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FOREIGN CULTURES 48: The Cultural Revolution Midterm Study Guide

Overview of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76 (Lieberthal: Governing China, pp. 84-112) The Maoist Era Mao was the source of ultimate wisdom; policy making was an example of the bandwagon effect, where other officials would try to sense in which direction Mao was leaning and then jump on the Maoist bandwagon Mao had and especially strong impact concerning three issue areas: o Relations with the U.S. and Soviet Union o o Policies to promote the revolution in China Agricultural policy

Mao felt least comfortable with urban economics 1949-56: Economic and political recovery and basic socialist transformation o Four broad policies of the early years: o 1) Cement terms of relationship with USSR 2) Establish governing apparatus to rule urban China and unite the country 3) Restore urban economy 4) Consolidate control over countryside while instituting land reform on a nationwide basis Mid-1950: CCP instituted series of mass political campaigns: (1950-52) Land Reform Campaign: CCP sent land-reform teams to redistribute land from the landlords to the peasants; they also categorized peasants into different classes Very violent; at least 800,000 landlords killed CCP able to establish communist power structure in the countryside

Wielding Power

(1951) Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Campaign: targeted civil-servant holdovers from KMT regime and urban secret societies Did not involve mass mobilization Three Anti Campaign: targeted waste, corruption, and bureaucratism among basic-level urban cadres

(1951-52) Three Anti Five Anti Campaigns: against corruption

Five Anti Campaign: targeted corruption, tax evasion, stealing state property, cheating on state contracts, and stealing state economic secrets among urban businessmen

Campaigns involved mass mobilization, study groups, thought reform

(1951-52) Thought Reform of Intellectuals Campaign: encouraged university student to criticize their teachers and advocate the Soviet system over the American/European models Campaign involved mass mobilization, thought reform

Socialist transformation of the economy (1953-1957) First Five-Year Plan: involved funneling resources into investment in almost 150 Soviet-assisted new enterprises (1955-56) Agricultural cooperativization At the same time, the Socialist Transformation of Industry and Commerce campaign allowed urban capitalists to sell their enterprises to the state

1956-57: Contradictions and Rethinking of the Soviet Model o Four tensions that led to the Great Leap Forward 1) Maos role in the system: Mao felt that he could not exit from the bureaucratic routine (retreat to the second line) without risking loss of control and power 2) Soviet-style economic development favored top-down control as well as inequalities in income and power; Soviet system sought to exploit the countryside to serve the urban population 3) Chinas need to mobilize domestic capital formation 4) Tension between peasant cadres and urban intellectuals: intellectuals regarded peasant cadres as uncivilized, peasants regarded intellectuals as elitist and bourgeois o 1956: Soviet de-Stalinization initiative made Mao rethink Khrushchevs policies and qualifications Mao began to modify the Soviet model to made it more applicable to his own priorities: On the Ten Major Relationships o (1957) Hundred Flowers Movement: Mao encouraged intellectuals to speak their minds and point out the errors of party officials, but the outpouring of criticism drove Mao to end the campaign o Antirightist Campaign: initially targeted dissenters from Hundred Flowers campaign but ended up indiscriminately labeling many individuals rightists Important results of Antirightist Campaign: 1) No one dared to criticize the shift toward radical political and

economic policies 2) Many intellectuals lost (professors, engineers, economists, scientists), which would make a highly centralized, government-administered approach to economic development difficult 1958-61: The Great Leap Forward o Idea that China could leap over the normal stages of economic development, based on the notion that the organized masses could transform their labor into capital o o Great Leap approach expanded role of CCP at the expense of the government, greatly decentralized policy implementation Key slogan: Strive to go all out to achieve more, faster, better, and more economical results o In reality, better and more economical were sacrificed for more and faster Aug 1958: Mao called for the establishment of peoples communes, large, centralized organizations in the countryside meant to facilitate meshing the government administration with economic production o In terms of the PLA, Great Leap favored some of its previous guerrilla-war traditions o Military was made more egalitarian, more involved in domestic economic construction and in developing extensive militia organizations Great gains in production (i.e. steel output) Partly due to many key Soviet-aided plants that came on line in 1958, good weather Many problems arose: Disorganization: too many people removed from the fields to permit successful harvest, steel produced in backyard smelters was of very poor quality, transportation system clogged o Problems of administration and morale in the peoples communes Officials inflated production figures

(1959) Lushan Plenum: Peng Dehuai criticized the excesses of the Great Leap Mao criticized and purged Peng and colleagues Consequences: Future policy debate discouraged Peng Dehuai replaced with Lin Biao Radicalism surged anew during 1959-60

Famine in the countryside Low agricultural production, but leaders still demanded for food for the cities

 o o -

Roughly 30 million people starved to death

Chinese economy sunk into depression 1960: Soviets withdrew aid

1962-65: Recovery and Growing Elite Divisions o 1961-62: 20 million citydwellers forced back to the countryside via rationing of urban food and consumer goods o o Urban unit system led to a two-tier system of privileged urban society and exploited rural society Mao feared economic rehabilitation policies would steer China away from revolution continued mobilization to attack internal political enemies Mao feared China would follow the Soviets (no longer appeared socialist under Khrushchev)

Increasingly relied on PLA, headed by Lin Biao Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 53-70, 106-7, 110-123 The Confucian Pattern 1) Most successful of all systems of conservatism a) Was the main orthodoxy of for 2000 years b) Did go through reforms, decline and revival, and innovation during this time 2) Confucian aristocracy a) government by the best b) Chinese philosophers adopted meritocracy during the Warring States Period c) Men are perfectible through education 3) Government by Moral Prestige a) Mandate of Heaven dates by the Zhou period (ca 1027-770) and emphasized that good conduct or virtue gave the ruler ethical sanction to rule b) right of rebellion stems out of the idea that Heaven can withdraw its Mandate i.e. any successful rebellion is justified c) proper behavior according to status- code of conduct initially only applied to scholar-officials; the common people were to be controlled by rewards and punishments d) Confucian ideals stem from relationship of Chinese man to nature i.e. fengshui i) Human conduct is reflected in acts of nature ii) Man must harmonize with unseen forces to avoid calamity iii) Ruler thought to intervene between mankind and the forces of nature; maintained universal harmony through right conduct i.e. government by goodness

4) Early Achievement sin Bureaucratic Administration a) Han Dynasty formalized the bureaucratic system i) Chief ministers administrate on behalf of the Emperors authority ii) Emperor exercised power of appointment iii) Developed system of inspection where officials checked on each other independently b) Central problem: selecting & controlling bureaucrats i) Gained strength from Legalist methods ii) Civil service exams established and later reinforced under Tang Dynasty 5) Classical Orthodoxy a) Classics mentioned during Han Dynasty: Book of Changes, Book of History, Odes, Book of Ceremonies and Proper Conduct, Spring and Autumn Annals b) Book of Mencius elevated to a classic under Tang Dynasty c) Classics depict paternal government as key to social order

d) Religious side: official rites, temples, pantheon of sages, etc state cult e) During decline of Han, almost eclipsed by Buddhism revived under Tang
f) Foreign aggression during the Song Dynasty strengthened ethnocentricity which has remained a chief characteristic. 6) Neo-Confucianism began during the Song Dynasty

a) More systematic and more complete more metaphysical content

c) Greatest Neo-Confucian synthesizers is12th century philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200); i) Absolute first principle is the Supreme Ultimate; li, the laws or principles of form, is a
manifestation of the Supreme Ultimate

ii) Evil: obscuring of the li and qi (physical matter). No active principle of evil.
iii) Highest Confucian virtue complete sincerity iv) Believed in original goodness of man 7) Chinese Militarism a) Man of violence looked down i) Every dynasty is established by the sword, but after conquest is over, civil rule is more esteemed ii) Problem of force in China essentially a police problem (1) Difficult to reconcile police institutions with type of warfare needed to defend borders b) Military always just part of the bureaucracy while orthodoxy was the primary means for preserving order c) Violence is last resort i) Sun Zi stated: The acme of skill in warfare is to subdue the enemy, without fighting.

The Political Tradition Imperial system survived until 1912 1) Bureaucracy a) Administration divided among Six Ministries of civil office (revenue, ceremonies, war, punishments, and public works) + military + Censorate + minor offices b) Ming Dynasty created the Grand Secretariat (body of high officials to assist Emperor) c) Manchus added a less formal body, the Grand Council, at the top of administration d) 18 provinces divided into circuits, then prefectures, etc e) Imperial civil service has nine ranks, each with higher/lower grade i) Emperor appoints all officers down to county magistrate ii) Circulation: few officials left at one post for more than 3 years f) Principle to set one official to check upon another i) Each province has a governor and every two provinces has a governor-general ii) Under Qing Dynasty, Ministries have 2 presidents (1 Manchu, 1 Chinese) iii) Censorate entrusted with duty to inform the Emperor of all matters in his kingdom i.e. the Emperors eyes g) Safety in conformity tended to kill initiative at the bottom and efficiency of one man at the top was impaired by a bottleneck h) Bureaucracy relatively small: relied on gentry class to lead the peasantry

i) Low salaries corruption

c) Confucius said that legal rules came from the moral character of nature itself Law is
subordinate to morality & law is an inferior substitute for morality d) Chinese imperial code was chiefly penal i) Law pertained only to public affairs and occupied small share of public scene ii) One major aim of the legal system was to preserve the Confucian social hierarchy

e) Private law remained underdeveloped in this legal system appealed to old custom for
resolution of private conflicts i) Partially due to non-development of private business; all businesses in China were family businesses

3) The Victory of the Chinese Communist Party, 1917-49 (Lieberthal: Governing China, pp. 39-56) Six basic strategies for the CCPs path to power o Labor mobilization (1921-23) CCP formed a labor secretariat to organize trade union activity Problem: Chinas small proletariat (less than 1% of population) could not stand up to warlords o i.e. February Massacre Comintern advised CCP to ally with GMD Communists sought to gain access to a broader spectrum of the populace, help the GMD to power, and then take control CCP benefited from identification with GMD, which was recognized as a force for Chinese nationalism CCP focused on political organization in urban areas, emphasizing antiimperialism Tensions between CCP and GMD resulted in GMD forces slaughtering communists in Shanghai and Wuhan (1927) CCP members who emphasize urban revolution (rather than rural) were mainly the ones killed those left were more inclined toward peasant mobilization o Adapting to the countryside (1929-34) Mao Zedong and Zhu De established the Jiangxi Soviet in Ruijin Mao and colleagues experimented with land reform, methods for developing peasant political involvement, means of recruiting and training a revolutionary army o Strategic retreat: the Long March (1934-35) Two main legacies: 1) Mao Zedong achieved primacy within in the CCP at the Zunyi meeting in 1935 o Mao fought to consolidate his victory over Wang Ming for the next seven years o 2) The march became the basis for a heroic myth that bolstered CCP unity and prestige The Yanan Era (1935-47) CCP greatly expanded its base, developed techniques of governance, enhanced

United Front with the GMD (1924-27)

its political prestige Consolidation of Maos power from 1942 to 1944 1945: Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought adopted as guiding ideology of CCP 1942-1944 thought-reform campaign to eliminate any remnant influence of Soviet-oriented communists Implemented echniques of washing the brain through pressure, ostracism, and reintegration The Yanan complex: CCP emphasized decentralized rule, importance of ideology in keeping cadres loyal to leaders, preference for officials who could provide general leadership, developing and maintaining close ties with local population, egalitarianism and simple living among officials o Rectification campaign led by Kang Sheng: used false accusations, torture, special case groups to elicit confessions from alleged enemies Fighting a civil war (1947-49) CCP strategy: surround major cities and cut them off (guerrilla, rural-based strategy) Huai-Hai campaign (1949): huge communist victory GMD fell more quickly than expected 1948: Communists shifted their war strategy and political line to appeal more to capitalists and intellectuals, whom they hoped to win over Legacies of the CCPs path to power o Discontent within Chinese society made it very mobilizable o o o o o o o CCP typically failed to translate popular support into sustainable political power; the GMD essentially helped take itself down Long March and Yanan Period helped shape subsequent CCP policies and views Mao attained unchallengeable stature in the CCP Overwhelmingly rural party membership was reflected in CCPs subsequent policies (i.e. decentralization, mass political campaigns, attacks on intellectuals) Peasant-based military path to power deeply intertwined party and army CCP developed mindset that the proper combination of will and strategy could overcome any difficulties CCP grew cautious of Soviet advice

MacFarquhar (2nd ed.), The Politics of China, pp. 5-40

Between 1949 and 1957, the CCP established a strong centralized state, took major steps toward

industrialization, achieved a good rate of economic growth, increased living standards, and implemented Marxist social principles in a relatively smooth fashion. success Only one major purge affected the top eliteGao Gang and Rao Shushi Ruling elite was stablefew power shifts occurred, and members remained the same. Strong elite was necessary for real debatepolicies could be discussed without fearing for the regime o Confidence from this united leadership also impressed population and local officials, which made acquiescence to Party programs easier. Roots of unity Victory in 1949 o Culmination of long struggle, and success led to most CCP civilian and military members getting positions, regardless of any factonalism pre-1949. Since spoils were shared, no single group posed a threat to unity. Shared ideology and common goals o Ideological commitment to Marxism, and broad consensus that China should industrialize and transform socially. o o Cohesive leadership produced good policies, which in turn helped solidarity Success also tended to smooth over long-term inconsistencies in policies The unity and cohesion of CCP leadership played an instrumental role in the regimes early

Soviet model helped focus debate on details rather than fundamental approaches, which lowered the stakes of any conflict.

