T H E UNION OF G O D AND M A N IN JESUS CHRIST IN THE THOUGHT OF GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS

Kenneth Paul Wesche

Introduction To explain the union of the Divine and human natures in Christ, "the task confronting Gregory was to come to terms with the ques tion whose insolubility Apollinaris had sought to make clear to the Nicaeans: how could two teleia come together in a real unity?"1 Obviously, this is a problem of a different order from explaining the unity of essence and distinction of Persons in the Trinity. In the latter, one is dealing with Persons of the same essence, whereas in the former one is confronted with a Person of two different essences. The distinctions which the Cappadocians had worked out for Trini tarian theology between ousia and hypostasis could not be applied directly to Christology since the philosophical notion of hypostasis was strictly confined within the context of one ousia. The ontological distinctions in Stoic philosophy of undetermined matter [essence], determining quality [which, added to the essence, forms a nature, or species], and of particularizing characteristics [which, added to the species, forms the individual, or hypostasis]?
*. Holl, Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhltnis zu den Grossen Kappadoziern (Tbingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1904), p. 186. "Aber nunmehr lag Gregor die Aufgabe ob, sich mit der Frage abzufinden, deren Unlsbarkeit Apollinaris den Nicanern deutlich zu machen gesucht hatte: wie knnen zwei teleia zu einer wirklichen Einheit zusammengehen?" 2 For a discussion on the Cappadocian theology of the Trinity and its relation to the homoiousion party, cf. the excellent article by J. Lebon, "Le Sort du 'Consubstantier Nicen, II, Saint Basile et le 'ConsubstantieP Nicen," Revue d'Histoire Ecclsiastique 48 (1953): 632-82. 3 Cf. Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. I, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), trans. John Bowden, 2nd rev. ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975) p. 372f.

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while helpful in supplying a conceptual terminology for the distinction of Persons in the Trinity, would be of little help in explaining the duality of natures in the One Person Jesus Christ, since within this framework the notion of person is conceived within the notion of one nature. It is subordinate to nature in such a way that the con cept of nature governs the concept of person. The philosophical aspect of the Christological problem facing Christian thinkers in the latter quarter of the fourth century is not difficult to see. When applying the philosophical notions of hypostasis and ousia to the Trinity, the Son is one hypostasis, homoousios to the Father. That is to say, he is one Person "composed of" one essence which he shares in common with the other Persons of the Trinity. But Jesus Christ also appears to us as one Person in the form of man. So beneath his outer manifestation what is he essentially? If he is the Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, homoousios to the Father, then his nature is divine. So in what way is he human? In short, what is the relation of his one-ness to his nature as God and his appearance in the form of man? The manner in which Gregory Nazianzen addressed this problem of the union of the Divine and human natures in Jesus Christ and the theological insight which is evinced in his solution form the subject of this study. The significance of his solution is seen more clearly against the backdrop of the solutions represented by Apollinaris, Gregory's chief foe in the last years of his life, and the Antiochenes. I. The Solution of Apollinaris and the Antiochenes

Apollinaris was the only fourth century Christian thinker, other than Theodore of Mopsuestia, to take the Trinitarian usage of 4 hypostasis and apply it to Christology. Hypostasis, for Apollinaris, is closely synonymous to prosopon, and the latter is his preferred term when working with the doctrine of the Trinity. In his work the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity which Apollinaris seems to make is this: within the Divine Ousia each Person of the Trinity is distinguished in the Prosopon of its Nature.5 Ousia is the more abstract concept, nature
4 Marcel Richard, "L'Introduction du Mot 'Hypostase' dans la Thologie de l'Incarnation," Opera Minora II (Turnhout, Brepols: Leuven University Press, 1977) chptr. 42, p. 29 [25]. 5 Apollinaris, ; ed. Hans Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule (Tbingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1904). The relevant passages are 14-19, pp. 172f., and 25-27, pp. 176f.

