IN THE DELAWARE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CIVIL DIVISION
DEUTSCHE BANKNATL. TRUST CO. )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
-vs.- )
)
ROBERT SLAYTON, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
CASE NO.: 08 CV E 09 1219
JUDGE: KRUEGER
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE
Now comes Defendant, Robert Slayton ("Defendant"), by and through his undersigned
counsel, and for his motion to vacate this Court's August 26, 2010 judgment entry granting
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Co's ("Plaintiff') motion for summary judgment on the
basis of the Supreme Court's October 31, 2012 holding in Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation v. Schwartzwald,2012-0hio-5017.
Respectfully submitted,
MILLS, MILLS, FIELY & LUCAS, LLC
lsi John Sherrod
JOHN SHERROD (0078598)
503 South Front Street, Ste. 240
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614.754.7076
330.336.7956 fax
isherrodCG>mlnfllaw.com
Counsel for Defendant
1
Memorandum In Support
Introductory Statement
As an initial matter, Defendant freely acknowledges that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in 2008,
and much litigation has since ensued, including an appeal and motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B). This does not, however, change the fact that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear this matter on September 10, 2008, the date Plaintiff filed the foreclosure
complaint, or at any point thereafter, without Plaintiff having first been assigned the mortgage in
question.
I. Relevant Factual Background
1. On September 10, 2008, Plaintiff filed the foreclosure complaint in this action.
2. As of September 10, 2008, the mortgage at issue had not been assigned from whoever the
previous holder/owner was, to Plaintiff herein.
3. On August 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed a notice of assignment of mortgage, which attached a
copy of a recorded assignment of Defendant's mortgage to Plaintiff. ("The Assignment,"
attached hereto as Exh. "A").
4. Plaintiff recorded the Assignment on September 18, 2008, or eight days after the filing of
the foreclosure lawsuit.
5. On August 26, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
entered a decree of foreclosure against Defendant.
II. Law and Argument
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Schwarzwald, et al., a case recently decided
by the Supreme Court, plaintiff bank brought a foreclosure lawsuit before it obtained an
2
assignment of the mortgage securing defendant homeowners' loan. Defendants maintained that
plaintiff lacked standing to sue (much as Defendant previously contended in this case) because
the assignment of mortgage had not been recorded prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff was
assigned the mortgage via formal assignment, as here, only after the filing of the lawsuit. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, and the Second District Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must
be satisfied to even initiate a foreclosure lawsuit:
We recognized that standing is a 'jurisdictional requirement' in State ex rei.
Dallman v, Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St. 2d 176, and
we stated: 'It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative
capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action.' (Emphasis added
by the Court).
(Schwarzwald, attached hereto as Exh. "B" at para. 22).
Further, the Court stated, "Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction
of the common pleas court, 'standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit. '" Id.
at para. 24. Invoking jurisdiction of the court, thus, depends on the state of things at the time the
action is brought, and not after. ld. at para. 25.
In reversing the Second District, the Supreme Court concluded:
The lack of standing at the commencement of a foreclosure action requires
dismissal of the complaint[.]
ld. at para. 40 (Emphasis added).
Here, in accordance with the Supreme Court, when Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on
September 10, 2008, it did not have "standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court," because it
had not yet been assigned the mortgage, and it could not cure this lack of standing through the
3
later fling of the mortgage assignment as it attempted to do on August 1, 2010. Id. at para. 41.
As a result, the Court's August 26, 2010 entry granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
and issuing a decree of foreclosure should be void ab initio (as opposed to voidable).
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that the August 26, 2010
entry be vacated and this matter otherwise dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
MILLS, MILLS, FIELY & LUCAS, LLC
/s/ John Sherrod
JOHN SHERROD (0078598)
503 South Front Street, Ste. 240
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614.754.7076
330.336.7956 fax
isherrodC(Vmmt1law.com
Counsel for Defendant
Certificate of Service
Undersigned certifies a true and accurate copy of the foregoing, was delivered to the
following, via regular US Mail, this 31st day of October, 2012, postage prepaid:
Scott King, Esq.