Potential sources of disunity o Participants of the revolution had taken part in different groups and organizations, and had different experiences (ie. Those who worked in the white areas, or underground work, like Liu Shaoqi), though in this early period these differences did not disrupt larger group cohesion. o o o Personal tensionMao and Peng Dehuai already had a tense relationship Disagreements over speed of economic development and social transformation, but disagreements tended to be minor Individual leaders increasingly identified with their respective departmentsZhou Enlai with government vs. party, Peng Dehuai with the army. But during this time, emphasis was still on Party line. o Tension certainly existed, but it was willingness of leaders to overlook them and work toward consensus that ensured unity. But when Soviet model was no longer guiding principle, and policies led to disasters, cleavages would erupt again.

Mao Zedong Unchallenged leaderpower was built off successful strategies during and after SinoJapanese War. Further aided by instances where he individually clashed with key colleagues o Mao overrode concerns of his associates by involving China in the Korean War. Benefits in security and international peace helped Maos reputation for political wisdom. o o o Decision to speed up agricultural cooperativization led to achievement far before the original projection, which demonstrated Maos insight Hundred Flowers was third instance of a break from elites viewpointsless successful but his immediate shift to the right mitigated the damage. Maos authority was linchpin of elite stability Final arbiter of disputes Policy advocacy was aimed at winning Maos approval rather than individual prestige, so less infighting b/c discouraged competitionMao wanted solidarity. Observed rules of collective leadership and democratic discussion: officials were valued for their input and various expertise.

Mao kept out of most policy areas, limiting himself to areas of expertise agriculture and revolution. And he was relatively centrist at this time, which helped him mediate conflicts within the party rather than exacerbate them.

Broad agreement on following Soviet model helped facilitate stability Basic question: how should soviet model be adapted to fit Chinese situation? How fast to industrialize? Important questions, but not ones that would split the party. Strong soviet system bolstered Chinese confidence But kept Chinese priorities and realities clearstrong nationalism helped keep CCP from uncritical borrowing from Soviets. o First five year plan imitated USSR, but by 1956 making modifications Committed to similar ideas of socialist modernization and urban-oriented development strategieswas seen as natural consequence of revolutionary success Soviet model was not just one course of actionthere was a wide body of perspectives and ideas to look at. USSR had influence over larger Chinese society as wellmodel used in propaganda and slogans.

1949: Consolidation and Reconstruction Beijing fell to CCP in Jan 1949, Shanghai in Apr and Wuhan in May. Took Guangzhou after est. PRC, and finally Chengdu in December. Military victories helped facilitate reunificationhelped build patriotic support for CCP. Wanted integrated, centralized state, but would require replacing Chinas traditional parochialism (life revolved around villages and small social networks) with societal structures more directly connected to the center. o Would require social transformation to encourage more mass mobilization and political awareness. Other concerns o Need to reunify in face of years of warfarestill groups that resented the CCP. o o o Economy was severely damaged Establish a strong, centralized government. Sometimes aims conflicted: economic revival required reassuring groups in society and making some concessions, but a strong government required organizational control Different areas had different needs o old liberated areas of north, northeast, parts of northwest revolution had essentially been won in these areas. Organizational presence was established here down to the grassroots.

Main task was to extend party control to pockets unoccupied by CCP, and carry out land reform and cooperative agriculture. By mid 1950, land reform declared complete, and 1/3 of population in mutual aid teams (MATs)first step to cooperatives.

new liberated areas much of east and central china, and south of yangtze the Party had lacked organizational support or resources herecontrol had come from military conquest. (had not been policy of countryside surrounding the cities, but seizing the cities, and then branching out). Had to deal with the presence of resistance groups, and had to restore order and production while in a more precarious position because countryside was unsettleddidnt have a supportive rural base.

CCP unaccustomed to running cities, or such a large area in general Lacked adequate #s of personnel: led to rapid recruitment. Began developing specialized cadres that would be able to deal with economic management, urban infrastructure, etc. CCP had some experience from before 1949. Also attitude that urban phase of revolution was to be welcomedmade Party devote attention to recruiting workers and addressing urban problems.

Coped by making use of existing personnel/ systems to restablish order while finding addtl resources. Initially mobilized private and local organizations to provide serviceslike benefit societies. But political organization was soon centralized. Factories had stopped working, but Liu pushed for production again by calling for labor discipline, wage limits, and other policies to stimulate growth. Production was restored in many areas by 1952. Growth of labor unions and extensive labor policies helped solidify central govts access to urban industry.

United Front and democratic dictatorship Maximized support and minimized fears Unification had won CCP widespread support, even from non-Communists, bc of patriotic desire for unified nation o Traditional aspect: saw CCP as new dynasty o KMT had been discreditedoccupying KMT forces had been corrupt Unification was part of united front strategy o Gathering a wide collection of allies by setting limited goals and defining narrow enemies.

Developed Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)a system of peoples congresses that drew lineage from a similar KMT organization. o Small democratic parties put into these congresses, including small middle class and intelligentsia groups. CCP in formal power and held most seats, but genuinely sought opinions of non-Communists.

Blueprint for future: Common Program was moderate and conciliatory. o Adopted gradualism o Narrowly defined enemies as imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism Patriotic policies asserting Chinas rights Large enterprises run by KMT were bur. Capitalism. Landlords = feudalism

Constituted a peoples democratic dictatorshipnot just dictatorship of proletariat, bc bourgeoisie and peasantry joined working classes as ruling class.

Role of military First, military and decentralized rule because newly liberated areas fell to PLA. Was crucial at first because areas were so different from one another and needed decentralized rule. o Military Control Commissions were set up as local authorities. But shifted to civilian authorities as soon as possible o Regional admin remained until 1954, but power shifted as soon as it couldMCC responsibilities were quickly taken over by governmental groups. o Mao articulated clear distinction between civilian and military authority as early as 1938: Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. o Appointments to regions were all held by pol figures (except for Lin Biao), and military roles were diversified to create a modern, professional militarypart of Common Program and motivated by Korean War. o Central authority came up with policy, but regional admins decided pace and implementation. Sometimes this led to lags: in Guangdong, people served parochial interests by doing land reform slower. Used old liberated areas like North and northeast to test and optimize policies before implementing in less stable areas.

Land Reform Familiar terrain for CCP, but still different because not wartime anymore, and often entered local regions without knowledge of conditions or often even dialect.

First to arrive: PLA that suppressed bandits, organized local militias, and disarmed population. After: work teams cameonly small proportion of members had experience with northern agrarian struggles, whereas most were urban intellectuals and students. Many were very young or had questionable class backgroundstrying to prove revolutionary status. o Collected taxes o o Organized peasant associations, reduced rents and interests, and carried out campaigns against landlords and old elite. Characterized land reform, as per Liu Shaoqis instructions, as freeing rural productive forces for industrialization. o But didnt work very wellpeasants hesitant about CCPs promises, and still mindful of traditional power structure. Reworked it by emphasizing class struggle and mass mobilizationsome social transformation would be necessary to make land reform stick. Class identification, then land confiscation and redistribution. Work teams mobilized villages against landlords with speak bitterness campaigns and mass trials.--> often led to violence and brutality Inverted power structurenew ruling elite was poor and middle peasants.

Constant propaganda during this timeused persuasive and coercive methods Land reform demonstrated partys credibilityenhanced future persuasive capabilities among peasants.

Urban mass movements Feb 1951-1953: Campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries Fall 1951-Summer/ Fall 1952 o Three Antis Campaign against corrupt cadres o o Five Antis Campaign against respected national bourgeoisie Thought reform campaign aimed at intellectuals

Often violent, and intense psychological pressure used o Forced confessions in small groups and mass trials attended by tens of thousands. o Fostered climate of distrust that broke down interpersonal relationships- quanxi. Helped break down paternalism in urban society because traditional bonds broken

Happened after entry into Korean Warso fear of KMT sabotage was very real. o But also presented convenient opportunity to push campaigns that were already planned

o o

Opponents of revolution and regime were targeted, but so were some people who were prominent and may have become alternate leaders. Chinese approach: get mass participation to not offend public opinion.

General public found campaigns understandable, though frightening, but many found themselves rudely awakened o Three Antis: targeted urban cadres who had become corrupted from dealings with bourgeoisie o Five Antis: directed at lawbreaking capitalists. General idea was to weaken influence of all intellectual currents that werent Marxist-Leninism. While investigating capitalist crimes, set up Party branches in many enterprisesgave authorities much greater knowledge of internal workings of businesses.

The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1946-57, The Politics of China, pp. 40-86. Socialist Construction and Transformation, 1953-6

new phase entered as a result of increasing political controlling beginning of national economic planning

1955- first five year plan for 53-57 approved continuity with previous period gradualism- planned industrialization over 15 years still united front slightly more radical policy overall than seen previously

formulation of general line for the transition to socialism

Mao plays a large role in shifting emphasis to transformation- Bo Yibo denounced for lightening the tax load on capitalists, warning for others

CCP has significant base reserves with which to carry out change (80% of industry, 6.5 million members by 1953, many affiliated groups) regularization/centralization in all spheres of life greater emulation of Soviet methods The Gao Gang Affair

only serious high-level purge of the period Gao Gang = Politburo member, head of State Planning Commission Rao Shushi = director of Central Committee's organization department, leading party figure in East China Gao and Rao attempt to out Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai from their positions

Mao approves of/trusts Gao, expresses dissatisfaction with Liu/Zhou- Gao takes this as motivation to act Rao jumps on the bandwagon- feels insecure in his current position etc. Use debates to attack policies of Liu and Zhou, try to garner Soviet support, win backing of other high officials by promising them better positions Gao travels around China to try and garner support- his actions are brought to Mao's attentions, who expresses his anger December Politburo meeting- Gao is formally criticized, eventually commits suicide Lessons-Mao is crucial, first as inspiration for affair, then in squashing it 1954- adopt state constitution, which is extension of 1949 Common Program very similar to Stalin's constitution of 1936, BUT Chinese system has

The constitutional and institutional pattern

no universal, equal, direct suffrage creation of separate/visible chairman position for Mao unified multinational state- no secession of minorities

Agricultural cooperativization

very significant achievements Mao pushed for more rapid cooperativization- that agriculture was largely socialized by 1956 was vindication of Mao, success for party CCP carries out a much more logical, thought out process that Soviets, doesn't kill peasants, less emphasis on all agriculture being used to support industry Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs)- basic unit of socialized agriculture debate over speed of socialization- Mao pushes for more rapid process, is successful because of his undisputed leadership, well thought-out program better to err to the left than the right peasant resistance appears in China, but to a MUCH lesser degree than in USSR gradualism, disciplined party, good rural economic policies help this

Transforming the modern sector and the first leap forward

now that agricultural socialization was succeeding, could move to industry once again, debate over speed, Mao emphasizes need for alacrity again, overfulfillment of targets- even more so than with APCs importance of science and technology

Adjusting the new Socialist system, 1956-7

reassessment of conditions new course socialism has officially triumphed over capitalism

new propositions:

attenuated class conflict- end of turbulent revolution shift of priorities to economic development social forces should be mobilized in new adaptation of united front

attitude towards intellectuals softens Adapting the Soviet Model

beginning of censure of Soviet ideas Mao's speech in april 1956- Ten Great Relationships

changes to Soviet structure-- less emphasis on heavy industry, changes in economic administration (greater consultation with local authorities)

The Eighth Party Congress

September, 1956 emphasis on steady (not crazy rapid) advance, economic progress as opposed to revolution not as much of a personal triumph for Mao (in light of Kruschev, de-emphasis of personality cult) Mao begins to plan for orderly succession expansion of Politburo and CC, increased bureaucracy reform targeting subjectivism, bureaucratism, sectarianism cautious approach to party reform initial plan to accept input from intellectuals etc- doesn't go over so well eventually, intellectuals do criticize party- these attacks are unsettling to the party, particularly student vehemence morale suffers, experiment is a failure- faulty assumption that intellectuals are on the side of the party

Party Ramification and the Hundred Flowers

The Anti-Rightist Campaign

direct counterattack to intellectual criticism of Hundred Flowers Mao is at forefront of this effort defensive tone to campaign harsh attcks, struggle meetings viewed as overly harsh post-Mao

Conclusions

major problems by 1957, but overall remarkably successful since 49 soviet model, leadership unity, persuasive appeals in securing compliance, application of successful revolutionary era strategies, absence of any perceived incompatability in policies key in successful.

