in power, the Constitutionalists did not find strict abidance by the 1838 Constitution as indispensable as they had in the early 1840s. Garaanin became increasingly concerned with constitutional issues in the 1850s, especially between his fall from power in 1853 and the Assembly held in December 1858 on St Andrews Day (Svetoandrejska skuptina). Garaanins papers include three constitution drafts two written by his hand and one by the hand of Jovan Marinovi, Garaanins influential, Paris-educated assistant. Garaanins correspondence sheds light on this concern of his. In a letter to Marinovi of 1855 he wrote about the ongoing wrangle between the Prince and the Council over the Constitution and the Councils organization. Garaanins advice to Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi (18421858) was that political activities should not focus on bringing the two documents into agreement because the time was not right for that. Focusing on that particular issue would be like trying to find a cure for a corpse that we are about to bury. Garaanin once more expressed his concern over foreign involvement in Serbian politics and explicitly warned the Prince that both the Constitution and the Council Organization Act have endured through the years of practice and that the Prince should be careful not to transgress the law in any way.15 Only two years later, now as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garaanin resolutely stood up for a modified and amended Council Organization Act, thereby defending the Constitutionalists powers from the Prince.16
AS, IGP, 302. Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu [Ilija Garaanins Letters to Jovan Marinovi], ed. St. Lovevi (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1931), vol. I, 277. 16 Ibid., 408.
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Two of the three abovementioned documents preserved among Garaanins papers are certainly constitution drafts. The form of the third, however, rather suggests the draft of a hatt-i sherif regulating the relationship between the Principality of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, and, as such, is a quite valuable source for our analysis. It is quite unlikely that its provisions could have been included in a constitution promulgated by the Principalitys National Assembly or, even less, by the Sublime Porte. Here is what it envisioned, in eleven points, for the Principality of Serbia: 1) Serbia remains a tributary principality paying tribute to the Porte as decreed by the Hatt-i sherif; 2) Principality of Serbia enjoys perfectly independent internal self-government17 in matters of law-making, religion, trade and river faring; 3) Serbia has her national coat of arms and flag;18 4) The existing form of government, constitutional monarchy, is to be preserved; 5) Principality has the right to a sufficient number of national soldiers to maintain internal security and defend the borders of the country from any attack; 6) In case of war between the Sublime Porte and any other state, no armies are permitted to enter or cross Serbia;19 7) To forestall the above-stated, the Ottoman garrisons should be moved out and the fortifications destroyed; 8) All Turks(Ottoman Muslim population) should move out, according to the Hatt-i sherif of 1830, except for those who should choose to stay and submit themselves to Serbian rule, thereby becoming equal in rights to Serbs and enjoying the freedom of religion; 9) The Serbian government has the right to establish relations with foreign governments and to conclude customs and other agreements relevant to the wellbeing and further development of the country; 10) All previous agreements concluded by the Sublime Porte should be examined and rectified if in disagreement with international law or if violating Serbias autonomy; 11) All areas defined by the Hatt-i sherif of 1833 should be incorporated into Serbia if they remained within Ottoman Turkey through abuse in border demarcation.20 This source quotes the rights Serbia was granted by the Sultans decrees during the first reign of Prince Milo, but in a somewhat expanded form. The only controversial issue would be that of succession to the Serbian throne, as it was not explicitly addressed. The document not only envisUnderlined in the original text kept in Archives of Serbia (AS), Varia, 782. The further text reads: according to the hatt-i sherifs of 1835 and 1838. These in fact were the firmans of 1835 and 1839. See R. Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (18301839), 291295. 19 This suggests that the document may be dated to the time of the Crimean War. 20 See R. Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (18301839), 4043. Three copies of this document have survived: AS, IGP, 862; V, 782; Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter ASANU), Belgrade, no. 14233/g.
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aged the removal of Ottoman garrisons but also the demolition of the forts. According to it, the Principality would further enhance its autonomy by declaring void all agreements concluded by the Ottoman Empire if harmful to her autonomous status, by effecting minor territorial enlargement, by precluding the entry of foreign troops into her territory and by partially modifying the scope of the acquired rights, especially in relation to Ottoman Turkey.21 Serbia was supposed to remain a tributary principality, but with a more complete and improved internal self-government. The question of the Portes privilege to intervene as regards the Council members was not addressed, which left room for undermining the powers of self-government. Garaanins constitution draft was not made until after the Treaty of Paris was concluded in 1856. The draft had no title and was divided into three sections: 1) Political rights of the Principality of Serbia (11 articles); 2) Civil rights of Serbs (10 articles); 3) Central government (one article): a) On the authority of the Prince (19 articles); b) On the State Senate (19 articles); and c) On the Principality Council (8 articles). The draft consists of sixty-eight articles, is undiversified and quite conservative. The following articles of the first section deal with Serbias relationship with Ottoman Turkey. Serbia is a Principality dependent on the Sublime Porte, paying an annual tribute of 2,400,000 grossi. It enjoys independent national self-government reflected in the freedom of religion, law-making, trade and river faring, in accordance with the previously issued imperial decree. The princely title is hereditary in the Karadjordjevi family and based on the principle of primogeniture. Should the Prince be without male heirs, he can adopt a son from either male or female sides of the family. Only if even this option fails are the people allowed to elect another princely family. Serbia has the right to have a representative in Constantinople and agents at guaranteeing courts. With the Portes assent, she can establish trading agencies in the Empire and beyond. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical patriarch and is autonomously administered by the Metropolitan of Belgrade. Serbs are free to trade and travel with their passports throughout the world. Where there are no Serbian agents, Serbian merchants are represented by the Ottoman consul and, where there is no Ottoman consul, by the consul of a guarantor state [reference to the Treaty of Paris]. Free use of the coat of arms and flag. The Serbian government may post a national guard at the border on the Sava and Danube rivers, which will prevent the enemy of the suzerain [Ottoman] court from crossing into her
Serbia had been granted a limited right to establish foreign relations even under the Constitution of 1838.
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territory. National Assembly will not convene except for the purpose of electing the ruling family.22 The outlined legal status of Serbia is considerably more reduced than the one envisaged in the previous document. Nonetheless, the draft fully conforms to the basic ideas of the Constitutionalist movement, as best evidenced by the article precluding the National Assemblys convening. Sessions of the National Assembly had not been provided for by the 1838 Constitution either, but Prince Milo swiftly rectified the blunder by issuing in 1839 a decree providing for its regular convening in accordance with customary law.23 There is no mention of resettling the Turkish population from Serbia or of some other points contained in the previous document. On the other hand, an attempt is observable to ensure the renewal of the right to the hereditary princely title and its transfer to the new ruling House of Karadjordjevi. Whatever Garaanins reference points in drawing up this draft were, his attitude towards the Porte was obviously moderate and cautious. It is difficult to see from the available documentary material whether Garaanin meant for this new constitution to be promulgated at home, with or without the knowledge of Constantinople, or granted to the people of Serbia by the Porte. The next draft contained in Garaanins archives, handwritten by Jovan Marinovi, conceded to the Sublime Porte the privilege of granting a constitution to Serbia.24 It is known that in late 1858 Marinovi asked Garaanin for copies of the Council Organization Act and of the 1835 Constitution. Given that Marinovis draft, unlike Garaanins, makes no mention of the Karadjordjevis, it may be assumed that it was drawn up in 1859. Sending the requested copies, Garaanin wondered: But then, is it possible to maintain a constitution which has already sustained so much damage that, judging by the current situation, it will only survive on paper? I have an opinion about that but dare not express it, and I am even more
AS, IGP, 656, handwritten by I. Garaanin. R. Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (18301839), 186. 24 It is more elaborate and contains ten sections: 1) Political rights of the Principality of Serbia; 2) Civil rights; 3) On the government of Serbia; 4) On the Prince; 5) On the State Council; 6) On the ministers; 7) On the Administrative Council; 8) On courts; 9) On administration; and 10) Conclusion, with a total of 92 articles. The title of the first section and most articles are the same as in the previous draft, which indicates the identical views of the two Serbian politicians and, possibly, their working together. The draft is kept in AS, IGP, 1682. For a reference to this draft as Garaanins creation, see D. Popovi Garaaninov ustavni nacrt iz 1858. godine [Garaanins constitution draft of 1858], in Ilija Garaanin 18121874, ed. V. Stojanevi (Belgrade: Nauni skupovi, vol. 54, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, vol.16, Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1991), 167178.
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unwilling to express it as I hope that my role in these affairs of state will end soon.25 Garaanins predictions that Prince Milo would not abide by the Constitution of 1838 which is the main reason why he had been forced to give up the throne and leave Serbia in 1839 soon proved justified. Milo reassumed the throne in 1858 and Garaanin resigned soon afterwards, thus putting an end to his work on constitutional issues. A short note of Garaanins on the constitutional issue might have been written at about that time. Similarly to what he wrote in the letter to Marinovi quoted above, Garaanin had his doubts: How can it be that the Porte imposes a constitution, which is the source of all laws in Serbia, when Serbia enjoys independent self-government? Turkey gives with one hand but snatches away with the other. Serbia will not be able to have a good legislature until she obviates that influence. The following quotation is quite characteristic: Both Russia and the Porte made a mistake by imposing this [1838] constitution on Serbia, but Serbia too made a mistake by accepting it, and it is now up to the Guarantor powers to rectify it.26 Prior to St Andrews Day Assembly, which deposed Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi, Garaanin had actively worked towards dethroning the Prince, while defending other achievements of the Constitutionalist regime.27 On his return to the throne in 1858, Prince Milo rejected the Turkish Constitution, but he sent a delegation to Constantinople trying to ensure that Serbia could promulgate her constitution independently of the Sublime Porte. As the delegation failed, both he and his successor, Prince Mihailo, resorted to issuing separate laws, whereby the Constitution of 1838 was practically suppressed. In 1860 Prince Milo raised the issue of succession to the throne at the Porte, an opportunity Garaanin used to draft a confidential document to revisit constitutional issues. According to him: This Constitution is either completely derogated or, to put it mildly, it has been interpreted as the Prince and the people have believed to be for the better, in every respect contrary to the way it has heretofore been understood and interpreted. I am not a supporter of the Constitution as it is now. He believed that neither the European powers nor the Serbian people would oppose changing it provided that the change was carried out in a way that would not be defiant towards the Porte; the old Constitution should be honoured until the required change was made; the Porte would defend the old Constitution because its suppression violated the Portes basic right in relation to Serbia; the Powers would be on the side of Ottomans, and
Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 17. AS, IGP, 1153. 27 S. Jovanovi, Druga vlada Miloa i Mihaila 18581868 [The Second Reign of Milo and Mihailo 18581868] (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1923), 6.
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had the matter been handled differently, they now would be on the side of Serbia. Someone might say that I, being so sceptical, have little faith in our rights, Garaanin stressed, but added that the only thing he was sceptical about was our strength to carry it through. Believing that law alone helps little in politics and a convoluted one not at all, Garaanin suggested reliance on the guarantor powers for resolving the whole issue.28 For a few years the constitutional issue seems to have remained outside the scope of Garaanins interest. It was only the Constitution of 1869 that motivated him, already retired and aged, into writing My Reflections, a text in which he took a critical look at this important document for Serbias nineteenth-century statehood building. Garaanin made an overview of Serbias entire constitutional development. The first thing he wanted to challenge was the appropriated right to promulgate a constitution: It is not at all the merit of the Pentecost Assembly that the new constitution ended the Portes privileges that the latter had included in the old constitution, but stressed that the Portes privileges had already been effectively derogated by Prince Mihailos laws of 1861. He recognized the merits of Prince Milo in restoration of Serbia, but he also emphasized the benefits the Principality had gained from the Turkish Constitution. Still, Garaanin dared point to its greatest weakness a Council members responsibility had to be proved at the Porte and described it as entirely unpopular. He admitted that it was on the grounds of that privilege that Edhem Pasha had been able to come to Serbia and save Stefan Tenka Stefanovi, the instigator of a failed attempt to overthrow the Obrenovi dynasty in 1857. After all, had the Prince not ousted him, Garaanin, from office at Russias behest? Garaanin tried to find a justification for his own political party by stating that the Constitutionalists had not requested that such a provision on Council members be included in the Constitution of 1838. The provision had been included in the Sultans decree of 1830, which Prince Milo had accepted without being denounced as traitor for that. Garaanin consciously chose not to mention the difference in the provisions on the responsibility of Council members between the two decrees. Besides, Prince Milo had not been willing to establish the Council until Miletas Rebellion (Miletina buna), not even according to the much more favourable provision contained in the Decree of 1830. Garaanin also took a look at the 1835 Constitution and emphasized that the Constitutionalists had been instrumental in its promulgation, trying to prove that the 1835 Constitution had been suspended due to certain circumstances rather than due to the Constitutionalists longing for a foreign constitution.29
28 29
AS, IGP, 1133, dated February 1860. AS, IGP, 1702.
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In his letter to Marinovi dated August 1869 Garaanin repeated some of these views by criticizing the regents for being satisfied with form, while the content of the Constitution brought no novelty. However, the way the Constitution was adopted and presented to Ottoman Turkey was a significant step towards independence, and there is no doubt that it contained novelties: The wellbeing of the people depends on those who govern, and progress could and can be achieved both ways, under the old and under the new constitution alike. Honest intention is the best constitution and no other form can compare with it. The way Garaanin treated Serbias fundamental law on equal terms with honest intentions lacking tangible guarantees were obviously the views of an aging conservative bureaucrat.30 The issue of hereditary succession
Hereditary succession to the princely title was an important ingredient of the constitutional issue and played an important role in the legal relationship between the Principality of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. What was Ilija Garaanins stance towards the issue? He changed his stance at least twice in the course of his long political career. In the 1830s, as a young Constitutionalist and especially as a Council member and the highest ranking military official, he supported this significant accomplishment of Prince Milo. When in 1839 the Porte changed its position and deprived the Obrenovi family of hereditary right, the Constitutionalists complied with the decision of the suzerain court. They were unable to exert any influence on the Porte as regards the contents of the berat on succession issued to Milan, the oldest son of Prince Milo.31 However, at the moment the Porte showed willingness to recognize the right of hereditary succession to Prince Milan, the Constitutionalists, through their leaders Toma Vui Perii and Avram Petronijevi, managed to persuade the Porte into limiting the right to his heir. Since Milan never married and had no children, the right expired with his death. This interpretation of the right of succession suited the Porte and was fully in accordance with the Berat of 1830. Under the berats issued to all succeeding princes (Milan and Mihailo Obrenovi, Aleksandar Karadjordjevi, and anew Milo and Mihailo Obrenovi during their second reigns), the princely title was non-hereditary. It should be noted that under the Constitution of 1838 the Berat of 1830 was kept in force, and thus the right of succession as stated therein.
Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 256257. Milan Obrenovi was severely ill and died only a few weeks after being officially appointed prince in 1839. He was succeeded by his younger brother Mihailo (1839 1842).
30 31
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Serbias vulnerability stemming from her no longer being a hereditary principality was noticed by Polish migrs as well.32 Thus, Prince Adam Czartoryskis advice was that Serbia should regain hereditary right from the Porte, avoiding foreign mediation in the process. Czartoryskis suggestion was accepted and additionally underscored both by his representative in Belgrade, Franz Zach, and by Ilija Garaanin: But it must be represented and established as an essential and fundamental law of the state that the princely title is hereditary (emphasis R. LJ.). Without this principle, through which unity becomes embodied in the dignity of the highest office, a permanent and stable union between Serbia and her Serbian neighbours cannot even be imagined. Garaanin only slightly, but essentially, modified Zachs project. Namely, Zach had in mind the Karadjordjevi family as the hereditary dynasty. Garaanins version, on the other hand, omitted this specification and extended the concept into a general principle. Having witnessed the frequent change of rulers, he deemed it best not to link the principle of hereditary succession to any particular dynasty.33 Yet another fact is important in analyzing Garaanins view on this issue. In the 1844 Naertanije he advocated Serbian support for autonomy to Bosnia, which would make it possible for Serbia and Bosnia to become more closely associated. The autonomous rights thus obtained were not supposed to include the right of hereditary succession, as that could be an obstacle to a union between Serbia and Bosnia.34
Zach wrote to Croatian leader Ljudevit Gaj in January 1844: So we accept Serbia as a starting point, but Bosnia should act on her own; Serbia and Croatia should only give advice and moral support; Austrian intervention must be forestalled. Since Bosnia has to be assimilated into Serbia, Serbia being the centre for all Slavs to gather together one day, no new centre should be established in Bosnia, that is, a separate principality with a dynastic family should be avoided there. They should be content with a council headed by someone elected for a term of several years. Should succession be established there, there would be power struggle between two dynastic families, from Bosnia and from Serbia. See V. aek, eko i poljsko uee u postanku Naertanija [Czech and Polish Roles in Creating the Naertanije], Historijski zbornik XV/1-4 (1963), 43. 33 This may support the assumption that Garaanin did not present Zachs Plan and his own Naertanije simultaneously to Prince Aleksandar as the Prince would have noticed the difference easily. In all probability Prince Aleksandar had no knowledge of Zachs Plan. Cf. D. Stranjakovi, Kako je postalo Garaaninovo Naertanije [The Origin of Garaanins Naertanije], Spomenik SAN XVI/87, 106. See also D. Mackenzie, Ilija Garaanin. Dravnik i diplomata (Belgrade: Prosveta 1982), 75. The original monograph was published in English: D. MacKenzie, Ilija Garaanin. Balkan Bismarck (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 34 Stranjakovi, Garaaninovo Naertanije , 88. Prior to the influence of the Polish emigration, Garaanins views on succession to the throne were quite different. Zach or Tschaikovsky referred to that in a letter to Czartoryski: He hasnt fully grasped the sig32
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Garaanin informed Prince Aleksandar about Czartoryskis Counsels in 1845. It was probably this that encouraged the Princes friend and influential Council member, Stefan Petrovi Knianin, to raise the issue of succession to the throne of Aleksandar Karadjordjevi, at first before the National Assembly and then at the Porte. Knianin suggested the method used by Prince Milo. Minister of the Interior at the time, Garaanin did not accept the suggestion: Prince Milo obtained hereditary right or, to be more precise, Serbia obtained it for her ruler, in a much better and firmer way than the one you suggest, and yet it was later lost in specific circumstances as if it had never been. Aware of the importance of this privilege, he added: Without being confirmed by the Suzerain Court, hereditary succession would have no validity at all. A proposal submitted to the Porte through Avram Petronijevi was rejected in early 1848, one of the stated reasons for the rejection being Garaanins disapproval of it.35 This shows that Garaanin was well aware of the importance of the right of hereditary succession for Serbia. This right, however, was hardly reconcilable with the Constitutionalists pro-Ottoman policy pursued at the time, whose interest was a feeble ruler, such as the one bearing a non-hereditary title. It was only once more that Garaanin took interest in the issue during the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi in his already discussed constitution draft. Although the draft envisaged the Karadjordjevis as hereditary dynasty, it appears obvious that the issue was of secondary importance to the Constitutionalists, and therefore to him. To clarify, the Constitutionalists sacrificed a state right to their political goals, the foremost being to strengthen the powers of the Council in relation to the ruler. It should be noted here that Jovan Risti was aware of the divisions within the Constitutionalist leadership over the succession issue: Knianin sided with Avram Petronijevi, whereas Garaanin objected, arguing that the best way for a prince to ensure succession for his offspring is to bring them up properly.36 There seems to have been a direct link between this view of Garaanins and the accusations that he harboured the ambition of becoming a prince himself.37 The succession issue became particularly important after the Obrenovis reassumed the throne in 1858. In his capacity as Prime Minnificance of Slavs yet or the need [of Serbia] for a [hereditary] dynasty, but he is capable of figuring it out. In Mackenzie, Garaanin, 75. 35 AS, IGP, 250, 255; Prepiska, 134136; Ljui, Pitanje dinastije, 118119. 36 J. Risti, Spoljanji odnoaji Srbije novijeg vremena 18481860 [Foreign Relations of Serbia in Recent Times 18481860] (Belgrade 1887), vol. I, 106107. 37 See D. Stranjakovi, Ilija Garaanin, unpublished biography, ASANU, 99107; Mackenzie, Garaanin, 245 and passim.
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ister (18611867) during the second reign of Prince Mihailo, Garaanin must have dealt with it, but there is little evidence in the surviving documentary material. In one of his letters to Marinovi, Garaanin reported that the Prince wanted him to discuss the issue of succession with you and to submit an opinion on what should be ordered and how.38 A law passed in 1859 ensured succession to the throne for the Obrenovis, whereby the formal aspect of the issue was resolved, and therefore this question was not raised at the Porte during Garaanins mission to Constantinople in 1861. In reality, however, the issue was irresolvable because Prince Mihailo had no offspring. Towards the end of Princes Mihailo reign Garaanin brought up the issue before the cabinet: Serbia is intent on becoming the leader of a Yugoslav state in the east and on keeping that position for good. He believed that the goal was unattainable without a practically secured dynasty, an issue that should be resolved promptly if Serbia intended to preserve the prestige she had acquired among the South Slavs. Garaanin believed, then, that a strengthened and firmly established dynasty meant better prospects for Serbia to accomplish South-Slavic unification.39 Never before in his political career had Garaanin been as resolute to resolve a problem as he was about the succession issue. But only two days after he divulged his proposal, and partly as a result of it, Garaanin was ousted as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that he deemed feeble and non-hereditary rulers more suitable for his political purposes than powerful and hereditary. At any rate, Garaanins attitude towards Serbian rulers remains a most controversial and little studied topic.40 Internal independence