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the more concrete which indicates the essence out of which each prosopon is particularized.6 Essence, then, possesses the individual prosopa so that while ousia may be possessed of numerous prosopa, one prosoponbecause its nature is derived from the common ousia may not be possessed by more than one ousia. Accordingly, if Christ is one, he is one physis, one hypostasis, one energeia, one prosopon.1 Because of Apollinaris' notion of the relationship between nature and personthe significance of which lies not so much in that they are improperly distinguished, but rather in that essence, or nature, possesses the individual personsto say that Christ is one Person is also to say that he is one nature. Person is the final ontological level at which nature is particularized. The result is the ontological sub ordination of person to nature so that person is strictly confined within the limits of nature. As in his philosophical treatment of the Trinity, so in his philosophical treatment of Christ, Apollinaris can only conceive prosopon to be composed of one ousia, one nature, precisely because prosopon is derived out of ousia. If Christ were two complete natures, he would be two prosopa, two hypostases, two persons. Apollinaris' Christological solution, then, is to understand the nature of Christ on two levels; what we might call the level of essence, and the level of form. It is only on the level of form that Christ can be called man insofar as his composition of Logos and flesh corresponds to the composition of man which is logos and 8 flesh. But, in fact, on neither level is the Person of Christ essentially
6 Apollinaris, ..., 27: ed. Lietzmann, p. 176, lines 19ff.: " , , , , , , v .'* 7 11., De Fide et Incarnatione 5: ed. Lietz., p. 199, lines 16-17. See Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 339, who says: "The only correct starting point (to explain the Apollinarian concepts) is the idea of vital unity which is achieved because the Logos is the determining principle of the whole of Christ's human nature, i.e., of his flesh and his lower soul." In my mind, the idea of vital unity in Apollinaris is of a piece with the ontological subordination of person to nature which, as far as I can tell, is an axiomatic assumption until the Cappadocians. 8 Apoll. Tomus Synodalis: ed. Lietz., p. 262, line 28p. 263, line 5: " ' . ."

