Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic Author(s): Sheri Berman Source: World Politics, Vol.

49, No. 3 (Apr., 1997), pp. 401-429 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054008 Accessed: 10/10/2010 16:15
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

BySHERIBERMAN*

everywhere one looks, from social science mono

to PRACTICALLY graphs political speeches to

society" is in vogue. A flourishing civil society is considered to have helped bring down the Evil Empire and is held to be a prerequisite for
the success cline of post-Soviet is said to threaten democratic democracy a civil society in de experiments; in America. is the the Tocqueville

People magazine,

the concept

of "civil

orist of the decade, having noted a century and a half ago that
"Americans forever robustness claimed, ciations are of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition to the associations." he linked such behavior Further, forming of the nations "more deserves in America_In is the mother institutions. representative attention than the intellectual democratic of countries forms all other such he "Nothing," asso and moral of how on its

to combine progress Today society

the knowledge of knowledge; Putnam while

depends

that of all the others."1 as Robert argue that civil authors like

neo-Tocquevilleans to is crucial "making

democracy

work,"2

Francis Fukuyama and Benjamin Barber (who differ on everything else) agree that it plays a key role in driving political, social, and even
economic flawed. outcomes.3 It is simply it, "Tocqueville was
* The

not

is conventional wisdom, however, true that, as Putnam (for example) puts always not is strengthened, Democratic government right:

This

new

author would like to thank Peter Berkowitz, Nancy Bermeo, David P. Conradt, Manfred Anna Seleny, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Kreuzer, Andy Markovits, Carolyn Warner, Halpern, Marcus and especially Gideon Rose, for helpful comments and criticisms. 1 inAmerica (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 513, 517. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy 2 in Modern Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions Italy (Princeton: Princeton Univer Social Capital," fournal sity Press, 1993); see also idem, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining of no. 13 (Spring Democracy 6 (January 1995); idem, "The Prosperous Community," American Prospect, of Civic America," American Prospect, no. 24 (Winter 1993); and idem, "The Strange Disappearance

1996).
(New York Free Press, Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity Barber, Jihad vs.McWorld How the Planet Is Both Falling Apart and Coming Together?and Means for Democracy (New York: NY Times Books, 1995). 3 1995); and What This

WorldPolitics 49 (April 1997), 401-29

402

WORLD POLITICS

This essaywill show weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society."4 how a robust civil society actually helped scuttle the twentieth century s
most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany.

Associational

life flourished inGermany throughout the nineteenth

and early in the twentieth century. Yet in contrast to what neo-Tocque theories would levels of associationism, absent villean high predict, and responsive national government and political served strong parties, to was weak rather than unite German society. It political fragment a weak rather than civil society that was Germany's institutionalization

main problem during theWilhelmine

Huntington often noted almost into three decades

and Weimar

eras. As Samuel
highly active

ago, societies with

and mobilized
degenerate

publics and low levels of political institutionalization

instability,

and even violence;5 German disorder, a classic in ac provides example of this dynamic political development in particular, Germans tion. During threw them the interwar period selves zations into their clubs, voluntary and professional associations, organi out of frustration with the failures of the national government Hitler s rise to power. In addition, Weimar Socialist German s rich asso Workers'

Weimar Repub and political parties, thereby helping to undermine the

lic and facilitate cadres German

ciational life provided a critical training ground for eventual Nazi

and a base civil from which the National

Party (NSDAP)could launch its Machtergreifung (siezure of power). Had

never have been the Nazis would society been weaker, so many citizens for their cause or eviscerate their op able to capture so ponents swiftly.

A striking implication of this analysis is that a flourishing civil soci

for the prospects of liberal democ bode well ety does not necessarily effects neo-Tocquevilleans For civil society to have the beneficial racy. context has to be right: absent strong and responsive posit, the political serve to an active civil society may institutions, increasingly political a institu rather than strengthen, undermine, regime. Political political tionalization, in other words, may be less chic a topic these days than

civil society, but it is logically prior and historically more important. As

Huntington and stable it, a well-ordered of institutional pattern put civic polity authority requires "a recognizable . . . institutions political

[must be] sufficiently strong to provide the basis of a legitimate politi Without such political in cal order andworking political community."
stitutions,
4 Putnam 5 Samuel 1968).

societies
(fn. 2,Making P. Huntington,

will

lack trust

and the ability

Societies

to define

and realize

Democracy Work), 182. Political Order in Changing

(New Haven:

Yale University

Press,

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

their as common interests.6 Political scientists need to remember to examine

403 that more

Tocqueville himself considered Americans' political associations to be

important closely how the two as their ones, and they need nonpolitical interact in different situations.7

Neo-Tocquevillean
The logic

Theories

of neo-Tocquevillean theories bears closer examination. turns out, are not the first to "rediscover" the it scholars, Contemporary

great Frenchman, nor even the first to link group bowling and political development.8 After World War II several social scientists also claimed
to have success hauser into a found in associational life a key to understanding democracy's or failure.

During

the 1950s and 1960s social scientists such as William

Arendt theory helped for explaining was turn

Korn

and Hannah powerful slide

the concept of "mass society" the disintegration of democracy

and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe.9 This

Europe's into barbarism

school believed that

collapse of intermediate to Kornhausers Mass Politics of So ing the interwar years; the epigraph was s that "if men are to remain civilized or to warning ciety Tocqueville must grow and in become so, the art of associating together improve the same ratio in which is increased."10 the equality of conditions
6 Ibid., 82-83,5-25. 7 Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," Journal ofDemocracy 1 (July 1996); Larry Diamond, Consolidation," Journal of "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Problem: Civic Engagement inAmerican Democracy 5 (July 1994); Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville of the Social Science History Association, (Presidential address for the annual meeting Democracy" New Orleans, October from Above," American Prospect, no. 25 12, 1996); and idem, "Unravelling 1996). (March-April 8 toMax Weber; see fn. 23 below. A distinction apparendy belonging 9 Mass Society (Glencoe, 111.:Free Press, 1959); and Hannah William The Politics of Kornhauser, Brace Jovanovich, Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt 1973). See also Sig mund Neumann, Permanent Revolution Man and Society (New York: Harper, 1942); Karl Mannheim, in an Age and Kegan Paul, 1980); Erich Fromm, Escape from (New York: Routledge of Reconstruction Freedom (New York: Rinehart, 1941); Edward Shils, "The Theory of Mass Society," in Philip Olson, "'Mass Society': The ed., America as aMass Society (New York: Free Press, 1963); and E. V. Walter, Late Stages of an Idea," Social Research 31 (Winter 1964). It should be pointed out that the concept of mass a one discussed here, the most well society has variety of different interpretations. Apart from the known usage of the term is associated with Jos? Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), and other theories of cultural decay. For a recent discussion of this latter usage, see Neil Mclnnes, Interest (Summer 1996). For general of theMass," National "Ortega and theMyth overviews of the mass society literature, see Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Salvador Giner, Mass Soci Press, 1976). ety (New York: Academic 10 On the intellectual history of mass society theories, seeWalters (fn. 9), 405; and Sandor Haleb a Reconstruction sky,Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward of Theory (New York: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1976).

greased by, among other factors, the across much of the Continent associations dur

404 on Durkheim, Drawing ety theorists argued that izens from one another, from belonging. Ripped able for mobilization by

WORLD POLITICS
and to a lesser degree on Marx, the mass soci cit industrialization and modernity estranged them rootless and searching for ways of leaving their traditional extremist moorings, movements?unless, masses were avail that is, individ

uals could develop communal bonds through organizational affiliations and involvement. Without "amultiplicity of independent and often
conflicting resources atomization therefore these Kornhauser of association," wrote, "people lack the as well as that of others. Social to restrain their own behavior forms of alienation and anxiety, and strong feelings to engage to escape from in extreme behavior to these mass theorists, was an antidote

engenders the disposition tensions."11

to the po in organizations society. Participation not and foster together, bridging cleavages only helped bring citizens for democratic but it also satisfied their skills necessary governance, ing to this view, a to some need to belong key larger grouping. According was its status as a clas reason for the of theWeimar Republic collapse to the blandishments sic mass it susceptible of to society, which made s supporters were drawn talitarian demagoguery. Hitler from primarily Civil society, according litical viruses that afflicted alienated berships individuals and who lacked a wide civil range of associational mem saw in the NSDAP a way into a of integrating themselves society been stronger, the republic such a causal of newer sequence. For and trendier theo

had German larger community; not have fallen.12 might The

evidence did not support empirical reasons this and other (such as the advent of mass out of vogue. society had fallen a third wave of democratization sought democratic to

ries), by the late 1960s social scientists had moved on and the concept
ever, scholars mined in the 1970s, how Beginning across the swept globe,13 and as well as those factors that deter

sameTocquevillean others a few decades

identify its causes, success more Several were drawn to the generally. Arendt and that had attracted Kornhauser, insights earlier. Putnam's Making Democracy Work was par

11 Kornhauser (fn. 9), 315-23. For a general review of the literature on (fn. 9), 32; see also Arendt "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," American Sociological Review this point, see Joseph R. Gusfield, 12 see the excellent essay On mass society theories and theWeimar by Bernt Hagtvet, Republic, in Stein "The Theory of Mass Society and the Collapse of theWeimar Republic: A Re-examination,w and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds., Who Were theFascists? Social Roots ofEuropean Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, Fascism (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1980). 13 in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The Third Wave: Democratization Samuel P. Huntington, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

17 (1982).