The constitutional and succession issues were closely linked to that of preservation of internal independence. In his capacity as long-time head of the Interior, Garaanin must have been concerned with this important issue. A threat to internal independence could come not only from Ottoman Turkey
Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 116. AS, IGP, 1623; V. J. Vukovi, Politika akcija Srbije u junoslovenskim pokrajinama Habsburke monarhije18591874 [Political Actions of Serbia in the South-Slavic Provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy 18591874] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1965), 317319; Mackenzie, Garaanin, 433; G. Jaki and V. J. Vukovi, Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila. Prvi balkanski savez [Foreign Policy of Serbia during the Reign of Prince Mihailo. The First Balkan Alliance] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1963), 430436. 40 See Stranjakovi, Ilija Garaanin, 108144.
38 39
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but also from other states, most of all the Habsburg and Russian empires. He saw Austrian and Russian influences as potentially the most dangerous for Serbias national autonomy. It was quite early in his career that he (in the Naertanije of 1844) put forward his assessment that Austria will be a permanent enemy of a Serbian state. His refusal to accept an Austrian medal was in keeping with Serbias foreign policy, and was meant to demonstrate that it was not the Habsburgs but the Serbian cause that he had supported during the 1848 revolutions.41 Garaanin repeated many times in his correspondence that Austria means to use her power to endanger the small and weak Serbia. Frustrated at Austrias repeated meddling in Serbias internal affairs, carried out via the Austrian consul and the domestic pro-Austrian supporters, among whom he occasionally included Prince Aleksandar himself, Garaanin refused in 1854 to become engaged in state affairs just because Austria has assented thereto.42 The Austrian influence on Serbias affairs after the 1856 Treaty of Paris he saw as the greatest evil that could befall the Principality.43 While proving beneficial to Serbias foreign affairs, Russian patronage stifled her internal independence; as if Russia sought to turn the Principality of Serbia into just another Russian province.44 Garaanin particularly emphasized this point in the Naertanije: The more autonomously Serbia is governed, the less confidence Russia will have in her. Russia would seek to change that and to disparage Serbias independent policy.45 One of Garaanins notes betrays his anger at Russia for not respecting the right of the Serbs to travel with the Princes passport, a right granted by the Sultans Decree of 1830. Russian consuls were the only who took away the Princes passports from Serbian travellers, even from distinguished politicians, replacing them with Russian ones, thereby violating a major right in the area of international relations.46 Although Garaanin was inclined to cooperation with Western Powers, he soon became disappointed with them as well. One particular event made me never trust Russians, and I did not trust them and was right not to trust them. This now is enough to make me distrustful of others as well, he wrote to Marinovi in June 1854 upon hearing the unconfirmed news
S. Jovanovi, Spoljanja politika Ilije Garaanina [Foreign Policy of Ilija Garaanin], Politike i pravne rasprave [Political and Legal Treatises] (Belgrade 1932), vol. II, 347. 42 Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu I, 182, 192193, 201, 227. 43 Jovanovi, Spoljanja politika, 349. 44 Ibid., 345. 45 Stranjakovi, Garaaninovo Naertanije , 8283. 46 AS, IGP, 1401.
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that a secret agreement between the Western Powers and the Ottomans had given the green light to Austria to enter Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania and Serbia. However, the final disappointment came after the Treaty of Paris. Europe acts the same as Russians have been acting, but sometimes some good can come out of a great evil Thanks to Europe for acknowledging our achievements, it is nice and fair of her; she could just as well have taken away something, he wrote to Marinovi sarcastically. Apparently, Garaanin had expected a more significant Western support for the strengthening of Serbian statehood in the Paris Treaty process. In an outline text analyzing the provisions of the Treaty, Garaanin reasserted his gratitude to Europe for taking upon herself to guarantee the acquired rights of the Principality of Serbia. He considered the statehood of Serbia as being the result of negotiations between the Serbian side and Ottoman Turkey and Russia. These negotiations and agreements had, when necessary, been accompanied by arms until the present rights of the Serbian People were established. Few Serbian politicians had as serious reservations about the Treaty of Paris as he did.47 Garaanin emphasized that Serbia was not a childrens ball for others to play with: Serbia shall not obey the unconditional orders of any power, nor shall she acquiesce in anything under duress, because it would mean depriving her of all merit, and that would be understood here as a humiliation to the nation and could entail difficulties unprovoked by Serbia in any way. Should the Principality prove unable to resist pressure from the powers: If there has to be a master to rule over Serbia, all Serbs favour [Ottoman] Turks and nobody else. In Garaanins view, the politics aimed at defending Serbian statehood faced many a danger.48 During his long political career Garaanin was in a position to promote Serbian statehood by furthering internal self-government. At the beginning of the Constitutionalist regime he was convinced that Serbian citizens believe they enjoy the best possible rights. In the revolutionary 1848, however, he suggested to Prince Aleksandar to act accordingly and launch a more effective policy towards the Porte. Without the Princes knowledge, he began working towards the establishment of a Serbian vicekingdom within the Ottoman Empire through the Serbian representative at Constantinople Konstantin Nikolajevi. The Grand Viziers criticism aimed later that year at the National Assemblys convening elicited his bitter response in a letter to Acika Nenadovi: We have found ourselves standing on thin ice more than once because of their [Ottoman] lame politics and we have had trouble getting rid of it; they should at least let us run our in47 48
Ibid., 1011; Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu I, 215217, 303304. Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu I, 118, 196, 203, 307.
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ternal affairs the way we know best. He took this move of the Porte as the greatest insult to Serbia, because it violated the ancient custom-based right to convene a popular assembly. Yet, Garaanin only stood up for this right in relation to Ottoman Turkey. Whenever this issue was not in the focus of Serbo-Ottoman relations, he ignored it completely. Before the National Assembly Act was passed in 1860, Garaanin stood up for the Assemblys right to convene only twice (1848, 1858), on the two occasions the Assembly did convene.49 In the first phase of their regime the Constitutionalists were unwilling to spoil relations with the Porte by raising the issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia. They raised it only in 1846 by invoking the stipulations contained in the hatt-i sherifs. In the summer of 1848, they were expecting a favourable decision from the Porte and a new Sultans decree, planning to announce it at St Peters Day Assembly.50 It was this issue that most burdened Serbo-Ottoman relations in the following years, and it was paid special attention during the second reigns of Prince Milo (18581860) and Prince Mihailo (18601868), when it was Ilija Garaanins responsibility. Until the end of the Constitutionalist period, there was no significant shift in Garaanins attitude towards the Porte as regards securing the Principalitys state rights. Serbia was granted yet another hatt-i sherif (1853), which simply confirmed the existing arrangement. Prince Milo rejected it, as he occasionally did with legal acts that were to no betterment to the statehood of Serbia. Threatened by Austria the following year, the Constitutionalists, Garaanin included, drew up a memorandum requesting protection from the Porte.51 Garaanin was generally opposed to any direct involvement of the Porte in Serbias internal affairs. In a letter to Marinovi from Vienna (1853), he asked: For Gods sake, what is Shekib Effendi doing down there again? In Garaanins opinion, national rights were jeopardized whenever the Porte wanted to exercise its privileges inside Serbia.52 A few years later, the Porte for the first time exercised the right it had under Article 17 of the Turkish Constitution to intervene in a conflict between the Council and the Prince. There is no evidence that Garaanin, who held the office of Minister of the Interior, was against the visit of an Ottoman pasha to Serbia. After all, Edhem Pasha was coming to the Constitutionalists aid. In the
The sessions of the Assembly that elected Aleksandar Karadjordjevi Prince of Serbia have not been taken into account. 50 Matica Srpska, Novi Sad, Rukopisno odeljenje [Department of Manuscripts], No. 25276; Prepiska, 35, 37, 98, 104, 133, 197, 372374. 51 Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu I, 163, 167, 190, 245. 52 Ibid., 139, 401.
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eyes of many, the representatives of the Constitutionalist party, headed by Garaanin, did not take a very dignified stand. They received Edhem Pasha in front of the city walls with fezzes on their heads, and Garaanin kept the fez on while riding with the pasha about the town in the princely carriage. The guest was accommodated in the inn called The Serbian Crown, but the signboard was removed. It made a bad impression on the younger generation who believed that the Treaty of Paris had strengthened Serbias autonomous rights. Jovan Risti pointed out: These fezzes signal the political course for the Opposition better than any flag.53 The stand taken by the Constitutionalists may be justified by the necessity of resolving the conflict between the Prince and the Council, but their performance undoubtedly undermined Serbias statehood. Garaanin must have been aware of that because it was as early as then that he suggested a change to the article of the 1839 Council Organization Act stipulating that a Council member could not be ousted without the Portes knowledge. His suggestion was accepted. Not much later he defended, also before the Porte, the right of Serbia to convene a session of the National Assembly (the one held on St Andrews Day). In doing so, however, he did not invoke the right that the Principality had been granted in 1839 in accordance with customary law, but claimed that the right had not been denied by the Constitution. Garaanin was instrumental in dethroning Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevi in 1858, but this time, in order to avoid further Ottoman involvement in Serbian affairs, he sought no aid from the Porte in the form of a firman.54 Even so, the fact remains that Garaanin, guided by the current political agenda and obviously inconsistently with his Naertanije, handed the Serbian ruler over to the Ottoman garrison in the Belgrade fortress. When the Obrenovi dynasty reassumed the throne in 1858, Serbias policy towards the Porte completely changed. The Constitutionalists, as their representatives, had not ensured any additional privilege for Serbia, except for the patronage of the guarantor powers, and they had lost her right to the hereditary princely title. It was not easy for Garaanin to cast off deeply rooted Constitutionalist ideas. When the Porte and Prince Milo appointed a temporary government until the rulers return to the country, he stood up against it as a violation of the peoples privilege. He complained to Marinovi that no one had ever considered Steva Mihailovis acceptance of the office of kaymakam a major transgression, but had he, Garaanin, taken the office (and he was accused of harbouring such an ambition), everyone would have
J. Risti, Spoljanji odnoaji Srbije [Foreign relations of Serbia] (Belgrade 1882), vol. I, 253259. 54 Stranjakovi, Ilija Garaanin, 89.
53