MacFarquhar (ed), The Politics of China, pp. 87-117

Great Leap Forward- Overview 1958, CCP leaders still confident about Chinas progress, but within 8 years leadership would be wracked with division, and Mao would launch an attack on his colleagues that would lead to a decade of tumult and chaos. Party would lose the prestige it had enjoyed from 1949-1957, which was the result of strong leadership and effective policies Great Leap Forward (GLF) was alternate plan meant to replace the Five Year Plans imported from Sovietsmade use of mass mobilization, a technique that had worked in the past. o o Replaced technical expertise with efforts to rouse workers enthusiasm Strained Sino-Soviet relations because USSR advisors lost prestige in country.

But GLF fared poorlywas used to justify a lot of extremism and produced poor economic results. Even when Mao began to try to bring situation under control again, couldnt. o Coupled with political attacks from within against the GLF: Peng Dehuai cultivated strong relationship with Soviets and criticized Great Leap.

1960: Soviet aid withdrawnhurt a number of key industrial development projects, on top of damage that had already been done by the Leap. 1961: economic malaise spread from rural areas to cities.

Once things got better, though, political tensions flared. Mao, though still the dominant authority, had suffered for the misjudgments of the GLF, and though it had been clear that mass mobilization had failed to bring econ progress, still advocated it to prevent the bureaucratic deterioration of the revolution that he observed in USSR. o His colleagues thought CCP should shift emphasis on technical expertise and specialists to guide growth. o Maos search for allies and alienation of colleagues who disagreed with him would define the political landscape for years to come.

Origins of GLF Problems with Five Year Plans o Chinese didnt have the same consistent rural surplus that Soviets could use to implement their other policies and provide a buffer for rough times. o CCP was also predominantly rural, whereas Soviets were urban. FYPs in Soviet Union were exploitative and led to millions of peasant deaths the CCP (mostly rural) was unlikely to favor this.

Debated a new strategy that would allow rapid growth of heavy industry while expanding agricultural outputwithout the human cost. Discussed at 3rd plenum of Eighth CC 1957. o Needed to provide incentive for peasants to increase output even thought state investments were used on heavy industry. o Mao thought organizational and political tools could be used, but Chen Yun, 5th ranking member of the party and economic specialist, thought peasants would only respond to material incentives. Chen wanted emphasis on light industry so peasants could benefit from the economic growth. Over time, this would also produce enough profit to develop heavy industry quickly. But defeated by impatienceplan would take years to implement. Larger reason for defeat was ideological shift in party. Plan relied on continued centralized control of economy, work that required literacy and statistical skillsmore prevalent in urban intelligentsia than peasant masses. But Hundred Flowers and Antirightist Campaign had largely discredited the urban, bourgeois experts, and had led to a strong belief in the power of mass mobilization because of the success of cooperativization in the countryside. o Peoples Communes were developed to provide bigger organizational unit in order to facilitate mass mobilization. (1958) o o Initially huge, embracing several standard marketing areas 1959-1962communes became smaller so they could be better managed. Everything collectivized, and incomes paid out to people equally, at first, and then based on the brigade or team that they were in. Mobilization over expertise also meant that CCP would play greater role than government bureaucracy. Other motivations Soviet approach to status had led to stratification of cities and party industry, commerce and civil service had grade system that led to more status consciousness and careerismgood for growth but Mao didnt like it. Maos area of expertise was rural policy, not urban economics. GLFs particular methods helped refocus policies on areas with which he felt familiar. o Ultimately relied on creative set of military and political policies centered on mobilization of wide range of forces to save the day

 GLF: Strategy

Strategy flushed out over several conferences/ meetings GLF formally adopted at Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress in May 1958.

Four key elements o Make up for lack of capital in agricultural and industry by mobilizing underemployed labor powerproduced essentially self-financed development o o Set ambitious goals for leading economic sectors and encouraged any innovation necessary to prevent bottlenecks and promote growth. Use modern and traditional methods to increase output o Invest in major steel complexes Also build backyard furnaces Traditional sectors usually used to feed inputs into modern sector with nothing in return. Disregard expertise in favor of more, faster, economical results

Initial success was largely false o Destroyed statistical system and applied great pressure to cadresled to falsifications. o o o But 1958 weather was good, which did make agricultural performance better. Many projects from first FYP had stared to come on stream, so this led to impressive growth in output. CCP and leadership found this encouraging People generally supportive. Motivated by the hard work put into mass mobilization, and elimination of money in communes led to belief that food problems had been solved and commune dwellers got free supplies of food.

Politics Most people encouraged GLF. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun only dissenters in Politburo (as Premier and head of the state council, Zhou would have lost power given the strategy of mass mobilization and decentraliztion) o Liu shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were involved more with the party, so they liked the plan. Deng was part of Antirightist campaign and played key role in managing GLF. o Liu was has succession in mind, and agreeing with Mao would be important. Military also did not like obligations to support miltias and participate in civilian workmost prominent dissenter was Peng Dehuai, who had always had a stormy relationship with Mao o He also wanted good relationship with Soviets, who were necessary to help China build a strong, professional, modern army. GLF was way to cast Soviet model.

Mao moved Lin Biao, a close supporter and great military tactician, to place in politburo above Peng o Once GLF ran into trouble, these underlying tensions would bubble to the surface.

Planned adjustments to GLF after bad reports started coming in Peasant food shortages despite optimistic official reportssometimes food not harvested because people had left to join local industry or gone to cities to work at factories. Advocated adjustments at First Zhengzhou Conference Nov 1958asked for figures for production to be a bit more realistic Feb 1959: mao urged to use right opportunismwanted decrease in communization. o Many mid-level cadres unwilling to abandon the radical approachwanted to keep strategy of going all out. Was very popular with peasant cadres bc of emphasis on abandoning urban expertise. Spring 1959: Tibetan revolt o Due to some actions and missteps by han soldiers and civilians in 1959. Lasted an entire monthMao launched attack against Peng Dehuaidefense minister and one of the PLAs ten marshals. Set in motion effort to replace him with Lin Biao. o Kruschev cancelled aid right after Peng had been in MoscowMao claimed this meant he was scheming with Krushschev o o Peng also criticized small group discussions during the conference, but these mostly kept along with what others were saying. July 14: Peng wrote letter to Mao to complain about GLF. Letter was printed and circulated to all participants at Lushan by MaoJuly 23, he responded by calling Peng Dehuai a right opportunist who had deliberately attacked Mao in the letter. Considered it a breach of permissible behavior. o Baffling bc Peng had not really said anything that extraordinary Peng had been involved in Gao Gang affair, and letter may have seemed like 2nd attempt to position for higher office. Mao had wanted Lin Biao to take his place anyway, was just taking opportunity. Zhang wentian, a vice minister of foreign affairs who had close ties to Moscow and Peng, and put Peng up to write letter, could have been General Sec of Party during Long March, but was edged out by Mao and steadily demoted since then. But other circumstances:

Lushan Conference, July 1959

Afterwards, during Lushan Plenum and MAC meeting that followed, Peng was ousted and told to study for a few years. Zhang also removed.

Consequences o Mao broke unwritten rules of debate among top leadership- before, leaders could freely voice opinions Mao labeled it unprincipled factional activitysowed some personal bitterness Lin Biao bumped up to defense ministergave Mao more influence over the PLA than he had had before. Luo ruiqing became chief of staff, and hua guofeng, who undercut Peng to service Mao, was elevated to a higher post in Hunan.

Anti-Right Opportunist Campaign also attempted a second leap forward in 1960 o Failed: agric output in 1960 was 75% that of 1958. Light industrial output declined 21% in 1961 severe goods famine to complement food shortages. o Most devastating famine of 20th C in China 1959-60. Mistaken policies led to food shortfallslike insisting that peasants leave land fallow or poor management due to push for more efforts in industry.

Failure of second leap and outrage over Peng Dehuais dismissal broke down solidarity cultivated Kruschev had wanted to discourage China from GLF by withholding aid, but this only caused Mao to reevaluate the Russian Revolution. By the end, Mao believed that the Soviet system had degenerated from socialism to fascism, and Mao began to fear that his lifes work would be wasted in a similar way in China o Mao would devote much of his time to dealing with the Soviet issuebringing on kang Sheng to help due to his experience with soviet affairs. o Mao feared soviet revisionism more and more and used that as impetus for movements, and Kang Shengs experience with Stalinist politics would give party politics a more Stalinist air rather traditional maoist one. Maos prestige in highest levels of CCP suffered o Made a form of self criticism at CCP Central Work Conference in Beijing in June 1961. o Found himself pushed out of day to day affairs more, and didnt think he was getting as much deference as he had been. (Deng Xiaoping is cited as an example.) Different leaders drew diff conclusions from failure of GLF o Mao realized political mobilization couldnt produce rapid economic growth

since Yanan. 6 different factors

o o

But he retained faith in mobilization as a method to produce changes in values, distrib of power, and outlook. But many of his colleagues and supporters wanted to get rid of political campaigns altogetherthe time of high tide politics of Yanan was over.

CCP lost prestige and organizational competence bc it had run GLF o Cadres who had supported second leap were branded as leftists and purged. Maos own self criticism was never circulated to lower levels. o Lost a lot of morale. And question of how to deal with lower levels also caused dissension.

Disagreed over how quickly China was recoveringMao was super optimistic o Mao began to sense that pessimists were limiting his flexibility within the system. Extraordinary damage had been donevindicated what Peng had said. o Peng petitioned for rehabilitation based on rural investigations, and submitted 80,000 character document to central committee about how he had been right. o Mao blocked it, and thus distanced himself from even more of his colleagues.

After the leap: Liu and Deng Beidahe Meeting in Jul/ Aug 1960 began to tackle issue of dealing with GLF disaster o Policies came out of this meeting and following months as harvest looked bad o o Second leap terminated Guiding policy changed from more, faster, better to agriculture as base, industry as leading factor, with readjustment, consolidation, filling out, and raising standards as formula. o Agriculture as base became official policy at 9th Plenum in Jan 1961. Wanted to regain control and repair national apparatus by setting 6 regional bodies. o Zhou Enlai helped put out Twelve Articles of Peoples Communes, which permitted great decentralization in communesled to GLFs collapse o Helped create material incentive again for production Two types of responses predominated in spring 1961 o Lin Biao and military: stressed renewed study of politics to boost morale and increase discipline Sept 1960, Lin called for program of concentrated study of Maos works. Targeted toward barely educated peasants, so needed simplification: produced Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedonglittle red book. But 1960-3, most people did not think Lins method served a purpose outside of the army.

Liu and Deng: series of investigations that provided material used for programmatic policy documents in various areas. 1961-2: various major policy papers produced. (#s of articles) Party leaders took charge of drafting process Three broad policy groups were developed under Secretariat to oversee and coordinate policy issues. Economic policy: chen yun and li fuchun Cultural and edu affairs: peng zhen Political and legal work: Deng Xiaoping

In making reports, typically ascertained actual situation with on the spot investigations, then solicited opinions from experts. Multiple drafts resulted from frequent consultations with other party members and experts. Emphasis on expertise clashed with lin biaos approach, which claimed that Maos thought held answers to any question.

Liu and dengs policies also undercut basic GLF tenets Large scale factories in sharp contrast with the small scale production encouraged in GLF (backyard furnaces) Uses fertilizer plant as example. Large plants also required imports, which GLF had been against (opting instead for self reliance) Bo yibos report on industry placed emphasis on material incentives and experts Articles on literature valued traditional art forms, and articles on education undercut many of the local schools that had opened. Peoples communes article shifted toward more private plots, team as basic accounting unit, and generally more material incentive.

No evidence Mao disagreed with these trends in 1961. He wrote the 60 Articles on Peoples Communes himself. But he gradually grew more disconcerted as investigations and consultations yielded more and more to policy.