COLLAPSEOF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

405

ticularly important for the revival of interest in the role played by pri
in sustaining associations vibrant democracy.14 vate, voluntary mass recent Like the society theorists, analyses neo-Tocquevillean stress the way individuals relate to each other and their society when function well. To measure and ex explaining why democratic regimes uses the the success of democracy, for example, Putnam, concepts plain

of civic community and social capital; for both of these the key indica
be termed associationism, the propensity of individ might a wide to form and of organizations range join spontaneously. to Putnam: According uals Civil associations
government. and because of their

tor is what

contribute
because "extemaT

to the effectiveness
of their "internal" on the wider effects

and stability of democratic

effects polity. on individual members associations Internally,

. . both

instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness.

Externally articulation and laboration.15 . .. ... a dense network of of secondary and] associations contributes aggregation interests . .. [enhances to effective social the col

Associations into the

"broaden 'We.'"

any as as it is functions, long not around vertical bonds of authority and dependency. As organized he puts it: "The manifest of the association be po [need not] purpose in a choral society or a bird-watching litical."17 club can "Taking part an teach self-discipline and for the joys of successful col appreciation to the he writes, thus contributing of regional laboration," efficiency

norms sturdy of social trust," which help resolve dilemmas economic smooth and political negotiations.16 serve these association will type of secondary

sense of self, the participants' the T developing of civic engagement," "foster meanwhile, of generalized and encourage the emergence reciprocity "Networks of collective For Putnam action almost and

government in Italy; the decline of league bowling, similarly, signals the

decay of democracy in the United States.18 In sum, for Putnam and oth
14 are somewhat different in ear Recent neo-Tocquevillean analyses emphasis, however, from their lier mass society counterparts. In particular, they focus?as Putnam's title states?on what "makes some democracies healthier than others; there is no explicit dis democracy work," that is,what makes cussion of the possibility of a new descent into totalitarianism. For Putnam and his counterparts, in other words, the dependent variable is the strength or effectiveness (it is unclear which) of democratic variable was the slide into totalitarianism. institutions, while for mass society theorists the dependent 15 Putnam (fn. 2,Making Democracy Work), 89-90. On social capital, see also James Coleman, Foun dations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990). 16 67. See also idem, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance Putnam (fn. 2,1995), of Social Capital inAmerica," PS (December 1995); and idem (fn. 2, "The Prosperous Community"). 17 Putnam of (fn. 2, Making Democracy Work), 90. For a separate argument on the consequences "ATheory internal structures, see Harry Eckstein, of Stable Democracy," in Eckstein, organizations' Division and Cohesion inDemocracy: A Study ofNorway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 18 70. Putnam (fn. 2,Making Democracy Work), 90; idem (fn. 2,1995),

406 ers in the new generation

WORLD POLITICS
of neo-Tocquevillean analysts, associationism is

both an indicator of healthy democracy and a prerequisite for it. Testing

This

the Theory
attention, especially scene. Nevertheless,

thesis has attracted much neo-Tocquevillean to the contemporary in its American application and "external" effects associations This

there has actually been little in-depth analysis by political scientists of

the "internal" vidual members test the claims course of almost and the wider polity.19 of the theory?specifically, a century (from on indi actually have sets out to essay therefore the effects of as in

sociationism on the political life of one country (Germany) over the

the mid-1800s to the Nazi takeover

by probing

1933). The investigation is facilitated by thework of historians of Ger many, who, largely unnoticed by political scientists, have fought their
own battles over some related issues: civil those debates evidence One of the vigor of German and effects. counter, society, extensive provide documenta along with

tion of its causes might case

of course, that a theory based on only a single and that, moreover,20 is inherently German political problematic a range of influenced this period was certainly by during development civil society, many of them highly particular. factors extending beyond an reasons of neo there are several Nevertheless, inability why to account for the central features of this case analysis Tocquevillean

should be significant and troubling. First, scholars have long viewed

the Weimar ground. central The to our Republic and disintegration as a crucial theoretical its collapse testing is so in interwar Germany of democracy

and so critical for of comparative understanding politics that we should at the least be wary of any the history of modern Europe it. Second, the that cannot explain development theory of political

19 studies to buttress his points, but and economic for example, cites some development Putnam, on citi s much less empirical research has been carried out on associationism political effects, whether to investigate some of zens or societies. The old mass society literature did, however, spur sociologists Babchuk and John N. Edwards, these questions. See, for example, Nicholas "Voluntary Associations E. W. Holden, "Associ and the Integration Hypothesis," Sociological Inquiry 35 (Spring 1965); David to the Problem," Rural ations as Reference Groups: An Approach Pinard, Sociology 30 (1965); Maurice A New Formulation," American Journal ofSociology "Mass Society and Political Movements: (July and Democratic Consensus," Journal of 1968); and also Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership to See Politics 27 (August 1965). Some political scientists are beginning investigate these questions. in Kenneth "Associations and the Creation of Social Capital," Stolle and Thomas Rochon, Dietland Newton et al., eds., "Social Capital in Western 1996); and idem, "Social Capi Europe" (Manuscript, inAmerican Behavioral Scientist (forthcoming). and American tal, Associations Exceptionalism," 20 Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in and Sidney Verba, Designing Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Press, 1994), 209-12. Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University

COLLAPSEOF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

postwar neo-Tocquevilleans highlighted precisely

407

this case as an exam

ple of the impact of associationism (or lack thereof) on political out comes. And third, while the United States has been considered the
homeland of associationism ever since

could also be bestowed on Germany, making it resemble amost likely case for determining the reliability of the neo-Tocquevillean theory. The extraordinarily vigorous associational life ofWilhelmine and
Weimar Germany was that contemporaries (roughly, associational or mania) fetishism that beset German and joked that whenever society were to draw up three or more Germans they likely by-laws gathered, and found an association.21 The German for forming organiza passion tions was so characteristic that it became the butt of several well-known commented frequently of the Vereinsmeierei spoke on, so much so in fact

Tocqueville,

comparable

honors

satires, including Kurt Tucholskys

classic poem "DasMitglied"

(The

most Max Weber, Member).22 Germany's analyst during this perceptive note of his took for voluntarily countrymen's join period, predilection in groups; recognizing of this the significance ing together phenome non for to he urged his colleagues study German development, political

organizational life in all of itsmanifestations, "startingwith the bowling

to the artis club [!]... and continuing party or the religious, political tic or literary sect." Yet Weber that German association also observed

ism, unlike itsAmerican or British counterparts, did not lead directly to

responsible quantitative much less to liberal or democratic values. "The citizenship, of organizational life," he argued, "does not always spread in, say, a choral society is accustomed "Aman who did not promote necessarily to use his larynx in voicing however, finding any con "that is a group members, in the passive sense of the

go hand in hand with its qualitative significance." He explicitly noted

that participation true civic virtue: powerful nection

on a sentiments daily basis without, to his actions," he said of singing ... a man who easily becomes good citizen
word."23

21 in theNineteenth N.J.: Hu James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism Century (Atlantic Highlands, im sp?ten "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland manities Press, 1995), and Thomas Nipperdey, in Nipperdey, 18. und fr?hen 19. Jahrhundert: Eine Fallstudie zur Modernisierung," Gesellschaft, Kul und Ruprecht, tur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufs?tze zur neueren Geschichte (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck 1976). 22 inMary Gerold-Tucholsky, "Das Mitglied," Kurt Tucholsky, ed., Zwischen Gestern undMorgen: Eine Auswahl aus seinen Schriften und Gedichten (Hamburg: Taschenbuch, 1952), 76. 23 auf den deutschen und Diskussionsreden Max Weber, "Gesch?ftsbericht soziologischen Tagun Gesammelte Aufs?tze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1924), Weber, (T?bingen: J.C B. Mohr, gen," in 1880-1935 442, quoted in Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, (Chapel Hill: of North Carolina Press, 1986), 4, emphasis added. See also Margaret Levi, "Social and University Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work,n Politics and Society 24 (March 1996).