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considered it a major transgression. Ottomans thought of him as their greatest foe, and he, in turn, named a Turk every person who should violate Serbias rights.55 There was nothing left to Garaanin but to resign as Minister of the Interior. Prince Mihailo knew how to put Garaanins political skills to a good use. Already in 1861 he entrusted him with a mission to Constantinople in order to resolve the issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia. Garaanin tried to give the issue a more modern form. The instructions he received insisted on basing his position in negotiations on the clear stipulations of the Sultans Decree of 1830. The new way of enforcing this unexercised right was to be as follows: The Turks in Serbia living out of towns would submit themselves to the Serbian authorities and would have equal rights and duties to Serbs, while the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire would be limited to towns. According to this compromise solution, Serbia would give up resettling Turks from Serbia and the Porte would surrender control over the Ottoman-held part of Belgrade. Following his instructions, Garaanin submitted a memorandum to the Porte, and notified foreign representatives in Constantinople of its contents. The memorandum was written in a moderate tone. Garaanin must have thoroughly studied both hatt-i sherifs. Some of his notes show how much effort he had put into finding the most appropriate solution to the problem. The Decree of 1830 was more favourable to Serbia than the one of 1833. Garaanin claimed that the unfavourable clauses of the latter should be contested on the grounds of the former being the result of an agreement between the Porte and the Serbian representatives. However, both decrees came as a result of the same process and in both cases Russia mediated, with the difference that in 1833 she supported a solution that was more favourable to the Ottoman side. Garaanin was told by the Ottoman Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Serbian proposal was moderate, but his mission failed nonetheless, and due to a number of reasons, to mention but the insufficient support of the Great Powers, the change on the throne and a freer approach of Belgrades press. Moreover, the Porte was unwilling to give up control over the fortress of Belgrade, and that was the most controversial point in negotiations, apart from the issue of compensation to the Muslim population who had already left Serbia and the issue of boroughs. In Garaanins opinion, previously made concessions had not helped resolve the problem.56
Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinovi II, 12, 2728, 31. AS, IGP, 1147, 1161, 1177, 1183, 1192, 1204, 1213; Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 87, 91; Jaki and Vukovi, Spoljna politika, 6671.
55 56
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The issue of Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia was addressed more resolutely after the bombardment of Belgrade in 1862. Garaanin was not satisfied with the resulting Kanlidja Conference Protocol (1862), as evidenced by the outline of a text preserved in his archives.57 The Serbs insisted on the hatt-i sherif of 1830, the Ottomans on the one of 1833. Garaanin wrote about that in 1863: And besides, Serbia has law on her side. The hatt-i sherif of 1830 proves it most clearly. If the Porte invokes a later decree, it just repeats its earlier injustice towards Serbia because it had no right to abolish an already acquired Serbian right without Serbias consent, and since Serbia did not consent and she never will under any conditions or urging, the relevant clause of the firman can have no validity to Serbia.58 Such a resolute stance, taken not only by Garaanin but by Prince Mihailo as well, was bound to bear fruit. A Serbian representative in Constantinople, Jovan Risti informed Garaanin about his talks with the British ambassador to the Porte (Bulwer), who suggested that the Prince should come to Constantinople, and promised him he would get everything except towns. Garaanin made a comment about the British diplomats suggestion in a letter to Marinovi: Can this advice be taken as anything but derision? The Prince, having read the cable, laughed wholeheartedly and said in jest: Cable to Risti that the Prince is ready to go to Constantinople any time and that he asks for nothing but the towns. The shift in the Principalitys stance on the issue is obvious. Serbia went a step further from her initial request for assuming legal authority over her Muslim population, and requested control over the towns, which was not envisaged under the hatt-i sherif. Risti submitted an official document to the Porte and it was the first time that Serbia voiced an extension of her autonomous rights. By surrendering the Ottoman-held fortresses, the Porte was supposed, according to Garaanin, to repay Serbia a debt of thirty odd years with no interest charged. This policy soon bore fruit and in 1867 the Ottoman garrisons withdrew from six towns they still held. According to the firman, the towns were entrusted to the Prince for safeguarding, and Ottoman suzerainty was represented by Ottoman flags flied next to Serbian.59 That was the greatest success of Serbian diplomacy during the second reign of Prince Mihailo and Garaanins last triumph. After Milos achievements in the 1830s, that was the most significant step towards re-establishing Serbias statehood. As Garaanin is known to have been more a man of great ideas than of great deeds,60 his vision of a future Serbian state deserves a more elaboAS, IGP, 1245. Ibid., 1163. 59 Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 115, 147, 173, 190. 60 Jovanovi, Spoljanja politika, 352.
57 58
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rate approach. That Ilija Garaanin showed a constant concern for the future and unification of the Serb nation is illustrated by his letter to Jovan Marinovi of 21 May 1860: I shall be concerned with the destiny of our areas as long as I live, you know that.61 What were Garaanins ideas for the future? The best evidence can be found in the Naertanije. Notions of the state in the Naertanije
It is a fact that the Constitutionalists came to power showing a sympathetic attitude towards the Ottomans. Garaanins pro-Ottoman stance is quite obvious at the time he drew up the Naertanije. The same year (1844) he wrote to Toma Vui Perii: The present government is quite enthusiastic about the Porte.62 Over time the sympathy paled. After all, it had stemmed from the Constitutionalists political interest to depose the Obrenovi dynasty and establish their regime rather than from a distinct political belief. Garaanins Naertanije, then, appeared at a time the Constitutionalist regime had not yet been established firmly enough and Garaanins sympathetic attitude may in fact be interpreted as a cover for his national strivings. Garaanin wrote the Naertanije, a programme of Serbian national policy, while holding the office of Minister of the Interior, which is not an irrelevant fact. The Naertanije would probably not have been drawn up at all had it not been for the involvement in Serbian affairs of the Polish emigration. Preparing a conspiracy against Russia, Polish patriots, led by Prince Adam Czartoryski, reached the Principality of Serbia as well. The moment was right given that relations between the Constitutionalists and Russia were quite strained. Even so, Garaanin was reluctant to join the conspiracy and sought not to let Polish agents draw Serbia into an open conflict with Russia. Although quite young he was thirty-two in 1844 Garaanin was perceptive enough to realize that the adversary of his people was Ottoman Turkey rather than Russia. The Poles felt quite differently. Ilija Garaanins Naertanije has received varied interpretations in Serbian, Yugoslav and international historiography. Most of the time it has been seen either as a pro-Yugoslav Dj. Jeleni, F. ii, D. Stranjakovi, Lj. Aleksi, V. J. Vukovi and V. aek, or as a pro-Greater Serbian project J. D. Mitrovi, P. imuni, M. Valenti, J. idak, V. ubrilovi, Ch. Jelavich, N. Stani, P. Hehn, S. Murgi, D. Poll, O. Kronsteiner, W. Petrich,
61 62
Pisma Ilije Garaanina Jovanu Marinoviu II, 64. Prepiska Ilije Garaanina, 104.
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and D. Mackenzie. 63 Only R. Perovi and J. Milievi see the Naertanije as a Serbian programme, though with some Greater-Serbian elements, as well as D. T. Batakovi,64 but without the latter remark. More recent work of Croatian and other foreign historians and politicians has added to the Greater-Serbian interpretation of the Naertanije by alleging that it was the source of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the purported cause of Serbian expansion and ethnic cleansing in the late twentieth century. Arguing for one interpretation of Garaanins Naertanije or another authors often disagree on many essential points, but not all are exclusive-minded. For example, Mackenzie claims that Garaanin was at once an advocate of Greater Serbia and the spiritual father of the Yugoslavia of 1918.65 Characteristically, all but one Croatian historian interpret the Naertanije as a basis for an alleged Greater-Serbia policy, moreover, as a basis for Serbian
See e.g., Dj. Jeleni, Nova Srbija i Jugoslavija. Istorija nacionalnog oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca od Koine krajine do Vidovdanskog ustava (17881921) (Belgrade 1923); F. ii, Jugoslovenska misao (Belgrade 1937); D. Stranjakovi, Jugoslovenski nacionalni i dravni program Kneevine Srbije 1844 (Srem. Karlovci 1931); idem, Garaaninovo Naertanije; V. J. Vukovi, Knez Milo i osnovna politika misao sadrana u Garaaninovom Naertaniju, Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo I/3 (1954), 4458; idem, Prilog prouavanju postanka Naertanija (1844) i Osnovnih misli (1847), Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo VIII (1961), 4979; Lj. Aleksi, ta je dovelo do stvaranja Naertanija, Historijski pregled I/2 (1954); aek, eko i poljsko uee; J. D. Mitrovi, Dr. Dragoslav Stranjakovi: Srbija od 1833 do 1858 god., Glasnik Jugoslovenskog profesorskog drutva XIX (193839); P. imuni, Naertanije: Tajni spis srbske nacionalne i vanjske politike (Zagreb 1944); M. Valenti Koncepcija Garaaninovog Naertanija (1844), Historijski pregled VII (1961); J. idak, Hrvatsko pitanje u Habsburkoj monarhiji I, Historijski pregled IX (1963); V. ubrilovi, Istorija politike misli u Srbiji XIX veka (Belgrade 1958); Ch. Jelavich, Garasanins Nacertanije und das grosserbische Programm, Sdostforschungen XXVIII (1968); N. Stani, Problem Naertanija Ilije Garaanina u naoj historiografiji, Historijski zbornik XXII-XXIII (196869); P. Hehn, The Origins of Modern pan-Serbism: The 1844 Nacertanije of 96869); Ilija Garasanin, East European Quarterly 2 (1975); S. Murgi, T. Bogdani, S. Budimir, Kontrapunkt slobodi. Kritika Naertanija Ilije Garaanina (Zagreb 1997); D. Poll, in Die slawische Sprachen 29 (1992), 55156; O. Kronsteiner, Die geheime Programmentwurf Ilija Garaanins fr eine serbische Politik, Die slawische Sprachen 31 (1993), 3989; W. Petrich, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler, Kosovo, Kosova, Myten, Daten, Fakten (Klagenfurt, Vienna, Ljubljana, Tuzla, Sarajevo 1999); Mackenzie, Garaanin, passim. 64 J. Milievi, in Istorija srpskog naroda V-1 (Belgrade: SKZ, 1981), 269273; R. Perovi, Oko Naertanija iz 1844. godine, Istorijski glasnik I (1963); D. T. Batakovi, Naertanije: batina ili hipoteka, preface to Naertanije Ilije Garaanina, ed. M. JosiVinji (Belgrade 1991) and idem, in Nova istorija srpskog naroda (Belgrade 2000). Cf. also D. T. Batakovi, Ilija Garaanins Naertanije: A Reasessement, Balcanica XXV-1 (Belgrade 1994), 157-183. 65 Mackenzie, Garaanin, 83.
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expansionism in the last decade of the twentieth century. There also are historians who have not attempted to define what the main objective of the Naertanije was (Vladimir orovi, Vasilj Popovi, Milorad Ekmei).66 Indicatively, between the two world wars the Naertanije was seen as a Yugoslav project and after the Second World War it has been increasingly seen as Greater-Serbian and invasive. Historiography has obviously been under the sway of shifting politics, notably during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Of course, this does not go for all researchers, especially not foreign, but it is a fact that most have been unable to detach themselves from the political needs of the regimes in power. The age-old Austro-Hungarian claim that the Principality, and later Kingdom, of Serbia pursued a GreaterSerbia policy, a claim subsequently adopted by the Comintern though, of course, in a changed, interwar, setting has been influencing historical thinking about Garaanins Naertanije until this day. In analyzing the Naertanije it is important to determine what kind of a Serbian state Garaanin envisaged, and to identify what elements of this at once disputed and praised document may be described as Serbian, Greater-Serbian and Yugoslav. The Naertanije was preceded by two documents: Czartoryskis Counsels and Zachs Plan. The Naertanije was an elaborate draft of Serbian national policy. It consists of an introductory part and two chapters: Politics of Serbia and On the means to achieve the Serbian cause (divided into five subchapters). The introduction and the first chapter are the core of the document as they contain Garaanins ideas on a future Serbian state. The rest of the document offers guidelines for Serbian propaganda policy. Garaanins motivation was that Serbia needed a plan for her future (emphasis R. Lj.), that is that she needed to set her foreign policy on a course that should be pursued over a longer period. As Garaanin set no deadline for the realization of the goal, it remains uncertain what his estimations were. Given that he envisaged preparations for accomplishing the goal to unfold while Serbia is under Turkish rule, it may be assumed that he did not expect its realization until the cessation of Serbias vassal status at the earliest. Whatever his expectations may have been, he insisted that faith in the future had to be kept. It was only four years after Garaanins death that the Principality became fully independent (1878), but that country was nowhere near his vision.