10050 Innovation Drive
Ste.400
Dayton, Ohio 45342
/s/ John Sherrod
John Sherrod
4
-vs-
Plaintiff,

!Case No. 08 CV E 09 1219

200842792
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Robert P. Slayton, et ale
Defendants.
Deutsche Bank National trust
Company, as Trustee for FFMLT
2006-FF13
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Now comes the plaintiff and hereby gives notice of the
filing of the Assignment of Mortgage, said Assignment of
Mortgage being attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
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Amy Hathaway
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Brad J. Terman
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LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 5480
Cincinnati, OH 45201-5480
(513) 241-3100
[email protected]
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This is to certify that a true and exact copy of the
foregoing has been duly served upon the following by ordinary
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this ~ ~ day of ~ , 2010.
Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc .
P.O. Box 7814
Ocala, FL 34478-7814
Beneficial Ohio, Inc.
2700 Sanders Road
Prospect Heights, IL 60070
Terri L. Samson
2460 Old Stringtown Road
Grove City, OH 43123
Michael T. Gunner, Esq.
3535 Fishinger Blvd.
Suite 220
Hilliard, OH 43026
Christopher D. Betts, Esq.
140 N. Sandusky Street
Delaware, OH 43015
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Julla E. Steelman
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LS&R No.: 200842792
Loan No.: 1328016301
Pidn: 317-230-09-007-000
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned,
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systema, Inc. as nominee for
First Franklin a Division of Nat. City Bank of IN, ita successors
and assigns, whose address is PO Box 7814, Ocala, FL 34478, does
hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Deutsche Bank
National trust Company, as Trustee for FFMLT 2006-FF13, whose
address is 3476 Stateview Boulevard, Fort Mill, SC 29715 Mac#
7801-013, a certain mortgage from Robert P. Slayton and Lisa J.
slayton, husband and wife, to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems I Inc. as nominee for First Franklin a Divis ion of Nat.
City Bank of IN, its successors and assigns, dated July 24, 2006,
recorded August 11, 2006, in Volume 729, Page 989, in the office
of the Delaware County Recorder, and all sums of money due and to
become due thereon, and secured by the following real estate;
LEGAL DESCRIPTION
Siwated In the State or Ohio, In the COunty or Delaware and In the Township oc Genoi2;
Being Lot Number Three ThouSbl'ld F(lur Hundred Slxtyone (3461), of HIGHLAND HILLS AT
THE tAKES SECTION ONE, t1:5 the semeIsnumberedenddel!neatedupon the recorded plet
thereof, of record In Plat cabinet 1, slld@$ 705 end 70M Recorder's omce County
OhIo. '"
PROPERTY ADDRESS:
5244 LEYDORF LANE
WESTERVILLE, OH 43082
200800026906
Filed for Record in
DELAWARE COUHTY, OHIO
AHDREIrl 0 P.f\EJr.lNER
09-18-2008 At 10:03 Oh.
MTG ASSIGH 32.00
OR Book 865 Pn,p. 1590 - 1591
Certified True
09-18-2008 At 10:03 a".
AHDREU 0 BREHMER
RECORDER
COUNTY, OHIO
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
as nominee for First Franklin a Division of Nat. city Bank of IN,
its successors and assigns has set its hand this
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Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. as nominee for
First Franklin a Division of
Nat. City Bank of IN, its
successors
BY: -"U'--+ _
Kevin Prieshoff,
Assistant Secretary and Vice
President
STATE OF OHIO
S8.
COUNTY OF HAMILTON
PAMELA K. TROXELL
Notary Public.State01 Otlio
My CommissiOn Expires
June 4.2013
PAMELA K.TROXELL
WITNESS my hand and offic
This instrument was prepared by:
LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS
A Legal Professional Association
P.o. Box 5480
Cincinnati, OH 45201-5480
On SE? 112008 before
Notary Public, State of personally appeared
Kevin Prieshoff, Assistant and Vice President,
personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of
satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed
to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same in his authorized capacity, and that by his signature
on the instrument the person, or the upon behalf of which
the person acted, executed the instrument.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, Slip Opinion No. 2012-0hio-5017.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio,
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINIONNo. 2012-0HIO-5017
FEDERAL HOME LOAN CORPORATION, APPELLEE, v.