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human. On both levels we encounter only one nature, and that is the Divine Nature.9 On the level of form the humanity of Christ is not a human nature of body and soul; it is only a mind-less flesh, the taking of which makes the Logos incarnate.10 That is to say, the second Prosopon of the Trinity, who in his nature is perfectly God,11 takes on himself not a human nature, but only the human character istics of flesh and irrational soul. This is the incarnation of the Logos: a new creation, a wondrous mix of God and flesh.12 One sees how Apollinaris' understanding of the relationship between nature and person, in which person represents the final stage of particularization deriving out of nature, precludes the possibility of ascribing to Christ two complete natures. It is conceptually im possible. Only because of the way Apollinaris conceives the relation of man's logos to the Divine Logos is he able in some way to describe Christ as man. Apollinaris' philosophical understanding of nature and person has affinity with that of the Antiochenes, even though the latter worked out a different solution.13 In the classical Antiochene Christology both the Divine and the human, which are both complete natures, possess by virtue of that completeness their own prosopon which come together to form the Prosopon of the Incarnate Christ: the will, rather than the flesh being the point of union. Again, for the Antiochenes, prosopon is the final ontological level derived out of nature. Two natures, each one particularized into its own prosopon, are juxtaposed within the broader Prosopon of the Incarnation
Apollinaris, in fact, does not want Christ to be man for a man cannot save: only God can. See Anacephalaeosis 2: ed. Lietz., p. 242, lines 27-29: " , ' fj . ' ." Later, in the same passage Apollinaris con cludes with a positive statement concerning Jesus' identity: *' ' , * ." 10 11. ... 28: ed. L., . 177; 4-9: " , , , , fjv ." "Ibid. 12 Apoll. f. 10: ed. L., p. 207: " ( ) ." 13 Marcel Richard, op. cit., chptr. 42 "Thodore de Mopsuestia," pp. 21 [17]-29 [25]. Theodore of Mopsuestia desired to affirm against Apollinaris the full integrity of the human nature but given his close proximity to Apollinaris, and given the superiority of Apollinaris* system, he found himself, along with others, attacking Apollinaris from his (Apollinaris') point of view and to a certain degree using his modes of expression (p. 26 [22]).
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which serves as the ontological framework for the union of the divine and human natures.14 In this case, however, we really do have not one person, but two. The Prosopon in which is conjoined the divine and human prosopa, itself is not a person: it is not personal with its own personal center. It is merely an impersonal ontological framework within which two personalized natures come into conjunction. A common concern to all parties was to preserve the impassibility of God. No one wanted to say or imply that the Divine Essence suffered. This concern to preserve the impassibility of God is illuminating when one reflects upon it within the context of the philosophical relationship of nature and person. When one person is understood within the context of essence, and more precisely of one essence, then the concept of person collapses into that of essence. If, then, the Divine Essence cannot suffer, neither can the Divine Person. Consequently, to account for Christ's suffering, and at the same time for his unity as God and man, one is led either to posit two independent prosopic natures conjoined in one [impersonal] Prosopon within which only the human prosopon suffers, or on the other hand, to posit one Divine Nature onto whose particular Prosopon is appended that part of the humanity which does suffer, viz., the flesh. Another conception is shared by these two different schools which is even more basic than the conceptual subordination of person to nature and which goes to the heart of what divides the Cappadocians, Cyril of Alexandria, Justinian, and Byzantine Tradition from the Antiochenes and the Monophysites. That is the relationship of God and man, and to be more precise, the meaning of communion and theosis. For both Apollinaris and the Antiochenes the separation of God and man is maintained. There is no communion between man and God at the deepest level of man's being. In Apollinaris the point of union is the flesh which is deified through its union with the Divine Logos: but the human mind plays no part at all in the Incarnation so that finally, there is no contact between the human nature and the Divine. For Antiochene Christology the two acting subjects in Christ, the human and the Divine, again are kept apart by means
14 Ibid., p. 25 [21]. Because of the close identity of nature, person, and hypostasis in the Apollinarian system, when Theodore seeks to use these same modes of expression to affirm the full humanity of Christ, he has no other choice than to maintain two hypostases. "Ainsi donc Phypostase irait tantt avec la nature, tantt avec la personne. Le Christ aurait deux hypostases si Ton considre ses natures Tune aprs l'autre; il n'en aurait plus qu'une seule si l'on considre l'union. Voil qui parat bien subtil!"

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of the prosopic union: the point of union is the will which itself is not nature, but the manifestation of nature. For Gregory of Nazianzus, on the other hand, the point of union is the mind, that which in the thought of the Cappadocians is the most essential part of man.15 Clearly, we are in the presence of a completely different con ception of the relation between nature and person. This conception leads to a correspondingly different understanding of the manner of union in Christ and goes to the heart of Gregory's theological affirma tion ocncerning the relationship of God and man. Our aim now is to cover the substance of that affirmation. II. The Solution of Gregory of Nazianzus

Given the philosophical subordination of person to nature, when the term hypostasis was applied to Christology it was most difficult to explain satisfactorily the union of the two natures without imply ing also two persons on the one hand, or denying one of the natures on the other. The solution of Apollinaris, in fact, was actually the most satisfactory from a philosophical point of view. He was able to account for the Divinity of Jesus and his appearance as a man very neatly without falling into the difficulty of implying two persons in Christ. The issue arose, however, when one turned to the soterio logical aspect of the Incarnation. Yet even here Apollinaris had a very strong doctrine of salvation. If the flesh was that which caused man to sinimplying by this, of course, that the mind in itself is unaffected by the Fall and is imprisoned in the corruptible fleshthen salvation must consist in the deification of the flesh, which only the Logos can do, so that it no longer serves as an obstruction to the mind's ascent to God. One cannot say, then, that Apollinaris' system was soteriologically inadequate, given his premises.16 The
15 Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101 Ad Cledonium Presbyterum Contra Apollinarium. Migne, PG 37, col. 184. "'* , , , . ; yp , ' , , .** 1 understanding of Apollinaris' soteriology is predicated on how one understands his view concerning the nature of the human soul. R.A. Norris, in Manhood and Christ: A Study in the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Oxford: 1963), pp. 116ff., argues that Apollinaris, borrowing from NeoPlatonic psychology, viewed the soul as inherently divine. Consequently, the fall according to Apollinaris is the result of the soul's inability to control the passions of the flesh. It is the flesh, then, which must be sanctified. Ekkehard Mhlenberg {Apollinaris von Laodicea, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969, p.

