Intod Vs Court of Appeals
Intod Vs Court of Appeals
Intod Vs Court of Appeals
COURT OF APPEALS 215 SCRA 52 (1992) Petitioner: Sulpicio Intod Respondent: Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippine Islands Ponente: J. Campos, Jr. FACTS: It was on one morning of February when the accused, Sulpicio Intod and his three other companions (Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig) went to Salvador Mandayas house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan, who in turn told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them. Dumalagan added that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men in doing so; otherwise, he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and his companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house. Thereafter, the petitioner fired the bedroom as directed. However, it turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired and no one was hit by the gunfire. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, convicted Intod guilty of attempted murder. The siad petitioner seeks for a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime based on Aticle 4, paragraph 2. It was on his contention that Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines argues that there was intent in committing the crime and the act itself is not impossible but, instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict the accused for attempted murder. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that the crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3). Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. ISSUE: Is the petitioner liable only for the commission of impossible crime? DECISION: Yes. According to Article 4, paragraph 2, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual. Thus, to be under in this clause and the intended act to be qualified as an impossible crime, the act by nature must either have legal impossibility or physical impossibility. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime while factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
Accordingly, the present case of Intod belongs to this category, where the petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The case actually presents a physical impossibility which renders the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. Thus, under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. Hence, SC granted the petition of the accused and modified the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals. Intod was charged guilty of an impossible crime under Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code with a penalty of six months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law.