SCHWARTZWALD ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,
it may be cited as Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald,
Slip Opinion No. 2012-0hio-5017.]
Foreclosure-Jurisdictional aspects of standing-Civ.R. 17(A)-Jurisdiction
determined as oftime offiling suit.
(Nos. 2011-1201 and 2011-1362-Submitted April 4, 2012-Decided
October 31, 2012.)
ApPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Greene County,
No. 2010 CA 41, 194 Ohio App.3d 644,
O'DONNELL, J.
Duane and Julie Schwartzwald appeal" from a judgment of the
Second District Court of Appeals affirming a decree of foreclosure entered in
favor of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. In addition, the appellate
court certified that its decision in this case conflicts with decisions of the First and
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Eighth Districts on the following issue: "In a mortgage foreclosure action; the
lack of standing or a real party in interest defect can be cured by the assignment of
the mortgage prior to judgment."
2} Federal Home Loan commenced this foreclosure action before it
obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the
Schwartzwalds' loan. The Schwartzwalds maintained that Federal Home Loan
lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that-Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when
it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest.
However, standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the
common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the
complaint. Thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage
from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the
entry ofjudgrnent does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and
the cause is dismissed.
Facts and Procedural History
5} In November 2006, Duane and Julie Schwartzwald purchased a
home inXenia, Ohio, and received a mortgage loan from Legacy Mortgage in the
amount of They executed a promissory note and a mortgage granting
Legacy Mortgage a security interest in the property. Legacy Mortgage then
endorsed the promissory note as payable to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and assigned
it the mortgage.
6} In September 2008, Duane Schwartzwald lost his job at Barco,
Inc., and the Schwartzwalds moved to Indiana so he could accept a new position.
They continued making mortgage payments as they tried to sell the house in
Xenia, but they went into default on January 1, 2009. In March 2009, Wells
2
January Term, 2012
Fargo agreed to list the property for a short sale, and on April 8, 2009, the
Schwartzwalds entered into a contract to sell it for $259,900, with closing set for
June 8, 2009.
{, 7} However, on April 15, 2009, Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation commenced this foreclosure action, alleging that the Schwartzwalds
had defaulted on their loan and owed $245,085.18 plus interest, costs, and
advances. It attached a copy of the mortgage identifying the Schwartzwalds as
borrowers and Legacy Mortgage as lender, but did not attach a copy of the note,
claiming that "a copy of [the note] is currently unavailable."
{ ~ 8 } Julie Schwartzwald then contacted Wells Fargo about the
foreclosure complaint. She testified, "I was told that itwas 'standard procedure'
and 'don't worry about it' because we were doing a short sale." The
Schwartzwalds did not answer the complaint.
{ ~ 9 } On April 24, 2009, Federal Home Loan filed with the court a copy
of the note signed by the Schwartzwalds in favor of Legacy Mortgage. The final
page carries a blank endorsement by Wells Fargo placed above the endorsement
by Legacy Mortgage payable to Wells Fargo.
{ ~ t O } On May 15, 2009, Wells Fargo assigned the note and mortgage to
Federal Home Loan, and Federal Home Loan filed with the court a copy of the
assignment on June 17, 2009. It then moved for a default judgment and a
summary judgment, but the trial court discovered that Federal Home Loan had
failed to establish a chain of title because no assignment of the mortgage from
Legacy Mortgage to Wells Fargo appeared in the record.
{ ~ II} During this time, even though it had assigned its interest in the
note and mortgage to Federal Home Loan, Wells Fargo continued discussing a
short sale of the property with the Schwartzwalds, but delays in. this process
eventually caused the Schwartzwalds' buyer to rescind the offer. On December
14,2009, the trial court granted the Schwartzwaldsleave to file an answer. That
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
same day, Federal Home Loan filed with the court a copy of the assignment of the
mortgage from Legacy Mortgage to Wells Fargo dated November 27, 2006.