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issue, then, cannot have been that Apollinarianism was so strictly philosophical that it ignored soteriology. Rather, the issue was over the premises which formed the foundation of that system. More than one author notes that Gregory's theologizing was an expression of his profound spirituality.17 Gregory's spirituality may help to explain his reaction to Apollinaris. Some have suggested that the Cappadocian doctrine of sin fails because of its inability to break out of its dependence on the categories of Platonic dualism.18 Sin is explained in such a context as the result of bodily passion, or of ignorance. There is no trace of that "inwardness through which Augustine became aware of the nature and meaning of sin as a deliberate choice of the lesser good and thus a deliberate rebellion against God."19 But Gregory Nazianzen is keenly sensitive to the spiritual dimension of sin: to him, sin is the result of the choice which the most human part of man made, viz., the mind.20 Salvation is not simply revelatory, to correct an essential ignorance, but it is a cleansing which must touch every aspect of human nature, especially the mind: "They who take away the humanity and the interior image cleanse by their invented mask only our outside."21 At stake for Gregory is a proper understanding of man's nature
199) traces the influence of Athanasius on Apollinaris and argues that the soul is not inherently divine, but becomes divine through the knowledge of the Good. The goal of the Incarnation, then, is, for Apollinaris, to impart the knowledge of God as the true Good. Brooks Otis, in his excellent paper, "Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 (1958), pp. 95-124) outlines the major lines of development in the two traditions stemming from Irenaeus and Origin, and traces their final point of divergence in the conflict between Apollinaris and the Cappadocians. The task which the Cappadocians and Apollinaris undertake, and the conflict stemming from that, consists in the effort to incorporate the doctrine of the common ousia in the Trinity into their anthropology and Christology. It was the Cappadocians who successfully achieved a synthesis of the two traditions. 17 See Emile Mersch, S.J., The Whole Christ, trans. J.R. Kelly (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1938) pp. 303-14: K. Holl, op. cit., pp. 178-83: A. Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 370. 18 Brooks Otis, art. cit.: On Gregory's doctrine of sin see also J.M. Szymuslak, S.J., "Grgoire de Nazianze et le Pch," Studia Patristica 9 (1966) 288-305; and Donald Winslow, "Orthodox Baptism- Problem for Gregory of Nazianzus," Studia Patristica 14 (1976) 371-74. 19 Brooks Otis, art. cit., p. 123. 20 Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101 Ad Cledonium, PG 37, col. 188: "Et iva , . . . , ', . . , yp , ." 2iGreg. Naz., Ep. 102 Ad Cledonium, PG 37, col. 197.