V. orovi, Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade 1933) and Istorija Srba (Belgrade 1992); V. Popovi, Politika Francuske i Austrije na Balkanu u vreme Napoleona III (Belgrade: Srpska Kraljevska Akademija 1923) and Evropa i srpsko pitanje u periodu oslobodjenja 18041918 (Belgrade: Geca Kon 1940); M. Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I (Belgrade: Prosveta 1989).
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Garaanins starting point in creating his foreign policy strategy was the fact that Serbia was a small country and that it was dependent on Ottoman Turkey. Such a position of Serbia directed her foreign policy towards the idea of expanding her territory by embracing all Serbian peoples that surround her (emphasis R. Lj.). Unless she expanded by unifying the Serb nation, Garaanin believed, Serbia as it was would have no future and the first European storm would push it onto a rock and it would break as a derelict boat. The title of the first chapter of the Naertanije is subtitled Remarks on the partitioning of the [Ottoman] Empire. It contains two important points an assumption about the imminent collapse of Ottoman Turkey and the restoration of the Serbian state. Garaanin believed that the Ottoman Empire would inevitably disintegrate, and with either of two outcomes: it would be partitioned between Austria and Russia, or Christian states would be established in its former territory. It hardly seemed likely to him that the two interested powers would allow a Christian empire to be built on the ruins of the Ottoman one, but the Western Powers might support such an outcome. This seems to be a general and simplified framework for the fate of Ottoman Turkey in which Garaanin was seeking the space for a future Serbian state. The core of Ilija Garaanins Naertanije relates to establishing a new Serbian state in the south. What state did he have in mind? He did not specify its territory, but it can be identified. Its core area was supposed to be the Principality of Serbia, subsequently united with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Old Serbia (Northern Albania in his text); in other words, the predominantly Serb-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire. Such a state, in his view, not only had its basis and firm foundations in the Serbian Empire of the fourteenth century but also in a more remote glorious past. The Principality of Serbia was entitled to invoke its historic rights and come before Europe as the rightful heir to our great fathers, doing nothing more than restoring its patrimony. This idea, that the Serbian people, its nationality and statehood are protected under the aegis of the sacred historic right, required a link to the past. The Serbian people, he believed, had good roots, whose branches were cut off by the Turks, but the roots survived and would send forth a new blossom of Serbian statehood. Some of the great European powers he dared not specify which envisaging a great future for Serbia was one more reason why the Principality should not remain within its current borders as that would kill the seed of a modern Serbian empire. The second part of the Naertanije is concerned with the accomplishment of the goal set in the first. Modern Serbia as envisaged by Garaanin was supposed to be restored on the grounds of historic legitimacy. What
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Garaanin wanted to demonstrate by invoking historic rights was that the Serbs were not asking for anything new or unfounded, that they only claimed what once had been theirs, and without resorting to a coup or a revolution. What means did Garaanin propose to terminate a declining empire and build a new one in its European part? To put it briefly Serbia must seek to chip away at the edifice of the Turkish state, stone by stone, in order to use this good material to rebuild a new great Serbian state upon the good old foundations of the ancient Serbian empire (emphasis R. Lj.). Garaanin obviously was cautious and his idea of how to unite Serb-inhabited lands obviously was conservative. On the other hand, he made no reference to the results of the Serbian revolution. There are only two indirect references to the revolution as an event that could play a role in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: his remark that the restoration of Serbias statehood made a fortunate start, and his statement that only Serbs of all South Slavs fought for their freedom with their own resources and strength. As many other nineteenth-century Serbian politicians, he was unaware that the modern Serbian state originated from revolution. A revolutionary state, such as the Principality of Serbia had been at its founding, and the restoration of Stefan Duans Empire on the grounds of historic right, were two completely irreconcilable concepts. It is difficult to conclude whether Garaanin took both options into account; if he did, he eventually gave precedence to Duans Empire over the revolutionary Serbia of Karageorge and Milo. Such a choice of his was influenced by the conservative Poles and his own pro-Ottoman stance. A plan such as he drew up could hardly have originated at the time of Kargeorge or Prince Milo. One of the probable reasons why it could come into being in the Constitutionalist age is the fact that the influence of the revolution was fading as was the memory of the uprisings in which Garaanins own father had taken part. The existing political circumstances, the Constitutionalist regimes pro-Ottoman stance in particular, the suggestions of the Polish emigration and the living tradition of the medieval empire, provided powerful enough reference points for Garaanin to embrace the idea of founding the claim to restoring statehood on the historic right. In the second and much more extensive part of the Naertanije, Garaanin set guidelines for national propaganda in South-Slavic areas. He handled the matter so efficiently that it alone would suffice to secure him a prominent place in Serbian history. Propaganda was to be organized on the territories of both empires, Ottoman and Habsburg, and in the following provinces: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Old Serbia, Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat, Baka, and Bulgaria (Bulgaria was omitted in this part of the text but was given a special sub-chapter later on). One of the tasks of agents of the Serbian government in these areas would be to
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find out what the people expect from Serbia. His proposal to the heavily enslaved Bulgarians was Serbias support in the field of education for students and priests, book printing and liberation. It is important to emphasize that Garaanin was advocating freedom for Bulgaria, not her union with Serbia. He then described in detail what propaganda actions should be undertaken in the areas that were supposed to unite with the Principality of Serbia (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Old Serbia). It should be noted that Garaanin envisaged the policy of opening Serbias borders to the enslaved co-nationals, as well as the freedom of religion, education and autonomous rights for all immigrants. In his view, an important factor in achieving union (sojuz) was a Serbian dynasty. He showed his farsightedness by accepting Czartoryski and Zachs concept of hereditary princely title but, unlike them, without linking it to any particular Serbian dynasty. Garaanin obviously gave precedence to Serbian unification over dynastic rivalries. Garaanin believed that a new trade road between Belgrade and Ulcinj (Dulcigno) on Adriatic coast would economically tie Serb-inhabited areas more firmly together. The propaganda effort discussed in the Naertanije did not include Croatia, while Srem, the Banat and Baka were just cursorily mentioned. Garaanin devoted only a few words to union with the Czech Slavs, but described it is as impractical and thus ended his text without adding any particular conclusion. The analysis of the document clearly shows that Ilija Garaanin was drafting a future Serbian state. That state was supposed to comprise the Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Albania (Old Serbia). It was supposed to be a monarchy with the prospect of becoming an empire under certain historical circumstances. Stefan Duans medieval empire would be renewed, then, but this new empire would be different in territorial terms. The second part of the Naertanije is somewhat confusing. Garaanin referred to Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia as areas where Serbian propaganda should also be conducted, but did not elaborate it anywhere in the text. He had omitted that portion of Zachs Plan and kept the subchapters relating to the Serbs in Southern Hungary, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks. Although he did not specify it, it may be assumed that those areas were also meant to be united with Serbia under favourable historical circumstances. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the reason for undertaking the propaganda effort in those provinces. The first step, then, was supposed to be the unification of the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey, followed by the Serbs in Habsburg-held Southern Hungary. The state thus created would still be a Serbian state. Through union with Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia it would lose its Serbian distinctiveness
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and gain a South-Slavic (Yugoslav) one instead. Should Bulgaria join in as well, it would truly become a South-Slavic state. (It was of lesser importance whether Croatia or Bulgaria would unite with Serbia first.) This second step in the unification process was not Garaanins explicitly expressed option, but it cannot be ruled out. What may be taken as certain is that he had plans for a new Serbian state, leaving room for a South-Slavic one (SerbianCroatian-Bulgarian). Garaanin was clear and specific about the former, and imprecise and vague about the latter. The first state was something that the Serbs had to fight for and win if they wanted to survive; the second was a matter of favourable political circumstances. In any case, with its focus on the unification of the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire, Garaanins Naertanije was a programme of Serbian national and state politics. Once achieved, it would be followed by union with the Serbs in Austria, Croats and Bulgarians. A South-Slavic state, if it were created, would also be the result of Serbias foreign policy means and goals. Should the plan of Serbias national policy be termed Serbian or Greater-Serbian, in other words, did Garaanin advocate the creation of Serbia or Greater Serbia? It has been established long ago that Garaanin changed some terms contained in Zachs Plan. Thus the words Slavic, SouthSlavic and South Slavs were replaced with Christian, Serbian and Serbs respectively. Here are some examples, the first being from Zachs Plan, the second from Garaanins Naertanije: to other South Slavs to other surrounding peoples (twice); Slavic politics of Serbia politics of Serbia; an independent and self-reliant Slavic state an independent Christian state; a new South-Slavic, Serbian state a new Serbian state in the south; On the means to achieve the unification of all South Slavs On the means to achieve the Serbian cause; to build a great new Slavic state to build a great new Serbian state; to the South Slavs to this people. This shows that not even Zach had a perfectly clear idea about the things he wrote about: his thinking sways between a Slavic and a SouthSlavic state. At one point he stated that Serbia should pursue a South-Slavic policy, and at another that a Slavic empire should arise from Ottoman Turkey. This deserves attention because the Czech-born Polish agent Franz Zach devoted an entire subchapter to an association with Czech Slavs. It may be assumed therefore that Zach advocated the idea of a South-Slavic state which would need to show consideration for other Slavs as well, primarily Czechs and Slovaks, who would then join an unspecified association. Relevant historiography research has confirmed that Zachs ambitious Plan was quite unrealistic for the vassal Principality of Serbia to achieve. Wellaware of that, Garaanin made modifications to it, quite often by changing a single word, but effecting essential change.
