Long On China, Short On The United States by Tim Swanson
Long On China, Short On The United States by Tim Swanson
Long On China, Short On The United States by Tim Swanson
The year is 1969. Chairman Mao is beginning to construct underground escape tunnels throughout
Beijing and anticipates a Soviet invasion and bombardment within days. The PRC has just detonated its
first hydrogen thermonuclear device in Lop Nur and the countryside is seething in a book-burning
cultural revolution. To many foreign observers, the end of China is imminent.
The year is 1979. Soft-spoken minister Deng is quickly drawing up agricultural-reform plans to prevent
widespread famine and to stymie civil unrest. Border skirmishes between the PLA and Vietnam turn
into a hot war involving tens of infantry divisions. Total foreign investment amounts to a mere
$800,000. To many foreign observers, the end of China is imminent.
The year is 1989. Perestroika-minded Gorbachev visits Beijing to repair diplomatic dialogue.
International media outlets cover the bilateral event while thousands of students simultaneously occupy
Tiananmen Square.[1] By the end of the summer, tanks roll through the city and multinational
businesses leave once again. To many foreign observers, the end of China is imminent.
The year is 1999. President Jiang continues reforms and privatizes thousands of state-owned enterprises
putting more than 4 million Chinese temporarily out of work.[2] Currency collapses sweep across East
Asia smothering South Korea and Thailand. Industry leaders such as Daewoo go bankrupt. The IMF
lends tens of billions of dollars to several emerging countries as their stock markets crash. During this
period, China's GDP drops more than 2.5% as exports slow. To many foreign observers, the end of
China is imminent.
The year is 2009. China's GDP growth slows to an unimaginable 5%. Exports to the developed world
nearly stop as demand shrivels into the single digits. Half of all toy-exporting factories have closed,
sending tens of thousands back to their family farms. [3] Many foreign owners have quietly left the
factories, leaving behind unpaid workers.[4] Mainland stock markets continue to dip as listed firms
repair balance sheets and account for losses from overseas investments. To many foreign observers, the
end of China is imminent.
Another decade, another purported crisis in the Middle Kingdom. The same exercise can also be done
in the reverse, starting with the fiery 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates involving the Taiwanese Strait
Crisis or the 1948–1949 civil war or even the Japanese invasion and occupation of the 1930s. Yet time
and again, China somehow manages to survive.
Over the course of more than 5,000 years, it has endured every imaginable crisis — both man-made
and natural — and will undoubtedly survive this latest man-made disaster.
However, once again, to many foreign observers, such as Time magazine, the end of China could be
imminent. And mainstream pundits such as Nouriel Roubini and überbear Marc Faber forecast a "hard
landing" for the world's most populous nation.[5]
Yet the truth of the matter is, no matter how hard or soft China's recession will be, the West and in
particular, the United States, will be hitting every limestone rock across Mount Everest's northeastern
face and then will continue tumbling across the Tibetan plateau. And if the next administration plays its
cards right, the United States could very well end up in the Challenger Deep instead of just the Turpan
Basin.
Saving Itself Out of a Recession
Arguably, the worst thing that could happen to China this time around is a growth recession similar to
Japan's in the 1990s.[6] No Zimbabwe. No Argentina. No Weimar. No Iceland. No United States. In
fact, commentators such as Joseph Salerno and Peter Schiff have noted that, despite its spendthrift
government and zero-interest rates, Japan managed to still grow and (relatively) thrive because of its
enormous domestic savings, current account surplus, and robust manufacturing capacity. [7]
Likewise, the average Chinese citizen not only has little debt but actually saves more than half of his
annual income.[8] Student loans, auto loans, and credit-card loans are as plentiful as purple pandas.
Very few municipal or provincial governments are running deficits. Oh, and home equity — what is
that?
Yet according to the NY Times, this fiscal responsibility is a bad thing and is the root cause of the
current crisis. The Asian people saved too much money, lent the United States and other Western
governments money at cheap rates, and therefore created an asset bubble.
This increasingly popular line of reasoning was reiterated in a recent episode of Dialogue on CCTV in
which two American professors, Michael Pettis of Peking University and John Attanasio of SMU,
noted that in 1998, Americans began spending and shopping like never before. Pettis suggested that
Americans were funded in part by Asian countries, which, having experienced a calamitous financial
crisis in 1997–98, sought to park their savings in safe havens (e.g., US Treasury bonds). As a result,
this immense savings distorted the marketplace and caused the ensuing bubble.[9]
Emerging on Top
As noted above, in the past year at least 67,000 factories across China have closed down and hundreds
of thousands of migrant workers have moved back to family farms. [17] While this phenomenon may
be painful in the short run, the Chinese are at least allowing bankruptcy to clear out ineffective business
models.[18]
In the United States, failure is no longer an option. In fact, more than $8.5 trillion dollars are being
used to prop up catatonic firms such as Citi, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG.
As a result, in the long run, China as a whole will be able to adapt to market conditions and prosper
because sick companies will have been expelled from the marketplace and capital will be reallocated to
the most efficient participants. Conversely, because the West has given up on bankruptcy and the
freedom to fail, they will continue to flounder as they prop up poorly managed firms.
Furthermore, the Chinese not only have relatively high household savings and relatively low corporate
debt ratios, but the government continues to privatize state-run firms and allow them to go bankrupt.
Thus the only unknown factor for the future is just how much damage the Fed will do to the US
currency, potentially driving away foreign holders of dollars.
If history is any guide, while China may be faced with uncertainty once again in 2019, it is backstopped
by a nearly $2 trillion foreign reserve and solid financial ground. The same cannot be said for the
United States. Perhaps foreign observers should take note.