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and destiny, indeed one's very salvation: "If anyone has hoped in a mindless man, truly he is mindless, and is not worthy to be saved."22 Communion with God is the heart of Gregory's theological intuition and this concern unites into a coherent framework those various statements of Gregory's which some have suggested indicate an ambiguity, if not contradiction, in his Christology.23 Gregory's fundamental premises concerning the relation of God and man are seen more clearly when compared to Apollinaris. K. Holl notes, "It was not his opposition to Apollinaris but his agreement with him that gave Gregory's Christological formulae their characteristic stamp."24 The agreement is in the need which Apollinaris and Gregory both share for a suffering God and for a living unity in the historical Christ.25 Yet when one goes beyond this agreement one finds some very basic differences. Most basically, the differences concern the conception of man. For Apollinaris, the soul is other than the body.26 The mind is accordingly the ruling principle, the body is the Organon.21 This means that in the Incarnation of the Logos, there cannot be a human ruling principle for then there would be two life-giving principles, which would be absurd, and moreover, there would be a loss of freedom to the human nature.28
22Greg. Naz., Ep. 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 181. See Donald Winslow, "Christology and Exegesis in the Cappadocians," Church History 40 (1971) 390-91. After giving several apparently contradic tory Christological statements by Gregory, Dr. Winslow concludes, "What we have seen thus far, therefore, is an inconsistency (if not patent contradiction) between Gregory's assertion of the unity of Christ, on the speculative level, and his demand, on the exegetical level, for at least a functional, if not wholly personal, distinction between the two natures." See also A. Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 369: "Granted that the Cappadocians' deliberations mark one phase in the history of the definition of nature and person, in effect, they still remain in the realm of material categories as a result of their philosophical starting point. The Cappadocians have seen something, but neither their path nor their goal is stated clearly." 24K. Holl, op. cit., p. 185. 25Ibid., p. 186. 26Apollinaris, De Unione 5: ed. Lietz., p. 187, lines 5-14. 28Apoll., fr. 107: ed. L., p. 232, lines 16-21: " y p v , . , * ." See also fr. 87: ed. L., p. 226: " E t , , , 23

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The contrast in Gregory, on the other hand, is not set up be tween soul and body but between God and man.29 In the Incarnation, God is other than man so that the ruling principle is God, while that which is ruled is man as a whole nature. The soteriological implications already are apparent. For Apollin aris the human mind is not in need of salvation: rather, it needs to be liberated from the flesh. For Gregory, precisely the mind is in need of salvation for the mind is what fell.30 Apollinaris' system leads to the consequence wherein the flesh led Adam to sin, thereby setting up a rigid dichotomy between soul and body. But for Gregory, the human nous, which is man himself and the mediator between God and man, sinned. Because man him self sinned the whole man must be assumed to be saved. For Gregory, the contrast between body and soul is not that the flesh is inherently the cause of evil, but rather that the body is corporeal, while the mind is incorporeal. One sees the relation of body and soul most clearly in Gregory of Nyssa. For Nyssa, the flesh is not other than man: it is the corporeal part of his being such that even in his bodily form man reflects his creation in the image of God.31 True, for Nyssa as for Nazianzus, the mind is that which is most like the Divine. But this does not mean that the mind is other than the body as virtue is other than vice. The Logos could become man, body and soul, because the contrast between God and man is that of a Good Uncreated to the Good created: it is not of one who is essentially virtuous to one 32 who is essentially evil. In such a conception, the whole focus shifts dramatically with regard to the relationship of God and man and the meaning of com munion. It shifts from conceiving man as a soul in a body, to con ceiving him as an essentially spiritual being who exists in a fleshly way. But if man is essentially a spiritual being, the spiritual being of man must be assumed if he is to be essentially saved. So the Logos
* . " 29 Gregory accepts Apollinaris' distinction of soul and body, but turns it to illustrate his own position on the relationship between God and man. See Ep. 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 180: " , ." See also col. 185 (endnote 54) in which God rules the whole man in the same way that the mind rules the body. 30Greg. Naz., Ep. 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 188: " ( ), ." 31 Gregory of Nyssa, De Opificio Hominis 8, PG 44, col. 144. 32 Greg. Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica IX, PG 45, cols. 40-41.