408
This essay now proceeds of German associationism, theWeimar

WORLD POLITICS
the internal and external effects explore on the Protestant middle classes in focusing to

particular because of the critical role they played in the disintegration of

and the rise of the Nazis.24 The results show that Republic were wrong the postwar in their assertion that an neo-Tocquevilleans absence of civil society paved the way for the collapse of democracy and in Germany. the rise of totalitarianism I find, to the contrary, that par

ticipation in organizations of civil society didlink individuals together and help mobilize them for political participation (just as current neo
Tocquevillean NSDAP their rose scholars to power, claim), not but in the German case this served not

to strengthen democracy but toweaken it.And finally, I show that the

by attracting alienated, to apolitical Germans,

but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting

consolidate skills and associational affiliations as the its position largest of political development. expand political force the party's appeal and in Germany. The

essay concludes by probing the broader implications of the German

case for theories

Civil

Society in Bismarckian wllhelmine germany

and

German associational life grew rapidly during the late eighteenth and
in the legal code, the break by changes and growing down of preindustrial social wealth traditions, corporate an and diversification, dense network of private voluntary increasingly associations the country. This trend was pronounced spread throughout was in the an "as to comment that Germany enough for many grips of on the eve of the 1848 revolutions. asso sociational passion" Voluntary to ciations were active in public in areas ranging from education life, a in particular, land preservation and self policy; they helped growing nineteenth Spurred assertive historians, the mid-eighteenth bourgeoisie therefore, its social and economic interests. Many pursue have interpreted German associational life from to the mid-nineteenth century as a "symptom of centuries.

24 and Reinhard For a review of the literature on the middle classes and fascism, see Bernt Hagtvet to Fascism: A Survey of Paradigms," and Reinhard K?hl, "Precon K?hl, "Contemporary Approaches and Myklebust ditions for the Rise and Victory of Fascism inGermany," both in Larsen, Hagtvet, (fn. and theMiddle Social Conservatism Classes in Germany, 1914-1933 12). See also Hans Lebovics, Press, 1969); Hans Speier, German White Collar Workers and the Rise (Princeton: Princeton University in der deutschen Press, 1986); and J?rgen Kocka, Die Angestellten (New Haven: Yale University ofHitler und Ruprecht, Geschichte, 1850-1980 1981). For reasons detailed in the text (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck to associationism do not necessarily and notes below, observations about bourgeois Protestant apply its labor or Catholic among others. counterparts,

COLLAPSE the rise of bourgeois

OF THE WEIMAR and ... a factor

REPUBLIC serving to accelerate"

409 its

society

new Ger the constitution adopted by the a the granting of universal encouraged suffrage in order to wide variety of groups to form organizations themselves give a voice as the institu in the More just sphere. importantly, political tional structure of the Reich was prompting certain kinds of organiza man Reich in 1871: tional activity, the prolonged economic downturn that began in the late

development.25 The next spurt of German One factor was contributing

associational

growth

began

in the 1870s.

1870s highlighted
demands

the vulnerability of different groups and increased

two decades for state aid. During the following almost all sec tors of German in a frenzy of associational society activity, engaged with heavy small business, the Mittelstandy and white-collar industry, all forming their own organizations.26 The fight over protec groups a reason for the emergence tionism was certainly of new associa key tions, but the Great

more than merely highlight the divergent interests of different socio

economic torical and groups. It led many turning point, poised The industrialized modernity. the formation stimulated of a wide (such patriotic associations) rather than directly within as was at a his to that Germany recognize a traditional existence between agricultural tension between these two visions

Depression,

as

contemporaries

referred

to it, did

which borhood lifestyles, existing

of many variety of organizations, and reading clubs, and neigh societies, sports were to foster certain values and designed engage the political society, since process.

In practice, the political system set up in 1871 only widened

cleavages German political parties
25 Nipperdey

the
were

and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German (fn. 21), 182; see also David Blackbourn inNineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Oxford University History: Bourgeois Politics and Society inDavid Black "The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction," Press, 1992), 194ff.; David Blackbourn, bourn and Richard J. Evans, eds., The German Bourgeoisie (London: Roudedge, 1993); J?rgen Kocka, "The European Pattern and the German Case," in J?rgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell, eds., Bourgeois (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Karl-Erich Born, "Der soziale und Century Europe Society inNineteenth am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Hans-Ulrich wirtschaftliche Strukturwandels Deutschlands und Witsch, 1966); and Vereinswesen Wehler, Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und b?rgerliche Gesellscaft inDeutschland, (Mu special issue of Historische Zeitschrift, ed. Otto Dann nich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1984). 26 und Interventionsstaates in Hans-Ulrich "Der Aufstieg des Organisierten Wehler, Kapitalismus in Heinrich ed., Organisierter Kapitalismus: Deutschland," August Winkler, Voraussetzungen und An und Ruprecht, Vandenhoeck Mittelstand, 1974); Heinrich August Winkler, (G?ttingen: fange von Handwerk und Nationalsozialismus: Die politische Entwicklung und Kleinhandel in der Demokratie Weimarer und Witsch, 1972), 47ff.; Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bis Republik (Cologne: Kiepenheuer marcks: Parteien und Verb?nde in der Sp?tphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Volatility: The German Petite und Witsch, "Between Resignation 1970); David Blackbourn, in the Nineteenth eds., Shop Century," in Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Bourgeoisie in Nineteenth Century Europe (London: Methuen, 1984); and J?rgen Kocka, Facing keepers and Artisans Total War: German Society, 1914-1918 Press, 1984). (Cambridge: Harvard University

410

WORLD POLITICS
social or groups and since na to over activity

around discrete, organized particularistic structures were not strong tional political come social divisions. Under these

responsive enough associational conditions,

occurred largely within

each sector of society and helped lock in the

apace as the power bloc that had

of the Reich. fragmentation continued These developments a new tion

dominated the Reich since 1871 fell apart and German politics entered
had been able to hold together a majority coali phase. Bismarck and a protectionist the based on antisocialism serving logroll interests of "iron and rye." By the early 1890s, however, the Iron Chan within the cellor had been dismissed and mounting contradictions classes

dominant

versus free versus agriculture, (industry protectionists versus for the domestic market) threatened traders, exporters producers to the ruling coalition. The lower and middle classes, more rip apart in electoral participation over, were becoming increasingly mobilized:

creased from 50.7 percent of those eligible in 1871 to 77.2 percent in

1887,

percent from then until the outbreak of war in 1914.27This posed a

in general and to existing in political parties particular.28 in the years after had been the dominant force in Germany Liberals like those of other estab but their political unification, organizations, challenge political such as the National structures Liberals to traditional

and participation

in Reichstag

elections

averaged

more

than 75

lished groups, found it difficult to adapt to the changing environment inwhich they had to operate. Until the 1890s most parties (with the exception of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [the SPD] and to a lesser extent the Catholic Zentrum) were informal collections of notables {Honoratioren).These parties had little in the way of formal
at the grassroots level, and were really active organization, especially were not up to structures at election time; their institutional only simply in the hurly-burly that was now German the task of performing well of their potential conditions left many constituents, particu in rural areas and among sections of the middle class, searching for larly This their social and political other ways of expressing aspirations.
27 of North Carolina Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics inWilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill: University Press, 1985), esp. chap. 2. 28 section draws heavily on Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nation The following of Michigan alism and Political Change after Bismarck (Ann Arbor: University Press, 1994). See also Blackbourn and Eley (fn. 25), 144-55; and Koshar (fn. 23), esp. 46ff. 29 and the Liberals did make some attempts to respond to the challenges of popular mobilization See Eley (fn. 28), 2; and of workers by the SPD, but these proved unsuccessful. political organization Sheehan (fn. 21), pt. 6.

politics.29The failure of the National Liberals in particular to adjust to

the new

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

helped sprang By civic spur yet another burst of associational growth in Germany,

411 as

organizations designed to appeal to awide variety of disaffected groups

up across the country. the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, a distinct national or unable and trou

bling pattern had already begun to appear inGermany?the

associations and stitutions succor weak and during structures periods of strain. When

growth of
in political to address

their citizens'

either unwilling proved turned away from them and found needs, many Germans in the institutions of civil society instead. Because support

institutions reinforced social cleavages instead political to narrow of helping associational them, moreover, activity generally occurred within rather than across group lines. Under these circum national into the life served not to integrate citizens stances, associational polit as ical system, would but rather to divide neo-Tocquevilleans predict, exist them further or mobilize them outside?and often against?the

ing political regime.

the liberal parties stumbled, of their and many unorganized, adrift and in search of alternative affairs. As with nomic one observer As their natural natural constituencies found were themselves left activists

in public involved ways of becoming strata may has noted, "Members of the middle in a dense network of other institutions roles so popu in

have looked with disdain on parties and elections, but they participated through which they sought political influence, social identity and eco
advantage."30 and staffing forming The nationalist of these activists Many the nationalist associations as Geoff critical played that became extraordinary vigor

lar inGermany in the decades beforeWorld War

"symptoms

I.

ganizations within a spacewhich the difficulties and obsolescence of an

older mode a broad targeted politics had opened up."31 They new chan to society and attempted provide in public life. Many nels for participation of these groups were not di was not to however. Their primary goal rectly "political" organizations, swath of German of dominant-class

are best viewed as associations, Eley argues, or of change. They were formed as distinctive and agencies

Wilhelmine political system, and indeed, they often participate in the in direct repudiation of existing political institutions defined themselves
and structures, tions) devoted tinctive associa that they were Volksvereine arguing (people's to cross-class dis and national unity. Another solidarity to of these groups was that, in contrast characteristic old-style

^Sheehan?fn^l)^. 31Eley(fn.28),xix.

