Evolution of Air Power History
Evolution of Air Power History
Evolution of Air Power History
by
Edited by
Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF
1997
Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
The paths of heaven : the evolution of airpower theory / by the School of Advanced
Airpower Studies ; edited by Phillip S. Meilinger.
p. cm.
Includes index.
1. Air power. 2. Air warfareHistory. I. Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948 . II. Air
University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. School of Advanced Airpower
Studies.
UG630.P29 1997
358.4dc21 9724531
CIP
ISBN 1-58566-027-2
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,
the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:
distribution unlimited.
ii
Contents
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
iii
Chapter Page
CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
iv
Illustrations
Figure Page
Table
v
Foreword
For the past half century, the United States Air Force has
been responsible for controlling and exploiting the air and
space environment to meet the needs of the nation. We are
Americas Air Forcethe only service that provides airpower
and space power across the spectrum, from science and
technology, research and development, testing and evaluation,
to fielding and sustaining forces.
Although the men and women of the Air Force have
recorded some outstanding accomplishments over the past 50
years, on the whole, our service has remained more concerned
with operations than theory. This focus has produced many
notable achievements, but it is equally important for airmen to
understand the theory of airpower. Historian I. B. Holley has
convincingly demonstrated the link between ideas and
weapons, and in the conclusion to this book, he cautions that
a service that does not develop rigorous thinkers among its
leaders and decision makers is inviting friction, folly, and
failure.
In that light, The Paths of Heaven i s a v a l u a b l e m e a n s o f
increasing our expertise in the employment of airpower. It
offers an outstanding overview of airpower theories since the
dawn of flight and will no doubt serve as the basic text on this
vital subject for some time to come. The contributors, all from
the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) at Maxwell
AFB, Alabama, are the most qualified experts in the world to
tackle this subject. As the home of the only graduate-level
program devoted to airpower and as the successor to the Air
Corps Tactical School, SAAS boasts students and faculty who
are helping build the airpower theories of the future.
In explaining how we can employ air and space forces to
fulfill national objectives, this book enriches the Air Force and
the nation. Airpower may not always provide the only solution
to a problem, but the advantages of speed, range, flexibility,
and vantage point offered through the air and space
environment make airpower a powerful instrument for
vii
meeting the needs of the nation. Understanding these
advantages begins by knowing the ideas behind the
technology.
RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, USAF
Chief of Staff
viii
About the School of
Advanced Airpower Studies
Established in 1990, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies
(SAAS) is a one-year graduate school for 27 specially selected
officers from all the services. The mission of SAAS is to develop
professional officers educated in airpower theory, doctrine,
planning, and execution to become the air strategists of the
future. SAAS achieves this mission through a unique
educational process that blends operational expertise and
scholarship in an environment that fosters the creation,
evaluation, and refinement of ideas. The goal is thus twofold: to
educate and to generate ideas on the employment of airpower in
peace and war. SAAS is part of Air Command and Staff College,
located at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.
The SAAS curriculum consists of a series of courses that
emphasize military and airpower theory, political science,
economics, history, and technology. Civilian academics and
high-ranking military officers are frequent visitors. All students
must write a thesis and undergo an in-depth oral examination
by the faculty. In addition, students participate in war games
and joint exercises which hone their skills as airpower thinkers
and planners. The faculty implementing this curriculum is
composed of eight membersfour military and four
civilianwho are chosen for their academic credentials (a
doctoral degree), teaching abilities, operational experience,
desire to write on topics of military concern, and dedication to
SAAS and its students. Strict academic and professional criteria
are used to select students for SAAS, and volunteers are
ultimately chosen by a special board of senior officers. The
typical student is an aviator who has an outstanding military
record, has been promoted ahead of his or her contemporaries,
already holds a masters degree, and has a strong desire to learn
and to serve his or her country. Upon graduation with a
masters degree in airpower art and science, officers return to
operational assignments or are placed in impact positions on
higher headquarters staffs in the Pentagon and around the world.
ix
Introduction
xi
includes not only military forces but also the aviation
industry, including airline companies and aircraft/engine
manufacturers. On an even broader plane, airpower includes
ideasideas on how it should be employed. Even before the
aeroplane was invented, people speculatedtheorizedon
how it could be used in war. The purpose of this book is to
trace the evolution of airpower theory from the earliest days of
powered flight to the present, concluding with a chapter that
speculates on the future of military space applications.3
Attempting to find the origins of airpower theory, trace it,
expose it, and then examine and explain it, is no easy task.
Perhaps because airpowers history is shortall of it can be
contained in a single lifetimeit lacks first-rate narrative and
analytical treatments in many areas. As a result, library
shelves are crammed with books about the aerodynamics of
flight, technical eulogies to specific aircraft, and boys
adventure stories. Less copious are good books on airpower
history or biography. For example, after nearly five decades,
we still do not have an adequate account of American
airpower in the Southwest Pacific theater during World War II,
or the role of George Kenney, perhaps the best operational-
level air commander of the war. Similarly, we need a
biography of one of the most brilliant thinkers and planners in
US Air Force history; the only airman ever to serve as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the third youngest
general in American historyLauris Norstad. Nor do we have
a complete, official history of airpowers employment in the war
in Southeast Asia. Much needs to be done to fill such gaps.
The second roadblock to an effective concept of airpower
employment in an evolving world is the lack of a serious study
of airpowers theoretical foundations. For example, each of the
two editions of Makers of Modern Strategy, the classic
compendia of military theory, includes only a single chapter
out of two dozen that deals with air theoryand neither is
comprehensive.4 Admittedly, however, the list of great air
thinkers is not large, and in some cases the list of their
writings is surprisingly thin. Nonetheless, even before the
invention of the airplane, some people imagined flight as one
of mankinds potentially greatest achievements. Flight would
not only free people from the tyranny of gravity and its earthly
xii
chains, but it would liberate them mentally, socially, and
spiritually. This linkage of the airplane and freedom was
prevalent in much of the literature of the first decades of this
century. This spirit dovetailed with the growing fascination
with all things mechanical. The machine became synonymous
with modern man, who saw the airplane as the ultimate
machine. Certainly, it was capable of causing great harmthe
scientific fantasies of H. G. Wells and Jules Verne anticipated
this clearlybut, paradoxically, the airplane and its pilot were
held up as a symbol of courage and nobility. Once in the
clearness and pristine purity of the sky, the dirt and
meanness of earthbound society were left behind. This was
heady stuff, bespeaking the callowness of a forgotten era.
Although most military men dismissed such fantasies,
arguing instead for more traditional means and methods of
war, others quickly saw the airplanes potential as a weapon.
Perhaps the most important air theorist was Giulio Douhet.
When studying him, however, one is struck by how little has
been written about the man and his ideas. No biography of
Douhet has been published in English (although a useful
doctoral dissertation on him appeared nearly 25 years ago),
and little is known about his life. Analyses of his works are
also surprising in both their superficiality and their paucity in
number. Most amazing of all, although Douhet wrote
prodigiously, very few of his works have been translated from
his native Italian. His prewar writings, war diaries, and
numerous articles and novels composed in the 1920s are
unknown in English. Indeed, fully one-half of the first edition
of his seminal The Command of the Air r e m a i n s u n t r a n s l a t e d
and virtually forgotten.
Nonetheless, the available writings clearly place Douhet in
the top rank of air theorists. He was one of the first to think
and write seriously and systematically about the air weapon
and the effect it would have on warfare. Like the other early
airmen, he was profoundly influenced by the carnage of World
War I. Douhet was a believer in the future of airpower even
before the war, and his experiences during the Great War and
the horrendous casualties suffered by the Italian army on the
Austrian front hardened his views even further. His basic
preceptsthat the air would become a violent and crucial
xiii
battlefield; that the country controlling the air would also
control the surface; that aircraft, by virtue of their ability to
operate in the third dimension, would carry war to all peoples
in all places; and that the psychological effects of air
bombardment would be greathave proven accurate.
Unfortunately, however, he also had a distressing tendency to
exaggerate the capabilities of airpoweran endemic affliction
among air theorists. He grossly overestimated the physical
and psychological effectiveness that bombing would have on
civilian populations. Douhets hyperbole should not, however,
allow us to ignore his very real contributions to the early
development of airpower theory.
Another of the early thinkers who had a similarly great
impact on the evolution of the air weapon was Hugh
Trenchard. Widely recognized as the father of the Royal Air
Force (RAF), Trenchard was both more practical and less
inclined to exaggerate claims for the air weapon than was his
Italian counterpart. As commander of the British air arm in
war and peace, he was responsible not only for imparting a
vision for the use and future of the air weapon, but also for
carrying out the sobering task of organizing, equipping,
training, and leading a combat organization on a day-to-day
basis. Initially not a strong advocate of strategic airpower,
Trenchard soon became a passionate proponent. Specifically,
he was convinced that air bombardment of a countrys
industrial infrastructure would have a devastating and
decisive psychological effect on the morale of the civilian
population. His emphasis on morale, regrettably, was often
misunderstood as a brief for population bombing. Unlike
Douhet, Trenchard never advocated such an air strategy.
A major reason for this misunderstanding was an unwilling-
ness or an inability to fully articulate his ideas on airpower.
One can count the number of Trenchards published writings,
none longer than 10 or so pages, on the fingers of one hand.
Added to this were his notoriously poor speaking skills;
seemingly, he was not a very good communicatoralthough it
must be said that the RAF certainly seemed to divine his drift.
Thus, attempting to reconstruct his views on air warfare is not
an easy task. Indeed, to write a history of RAF thought between
the world wars, one must mine the fairly modest collection of
xiv
essays written by serving RAF officers (mostly junior) that
were published in the occasional book or in the pages of the
RAF Quarterly a n d RUSI [Royal United Services Institute]
Journal.
No individuals dominate this field, with the possible
exception of John Slessor. But even his intellectual reputation
is based largely on, first, his book Air Power and Armies, t h a t
contains a collection of his lectures at the British Army Staff
College in the early 1930s, and, second, his later fame as a
marshal of the RAF and the relatively prolific (for an airman)
literary legacy that he accumulated after retirement. One
should also note that there is no history of the RAF Staff
Collegewhat Trenchard called the cradle of our brain,
where airpower doctrine was formulated and promulgated
between the wars. Moreover, there is not even a complete
collection of Staff College lectures extant that can give us a
definite picture of what was taught there.
Excavating the intellectual foundations of the US Army Air
Corps can also be a challenge. We certainly have available the
extensive writings of Billy Mitchell, who published five books,
dozens of articles, and scores of newspaper op-ed pieces.
Unquestionably, Mitchell dominated the early years of the
American air arm just as Trenchard did the RAF. Like his
British counterpart, this influence was due not simply to his
administrative position but also to his ability to impart a
vision of airpower to an eager group of subordinates. The men
who would lead the Army Air Forces in World War IIHap
Arnold, George Kenney, Carl Spaatz, Frank Andrews, and
othersconsidered him their intellectual father.
Mitchell achieved this status through the strength of his
personality and through his incessant writing and speaking
efforts, bringing the message of airpower to the American
public. Unfortunately, Mitchells writings become almost
embarrassingly repetitious after 1925 or so. Moreover, his
inordinate and near-neurotic hatred of the Navy distorted
much of his writing, confused his message, and left a legacy of
animosity between the two services that has never fully
healed. One could certainly argue, both paradoxically and
heretically, that because of his incessant attacks, the Navy
was forced to adapt in ways it otherwise might not have.
xv
Consequently, Mitchell may have been the father of both naval
aviation and interservice rivalry. If this hypothesis is accurate,
one could further argue that precisely because of his
enormous popularity and influence within the Air Service,
Billy Mitchell was both one of the best and one of the worst
things that ever happened to American airpower.
Undoubtedly, many naval aviators would resent the
implication that the rise of their branch was somehow due to
the rabble-rousing of Billy Mitchell. Naval aircraft had
participated in the Veracruz operation of 1914, and their
record in World War I was sound if not glorious. After the war,
farsighted naval airmen like John Towers and Ernie King
pushed hard for the development of aircraft carriers and a
change in naval doctrine and organization to accompany those
carriers. In 1921 the Navy formed the Bureau of Aeronautics
and placed Adm William Moffett in charge.
Moffett was certainly no friend of the outspoken Mitchell
and people of like mind. But the former battleship captain
realized that a sea change was in the offing in naval warfare
and moved to alter his services thinking to accommodate that
change. In this regard, he was assisted by the Washington
Naval Conference of 192122 that placed strict limits on the
tonnage of capital ships. If battleships could not be built
under the treaty, aircraft carriers certainly could, and by the
end of the decade the Langley, Lexington, a n d Saratoga w e r e
in commission. Although surface seamen still dominated their
service in the interwar years, the role of the aircraft carrier
was becoming increasingly prominent. Everyone recognized
that air superiority over the fleet was essential, but surface
admirals saw the main decision in battle still residing with the
big guns. Naval airmen quietly disagreed, thinking instead of a
fleet based around aircraft carriers as the decisive arm.
The war in the Pacific, heralded by the destruction of the
battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor, to a great extent fulfilled the
hopes of the naval airmen. Although initially seeing their role
as fleet defense and then as air support during amphibious
operations, by the end of World War II their sights were set
higher. In 1945 targets ashore increasingly became the
objectives of carrier air. Thus, it was a small step in the
postwar era to move from air attack of land targets to strategic
xvi
bombardment, using nuclear weapons, of objectives deep
inside enemy territory. Once a small and weak youngster,
naval airpower became the dominant force within its service in
the space of a generation. Traditional sea power had given way
to airpower employed from the sea. The most interesting
aspect of this transformation is that it was accompanied by
surprisingly little internal bloodshed. Naval aviators saw
themselves as sailors first; there was little talk of divorce. The
Navy had no Billy Mitchelland obviously has not regretted it.
Perhaps it is not surprising that Britain and the United
States, traditional sea powers, embraced strategic airpower
more vigorously than did other countries. Similarities exist
between the type of long-termand long-rangeeconomic
warfare characterized by a naval campaign and the aerial
bombing of a countrys centers of gravity. The broad, strategic
thinking required of sailors was akin to that required of
strategic airpower advocates. On the other hand, the four
major continental powers in interwar EuropeItaly, France,
the Soviet Union, and Germanywere traditional land powers.
Logically, they saw airpower from a ground perspective. Giulio
Douhet was an exception; most of his countrymen had
different ideas on the proper use of airpower.
Amedeo Mecozzi was a decorated combat air veteran who
rejected Douhets calls for an emphasis on strategic airpower.
Instead, he stressed the need for tactical aviation to cooperate
with the army. His ideas were adopted by the Italian air
minister, Italo Balbo, and the composition of the air arm took
on a balance that Douhet would have found dismaying. It
mattered little. A combination of poor leadership, political
indecision, corruption, and financial constraints resulted in a
weak and ineffectual air force at the outbreak of World War
IIdespite il duces exhortations to the contrary.
The story in France was similar. At the close of World War I,
the French air force was one of the largest and most well
respected in the world. The psychic paralysis that gripped the
army, however, was transmitted to the entire defense
establishment. With the exception of Air Minister Pierre Cot
and a handful of his disciples, the French were simply not
interested in a defense policy that advocated offensive
operationsespecially strategic air operations that might
xvii
bring retaliation down on French cities. As in Italy, when
World War II broke out, the French air force was hopelessly
outclassed by the Luftwaffe. Moreover, French doctrine, which
emphasized the primacy of defensive air operations, made the
air arm almost an irrelevancy.
One finds a different story in the Soviet Union. When the
Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, the countrys air arm was
weak and outmoded. For the next few years, this downward
trend continued but began to change in the mid-1920s, when
revolutionaries started rebuilding their military forces. Mikhail
Tukhachevski, army chief of staff, articulated the concept of
deep battle that was to dominate Soviet military thinking for
the next several decades. Airpower played a major role in this
type of warfare, mainly via interdiction of enemy troops and
supplies. The predilection for tactical airpower was reinforced
by the Soviets close relationship between the wars with the
German military, which also emphasized tactical over
strategic airpower. Although the Soviets did not neglect
bombardment doctrine or the development of bomber aircraft,
by the outbreak of war, the Soviet air force had a distinctly
tactical focus.
The rise of the Luftwaffe from the ashes of defeat makes for
a remarkable tale. Field Marshal Hans von Seeckt was the
intellectual progenitor of what would soon be called blitzkrieg.
In this type of war, reminiscent of the ideas then being
espoused by Tukhachevski, airpower was of great importance.
More so than in any other country, the actions of the ground
and air arms were closely linkeddoctrinally and
organizationally. The experience of the Spanish Civil War
bolstered these beliefs. As a result, although the Luftwaffe
flirted with the idea of strategic bombing in the 1930s, for a
variety of reasons, the Germans never built a long-range air
force. It is certainly debatable whether or not that was a wise
decision. In any event, Germany, prostrate in 1919, had the
strongest and most capable air arm in the world 20 years
later.
The intellectual center of the American air arm during the
1930s was the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). A coterie of
exceptional individuals at Maxwell Field, Alabama, devised
and disseminated the doctrine of high-altitude precision
xviii
bombing of an enemys industrial centers. This was the
industrial web concept that the Army Air Forces followed in
World War II. Nonetheless, we must not forget that our
knowledge of these men and their work is most unusual.
First, they published very little at the time: the Air Corps
had no professional journal equivalent to the RAF Quarterly .
The closest thing to it on this side of the ocean was US Air
Services, a n i n t e l l i g e n t m o n t h l y m a g a z i n e t h a t d e a l t w i t h
aviation matters in both the military and civilian sectors. It
often contained articles by American military airmen, but
these were generally short and dealt with technical or tactical
matters. Published herein and elsewhere were articles by
George Kenney, Ken Walker, Claire Chennault, Hugh Knerr,
and others. As in Britain, their names call to us from the
pages of the 1930s, not really because of what their articles
contained, but because of who they later became.
How then do we know in such detail the nature of American
airpower thought in the 1930s? Thankfully, we have a
remarkable collection of lectures, written and delivered at
ACTS, carefully stored away, and often containing appendices,
notes, and comments by later lecturers. Most of our
knowledge and understanding of American airpower theory is
based on these documentsa fact that is both comforting and
dangerous. It is comforting because we have a readily
accessible, discrete, limited, and authoritative cache of
information that, once mastered, gives a remarkably clear
view of what went on at ACTS. But does that picture reflect
thinking throughout the Air Corps as a whole? Therein lies the
danger.
Generally, historians base their chronicles on the written
evidence at hand; if there is no written evidence, there is no
history. Because of this rather simple but ironclad rule, we
know precious little of what doctrinal innovation was
occurring at airfields and operational units around the
country. Airmen were too busy operating to be encumbered
with writing down what they did. Their story, though crucial,
is little known and thus overshadowed by that copious, clear,
discrete, and authoritative cache referred to above. In short,
do we give a disproportionate share of emphasis and credit to
the thinkers and instructors at ACTS merely because they
xix
were the ones who had the time and opportunity to write all
the books? Do we really know the extent of their impact on the
contemporary Air Corps? Did anyone in the field actually
listen to them?
There are no such doubts regarding Alexander P. de
Seversky (who liked to use his reserve rank of major), a
prodigious writer and speaker who had an enormous influence
on the American public. De Seversky was perhaps the most
effective popularizer of and propagandizer for airpower in
history. He wrote three booksone of which, Victory through
Air Power, was a Book of the Month Club selection, reportedly
read by five million people and even made into an animated
movie by Walt Disney. He also wrote scores of articles for
magazines as diverse as Ladies Home Journal, Look, Readers
Digest, Mechanix Illustrated, a n d Air University Quarterly
Review . F i n a l l y , h e g a v e h u n d r e d s o f r a d i o a d d r e s s e s a n d
wrote hundreds more press releases for the news media. All
were devoted to the same theme: the importance of airpower
to American security.
Because he was a civilian, he did not have to worry about
angering his military superiors, as did Douhet, Mitchell,
Slessor, and others, and because he was a successful aircraft
engineer and manufacturer, he spoke with formidable
technical authority. Significantly, the target audience of de
Severskys message was the American public and its elected
representatives. He decided that the civilian and military
leadership of the countryincluding that in the Army Air
Forceswas too conservative and too dominated by vested
interests to be receptive to new ideas. The major, himself a
simple and straightforward man, wanted his unfiltered
message to reach average Americans so, collectively, they
could put pressure on the countrys leadership to change
defense policies.
De Seversky made victory through airpower and peace
through airpower household terms in America during the
1940s and 1950s. He certainly did not originate ideas about
global airpower, its dominance over surface forces, or massive
retaliation, but, to a very great extent, he explained and sold
those ideas to the public. Despite de Severskys many
xx
exaggerations, his repetitiveness, and his missteps, there has
never been a more effective spokesman for airpower.
After de Seversky, airpower thought fell into a funk, where it
lay for several decadesnot that people ignored the subject,
but theorists were writing little that was fresh or innovative.
No major figures emerged as airpower thinkers, for a fairly
apparent reason. Atomic weaponsand then nuclear
weaponsappeared to throw traditional concepts of warfare
and strategy out the window. This was virgin territory, and no
one quite knew his wayno experience or historical models
seemed relevant to this new era. As a result, a new breed of
strategists invented a new field of study, related tobut not
identical totraditional airpower thought. Men like Bernard
Brodie and Herman Kahn, civilian academicians rather than
uniformed professionals, took the fore in thinking and writing
about nuclear strategy.
These civilians had significant advantages over the airmen
who preceded them. Before World War I, airpower had been
largely untested, and its impact on war speculative. For many,
therefore, it was easy to dismiss the ideas of the air advocates.
In the decades after Hiroshima, however, the nuclear theorists
had no such problem; everyone recognized the deadly
seriousness and import of the new weapon. In addition,
although the complexities of conventional war took a lifetime
of study, the principles of nuclear theoryassured
destruction, deterrence, m u t u a l a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n , a n d s o
forthwere relatively straightforward. As one of the
contributors to this book wryly puts it, any above-average
graduate student can learn the rudiments of this discipline
m e r e l y b y w a t c h i n g t h e m o v i e Dr. Strangelove or: How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. Although an
exaggeration, this comment has more than a little truth to it.
The product of the labors of these new thinkers was a
substantial literature grounded more in the social sciences
than in history. Models and case studies replaced historical
narrative. Because there was virtually no experience extant on
the subject of nuclear war and its effects on a population or
its leaders, the new theorists wrote of models and logic.
Precisely because there was no experience, there was no proof,
and no one could say whether the academicians were right or
xxi
wrong. These were exercises in Aristotelian logic. Thus, the
new thinkers were in much the same position as Douhet,
Mitchell, Trenchard, and others several decades earlieror,
for that matter, as the medieval theologians who debated how
many angels could dance on the head of a pin.
During the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, this new breed
dominated strategic thinking. Some people would claim that
this domination was most unfortunate for the country,
because thinking about conventional warfareespecially
conventional air warfareatrophied. Airmen like Douhet
argued that war, though inevitable and total, would be
mercifully short and decisive due to airpower. The nuclear
theorists offered a more positive future: major war was now so
horrible and thus unthinkable that it might no longer occur.
Unfortunately, it did. As a result, this new breed planned and
articulated, to a great extent, the strategy (or nonstrategy) of
Vietnam. Military leaders, having lost their preeminence in the
realm of military strategy, largely through their own
intellectual lethargy, now received schemes designed by whiz
kids and had to implement them. By necessity, airmen in the
United States were forced to grapple, however tentatively, with
the issue of the role of airpower in what was euphemistically
referred to as low intensity conflict (LIC).
LIC is not a subject most airmen readily discuss. Indeed,
most military officers prefer not to treat with the subject. LIC
is a nasty and brutish affair, not conducive to the gaining of
either glory or military force structure. A standard response of
military leaders is to assume away the problems involved in
this type of warfare, believing that preparation for general war
will ensure automatic coverage of lesser forms of war. This
was certainly the attitude in the US Air Force. Despite the hint
of things to come, represented by guerrilla insurgencies in the
Philippines, Malaysia, and French Indochina during the
decade following World War II, airmen focused on the major
nuclear threat emanating from the Soviet Union. This
absorption was so pronounced that not even the Korean War,
although largely conventional, could shake the belief that
such conflicts were peripheral, aberrant, or both. The lack of
interest generated in the subject of airpower in LIC is
illustrated by the fact that during the entire decade of the
xxii
1950s, despite the four conflicts noted above, only two articles
on the subject appeared in the Air Forces professional
j o u r n a l , t h e Air University Quarterly Review .
Quite surprisingly, this institutional reluctance to engage
with the subject of airpower in LIC continued, even as the
country found itself ever more deeply involved in Vietnam
during the 1960s. Not until 1964 did official doctrine manuals
seriously discuss the subjectand then it received a scant
two pages. As the war struggled into the 1970s, this disregard
increased rather than decreased. Never a popular topic, LIC
became even more disdained as the Vietnam War shuddered
to its unhappy conclusion. The role of airpower in LIC carried
with it an odor of defeatnot a scent of victory. On the other
hand, although the disaster of Vietnam had many such negative
outcomes, one of the positive aspects was a resurgence of
strategic thinking within the services.
Realizing that war was too important to be left to scholars,
the generals began to reassert themselves. In the American
Air Force, this trend began with John Boyd, a semilegendary
cult figure in the fighter community. Boyd had flown F-86s in
the Korean War and was struck by the 10-to-one kill ratio that
US aircraft had enjoyed in combat with the Soviet-built
MiG-15. The smaller, quicker, and more maneuverable MiG
should have performed better. Although most observers
attributed the Sabres advantage to the superior quality of
American pilots, Boyd thought otherwise. He theorized that
the hydraulic flight controls of the F-86 were the key factor,
because they allowed the pilot to move from one attitude to
another more quickly than his MiG counterpart.
Upon returning to the Fighter Weapons School, Boyd
continued to study what he termed fast transient maneuvers,
a concept that evolved into his famous OODA Loop. Battle was
governed by the continual cycle of observing, orienting,
deciding, and acting. Pilots who were able to outthink their
opponentsto get inside their OODA Loopwould be
successful, just as the Sabre could physically maneuver inside
the MiGs decision cycle. More importantly, Boyd hypothesized
that the OODA Loop concept applied at the strategic level of
war as well as the tactical. Countries that could plan, decide,
and carry out military operations more rapidly than their
xxiii
opponents would so disorient and confuse them that victory
would become inevitable. At the same time, Boyd focused on
the primacy of the orient portion of his loop, arguing that
modern war demanded broad, interdisciplinary thinking that
could continually extract ideas and fragments of ideas from
diverse sources and then reconstruct them in new and
original ways. This process of destruction and creation lay at
the heart of orienting oneself in an increasingly complex
world.
These theories and their implications for a rapid, paralyzing
method of warfare were particularly suited to airpower.
Unfortunately, Boyd has never really put his thoughts on
paper, relying instead on extremely long briefings composed of
scores of slidessome containing only a single word or phrase
that last for up to eight hours. As a result, his theories remain
vaguely known and understood by the military and academic
communities.
An o t h e r A m e r i c a n f i g h t e r p i l o t w h o b e g a n q u e s t i o n i n g
conventional wisdom emerged in 1986 at National Defense
University (NDU). There, a young colonel, John A. Warden III,
wrote a thesis titled The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat,
an unusual and controversial piece. Whereas most of the Air
Force seemed polarized between those who saw war largely at
the nuclear level and those who concentrated instead on the
tactical air battle, Warden dared to consider the possibility of
strategic, conventional operations. Fortunately and fortuitously,
the president of NDU at the time was Maj Gen Perry McCoy
Smith, who as a young officer was himself accused of being a
controversial and therefore troublesome writer in matters
c o n c e r n i n g h i s s e r v i c e .5 S m i t h e n c o u r a g e d a n d b a c k e d
Warden in his efforts, and the thesis became a book.
Warden expanded on his theory of airpower, characterized
by visualizing a society as a series of concentric rings. The
most important of these rings, the center, was enemy
leadership, because leaders make decisions regarding peace
and war. The military, therefore, should direct its actions,
both physical and psychological, towards removing, blinding,
confusing, or disorienting the enemy leadership. This in turn
would lead to paralyzing indecision and inaction. Although
many critics have disagreed with Wardens theories, his books
xxiv
importance lies in the fact that it is one of the very few works
about airpower theory written by a serving American officer
since World War II. More importantly, Warden would
eventually end up at the Pentagon as the deputy director for
war-fighting concepts development, a position he held when
Saddam Hussein decided to move south. His superiors then
gave him the opportunity to translate his theories into a
workable air campaign plan that served as the blueprint for
the air war against Iraq.
In some ways Warden was responding to a tendency he saw
developing in the Air Force since the end of the Vietnam War:
the increasing emphasis placed on tactical air operations.
Institutionally, the US Army and the US Air Force emerged
from Vietnam with much closer ties to each other than had
existed before the war. As the senior leadership in the Air
Force slowly changed from officers with bomber backgrounds
to those with fighter backgroundsthe men who had borne
the brunt of air combat in the Vietnam Warthis closeness
increased, especially in the sphere of doctrine. Significantly,
because the Army has always taken the subjects of theory and
doctrine most seriously, and because it formed a Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973, the Army took the lead
in evolving new concepts and methods of achieving air-ground
cooperation. 6 A strengthening of Warsaw Pact forces in the
Central Region in Europe spurred this move. Outnumbered
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces needed to
maximize the efficiency and punch of their combat units.
The initial Army response, partly induced by the trauma
still lingering from Vietnam, entailed an emphasis on
defensive operations. But by the early 1980s, this posture was
already moving towards a far greater concentration on the
offensespecifically, deep operations employing airpower and
highly mobile maneuver units that could attack second- and
third-echelon forces. This concept developed into the Armys
AirLand Battle doctrine, acknowledged and approved by the
Air Force. In solving one set of problems, however, others
arose. For decades the main area of disagreement between
land and air forces has been command and control
ownership of airpower over the battlefield. In truth, the issue
of the tactical battle was easily solved: the ground commander
xxv
clearly had a dominant influence in matters regarding close
a i r s u p p o r t o f t r o o p s i n c o n t a c t . S i m i l a r l y , t h e deep
battlestrategic attackwas reserved for the air commander.
The contentious issue became the area in between, where
interdiction tended to occur. The development of new
weaponsattack helicopters and surface-to-surface missiles
that allowed the Army to strike deeper than it had previously,
aggravated this disagreement.
The interesting aspect of the debate was its surprisingly
amiable resolution. Personalitiesclose personal compatibility
between senior Army and Air Force leaderswere instrumental
in forging a partnership between the two services. Even these
close ties could not, however, completely resolve underlying
tensions that emerged from the services operating in two
vastly different media. Nonetheless, the mutual trust and
respect evident between Army and Air Force leaders in the
period from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War stand in marked
contrast to the Air Force leaderships traditionally more
stormy relationship with its naval counterparts. Personalities
have been crucial in both instances.
A particular and unique strain of airpower theory evolved in
Europe as a result of NATO. The mission of the alliance was to
keep the peace in Europe. However, the peculiar demands of
each member nation ensured that military strategy was
dominated by political imperatives to an unusually high
degree. For example, in order to project the image that NATO
was purely defensive, military planners were not allowed to
plan for offensive operations outside alliance territory. If
Warsaw Pact forces attacked, they would merely be driven
back. NATO had no intention of liberating even East Germany,
much less Eastern Europe. In addition, the requirement that
military decisions, doctrine, and policy have unanimity among
all the member nations put a high premium on compromise
and consensus building.
Analysts recognized early in the 1950s that NATO could
never match the size of the Warsaw Pact forces opposing
them. In geographic terms, this translated into a realization
that West Germanyand perhaps the low countries as
wellwould be difficult to hold in the event of Soviet attack.
To counter this deficiency, NATO relied on several factors:
xxvi
technological superiority, nuclear weapons, energetic
commitment to maneuver warfare, and airpower. In truth, all
of these factors were directly related to airpower. This
realization led to a number of doctrinal initiatives that
stressed, among other things, centralized command and
control of air assets. It also led to a long and spirited debate
between and within member nations regarding the relative
importance of strategic air attacks, air interdiction, and close
air support.
The nations attained consensus, but it took many years
and it carried a price. In order to maximize the effectiveness
and efficiency of NATO airpower, nations have had to
specialize in those areas most useful to the overall good. In
some cases, this has resulted in hopelessly unbalanced air
forces: excellent interceptors, but with no ground attack
capability; or perhaps a strong tactical airlift fleet, but no
tankers, strategic airlifters, or ability to project power.
Nonetheless, the imperative of a serious, technically
sophisticated, and numerically superior foe has forced a
resultant and beneficial emphasis on quality, efficiency,
standardization, and professionalism.
The Soviet Unionthe object of all these doctrinal
evolutions both within the United States and in NATOwas
undergoing its own metamorphosis. Understanding the Soviet,
and then Russian, experience requires first that one recognize
that doctrine and theory have a political component quite
different than that operating in the West. To the Russians,
military doctrine is neither a general theory nor the view of
individuals. Rather, it is a system of official state views shaped
and responsive to the ideological imperatives of the leadership.
Although the Marxist-Leninist prism has been tarnished and
discredited to a great degree, the political underpinnings of
military doctrine represented by that ideology have not. The
result is a relatively dogmatic approach to warfare: political
objectives drive military doctrine, and that doctrine is not
open for debate.
Nonetheless, change has occurred in Russia, and since
1989 that change has been dramatic. The collapse of the
Soviet Union signaled both massive external and internal
changes. Not only did the entire strategic situation change
xxvii
with the loss of ally/buffer states in Eastern Europe, but the
privileged position and economic priority of the military within
the state ended as well. The greatest external shock, however,
occurred in 199091, when the Russians saw the astounding
ability of the West to project power on a global basis and then
employ that power in an overwhelmingly decisive way.
Russian military leaders were mesmerized by the effectiveness
of airpower in the Gulf War. The combination of mobility,
accuracy, stealth, rapid communications, intelligence
g a t h e r i n g a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n , t a r g e t a n a l y s i s , C2 c h a n n e l s ,
and simple professionalism had a profound impact on
Russian military leaders. In their view, airpower had become
the dominant factor in modern war. The challenge, however, is
not only for Russia to modernize its military forces on the
Western model within the constraints of its faltering economy,
but more importantly, within the parameters of an
increasingly volatile political situation. Reconciling military
reality with political ideology will be extremely difficult.
One should note that, until recently, most airpower
theorists around the world tended to equate strategic bombing
with strategic airpower. Consequently, differences between
theorists have generally focused on which set of targets is
most appropriate to achieve a given strategic objective.
Although the Berlin airlift of 194849 demonstrated that one
can wield strategic airpower without firing a shot, most
airmen have focused on the fire and steel side of operations.
Over the past decade, this has changeddue partly to a
dramatic lowering in tensions between the superpowers,
partly to increased capabilities that allow the employment of
air and space assets in varied and discrete ways, and partly to
heightened sensitivities over the use of force, emphasizing less
loss of life and less collateral damage. This more peaceful use
of strategic airpower has become a much debated and
explored topic of late.
One of the main foci of that debate has been space-based
assets and capabilities. In truth, it is interesting to note that
for most of the past century, ideas about airpower have been
far in advance of the technology needed to carry them out.
Many people argue that only today are capabilities finally
catching up to the predictions of the early air theorists. In the
xxviii
case of space, however, just the opposite is true: the technology
is far in advance of the doctrine and concepts regarding its
employment. Because this situation is beginning to change, it
is time to examine more fully the fundamental issue of
whether air and space are one and the sameor if indeed they
are two separate realms. This issue is fraught with political,
economic, military, and bureaucratic minefields. The Air
Force, perhaps in an attempt to solidify its hold on space and
keep the other services at bay, argues forcefully that space is
merely a place, one that is akin to the atmospherewhich is
to say it is fundamentally different from the places where land
and sea forces routinely operate. The Air Forces share of the
space budget, generally 90 percent, fortifies this strongly held
belief by putting money where the talk is. Even airmen,
however, are questioning that postulate, precisely because the
cost of space is increasing dramatically, as are the capabilities
it promises. In order to address this issue most dispassionately,
one must examine the basic characteristics of both air and
space. Once that is done, a more logical and verifiable answer
will be forthcoming to the question, Whither space?
Theory and doctrine are not subjects that airmen readily
take to. As Carl Builder has noted, airmen tend to be doers,
n o t t h i n k e r s . 7 That is not a healthy trait. Unfortunately, the
most recent major conflict has not helped the situation. In the
Persian Gulf War, the abundance of available airpower allowed
us to use it redundantly and even inefficiently in order to
avoid irritating service and allied sensitivities. Doctrinal and
theoretical differences were therefore papered over. But force
drawdowns may not permit inefficiencies and doctrinal
vagueness in future conflicts. The double bind for the future is
that interservice rivalry will heighten as a result of budget
cuts at precisely the time decreased forces and capabilities
make any such rivalry unacceptably dangerous. Key issues
such as command and control, theater air defense, the joint
use of strategic tanker aircraft, the employment concepts of
attack helicopters, the effectiveness of land-based versus
sea-based airpower, the emerging field of information warfare,
the organizational structure for employing space assets, and a
host of other such issues must be addressed and resolved.
Moreover, this must be done in peacetime; when a crisis
xxix
erupts, it is too late to begin thinking through basic premises.
It is the hope of the contributors, all associated with the
School of Advanced Airpower Studiesthe descendant of the
Air Corps Tactical Schoolthat this book will serve as a
primer and an analytical treatment of airpower theory for
fellow students of modern war.
Notes
1. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of
Modern Air PowerEconomic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons,
1925), xii.
2 . M . J . A r m i t a g e a n d R . A . M a s o n , Air Power in the Nuclear Age
(Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 2.
3 . W h e n t h e t e r m airpower is used in this book, it refers not only to
terrestrial assets, but space assets as well. The term aerospace, i n t e n d e d
explicitly to include both regimes, is inelegant and has never achieved
universal acceptance.
4. The first edition, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler, w a s e d i t e d b y E d w a r d M e a d E a r l e a n d p u b l i s h e d b y
Princeton University Press in 1943. The modern edition, Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, c o n t a i n i n g n e w e s s a y s b u t
covering largely the same people, was edited by Peter Paret and published
by Princeton in 1986.
5. Smiths controversial dissertation from Columbia University was
p u b l i s h e d a s The Air Force Plans for Peace, 19431945 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970).
6. Predictably, the Air Force responded with technologydeveloping the
A-10 ground attack aircraft.
7. Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in
the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1994).
xxx
Chapter 1
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him, and the court found him guilty. Douhet was sentenced to
a year in jail at the fortress of Fenestrelle, beginning his
incarceration on 15 October. One can only speculate on
w h e t h e r D o u h e t was actually relieved to have finally brought
matters to a head. In a mood that echoes of resignation,
mingled with frustration, he confided in his diary, They [the
g o v e r n m e n t ] c a n n o l o n g e r s a y t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t w a r n e d . 1 6
Colonel Douhet continued to write about airpower from his
cell, finishing not only a novel on air warfare but suggesting in
a letter to the war minister that a great interallied air fleet be
created. He envisioned a fleet of 20,000 airplanes, mostly
provided by the United States , whose role would be to gain
command of the air and carry out a decisive air attack on the
enemy. 17
Meanwhile, the fortunes of the Italian army c o n t i n u e d t o
plummet, culminating in the disaster of Caporetto in October
1917, when the Italians lost three hundred thousand men.
Released from prison that same month, Douhet returned to
duty, and, because calamity breeds change, he soon became
central director of aviation at the General Air Commissariat,
w h e r e h e w o r k e d t o s t r e n g t h e n I t a l y s air a r m . H e a l s o
continued his close relationship with Caproni, and it is likely
the two had a role in determining the force structure and
philosophy of the new American Air Service .
Shortly after entering the war in April 1917, the United
S t a t e s sent a mission to Europe headed by Col Raynal Bolling
to decide which aircraft were most suitable for construction in
America. A member of the Bolling team, Maj Edgar Gorrell,
h a d s e v e r a l t a l k s w i t h C a p r o n i, w h o p e r s u a d e d h i m t o
purchase the rights for several hundred of his heavy bombers
for construction in America. Soon after, Gorrell w r o t e C a p r o n i,
requesting information on German industrial targets for use
in planning Allied bombing missions. Douhet probably helped
Caproni compile this information, since Douhet also was
collecting intelligence on the location of German factories.
Although the Caproni bomber contract was not fulfilled, the
relationship established among these men planted the seeds
for American airpower. 18
A t t h e s a m e t i m e , C a p r o n i provided Gorrell with a copy of a
polemic written by Nino Salvaneschi, a n I t a l i a n j o u r n a l i s t a n d
6
MEILINGER
friend of Douhet . Titled Let Us Kill the War, Let Us Aim at the
Heart of the Enemy! this propaganda pamphlet accused the
Germans of endless atrocities, thereby justifying any and all
a c t i o n s t a k e n t o d e f e a t G e r m a n y. Although Germany q u i t e
clearly had attempted to bomb Britain i n t o s u b m i s s i o n b y
zeppelin a t t a c k s , t h e a i r s h i p c o u l d n o t a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e
results. Now, however, the Allies had large aircraft (not
coincidentally, Capronis ) capable of carrying tons of bombs.
These aircraft, termed battle planes by Salvaneschi, m e a n t
that the sky is the new field of combat and death which has
unbarred her blue doors to the combatants. The purpose of
t h e s e b a t t l e p l a n e s was to kill the war, not by destroying the
enemy army but by destroying its manufactories of arms.
This in turn would leave the enemy with insufficient strength
t o c a r r y o n t h e w a r . 19
Gorrell w a s q u i t e t a k e n w i t h S a l v a n e s c h i s p i e c e a n d
distributed numerous copies of it within the American Air
Service . O v e r t h e m o n t h s t h a t f o l l o w e d , G o r r e l l w r o t e a
remarkably farsighted memo on the desirability and feasibility
o f s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g. P e r h a p s n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , s t r o n g
s i m i l a r i t i e s e x i s t e d a m o n g G o r r e l l s m e m o , S a l v a n e s c h is
p i e c e , a n d t h e i d e a s t h e n b e i n g e x p o u n d e d b y D o u h e t. 20
I n J u n e 1 9 1 8 D o u h e t retired from the army, disgusted with
the inefficiency and conservatism of his superiors, and
returned to writing. Soon after the armistice, h e b e c a m e u p s e t
with the government for not dealing adequately with veterans
of the war. He therefore started D u t y , a n e w s p a p e r t h a t d e a l t
largely with domestic, economic, and political issues. In this
position, he learned that the government had launched an
official investigation into the battle of Caporetto. The report
concluded that defeat resulted from deficiencies in organization
and leadership, many of which Douhet had noted. The retired
colonel therefore petitioned to have his court-martial
reexamined. When the judges perceived the accuracy of his
criticisms and predictions, they decided that Douhet h a d
indeed been primarily interested in the safety of his
countrynot in personal gain. The verdict was overturned in
November 1920, and he was promoted to general.2 1
R a t h e r t h a n r e t u r n i n g t o a c t i v e d u t y , D o u h e t continued his
literary efforts. In 1921 he completed his most famous work,
7
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Witnesses of the earlier air attacks before our defence was organized,
will not be disposed to underestimate the panic and disturbance that
would result from a concentrated blow dealt by a superior air fleet.
Who that saw it will ever forget the nightly sight of the population of a
great industrial and shipping town, such as Hull, streaming out into
the fields on the first sound of the alarm signals? Women, children,
babies in arms, spending night after night huddled in sodden fields,
shivering under a bitter winter sky.4 2
Douhet had read of such panic during the war and noted it
in his diaries. Clearly, these reports made a deep impression
on him. In truth, one could find many such descriptions in
the literature of the time, and even Stanley Baldwin, former
British prime minister, proclaimed glumly in 1932 that the
b o m b e r would always get through.4 3 People clearly believed
such warnings: during the Munich crisis of 1938, fully
one-third of the population of Paris evacuated the city to avoid
a possible German air assault.44 The problem with such
apocalyptic predictions was that they failed to address
whether morale was even a relevant issue in a tightly
organized police stateas were Germany a n d J a p a n d u r i n g
World War II. In addition, the dire predictions of Douhet a n d
others erred by underestimating the resiliency of human
beings in the face of adversity. Civilian morale did not break in
World War II w i t h a n y w h e r e n e a r t h e r a p i d i t y o r f i n a l i t y
20
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
24
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m u s t f o l l o w p o l i c y , b u t t h i s m i s s e s t h e m a r k . 56 R a t h e r ,
Douhet expected that future wars would be just as inane as
t h e G r e a t W a r. More cynic than realist, he was profoundly
skeptical of human nature and rejected arguments that war
could be carefully guided or finely tuned to reflect political
will: War . . . is a kind of irrepressible convulsion, during
which it seems to lose or suspend every human sense; and it
[humanity] appears to be invaded by a devastating and
d e s t r u c t i v e f u r y . 5 7 F o r t u n a t e l y , h e w a s n o t c o m p l e t e l y
correct; World War II was not as devoid of clear objectives as
w a s t h e G r e a t W a r . Moreover, limited wars like those in Korea
a n d V i e t n a m have become the norm in the second half of this
century, and in many of these warsas against the Vietcong for
exampleairpower, as he envisioned it, is largely inappropriate.