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must become man both in mind and in body. If, as in Apollinaris, he assumes only a human flesh, then in fact he has not become man at all, and not only is the flesh of man not saved, but man himself is not saved.33 For the Cappadocians, man is in relationship with God as a spiritual being, and the point where God and man meet is in the deepest dimension of man's being. In that man's nature is most like God in its incorporeal, spiritual dimension, that is to say, in his mind, the point of union is precisely here where the "natures so separate were knit together by the affinity of each to the element which mediated between them."34 Whatever changes one may find in Gregory's Christology as it developed through contact with the Arians and the Apollinarians, at least one concept remains constant throughout, and that is that the mind is the point of union between God and man. The reference just given, in fact, is dated well before the fight with Apollinaris when Gregory was exercised to account for the union of the divine and human in Christ, during the period when he found it necessary to affirm the duality of Christ in order to account for his passion.35 It is significant, then, that even though Gregory places the union in the most essential part of man, he is still able to describe, even in this period, the humanity of Christ as though a complete being outside of the Logos.36 It is all the more significant that, at the same time Gregory speaks of the humanity of Christ as though outside of the Logos, he is still able to speak of the coming together of the two natures in terms of mixis, a term describing a mixture in which the weaker is changed into the stronger, or where each of the elements
^Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101 Ad Cled., PG 97, col. 177: "* . ." Gregory argues that if, in fact, God can save apart from the mind, he can save apart from the flesh as well, thereby rendering the Incarnation pointless: "Et , , , , , . . . . " , ' ." . 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 188. ^Greg. Naz. In Defence of His Flight to Pontus, NPNF vol. Vili, p. 210. 35 0 n the historical circumstances prompting Gregory's polemic see Don ald Winslow, "Christology and Exegesis," CH 40 (1971) 389-96. 36 Indeed, the point of the Apollinarian conflict later is that even within a union ' , i.e., in the mind, the humanity is still complete, and its freedom is not destroyed. See below.

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so permeates the other as to become a genuinely united composite.37 Using this constant, that the mind is the point of union, as the starting point for further reflection, and in the light of Gregory's apparent ease in treating the humanity as though outside the Logos, we may ask, how are we to understand Gregory when he makes the union as intimate as possible and at the daeepest level of man's being? What does he mean to affirm, for example, when he says, "If anyone says that Christ has been energized by grace as in a prophet, but was not and is not united essentially [ ' ] let him be anathema"?38 Or when he says, "The names are mixed [] as the natures, and they flow into one another [] by the law of their intimate union []?" 39 In contrast to Apollinaris and the Antiochenes, the union of God and man in Christ ' is simply for Gregory an affirmation that when man himself comes in contact with God him self his nature is not destroyed: rather, it is truly made human. In other words, man does not cease to be man, but in fact becomes truly man only in communion with God. In the Incarnation, God can indeed assume a full human nature, including the human nous, without there having to be some kind of barrier erected between the two natures in order to protect the integrity of the humanity. The relationship of God and man means that at the deepest ontological level there can be full communion between God and man. It is true, the result of this Divine-human contact is a transformation, but not of the Godhead: it transforms the humanity. Yet the transformation is not away from man's essence, but rather it is precisely the fulfill ment of his natural destiny, viz., to be filled with the Glory of God, for man is, after all, of divine origin, having been created by God for communion with God himself. Having said that there can be a true union of God and man at the deepest ontological level, we return once more to the problem with which we began, the relationship of nature and person. We now want to look at the manner in which Gregory of Nazianzus under stood these concepts and how he applied them to Christology. We will find that we are once again taken into the heart of his theological insight concerning the relationship of God and man and his funda mental affirmation on man's true nature and destiny.
See H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), vol. I, Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, pp. 397 and 420-24. ^Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101 Ad Cledonium, PG 37, col. 180. S9Ep. 101, PG 37 col. 181.
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It is interesting that even in the controversy with Apollinaris Gregory did not take occasion to apply hypostasis to Christology. Perhaps Gregory did not use hypostasis because of the way it was used by Apollinaris. Perhaps in his mind the term was still too closely tied with the notion of one ousia for him to make the shift from speaking of three hypostases of one ousia, to one hypostasis of two ousiai. Nonetheless, if we examine his doctrine of the Trinity and the manner in which he applied his terms, we find again that when one goes beyond philosophical expression, the differences between Gregory and Apollinaris are significant, and the impact of these differences carry over into Christology. Whereas the concept of person seems to be subordinate to that of nature in Apollinaris and the Antiochenes, in Gregory the Persons are not contained by the essence, but the essence is possessed by the Persons.40 The Trinity itself, not the ousia set over against the Persons, as it were, is the source of the unity.41 The critical point, then, is not so much the terms, but the way in which they are applied.42 For Apollinaris and the Antiochenes essence is the first ontological level which is particularized by the prosopa or hypostases. But now in Nazianzus the first ontological level is the hypostasis. His concept of nature and person is very much in accord with the philosophical distinctions made in the sixth century in which, "The hypostasis is not the product of nature: it is that in which nature exists, the very principle of its existence."43 Thus Gregory is able to affirm both the essential union of Christ and also the full integrity of the two natures not only on the basis of his concept of person and nature, but also because of his theo^Oration 31.14, Sources Chrtiennes 250 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), p. 304: " . . . ." 41 See the Introduction by M. Jourjon in Sources Chrtiennes 250, p. 63f.: "Proccup de maintenir la parfaite galit des hypostases, Grgorie, s'il ne nie pas Tordre des personnes, tant s'en faut, redoute quelque peu l'insistance sur la primaut du Pre. Il sait parfaitement que l'inengendr est seul sans principe et qu'il est principe du Fils et de l'Esprit. Mais la cause premire c'est la divinit tout entire." 42 Compare, for example, similar language in Apollinaris, , 14: ed. L., . 172, lines 3-4: " ." From the context it seems clear that Apollinaris is not thinking along the same lines as Nazianzus, but is simply stressing that each prosopon of the Trinity, by virtue of His nature which is grounded in the common ousia is in Himself Divine. Apollinaris, in fact, goes on to say in the same pasage: " y p , ." Ibid., lines 10-11. 43 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975), p. 77.