412 Honoratioren legitimacy

WORLD POLITICS
and parties, organizations they placed and center. The Navy front League the idea of popular and Pan-German

for example, broke new ground in terms of mass League, participation and activism. Both emphasized in discussion involvement membership and decision and both were more willing than the Honora making, to offer tioren organizations individuals the op "particularly deserving" portunity to rise to In many ways, the nationalist leadership positions. neo to the type of civil conform institutions organizations society up as exemplary: "horizontally" to and community, devoted stressing overcoming equality interests. ticularistic scholars hold Even were was though increasing numbers of Germans turned organized, narrow par

Tocquevillean

away from na

tional politics during the Wilhelmine

era, this hardly meant that they

becoming apolitical. increasingly mobilized to note the change, because the however, popular Protestant classes in particular were channeled middle side of national

in fact: the population the contrary, Quite active. Some observers and politically failed of the energies into arenas out

structures and Some took political organizations.32 an arena in which in local government, for example, liberals and refuge the middle felt they could play an important classes more generally role. A National Liberal and former mayor of Berlin parliamentarian

named Arthur Hobrecht

captured this feeling in his observation that

"the citizenship which is derived from common in the organs endeavors of local government becomes valuable for us the more the increasingly whole."33 Some interests contemporary fragments the discontented In general, middle though, to the of the German turned organizations population of these were drawn isting political parties; from traditional politics. The "various organizations strata of the Protestant middle therefore, belonged,
32 Workers

conflict

of material

society and rural of civil

as a strata

into political life and developed most however viewed themselves

society. ties with ex

to which helped

as a sanctuary members to deepen

were efficiendy SPD and the and Catholics, by contrast, organized through and by the contrast to the liberal parties, both the SPD and the Zentrum were able to Zentrum, respectively. In create their own affiliated associations in most areas of social life. One consequence of this, however, was the further fragmentation of German affiliated with these parties were society, as the associations so as to create "subcultures" that hived off their members from other groups. Referring encompassing to the SPD in particular, Dieter Groh has termed such behavior "negative integration"; see Groh, Neg und revolution?rer Attentismus (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1973). The litera ativeintegration ture on the socialist and Catholic is immense; good subcultures in Wilhelmine andWeimar Germany in Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London: Unwin places to begin are the bibliographies The Rise and Fall ofWeimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: University 1988); and Hans Mommsen, Hyman, of North Carolina Press, 1996). 33 Sheehan (fn. 21), 237.

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

tation On of liberalism's

413

the divisions within their ranks and furthered the debilitating fragmen
social base."34 War I, practically all Germans were discon the eve of World

tented with national political life. The then chancellor Bethmann Hollweg would laterwrite of this period:
While the storm-clouds

. . . on the inexplicable pressure weighed political life of Germany. and dejection imparted a depressing tone to political party activity, [M]alaise which lacked any progressive impulse. The word Reichsverdrossenheit [dissatis faction with the imperial state] rose up out of the darkness.35 most With the national government unresponsive to calls for economic and

gathered

ever more

heavily

on

the world

horizon,

an al

political change and traditional political parties unable to adjust to the

civil society offered an outlet for the demands and politics, restive German of an increasingly This growth of aspirations populace. a not in liberal values associations during these years did signal growth or democratic the structures; instead, it reflected and furthered political fragmentation tional political nous turn of German institutions. political life and the delegitimization relations thus took State-society era, with consequences of na an omi era of mass

during

the Wilhelmine

that would

Weimar Republic in later decades. plague the Civil Society in the Weimar Republic I opened

The democratization of Germany at the end ofWorld War

in the country's life. Hitherto associational up a new phase unrepre to form their own sented and unorganized groups began organizations, at prac and theWeimar feverish associational years witnessed activity tically every level. The number of local voluntary extremely high standards.36 National associations levels as measured associations grew by also the 1920s, throughout reaching both historical and comparative

34 vor und Parteien inDeutschland See also Thomas Nipperdey, "Interessenverb?nde Ibid., 237-38. in Wehler dem Ersten Weltkrieg," (fn. 25). 35 von Bethmann-Hollweg, zum Theobald Weltkrieg, vol. 1 (Berlin: R. Hubbing, Betrachtungen a Seizure of Power: The Experience Sheridan Allen, The Nazi of Single German Town, 1922-1945 (New York: 1984); Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobiliza tion inWeimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Koshar (fn. 23). For cross-na see Nancy Bermeo, "Getting tional comparisions of the impact of civil society activity on democracy, in Interwar Europe" (Paper Mad or Going Mad? Citizens, Scarcity, and the Breakdown of Democracy at the annual meeting of the APSA, San Francisco, and Phil Nord, 1996); Nancy Bermeo presented Princeton 1996); and Dietrich eds., "Civil Society before Democracy" University, (Manuscript, and Democ and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 113-14. racy (Chicago: University 1919-21). 36 William

414 grew

WORLD POLITICS

in reached organizations rapidly, and participation professional levels among the middle classes in particular.37 Yet, as in Wil very high not the the rise in associationism helmine Germany, signaled, spread of

liberal values or the development of healthy democratic political insti

had tutions, but rather the reverse. The parties of the bourgeois middle reconstituted themselves after the war and their commit proclaimed ment to

ciety. But these parties found it increasingly difficult to hold on to their

constituencies conflicts weakness many during of the bourgeois parties succor citizens looking for in the face of growing the 1920s. Once again and economic, political, this created a vicious political into civil and social circle. The structures drove

becoming

true

"people's

parties"

and reintegrating

German

so

and national support

zations, which were organized primarily across them. The of associational vigor undermine and delegitimize the republic's ground

along group life, in turn, political

society organi lines rather than to further The re

served structures.

sultwas a highly organized but vertically fragmented and discontented

society that proved to be fertile for the Nazi's rise and eventual classes that Machtergreifung. The German the "divisive"

revolution and

raised hope

among

the middle

era parties "unrepresentative" a the nation's would be replaced by single Volkspartei capable of unifying the menace of social democracy. and confronting patriotic bourgeoisie for such a course was strong, but institutional support jeal Popular its adoption. ousies and elite divisions Instead, Weimar's prevented of the Wilhelmine a conservative movement, strengthened early years saw, along with of two main Democratic formation liberal parties German (the the Party

[DDP] and the German People's Party [dvp]) and of several smaller re

as well as reconsolidation of the Catholic Zentrum. The gional parties, was thus perma of Germany's nonsocialist spectrum portion political parties, The which failure to themselves.38 began squabble among to form a movement of the bourgeois parties single classes for some form of antisocialist unity soon

nently divided among a large (and eventually increasing) number of

or and a

even to agree on important issues of the day did not dull the desire of
the German middle
37 andWhite Kocka (fh. 26); idem, "The First World War and the 'Mittelstand': German Artisans "German Inter Collar Workers," Journalof Contemporary History 8 (January 1973); Gerald Feldman, est Group Alliances in Suzanne Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in in War and Inflation, 1914-1923," Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics (New York: Cambridge Uni in Weimar Ger The Lower Middle Classes versity Press, 1981); Rudy Koshar, "Cult of Associations? and Meier, 1990); and Hagtvet (fn. many," in Rudy Koshar, ed., Splintered Classes (New York: Holmes 12). 38 Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and theDissolution of North Carolina Press, 1988). (Chapel Hill: University 1918-1933 of theWeimar Party System,

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

greater demand role more in the political, effective social, and economic

415

life of the republic.