D o u h e t denigrated limitations imposed by law and morality
and continued to advocate aerochemical attacks on cities,
even after Italy had ratified the Geneva Protocol o f 1 9 2 5 t h a t
prohibited them. This too showed Douhet s pessimistic view of
human nature. He was certain that total war would rationalize
any type of activity, stating, He is a fool if not a patricide who
would acquiesce in his countrys defeat rather than go against
those formal agreements which do not limit the right to kill
and destroy, but simply the ways of killing and destroying.
The limitations applied to the so-called inhuman and
atrocious means of war are nothing but international
demagogic hypocrisies.5 8
Given the world war hecatomb, it is not surprising that
Douhet was so pessimistic. But as horrendous as was the
destruction in World War II, none of the belligerents resorted
to gas warfare, a l t h o u g h m o s t p o s s e s s e d t h e m e a n s t o d o s o . 59
Moreover, since 1945 several conventions have been held
regarding the law of war and have proposed a variety of
rulings. Most of these limitations are contained in the Geneva
Protocols of 1977, and although the United States rejected them,
it still follows their basic thrust.6 0 T h i s w a s t h e c a s e i n
Operation Desert Storm , when coalition airmen went to great
lengths to restrict the types of targets struck and weapons
employed so as to minimize civilian casualties and collateral
damage. Now that precision bombing has become more routine,
s u c h s c r u p u l o u s t a r g e t i n g likely will become standard practice.
25
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
26
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28
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30
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missiles h a d c h e m i c a l w a r h e a d s . W h o w o u l d h a v e t h o u g h t
that a country as inured to warfare and the threat of terrorist
attacks as Israel would react in such a fashion?)
A seemingly more reasonable approach maintained that
atomic weapons vindicated Douhet; after all, an invasion of
J a p a n proper was unnecessary, and the only battle of the
home islands was the one conducted by American B-29s.
Atomic weapons s e e m e d t o g r a n t n e w r e l e v a n c e t o D o u h e t
because a handful of bombs could now devastate a country,
a s h e h a d p r e d i c t e d .6 7 S u c h a r g u m e n t s m a y b e e v e n l e s s
c r e d i b l e t h a n t h e c l a i m s t h a t D o u h e t did not receive a fair test
in World War II. I f t h e o n l y c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t m a k e s D o u h e t
relevant is nuclear holocaust, then he is totally irrelevant.
Given the limited wars of the postwar era, especially
Vietnam , Douhet s ideas on airpower seemed best confined to
the dustbin of history. This has now changed because the
thawing of the cold war and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact,
coupled with the decreased presence of forward-deployed
American troops, have put a premium on the ability to project
power over great distances. This requirement is a natural
characteristic of airpower, and the efficacy of the air weapon
was never demonstrated more clearly than in the Persian Gulf
W a r. For decades, airmen described airpower with terms like
furious, relentless, overwhelming, a n d s o f o r t h , b u t t o a g r e a t
extent those were just words, because the technology d i d n o t
e x i s t t o m a k e t h e m t r u e . B u t t h e a i r w a r in the Gulf finally
lived up to the prophecies of the past seven decades.
One of Douhet s ideas that has become increasingly relevant
is his call for a single department of defense. Douhet
advocated such an organization as early as 1908, when he
wrote a stinging essay titled The Knot of Our Military
Question, which criticized the lack of cooperation between
the Italian army a n d n a v y . H e s u g g e s t e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
a single ministry of defense headed by a civilian. At the same
time, he called for a military chief of staff to coordinate the
combat operations of the services.6 8 His superiors ignored the
proposal, but he would return to the idea later.
In The Command of the Air, h e e n l a r g e d h i s d e f e n s e m i n i s t r y
to include an air force, but the services were still united under
a single civilian head, and military operations were
31
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Notes
34
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35
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
responses, not the critical letters from Italian airmen, soldiers, and sailors
to which he was responding.
23. Douhet (Fischer translation), 13.
24. Ibid., 144. Douhet recognized a distinction between air defense and
protection from air attack: one cannot stop the rain, but one can carry an
umbrella to avoid being soaked. Nonetheless, he believed that civil defense
actions such as underground shelters and evacuation plans were of little
use. The people must expect bombardment and endure its horror. Ibid.,
198.
2 5 . I u s e t h e t e r m precept r a t h e r t h a n principle b e c a u s e D o u h e t r e j e c t e d
the latter term. In his view, common sense should prevail in war.
Unfortunately, when a concept was elevated to the status of a principle, it
too often became a dogmatic assertion divorced from common sense.
Airpower required new thinking and the rejection of dogmatic assertions
applicable only to a bygone age.
26. The Department of Defenses current definition for air superiority
reads, That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another
which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land,
sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force. Air supremacy is defined as that degree of air
superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective
interference. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994. Douhets concept of command of the
air is closer to our notion of air supremacy.
27. Douhet (Fischer translation), 4748. In a memo written in 1916,
Douhet was a bit more specific, listing the following as potential targets:
railroad junctions, arsenals, ports, warehouses, factories, industrial
centers, banks, ministries, etc. Cappelluti, 107.
28. Douhet (Fischer translation), 48.
29. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942;
reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 36768.
Although the editors have added a brief introduction, the pagination of the
essays themselves remains the same as in the original.
30. Douhet (Fischer translation), 171.
31. Ibid., 8384.
32. Ibid., 86.
33. There is little indication Douhet attempted to spread his ideas on
airpower outside Italy. He wrote virtually all of his works for Italian
magazines and journalshe was not a propagandist in the mold of Billy
Mitchell. Although he probably attempted to influence the Bolling
Commission during World War I, he did so to enlist the United States as a
useful ally and partner in the war against the Central Powers.
34. Douhets reference to the United States is significant and is
exemplified today by our Armys helicopter fleet, one of the largest air forces
in the world with more than six thousand aircraft. Its sole mission is to
36
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45. The best studies on the effects of morale bombing are the US
Strategic Bombing Survey, Report no. 64b, The Effects of Strategic
Bombing on German Morale (1947); Fred C. Ikl, The Social Impact of Bomb
Destruction ( N o r m a n , O k l a . : U n i v e r s i t y o f O k l a h o m a P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) ; a n d
Irving L. Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1951).
46. What Lessons from Air Warfare? U.S. Air Services, April 1938, 78.
This editorial argues that the civil war in Spain was simply not a condition
anticipated by Douhet.
47. Douhet (Fischer translation), 17.
48. Barry H. Steiner, Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American
Nuclear Strategy (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 94.
49. Lt Gen N. N. Golovine, Air Strategy, Royal Air Force Quarterly 7
(April 1936): 16972. Golovine was a Russian expatriate who had served in
World War I. Douhet gave no estimates on the amount of incendiary bombs
needed to burn a target. They had not been used extensively during the
war, so there was little experience on which to base calculations. Gen Billy
Mitchell, in his 1922 manual Notes on the Multi-Motored Bombardment
Group (page 81), estimated that only 30 tons of gas were required to render
an area of one square mile uninhabitable. Thats about one-third the
amount suggested by Golovine.
50. For example, one US Navy officer stated in 1923 that there is
scarcely a city in America which could not be destroyed, together with every
living person therein, within, say, three days of the declaration of war.
Airplanes, and General Slaughter, in the Next War, Literary Digest, 1 7
November 1923, 61. Amusingly, the first page of this article has a picture of
the hapless Barling Bomber with the caption A few of these could wipe out
a city. Likewise, in 1920 the chief of the aircraft armament division in the
US Army declared that a one-hundred-pound bomb would destroy a small
railroad station or warehouse, and a one-thousand-pound bomb would
completely demolish a large factory. William A. Borden, Air Bombing of
Industrial Plants, Army Ordnance, NovemberDecember 1920, 122.
51. Douhet (Fischer translation), 185.
52. Lee Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Scribners,
1982), 55. Kennett states that Douhets name does not appear on the lists
of licensed Italian pilots through 1918. One should know, however, that
when Douhet took command of the Aviation Battalion in 1913, he was
already 43 years of agetoo old to take on the arduous task of learning to
fly the dangerous and flimsy aircraft of the day. On the other hand, Douhet
worked closely with Caproni in developing an aircraft stabilization device
and an aerial camera, as well as designing a special bomb that was
flight-tested in 1912. Although he may not have been a pilot, Douhet
understood many of the technical problems of flight. Cappelluti, 59;
C a p r o n i d i a r y , M a r c h 1 9 1 3 ; a n d L e e K e n n e t t , The First Air War: 19141918
(New York: Free Press, 1991), 37.
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40
Chapter 2
41
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43
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45
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identification h i n t e d a t h e r e w o u l d c o n t i n u e f o r t h e n e x t
several decades.
In his official report soon after the war, Trenchard reiterated
his previous stance that the aerial needs of the British army
i n F r a n c e had had first priority, but after his air forces met
t h o s e n e e d s , t h e b o m b i n g o f G e r m a n y became a necessity.
Its objective was to achieve the breakdown of the German
a r m y i n G e r m a n y, its government, and the crippling of its
sources of supply. Recognizing that he had insufficient forces
to collapse the German industry, he nonetheless attempted to
hit as many different factories as possible as often as possible,
so that no one felt secure anywhere within range of his
bombers . Using a subjective and unprovable statistic that
earned him much (largely deserved) ridicule, Trenchard s t a t e d
that the psychological effects o f b o m b i n g o u t w e i g h e d t h e
material effects at a ratio of 20 to one. 1 1 During its short life,
t h e I n d e p e n d e n t F o r c e flew all of its missions against targets
with military significance. 12 T h u s , o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t
Trenchard d i d n o t a d v o c a t e t h e b o m b i n g o f G e r m a n
population centers with the intention of causing a popular
revolt (the concept put forward by his contemporary in Italy,
Gen Giulio Douhet). Rather, Trenchard implied that the act of
bombardment in generaland the destruction of selected
German factories in particularwould have a devastating
effect on the morale o f t h e w o r k e r s a n d , b y e x t e n s i o n , t h e
German people as a whole. He had seen such effects in Britain
as a result of German air attacks and was profoundly
influenced by them. He would articulate this concept more
clearly in the years leading up to World War II.
S o m e c r i t i c s l a t e r a r g u e d t h a t T r e n c h a r d s enthusiasm for
strategic bombing did not develop until after the war. Further,
they maintained that during the war, he remained an
implacable foe not only of strategic bombing but also of a
separate RAF a n d t h e I n d e p e n d e n t F o r c e t h a t i t s p a w n e d .
These accusations are inaccurate. In October 1917 Trenchard
proposed the combination of the RNAS a n d t h e R F C i n t o a
single service under an air secretary and an air chief of staff.
The following month, he stated that long distance bombing . . .
ought to be vigorously developed as part and parcel of the
46
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original). 1 6 W h e n t h e a r m y a n d n a v y c o n t i n u e d t o p u s h t o
disband the RAF in the interests of economy, the CAS
responded in a wonderfully Trenchardesque style : The Field
Marshal wishes to lay axe to the roots, as by doing so he
thinks he may the easier obtain the fruit. What is wanted in
order that the maximum amount of fruit may be got for our
money is a severe pruning of the overhead fruitless branches
of some of the neighboring trees which are at present
crowding out the younger and more productive growth and
thereby preventing its vigorous expansion to full maturity.17
Given the increasingly heated verbal and bureaucratic
sparring, it is surprising that Trenchard w a s a b l e t o w i n a
major concession from Beatty and Wilson i n l a t e 1 9 2 1 .
Catching them off guard and appealing to their sense of fair
play, Trenchard convinced them to cease attacking his service
for one year while he attempted to organize his fledgling
command and make their struggle a more equal one. 18 The
two men later regretted their decision, because Trenchard
used that time to solidify his power, establish the RAF o n a
strong organizational and administrative footing, and devise a
use for the air weapon that would ensure its survival as a
s e p a r a t e serviceair control of colonial territories.
Administering the worlds largest empire was an expensive
and labor-intensive enterprise, each colony requiring a
garrison of sufficient size to maintain peace and order. In the
aftermath of the war, such an expense caused consternation
in the British government. In mid-1919, therefore, Trenchard
suggested to Churchill that the RAF be given the opportunity
t o s u b d u e a f e s t e r i n g u p r i s i n g i n S o m a l i l a n d. C h u r c h i l l
agreed. The results were dramatic: the RAF c h a s e d t h e r e b e l
ringleader, the mad mullah, out of the area and pacified
Somaliland at a cost of 77,000 rather than the 6 million it
would have cost for the two army divisions originally planned.
As a consequence, the demand for air control grew quickly,
and over the next decade the RAF deployedwith varying
degrees of successto Iraq, Afghanistan, India , Ad en , T r ans-
jordan , Palestine, Egypt, a n d S u d a n .1 9 The strategy employed
in these campaigns involved patrolling the disputed areas,
flying political representatives around to the various tribes to
discuss problems and devise solutions, issuing ultimatums to
49
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51
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52
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53
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54
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55
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56
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57
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58
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59
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60
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a i r s u p e r i o r i t y, b u t e v e n t h i s w a s d i f f i c u l t a n d r e q u i r e d
constant maintenance. Air superiority w a s n o t a p h a s e ; i t
required persistence.
Slessor also emphasized that winning the air superiority
campaign demanded initiative. Here he echoed the views of
h i s m e n t o r , T r e n c h a r d , by noting the importance of morale.
One did not achieve victory by waiting for the enemy but by
s t r i k i n g f i r s t a n d h a r d . 62 S l e s s o r d i d n o t a d v o c a t e t h e
b o m b i n g of airfields, which he considered ineffective and at
best a temporary nuisance; nor did he see much utility in air
patrols. Such activities might prove useful, but the primary
means of destroying the enemy air force remained air combat.
One must bring the enemy air force to battle, but this could
be difficult. Unlike armies that had to fight in order to achieve
their objective of defeating the enemy army or preventing it
from overrunning their country, air forces could avoid battle
yet still bomb a countrys vital centers.
Thus, one need not choose between air superiority a n d
bombardmentone could wage both campaigns simultaneously.
T h i s a b i l i t y t o c o n d u c t p a r a l l e l n o t m e r e l y s e q u e n t i a l
combat operations was one of the factors that differentiated
airpower from surface forces . Even so, Slessor remained
ambivalent about the air superiority c a m p a i g n , a r g u i n g o n t h e
one hand that it was necessary but on the other that one
should not see it as an end in itself. A line, fine though it
might be, clearly existed between aggressively waging the
battle for air superiority while also avoiding its distractions in
order to conduct a more lucrative bombing
Slessor p o s i t e d a w a r i n w h i c h t h e B r i t i s h a r m y h a d
deployed to the Continent to secure the low countries from a
hostile power. The initial stages of that joint campaign were
therefore symbiotic: the army and navy s e c u r e d a f o o t h o l d a n d
established air bases, and the air force then protected the
surface forces f r o m e n e m y a t t a c k . T h a t d o n e , o n e c o u l d c a r r y
out a strategic air campaign against the enemys vital
c e n t e r s. 63 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , S l e s s o r d e c l i n e d t o d i s c u s s t h e
details of such an air campaign . Instead, he concentrated on
the preliminary joint campaign , largely because he believed
that airpower would not stop a major land assault by itself
a n d t h a t h i t t i n g s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t s would not take effect quickly
63
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64
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65
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66
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67
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68
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Notes
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close enough to attack it. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, The Central
Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1956), 1014.
2. The German navy lost 53 of 73 airships built during the war, and the
army lost 26 of 52. Approximately 49 percent of all aircrews assigned to
airships were lost during the warthe worst casualty rate of any branch,
including infantry. Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and
the Popular Imagination ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1992), 50.
3. Lt Gen Jan C. Smuts, The Second Report of the Prime Ministers
Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, 17
A u g u s t 1 9 1 7 , a s q u o t e d i n E u g e n e M . E m m e , e d . , The Impact of Air Power
(Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959), 35.
4. There are many accounts of these squabbles, and none of the
principals emerge looking either statesmanlike or dignified. See especially
H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 19181939
( L o n d o n : H e i n e m a n n , 1 9 7 6 ) ; A n d r e w B o y l e , Trenchard: Man of Vision
(London: Collins, 1962); and Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles (London:
George Harrap, 1942).
5. Future Policy in the Air, 22 September 1916, Trenchard Papers,
RAF Hendon, England, file CI/14. This memo was later published as a
Royal Flying Corps pamphlet titled Offence versus Defence in the Air,
October 1917; a copy is located in Brooke-Popham Papers, Liddell Hart
Archives, Kings College, London, file IX/5/4.
6. Ibid.
7. Brig Gen Sefton Brancker, the deputy director of military aeronautics,
made an astounding comment in this regard in a letter to Trenchard in
September 1916: I rather enjoy hearing of our casualties as I am perfectly
certain in my own mind that the Germans lose at least half as much again
as we do. Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1986), 75.
8. A Review of the Principles Adopted by the Royal Flying Corps since
the Battle of the Somme, RFC pamphlet, 23 August 1917, Brooke-Popham
Papers, Liddell Hart Archives, Kings College, London, file IX/3/2.
9. Long Distance Bombing, 28 November 1917, Trenchard Papers, RAF
Hendon, England, file I/9.
10. The Scientific and Methodical Attack of Vital Industries, 26 May
1918. This document is in the same file as the Long Distance Bombing
memo noted above but is a fragment of a larger, unspecified document and
is of a later date; see also Memorandum on the Tactics to be Adopted in
Bombing the Industrial Centres of Germany, 23 June 1918, Trenchard
Papers, RAF Hendon, England, file I/10/4.
11. Bombing Germany: General Trenchards Report of Operations of
British Airmen against German Cities, The New York Times Current
History, April 1919, 152. Although a strategy of a geographically dispersed
campaign appears to violate the principle of mass, Trenchard believed that
73
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
his forces were too small to cause catastrophic damage in any event, so
opting for a psychological effect seemed wiser.
12. A list of all 350 strategic bombing missions conducted by the
Independent Force and its predecessors between October 1917 and the
armistice, excluding aerodrome attacks, is contained in H. A. Jones, T h e
War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the
Royal Air Force, vol. 7, Appendices (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 4284.
13. Memorandum on Future Air Organisation, Fighting Policy, and
Requirements in Personnel and Material, 2 October 1917, Trenchard
Papers, RAF Hendon, England, file CI/14; Long Distance Bombing; and
On the Bombing of Germany, 23 June 1918, Trenchard Papers, RAF
Hendon, England, file I/9.
14. Transcript of interview between Trenchard and H. A. Jones, 11 April
1934, Public Records Office, Kew, England, file AIR 8/179. This rationale is
also developed at some length in John C. Slessor, These Remain: A Personal
Anthology (London: Michael Joseph, 1969), 8085.
15. Sykes, 55861; and P. R. C. Groves, B e h i n d t h e S m o k e S c r e e n
(London: Faber & Faber, 1934), 25359. Groves was the RAFs director of
flying operations under Sykes in 1919.
16. The Future of the Air Force in National and Imperial Defence, Air
Ministry pamphlet, March 1921, Brooke-Popham Papers, Liddell Hart
Archives, Kings College, London, file IX/5/11, 1314. One should also note
that throughout most of the interwar period, the RAF received less than 20
percent of the defense budget.
17. Hugh Trenchard, memorandum to Henry Wilson, ca. 1920, Public
Records Office, Kew, London, file AIR 8/2.
18. Boyle, 34851; B. McL Ranft, ed., The Beatty Papers, vol. 2, 1 9 1 6
1 9 2 7 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1993), 84; and Malcolm Smith, British Air
Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 23. Naval air
was generally slighted while it was part of the RAF, and the Admiralty
complained that its legitimate aviation needs were not being met. It
therefore insisted that naval aircraft be returned to fleet control, which
indeed occurred in 1937.
19. Notes on the History of the Employment of Air Power, August
1935, Public Records Office, Kew, England, file AIR 10/1367. For accounts
of these operations, see David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control:
The Royal Air Force, 19191939 (New York: Saint Martins, 1990); and Philip
A. Towle, Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare,
1 9 1 9 1 9 8 8 (London: Brasseys, 1989). The surprising success of these
operations possibly fueled even further the RAF belief in the psychological
effects of bombing.
20. Minutes of Meetings and Memoranda of Sub-Committee on the
Continental Air Menace, December 1921March 1922, Public Records
Office, Kew, England, file AIR 8/39.
21. Staff Notes on Enemy Air Attack on Defended Zones in Great
Britain, 28 May 1924, Trenchard Papers, RAF Hendon, England, file
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76
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78
Chapter 3
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82
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84
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Force (AEF) i n t o c a t e g o r i e s o f t a c t i c a l a n d s t r a t e g i c a l
a v i a t i o n . H e m a d e h i s p r o p o s a l t o G e n J o h n J . P e r s h i n gs
chief of staff, Brig Gen James G. Harbord , who arrived in
France with the commanding general in mid-June 1917.
Tactical aviation w o u l d c o n s i s t o f s q u a d r o n s a t t a c h e d t o
divisions, corps, or armies and would operate as any other
combat arm. In contrast, strategical aviation would be
bombardment and pursuit formations and would have an
independent mission very much as independent cavalry used
to have. . . . They would be used to carry the war well into the
enemys country.1 4 This mission, he insisted, could have a
greater influence on the ultimate decision of the war than any
other arm.1 5
Soon after receiving Mitchells p l a n , P e r s h i n g selected a
board of officers to determine the proper composition for AEF
aviation. Because Mitchell was the senior American aviator in
E u r o p e , the general made him chief of the newly created Air
Service , which had replaced the Signal Corps a s t h e A r m ys
air organization in the AEF .1 6 Mitchells appointment did not,
however, guarantee his proposals acceptance. On 11 July,
P e r s h i n g outlined a comprehensive plan for AEF organization
that authorized 59 squadrons of tactical aircraft for service
with the field armies. The plan made no mention of an
independent force for strategical operations.
P e r s h i n gs failure to approve the proposal caused Mitchell t o
r e d o u b l e h i s e f f o r t s . I n A u g u s t 1 9 1 7 h e a s k e d t h e A E Fs
intelligence branch to provide information on strategic targets
i n G e r m a n y and later received a list of industrial targets i n t h e
R u h r f r o m t h e F r e n c h . 17 His staff also explored in more detail
the possibilities of bombing Germany. His officers performed
this activity in relative splendor, for Mitchell c h o s e t h e
Chteau de Chamrandes, a magnificent hunting lodge built by
Louis XV, as his headquarters. 18 He was always flamboyant.
One of his more capable staff officers was Nap Gorrell , a
26-year-old major whom Mitchell had selected to head the Air
Service Technical Section . Gorrell d i r e c t e d t h e e f f o r t t h a t
ultimately produced the first American plan for a strategic air
campaign . This plan would reflect Mitchells ideas, gleaned
largely from Trenchard , about airpowers potential to destroy
t h e G e r m a n a r m ys m e a n s t o f i g h t . 19
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r e s e m b l e G o r r e l l s p l a n f o r b o m b i n g k e y G e r m a n w a r
industries. In a treatise entitled Tactical Application of
Military Aeronautics, he argued that the main value of
bombardment would come from hitting an enemys great
nerve centers at the very beginning of the war so as to
paralyze them to the greatest extent possible.2 7
That the war ended before American bombers h a d t h e
chance to bomb German soil proved significant. Production
deficiencies had prevented the first squadron of American
n i g h t b o m b e r s from arriving at the front until 9 November
1918. Since manufacturing problems had stymied the dream
of defeating Germany through American airpower , the dream
endured intact. Mitchell, Gorrell, and other Air Service officers
could speculate about the probable effect that a bomber
offensive would have had on the outcome of the war and could
blame the lack of aircraft as a reason why the offensive never
materialized. Such difficulties could be overcome. Air officers
now were aware of Gorrells p o s t w a r a d m o n i t i o n t h a t m o n e y
a n d m e n c o u l d n o t m a k e a n a i r p r o g r a m o v e r n i g h t , 2 8 a n d
they would make amends.
For Mitchell, the prospects of applying airpower independently,
r a t h e r t h a n i n s u p p o r t o f t h e A r m y, gradually merged with the
notion of an air force s e p a r a t e f r o m A r m y control. In July
1918, he insisted that the chief of the Air Service, r a t h e r t h a n
t h e A r m ys General Staff, should direct the Air Services GHQ
Reserve , the name given to the phantom force of bombers t h a t
never materialized. He based his argument on the need for
u n i t y o f c o m m a n d , which would allow the Air Service chief to
concentrate all available airpower in a critical area for
maximum impact. His plea went unheeded.
I n J u n e , P e r s h i n g s c h i e f o f s t a f f , M a j G e n J a m e s W .
McAndrew, admonished air officers who stressed independent
air operations: It is therefore directed that these officers be
warned against any idea of independence and that they be
taught from the beginning that their efforts must be closely
coordinated with those of the remainder of the Air Service a n d
t h o s e o f t h e g r o u n d a r m y . 29 Mitchell b e l i e v e d t h a t s u c h
nonflyers had little appreciation for the airplanes unique
capabilities, and he bemoaned their efforts to restrict aviation
to battlefield support. He stated that Army officerswith the
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Mitchell a d d e d h i s t h o u g h t s a b o u t a i r p o w e r s r o l e i n a
future Pacific war to his account of the journey. He believed
that the value of aircraft carriers was practically nil because
not only can they not operate efficiently on the high seas but
even if they could they cannot place sufficient aircraft in the
a i r a t o n e t i m e t o i n s u r e a c o n c e n t r a t e d o p e r a t i o n . 4 0 H e
thought that land-based aircraft were the key to dominating
Pacific island groups and might enable the Japanese to
launch a surprise attack on American forces in the Hawaiian
Islands. Mitchell contended that only an opposing air force
could stop such an aerial assault. Other defensive measures,
like cannon and barrage balloons, acted only to give a false
sense of security very much [like] what the ostrich must feel
w h e n h e h i d e s h i s h e a d i n t h e s a n d . 4 1
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94
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95
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96
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97
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98
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99
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100
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101
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102
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103
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104
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106
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108
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Notes
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of Congress, Washington, D.C. Mitchell tried to bill the government for his
training, but the Treasury comptroller ruled that individual payments made
to civilian flying schools were not refundable.
11. Hurley, 21.
12. William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I: From Start to Finish of Our
Greatest War (New York: Random House, 1960), 59. Parts of these memoirs
were serialized by Liberty m a g a z i n e i n 1 9 2 8 . T h i s m e m o i r i s b a s e d o n t h e
diaries Mitchell kept during the war. Regrettably, those diaries are now lost,
so one must read this work with caution.
13. Mitchell, Memoirs, 10311; Isaac D. Levine, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air
Power, rev. ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1958), 9497; Hurley,
2527; and John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from
1909 to 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 271.
14. Maj W. Mitchell, memorandum to chief of staff, AEF, 13 June 1917.
Quoted in I. B. Holley, I d e a s a n d W e a p o n s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1953), 47.
15. Maj W. Mitchell, memorandum to chief of staff, AEF, 13 June 1917.
Extract in Maurer Maurer, ed., The US Air Service in World War I, vol. 2
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), 108.
16. In the United States, however, the Signal Corps maintained control
over its Aviation Section.
17. Hurley, 32.
18. Mitchell, Memoirs, 15354, 157. Mitchell used the chteau to inspire
his staff to converse in French, which he encouraged to enhance Allied
cooperation.
1 9 . M a u r e r , vol. 2, 14151.
20. Mitchell, Memoirs, 1 4 6 .
21. Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps, memorandum to commanding
general, I Army Corps, 16 February 1918, Mitchell Papers, General
Correspondence, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
22. Hurley, 32; and Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:
Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1 9 0 7 1 9 6 0 (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989), 22.
23. Mitchell, Memoirs, 268; Planned to Drop Americans from Sky in
Hun Rear, New York Herald, 8 March 1919, 2; and William Mitchell,
Wiping Danger from the Sky, Liberty, 2 4 J u n e 1 9 3 3 , 1 7 1 8 . I n Notes on
the Multi-Motored Bombardment Group, Day and Night, a t a c t i c a l m a n u a l
that Mitchell wrote for his troops in 1922, he also suggested parachuting
commandos behind enemy lines to blow up key installations such as
ammunition dumps.
24. Quoted in Levine, 148.
25. Quoted in ibid., 147.
26. Quoted in Hurley, 37.
27. Brig Gen William Mitchell, Tactical Application of Military
Aeronautics, 5 January 1919, 3, US Air Force Historical Research Agency
[hereinafter AFHRA], Maxwell AFB, Ala., file 167.4-1.
110
CLODFELTER
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112
CLODFELTER
113
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
P. Summerall, Maj Gen Fred W. Sladen, and Brig Gen Albert J. Bowley. One
who remained was Brig Gen Douglas MacArthur, an old friend of Mitchells
since childhood; in fact, MacArthur had dated Mitchells sister at one point.
81. Michael L. Grumelli, Trial of Faith: The Dissent and Court-Martial
of Billy Mitchell (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1991), 262.
82. Hurley, 108.
83. See, for instance, Harvey F. Trumbore to Gen William Mitchell,
letter, 27 January 1926; Elverton H. Wicks to Colonel Mitchell, letter, 31
December 1925; and Horace C. Carlisle to Colonel and Mrs. Mitchell, letter,
21 December 1925, Mitchell Papers, General Correspondence, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
84. Arnold, 15859.
85. Quoted in Futrell, vol. 1, 48.
86. Ira C. Eaker, Maj. Gen. James E. Fechet: Chief of the Air Corps,
19271931, Air Force Magazine, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 8 , 9 6 ; J e f f e r y S .
Underwood, The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the
Roosevelt Administration, 19331941 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M
University Press, 1991), 3031; and Emme, 72.
87. Eaker, 96; and James Parton, The Thirty-One Year Gestation of the
Independent Air Force, Aerospace Historian 34 (September 1987): 153.
88. Futrell, vol. 1, 67.
89. Quoted in ibid., 7071.
90. Arnold, 122.
91. Quoted in Shiner, 51.
92. William Mitchell, Airplanes in National Defense, Annals of the
American Academy, M a y 1 9 2 7 , 4 2 .
93. Jeffery Underwood maintains in The Wings of Democracy t h a t t h e
failure of Mitchells controversial public appeals to produce an independent
air force caused his successorswith the notable exception of Air Corps
chief Benjamin Fouloisto work within the system to secure their goal.
While this was certainly true of many airmen, Maj Gen Frank Andrews, the
commander of GHQ Air Force, and his chief of staff Col Hugh Knerr
sometimes resorted to controversial publicity when they thought it would
further the cause of an independent air force.
94. Mitchell, Winged Defense, 220. See also Ronald Schaffer, Wings of
Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 1718.
95. Quoted in Parton, 152.
96. Maj Gen Mason Patrick, memorandum to the War Department
adjutant general, subject: Reorganization of the Air Forces for National
Defense, 19 December 1924, Mitchell Papers, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
97. Maj Gen Clayton Bissell, transcript of oral history interview by Brig
Gen George W. Goddard, 22 February 1966, 810, AFHRA, file
K239.0512-987; and Hurley, 128.
114
Chapter 4
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117
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118
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validity of Douhets n o t i o n t h a t a t t a c k s o n c i v i l i a n m o r a l e
would be humane because they would end the war quickly
and thereby eliminate the danger of another misery in the
trenches. Westervelt, e v e n i n 1 9 1 7 , s h o w e d c o n s i d e r a b l e
insight in suggesting that in the short term, the German
attacks may have had military value in that they diverted very
considerable military potential from the fighting front for the
largely futile defense of London . In the long term, however, he
s p e c u l a t e d t h a t G e r m a n y might come to regret it. He thought
the attacks might even toughen British civilian morale o n t h e
one hand and, on the other, act as a stimulus for greater and
more destructive reprisals on the Germans by British a n d
French air forces . 24
At the end of World War I, the General Board of the Navy
made up of a group of the services seniormost officers,
necessarily nonaviators at that timeadvised the secretary on
fundamental issues affecting the life of the organization. In
1919, before Billy Mitchells b o m b i n g t e s t s , t h e b o a r d h e l d
formal hearings and explicitly advised the secretary that the
integration of aviation into the fleet was of the highest
priority. 25
Further, one should not infer that all the logic was on the
side of the aviators and that the gun club was irrational in
i t s a r g u m e n t s .2 6 Had the flying boat proven practical in timely
reconnaissance and spotting support in midocean areas in the
1920s, it might have been a better solution to the air problem
than either catapult-launched or carrier-launched aircraft .
Indeed, flying-boat technology w a s m u c h m o r e m a t u r e t h a n
that of the other craft, and aircraft operated from catapults or
platforms atop turrets probably would have reduced the fields
of fire as well as the volume and rate of fire of the main
armament. (Although aerial observation would radically
enhance the accuracy of fire, more might be lost than gained.)
Moreover, it was hard to imagine ever developing the means of
recovering such catapulted aircraft without stopping the
shipclearly suicidal in the presence of enemy surface ships
o r s u b m a r i n e s .2 7
On the other hand, if one accepted the assumption that the
decision in war would come through use of the battleship
fleets guns, then the provision of aerial spotting t h r o u g h
121
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122
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123
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124
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125
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126
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128
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p r o v i d e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e, a s w e l l a s s p o t t i n g a n d d a m a g i n g
battleships to slow them down for the great sea battle, t o b e
c o n c l u d e d b y o u r o w n b a t t l e s h i p s . This vision of surface
sailors received decreasing favor from aviators as the interwar
period wore on. For the most advanced aviators, aircraft
would win command of the sea by sinking enemy carriers , a n d
then the air arm would turn to exploitation through mining or
supporting an invasion.
Objectives
Notwithstanding the fact that implementation in war
differed from that envisioned, the preferred strategy of the
Navy remained the same. Air battles instead of battleships
won command of the sea, but the central Pacific thrust with
island hopping and base development remained the strategy.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff d i d n o t h a v e t h e p o w e r o r t h e
inclination to force the Navy into another choiceor to
p e r s u a d e D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r in the Southwest Pacific Area t o
join the Navy s s t r a t e g y . I t w o r k e d r a t h e r a s p l a n n e d , 5 9 with
t h e r e m n a n t s o f t h e J a p a n e s e f l e e t coming out to fight the
129
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130
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131
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132
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133
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134
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135
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136
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Notes
137
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138
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139
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140
METS
23. For information on Sims, see, among many others, Wheeler, William
Veazie Pratt, 149; Hagan, This Peoples Navy, 25558; David F. Trask,
William Snowden Sims: The Victory Ashore, in James C. Bradford, ed.,
Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition,
1 8 8 0 1 9 3 0 (Annapolis: USNI Press, 1990); and Elting E. Morison, Admiral
Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942). For
information on Moffett, see Trimble; Thomas C. Hone, Navy Air Leadership:
Rear Admiral William A. Moffett as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, in
Wayne Thompson, ed., Air Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, 1986), 83113; and Clark G. Reynolds, William A. Moffett: Steward
of the Air Revolution, in Bradford, 37487. Lesser known was Rear Adm
William Freeland Fullam, whose papers are in the Library of Congress, as
are those of Admiral Sims. Moffetts papers are at the Naval Academy
(microfilm copy at USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.).
For a seminal piece on the subject, see Stephen Peter Rosen, New Ways of
War: Understanding Military Innovation, International Security 1 3 ( S u m m e r
1988): 13567; and especially his Winning the Next War: Innovation and the
Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 5870, 7680,
13047, 23450.
24. As Melhorn shows, the US Navy observers in Britain during World
War I were aware of the German zeppelin operations, both against the Royal
Navy and against London, and Mitchell and others brought the idea for
such operations before the Navys General Board and the rest of the Navy
right after the war. See Melhorn, 35, 40. One of the others was Maj B. L.
Smith, USMC, and Commander Kenneth Whiting himself. See testimony,
page 991, in US Navy General Board, GB Proceedings 80, reel 12, M1493,
1918, National Archives; and testimony, page 1951, 10 March 1919, in US
Navy General Board, GB Proceedings 80, reel 13, M1493, 1919, National
Archives, respectively.
In a report on a trip to Europe that same year, Capt Henry Mustin
discussed Italian ideas on strategic bombing and British experience with a
separate air force. See Aviation Organization in Great Britain, France, and
Italy, 25 August 1919; and Capt Henry Mustin, Abstracts of Interviews
Held with Authorities in Great Britain, France and Italy, report, 1 October
1919, Mustin Papers, box 3, Library of Congress, which gives the views of
Hugh Trenchard and Sir David Beatty.
Two years earlier, Capt George Westervelt, USN, kept a diary of his trip to
England, in which he speaks of the relative invulnerability of the Germans
bombing London and their barbarity in doing so. See Off to War, diary,
page 27, E. E. Wilson Papers, box 22, USNA Special Collections; and Adm
William V. Pratt, USN, Some Aspects of Our Air Policy: An Argument from
the Viewpoint of American Principles and of the Law, February 1926,
Record Group 4, NWC History Collection.
The staff presentations at the Naval War College increasingly included
allusions to the possibility of air attack against enemy industry or civilian
moraleor the possibility of such attacks on the United Statesas
141
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143
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
remarked that one should in the beginning of his study definitely eliminate
from his mind the idea that aircraft will revolutionize naval warfare.
35. Trimble, 67; Westervelt, in Statement of Captain G. C. Westervelt,
also argued in 1925 for the creation of a separate aviation corps within the
Navythough he was resolutely opposed to any separate air force.
36. Barlow, 4.
37. Trimble, 6786; Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The
Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis: USNI Press, 1991), 176; and
idem, William A. Moffett, in Bradford, 374. Theodore Taylor, in T h e
Magnificent Mitscher (New York: W. W. Norton, 1954), 8889, shows that
Mitscher shared the harsh feelings on the parts of some aviators toward
their seniors who went to flight training as senior officers, seemingly to
preempt the top commands in naval aviation without having paid their
dues.
38. Reynolds, Towers, 319, 432; and Trimble, 78.
39. Rear Adm Nathan C. Twining, USN, USS New Mexico, at San Pedro,
Calif., to Captain Mustin, aboard the USS Aroostook, letter, 24 December
1919, Mustin Papers, box 7, Library of Congress.
40. Westervelt, Statement of Captain G. C. Westervelt.
41. Hurley, 2425.
42. Commander H. C. Dinger, USN, Aviation Abroad, testimony, in US
Navy General Board, 23 August 1918, GB Proceedings 80, M1493, 1918,
National Archives. In Aviation Organization in Great Britain, France, and
Italy, report to the secretary of the Navy, 25 August 1919, Mustin Papers,
box 3, Library of Congress, Capt Henry Mustin, USN, expressed a contrary
view. He remarked on a general tendency toward centralization of the
management of airpower, including naval airpower, in approving terms. He
also cited that the main opposition to the Air Ministry and the RAF in
Britain lay within the ranks of the Royal Navy. See also Commander J. L.
Callan, USNRF, to Capt Henry Mustin, USN, Memo for Captain Mustin, 3
July 1919, Mustin Papers, box 3, Library of Congress, which reports on
their visit to the HMS Furious a n d h e r c a p t a i n s a d v i c e u r g i n g t h a t t h e
United States not follow the British example.
43. Vice Adm F. W. Pennoyer Jr., USN, Retired, Outline of US Carrier
Development, 19111942, draft, 17 December 1968, E. E. Wilson Papers,
binder 7, USNA Special Collections.
44. Lt Commander H. T. Bartlett, USN, Mission of Aircraft with the
Fleet, USNI Proceedings 4 5 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 1 9 ) : 7 2 9 4 1 ; C r a v e n , N a v a l
Aviation, 18191; idem, Naval Aviation and a United Air Service, USNI
Proceedings 4 7 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 2 1 ) : 3 0 7 2 1 ; C o m m a n d e r D . E . C u m m i n g s , T h e
Air Detachment, USNI Proceedings 46 (January 1920): 89194; idem, Use
of Aircraft in Naval Warfare, USNI Proceedings 47 (November 1921):
167788; Lt Forrest P. Sherman, Naval Aircraft in International Law, USNI
Proceedings 5 1 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 2 5 ) : 2 5 8 6 4 ; i d e m , A i r W a r f a r e , U S N I
Proceedings 52 (January 1926): 6271; idem, Some Aspects of Carrier and
Cruiser Design, USNI Proceedings 5 6 ( N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 0 ) : 9 9 7 1 0 0 2 ; L t
144
METS
145
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146
METS
58. Clearly, the idea of independent carrier task forces antedated Pearl
Harbor and the lost battleships, having its genesis in part in the annual
fleet exercises dating from the late 1920s. See Turnbull and Lord; Hayes,
5 4 5 5 ; Reynolds, Towers, 272, 292; idem, The U.S. Fleet-in-Being Strategy
of 1942, 10911; and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval
Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield, 1976), 305.
59. It is quite possible that ORANGE resistance will cease when
isolation is complete and before steps to reduce military strength on
ORANGE soil are necessary. In either case the operations imposed upon
BLUE will require a series of bases westward from Oahu, and will require
the BLUE Fleet to advance westward with an enormous train, in order to be
prepared to seize and establish bases. Nimitz, Thesis on Tactics, 35.
60. Baer, 127.
61. Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral
Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 18297, 46873; E. B. Potter,
Nimitz (Annapolis: USNI Press, 1970), 271; Thomas J. Cutler, Greatest of
All Sea Battles, Naval History 8 ( S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r 1 9 9 4 ) : 1 0 1 8 ; J a c k
Sweetman, Leyte Gulf, USNI Proceedings 120 (October 1994): 5658; and
Milan N. Vego, The Sho-1 Plan, USNI Proceedings 120 (October 1994):
6163.
62. Kennedy, 303.
63. Buell, Preparing for World War II, 45; Potter, Bull Halsey, 3 4 6 ; a n d
Towers, Strategic Employment of Naval Forces.
64. Melhorn, 21; Capt W. D. Puleston, USN, Retired, The Probable
Effect on American National Defense of the United Nations and the Atomic
Bomb, USNI Proceedings 72 (August 1946): 101729; Chester W. Nimitz,
The Future Employment of Naval Forces (a paper expressing the views of
Fleet Admiral Nimitz on the function of naval forces in maintaining the
future security of the United States), 1947, Whitehead Papers, box 648,
Special Collections, National Museum of Naval Aviation, Pensacola, Fla.;
Adm Arthur W. Radford, USN, Statement of Arthur W. Radford, Admiral
United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet . . . before the Armed
Services Committee of the House of Representatives Investigating the B-36
[1949], Halsey Papers, box 51, Library of Congress; Adm Raymond A.
S p r u a n c e , S t a t e m e n t b y R . A . S p r u a n c e , A d m i r a l , U S Navy, Retired,
Delivered before the House Armed Services Committee [1949?], Halsey
Papers, box 51, Library of Congress; and Adm John H. Towers, USN, draft
speech [195153], Towers Papers, box 4, Library of Congress.
65. Friedman, 3.
66. Reynolds, T o w e r s , 50745; Aircraft Carrier, staff presentation,
Naval War College, 4 February 1943, Record Group 4, NWC History
Collection; Taylor, 321; and Fast Carrier Task Force, staff presentation,
Naval War College, 26 July 1945, page 1, Record Group 4, NWC History
Collection.
6 7 . T h o m a s B . B u e l l , The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis: USNI Press, 1987), 38586; Statement
147
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148
METS
the single most serious problem facing the Navy at that time; and
Friedman, 3.
78. Hodermarsky, 169; and Friedman, 17.
79. David A. Rosenberg, American Postwar Air Doctrine and
Organization: The Navy Experience, in Air Power and Warfare: Proceedings
of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy,
1820 Oct, 1978, ed. Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 24570; and idem, Reality and
Responsibility: Power and Process in Making of United States Nuclear
Strategy, 194568, The Journal of Strategic Studies 9 (March 1986): 3552.
8 0 . A d m J a m e s D . W a t k i n s , U S N , The Maritime Strategy (Annapolis:
USNI Press, 1986); John J. Mearsheimer, A Strategic Misstep: The
Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe, International Security 11 (Fall
1986): 357; Sean OKeefe, Interview: Be Careful What You Ask For, USNI
Proceedings 1 1 9 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 9 3 ) : 7 3 7 6 ; G e n C a r l E . M u n d y , U S M C ,
Coping with Change: The Department of the Navy and the Future,
Strategic Review 22 (Winter 1994): 2024; and Geoffrey Till, Maritime
Power in the Twenty-First Century, The Journal of Strategic Studies 1 7
(March 1994): 17699.
149
Chapter 5
France
F r a n c e in the interwar period provides an excellent example
of how the lack of effective and appropriate air doctrine
reduced a nation from a premier air power at the end of World
W a r I to a second-rate force at the outbreak of World War II.
Ineffective air performance in 1940 played a decisive role in
the defeat of France . The weakness of larme de lair d i d n o t
151
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a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t . 4 I n c o n t r a s t t o G e r m a n a r m y d o c t r i n e,
French operational doctrine made little mention of airpower
except in its reconnaissance and observation roles. Though
revised in 1936, the principles of French army doctrine
remained basically unchanged throughout the interwar period.