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logical insight into the relationship of God and man in which man becomes truly man only in communion with God. When nature is possessed by person such that person is the ontological foundation for existence, the way is open to describe the union of God and man in Christ as Gregory does: . . . ," 4 4 not two persons, but two natures. The Person of the Logos, then, not an impersonal Prosopon, is the receptacle for the union of the two natures. If Cyril of Alexandria's key-word to describe the union will be hypostasis, Gregory's is heautos. "In himself he represented us and we were taken up and saved by the sufferings of him who is impassible."45 "He bore in himself the whole of me that he might consume in him self my inferiority."46 The union of God and man in Christ is at the deepest level of human nature, "The Nous is mixed with nous being nearer and more closely related, and through this it is mixed with flesh, the mind being the mediator of Divinity and carnality."47 Man himself is mixed with God himself in an intimate communion: For both of the [natures] are one in the mixture48 . . . and I partake of him through the mixture49 . . . and the whole [of Adam] is united to the whole of Him who was begotten and is wholly saved50 . . . for whatever is not assumed is not saved, but whatever is united to God is saved.51
^Gregory of Naz., Ep. 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 180. ^Oration 30.5, SC 250, p. 234, lines 26-29: " . . . ." (Eng. trans.: Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. E. R. Hardy, Philadelpia: Westminster Press, 1st pubi. 1954, p. 180.) ^Oration 30.6: SC 250, p. 236, lines 9-10: " , * " (Hardy, . 178). 47 . 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 188: " , , " (Hardy, . 220). 48 . 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 180: " ." 4 9 Or. 30.6. SC 250, p. 236, lines 11-12: " ." 50. 101 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 184: " E i ', . , , " (Hardy, . 218). 51 . 101, Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 181: "T , * , " (Hardy, . 218).