{ ~ 1 2 } Federal Home Loan again moved for summary judgment,
supporting the motion with the affidavit of Herman John Kennerty, vice president
of loan documentation for Wells Fargo as servicing agent for Federal Home Loan,
who averred that the Schwartzwalds were in default and who authenticated the
note and mortgage as well as the assignment of the note and mortgage from Wells
Fargo. Subsequently, Federal Home Loan filed copies of the notarized
assignments from Legacy Mortgage to Wells Fargo and from Wells Fargo to
Federal Home Loan.
{Ij[ I3} The Schwartzwalds also moved for summary judgment, asserting
that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to foreclose on their property.
{ ~ 1 4 } The trial court entered summary judgment for Federal Home Loan,
finding that the Schwartzwalds had defaulted on the note, and it ordered the
equity of redemption foreclosed arid the property sold. Federal Home Loan
purchased the property at a sheriff s sale.
{Ij[ I5} On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed and held
that Federal Home Loan had established its right to enforce the promissory note
as a nonholder in possession, because assignment of the mortgage effected' a
transfer of the note it secured. The court further explained that standing is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite and that a lack of standing may be cured by substituting
the real party in interest for an original party pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A). Thus, the
court concluded that although Federal Home Loan lacked standing at the time it
commenced the foreclosure action, it cured that defect by the assignment of the
mortgage and transfer of the note prior to entry of judgment.
{Ij[ 16} The court of appeals certified that, its decision conflicted with
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-0hio-:4603, 897
N.E.2d 722 (1st Dist.), ~ 15-16; Bank of New York v. Gindele, 1st Dist. No. C-
4
January Term, 2012
090251, 2010-0hio-542, ~ 3-4; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 8th Dist.
No. 91675, 2009-0hio-1092, ~ . 21, cases that held that a lack of standing cannot
be cured by substituting the real party in interest for an original party pursuant to
Civ.R. 17(A). We accepted the conflict and the Schwartzwalds' discretionary
appeal on the same issue.
Arguments on Appeal
{ ~ I 7 } The Schwartzwalds explain that the essential aspect of standing is
injury to a legally protected right and claim that Federal Home Loan had not been
injured bytheir default at the time it commenced this foreclosure action, because
it had not obtained the note and mortgage until after it filed the complaint.
Relying on federal caselaw, they maintain that standing is determined as of the
time the action is brought, so that subsequent events do not cure a lack of
standing. They further urge that although the requirement of a real party in
interest can be waived, that requirement cannot be equated with the requirement
of standing.
{ ~ I S } Federal Home Loan asserts that pursuant to R.C. 1303.31, it is a
"person entitled to enforce the note" because it is "[a] nonholder in possession of
the instrument who has the rights of a holder" by virtue of the negotiation of the
note from Legacy to Wells Fargo and the assignment from Wells Fargo. Further,
it maintains that R.C. 1303.31 defines only which party is entitled to enforce a
note and that the failure to be. a real party in interest at the commencement of suit
can be cured pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A) by the assignment of the mortgage and
note. It also contends that the jurisdictional requirement of justiciability is
satisfied if the allegations of the complaint establish that the plaintiff has standing
to present a justiciable controversy and that even if it is determined that those
allegations were in fact false, the matter remains justiciable so long as the plaintiff
subsequently obtains the right to foreclose prior to judgment. On this basis, it
argues that because "the Ohio Constitution bestows general (and not limited)
5
'SUPREME COURT OF OKlO
" 'Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise
justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of .that
controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the
question of standing to sue. Where the party does not rely on any
specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the
question of standing depends on whether the party has alleged
* * * a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." , "
6
JanuatyTerm,2012
Id., quoting Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 495 N.E.2d 380
(1986), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-732, 92S.Ct. 1361,31
L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7
L.Ed.2d 663 (1972). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court observed in
Steel Co. v, Citizens for aBetter Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003,
140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), that "[ s]tanding to sue is part of the common
understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case."
{ ~ 2 2 } We recognized that standing is a "jurisdictional requirement" in
State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d
176,179,298 N.E.2d 515 (1973), and we stated: "It is an elementary concept of
law that a party lacks standing to invoke thejurisdiction of the court unless he has,
in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter
of the action." (Emphasis added.) See also New Boston Coke Corp. v. Tyler, 32
Ohio St.3d 216, 218, 513 N.E.2d 302 (1987) ('"the issue of standing, inasmuch as
it is jurisdictional in nature, may be raised at any time during the pendency of the
proceedings"); Steinglass & Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference
Guide 180 (2004) (noting that the jurisdiction of the common pleas court is
limited to justiciable matters).
