An Interview with Laurent Thvenot: On Engagement, Critique, Commonality, and Power

Interviewed by Paul Blokker and Andrea Brighenti University of Trento, Italy in: European Journal of Social Theory, 14(2), 2011.
Pragmatic sociology as a distinct, new type of French social science probably became most well-known in the English-speaking world because of the major contribution On Justification. Economies of Worth, published in English in 2006, but already introduced in a number of articles in the European Journal of Social Theory in 1999, as well as through an earlier article by Nicolas Dodier in 1993.1 On Justification is, however, probably best understood as a 'travail d'tape'2, an intermediate stage in a much larger and highly original social-theoretical enterprise. In this, however, the two authors of On Justification, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thvenot, took quite different directions in developing pragmatic sociology further, also as a consequence of their own earlier work. Before collaborating on On Justification, an important part of Thvenot's work was on categorization and classification, which make entities more general, and in a broader sense, on conventional forms in their relation to action coordination, in particular in the context of the study of labour and organizations (the 'economy of conventional forms'). Much of his work since On Justification which, in his own terms, constitutes an 'attempt to put the perspective adopted in On Justification [a perspective viewed from the public, pb] upside down'3 draws on earlier insights while developing a rich, novel perspective on the analysis of social life. Recently, as documented most importantly in L'Action au Pluriel (2006), as well as in a range of recent articles, Thvenot has explored the dimensions of social life 'under the public' as a condition to enlarge the scope of public critique to oppressions, and to understand the required transformations and obstacles to their exposition in common, to the discord of the political community. He has developed what he calls three 'regimes of engagement' with the world, i.e., publicly justifiable engagement, engagement in an individual plan, and familiar engagement, and, in a related way, three grammars of constructing commonality in the plural, i.e., the grammar of plural orders of worth (grounded in On Justification), the grammar of individual choices in a liberal public, and the grammar of personal affinities to a plurality of common places. One of his most interesting and fruitful insights is that he suggests a duality in human engagement with the world, i.e.,
1 The first publication in French was issued in 1987: Les conomies de la grandeur, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France et Centre d'Etude de l'Emploi. 2 M. Breviglieri, C. Lafaye, D. Trom, 'Prsentation. Sociologie pragmatique et normativit de l'agir en publique', in: idem. (eds.), Comptences critiques et sens de la justice, Paris: Economica: pp. 7-12. 3 L. Thvenot (2009), 'Biens et ralits de la vie en socit. Disposition et composition d'engagements pluriels', in: M. Breviglieri, C. Lafaye, D. Trom, (eds.), Comptences critiques et sens de la justice, Paris: Economica: pp. 37-54, 40.

as both providing confidence in the world, as a form of guarantee, and as always entailing a dimension of doubt (with regard to the sacrifice entailed). In the following, we discuss a number of aspects of Thvenot's sociology including issues of classification, commonality, differences with Luc Boltanski, forms of sacrifice, and comparative efforts - with the French sociologist. LT = Laurent Thvenot, PB = Paul Blokker, AB = Andrea Brighenti PB In your recent work not least in Laction au pluriel - you focus on the different ways people engage with the world (regimes of engagement) and different ways of constructing commonality "in the plural". In many respects, your current work seems to explore new terrain that was not the main focus of the seminal On Justification, but with which you in a way - had already been dealing in the past. I would therefore like to propose to start our discussion with the initial steps in your research. How does your earlier work - related to classification, and generalization - relate to your current interest in the different ways attachments are made common and commonality is constructed? LT The first steps of this research were connected with the INSEE (Institut national de la statistique et des tudes conomiques), the institute of French statistics, which differs from other governmental statistical institutes in that it mixes together statistics and research. At that time (the end of the 1970s, early 1980s, PB), there was a huge reflection on classification going on, something which is not at all the situation you would find at other statistical institutes. When I began to work there, Alain Desrosires, who was ten years older than me, was already working on the issue of classification from within a historical perspective, and was soon to do so also in connection with the work of Bourdieu. Indeed, even before he arrived, there had been already exchanges between people working on Bourdieu's sociology and people working at the INSEE. Why do I mention that? Well, since this constituted a certain continuation of the Durkheim/Mauss concern4 for the relation between cognitive categories and the political construction of the community. This concern somehow re-emerged in the nineteen seventies and eighties, both at the INSEE and in connection with the school of Bourdieu. The latter, as you know, was prolonging the Durkheim-Maus concern for classification and its relation to social groups, but with a strong twist, in that the emphasis was on a classification struggle between groups. This was the concern of Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski when they were working together. Bourdieu mainly dealt with this relation in terms of struggle between social groups or a collective habitus already aligned, whereas what I have been doing since that time, is something else. My concern was to get a step prior to this and consider the formation of commonality and thus community in action, based on various operations and devices which practically bring together, in a cognitive, social and political sense. In the beginning, my interest was mostly in the operation of generalizing in relation to action coordination, something broader than classification. In my first papers, I related
4 See their classical article, E. Durkheim & M. Mauss (1971 [1903]), 'De quelques formes primitives de classification. Contribution l'tude des reprsentations collectives', in: Anne Sociologique, 6.