Prior to 1925, the primary activity of the French air force
w a s s u p p o r t i n g t h e a r m ys g r o u n d c a m p a i g n s in Morocco. In
the French air service journal, most discussion concerned the
t a c t i c a l and support aspects of aviation . 5 B y t h e m i d - 1 9 2 0 s ,
however, French airmen had begun to chafe in this
s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e . A s t h e a r m ys new Maginot Line d e v o u r e d a
massive share of appropriations, funds available for air force
modernization shrank. By tradition, French officers were not
encouraged to openly disagree with official operational
d o c t r i n e, s o a i r m e n s o u g h t a m e a n s o f e n c o u r a g i n g t h e r o l e o f
airpower and the independence of the air force by discussing
the concepts of the Italian general Giulio Douhet. The first
discussion of Douhet s t h o u g h t a p p e a r e d i n Revue Maritime in
1 9 2 7 . 6 In the early 1930s, French officers published books
a n d a r t i c l e s t h a t c o m m e n t e d f a v o r a b l y o n D o u h e ts t h e o r i e s .7
A n a v i a t i o n j o u r n a l , Les Ales, t r a n s l a t e d a l a r g e p a r t o f
D o u h e t s T h e C o m m a n d o f t h e Air ( 1 9 2 1 ) i n t o F r e n c h .8
D o u h e t s s t a t u r e a s a m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t p r o v i d e d F r e n c h
airmen with a legitimate means of mobilizing popular and
political support for the creation of an independent air force. 9
Part of the independence campaign of French airmen was
realized in 1928 with the establishment of the Air Ministry,
which for the first time assured airmen and their views of
limited access to the top defense councils. Although the air
service reported to the Air Ministry in peacetime, in wartime it
r e m a i n e d s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e a r m y. Only in 1933 did the air
force officially become a separate branch of the military. The
service found its independence still limited, however, because
the High Command of the armed forces set objectives and
provided strategic direction for all the armed forcesand the
a r m y dominated the High Command. In the interwar period,
only three generalsPhilippe Petain , Maxime Weygand, a n d
Maurice-Gustave Gamelin h e l d t h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d . A l l
were army officers, and none had more than a minimal
understanding of airpower. Army and air force u n d e r s t a n d i n g
153
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154
CORUM
155
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156
CORUM
157
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i m p o r t a n c e o f s u p p o r t a v i a t i o n f o r t h e a r m y, b u t t h e
development of the strategic air force remained their top priority.
The replacement of Cot with Guy LeChambre as air minister
killed any hope for real reform in the air force. L e C h a m b r e
disbanded the strategic air force t h a t C o t had tried to create,
and new production plans gave fighter planes top priority. 28
The paratroop force created by Cot m e t t h e s a m e f a t e , a n d n o
one seemed interested in incorporating antiaircraft defense,
civil defense, and fighter defense under one command. With
t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e a r m y s H i g h C o m m a n d , L e C h a m b r e
rescinded some of Cot s most significant reformsorganizing a
bomber force under air force command and placing all fighters
for home defense under a single command. The bomber a n d
fighter groups reverted to the direct control of army r e g i o n a l
commanders. General Gamelin i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e p r i m a r y d u t y
of airpower lay in protecting the army from enemy air
a t t a c k , 2 9 nullifying previous attempts to instill an offensive
orientation in the French air force.
At the outbreak of World War II, in many respects, French air
doctrine e x h i b i t e d l i t t l e c h a n g e f r o m 1 9 1 8 . F i g h t e r u n i t s
defended specific sectors, and air units fell under the
jurisdiction and direct control of army regional commanders.
Although the French air force remained by doctrine a n a r m y
support force, few updates of operational doctrine for support
operations had occurred. For most of the interwar period, the
French air force showed little interest in dive-bombers or attack
aviation . The air war in Spain from 1936 to 1939, however, led
to a renaissance in doctrinal thought among French air force
officers. French military journals reported and commented in
great detail on the air operations of both sides in Spain . Between
1937 and 1939, German and Italian use of dive-bombers a n d
b o m b e r s in the interdiction and close air support roles received
favorable coverage on numerous occasions in both Revue de
lArme de lAir a n d Revue Militaire Gnrale .3 0 Air force general
Maginel cited the successful use of attack aviation a g a i n s t
ground troops in the Battle of Guadalajara in 1937 as a model of
airpower in support operations.31
Unfortunately, this innovative analysis within the officer
corps came too late to enable a revision of tactical support
d o c t r i n e t h r o u g h o u t t h e a i r f o r c e. Moreover, the army w a s
158
CORUM
Italy
Although Giulio Douhet is virtually the only name generally
associated with interwar Italian aviation, the Italian military
produced other notable aviation theorists whose influence, in
Italy a t l e a s t , s u r p a s s e d D o u h e ts. The thesis of T h e C o m m a n d
of the Air, which urged the development of a strategic air force
that would strike decisively at the enemys homeland, might
have found popularity in Europe , but Douhets home country by
159
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160
CORUM
161
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
mechanized Nationalist a n d I t a l i a n a r m y u n i t s , e n a b l e d t h e
Nationalist army t o m a k e r a p i d a d v a n c e s a c r o s s t h e
R e p u b l i c a n F r o n t t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , isolating Catalonia
from the rest of the republic. 45
The only Douhetian-style strategic bombing executed by the
Italian air force i n t h e S p a n i s h W a r involved the bombing of
Barcelona in March 1938. Benito Mussolini, perhaps Italy s
last true believer in Douhetian theory, ordered massive
bombing of Barcelona by the Italian air force , h o p i n g t o b r e a k
the will of the Catalonian population and swiftly end the war.
Although the bombing produced over two thousand
c a s u a l t i e s ,4 6 t h e c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t B a r c e l o n a had precisely
the opposite effect, as the Germans and many Italians had
predicted. Rather than breaking the will of the civilian
population, it angered them and strengthened their will to
resist. After the bombing, t h e R e p u b l i c a n r e t r e a t h a l t e d , a n d
the Catalonians held the front with renewed enthusiasm.
Catalonia would not collapse for another year. 47
By the outbreak of World War II, the Italian air force boasted a
balanced force of bombers and fighters , as well as assault a n d
reconnaissance aircraft. In Spain the air force had extensively
practiced its primary operational doctrine, a s a d v o c a t e d b y
Mecozzi, and had found it effective. The poor performance of the
Italian air force during World War II resulted not from poor
doctrine but the incapacity of Italian industry to produce aircraft
and engines that could match those of its opposing air forces,
either in quantity or quality. Even if Italy had made the air force
its top priority and had poured all available resources into
aviation, its financial and technological position still would have
proved too weak to have maintained a first-rate air force by
World War II. Italy, whose best aircraft lacked modern radios,
bombsights, and navigation equipment, provides an example of
a nation whose strategic ambitions far outreached its fairly
limited capabilities.
Soviet Union
In the interwar period, the Soviet Union b e g a n w i t h t h e
weakest air force a n d a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y of the major powers.
From this disadvantageous position, the new Soviet Union
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d u r i n g t h e e a r l y 1 9 3 0 s .5 0 As always, Tukhachevski t h o u g h t o f
aviation not as a subordinate or an independent entity but as
an integral part of a joint force, with the objective of driving
deep into the enemys rear with the intention of destroying his
armed forces.
One finds the most complete exposition of Tukhachevskis
concept of airpower and the deep battle in the Soviet army
field service regulations of 1936, in which the employment of
the air force plays a central role. These regulations specify in
detail the roles of ground-attack aviation , fighter aviation, and
l i g h t b o m b e r s . 51 The air force had as its first objective the
annihilation of the enemy air force, which would then free
airpower to act decisively against enemy columns and reserves
i n t h e a p p r o a c h a n d p u r s u i t p h a s e s o f t h e b a t t l e . 5 2 Another
important aviation mission entailed supporting ground forces
by silencing enemy artillery. 53
Tukhachevski d i d n o t i g n o r e s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g i n h i s
theories. In 1932 he declared that, in the future, independent air
operations, which he defined as strategic bombing a n d a i r b o r n e
operations, would prove decisive in war. Tukhachevski predicted
that in the near future, improved aerodynamic design would
enable aircraft to fly fast, at great range, and at high altitude.
Thus, he foresaw that, in a decade or so, strategic bombing,
coupled with airborne drops, could seize the enemys rail
systems and paralyze the mobilization of enemy forces, thus
turning previous operational concepts inside out.54
In the years of the civil war (191822), the Red Air Force
functioned purely as a support and auxiliary force for the
a r m y.5 5 P r o v i s i o n a l f i e l d r e g u l a t i o n s o f 1 9 2 5 e m p h a s i z e d
support of the ground forces, a n d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 s m o s t a i r u n i t s
w e r e a t t a c h e d t o g r o u n d u n i t s .5 6 However, the concept of
independent strategic airpower c a u g h t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n o f t h e
young services officers. The most notable early theorist of
Soviet aviation, later chief of staff of the air force, was Gen A.
N . L a p c h i n s k y, w h o i n 1 9 2 0 w r o t e a b o o k a n d s e r i e s o f
articles outlining how strategic bombing would become a
major weapon of modern warfare. 57 I n t h e e a r l y 1 9 2 0 s , a t a
time when the Soviets still flew a motley collection of obsolete
aircraft left over from World War I and the civil war,
L a p c h i n s k y laid the theoretical groundwork for the creation of
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Germany
One can attribute a great part of the success of the
W e h r m a c h t from 1939 to 1941 to the effective use of airpower.
Of all the Continental nations after World War I, G e r m a n y
made the most thorough and comprehensive study of airpower
and, by means of analysis, managed to transform airpower
theory into a highly effective war doctrine by the outbreak of
World War II.
Although the interwar period featured many German
civilian commentators and theorists of airpower, their impact
on military organization and doctrine proved relatively minor.
Airpower thought i n G e r m a n y r e m a i n e d c e n t e r e d i n t h e a r m y
and, later, in the air force General Staff. After World War I,
with Germany forbidden to have an air force, t h e a r m y
maintained a shadow Air Staff within the army General Staff.
The enormous body of experience that the Germans had
acquired by 1918 proved advantageous in the creation of
airpower theory i n G e r m a n y. During World War I, the German
air service had fought every kind of air campaign tactical,
strategic, a n d s u p p o r t. The German military contained a large
body of highly experienced air commanders and Air Staff
officers. As early as 1916, the German air service h a d
acquired a centralized command. In fact, in 1916 the air
service p r o p o s e d t h a t i t b e c o m e a n i n d e p e n d e n t b r a n c h o f t h e
armed forces, equal to the navy a n d t h e a r m y.6 8 T h e a r m y
General Staff strongly supported this proposal. Against strong
navy o p p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e i d e a f o u n d e r e d . C e r t a i n
principles, nevertheless, were established at this time. For
example, all aviation matters, from aircraft deployment and
production to antiaircraft artillery a n d c i v i l d e f e n s e , w e r e
centralized and placed under the control of the air service. 69
In late 1916, the air service acquired its own General Staff.
The German air service also enjoyed special prestige after the
war. By the close of the campaign in 1918, the air service
found itself the only sufficiently viable fighting force in the
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170
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the war will begin with a simultaneous attack of the air fleetsthe
weapon which is the most prepared and the fastest means of attacking
the enemy. Their target is, however, not the major cities or industrial
power, but the enemy air force, and only after its suppression can the
offensive arm be directed toward other targets. . . . It is stressed that
all major troop mobilization centers are worthwhile and easy targets.
The disruption of the personnel and materiel mobilization is a primary
mission of the aerial offensive. 75
Von Seeckt i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e G e r m a n a r m y b e c o m e t h e m o s t
a i r - m i n d e d i n t h e w o r l d . A l t h o u g h G e r m a n y was disarmed in
the air, von Seeckt o r d e r e d t h a t t h e a r m y keep 180 pilot
officers to provide the core of an Air Staff. 76 He initiated a
program of secret testing, training, and development of
a i r p o w e r i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n .7 7 G e r m a n o p e r a t i o n a l
regulations that were developed under von Seeckt between
1921 and 1923 contained extensive discussion of airpower on
b o t h t h e s t r a t e g i c a n d t a c t i c a l levels.
The German army of the interwar period maintained a
thorough study of airpower theories and technologies of other
nations. Writings and speeches of such air leaders as Gen
Billy Mitchell, Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard , a n d G e n J . F . C .
Fuller w e r e q u i c k l y t r a n s l a t e d a n d d i s s e m i n a t e d t h r o u g h o u t
t h e G e r m a n m i l i t a r y. 78 D o u h e t, h o w e v e r , r e c e i v e d l i t t l e
attention from German air thinkers in the 1920s.
Wilberg, w h o h a d m a d e h i s r e p u t a t i o n i n W o r l d W a r I a s a
leader in the development of close air support , also led the Air
Staff in developing concepts of strategic air war a s e a r l y a s
1 9 2 4 . T h a t y e a r , t h e R e i c h s w e h r secret Air Staff conducted an
air war game that included a plan for a strategic bombing
campaign against France. The Germans studied French
a r m a m e n t s i n d u s t r y, l i s t i n g t h e m o s t v i t a l f a c t o r i e s a n d
i n s t a l l a t i o n s s u p p o r t i n g t h e F r e n c h a r m y and air force , a n d
assigning target priorities. They estimated that the destruction
of 20 to 30 vital factories could severely hamper French
a r m a m e n t s p r o d u c t i o n . 79
By 1926 postwar studies and air war games conducted by
the General Staff culminated in a comprehensive air doctrine,
e x p r e s s e d a s Guidelines for the Operational Air War, 8 0 which
described the air force of the future as, essentially, two forces.
One would provide aviation s u p p o r t f o r t h e a r m y, including
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , artillery spotting, and close air support . The
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172
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174
CORUM
Conclusion
During the interwar period, each major Continental air
power experienced a debate between two basic airpower
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176
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Notes
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57. Ibid. Lapchinsky stated that the airplane enters the field of military
equipment as a new, independent factor of warand not just as a support
weapon. Groehler, 130.
58. Manfred Zeidler, Luftkriegsdenken und Offizierausbildung an der
M o s k a u e r Z u k o v s k i j A k a d e m i e i m J a h r e 1 9 2 6 , Militrgeschichtliche
Mitteilungen 27 (1980): 12774, especially 15354.
59. The best overview of the German-Russian military relationship is
M a n f r e d Z e i d l e r s R e i c h s w e h r u n d R o t e A r m e e , 1 9 2 0 1 9 3 3 ( M u n i c h :
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993). On air force training, see especially 11217 and
17588.
60. See Kilmarx, 1 2 3 .
61. Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air Force since 1918 (New York: Stein &
Day, 1977), 56.
62. Ibid., 75.
63. Howson, 24 and 303.
64. Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air
A t t a c k , 1 9 1 1 1 9 4 5 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : S m i t h s o n i a n I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s ,
1989), 97102.
65. Ibid., 115.
66. Kilmarx, 1 2 3 .
67. Kenneth Whiting, Soviet Aviation and Air Power under Stalin,
19281941, in Soviet Aviation and Air Power, 63.
68. Dr. Klemp, ed., Die Luftstreitkrfte des Deutschen Reiches
(Potsdam: Bundesarchiv Militrarchiv, W-10/50845, ca. 1931), 1732.
69. John Morrow, T h e G r e a t W a r i n t h e A i r (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 15860.
70. Ibid., 30910.
71. Matthew Cooper, The German Air Force, 19221945: An Anatomy of
Failure ( L o n d o n : J o n e s , 1 9 8 1 ) , 3 7 9 .
72. James Corum, The Old Eagle as Phoenix: The Luftstreitkrfte
Creates an Operational Air War Doctrine, 19191920, Air Power History,
Spring 1992, 1321.
73. From January to September 1918, when the Allies had numerical
superiority in the air, the Luftstreitkrfte shot down 3,732 Allied aircraft for
a loss of 1,099. From Richard Suchenwirth, The Development of the German
Air Force, 1919 1 9 3 9 , USAF Historical Study 160 (New York: Arno Press,
1968), 2.
74. Heeresdienstvorschrift 487, Fhrung und Gefecht der Verbundenen
Waffen, T e i l 1 , S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 1 , p a r s . 7 7 a n d 3 1 4 .
7 5 . H a n s v o n S e e c k t , G e d a n k e n e i n e s S o l d a t e n (Berlin: Verlag fr
Kulturpolitik, 1929), 9395.
7 6 . S e e S u c h e n w i r t h , 5.
77. The best work on the German air program in Russia is Manfred
Zeidlers Reichswehr und Rote Armee, 1920 1 9 3 3 ( M u n i c h : R . O l d e n b o u r g
Verlag, 1993).
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other words, the Air Service had yet to codify itself in any
meaningful way; it still awaited the types of Progressivist
reforms that Elihu Root had introduced to the Old Army at
t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y . 13
Because of the above problems, the Air Service was clearly in
a difficult position. Would it survive its own demobilization
and, by extension, the growing parsimony and isolationism of
postwar America? Would it shape its own intellectual destiny,
ranging from basic operating principles through a working
theory of airpower, or would it remain under the strict control
of the Armys old guard, who largely dismissed airpower as
a i r b o r n e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o r a r t i l l e r y? A s l o n g a s t h e s e
questions remained open, the Air Service w a s v u l n e r a b l e t o
the depredations of Army traditionalists, who responded to
free-thinking airmen like Billy Mitchell with open suspicion, if
not outright hostility. (General Pershing, for example, once
a t t r i b u t e d M i t c h e l l s z e a l o t r y t o a n i n s i d i o u s B o l s h e v i k
bug.) 1 4 Additionally, a delimited and ill-defined Air Service w a s
in danger of never realizing what the dervishes of airpower
wanted mostcoequal status with the Army and Navy a n d a
doctrine u l t i m a t e l y c o m m i t t e d t o i n d e p e n d e n t s t r a t e g i c
bombardment against the vital centers of an enemy state.
To resolve the above questions favorably and to ensure that
American airpower realized its full potential, early air leaders
a n d t h i n k e r s s u c h a s M i t c h e l l, P a t r i c k , Gorrell , M i l l i n g,
S h e r m a n, Benjamin Benny Foulois , and Henry Hap Arnold
haltingly developed an ad hoc, four-part strategy designed
either to create new roles and missions for the Air Corps or to
s t e a l o l d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a w a y f r o m t h e A r m y a n d N a v y.
Specifically, the strategy sought to (1) redefine America as an
airpower rather than a maritime nation; (2) demonstrate and
publicize the versatility of airpower in peacetime roles; (3)
create both a corporate Air Corps identity through political
m a n e u v e r i n g a n d a n i n d e p e n d e n t a i r f o r c e through legislation;
and (4) perhaps most importantly, develop a unique theory of
a i r w a r f a r e u n e s c o r t e d h i g h - a l t i t u d e p r e c i s i o n d a y l i g h t
bombardment (HAPDB) against the key nodes of an enemys
industrial infrastructure. (The development of air theory and
d o c t r i n e became the special responsibility of the Air Service
Field Officers School [ASFOS , 192021], which the Army later
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b o m b u s f e r v i d u s , a d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k o n A m e r i c a s
industrial triangle could unfold in the following way:
Simultaneously, the mass of the Allied air forces have been flown, or
shipped under submarine and patrol boat convoy, from Ireland to
Newfoundland and are prepared to launch air attacks, from air bases
in eastern Canada, against any targets of their choice in the vital
industrial heart of our country. (Emphasis in original)4 5
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The Navys r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e c o m p l a i n t s w a s t o r e s c i n d t h e
MacArthur-Pratt Agreement i n 1 9 3 5 . 6 8 As a result, the Air
Corps s ultimate intrusion into the Navys d o m a i n w a s n o t
attributable to mutual cooperation or concessions to its
complaints. Instead, it was attributable to the Air Corpss
ability to provide a clearly stated alternative to sea-based
n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e, which then attracted the support of a very
powerful friendPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt .
But who specifically provided the Air Corpss blueprint for
n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e in the mid- to late-1930s? Not surprisingly, it
was ACTS and the Air Corps Board (ACB), a g r o u p r e s u r r e c t e d
b y t h e B a k e r B o a r d i n 1 9 3 5 . 69 F r o m 1 9 3 5 t o 1 9 4 0 , t h e
revitalized ACB worked side by side with ACTS at Maxwell
Field . Its members usually included the ACTS c o m m a n d a n t
and assistant commandant as ex officio members; a director
of the board, who was usually its senior permanent member
(Col Douglas B. Netherwood , Lt Col Edgar B. Sorensen, a n d
Col Robert Kauch , for example); and five to eight officers and
civilians who had an almost incestuous working relationship
with ACTS . I n t h e l a s t c a s e , b o m b e r p r o p o n e n t L a u r e n c e
Kuter recalled that the school thought it could get some
things through the chiefs office via the board that it couldnt
any other way [and that] the board was quite happy to have
t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t t o o . 7 0 As a result of this close association,
for several years ACTS formally scrubbed all ACB r e p o r t s t h a t
went to the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC); t h e
board ensured that its studies were compatible with the
p r i n c i p l e s t a u g h t a t t h e T a c t i c a l S c h o o l; a n d t h e m u t u a l
cooperation between both organizations ensured that they
spoke with one voice, especially when they developed the
theoretical and doctrinal language that the Air Corps
increasingly used to claim a role in offshore defense.
In developing the above language, the ACB fulfilled a
charter that was both theoretical and practical. On the
theoretical level, its role was to study Air Corps p r o b l e m s a n d
issues that involved considerable study and research, as
assigned by the chief of the Air Corps under the provisions of
AR 95-20 (9 November 1934). 7 1 In 1936 Lt Col R. M. Jones,
General Arnold s executive officer, highlighted two of these
problems and issues in particular. First, he asked whether the
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o r d e r , a n d s u p p o r t g r o u n d a n d n a v a l f o r c e s . 78 However, since
airpower was inherently strategic, it also insisted that the Air
Corps develop, operate, and maintain follow-on air forces for
defensive and possibly offensive strategic operations. 79 (Why?
Because long-range aviation constituted a new type of force; it
influenced ground a n d sea action yet operated outside their
domains; and it seriously complicated an opponents ability to
wage war.)8 0 Second, the report identified potential target sets
for air bombardment that deliberately obscured the distinction
between tactical, operational, and strategic-level objectives.
The suggested targets included but were not limited to troop
cantonments or concentrations, choke points in lines of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , enemy air forces and naval vessels, fuel
storage plants, power grids, munitions and aircraft factories,
and assorted types of refineries.8 1 Last, ACB-31s definition of
air-based coastal defense was also premeditatedly vague. Yes,
it included protecting shipping in coastal zones, guarding
military and civilian facilities, preventing invasion, and
ensuring the security of vital military and commercial coastal
areas. However, the most effective way that land-based
aviation could accomplish these objectives was to conduct
unrestricted counterair operations against distant
installations or to thwart the creation and use of staging areas
for a continental attack. In either case, the need for long-range
aircraft became a matter of prime importance.82
In the case of ACB-35, Employment of Aircraft in Defense of
the Continental United States, the Air Corps classified it Secret
and did not release it until 7 May 1939, even though ACB h a d
finished the original version in late 1935. 83 Nevertheless, the
report passed from one influential person to another,
especially between those individuals interested in providing
the newly minted GHQ Air Force a shadow doctrine. As a
result, ACB-35 augmented the doctrinal vocabulary provided
by its predecessor. Both reports popularized the concept of a
strategic strike force dedicated to destroying a spectrum of
targets in the name of coastal-continental defense. ACB-35,
however, made an even bigger claimthat the strategic
bomber was the ideal instrument of hemispheric defense and
beyond. The report noted that the possibility of applying
military force against the vital structure of a nation directly
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What was the reason for such hostility? Maj Gen Mason
Patrick, while head of the Air Service, argued politely that in
the case of the Army, its leaders were hidebound Neanderthals
who did not realize the full potential of airpower and therefore
took three years to acknowledge they even had an Air
Service . 91 In turn, Robert Bullard claimed that the directors of
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temporarily gained a p o t e n t i a l n e w a d v o c a t e i n t h e a s s i s t a n t
secretary of war for air affairs.116
Limited but incremental progress continued with the Drum
Board in 1933, although frustrated airmen now defined a board
of inquiry as something long, narrow, and wooden.117 T h e
boards membersincluding the commandant of the Army War
College, t h e c h i e f o f t h e c o a s t a r t i l l e r y , a n d o t h e r A r m y
stalwartsrejected the idea of an independent Air Corps, b u t
they did endorse (yet again) the creation of a semiautonomous
GHQ Air Force to conduct independent operations. Conspiracy-
minded airmen like Haywood Hansell rightfully worried that the
proposal was part of a divide-and-conquer strategy by the Army.
If the staffs of OCAC and GHQ Air Force became bureaucratic
rivals, as Army traditionalists hoped, they would quickly
squander their political capital by battling each other rather
than their parent service. (The hope was understandable but
also unfounded. Air Corps leaders successfully prevented the
rivalry from becoming unmanageable.)
L a s t , i n 1 9 3 4 t h e B a k e r B o a r d rejected the Air Corpss
familiar demands for independence and a substantive role in
national defense, but the rival Howell Commission d e c i d e d , a s
Perera observed, that the Air Service h a d n o w p a s s e d b e y o n d
its former position as a useful auxiliary and should in the
future be considered an important means of exerting directly
t h e w i l l o f t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f . 118 A s a r e s u l t , t h e
commission called for a highly mobile GHQ Air Force t h a t
would operate as an independent striking unit and not
merely as a strategic reserve. The Army, i n t h e m i s t a k e n h o p e
that the Air Corps would divide itself into pro- and anti-GHQ
factions, finally agreed to the idea.
On 1 March 1935 the semiautonomous GHQ Air Force
became a reality but only after multiple aviation boards and
commissions had sponsored a number of incremental reforms.
This political victory, however, was merely the third
component of a four-part strategy. The remaining part
required the Air Corps to develop a new theory and doctrine of
w a r f a r e t h a t m a x i m i z e d t h e i n d e p e n d e n t use of airpower. The
responsibility to develop this theory and doctrine devolved
almost immediately to the Air Corps Tactical School.
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o f F e r r y i n g C o m m a n d. B r i g G e n K e n W a l k e r h e a d e d 5 t h
B o m b e r C o m m a n d in the Pacific theater . O n 5 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 ,
he died while leading a daylight bombing attack against
Japanese shipping at Rabaul, New Britain . (For his
conspicuous leadership during the raid, Walker
posthumously received the Medal of Honor.) Lt Gen Harold
Lee George guided Air Transport Command, which became
Military Airlift Command d u r i n g t h e c o l d w a r . M a j G e n
Haywood Hansell c o m m a n d e d 2 1 s t B o m b e r C o m m a n d i n t h e
Pacific until he ran afoul of General Arnold . 1 3 1 L a u r e n c e
Kuter, w h o b e c a m e a f o u r - s t a r g e n e r a l a n d c o m m a n d e r o f
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) i n t h e
cold war, served as deputy chief of the Air Staff for plans.132
Muir Fairchild , a n o t h e r f u t u r e f o u r - s t a r g e n e r a l , w a s t h e
intellectual father of the Strategic Bombing Survey a n d a
member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee , which was
one of the most influential planning agencies in the wartime
armed services.1 3 3 Ultimately, the ACTS Bomber Mafia was
an inordinately talented collective brain with a unique vision
and the resolve to bring it to life. As Kuter later observed,
Nothing could stop us; I mean this was a zealous crowd.134
The zealotry, as already pointed out, involved unescorted
HAPDB against an enemy nations vital centers . T h a n k s t o t h e
initial efforts of Olds , Walker , and Wilson , the concept first
appeared in 1932 and went as follows:
217
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
218
FABER
219
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
220
FABER
221
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
An Open Conclusion
222
FABER
223
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
224
FABER
Notes
225
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
bombing raids. (The deepest raid penetrated 160 miles into enemy
territory.) On the negative side, Americas industrial mobilization was so
chaotic that its nascent aeronautical industry provided only 196
indigenously produced aircraft before the armistice. Further, wartime
bombing results were so limited, due to inadequate equipment and
personnel, that anything but the tactical value of airpower remained in
doubt. See Mason Patrick, The United States in the Air (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, Doran, 1928), 44, 4950; Air Service Newsletter, 1 0 J a n u a r y
1920, 9; Lt Col Herbert Dargue, AEF, to director of military aeronautics,
letter, 9 November 1918, 13; and William C. Sherman, Air Warfare (New
York: Ronald Press, 1926), 4.
9. Maurer, 9, 11, 13.
10. See Patrick, 83, 89; and Maj Thomas D. Milling, Air Power in
National Defense, ca. 1928, 3, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-122.
11. See Statement of Brigadier General H. A. Drum, Assistant Chief of
Staff, Operations and Training Division, War Department General Staff,
before Board of Aviation Inquiry, Part I, 21 September 1925, 55, AFHRA,
file no. 248.211-16D; and James L. Crowder Jr., Osage General: Major
General Clarence L. Tinker (Tinker AFB, Okla.: Office of History, Oklahoma
City Air Logistics Center, 1987), 96.
12. Barker, 1 .
13. Thomas D. Milling, The Air Service Tactical School: Its Function and
Operation, 1 9 2 4 , 1 , A F H R A , f i l e n o . 2 4 5 . 0 1 - 3 . P r o g r e s s i v i s m w a s a n
amorphous social and political movement in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. As a political movement, it advocated an active
government defense of the weak and oppressed. Its specific achievements
included the breakup of monopolies and trusts, the introduction of lower
tariffs, the popular election of senators, and the introduction of child labor
laws. In the spheres of business and education, Progressivism stressed
technicism, standardization, professionalization, formalized education,
scientific management, and timeliness and efficiency. One can argue that
Secretary of War Roots reforms, which included the introduction of the
general staff system and the further rationalization of military education,
were Progressivist acts. See Peter Karsten, Armed Progressives: The
M i l i t a r y R e o r g a n i z e s f o r t h e A m e r i c a n C e n t u r y , i n Building the
Organizational Society, ed. Jerry Israel (New York: Free Press, 1972),
197232. For a discussion on the difficulties of defining Progressivism as a
movement, see Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for the Progressive Movement,
American Quarterly 22 (Spring 1970): 2034.
14. Benjamin Foulois, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 202. More than a few airmen shared Pershings
distaste for the supercilious Mitchell. In 1919, for example, Oscar Westover
(a future Air Corps leader) complained to Maj Gen Charles Menoher that
Mitchell believes that his rank entitles him to special deference as a Group
Chief and that all other Air Service activities ought to cow-tow to him as
Chief of the Training and Operations Group. Such arrogance drove
226
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227
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
228
FABER
were merely jabbering. See Henry H. Arnold, Bill Bruce on Border Patrol
(New York: A. L. Burt, 1928), 9, 56, 88, 90, 133, 147, 149, 215.
28. Vaughan, 4445.
29. On 21 September 1938, the peripatetic Westover died in an aircraft
accident. In a fateful move for the Air Corps, Arnold succeeded him nine
days later. At the time of his death, the plain-spoken Westover, who was
also known as Tubby to his West Point classmates, was one of roughly 35
Air Corps officers who held all four of its flight ratings. See AFHRA, file nos.
168.7089-3 and 168.7089-10.
30. See Westover, radio address, 12 December 1936, 1.
31. Maj Gen Oscar Westover, chief of the Air Corps, transcript of radio
address to the Junior Birdmen of America, 4 May 1935, 2, AFHRA, file no.
168.7089-10. The inference, of course, was that these four-engined aircraft
would be bombers.
32. Ira Eaker Papers, Personal Correspondence (1935), box 3, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. Although Flying and Your Boy n e v e r a p p e a r e d
( a s c o n c e i v e d ) i n p r i n t , A r n o l d a n d E a k e r s This Flying Game (1936)
included a dedication to the Junior Birdmen of America and the Jimmie
Allen Flying Club.
33. See AFHRA, file no. 168.7023-4.
34. Quoted by Oscar Westover in Military Aviation, speech to the Aero
Club of America, Buffalo, N.Y., 7 December 1932, 16, AFHRA, file no.
168.7103-26.
35. General Pershing, who appointed the tough but fair Patrick,
expected his West Point classmate to muzzle the garrulous and therefore
subversive Mitchell. Patrick was only partially successful. However, as a
respected moderate who often (but carefully) sided with his subordinates
against the old guard, he provided the Air Service with something it sorely
neededcredibility. Also, it probably helped that Patrick was physically
unprepossessing; his false teeth whistled when he spoke and he wore a
toupee, which one unfortunate captain once pulled off while helping him
remove his flight helmet. See Partridge, 8485; and Brig Gen Ross Hoyt, A
Prisoner of War, microfilm 34472, n.p., AFHRA, file no. 168.7130.
36. See Maj Gen Grandison Gardner, Life Memories of Grandison Gardner,
bk. 1 (Memories of My Service in the U.S. Air Force and Its Ancestral
Organizations), 4 February 1952, 15, AFHRA, file no. 168.7016-1; August Air
Defense Command letter 47-6, History of the Army Air Forces, 19071947, 2
July 1947, 7, AFHRA, file no. 168.01; Lt Col Frank Lahm, to Mabel Kaplan,
letter, 17 February 1925, 3, AFHRA, file no. 167.401-4; and Arnold, Airmen
and Aircraft, 14647. To further illustrate the value of airborne fire patrols,
Secretary of War John Weeks claimed that wildfires in California increased by
23 percent when the Air Service did not provide airplanes for forest protection
in 1922. See John Weeks, Peace-Time Accomplishments of the Army, 2 1 M a y
1923, 4, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-101.
37. Gardner, 17; Patrick, 133; Weeks, 4; Lahm, 4; Alfred Goldberg, ed.,
A History of the United States Air Force, 19071957 (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
229
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Nostrand, 1957), 3435; and A. M. Jacobs, Knights of the Wing (New York:
The Century Co., 1926), 134.
3 8 . Fifty Years of Aviation History at Maxwell Air Force Base, 19101960
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Office of Information [Historian], Headquarters, Air
University, 1960), 31.
39. Ibid., 3133. Some of the items delivered included sixty-four
hundred loaves of bread, fifty-four hundred blankets, 4,516 pounds of
canned cooked meats, 1,651 pounds of bacon, 1,010 cans of evaporated
milk, and 105 boiled hams.
40. See Maurer, 299317; and Foulois, 242. An illustration of the Air
Corpss problems is that it initially flew airmail routes totaling 40,800 miles
a daynot even one-third the distance flown by the suspended contractors.
By mid-March, the Air Corpss total mileage was down to 30,900 a
dayalmost 10,000 miles less than the previous month. A considerable
number of the Air Corpss problems, however, were self-generatedits
pilots lacked sufficient instrument and night-flying training; only a few of
its aircraft had landing, navigation, or cockpit lights; and anti-icing
equipment was unavailable. Still, it didnt help that pilots flying in one
particularly stormy area of the Western Department depended on a blind
weatherman for their forecasts.
41. See Crowder, 188; and Foulois, 258.
42. See Maj Donald Wilson, Testimony before the U.S. Federal Aviation
Commission, 7 May 1935, 2, Air University Library, Documents Section,
Maxwell AFB, Ala., file no. UGK 27 US7. The post-Napoleonic assumption
that whole peoples warred against each other went unchallenged by Air
Corps strategists, who believed that no military could survive without the
sinews of wara nations people and its economy.
43. Ibid., 9 (Walker section).
44. See Brig Gen Herbert Dargue, to Maj Gen Hap Arnold, letter, 7
October 1939, 12, AFHRA, file no. 168.7119-19.
45. Wilson, 3 (Olds section). Wilson argued that Oldss scenario was
theoretically possible because our oceans were no longer impregnable
moats and because we had militarily weak neighbors who were vulnerable
to foreign control. As a result, the traditional source of Americas
inviolabilitydistanceno longer existed. See Wilson section, 6.
46. Ibid., 10 (George section). See also Harold Lee George, Principles of
War, n.d., AFHRA, file no. 248.11-9.
4 7 . Influence of Airplanes on Operations in War, n.d., 2, 17, AFHRA, file
no. 248.21-121.
48. Wilson, 9 (Webster section). Did World War II prove Webster right?
Soldiers, critics, and historians remain divided on the issue.
49. Thomas D. Milling, in Testimony of General M. M. Patrick [and
others] before the Morrow Board, 21 September 1925, 79, AFHRA, file no.
248.211-61V.
5 0 . S e e G - 2 W e e k l y P r e s s R e v i e w , 2 3 A u g u s t 1 9 2 3 , 4 (W ashington
Herald, 20 August 1923), AFHRA, file no. 248.501-91.
230
FABER
5 1 . S e e G - 2 W e e k l y P r e s s R e v i e w , 1 4 F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 3 , 2 (R ochester
Herald, 31 January 1923), AFHRA, file no. 248.501-91.
52. Alexander Graham Bell, Preparedness for Aerial Defense, address
to the National Convention of the Navy League of the United States, 1013
April 1916, 8, AFHRA, file no. 167.1-2. The Navy League saw itself neither
as pro-anything or anti-anything but as a just plain American group
dedicated to protecting the United States from invasion.
53. William Mitchell, Tactical Application of Military Aeronautics, 1 9 1 9 , 2 ,
AFHRA, file no. 248.211-130.
54. Ibid., 4, 6; William L. Mitchell, General Mitchells Startling
Testimony, Aviation 10 (7 February 1921): 165.
55. Milling, Testimony of General M. M. Patrick, 81. If the Navy was the
spearhead, the Army was the bulwarkor so Milling further argued. In reality,
this bulwark remained porous, at least against attacking aircraft. By 1936
the Armys Coast Artillery Corps still relied on sightless machine guns,
three-inch guns, and 105 mm pieces that fired 62-pound shells. In the case of
aerial defense, the normal mission was to concentrate fire on aircraft not
attacking defense batteries! Even then, the batterymen had trouble properly
aiming and firing their three-inch guns six hundred yards ahead of their
intended targets (to establish a killing zone for oncoming aircraft). See Maj Gen
A. H. Sunderland, The Coast Artillery Corps, lecture given at the Army War
College, 9 October 1936, AFHRA, file no. 168.7001-37.
56. Wilson, 8, 9 (Walker section). In his testimony, Walker cleverly used
the writings and lectures of Navy officers against their own service.
57. Ibid., 7 (Webster section).
58. Ibid., 68.
59. The Navys reaction is beyond the scope of this chapter, but
Josephus Danielss huffy response to the dangers posed by land-based
aviation to modern fleets was highly representative. According to Daniels,
no air force would get close enough to drop salt upon the tail of the Navy.
S e e New York Tribune, 8 F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 1 , 1 .
60. Quoted in Westover, Military Aviation, 9. However, did Coolidge
envision a robust national defense? One should not forget the frugal
presidents comment to Secretary of War John M. WeeksWhats all this
talk about lots of airplanes? Why not buy one airplane and let the Army
pilots take turns flying it? See Foulois, 199.
61. Lt Gen Robert L. Bullard, Army and Navy Become Mere Escorts to
Airplane in Warfare, Says Bullard, 34, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-21.
62. Millard F. Harmon, Preliminary Rough Draft on Policy for Future
Military Education of Air Corps Officers, n.d., 2, AFHRA, file no. 245.04B.
According to Grandison Gardner, Miff Harmon, who acted as ACTS
commandant and assistant commandant from 1938 to 1940, was one of
two officers Hap Arnold probably leaned on most. The other was Carl
Spaatz. See Gardner, 160.
63. Maj Oscar Westover, Effect of Air Service on Employment of Cavalry
and Coast Artillery, 23 September 1925, 1, AFHRA, file no. 168.7089-8.
231
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
232
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233
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
84. See Air Corps Board Report 35, Employment of Aircraft in Defense of
the Continental United States, annex 2, 7 May 1939, 3, AFHRA, file no.
167.5-35.
85. Ibid., annex 4, p. 1. ACB-35 based its argument on a major principle
of wareconomy of force. To use aircraft against objectives that are within
range of ground or naval weapons is to use them in lieu of rather than in
support of those weapons. See annex 4, p. 3.
86. Analytical Study of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 3.
87. Air Corps Board Report 35, 12.
88. For a thorough discussion of how FDR came to support airpower as
a favored instrument of diplomacy and national defense, see Jeffery S.
Underwood, The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the
Roosevelt Administration, 19331941 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M
University Press, 1991).
89. The evolution of bomber technology, although outside the purview of
this discussion, played a critical role in the Air Corpss success against the
Navy and in transforming a mere theory of airpower into reality. In the
1920s, bombers were cumbersome and lightly armed machines that
trundled along at 110 MPH. Their operating ceiling, bomb-carrying
capacity, and defensive firepower were also limited. Such aircraft, like the
Curtis Condor and Barling bomber, were much too vulnerable to carry out a
successful bombing campaign in the face of hostile fighters. By 1932,
however, bomber technology suddenly leapt past fighter capabilities. (The
change was attributable to innovations in large civilian aircraft, which then
positively affected bomber development.) When it appeared in 1931, the
Boeing B-9 represented a significant leap in bomber technology, although it
was an interim aircraft (only nine saw service). The plane contained
preliminary engineering items later found in the B-17, which at this point
was entering the advanced design phase. Better yet were the follow-on B-10
and B-12. The Boeing B-10, for example, was an all-metal, midwing
monoplane with retractable landing gear. It could go 235 MPH (at least 10
MPH faster than contemporary fighters), climb up to 21,000 feet, and carry
five machine guns. Its other novel features included an enclosed cockpit,
cowling over the engines, and cantilevered wings. Such developments
encouraged new experimentation, and in September 1934, Boeing
introduced the XB-17. This all-metal, midwing monoplane could do the
work of four B-10s. It could also travel at 250 MPH, carry an internal bomb
load of twenty-five hundred pounds for twenty-six hundred miles, and
operate up to 30,000 feet. Here for the first time in history, Hap Arnold
observed, was airpower you could put your hands on. When fighter
technology improved in the late 1930s, it was too late from a doctrinal
standpoint. The Air Corpss prewar commitment to four-engined bombers
and long-range operations was irreversible. See Thomas H. Greer, T h e
D e v e l o p m e n t o f A i r D o c t r i n e i n t h e A r m y A i r A r m , 1 9 1 7 1 9 4 1 , USAF
Historical Study 89 (1955; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1985), 4647.
234
FABER
235
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Documentary Research Division, 1949); and Maj Guido
Perera, A Legislative History of Aviation in the United States and Abroad,
March 1941, AFHRA, file no. 167.401-28.
109. By 1925, and with the waning influence of Billy Mitchell, senior
airmen sought more immediate goals. Mason Patrick, for example,
advocated to the Morrow Board that Congress create permanent aviation
committees in both houses to develop definite, comprehensive, and evolving
government policies on civilian and military aeronautics.
110. Maj Gen Charles Menoher, Address Given at Society of Automotive
Engineers Dinner, 10 March 1920, 8, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-130. Mason
Patrick expressed similar sentiments in his Testimony of General M. M.
Patrick, 56.
111. Perera, 57, 65.
1 1 2 . S e e Milling, Air Power in National Defense, 4.
113. For a discussion of the following boards and commissions of
inquiry, see Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking
in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1 9 0 7 1 9 6 0 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air
University Press, December 1989), 2948; and Greer, 2129, 7173.
114. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 codified this view into law
and made the Air Service a regular combat arm. It also provided for a chief
and assistant chief of staff, and it further codified a professional school
system.
115. Foulois, 199200. Dargue later served as assistant commandant of
ACTS from 1934 to 1938.
116. According to Benny Foulois, the Morrow Boards accommodations
may have been part of a preemptive attempt to weaken the political impact
of Billy Mitchells upcoming trial. See Foulois, 201.
117. Hoyt, 83.
118. Perera, 61. As in previous boards and commissions that were
hostile to the Air Service/Air Corps, the membership of the Baker Board
was an issue. Major General Foulois, for example, was the lone Air Corps
representative and faced off against four generals assigned from the Army
General Staff, among other opponents. In contrast, an obviously biased
Foulois thought the Howell Commission was the most objective board of
inquiry in the interwar period. In addition to the above recommendations, it
also supported the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (i.e., t h e f o r e r u n n e r o f t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n
Administration).
119. For the above statistics, see C. A. McMahan, John Folger, and
Stephen W. Fotis, Graduates of the Air Corps Tactical School, 19211940,
April 1953, 3, 5, AFHRA, file no. K243.041-2.
120. William Sherman, Air Tactics, sect. 2 (Fundamental Doctrine of the
Air Service), 1922, 5, AFHRA, file no. 248.101-4A.
121. Milling, The Air Service Tactical School, 1.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
236
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124. See Training Regulation 440-15, Air Tactics, 1926, AFHRA, file no.
248.211-65A.
125. Air Service Tactical School, Bombardment, 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 5 , 6 6 , 8 3 ,
AFHRA, file no. 248.101-9.
126. Air Service Tactical School, Bombardment, 1926, 4, AFHRA, file no.
248.101-9.
1 2 7 . S e e Futrell, 31.
128. Air Service Tactical School, Employment of Combined Air Force,
19251926, 3, AFHRA, file no. 248.101-7A.
129. Ibid., 34, 12, 29.
1 3 0 . S h e r m a n , Air Warfare, 6 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 3 2 , 1 3 0 , 2 0 9 1 0 , 2 1 7 .
131. Arnold was an impatient man who demanded immediate results
from his commanders. Without a rapid return on investment, he worried
that funding for strategic air operations would disappear and therefore
threaten his dream of an independent Air Force with an autonomous
mission. To Arnold, Hansells dogged and misplaced attempt to perform
HAPDB in the Pacific theater was an example of too little, too late. As
Hansells successor, Curtis LeMay abandoned HAPDB for low-level, almost
indiscriminate incendiary attacks against Japanese urban areas.