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It has been shown that what Garaanin opted for was a united Serbian state. He used the attribute great only once and not even then in a Greater-Serbia context but in the context of a great new Serbian state to be rebuilt on the foundations of the medieval Nemanji Empire. Rather than that, what might support the interpretation of his programme as Greater Serbian is his emphasis on the future state as an empire and, partly, his reference to Stefan Duans Empire. The modern Serbia as Garaanin saw it was supposed to encompass other peoples as well. In his times, however, these ethnic groups were still far from having well-developed identities as modern nations. The question may be posed as to whether this state created by the unification of Serbs would have been achievable at all without having other ethnic groups within its borders. Should such a state be qualified as Greater Serbian, especially in the light of the fact that the majority of Serbs living inside the Habsburg Monarchy were supposed to remain outside its borders? A state that could rightfully be termed Greater Serbia (and the policy of the Principality of Serbia as Great Serbian) would have had to encompass a vast majority of the Serbs, both from Ottoman Turkey and from Habsburg Austria, as well as the minorities who lived amongst them. A Serbia comprising all Serb-inhabited areas in Ottoman Turkey cannot be described simply as Greater Serbia. Consequently, Garaanins programme should be defined as Serbian rather than purported Greater Serbian. According to Garaanin, a state encompassing the Serbs from Turkey-in-Europe was to be the first phase in uniting the Serb nation. The second phase was to include the Serbs from Austria (Habsburg Monarchy), but he neither elaborated it nor set a time limit. Garaanin was aware that such a union would entail the inclusion of other peoples and that such a state would not be entirely Serbian. In order to achieve unification with Serbs from Austria, he was willing to allow for a big step from a Serbian to a South-Slavic state precisely because such a state would include Croats as well. Rather than proposing a Greater Serbia, Garaanin was thinking of a new South Slavia that would encompass Serbs, Bulgarians and Croats. Moreover, Garaanin was willing to sacrifice a freshly restored Serbia to a future South-Slavic union of Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians. Should more be expected from a young Serbian statesman, especially when we know that statehood ideas were still in their initial phase among both Croats and Bulgarians? Garaanins foreign policy strategy set two objectives: 1) unification of the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire into an independent Serbia; 2) unification with the Serbs from the Habsburg Empire, along with the Croats, and with the Bulgarians from Ottoman Turkey, into a larger South-Slavic
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(i.e. Serbian-Croatian-Bulgarian) state. Garaanin gave precedence to the first objective and thought of the second as an untimely possibility. Garaanins Naertanije has been assessed as more realistic than Zachs Plan. One can pose the question as to how realistic it really was. Garaanin based his plans on the impending dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As it turned out, however, his belief that Turkish power is broken and destroyed was rash. The mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire was still a resilient power. Where his predictions proved to be nearer to reality was the case of Austria, which, in his view, will be a permanent enemy of a Serbian state. Garaanin went far beyond the Polish emigration and their Czech representative in Belgrade, F. Zach, when he modified their stance on relations between Russia and the South Slavs, notably Serbs. His position was quite unambiguous: There is no easier way for Serbia to achieve her cause than in accord with Russia. He took a step further by claiming that it was in the interest of the Western Powers, as a result of their rivalries with Russia and Austria, to support the establishment of a new independent state in the Balkans. This is not to say that Garaanin meant to ally with France or England, rather that he left his options open for asking for their support to the state-building process in the future. Prince Milo, though only briefly (18371839), had also relied on the Western Powers for support, which cost him the throne. Fully aware of that fact Garaanin chose to proceed with caution. Garaanin obviously articulated demands that were feasible at some point in the future. Yet, the unification of the Serbs followed a different path from the one defined by the Naertanije: 1) Modern Serbia was not re-established on historic rights grounds nor was it further built upon them; 2) The further state-building process, in terms of both unification and independence, was not based on the renewal of Stefan Duans Empire, an idea taken into account before Garaanin both by Kargeorge and by Milo; 3) Serbia, independent since 1878 and enlarged as a result of the Balkan Wars of 19121913, did not reach the territorial extent envisaged by the Naertanije; 4) the Yugoslav state created in 1918 did not coincide with Garaanins South Slavia; it was the common state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while Garaanin had had in mind a union of Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians. It appears therefore that Garaanins ideas did not materialize. Historical circumstances tied the Serbs, and other South-Slavic nations, into a different union from the one envisaged by the Naertanije. Garaanins contemporary critics denounce his path to Serbian unification. His expressions such as to adjoin, to annex, to chip off , however, form part of the typical wording of the period, but he obviously did not eschew a different option either. That option explicitly referred to Bosnia, but did not exclude
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other provinces. Serbia was supposed to support the autonomous rights for Bosnia upon which Bosnia could associate with Serbia more closely. For that reason he, quite foresightedly, believed that the obtainment of the right of hereditary succession for Serbia should be delayed until after this association materialized seeing it as a potential obstacle. He also emphasized that the upbringing of the young people in Turkey should imbue them with the life-saving idea of all-embracing union and progress (emphasis R. Lj.). As such a position is not contained in Zachs Plan, it seems reasonable to assume that Garaanin did not favour the simple act of annexation through military force over peaceful unification through association. Garaanins Naertanije was a secret document, and it remained unknown to European politicians until the late nineteenth century and to the Serbian public until the early twentieth century. Little is known about the extent to which the successive Serbian rulers were informed of its contents, even less about what their stance as regards its central ideas might have been. Many unknowns surround this document. It is unknown which Serbian politicians were acquainted with its contents, and it remained hidden for too long to be able to influence a wider public. It may be said, therefore, that the overall influence of the Naertanije was not significant, moreover, that Ilija Garaanin was practically the only political actor who pursued the agenda proposed in this plan. That line of his political activity was quite significant, especially in 1848/49 and in 18611867. In a way, the second part of the Naertanije may be said to have been more effective than the first, given that the guidelines for the Principality of Serbias propaganda effort among the South Slavs laid out in it were put into practice. Garaanins Naertanije was not a conservative document, although some conservative ideas, such as the historic rights concept, ran through it. Nor was it revolutionary. What seems to be its closest definition is that the Naertanije was a modern programme of Serbian foreign policy whose main goal was the creation of a Serbian state first, and then of a South Slavic one. The fact that the Naertanije was the first articulation of nineteenth-century Serbias foreign policy and that Garaanin was the first to become aware that such an articulation was needed should be taken into account in assessing the significance of his role for the Serbs and South Slavs.67 Four years after the Naertanije was drafted Garaanin got the opportunity to start working along its lines. The revolutions of 18481849 created a propitious setting. Garaanins attention was focused on the Serbian and South-Slavic communities in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires alike. The Austrian Serbs got involved in the European revolution, while their co-nationals in Ottoman Turkey were suffering under much worse econom67
All quotations from Stranjakovi, Garaaninovo Naertanije .
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ic and political conditions. That situation strongly influenced Garaanins stance on supporting the Serbs in both empires. He backed the Habsburg Serbs in Southern Hungary in establishing an autonomous Serbian Duchy (Srbska Vojvodina, Vojvodstvo Srbije or, abbreviated, Vojvodina), and continued diplomatic efforts for an autonomous province for the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey. The idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom, a brainchild of the Serbian representative in Constantinople Konstantin Nikolajevi, arose at an early stage of the 1848 Revolution. Nikolajevi and Jovan Marinovi, the latter serving as an informal Serbian representative in Paris at the time, kept warning Garaanin that Serbia could not afford to stay away from the revolutionary movements in Europe because she might die from inactivity.68 In midMarch 1848, Nikolajevi drew up a political draft just to kill loneliness: Although I havent had the time to do it a little better, I am taking the liberty of submitting it to you [Garaanin] for consideration, if nothing else than as a theory to think about now that all of a sudden many a theory is being put into practice.69 In his letter of 7 May, Nikolajevi expressed his belief that the developments in Europe give us hope that we shall be able to restore our fatherland.70 Garaanin gave his opinion about Nikolajevis idea in his letter of 22 May: We all like your ideas for the Slavs in Turkey very much and it seems to us that it is only through such a policy and its successful outcome that our fatherland can be honoured and the old glory of the Serbian people restored, but we now need to work on it diligently and only from here, and in a way chosen as the most appropriate for it. He complained that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avram Petronijevi, has neither the energy nor the ways needed for overseeing such a serious effort, but nevertheless instructed Nikolajevi to find a way for his ideas to reach the Porte without being taken as an official proposal of the Serbian government: Think it through carefully, talk it over with your friends if you find it fit, and then take a step, with reasonable caution, of course, so that we might at least find out where we stand with the Porte Besides, and above all, keep me posted about your ideas on the matter, and I shall be able to put them to good use. I have to make yet another remark here on her own, without the Porte, Serbia can hardly put this policy through. Serbia was peaceful, Garaanin added, but there was a vague sense of discontent over the governments passive attitude towards the compatriots in Ottoman
AS, IGP, 340. A draft of a Serbian vice-kingdom was enclosed with his letter of 24 March: AS, IGP, 350. 70 Archives of the Historical Institute, Belgrade (hereafter: AII), Konstantin Nikolajevi Fund (KNF), V/5.
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Turkey. He ended the letter with a promise that he would send Nikolajevi some drafts [of his] relating to the Porte and the Christian population in Turkey.71 In the spring and summer of 1848, the exchange of letters between Garaanin and Nikolajevi intensified. In a letter dated 5 June, Garaanin discussed the political situation in the Ottoman Empire in detail, stating his belief that the Porte was about to face a great danger which could only be removed if its Christian peoples were granted the rights that match todays mores and outlooks; that the Portes simple firmans were no longer enough to deceive its peoples; that the Slavs across the Sava and Danube rivers [in Habsburg Monarchy] were on the threshold of a beautiful future, and that therefore the Porte should promptly make concessions in order to win over its Christian subjects. Your project seems to be our only hope; anything else is just a stopgap and of no use. With that, we would be safe from any storm that might befall us, but can we hope for that? He emphasized again that the proposal should reach the Porte in a roundabout way, through friends. Garaanin enclosed with this letter a project drawn up by Jovan Marinovi, suggesting that it also should be proposed to the Porte indirectly, not so much in order that it may be accepted, as it would not be very helpful right now, but rather in order not to let the Porte think that, just because we keep quiet and make no proposals, we are engaged in something more important. Garaanin did not fail to take a look at the position of Serbia in the context of the events unfolding in Europe. Insisting that Serbia should think of her future, especially in the light of this battle fought by kindred peoples, he stated that she should neither hesitate nor expect charity. It is unbefitting to the spirit of the Serbian people and to the memory of their former historical life to accept charity extended by others out of mercy. Serbia should define her role, especially as regards her union with other South Slavs. Serbia does not find a perfect guarantee of her nationality in a union of all [South] Slavs, but, if there is no other way, she will have to accept it, and many thus-minded spirits have already been arising among the people.72 In a letter dated 3 July, Nikolajevi informed Garaanin about having been told by a friend that the vice-kingdom project would find its way to the Sultan.73 Even though this friend, either an Ottoman official or one of the Polish migrs in Constantinople, failed to accomplish the