Throughout
and refused

the 1920s "burghers from all social stations [continued] to

to abandon and a more direct political voice" representation the ideals of bourgeois unity and community.39 on a renewed sense social life took bourgeois vigor and

In this context, associations and "More voluntary attracted more members of urgency. did so in amore active fashion than ever before. Just as retailers, bakers, interest had organized into economic employees so also did gymnasts, and churchgoers folklorists, groups, gather singers into clubs, rally new members, schedule meetings, and plan a full as sortment of conferences and tournaments."40 and commercial in conjunction with, or at least parallel first, this activity occurred since the newly reconstituted traditional liberal par to, party politics, ties tried to improve their grassroots cultivate broader organization, At ties, and even achieve the decade, however, the attempt of the status of a "people's party." By the middle to the relationship between reshape

national political life and civil society had failed, with the Great Infla tion of 1922-23 being the turning point. Economic historians may dis
agree more over which socioeconomic groups suffered the most, but there is

little doubt that the middle classes suffered gready, even if the pain was
than material.41 This was followed by the crushing psychological of 1923-24, which hit white-collar workers and the mid stabilization particularly no hard. "By the end of the 1920s to possible distinguish as a criterion."42 made the economic it from po

dle classes extent

sition of the independent middle

that it was tariat on the basis The economic longer of income dislocations

class had deteriorated

to such an
the prole

cioeconomic

interests

and more

while making demands, both workers and big business, tionate fighting influence over for measures

all groups more jealous of their so in their political strident and narrow of resentful the middle classes increasingly who were seen as a having dispropor and political parties. By the day and better wages,

government such as the eight-hour

the national

39 classes and the revolution, see also Arthur Fritzsche (fn. 36), chap. 2, quote at 21. On the middle and Kocka (fn. 26). 1936); Winkler Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic (London: Methuen, 40 Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76. 41 treatment of almost all aspects of the Great Inflation and its aftermath The most comprehensive and Society in the German Inflation, is Gerald The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics Feldman, 1919-1924 Press, 1993). On the psychological (New York: Oxford University aspects in particular, see von Kr?dener, der deutschen Zur Sozialpsychologie "Die Entstehung des Inflationstraumas: J?rgen in Gerald Feldman et al., eds. Consequences of Inflation (Berlin: Colloquium, 1922-23," Hyperinflation " 42 and the Fragmentation 'The Dying Middle': Weimar Germany Larry Eugene Jones, geois Politics," Central European History 5 (1972), 25; see also Kocka (fn. 37).

1989).

of Bour

416 SPD was considered

WORLD POLITICS
to be serving the class interests classes of its core con

stituency above all else; the contrast between real (if limited) SPD suc
cess and the of the middle impotence political of antisocialist fervor.43 paroxysms Middle-class groups also became increasingly generated with further the un

frustrated

willingness or inability of liberal and conservative parties such as the DDP, DVT and DNVP (German National People's Party) to recognize
their needs and act as their came stage. These parties on the national representatives political to be seen as the tools of and big capitalists

financial interests, and the ideal of the people's party faded as the tradi tional parties of the middle and right seemed to be run by and for an
elite.44 Local-level and associational af organizations unrepresentative or break away. Not were to allowed filiations, furthermore, languish the vote share of the traditional bourgeois surprisingly, parties dropped managed forming to attract to capture and splinter parties only about 15 percent, alienated and fragmented their increasingly were con

precipitously throughout the 1920s. In 1924 the DVP and DDP together

stituency. By 1928?the high point of economic stabilization and sup Weimar Republic?the splinter parties posedly the "golden age" of the
were the traditional parties of the middle.45 outpolling tension and frustration As before, middle-class sparked activity. During into their clubs, community increasingly abandoning the 1920s middle-class in growth Germans threw a

associational themselves tions while

groups, and patriotic organiza the seemingly ineffectual liberal

parties. By the middle of the decade both the style and the substance of bourgeois social life inGermany had begun to change:
to preserve SPD itself did much its image as a worker's rather than a people's party. See 1918-1933 Books, 1964); Donna Hunt, German Social Democracy, (Chicago: Quadrangle of North Carolina Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Fascism (Chapel Hill: University oder Vblkspartei?" Geschichte und Press, 1993); Heinrich "Klassenbewegung August Winkler, eine vblkspartei "K?nnte die SPD der Weimarer Republik Gesellschaft, vol. 8, 1972; Hans Kremdahl, und Sozialdemokratie and Thomas Meyer, werden?" inHorst Heimann (Berlin: eds., Reformsozialismus 1982); and Sheri Berman, Ideas and Politics: Social Democracy in Interwar Europe Verlag J.H.W. Dietz, Press, forthcoming). (Cambridge: Harvard University 44 coalition of iron and rye, The 1920s even saw something of a resuscitation of the old Bismarckian which like its predecessor was able to secure awide range of subsidies and tariffs, the most infamous of in der Sp?tphase der which was the Osthilfe. See Dietmar Petzina, "Elemente derWirtschaftspolitik Vom Weltkrieg Weimarer Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 21 (1973); and Gerald Feldman, Republik, zur und Ruprecht, 1984). (G?ttingen: Vandenhoeck Weltwirtschaftskrise 45 and the Legiti Jones (fnn. 38, 42); idem, "In the Shadow of Stabilization: German Liberalism Richard Par "Interest and Ideology: Anti-System macy of theWeimar Party System," and Thomas Childers, der Inflation auf die ties in the Era of Stabilization," both in Gerald Feldman, ed., Die Nachwirkungen "The Decline of deutsche Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1985). See also Hans Mommsen, inMommsen, From in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth the B?rgertum Century Germany," Weimar toAuschwitz Press, 1991). (Princeton: Princeton University 43 The

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

un Spurred by growing political tensions, social organizations helped to lead an of apoliticism that escaped the control of bourgeois elites.... precedented surge [M]any spokesman forWeimar apoliticism argued that social organizations would do more than cushion political strife?they would bind together amoral
istic, middle antisocialist, and late "folk 1920s ... of classes community" disparate an acceleration thus saw not only and of strata. tensions . . . [T]he that had

417

originated in the Empire but also an unprecedented rupture between the social and the political authority of the local bourgeoisie.46 What occurred in Germany not was no less than an inversion in civil but of neo-Toc

theory; quevillean tions fail to contribute hostile proto towards political

only did participation to virtue, republican

society organiza it. it in fact subverted to be channeled organizations these into of the

"[A]s the middle class became more and more disenchanted with and
the republic, organizations their energies ceased and party political class deserted

center and right which the old elites had traditionally headed. Instead
the radicalized and their Private troops leaders."47 associations of the middle were organizations

seen to offer benefits that the tra correctly were as a sense of to such ditional failing bourgeois provide, parties the DDP, DVP and DNVP had trouble shak and unity. While community asHonoratioren and agri parties dominated by business ing their image cultural a associations elites, many private bourgeois together brought a sense of purpose that and created range of individuals relatively wide divisions. socioeconomic transcended For many provincial burghers, associational life facilitated social contacts and was lauded for friendships and muffled party differences. Repeatedly, the club As an officer of a bourgeois choir inHesse's Marburg reconciling burghers. commented, in "a time of both internal and external antagonisms, it is the Ger
man song that binds together and members of the folk..." In a similar fashion, the

summer festival of Celle's

unity between "burgher

riflery club offered the mayor a happy example of

civil servant."48

A erans

fine example organization

of these known

trends

can be found

in theWorld One of the

War largest

I vet and

as the Stahlhelm.

most politically powerful organizations during the 1920s, the Stahlhelm reached a peak membership of between five and six hundred
to the election role in Hindenburg's and played an important a It had support attracting relatively diverse membership, presidency. thousand
46 "German Interest Group Alliances Koshar (fn. 23), 166. See also Gerald Feldman, "Strukturen kapitalistischer in Berger (fn. 37); and Charles Maier, Inflation, 1914-1923," Winkler den zwanziger Jahren," in (fn. 26). 47 Dedev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic (New York: Hill andWang, 1989), 230. 48 Fritzsche (fn. 36), 76. in War Stabilit?t and in

418

WORLD POLITICS

from different socioeconomic groups, regions, and both the liberal and
conservative camps. In addition, contacts the organization with other clubs

level of membership participation, had a relatively democratic internal

structure, and maintained and associations. In

encouraged

high

the early years of the republic the Stahlhelm developed ties with par ties of the center-right and right, viewing such links as the best way to
of its nationalist, antisocialist agenda. By the mid was tra the organization disillusioned with 19205, however, becoming a nationalist to ditional and began and party politics emphasize to transfer their communitarianism. populist Many burghers began pri ensure the success

mary political loyalties to it from center-right and right political par

ties, helping nature The these parties' authority is captured well of the organization to eradicate at the grassroots level. a 1927 manifesto, by

which declared:
Stahlhelm does not want to form or become a new party. But it does want... for

itsmembers to acquire the possibility and the right of decisive participation in all positions of public service and popular representation, from the local com
munity to the national government.... Stahlhelm opposes all efforts and con

ceptions that seek to divide the German people. It esteems highly the experience of old comradeship at the front and unity and wants to develop out of it a na tional sense of unity. . . . [I]n full recognition of the value and the vital unity among enterprise, entrepreneur, and fellow workers, Stahlhelm will not hinder an honest and decisive settlement of conflicts of interest. It demands, however,
the maintenance community.49 and preservation of the transcending interest of the German

After 1928 the Stahlhelm began to lose membership and influence, in part because it allied itself more closely with the DNVP, but mostly
because icalism itwas unable to adjust to the increasing mobilization the late 1920s and rad sweeping Germany during tied to the memory remained organization in attracting those who came of and was not very successful generation amid the accelerating age later. It had trouble operating disintegration 1930s. The that was and early of the wartime

of traditional political structures and did not manage to cultivate ties to

49 the other goals of this neo-Tocquevillean paragon, it is interesting to note, were rearma Among of Lebensraum. the extirpation of degeneration and foreign influence, and the acquisition ment, first published in Stahlhelm und Staat (May 8,1927), "Berlin Stahlhelm Manifesto," reprinted inAnton Kaes, Martin eds., The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley: University Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, see Fritzsche of the Stahlhelm, of California (fn. 36), Press, 1994), 339-40. On the development 1918-1935 (D?sseldorf: Droste, chap. 9; Volker Berghahn, Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten, of Indiana 1966); and J.M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics inWeimar Germany (Bloomington: University Press, 1977).