The Politics of China (Continued), Pg 117-147

7000 Cadres Conference, Jan-Feb 1962 Convened to review methods of leadership and to sum up the situation o Liu: lets avoid the brutal purges and counterpurges; they hurt the Purty Mao actually agrees, for the most part o They disagree, however, in their evaluation of the GLF Liu thinks bad policy is 70% responsible for the disaster, bad weather 30% Mao thinks this should be flipped, thinks economy is doing fine o Zhou agrees with Mao, overall positive about the GLF This reflects Zhous operational practice of siding with Mao whenever there was an open clash o Peng Zhens position Ordered his Beijing subordinates to investigate the real causes of the GLF and prepare a report Deng Tuo is in charge of the investigation The report blames the disaster directly on the mobilizational politics of the GLF strategy GLF disaster must be laid largely at the doorstep of the Politburo Peng, upon sensing the tenor of the conference, does not bring up this report o This shows the extent of Maos authority Mao is truly in a unique position: as Chairman, he stands above the hierarchy No institutional curbs on his power o Other divisive issues: Rehabilitation of rightists: some want to bring back Peng Duhuai Evaluation of current situation: Mao was optimistic Party rectification: issue of how best to reconstruct a disciplined party Ministry of Finance projection by Chen Yun o Huge deficit o Gloomy forecast, scaling down of production o 1962-1965 will be a period of recovery o Xilou Conference: called by Liu, with Mao out of town, to address the issue Endorsed Chens assessment Support systems of individual responsibility in agriculture, a de facto partial decollectivization Thus, we had two different assessments of the 1962 situation: o Mao/Lin argue that the country is well on the way to recovery, opposes further decollectivization o Deng, Liu, Chen Yun say situation is desperately bad, situation demands decollectivization Beidaihe Conference, 10th Plenum o Clash of the two approaches
o

Mao feels like hes losing his grip in the Politburo, creates a coalition of his own Jiang Qing, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng o At conference, Mao attacks Ministry of Finance; stresses need for class struggle, warns against retreat from socialism o 10th Plenum: Mao warns against revisionism (catering to intellectuals, leaving egalitarian paths) Here, he resolutely opposes decollectivization and insists that communes remain intact o At tenth plenum, compromise is reached: Maos ideas are embraced in theory Rise of Lin Biao o Faced with two tasks: consolidate his position in PLA, solidify his relationship with Mao o Reforming the PLA Bringing Military Affairs Commission (MAC) bck into prominence A party body use dto control the military Personnel changes to ensure his control fo the ministry of defense Stress role of Mao Zedong thought in the military Enhance role of PLA in CCP affairs Criminal responsibility is not pursued by the authorities during and after cultural revolution Students and Red Guards who when the Great Cultural Revolution began were under eighteen years of age, who later realized and admitted their errors, and whose current behavior is good, are not to have it held against them that they participated in mass beatings with a fatal outcome Violence is not limited in cities, Daxing county, southern outskirts of the capital, Changping country, and north of the city, all suffered greatly. The elders and kids got killed as well in some extreme cases. (e.g. Daxing county) September 2, the central authorities issued Zhongfa [1966] 445 in a first attempt to bring the red terror under control. I meant to clarify the relationship between Red Guards and the police. Mao, on one hand, had hundreds of thousands of teenagers destroy the four olds in an orgy of violence and destruction, on the other hand, tacitly supported more mature university students in a head-on conflict with the local state. Top leaders sent their children to the local communities and universities to get a true sense of what was going on there. Mao sent Li Na to Beijing Geological Institute. Thus, one-on-one connection was built between top leaders and the leaders of selected organizations. Capital 3rd HQ and Zhu Chengzhao, the group endorsed by top leaders, grew rapidly, they supported Lin Biaos note on not defining everything based on family background. They helped to organize the hearings about the progress of Cultural Revolution for the top leaders. Bourgeois reactionary line---- the term Mao Zedong coined in Red Flag magazine to instruct the mass about the situation. The central work conference followed up on bourgeois reactionary line, local and central leaders tried to understand the aims of Cultural Revolution. Most of them were confused from the beginning. No one really knew what Mao wanted. Mao got disappointed by the progress of the conference. Chen Bodas report on bourgeois reactionary line:

Describe the current situation as excellent Criticize the role of the sons and daughters of high level officials. They sometimes assumed that they were the successors to the revolution. o Criticize the work team o Self criticism. Liu Shaoqis self criticism. Deng Xiaopings criticism. Mao sees problems at both the apex and the base of the political system
o

Apex: Colleagues want policies that strength anti-Communist forces o Base: GLF has done huge damage to basic-level Party units Mao believes rectification campaigns can solve both problems o Former Ten Points: Lays out structure of Socialist Education Movement (SEM) o Sets up poor and middle peasant associations to serve as a vehicle for exercising supervision over the erring basic level cadres o Called for formation of urban-based work teams, carry out urban Five Antis Campaign o Eventually shifts to rural areas: high level cadres go to rural areas, report on conditions Liu Shaoqi, for example, goes to Henan, finds widespread corruption o Revised Ten Points, Sept 1964: Reflects these worries; calls for large work teams to go to select communes, take them over, and shake the minto shape. o Mao didnt like these revised ten points quite as much, for 3 reasons: 1. Narrowed target of attack from revisionism to corruption 2. Imposed penalties that were too harsh on cadres 3. Involved imposition of massive work teams instead of mobilizing the masses o Mao wants the SEM to be about fighting revisionism, not jus tabout battling corruption Mao tries to change the direction with his 23 Articles, Jan 1965 Work teams pull back, punished cadres are rehabilitated Why did Mao decide to launch an assault against his colleagues in the Politburo? o 3 elements affected Maos psychology in 1959-1966: 1. Concern about evolution of Chinese Revolution 2. Concern about succession 3. Related sense of impending death o 1. Concern about evolution of Revolution Soviets have gone astray from fundamentals Mao questions the permanence of any socialist revolution Writes polemics against USSR, Khruschev Mao shares his political views through these polemics Mao genuinely worries about the youth growing up with a revisionist perspective He did not want to be seen as Chinas Stalin; the person who was later seen as having led the country astray o 2. Worries about succession Compains that Deng, the Secretariat leader, did not consult with him on policy

Mao pulls back from regular meetings because he dominated the political system to such a great degree Implemented strategy of stepping back to give more influence to successors BUT after collapse of GLF, he has a hard time assuming full control of policy Liu and Deng restrict his access to policy flow He tested his successors on their loyalty; found that they were inadequate Mao retains his faith in mass mobilization as an instrument of social change, ideological renewal. Mass mobilization is anti-bureaucratic, antiintellectual Liu and co. believe that mass mobilization is no longer a useful tool for policy (read: GLF failure). Experts need to take control of the economy, boost production once again. Mao tries to get his way: in culture, emphasizes learning from average people, in the countryside Objecting to economic centralization, Mao calls for greater regional selfsufficiency Liu implemented Maos wishes only halfway, at best; Mao increasingly saw his colleagues as running a bureaucratic leviathan that gobbled up his pressing demands and turned them into relatively innocuous reforms (144) o 3. Concerned about own moratality Saw his fundamental identity tied to the fate of the revolution he had fathered. Achieve immortality through proper revolution The split in the Yanan leadership o Leaders did not appear to see the impending showdown with Mao, although they did try to keep PLA/Jiang Qing in check o Areas of doubt: What did the leadership who did not join the CR coalition think about the policies? It seems that they tried to meet Mao more than halfway Mao appears to have distorted reality in his own mind, his suspicions fed by Jiang Qing and others Role of public security apparatus, Maos personal security forces Role of Zhou Enlai is obscure: did he begin to see himself as Lius replacement? o Three factors led to the split in the leadership: Different lessons drawn from the GLF Tensions regarding the issue of succession to Mao Growing fears of an aging and possibly senile leader

Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China, pp. 62-76 4 period of Mao's leadership: (1)1949-1958: all modes of legitimation reinforced Mao's authority (2)1959-1965: Mao's behavior led to reservations on traditional and legal-rational grounds by ranking officials but no serious challenge (3)1966-1971: the resort to unbridled charismatic claims destroyed legality and caused graver doubts within the elite (4)1972-1976: limited challenges to Mao's authority appeared Major setback to Mao's authority: Economic crisis following GLF: shook the faith of peasantry Consequences of Cultural Revolution: disillusioned intellectuals, urban youth, ordinary Party members and bureaucrats 1949-1958 Mutual Reinforcement With victory of the revolution, Mao's role established as the "exceptional" strategist leading communist and national victory and liberation Achievement of socialist transformation and economic growth o 1st FYP(1953-1957): collectivization of agriculture, socialization of commerce and industry, o Goals accomplished ahead of time, high economic growth rate Mao's specific policy initiatives: o Operated as a consensus leader o Made wise decision in case when he needed to play forceful role Korean War made China a force to be reckoned in international politics Made the mistake in the Hundred Flowers since the initial plan fell and he used the Anti-Rightist Campaign to restore the prestige in the party Mao pushed GLF since the output of the agriculture by the end of 1958 was nice Maos personal cult: o The excising of the thought of Mao Zedong from the new Party constitution. o It is an anti-personal cult movement led by Khrushcheves denunciation of Stalin. No purge for policy reason until late 1957 In earliest period of the PRC, tradition as well as legal-rational considerations reinforced the essentially charismatic basis of Maos legitimacy 1959-1965 Legal-Rational and Traditional Ambivalence Lushan conference affects Maos standing The developments at Lushan can be seen as the relationship between an emperor and his

ministers. All those failures in economic reform or other campaigns paled in comparison with Maos dual victory of Communist revolution and national liberation. Liu Shaoqi was chosen as successor. Lius position was dependent on the favor of the charismatic leader, less on recent achievements. 1966-1971 Legality Shattered, Charisma Triumphant Frustration with current policy led to Maos fundamental rejection of legal rational norms during the Cultural Revolution. The campaign attacked on long standing CCP norms, and any opposition or deviation from Mao is viewed culpable now. As Maos cult intensifies, distortions of revolutionary history virtually eliminate the contributions of most other leaders, and Mao could hardly have enhanced his reputation within the top elite. In reality, the disruption of this period led to net loss of authority of Mao among public. But his personal cult sent to the masses an image, mixture of imperial dynasty founder, revolutionary leader, and remote father. Lin Biao was pictured as Maos best student and has his authority derived from Mao. He was suddenly given power during August 1966 Plenum, mainly based on favor of charismatic leader just like Liu Shaoqi. Cultural Revolution attacked all institutions except PLA, and purged most of the top elites. Yet the elites only defended reputation and avoided disgrace, instead of coalescing to oppose Mao. In February Adverse Current in 1967,veteran officials failed to restrain Mao. Politburo was replace by CRG where Jiang Qing was key role. Why they refused to fight: fear of damaging the system that relies on its founder; hope that Mao will ultimately act within bounds; threat from military which Lin controls. Faith still existed based on pre-1949 successes of Mao 1972-1976 Traditional Resistance to the Leader Mao was physically unable to make decisions among factionalized power (Gang of Four vs. more pragmatic officials), by 1976 even could not communicate. His power limited, influence diluted. Mao is more inclined for the radical side, the rebellious and egalitarian. No more official endorsement for the Four Modernization that Zhou promoted and the legal organs sanctioned. Zhou protected high-ranking comrades during the Cultural Revolution. This added to prestige. Deng later returned to power, after getting sanctions from Mao through Zhous urging. Maos authority significantly faded. Even though he tried to purge Deng again and put Hua Guofeng as premier after Zhous death, it never worked in reality. Some high officials also plotted secretly with Deng, even though they didnt prepare to act against Mao himself. Maos authority was still enough to keep him on the throne, but not enough to command full obedience or prevent his comrades from planning a reversal of the course he had set in his last decade.