generalizing to the notion of investment in the form of social coding, what I called the economy of codage social.5 It allowed to investigate progressively into what is needed for living together, in terms of making some sort of commonality, and to differentiate ways of building collectiveness or commonality. We have to distinguish ways of bringing together both human beings and other entities, without taking the collective and the struggle between collectives for granted. This confrontation between grouping is a sort of antagonistic second level. But it leaves aside the fact that the construction of the collectivity itself takes very different forms, according to different ways of building commonality. Studying the ways individuals claim to be grouped and qualify for an occupation, I observed three models which were to be developed later as different orders of worth: traditional and personalized ability in craft (mtier) (domestic worth), standardized technical competence (industrial worth), and state credentialed profession (civic worth). Considering the social coding, my first paper in Bourdieu's journal tackled what I call the paradox of coding.6 We were responsible at that time, with Alain Desrosires, for the reform of French official social system of classification, and we were receiving complaints from sociologists saying: your classification is not detailed enough. If you think of it, this ignores what it means to classify. When you code or classify, you make things general. If you make things general, you lose something. This is the paradox of coding also involved in institutions and any construction of a political community. Now, I would put it in the following way, which is at the core of the idea of 'investment in forms'. Making entities more common (or what we called "more general" at that time) requires a sacrifice of other potentialities of these entities. If you think of the economic view of investment, the sacrifice is nothing but a cost. If you go more deeply, it appears to be the sacrifice of the immediate market use of money. Of the fact that you could use that money for present, market coordinated, transaction. When you invest, you sacrifice this possibility for another one. Which is future-oriented, and involves what we developed later in terms of the industrial worth. And not only futureoriented but also supported by techniques, methods, which guarantee this future orientation. Because this is not just a fancy of the future, this is an implementation of the future in the present. The reason why the tools play such a role in human life and are not only resources among others. My interpretation of this classical notion of investment and my extension into the notion of investment in form already pointed to the sacrifice.7 Other possibilities of coordination (market, present-oriented coordination that is sacrificed in economic investment) are sacrificed in favor of the form of equivalency which is supported by the investment in form (industrial and future-oriented coordination in economic investment). Three characteristics of investments in forms (lifespan, area of validity and material equipment) prefigured the plurality of ways to make people and things more general. This is a strong element in The Economies of Worth [Les conomies de la grandeur] to be published with Luc [Boltanski] in 1987. I do not want at all to minimize
5 (1983) 'L'conomie du codage social' in Critiques de l'Economie Politique, n23-24, pp.188-222. 6 (1979) 'Une jeunesse difficile; Les fonctions sociales du flou et de la rigueur dans les classements', in: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n 26-27, pp. 3-18. 7 (1984) 'Rules and implements: investment in forms' in: Social Science Information, 23(1), pp. 1-45.

his own contribution to it. It came from his remarkable work on denunciation which prefigured the analysis of the denunciation of the domestic world from the view of the civic worth.8 It also resulted from his earlier research on professional representation at the core of his book on Les Cadres.9 We began to work together in the early 1980s, designing experimental studies on social categorization, which were published in English as Finding One's Way in Social Space in 198310, and marked the transition between Bourdieu's sociology and our own construction on the making. AB On Bourdieu, if I am correct, his weak point - related to the genetic part of his work in which he dealt with how groups are created - was mostly focused on reproduction rather than production. LT Exactly, and as you know, he did not have a very sophisticated understanding of politics, in terms of views on the political community. Of course, he had a highly consistent and illuminating view about domination, which is a very important issue for politics, but he had no interest in the variety of constructing political communities. Which is what I am concerned with, particularly with the three models on commonality in the plural. And this is not something that Luc [Boltanski] is concerned with. Indeed, when I read De La Critique, as I told him very openly, I found his notion of the collective reductive. It is even regressive compared to the plurality of orders of worth which account for various forms of interdependency and material support which contribute to aligning people (and mobilizing them as well) around common issues and notions of the common good. PB How does your own work then relate to notions of culture and collectivity? In your work with Michle Lamont you engaged with culture in terms of cultural repertoires that are present in distinct national contexts to be more precise, France and the United States in your analysis. In this comparative study, you already - very significantly - I think, indicate the problems of any kind of homogeneous understanding of national culture. In your notion of a plurality of 'grammars of securing life together', you make this even more explicit. In this regard, how do you see then the relation between Boltanski's understanding of the collectivity, and his notion of world ('monde'), and your own idea of different ways of constructing commonality? LT The old, classical view, including the Durkheimian view, understands the collective in strongly homogeneous terms, something really consistent in terms of shared representations or beliefs. Such views of the collective really disregard, misrepresent the strong tension between a personalized relation to the world and a commonalized relation to the world, which is for me inescapable to deal correctly with
8 (1984) avec Darr, Y. et Schiltz, M.-A., 'La dnonciation', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n51, pp. 3-40. 9 (1982), Les cadres; la formation d'un groupe social, Paris: Editions de Minuit, translated in: (1987), The Making of a Class. Cadres in French Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. 10 'Finding One's Way in Social Space: A Study Based on Games', in: Social Science Information, vol. 22:4-5, pp. 631-680.

