How did the relationship between Joe McCarthy and the American press contribute to the rise, as well

as the fall, of McCarthy and the anticommunist panic? One may argue that both used each other for their own agendas. At first, McCarthy utilized the press to spread his anti-communist agenda across the airwaves, since no journalist was willing to or capable of standing up against him. However, as McCarthy became more offensive, the press responded by beginning a vehement backlash against McCarthy, who was thus thrust into obscurity. Arthur Herman, author of Joseph McCarthy, argues that both McCarthy and the press used each other, but his critics often used the same tactics for which they criticized him against him. Herman believes that McCarthy was bringing to the publics attention a good point, but the manner in which he went about publicizing his ideas were in poor taste and eventually caused his decline. David Oshinsky, author of A Conspiracy so Immense, argues that a combination of the sensationalistic headlines that McCarthy created and McCarthys intimidation tactics made him famous. He muddled the line between objective and subjective journalism, and, as a result, many reporters lost touch with their role in the news industry, and questioned to what extent were they required to provide the public with balanced news. A fierce anti-communist movement in the United States accompanied the Cold War. After the development of devastating nuclear weapons, many Americans feared that the rivalry between themselves and the Communist Soviet Union would result in destruction and violence of great proportions. Although the government created the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938 to uncover Soviet spies, it soon criticized any group or individual that resembled or was slightly linked to communism. Joe McCarthy was an Wisconsin senator who seemed like an unlikely candidate to emerge as the symbol of anti-communism in America. He first gained recognition when he delivered an extremely controversial speech in Wheeling, West

Virginia. In this speech, he claimed that he possessed a list of hundreds of communists who had infiltrated the United States government. He also argued that Roosevelts and Trumans policies were tolerant of Communist expansion overseas and damaged national security by allowing Communist spies to enter the country. McCarthys fearless personality brought him great notoriety throughout America. To discredit his opponents, McCarthy suggested that anyone who supported the Communist Party was anti-American. As a result, initial efforts to dispel McCarthy from the government, such as the Tydings Committee, were denounced as pro-Communist endeavors. McCarthy had even asserted that General Marshall, a deeply admired American war hero, could have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor. He also criticized General Marshall and Trumans Secretary of State Dean Acheson for the United States passiveness during the communist takeover of China. Yet, his candidness appealed to Americans who believed that the mere existence of Communist ideology in America challenged traditional American values and posed a threat to national security. The press was largely uncritical of McCarthy, but there were many notable journalists, such as Drew Pearson, Elmer Davis and Stewart Alsop, who spoke out against him. In 1953, McCarthy was named chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), which had the power to investigate misconduct and corruption in the government. He appointed Roy Cohn, the lawyer who helped to expose the notorious Soviet spies Jules and Ethel Rosenberg, as the chief counsel of the board. Cohn, with McCarthys permission, appointed Gerard David Schine, a wealthy, young Harvard University graduate, to the subcommittee staff. After Schine was drafted to the Army in Fort Dix, New Jersey, to serve his compulsory military service, Cohn lobbied tenaciously for Schines preferential treatment. Consequently, Schine was given less demanding duties and more leisurely excursions from the military base than his counterparts had received. Frustrated with McCarthy and Cohn, military

