Some Unconventional Wisdom

J. Peter Pbam

Ian Bremmer, The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 320 pp., $26.00. Charles Pena, Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 272 pp., $27.95.

IVEN CURRENT eventsthe disappointing lack of progress (if not backsliding) in Afghanistan, the de facto sectarian and ethnic civil war in Iraq, and the difficulties the United States faces in obtaining an international consensus on how to deal with the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Koreait is rather ironic that it is realism, rather than other schools of international relations, which labors imder something of a cloud. Nonetheless, it is realistssuccinctly defined by Eliot Cohen in a Wall Street Journal op-ed last December as those who "believe that in foreign pohcy what matters is the national interest coolly calculated, the relationships of power, and the incurable nastiness of the human condition" {N.B. the good professor did not intend this characterization to be viewed favorably)^who find themselves assailed by both cosmopolitans on the left and neoconservatives on the right, both accusing them of varying types of amorality, if not worse. It was not supposed to be this way. Realists had hopes that, after the repeat114-

ed failures of forays into nation-building and the humiliatingly ineffective response to real threats of terrorism under the Clinton Administration, George W. Bush would preside over a reordering of America's international priorities. During his campaign for the presidency in 2000, Bush was unrelenting in his criticism of the Clinton Administration's commitment of U.S. military forces to nationbuilding exercises in places like Somalia and Haiti which, according to the Republican presidential candidate, were at best peripheral to America's core strategic interests. During his second debate with Al Gore, Bush responded to a question concerning the use of American soldiers for such "humanitarian interventions":
It started off as a humanitarian mission and it changed into a nation-building mission, and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price. And so I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win a war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow the dictator when it's in our best interest. But in this case it was a nation-building exercise and same with Haiti. I wouldn't have supported either.

Earlier in the campaign, the day before the Republican primary in Iowa, Bush told ABC's This Week that he would have been unwilling to commit American troops even in the event of a repeat of

.The National InterestSept./Oa. 2006-

the Rwandan genocide, unless clear U.S. ligent works, and quite a few downright interests were at stake: "We should not unintelligible volumesPena's work is send our troops to stop ethnic cleanscharacterized by neither a militant antiing and genocide in nations outside our Americanism nor a reflexive pacifism. strategic interest. I don't like genocide The author argues: "Even if Iraq posand I don't like ethnic cleansing, but the sessed chemical or biological weapons president must set clear parameters as (which was a fair assumption) or even to where troops ought to be used and a nuclear weapon (which was a stretch when they ought to be used." In fact. of the imagination), it did not have the Bush argued that foreign policy under long-range military capability to strike Clinton had become divorced from the the United States and thus pose a dicountry's interests, resulting in "action rect threat." What of the United Nations without vision, activity without priority, resolutions that Saddam Hussein clearly and missions without endan approach fiaunted? Eor someone who works inside that squanders American will and drains the Washington beltway, Pena is refi-eshAmerican energy." Many realists agreed ingly blunt, if rather unconventional, in and looked forward to a salutary change his riposte: "Even if Iraq was in violation in the conduct of foreign policy to be anof UN resolutions, the U.S. military exists ticipated with the return to Washington to defend the United States: its territoof "adults" like Condoleezza Rice, Richrial integrity and national sovereignty, its ard Armitage and Dov Zakheim, after population, and the liberties that vmderlie the wunderkind had been allowed to run the American way of life." amuck during the Clinton years. It goes If defense of the patria is the principal without saying that, six years later, forpurpose of maintaining nation's military eign policy realists are generally dismayed strengthand one would be hard-pressed with what they have ended up with. What to disagree with Penaand Al-Qaeda they have done with their disappointand its loose network of allies represent ment, however, has varied. the most significant threat, what is a realSome have opted for the critical ist to prescribe for the situation that the route. In Winning the Un-War: A New United States finds itself in, with some Strategy for the War on Terrorism, Charles 130,000 military personnel presently staPena, the former director of defense politioned in Iraq and taking casualties from cy studies at the libertarian Cato Institute anti-regime insurgents and foreign terand now senior fellow with the Coalition rorists as well as the crossfire of an undefor a Realistic Eoreign Policy, essentially clared civil war? It is here that Pena's artchronicles the story of realists' growing fully constructed case not only begins to disenchantment with the Bush Adminfray, it also diverges from the principles istration, especially after 9/11. Deconof realism. structing the "global war on terrorism" Pena advocates a vigorous defense of that has come to define the Bush presithe United States against its foes in the dency, Pena presents a provocative but "War on Terrorism." Eirst, he argues, well-documented indictment of current the enemy must be defined in order to be U.S. foreign policy, as well as the policytargeted. Eor Pena, the enemy that truly makers responsible for shaping it. threatens America is Al-Qaeda and, to Unlike other critiques of the admina certain extent, those Islamists groups istration's stewardship of American interaligned with it. He cautions against castests abroada veritable cottage industry ing the net much wider since, while all these days consisting of some intelligent acts of terrorism are unjustifiable, not all contributions, a great many not-so-intelterrorist organizations represent direct
.Books ir Reviews.