Maos Last Revolution (MLR), pp. 14-51 Chapter 1: The First Salvos (p14-31) The Campaign Against Wu Han The Purge of the PLA Chief of Staff: Luo Ruiqing <1965> Lin Biao first targeted Xiao Xiangrong (Luos deputy) accused of being anti-Mao Defended by Luo gives Lin Biao an opening Ye Quns private conversation with Mao 1) Unwillingness to report to Lin on a regular basis 2) Attempts to supplant Lin by getting him to resign Mao denounced Luo as a way to sever the link between the PLA and the CCP Accused Luo of being revisionist Members of Politburo were uneasy about the Luo case Ideal opportunity for Liu, Zhou, Zhu De and Deng to defend Luo, stand up against Mao Last chance for them to restrain Mao before they were divided and denounced Pengs February Outline and Jiang Qings Forum Summary <1966> Chapter 2: The Siege of Beijing (p32-51) <April 1966> Peng Zhen criticized by Kang Sheng and Chen Boda February Outline annulled, Group of Five dissolved Replaced by cultural revolution document drafting group Central Cultural Revolution Group <May 1966> Dismissal of Lu Dingyi (Pengs senior colleague in the Group of Five) Lus wife Yan Weibing wrote letters accusing Ye Qun of being a slut Lu accused of collaborating with wife to frame Lin Biao and his family Yang Shangkun (controls paper flow) accused of tape recording Maos conversations Part of normal process, not extremely out of the ordinary But, Mao wanted someone he could totally trust to control the CCs paper flow Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang purge is a hinge event: last pre-Revolution purge, first purge of the Revolution May 16 Notification published 1966, released to public 1967 Four families condemned, many punished/imprisoned/removed from office Marked the beginning of the Cultural Revolution

Party cadres found it difficult to believe the accusations against Peng, Luo, Lu, Yang worried about who might be next In reality, only Mao could decide who the revisionists were Never revealed his thoughts people work toward the Chairman, led to some of the most radical and worst excesses of the Revolution

<1966> Mao is paranoid established the Capital Work Team to secure the capital and Zhongnanhai Li Zhisui, pp. 433463 Nov. 1965Li visited by Wang Dongxing, head of Central Bureau of Guards Discussion of the LuoLuPengYang purges: Mao purged Yang Shangkun because he never trusted him over the bugging incident, where Yang used tape recorders to keep records of what Mao said; Mao placed the real blame on higher ups, but struck at mid-levels first Kang Sheng told Mao that Peng Zhen had anti-Mao tendencies Lu Dingyi was in charge of propaganda, so Li says it was almost inevitable that he would be purged Luo Ruiqing had differences of opinion with Lin Biao (esp. over professionalization of the military); Mao agreed with Lin that ideology was more important than weapons, so Luo was in trouble with Mao; Lin Biaos wife Ye Qun campaigned against Luo; there was talk that Luo wanted Lin Biao to resign Wang Dongxing summoned back to Beijing; Li summoned on 1 Jan. 1966 to see Mao at Nanchang because he was ill Mao was surrounded by female attendants; was ill with a cold and fever, and addicted to sleeping pills for insomnia; Li dilutes his sleeping pill supply with placebos because he doesnt want Mao to overdose on his watch Mao read histories of earlier dynasties, rather than Marx, when preparing for political battle Mao thought that Wu Hans play about Hai Rui was meant to be an attack on his dismissing Peng Dehuai; Mao supported Yan Wenyuans published article attacking Wu Han, partly due to Jiang Qings urging; but Peng Zhen and others tried to protect Wu Han Li did not understand at the time that Mao was planning to attack the top leaders in the party, including Liu Shaoqi Mao was paranoid about the guesthouse; accused the guesthouse of being poisonous and decided to move to Wuhan

In Wuhan, Mao explained to Li that the four cleanups were no longer a priority, asked Li to stay Feb. 1966Lu, Kang, Peng, Zhou Yang (deputy chief of propaganda), Wu Lengxi (head of Peoples Daily) meet with Mao to discuss Wu Hans play; Kang declared Wu Han to be anti-party, but Peng and Lu tried to promote the view that the disagreement was academic only; Mao adjourned meeting without making his views clear and refused to review Pengs document (the February Outline) After publication of Feb. Outline 4 days later, Mao interpreted it as a rebuke to his own views; Peng Zhen was to be toppled for it Mao became irritable, thought someone broke into his guesthouse attic; turns out to be wildcats, but Mao insisted on leaving and moving to Hangzhou Dinner with Mao revealed that he thought the characters that Deng Xiaoping employed in the central secretariat were shady Jiang Qing meets with Mao, forges an alliance with Lin Biao and writes a document attacking Lu Dingyi Mar. 1966Li learns from Lin Biaos doctor that he was a hypochondriac, learns from his wife that he had been addicted to opium and later to morphine (treated in the Soviet Union in 1949), had fear of water and never used a toilet 15 Mar. 1966Mao arrives in Shanghai, convenes Politburo meeting where he singles out Wu Han and three others for particular rebuke; proposes launching a Cultural Revolution in literature, history, law, economics At the same time, Mao went outside the PSC and met with Jaing Qing, Kang Shen, and Zhang Chunqiao, telling them he wanted the Five-Man Small Group of the Cultural Revolution and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee abolished. April 1966Mao officially expands his criticisms to include Peng Zhen 24 April 1966enlarged PSC meeting discusses Chen Bodas draft revoking Feb. Outline; new Central Cultural Revolution Small Group formed, under PSCs direct supervision; circular submitted to enlarged Poliburo in May and passed (May 16 Circular) Mao suggested that Li make peace with Jiang Qing; Li did not wished to and tried to find other protection May 1966Mao retreats from politics, letting others work things out; returns to home village of Shaoshan on June 18; too hot, so moves to Wuhan on June 28

Mao writes letter to Jiang Qing, writing that rightist movements cycle and reappear every few years, and writing about his discomfort with his cult of personality; Jiang Qing excited about letter and tries to have it published, but Mao withdraws the copies

July 1966Beijing in chaos; Mao gets ready to return; Mao instructs Li to see Tao Zhu and to investigate the Cultural Revolution in Beijing 16 July 1966Mao swims in Yangtze, floats like a balloon, gets ready to return to political stage (arrives in Beijing on 18 July) MLR, pp. 52-70 Potential IDs News blackout Refers to the consignment of criticism to inner pages or academic supplements of newspapers, which is what happened with criticisms at the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Marxist-Leninist Big-Character Poster These posters would have big characters written on them to accuse certain Party leaders of being revisionist, etc. The first such poster, created by Nie Yuanzi and six colleagues at Beida, helped mobilized the masses and led to utter chaos. Cao Yiou Cao, the wife of Kang Sheng, was sent by her husband on a secret mission to Beida to stir up grassroots opposition to the schools party leadership. She had access to valuable information as head of her husbands private office. Nie Yuanzi Not known as a very good person since her years in Yanan during the Sino-Japanese War, Nie helped bring down party leaders at Beida in 1966 after an unsuccessful first attempt to knock the university president Lu Ping off his perch in 1965. She had joined the CCP in 1938 at age 17. Work Team Whenever problems arose, work teams, composed of trusted cadres from uninvolved units, were sent in to stabilize the situation, establish reasons for the problems, deliver a judgment, and distribute punishments and rewards. One of the only restrictions on their leadership is that they have to receive permission from the central authorities before taking action against cadres at or above the rank of country governor.

Chen Boda New leader of the Chinese Communist Revolutionary Group (CCRG), who headed the Peoples Daily work team. General Summary In Phase II, Mao manipulated a mass movement at Chinas educational institutions to unseat the head of state. The first battles of the Cultural Revolution largely did not affect ordinary citizens. As evidenced in diary entries, China seemed to be far more concerned with escaping poverty than with class struggle. In early 1966, the Xinhua News Agency had imposed a news blackout on the criticism of people such as Wu Han. Not until April 15 did this practice change; three days later a powerful editorial in the Liberation Army Daily leaked the main points of Jiang Qings Forum Summary, urging people to rise up in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution. Yet, top Communists did not necessarily trust the worker-peasant-soldier masses to emerge victorious. Kang Sheng sent his wife Cao Yiou on May 14 to Beida supposedly to examine the academic criticism at the university. It was clear, though, that the criticism would be bogus rather than genuine, since it would have followed the line of Peng Zhens February Outline, which had not yet been publicly repudiated by Mao with the May 16 Notification. The real purpose of the trip was to stir up grassroots opposition to the schools party leadership. Nie Yuanzi had been severely criticized in 1965 because of her vendetta against university president Lu Ping, and was about to lose her job. From reading the Peoples Daily, Nie and her leftist friends realized that the widening of the anti-Wu Han campaign to include Deng Tuo meant that Bejing party propaganda establishment was in trouble and Lu Ping had lost his high-level protection. Emboldened by Cao, Nie teamed up with leftist colleagues, who ultimately decided to attack with a big-character poster. Cao gave the green light to Nie to put it up despite not seeing the text. The poster, titled What are Song Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun up to in the Cultural Revolution? was put up on May 25. The answer was cunning scheme, a reference to Songs support of stronger leadership when the Beijing Party Committee was no longer functioning in order to persuade the masses to the correct road. But Nie and her colleagues called these attempts to direct the Cultural Revolution revisionist. Chaos ensued, with hundreds and thousands of big-character posters put up soon after. Zhou Enlai tried to ensure a controlled burn, sending Zhang Yan, deputy director of the State Councils Foreign Affairs Office, to remind everyone that the presence of foreign students imposed certain restrictions on the right to put up big-character posters in public places. At midnight on May 25, Li Xuefeng, newly appointed Beijing first secretary, visited 800 CCP and CYL members to stress the importance of struggling in an orderly fashion. After reading the text on June 1, Mao ordered it be broadcast in its entirety by Xinhua News Agency and published in all the nations newspapers. Alongside the text in the Peoples Daily was a laudatory essay written under the direction of Chen Boda. June 2 became a turning point for Cultural Revolution activity in colleges. The public announcement on June 3 of the dismissal of the Beijing Party Committee was the more significant explosion, particularly for foreigners. Constant noise was a hallmark of the revolution. The movement of foreign journalists was curtailed. The noisy fairground atmosphere that gave foreigners

the illusion of good humor and organization was achieved only by considerable behind-the-scenes activity by the Beijing Garrison, though. On May 29, Liu, Zhou, and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in a temporary work team under Chen Boda, the new head of the CCRG, to take over at the Peoples Daily (Zhou immediately phoned Mao to get his permission). Chen took over on May 31. The Central Committee Secretariat then sent a work team to take over at the Propaganda Department on June 6. In addition, students were in an uproar. Mao approved sending in a Beida work team, and on June 3, an expanded PSC meeting under Lius chairmanship agreed that the new Beijing Party Committee should send in work teams to various colleges and schools. Chen Boda opposed the decision. When Liu and other leaders went to report to Mao in Hangzhou on June 9, Mao refused to be pinned down on what should be done, though he said that sending in work teams too early would not be good. During the early weeks of June 1966, work teams totaling 7,239 cadres entered educational and cultural institutions in Beijing. Provincial party committees also began to send work teams after Beijing. Students and junior staff turned against anyone who might be a potential member of the counterrevolutionary black gang, but discarded this label in August after two months for supposedly not indicating the nature of the person labeled as such. Students didnt want to humiliate teachers too drastically, but also wanted to avoid criticism from their classmates. Class-based discrimination charges found a more receptive audience than gender-based discrimination charges did, and officials were at risk from not only students, but colleagues with confidential insider information or even chauffeurs. MLR, pp 70-85 Summary: This section of the book concentrates on the Fifty Days (see IDs) at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution without the guidance of Mao. After the May 16 Circular, a revolution began at the university levels with Big Character Posters and student movements. However, no one really understood who the real target of the revolution is. Most people still believed it to be the intellectual bourgeois, when in reality, it was the top leaders from the center. Since there didnt seem to be a set target, everyone was being attacked. In order to control this chaos, Liu and Deng decided to send work teams to universities in order to control the students. But due to the incompetence of the untrained workteams and the explosive craziness of the students, there was great resistance and rebellion against authority. Mao finally returned to the scene in mid July (Yangzte swim to show his health and power). He showed great dissatisfaction with the progress of CR and the decision of sending in workteams. He finally within drew the workteams, called this period the fifty days and used it to condemn Liu and Deng. Important things to remember: Mao never lost control of the revolution, or was unaware of the situation in Beijing. The problem was that he kept his colleagues in the dark about what he was trying to achieve. The practice of acquiring/releasing information through the children of the politburo members began. It was the students revolution, not the workteams. One can only learn to make revolutions by making revolutions. IDs: Socialist Education Movement: Investigation led by Liu Shaoqi reported that there was a

significant anti-Party sentiment in rural China ca. 1964, and counterrevolution was a serious threat. There was widespread corruptionand to deal with this he recommended severe measures be introduced. Result = Revised Later10 Point Plan (Sept. 64) sent large workteams to selected communes to thoroughly shake themup and wipe out all revisionism and anti-Party ideology. This was the Socialist Education Movt.Workteams would stay in a commune for up to 6 months and punish severely those who opposed them. Mao felt that Lius approach here was flawed in that it focused on fighting corruption more than the greater threat of revisionism. Mao also felt that it was too harsh on basic-level party cadres. Mao reorganized this movement issuing his 23 Articles in Jan 65 such that it became a campaign to educate all levels of the Party on the evils of revisionism. Workteams were therefore withdrawn and those who had been punished by them were rehabilitated. This served to increase the division among cadre ranks in rural China just as the Cultural Revolution was about to take off. Nie Yuanzi: a teaching assistant in the philosophy department at Peking University. On May 25, she led a group of radical professors and teaching assistants to write a largecharacter wall poster (dazibao) criticizing the universitys leadership for having supported the liberal policies of the February Outline and for having prevented mass discussion of the political issues raised by the Hai Rui affair. Nie probably received encouragement from Kang Shengs wife, Cao Yiou, and the Cultural Revolution Group. The university administration and Zhou Enlai opposed this dissent, and Zhou Enlai even sent a second central work group to criticize Nies wall poster, but Mao ordered that the poster be broadcast and published nationally, with favorable commentary, on June 1. This announcement served to legitimate spontaneous mass protest as part of the campaign against revisionism. Kuai Dafu: one of the leading radical students at Qinghua University. July 1966, criticized there by the work teams sent; his case was the subject of a high-leve Party meeting in Beijin. At the meeting, Liu Shaoqi attacked Kuai as a troublemaker, and Kang Sheng defended Kuais right to criticize revisionism in the Party. It marked the beginning of the conflict between the radicals (connected to the central CRG advised by Kang Sheng) and Liu Shaoqi and his work teams. Bo Yibo: vice premier at the time of the Fifty days who chaired the Sate Councils Industry and Communications Office Party Committee. Like many others, he inaccurately predicted the true targets of the Cultural Revolution, claiming that it was the outspoken teachers and students. He told his workteam leaders You trick the snakes into leaving their pit, and then you wipe them all out at the same time. Eight-Point Guideline: Drafted by Li Xuefeng, but was soon to be breached. Basically 8 rules limiting and regulating the activities of the Red Guards. Even before its elimination after the fifty days, they were almost impossible to enforce due to the uncontrollable Red Guards and incompetent and unprFMJepared workteams.