leaders reassigned Schine to a base in distant Georgia. Outraged, McCarthy, in retaliation, called General Zwicker, who had received top honors for his role in World War II, before the PSI. He called him unfit for command because he had allowed Irving Peress, an army dentist who had had loose Communist affiliations, to serve in the army before he had been given honorable discharge. McCarthys cruel and inappropriate treatment of Zwicker angered and shocked many military officers. After this encounter with Zwicker, CBS aired Edward R. Murrows famous critique on McCarthy, which significantly and permanently damaged McCarthys reputation. The government quietly hired a man named John Adams to gather evidence of every time that McCarthy and Cohn had, often threateningly, appealed to the Army for special treatment for Schine. When the Adams report was released, McCarthy responded that army officials were threatening to destroy Schine if McCarthy did not suspend his examination of the Army. At this point, the roles had been switched. McCarthy stepped down as chairman of the PSI and was put on trial against the U.S. Army, who was represented by the Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens. These trials made up the famous televised Army-McCarthy hearings. McCarthys career and reputation were completely destroyed after the Adams Report was released. The decision to censure McCarthy for his tasteless treatment of General Zwicker and his acts of disdain towards the Senate was highly favorable with the Senate, especially due to the return of a Demoratic majority in the Senate in 1954. Arthur Herman argues that both Joseph McCarthys bold personality and confidence in his claims enticed journalists contributed to his rise, but he was undermined by the many reporters who stooped to tactics of smear and innuendo in order to give McCarthy the appearance of a fool. Herman strongly defends McCarthy because he agrees with his political views. Unlike most historians, he claims that Joseph McCarthy was making a good point

badly.1 He argues that the post-World War II Communist threat was enhanced by the New Deal liberalism[that was] unable to deal effectively with the kind of ideological challenged communism representedthanks to [its] seemingly fatal attraction to the goals and aimsof communism.2 Thus, Herman believes that McCarthys response to the development of the New Deal and the expanding role of government was an appropriate one, though his methods were not. Herman also argues that the American media used McCarthy for its own purposes, in both the short term and for its own greater glory in the long haul.3 McCarthy knew exactly how to make use of the press as a medium for his anti-communist message, but those of the press were not totally clueless. Editors realized that McCarthy was excellent copy4 because he often made broad, scandalous claims, which were proclaimed news whether or not they were true. McCarthy was utterly fearless and willing to take on anyoneand fight any battle he thought worth fighting5 because he was fully dedicated to eliminating the looming threat of Communism. Many reporters were merely fascinated by McCarthys eccentric character. Yet, it is fitting that McCarthys zealous character would cause considerable and marked divisiveness. Although some notable papers such as the Chicago Tribune and the New York Journal-American were considered McCarthy supporters, the opponents were generally considered to be more esteemed than the supporters, if not more numerous. McCarthy opponents disagreed with the manner in which he attempted to verify his claims. McCarthy often used smear and innuendo6 in order to justify his charges, which were often backed with out of date or inadequate evidence.

Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 100. 2 Ibid, 88. 3 Ibid, 230. 4 Ibid, 231. 5 Ibid, 237. 6 Ibid, 230.

Determined to defeat McCarthy and the dire threat that he placed upon American liberty,7 many journalists condescended to what they considered McCarthys level in order to diminish his influence. Drew Pearson, an outspoken critic of McCarthy, ran fictitious stories about McCarthys alleged homosexual affair, accused McCarthy of anti-Semitism and seriously intensified the scandal between McCarthy and the U.S. Army. David Schine had initially delayed his compulsory military service due to serious back injuries, but Pearson successfully and aggressively intimidated military leaders into reevaluating Schines medical condition and, accordingly, his capability to serve in the military. Deemed healthy enough to serve, Schine was subsequently enlisted in the army. Herman suggests that Robert T. Stevens, the Secretary of the Army, inquired about Schines preferential treatment in order to distract McCarthy from exploring Irving Peresss ambiguous history. The problem with Peress was not simply that he was a communist, but that he had been permitted to stay in the army and had been promoted to major, in clear violation of the law.8 McCarthy called General Zwicker to testify and angrily lashed out against the Armys incapability to identify Communists within their ranks, which compromised national security. His mistreatment of Zwicker, combined with the newly leaked Adams Report created a frenzy around McCarthy. Edward R. Murrows See It Now program on McCarthy did not exist to educate the public: it served simply to attack McCarthys character. Murrows producers had employed the same methods of partial truth9 that they had accused McCarthy of using . Yet, critics of Murrow praised him for his reproach of McCarthy, and the public responded very favorably to the program. The result was devastating. McCarthy lost all his influence because suddenly everything [he] said was automatically a lie and everything his