the most difficult issues of politics, and which is not reducible to the individual collective opposition or the public private opposition. And you will not find anything about that in Bourdieu, because even habitus is already collective. And in Luc's work, when he speaks of the collective as something needed for politics, which is of course relevant, he is back to the very classical view of the collective. While my sociological work was concerned with deepening the understanding of the making of what I now prefer to call commonality, because commonality is broader than publicity, as shown by the grammar of personal affinities to a plurality of common places. The public, as stressed by the first step of my earlier work on categorization or classification, but already from within this inheritance from Durkheim-Mauss, needs operations of representation in politics. Yet, in the third grammar [the grammar of personal affinities to common places, pb], there is no such thing as representing, as being represented. As citizens oriented towards the civic worth, we would assume representation is the basis of any form of commonality, but it is not. PB To what extent was your move towards more comparative approaches I guess your book with Michle Lamont came out much later, and you were doing comparative stuff already earlier on - to what extent was that also a move because of your dissatisfaction with being predominantly focusing on the public in On Justification? I mean was that an explicit move? LT I began to work on under the public at the beginning of the 1990s through a fairly large empirical study about the plurality of relations to our material environment. And I studied standardization for that. Standardization is at the uppermost level of the public and puts an enormous strain on the plurality of personal usages of things. I also went below the public through my fieldwork on environmental disputes published in the book with Michle. Environment cannot escape proximity. Of course, the environment leads to the most global issues, but environment cannot reasonably be treated without the most proximate concerns and personal attachment to the world. PB To what extent do you think there is a normative background to your work, in terms of, for instance, emancipation and inclusion? One could read such a dimension into notions such as plurality (as an acknowledgement of the need for the openness of societys institutions), inquietude (as an acknowledgement of the impossibility of providing societys foundations once and for all), as well as the idea of two-sided engagement (one could formulate this perhaps as the identification of the tension between what is and what could be). LT You are right. Regarding the two sides of the engagement, you said: as the identification of what is and what could be. I would not put it in exactly those terms. But what you say is not out of the picture. At the core of the of 'investment in form', I was concerned with the fact that this investing in conventional forms facilitated coordination, because people rely on the coded form or the invested form. At the same time, you have people like those I mentioned before who complained that the code was losing details who are on the second side, that is, the side of doubt about what is sacrificed. Here is the mainspring of emancipation, and it is not limited to public 5

criticism.

Your point touches maybe the most important, core issue in my sociology, and certainly one marking a research strategy which differs from Luc's [Boltanski]. It departs from the purely cognitive issue of classification, the relation between the set and the items. Investment in form allows action coordination while pointing to sacrifice, and thus opens the possibility of doubt and criticism, of making sensible the oppression of what has been disregarded. This is what I am working on, without limiting myself to a view from the public. I would relate criticism to the complaint of undue sacrifice. Thus I mentioned criticism against the sacrifice resulting from a new investment in forms, like an in-house (domestic) job classification which is intended to replace a large-scale and State-certified job scale (civic) (1984). But it was only later that I developed the two sides of the 'convenient action' ['L'action qui convient', 1990]. I made more precise with the notion of engagement, in the book of 2006 [L'action au pluriel, PB], the two sides of reliance and doubt, which I see necessary to grasp in a unique schema. Which is not the strategy chosen by Luc, because he is making distinct what he calls the register of confirmation ('test of truth') and the register of critique ('test of reality') both at the public level he calls metapragmatic, while the lower, rather unstructured, so-called 'pragmatic' level escapes this tension. Now it makes a strong difference to encompass the side of confidence and that of doubt within the same notion of engagement which, as commitment in the classical paper by Howard Becker, belongs to the family of 'promise'. 11 In addition, the notion of engagement captures modes of confidence which are far below the level of the public and still involve the same kind of tension vis--vis doubt. These modes can be oppressed as well, while their publicization raise particular difficulties for critique. I find it important to deal with engagement through these two sides. The first side is what you rely on once you close your eyes. Which is what you need to do for the economies of your relation to the world, and to others, you need to have those relaxing moments of these economies. I am still hesitating in English about the right metaterm (I use quietude in French). Confidence, assurance, trust? The problem with trust is the fact that it has so overwhelmingly been treated as an issue for two persons. Which it is too limitative, in my understanding. It might be to other persons but it is also to the material world. The two sides are two stances of the same concern, which is engaging, something in relation to the future, and to the past. This category is then very different from notions of regime of action used very loosely, as logics of action. Engaging assumes the concern of co-responding, a correspondence of one state to another state, different in time and place. The second side regards opening one's eyes, which means, doubting what I called inquitude and is certainly related to criticism. So, I agree with your formulation it could be for the second side. This could be is the basis for criticism: it could be otherwise. Because it could be, it questions, you would say, what is. Now, I would