Fifty Days: A critical period from June to July 1966 (during the eve of the Cultural Revolution) that resulted in the downfall of Liu Shaoqi and Maos approval of the Red Guards. Basically Mao, in the May

16 Circular, had called for a thorough purge of revisionism and capitalists in Chinese culture and the CCP bureaucracy. This had led to student uprisings sparked by Nie Yuanzis dazibao attack on Beijing University authorities. With Mao gone from Beijing and mumbling whenever consulted, Liu Shaoqi suspended enrollment for 6 months in the schools and sent 400 work teams to enact reforms. Teams were ordered to replace the authorities of the schools, restrain campus violence, and try to bring students back under party control while leading the CR. The work teams were not well trained. These work teams were composed of personnel from the Party, the Chinese Youth League, and the Socialist Education Work Teams. They were large in size, but low in quality. While students initially expected the arrival of these work teams to resolve the conflicts with the School Party Committees, they were dissatisfied with the work teams and began to crit icize them too. Work teams were the usual method Communists used to organize large events. (E.g., they had been used in the late 1950s to aid the collectivization of farming throughout China.) This work team campaign lasted for 50 days until Mao stepped back in and the work teams were recalled. Mao criticized Lius approach as too similar to the Socialist Education Campaign: low officials were attacked, mass involvement was restricted, and no one acknowledged the responsibility of higher officials for revisionism. Mao used these 50 Days to discredit Liu Shaoqi and set him up for a fall in his position in the Politburo Standing Committee, as Liu was put in the difficult situation of having to simultaneously support the revolutionary movement and maintain some semblance of party order and control on the campuses. All of this helped set up the CR. MLR, pg 86-101 Summary: This short part of the book depicts Maos starting actions against the establishment. From the 11th plenum to purges of officials and reorganization of party organs. The terms below detail the important points. Eleventh Plenum Gathered after Mao had evicted Liu Shaoqi from control over the Cultural Revolution. The Plenum was a gathering of party leaders. During Liu Shaoqis opening remarks, Mao interrupted frequently and asserted that the work teams for which Liu had taken responsibility were major errors. Mao raged against the party members after it became clear that some of them were luke-warm rather than enthusiastic to the removal of work teams. Tsinghua Red Guards A group of red guards that sent Mao two big character posters. Mao signed them and gave symbolic support to the red guards actions. Bombard the Headquarters Mao wrote this phrase on a character poster during the 11th Plenum. The phrase is symbolic of the purging of the top level of the CCP. The Sixteen Points Maos blue print for the cultural revolution. This platform was more moderate than one would have expected from Maos speeches at the plenum. It was broadcast , sold and presented to the public. It attacked the four olds and suggested that the CR would continue much as before, involving only the cultural and education spheres and denunciations of the usual suspects of bourgeois background. It gave almost totally free reign to the red guards to continue their work.

Central Cultural Revolution Group Campaign headquarters of the Cultural Revolution. It began as a group of 10 party intellectuals and the wife of the CCP chairman charged with drafting policy documents for the PSC. By 1967 it grew to a bureaucracy employing thousands, replacing the CC secretariat and becoming as powerful as the MAC and State council on paper. Zhou Enlai and Lin Bao praised it as having firmly carried out Maos proletarian revolutionary line at its dissolution. The book notes that it was a very chaotic institution due to internal disagreements.

MLR, pp. 102-128 Red Terror A well-known period of violence from Aug-Sept 1966 during which private and public property was destroyed, urban undesirables expelled, and a significant number of people murdered. The violence that spread through the campuses of colleges and middle schools was a product of the Red Guard movement and Maos endorsement of student rebellion, an act which removed the constraints on violence imposed by earlier work team. Red Guard Urgent Appeal Issued Aug 6 by Red Guards from three elite middle schools, the appeal spoke of hooligans masquerading as Red Guards causing chaos and called on genuine Red Guards to end the disorder. Mao, wanting chaos, did not support the appeal. Zhongfa 312 Revoked by Mao on August 5, this communication had endorsed the Peking University work teams breakup of the June 18 incident. In Maos opinion, the incident was revolutionary, not counterrevolutionary. Aug 13 Rally at Beijing Workers Stadium Event staged by the Beijing Party Committee during which 70,000 youth gathered to watch the denunciation of about a dozen hooligans who were eventually beaten up when the rally got out of control. The Red Terror began its spread through the capital that Saturday night. Red Guard movement Movement born as early as May 29 when students from elite middle school attached to Tsinghua University organized themselves to support Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, and to struggle against revisionism. In early August, Mao gave the Tsinghua middle school Red Guards his ardent support and the movement took off. Red Guard rallies After Chen Boda, at Maos insistence, invites students to visit the capital, eight massive rallies were held in Beijing between mid-Aug and late Nov. At the first six-hour rally on Aug18, a million students and teachers were led into Tiananmen Square to visit Mao and other officials. By the last rally on Nov26, Mao had manifested himself to 12 million Red Guards from all over China; he believed that Chinas youth should see leaders in person in order to keep them loyal to the cause. Song Binbin She was one of the students chosen to meet the leaders during the rally. Her placement of a Red Guard armband on Maos arm signaled his support of the movement and legitimized it nationwide.

Four Olds Prime task for the Cultural Revolution was the elimination of old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes. These were reaffirmed in Lin Biaos speech during the Aug18 rally. Destroying the four olds and fostering the four news became one of the Red Guards first tasks. Zhang Shizhao Zhang was a retired journalist, educator, and official that had earned Maos gratitude for arranging financial assistance for a nascent CCP. His complaint to Mao after Red Guards trashed his house enabled Zhou to issue an order protecting the homes of several senior non-Communists, including Song Qingling. Tan Houlan A young cadre that led fellow students and teachers from Beijing Normal University to Qufu county where they destroyed the Confucius Temple in November 1966. In the course of four weeks, they, joined by locals and students from the Qufu Teachers Institute, destroyed 6618 artifacts, including 2000 graves. Chen Boda had decreed it alright to level the grave of Confucius. Wu Xun A 19th century cultural hero, Wu Xun was a beggar that used all the money he gained to found schools. He was attacked as a propagator of feudal culture and his corpse was exhumed, broken, and burned by Red Guards. Repatriation The eviction of urban residents from their homes and forced removal to the villages of their ancestors Five black categories The bad classes targeted for repatriation: the landlord element, rich peasant element, reactionary, hooligan, or rightist. Five red categories The good classes: workers, poor peasant, soldiers, revolutionary cadres, and martyrs relatives. West City Pickets An elite Red Guard organization that enforced the repatriation program, the West City Pickets received material support (office space, vehicles, etc.) and political backing from the authorities (likely because its members included the children and grandchildren of influential cadres). Xie Fuzhi (Minister of Public Security) He approved 100+ municipal level mass rallies struggling deposed authorities from April 23 to October 27, 1967. His ministry also sent a report to Mao that became Zhongfa 410. Issued August 22, 1966, this Central Document prohibited police suppression of student movements.

Jinggangshan organization An organization of Red Guards at Tsinghua University, Jinggangshan was led by Kuai Dafu. With the cooperation and logistical support of authorities, the group organized a large on-campus rally that struggled Wang Guangmei (Liu Shaoqis wife) and 300 others. General Summary As the Cultural Revolution started, the most fervent supporters turned out to be the middle and even elementary school students. Many students were the children and grandchildren of party leaders that outranked their teachers. MacFarquhar argues that the Cultural Revolution provided them with the opportunity to emulate their parents and take advantage of knowledge gained from reading secret documents at home. On June 13, the CCP decided to temporarily suspend all classes. Students were encouraged to devote themselves full-time to the Cultural Revolution to start Cultural Revolution committees and small groups; to criticize teachers for their bourgeois/revisionist teachings; and to create, post, and study big character posters. At Maos insistence, Chen Boa invites students to the capital. By November, as the last of the rallies were held, more than 200,000 were arriving by train every day. Mao also believed that Red Guards should enjoy free travel and accommodations s they traveled the country igniting the fires of revolution. This exciting time for students was an administrative nightmare and also led to outbreaks of epidemic meningitis. As the Red Guard movement took off and pledged to combat the four olds, some eclectic aspects of the movement included demands for undesirable elements to labor under mass supervision (and in one case to collect their own feces themselves), calls for a 25 year drinking/smoking age requirement, denunciation of vulgar language, and the changing of names (street, shops, personal, etc.) to reflect the revolutionary ideal. There was even an attempt, prevented by Zhou, to rename Beijijng East Is Red City. Many changes were made; since Red Guards could not consult party members every time, it was safer to go along with most changes. During the Red Terror starting in the summer of 1966, there was mass searching, looting, and destruction of property belonging to families of bad class background. Red Guards first targeted capitalists, landlords, and other bourgeois regardless of status, but also entered homes of adres and people connected to the movement. They also destroyed public property, mainly places of cultural or historical significance, including the Confucius Temple in Qufu county (Confucianism was thought to foster landlords, rich peasants, etc.) and Hai Ruis grave. Zhou sought to limit the destruction, declaring the Forbidden City, the Great Hall of the People, the broadcasting station, newspaper offices, and airfields off-limits. However, his attempts to issue nationwide orders of protection and set rules restricting Red Guard behavior were vetoed by Mao and the CCRG. Some destruction was organized and sanctioned officially and the CCRG used the media to encourage and promote the Red Guards. During this period, some urban residents were evicted and forcibly repatriated to their ancestral villages. Carried out by the Red Guard and supported by party members (often under pressure to conform), this process relocated 397,000 people throughout China. Others, especially top-level revisionists like Peng Zhen and Peng Dehuai, were humiliated, or struggled, in front of mass rallies designed to rouse the Red Guards to greater fury against Maos enemies. Many were tortured and killed, often beaten to death; many others committed suicide. The police were told to support the Red Guards

and, even after the Cultural Revolution, no criminal responsibility for the murders was pursued by the authorities.

Esherick et al., The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, pp. 64-95, 96-123 (Readings 7, 8) *Note* to be honest, Im not sure how useful any of the material in these two readings will be to you: it seems to be more like a context-builder and discusses some pretty ancillary topics in way too much detail (lots and lots of anecdotes). Ive decided not to put in lots of examples because youll never remember them anyway. Im only going to lay out the argument, and mention some particularly good supporting evidence if necessary. Be warned though, this is not everythingif you feel this is very important, then you should probably read the article Nick 7. To Protect and Preserve Short Summary The article covers the Destroy the Four Olds campaign over the period from 1966-1967. It was inspired by the essay on New Democracy which said that there is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming, and no motion without rest, apparently authorizing the destruction of Chinese cultural relics. Contrary to popular view, the author basically argues that it was not a one-sided, all-consuming mass movement in which Chinese culture was wholly repudiated. He gives examples of how in all segments of society (from the highest party officials to the local peasantry) there were those who actively opposed the work of the Red Guard in destroying Chinese cultural artifacts. Specifically, we have efforts from these elements of society Zhou Enlai, Chinas patron saint of cultural relics: Protected Beijing Ancient Observatory, the Imperial Palace, Han tombs at Mancheng Lingshan etc Even if he did not do all the protecting, he became the symbol of cultural preservationmany citizens would write personally letters pleading for his assistance in protecting one artifact or another Key members in Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission (bodies which, together issued two circulars directly advising against the destruction of relics)names include Chen Yi, Li Xiannan, Qi Benyu, and even Kang Sheng (who actually protected them to seize them for his own collection) Passive resistance from villagers and local committee members, who buried, closed up, or covered many important artifacts (for example, a temple bell from the Sigou village temple) Active resistance (i.e. physical violence against red guards) as in the defense of the Confucius

Temple complex in August 1966. Successfully (and violently) resisted first Red Guard attempt, though it was eventually lost after they were reinforced by other red guards The red guards (or certain ones among them) viewed certain relics with an element of national pride, and might have stayed their own hands when it came to certain things.