{4J 23} And recently, in Kincaid v. Erie Ins. c, 128 Ohio St.3d 322,
2010-0hio-6036, 944 N.E.2d 207, we affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for
lack of standing when it had been filed before the claimant had suffered any
injury. There, Kincaid asserted claims that his insurer had breached the insurance
contract by failing to pay expenses covered by the policy; however, he had never
presented a claim for reimbursement to the insurer. We concluded that Kincaid
lacked standing to assert the cause of action, explaining, "Until Erie refuses to pay
a claim for a loss, Kincaid has suffered no actual damages for breach of contract,
the parties do not have adverse legal interests," and there is no justiciable
controversy." Id. at 113.
7
SUPREME COURT OFORIO
{'if 24} Because standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the
common pleas court, "standing is to be determined as of the commencement of
suit." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570-571,112 S.Ct. 2130,119
L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), fn. 5; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610
(2000); Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154-1155 (lOth Cir.2005);
Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 FJd 1263, 1275
(lith Cir.2003); Perry v. Arlington Hts., 186 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir.1999); Carr
v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1061 (5th Cir.1991).
{, 25} Further, invoking the jurisdiction of the court "depends on the state
of things at the time of the action brought," Mullan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539,
6 L.Ed. 154 (1824), and the Supreme Court has observed that "[tjhe state of
things and the originally alleged state of things are not synonymous;
demonstration that the original allegations were false will defeat jurisdiction."
Rockwell Internatl. Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1397,
167 L.Ed.2d 190 (2007).
{, 26} Thus, "[p[ost-filing events that supply standing that did not exist
. on filing may be disregarded, denying standing despite a showing of sufficient
present injury caused by the challenged acts and capable ofjudicial redress." 13A
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 9, Section 3531
(2008); see Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 575, 124
S.Ct. 1920, 158 L.Ed.2d 866 (2004), quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S.
61, 75, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (rejecting argument that" 'finality,
efficiency, and judicial economy' " can justify suspension of the time-of-filing
rule); Utah Assn. of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1101, and fn. 6 (lOth
Cir.2006) (a plaintiff cannot rely on injuries occurring after the filing of the
complaint to establish standing).
8
January Term,2012
{, 27} This principle accords with decisions from other states holding that
standing is determined as of the filing the .complaint. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank
Natl. Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, 270 P.3d 151, ~ 11 ("If Deutsche Bank
became a person entitled to enforce the note as either a holder or nonholder in
possession who has the rights of a holder after the foreclosure action was filed,
then the case may be dismissed without prejudice * * *" [emphasis added]); us.
BankNatl. Assn. v, Kimball, 190 Vt. 210,2011 VT 81, 27 A.3d 1087, ~ 14 ("U.S.
Bank was required to show that at 'the time the complaint was filed it possessed
the original note either made payable to bearer with a blank endorsement or made
payable to order with an endorsement specifically to U.S. Bank" [emphasis
added]); Mtge. Electronic Registration Sys., Inc: v. Saunders, 2010 ME 79,2 A.3d
287, ~ 15 ("Without possession of or any interest in the note, MERS lacked
standing to institute foreclosure proceedings and could not invoke the jurisdiction
of our trial courts" [emphasis added]); RMS Residential Properties, L.L.C. v.
Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 229, 232, 32 A.3d 309 (2011), quoting Hiland v. Ives, 28
Conn.Supp. 243, 245, 257 A.2d 822 (1966) (explaining that" '[s]tanding is the
legal right to set judicial machinery in motion' " and holding that the plaintiff had
standing because it proved ownership of the note and mortgage at the time it
commenced foreclosure action); McLean v, JP Morgan Chase Bank Natl. Assn.,
79 So.3d 170, 173 (Fla.App.2012) ("the plaintiff must prove that it had standing
to foreclose when the complaint was filed"); see also Burley v. Douglas, 26 So.3d
1013, 1019 (Miss.2009), quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
571, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), fn. 5 (" 'standing is to be
determined as of the commencement of suit' "); In re 2007 Administration of
. Appropriations of Water of the Niobrara, 278 Neb. 137, 145, 768 N.W.2d 420
(2009) ("only a party that has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal. And the junior appropriators did not lose standing if they possessed it
under the facts existing when they commenced the litigation" [footnote omitted]).