11 H.S. Becker (1960), 'Notes on the concept of commitment', in: American Journal of Sociology, 66:1, pp. 32-4.

capture the first side of the engagement not as it is, but as, I am confident in it, which is not the same, I am relying on it. And I would consider modes of confidence in reality which are not related to public justifications and criticisms and to institutional faith, but to non-publicly guaranteed senses of reality. Through this we can go to one of the main differences of strategy with Luc. As you know, Luc has this notion of reality, which I find too close to the classical Social Construction of Reality [Berger and Luckman's classic, PB]. Although he looks at it from the view of possible criticisms, which is not the orientation of The Social Construction of Reality. In the part of his book I do much appreciate, he deals with this institutional "reality" in terms of faith and confirmation, referring to tautology of language, which converges with the closure of the code. For me, it is a problem to call it reality. He finds himself in need of creating something else for other experiences we have of reality, and he merges them all in what he calls 'le monde'. What he calls 'le monde' is then not very clear for me, and prevents him for taking into account actors' sense of reality and the reality tests of action which are so important in the American pragmatist heritage. Whereas I have put action and its coordination even coordination with oneself at the center of my concern, I don't think it is the case for Luc. It is also visible in his main understanding of the test from the model of sport competition or school examination. By contrast, the plurality of regimes of engagements involves an extended notion of testing moments both trying and probative which include a simple malfunction of a normal individual plan or a snag in a familiar and personal habit. In both cases, a sense of reality is at stake which is neither "la ralit" nor "le monde". For the stake of realism but also for our concern in politics we have to make room for the plurality of senses of reality - which do not imply relativism since they have some shared anchoring associated to the plurality of sources of confidence in our relation with the world. They require that we look at the two sides or two stances of the engagement at different levels. And certainly not only at the level of the public. Also at the level of what I call familiar engagement, highly personal familiarization with the world, and what I called, following Nicolas Auray, the explorative engagement in search of the assurance of the excitement of the new. Both are intimate and far from being public. Distinguishing these experiences with the world gives us a more sophisticated notion of the variety of senses of reality. They are to be articulated in our lives and in our living in common, and it raises huge difficulties which are usually ignored in social and political theory. So, I would say that the two-sided nature of the engagement is not something to be limited to publicity, and not restricted to the level of institutions and the opposition between confirmation and criticism. It opens a new perspective on the dynamic constitution of both personalities and communities, as integrating a moving combination of engagements. Look at the level of familiar engagement. In the social sciences literature, we have a widespread use of routine. But usually routine is assuming stability, something like an entrenched habit. Routine is thus limited to the first side of the familiar engagement. And the good of the ease which is based on this sense of reality also goes with the other side of the engagement: experiencing, at this level and in your body, the discomfort of a familiar environment at hand that escapes your control, this inquietude opening the possibility of new habituation. 7

AB

Which means that you need to open your eyes?

LT You can open your eyes at this level of proximity to the world, which is a very weak way of opening the eyes. Just re-acting, re-arranging your habit, distancing the confidence in you habit. And as you see, and this was the very beginning of our discussion on this issue, I am not dealing with the opposition between static and dynamic. It is another distinction between relying on confidence and opening to inquietude. And that gives the possibility for a much more realistic construction of living and living together. AB Just to clarify, in your view realism is this attitude towards reality, you find it in both the idea of acceptance, reliance, and opening your eyes and doubting. Realism goes through, you need to have both for the two sides of engagement. LT I think so, and I add that we should no limit ourselves to the most communalized sense of reality either in explicit publicity or in tacit taken for granted knowledge. Apart from social reality, we have to take into account deeply personal and intimate senses of reality which are note easily communicated, made common. PB Another point of clarification. Perhaps it brings us into different directions. I fully agree with you that this complex plurality of senses of reality operating on what one could see as different levels is extremely important, but of course it begs the question, how do you see then the relation between the micro and the macro, and everything in between. I mean, for instance in your own comparative work, with Michele Lamont on the USA and France, but also your work on France and Russia, you seem to indicate, that there are different macro-institutionalizations of what counts as a common sense of reality. But you could also, I guess, research this on lower levels, on levels closer to people. LT Let me be a bit more explicit about the third model of personal affinities to a plurality of common places, because it shows how the making of commonality can accommodate engagements at lower levels, even personal familiarity. I discovered these a posteriori because the three constructions of commonality in the plural resulted from empirical works on ways people disagree in communities, each of them is especially accommodating to one of the regimes of engagement. Of course, they do not superpose, since all these constructions deal with commonality. The first one only accommodates justification through the common good, qualification for worth being already oriented toward the common. The second, the liberal construction, is assuming the regime of plan, the individual reaching the liberal public by transforming something like an individual plan into an option which can be exposed publicly as an interest or an opinion. The most personal attachments are to be transformed into publicly exposable individual choices for options, which is a very severe requirement as we see from faith or so-called cultural attachments. As we see from contemporary issues regarding ethnicity, culture and religion, to present all these issues in the format of individual choice is extremely demanding, and 8

oppressive for other formats of engagement. But it is the constraint of the liberal construction of individuals in public, so that the relation with the engagement in plan is strong. Yet the first construction, based on the plurality of orders of worth, assumes that every personal concern or personal attachment has to be aggrandized and transformed so that it can be promoted in public as relevant for the common good. It is even more demanding! Now, the third model is the more hospitable towards familiar attachments. This is the reason we should not ignore it, because, it can always be re-elaborated in human communities from familiarity, even among friends. The meta-model for the three proposed constructions is simple, based on two operations. The first is communication which means precisely making common your most personal concerns, a very strong requirement needed to alleviate the tension of living both together and in person. The second is composition which means bringing together, integrating in some way, the plurality of these voices made common. In the first construction, composition relies on plural characterizations of the common good, while in the second, it relies on the plurality of individual choices for options made public. They are frequently called interest, but the reason why I do not immediately use interest is that it has become understood as something naturalized, as some inner push. In the third construction, composition relies on associations between a plurality of common places. The term common place here is not critical, not taken as clich. If actors see the reference to the common place as a superficial clich, it proves to them that the communication failed because the common place was not personally invested. The clich is devoid of personal investment. Through the common place, you can pass and communicate your personal concern in a common format. It can be a place, but it can be a quote from a poem, a film, that everyone knows and can use to express personal concerns in a particular situation. What is the consequence of that in terms of mediation through common places? With the three models, one can compare three mediations worths, individual options and common places. By contrast to the previous ones which assume a public space, common place is never explicit about its content, precisely for the reason that it has to be personally invested. Moreover, it will never pass the test of Jeff Alexander's civil society, because he will consider it to be irrational and emotional. Which is the case. I thought about it, because I have worked on emotions, mainly as motions, not in opposition to reason. Why has such a communication through common place to be strongly emotional? Because of the short-cut. The emotion is the evidence, the demonstration that your most intimate concerns are connected to some highly common place, with the result of a very strong emotional discharge. This is the opposite from arranging the non-emotional public in the liberal construction. And I am not playing the one against the other, because I want to clarify the respective advantage and disadvantage of each. The advantage of the third construction based on common places comes from its being hospitable to personal concerns, without big deformation of them. AB So where would your earlier notion of sacrifice fall in this? Initially you associated sacrifice with investing in form and in coding. Where is the sacrifice towards commonality? LT There is still a sacrifice. You are right to insist upon it. First, the sacrifice comes 9