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The destiny of man and the content of salvation is to be taken up into the Godhead, to be deified: His lower [nature], the humanity, became God because it was united to God, and became one because the higher nature prevailed in order that I, too, might be made God so far as he is made man52 . . . What greater destiny can befall man's humanity than that he should be intermingled with God, and by this intermingling should be deified?53 The prevailing of the higher nature means the affirmation, not the destruction, of humanity. Man's freedom, and the integrity of his human nature, is affirmed only in dependence on God and this is due to the very nature of man's being: "Our mind is perfect and commanding, but only with regard to soul and body, but it is not absolutely perfect; it is a servant and a subject of God. It is not a fellow ruler, nor is it held in equal honor."54 What is man but a servant and subject of God? Accordingly, union with God at the deepest level of man's being does not result in the loss of human freedom, nor does it destroy the integrity of human nature, but rather it fulfills precisely what man is, viz., a servant of God. It is an error, then, to think as did Apollinaris and the Antiochenes, that the union of man himself with God himself destroys, or at least seriously endangers, the full integrity of human nature and freedom when intimate communion with God is precisely what man was made for. Only in full communion with God is man's true nature and destiny fulfilled. Man's destiny, then, is as glorious as God himself. The trans formation of human nature is described by Gregory in dramatic terms: "A small light, being joined to a great fire, is neither des troyed, nor seen, nor extinguished, but the whole is the fire, the greater prevailing over the lesser."55 "To prevail" clearly means the transformation of the lesser into the glory of the Greater in which glorification there is a true union and a glorious affirmation of human nature; the whole is one, and yet at the same time the Greater and
52 0 r . 29.19: SC 250, p. 218, lines 7-10: " , , , , , " (Hardy, . 173). w o . 30.3: SC 250, . 230, lines 6-7: " , " (Hardy, . 178). 54. 101, Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 185; Hardy, p. 220. ssibid.

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the lesser remain what they are. The transformation of the lesser is not into another nature, but the glorification of its own into the glory of the Greater, this being the true destiny of man.56 When man, in his personal freedom, chooses to follow Christ, his nature is saved from the curse of sin, mortality, through the waters of Holy Baptism.57 His nature united to the Godhead, man is now called to realize in his personal freedom (his gnomic will, in the terms of Maximus the Confessor) who he is, viz., a creature created in the Image of God: They who have purified their mind by the imitation of his mind which the Savior took of us, and, as far as may be, have attained conformity with it, are said to have the mind of Christ: just as they might be testified to have the flesh of Christ who have trained their flesh, and in this respect have become of the same body and partakers of Christ.58 Conclusion: Even though he lacks precise philosophical terms when seeking to describe the union of God and man in Christ Jesus, Gregory
The statement, "The insistence that the Person of the Saviour, who mediates that salvation, must himself be fully divine . . . seems to arise out of a particular notion of salvation as the impartation of the divine nature," (M.F. Wiles, "Soteriological Arguments in the Fathers," Studia Patristica 9 [1966], p. 322) represents, certainly in the case of Gregory of Nazianzus as indeed also the whole Byzantine Tradition, a fundamental misconception of the notion of salvation. While there is certainly communion of natures, there is not an impartation of divine nature, though there is an impartation of divine life (see John Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas, trans. George Lawrence, 2nd ed. Great Britain: The Faith Press, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974, pp. 182-84). Nor can one accept the idea that, "The centrality of the Trinitarian and Christological debates in the life of the early Church and the passion which they aroused were due to the logically necessary link that the fathers believed to exist between beliefs on these matters and sotriology," (Ibid., p. 324). Just as Gregory's theological affirmations are an expression of an experiential spirituality, so the teaching of Christ was not in the Church Fathers a teaching based on what must be the link between Christ's Person and the content of salvation, but rather it was based on the lived experience of the Church, an experience which was centered in the Divine Life of God in Jesus Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit. 57 Donald Winslow, "Orthodox BaptismA Problem for Gregory of Nazianzus," SP 14 (1976), p. 371. ssGreg. Naz., Ep. 102 Ad Cled., PG 37, col. 198; Hardy, p. 226.
56

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nonetheless evinces a clear theological understanding of the true nature and destiny of man that is firmly anchored in the heart of Tradition. It is informed and guided by the Life of the Church as expressed in her Rule of Faith and experienced in her liturgical life. Subsequent Tradition made advances in terminology, but in so doing only clarified what Gregory had already said. In this, Gregory is a witness, even before Chalcedon, of the Byzantine synthesis and of the same theological insight which guided the Church in the formulation of the Chalcedonian definition concerning the Tradition's dogma of the Person of Jesus Christ.

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