COLLAPSEOF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

either the new bourgeois splinter parties or their constituencies.

419 Ironi

cally, therefore, while the Stahlhelm had played a crucial role in infus
ing nationalist weakening As the Great civil into the German populism political the traditional it was bourgeois parties, Depression society; spread throughout Europe, system and further and not the Nazis found

the Stahlhelm who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of these trends.

Germany

itself with weak political institutions and a fragmented but highly or

ganized prove ciety," would a skilled totalitarian anomie of a pure "mass so this, not the atomized to be the ideal to power of setting for the rapid rise movement.

The Rise of the nsdap During

funds

the 1920s the Nazi Party (the NSDAP)was stagnant?low

and unable

on

to fill halls or amass a significant share of the meeting so dire that the party to vote. By 1926 the situation had become began move toward a major shift in strategy. Where the NSDAP had previously on urban areas and it now re focused primarily voters, working-class its appeal toward the middle and farmers, oriented classes, nonvoters,

while proclaiming
country. percent, Weimar Thus, whereas

itself above the group divisions

1928 later elections they the Nazis The were the Nazis the four What years enabled

that plagued the

polled only 2.6 party in the

as late as the

spectacular the weak response depression, to it from mainstream charisma and political savvy?all parties, Hitler's a role. A these clearly played part of the answer, however, significant civil society. lies with German contemporary the 1920s As voters abandoned traditional bourgeois parties during inroads Republic.50 into the German electorate? then grappled opened up with in German the ravages a vac of the depression, political a a vacuum that offered the Nazis

largest to make such

and uum

politics, an to assemble To this coalition. unprecedented golden opportunity in Weimar's its increasingly the NSDAP exploited end, strong position

50 A good summary of the history of the Nazi party during this time is provided by Dietrich 1919-1933 Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, Orlow, The History (Pittsburgh, of theNazi Party, treatments of the formation of the Nazi constituency include Thomas 1969). Good English-language 1986); idem, "The Mid Childers, ed., The Formation of theNazi Constituency (London: Croom Helm, in Blackbourn and Evans (fn. 25); Peter Stachura, ed., The Nazi dle Classes and National Socialism," 1983); and Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The (London: George Allen and Unwin, Machtergreifung of North Carolina Press, 1983). Per Social Foundations ofFascism in Germany (Chapel Hill: University most up-to-date is J?rgen W. Falter, Hitlers W?hler (Munich: Verlag C.H. analysis in German haps the Beck,1991).

420
rich associational

WORLD POLITICS
life. The dense networks of civic engagement pro

vided the Nazis with cadres of activists who had the skills necessary to
and increase recruitment. Those networks spread the party's message also served as a fifth column, the NSDAP to infiltrate and mas allowing ter a sector of to seize significant bourgeois society before emerging structures. As one scholar notes: control of Germany's national political Path-breaking work in recent years on the rise of National Socialism has stressed
the importance of local newspapers, municipal notables, and voluntary associa

tions, and points to the buoyancy and vigor of civic traditions. Had bourgeois community life been overly disoriented and fragmented, the body of new evi
dence or plug indicates, into the the Nazis social would never necessary have been able to marshal success.51 the resources networks to their political

During tional party

the second

half Like

of the 1920s

the Nazis

concentrated Hitler

on at

who had become disillusioned with tradi tracting bourgeois "joiners"

politics. the neo-Tocquevilleans, recognized

that participation in associational life provided individualswith the kinds of leadership skills and social ties that could be very usefid in the political
the backbone of the Nazis' grass society activists formed machine. The party also skillfully exploited their or propaganda to contacts and social expertise ganizational gain insight into the fears roots to them? of particular and to tailor new appeals groups as "focus in other words, The activists, finally, pro using them, groups." In contrast with unparalleled local organizations. vided the movement to the other the Nazis were flexible able to develop parties, bourgeois that enabled and committed local party chapters full and accurate two between the national party and its frontline way communication troops. details the cru Recent research into local life in interwar Germany and needs arena.52 Civil

cial role played by bourgeois "joiners" in paving the way for the Nazi
for example, rise to power. Rudy Koshar's excellent study of Marburg, an were activist bunch. "Before shows that party members unusually

September 1930 there existed at least 46 Nazi party members with 73

were the period before 30 January 1933 overall, there students and 116 nonstudent party adherents with non to 375 cross-affiliations associations, sports clubs, occupational student fraternities electoral slates, civic associations, party municipal cross-affiliations. For at least 84 Nazi

51 Fritzsche (fn. 36), 13. 52 Rudy Koshar, "From Stammtisch in Fascism Weimar Germany? Journal "National Socialism: Hans Mommsen, Readers Guide (Berkeley: University of

to Party: Nazi Joiners and the Contradictions of Grass Roots Modern History 59 (March 1987), 2; idem (fn. 23), 185ff.; of in Walter and Change," Continuity Lacquer, ed., Fascism: A California Press, 1976); and Hagtvet (fn. 12).

COLLAPSEOF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

one Nazi in one out of every four groups Party member voluntary the city.53 The Nazi elite was even more well connected.54 in creating Koshar describes the key role of civil society activists

421

and other local voluntary groups." By January 1933 there was at least
in a

powerful and dynamic Nazi organization in Marburg. By the time of the Nazi breakthrough in the 1930 elections, the NSDAP had represen
move to range of civic associations working spread the out the vote, and discredit ment's message, get opponents. political be "The 1930-31 electoral victories were more than expected, lasting cause the NSDAP was control over a field of social organizations gaining tatives wider created chor match. than itself The that supporting a electoral powerfiil Nazis used bourgeois machine parties."55 The but also helped activists not the NSDAP only to an in a wide

in local communities their

events that would and political the NSDAP seem sympathetic and re ticular social rhythms, making contrast liberals and elitist and out-of-touch with sponsive by conservatives.
in conversations in part because attractive of its [T]he party was image positive in the local stores, university classrooms, houses, meeting fraternity marketplace, mass s soccer fields, could and homes. Hitler halls, mysterious seemingly appeal

in away no other bourgeois party could to local organization design propaganda mesh with and appeal toMarburg's par

hardly have been so extensive without

life... . Through the focus of infiltration,

the unplanned propaganda of daily social

gained moral authority over organiza

the NSDAP

tions inwhich
hub, had lacked.56

it also established amaterial base. Itwas becoming

legitimacy and material power, that bourgeois

the political

constituencies

The

associational did not merely exploit their cadres' preexisting a wide even activists into infiltrated bonds; range of deliberately they from in order to eliminate opponents bourgeois organizations potential Nazis positions of power within them.57 Without the opportunity to exploit

53 in inMarburg/Lahn, 1880-1933," Koshar, "Contentious Citadel: Bourgeois Crisis and Nazism See also Koshar (fn. 23); Hagtvet Childers (fn. 36); and idem, "The (fn. 12); Allen (fn. 50), 24,28-29. and the German of aTown," in John L. Snell, ed., The Nazi Revolution: Hitlers Dictatorship Nazification Nation 1973). (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 54 and several colleagues came In a study of right-wing extremists in the U.S., Raymond Wolfinger et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology," inDavid to a similar conclusion. SeeWolfinger E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964). 55 Koshar (fn. 23), 202. 56 Ibid., 204,202. 57 seeMommsen On the party's infiltration of a variety of bourgeois associations, (fn. 52);Winkler (fn. 26), 168ff.; Larry Eugene Jones, "Between the Fronts: The German National Union of Commer from 1928 to 1933," Journal of 'ModernHistory 48 (September cial Employees 1976); Koshar (fn. 37); in theWeimar Socialism and National and Peter D. Stachura, "German Youth, the Youth Movement in Stachura, ed., The Nazi Machtergreifung 1983). (London: George Allen and Unwin, Republic,"