AII, KNF, I/17. AII, KNF, I/17. A larger part of this letter was published in J. Milievi, O Bosni [On Bosnia], Istorijski glasnik 1 (1973), 102105. 73 Milievi, O Bosni, 109.
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mission, Garaanin did not throw in the towel. Well-aware of the widespread discontent over the governments inactivity, on 14 September he addressed a letter to Prince Aleksandar: The Porte knows what we are after and we shall never give it up.74 On 9 October, Nikolajevi finally informed Garaanin that things were going from bad to worse, and that they should not count on the Porte in any way anymore, or practically on anyone else.75 Thus the diplomatic effort of Nikolajevi and Garaanin towards creating a Serbian vice-kingdom ended with no tangible result. The correspondence between Garaanin and Nikolajevi reveals that there were in fact two different projects: Nikolajevis project for a Serbian vice-kingdom and Marinovis project of civil reforms in Turkey-in-Europe. Marinovis project, which Garaanin forwarded to Nikolajevi on 5 June, consisted of a lengthy introduction and only two points, suggesting reforms that would improve the position of the Christians in Turkey by granting them the right to elect their own local (nahiye) administrators (oborknez) who then would be confirmed by the Ottomans. Marinovi also suggested some improvements to the church organization, primarily the appointment of Serbs instead of Greeks as bishops and metropolitans.76 What were the central ideas of Nikolajevis memorandum? Convinced that the Empires half-measures gave it no prospect of pulling out of the crisis, he suggested the following: 1) Serbias union with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Upper Albania (i.e. Old Serbia); 2) Together they constitute a Serbian state within Ottoman Turkey; 3) That state has its ruler and independent internal administration, while the Porte remains the suzerain power; 4) The united provinces enjoy the same political rights as those currently enjoyed by the Principality of Serbia; 5) The new state enacts the constitution and laws without interference from the Porte or any other power; 6) It has the right to establish its own army to defend its borders but also the borders of the Ottoman Empire; 7) The Serbian and Turkish states within the Ottoman Empire each meets the costs of its internal and independent administration from its own revenues. Only tariff revenues go to the Sultan; 8) The Serbian united states have a diplomatic office in Constantinople through which the Serbian ruler maintains contact with the Sultan; 9) Turkey cannot conclude any agreement with a foreign power without the consent of the Serbian diplomatic representative in Constantinople except when the necessity forces the Sultan to do so
AII, KNF, L/17; Prepiska, 286. Milievi, O Bosni, 109. 76 R. Ljui, Marinoviev memoar o hrianima u Turskom carstvu iz 1848. godine [Marinovics Memorandum of 1848 on Christians in the Ottoman Empire], Istorijski glasnik 12 (1976), 161170.
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to save his states from peril; 10) Muslims and Orthodox Christians have equal rights in the Serbian united states; 11) Religious freedom for both Orthodox and Muslims, the latter being under the spiritual jurisdiction of Turkey; 12) the Bulgarians that remain in the Turkish state become equal to the Muslims; 13) They become entitled to enter public service; 14) Trade is free within both united states in the Ottoman Empire. No tariffs are paid on their common border except duties on transit goods; 15) The Serbian state has the right to open consulates in Turkey and foreign countries, and their jurisdiction must not be political, only commercial.77 The underlying idea of the memorandum was that of restructuring the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy. The Empire was supposed to consist of two states Asian Turkey and Serbian United States each with its own ruler, government, administration and territory. Foreign policy was the only area where the Serbian United States was to have limited independence. The draft was imprecise in many points, but obviously the two states within the Ottoman Empire were not to be completely equal, the Turkish state remaining the suzerain power, and, accordingly, the Sultan remaining the nominal head of the Empire, in other words, of both states. The documents many ambiguities make it difficult to infer exactly what the legal position of the new Serbian state was supposed to be. Undoubtedly, it would have been more favourable than the vassal position of the Principality of Serbia. The plan was obviously unrealistic, especially given that the powers that were supposed to make it happen did not have the strength. Ottoman
AS, IGP, 227, 465; published in M. Ekmei, Garaanin, artoriski i Maari 1848 1849. godine [Garaanin, Czartoryski and Hungarians 18481849], Srpsko-maarski odnosi i saradnja 18481867, ed. V. Kresti (Belgrade: Nauni skupovi, vol. 34. Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1987), 2931. D. Stranjakovi, who was the first to point to this plan in his paper The first political agreement between Serbs and Croats in 1860 (published in Belgrade in 1941, but only partially due to the breakout of the war), either had a different version of the plan or a different plan. Since he did not publish it as a whole, we are unable to discuss the differences. Only its first point is known, which reads: Restoration of a Serbian vice-kingdom within the borders it had in the mid fourteenth century, towards the end of Duans reign, when the Ottomans first began to break it, that is, comprising the following provinces of present-day European Turkey: Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania (South Serbia and Old Serbia), Roumelia (up to the river Maritza from its confluence to Edirne, and from Edirne, by land, to Burgos on the Black Sea), and Bulgaria. Based on these data, Ekmei has been convinced that there were two plans for a Serbian vice-kingdom, one with and the other without Bulgaria (p. 32). Since the manuscript of the plan used by Stranjakovi has not survived and no other sources have so far provided a clue, this remains an open question. Apparently, the text quoted in Stranjakovis paper is not authentic. My gratitude to Prof. Vasilije Kresti for making Stranjakovis manuscript available to me.
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Turkey would not have agreed to it even in the worst crisis, and the revolutions of 1848/9 did not affect her to the point of producing such a crisis. Nikolajevi acquainted the Polish emigration, French diplomats and the Porte with the memorandum, and Garaanin believed in the full backing of France.78 But such an ambitious project, which would have diminished the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, needed much stronger support than the one that could have been provided by the Polish emigration and France. Not only did Garaanin and Nikolajevi not expect support from Russia, they sought to suppress her influence in the Ottoman Empire and even explicitly renounced Russias patronage. They did not stop on the idea of restructuring the Ottoman Empire, but made further plans, as evidenced by a letter of Nikolajevi to Garaanin dated 9 October: The Slavic future presupposes the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. All German provinces should be united into the German Confederation, and the Czech, Moravian, Slovak and Polish Slavs into another confederation. The South Slavs, together with the Magyars and Wallachians, should create a federal state union which then should unite with European Turkey, thus forming a complete and purely Yugoslav [South-Slavic] empire. This empire should either be united with the Asian-Turkish one or become completely independent of it under a new native dynasty. It is only through such an all-Slavic idea that Serbian feeling can be stirred and the ideal of Serbian patriotism fulfilled; anything short of it would be just Russian or alien affair. He then linked this idea with the idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom. In this respect, I have [sent] you my previous draft on the restoration of a Serbian vice-kingdom in Turkey-inEurope, and if we were able to grab that much from the weak Porte and from the diplomacy that can still support it, I would be less doubtful about the triumph of that greater idea and that greater ideal (emphasis R.LJ.). This greater ideal would be the union of all South Slavs. The steps required, in his view, were the secession of Hungary and Corniola from Austria and their union under either the Hungarian or the Croatian crown. All South-Slavic provinces of the Habsburg Empire should form a separate vice-kingdom South Slavonia. This vice-kingdom was not supposed to include the Magyars and Wallachians, but Nikolajevi did not rule out the possibility either. He expected that when Serbias plan of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkey would materialize, the two vice-kingdoms would naturally come to a point where they would make an agreement about their final union and, guided by their own best interests, choose the ruling dynasty, be it Habsburg, Ottoman or native. Without elaborating any further, Nikolajevi merely stated
Garaanin to Acika Nenadovi, 3 September 1848: I can see that the French agree with what Ive been stirring up, in Prepiska, 272.
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that for the time being the establishment of a Serbian vice-kingdom should be given precedence. Although some of the concepts Nikolajevi used are vague, even contradictory, his plan may be summed up as follows: Serbia succeeds in bringing about the restructuring of the Ottoman Empire into two states, an Asian Turkish and a European Turkish (or Serbian United States or Serbian Vice-Kingdom). She then works towards the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, on whose territory a new vice-kingdom, South Slavonia, becomes established.79 Serbian United States and South Slavonia then become united into a complete and purely Yugoslav empire. Then the ruling dynasty becomes agreed upon, the Habsburg, the Ottoman or a native one. It is not explicitly stated, but this Yugoslav empire would have obviously been independent and sovereign. The reference to the Habsburg and Ottoman dynasties may be taken as implying moderation, but a native dynasty was clearly preferred. Nikolajevis plan is a very general one. It leaves many important points in obscurity, especially the way of carrying it through. Given Serbias geographic position, statehood and political role, however, he saw her as the champion of the unification process and the core of a future Yugoslav empire. Nikolajevis idea of a future South-Slavic state may now be described almost as visionary. His Yugoslav empire and the 1918 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are quite similar. Both, one virtual, the other real, rested on the ruins of the Austrian and Ottoman empires, had almost the same territorial extent and were monarchies. It should be noted that a similar idea of a Yugoslav empire centred on Serbs and Croats was promoted by members of the so-called Democratic Pan-Slavic Club, especially by Stevan Hrkalovi. The Club was overseen by Garaanin, as indicated by his letter to Stojan Simi dated 2 June 1848: The goal of both of them down there [Ljudevit Gaj and Hrkalovi] is to unite with all South Slavs and create a common empire. I have given him [Hrkalovi] an interim approval for the idea.80 There are a number of similarities between the plan for a Serbian vice-kingdom and the Naertanije: both Nikolajevi and Garaanin base their claim on historic rights; hope for the restoration of Stefan Duans Empire; delineate the same territorial extent; have the same stance on Bulgaria and, to some extent, on the possibility of creating a South-Slavic state
In one place he states that the vice-kingdom should encompass Magyars and Wallachians (Romanians), but does not mention them again. On the other hand, the name of the vice-kingdom, South Slavonia, would imply their being left out. This issue, therefore, remains open. 80 Prepiska, 165.