132. Kuter showed early signs of promise. Col Millard Harmon, for
example, described him as an exceptional officer who should be given a
rating of Superior plus. [He] possesses superior qualifications for staff
assignment and for future high command. See Official Statement of
Service, 30 January 1942, 2, Laurence Kuter Papers, box 1, folder 13,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
133. Quoted in Kenneth Schaffel, Muir S. Fairchild: Philosopher of Air
Power, Aerospace Historian 3 3 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 6 ) : 1 6 8 .
134. Kuter, oral history interview, 132, 163.
135. This synopsis of ACTS bombardment theory appears in Haywood S.
Hansell Jr., The Strategic Air War against Germany and Japan: A Memoir
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 7, 10.
136. Donald Wilson, Long Range Airplane Development, November
1938, 6, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-17.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. See Address by Major General Frank Andrews before the National
Aeronautic Association, 16 January 1939, 8, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-20.
140. Kenneth Walker, Memo to Assistant Commandant, ACTS, 24
September 1932, 3, AFHRA, file no. 248.211-13.
141. Hansell, The Strategic Air War against Germany and Japan, 1 2 .
142. Ibid., 1213.
143. Col Grover Brown, Concepts of Strategic Air Warfare, Part I,
lecture to Air War College, 3 December 1951, 4, AFHRA, file no.
K239.716251-28. At the time, the War Department prohibited the Air Corps
from constructing target folders on other nations. The practice was not in
keeping with the avowedly defensive military policy of the United States.
237
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
238
Chapter 7
Alexander P. de Seversky
and American Airpower
*I want to thank the following individuals, who have contributed their criticisms
and ideas to this essay: Duane Reed of the Air Force Academy special collections
branch, Ron Wyatt of the Nassau County Library, Josh Stoff of the Cradle of Aviation
Museum, Steve Chun of the Air University Library, Col Doc Pentland, Lt Col Pete
Faber, Dr. Dave Mets, Dr. Dan Kuehl, and Mr. Russell Lee.
Regarding sources, de Seversky died in 1974 without heirs. Apparently, most of his
files and personal papers were then deposited in the Republic Aircraft Corporation
archives on Long Island. When that company went defunct a decade later, what was
left of de Severskys papers went to the Nassau County Library, also on Long Island.
The collection is incomplete; much of it is taken up with copies of the several hundred
articles, press releases, speeches, and radio broadcasts de Seversky gave over the
years. Although these papers are of great value, virtually nothing of a personal nature
is contained therein; nor is there much in the way of official correspondence. Material
of a technical nature regarding de Severskys patents and aircraft designs has been
transferred to the Cradle of Aviation Museum, located in a hangar on the old Mitchel
Field, Long Island.
239
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
H i s i d e a s , l i k e t h o s e o f m a n y a i r t h e o r i s t s, o u t r a n t h e
technology available to implement them.
Born in Tiflis, Russia (now Tbilisi, Georgia), on 7 June
1894, Alexander grew up near Saint Petersburg. His father
was a wealthy poet and actor who also had a taste for things
mechanical; for example, he purchased two aeroplanes in
1909purportedly the first privately owned aircraft in Russia .
Alexander inherited not only his fathers theatrical flair but
also his technological inclinationhe experimented with
mechanical devices as a boy, even designing several aeroplane
models. Not atypically for a young man of his class, Alexander
went off to military school at age ten, graduating from the
Imperial Russian Naval Academy in 1914, shortly before the
outbreak of the Great War. After serving for several months on
a destroyer flotilla, Ensign de Seversky t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e
navys flying service, soloing in March 1915 at Sebastapol
after a total flight time of six minutes and 28 seconds.1
Posted to the Baltic Sea, de Seversky a n d h i s s q u a d r o n
sought to prevent the German navy from clearing mines that
Russian ships had placed in the Gulf of Riga. On his first
combat mission on the night of 2 July 1915, he met with
disaster. As he attacked a German destroyer, antiaircraft fire
struck his aircraft, causing it to crash into the water. The
concussion detonated one of the aircrafts bombs, killing his
observer and blowing off de Severskys right leg below the
knee. Miraculously, he survived; a Russian patrol boat
rescued him, and after eight months in convalescence, he
returned to active duty with an artificial limb.2
Assigned a job in aircraft production, de Seversky applied
his mechanical acumen to the design of aeronautical devices
that would make a pilots job easier, designing such devices as
hydraulic brakes, adjustable rudder pedals, and special
bearings for flight controls. He also experimented with a
sophisticated bombsight and aircraft skis for landing on icy
surfaces. His inventions won him an award in 1916 for the top
aeronautical ideas of the year.3
Although designing aircraft was important work, de
Seversky wanted to return to flying duty, but superiors denied
his request. Nevertheless, when in early 1916 a group of
dignitaries visited his airfield to witness the test flight of a new
240
MEILINGER
aircraft, de Seversky s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y t o o k t h e p l a c e o f t h e
scheduled pilot and put the aircraft through its paces for the
assembled crowd. This stunt caused an uproar, fueling talk of
a court-martial for endangering government property.
Fortunately, the czar himself heard of the incident, decided
Russia n e e d e d c o l o r f u l h e r o e s , a n d i n t e r v e n e d t o h a v e d e
Seversky returned to combat flying duty. 4
Over the next year, he flew 57 combat missions and scored
13 kills of German aircraft. On one mission, he and his
wingman bombed a German airfield and then attacked seven
planes in the air, shooting down three, despite receiving over
30 bullet holes in his own aircraft.5 For this exploit, the czar
presented him a gold sword. His wooden leg did not seem to
bother him. In fact, he later claimed that the injury made him
a better flyer because it forced him to think more deeply about
what he was doing, rather than simply rely upon physical
ability. Even so, the war remained a dangerous activity for
him: his good leg was broken in an accident on the ground,
and on one combat sortie he was shot in the right leg
although now he required the services of a carpenter rather
than a doctor.6
By mid-1917 the Russian monarchy had fallen. Due to lack
of reinforcements, de Severskys squadronshe was now chief
of pursuit aviation for the Baltic Seacould not prevent the
German fleet from entering Russian waters. He fled when
German ships shelled his headquarters but did not get far in
his damaged aircraft. After stripping the plane of its guns, he
set it afire and began walking towards the Russian lines.
Unfortunately, he ran into a band of armed Estonian
peasants, who debated turning him over to the Germans for a
reward. Upon learning that their captive was the famed
legless aviator, however, they sent de Seversky o n h i s
waywith his machine guns. This escape earned him the
Cross of Saint George, Imperial Russia s highest decoration.7
Alexander E. Kerensky, head of the provisional government,
then posted Lieutenant Commander de Seversky to
Washington, D.C. , a s p a r t o f t h e R u s s i a n n a v a l m i s s i o n . T h e
Bolshevik government, which took power soon after,
confirmed these orders, but within a few months of his arrival
241
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
242
MEILINGER
243
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
244
MEILINGER
245
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
246
MEILINGER
247
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
was his best friend, and he wrote several articles about the
general, even dedicating his first book to his mentors
memory. This affinity was not necessarily healthy because de
Seversky inherited Mitchell s inordinate distaste for the Navy .
The saying that there is no greater antipathy towards ideas
than that felt by the apostate was certainly true of former
naval officer de Seversky. His writings consistently stressed
the fleets lack of importance, arguing that sea power w a s
obsolete and that surface ships were doomed in the face of
airpower. Like Mitchell , he often compared the cost of ships to
that of aircraft, noting that one could buy hundreds of planes
for the price of a single battleship . He even began one article
with the blunt announcement that our great two-ocean,
multi-billion-dollar Navy, n o w i n c o n s t r u c t i o n , s h o u l d b e
completed five or six years from nowjust in time to have all
of its battleships s c r a p p e d . 2 9
However, de Seversky n o t o n l y d e n i g r a t e d t h e g u n s h i p s b u t
also questioned the utility of aircraft carriers, s e e i n g t h e m a s
little more than attractive targets. He discounted their ability
to project power ashore, asserting the inferiority of carrier
planes to land-based planes. Conveniently ignoring the Pearl
Harbor a t t a c k , h e s t a t e d t h a t i f c a r r i e r s a t t e m p t e d t o s t r i k e a
land power equipped with an air force, the latter would sink
them long before their planes could perform any constructive
p u r p o s e . 3 0 Like Mitchells attacks, de Severskys i n c e s s a n t
barbs needlessly antagonized the Navy , while also spurring it
to greater activity. Indeed, although the claim that Mitchell
a n d , b y e x t e n s i o n , d e S e v e r s k y w a s t h e f a t h e r o f n a v a l
aviation i s f a r t o o s t r o n g , i t d o e s c o n t a i n a k e r n e l o f t r u t h .
As with most people of his generation who had lived
through one world war only to see another spawned in its
wake, de Seversky believed that wars had become total.
Distinctions between soldiers and civilians no longer existed
all people were part of the war effort. To de Seversky, this
meant that all citizens might pay the ultimate price in war
and thus should have a voice in determining how those wars
were fought. In a dictatorship, rulers make war with little
regard for the will of the populacebut not in a democracy.
War strategy h a d b e c o m e f a r t o o i m p o r t a n t t o b e l e f t t o
military leaders. The people must have knowledge of the inner
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T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m u s t b u i l d i n t e r h e m i s p h e r i c b o m b e r s,
whose primary aim was to gain control of the airthat
achieved, an enemy became helpless. Perhaps most
importantly, the American publicnot just military and
political leadersmust understand all these ideas. In order to
e n s u r e t h a t t h i s w a s t h e c a s e , A m e r i c a must see itself as an
airpower nation and look skyward for its destiny.
Like many other air theorists, de Seversky e x a g g e r a t e d t h e
effectiveness of airpower. H e o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e p h y s i c a l a n d
psychological effects of strategic bombing. I n t h i s s e n s e , h e
shared the shortcomings of his predecessors. Like Douhet a n d
Mitchell, de Seversky understood the importance of morale
and will, realizing that, somehow, one must modify or bend
the enemys will. Unlike them, however, he rejected the notion
t h a t u r b a n a r e a b o m b i n g best produced this effect. Instead,
he opted for airpowers use against enemy industry or
infrastructure.
All of these men had the same goalto break, or at least
shape, enemy will but chose different mechanisms to reach
that goal. In short, they identified different key centers against
which airpower should concentrate. Again, like Douhet a n d
Mitchell, de Seversky combined this emphasis on psychological
goals with a penchant for selecting highly mechanistic methods.
The major was convinced that a finite number of planes and
bombs, delivered on specific targets, would equal victory. Air
strategy consisted of destroying target sets, r e s u l t i n g i n a
curious blend of psychology and science.
In the parlance of more classical military theory, he melded
Carl von Clausewitz a n d H e n r i d e J o m i n i. B u t t h e p r o d u c t
was not altogether satisfactory. For example, he never seemed
to appreciate the fact that nuclear weapons had an even
greater impact on the human mind than on physical
structures. They represented a threshold, and discussions
about their use far transcended considerations of military
effectiveness.
De Seversky clearly misjudged the technical obstacles to
building large aircraft. His trumpeting of the Douglas B-19
and Martin flying boat proved premature. He designed a
superclipper in the late 1930s, but it never got off the
drawing board due to technical difficulties. Although the B-29
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Notes
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de Seversky file, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. The Air Service became the
Air Corps in 1926 and the Army Air Forces in 1941.
12. A. D. McFadyn, Major Alexander de Seversky, Journal of the Patent
Office Society, April 1937, 27376.
13. For a good description of the P-35 and its lineage, see Joshua Stoff,
The Thunder Factory: An Illustrated History of the Republic Aviation
Corporation (Osceola, Wisc.: Motorbooks, 1990), 1135; and Edward T.
Maloney, Sever the Sky: Evolution of Seversky Aircraft (Corona del Mar,
Calif.: World War II Publications, 1979).
14. The Bendix Race was flown between Burbank, California, and
Cleveland, Ohioa distance of 2,045 miles. Interestingly, when told by the
Air Corps that the P-35 was too advanced for Army pilots, de Seversky
asked aviatrix Jackie Cochran to fly the plane and demonstrate its
simplicity and reliability. Cochran flew the P-35 to victory in the 1938
Bendix. Dan Dwiggens, They Flew the Bendix Race (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott, 1965), 94110.
15. De Seversky to Air Vice Marshal Sholto Douglas, letter, 8 April 1939,
Cradle archives.
16. In 1967 de Seversky recalled experimenting with 37 mm and 82 mm
cannon mounted on flying boats in 1917. Speech to the Naval War College,
28 April 1967, de Seversky Papers, Nassau archives. De Seversky argued
for greatly increased armament, including rockets, on fighter aircraft as
early as 1934. APS, How Can Pursuit Aviation Regain Its Tactical
Freedom? U.S. Air Services, March 1934, 1617. He reiterated this idea in
Lest We Forget, U.S. Air Services, J a n u a r y 1 9 3 7 , 1 6 1 7 .
17. De Seversky wrote letters to several high-ranking Air Corps officers,
including at least four to the chief of the Materiel Division, in May and June
1938, making such suggestions, but evidently the only response was from a
Lieutenant Colonel Volandt at Wright Field, Ohio, who stated that the Air
Corps simply was not interested. Copies of all letters are in the Cradle
archives.
18. Capt Claire L. Chennault, Special Support for Bombardment, U.S.
Air Services, J a n u a r y 1 9 3 4 , 1 8 2 4 ; a n d S t e p h e n L . M c F a r l a n d a n d W e s l e y
Newton, To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany,
1 9 4 2 44 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).
19. Evelyn de Seversky, transcript of radio broadcast, 22 June 1933,
Nassau archives. In addition, both the de Severskys generally took their
cocker spaniel, Vodka, along on their flights; she logged over one
thousand flying hours.
20. Presenting Alexander P. de Seversky, Pathfinder, 1 3 F e b r u a r y
1 9 4 2 , 1 6 ; New York Daily News, 1 August 1967, 12; APS, Scoring the
Stunt Contest, The Sportsman Pilot, M a y J u n e 1 9 3 3 , 1 0 1 2 , 4 5 4 8 ; a n d
John F. Whiteley, Alexander de Seversky, A Personal Portrait, Aerospace
Historian, Fall 1977, 15557.
21. Alexander de Seversky, interviewed by Murray Green, New York,
N.Y., 16 April 1970, Green Papers, USAF Academy archives, Colorado
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31. APS, Air Power and Space Supremacy, speech to Virginia Military
Institute, 7 March 1958, Nassau archives; and Evelyn de Seversky,
transcript of radio broadcast, 2 June 1942, Nassau archives.
32. APS, I Am an American, transcript of radio broadcast, 27 July
1941, Nassau archives.
33. Seversky Fears September War, New York Post, 1 3 J u l y 1 9 3 9 .
34. APS, My Thoughts on the War, Popular Aviation, April 1940, 19;
Seversky Feels British Could Balk Invasion, New York Herald Tribune, 1
June 1940, 5; and APS, transcript of radio broadcast, 20 June 1940,
Nassau archives.
35. Ten Air Power Lessons, 14; and APS, America Repeats Europes
Aviation Mistakes, American Mercury, O c t o b e r 1 9 4 1 , 4 0 1 4 .
36. APS, Hard Facts on Air Power, American Mercury, A u g u s t 1 9 4 0 ,
40614; Umbrella of Air Held Vital to Navy, New York World Telegram, 4
June 1940; and APS, transcript of radio broadcast, 26 May 1941, Nassau
archives.
37. APS, The Twilight of Sea Power, 64849.
38. APS, Why Lindbergh Is Wrong, American Mercury, M a y 1 9 4 1 ,
51932; and idem, Why the Luftwaffe Failed, The Atlantic, M a r c h 1 9 4 2 ,
293302.
39. APS, Aviation vs. Isolation, Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 J u l y 1 9 4 1 ,
55758.
40. APS, transcript of radio broadcast, 26 May 1941, Nassau archives.
41. The previous month de Seversky had written Congress, once again
recounting his plans for a long-range, heavily armed escort fighter in 1938
and complaining that Arnold had rejected his offers. De Seversky to Truman
Committee Investigating National Defense, letter, 18 January 1942, Nassau
archives.
42. APS, Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942),
21353; see also idem, Aviation Ballyhoo vs. Aviation Facts, American
Mercury, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 , 2 6 3 7 4 .
43. Severskys Reply to Critics, New York Herald Tribune, 2 5 A u g u s t
1942. This is apparently a response to a statement made by Arnold in a
book he coauthored the previous year: Comparative tests indicate there is
little difference and no great disparity between them [the P-40 and Spitfire]
in speed, climb and maneuverability. Maj Gen H. H. Arnold and Col Ira C.
Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York: Harper, 1941), 22.
44. Wing Tips, Steel, 1 4 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 2 , 1 0 0 ; a n d D a v i d B r o w n ,
Victory through Hot Air Power, Pic, 1 5 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 3 , 7 .
45. APS, Victory through Air Power, 3 0 7 .
46. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942;
reprint, Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 24450.
47. APS, World War III and How to Win It, Coronet, J a n u a r y 1 9 5 5 , 1 1 8 .
48. APS, Memo on Enforcement of Peace through Air Power, 6 January
1943, Nassau archives.
49. Douhet, 50.
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50. Hanson Baldwin, Victory through Air Power? No! Sea Power, J u n e
1942, 68; and Hoffman Nickerson, Seversky, Air Power! Nickerson, Not
Enough! Field Artillery Journal, July 1942, 54349. For the most vicious
response, see Maj Gen Paul B. Malone, Victory through Air Prophets?
S k y w a y s , November 1942, 69, 7475.
51. Quoted in Russell Lee, Victory through Air Power: A m e r i c a n A r m y
Air Forces, Navy and Public Reactions to the Book and Film during World
War II (masters thesis, George Mason University, 1992), 87.
52. Ibid., 5462. After the war, Arnold wrote to Gen Carl Spaatz, his
successor as commanding general of AAF, that de Seversky was
dangerous because of his incessant carping on the alleged failures of
American airpower during the war. Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 9 March 1946,
copy in Green Papers, USAF Academy archives. Interestingly, de Seversky
had great respect for Gen Frank Andrews, Arnolds contemporary, who was
then commander of the Caribbean theater. Andrews died in a plane crash in
May 1943.
53. William Bradford Huie, Whats behind the Attacks on Seversky?
American Mercury, F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 3 , 1 5 6 .
54. Clifton Fadiman, review of Victory through Air Power, The New
Yorker, 25 April 1942, 7476; Donald W. Mitchell, The Dominance of Air
Power, review of Victory through Air Power, The Nation, 23 May 1942, 604;
and Huie, 155.
55. Cited in Lee, 34; see also Richard Shale, Donald Duck Joins Up (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1982), 69. That was
approximately one of every six Americans at the time.
56. Walton H. Rawls, Disney Dons Dog Tags (New York: Abbeville, 1992),
6. Perhaps the most well known Disney military insignia was that used by
the Flying Tigers, the famed air unit based in China.
57. Transcript of BBC radio broadcast, 17 September 1943, Nassau
archives.
58. APS, transcripts of radio broadcasts, 13 August 1943 and 30
January 1944, Nassau archives; and idem, Walt Disney, an Airman in His
Heart, Aerospace Historian, Spring 1967, 7.
59. De Seversky had taken a Dale Carnegie course in 1933 to improve
his public speaking skills. Nevertheless, when rehearsing the script for the
movie, he stated that German troops landed on Norways beaches
pronouncing that word as if it were the term for female dogs. Disney then
decided that Sascha needed elocution lessons. APS, In the Lyons Den, 14
August 1943, Nassau archives.
60. Kuter, memorandum to Arnold, 23 June 1943, copy in Green
Papers, USAF Academy archives. The two friends were Gen Larry Kuter and
Gen Hal George. Gen Laurence Kuter, interviewed by Murray Green, New
York City, 17 April 1970, Green Papers, USAF Academy archives; and Lee,
7883.
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277
Chapter 8
*The author thanks Mark Bovankovich, Mark Conversino, Thomas Ehrhard, C harles
Glaser, Jonathan Kirshner, John Mueller, Robert Pape, Dan Reiter, and Jeffrey Ren e h a n
for their generous advice and comments on this essay.
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Nuclear Warheads
D u r i n g t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r, t h e A n g l o - A m e r i c a n
Manhattan Project produced the first atomic bombstested in
New Mexico and then dropped at Hiroshima a n d N a g a s a k i in
the summer of 1945. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic
bomb in 1949, followed by Great Britain in 1952. This first
generation of nuclear weapons derived its revolutionary
explosive power from nuclear fission the splitting of heavy,
unstable elements (uranium 235 and plutonium 239) into
smaller atoms, releasing vast amounts of energy as blast,
light, heat, and other forms of radiation.8 Early atomic b o m b s
were on the order of one thousand times more powerful than
conventional explosive bombs of similar size; fission weapons
subsequently became smaller and more efficient, evolving into
todays tactical nuclear weapons . 9
The destruction that a single atomic b o m b c o u l d w r e a k o n a
city or other target was comparable to that inflicted by a
massive conventional air raid involving hundreds of heavy
b o m b e r s . (One should recall that the deadliest bombing raid of
the Second World War o c c u r r e d n o t a t H i r o s h i m a o r N a g a s a k i
but Tokyo , on the first night of the US firebombing of that city,
910 March 1945.) One may fairly say that with this
technology, a i r p o w e r h a d f i n a l l y c a u g h t u p w i t h D o u h e ts
imagination. A state equipped with heavy bombers c a r r y i n g
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Delivery Systems
Heavy strategic bombers d e s i g n e d t o c a r r y c o n v e n t i o n a l
bombs dropped the first nuclear weapons on their targets, and
b o m b e r s remained the only major nuclear-delivery system for
the following decade. Subsequent generations of bombers
offered advancements in payload, range, and speed, especially
with the arrival of jet engines and aerial refueling. Designers
i n c r e a s i n g l y o p t i m i z e d a i r c r a f t t o c a r r y n u c l e a r w e a p o n s,
although most also retained some capability to deliver
conventional ordnance. The problem of penetrating enemy air
defenses b e c a m e m o r e d i f f i c u l t w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
evolution of surface-to-air missiles (SAM), n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e
development of higher- and faster-flying bombers . I n t h e
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Basing
The evolution of nuclear warheads and their delivery
systems has principally focused on features familiar in almost
all airpower theoryfirepower, accuracy, speed, range,
penetration ability, and flexibility. An additional area of
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ICBM l a u n c h , i t w o u l d h a v e p e r h a p s 2 5 m i n u t e s t o l a u n c h a
l a r g e n u m b e r o f a l e r t b o m b e r s. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f t h e
attack began with a rapid SLBM s t r i k e t o c a t c h t h e b o m b e r s
on the ground, the target might have time to launch its intact
ICBM force in retaliation before the enemy could attack it. And
no matter how one planned an attack, it could not destroy the
enemys patrolling missile submarines, which would therefore
provide a robust second-strike capability against area targets
such as cities.25
Strategic Defenses
All of these calculations assumed that, as Douhet a n d
Stanley Baldwin h a d o n c e p r e d i c t e d a b o u t c o n v e n t i o n a l
airpower, t h e b o m b e r s (and the missiles ) would always get
throughor at least that enough of them would to inflict
catastrophic losses on the target nation. One had considerable
incentive to intercept attacking missiles and aircrafta
familiar problem during the bomber a g e . A s h a d h a p p e n e d
before, the capabilities of fighter aircraft to intercept bombers
and of bombers to avoid interception raced against each other
as speeds, ceilings, rates of climb, ranges, firepower, and
sensor capabilities improved. SAMs , first developed by
G e r m a n y at the end of the Second World War, j o i n e d t h e
combination of early warning radars, interceptors , a n d
antiaircraft artillery (AAA). The United States deployed SAMs,
air-to-air m i s s i l e s , a n d r o c k e t s a r m e d w i t h s m a l l n u c l e a r
warheads to increase the effectiveness of its air defenses. T h e
improving capabilities of air defense systems prompted rapid
developments in electronic warfare a n d s t a n d o f f w e a p o n s, a
shift to low-level flight profiles to take advantage of difficulties
that ground clutter imposed on radar detection, and research
into stealth technologies to reduce the visibility of aircraft to
radar and other sensors. Although never easy for the bomber ,
getting through modern air defenses w a s n o t i m p o s s i b l e a n d
nuclear weapons meant that one could not disregard even a
low percentage of successful penetrations.
Ballistic missiles presented an even more difficult defensive
problem. In order for a SAM to be an effective ABM , it needed
to be able to shoot down an extremely small, sturdy projectile
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airpower w a s t h e s u b j e c t o f i n t e n s e s t u d y b y a l a r g e
community, including many highly trained and intelligent
people who could focus the bulk of their energies on the
subject. Finally, one should note that after 1945 the US
military almost completely abdicated its traditional
responsibility for strategic airpower t h o u g h t , p a s s i n g i t t o t h e
civilian experts they employed and whose guidance they
occasionally followed. Strategic Air Command (SAC) p l a n n e r s
remained occupied with compiling theoretical target lists a n d
operational-level war plans a n d c o n t i n u e d i n g e n e r a l t o
approach strategic airpower m u c h a s t h e i r w a r t i m e
predecessors had during the Combined Bomber Offensive. 34
This is not to hold up RAND as the intellectual heir of
Platos academy; indeed, it inherited the legacy of Douhet a n d
Alexander de Seversky. However, the nuclear theorists enjoyed
the advantage of being, if not powerful themselves, at least
consultants to the makers of military policy rather than
prophets in the wilderness. They did not have to persuade
t h e i r a u d i e n c e t h a t n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y o r n u c l e a r w e a p o n s were
important or cost-effective. Perhaps more significantly, for the
most part their policy-making audience accepted their status
as strategic experts, although this did not mean that their
opinions necessarily carried weight. In fact, the opposite was
more often true: the evolution of US nuclear strategy a n d
weapons development would have differed radically at a
number of points if nuclear strategists h a d b e e n m o r e
influential and military and political leaders less so. But it did
make their enterprise one of Big Sciencein some ways not
u n l i k e t h e M a n h a t t a n P r o j e c t itself.
In spite of the similarities between Douhet s vision of the
n a t u r e o f t h e n e x t w a r a n d t h a t o f t h e n u c l e a r s t r a t e g i s t s , they
d e v e l o p e d v e r y d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s . D o u h e t s p o s t w a r
intellectual successors did not share his belief in the
inevitability of another great (total) war. Douhet d i d n o t
e n v i s i o n m u t u a l a s s u r e d d e s t r u c t i o n ( M A D ), a l t h o u g h h e
could have done so. Instead, he argued that strategic bombing
would make wars inexpensive by ending them quickly and
efficiently, providing an escape from the prolonged carnage of
a n o t h e r G r e a t W a r. If the next war were going to be cheap,
states had little reason not to fight it. The nuclear theorists,
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having seen in the Second World War (like the Great War ) t h a t
one cannot easily terrorize modern nations into surrendering,
c o u l d n o t p r e t e n d t h a t a n o t h e r t o t a l w a r would be less than
horrific. They recognized that states fearing catastrophe would
try to avoid it.
The body of theory that emerged from their efforts
emphasizes a relatively small number of central concepts,
most of which are relevant toand many of which are
borrowed fromarenas of the military and other social
sciences not directly connected to nuclear strategy.
Deterrence
The most fundamental concept in nuclear strategy is
deterrence , t h e i d e a t h a t s t a t e s w i l l n o t a t t a c k e a c h o t h e r
when the expected costs and benefits of attacking appear less
attractive than the expected value of not attacking. Thus, by
shifting the balance in favor of the latter option, one can avert
war. 3 5 Strategic airpower s e e m e d t o a d d t o t h i s c a l c u l u s t h e
ability to make war unpleasant for a prospective attacker by
means independent of fighting the foe on the battlefield;
nuclear weapons radically increased the amount of such
damage one could inflict in a relatively short time.3 6 B e c a u s e
of their ability to punish a state massively for launching an
attack, successful or not, atomic especially thermonuclear
w e a p o n s permitted their owners to adopt security strategies
based on deterrence rather than defense.
The distinction between deterrence and defense is important
and widely misunderstood.37 On the one hand, deterrence h a s
to do with changing the enemys beliefs about how good or bad
war will be, relative to the alternatives. A punitive threat of
nuclear retaliation may deter, and so may a threat to defeat an
invaders army, making war look unappealing by making defeat
appear likely. 38 The latter approach to deterrence is commonly
known as deterrence by denial, although some theorists prefer
to reserve the deterrence label for punishment alone.3 9 B y t h e
same token, one could well speak of deterring through rewards
or other positive incentivesby increasing the attractiveness of
not attacking rather than (or in addition to) making attacking
look worse. 40
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Credibility
The preceding discussion of assured destruction focused on
issues of capability, but almost as important to nuclear
deterrence is the credibility of threats. Actually carrying out a
t h r e a t t o u s e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s would inevitably involve
significant costs for the state concerned, 58 and these might well
exceed the benefits, if any, expected from previous promises. Of
course, although one need not automatically believe an
adversarys threat, even a dubiously credible threat of
annihilation m a y c o n c e n t r a t e t h e m i n d a n d c a r r y d e t e r r e n t
weight. Credibility is an especially significant and potentially
problematic issue in two types of scenarios. One involves
extended deterrencethreats to retaliate i n r e s p o n s e t o a n
attack against a third party or other peripheral interest.59 T h e
other involves situations in which an enemy launches a limited
attack, presenting the victim with a choice between backing
down and avoiding additional destruction or responding to the
attack and risking escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange,
which would prove catastrophic for both sides.6 0
Making the response automatic would solve credibility
problems posed by the possibility of a leaders unwillingness
i n t h e b r e a c h t o l a u n c h a t h r e a t e n e d r e t a l i a t o r y strike. This
p o s s i b i l i t y f o u n d i t s a p o t h e o s i s i n H e r m a n K a h ns
h y p o t h e t i c a l i n v e n t i o n o f t h e d o o m s d a y m a c h i n e, a n
automated system that would trigger nuclear retaliation i n t h e
event of attack without (or in spite of) human involvement
later immortalized in Dr. Strangelove. 61 The United States
never opted to remove the human element from its deterrent
threats, although some evidence exists that the Soviets did
adopt a system to launch some of their missiles a u t o n o m o u s l y
if the national leadership were incapacitated by an attack. 62
However, the dead hand was also at work in the West. For
example, the fact that SSBN crews might choose to launch
their weapons on their own initiative if their leaders and
country were destroyed served to bolster the American threat
of assured destruction against the possibility of
decapitation . 63 A n a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n o n t h e d o o m s d a y
machine theme appeared in the 1980s, when scientists
discovered that a massive nuclear strike might produce
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can see the roots of MAD not only in the early nuclear world
b u t a l s o a d e c a d e e a r l i e r , w h e n b o t h G e r m a n y and the Allies
o p t e d n o t t o e m p l o y n e r v e g a s a n d o t h e r c h e m i c a l or biological
w e a p o n s during the Second World War , largely due to fear of
reprisals by their enemies.8 3
In some respects, conventional airpower, too, resembles its
nuclear cousin more and more as advances occur in the
guidance of precision munitions, stealth, and other technologies.
Contemporary arguments about the coercive impact of targeting
leaders, C 2 systems, economic infrastructure, military forces, or
civilian populations essentially recapitulate debates about
strategic nuclear targeting from the 1980s and before, save that
conventional weapons w o u l d p r o d u c e f a r l e s s c o l l a t e r a l
damage.8 4 Schellings coercive principle of targeting what the
enemy values applies similarly in both the nuclear and
conventional worlds, underpinning both yesterdays and todays
debates about the relative merits of punishment and denial.
Similarly, parallel attack and the quest for strategic paralysis
achieved with conventional airpower share a distinct kinship
with the pursuit of splendid first strikes a n d n u c l e a r
decapitation .
The nuclear revolution in airpower meant that the bomb (if
n o t a l w a y s t h e b o m b e r ) would in general get through and that
nuclear powers could do all sorts of damage that they could
not do before to an enemy without needing to conquer him
first. To a considerable degree, the more recent conventional
airpower revolution o f s m a r t w e a p o n s a n d s t e a l t h d o e s
something similar, except far less expensively, for both the
attacker and the target. Even the concept of MAD m a y b e
relevant to sophisticated conventional strategic attack. If, as
strategic airpower a d v o c a t e s o f s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s h a v e
argued, one can effectively cripple or destroy states from the
air with nonnuclear attacks against key economic,
communications, and other assets, and if states value their
own survival, it may not matter decisively for deterrence t h a t
this threat involves the deaths of thousands or hundreds
instead of millions.
In other respects, however, conventional airpower becomes
less and less like nuclear force as its ability to destroy targets
inexpensively and comparatively cleanly improves, and as its
307
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Notes
308
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309
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1991); and Alastair Ian Johnston, Chinas New Old Thinking: The Concept
of Limited Deterrence, International Security 20 (Winter 1995/1996): 542.
6. Aaron L. Friedberg, A History of the US Strategic Doctrine1945 to
1980, Journal of Strategic Studies (December 1980): 3771; David Alan
Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill, International Security 7 (Spring 1983):
367; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1991); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear
Strategy , 2d ed. (New York: Saint Martins, 1989); Desmond Ball, Targeting
for Strategic Deterrence, Adelphi Papers, no. 185 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1983); Peter Pringle and William Arkin,
SIOP: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (New York: Norton, 1983);
McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988);
Steven T. Ross and David Alan Rosenberg, eds., Americas Plans for War
against the Soviet Union, 19451950, 15 vols. (New York: Garland, 1989);
and Anthony Cave Brown, ed., Drop Shot (New York: Dial/James Wade,
1978).
7. The literature on nuclear arms control is truly immense. Among the
best of literally thousands of publications on the subject are Bernard
B r o d i e , O n t h e O b j e c t i v e s o f A r m s C o n t r o l , International Security 1
(Summer 1976): 1736; McGeorge Bundy, To Cap the Volcano, Foreign
Affairs 4 8 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 6 9 ) : 1 2 0 ; T h o m a s C . S c h e l l i n g a n d M o r t o n H .
Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-
Brasseys, 1961/1985); and Thomas C. Schelling, What Went Wrong with
Arms Control? Foreign Affairs 6 4 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 5 / 1 9 8 6 ) : 2 1 9 3 3 .
8. On the effects of nuclear weapons, see Samuel Glasstone and Philip
J. Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.:
US Department of Defense and Department of Energy, 1977); US Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, a u g m e n t e d e d .
(Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1984); Irving L. Janis, Air War and Emotional
Stress (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1951/1976); and Jeannie Peterson
and Don Hinrichsen, eds., Nuclear War: The Aftermath (Oxford: Pergamon,
1983).
9. For an overview of nuclear warhead technology, see Cochran, Arkin,
and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1, chaps. 12.
10. Writers often observe that Curtis LeMays bombing campaign against
Japan in 1945 had a pronounced Douhetian flavor to it, as the armadas of
B-29s inexorably razed one Japanese city after another. However, one
should recall that the target country was effectively defenseless against the
onslaught in this case. Not until a single penetrating bomber could destroy
a city were the civilian populations of evenly matched countries vulnerable
to rapid destruction from the air, as Douhet had envisioned in The War of
1 9 . See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari
(1942; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983),
293394.
11. The development of H-bombs also removed the constraint that
limited plutonium supplies had previously placed on the expansion of the
310
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311
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312
MUELLER
26. One problem with this scheme was that the electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) produced by the detonation of the multimegaton, enhanced X-ray
radiation, exoatmospheric ABM warheads would have done considerable
damage to electronic systems on the ground, including the ABM tracking
radars themselves.
27. Subsequent proposals to build a less capable US ABM system to
provide protection against an isolated, accidental Soviet missile launch or a
small Chinese nuclear attack were deemed unworthy of the necessary
investment. Exactly the same arguments would emerge in the late 1980s for
constructing Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS)a smaller
version of the missile defense envisioned in the Strategic Defense
Initiativeusing a constellation of brilliant pebbles orbital interceptor
missiles.
28. The ABM Treaty actually allowed each party to construct two ABM sites
(later amended to one site) to protect the national capital, as well as an ICBM
base, each with no more than one hundred interceptor missiles. The Soviets
deployed (and continue to maintain and update) one hundred GALOSH ABMs
around Moscow, but Congress ordered the single US Safeguard ABM site,
constructed near Grand Forks, N.D., to be deactivated one day after declaring
it operational in 1975, on the grounds of being cost-ineffective. On the US ABM
programs, see B. Bruce-Riggs, The Shield of Faith (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1988); and Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy
(Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1977).
29. In the end, the worlds most advanced civil defense program was
probably that of Switzerland, perhaps due in part to the Swisss having so
little control over whether a superpower nuclear exchange might occur.
30. Among many works about SDI, see Steven E. Miller and Stephen
Van Evera, eds., The Star Wars Controversy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1986); US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Strategic Defenses (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986);
Kenneth N. Luongo and W. Thomas Wander, eds., The Search for Security in
Space (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); William J. Broad, S t a r
Warriors (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985); and idem, Tellers War.
31. For example, Janis.
32. Expert advice had indicated that bombing of London and the great
cities would lead to casualties of the order of hundreds of thousands, or
even millions, within a few weeks. Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change,
1 9 1 4 1 9 3 9 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 522. On fears of air attack
prior to the Second World War, see Uri Bialer, In the Shadow of the Bomber
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1980).
33. See, for example, Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, 3 1 2 ,
3 2 4 2 5.
34. See, for example, Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 4547. On
this subject, see also Bernard Brodie, Strategy as a Science, World Politics
1 (July 1949): 46788.
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35. The seemingly obvious point that one must weigh the value of going
to war against the value of not doing so is absolutely essential to deterrence
theory; however, it is often ignored by deterrence theorists who find it
convenient to treat states satisfaction with the status quo as a constant
instead of an important variable.
36. See, among others, Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age .
37. For the classic explanation of the relationship between these
concepts, see Snyder, chap. 1.
38. See, for example, ibid., 1416; and J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms
Control, and Disarmament (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press,
1962), 2224.
39. See, for example, Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), 2022; Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz,
Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force, in Art and Waltz, eds., T h e
Use of Force, 2d ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), 10.
40. The seminal presentation of such a broad perspective on deterrence
can be found in Thomas W. Milburn, What Constitutes Effective
Deterrence? Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 (1959): 13845. Among the few
works to have seriously addressed the use of positive incentives for
deterrence are David Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions, World
Politics 24 (October 1971): 1938; and Peter Karsten, Response to Threat
Perception: Accommodation as a Special Case, in Klaus Knorr, ed.,
Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems ( L a w r e n c e , K a n s . :
University Press of Kansas, 1976), 12063. For further discussion of
deterrence definitions, see Mueller, chaps. 12.
41. See George H. Quester, Deterrence before Hiroshima, rev. ed. (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1986); John J. Mearsheimer,
Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and
B a r r y R . P o s e n , The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1984).
42. Schelling, Arms and Influence, v.
43. It does not follow, of course, that these strategic reasons actually
determined the size of the Soviet and American arsenals. Perhaps the best
known of many illustrations of this notion is Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamaras decision to buy one thousand Minuteman ICBMs not because
he and President Kennedy thought they needed that many, but because it
seemed to be the smallest number acceptable to the Air Force and
Congress. See Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1980), 23252.
44. Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 14479.
45. Exactly how much damage one must inflict in order to destroy an
enemy became the subject of considerable debate over the years. The best
known standard for assured destruction capability was that adopted by
McNamara during the Kennedy administrationthat US retaliatory forces
should be able to destroy 50 percent of the Soviet industrial base and kill
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MUELLER
30 percent of the Soviet population after absorbing a Soviet first strike. For
discussions of the merits of different types of targets, see Desmond Ball and
Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1986); Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy
and National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989);
George Quester, Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come,
Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982); and Michael J. Mazarr, Military
Targets for a Minimum Deterrent: After the Cold War How Much Is
Enough? Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (June 1992): 14771.
46. On LUA, see US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, MX
Missile Basing, c h a p . 4 .
47. Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled? Adelphi Papers, no.
169 (London: IISS, 1981); Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of
Nuclear Forces (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983); Bruce G.
Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1985); and Ashton B. Carter, The Command and Control of
Nuclear War, Scientific American 252 (January 1985): 3239. Bruce G.
B l a i r , i n The Logic of Accidental War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1993), also describes Soviet C2 systems. See also Ashton B.
C a r t e r , J o h n D . S t e i n b r u n e r , a n d C h a r l e s A . Z r a k e t , e d s . , Managing Nuclear
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987); and on C3 in
less developed countries, see Peter D. Feaver, Command and Control in
Emerging Nuclear Nations, International Security 17 (Winter 1992/1993):
16087.
48. In addition to short-warning SLBM strikes against leadership and C 2
targets, some decapitation scenarios involved the possibility of detonating
large nuclear weapons at exoatmospheric altitudes in order to maximize
their EMP effects, which would damage or destroy unhardened electronic
systems over an enormous area. See Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?
1012. Today small, nonnuclear, microwave-generating electronic
countermeasures (ECM) warheads are being developed for tactical weapons
to produce localized EMP-like effects against enemy C2 t a r g e t s a n d o t h e r
electronic systems.
49. French strategists refer to essentially the same concept as
proportional deterrence. See Beaufre. Charles de Gaulle characterized it
less abstractly as the ability to tear off an arm of the attacker. This
principle clearly lay behind the British Chevaline SLBM warhead program
in the 1970s, which was directed at enabling the single British SSBN on
patrol during a crisis to destroy Moscow, in spite of the ballistic missile
defenses deployed around that city, by firing all of its missiles at the Soviet
capital. See Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook,
vol. 5, 11012. On the Swedish nuclear program and its eventual
abandonment, see Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear
Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), chap. 2.
50. However, assured destruction is more robust than marginal cost
deterrence because a threat to annihilate an enemys country is far less
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sensitive to marginal changes in the amount of damage that one can inflict
than is a threat to destroy only one or a handful of highly valued targets.
Therefore, although nuclear deterrence by smaller powers is similar to that
of the United States or Russia, a potentially important difference exists
between the two classes of states with respect to considerations of crisis
stability.
51. For further debate regarding the validity of the rationality
assumptions in deterrence theory, see, among many others, Philip Green,
Deadly Logic (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Robert
Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and
Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Edward
Rhodes, Power and MADness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989);
Richard Ned Lebow, Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I
Deter, World Politics 4 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 9 ) : 2 0 8 2 4 ; D o w n s ; C h r i s t o p h e r
Achen and Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative
Case Studies, World Politics 4 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 9 ) : 1 4 3 6 9 ; a n d P a u l H u t h
and Bruce Russett, Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,
World Politics 42 (July 1990): 466501.
52. See, for example, George Quester, Some Thoughts on Deterrence
Failures, in Stern et al., 5960.
53. An additional school of criticism challenges not the nature of MAD
but the significance that many analysts attribute to it, maintaining that
other factors so overdetermined the postwar peace among the nuclear
powers that their nuclear strategies, doctrines, and force postures have
been inconsequential. See John E. Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of
Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World, International Security 1 3
(Fall 1988): 5579; idem, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major
W a r (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and, in reply, Robert Jervis, The
Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, International Security 1 3
(Fall 1988): 8090.
5 4 . S e e R u s s e l l H a r d i n e t a l . , e d s . , Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and
Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Charles J. Reid Jr.,
ed., Peace in a Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1986); Geoffrey Goodwin, ed., Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence
(New York: Saint Martins, 1982); and Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Kenneth L.
S c h w a b , e d s . , After the Cold War: Questioning the Morality of Nuclear
Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
55. For example, Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York:
Knopf, 1982); and idem, The Abolition (New York: Knopf, 1984). For an
argument that nuclear accidents are inevitable (along with much evidence
that they are extremely unlikely), see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety:
Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
56. For one example among a plethora, see Lewis A. Dunn, Nuclear
Proliferation: What Difference Will It Make? in Fred Holroyd, ed., Thinking
about Nuclear Weapons (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 11836.
316
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317
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(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990); Rosemary Foot, Nuclear Threats and
t h e E n d i n g o f t h e K o r e a n C o n f l i c t , International Security 13 (Winter
19881989): 92112; and Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds.,
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994).
61 . K a h n , On Thermonuclear War, 14453.
62. Bruce G. Blair, Russias Doomsday Machine, New York Times, 8
October 1993, A35; and William J. Broad, Russia Has Doomsday
Machine, US Expert Says, New York Times, 8 October 1993, A6.
63. See Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness, chap. 6. Similarly, the
possibility of unauthorized nuclear launches by dual-capable artillery units
facing imminent destruction, as well as the existence of the British and
French independent nuclear forces, bolstered the credibility of NATOs
threat to escalate to nuclear warfare in the event of a successful Warsaw
Pact invasion of West Germany.
64. This argument first appeared in R. P. Turco et al., Nuclear Winter:
Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, Science 2 2 2 ( 2 3
December 1983): 128392; and Carl Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic
C a t a s t r o p h e : S o m e P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s , Foreign Affairs 6 2 ( W i n t e r
1983/1984): 25792. Further study caused estimates of the probable
severity of nuclear winter to diminish rapidly. See Starley L. Thompson and
Stephen H. Schneider, Nuclear Winter Reappraised, Foreign Affairs 6 4
(Summer 1986): 9811005. For a critical overview of the debate and
indictment of the wild exaggeration of the initial research results, see
Russell Seitz, In from the Cold: Nuclear Winter Melts Down, The National
Interest 5 (Fall 1986): 317.