from passing through the common. This is still a constraint for the third model as it was for the two others. Second, this third model, while being more hospitable than the two previous ones to the familiar engagement is, by contrast, inappropriate for argued public debates about plural characterizations of the common good. This kind of engagement of public criticism and justification is sacrificed. Third, this model also hinders the expression of an individual project which is the basis for affirmed autonomy: it oppresses the engagement in an individual plan. This is the reason why I extend critique to oppressions that might not have access to public criticism, in order to study the obstructed path from oppressed close engagements to public criticism. My contention is that we need an extension of our analytical tools to deal with contemporary politics, not only public criticism but modes of resistance or resentment that might stay mute before creating violent explosions, or reactions that can get dramatically reactionary. While aiming at being universal, in time and space, most analytical tools are still too dependant on a certain restricted western understanding of modernity, and even a formulating of the emancipating project of the Enlightenment. I am concerned by what was left over by this formulation, a remainder that only appeared through counter-revolutionary political constructions or more recently in the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. I think we need to account for modes of differing that lack the detachment of the public space, what the third model based on affinities to plural common places aims at. And we have also to look 'from below' public criticism and public causes. The ways people differ over issues, in a political community, should be considered from their most incommensurable personal concerns and not from a preformatted individual who is ready made for contradictory debate on a public space. It goes beyond our former view from the public which considered a continuum from the singular or individual to the general or collective, as a simple axis of generalizing [monte en gnralit]. The plurality of engagements and kinds of good and capacity which each ensures, from personal ease in close familiarity, accounts for the various oppressions of one regime from another, and makes more precise the sacrifices that result from the trans-formation of one format of engagement into another, and the alteration required by communication, by making common. Comparing the liberal construction of commonality with the construction through a plurality of orders of worth that propose conflicting characterization of the common good helped me to delineate more precisely what On Justification deals with. In spite of our explicit statements, it was wrongly misunderstood as a social theory or a theory of social action. But it was not even a theory of all forms of public justification. It was more restricted, and dealt with the dynamics of justification and critique based on specification of the common good. PB With regard to possible misunderstandings, Axel Honneth has recently argued 12 that On Justification seems to wholly avoid any kind of theoretical-structural stipulations. He argues that it gives the impression that the interpretative efforts of the actors were not subject to social-structural conditions (Honneth 2010: 380). To what

12 Axel Honneth (2010), 'Dissolutions of the Social: On the Social Theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thvenot', in: Constellations, 17(3), pp. 376-389.

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extent is this a fair portrayal of the books argument you think? LT Honneth's paper reveals some strong misunderstandings but also addresses quite relevant questions. Some of them were answered before or after his paper, others not. Let us consider some of them successively. A misunderstanding is to treat the model of Economies of worth as a general theory of society and social action. Honneth understands that all "cities" "represent the normative core of an entire lifeworld" and "refer to conceptions of an entire way of life", the actor being "permanently forced to competently move back and forth among six different lifeworlds" (id.). We were explicit in the book that we limited our research to situations of dispute where reference to a public third party judgment is aimed at. In the 1991 edition that was translated we added a postface which situated this public regime in a wider perspective. My own concern was to situate the public level of criticism and justification within an architecture of regimes of "appropriate action" that differentiate the complexity of "lifeworlds". A second, even more devastating misunderstanding, is to take the book as a theory of hierarchical structures of social status based on individual desert, a conception that would be oblivious of civic egalitarianism. In continuity with what I said before of investments in equivalence forms and the power to coordinate, the Economies of worth model addresses a main source of power and its criticisms: the power ensuing a form of generality, the power to participate in commonality through a certain form of generalized interdependency. This power at stake is not hierarchical in the usual meaning of direct subordination which would only be observed in the domestic worth, and to a lesser extent the industrial worth. The hierarchy is the inevitable consequence of the process of taking part in commonality. Even the highly egalitarian civic worth raises the issue of the power of the representative, of the spokesperson speaking the voice of the egalitarian collective. Now, there is something quite relevant in Honneth's criticism of the limitations of the book. He questions its pretense to deal with public justification in general. As an evidence for missing traditions which would inform contemporary conceptions of justice, Honneth rightly mentions John Locke's classical liberalism. The reason why we left aside this tradition is that we restricted our research to justifications and criticism that were relying on characterizations of the common good. And this last element is quite limiting. This became clear to me from the first program on the US-France comparison with Lamont. As you know the liberal tradition of politics is constructed to prevent the confrontation of conflicting characterizations of the common good which might lead to civil war. Thus it departs from the critical sense of justice and justification that we worked on. And Luc and I were not aware of the degree to which we were limiting our approach of public disputes by relating them to plural characterizations of the common good and to the kind of aggrandizement it assumes for the criticism to be acceptable. Yet, this first model was useful to identify some features of the second liberal model which remain usually unnoticed. We live in a time of a huge diffusion of this model, which is not a bad thing unless when it is confused with market coordination. I hope you understand that I am not against political liberalism although many French social and political scientists are. I am respectful for this model because it is the only one 11