422 Weimar's been able rich associational to capture

WORLD POLITICS
not have in short, the Nazis would network, so sectors of the German electorate important

quickly and efficiently. A brief profile of the Nazi methods

German ticipated associations, the peasantry republic peasantry. in a wide During the interwar

can be found in the case of the

years peasants

joined and par range of professional, special interest, and regional a trend carried over from theWilhelmine era. Early in the tended to vote liberal or conservative, but they

like other bourgeois groups soon began to desert traditional political

the second half of the 1920s most peasants either with parties. During arena or gave their one of drew from the national support to political new ex not the support the splinter parties; they did disproportionately treme man right.58 As agriculture areas more volatile. and other political the depression became more Large acute bore down, however, and the political used their a to secure large the crisis situation in Ger in rural

landowners

influence amount

on the DNVP of help (in

organizations

cluding the notorious Osthilfe), but the peasantry found itselfwithout a powerful political champion. Until late in the day the Nazis essentially ignored ruralGermany, and the vaguely socialist aspects of the Nazi program (such as land re
form and expropriation) tended to drive farmers away. But by the end in ways its competi of the 1920s the NSDAP, clever and opportunistic tors were not, noticed the political of the frustration and un potential across the rest In 1928, the party therefore, countryside. spreading its agricultural offensive refashioned many program, eliminating planks and focusing habitants.59 instead on the particular needs and demands of rural in

R.Walther Darre was the key figure inNazi agricultural policy, and
that the way to win the peasantry's sup by the end of 1930 he decided in rural areas was to capture ex and box out potential port opponents 1930 an instruction In November isting agricultural organizations.
58 rural districts In the 1928 elections, for example, the NSDAP share of the vote in the predominendy was below its national average. and Hesse-Darmstadt of East Prussia, Pomerania, East Hannover, in Horst Gies, "The NSDAP and Agrarian Organizations in the Final Phase of theWeimar Republic," and the Third Reich (New York: New Viewpoints, 1972), 75 fn. 2. See Henry A. Turner, ed., Nazism also Richard J. Evans andW. R. Lee, eds., The German Peasantry (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986); German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914-1924 of Robert G. Moeller, (Chapel Hill: University North Carolina Press, 1986); Shelley Baranowski, The Sanctity of Rural Life: Nobility, Protestantism, inWest Prussia (New York: Oxford University "The Po Press, 1995); andWerner Angress, no. 3 (1959). litical Role of the Peasantry," Review of Politics 21, 59 On Nazi agricultural policy during this period, see J. E. Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika: The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany, 1928-1945 (London: Sage, 1976). For a discussion of why other see Berman as the SPD (fn. 43). parties such passed up this opportunity, and Nazism

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

rat, or aA) to

423

sheet ordered the NSDAPs agricultural apparatus (agrarpolitische Appa

aA] penetrate into all rural affairs like a finely intertwined root system_[The should embed itself deeply in [all rural organizations] and seek to embrace every element of agrarian life so thoroughly that eventually nothing will be able to occur in the realm of agriculture everywhere in the Reich which we do not ob
serve village, and whose no basis we no do not understand. Let no there local be no farm, no estate, no cooperative, industry, agricultural organization no rural etc., association, equestrian our [representatives].60 of the RLB etc., where

[an agricultural we have not?at

organization], the least?placed

Darre

became

(RLB), a major player inGerman agrarian life that by the end of the 1920s had 5.6 million members. During the 1920s the RLBhad coop
erated with But a number the organiza disgusted to consider and began and inept leadership tion's political interests. During the for agricultural the NSDAP as a potential champion that the best way to gain control over latter part of 1930 Darre decided one after another from within."61 the RLB was by "conquering position eventually many vacillation grew with aA focused on first on placing then nized capturing leadership the value of gradualism in lower ranks of the RLB, supporters Like his f?hrer, Darre recog positions. that if the Nazis and legalism, reasoning of bourgeois RLB members parties including the DVP and DNVP.

particularly

interested

in capturing

the Reichslandbund

The

nibbled "away at [the RLB's] official apparatus, then, along with

mortar, After to the big stones will fall out on their own."62 successes in 1931, Darre in local elections the NSDAPs to the RLB Nazi harder for leadership. He appointments RLB endorsement Soon he succeeded elections. could play an important a Nazi in getting named

this

began recog role in one of

push nized that an official the 1932 Nazis.

the four presidents of the RLB, and in 1932 the RLBduly endorsed the
Darre continued non-Nazis his attack from

RLB increasingly into the Nazi fold, brandishing the NSDAPs image as
of Germany's the champion up new opening "neglected" groups while an obstacle to Nazism avenues for in "Instead of proving manipulation. the RLB and other agricultural the countryside, convenient belts for Nazi propaganda conveyor
60 in Gies (fn. 58), 51. Quoted 61 Ibid., 62. See also Zdenek Zofka, "Between Bauernbund in the Final Phase of theWeimar of the Peasantry Orientation 62 Ibid., 65.

remaining

on the RLB from within, This all influential positions.

eliminating the pushed

organizations reaching deep

became into the

and National Republic,"

Socialism: The Political in Childers (fn. 50).

424

WORLD POLITICS

rural population. In thisway the intermediate groups facilitated the rise

of Nazism."63

The Nazis had infiltrated and captured awide range of national and local associations by the early 1930s, finally bridging the gap between bourgeois civil society and party politics that had plagued Germany for
half had a century. From this base Hitler was long eluded German politicians?the machine and a true cross-class political and bourgeois competitors able to achieve creation coalition. With of two goals that an effective in Nazi it in found

these

hands

eliminated,

Hindenburg

creasingly difficult to ignoreHitler's demands for a change of course. By the end of 1932 Schleicher had lostHindenburg's confidence;64 two days
after Schleicher was forced to resign, Hitler was named chancellor.65

conclusions:

germany,

associationism,

and

Political
The civil German not conform

Development

society twentieth centuries, fertile

case reveals a distinct that does pattern of associationism to the theories. German of neo-Tocquevillean predictions was rich and extensive the nineteenth and early during and this nation This soil for a successful of joiners democratic does have accordingly it Instead, experiment. was not mean that civil society should

provided succumbed disconnected nected The tion

to totalitarianism. from German

in ways

vigor to the of national institutions vigor and responsiveness political to reduce social and structures. Instead of helping cleavages, Germany's institutions weak and poorly designed exacerbated them; in political

it was, rather, con political development; that the reigning neo-Tocquevillean theories ignore. civil society actually developed in inverse rela of German

stead of responding to the demands of an increasingly mobilized pop

the country's in public structures obstructed meaningful political and interests life. As a result, citizens' energies into private associational which were generally activities,

ulation,

participation were deflected

63 (fn. 12), 91. Hagtvet 64 At least partially because 75. 65

of the RLBs efforts, which

were

directed

by the Nazis; Hagtvet

(fn. 12),

In a tragic irony, Hindenburg's decision may well have allowed the Nazis to snatch victory from in the jaws of defeat. After the July 1932 elections the NSDAP began to run into trouble, as Hider's the Nazi coalition and ability to deliver on his promises caused dissent among different groups within the party's previously formidable organization had trouble maintaining necessary levels of enthusiasm and funding. A few months more out of power and the party might have begun to self-destruct. See 1933 (New York: Ad the new study by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.,Hitlers Thirty Days to Power:January "The Limits of National Socialist (fn. 50), 233ff.; and Childers, 1996); and also Orlow dison-Wesley, in Childers Mobilization," (fn. 50).