65. However, early LNOs were much less limited than many of those
later developed following National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)
242. See Lynn E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, Adelphi Papers, no. 121
(London: IISS, 1976); and Friedberg.
66. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
67. Among the archetypal statements of the war-fighting school are
Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory,
International Security 4 (Summer 1979): 5487; idem and Keith Payne,
Victory Is Possible, Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 1427; Paul Nitze,
Deterring Our Deterrent, Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 19761977): 195210;
Walter Slocombe, The Countervailing Strategy, International Security 5
(Spring 1981): 1827; Victor Utgoff, In Defense of Counterforce,
International Security 6 (Spring 1982): 4461; and Robert Jastrow, Why
Strategic Superiority Matters, Commentary, March 1983, 2732. See also
K a h n , On Escalation . O n e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t s o m e p r o m i n e n t w a r - f i g h t i n g
theorists such as Colin Gray were relatively skeptical of escalation
dominance and countervailing. For detailed analysis of the war-fighting
school(s), see Charles L. Glasers excellent essay Why Do Strategists
Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence? in Lynn
Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
318
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319
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320
Chapter 9
321
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322
DREW
323
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324
DREW
325
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326
DREW
327
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328
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329
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330
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I would like to see you familiarize yourself with the literature on this
form of warfare. . . . And also remember these two facts: (1) general
war poses the primary military threat to the security of the Free World
and (2) it is under the umbrella of strategic superiority t h a t t h e U n i t e d
States has freedom of maneuver in the lesser forms of conflict.37
Two things are striking about this policy letter. First, the
broad approach taken to the value of airpower in other than
firepower roles is unusual, especially coming from the airman
m o s t c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g d o c t r i n e,
n u c l e a r w e a p o n s, and SAC . T h e s e c o n d n o t a b l e p o i n t i s t h e
continuing reference to strategic superiority and freedom of
maneuver in lesser wars rather than different wars. Even
at this late date, with personnel already deployed to Vietnam
in the Farmgate program, the Air Force still regarded
insurgent warfare as a lesser, rather than fundamentally
different, form of warfare.
On 21 September 1962, Brig Gen Gilbert L. Pritchard ,
commandant of the new Special Air Warfare Center, s p o k e a t
a s y m p o s i u m o n l i m i t e d w a r a n d c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y held as
332
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333
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334
DREW
335
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336
DREW
337
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338
DREW
339
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340
DREW
341
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342
DREW
aerial firepower may make it much more useful than the RAF
found it to be. The key to the effective use of airpower in a
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t role, however, remains the total integration
of the airpower role in the overall military campaignand the
total integration of the military campaign in the overall
politico-military struggle. In many ways, the military portion
of the struggle is the least important element of the effort. 7 9
David Parsons produced the most innovative and
comprehensive theoretical approach but came to many of the
same conclusions as the authors previously cited. Using a
relatively obscure essay published in 1970 by Nathan Leites a n d
Charles Wolf Jr. as a framework, 8 0 Parsons p r o d u c e d b o t h a
general philosophical approach to counterinsurgency a n d t h e
role of airpower in such efforts. According to Parsons , Leites a n d
Wolf c h a r a c t e r i z e d a n i n s u r g e n c y a s a s y s t e m o f i n p u t s ,
conversions, and outputsall three of which form centers of
gravity f o r a n i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t . A c o m p r e h e n s i v e
counterinsurgent c a m p a i g n m u s t p e r f o r m f o u r f u n c t i o n s :
interdict inputs, disrupt the conversion process, reduce outputs,
and build a governments capability to resist. 81
Although military forces can prove useful in performing all
four functions, their primary role lies in reducing outputs in the
form of insurgent military forces, particularly their leadership
cadre. In this role, conducting reconnaissance , maintaining air
LOC, and flying close air support are most effective. However,
airpower, in the form of PSYOP, can also be an effective tool in
disrupting the conversion processand the maintenance of air
LOC can be crucial to building a governments legitimacy and
capacity to resist the insurgent movement. 82
Airmen concerned with protracted revolutionary warfare
and other forms of LIC also experienced one severe
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . C r i t i c s h a i l e d The Air
Campaign: Planning for Combat (1988) by Col John M. Warden
III as the most significant theoretical work on airpower since
the days of Billy Mitchell . Unfortunately, Warden a d d r e s s e d
only conventional warfare and failed even to acknowledge the
fundamental differences between conventional warfare a n d
protracted revolutionary warfare. 83 T h e f a c t t h a t W a r d e n s
subsequent writings have also ignored the subject is
particularly unfortunate because his influence has become so
343
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344
DREW
345
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Conclusion
US airmen have long been known for their fascination with
technology a n d t h e m e n t a l t o u g h n e s s r e q u i r e d t o p r e s s h o m e
a bombing attack against fierce resistance or to outduel an
enemy fighter . B u t t h e y h a v e n e v e r b e e n k n o w n f o r t h e i r
academic inquisitiveness, their devotion to the study of the art
of war, or their contributions to the theory of airpower.
Instead, American airmen have remained doers rather than
introspective thinkers.
Nowhere was that more evident than in the US Air Force
approach to the problem of protracted revolutionary warfare.
Wedded to the concept of atomic airpower (and its power to
justify an independent Air Force) d u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 0 s a n d e a r l y
1960s, American airmen virtually ignored the problem of
i n s u r g e n t w a r f a r e u n t i l t h e y e n t e r e d t h e V i e t n a m W a r.
346
DREW
A f t e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h d r e w f r o m V i e t n a m, b i t t e r
memories, confusion about the impact of strategic bombing on
the wars end, disagreement over the very nature of the
conflict, and the continuing Soviet threat made it all too easy
for US airmen to push the unsettled enigma of protracted
warfare i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d . R e t r e a t i n g t o t h e f a m i l i a r
problems of strategic nuclear warfare and conventional
warfare i n E u r o p e s e e m e d m u c h m o r e c o m f o r t a b l e .
But the problem would not go away. Afghanistan, E l
Salvador, Guatemala , Peru , and other trouble spots forced the
subject to the surface in the 1980s, and some airmen began to
seriously investigate the peculiarities of airpower application
i n i n s u r g e n t warfare. They succeeded in producing a concise,
well-reasoned modification of traditional airpower theory
based on the consensus developed over nearly 40 years of
experience, research, and publication.
Unfortunately, the doctrine they developed has not had the
impact it deserves. It remains buried in an obscure
operational-level doctrinal manual that few people know exists
and even fewer have ever read. Basic Air Force doctrine, t h e
capstone of Air Force airpower theory, remains virtually
unaffected at best and contradictory at worst. Most importantly,
however, the theory so painstakingly developedthe one that
airmen may need to deal with the post-cold-war worldremains
largely unknown.
In the grand scheme of things, the four-decade journey from
the grandiose theory of strategic bombardment and atomic
airpower to the subtle complexities of protracted revolutionary
warfare h a s b e e n q u i t e s h o r t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r A m e r i c a n
airmen, the journey has ended in contradiction and confusion.
Notes
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
aerospace power and its application since the dawn of powered flight and a
broad conceptual basis for our understanding of war, human nature, and
aerospace power. Finally, it is officially described as the starting point for
s o l v i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s . A i r F o r c e M a n u a l ( A F M ) 1 - 1 , Basic
Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, v, vii.
Although doctrine may not fulfill all of the requirements of a formal
academic definition of theory, it fulfills most of the same functions and in
that sense forms a poor mans theory of airpower.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define low intensity conflict as
political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below
conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.
It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and
ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of
armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political,
economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts
are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and
global security implications (emphasis added). Such a broad definition
lends itself to the inclusion of a wide variety of activities, especially since
the upper boundary (conventional war) is not defined by the JCS. Joint Pub
1 - 0 2 , Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2 3
March 1994, 222.
4. J o i n t P u b 3 - 0 7 , Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,
October 1990.
5. Col Dennis M. Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American
Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals, CADRE Papers, no.
AU-ARI-CP-88-1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, March 1988).
6. Ho Chi Minh, quoted in Douglas Pike, PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), 219.
7. Ibid., 22230. The Vietnamese called their version of this dual
strategy dau tranh. Pike also notes that the basic objective in dau tranh
strategy is to put armed conflict into the context of political dissidence. . . .
Conceptually they cannot be separated. Dau tranh is a seamless web.
Ibid., 233.
8. Between 1965 and 1968 in the Vietnam conflict, 75 percent of all the
battles occurred at the insurgents choice of time, place, and duration.
Further, fewer than 1 percent of the nearly 2 million allied small-unit
offensive operations resulted in any contact with the enemy. See W. Scott
Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam (New York:
Crane, Russak, 1977), 92, which quotes a national security study
memorandum of 1968 to this effect.
9. To my knowledge, the first person to point out this logistics
phenomenon was Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on
counterinsurgent warfare. See his book No Exit from Vietnam (New York:
David McKay, 1970), 3234.
10. Drew, 1819.
348
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349
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of defoliants in Malaya and that the United States began testing defoliants
as early as 1958.
25. See the following unpublished research papers: William R. Becker,
Air Power in the Fight against Guerrillas (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air
Command and Staff College, 7 May 1962); John L. Phipps, Basic Problems
in Counter-Guerrilla Air Operations (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and
Staff College, 7 May 1962); William C. Lockett Jr., COIN in the Air: A Study
of the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air
Command and Staff College, 22 April 1963); and Rupert L. Selman, What
Operational Concepts Should Govern the Use of Tactical Air Forces in
Guerrilla War? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1963).
26. Lockett states that normally, there are no strategic targets, no
opposition to air superiority, and very few tactical targets. Therefore, air
operations are primarily involved with indirect support of ground forces
(page 54).
27. Becker, 91.
28. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrilla War and U.S. Military
Policy: A Study, Marine Corps Gazette, J a n u a r y 1 9 6 2 , 2 4 3 2 .
29. D. G. Loomis, Counter-Insurgent Operations in Indonesia-1958,
Marine Corps Gazette, October 1962, 3441.
30. N. D. Valeriano and C. T. R. Bohannon, The Philippine Experience,
Marine Corps Gazette, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 2 4 ; O c t o b e r 1 9 6 3 , 4 2 4 5 ;
November 1963, 4651; and December 1963, 4143.
31. William J. Thorpe, HUK Hunting in the Philippines, 19461953,
The Airpower Historian, April 1962, 95100.
3 2 . J a m e s F . S u n d e r m a n , A i r E s c o r t A C O I N T e c h n i q u e , Air
University Review, NovemberDecember 1963, 6873.
33 . AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1953, 1954, April
1955, and December 1959. The next issue of the basic doctrine manual
(AFM 1-1) did not appear until fall 1964.
34. AFM 1-3, Theater Air Operations, September 1953 and April 1954.
The next edition of this manual (AFM 2-1) did not appear until June 1965.
35. Message, DTG 302128Z, vice chief of staff, Headquarters USAF,
M a r c h 1 9 5 4 , a s q u o t e d i n D a v i d J . D e a n , The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity
Conflict (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1986), 87.
3 6 . D e a n , 8794; and Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:
Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 2, 1 9 6 1 1 9 8 4 (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989), 25758.
3 7 . C u r t i s E . L e M a y , A i r p o w e r i n G u e r r i l l a W a r f a r e , Air Force
Information Policy Letter for Commanders 16, no. 80 (15 April 1962).
38. Gilbert L. Pritchard, Communism and Counterinsurgency: Air Force
R o l e i n C o m b i n e d S u p p o r t A c t i o n , Air Force Information Policy Letter
Supplement for Commanders, no.113 (3 November 1962).
39. AFM 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 1964. See in
particular chap. 6, Employment of Aerospace Forces in Counterinsurgency,
6-1 through 6-2.
350
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351
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352
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353
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
354
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84. Actually, Warden has published very little. Other than his book, his
only other publications are Planning to Win, Air University Review 34, no.
3 (MarchApril 1983): 9497; Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first
Century, in Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., eds., T h e
Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air
University Press, 1992), 5782; and The Enemy as a System, Airpower
Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 4055. When he served as commandant of
Air Command and Staff College, he produced several unpublished essays,
one of the most well known of which is Air Theory for the Twenty-first
Century. For an insightful critique of Warden, see David S. Fadoks chapter
in this volume.
85. The ArmyAir Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict produced 51
major studies between 1987 and the present writing. Only three pertained
directly to airpower: Logistic Support for Low Intensity ConflictAn Air Force
Perspective; Planning Considerations for the Combat Employment of Air
Power in Peacetime Contingency Operations; a n d A Security Assistance
ExampleThe US Air Force and the African Coastal Security Program
(Langley AFB, Va.: Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1988, 1988, and 1989,
respectively). Nonairmen dominated the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project
(only 13 percent of the participants were from the Air Force). Its final report
addressed only three airpower issuesall concerning specialized aircraft.
Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Low
Intensity Conflict Project, United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1 August 1986).
86 . Field Manual (FM) 100-2 and Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, Military
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 5 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 0 .
87. Ibid., E-4.
88. AFM 2 - 1 1 , Foreign Internal Defense Operations, 3 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 2 .
89. Ibid., 9, par. 3-3a.
90. Ibid., 910, par. 3-3b.
91. I was the team leader and one of the principal authors of the Air
Force basic doctrine manual published in March 1992. Early drafts of the
manual contained extensive information about the peculiar nature of
protracted revolutionary warfare and extensive comment about the
employment of airpower in such conflicts. All of this was essentially
eliminated at the general-officer level after lengthy arguments between me
and the general officers concerned. What remains are vague references
rather than explicit theory.
92. AFM 2 - 1 1 , 9 1 0 , p a r . 3 - 3 b .
93. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol.
1, March 1992, 12, par. 3-5a(5). This particular assertion was inserted at
the general-officer level over my objections. Interestingly, vol. 2 of the
manual, which contains evidence for every doctrinal statement made in vol. 1,
contains no evidence of any kind to support this particular assertion.
355
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358
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H a v i n g c o n s t r u c t e d a p a r t i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f p a r a l y s i s (a
three-dimensional strategy characterized by nonlethal intent
and force economization), we can now examine this notion in
light of Delbruck s typology, to further refine our concept by
demonstrating what strategic paralysis is not. In a truly
seminal work with a distinct Clausewitzian flavor, Delbruck
p r e s e n t s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e History of the Art of War within the
Framework of Political History . I n i t , h e a d d r e s s e s t w o
traditional strategies of combatannihilation a n d a t t r i t i o n .
The strategy of annihilation a i m s t o d e s t r o y e n e m y a r m e d
forces, whereas the strategy of attrition s e e k s t o e x h a u s t
t h e m . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a s D e l b r u c k himself feared, the majority
of his readers misconstrued these as the strategy of the strong
(i.e., quantitatively superior) and of the weak, respectively.
Delbruck c o i n s t h e t e r m Ermattungs-Strategie (strategy
o f a t t r i t i o n ) a s a n o p p o s i t e t o C a r l v o n C l a u s e w i t z s
Niederwerfungs-Strategie ( s t r a t e g y o f a n n i h i l a t i o n) b u t
confesses that the expression has the weakness of coming
close to the misconception of a pure maneuver strategy.8
Since by definition, annihilation strategy a l w a y s s e e k s
destruction of enemy armed forces through decisive battle, he
worries that people will misinterpret his notion of attrition
strategy a s t h e c o n s t a n t a v o i d a n c e o f b a t t l e t h r o u g h
m a n e u v e r . To clarify, Delbruck further defines the strategy of
attrition as double-poled strategy, one pole being battle a n d
the other maneuver . A military commander employing an
attrition strategy would continually shift between battle and
maneuver, favoring one pole over the other as circumstances
dictate. 9 Thus, while strategies of annihilation produce rapid
decisions through overwhelming defeat of enemy armed
forces, strategies of attrition p r o d u c e m o r e d r a w n - o u t a f f a i r s
capped by the slow but steady softening of the enemys will. 10
In contrast, strategic paralysis is a strategy neither of
annihilation nor attrition but a third type of warfare. It does
not seek rapid decision via destruction of enemy armed forces
in battle. Likewise, it does not seek drawn-out decision via
exhaustion of the enemy by continual shifting between the
poles of battle a n d m a n e u v e r . I n c o n t r a s t t o b o t h , i t s e e k s
rapid decision via enemy incapacitation by fusing battle a n d
m a n e u v e r . It bypasses battle with enemy armed forces in favor
360
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361
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362
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363
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364
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365
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366
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367
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368
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369
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of perpetual retreat.37 I n s t e a d , t h e c u r r e n t m i l i t a r y a d v a n t a g e
enjoyed by Imperial Japan d e m a n d e d a b l e n d o f a t t a c k a n d
retreatof operational/tactical swiftness and strategic
protraction. In this way alone could the Chinese resistance
simultaneously preserve itself and defeat the enemy through
gradual erosion of his relative superiority.
Mao insisted that calls for quick victory within the Chinese
Communist camp had no basis in an objective appraisal of
current capabilities and therefore played into the hands of the
J a p a n e s e a r m y. S i m i l a r l y , c a l l s f o r n a t i o n a l s u b j u g a t i o n
within the Kuomintang government had no basis in an
objective appraisal of future possibilities. In other words, Mao
claimed that the Chinese could defeat Japan tomorrow if they
could survive today. Brandishing time as a weapon to achieve
the dual object of enemy destruction and self-preservation,
Maos strategy of protracted war p r o v e d s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e
Chinese resistance of Japan and, later, in the Vietnamese
resistance to both France and the United States.
Boyd readily acknowledges the influence of Maoism and other
Eastern philosophies of war on his own thoughts, an impact
most evident in his emphasis on the temporal dimension of
warspecifically, in his incorporation of the notion of time as a
weapon. Yet, Boyd fails to fully appreciate this weapon in the
context of Taoisms yin and yang. The duality of opposites
suggestsand twentieth-century revolutionary warfare
supportsthe conclusion that time can be a most potent force
in either its contracted or its protracted forms.
Throughout his retirement, Boyd has briefed his Discourse
on Winning and Losing to hundreds of audiences in both
civilian and military circles, leaving copies behind to assure a
degree of permanence for his ideas. Interestingly, one of the
agencies he talked to several times in the early 1980s was the
newly formed Checkmate Division within the Air Staff at the
P e n t a g o n . This divisions responsibilities include short- and
long-range contingency planning for the employment of the
United States Air Force. Eventually, this division would have
as its chief our second modern-day theorist of strategic
paralysis. 3 8
J o h n W a r d e n has emerged as a leading advocate of force
application in the third dimension. Credited as the originator
370
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371
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372
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373
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374
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375
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376
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377
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378
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379
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380
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m i n d h a v e m u c h t o d o w i t h i t i s u n d e n i a b l e . 6 9 T h u s ,
Clausewitzians s h a r e t h e b e l i e f t h a t o n e c a n d e f i n e a n d
should teach the genius of wara cherished conviction
s i m i l a r t o t h e J o m i n i a n belief in the principles of war.
Evaluating our theorists of strategic paralysis in this light,
we note that Warden s t h o u g h t s a r e p r e d o m i n a n t l y J o m i n i a n
i n t h e i r c h a r a c t e r , c o n t e n t , a n d i n t e n t , w h i l e B o y d s a r e
p r e d o m i n a n t l y C l a u s e w i t z i a n. W a r d e n s t h e o r y o f s w i f t ,
simultaneous attack against the enemys physical form, as
depicted by the five-rings model, is practical, concrete, and
linear. He prescribes direct and/or indirect attack upon the
enemy leadership as the way to impose ones will in a world of
conflict. Though one may want to vary ones tactical approach,
if a bullet through the brain has worked once, it will always
work; therefore, it should remain the strategic aim of military
operations. 70
In addition, Warden s representation of combat effectiveness
as the multiplicative product of physical and moral strength
allows him to focus on the tangible variable in the equation to
the exclusion of the intangible one. Decimating the enemys
physical capability renders his moral strength irrelevant.
T h u s , i n b o t h t h e p r a c t i c e a n d t h e t h e o r y of war, emphasis on
the physical sphere is understandable, acceptable, and
indeedpreferable.
In contrast, Boyd s theory of maneuvering inside the
enemys mental process, as depicted by the OODA loop model,
is more philosophical, abstract, and nonlinear. He recognizes
the uncertainty of war and the subsequent need for mental
agility and creativityin short, genius. He believes that one
can teach genius and sets out to do just that for his audience
by means of the mental process of destruction and creation.
He preaches familiarity with many different theories,
doctrines, and models so that, through the genius of
destruction and creation, the military strategist can build
from the gems in each of them a plan of attack most
appropriate to the situation at hand. Furthermore, through
extensive training and practice, the strategist c a n b u i l d s u c h a
plan at a faster tempo than his adversary so as to fold him
back inside himself and ultimately defeat his will to resist .
381
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382
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383
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384
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385
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386
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387
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W a r d e n , a c t u a l plans t o i n c a p a c i t a t e a n a d v e r s a r y m a y
themselves remain characteristic combinations of the three
war forms of paralysis discussed aboveeconomic warfare
b a s e d o n i n d u s t r i a l t a r g e t i n g, c o n t r o l w a r f a r e b a s e d o n
vertical command targeting, and control warfare based on
lateral information targeting.
Though experiencing a renaissance in the wake of Desert
S t o r m , the notion of strategic paralysis h a s b e e n a r o u n d f o r
quite some time. The nonlethal intent of incapacitating
(instead of annihilating or attriting) the enemy sprang quite
f o r c e f u l l y f r o m t h e c a r n i v o r o u s t r e n c h e s o f W o r l d W a r I.
Airpowers first major war was one of mankinds bloodiest and
most senseless. Unsurprisingly, then, air veterans of that war
heeded the strategic call to think in terms of paralysing, not
of killing.9 4 Two modern-day airmen, John Boyd a n d J o h n
Warden, have done just that.
As I have explained, Boyd s t h o u g h t s a r e process oriented and
aim at psychological paralysis. He speaks of folding an opponent
back inside himself by operating inside his OODA loop , a n
action that severs the adversarys external bonds with his
environment and thereby forces an inward orientation upon
him. This inward focus necessarily creates mismatches between
the real world and his perceptions of that world. Under the
menacing environment of war, the initial confusion and disorder
degenerate into a state of internal dissolution that collapses his
will to resist. To counter this dissolution, Boyd o f f e r s t h e
orientation process of destruction and creationa form of
mental gymnastics designed to permit more rapid construction
of more accurate strategies in the heat of battle. His theory of
conflict is Clausewitzian i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t r e m a i n s
philosophical, emphasizes the mental and moral spheres of
conflict, and upholds the importance of teaching warriors how to
thinkthat is, teaching the genius of war.
W a r d e n s theory of strategic attack is form o r i e n t e d a n d
a i m s a t p h y s i c a l paralysis . It advocates parallel, inside-out
strikes against an enemys five strategic rings, with
unwavering emphasis on the leadership bulls-eye. Continual
differentiation of these rings by air strategists r e v e a l s t h o s e
COGs w i t h i n a n d b e t w e e n r i n g s t h a t , w h e n s t r u c k ,
incapacitate the enemy system through the rapid imposition
388
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Notes
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390
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17. Quoted in Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Air
Arm, 1917 1 9 4 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 9.
18. William Mitchell, S k y w a y s (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1930), 255.
19. Boyds theories have significantly affected the operational doctrines
of both the United States Army, as reflected in Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations, May 1986, and of the Marine Corps, as reflected in Fleet Marine
Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, 6 M a r c h 1 9 8 9 . H i s i d e a s h a v e h a d
lesser influence upon Air Force and Navy operational doctrines.
20. John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, August 1987,
2, document no. M-U 30352-16, no. 7791, Air University Library, Maxwell
AFB, Ala.
21. William S. Lind, Military Doctrine, Force Structure, and the Defense
Decision-Making Process, Air University Review 30, no. 4 (MayJune 1979): 22.
22. This psychological paralysis often entails physical destruction, but
such destruction is never an end in itself.
23. For Boyds analysis, see his Patterns of Conflict briefing within A
Discourse on Winning and Losing.
24. Boyds coupling of initiative and harmony stems from his study and
acceptance of the German concepts of Auftragstaktik (mission order tactics)
a n d S c h w e r p u n k t (focus of main effort).
25. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict in A Discourse on Winning and Losing,
141.
26. William S. Lind, Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps,
Marine Corps Gazette 64 (March 1980): 56.
27. Boyd treats decision making and action taking as the process and
product of a unitary rational actor. However, as Graham Allison argues,
other models of nation-state behavior account for the bureaucratic nature
of governments and the complications this introduces into the behavioral
equation. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). Boyd would maintain, however,
that minimizing the impact of such bureaucratic factors by streamlining
organizational form and process is just another way to enhance ones own
OODA loop.
28. By folding an opponent back inside himself, Boyd simply means
restricting an opponents ability to reorient to a rapidly changing
environment.
29. Boyd, The Strategic Game of ? and ? in A Discourse on Winning
and Losing, 10.
30. Boyds dialectic process of destruction and creation corresponds
fairly well to the modern scientific literature on genius. In The Puzzle of
Genius, N e w s w e e k , 2 8 J u n e 1 9 9 3 , 1 2 1 , S h a r o n B e g l e y s u g g e s t s t h a t
genius rests in the ability to combine in novel ways elements from
seemingly unrelated fields. Interestingly, Boyds analysis/synthesis also
correlates with the bihemispheric organization of the human mind as
indicated by modern split-brain research. Pioneered by the California
Institute of Technologys R. W. Perry, psychologist and cowinner of the 1981
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Nobel Prize, this research suggests a division of labor between the left and
right cerebral hemispheres of the brain. As Jan Ehrenwald explains in
Anatomy of Genius (New York: Human Sciences Press, 1984), the left side is
analytic and rational in its thinking, focusing on the trees. In contrast, the
right side is holistic and artistic, focusing on the forest. He then states that
concerted evidence supports a combined left- and right-hemispheric
approach to the mental process we call genius (pages 1419). R. Ochse
offers a similar definition of creative genius in Before the Gates of Excellence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). It involves bringing
something into being that is original (new, unusual, novel, and unexpected)
and valuable (useful, good, adaptive, and appropriate).
31. This is precisely why Boyd claims that orientation remains the most
important portion of the OODA loop.
32. Pape has introduced a methodology for analyzing strategic theories,
particularly those dealing with the application of coercive airpower. Very
simply, his approach links military means to political ends by way of
mechanisms, which address w h y t h e o r i s t s e x p e c t t h e i r p r o p o s e d m e a n s
or target sets to achieve the ends or desired results. In other words, if one
attacks a given target (means), something will happen (mechanism) to
produce the desired results (ends). Depicted graphically, TARGET
MECHANISM RESULT.
33. John R. Boyd, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by author, 30 March
1994.
34. For those disappointed readers still looking for an operational
example of Boyds ideas, I offer the following, both of which were acceptable
to Boyd as possible applications. The first is the Russian concept of the
operational maneuver group (OMG), a combined-arms team of raiders,
p a r a t r o o p e r s , a n d d i v e r s i o n a r y u n i t s d e s i g n e d t o o p e r a t e within e n e m y
formations. As Dr. Harold Orenstein describes it, Such activity changes the
classical concept of crushing a formation from without (by penetration,
encirclement and blockade) into one of splitting it from within (by raids,
airborne landings and diversions). See Harold Orenstein, Warsaw Pact
Views on Trends in Ground Forces Tactics, International Defense Review 9
(September 1989): 114952.
35. Clausewitz defines the ultimate object of war in identical terms.
See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter
Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 484.
3 6 . M a o T s e - t u n g , S i x E s s a y s o n M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s (Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1972), 273.
37. Ibid., 299.
38. Regarding his briefings to the USAF Checkmate Division, Boyd
implies that he implanted this idea of strategic paralysis in the Air Staff (see
Boyd, interview). However, the historical review presented earlier suggests
that this notion has underpinned US strategic air theory from its earliest
days. Boyd does not recall briefing John Warden directly, and Warden
claims to have only a superficial appreciation of Boyds ideas. He is,
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however, most familiar with those concerning air combat and energy
maneuverability, owing to his fighter background. Col John A. Warden III,
commandant, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
interviewed by author, 27 January 1994.
39. One detects a distinct strategic flavor to Wardens discussions of air
superiority and interdiction in The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988). Emphasizing that
command is the sine qua non of military operations, he advocates attacking
the three elements of command (information gathering, decision, and
communication) as part of the effort to win air superiority (pages 5158).
Likewise, he clearly prefers distant interdiction against the source of men and
materiel as the most decisive form of interdiction (pages 9495).
40. Ibid., 9.
41. In defining a center of gravity as the hub of all power and
movement, Clausewitz viewed COGs as strengths alone. Also, in his quest
to reduce the enemys COGs to a single, omnipotent hub, Clausewitz
diminished the strategic significance of interrelationships between COGs.
He did acknowledge that one could not always reduce several COGs to one
(though these cases were very few in number). He also recognized a
certain connectedness between COGs when he wrote of their spheres of
effectiveness to describe the influence of one hub upon the rest. However,
Clausewitz still advocated attacks upon the COGs themselves, overlooking
the possibility of targeting the vulnerable linkages between COGs. These
linkages and interactions are addressed by Boyd, Warden, and, most
recently, Maj Jason Barlow through his creative concept of national
elements of value (NEV). For more on NEVs, see Barlow.
4 2 . W a r d e n , The Air Campaign, 1 4 9 .
43. This assertion contains two presumptions: (1) an enemys COGs are
material in nature and (2) an enemy possesses COGs that are vulnerable to
attack. Regarding the first presumption, certain nonmaterial COGs may
actually be more vulnerable to attack by surface forces than by air forces.
For example, if popular support is the strategic COG for a guerrilla
insurgency, then surface forces may have the advantage over air forces due
to their ability to occupy territory and, if necessary, separate the population
from the insurgents. In terms of the second presumption, an enemy may
have no vulnerable COGs at all due to the inherent redundancy and/or
resiliency of his system.
44. Warden defines a strategic entity as any organization that can
operate autonomously; that is, it is self-directing and self-sustaining. As he
goes on to explain, this definition implies that his theory of strategic attack
against the enemy as a system is as applicable to a guerrilla organization
as to a modern industrial state. See Col John A. Warden III, The Enemy as
a System, Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 55, note 1. Although
one can certainly argue with Wardens contention that his theory applies to
all forms of warfare, one cannot insist (as many do) that he assumes the
enemy is a modernized nation-state. He does presume that one can analyze
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FADOK
52. For additional detail, see Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-first
Century, 814.
53. Ibid., 3.
54. In certain respects, Wardens dismissal of destruction strategies
resembles Clausewitzs idea that absolute war (involving pure violence and
the total annihilation of the enemy state) was virtually impossible to
conduct due to real-world constraints.
55. As mentioned in footnote 41, Major Barlow provides an excellent
discussion of the dynamic interactions between what he calls national
elements of value. He explains that these NEVs are both interdependent
and self-compensatingboth critical attributes to consider when one is
trying to dismantle the enemy as a system.
56. Eliot Cohen, Strategic Paralysis: Social Scientists Make Bad
Generals, The American Spectator, November 1980, 27.
57. Col Pat Pentland, class notes, Course 633, Center of Gravity
Analysis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies. See also idem, Center of
Gravity Analysis and Chaos Theory: Or How Societies Form, Function, and
Fail (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 19931994).
58. Warden, interview, 17 February 1994.
59. Clausewitz, 136.
60. Warden, The Enemy as a System, 43. Again, notable parallels exist
between Wardens formula and the following one developed by ACTS:
NATIONS WAR-MAKING POTENTIAL = WAR-MAKING CAPABILITY x WILL
TO RESIST.
61. Warden, interview, 17 February 1994.
62. Warden, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, 3.
63. Warden, interview, 17 February 1994.
64. Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, in Roots of Strategy, b k . 2
(Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1987), 436.
65. Interestingly, many prominent historians note that the Jominian
tradition has dominated American military thinking over the past century
and a half. For example, Michael Howard argues that it is in Jominian
rather than in Clausewitzian terms that soldiers are trained to think since
the complicated craft of war is most easily taught by focusing on the
mechanics of military operations rather than on the more nebulous features
of morale, genius, and so forth. Peter Paret traces this Jominian dominance
back to the intensely empirical atmosphere of the late nineteenth century.
Michael Howard, Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought,
and Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century, in The Theory
and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1975), 1314, 31.
66. In an extremely thought-provoking article, Alan Beyerchen argues
that Clausewitz himself was a nonlinear thinker and that O n W a r i s a
classic expos of the essential nonlinearity or unpredictability of battle. See
Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of
War, International Security 17 (Winter 19921993): 5990.
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398
Chapter 11
An Ambivalent Partnership:
US Army and Air Force Perspectives
on Air-Ground Operations, 197390
*The author wishes to thank Andrew Bacevich, Dennis Drew, Douglas Johnson,
Thomas Keaney, Phillip Meilinger, David Mets, and John Romjue for their substantive
and useful comments on an early draft of this essay. All matters of fact and interpre -
tation herein remain, however, the authors responsibility.
399
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Air Force . Two other conditions affected both services: (1) the
emergence of technological capabilities that accentuated the
speed, lethality, and precision of weapons systems for both
l a n d a n d a i r w a r f a r e and (2) the identification of a possible
W a r s a w P a c t invasion of western Europe a s t h e s i n g l e m o s t
significant threat for which the United States h a d t o p r e p a r e
conventional forces.
This essay provides a critical, comparative analysis of Army
and Air Force doctrine regarding air-ground operations i n t h e
period 197390. For purposes of the analysis, the essay
defines air-ground operations a s a t t a c k s f r o m t h e a i r a g a i n s t
enemy ground targets that have either tactical or operational
consequence for friendly ground formations. One usually
classifies such attacks under the rubrics of close air support
(CAS) and air interdiction (AI). The essay excludes explicit
consideration of tactical air reconnaissance and tactical airlift .
The analysis seeks to determine the degrees of commonality
and divergence that marked the two services approaches to
a i r - g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s and the underlying reasons for either
the compatibility or tension between the emerging doctrinal
positions. Initial factors examined here include the services
reactions to the external influences mentioned above as well
as the following internal factors: their visions of the nature of
war, their doctrine-development processes, and the roles of
key Army and Air Force personalities in shaping doctrine.
The first part of the essay focuses on the period from 1973
to 1979, when the Army and the Air Force began a
p a r t n e r s h i p b a s e d p r i m a r i l y o n t h e A r m ys realization of its
need for Air Force support in executing its Active Defense
d o c t r i n e. The second examines the period from 1980 to 1986,
w h e n t h e A r m ys move from a doctrine of Active Defense t o
AirLand Battle a n d i t s g r a p p l i n g w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e
operational level of war served to strengthen that partnership.
The final section assesses the era from 1987 to 1990 in light
of the Armys efforts to develop capabilities to execute deep
battle and of the emergence of unofficial thought within the
Air Force concerning the operational level of war.
This essay fits within the general field of peacetime
preparation for war and institutional responses to challenges
imposed by such preparation. As Michael Howard noted in
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403
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405
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407
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409
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411
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413
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415
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joint BAI a n d C A S i n a c a t e g o r y k n o w n a s o f f e n s i v e a i r
s u p p o r t ( O A S ). 88 Reflecting the British preference for the
nexus of air-ground operations at the army group/ATAF level
rather than at the AFCENT/ AAFCE level, once the apportion-
m e n t decision was made, OAS sorties were allocated t o t h e
ATAF commanders. Furthermore, because the ATAF had
responsibility for supporting an army group, the latters
commanders had significant influence in determining how the
OAS s o r t i e s w e r e s u b a l l o c a t e d a m o n g t h e c o r p s u n d e r t h e i r
c o m m a n d . O n t h e w h o l e , t h e U S A r m y was quite satisfied with
this arrangement. The CENTAG commander had to trade off
proximity to his fighting corps for proximity to his supporting
air commander in choosing his command location. But the
OAS = BAI + CAS formulation gave him sufficient influence
over air operations t o p r o s e c u t e t h e m a j o r l a n d o p e r a t i o n s h e
had to execute under the rubric of the theater campaign plan.
Although this arrangement did not provide subordinate corps
commanders the amount of influence over air operations t h e y
felt they required to deal with Soviet second-echelon
formations, it did give them access to an Army commander in
the person of COMCENTAG, to whom they could make their
case for priority of both BAI and CAS sorties. The USAF ,
h o w e v e r , r e m a i n e d m u c h m o r e a m b i v a l e n t a b o u t B A I.
Although the constraints of allied diplomacy had obliged
senior American airmen to accept it as NATO doctrine, they
were reluctant to incorporate into US doctrine any provisions
f o r g r o u n d c o m m a n d e r s to influence air interdiction.
An unprecedented 20-star conference held at TRADOC in
October 1979 reviewed a number of air-ground issues,
including the BAI question. Attendees at this meeting
included Generals Meyer, Lew Allen , Starry, a n d C r e e c h , as
well as Gen John W. Vessey J r . , t h e A r m y vice chief of staff,
who had served with the Air Force at Udorn AFB, Thailand,
d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m W a r. At this meeting, the TAC briefer on
OAS stated that although use of the A-10 to attack Soviet
second-echelon forces was not desirable, it would be feasible if
b o t h t h e A r m y and the Air Force were willing to pay the price
in SEAD r e s o u r c e s .8 9 T h e m e e t i n g p r o d u c e d a c o n s e n s u s t h a t
AI, c o u n t e r a i r / a i r d e f e n s e, and SEAD were the priority study
issues for ALFA. 90 It failed, however, to resolve the essential
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1 9 7 9 . T h i s r e g u l a r i z a t i o n , c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e A r m ys
development and refinement of its AirLand Battle doctrine,
manifested itself in the series of J manuals produced by the
TAC / TRADOC relationship and in the 31 initiatives at the
departmental level. The Air Force a l s o d e v e l o p e d a m o r e
c o h e r e n t s t a t e m e n t o f i t s b a s i c d o c t r i n e. A l t h o u g h t h i s
d o c t r i n e did not take explicit cognizance of the operational
level of war articulated in the 1982 and 1988 editions of FM
100-5, it at least demonstrated a preliminary vision for how
air and ground forces might cooperate at this level. However,
divergences of perspective remained about air-ground
interface: although the interdepartmental position paper on
OAS apparently resolved these differences, they continued to
boil beneath the surface.
Crosscurrents, 198790
F r o m 1 9 8 7 t o 1 9 9 0 , t h e A r m yAir Force p a r t n e r s h i p
continued to mature. Two developments, however, one in each
service, influenced the partnership in ways not immediately
apparent. The first was the Armys effort to develop a detailed
doctrine for the corpss conduct of deep battle ; t h e s e c o n d w a s
the publication of a National Defense University thesis entitled
The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, written by a
relatively obscure Air Force colonel named John Warden .
The continuation of a number of biservice projects reflected
t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e A r m yAir Force p a r t n e r s h i p . B y D e c e m b e r
1987, TRADOC and TAC , operating under the aegis of the 31
initiatives, developed a draft summary of requirements for a
follow-on to the A-10 as a CAS aircraft.9 6 By 1988 the services
estimated that their joint force-development initiatives had
resulted in a savings of $1 billion dollars in cost avoidance. 97
Additionally, they had reached agreement on concepts for joint
attack of Soviet helicopters, the alignment of air liaison
officers and forward air controllers with Army m a n e u v e r u n i t s ,
and a follow-on to the JSEAD manual of 1982. An article
entitled The Air Force, the Army, and the Battlefield of the
1990s by Gen Robert D. Russ, Creech s successor at TAC ,
provided further indication of institutional solidarity. Here
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428
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I n o r d i n a r y t i m e s , W a r d e n s b o o k a n d h i s s u b s e q u e n t
musings on targeting philosophies would have held not much
m o r e t h a n a c a d e m i c i n t e r e s t . 1 0 9 Regardless of the strengths or
weaknesses of his approach to warfare, one thing remained
c e r t a i n : i t w a s not A i r F o r c e d o c t r i n e . I t d i d , h o w e v e r ,
represent a view in the Air Force t h a t o n e c o u l d p e r h a p s
even shouldthink of the application of airpower as
i n d e p e n d e n t o f g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s. T o t h i s e x t e n t , i t
c o n s t i t u t e d a n o t h e r c r o s s c u r r e n t i n t h e s t o r y o f A r m yAir
Force p a r t n e r s h i p
Conclusions
This study has endeavored to answer questions about the
areas of convergence and divergence between Army and Air
Force perspectives on air-ground operations between the end of
the Vietnam War and the eve of Operation Desert Shield, a n d
the underlying causes for them. Clearly, the services agreed
about a great dealthat CAS was important, that it was an Air
Force mission, and that they needed a dedicated CAS platform
(and, therewith, a dedicated group of pilots whose sole training
focus would address execution of the CAS mission). They agreed
on the importance of SEAD , the fact that it was a shared
responsibility, and the detailed procedures required to effect it.
They agreed on the importance of attacking enemy
second-echelon forces, the use of Army helicopters and Air Force
platforms working in close cooperation to accomplish this
mission, and the detailed tactical procedures required to do it.
They disagreed over two issues: (1) the amount of influence that
senior ground commanders should have over Air Force
interdiction operations and (2) the mechanisms for coordinating
the effects of fixed-wing air and extended-range Army s y s t e m s .
At the risk of being somewhat simplistic, one can conclude that
although very significant agreement existed at the tactical level,
noticeable divergence characterized the operational level.
One can gain insight into the dynamics behind these
similarities and differences of perspective by surveying the
centripetal forces that tended to pull the Army and the Air
Force together and the centrifugal forces that tended to pull
them apart.
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431
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432
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Notes
433
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434
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435
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436
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437
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understanding, s u g g e s t i n g a g r e a t e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e t e r m s
thereof.
80. Davis established these categories of initiatives for purposes of
historical analysis; the memorandum of agreement merely listed the
initiatives themselves. See Davis, 4764.
81. Ibid., 7179.
82. Ibid., 75.
83. AFM 1 - 1 , 1 9 8 4 , 2 - 2 0 .
84. According to Joint Pub 1-02, apportionment is the determination
and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority
that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic
areas for a given period of time. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2 2 M a r c h 1 9 9 4 , 3 1 .
8 5 . J o i n t P u b 1 - 0 2 d e f i n e s allocation a s t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e
apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for
each operation/task. Ibid., 23.
86. See Steven L. Canby, Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare: The
Divergence within NATO, Air University Review 30 (MayJune 1979): 220.
87. This doctrine was codified in the NATO Allied Tactical Publication
27(B), Offensive Air Support, M a y 1 9 8 0 .
88. Stephen T. Rippe, An Army and Air Force Issue: Principles and
Procedures for AirLand Warfare, Air University Review 3 7 ( M a y J u n e
1986): 63. For a more extended analysis of the OAS/BAI issue from the
ground perspective, see idem, An Army and Air Force Issue: Principles and
Procedures for AirLand Warfare: A Perspective of Operational Effectiveness
on the Modern Battlefield (thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort
Leavenworth, Kans., 1985).
89. ALFA, memorandum for record, subject: 20-Star Meeting,
Headquarters TRADOC, 11 October 1979, 12 October 1979, THO.
90. TAC deputy chief of staff, plans memorandum, subject: Update of
ALFA Activities, 17 October 1979, in History, TAC, 1 January31 December
1979, AFHRA, file no. K417.01.
91. Romjue, From Active Defense, 62.
92. The phrase doctrinal step backward comes from ibid.
93. Army deputy chief of staff for operations and plans/Air Force deputy
chief of staff for plans and operations, information memorandum, subject:
USA and USAF Agreement on Apportionment and Allocation of Offensive Air
Support (OAS), 23 May 1981, THO.
94. USA and USAF Position on Apportionment/Allocation of OAS,
attachment 2 to ibid., par. 6d.
95. The AF/XO history of the period reflects these reservations:
Following the Field Review, AF/XOXID forwarded much of the background
data on the OAS Agreement to TAC and USAFE in an effort to defend the
issue. However, it is obvious that opinions continue to differ and that
discussions on this subject will continue in the coming months. History,
439
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AF/XO Director of Plans, 1 July31 December 1981, 90, AFHRA, file no.
K143.01.
96. AHR, TRADOC, 1 January31 December 1987, August 1988, 93, THO.
97. AHR, TRADOC, 1 January31 December 1988, June 1989, 3637, THO.
98. Gen Robert D. Russ, The Air Force, the Army, and the Battlefield of
the 1990s, Defense 88, August 1988, 13. Russs statement proved quite
controversial within some circles of the Air Staff because it seemed to
preclude the use of tactical air assets for strategic attack.
99. Army deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, memorandum,
subject: Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review, 11 December
1984, attachment, Deep Attack Program Office, draft charter, CAC
historical files.
1 0 0 . F i e l d C i r c u l a r 1 0 0 - 1 5 - 1 , Corps Deep Operations (U), 1985, ii,
B1-29, CAC historical files. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
1 0 1 . Deep Operations Capabilities Handbook: Present and Future (U)
(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1987), iii,
121, CAC historical files. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
1 0 2 . Corps Deep Operations (ATACMS, Aviation and Intelligence Support):
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US
Army Combined Arms Center, 1990), 15, CAC historical files.
103. Ibid., 48.
104. Ibid., 416.
105. The TRADOC history of 1988 mentions an agreement signed that
year by the service chiefs that established notification and coordination
procedures for Army fires beyond the FSCL. AHR, TRADOC, 1 January31
December 1988, 35. However, as in the case of the BAI agreement signed by
the service operations deputies, the provisions of this agreement were not
incorporated into doctrine.