A general theme that flows through is the idea of using revolutionary rhetoric to persuade the Red Guards not to attack the property. Relics were declared safe on the pretext that it would be good for the revolution, because they were state property or because they were fruits of the genius and creative power of the Chinese masses, or because they would be useful as educational materials for the future. Otherwise, Enlai and others might never have gotten away with protecting as many relics as they had the Red Guard were simply too powerful to control absolutely. A great example is that the Forbidden Palace was spared not just due to Enlais efforts, but because it surfaced that Peng Zhen had initially planned to make changes to the palace. After his public disgrace, no one wanted to be identified with counterrevolutionary revisionist Peng Zhen, so the Palace was saved. Potential IDs (again, not sure how much material will show up, but some helpful points) Zhou Enlai protector of cultural artifacts, major centrist and was key to the preservation of many key sites. Revolutionary rhetoric is so vague that it could clearly be used to argue on both sides. More generally what this paper illustrates is that there was not a mass hysteric frenzy in support of Mao. Even as people might pretend to support Mao and his revolution, a large number might actually have had ulterior motives and even objectives directly conflicting with Maos own agenda. Destruction of the Qufu Confucius Temple Complex although this incident is regularly used as an example of the wholesale renunciation of traditional culture, it was far from it: the temples destruction was contested (and indeed to some extent advocated against by Party leadership), which illustrates the general point that not all (or even most) of China was very convinced by Maos orders to bombard the headquarters 8. Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution Short Summary This reading discusses the phenomenon of mass killings that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. These are defined as incidents in which 10 or more non-combatants belonging to a single category (i.e. military captive; one of the four types; etc) were intentionally killed over a short time period He examines their prevalence on a county level in three provinces: Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hubei, and finds that there are substantially more mass killings in the former two than in the latter.

Most of the paper is actually a summary of these findings, of which I have selected some salient facts: In Guangxi, 15 counties out of sixty-five reported more than 1000 deaths (each), with the worst county (Wuming) having 2463. Similar in Guangdong Hubei rarely had killings, though it often had beatings Killings happened after the formation of revolutionary committees, in rural areas far from the provincial capital. They were perpetrated by governmental authorities, who viewed killing as a political duty, and there seems to be a connection between violence, and future political reward. The remainder of the paper discusses the reasons for variation between low-occurrence provinces like Hubei, and more violent ones like Guangdong. Perhaps due to differences in government structure (Hubei incorporated those who were against the preCultural Revolution government, while Guangdong had more conservatives), such that the mass killings might be attributed to conservatives lashing out against opposition without restraint. Another theory is that mass-killing is part of the class-elimination policy of the part (but taken to an extreme), and a more diverse government provides deterrents. But as in the previous reading, this might have just been the rhetoric concealing the true motive: There was a great deal of factionalization, and the revolutionary committees that were called for by party policy had to use class struggle terms to attack their enemies to gain control (possibly intentionally encouraging their outright execution). The situation was worse because the Cultural Revolution caused disintegration of the infrastructure of the state: even if the upper levels of the government did not view the violence as acceptable, they would always find out too late to do anything about it Potential IDs Only one big one I can think of here: Factionalization: even though the order to form revolutionary committees came from the very top of the party bureaucracy, they took a long time to form, and to even do that required some crafty rhetoric and extreme violence. It goes to show just how fragmented the political climate was, and furthermore how tenuous a hold the party had on everything, as the Cultural Revolution was in full swing and interrupted usual means of party control.

Esherick et al., The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, pp. 93 -123

Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces Most mass killings took place when party-state began to form new local governments and demobilize mass organizations Local representatives of the state turned class struggle into a reign of terror mass killings Documenting Mass Killings with County Gazetteers: Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hubei provinces County gazetteers will underreport, if anything Definition: intentional killing of a significant number of the members of any group of noncombatants Membership based on alleged political crimes or unfavorable family background Event must not have occurred during armed combat between mass factions Four-types: landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements Types of mass killings 1) Pogrom against the four-types 2) Killings in a political witch-hunt: based on association with alleged conspiratorial groups 3) Summary execution of captives Mass Killings in Three Provinces Most mass killings in Guangxi and Guangdong, fewer in Hubei Peaks of mass killings closely followed the founding of the revolutionary committee Killings concentrated in a few months evidence for correlation with establishment of revolutionary committees and demobilization of mass organizations In Hubei, unlike in Guangxi and Guangdong, rebel faction had been included in the new government Killings tend to occur in commune or brigade level, rather than county level Lack of mass killings in urban settings, abundance in rural villages Reflects disconnect between lower-level jurisdictions and upper-level authorities Indicates weakness of state control at lower level Perpetrators organized by governmental authorities (militia, mass organizations, new volunteers) Killings carried out as political duty, often with political rewards Provincial Variations - Hypotheses Differences not historical fact, but result of editorial policies in compiling county gazettes Recording in broad strokes, not in detail Hubei gazette may have been more conservative however, reports many injuries Differences most likely indicate real differences in political events across provinces Divergent paths of prior conflict leading to the founding of revolutionary committees Most provinces had two factions: more militant rebel faction wanting to overthrow pre-Cultural revolution government, and more moderate faction defending the government Type I provinces (i.e. Hubei): rebel faction dominated the new government Type II provinces (Guangdong, Guangxi): moderate faction dominate, united with revolutionary committee to crush the rebel faction

Hypothesis: Hubei government was more representative of oppositional elements deterred mass killings

The Political Context <1967> Mass factions demobilize, Mao wants revolutionary committees established by Feb 1968 Two tasks involved in establishing a new order: 1) Installing an effective local government 2) Cracking down on dissenting mass opposition Leaders of the mass factions that were shut out of the revolutionary committee could become strong opponents of the new order Revolutionary committees encouraged to defend their power and treat opposition in class struggle terms terror campaigns Mass killings involve dehumanization of a population segment the class enemy Whoever the local government deemed to be standing in the way of the new social order Enables manufacture of tangible threats to justify terror However, central and provincial governments constantly warned against excess violence Clogged channels of information flow from top down and bottom up State do not find out about mass killings until too late, localities do not report mass killings Conclusion/Main Points: 1) Mass killings result from province-specific conditions rather than national politics as a whole 2) Result of repression by local state rather than of conflicts between independent mass groups 3) Primarily rural phenomenon 4) Perpetrators were local leaders and their mass followers

MLR, pp. 155198 26 Dec. 1966Mao toasts cultural revolution at his 73rd birthday, looks forward to year of all-round class struggle From early 1967, Mao sent his documents to Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, CCRG, but not other PSC members (Tao Zhu, Deng, Liu, Chen Yun); creation of Central Caucus at 11th Plenum strengthened power of radicals, as did disappearance of the CC Secretariat and disappearance of CCPs regional bureaus 8 Jan. 1967Mao declares ministries superfluous for revolution, purges senior staff in State Council; military/industrial complex least affected, culture, education, public health most affected Zhou promoted the idea that power seizure in the ministries was a political, not professional act, laid down guidelines and tried to make sure that routine performance was not affected May 1967Zhou gets Maos permission to send in PLA into the ministries as government crumbled,

taking various levels of control; beginning 1968, large percentage of ministry employees sent down to May 7 Cadre Schools to do manual labour Late August 1966Beijing Red Guards arrive in Shanghai in three waves, try to foment rebellion 12 June 1966first workers big character poster, put up by Wan Hongwen, who later emerges as head of Workers General Headquarters (WGHQ) 30 Nov. 1966Red Guards occupy Liberation Daily offices, encounter resistance and appeal to WGHQ for help; in return, establishment of a united organization, with WGHQ being dominant To combat, Shanghai Party Committee organizes 800,000-strong Scarlet Guards 28 Dec. 1966Zhang Chunqiao informed that Scarlet Guards planning to cut off utilities in Shanghai, ordered WGHQ for action 30 Dec. 1966four hours of fighting; Scarlet Guards capitulate (Kangping Road incident), signifying beginning of nation-wide violence 1 Jan. 1967Liao Zhengguo, commander of Shanghai Garrison, orders all workers militia members to hand in weapons for inspection and repair; Zhou Enlai phones Shanghai party secretary Chen Pixian and orders him back to work and to disperse the 20,000 Scarlet Guards attempting to petition authorities in Shanghai and disrupt traffic; Chen Pixian orders urgent meeting drafting order to petitioners to withdraw and open letter calling on people to grasp revolution, promote production, etc. 5 Jan. 1967open letter to people of Shanghai published in Wenhui Daily 4 Jan. 1967Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan arrive in Shanghai from Beijing, begin precipitating rebellions at Wenhui Daily, Liberation Daily, radio and TV stations, etc. 6 Jan. 1967100,000 gather to witness denunciation of Chen Pixian; municipal committee effectively collapsed, mayor and deputies purged 9 Jan. 1967Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily publish joint urgent notice on measures to fight economic chaos; Mao reads and endorses; Zhou drafts telegram congratulating rebels in name of party centre, etc. 16 Jan. 1967Mao formally approves Shanghai seizure of power 5 Feb. 1967establishment of Shanghai Commune, under Zhang and Yaos leadership 12 Feb. 1967upon return to Beijing, Zhang and Yao are informed that Mao has changed his mind about the commune idea (thought commune would be too lax), organ of power changed on Feb. 23 to Revolutionary Committee of Shanghai Municipality.

In wake of Shanghais January Storm, most attempts at power seizures failed; only 8 were recognized in 1967, 20 more not till 1968. Heilongjiang: revolutionary committee set up 31 Jan. 1967, party first secretary skilful enough to manoeuvre into becoming chair of revolutionary committee (Pan Fusheng) In Shanxi, party first secretary was outsmarted by party secretary Liu Geping (Muslim), who with backing of military district put himself at head of command, taking control 12 Jan. 1967; party first secretary imprisoned and committed suicide Beijing had already experienced a power struggle, but on Jan. 1819, chaotic attempt to take over lead by various rebel coalitions; Zhou had to mediate and the revolutionary committee was finally inaugurated April 20. Spring 1967Zhou gets Maos approval for limiting confusion of revolution; limits to travel, national security buildings were off-limits, schools recalled, urban youths originally sent to countryside who had returned during revolution were sent back, workers were told to make revolution in their spare time; work stoppages, esp. along Third Front, were causing Five-Year Plan targets to slip PLA played double role, maintaining security and playing key role in power seizures (major force behind successes of early power seizures); Mao ordered military to support rebels in Hefei when they requested However, problem with military discipline, as Lin Biao had conceded that military academy students could challenge leaders just like Red Guards as early as Oct. 1966 23 Jan. 1967extended session of MAC ask Lin and Biao for measures to restore order in PLA; request was granted and Mao acknowledged the 8 measures as very good (known as the Eight Points) 19 Mar. 1967Three Supports and Two Militaries published; military ordered to support the left, peasants, workers; and to carry out military training and control Military tries to impose control, shoots rebels; anecdotes about confrontations at Qinghai Daily in Xining 1 April 1967Mao critiques PLA, saying that they are taking too serious a view of student assaults 2 April 1967Peoples Daily editorializes on behalf of leftists (Adopt a Correct Attitude toward the Little Generals) 6 April 1967on basis of editorial, Lin Biao draws up 10-point order endorsed by Mao, in favour of rebels; Jiang Qing explains that the 8 Points and 10 Points are not contradictory: one was to support the army and the other to cherish the people

Anti-PLA riots break out in response to order Mao seems never to have ordered execution of his colleagues, but Zhous ability to protect them was limited; this frustrated Zhou Zhou had relied on Tao Zhu, transferred to centre from the Central-South Region, extensively in second half of 1966; CCRG leaders, knowing they could not attack Zhou, attacked Tao instead 27 Nov. 1966Jiang Qing requests document detailing 7 of Taos crimes from Guan Feng; Maos reaction unclear 6 Dec. 1966first serious attack on Tao Zhu; Wang Li and others accuse him at expanded Politburo conference; Tao tried to protect his former Central-South Region deputy Wang Renzhong 2728 Dec. 1966meeting to discuss Wang Renzhong turns into attack against Tao; none of his Politburo colleagues defend him 29 Dec. 1966Mao criticizes Jiang Qing for not getting prior permission for attack on Tao, praises Taos work, and discusses with Tao need for 23 month provincial tour to inspect Cultural Revolutions progress 30 Dec. 1966Tao Zhu has confrontation with Red Guards who claimed to be aiming to seize Wang Renzhong; angry words; guards rush in to protect Tao and he is accused of suppresses the masses 4 Jan. 1967Chen Boda and Jiang Qing denounce Tao; to a question from Mao, Zhou denies Tao is guilty of suppressing the masses; Maos reaction ambiguous 8 Jan. 1967Mao comments that Tao Zhus issue was very serious, that he was very dishonest, denies personal knowledge of Tao before his transfer to the centre, wishes Red Guards good luck in dragging out Tao; appoints Wang Li to succeed Tao Zhu as head of CC Propaganda Dept 3 Feb. 1967Mao criticizes CCRG for submitting reports only irregularly 10 Feb. 1967Mao summons Lin Biao, Zhou, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Li Fuchun, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, Wang Li to meeting, attacks Chen and Jiang, loses his temper at their Jan. 4 attack on Tao Zhu, accuses them of being opportunist; tells CCRG to hold meeting to criticize Jiang Qing and Chen Boda, but says this issue not to be debated elsewhere Mao probably did not really want to save Tao, because he has in other cases intervened personally much more decisively on behalf of colleagues he wanted to save, and here he did not; probably moved Tao to centre earlier as calculated move to separate Tao from his power base Li Fuchun shares Maos criticisms of Jiang and Chen with other members of Poliburo