9
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{Il28} Here, Federal Home Loan concedes that there is no evidence that it
had suffered any injury at the time it commenced this foreclosure action. Thus,
because it failed to establish an interest in the note or mortgage at the time "it filed
suit, it had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction ofthe common pleas court.
The Real-Party-in-Interest Rule
{ ~ 2 9 } The court of appeals and Federal Home Loan relied on the
plurality opinion in State ex rei. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d
1002 (1998), which suggested that "[t]he lack of standing may be cured by
substituting the proper party so that a court. otherwise having subject matter
jurisdiction may proceed to adjudicate the matter. Civ.R. 17." However, four
justices declined to join that portion of the opinion, and therefore it is not a
holding of this court. See Ohio Constitution, Article N, Section 2(A) ("A
majority of the supreme court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to
render a judgment").
{ ~ 3 0 } At common law, all actions had to be brought in the name of the
person' holding legal title to the right asserted, and individuals possessing only
equitable or beneficial interests could not sue in their own right. See generally
Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 Yale LJ. 259 (1925); 6A
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 1541 (2010).
However, the practice in equity relaxed this requirement, and states later
abrogated the common-law rules and adopted "rules that permitted any 'real party
in interest' to bring suit." Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc.,
554 U.S. 269, 279,128 S.Ct. 2531,171 L.Ed 2d 424 (2008).
{ ~ 3 1 } In Ohio, Civ.R. 17(A) governs the procedural requirement that a
complaint be brought in the name of the real party in interest and provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
10
January Tenn, 2012
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a
contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his name as such representative
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
brought. When a statute of this state so provides, an action for the
use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of this state.
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has
been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of
the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.
Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party
in interest.
{ ~ 3 2 } Considering Civ.R. 17(A) in Shealy v. Campbell, 20 Ohio St.3d 23,
24-25, 485 N.E.2d 701 (1985), we observed:
The purpose behind the real party in interest rule is " '* * *
to enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses
that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to
assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be protected
against another suit brought by the real party at interest on the
same matter.' Celanese Corp. ofAmerica v. John Clark Industries
(5 Cir.1954), 214 F.2d 551, 556." [In re Highland Holiday
Subdivision (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 237] 240 [273 N.E.2d903].
{ ~ 3 3 } As the Supreme Court explained in Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche,
546 U.S. 81,90, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005), the real-party-in-interest
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rule concerns only proper party joinder. Civ.R. 17(A) does not address standing;
rather, the point of the rule is that "suits by representative plaintiffs on behalf of
the real parties in interest are the exception rather than the rule and should only be
. allowed whenthe real parties in interest are identifiable and the res judicata scope
of the judgment can be effectively determined.". Consumer Fedn. of Am. v.
Upjohn Co., 346 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C.1975) (construing analogous District of
Columbia rule),
{ ~ 3 4 } Thus, the Third and the Ninth Circuits have rejected the notion that
Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a), on which Civ.R. 17(A) is based, allows a party with no
personal stake in a controversy to file a claim on behalf of a third party, obtain the
cause of action by assignment, and then have the assignment relate back to
commencement of the action, stating:
"Rule 17(a) does not apply to a situation where a party with
no cause of action files a lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations
and later obtains a cause of action through assignment. Rule 17(a)
is the codification of the salutary principle that an action should
not be forfeited because of an honest mistake; it is not a provision
to be distorted by parties to circumvent the limitations period."
Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544F.3d 553, 563 (3d Cir.2008), quoting
United States ex rei. Wulffv. CMA, Inc., 890 F.2d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.1989).