1 0 6 . J o h n A . W a r d e n I I I , The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988).
107. Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by
author, 6 June 1995. In this interview, Warden explicitly stated that his
purpose was to create a new vision of airpower that would supplant the
Creech/Russ view that airpowers primary function was to support the Army.
108. One can find the fully developed concept in Col John A. Warden,
The Enemy as a System, Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 4055.
109. The role that Wardens ideas played in shaping the American
military response to Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is beyond the
scope of this study. One version of that story is dramatically outlined in Col
Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign
against Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 1995).
110. Starry was emphatic on this point. He stated categorically that we
would not have had AirLand Battle had it not been for him [Bill Creech]. I
could not have carried it off by myself. Starry, interview, 13 May 1995.
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111. These figures and those that follow are taken from James M. Ford,
Air Force Culture and Conventional Strategic Airpower (thesis, School of
Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1992), 60.
112. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations, a s a t e s t p u b l i c a t i o n o n 1 0 J a n u a r y 1 9 9 0 . A H R , T R A D O C , 1
January31 December 1990, June 1991, 55, THO. The manual was not
published in final form until 1994.
113. Robert C. Marsh, The Cleveland Orchestra: One Hundred Men and
a Perfectionist, High Fidelity 11 (February 1961): 38.
114. The literature of the Gulf War is replete with instances of ineffective
communication between the Army and the Air Force. See, inter alia, Rick
Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 15152, 21823, 33840; Robert H. Scales, Certain
Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), 17481, 31516; Richard M.
Swain, Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 18190;
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War: The Inside
Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 2034, 32448,
44754, 494; and Barry D. Wattss perceptive review essay of Gordon and
Trainors work, Friction in the Gulf War, Naval War College Review 4 8
(Autumn 1995): 105. For a dissenting view, see Edward Mann, who
contends that the air campaign plan would eventually meld perfectly with
schemes of surface maneuver to be developed later. Col Edward C. Mann
III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, April 1995), 175.
441
Chapter 12
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Origins to 1967
Although this chapter does not intend to cover the political
origins of NATO, 10 four key events greatly affected the military
strategy adopted by the alliance in the early 1950s. First,
NATO came into existence after the World War II alliance
among the great powers of the West (the United States a n d t h e
United Kingdom) a n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n had irrevocably
dissolved. Failure to achieve a peace treaty, the Soviet
blockade of Berlin , and the continued presence of massive
Soviet forces outside the USSRs borders all pointed to an
i n c r e a s e d , n o t d e c r e a s e d , s e c u r i t y t h r e a t .1 1 T h e c o u p i n
February 1948 that overthrew the democratically elected
government in Czechoslovakia p r o m p t e d t h e e v e n t u a l
formation of NATO i n 1 9 4 9 . 12 S e c o n d , a f t e r t h e F e d e r a l
Republic of Germany formed in 1949, certain states sought to
s e c u r e W e s t G e r m a n ys fortunes to those of its erstwhile
e n e m i e s i n t h e W e s t . F r a n c e in particular wished to tie West
Germany politically, economically, and militarily to the
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446
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447
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448
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449
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Modernization, 196789
Starting in the late 1970s and continuing into the
mid-1980s, NATO s u b s t a n t i a l l y u p g r a d e d i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d
nuclear forces.27 The USAF removed most of its older weapon
systems and introduced newer aircraft such as the A-10,
F - 1 1 1 F , F-15, a n d F - 1 6 . E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s i n t r o d u c e d n e w
p l a t f o r m s s u c h a s t h e T o r n a d o a n d F - 1 6 into their inventories,
a l t h o u g h a t a s l o w e r p a c e t h a n d i d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . NATO
also acquired precision-guided munitions such as
laser-guided bombs, electro-optical guided bombs, precision
television-guided a n d i n f r a r e d - g u i d e d a n t i t a n k m i s s i l e s , a n d
runway attack munitions. NATO s decision in 1979 to deploy
nuclear-armed ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) a n d
Pershing II m i s s i l e s t o e n h a n c e d e t e r r e n c e b y c o u n t e r i n g
Soviet SS-20s p r o v e d b o t h a m a j o r m i l e s t o n e i n a l l i a n c e
military history and a highly political act. Upgrades to the
command and control (C 2 ) arena included a NATO airborne
early warning (NAEW) a i r c r a f t , b a s e d u p o n t h e U S E - 3
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) a i r c r a f t , a n d
the allied C 2 s y s t e m .
The late 1960s witnessed numerous changes that would
ultimately lead to a major reexamination of NATOs military
strategy . Following years of modernization prompted by the
Soviet humiliation during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the
Soviets appeared to gain parity with US forces in the strategic
nuclear arena. Further, appraisals of Warsaw Pact capabilities
led some people to conclude that NATOs conventional forces
were in a much better position than they were in the 1950s.2 8
And in the political arena, a spirit of dtente 2 9 a n d m o v e m e n t
towards arms reduction agreements 3 0 between the superpowers
led to a further lessening of tensions.
In 1967 NATO adopted MC 14/3, the strategy of flexible
response, marking a significant change in both the political
outlook and the military strategy of the alliance. 3 1 Although it
retained the option of a strategic nuclear response from the
United S t a t e s 3 2 to counter any Warsaw Pact breakthrough in
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452
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Counterair Doctrine
One finds NATOs doctrine f o r c o u n t e r a i r i n A T P - 4 2 . 48
Closely tied to it is ATP-40, Doctrine and Procedures for
Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 49 NATO h a s a l w a y s
recognized a need for air superiority. The two major areas of
disagreement lie in the role of attacks against the enemys
integrated air defense system (IADS)commonly referred to as
SEAD and C 2 of counterair r e s o u r c e s .
The pamphlet defines counterair operations a s t h o s e
operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree
o f a i r s u p e r i o r i t y t o p r o d u c e a f a v o u r a b l e a i r s i t u a t i o n
essential for the successful conduct of combat operations.50
Although doctrine separates these into offensive and
defensive operations, it recognizes that, particularly since
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they often use the same resources, one cannot view them in
isolation from each other. ATP-42 considers SEAD p a r t o f t h e
offensive operations and defines it as activity which
neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades enemy air
defense s y s t e m s i n a s p e c i f i c a r e a b y p h y s i c a l a t t a c k a n d / o r
electronic warfare.51
SEAD b e c a m e a n i m p o r t a n t a r e a o f d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e
USAF and NATO . USAF doctrine considers SEAD coequal with
OCA a n d D C A, while NATO, as shown above, views SEAD only
a s p a r t o f O C A. Specifically, at the most basic level, USAF
d o c t r i n e assumes a global perspective whereas, obviously,
NATO doctrine covers a more narrowly focused region. In the
1970s, the USAF had an opportunity to test its doctrines in
the skies over Vietnam. O n e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n i t l e a r n e d t h e r e
was that SEAD deserved to be elevated to a position coequal
with OCA a n d D C A. Further, few NATO air forces other than
US forces have resources (such as the US F-4G Wild Weasel
aircraft) for the SEAD m i s s i o n .5 2 T h e s e c o u n t r i e s f e a r e d t h a t a
separate SEAD m i s s i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e m t o b u y
SEAD -dedicated aircraft. Also, within NATO itself, a difference
exists between separate allied tactical air forces (ATAF). As
Stein , K i m b e r l y N o l a n , a n d R o b e r t P e r r y w r i t e , 2 A T A F
(dominated by the RAF ) and 4ATAF (largely a USAF o p e r a t i o n )
tend to operate as national tactical air forces rather than as
a combined force.5 3 For example, although 2ATAF d o e s n o t
have specific doctrine for SEAD , 4ATAF d o e s .
The C2 of counterair operations flows from the major NATO
commanders (e.g., SHAPE ) through major subordinate
c o m m a n d e r s ( M S Ce.g., AFCENT ) to principal subordinate
c o m m a n d e r s ( P S C e . g . , o f A i r F o r c e s C e n t r a l E u r o p e
[COMAIRCENT]), who generally exercise operational c o n t r o l54
for counterair operations (and other air missions) though, in
practice, tactical control is further delegated to ATOCs a n d
t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s e c t o r o p e r a t i o n s c e n t e r s ( S O C ).
Furthermore, the operational commander designates an
airspace control authority (ACA), who has responsibility for
planning, coordinating, and operating an airspace control
plan. Key elements of this plan include airspace control
measures and means such as control zones, restricted
operations areas, and transit routes. Finally, these measures
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Air-to-Surface Doctrine
Although NATO countries generally agreed on the proper
air-to-air role of airpower, the air-to-surface role proved
c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e c o n t e n t i o u s .5 8 T h e p r i m a r y d o c t r i n a l
pamphlet that covers these missions is ATP-27, Offensive Air
Support Operations . 59 The four areas of disagreement included
battlefield air interdiction (BAI), f o l l o w - o n f o r c e s a t t a c k
(FOFA), A i r L a n d B a t t l e , a n d C 2 o f t h e s e a i r r e s o u r c e s ,
including request procedures, approval authority, planning
locations, and control functions.
OAS operations involve those that support land forces. T h e
first rendition of this doctrine, ATP-27(A), included three
functions under the OAS umbrella: CAS , AI, and tactical air
reconnaissance (TAR). 60 During discussions about revisions to
ATP-27(A) at the 1977 TAWP , 61 the USAF o b j e c t e d t o t h e
inclusion of AI as an OAS m i s s i o n b e c a u s e i t i s n o t a s u p p o r t
mission; its objectives derive from the overall goals of the
combined forcenot those specifically derived from the land
force commander . F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e t h e s e m i s s i o n s o c c u r
outside the direct scope of land operations, they do not
require the detailed integration with the fire-and-maneuver
scheme of ground forcesa requirement inherent in CAS . 62
TAWP accepted this, and ATP-27(B) removed AI from OAS b u t
replaced it with BAI : air action against hostile surface targets
which are in a position to directly affect friendly forces and
which requires joint planning and coordination (emphasis
added). 6 3
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458
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
CAS m i s s i o n r e q u e s t e d b y t h e g r o u n d c o m m a n d e r . S i n c e
ATP-27 implies that CAS and BAI provide support to the land
force commander , the diversion request would apparently take
priority.
In sum, one can call the period following the adoption of
flexible response the Golden Age of NATO air doctrine. Before
the Goodpaster initiative in 1970, the doctrine that existed was
largely national. The doctrine that emerged was a negotiated
doctrine. N o o n e m e m b e r d o m i n a t e d t h e i d e a s c o n c e r n i n g
airpower employment t h a t N A T O e v e n t u a l l y a d o p t e d . T h e
arguments and final outcomes of the BAI and SEAD issues
clearly point this out. Despite national preferences, airmen from
every member country held similar beliefs on the proper role of
airpower. The near unanimity over counterair operations
(besides SEAD ) and CAS attests to this fact.
During this period, NATO t o o k t h e f i r s t s t e p s t o w a r d s
rationalizing its air structure, primarily through the creation
in 1974 of AAFCE , l o c a t e d a t R a m s t e i n A i r B a s e , W e s t
G e r m a n y, to command 2ATAF and 4ATAF . Although this did
not provide a true centralized control apparatus (for example,
BAI was still allocated, tasked, and executed at the ATAF
level), it began the process of integrating air assets into a
theaterwide view versus a more narrowly defined (by
land-force boundaries) view of airpower. This move was
essential if airpower intended to play a more decisive role in
blunting massive Warsaw Pact attacks through interdiction
against second-echelon (and deeper) forces. Furthermore,
planning of air defense and offensive air operations became
combined in the ATOC , which eliminated the false distinction
b e t w e e n t h e s e a i r o p e r a t i o n s. I t a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h e
importance of both missions to the counterair s t r u g g l e a n d
acknowledged that one would likely use the same assets in
both roles. Again, this action highlighted a theaterwide view of
airpower employment.
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462
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463
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464
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465
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Conclusions
NATOs first priority has always been alliance cohesion; its
second, a deferral to national preferenceswitness the initial
decision to sacrifice operational depth of maneuver in favor of
forward defense along the inter-German border (IGB) a n d t h e
preponderance of European air forces still deployed in their
home countries. One also sees these priorities in the
deployment of NATO s ground forces ( a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t
strain that placed on NATOs air forces), which is more a
reflection of postwar occupation areas than militarily viable
defensive positions.
The third priority of the alliance remains the strict
maintenance of the image and reality of a defensive
organization, which enhances alliance cohesion in several
ways. For instance, every nation can agree on the defense.
Offensive operations imply an out-of-area objective,
specifically rejected by NATO from its inception. From the
mid-1950s on, liberating eastern Europe o r e v e n E a s t
G e r m a n y was never an overt objective. Further, presuming
that defensive forces are less expensive than offensive ones,
this strategy eases the fiscal burdens of European
membersan especially critical point in the 1950s, when
E u r o p e was rebuilding from the ashes of World War II. Also, a
defensive posture remains critical to maintaining stability in
Europe because it denies anyone an excuse to launch an
attack against the alliance.
NATO s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , d e p l o y m e n t p o s t u r e , a n d a i r
doctrines r e f l e c t t h e s e p r i o r i t i e s . F r o m i t s f o u n d i n g , t h e
a l l i a n c e h a s e m p l o y e d a t h r e e f o l d a i r s t r a t e g y. T h e f i r s t
priority, air defense, did not imply air superiority as the USAF
defines it. Air planners never foresaw gaining command of the
air but focused more narrowly on achieving security against a
Warsaw Pact a i r a t t a c k on NATO s p o r t s a n d m a j o r l i n e s o f
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . Furthermore, air defense remained largely a
passive campaign, featuring DCA patrols integrated with
ground-based systems, albeit paying some attention to
a t t a c k i n g W a r s a w P a c t airfields.
The second priority for NATOs air forces was attacking
W a r s a w P a c t second-echelon forces. The early years saw these
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NATO planners did not envision total air superiority over all of
w e s t e r n E u r o p e, seeking instead only local or battlefield air
superiority, w h i l e U S A F d o c t r i n e e m p h a s i z e d t h e c r i t i c a l
requirement for theaterwide air superiority as the first priority
of an air force.
By the 1970s and 1980s, NATO and USAF doctrines w e r e
back in sync, not because NATO changed but because USAF
d o c t r i n e dramatically shifted from an offensive, global, nuclear
orientation to a conventional, European one. Perhaps the
most dramatic example of this shift lay in the changing
perception of the role of airpower in the opening days of a
conflict. Under the NATO s c e n a r i o a s s u m i n g t h e n u m e r i c a l
superiority of Warsaw Pact forces, a Warsaw Pact initiative,
and a requirement for US air and ground supportUSAF a n d
NATO commanders recognized that a specific battle for air
superiority, especially through offensive airfield attacks, would
have to wait. The immediate priority would be air defense of
ports, nuclear facilities, command centers, and movements of
NATO ground forces, along with battlefield support to prevent
a W a r s a w P a c t b r e a k t h r o u g h . 104
The latest version of USAF basic doctrine, published in
1992, had no link to NATO air d o c t r i n e 1 0 5 a n d c a m e a t a t i m e
when NATO u n d e r w e n t m a s s i v e c h a n g e s . U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e
two doctrines diverged somewhat. However, in the mid-1990s,
both USAF/US joint doctrine and NATO doctrine a r e
undergoing substantial changes that promise a new era of
convergence. One should note that the USAF doctrine
preceded both the joint and NATO doctrinal development. Of
course, one should expect this, insofar as doctrinal
innovations should come from the air service first, because of
its expertise and familiarity. It then diffuses through the other
d o c t r i n a l o u t l e t s , s u c h a s j o i n t d o c t r i n e or NATO p a m p h l e t s .
The role played by operating commands in doctrinal
development reveals another important aspect of the
differences between the US and NATO experiences. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e d a r o l e f o r U S
w a r - f i g h t i n g c o m m a n d s ( e . g . , U S E u r o p e a n C o m m a n d, Pacific
C o m m a n d, A t l a n t i c C o m m a n d, and others), whereas in NATO,
the war-fighting commands (e.g., Allied Forces Central, Allied
Forces South, and their subordinate allied air commands) play
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may lay on the horizon, and how will they become part of
NATOs air doctrine?
In their study of the process and problems in the
development of NATOs doctrine, Stein , N o l a n , a n d P e r r y
emphasize two critical aspects. First, although national
doctrines often reflect unique national service traditions and
capabilities, gaining NATO -wide acceptance for those views
can prove difficult. This is especially true of US doctrine if
other countries believe it may harbor hidden agendas or may
result in expensive modernization schemes. Second, they
argue that NATO has experienced difficulty keeping its
d o c t r i n e in tune with rapidly changing developmentsboth
technological and political.1 1 1 NATO finds itself in such a
situation now. The unanswered question is, How will its air
doctrine evolve in light of these unprecedented changes?
One may gain some insight from the 18th TAWP h e l d a t
NATO h e a d q u a r t e r s i n A p r i l 1 9 9 5 . A t t h a t m e e t i n g , s o m e
familiar processes still existed: the degree of participation by
the various countries related mainly to the issue at hand. For
example, Spain did not send a delegate at all, while Turkeys
delegate attended sessions that dealt only with specific ATPs
(such as the one dealing with airspace) in which it had a
particular interest. On the other hand, in order to facilitate
progress, delegates acting as individuals often attempted to
clarify issues or offer proposed solutions (especially when two
countries differed). Likewise, the TAWP, recognizing the slow
and cumbersome process of making changes to existing
d o c t r i n e, acknowledged the need to speed up the process in
light of changing circumstanceswitness the requirement to
update procedures used in CAS missions, found in two
annexes of ATP-27.
AIRCENT h a d s u b m i t t e d e x t e n s i v e c h a n g e s f o r n e w
procedures (e.g., on night CAS , laser operations, etc.), based
upon the experience of Operation Deny Flight ( t h e n b e i n g
conducted by NATO over the former Yugoslav Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina) . T h e T A W P , r e c o g n i z i n g b o t h t h e
existence of a short-term problem on updating guidance on
OAS p r o c e d u r e s t o g e t t o t h e f i e l d a n d a l o n g - t e r m
philosophical debate on OAS , d e c i d e d t o h o l d t h e d o c t r i n a l
debate in abeyance and proceed with updating the applicable
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Notes
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who has successively attended nine of the 18 TAWPs, this one was
representative of most TAWPs.
10. For information about the founding of NATO, see Don Cook, Forging
the Alliance: NATO, 19451 9 5 0 (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1989);
William Park, Defending the West: A History of NATO (Brighton, England:
Wheatsheaf, 1986); or Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of
the North Atlantic Treaty, 19471 9 4 9 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977).
11. The rapid and extensive demobilization undertaken by the West after
World War II had the effect of worsening this situation.
12. Josef M. A. H. Luns, former secretary-general of NATO, in Golden et
al., x.
13. The Schuman Plan (named after the French foreign minister),
announced in May 1950 and eventually becoming the European Coal and
Steel Community (the antecedent organization to the European Economic
Community formalized in the 1957 Treaty of Rome), is another example of a
measure undertaken to tie Germany and its former adversaries together.
14. West Germany also presented NATO with a significant military
problem in that it forced the alliance into a strategy that became known as
forward defense, which in 1963 tasked NATO ground forces with
defending the inner German border and precluded them from trading space
for time.
15. Thompson, 23. See also Werner Kaltefleiter, NATO and Germany,
in Lawrence S. Kaplan et al., eds., NATO after Forty Years (Wilmington, Del.:
Scholarly Resources, 1990); and Ian Smart, The Political and Economic
Evolution of NATOs Central Region, in Golden et al.
16. Pierre Melandri, France and the United States, in Golden et al.
Melandri argues that events such as the Marshall Plan, German
rearmament, colonial policies (especially in Algeria and Indochina), the
1956 Suez crisis, and even the formation of NATO itself, bespoke increasing
French dependency on the United States, which sparked a nationalistic
backlash. Kugler points out that France, under the conditions of the 1946
McMahon Act, which prohibited the United States from sharing information
about atomic weapons even to its allies, was not included in a 1958
amendment that allowed Britain to receive nuclear help (page 86).
17. Melandri, 6 6 .
18. This is not to imply that NATO waited until the Warsaw Pacts
founding in 1955 before assessing the attack options from the east. Rather,
this constitutes a more general statement on the threat assessment NATO
planners undertook in these early years. Furthermore, while other Warsaw
Pact countries did retain significant military forces, planners always
considered Soviet forces the major threat, particularly those in eastern
Europe.
19. MC 14/1 dates from the beginning of the alliance in 1949. However,
NATO did not formally accept the force goals needed to implement the
strategy until the Lisbon summit in 1952. NATO intended to attain these
goals by 1954 but never did so, abandoning them in December 1953,
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THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
following the easing of tensions in Europe that arose from the signing of the
armistice in Korea and the death of Stalin. See William H. Park, Defense,
Deterrence, and the Central Front: Around the Nuclear Threshold, in
Kaplan et al., 222.
20. Philip A. Karber, NATO Doctrine and National Operational
Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks: Part I, in Robert ONeill, ed.,
Doctrine, The Alliance and Arms Control (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1987).
21. This chapter principally addresses NATOs conventional strategy.
However, no analysis of NATO military strategy gets very far before the issue of
nuclear weapons, both their deterrent effects and their employment options,
comes to the fore. Without going into a detailed recap of nuclear deterrent
strategy, suffice it to say that two conceptscentral deterrence and extended
deterrenceare key. The first refers to the US strategic nuclear forces and their
deterrent effect of precluding general nuclear war, which presumably would
have included the NATO countries. The second refers to the deterrent effect of
US strategic forces precluding general war, either conventional or nuclear,
within Europe, which presumably could have spread to general nuclear war
between the United States and the USSR.
22. One must recall that western Europe was still rebuilding from the
devastation of World War II; despite the aid arriving under the Marshall
Plan, the European economic miracle was just beginning to unfold in the
mid-1950s.
23. Philip A. Karber and A. Grant Whitley, The Operational Realm, in
Golden et al.
24. Besides Park in Kaplan et al., see also Richard K. Betts, Alliance
Nuclear Doctrine and Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and
Policy Confidence, in Golden et al.
25. Park in Kaplan et al., 224.
26. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff made the same assumption in
approving the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. See Robert Frank
Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air
Force, vol. 1, 1 9 0 7 1 9 6 0 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December
1989), 249.
27. The heart of this upgrade program is the Long Term Defense
Program, consisting of 10 separate yet integrated initiatives formally
adopted by NATO in 1978. However, the genesis of the modernization goes
back to the early 1970s.
28. See Barry R. Posen, Measuring the European Conventional
B a l a n c e , International Security 9 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 4 / 1 9 8 5 ) ; a n d J o h n J .
Mearsheimer, Why the Soviets Cant Win Quickly in Central Europe,
International Security 7 (Summer 1982).
29. At the same time NATO adopted MC 14/3, it also adopted the
Harmel Report, which called for arms-reduction negotiations between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO.
30. Two examples were the NATO/Warsaw Pact Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR) talks started in Vienna in 1968 and the 35-nation
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478
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479
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480
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481
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482
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The second issue involves logistics. Historically, NATO has relied on the
doctrine of national logistics, which requires each country to supply its own
forces. Lacking complete standardization and interoperability, this doctrine
would create a nightmare of logistics in a multinational force. The third
issue entails command arrangements. Traditionally, NATO senior
commands have either been allocated to a particular country (e.g., SACEUR
has always been a US general) or rotated on a rigid schedule. No one knows
whether this practice will suffice in multinational forces. See David
Greenwood, Refashioning NATOs Defences, NATO Review 38 (December
1990): 28.
89. The immediate reaction force (IRF) is an augmented AMF of about
five thousand troops able to deploy anywhere within Europe within 72
hours. The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) consists
of upwards of one hundred thousand multinational troops deployable
within six to 10 days. See David M. Abshire, Richard R. Burt, and R. James
Woolsey, The Atlantic Alliance Transformed (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 22.
90. Galvin, 1517.
91. A somewhat related issue that arose in the 18th TAWP dealt with
former Warsaw Pact material now in NATO. For example, Germany retained
a squadron of MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft from the former East German air
force. Delegates expressed concerns about identification-friend-or-foe issues
that directly affect NATO airspace control doctrine.
92. A preliminary draft is just a working document. After all the issues
are ironed out, a final draft is sent to the countries for ratification. As
outlined earlier, after ratification, the document (whether a change, major
revision, or new document) is promulgated.
93. AJP-1(A), Allied Joint Operations Doctrine, 22 November 1996, par.
0001.
94. AJP-1(A), chap. 18, Joint Air Operations and Airspace Control.
95. ATP-33(B), proposed change three, December 1994, par. 306. At the
18th TAWP, the United Kingdom proposed suspending further work on
ATP-33 and -27 pending a complete review of NATO air doctrine. Much like
the earlier TAWP that established a separate forum to work out the
differences between the United States and United Kingdom over BAI (see
above), this TAWP established a working groupwhich met in Germany in
1995to study these issues (e.g., the Meyer paper and a contending United
Kingdom proposal).
96. Ibid., par. 5056.
97. Maj Luigi Meyer, memorandum to Tactical Air Working Party
agencies, subject: US Paper on Joint Air Operations, Department of the Air
Force, 27 July 1994, 5.
98. ATP-42(B), Counter Air Operations, D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 4 . P a r a g r a p h 5 0 3
states that Offensive Counter Air should be the prime consideration in the
effective employment of friendly tactical air resources.
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99. Ibid., par. 802c: Indeed, the first positive indication of an impending
conflict may be the need to conduct air defence operations.
100. ATP-40(A), Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War,
December 1994, chap. 3.
101. In the early 1990s, NATO renamed some of its MSCs and PSCs.
Hence, AAFCE became AIRCENT.
102. Col Robert D. Coffman, USAF Doctrine Center, Langley AFB, Va.,
interviewed by author, 17 March 1995.
103. Gen Thomas D. White, Air Force vice chief of staff, said that the
strategy allows recognition of the Air Force as an instrument of national
power. Furthermore, he noted that the strategy was in line with the ideas of
Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Hap Arnold, and other early airpower
theorists and leaders. See Futrell, vol. 1, 432.
104. Futrell, vol. 2, 49495. Futrell extensively quotes Gen David C.
Jones, USAF chief of staff, who came to the chiefs position from
commanding all USAF and allied air units in Europe. General Jones
explicitly outlined NATOs air requirements of blunting the Warsaw Pact
armor attack, providing some battlefield air superiority, and attacking
Warsaw Pact second-echelon forces.
105. Col Dennis Drew, USAF, Retired, team chief and principal author of
the 1992 edition of AFM 1-1, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 10
March 1995.
106. For USAF doctrine, the primary publication is AFM 1-1. For joint
doctrine, the key publication for operations is Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine
for Joint Operations, 9 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 3 .
107. For NATO, the keystone doctrine for the planning, execution, and
support of allied joint operations is AJP-1(A).
108. See AFM 1-1, vol. 1, par. 3-1; JP 3-0, chap. 2; and AJP-1(A), chap.
18, sec. 3.
109. See AFM 1-1, vol. 1, par. 3-5b(1); JP 3-0, chap. 4, 3f. AJP-1 does
not address this level of specificity; however, ATP-33(B), proposed change
three, par. 5067, discusses the need for close coordination between AI and
ground maneuver.
110. See AFM 1-1, vol. 1, par. 3-5a; JP 3-0, chap. 4, 2c; and AJP-1(A),
chap. 18, par. 1805.
111. Stein, Nolan, and Perry, 1213.
484
Chapter 13
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486
FELKER
strategy p r o v i d e d t h e t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t u n i t e d
domestic politics, economics, history, morale, science,
international politics, and military forces. It also unified
military doctrine a n d o p e r a t i o n a l a r tits ultimate application.
Military strategy linked political leadership and the Soviet
High Command in preparing the nation for war. The Soviet
High Command organized strategy, planned force
deployments, prepared the armed forces for war, and
controlled them during war. Military strategys political basis
directly influenced the military-technical fundamentals of
d o c t r i n e. B e c a u s e o f t h i s c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n
military strategy a n d d o c t r i n e , a n y c h a n g e i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l
base of one produced changes in the other. Doctrines views
a b o u t f u t u r e w a r guided strategy. Simultaneously, strategy
a f f e c t e d t h e f o r m u l a t i o n a n d p e r f e c t i o n o f d o c t r i n es
military-technical component.
This military-technical aspect of doctrine r e m a i n e d a
dynamic idea, constantly adjusted to reflect changes in force
posture, political requirements, economic factors, scientific
achievement, and changes introduced by potential enemies.
Timothy Thomas n o t e s s i x c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e m b r a c e d b y t h e
m i l i t a r y - t e c h n i c a l d i m e n s i o n o f m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e: ( 1 ) t h e
character (nature) of the military threat; (2) the type and
struggle that may result (future war); (3) the requirements for
defense (historical paradigm about wars beginning, initial
period, timing, and interaction of technology); (4) the required
armed forces (strategic posture, mobilization, and
deployment); (5) the means to conduct armed struggle and the
use of the armed forces (force generation, manning, and
equipping); and (6) preparation of the armed forces to
accomplish these tasks (training, etc.). 9
Soviet military doctrine guided the development of military
a r t , but military art was not its subset. Doctrine consisted of
general principles regarding the nature of war, whereas
military art concerned the practical issues of war fighting. 10
Given military doctrines view of the future battlefield, military
art described the nature of warfare in general terms. It
articulated the likely enemy, types of action to expect and
prepare for, and measures to equip and train forces. Further,
it provided the synthesis of the national economy and
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p o p u l a t i o n i n s u p p o r t i n g f u t u r e w a r. Military art a n d i t s
doctrinal underpinnings, therefore, were closely coordinated.
In the initial period of war, this coordination became critical. 11
According to army general M. V. Gareyev, t h e r e s p o n s e i n t h e
initial period most directly reflected the Soviets political
intent. He observed that while politics usually prevails
throughout a war, the political aspects are most prevalent on
the eve or at the beginning of a war.12
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c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s p e r i o d .1 5 A l t h o u g h t h e w a r l a i d t h e
foundation of military doctrine, the Soviets conducted little
critical examination of their failures in 1941 and 1942.
Furthermore, Joseph Stalin placed great importance on atomic
weapons and rocketry for international prestige. US superiority
in strategic nuclear weapons and airpower prompted a Soviet
emphasis on strong conventional forces and offensive
counterattack into Europe from Soviet bases in Eastern Europe.
The international political environment and Marxist-Leninist
i d e o l o g y a l s o s h a p e d m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e. M a r x i s t i d e a l i s m
included the inevitable clash between capitalism and socialism,
which reinforced the Soviets view of the world.
Most influential was the role played by the nature of the
internal Soviet political system. Under Stalin , the Soviet Union
became more authoritarian. Elevating to doctrinal status
those factors he believed were responsible for winning the war,
he ignored developments in conventional weapons , the role of
surprise on the battlefield, and any failures the Soviets may
h a v e h a d d u r i n g t h e G e r m a n p u s h t o M o s c o w , Leningrad, a n d
Stalingrad. Stalin considered these deficiencies irrelevant to
victory.
Both defense and offense played major roles in conventional
warfare. Victory resulted from accumulating successful battles
along slowly moving, continuous fronts . Frontal breakthroughs
occurred by massing forces on a main axis of attack. The
military concentrated its forces in strike sectors for speed,
firepower, and shock to penetrate, envelop, and thrust into the
enemys rear areas. Combined arms, with preeminent ground
forces in a European environment, became the primary vision of
f u t u r e w a r.16
Khrushchevs Era (195464). Freed from the stupefying
control of Stalin , military doctrine changed significantly under
N i k i t a K h r u s h c h e v. T h e m a j o r d o c t r i n a l t r e n d b e c a m e
a d a p t i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and missiles to the old concepts of
f u t u r e w a r. 17 K h r u s h c h e v dropped the idea of the inevitability
of a protracted ground war i n E u r o p e . Instead, war would
result from the presumed escalation of a small conventional
war into a nuclear one. Short, intense, and massive exchanges
o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s dominated this view of war.1 8 B e c a u s e o f
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490
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492
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n u c l e a r w e a p o n s, i n s h a r p c o n t r a s t t o t h e d o c t r i n es
reorientation, which emphasized defensive preparation. He
argues that the Soviets announced defensive position
remained more in the realm of intent . . . than . . . immediate
reform.3 2 Officially, the General Staff embraced the defensive
but continued an offensive spirit.
Immediate PreGulf War Era (199091). This period
m a r k e d t h e e n d o f c o m m u n i s m, t h e b r e a k u p o f t h e W a r s a w
Pact , the dissolution of the Soviet Republic, the rise of Boris
Yeltsin , and the formation of the Russian Federation . In 1989
G o r b a c h e v a n n o u n c e d u n i l a t e r a l f o r c e r e d u c t i o n s i n E u r o p e, a
move toward professionalism versus conscription, and force
development began to focus on qualitative factors. Political
factions reassessed the military threat from the West and
declared it less daunting. The central theme of doctrine
evolution during this period addressed ways of making
defensive doctrine and reasonable sufficiency work after
military restructuring. According to Lester Grau of the Foreign
Military Studies Office, m a n y i n d i c a t o r s s h o w t h a t t h e
declaration of a defensive doctrine w a s a p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l
decision made for economic and political purposes and
imposed on the military with little regard for the military logic
of that doctrine.3 3 H e p o i n t s o u t t h a t , a f t e r t h e n e w d o c t r i n e
declaration, professional books and journal articles published
i n t h e U S S R continued to reflect the Soviet militarys
conservative approach to operational art. The Soviets found
themselves on a trip down a poorly lit and twisting path,
where perceptions and reality would come into sharp conflict.
New US and NATO systems were clearly a generation ahead
of those of the Soviets. The role of precision-guided munitions
(PGM) and electronic warfare (EW) h a d a d d e d a g r e a t c o m b a t
additive to NATO forces. Although the Soviets clearly lagged
behind, they did not intend simply to mirror NATO s r e l i a n c e
o n t e c h n o l o g y a s a f o r c e m u l t i p l i e r . 34 S o v i e t m i l i t a r y
professionals asserted that they would not follow in the wake
of the probable enemy and copy his weapons and employment
concepts [but would] seek asymmetrical solutions, combining
high combat effectiveness with economic efficiency.3 5 T h e
Soviet forces are to become equipped with the latest in
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495
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496
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498
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Strategy
To the Soviets, strategy linked political aims with the posture
of the military forces; it defined wars conditions and
characteristics. Through strategy, the Soviets identified and
adapted experiences related to the preparation and conduct of
past wars with the study of future wars. Thus, the Gulf War w a s
not just an exercise in weapons evaluation but a necessary and
basic requirement of the Soviets strategy-formulation process.
The Gulf War altered their strategic concept about the
characteristics of the danger or threat, the nature of future war,
and the importance of the initial period of war.
For four decades, the Soviets military doctrine concerned
itself with opposing NATO. In evaluating the causes of the Gulf
War, the High Command drew several conclusions concerning
the West. It believed that the United States showed weakness in
signaling a warning to Saddam Hussein of its probable response
in late June 1990, when Iraq massed forces at the Kuwaiti
border. The High Command also believed that the failure of the
United Nations to act against aggression in South Lebanon a n d
P a n a m a gave Saddam a false sense of security. Further, it
believed that the Western powers thought they could achieve
strategic goals through local conflicts, so that now they actually
encouraged war. In all these beliefs, the Soviets reinforced their
old mistrust of Western hegemony. 5 1
Maj Gen V. Zhurbenko, deputy head of the main department
of the Soviet General Staff, said in an interview with T a s s t h a t
the Gulf War was without analog since World War II .52 Mary C.
FitzGerald points out that since Soviets structured the armed
forces according to their view of the nature of future war, their
military doctrine is riveted to future military capabilities and
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Operational Art
Operational art d e s c r i b e s h o w S o v i e t f o r c e s a r e f o r m e d ,
organized, and employed to achieve military strategy. Soviet
o p e r a t i o n a l a r t, w h i c h e n c o m p a s s e s t h e o p e r a t i o n a l - l e v e l
commanders sphere of actions, had become focused on speed,
mass, shock, and firepower of preeminent ground forces , with
other services in a supporting role. The success of the coalition
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systems, destroy his air defenses , and weaken the ground forces
striking power. In terms of the choice of objectives, it was more a case
of a classic air offense. And these objectives were achieved. Broadly
speaking, this is the first time we have seen a war which aviation took
care almost entirely of all the main tasks.6 7
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505
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506
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507
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508
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509
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The Threat
The new military doctrine listed several scenarios that
future war might take. It placed primary emphasis on meeting
threats that endangered Russian sovereignty or territory
either autonomously or as part of the Confederation of
Independent States (CIS). It also noted that hostilities might
result from economic or political pressure from a major
p o w e r .9 0 I n t h e p a s t , f i g u r i n g o u t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a t h r e a t
normally fell to Marxist-Leninist ideology within the
sociopolitical dimension of military doctrine.
Although it did not specifically identify potential enemies, the
new doctrine listed several factors that could lead to conflict,9 1
describing them as possible sources of military danger.92 First,
the Russians viewed NATO s military power and the American
presence in Europe a n d t h e F a r E a s t as their greatest potential
danger.9 3 Second, the doctrine examined the anxiety over the
rise of global or regional powers, especially Germany, J a p a n ,
Iran , and Turkey. Third, the doctrine noted the pressure exerted
by the leverage that Western economics might create against the
Russian government. Last, it echoed the concern over Americas
exerting military power beyond its borders to further the aims of
foreign policy.9 4 The doctrine also described two direct threats to
Russia : (1) the introduction of foreign troops into any of its
adjacent statesa concept similar to the stereotypical direct
threat to Rodina 95 and (2) the buildup of air, naval, and ground
forces near Russian borders. 96
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511
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512
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status quo along its borders, and eventually rout the enemy.
G o r b a c h e vs earlier military doctrine e s p o u s e d m o r e m o d e s t
terms of cessation to hostilities. The preGulf War d o c t r i n e
specifically addressed partial victory, enemy withdrawal, and
restoration of peace. The new doctrines resurrected idea of
total victory incorporates traditional Soviet thinking that
prevailed well into the late 1980s.
Most important of all, the new doctrine stressed the decisive
importance of the initial period of war.107 In Desert Storm , the
Russians saw the initial period consisting of air strikes a i m e d
at disrupting enemy strategic deployments, disorganizing
civilian and military C3 I, and collapsing any enemy coalition.
The Russians new doctrine specifies the destruction of
economic a n d m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s by ACMs s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o r
preemptively with electronic warfare. 1 0 8 Of significance is the
Russians new belief that ACMs c o u l d a c c o m p l i s h m i s s i o n s
o n c e t h o u g h t p o s s i b l e o n l y b y n u c l e a r w e a p o n s. T o t h e
R u s s i a n s , s u p e r i o r i t y i n E W a n d C3 I a r e n e c e s s a r y a n d
sufficient to ensure victory in warfare. 1 0 9
Both the Gorbachev doctrine a n d t h e n e w m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e
stress the need to obtain high-technology weapons a n d
maintain a mass-mobilization capability. Neither doctrine
seems to accept the social, economic, and political reality that
might stand in the militarys way of carrying out that doctrine.
C. J. Dick aptly cites the Russian General Staff for living in an
Alice in Wonderland world, reinforced by its assertion that
force reductions can take place only when the right military-
technical, economic, and social conditions are created. 1 1 0
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516
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517
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518
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519
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Notes
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522
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523
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524
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80. A. Ladin, Prepared Statements from the Podium, Honest Talk in the
Lobby, K r a s n a y a z v e z d a , 22 March 1991, in FBIS-SOV-060, 28 March
1991, 38.
81. Cited in Maj Gen I. Losev and Lt Col A. Yakovlevich, Desert Storm
Revisited: Lessons from the Persian Gulf War, Vestnik protivovoz dushnoy
oborony, 7 July 1992, JPRS-UMA-92-040, 5759.
82. Quoted in Maj Gen V. Shevchenko, Soviet Air Force Col-Gen
Shaposhnikov Assesses Air War in Gulf, K r a s n a y a z v e z d a , 2 5 J a n u a r y
1991, FBIS-SOV-91-021, 9.
8 3 . L a m b e t h , Desert Storm and Its Meaning, 4 3 4 4 .
84. Ibid., 6988. One apocalyptic Soviet correspondent, Pavel
Felgengauer of Nezavisimaya gazeta, m a y h a v e e x p r e s s e d a c o n c e r n o n t h e
minds of many of the General Staff when he said, The indestructible Red
Army, made up for the most part of unprofessional officers and
semi-trained conscripts, could hardly manage to put up sustained
resistance to the professional NATO armies and modern highly accurate
superweaponry. The clash of brute force and reason, a bullfight in essence,
would end, like all bullfights, with the moment of truth. Quoted by
Stanislav Kondrashov in Political Observers Notes, I z v e s t i y a , 2 8 J a n u a r y
1991, in FBIS-SOV-91-021, 31 January 1991, 15.
85. Moiseyev, From Defense Doctrine Positions, 81.
86. Thomas, 594.
87. FitzGerald, Russias New Military Doctrine, 6.
88. Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation:
Russias Military Doctrine, Rossiyskiye vesti, 1 8 N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 2 , i n
FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, 111 (hereinafter Russian Draft Military Doctrine).
89. Ibid., 1.
90. Ibid., 23.
91. Ibid.
92. The draft doctrine defines military danger as an immediate threat
of direct aggression against the Russian Federation, describing the danger
in terms of social, political, territorial, religious, national-ethnic, and other
conflicts. The military danger derives from the desire of a number of states
and political forces resolving their problems through armed struggle. It
describes armed conflict from aggressive nationalism and religious
intolerance as posing a special danger. A military danger becomes a
military threat when there is an immediate danger of war. See ibid., 23.
93. Moiseyev, From Defense Doctrine Positions, 78.
94. Natalie Gross, Reflections on Russias New Military Doctrine,
Janes Intelligence Review, A u g u s t 1 9 9 2 , 3 3 9 .
9 5 . Rodina (the motherland) is a Russian concept that links preservation
of state, cultural pride, and nationalism. It elevates patriotism and
self-sacrifice for the motherland to a near-religious level. See Dick, Russian
Views, 362. Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev noted as early as March 1991
that a military threat to the Soviet Union no longer exists, but a military
d a n g e r does (emphasis added). According to Timothy Thomas, Defense
526
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Minister Yazov later echoed these concerns about military danger instead of
military threat. See Thomas, 596.
96. Russian Draft Military Doctrine, 23.
97. Ibid., 56.
98. Ibid., 5.
99. Ibid., 79.
100. FitzGerald, Russias New Military Doctrine, 45.
101. Russian Draft Military Doctrine, 56.
102. Dick, Initial Thoughts, 560.
103. Russian Draft Military Doctrine, 68.
104. Ibid., 8.
105. FitzGerald, Russias New Military Doctrine, 4546.
106. Russian Draft Military Doctrine, 2.
107. Ibid., 6.
108. Ibid.
109. FitzGerald, Russias New Military Doctrine, 46.
110. Dick, Initial Thoughts, 562.
111. Amidst the domestic stagnation of the Brezhnev years and the
resurgence of American strength, Ogarkov evinced deep concern about the
Soviets ability to keep pace with the truly revolutionary transformation of
military affairs now occurring as a result of the development of
thermonuclear weapons, the rapid evolution of electronics and weapons
based on new physical principles, as well as the wide, qualitative
improvements in conventional weaponry. Quoted in Ilana Kass and Fred
Clark Boli, The Soviet Military: Back to the Future? Journal of Soviet
Military Studies, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 0 , 3 9 2 .
112. Aleksandr Stukalin, Armed Forces Viewed after One Year in
Existence, Kommersant-Daily, 8 May 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-088, 10 May
1993, 3638.
113. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Red Phoenix Redux: The Fitful Emergence
of a New Russian Air Force, draft (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, March
1994), x.
114. Ibid., 2832.
115. An interesting observation by Kipp pertains to the impact of arms
sales on the overall Russian economy. Since industrial plant costs were
already accrued (sunk costs) and with labor costs also very low, military
sales were actually making money and stimulating the economy. Although
one central theme of this essay holds that the Russian economy will have a
deleterious effect on the Russian military, Kipps reasoning might at first
appear to counter that notion. It might prove interesting to consider how
much of the Russian military the politicians are willing to sell for this
temporary economic stimulation. I do not believe that the Russians will
mortgage the state at the expense of the military. Dr. Jacob Kipp, Foreign
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., interviewed by author, 21
March 1994.
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528
Chapter 14
529
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power a s p r e s c r i b e d b y M a h a n . I f t h e p o p u l a r M a h a n i a n
theoretical base and presidential endorsement were not
enough, technological growth (smokeless guns, turbine
engines, and submarines), naval successes in the
Spanish-American War (1898), several South American
ventures, and a growing threat of German naval power in the
Pacific all gave impetus to the production of a very capable
Navy. The rise of American sea power p u s h e d t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s o n t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a g e . 1 The lesson is clear: if
those periods possess (1) the necessary resources, (2) an
u n e n c u m b e r e d economy, (3) an immediate motivation (here,
an immediate threat), and (4) a common vision that supports
specific technologies, t h e y a r e t e m p o r a r y a n d p r e s e n t w i n d o w s
of opportunity.