7 8

Ibid, 237 Ibid, 248. 9 Ibid, 253.

opponents said was automatically true.10 Although McCarthys reputation had already been destroyed, the infamous, televised Army-McCarthy hearings only worsened his public image. Unfortunately, many of his mannerisms, such as his sardonic humor, did not translate to television audiences.11 McCarthy was attracted to the powerful medium of television that would cause his ultimate demise. Herman suggests that the press took every chance they had during the hearings to shame McCarthy. He had brought as evidence a letter from the FBI that justified his investigation of Fort Monmouth. Joseph Welch, the head counsel for the U.S. Army at the time, questioned where McCarthy had obtained this confidential document. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, sent in a statement that the document that McCarthy possessed was not the original that he had sent, because the letter did not bear his signature. Though Hoover did not directly say that the contents of the letter had been altered from those of the one that he had sent12 , the press understood this statement as proof that McCarthy and Cohn were using counterfeit documents to substantiate their claims. However, both McCarthy and Cohn admitted that they had performed poorly in these trials. Cohn once even outrageously claimed that the Pentagon had used Schine as a hostage to encourage McCarthy to discontinue his investigations of the Army. This ridiculous claim, backed by faulty evidence, destroyed all of his credibility and made McCarthy seem foolish as well. McCarthys effectiveness as a political and anticommunist crusader had been shattered by the televised hearings.13 After the ArmyMcCarthy hearings, the Wisconsin senator had lost all of his integrity and credibility, and was further disgraced when he was censured by the U.S. Senate. He quietly moved back to Wisconsin

10 11

Ibid, 254. Ibid, 260. 12 Ibid, 268. 13 Ibid, 639.

where he battled with alcoholism for the rest of his life, and he was no longer considered relevant by the press. In the biography A Conspiracy so Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy, historian David Oshinsky describes how the Wisconsin senator benefitted from the presss responsibility to stay objective and recognizes McCarthys willingness to intimidate the press for coverage. In the 1950s, all the major, ten best14 newspapers had a moderate outlook and were therefore opposed to spreading McCarthys radical ideology. By reporting McCarthys claims as news, they believed that they would be violating their commitment towards bipartisanship. Journalists were helpless: they acted simply as conveyor belts for material they knew to be false.15 However, they could not simply ignore him, because he had garnered so much influence in America and was a key player in the anti-communist movement. The journalist Richard Rovere argued that allowing the readers to make the decision to accept or deny McCarthys charges was like saying that if a restaurant serves a diner a poisoned meal, it is the diners choice to either eat or not eat it.16 In order to combat this quandary, the Milwaukee Journal and a few other newspapers shifted their editorial page to the front, which allowed them to publicly scrutinize McCarthy. While some reporters were frustrated with McCarthys alleged radicalism, others were quite fond of McCarthy because they got their story [while] Joe got his publicity.17 Sensationalistic journalism was the best way to sell newspapers because shocking headlines grabbed the attention and interest of readers. Journalists were grateful for McCarthys accessibility because he helped them ameliorate their own prominence. He knew exactly how to manipulate the press for his own purposes, and was, essentially, a publicity genius who
14 15

David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy so Immense (New York: Free Press, 1983), 182. Ibid, 186. 16 Ibid, 187. 17 Ibid, 188.