.US

threats to the United States (the author cites the Basque group ETA by way of illustration). Pena goes on to signal another folly: perceiving Al-Qaeda "in organizational terms as a centralized hierarchy, much like an organized crime family", which can be collapsed by decapitating the leadership. While Osama bin Laden and his top deputies are important targets, the terrorist group's distributed and cellular network must be dismantled piece by piece over the long term. Thus, Pena posits that the war in Iraq creates a "dangerous distraction"and it should be noted that he was a critic of the conflict long before it became fashionableby diverting the country's attention from the inch-by-inch war America should be waging against its real "enemy at the gates."

international geopolitical grand strategy. Although he holds an adjunct position at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and is a contributing editor of The National Interest, Bremmer comes more directly from the world of business, where he heads the Eurasia Group, a global political risk advisory and consulting firm based in New York. Hence it is not surprising that The J Curve combines botb realist concerns for national interests with the contemporary business world's demand for effective modeling.

J-curves themselves are not new to the social sciences. They have been used to plot the dangers inherent in gaps between rising expectations and actual experiences, trade deficits and currency values, and a whole host of other political and economic data of interest. Bremmer Pena then takes a strategic gamble, uses this tool to model the relationship generally dismissing the alleged links bebetween the stability of states (the vertitween Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's cal axis) and their political and economic Ba'athi regimea potential misstep, openness (the horizontal axis). The data given the masses of documents yet to points for a cross section of countries be translated, much less analyzed. And produce a J-shaped curve: nations to the he fails to address the reahty with which left of the curve's dip being less open, napolicymakers have to deal: regardless of tions to the right being more open; those how it became that way, Iraq today is the higher on the graph being more stable, central front in the War on Terror. Likethose lower less stable. As a general rule, wise, the author's proposition that "moderating" U.S. support for both "apostate" countries on the left of the curve depend on powerful individual leaders for their Muslim governments and Israel would stability, while those on the right depend remedy the hatred of Al-Qaeda and likeon strong institutions. Movement along minded groups towards the United States the curve plots a descent into the dip of is left disappointingly vague and facile instability. (even were it not highly questionable): recall that arguably no American adminBremmer demonstrates his frameistration has pushed as hard as Bill Clinwork by closely examining twelve counton's to achieve a Palestinian state and tries at various points on the curve yet it was at that very time that Al-Qaeda North Korea, Cuba, Saddam Hussein's gathered its forces for the 9/11 attacks. Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, South If the "critical realism" in Pena's work Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Israel, India and Chinaand analyzing raises some very significant questions the pressures and motivations that infiuwithout quite providing the satisfactory ence these countries' leaders given their answers, the "analytical realism" in Ian Bremmer's The J Curve: A New Way to relative position and, consequently, how Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall of- realistic policymakers should interpret the challenges posed by their regimes. fers some tools for constructing a realistic
116-The National InterestSept./Oct. 2006-