A t t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s stood poised
on the threshold of a great era: the preeminence of sea power .
We are again at the turn of a century and again at the
threshold of another great era: the preeminence of space
power . The question is no longer one of if but when. Is the
time right for the US military to follow suit with a
M a h a n i a n-type book outlining The Influence of Space Power
upon History? Are airpower theory and doctrine logical points
of departure? The answers to these questions lead directly to
key military issues dealt with in this chapter: What impact
c a n c u r r e n t a i r p o w e r t h e o r y h a v e o n s p a c e p o w e r t h e o r y? Is a
s e p a r a t e S p a c e F o r c e required? If so, when?
To determine the potential impact of airpower theory upon
space power theory, o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d c u r r e n t A i r F o r c e
thinking, which is offered here as an aerospace power
conjectureto wit, one should build space power theory a n d
d o c t r i n e u p o n a i r p o w e r t h e o r y a n d d o c t r i n e. Current Air Force
doctrine strongly indicates acceptance of this conjecture.
Specifically, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace
Doctrine of the United States Air Force, s t a t e s t h a t t h e
aerospace environment can be most fully exploited when
considered as an indivisible whole. Although there are
physical differences between the atmosphere and space, there
is no absolute boundary between them. The same basic
military activities can be performed in each, albeit with
d i f f e r e n t p l a t f o r m s a n d m e t h o d s . 2 A i r F o r c e S p a c e
530
DE BLOIS
531
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1. role: r e a l m p r e s e n c e .
mission: posturing the full complement of military
capability and/or maintaining the recognized capability
to access and dominate a particular realm with the
intent to deter or compel allies and adversaries in
consonance with US national objectives. 9
2. role: realm vigilance.
mission: continuous monitoring and analysis of and
from the realm in support of global awareness. This
includes a subset of information operations (weather,
intelligence , surveillance , a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ).
3. role: realm control.
mission (counterrealm): discriminating application of
combat power against enemy forces within the realm or
a g a i n s t t h e i r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s u p p o r t i n g t h e r e a l m . 10
532
DE BLOIS
533
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Space Policy
Emotional, legal, and rational political considerations
directly affect the will to use space power a n d , a s s u c h ,
534
DE BLOIS
Emotional Factor
Competing schools of thought lie at the root of the debate
over space weaponization . In his book On Space Warfare,1 8 Lt
Col David Lupton s u m m a r i z e s f o u r c o m p e t i n g s c h o o l s o f
thought that surfaced during the 1980s, when the issue of
weaponizing space received a great deal of publicity.
The Sanctuary School views space as a realm free of
military weapons but allows for military-related systems that
provide the functions of treaty verification, intelligence
activities, and so forth. Advocates maintain that the only way
to ensure the legal overflight aspect of current space treaties is
to declare space as a war-free zone or sanctuary. This school
calls for virtually no funding of military space programs aimed
at weaponizing s p a c e . T h e S a n c t u a r y S c h o o l o f t h o u g h t h a s a
substantial following in the domestic and international
populace, though many people within the military see it as a
head in the sand approach to national security.
The Survivability School also argues that military forces
should deemphasize space access, but for less idealistic
reasons. It assumes that space forces are inherently exposed
and vulnerable. Survivability adherents assert that the
probability of using nuclear weapons i n t h e r e m o t e n e s s o f
space is higher than in other media. This notionalong with
the fact that weapons effects have longer ranges outside an
inhibiting atmosphere, as well as the inherent vulnerability of
predictable orbit locationssupports the survivability
position. Remoteness also allows for plausible deniability of
the attacker, which increases the probability of attack. The
Survivability School calls for recognizing that space forces a r e
not dependable in crisis situations. Thus, one should limit
m i l i t a r y s p a c e m i s s i o n s t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , s u r v e i l l a n c e,
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , and weather reporting. From this perspective,
investment strategies ought to fund those missions, along
with redundant space/terrestrial programs and perhaps
ground-based antisatellites (ASAT).
535
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Legal Factor
In addition to the various schools of thought, several
important treaties have made a significant impact on military
space policy. Of note are the following:
1. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) o f 1 9 6 7 s t a t e s t h a t
international law applies beyond the atmosphere. The
536
DE BLOIS
537
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Rational Factor
Military space policy, which derives from national security
policy, m u s t s u p p o r t n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l
collective security interests and remain consistent with
domestic economic and social interests. Any treaty negotiation
aimed at bolstering national security would have to consider a
variety of factors. To name a few, current military space
capabilities along with the corresponding dependencies of the
United States, our allies, and our potential adversaries are of
primary importance. From a broader perspective, investment
in expensive space weapons creates an opportunity cost;
trade-offs with more conventional military systems become a
significant consideration. The difficult matter of verification,
which remains a concern, was a prime motivator behind the
US rejection of several Soviet treaty proposals to control space
w e a p o n s i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s . 23
The bureaucratic decision process that combines the
emotional, legal, and rational factors into a coherent space
policy is complex. Analysis of bureaucratic decision making a t
the level of national policy is a science (or an art) unto itself. 24
Certainly, personal agendas, timing, and organizational
structures all play a role in such decisions. This essay
assumes that a rational decision-making authority recognized
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and/or international collective security as
primary drivers, understood the emotional perspective and
legal limitations, and subsequently produced the current
space policy. T h e u n i l a t e r a l c o n g r e s s i o n a l m o r a t o r i u m o n t h e
funding of space-based weapons resulted from that rational
process, which is not mandated by law but perhaps by better
j u d g m e n t . 25 E m e r g i n g f r o m t h i s d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s a r e t h e
n a t i o n a l , D O D, a n d A i r F o r c e p o l i c i e s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e
538
DE BLOIS
539
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
540
DE BLOIS
Sovereignty
Nations retain sovereignty over their air realm, but by virtue
of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, they can claim no
sovereignty of the space realmsovereignty rests with the
spacecraft a n d n o t t h e m e d i u m .3 1 Although this situation
imposes some limitations since no national borders protect
space assets, it facilitates most operations. Unrestricted
access to and overflight of every nation on Earth exist for
space operations but not for air operations, a s i t u a t i o n t h a t
poses advantages for a nation with superior space power a n d
541
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
542
DE BLOIS
Technology Dependence
The development of air and space technology is virtually
s y n o n y m o u s w i t h h i g h t e c h n o l o g y . Humans have existed in
the land and sea realms for thousands of years. Although
technological advance remains crucial to exploiting both
realms, people do not need it to access them. In contrast,
people have needed high technology to provide air and space
access from the outset. Investment in high-technology R&D is
essential to the progress of both airpower and space power .
More so than on land or at sea, where technology is a force
multiplier a n d n u m b e r s a r e o f t e n t h e d e t e r m i n a n t , i n a i r a n d
in space, technology is not just the force multiplier b u t t h e
force itself. In the future, the role of humans will remain
essential, but their primary value will lie in the preparation
and orchestration of assets before the fightnot in a fight that
will occur at speeds beyond human comprehension. Exposure
of expensive technological assets may distinguish airpower
a n d s p a c e p o w e r in terms of environmental characteristics
(see below). Insofar as both airpower and space power heavily
depend on advanced technology for access and manipulation
of air and space, technology dependence is a characteristic
similarity of airpower and space power.
543
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
544
DE BLOIS
Execution
Air Force doctrine cites effective spans of control,
responsiveness, and tactical flexibility as justification for the
decentralized execution of airpower.3 6 T h i s e s s a y d o e s n o t
challenge the historical legacy supporting this air doctrine for
manned flight. Suffice it to mention that one may question the
value of decentralized execution when (if ) centrally controlled
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) come to dominate the air realm.
Ironically, experience in the space realm may provide insights
for those airpower theorists considering centralized execution .
Space provides for an ideal adaptation of centralized
execution . T h e t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y t y p i c a l l y p r o v i d e d b y
decentralized execution is not an efficient option for employing
centrally controlled, speed-of-light-responsive, unmanned
national space assets with global reach . Space power requires
centralized execution i n o r d e r t o o r c h e s t r a t e o p t i m u m u s e o f
assets throughout the battle space. Tactical effectiveness will
rest on speed-of-light requests for support to some central
buffer, priority assignment (some automated, some screened),
and subsequent centralized execution . An extreme example
warranting decentralized execution might involve spaced-
b a s e d - l a s e r c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t. B u t e v e n t h o u g h t h e
requirement is near instantaneous, a priority-one input by the
field commander would still have to go through a central
control node that would subsequently execute the command.
Assigning direct control of a satellite to the local commander
would waste the potential use of the asset in other areas of the
battle space at other times.
Air Force space doctrine currently under development
agrees. For example, in the draft version of AFDD 4, Space
Operations Doctrine, Gen Thomas D. White comments that a
lack of centralized authority would certainly hamper our
peaceful use of space and could be disastrous in time of war.
Failure to properly coordinate peaceful space activities under
common direction could cause confusion. . . . In war, when
time is of the essence and quick reaction so necessary,
centralized military authority will surely be mandatory.
F u r t h e r , w i t h r e g a r d t o u n i t y o f c o m m a n d, t h e d o c u m e n t
observes that centralized control and decentralized execution
545
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
546
DE BLOIS
Realm-Access Characteristics
of Military Power
Technological advances in aerodynamics, materials,
propulsion, guidance, and control all facilitated access to the
air realm at the turn of the twentieth century. Similarly, in
astrodynamics, ongoing studies of forces and motion in space
suggest that proliferated access t o t h e s p a c e r e a l m i s n e a r a t
hand. But one should remain cautious about such
technological optimism: Scientists and engineers now know
how to build a station in space that would circle the Earth
1,075 miles up. . . . Within the next 10 or 15 years, the Earth
will have a new companion in the skies, a man-made satellite
that could be either the greatest force for peace ever devised,
or one of the most terrible weapons of wardepending on who
m a k e s a n d c o n t r o l s i t . 38
Surprisingly, those comments came from Wernher von
Braun, speaking in 1952. Relatively recent experience with
understanding the air realm, together with the ability to
rapidly overcome air-flight-related technical obstacles,
naturally led to the same expectation for spaceflight-related
technical obstacles. The experiences of the last 45 years with
s p a c e r e s e a r c h have emphasized a real difference between
understanding a theoretical environment and building
systems to gain physical access to it. The air accessspace
a c c e s s analogy breaks down for several reasons: access to the
air realm, at the lowest technological level, is as easy as
throwing a rock or glider. But space is not a realm to which
we have immediate access or in which we have experience.
Prior to specifically addressing the realm-access
characteristics of airpower and space power , therefore, one
needs some background regarding space-lift efforts, including
significant technical hurdles to space lift, technological
development designed to negotiate those hurdles, and the
547
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
548
DE BLOIS
549
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Realm-Environment Characteristics
of Military Power
Methods of operations within the air and space realms are
drastically different. The underlying cause of this difference
lies in the unique composition, size, and position of the
respective realmscharacteristics that have significant impact
on the employment of military power.
550
DE BLOIS
Table 1
The Changing Atmospheric Medium
Altitude (km) Density (d)/Density at Sea Level (d0)
0 d 0 = 10 1 8 p a r t i c l e s / c m 3
5 d = .492 x d 0 (one-half of Earths
a t m o s p h e r e is below this)
10 d = .242 x d 0 (supplemental oxygen
required for respiration)
15 d = .119 x d 0 ( s u p p l e m e n t a l p r e s s u r e a n d
oxygen required for respiration)
24 d = .033 x d 0 (compressing external air is
n o longer economical; humans
require self-contained environments)
32 d = .011 x d 0 (operating limit of turbojet
engines)
45 d = .002 x d 0 (operating limit of ramjet
engines)
100 d = 1 0 12 p a r t i c l e s / c m 3 (aerodynamic
effects become insignificant)
1,000 d = 105 particles/cm3
2,000+ d = one particle/cm 3 (the hard vacuum
of space)
551
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
552
DE BLOIS
553
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
554
DE BLOIS
Realm-Afforded Capability
Characteristics of Military Power
Autonomy of operation, surveillance a n d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,
duration (staying power/presence), range, maneuver, flexibility
555
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Autonomy
Evaluation of this characteristic assumes that system
dependence on external information is undesirable. Lack of
autonomy represents vulnerability. This view does not advocate
complete decentralization but simply recognizes the fact that,
necessary or not, external dependence further exposes the
system. Considering just the communications aspect of any
spaceborne system , one notes that large-scale data transmission
capacities will require innovations in both data transmission
(bandwidth and data-link security) and processing (expert
systems for data synthesis and computing power). The advent of
remotely piloted airborne vehicles w i l l p l a c e t h e s a m e
requirements on many airborne platforms. The critical element
in the evaluation of this characteristic is not whether the system
is airborne or spaceborne but whether the system is manned or
unmanned. Unmanned systems inherently lack autonomy and
critically depend on secure, high-transmission data links.
Because spaceborne systems are much more difficult to man,
autonomy is a characteristic advantage of airpower.
Surveillance/Reconnaissance
The idea that space assets provide omniscience/omnipresence
is a common one: 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year, c o n t i n u o u s
556
DE BLOIS
557
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Duration
Geosynchronous satellites p r o v i d e a p e r s i s t e n t a n d
continuous presence. One can also arrange satellites in LEO
to provide a similar presence.5 8 Aircraft presence is transient,
and even though long-loiter UAVs may extend aerial presence
significantly, aircraft presence requires sortie generation
and supportsatellites do not. Duration is a characteristic
a d v a n t a g e o f s p a c e p o w e r.
558
DE BLOIS
Range
Airpower and space power both have global range. Either
medium provides access to any surface target. The range of
space power extends beyond the near-Earth environment,
c u r r e n t l y o u t t o G E O. A l t h o u g h a i r p o w e r a s s e t s s u c h a s
airborne lasers or kinetic miniature homing vehicle ASATs
may soon offer regular access to LEO, they will not have
access to deep-space locations. Considerable time may pass
before the range extension of space power exceeds that of
airpower, particularly in a strike capacity. Inherently, though,
range is a characteristic advantage of space power.
Maneuver
A satellite in LEO (200 km) travels at roughly 7,790 meters
per second (17,425 MPH). 59 A small satellite (100 kg) traveling
at this speed has the kinetic energy roughly equivalent to an
F-16 t r a v e l i n g a t M a c h 2 ( s e a l e v e l ) . 6 0 U n l i k e t h e F - 1 6 ,
however, the satellite h a s n o a i r o n w h i c h t o m a n e u v e r o r s l o w
down, and because it is so expensive to lift fuel to space,
satellites typically have very little energy available to provide
on-orbit thrust, which in turn equates to maneuverability. The
cross-range capability of satellites is so low, in fact, that the
most maneuverable, powered, space conceptsthe current
reusable launch vehicle (RLV) designsallow only for eleven
hundred miles of lateral maneuver capability. 6 1 T h i s e s s a y
has already mentioned the incredible costs incurred by lifting
mass (fuel) to orbit for such maneuvers. These are daunting
obstacles; as such, the virtual immobility of spaceborne assets
from fixed orbit stands as their biggest drawback. Maneuver is
a characteristic advantage of airpower.
Flexibility
System flexibility equates to options. Spacecraft o p t i o n s a s
compared to aircraft options are severely limited on several
counts:
1 . A s d i s c u s s e d , t h e e n e r g y c o s t o f maneuvering s p a c e
assets reduces the number of target options.
559
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Precision
Automated terminal guidance and control are equally
applicable from the air and space. Remote, data-linked
terminal guidance provides its own inherent limitations,
however. Because data-link vulnerability is always an issue,
as are weather restrictions, the Air Force continues to retain
manned aircraft with ballistic bombing capability. Typically, in
the absence of terminal guidance, the precision of ballistic
weapons is directly related to release rangeand release
range from terrestrial targets is less for air assets as compared
to the further-removed space assets. The proximity of the air
r e a l m p r o v i d e s precision as a characteristic a d v a n t a g e o f
airpower.
Speed of Response
If one removes the three previously considered limitations of
space power (maneuver, flexibility, and precision) from the
calculation,6 2 s p a c e - b a s e d r e s p o n s e t i m e c a n b e c o m e a l m o s t
560
DE BLOIS
Firepower
An Mk 84 two-thousand-pound all-purpose bomb without
any explosive charge, released at 30,000 feet and 530 knots,
carries the energy equivalent to roughly 145 pounds of TNT.
The same Mk 84 dumb bomb in LEO carries one hundred
times the energythe explosive power of seven tons of TNT. 64
This may seem like a great deal, but several mitigating factors
come into play:
1. If that energy is employed, most is lost due to drag
effects upon reentry.
2. The explosive power of modern conventional weapons
comes from their explosive filling rather than their
kinetic energy: the explosive charge of an Mk 84428 kg
of Tritonal6 5 i s e q u i v a l e n t t o r o u g h l y n i n e h u n d r e d
pounds of TNT. Other conventional explosives marginally
exceed Tritonal capacity. 66
3. Many lofted weapons (e.g., cluster bombs) require
specific velocities for employment, completely negating
the space-stationed energy advantage.
4. The cost of putting dumb energy in orbit is prohibitive
(at $10,000/pound, putting a dumb Mk 84 in orbit
would cost an astronomical $20 million). 6 7
561
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Stealth
Because of their close proximity to the surface, aircraft are
exposed to low-technology, surface-based threats such as
antiaircraft artillery a n d s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s . T h e i r
exposure, however, is transient and limited by various
unpredictable factors: timing, flight path, velocity,
maneuverability, stealth technology, and weather.
The high speed and remote aspects of spacecraft clearly
provide certain security advantages. A spacecraft i n n ea r -
circular LEO with an apogee and perigee of approximately
2,128 miles travels a set path at a known velocity of roughly
17,420 MPH, while a satellite in a near-circular GEO (22,241
miles) requires a velocity of 6,880 MPH to remain stationary,
relative to the Earths surface.6 9 B u t a s t e c h n i c a l a c c e s s t o
s p a c e proliferates, the advantages of remote speed give way to
the disadvantages of predictable locations and paths. Physical
cluster areas at LEO, GEO, and Lagrange p o i n t s 7 0 also add to
the exposure of space assets. Additionally, the absence of an
inhibiting atmosphere greatly extends space-based sensing
capability and weapons effects, further complicating the
space-security issue. Historically, space support based in the
continental United States has remained more centralized than
air-support infrastructure, thus increasing its vulnerability.
After defining stealth a s a m i l i t a r y t e r m r e f e r r i n g t o t h e
difficulty of acquiring, locking, and killing a potential target,
and after comparing the transient, maneuverable, low-level
562
DE BLOIS
Conclusion
Clearly, the characteristics of airpower and space power a r e
quite different, as indicated by highlighting their relative
advantages (table 2). Only the characteristic of technological
dependence shows a significant similarity between airpower
a n d s p a c e p o w e r . One should note, however, that techno-logical
advances will mitigate some of the differences in
characteristics. Unfavorable characteristics of airpower may
change significantly with the advent of long-loiter UAVs , while
563
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
Table 2
Characteristic Advantages of Airpower and Space Power
Development/ Centralized C 2
Employment Decentralized execution
564
DE BLOIS
565
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
566
DE BLOIS
567
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
When
As mentioned above, we should create a separate Space
Force when the technological development and domestic will
allow pursuit of the full spectrum of roles and missions from
space (i.e., not yet). Apparently, a compelling immediate
motivation is missing. We find ourselves in a period that
possesses (1) the necessary resources, (2) an unencumbered
economy, 75 (3) a weak immediate motivation (here, the threat
of proliferated space access), and (4) a common vision that
supports specific technologies . It may be temporary, but it
presents a window of opportunity.
The lack of centralized controlwhich results in service
infighting, inefficiency, and duplicationmay warrant a move
now. A reasonable compromise would entail creation of a
Space Force whose roles and missions statements do not
include force application b u t w h o s e t h e o r e t i c a l a n d d o c t r i n a l
development ought to include the potential for force
application from space. Aspects of each service culture should
contribute to that theoretical and doctrinal development: we
must plan to fight while living and operating in a hostile
environment (Navy), from a fixed, possibly fortified
position/orbit (Army) , a n d a c h i e v e t h e o b j e c t i v e b y f o r c e
application f r o m t h e t h i r d d i m e n s i o n ( A i r F o r c e ) . T h e
dominant nature of the last element, together with the fact
that one must traverse the air in order to reach space,
currently gives the Air Force a lead role in developing space
s y s t e m s .7 6 The Air Force is clearly the primary player in
military space, having an estimated budget of $2.6 billion for
fiscal year 1996, as compared to projected Army spending of
$110 million and Navy spending of $120 million.77
568
DE BLOIS
How
Because the standard military acquisitions approach for
investment in space power may be premature, the following
suggestion may have some merit: Given the enormity of the
physical problems discussed and the opportunity afforded by
the collapse of a major threat, perhaps the United States ought
to spend more of its current space budget on space-related
education, training, and R&D, as opposed to operations and
procurement. If technological difficulties are enormous now
and if theoretical technical advances continue at the current
p a c e , i t m a k e s s e n s e t h a t a c c e s s to space will become much
cheaper in the future. Rather than producing next-generation
dinosaurs, it is better to put money into R&D that will benefit
the United States 25 years from now.
Objections to the effect that this would mean abandoning
the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) a r e
unfounded. All fiscal decisions affect the DTIB. The question
is not one of supporting the DTIB but of deciding what part of
the DTIB t o s u p p o r t : n e a r - t e r m m a n u f a c t u r i n g / p r o d u c t i o n
lines and operations or education, science, and R&D leading
to long-term capabilities. The idea of a flawed approach that
leads to the misallocation of limited military resources (i.e.,
trying to do too much too soon) is not new. The Third Reich
m a d e e n o r m o u s i n v e s t m e n t s i n r o c k e t t e c h n o l o g y to the
569
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
570
DE BLOIS
Notes
571
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
10. The definition provided here is consistent with Air Force and joint
doctrine on the subject of air and space forces: Aerospace Control, role no.
1 in AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 7; Counterair, Counterspace, and Counter-
information in AFDD 1, 42; Space Control (assure friendly use while
denying use to the enemy) in AFDD 4, 4; Space Control in Joint Doctrine
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14, Space Operations, April
1992; and combat against enemy forces in space and their infrastructure
in the latest draft of JP 3-14, 13 March 1996. As used here, the term
discriminate emphasizes US tendencies to avoid the use of indiscriminate
weapons (weapons of mass destruction, various nonlethal weapons, etc.).
11. Subtle but important differences exist between Air Force and joint
doctrine regarding force application. While joint doctrine focuses only on
a t t a c k a g a i n s t e n e m y forces, Air Force doctrine allows for the possibility of
attacking enemy critical nodes or key targets, including both enemy forces
(interdiction, close air support, and C2 attack) and strategic critical nodes
(strategic attack) that are not necessarily part of the enemy force.
12. The definition provided here is consistent with Air Force and joint
doctrine on the subject of air and space forces. The one internal
discrepancy involves lift. AFM 1-1 includes lift in force enhancement, while
JDTTP 3-14 puts it under force support. This essay assumes that lift falls
u n d e r s u p p o r t , n o t e n h a n c e m e n t , a s d o e s AFDD 4 (see page 9). As noted
earlier, though, the role and mission matchups are not exclusive. Further,
although one typically assumes that space assets will support terrestrial
military functions, force enhancement could eventually cut both waysthat
is, terrestrial assets may support space warfare.
13. The definition provided here is consistent with Air Force and joint
doctrine on the subject of air and space forces.
14. See Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari
(1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983);
and Phillip S. Meilinger, Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington,
D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 1419.
15. AFDD 4, Space Operations Doctrine, draft, August 1995, 5.
16. Defining Missile Defense: What Missile, Which Defense? Military
S p a c e 13 (8 January 1996): 15. Current budget debates focus on the level
of Department of Defense (DOD) ballistic missile defense (BMD) spending.
This is not a question of whether or not to pursue BMD but one of how
much and how soon. President William Clinton recently vetoed the $3
billion proposed by Congress, which exceeded his request of $2.44 billion.
1 7 . T h e o u t d a t e d A F M 2 - 2 5 , Air Force Operational DoctrineSpace
Operations, March 1991, sorted Space Force characteristics into environ-
mentally, logistically, and politically influenced characteristics. The
taxonomy used in this essay renames these as realm environment, realm
access, and political characteristics, and adds the categories of
development/employment and realm-afforded capability.
18. Lt Col David Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 3346.
572
DE BLOIS
573
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
28. Findings of the Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel on the Future of the Air
Force in Space, as reported in AU-18, vol. 1, 73.
29. See C. McKinley, Air Force Space Commands High Ground
Strategy, draft, AFSPACECOM/XPX, 23 February 1996.
30. P. Calvocoressi and G. Wint, Total War: The Story of World War II
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 522. One should note that the political
will to dominate a particular realm has historically been a touchy issue
when humanity is on the threshold of gaining significant access to a new
environment. The Hague Convention of 1899 prohibited the bombardment
of cities from aerial balloons at the outset of mankinds accession to the air.
This prohibition, however, was not renewed in 1907.
31. The Navy means of satisfying its role of forward presence
(demonstrating national commitment) differs somewhat from the air or land
means. Freedom of the seas does not require negotiated forward basing of
air and land assets on sovereign territory. By virtue of the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967, the means of satisfying forward presence in space is much
more akin to the means of doing so on the sea.
32. One can argue that this is simply the result of recent US fighting for
matters of less than vital interests. It does not detract from the
significance of the characteristic, because American military involvement in
foreign ventures that require fighting for less than vital interests will no
doubt continue.
33. Space operators are typically remotedata-linked to the space
asset but physically isolated from the battlefield by virtue of being based in
the continental United States.
34. AFDD 4, 22 May 1996, 3.
35. See Air Force Association Special Report, Facing Up to the Space
Problem, 1 November 1994.
36. AFM 1-1, 8.
37. AFDD 4 (1995), 3.
38. Wernher von Braun, Man Will Conquer Space Soon, Colliers, 2 2
March 1952, 1. One should note that, at the time, the Van Allen radiation
belts had yet to be discovered. Von Braun did not realize that an orbit at an
altitude of 1,075 miles would be a dangerous place to put a space colony.
This raises another caution regarding our lack of experience in space: what
else dont we know?
39. The shuttle carries its empty weight of 105,000 kg and a maximum
payload of 21,140 kg to LEO (204 km, 28.45) a n d u s e s a t o t a l l a u n c h
thrust of 7,781,400 pounds (6,600,000 pounds in the first two minutes
contributed by the solid-rocket expendables, and 1,181,400 pounds over
the first eight minutes and 50 seconds by the orbiter main engines). An
Atlas II can place 6,000 kg in a similar orbit with its 485,000 pounds of
l a u n c h t h r u s t . Janes Space Directory (Alexandria, Va.: Janes Information
Group Ltd., 1995), 274.
Placing an empty F-16 (11,300 kg) and a reasonable payload (3,700 kg)
in the same location via a shuttle-type approach requires 15/105 the thrust
574
DE BLOIS
575
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
53. J. Hyatt et al., Space Power 2010 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University,
May 1995), 32.
54. The aerospace control war game, held at the Air University
Wargaming Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August 1995, and the Navys
technology initiatives game (TIG)-95, National Maritime Intelligence Center,
Suitland, Md. (attended by this author).
55. P. Anson and D. Cummings, The First Space War: The Contribution
of Satellites to the Gulf War, in Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information
War: The Story of Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in
the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992), 130.
56. N. Hudson, Air Force Researching Ground-Based Lasers, Air Force
Times, 30 May 1993. Air Force Space Command estimates that 30 countries
will have satellite reconnaissance capability by the year 2000.
57. For information about the USA Eyeglass Satellite, see Berner,
Lanphier, and Associates, Many Nations Feed Commercial Imagery
Market, S p a c e N e w s , 6 M a r c h 1 9 9 5 .
58. That is, in coordinated orbital paths and networks.
59. Circular Keplarian Orbital Velocity: Vc = (m eG / rs )1 / 2 w h e r e E a r t h
m a s s : m e = 5 . 9 7 4 x 1 0 2 4 kg,
Earth radius: re = 6,371 km,
Satellite orbital radius: r s = r e + a l t i t u d e , a n d
Newtons gravitational constant G = 6.673 x 1011 Nm 2 / ( k g 2 )
Orbital Velocity LEO (200 km): 7,789 m/s ~ 17,425 MPH
60. Kinetic energy, or work done against inertia, is the appropriate
measure since the inertia of the satellite must be maneuvered.
Mach 2 at low altitude ~ 1,440 MPH or ~ 645 m/s
Kinetic energy KE = (1/2)mv2 :
KE s a t = (1/2) x 100 kg x (7,800 m/s)2 ~ 3 x 1 09 Nm
KE F - 1 6 = ( 1 / 2 ) x 1 4 , 6 2 5 k g x ( 6 4 5 m / s )2 ~ 3 x 10 9 Nm
61. M. Rampino, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by author, January
1996. The figure mentioned is not an eleven-hundred-mile lateral movement
in orbit capability. It refers to lift-and-drag-aided RLV maneuverability
within the atmosphere, minimizing the more expensive proposition of
spending fuel to change orbit.
62. This assumes that the right satellites are in the right orbit (limitation
of maneuver) with the right capability (limitation of flexibility) and that
those satellites can precisely acquire the right target (limitation of
precision).
63. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey,
vol. 3, Logistics and Support (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air
Force, 1993), chap. 3.
64. Total Energy = Kinetic + Potential Energy
KE s a t = (1/2) x 908 kg x (7,800 m/s)2 ~ 2 . 7 6 2 x 1 01 0 Nm
PE sat = 908 kg x (9.807 N/kg) x 200,000 m ~ 1.781 x 10 9 Nm
TE sat = 2.94 x 101 0 Nm
A one ton (2,000 lb) TNT explosion equates to 4.184 x 109 N m .
576
DE BLOIS
577
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
78. From the space power perspective, space systems will also find it
difficult to compete with air systems in an Air Force environment.
79. Michael Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemnde and the
Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (New York: Free Press, 1995), 52.
80. Revolutionary planning efforts include New World Vistas: Air and
S p a c e P o w e r f o r t h e 2 1 s t C e n t u r y (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific
Advisory Board, 19951996), which seriously considers basic research as a
funding priority; and 2 0 2 5 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996),
consisting of three monographs and four volumes of white papers.
578
Chapter 15
579
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
O n e c a n c l a s s i f y i d e a s b y t h e w a y t h e y a r e a u t h e n t i c a t e d .1
The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum
against which to set our airpower thinkers:
Theories a r e i d e a s t h a t a r e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p r e p a r e d f o r
authentication.
Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authen-
tication.
Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic prepar-
ation for authentication.
Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any sys-
tematic authentication.
Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication
process.
Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication
process.
Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet w a s a visionary . With only the
scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the
concept of strategic air war. By sheer imagination, he also
recognized the necessity of air supremacy or what he called
command of the airall this before Italy h a d e v e n e n t e r e d
the war in 1915. Not surprisingly, these profound visions of
what the future would bring were, when it came to details,
seriously flawed. Douhet failed to anticipate the character of
air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of
c o n v e n t i o n a l b o m b i n g, a n d m i s u n d e r s t o o d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f
aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other
r e s p e c t s , D o u h e t s v i s i o n w a s d e c i d e d l y f l a w e d . B u t t h e
evidence of experience would overcome these details. The
significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the
stream of thought they set in train.
Although Douhets works were not widely used by military
schools in other countries, his vision of strategic airpower
undoubtedly was a significant inspiration to Edgar Gorrell a n d
Gen Billy Mitchell , who carried his ideas to the United States
and ran with them in their own way. We may conclude, then,
t h a t D o u h e t h a d a g r a n d vision of airpower, butlacking the
factual evidence of experiencehis vision was not
systematically prepared for authentication. It would remain
elusive and difficult to assess.
580
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581
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
582
HOLLEY
u n s y s t e m a t i c t h i n k e r , b u t h e i n s p i r e d m e n w i t h h i s vision .
Hap Arnold , Carl Spaatz , and Ira Eaker t o n a m e o n l y t h e
obvious individualswere among his votaries, carrying the
torch for strategic airpower a n d a n i n d e p e n d e n t a i r f o r c e
through the difficult interwar years. Sometimes visions and
even myths are more powerful than the most meticulously
and rationally supported theories.
Mitchell brought trouble on himself needlessly. In calling for
a single air arm that would include the air components of the
Navy, he aroused the implacable opposition of the sailors. Had
he given even superficial thought to British experiencethe
failure that followed the absorption of naval air assets by the
RAFhe could have avoided the opposition on the part of the
Navy t h a t h a s p e r s i s t e d i n s o m e q u a r t e r s e v e n t o t h e p r e s e n t .
Ironically, Mitchell may have been the unwitting agent in
creating the carrier Navy . Although all battleship admirals
were by no means as reactionary and opposed to aviation as
s o m e t i m e s p i c t u r e d , t h e Ostfriesland sinking clearly played
directly into the hands of the small coterie of naval aviation
pioneers. Even the most obdurate mossback admirals could
scarcely reject the naval pilots contention that the Navy would
be far better off developing its own air arm than allowing the
task to slip into the hands of Mitchell a n d h i s c o n g r e s s i o n a l
allies, who were calling for an independent air service w i t h a
monopoly of all military aviation.
The Navy s success in developing aviation a p p e a r s t o h i n g e
on two fortuitous events. The first was the decision to put
William Moffett, a safe and experienced battleship admiral,
in charge of aviation. The second was the unintended
consequence of the naval disarmament treaty of 1922. Forced
to discontinue construction on two unfinished battle cruisers,
the Navy, at the instigation of Moffett, converted these hulls
into the carriers Lexington a n d Saratoga . Is it too much to
suggest that the doctrinal development and training of naval
aviators provided by these two carriers i n t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s
were crucial to the Navys r o l e i n w i n n i n g t h e w a r i n t h e
Pacific in World War II? B y t h e e n d o f t h a t w a r , c a r r i e r
admirals were governing the Navy i n m u c h t h e s a m e w a y
b o m b e r generals would govern the Air Force a few years later.
In this respect, one might say that naval aviators were
583
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
584
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585
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
586
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587
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
588
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589
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
590
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591
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
592
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593
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
594
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595
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
During World War II, the Soviet air arm was essentially a
ground-support force, an orientation continued until the
death of Stalin in 1953. Under his successor, Nikita
K h r u s h c h e v, Soviet airpower theory changed drastically. He
p u s h e d f o r g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n s t r a t e g i c a i r w a r , with aircraft
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. More importantly, he
downgraded conventional ground forces and moved the major
s h a r e o f t h e d e f e n s e b u d g e t to strategic rocket forces, with an
eye toward preemptive strikes. But the realization that NATO
nuclear forces were at least a generation ahead of the Soviets
led to a gradual shift from offensive thinking to defensive.
The war in the Gulf had a chilling impact on Soviet
thinking. The miserable performance of Soviet arms in Iraqi
hands proved profoundly disturbing. The tank-heavy Soviet
a r m y found it especially disconcerting that tanks had become
an endangered species without control of the air (p. 508).
Although senior Soviet officers, in characteristic authoritarian
fashion, tended to stifle criticisms arising from elaborate
analysis of the Gulf War experience, younger officers managed
to come up with a realistic assessment of the future character
of air war that parallels US airpower theory in many respects.
Notably, the pendulum of theory once again swung back from
Mikhail Gorbachevs defensive doctrine to an appreciation
for the primacy of the offensive. The collapse of the Soviet
Union l e a v e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s s h i f t v e r y m u c h i n
doubtespecially insofar as it relates to investments in
r e s e a r c h a n d d e v e l o p m e n t for space.
The final substantive chapter in this volume attempts to
provide a rigorous analysis of the comparative characteristics
o f a i r p o w e r a n d s p a c e p o w e r. T h e a n a l y s i s i s i n d e e d
illuminating, dealing as it does with the radically different
characteristics of the air and space realms. However, in
contrast to the earlier chapters of this book, which treat their
subjects historically and descriptively, this chapter sets up
w h a t i t s a u t h o r c a l l s a s p a c e p o w e r conjecture, positing that
space power is merely an extension of airpower. Major DeBlois
then sets out to demonstrate that the conjecture is false. The
Air Force , he concludes, will eventually have to cut loose its
child and create a separate Space Force.
596
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597
THE PATHS OF HEAVEN
598
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Notes
1. Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (New York: Basic Books,
1980), 45.
2. Parenthetical page references in the text are to The Paths of Heaven.
3. See Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power
Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1994).
4. See John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988).
599
Contributors
Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter was a professor of airpower history
at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) from 1991
to 1994. He received his BS from the US Air Force Academy in
1977, MA from the University of Nebraska, and PhD from the
University of North Carolina. He is the author of the critically
acclaimed The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of
North Vietnam (Free Press, 1989), as well as numerous articles
dealing with military and airpower history. A weapons
controller with a tour in South Korea, he is currently professor
of aerospace studies at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. His latest project is a history of American
strategic bombing, to be published by Free Press.
601
astrophysicist in Sunnyvale, California. He is the author of
several articles on scientific and engineering subjects, as well
as Dropping the Electric Grid, the top research project at Air
Command and Staff College in 1994. He is currently editing a
book on space theory and doctrine.
602
aircraft commander and instructor pilot in both EC-130s and
C-5s, and has served in the Plans Division on the staff at
Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. At
the present time, he is the commander of the 2d Air Refueling
Squadron at McGuire AFB, New Jersey.
603
in combat during the Persian Gulf War. He is one of the Air
Forces leading experts on air campaign planning, has
published extensively on the subject, and is currently chief of
the Command and Control Integration Division at
Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia.
604
political science at Kalamazoo College and the University of
Michigan. He has authored several articles on alliance and
deterrence theory, and his book on that subject will soon be
published by Cornell University Press.