which deals with the genuine foreigner, stranger or even with strangeness. Which is exactly the difficulty all communities in the world face nowadays. But, many French colleagues just ignore it, not taking the measure of multiple cultural attachments in contemporary France. The French multicultural society needs to be studied from the view of the newcomers, what she is asked and the way she is hosted and treated in the community. This has been at the centre of Joan Stavo-Debauge's pathbreaking approach.13 He has studied at length the controversy about ethnic, or cultural categories. There is still a huge battle going on, even among most left-oriented people, many of them taking an opposing stance. It results from the confusion with the complex mixture called neoliberalism. I obviously agree with criticizing neoliberalism, and analyzing this mixture, but this is not political liberalism. When I took the second step of comparative reflexive studies, it was a deliberate choice to analyze the US and discover something different from economies of worth. First, in contrast to the idea that the model of the orders of worth was French, empirical fieldwork demonstrated that all of these orders were referred to in the US, with strong differences in their relative strength and in their combination within compromises. But it also led me to understand this liberal construction is something very difficult to grasp for a Frenchman. Because what is called liberal in France regards free-trade businessmen, clearly right-oriented. I was helped too by American colleagues and friends who were all fluent in this liberal composition of the public while highly sensitive to inequality and certainly not right-oriented. My fieldwork on environmental issues also demonstrated coordination within the liberal public and contrasted the idea of an atomistic society, which many French sociologists tend to relate to liberalism. So that it raised for me a new issue, which constitutes the common framework for the three ways of constructing commonality in the plural. This "in the plural" is important because usually when you refer to the polarity liberalism/communitarianism the second pole assumes a strong emphasis on what is shared, with the notion of culture denoting what is shared in a holistic perspective. This is weak, because you cannot reasonably think of a relevant model of community just assuming things are shared. If you have no idea of what is made of plurality, of difference, of differing, well then you miss the point. As an output of comparative empirical research in different countries, I made room for a third model, important for a broader perspective, a model of the construction of commonality but not publicity actually, with a distinct way of differing. AB But the issue of plurality remains.

LT Yes, and retrospectively I found that plurality was already an implicit normative requirement of the orders of worth which, when we were writing the book, we rather considered one by one in each pretension to support a city. PB I believe your attempt to detach social action and justification from distinct social roles, either in the form of class situation or any other form of aprioristic classification, is admirable and very much to the point. However, the critique that in this

13 J. Stavo-Debauge (2009) 'Venir la communaut. Une sociologie de l'hospitalit et de l'appartenance', thse de doctorat l'EHESS, 965p.

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way you disregard power relations and forms of domination is easily made. How do you think you can ultimately satisfactorily deal with such questions regarding power relations and domination - while holding on to the contingency and situatedness you point to? LT In On Justification, the actor's impetus comes from the need to adjust the situation a heritage from the pragmatist tradition which is thus given a kind of normative involving appeal. The notion of engagement I developed later clarifies and pluralizes such involvements in the situation. AB Whereas with engagement?

LT Well, engagement it is not just an issue of the situation. The notion is framed in terms of being committed to what you are doing. It indicates a relation to yourself through the environment, in time, and not only to the present situation. Moreover, engaging with an appropriate environment, is a condition for enacting a certain beneficial capacity. This capacity is thus shown in its dependency, not only on the actor's disposition but on the disposition of the prepared environment as well. Impinging on this environment, even without direct constraint or control on the actor, might originate kinds of oppression that theories of domination do not currently acknowledge, and that enlarge the scope of critique. With this insight into dependency, I come to your question about power, which is also at the background of Honneth's criticism. Should we add to our approach some pieces of Bourdieu's theory, as reproductive unconscious habitus, symbolic domination or competitive struggles of species of capital in different fields ? Honneth did himself combine somewhat surprisingly and inconsistently some of these pieces to his remarkable moral theory of recognition which takes seriously into account moral concerns and their denial. My strategy is different. It is based on the role I give to realism, in contrast to Bourdieu's focus and Luc's as well when he comes back to "la ralit" on social objectivation. In spite of the benefits from this view, I think we need to acknowledge actors' realisms, meaning the plurality of ways they engage with an appropriate reality to put their capacity into action. A view which was already adopted in American pragmatism and which I elaborated with the notion of engagement. Therefore, actors are not just "free to decide which justification order they use to attempt to address the action" in a "strange voluntarism" (Honneth 2010: 387). The dispositions of formatted, or prepared, actors and of environmental arrangements, appropriated for certain engagements, influence the way actors address the action since these dispositions are sources of confidence and vehicles of oppression. Here lie the "crystallizations of normatively coordinated action" that Honneth is calling for. But these "socially congealed structures", to borrow another of his formulations, are not limited to routines or habitus. Adherences to use another metaphor pointing to the first side of the engagement are to be found in every regime of engagement, from highly institutionalized and conventionalized ones to the most personally familiar, passing through the functional one of the engagement in plan. And they are to be found in the development of both human and environmental dispositions. 13