While the author's intent is to provide an analytical tool rather than a grand architecture, his model does dispel some of the cliched aspersions often cast at realists: Cohen, in his December op-ed, for example, characterized realists as those who beheve that "domestic politics, including massacre or mere repression, is no one else's business." Bremmer points out that, thanks to the forces of globalization, states on the right side of the J curve "must be more concerned than ever by the internal developments within left-side states. Social unrest in China, the Saudi education system, a security vacuum in Afghanistan, ethnic tensions in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta, and market volatility in Argentina each have a more immediate impact on geopolitics and economics than ever before." Hence, while the most powerful agents for change in any society must emerge from within, states on the right side of the curve have political, economic and security intereststo say nothing of moral stakesin assisting the movement of states on the left side of the curve through the dip of instability. "Assistance", of course, ought not to be construed as a euphemism for "regime change." Bremmer argues that globalization, with its complex flows of goods, services, technologies and information, undermines the ability of authoritarian regimes to isolate their peoples and provides citizens with the opportunity to build private wealth, a solid first crack in the edifice of totalitarianism. On the other hand, Bremmer acknowledges the downside of globalization: It can also be tremendously destabilizing, especially when an ill-prepared country is pushed into the unstable depths of the curve. Should this happen, citizens may demand a return to stability, even at the expense of openness. Or, worse yet, the state may collapse altogether. Consequently, Bremmer sounds a cautionary note about the active promo-

tion of democratization as a U.S. foreign policy, whether it is carried out by hard military power, as was the case in Iraq, or via the "soft power" of political pressure and public diplomacy:
[T]he strategy is dangerous precisely because the Bush administration hasn't fully articulated how states that aren't ready for the transition can withstand the buffeting they'll face in the depths of the curve. Foreign policymaking is not an abstraction, and a one-size-fits-all approach is doomed to failure.

The constructive solution is for rightside states to pursue a strategy of raising the entire curve for left-side states: more stable countries are better able to withstand the stress of the movement towards greater openness. The example Bremmer invokes is that of the generally wise and largely bipartisan U.S. support for integrating China into the global economy:
[T]he best way to undermine China's police state remains a strategy that helps build a Chinese middle class and binds China's economic future and political stability to rules-based international institutions. Helping the Chinese Communist Party create prosperity within China fortifies its citizens to demand change from their government and increases the probability that China can survive its transition with as little instability as possible . . . Hundreds of millions of Chinese people, thanks to the economic reforms that have lifted them toward a middle class, now have a greater stake in protecting China's future, even as they dismantle China's past. Raising the curve also means that a new government will have the resources to maintain a new political order as China goes about the difficult business of opening and restructuring its society. In other words, economic reform prepares the ground for stable political reform.

This approach also opens the way for

-Books & Reviews.

a more balancedbut still realistapof-the-J-curve neighborhood. But if the praisal of the Bush Administration's forU.S.-led coalition should fail, demand eign policy. Clearly, as Bremmer notes, for security among ordinary Iraqis will "winning the global war on terror is imtrump demand for an open society, and perative for the stability of the right-side left-side-of-the-J-curve rule might well states that are under attack." Corollary return to Iraq." to this is the fact that dismantling terrorEven at this juncture in the Bush ist cells and strengthening the counterpresidency, it might not be too late for it terrorism capacity of weak states both to redeem its earlier promise. The realist raises these countries' curves and edges critique of Charles Pena raises questions them toward the right-side of the curve. that highlight the stakes in U.S. commitThe administration's favoring of conments overseas, while the realist analysis ditioned foreign aid through initiatives of Ian Bremmer offers the tools both for like the Millennium Challenge Account, crafting policy solutions and assessing which ties development assistance to obtheir possible outcomes. As American forjective criteria for economic and politieign policy navigates through the shoals cal reform, is an excellent example of of the coming years, it might well be that implementing the constructive solution. much-maligned realism alone offers the What is arguably the most pressing forclarity of vision necessary to safely steer eign policy challenge facing the United the ship of state. D Statesthe battle in Iraq against foreign terrorists and local insurgentscan like- J. Peter Pham is director of the Nelson Institute wise be assessed using the model offered for International and Public Affairs at James by Bremmer's J Curve: "Winning this war Madison University and an adjunct fellow of could help establish a right-side-of-thethe Foundation for the Defense of Democracurve state in the middle of a left-sidecies.

-The National InterestSept./Oct. 2006-