{ ~ 3 5 } The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528 (6th Cir.2002), illustrates this point. In that case, a
fire at a warehouse destroyed property insured by American Guarantee, which
paid out a claim for damages. However, another insurance company, Zurich
Switzerland, filed a complaint claiming to be the insured's subrogee,
notwithstanding the fact that Zurich Switzerland. had neither issued an insurance
12
I '
January Term, 2012
policy nor paid out any money to the insured. The defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of standing, and Zurich Switzerland sought to substitute American
Guarantee as the real party in interest pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a). The district
court dismissed the action.
{ ~ 3 6 } The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the statute
of limitations would bar American Guarantee's claim unless Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)
'allowed it to be substituted for Zurich Switzerland. However, the court
distinguished between the requirement of standing and the objection that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, and it held that because "Zurich American
admittedly has not suffered injury in fact by the defendants, it had no standing to
bring this action and no standing to make a motion to substitute the real party in
interest." fd.
{ ~ 3 7 } Other courts have also determined that a plaintiff cannot rely on
procedural rules similar to Civ.R. 17(A) to cure a lack of standing at the
commencement of litigation.. Davis v. YageoCorp., 481 F.3d 661, 678 (9th
Cir.2007) ("whether or not Dux was the real-party-in-interest, it does not have
standing, and it cannot cure its standing problem through an invocation of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a)"); Clark v. Trailiner Corp., 242 F.3d 388 (lOth Cir.2000)
(table), opinion reported at 2000 WL 1694299 (noting that the plaintiff cannot
"retroactively become the real-party-in-interest" in order to cure a lack of
standing at the filing of the complaint [emphasis sic]); accord State v. Property at
2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1027-1028 (Ala.19.99) (rejecting the
argument that a lack of standing can be cured after filing of the complaint);
Consumer Fedn. of Am. v. Upjohn Co., 346 A.2d 725, 729 (D.C.App.l975)
(explaining that dismissal for lack of standing is consistent WIth D.C.
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 17(a)); see also McLean v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Natl. Assn.,
79 So.3d 170, 173 (Fla.App.2012) ("a party is not permitted to establish the right
13
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
We agree with the reasoning and analysis presented in these cases.
Standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.
Pursuant to Civ.R. 82, the Rules of Civil Procedure do not extend the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state, and a common pleas court cannot substitute a real party
in interest for another party if no party with standing has invoked its jurisdiction
in the first instance.
Accordingly, a litigant cannot pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A) cure the
lack of standing after commencement of the action by obtaining an interest in the
subject of the litigation and substituting itself as the real party in interest.
Effect ofLack ofStanding on Foreclosure Actions
The lack of standing .at the commencement of a foreclosure action
requires dismissal of the complaint; however, that dismissal is not an adjudication
on the merits and is therefore without prejudice. See State ex rei. Coles v.
Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-0hio-6057, 877N.E.2d 968, 51. Because
there has been no adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, our dismissal has
no effect on the underlying duties, rights, or obligations of the parties.
Conclusion
It is fundamental that a party commencing litigation must have
standing to sue in order to present a justiciable controversy and invoke the
jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Civ.R. 17(A) does not change this
principle, and a lack of standing at the outset of litigation cannot be cured by
receipt of an assignment of the claim or by substitution of the real party in
interest.
Here, it is undisputed that Federal Home Loan did not have
standing at the time it commenced thisforeclosure action, and therefore it failed
14
January Tenn,2012
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. Accordingly, the
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is dismissed.
Judgment reversed
and cause dismissed.
O'CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, Cupp,
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur.
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Scott A. King, and Terry W. Posey Jr., for
appellee.
Andrew M. Engle, for appellants.
Bruce M. Broyles, urging reversal for amici curiae Homeowners of the
State of Ohio and Ohiofraudclosure.blogspot.com,
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., and Andrew D. Neuhauser;
Legal Aid Society of Cleveland and Julie K. Robie; Legal Aid Society of
Southwest Ohio, L.L.C., and Noel M. Morgan; Community Legal Aid Services,
Inc., Christina M. Janice, and Paul E. Zindle; and Ohio Poverty Law Center and
Linda Cook, urging reversal for amici curiae Advocates for Basic Legal Equality,
Inc., Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio,
L.L.C., Community Legal Aid Services, Inc., Ohio Poverty Law Center, Legal
Aid Society of Columbus, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Legal Aid of
Western Ohio, and Pro Seniors, Inc.
15