These developments result from the entrenching in various regimes but also, in the genesis of a new order of worth. The picture I proposed is different from the Boltanski/Chiapello model regarding the displacement of justificatory tests. The story begins with a certain realistic dependency of human capacity on the material world, including our human bodies. As clearly visible in the ongoing genesis of the worth of information, it occurs when new equipment for capacities is discovered or created in the material world. The progress of the equipment of the world brings new capacities for human beings. Justice is not the issue at first. If you have, for instance, a relationship of familiarity with an environment, you can find new capacities, and this causes no problem of justice because these capacities are not transferable, made equivalent from one person to another. They are dependent on personal accommodation. The scope changes when a relation to the material environment is becoming more and more generalized, systematized I would say, to introduce the notion of system, which means articulated in a common format, in common terms. Tools, equipment, are a very central way to generalize a relation to the world. Then, the capacity which relies on this newly generalized relation to the material world and to other human beings becomes questionable, opening the side of public inquietude. Because of the equivalence which is made and which supports a new general capacity, and possible source of abusive power. What about the people who have a larger access to information techniques? This is typically the basis of criticism. What about the unequal power with respect to this information capacity? And because of the extension of this coordination through information technologies, what about the power on other persons ensuing from this systemic interdependency through such technologies, far from the isolated personal capacity of using this equipment. In the answer to this critical questioning lies the possible genesis of a new order of worth. Because of a lot of elaboration to demonstrate that this equipped interdependency would contribute to something like a common good, would be beneficial to all and even to those who experience the lesser informational capacity, as a result of developed channels of information for instance. If it is accepted as beneficial to all, as a characterization of the common good, it is not just a resource that will bring inequality between human beings. And you see, through this process, the construction of a new order of worth, or the effort to do so, is an answer to the suspicion of an abuse of power which is itself the result of the generalization of a new systematic relation to the world. From this social and historical work on the equipment of the community, related to systemic interdependency and to a normative questioning about justice, we get an idea of powers involved in this process and of their possible structural entrenchment. I would add that this view from material and systemic interdependency and efforts to demonstrate beneficial returns for all dismisses the understanding of economies of worth as a simple issue of desert based on individual achievement. This is another of Honneth's criticisms when he considers the order of worth as "a hierarchy of social status" based on "individual desert". Orders of worth are dynamically used in public disputes referring to common good interdependencies. Entrenched unequal social status is precisely what is criticized from this critical dynamics based on the model of orders of worth. Of course such unequal permanently attached statuses are most usual because of weakness or lack of criticism, some of the reasons being mentioned in the book, 14

others not.

PB I was wondering how this explanation of the emergence of the orders of worth relate to you own historical narrative of those waves of critique that you describe in your recent article in Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia.14 There, maybe I should look at it again, but I have difficulties of find an explicit statement of why and how this critique emerges. If you now put it in the term of capacities, which I find extremely interesting, how does that relate to the context let us say of the waves of critique in the 1950/60s, and the 1970s/80s that you refer to in that article? LT In the paper, I rather tried to clarify something which is unduly treated in terms of an opposition between vertical and horizontal governance (or "flat world" as Ota de Leonardis rightly ironized), and to demonstrate that this last one is still "hierarchical" in the extended perspective I adopted before on power and coordination forms, on power ensuing from participation to commonality. As I mentioned when referring to the liberal model, this "horizontal" public commonality also involves such potential power, and may be oppressive as well, although it is usually assumed to be only beneficially "empowering". The domestic order of worth that entails direct person to person hierarchical subordination was the most criticized in the 1950/60s waves of critique, and secondary the industrial worth which eventually spread all over again through the present "governing by standards" and not only through direct technical subordination.15 But your question points to the emergence of critique. The different waves illustrate different courses of critique. May 68 has something of a revolutionary movement, whereas two "modernization" waves came top-down from State policies reform. Luc rightly insisted on the course resulting from the public "cause" and its generalizing move mainly oriented towards the civic worth kind of collectiveness. Yet the architecture of regimes of engagement brings light on more tortuous paths which may start from inquietude in close engagements and lead or not, because of the required transformations to more common issues and public criticism. In a collective research program which I ran with Marc Breviglieri on the evolution of the welfare state, education services and workers ("Les politiques du proche"), we observed such a move from personal uneasiness to a commonalized malaise about individual autonomy, which paved the way to the late (re)discovery in France of the liberal model of individuals opting in the public.16 But this is not a complete answer to your question which would
14 Thvenot, L. (2010), 'Autorit e poteri alla prova della critica. L'oppressione del governo orientato all'obbiettivo', in: Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, no. 4. On the criticisms of hierarchy and different orders of worth in French May 68, see: , . (2009), ' : 68 ' in: . . . . . . , . , . , . . .: , 242-293. 15 Thvenot, L. (2009), 'Governing Life by Standards. A View from Engagements', in: Social Studies of Science, 39:5, pp.793-813. On the criticism of this governing by standards in education policies, see: R. Normand, (2008) 'School effectiveness of the horizon of the world as a laboratory', British Journal of Sociology of Education, 29:6, pp. 665-676. 16 M. Breviglieri, J. Stavo-Debauge, L. Pattaroni (2003), 'Quelques effets de l'ide de proximit sur la conduite et le devenir du travail social', in: Revue Suisse de Sociologie, 29:1, pp. 141-157. Benefiting

