IOSRJEN (WWW - Iosrjen.org) IOSR Journal of Engineering
IOSRJEN (WWW - Iosrjen.org) IOSR Journal of Engineering
IOSRJEN (WWW - Iosrjen.org) IOSR Journal of Engineering
org
Abstract : - Traditional election has many obscurity and people trust it difficult. Governments try to get
dependence in society and it has no way except move to E-democracy. But there is many challenges in it. There are some security requirements such as Performance, Comfortable, Availability, Privacy, Eligibility that provide with Mobile voting simply. Keywords: - E-Government; E-Democracy; M-Voting; Mobile infrastructure; Mobile requirements security
I. INTRODUCTION
E-Democracy is base of E-Governments. Dependency of people to government is like root and leads the society to national alliance. Voting is the best form and symbol to displaying democracy. But there was many ways to fluctuation in traditional voting. We discuses about E-government and democracy and then expression Electronic voting with disadvantages. So introduce Mobile voting as a good way to implement democracy. We notify voting requirements for mobile voting.
III. E-DEMOCRACY
E-democracy is concerned with the use of information and communication technologies to engage citizens, support the democratic decision- making processes and strengthen representative democracy Citizens are the heart of democracy. Democracy is kind of system of government that is depends on citizen satisfaction. The freedom to connect the idea that governments should not prevent people from connecting to the internet, to websites, or to each other. The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in
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IV. E-VOTING
Electronic voting systems are increasingly replacing the traditional paper-based voting systems. These systems can make the voting process more convenient and may, therefore, lead to improved turnout. Electronic recording and counting of votes could be faster, more accurate, and less labor intensive [3]. There are three classical cryptographic techniques for electronic voting [4]: A. Homomorphic scheme Homomorphism is an algebraic property particularly useful in electronic voting schemes because it allows applying operations on sets of encrypted ballots without need of decrypting them. In a homomorphic voting system, the clear text ballots are never visible to anyone except the voter. The encrypted ballots are made public and are aggregated in encrypted form. The encrypted tally is then decrypted. These systems require special types of homomorphic encryption schemes, and homomorphic counters, which enable the computation of the encrypted tally from the encrypted votes. A function F is said to be an (,) homomorphism if F(a) F(b) = F(ab). In particular, if F is an encryption function, and a b are votes, and is regular addition; the encrypted tally is obtained by applying to the encrypted votes. In a homomorphic encryption scheme anyone can check that the encrypted tally is computed correctly, as all the encrypted ballots are public [4]. B. Blind Signature A blind signature allows somebody for instance an authority to sign an encrypted message without decrypting it. Once the message signed and resent to the sender, he has a signed version of his vote by the authority and a guarantee that his vote has not been seen [5]. Formally, the blind signature scheme with message space is a 5-tuple (; ; ; ; ) , where a) is a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm, that constructs the signers public key () and its corresponding secret key ( ); b) is a polynomial-time blinding algorithm, that on input a message , a public key and a random string , constructs a blind message ; c) is a polynomial-time signing algorithm, that on input a blind message and the secret key constructs a blind signature on ; d) is a polynomial-time retrieving algorithm, that on input a blind signature and the random string extracts a signature on ; e) is a polynomial-time signature-verifying algorithm that on input a message signature pair (; ) and the public key outputs either yes or no. Blind signature is often used to get a token from the authority: The voter gets a signature from the authority of his ballot and then he is able to cast his ballot. It is used to achieve eligibility. C. Mixnet After finishing the voting, when all voters vote using a ballot box , votes come out in a different order. This ensures the anonymity of the voter. One possibility to realize it electronically is to use so-called mix-net first introduced by Chaum [6]. In these protocols mix messages by sending them through a network of authorities, where each authority shuffles the received list of messages before to send it to the next one, while keeping the permutation secret to send it to the next one, while keeping the permutation secret[5].
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Mobile voting (chance or challenge) VIII. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MOBILE VOTING
In different protocols, according to kind of elections and applications, we need different stages and different requirements. In order to be usable in practice, electronic voting scheme has to satisfy some requirements. A. Verifiability A voter should be able to verify whether his vote was correctly recorded and accounted in the final vote tally. We distinguish between individual and universal verifiability. In the latter case not only the voter but anyone can verify that all valid votes were included and the tally process was accurate. B. Dispute-freeness A voting scheme must provide a mechanism to resolve all disputes at any stage. C. Accuracy A voting scheme must be error-free. Votes of invalid voters should not be counted in the final tally. D. Fairness No one should be able to compute a partial tally as the election progresses. E. Robustness. A scheme has to be robust against active or passive attacks and faults as well. F. Receipt-freeness A voter should not be able to provide a receipt with which he may be able to prove his vote to any other entity. G. Practicality A voting scheme should not have assumptions and requirements that may be difficult to implement for a real application. H. Eligibility Only valid voters who meet certain pre-determined criteria are eligible to vote. I. Privacy In a secret ballot, a vote must not identify a voter and any traceability between the voter and his vote must be removed. J. Individual verifiability Each eligible voter can verify that his vote was really counted. K. Universal verifiability Any participant or passive observer can check that the election is fair: the published final tally is really the sum of the votes. L. Incoercibility Say that the scheme is incoercible if the voter cannot convince any observer how he has voted. This requirement prevents vote-buying and coercion. M. Democracy No voter can vote more than once. N. On-line property A voter can join or leave the voting session at any time without losing the possibility to vote once. O. Walk-away property After a voter has cast his vote he can leave the voting session (walk-away) with the assurance that his vote is counted. P. Availability A voter eventually succeeds in casting a vote. Q. Anonymity No one cant access to any vote. R. Performance E-voting systems should can faced with any problem in high volume and can continue their activities and ultimately count the obtained valid votes, and then to inform the results with end of performance.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Presence of mobile in modern life is undeniable. It can replace for many devices, such as camera, video camera, phonebook and ..., So according to the requirements stated importance usage of mobile voting will be displayed more. Mobile provides performance, comfortable, democracy, privacy, availability more than Evoting. REFERENCES J. C. Bertot, P. T. Jaeger, The E-Government paradox: Better customer service doesn't necessarily cost less, Government Information Quarterly, Volume 25, Issue 2, April 2008, pp. 149-154. H. Cilinton, "Remarks on Internet Freedom." U.S. Department of State. 21 Jan. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2011. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/01/135519.htm> K. Weldemariam, R. A. Kemmerer, A. Villafiorita, Formal Specification and Analysis of an e-Voting System, International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2010. S. Pppoveniuc, A Framework For Secure Mixnet-Base Electronic Voting, Phd thesise, Washington University, 2009. L. Fouard, M. Duclos, P. Lafourcade, Survey on Electronic Voting Schemes , VERIMAG, 2 avenue de Vignate, 38610 Grires, France. D. L. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM, 24(2):8490, 1981.
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