11 & 16 Feb. 1967two meetings of Central Caucus; Old Guard attack CCRG (February Countercurrent); significantly, Zhou Enlai did not support his colleagues from the State Council and PLA Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Yao Wenyuan meet with Jiang Qing, agree that the three men would report to Mao; Mao becomes angry upon hearing of Chen Yis remarks that the guys in power are the ones who are revisionists 18 Feb. 1967Mao signs off on Zhou Enlais submitted editorial Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly, but was privately furious 19 Feb. 1967Mao launches counterattack at meeting of senior officials, threatens to fight guerrilla war again if opposed; says that Tan Zhenlin (vice premier), Chen Yi (marshal), Xu Xiangqian (marshal), who were the principal Old Guard attackers, were to self-criticize 22 Apr. 1967Mao orders United Action Committee members freed; these were sons and daughters of high-level officials who organized to oppose left-opportunism, Jiang Qing, etc., and had been imprisoned three months earlier; speculation that reason for freeing them was that Mao did not want to antagonize Old Guard further 30 Apr. 1967unity meeting with Zhou Enlai and Feb. Countercurrent protagonists; permits them to watch May Day fireworks from Tiananmen Schoenhals, China's Cultural Revolution, pp. 93-135 (Reading 9) Not a Dinner Party Short Summary Basically a collection of primary sources (party documents, transcripts, etc) that show how the Cultural Revolution was just as destructive internally (i.e. to CCP members) as it was externally. In order of documents: 19 Annihilate Every Renegade (Nankai University Red Guards) Details the Nankai University Red Guards role in uncovering the renunciation of communism by Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen and others that would serve as fuel for the denunciations, and for Liu Shaoqis downfall. This includes the big-character poster Unmasking the Inside Story of the Big Renegade Clique which made public the list of names.

In general the ostentatious and propagandistic tone of the report conveys the political atmosphere at the time: Red Guardists were keen to interpret any and all evidence as categorical proof that the enemies of China were precisely the ones Mao said were his enemies.

20 Interrogation Record; Wang Guangmei (Qinghua University Red Guards) A frightening look at the power of the Red Guards: interrogating a former lady, she clearly fears them greatly, and is humiliated by them with little protest She cannot even reason with them, as they refuse to hear anything they do not like We are the revolutionary masses, and you are a notorious counter-revolutionary old hag. Dont try to confuse the class demarcation line Interesting points: Main purpose of interrogation is to get material to implicate Liu Shaoqi further as a reactionary revisionist. Secondarily, she is accused of her own crimes

21 On Case Examination Work (Kang Sheng) Document from Kang Sheng giving guidance to those conducting Case Examinations Preaches a degree of moderateness and the need to be exceptionally careful in considering the circumstances of the past, given that the result could affect a persons political life. The reserved, cautious tone is slightly ironic (especially given the subsequent document in which Kang is adamant that they extract a confession from Bo Yibo) Not just ironic, but perhaps a way for Kang to justify the suppression of evidence against those who were not meant to be purged. Directly criticizes the factional fighting that characterizes the period (and comes up in previous documents)

22 Bo Yibo Has an Attitude Problem Account from much after the Cultural Revolution, which paints Bo Yibo in a completely different light: here he is the martyr; the upright, and principled idealist who refused to bow to the injustices of his guards. Describes how Bo was tortured, struggled against, and humiliated constantly in order to force from him a confession that he was reactionary and a member of the renegade group of traitors. Also interesting because it illustrates just how substantially party position changed after the Revolution. Again refers to the Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism

Potential IDs Nankai University Red Guards/Open Notice of Renunciation of Communism/Bo Yibo important fuel for the fire that would ultimately purge Liu Shaoqi and supporters from the Politburo. Kang Sheng/Case Examinations Investigations to find evidence against key members to justify their purge. MLR, pp 199-238 Summary: This part of the book is divided into two parts: The Wuhan Incident and The May 16 Conspiracy pp 199-220 The Wuhan incident occurred during a period of chaos and struggle between the conservative and radical mass organizations of the Cultural Revolution. The role of the PLA was to support the revolutionary masses of the left. However, as both groups claimed to be the true left, it was difficult to determine who to support and who to suppress. After aligning with the conservatives, the regional commander in Wuhan, Chen Zaida, disbanded the Workers' General Headquarters of the radical side. He declared them as a disruptive counterrevolutionary adverse current. However, the judgment from the center at Beijing was quite the opposite. Although Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhau almost succeeded in gaining the support of the CCRG after returning to Beijing for a meeting, Jiang Qing interfered and caused a series of confusion. As a result, a Wuhan civil war broke out between the radical SteelTempered groups and the conservative Million Heroes. Each side claimed that CCRG was on their side. And due to the ten-point MAC order of April 6 and the February Countercurrent, the PLAs ability to keep order was weakened. Despite Maos order of struggle with words, not weapons, horrific acts of violence occurred everywhere. The members of the mass organizations were not the only ones affected; even incidents of children being paid to kill other children were recorded. Mao, of course, reacted with his usual ambiguous manner. Although ostensibly, he appeared to advocate for nonviolence, in reality, he was willing to sacrifice anything for the sake of revolution. On his departure, he addressed the PLA senior officers with the line The bigger the trouble gets, the longer it lasts, the better.In the end, this constant contradiction of restoring order and supporting chaos not only confused the role of PLA, it also created many tension and division within the organization. pp 221-238 After the Wuhan incident, radicals - supported by the CRG - became motivated to press for wider attacks on conservative groups, with the specific intention of targeting foreign diplomats (incl. ultimately Zhou Enlai) and the PLA. This potentially explosive atmosphere directly threatened the legitimacy and power of Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Mao. Therefore, in August 1967, the CRG was ordered to reorganize. Four of the most radical members (Wang Li, Mu Xin, Lin Jie, Guan Feng) were dismissed and

the Party's theoretical journal Hongqi, which was under the editorship of Chen Boda and had been a mouthpiece of the CRG, was forced to suspend publication. The fallen individuals in this group of targeted radicals were known as the May16th Group (the "516 Group"). IDs:

Million Heroes: This organization, purportedly made up of 1.2 million people, was the more conservative organization in Wuhan at the time of the Wuhan Incident. The majority of them were workers in the factories of Wuhan who felt indebted to settled authorities for their work related benefits (housing, medical care, etc.). Opposite them were the Rebels who were made up of 50 Red Guard organizations and workers. They didnt like the insecurity and instability of the CR in Wuhan and decided to take violent action against the rebels. Because the radicals were fragmented and the Million Heroes were well organized, the Million Heroes destroyed the radicals, pushing them out of all of their strongholds in just over a month. Lots of bloodshed & death. The Million Heroes even paid for the murders of Red Guards. When Beijing told them to stop, they were angered and beat up Chen Zaidao (leader of the Wuhan Military Re gion, which had sided with the MH) because they thought he had given up on them. Later they even kidnapped Wang Li (important member of CRG). They did not realize that Mao was in Wuhan and that most of the orders came from him. However, when Mao labeled them as conservative, their days were soon over. They disbanded soon afterwards, and the rebels had control of the city. The important thing to note is that, at this time in Wuhan, everyone thought the Chairman was behind them and believed they were supporting Maos Thought. Because Mao sort of gave contradictory messages, they didnt realize that they were not in his favor until after several weeks of violence. The end of the Million Heroes was sort of the last stand of armed resistance against the radicals, as Mao said, upon their dissolution, Attack with words, defend with weapons. After this incident, the radicals weregiven weapons and the military was strictly ordered to support the radicals (unlike previous vague orders to support the left). Wang Li: a member of the Cultural Revolution Group. In 1966, the conflict between the radical group and the conservative (the Million Heroes) in Wu Han was very intense. The military commander in Wu Han, Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai, military and the CRG. Wang Li was one of the two representatives of the CRG to attend the meeting. Basically Chen Zaidao made self-criticism and promised to reinstate the workers organization. Then Wang Li and Xie were to inform the party. Angered by this development, the Million Heroes stormed Wang and Xies hotel, kidnapped Wang and beat him up. Wang Li was rescued by Zhou Enlai and brought back to Be ijing. He received a formal welcome. In end, he was dismissed as a result of May 16th Conspiracy. Xie Fuzhi : He replaced Luo Ruiqing as Minister of Public Security and had a subsequent meteoric rise in the CCP in 1966-7, probably because the Ministry of Public Security played such a large role in the conflicts leading to the CR. Xie formed a close association with the CRG, and at the eleventh plenum in 1966 was appointed an alternate member of the Politburo, a member of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and named a member of the Party Secretariat responsible for all political and legal matters (a position formerly held by Peng Zhen). In 1967,

with Wang Li, as a part of the CRG, was left to convey the results of Mao's dictates after the Wuhan incident (in which the Million Heroes, a conservative umbrella organization, had begun to take over Wuhan) to criticize the Million heroes, repudiate the military region command, and endorse the city's radical mass organizations. The Million Heroes representatives were angered by this announcement and stormed the hotel where Xie and Wang were staying; Wang was seized but Xie was spared because of his formal position of vice-premier and minister of public security. Zhang Chunqiao: In 1966, Zhang was sent to deal with the Anting incident and pacify the workers. Instead, he recognized the Workers General Headquarters (WGH) under Wang Hongwen and met their five-point demands. Mao approved. In 1967, he and Yao returned to Shanghai, met with the WGH, and told the rebels to overthrow the Shanghai Party Committee and assume power. He became First Party Secretary/Mayor. About two weeks later in late January, the Red Revolutionaries (a Red Guard group) attack Zhang. However, Wang Hongwen and the CRSG supported him and the students were suppressed, dealing a major blow to the Red Guard movement. Chen Zaidao: the commander of the Wuhan Military at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. After the February Adverse Current, Chen decided that the radical organizations were gaining too much control in Wuhan. He felt that, since some of the central authorities were restricting the Cultural Revolution, he would be able to disband the Workers General Headquarters faction in Wuhan. The radicals in Wuhan (and all across China) protested, saying that the actions of Chen Zaidao and other players in the adverse current were suppressive. Radicals like Jiang Qing threw their weight behind the radical protests. In response, the party published directives that greatly limited the PLAs ability to suppress radical organizations. Under the directives, the armed forces could o longer declare an organization to be counterrevolutionary or to make mass arrests. This centralized the authority in Chinaonly Beijing could classify groups. The radicals could not be easily be controlled by the army, and many radical groups seized weapons and munitions from army storehouses. Because of the changes, Chen Zaidao requested a meeting with Zhou Enlai and the Cultural Revolution Group. The group actually agreed with Chen, and ruled that the Wuhan Military Region had acted correctly, and that the radicals (under the umbrella of the Workers General Headquarters) should stop attacking the city. Unfortunately for Chen, word of the agreement reached Wuhan before Beijing made an official declarationJiang Qing said that this meant that Chen was taking advantage of his success and going behind the partys back, giving her ammunition to undo the agreement. Despite the ruling, the struggle between large organizations in Wuhan intensified. A conservative group called The Million Heroes was established in defense of the military. The Million Heroes and the radicals continued to fight, necessitating a second series of meetings with Zhou Enlai and two members of the CRG (Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi). Mao even attended a couple of meetings. Mao and Zhou both criticized the decision to disband the Workers GH, and ordered that it be reinstated. After Mao left, Wang and Xie stuck around to enact his orders; they presented Maos instructions as a censure of the military, and endorsed the radicals. The Million Heroes stormed the hotel where Wang and Xie were staying to retaliate, possibly beating Wang in the process. The Wuhan Incident was only resolved when Zhou Enlai came to restore order. At the end of it all, Xie and Wang returned to Beijing as heroes, while Chen Zaidao was taken in for questioning. Surprisingly, Chen was let off

the hook without facing any major consequences. So, the whole point is that Chen was at the center of one of the more important events at the beginning of the CR. He tried to limit the Workers General Headquarters, but with the tacit support of Mao, the radicals were allowed to flourish, and efforts to curtails their activities were generally destined for failure.