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need further developments. AB You could apply your conceptual tools of the regimes to different contexts. By way of an analogy with Goffmans notions, for instance, when Goffman speaks of civil inattention, it is a sort of form or device, and of course civil attention is very different in a small village in Southern Italy than in the metro of Paris. But still you can observe that there is this device. LT I am particularly sensitive to the point raised by your question, that of the relative dependency or of social and political sciences tools to their social and political context of emergence, a point strongly demonstrated by Peter Wagner. We are constantly facing the risk of being unaware of this dependency. Our work is to design more general tools. This is what I try to do, coming from On Justification to these three constructions of commonality in the plural. Now, speaking of Goffman and his sophisticated sociology of the public and boundaries with the private, which I do really appreciate, I became more and more conscious from comparative studies of its dependency on the liberal construction of the public. I do not want to say that everything comes from it. But I regularly noticed in his work a bias in favor of the civility required by the liberal public construction of the common through individuals in the public. They need such a smooth and "cheerful" civility because they are much more exposed to sentiments of aggression from other alien individuals, than when persons invests orders of worth or common places. Let's take this third model and the case of Russia where it is much used. Well, from the view of Westerners, people there might be viewed as rude. This is so, precisely because some form of personal authenticity would be more required. Thus, for them, we are nothing but hypocrites. Which is true, you know, as explained in the very nice paper by Judith Shklar, on political hypocrisy,17 it is something highly needed by the detachment of the public. So, as scholars, we are always too dependent on our context, and we try to be less and look for more comprehensive models. With such models, I try to capture structural tensions raised by living together and human responses to assuage these tensions. Tensions between engaging in sources of confidence based on commonality, and sources based on highly personal experience. Tensions between quietude and inquietude within each engagement. I would not necessarily call these tensions contradictions, as Luc does in his remarkable La condition foetale and since.18 He had already this idea when we worked together. And my position is the following. Contradiction assumes the formality, the public formalization of logics. And, as you might have understood from the whole story of the sociology I have developed, the making of formality has been a

from Breviglieri's original sociology of "inhabiting" another collective program involving the cited authors documented parallel experiential paths towards liberal commonality within urban squats: Breviglieri, M. (2009), 'Habitations of a new kind: The urban squat and the possibility of negotiated conflict on quality of life', in Pattaroni, L., Rabinovich, A. & Kaufmann, V. (eds.), Habitat en devenir, Lausanne, Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes. 17 J. Shklar (1979), 'Let Us Not Be Hypcritical', in: Daedalus, 108:3, pp .1-25. 18 L. Boltanski (2004), La condition foetale: Une sociologie de l'avortement et de l'engendrement, Gallimard.

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key issue from the very beginning, it should not be a given. Of course, there are contradictions, I do not want to ignore that, but only at the level of the most public formalization, and we have to work also on lower levels. PB By way of a concluding question, you have recently explicitly related to the American pragmatic tradition19, in particular the work of John Dewey. American pragmatism had not been at the forefront of French pragmatism in any explicit way before, and, if I am not mistaken, does not seem to have been a major source of inspiration for developing On Justification. What are your reasons for turning to Dewey now, and what new insights has it generated? AB In a related way, you speak about playing with formats, how does this relate to pragmatism? LT If playing with formats suggests the pluralism in American pragmatism, I agree with you. By the way, there is an interesting and critical paper about the recent introduction of American pragmatism in the French sociology of the public, which points to what it left over.20 Paul is right too, there was no direct link between On Justification and American pragmatism, because we ignored it, which is a shame, but it was the case! I read the American pragmatists after On Justification, when working in the US on the comparative research.I am further sure that Hans Joas played a role in focusing my attention on it. When he wrote very few sociologists referred to pragmatism in France. But, we had a certain inheritance through American sociologists. The key category of test has something to do with pragmatism, but we rather knew it from either Bruno Latour or from the bridging experiments by Garfinkel or and even relating to Goffman's work.21 But the tests for worth, or even the testing moment of the engagement on the side of inquietude, contrast to the purely naturalistic orientation towards adjustment which is very strong in Dewey. We were inheritors somehow, but at the same time we were explicitly inheriting the Durkheim tradition which goes in another direction. I think it was the tension between the two which was fruitful.

About the authors

Laurent Thvenot is Directeur dtudes of the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences
19 L. Thvenot (2011), 'Powers and oppressions viewed from the Sociology of Engagements in comparison with Bourdieu's and Dewey's critical approaches of practical activities', in: special issue on "Key Issues in Contemporary Social Theory", Irish Journal of Sociology, 19:1. 20 J. Stavo-Debauge et D. Trom (2004), 'Le pragmatisme et son public lpreuve du terrain; penser avec Dewey contre Dewey', in: Karsenti, B., Qur, L. (dir.), La croyance et l'enqute. Aux sources du pragmatisme, Paris, Ed. Ehess (Raisons Pratiques 15), pp.195-226. 21 The reason why Cyril Lemieux brought together, in spite of their strong differences, the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation sociology of innovation (issued from Latour and Callon) and the Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale pragmatic sociology (issued from Boltanski and Thvenot) under the denomination "sociology of test" (sociologie des preuves) www.archivesaudiovisuelles.fr/343/liste_conf.asp

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Sociales (Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale, GSPM) and Senior researcher at the Institut National de la Statistique et des tudes conomiques, Paris (Laboratoire de Sociologie Quantitative). Paul Blokker is a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy. Andrea Brighenti is a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy.

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