COLLAPSEOF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

425

organized within rather than across group boundaries. The vigor of civil
to draw then continued interest and involve society activities public ment further sapping their away from parties and politics, strength and

significance. Eventually the Nazis seized the opportunities afforded by

such a situation, offering a unifying appeal and bold solutions to a na and

tion in crisis. The NSDAP drew its critical cadres precisely from among
bourgeois its swift civil society Machtergreifung. and one activists with In short, few ties to mainstream one cannot understand

itwas from the base of bourgeois civil society that the party launched
the rise of

politics,

the Nazis without

society, without From two reference

an appreciation of the role played by German civil

the contours of that civil society understand to the weak political institutionalization. country's tenure onward German Bismarck's parties exhibited political weaknesses.66 narrow First, socioeconomic they tended to focus and particular large landowners, on

cannot

major

groups. Workers, relatively Catholics?all had political large industrialists, parties catering specif to them. Instead of the interests of different groups or ically reconciling a sense of national creating ened the divisions within overcome and uniting unity, therefore, parties reflected and deep was German able to society. Only Hitler a cross-class coalition finally creating political of Germans under a sin (or at least a plurality) bourgeois

this pattern, a majority umbrella. Second, Germany's gle political lar never adjusted fully to the era of mass

parties in particu Instead, they retained politics. an elite or to strong grassroots organizational style and failed develop and to cultivate ties to the associational lives of their strong ganizations constituencies.67 dle classes The result was even withdrew further that large sectors from national of the German mid In activity. political to aggravate the lack of po since unification. Germany structures was a organizations, reason key and interest

the party system served therefore, general, litical and social cohesion that had plagued The weakness of such national political that Germans threw themselves into clubs,

groups during periods of strain like the 1870s and 1920s. Because the
66 for the nature of the German indeed, have blamed Bismarck Many, party system. By allowing Bismarck ensured that political par universal suffrage but failing to provide responsible government, ties would be necessary but also somewhat impotent. Furthermore, crises by continually manufacturing as enemies of the Reich, Bismarck and identifying certain parties (i.e., the SPD and Zentrum) increased the difficulty that parties and their constituencies had inworking with each other. 67 core con to avoid such Both the SPD and the Catholic Zentrum managed problems with their sistencies. Each maintained close ties with an extremely wide range of ancilliary organizations, and the SPD in particular was a very effective mass party. Largely as a result of these parties' ability to inte (i.e., workers and Catholics) grate political and civil society life, their constituencies proved less likely to vote for the Nazis later on than were other groups. Because they contributed to the segmentation of German society during the 1920s, however, these parties can still be held at least indirectly responsible for the collapse of theWeimar Republic.

426 political tutions

WORLD POLITICS

social civil society insti however, system deepened cleavages, to members catered often of a particular socialists, group: and bourgeois Protestants each joined their own choral soci Catholics, eties and clubs. However arid bird-watching horizontally organized civic minded their these memberships of what formation "68 was cleaved into distinct subcultures publics.' Germany increasingly or communities, each of which had its own, separate associational life. Civil the country's alone, in short, could not overcome society activity or social divisions the political cohesion that would have been provide necessary to weather the crises which beset Germany beginning to hive may have been, they tended rest of to the off from the society and contribute one observer has called re "ferociously jealous 'small associations

in

1914. For this, strong and flexible political institutions, particularly po

litical parties, would have been necessary. On the eve of the Great Depression, Germany found itself in a pre

carious political situation?its

civil society was highly developed but

were and its mainstream segmented, bourgeois parties disintegrating. were in secondary citizens associations active frus Many politically trated and dissatisfied; when the depression added economic and polit ical chaos to the mix, the result was a golden for a new opportunity out to the force. The Nazis into the breach, political reaching stepped or civil society activists and using the country's disaffected bourgeois to make into various constituencies. infrastructure inroads ganizational the NSDAP to cre The dense network of German associations enabled in a remarkably short time a dynamic coalition unlike anything Germany it soon succumbed. which ate class The German case should make and cross political machine to had ever before seen?one

us neo skeptical of many aspects of In particular, German theory. Tocquevillean political development raises questions about what has by now become conventional practically a between wisdom, namely, that there is direct and positive relationship a rich associational certain circum life and stable democracy. Under stances, prospects thermore, skills, clearly the very for democratic many opposite is the case: can associationism and the stability of the consequences between actually be inversely related. Fur of associationism stressed by neo de mobilization, facilitating be turned to antidemocratic

Tocquevillean

scholars?providing
bonds to collective

individuals with political and social

creating creasing barriers

citizens, action?can

68 Fritzsche und Sozial (fn. 36), 232. On this point, see also M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem in Gerhard A. Ritter, ed., struktur: zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft," Deutsche Parteien vor 1918 (Cologne: Droste, 1983).

COLLAPSE OF THEWEIMAR REPUBLIC

ends as well as to democratic ones. Perhaps, therefore, associationism

427

should be considered a politically neutral multiplier?neither inher nor inherendy bad, but rather dependent for its effects on endy good
the wider The political context.69 have neo-Tocquevilleans in fact already been criticized for their

inability to predict whether

civil society activity will have negative or

for political for example, Some, consequences positive development. to task for have taken Putnam the long-term praising salutory effect of

civil society activity inNorthern

selfsame activity analysis presented when civil society ratic tendencies, tions of political are capable political beneficial If, on proved here seems

Italywhile
to indicate

ignoring the fact that this

with Fascism.70 What the is that if we want to know

to be consistent

on or even antidemoc activity will take oppositional we need to our in concrete examina ground analyses If a country's institutions and structures reality. political of channeling and redressing and the existing grievances enjoys public support of the and legitimacy, status then association is the pattern are weak to

regime effects

ismwill probably buttress political stability by placing its resources and

in the service quo. This and

Tocqueville described.
the contrary, then civil political society institutions structures an alternative undermine

and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be ineffectual and il

legitimate, needs. activity may become will pol po

itics, increasingly absorbing citizens' energies and satisfying their basic

In such situations, associationism probably

litical stability, by deepening cleavages, furthering dissatisfaction, and

providing movements. rich soil for oppositional civil soci Flourishing in these circumstances and party fail ety activity signals governmental ure and may bode ill for the regime's future. This twentieth other latter centuries, cases as well, in the late nineteenth fits Germany and early to many have seen, but it may be applicable of with The weakening provocative implications. a in Eastern Europe, for example, was hastened regimes by pattern as we are witnessing a remarkable growth in Islamist civil

communist rary Arab

rise in civil society activity there in the 1980s; parts of the contempo
world
69 Problem"); Diamond (fn. 7); Pinard (fn. 7); Skocpol (fn. 7, "The Tocqueville Foley and Edwards (fn. (fn. 19); Hagtvet (fn. 12), esp. 94; Koshar (fnn. 37,23); Winkler (fn. 26), esp. 196; and Fritzsche 36). 70 across See Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," American Political Science Review 90 (June 1996). In terestingly, Tarrow also criticizes Putnam for failing to recognize that much of the civil society activity to Tarrow, in other he finds was directly or indirectly created by Italian political parties. According words, civil society may not be an independent variable (as Putnam claims) but rather an intermediary variable, along the lines suggested by the analysis presented here.

428 society activity that feeds

WORLD POLITICS
on the the frustration with citizenry's region's and unresponsive In such authoritarian governments.

unrepresentative situations civil

not liberal democracy, promote society may necessarily as the would have it, but rather may simply corrode neo-Tocquevilleans an orga the foundations of the current political order while providing it can be challenged. nizational base from which From this perspective, the fact that a militant Islamist movement, classes, supporters religious services tells us little about what ever gain power; it tells us much of the nations one need not York Times with example, provides and medical associations, professional should the movement might happen more about the political to find failure for its

and

gloomy

prospects

report trict of Columbia, for example, that for many ofWashington's residents home rule "has come to mean a patronage-bloated, ineffective city pay roll offering phantom services." The weakness and failure ofWashing

Unfortunately, this pattern. The New

regime. existing look so far abroad noted in a recent

of examples on the Dis

a ton's local government and political system, in turn, has spurred both rise in associational of social consciousness and a fragmentation activity " and communal [is] growing stronger in the face identity. Volunteerism bedevil that of the dwindling and budget shortfalls services, mismanagement to one activist. the city," according neighborhood "Gradually," says another, "people come to feel they have to take care of themselves and not worry about the other guy."71 Another observer proclaims:

"Amid widespread disillusionment with government and its ability to

movement a formed social loosely pervasive problems, ... a return to civil has emerged society' drawing promoting a diverse group of political and ideologically leaders."72 When powerful in such a context, associationism activities flourish and communitarian solve the nation's most it would deep seem that about concern is cause, not for celebration, but rather for institutions. the failure of the community's political there

the true connec if neo-Tocquevilleans have misunderstood Finally, tions between civic and political advice the policy institutions, they to current offer should be called into question. Responding public dis in America, satisfaction with the state of democracy many have argued

that the remedy lies in fostering local associational life.This prescrip

tion may prove If a population
71 Ward

to be both misguided increasingly

organizer

perceives

and counterproductive, however. its government, and politicians,

Park Citizens Association Kathy Smith and Cleveland president Stephen A. Koczak, respectively, quoted in Francis X Clines, "Washington's Troubles Hit Island of Af fluence," New York 77m?, July 26,1996, p. A19. 72 a Return to 'Civil to New Solutions to "Promoting Society,' Diverse Group of Crusaders Looks Social Problems," Washington Post, December 15,1996.

3 block-watch

COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

parties interest fragment democracy to be inefficient into and unresponsive, associations may public diverting only exacerbate were

429

society, would

secondary and weaken be better

cohesion political served if its problems

energies and the problem, further. American addressed unless di the

recdy rather than indirecdy. Increased bird watching and league bowl
are to have ing, in other words, positive unlikely are also revitalized.73 nation's political institutions effects

73 On

this point,

see also Skocpol

(fn. 7,1996,1996).