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(South Slavia or a Yugoslav empire); argue for two-phased unification of the Serbian people (at first within the Ottoman Empire, then in a Yugoslav state); support the preservation of Ottoman Turkey during the first phase of unification. The skeletons of the two drafts are nearly the same. The available sources do not provide explicit clues as to whether Nikolajevi was familiar with the Naertanije and with the Polish migrs projects submitted to Garaanin, or this project was entirely his own. While there is no evidence to support the former possibility, there are two pieces of evidence for the latter. 1) Sending his project to Garaanin, Nikolajevi wrote: I have taken the risk of enclosing [with this letter] one of my political drafts which I outlined for myself a few days ago, just to kill loneliness.81 2) According to what Tchaikovsky wrote to Czartoryski, Nikolajevi had shown him a project for uniting Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Illyria into a vice-kingdom.82 Lacking any other reliable information, we may only assume that the idea of a Serbian vice-kingdom or Serbian United States is Nikolajevis. That would be a second national and state-building plan of the Principality of Serbia. It was based on the same fundamental premises as the Naertanije, but was more elaborate and diversified. At the heart of both projects lay the restoration of Duans Empire, an idea already harboured by Prince Milo Obrenovi during his first reign.83 Over time, it increasingly took root and was kept secret neither from foreign diplomats nor from Ottoman pashas. Garaanin complained to Knianin about a Serbian politician drinking toasts, at the Russian Consulate in front of the pasha and all European consuls, to the creation of a Russian empire and of a grand Serbian empire and so forth. Not that I would mind the latter empire84 A lengthy manuscript of Garaanins, which was written in the mid1850s but has not been preserved in its entirety, contains some of his quite characteristic views on the state in general, and shows that he was familiar with the modern concept and meaning of the rule-of-the-law state, with Montesquieus LEsprit des lois and Rousseaus Contrat social: The state is
AS, IGP, 350 (emphasis R. Lj). Lj. Durkovi Jaki, Srbijansko-crnogorska saradnja (18301851) [Serbo-Montenegrin Cooperation 18301851] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1957), 88. See also, Ekmei, Garaanin, artoriski i Maari, 2, note 2. 83 Srbija u godini 1834. Pisma grofa Boa-le-Konta de Rinji ministru inostranih dela u Parizu o tadanjem stanju u Srbiji [Serbia in 1834. Letters of Count Bois Le Comte de Rigny to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris on the situation in Serbia], ed. S. Novakovi, Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije XXIV (1894), 3740; Ljui, Kneevina Srbija (18301839), 383385. 84 ASANU, No 7051/1901.
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a naturally necessitated condition for the historical existence of a people; beyond a state man can have neither life nor history: therefore any human action only begins with the state. Garaanins next writing, discussing the situation in the Ottoman Empire and the position of its Christian population, was predicated on the same premise as the Naertanije, namely, that the disintegration of the Empire was imminent and that therefore a new and solid state should be built on its ruins. He emphasized twice that Montenegro, by then being an independent state for 150 years, had through continuous warfare with the Ottoman Turks begun to harbour the insolent belief in its being the bearer of the Christian and Slavic [i.e. Serbian] state idea [] since the fall of the [fourteenth-century] Serbian Empire. Garaanin strongly suggested that Serbia and Montenegro should connect with one another via the area of Novi Pazar, Pe and Pritina: A single glance at the map of [Ottoman] Turkey reveals how important it is that this should happen. Discussing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he pointed to a religious rather than ethnic division: Bosnian Turks or, more correctly, Muslim Serbs are a quite distinctive phenomenon in the Slavic world, but he believed that neither the common people nor the nobility in that province should be isolated, if only because it is impossible to renounce a shared consciousness of the Serbs. He devoted a lot of space to Bulgarians, describing them as the most peaceful people in Turkey-in-Europe. Of relevance to our further considerations is how Garaanin understood the role of Serbia in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of a new state in its wake. He believed that the semi-sovereign status of the Principality of Serbia and its position entitled the Serbs to play the leading role in Turkey-in-Europe. The Serbs had been the first to start the struggle for liberation, whereby they proved to be the mightiest and the most promising Slavic branch. He saw the Serbs in general and the Principality of Serbia in particular as the pivot of the South-Slavic world round which others would gather. This was the first time that he seriously took the legacy of the Serbian revolution into account, though without giving up the historic right argument and the tradition of Duans Empire. Serbia is the product of a revolution of the Slavic element against the Turkish state; she is a recognized crystallization of fundamental Christian-Slavic interests in the Turkish Empire and basis for their furthering. Thence came Serbias moral strength and her potential for making an impact on Slavs far beyond her borders. He believed that all Serbs saw the Principality of Serbia as the cornerstone of their historical being, that Serbia was the mainstay of all Yugoslavs in Turkey, and more than that: she should gather all Yugoslavs into one state or at least into a union of several states. The Yugoslavs Garaanin had in mind most of all were Yugoslavs
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Serbs or, in other words, the Serbs in the South-Slavic-inhabited areas of Ottoman Turkey and Austria. Apparently he advocated a state that would encompass all Serbs. Garaanin also considered the issue of Serbian national integration. Serbs who are reaya in Bosnia and Serbs in the Principality of Serbia or in Montenegro, Serbs in the Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontiers [Vojna Krajina] and those in Vojvodina, they all consider themselves as belonging to one people and each part is concerned with that which concerns the whole. What he saw as particularly helpful for the process of national integration was: the existence of Serbian states Serbia and Montenegro, the activity of the peoples church, language and folk poetry. Garaanin did not try to conceal the hostile attitude of the Serbian people towards Ottoman rule. In his plans for undermining the Ottoman Empire he went so far as to expect to see a Serbian flag with the cross flying over Hagia Sophia in Constantinople after the final Ottoman defeat. In his expansionist plans Constantinople figured as the pearl of the Slavic east the first city of that Orthodox Serbian empire.85 Although he now used the term Yugoslavs more frequently than before, here he returned to the idea of a Serbian state once again. This time two points are controversial: claims to Constantinople as the future capital of a Serbian empire on the one hand, and the undefined role of the Austrian Serbs in the future state on the other. The Serbs beyond the Military Frontier and the Duchy of Serbia (Vojvodstvo Srbije Vojvodina) were not even mentioned. In neither case such a state would have been simply Serbian. Historic and natural rights were brought into confrontation here, and although Garaanin gave precedence to historic rights (reconstruction of the Serbian Empire), this was the first time that he acknowledged the revolutionary origin of the modern Serbian state. Even so, he was far from including the revolution as the source of legitimacy for the future Serbian state. A Balkan alliance
The political career of Ilija Garaanin reached its peak during the second reign of Prince Mihailo. It was a most dynamic period of Serbian foreign policy which was steered jointly by Prince Mihailo and Garaanin. Their guiding idea was Serbian unification and the establishment of a Balkan alliance. On a mission to Constantinople in 1861, Garaanin held secret negotiations with the Greeks. According to the agreed Serbo-Greek draft
AS, IGP, 855. In this writing, Garaanin wrote about his activities in 1848 as well, but without explicitly referring to Nikolajevis plan.
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convention, the Kingdom of Serbia was supposed to encompass: Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Upper Albania (or Old Serbia) and Montenegro provided that the latter does not staunchly hold onto being a separate and independent principality. This was the territorial extent already delineated in the Naertanije. As for Bulgaria, two options were envisaged: 1) to become an independent state like the Serbian and Hellenic kingdoms; 2) to remain within the Ottoman Empire. Garaanin did not rule out a confederation of several states, or a Serbian-Bulgarian-Albanian union, but he did not really believe it would be acceptable to European diplomacy. His priority obviously was a state that would encompass the entire Serbian community in Ottoman Turkey, and he was clear and precise on that point. He had several political options for whatever might come next, the central one being the formation of a Balkan alliance as a tool for bringing the Ottoman Empire down. Historiography has claimed that the draft of Serbo-Greek convention was just a new edition of the Naertanije. Garaanin accepted the revolutionary principle in resolving the national issue there. A draft agreement on an alliance among Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro was drawn up the same year.86 During the last two years of Garaanins engagement in state affairs (1866 and 1867), much effort was put into building a Balkan alliance. The first such agreement was concluded between Serbia and Montenegro (5 October 1866), and it was hoped that other Balkan peoples would gather round it. It brought nothing new compared to Garaanins previously articulated ideas: the Serbian people in Ottoman Turkey should be liberated and united in a future great Serbia to which Montenegro would join. The rest of the secret agreement was about the internal organization of this future Serbian state. It should be noted that therein the term Great Serbia was used for the first time, and referring to a state that would unite the Serbs in Ottoman Turkey, but not the Serbs in Habsburg Austria.87 In terms of ideas the secret agreement between Serbia and Montenegro is very similar to the first part of Garaanins Naertanije, just as the Programme of Yugoslav policy Garaanin proposed to the Croatian bishop and politician Strossmayer in March 1867 is similar to the second part of Naertanije. Its proclaimed goal was to unite the Yugoslav tribes into one federal state, with Belgrade and Zagreb as pivotal points in pursuing the Yugoslav cause. Religion was not to be a hindrance to Yugoslav unification, because the only principle the state should be based on was that of ethnicJaki and Vukovi, Spoljna politika, 66, 471478. Ibid., 486489; Srbija i oslobodilaki pokreti na Balkanu 18561878 [Serbia and Liberation Movements in the Balkans 18561878], vol. I, eds. V. Kresti and R. Ljui (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1983), 489493.
86 87
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ity, and Croatian and Serbian ethnicity is one, Yugoslav (Slav). The burden of Yugoslav liberation was supposed to be equally shared by all Yugoslav tribes. Although Garaanin obviously considered an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be more urgent than such a state, he clearly believed it possible for the Austrian South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to gather together at a suitable moment in a common state or in an association of South-Slavic states.88 It should also be noted that the Bulgarian proposal of April 1867 envisaged a Yugoslav empire as the state of Serbs and Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire. In August 1867 alliance with Greece was concluded, and a military convention followed in 1868, when the Balkan Alliance was joined by Romania.89 Garaanin pursued his basic idea of a future Serbian state originally proposed in the Naertanije, through the first Balkan Alliance, but he now enriched it with new elements. By building a Balkan alliance he was also seeking a key to Serbias future. One road to it could be a newly-formulated policy, which had already been the basic guideline of Serbian diplomacy under Garaanin: The Balkans to the Balkan peoples. What was new was an equal distribution of the burden of liberation from Ottoman rule among all Yugoslav and Balkan peoples.
UDC 929:32 Garaanin I :32 32 32.8:342.4](497.11)18
Jaki and Vukovi, Spoljna politika, 494504. For more, see V. Kresti, Hrvatskougarska nagodba 1868 [Croato-Hungarian Compromise of 1868] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1969), 348366, as well as his Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja [Serbo-Croatian Relations and the Yugoslav Idea] (Belgrade 1983), 982. 89 Jaki and Vukovi, Spoljna politika, 505521.
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Rado Ljui

School of Philosophy University of Belgrade

Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

The legal status of Serbia during Garaanins political career

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

AS, Belgrade, Ilija Garaanins Papers (hereafter: IGP), 855, 930.

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

The constitutional issue

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

AS, IGP, 1133, dated February 1860. AS, IGP, 1702.

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

All quotations from Stranjakovi, Garaaninovo Naertanije .

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

R. Ljui, Ilija Garaanin on Serbias Statehood

UDC 929:32 Garaanin I :32 32 32.8:342.4](497.11)18

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