605
Index
Abrams, Creighton W., 41112, 430
Achromeyev, S., 5067
acquisitions/policy, 127, 54344, 56667, 569
advanced conventional munitions (ACM), 500, 507, 514
Aegean Sea, 456
aerial
refueling, 282
spotting, 12122, 12526, 129, 152, 17071
aerospace control, 539
Aerospace Studies Institute, 335
Afghanistan, 49, 340, 342, 347
air
attack, 10, 1316, 20, 2627, 32, 43, 46, 50, 52, 54, 5657, 59,
93, 95, 97, 99, 106, 120, 123, 166, 197, 203, 215, 217,
22021, 255, 259, 265, 34546, 38384, 447, 468, 471, 593
base defense, 421
battle, 10, 14, 2324, 30, 52, 67, 93, 98, 101, 129, 156, 25354
campaign, 12, 2930, 45, 51, 108, 166, 220, 255, 334, 344, 371,
504, 506, 593
combat, 63, 98
commander, 11, 22, 28, 65, 107, 16870, 457, 459, 466, 502
command operations center (ACOC), 454, 459
component commander, 338, 41213, 421, 594
control, 49, 5456, 58, 70, 98
defense, 910, 16, 2627, 42, 51, 54, 67, 93, 155, 157, 160, 196,
198, 217, 220, 28285, 288, 304, 402, 407, 40911, 418, 421,
423, 426, 446, 44849, 451, 455, 460, 468, 470, 504, 5078,
518
defense commander (ADC), 465
interdiction (AI), 400, 402, 4078, 415, 418, 42124, 448,
45658, 465, 467, 471, 504
offensive, 30, 60, 84, 87, 502
operations, 10, 45, 47, 50, 55, 58, 151, 184, 193, 199, 208, 333,
33536, 339, 402, 411, 423, 427, 446, 449, 45153, 460,
46567, 497, 5014, 5078, 541, 585, 593
operations center, 467
plans, 209, 225
607
policing, 26465
reserve, 10, 160
strategy, 28, 54, 5760, 67
strikes, 15, 50, 60, 62, 371, 427, 503, 505, 514
superiority, 24, 45, 5154, 59, 6263, 6566, 9394, 122, 128,
15657, 16970, 196, 199, 250, 253, 260, 264, 267, 338, 371,
374, 44849, 45354, 466, 470, 490, 498, 502, 5045, 581
support, 87, 159, 401
support operations center (ASOC), 424, 457, 459
supremacy, 10, 62, 98, 170, 214, 503, 580
tasking message (ATM), 459
tasking order (ATO), 459
warfare, 14, 16, 29, 31, 34, 51, 54, 60, 6466, 68, 82, 86, 90,
131, 163, 16566, 169, 17174, 176, 18687, 211, 21516,
220, 22425, 239, 249, 25253, 291, 305, 337, 342, 382, 400,
428, 503, 592, 596
air-to-air refueling, 24243, 453, 589
Air Campaign, The: Planning for Combat, 3 4 3 , 3 7 1 7 2 , 4 2 8
Air Command and Staff College, 344
Air Corps, 33, 52, 64, 1058, 120, 184, 18693, 195210, 219,
22225, 24345, 247, 255, 266, 587, 589
Air Corps Act, 105
Air Corps Board (ACB), 200203, 211
Air Corps Reserve, 243
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), 28, 7172, 108, 115, 18788,
19295, 198201, 206, 21012, 21424, 264, 266, 291, 371,
383, 58788
aircraft
A-10, 40911, 420, 423, 425, 450
AH-1 Cobra, 413
AH-64 Apache, 41314, 427
airborne warning and control system (AWACS), 450
Allied bombers, 24
armed helicopters, 431
Army helicopters, 429
assault, 162, 167
attack, 95, 209, 285, 459
attack helicopter, 411, 41314, 420
B-2, 285, 287
B-17, 106, 201, 2034, 243, 269, 586
B-18 Bolo, 106
B-19, 254, 268
608
B-24, 269
B-29, 31, 132, 268
B-36, 134, 264, 269
B-52, 336
battle plane, 7, 1416, 19, 24, 99, 154, 222
Boeing 247, 17
bomber, 46, 1415, 18, 20, 27, 4647, 52, 54, 57, 67, 71, 79,
8788, 90, 93, 95, 98100, 102, 105, 108, 133, 135, 15556,
15859, 16263, 167, 170, 17273, 175, 18384, 187, 196,
19899, 2013, 206, 211, 214, 216, 21821, 224, 24244,
25455, 258, 264, 26869, 28189, 296, 303, 307, 43031,
449, 580, 58283, 58589, 598
bombing, combat, and reconnaissance (BCR), 154
Breda 65, 161
Breguet XIV, 152
British Aerospace Sea Harrier, 553
BT-8, 243
Caproni bomber, 4, 67
cargo, 7
carrier, 93, 12123, 127, 197, 248, 583
De Havilland D.H.4, 185
De Havilland D.H.4B, 185, 188
dive-bomber, 123, 128, 158, 161, 173, 175, 246, 58586
Douglas DC-3, 17
E-3, 450
escort, 14, 18, 22, 98, 132, 167, 172, 220, 242, 244, 258, 58889
F-4G Wild Weasel, 455
F-14, 451
F-15, 45051
F-16, 450, 548, 559
F-86 Sabre, 363
F-111F, 450
F-117, 24, 561
fighter, 42, 52, 67, 98, 15556, 158, 162, 167, 173, 214, 24244,
249, 25152, 269, 285, 288, 346, 430, 449, 451, 462, 589
German, 12, 24, 27, 154
Giant, 42
Gotha, 42
Handley Page, 86
helicopter, 341, 414, 497, 592
HH 53-H PAVE LOW III helicopter, 421
Hind helicopter, 412
609
Hurricane, 67, 249
interceptor, 27, 52, 258, 284, 288
Ju-88, 175
Lockheed Vega, 17
Messerschmitt, 252
MiG, 430
MiG-15, 363
Mi-24 Hind, 342
NATO airborne early warning (NAEW), 450, 463
night bomber, 88
P-35, 243, 246, 589
P-40, 252
P-47 Thunderbolt, 221, 243, 246, 589
P-51 Mustang, 221
pursuit, 9395, 196, 209
reconnaissance, 14, 15556, 162, 173
SEV-3, 243
SM 79, 161
Spad VII, 152
Spad XIII, 152
Spitfire, 67, 125, 249, 252
stealth, 108, 285, 287
Stuka, 159
tactical, 85, 463
tanker, 17
TB3, 166
Tornado, 45051
aircraft carriers, 9294, 11920, 12223, 12729, 131, 134, 136,
19697, 248, 250, 583, 590
aircraft industry, 10, 100, 152, 156, 165
Air Force Association (AFA), 333, 56768
Air Force Course, 215
Air Force Doctrine Center, 465, 467
Air Force Space Command, 531
air-ground operations, 400, 402, 409, 412, 417, 419, 42123, 429
AirLand Battle, 417
air-land battles, 166
Air-Land Forces Application (ALFA), 41112, 415, 423
Air-Land Forces Program Office (ALPO), 411
airlift, 330, 408, 420, 549
airmail service, 192
air-mindedness, 101, 18889, 204
610
Air Ministry, 48, 66, 68
Air Ministry (French), 15354, 157
Air Ministry (Italian), 161, 176
airpower
American, 7980, 83, 88
as artillery, 26, 64, 186
atomic, 34647
attributes of, 9, 15, 23, 26, 254, 371, 418
British, 72
carrier, 12627
conventional, 288, 294, 3078
counterguerrilla, 329
decisiveness of, 1920, 79, 269
defensive, 26
effectiveness of, 256, 268
French, 328
global, 26364, 267
land based, 126, 129, 184, 197
limits of, 28
long range, 197
missions, 157
nonnuclear, 280
offensive, 70, 86
operational, 279
peaceful applications of, 265
peacetime roles of, 187
as propaganda, 257, 265
psychological effects of, 51
Russian, 166, 519
strategic, 1214, 18, 41, 44, 5152, 65, 72, 164, 171, 202, 206,
214, 250, 252, 255, 261, 269, 279, 29093, 3067, 331, 334,
357, 385, 580, 583, 586, 589
tactical, 1213, 30, 65, 171, 255, 328, 334, 426
Air Service, 33, 80, 8591, 96, 99, 1012, 1045, 107, 11920, 124,
18492, 19697, 20410, 21214, 24243, 383, 582
Air Service Field Officers School (ASFOS), 186, 211, 21314, 216
Air Service Information Office, 188
Air Service Tactical School (ASTS), 33, 187, 198, 211, 21314, 216
Air Service Technical Section, 85, 383
Air Service Training and Operations Group, 21314
airships, 43, 9394, 103, 119, 122
air-space boundary, 530, 554, 565
611
airspace control, 45556, 466
airspace control authority (ACA), 455, 46566
airspace control system (ACS), 466
Air Transport Command, 217
Air University, 329, 331, 335, 337, 588
Air War College, 336, 344
Air War Plans Division, Plan 1 (AWPD-1), 187, 22425
Algeria, 33536
Alksnis, Ya. I., 167
Allen, Lew, 423
Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), 42224, 457, 460
allied
armies, 170
tactical air force (ATAF), 455, 457, 45960
tactical operations center (ATOC), 45455, 45960
Allied Command Europe, Mobile Force (AMF), 463
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), 42224, 451, 455
American Expeditionary Force (AEF), 85, 87, 18485, 197, 213, 586
amphibious operations, 13536
Andrews, Frank, 108, 207
annihilation, 4, 23, 215, 299, 308, 361
Anthis, Rollen H., 336
antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 168, 218, 220, 288, 562
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 534, 537
antisatellites (ASAT), 53537, 539, 541, 559
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 119, 135, 263
apportionment, 454, 467
Arab-Israeli War, 406
armistice, 7, 17, 35, 48, 74, 87, 91, 127, 18485
Armor Center, 415
arms
control, 131, 287, 3034
race, 290, 450, 500
Army Air Corps, 199
Army Air Forces (AAF), 83, 201, 203, 212, 225, 247, 25152, 256,
258, 263
Army Air Service, 216
Army Command and General Staff College, 211
Army League of the United States, 195
Army War College, 199, 205, 210
Arnold, Henry H. Hap,47, 83, 104, 1068, 18690, 198, 200201,
203, 207, 217, 22425, 24547, 251, 256, 258, 266, 583, 59091
612
Arquilla, John, 386
Asia, 269, 327
assured destruction, 29599, 301, 3034
Atlantic Alliance, 443
Atlantic Command, 470
Atlantic fleet, 197
attrition warfare, 23, 45, 183, 215
Austria, 11, 13
aviation
Army, 94, 105, 125, 188, 191, 205, 207, 209, 507, 587
assault, 160
attack, 15859, 414
auxiliary, 1314, 18, 30, 208
carrier, 132, 19697, 598
ground attack, 161, 164, 177
industry, 16, 155, 162
land based, 19798, 202
legislation, 207
long range, 2024
naval, 94, 11920, 125, 127, 136, 172, 191, 198, 248, 583
pursuit, 214, 241
strategic, 170, 177, 584
support, 153, 156, 158, 160, 17071, 17677
tactical, 153, 156, 160, 167
transport, 175
Axis, 71, 224
613
battlefield air interdiction (BAI), 42124, 426, 45657, 45960, 465,
467
battle fleet, 122, 127
Battle of Guadalajara, 158
Battle of Jutland, 119, 126
battleships, 100101, 1056, 118, 12024, 12630, 136, 19697,
248, 250
Beatty, David, 4849
Belgium, 22
Bell, Alexander Graham, 195
Bellinger, Patrick N. L., 116, 120, 122
Berlin blockade, 445
Berlin, Germany, 84
Betts, Richard, 295
Bishop, William, 188
Bismarck, 1 2 5
Bismarck, Otto von, 462
Bissolati, Leonida, 5
Blue Flag, 413, 419, 594
Boeing Company, 185
Bolling, Raynal, 6
Boll, Michael M., 493
Bolshevism, 165
Bomber Command, 6971, 253
Bomber Mafia, 187, 19394, 206, 211, 21518, 22021, 224, 593
bombing, 21, 46, 53, 61, 67, 8687, 154, 157, 170, 258, 334
aerochemical, 25
area, 68
atomic, 291
British policy on, 69
civilian, 46, 5556, 6869, 71, 96, 162, 17374
conventional, 285, 291, 294, 580
daylight, 253
dive, 17475
high level, 585
indiscriminate, 70, 581
industrial, 66, 88, 97
of Japan, 132
long range, 47, 172, 175
morale, 21, 64, 70
precision, 25, 383, 449, 588
psychological effects of, 20, 43, 46, 221, 268, 581
614
strategic, 7, 17, 2223, 3334, 42, 4446, 54, 61, 64, 71, 79, 87,
132, 134, 136, 15456, 16162, 16465, 167, 17173, 221,
249, 268, 292, 294, 327, 334, 347, 383, 449, 503, 581,
58486, 590
terror, 12, 56
urban, 12, 57, 7071, 268
bombs
aerochemical, 15, 22, 30
electro-optical guided, 450
gas, 15, 30
glide, 82
high explosive, 15
incendiary, 15
laser guided, 450
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 472
Boxer Rebellion, 81
Boyd, John, 35758, 36370, 379, 38182, 38489, 59293
Bradley, Omar, 264
Brant, G. C., 223
Braun, Wernher von, 547
Brezhnev, Leonid, 49091, 493, 512
Briey Basin, 152
British Army Staff College, 42
Brodie, Bernard, 24, 28, 266, 279
Brooke-Popham, Robert, 5859
Brooks Field, Texas, 190
Brown, George S., 411, 430
Brussels, Belgium, 446
budget
aviation, 14
defense, 26364, 432
military, 48, 106, 190, 327
Russian defense, 490, 507, 51516, 596
space, 569
Builder, Carl, 591
Bullard, Robert Lee, 197, 204
Blow, H. D. von, 377
Bureau of Aeronautics, 124, 131
Bureau of Navigation, 124
615
Canada, 464
capital ships, 100, 120, 12829, 136, 242, 250
Caproni, Gianni, 3, 6, 98, 184
carrier task force, 129, 136
Carter, Jimmy, 408
Catalonia, Spain, 162
Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 344
centers of gravity (COG), 57, 64, 66, 195, 198, 216, 32526, 339,
343, 365, 37174, 37678, 38688, 466, 471, 496, 504, 593
Central Army Group (CENTAG), 42223
Central Imagery Office, 544
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 410, 544
centralized
control, 283, 338, 42122, 454, 457, 466, 54446, 56768, 594
execution, 54546
military authority, 546
Central Powers, 83
Chain, John T., 420
Chassin, G. J. M., 328
Checkmate Division, 370, 373
Chennault, Claire, 52, 188, 244, 588
Chernyshev, Vladimir, 503
Chess Air, 188
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 118, 123, 131, 134
China, 81, 92, 369
China-Burma-India theater, 324
Churchill, Winston, 4849, 258, 298
civil
aviation, 1617
defense, 28990, 3034
civilian
casualties, 25, 469
morale, 2021, 30, 585
Clausewitz, Carl von, 96, 34, 11617, 220, 268, 360, 36465, 372,
374, 37781, 388, 416, 443, 594, 597
close air support (CAS), 152, 15861, 17175, 338, 34243, 400,
405, 40710, 414, 42126, 429, 448, 45657, 45960, 465, 472,
545
coalition forces, 1, 25, 197, 385, 433, 463, 502, 5048, 51011, 558
Coastal Command, 258
coastal defense, 120, 199, 202
Coffman, Robert D., 467
616
Cohen, Eliot, 376
cold war, 31, 217, 27980, 28788, 29596, 306, 485, 490, 508,
512, 594
collateral damage, 25, 307, 341, 485, 542
combat air patrol (CAP), 553
Combined Air Force Course, 215
Combined Arms Center (CAC), 412, 416, 426
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, 410
Combined Bomber Offensive, 292
Command of the Air, The, 8, 1315, 1718, 23, 26, 3133, 9899,
153, 159
command and control (C 2 ), 28, 29697, 302, 307, 328, 338,
38485, 450, 45257, 466, 471, 504, 513, 54344, 546
command, control, and communications (C 3 ), 297, 495, 53940
c o m m a n d , c o n t r o l , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d c o m p u t e r s ( C 4 ), 533
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(C 4 I), 386, 515
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I), 466,
507, 511, 514
command and control warfare (C 2 W), 465
Commercial Space Launch Act, 538
Communications Act, 538
Communism, 461, 485, 494, 515
Communist Party, 369, 519
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 508
Condor Legion, 586
Confederation of Independent States (CIS), 510, 515, 520
Congress (US), 94, 1012, 105, 131, 133, 185, 190, 2069, 222,
265, 412, 432, 587
Congress of Peoples Deputies, 509
conventional warfare, 263, 280, 300, 321, 32325, 32728, 330,
333, 33739, 34143, 347, 489, 510
Convention on Registration, 537
Cook, Orvel, 222
Coolidge, Calvin, 103, 197
Cot, Pierre, 15458, 176
counterair operations, 202, 338, 407, 421, 423, 45356, 45960, 466
counterforce battle, 2324, 54, 253, 300
counterinsurgency, 32223, 329, 33233, 33539, 34143, 345
Crabb, Jarred, 206
Creech, Wilbur L., 419, 423, 425, 430
Crete, 25051
617
Cuba, 80, 82
Cuban missile crisis, 19, 450
Curry, Charles, 207
Curry, John F., 101
Curtiss Aviation School, 83
cyberwar, 386
Czechoslovakia, 445
618
Dinger, H. C., 125
directed-energy weapons (DEW), 536, 562
dirigibles, 2, 4, 82, 94, 102, 195
disarmament, 131, 492
Disney, Walt, 25658
Dixon, Robert J., 41112, 419, 430
doctrine, 42, 127, 4035, 424, 431, 454, 47172, 487, 491, 532,
553, 569, 579
Active Defense, 400, 405, 407, 41417, 431
ACTS bombardment, 22223
Air Corps, 255
Air Force, 21415, 322, 331, 333, 337, 339, 34447, 400, 4034,
4079, 41415, 419, 421, 425, 429, 444, 448, 451, 453, 455,
465, 46971, 53032, 536, 54446, 566
Air Force writers of, 418
AirLand Battle, 400, 41417, 420, 425, 427, 431, 433, 456, 458,
503, 507, 594
airpower, 15152, 17677, 18587, 211, 213, 216, 322, 337,
342, 451, 473, 530, 54546, 569, 584, 58687, 593
Army, 214, 400, 4024, 414, 566
economy of force, 219
flexible response, 490
foreign military, 488
French, 15253, 15559, 176
German, 153, 16976, 446, 585
Gorbachev, 51315
interdiction, 595
Italian, 16062
joint, 408, 414, 432, 444, 453, 465, 467, 47071, 536, 566
LIC, 592
Luftwaffe, 174, 585
manuals, 42
massive retaliation, 444, 469, 490, 516
military, 168, 48689, 491, 500
mutually assured destruction (MAD), 590
NATO, 42124, 44345, 44849, 45155, 45961, 46465,
46773, 499
naval, 11517
negotiated, 444, 460
nuclear, 281, 302, 449
operational, 151
preemptive, 492
619
RAF, 42, 5354, 60, 7071, 382
reasonable sufficiency, 499, 513
Russian, 486, 488, 498, 50820
Soviet, 163, 167, 410, 48595, 49899, 500, 5024, 5089,
51213, 517, 519, 59596
space control, 540
space power, 530, 564, 567
strategic airpower, 222, 36263, 382
strategic bombing, 332, 383
war fighting, 301
Dodd, Townsend F., 99
Doolittle, Jimmy, 188, 190, 245
doomsday machine, 299300
Douhet, Giulio, 134, 46, 55, 6162, 71, 80, 92, 95, 9899, 121,
130, 15354, 157, 15961, 17172, 174, 176, 183, 246, 253,
255, 259, 261, 264, 266, 268, 279, 281, 288, 29192, 329, 357,
428, 503, 58082, 584, 590, 593, 597
Dowding, Hugh, 52, 67
Dresden, Germany, 70
drop tanks, 108, 589
Drum Board, 201, 210
Drum, Hugh, 2056
Dugan, Michael, 503
Dunkirk, France, 70, 250
Dutch East Indies, 92
620
El Salvador, 340, 347
encounter battle, 163
Environmental Modification Convention, 537
Estes, Howell, 205
Ethiopia, 161, 204
Eurocorps, 462
Europe, 33, 62, 66, 70, 81, 83, 85, 119, 151, 159, 184, 213, 224,
245, 249, 251, 269, 305, 32728, 339, 347, 400, 4057, 409,
41315, 430, 433, 443, 44647, 451, 46162, 464, 46768, 470,
489, 494, 510, 586, 595
European Command, 470
621
Five Power Treaty, 120
five-rings model, 37374, 37677, 381, 38587, 428, 593
Flanders, 51
fleet defense, 47
flexible response, 460, 469
flying boat, 12122, 254, 268
Flying Tigers, 588
follow-on forces attack (FOFA), 456, 45859, 469
force
application, 53334, 53940, 568
enhancement, 53334, 53940
multiplier, 507, 543
structure, 52, 5056, 51618, 529, 556
support, 53334
Forces Command (FORSCOM), 411
foreign internal defense, 339, 345
Foreign Military Studies Office, 494, 498
foreign policy
Russian, 518, 520
US, 510
Forrestal, James V., 13334
Fort Benning, Georgia, 411
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 82, 211, 412, 426
Fort Monroe, Virginia, 411
Fort Riley, Kansas, 83
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 102, 108
42d Rainbow Division, 91
forward line of own troops (FLOT), 467
Foulois, Benjamin Benny, 47, 80, 89, 91, 108, 186, 192, 204, 2079
4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF), 422, 455, 460
4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), 33132
France, 22, 26, 32, 4344, 4647, 50, 58, 61, 6970, 80, 85, 89, 94,
15152, 15455, 159, 171, 176, 24951, 284, 297, 370, 38384,
44546, 462, 471, 585
air force, 50, 121, 15259, 171, 176
army, 26, 15359, 171, 250
navy, 155
Franco, Francisco, 174
French
Plan I, 15556
Plan II, 156
Plan XVII, 45
622
Frunze, Mikhail, 163
Fullam, William, 120
Fuller, J. F. C., 171, 35859, 361, 371, 592
future war, 321, 382, 385, 387, 401, 407, 43031, 485, 48789,
496, 498502, 506, 510, 517, 519, 536
623
Goodpaster, Andrew, 451, 460
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 491, 494, 5089, 51214, 519, 596
Gring, Hermann, 175
Gorrell, Edgar Nap, 67, 80, 8586, 88, 183, 186, 383, 580
Gothlin, Oliver P., Jr., 223
Grachev, Andrei S., 507
Grau, Lester, 494
Great Britain, 7, 20, 30, 32, 4143, 46, 48, 5051, 57, 6162,
6771, 84, 94, 119, 123, 125, 172, 175, 249, 251, 261, 281, 284,
306, 33637, 382, 451, 529
air force, 50, 121
army, 4547, 49, 61, 6364, 70, 250
navy, 49, 63, 11920, 125, 250
Great Patriotic War, 302, 511, 517
Greely, Adolphus, 81
Green, John, 342
ground
attack, 154
battle, 90, 157, 160
campaign, 153, 511
commander, 65, 82, 84, 42223, 427, 429, 45758, 460
defenses, 183
forces, 1213, 20, 47, 55, 65, 94, 1078, 152, 158, 16465, 166,
170, 184, 202, 206, 21213, 250, 265, 372, 402, 408, 414,
41819, 427, 448, 456, 46870, 488, 49091, 497, 502,
5045, 518, 58182, 586, 594
operations, 62, 429, 519
support, 421
warfare, 96, 265, 489, 508, 512
Guadalajara, Spain, 166
Guatemala, 340, 347
guerrillas, 324, 333, 33536, 34042
operations, 336
tactics, 324, 329, 331, 341
warfare, 322, 402
Gulf War. S e e Persian Gulf War
Gullion, Allen, 1034
624
Hannibal, 19
Hanoi, North Vietnam, 335
Hansell, Haywood, 206, 210, 21617, 224
Harbord, James G., 85
Hardie, Robert L., 336
Harmon, Millard F., 198, 223
Harris, Arthur, 7071
Hay, James, 83
Henderson, David, 4344
high-altitude precision daylight bombardment (HAPDB), 186, 192,
21112, 21617, 21922, 224
Hines, John, 493
Hirohito, 258
Hiroshima, Japan, 259, 281
Hitler, Adolph, 33, 70, 133, 249
HMS
Prince of Wales, 1 2 9 , 2 5 0
Repulse, 1 2 9 , 2 5 0
Ho Chi Minh, 331
Horner, Charles A., 544
House Military Affairs Committee, 101
Howard, Michael, 400
Howell Commission, 184, 210
Hukbalahaps (Huks), 322, 326, 328, 330
Hurlburt Field, Florida, 419
Hussein, Saddam, 433, 499, 502
hyperwar, 378
625
triangle, 19395, 197
Information Age, 384, 387, 389
information dominance, 38586
Inskip, Thomas, 67
insurgency, 32226, 32833, 33536, 33841, 34347, 462
insurgent forces, 324
integrated air defense system (IADS), 454
intelligence, 60, 67, 32425, 407, 424, 53233, 535, 594, 598
air, 66
Army, 426
economic, 55
industrial, 64
military, 29, 585
strategic, 219
interdiction, 62, 6466, 106, 152, 158, 16061, 166, 170, 173, 214,
325, 328, 338, 405, 408, 41819, 422, 424, 427, 429, 451, 453,
460, 466, 504, 581, 594
atomic, 447
close, 342
deep, 327, 422
inter-German border (IGB), 468
internal defense and development (IDAD), 34445
international
law, 53, 56, 6869
politics, 308
relations, 298, 408
interservice rivalry, 48, 591, 598
Iran, 510
Iraq, 49, 265, 285, 290, 306, 344, 373, 385, 463, 499, 5012, 5045
Iraqi army, 13
isolationism, 100, 117, 186, 262
Israel, 3031, 306
Italy, 16, 13, 17, 19, 25, 29, 32, 46, 92, 98, 151, 15962, 176,
249, 580
air force, 34, 6, 8, 16062, 584
army, 2, 6, 31, 16062
Nationalist air force, 61
Nationalist army, 162
navy, 31
Japan, 2, 20, 3031, 81, 92, 96, 123, 126, 132, 135, 204, 254,
25760, 36970, 510
626
army, 370
carriers, 130
navy, 12627, 12930
Jervis, Robert, 302
Jeschonneck, Hans, 175
Jimmie Allen Flying Club, 189
joint
air-ground operations, 166
campaign, 63
force, 54, 164, 420
force air component commander (JFACC), 46567, 471
operations, 417, 465
surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS), 421, 426
task force, 417
Joint Board, 19798, 203
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 129, 322, 432, 452
Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project, 344
jointness, 269, 432, 536, 566
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 217
Jomini, Henri de, 34, 116, 268, 377, 379, 381, 389
Jones, R. M., 200
Jungle Jim, 332
Junior Birdmen of America, 189
627
Korean War, 134, 262, 331, 327, 363
Kubrick, Stanley, 280
Kugler, Richard L., 444
Kuter, Laurence, 200, 21617, 224
Kutsenko, N., 506
Kuwait, 373, 433, 463, 501
Kzheb, K., 504
628
war, 108, 263, 269, 322, 328, 33132, 340
Lindbergh, Charles, 190, 250
lines of communications (LOC), 130, 156, 199, 202, 336, 343,
34546, 383, 468
Lipetsk, USSR, 165
Lloyd George, David, 47
logistics, 32425, 329
London, England, 43, 50, 57, 60, 71, 121, 581
Lovell, George E., Jr., 223
low earth orbit (LEO), 548, 55859, 56162
low intensity conflict (LIC), 269, 32123, 331, 340, 34244, 592
Luce, Stephen B., 117
Ludendorff, Erich, 174, 176
Ludlow-Hewitt, Edgar, 56, 5960
Luftwaffe, 24, 33, 59, 67, 70, 154, 159, 172, 17475, 221, 24950,
58586. S e e a l s o G e r m a n y
Lupton, David, 535
Luxembourg, Belgium, 463
629
Mariana Islands, 130
Marshall, George, 264
Marshall Plan, 446
massive retaliation, 265, 300
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 266, 329, 344
Maxwell Field, Alabama, 28, 71, 18788, 192, 200, 211, 587
McAndrew, James W., 88
MccGwire, Michael, 488
McCook Field, Ohio, 242
mechanized warfare, 62
Mecozzi, Amedeo, 16062, 584
Mediterranean, 162, 456
Menoher Board, 208
Menoher, Charles T., 91, 94, 127, 196, 208
Mesopotamia, 56
methodical battle, 152, 592
Metz, France, 87
Mexico, 119
Meyer, Edward C., 41516, 420, 423
Meyer, Luigi, 46566
Middle East, 55, 58, 61, 264
Middle East War, 4056
MiG Alley, 363
Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), 45152
Military Airlift Command, 217
military art, 48788, 500, 595
Milling, Thomas, 183, 18586, 19596, 199, 206, 21316
Ministry of Air, 47
Ministry of the Interior (French), 157
Ministry of War, 47
missiles, 28384, 288, 485, 489, 598
air to air, 288
air launched cruise (ALCM), 296
antiballistic (ABM), 283, 28890, 3034, 537, 591
Army tactical system (ATACMS), 42627
Atlas, 548
ballistic, 283, 286, 28889, 534
cruise, 82, 285, 516
ground launched cruise (GLCM), 450, 463
guided, 266
Hellfire, 413
infrared-guided antitank, 450
630
interceptor, 289
intercontinental, 591
intercontinental ballistic (ICBM), 135, 28388, 29596, 303
intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM), 283
joint tactical system (JTACMS), 421
land based, 283, 287
long-range guided, 264
medium-range ballistic (MRBM), 283
Minuteman, 591
mobile, 287, 296
mobile ICBM, 285
MX (Peacekeeper), 287, 296
nuclear, 284, 286, 289
Patriot, 451
Pershing II, 450
Polaris, 135
precision television guided, 450
Scud, 31
sea-launched ballistic (SLBM), 134, 28388, 296, 303
short range, 285
short-range ballistic (SRBM), 283
Soviet, 299, 305, 450
submarine launched, 591, 598
submarine launched ballistic (SLBM), 134
surface to air (SAM), 282, 284, 288, 342, 562
surface to surface, 463
Trident D-5, 284, 296
V-2, 591
Mitchell, Elizabeth, 92, 102
Mitchell, William Billy, 28, 33, 47, 61, 79108, 121, 12425,
12830, 133, 171, 183, 186, 191, 19596, 207, 21314, 242,
24649, 253, 259, 261, 266, 268, 343, 36263, 371, 383, 428,
580, 58283, 58687, 590, 593, 597
Mitscher, Marc, 131
Moffett, William A., 116, 120, 124, 12728, 583
Moiseyev, Mikhail, 498, 508
Momyer, William, 337
Monroe Doctrine, 203
Moon, Odas, 216
morale, 5253, 55, 60, 63, 7072, 98, 121, 128, 173, 215, 221, 268,
383, 581
Morgan, J. P., 103
631
Moris, Maurizio, 2, 4
Morocco, 153
Morrow Board, 90, 1035, 204, 209
Morrow, Dwight, 103
Moscow Academy for Air Commanders, 165
Moscow, USSR, 461, 489, 506
mujahideen, 340, 342
multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV), 284, 287,
303
multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), 427
Mussolini, Benito, 8, 18, 162, 584
Mustin, Henry, 11819, 124
mutual assured destruction (MAD), 10, 292, 29598, 300302,
3047, 536
632
Naval Aircraft Factory, 125
Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean, 463
Naval War College, 11617, 120, 124, 12627, 131, 335
Nazi
Germany, 66, 69
ideology, 174
Nellis AFB, Nevada, 410, 412, 419
Netherwood, Douglas B., 200
Newport Agreement/Conference, 13334
Nicaragua, 340
Nimitz, Chester, 131, 133
XIX Tactical Air Command, 412
Nivelle, Robert, 83
Nixon, Richard M., 334, 403
Nolan, Kimberly, 455, 472
North Africa, 71
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 217
North Atlantic Council, 463
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 327, 405, 408, 410,
413, 415, 421, 430, 44356, 45873, 490, 49294, 49899, 510,
518, 59496, 598
Central Region, 424, 445, 448, 45657, 467
Northern Region, 445, 456
Southern Region, 445, 456, 462
Tactical Air Working Group, 424
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), 422, 457
Northrop Corporation, 285
North Sea, 42
North Vietnam, 334
North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 402
Norway, 25051, 456
nuclear
age, 294
arms control, 280
attack, 282, 286, 289, 308, 447
decapitation, 307
deterrence, 299
employment, 451
energy, 513
escalation, 300301, 304, 49192, 514
first strike, 28990, 29597, 300301, 3037, 591
fission, 281
633
fusion, 282
proliferation, 298, 306
retaliation, 289, 29397, 299, 3036, 597
second strike, 296, 299, 3036
strike, 300
superiority, 301
triad, 287, 297
war, 29091, 296, 300302, 3046, 308, 337, 513, 516
Nunn, Sam, 544
Pacific
Command, 131, 470
634
fleet, 197, 544
theater, 217
war, 123, 127, 131, 13536, 583
Palestine, 49
Panama, 20, 499
Panama Canal, 123, 194, 197, 529
Pape, Robert, 368
parallel
attack, 307, 37576, 382, 388
operations, 1516, 63
warfare, 365, 374
paralysis, 15, 52, 60, 65, 21718, 264, 35863, 36566, 36869,
3 7 3 , 3 7 5 7 6 , 3 7 9 , 3 8 2 8 4 , 3 8 7 8 9 . S e e a l s o strategic
paratroop force, 173, 175
Paret, Peter, 330
Paris, France, 83, 446
parochialism, 196
Parsons, David, 343
Partnership for Peace (PFP), 462, 46465
Partridge, Earl Pat, 188
Paschall, Rod, 340
Patrick, Mason, 89, 9192, 1078, 18586, 191, 198, 204, 242
Patton, George, 412
peacekeeping, 322, 464
peacemaking, 322
peacetime contingency operations, 322
Pearl Harbor, 120, 12223, 127, 129, 131, 248
Pentagon, 301, 370, 372, 402
Pentland, Pat, 377
Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, 326
Peoples Liberation Army, 326
Perera, Guido, 208, 210
perestroika, 491, 500, 512
Perry, Robert, 455, 472
Pershing, John J., 8589, 184, 186, 209
Persian Gulf War, 1, 13, 20, 24, 3031, 285, 306, 321, 344, 374,
385, 414, 444, 461, 463, 467, 471, 48586, 496, 498509,
51118, 558, 596
Peru, 340, 347
Petain, Philippe, 153, 176
Philippines, 8182, 92, 126, 322, 326, 328, 337, 340
Phillips Laboratory, 561
635
Pike, Douglas, 324
planners/planning/plans, 459
air campaign, 541
Air Force, 409, 413, 451
airpower, 221, 255, 264, 292, 468
Allied, 220
Army, 413
campaign, 372
military, 373, 461, 492, 55758, 563
mobilization, 506
NATO, 44648, 464, 470
Russian/Soviet, 490, 496, 508
space campaign, 541
strategic, 373, 593
TRADOC, 424
war, 280, 292
poison gas, 87, 90, 96
Poland, 69, 25051, 384, 585
policy
Air Force, 540
defense, 262, 264
foreign, 486
limited war, 262
military, 249, 292
national, 249, 262, 538
national security, 538
nuclear, 279, 286
public, 267
security, 294
Soviet foreign, 491
space, 53536, 53840
policy makers/making, 292, 294, 340, 374
Politburo, 491
Popular Front, 584
Posen, Barry, 305
Post, Wiley, 190
power projection, 134, 532
Pratt, William V., 120, 126, 198
precision-guided munitions (PGM), 108, 307, 410, 450, 494, 501,
511
precision location strike system (PLSS), 426
preemption, 490, 492, 495, 501
636
preemptive attack, 287, 289, 301, 3045
Preparedness Movement, 195
Primary Flying School, 188, 190
principal subordinate commander (PSC), 455, 467, 471
Pritchard, Gilbert L., 33233
professional military education, 579, 59899
Progressivism, 186, 220
Project Control, 265
propaganda campaigns, 174
protracted revolutionary war, 32527, 32931, 33440, 34347,
36970
psychological operations (PSYOP), 330, 338, 343
Pujo, Bertrand, 152
Pustay, John, 335
637
information, 38486
in military affairs, 485, 514
military-technical, 501
nuclear, 28081, 294, 303, 307
technological, 280
Reynolds, Clark, 128
Richardson, William R., 416
Rickenbacker, Eddie, 190
Ritter, Hans, 172
Rodionov, Igor, 519
Rogers, Bernard, 458
roles and missions, 193, 195, 19798, 204, 207, 53134, 555,
56568, 589
Ronfeldt, David, 38687
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 192, 200, 2034, 224, 245, 247, 258
Roosevelt, Theodore, 529
Root, Elihu, 186
Rothermere, Lord, 4344
Rougeron, Camille, 157
Royal Air Force (RAF), 24, 32, 4143, 4658, 60, 6672, 94, 125,
191, 24950, 253, 258, 26465, 337, 34243, 362, 382, 385,
4 2 2 , 4 5 2 , 4 5 5 , 4 5 7 , 5 8 1 8 3 , 5 8 6 . S e e a l s o Great Britain
Royal Air Force Staff College, 53
Royal Flying Corps (RFC), 43, 4647, 84
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), 43, 46
rules of engagement (ROE), 541
Russia, 11, 24041, 461, 510, 513, 51520, 585
air force, 167, 518
army, 512
Russian
Federation, 494, 50910, 513, 516, 520
military-industrial complex (VPK), 517
Russo-Japanese War, 2
Russ, Robert D., 42526
Saint-Mihiel, France, 86
Salvaneschi, Nino, 67, 184
Sarkesian, Sam C., 340
satellites, 286, 537, 54546, 550, 55253, 55859, 56263
Saudi Arabia, 501
Scapa Flow, 123
Schelling, Thomas, 279, 294, 307
638
Schlesinger, James, 412
Schweinfurt, Germany, 27
Scotland, 119
sea
battle, 118, 120, 12730
forces, 32, 72, 79, 254, 372
lanes of communications (SLOC), 19596
power, 16, 1819, 101, 117, 124, 12729, 183, 195, 248, 250,
258, 261, 52931, 53334, 536, 541, 56567, 570
warfare, 128, 251
seaplanes, 188
search and rescue, 453
II Air Corps (French), 155
2d Air Division, 336
2d Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF), 422, 455, 457, 460
Second Army, 197
Second Indochina War, 220
sector operations center (SOC), 455
Seeckt, Hans von, 16971
Senate Armed Services Committee, 544
Seventh Air Force, 33637, 411
Seversky Aircraft Corporation, 243, 245
Shaposhnikov, Y., 506
S h e n a n d o a h (dirigible), 1023
Sherman, William, 1078, 183, 186, 206, 21216
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 491
Shy, John W., 330
Siam, 92
Signal Corps, 8083, 85
Signal Corps Aviation Section, 83
Sims, William, 120
single air commander, 403, 467
Slessor, John Jack, 28, 42, 6166, 68, 72, 258, 385, 581
Slipchenko, Vladimir, 501, 505
Smuts, Jan, 43, 47
Somaliland, 49
Sorensen, Edgar B., 200
South Africa, 43
Southeast Asia, 326, 32831, 339, 341
Southeastern Aviation Conference, 190
South Lebanon, 499
South Vietnam, 334, 336
639
Southwest Pacific Area, 129
Soviet air defense organization (PVO), 507
Soviet threat, 269, 337, 347, 595
Soviet Union, 22, 133, 135, 151, 16263, 16567, 171, 176,
26062, 265, 281, 283, 287, 28990, 29597, 302, 305, 334,
445, 447, 449, 46061, 48586, 489, 49192, 494, 498, 505,
5089, 515, 518, 520, 537, 585, 592, 59596
air force, 16264, 167, 502, 506
army, 16365, 261, 596
military, 163
navy, 504
Spaatz, Carl Tooey, 107, 583, 58990
space
access, 535, 541, 54750, 554, 560, 562, 56869
control, 539
corps, 565
forces, 535
hazards, 551
lift, 54749, 553, 560
operations, 541, 548, 554
plane, 56566
policy, 534
power, 518, 53031, 53334, 536, 539, 54147, 549, 55456,
55861, 56371, 596
reconnaissance, 535, 558, 560
research, 547
shuttle, 548, 552
strikes, 562
support, 53940
surveillance, 535, 556, 558
systems, 54950, 552, 556, 568, 570
threats, 552
vehicles, 537
weaponization, 53536, 538, 540, 570
spacecraft, 541, 548, 552, 55960, 562
spaceflight, 266
Space Force, 53031, 56769, 596
Spain, 80, 15859, 16162, 16667, 174, 17677, 472, 584, 586
Spanish-American War, 530
Spanish Civil War, 161, 585
Spanish War, 162, 174, 177
special air warfare, 33839
640
Special Air Warfare Center, 33133
special operations, 331, 339, 342, 344, 408, 418, 453, 533
special operations forces, 421
Sperrle, Hugo, 170, 172
Spruance, Raymond, 13031
Sputnik I, 2 8 3 , 5 9 1
Stalingrad, USSR, 489
Stalin, Joseph, 163, 165, 167, 302, 48990, 585, 596
standoff munitions, 410
Starry, Donn A., 41516, 419, 423, 430
stealth, 374, 5078, 516, 542, 556, 56263, 592
Stein, David, 452, 45455, 472
Stirling, Yates, Jr., 123
Strait of Dover, 119
Strategic Air Command (SAC), 292, 328, 332, 336
strategic
air force, 47
air war, 580, 585
attack, 325, 334, 374, 403, 407, 46567, 471
aviation, 85
decapitation, 297
defense, 3025
paralysis, 307, 35763, 368, 370, 37677, 38284, 386, 38889,
5 9 3 . See also paralysis
posturing, 505
strikes, 47
superiority, 332
thinking, 120
triad, 135
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), 289
Strategic Bombing Survey, 217
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 290
strategists
airpower, 37374, 37677, 388
civilian, 286
military, 381
NATO, 469
nuclear, 286, 292, 328
strategy
airpower, 185, 268, 444
annihilation, 360, 375
attrition, 360
641
battle, 360
counterinsurgency, 340
counterrevolutionary, 340
defensive air, 169
flexible response, 45051
French military, 446
German, 175
imposed cost, 375
insurgent, 323
maneuver, 360
maritime, 305
massive retaliation, 263
military, 35859, 361, 37476, 402, 408, 419, 44344, 48687
national security, 407
NATO, 445, 447, 45051, 461, 46364, 468
nuclear, 27980, 29293, 297, 300, 3056
revolutionary, 340
security, 293
Soviet, 499500
targeting, 264
war, 248, 37980
Student, Kurt, 170
Submarine Officers Conference, 132
submarines, 107, 117, 119, 121, 132, 135, 28485, 28788, 297
fleet ballistic missile (SSBN), 297, 299
German, 71
nuclear, 134, 286
Soviet, 13435
warfare, 82
Sub-Saharan Africa, 340
Sudan, 49
Sukarno, 330
Sun-tzu, 364, 384
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), 408, 42021, 423,
42930, 45355, 460
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), 445, 452
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 445, 45152, 458
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 452, 455,
506
surprise attack, 488, 491, 500504, 512
surveillance, 341, 408, 453, 53233, 555
Sweden, 297
642
Sykes, Frederick, 44, 4748
Tactical Air Command (TAC), 331, 405, 40911, 414, 419, 421,
42325, 432
tactical
air control center (TACC), 41213
air control system, 338
air coordination element (TACE), 413
air forces, 490
airlift, 400
air operations, 45354
air reconnaissance (TAR), 400, 456
air support, 426, 445
aviation, 85
control, 455
superiority, 496
Tactical Air Working Party (TAWP), 444, 452, 45657, 46465,
47273
Taranto, Italy, 125
targeting/targets,11, 14, 25, 2829, 53, 60, 64, 255, 304, 459
civilian, 5556, 68, 264, 298, 308, 598
countervalue, 295
economic, 449, 511, 514, 598
guerrilla, 335
identification, 46, 338
industrial, 4142, 45, 60, 68, 7072, 85, 156, 255, 267, 38283,
388, 449, 466, 581, 598
information, 382, 388
interdiction, 45
leadership, 371, 377
military, 42, 46, 55, 57, 61, 68, 71, 504, 511, 514
morale, 51, 55
priorities, 225
selection, 52, 54
strategic, 64, 85, 215, 219, 221, 252, 325, 330, 511
strategic nuclear, 307
tactical, 215, 330
target lists/sets, 28, 64, 68, 202, 211, 219, 221, 268, 292, 375, 403
technology, 89, 24, 31, 82, 90, 95, 99, 117, 119, 134, 161, 167,
171, 173, 184, 21920, 240, 261, 267, 323, 342, 346, 35758,
376, 379, 382, 389, 422, 427, 431, 458, 471, 485, 48788, 492,
643
49495, 500501, 505, 511, 514, 51617, 530, 540, 543, 548,
55455, 565, 568, 570, 579, 597, 599
aerial, 165
aeronautical, 260
aerospace, 519
airpower, 34041
air and space, 516, 543
aviation, 151
flying boat, 12122
German, 173, 175
high, 543
jet engine, 266
military, 516
missile, 287
naval, 103
nuclear, 134, 27982, 284, 290, 294
rocket, 570
smart, 459
space, 548, 550, 570
stealth, 24, 284, 288, 307, 562
submarine, 135
weapons, 516
Tedder, Arthur, 56, 60
terrorism, 340, 462
theater
air commander, 422
commander, 65, 132
of military operations (TVD), 490, 49697, 501, 505
theorists, 281
ACTS, 264
Air Corps, 196
airpower, 32, 44, 61, 168, 240, 246, 253, 255, 258, 26869, 291,
345, 35758, 545, 579, 58182, 585, 588, 593, 595, 597, 599
insurgency, 336
MAD, 300302
mechanized warfare, 157
military, 163, 265, 590
nuclear, 29, 280, 29193, 302, 328
Soviet, 164, 500, 5023
strategic, 167, 298
strategic paralysis, 381
644
theory
bombing, 55
classical military, 268
conflict, 357, 36364, 368, 388
deterrence, 280, 291, 298, 305, 307
energy maneuverability, 363
European airpower, 586
German airpower, 16970, 172, 17475
insurgency, 336, 338
Jominian, 37980
land power, 531
military, 380, 485
naval, 115, 132
nuclear, 28081, 290, 306, 591
paralysis, 385
sea power, 531
Soviet airpower, 596
space power, 53031, 564, 567
strategic airpower, 264
strategic attack, 357, 388
strategic bombardment, 160, 165, 218, 323, 334, 347
strategic nuclear, 295
strategic paralysis, 37677, 382, 387
war, 38081
Third Army, 412
Third Reich, 570
Third World, 298
Thomas, Timothy, 487
Tinker, Villa, 192
Tirpitz, Alfred von, 123
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, 384, 387, 389
Tokyo, Japan, 92, 281
total
quality management, 387
war, 269, 293, 341
Towers, John, 124, 131
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 344, 4045, 40911,
41316, 419, 421, 423, 425, 432
transatmospheric vehicle (TAV), 564, 570
Transjordan, 49, 265
transportation nodes, 28
treaty negotiation, 538
645
Trenchard, Hugh, 28, 4153, 5658, 61, 63, 65, 7072, 7980,
8485, 95, 125, 130, 171, 266, 36263, 38283, 581
trench warfare, 83, 90
Truman Doctrine, 446
Truman, Harry S, 133, 262, 265
Tsygichko, V., 506
Tukhachevski, Mikhail, 16364, 16667, 585
Turkey, 3, 463, 472, 510
Twentieth Air Force, 132
21st Bomber Command, 217
Twining, Nathan C., 124, 205
646
24748, 256, 258, 26364, 419, 45253, 52931, 56869,
58283, 585, 59091, 597
United States Senate, 262
United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), 544
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 132, 136
unity
of command, 88, 206, 208, 545, 570
of effort, 570
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 545, 558, 564
USS
Chicago, 1 1 6
Langley, 93, 126
Lexington, 9 3 9 4 , 1 1 5 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 6 2 7 , 5 8 3
Ranger, 1 2 7
Saratoga, 9394, 115, 122, 12627, 583
Utz, Curtis, 127
647
War Department, 83, 1023, 1058, 191, 19798, 201, 2059, 211,
21314, 224, 247, 587
warfare
aerial maneuver, 363
chemical, 410
control, 358, 382, 38485, 38789
economic, 358, 38285, 388
incapacitation, 384
information, 387
psychological, 503
revolutionary, 370
strategic nuclear, 347
tactical nuclear, 333
unconventional, 338
War Plans Division, 106
Warsaw Pact, 31, 400, 4057, 40910, 414, 430, 44551, 45863,
46870, 490, 49394, 505, 520
Washington Conference, 132
Washington, D.C., 81, 92, 123, 136, 241, 262, 295
Washington Naval Conference of 1922, 92
Washington Treaty, 204, 463
weapons
advanced technology, 501
antisubmarine, 135
atomic, 31, 25960, 265, 28182, 291, 293, 449, 489, 590
ballistic, 560
biological/chemical, 3067, 463, 513
conventional, 282, 285, 307, 489, 537
directed energy, 290, 500, 561
environmental modification, 537
future, 501
high tech, 507, 509, 514, 517
high-tech conventional, 502
of mass destruction, 307, 463, 469, 513, 537
nuclear, 10, 30, 34, 130, 13334, 26061, 264, 268, 28082,
28486, 288, 29294, 29699, 3026, 327, 329, 33233, 443,
44749, 461, 463, 469, 485, 48991, 494, 497, 502, 51314,
516, 519, 535, 59697
precision, 29, 374, 599
smart, 307, 513, 515
Soviet, 500
space, 285, 534, 538, 598
648
standoff, 284, 288, 592
strategic, 267
strategic nuclear, 285, 287, 489
tactical nuclear, 281, 285, 491
thermonuclear, 282, 289, 293, 296, 308
Weaver, Walter Buck, 188
Webster, Robert, 183, 194, 196, 216, 219
Weeks, John W., 102
Wehrmacht, 16768
Weir, Gary, 119
Weir, William, 44
Western European Union (WEU), 462
western front, 47, 62, 84, 86, 90, 119, 126, 362
Westervelt, George, 12021, 125
West Germany, 443, 44546, 448, 457
Westover, Oscar, 108, 18990, 198, 201, 207
West Point, 82, 89, 420
Wever, Walter, 17273, 175
Weygand, Maxime, 153, 176
Weyland, O. P., 412
White House, 334
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 544
White, Thomas D., 546
Wickham, John A., 420, 430, 432
Wilberg, Helmut, 16971, 173
will, 55, 6667, 97, 162, 194, 218, 255, 268, 359, 364
civilian, 28
enemy, 1012, 15, 41, 5960, 79, 96, 101, 174, 259, 264, 268,
360, 374
to fight, 97, 217, 466
to resist, 194, 197, 219, 221, 359, 361, 365, 378, 381, 383, 388
Wilson, Donald, 193, 21619
Wilson, Henry, 4849
Wimmer, Wilhelm, 172
Wingate, Orde, 324
Winged Defense, 100, 1024
Wohlstetter, Albert, 286
Wolf, Charles, Jr., 343
World War I, 4, 89, 11, 13, 1617, 1920, 23, 2527, 30, 33,
4142, 50, 54, 58, 61, 66, 7172, 79, 89, 91, 106, 115, 11719,
121, 123, 125, 128, 15152, 160, 164, 16871, 17476, 18384,
649
188, 195, 206, 212, 214, 240, 250, 29193, 303, 358, 36162,
383, 388, 529, 581, 58586, 589
World War II, 15, 20, 23, 25, 27, 2934, 42, 46, 60, 66, 70, 72, 83,
115, 12324, 127, 12931, 133, 135, 151, 155, 158, 160,
16263, 168, 17374, 187, 204, 212, 216, 21921, 224, 239,
257, 259, 26263, 267, 281, 288, 291, 293, 307, 32122, 324,
326, 328, 331, 384, 406, 412, 427, 445, 449, 468, 488, 499,
58284, 58689, 591, 594, 596
Wrner, Manfred, 463
Wright brothers, 82, 89, 104, 187, 597
zeppelin, 7, 42
Zhurbenko, V., 499
Zone of the Advance, 86
650
The Paths of Heaven
The Evolution of Airpower Theory
Cover Design
Phil Meilinger
Chief Editor
Marvin Bassett
Copy Editors
Debbie Banker
Lula Barnes
Joan Dawson
Cover Illustration
Steven C. Garst
Illustrator
Susan Fair
Composition and
Prepress Production
Linda C. Colson