understood how the press worked and was able to exploit its weaknesses.18 Many reporters were also genuinely fascinated by McCarthy. Despite reporters genuine interest in him, McCarthy used intimidation tactics in order to garner his fame. He unsuccessfully attempted to blackmail Phil Potter, a Baltimore Sun correspondent, after he wrote an unfavorable article about him. McCarthy also sent letters to many newspapers condemning the Associated Press for biased coverage after Marvin Arrowsmith published some pieces critical of McCarthy. After this incident, Arrowsmith published a pro-McCarthy article in the Associated Press. Oshinsky evidences the hostile relations between McCarthy and journalist Drew Pearson to question whether McCarthy had been engaged in a campaign to silence his journalistic critics.19 McCarthy and Pearson had not always disliked each other: before their rivalry, McCarthy had even helped Pearson gain access to information that he would not otherwise have had at his disposal. However, Pearson attacked McCarthy in his column for his speech in Wheeling, and after that point tensions escalated to the point where the men were even involved in a brawl. Pearson himself was not known to be very accommodating. One reason many people were afraid to criticize McCarthy was because he was a fearless opponent. McCarthy portrayed the differences between the critic and himself as ideological; he attempted to maximize the critics discomfort; and he never backed away from a fight.20 Perhaps that is the reason why, amidst the anti-communist hysteria, any newsperson who persisted in criticizing the senator could expect to be labeled a Communist dupe, a degenerate or both.21 Oftentimes, McCarthys liberal critics who condemned his name-calling did the same to McCarthy. Nevertheless, the worst criticisms of McCarthy would only come after the Army-McCarthy hearings. These hearings were very

18 19

Ibid, 186. Ibid, 182. 20 Ibid, 183. 21 Ibid, 183.

popular among the American people. In the first week of the hearings, two thirds of the American population with television sets were tuned in to the hearings.22 Oshinsky argues that the popularity of the Army-McCarthy hearings meant that the press lost interest in more important national affairs such as Brown vs. Board of Education. The most devastating blow to McCarthys reputation was his angry criticism of young Frederick Fisher, assistant to lawyer Joseph Welch, who had once been part of the subversive National Lawyers Guild. Having discovered Fishers former association with the National Lawyers Guild, McCarthy, instead of defending himself, attacked Fishers character in court. Many people were appalled by McCarthy. Wisconsin newspapers which had often been sympathetic to McCarthy described his actions during the Army-McCarthy hearings as brutal and unwarranted. His popularity among the American people sharply dropped. The Louisville Courier Journal concluded that Senator McCarthy has shown himself to be evil and unmatched in malice, which came to be the general consensus of McCarthy.23 McCarthy slowly became less and less relevant. Before his censure, reporters hungry for a new story would follow McCarthy around. Yet, following his censure vote, he was completely disregarded. Two reporters from Newsweek, Willard Edwards and Sam Shaffer spoke of a press blackout- a conscious decision that McCarthy was no longer news.24 McCarthy had been humiliated and degraded before the American people, and he had no way to redeem himself. While David Oshinsky is committed to portraying Joseph McCarthy in a relatively impartial light, Arthur Herman is instead more dedicated to endeavoring to rehabilitate McCarthys reputation after many years of criticisms. Herman seems to generally justify

22 23

Ibid, 417. Ibid, 417. 24 Ibid, 496.

McCarthys actions while condemning those of his critics, and only rarely takes into account the counter-argument against McCarthy. Herman argues that the Democrats attacks against McCarthy stemmed from a mixture of frustrationand fear.25 As McCarthy does, Herman portrays the difference [between him and the critic] as ideological.26 He loses the value and the consequence of what McCarthys critics are saying, because he often just denounces their statements as slurs of McCarthys character. Although Herman suggests that McCarthy manipulated the press for coverage, he also believes that the press similarly used McCarthy because his headlines attracted readers. He claims the press used McCarthy for its own purposes, but never says directly that McCarthy used the press, only that he knew how the press worked better than most. On the other hand, while Oshinsky recognizes that McCarthys assertions sometimes turned out to be true, such as when he discovered that Americans were helping to supply communist China, he knows that many of McCarthys claims were false and contained faulty information, or that which had already been investigated. He acknowledges that reporters had become angry with McCarthy because he had spread, whether knowingly or not, many falsehoods, and they felt helpless because they were incapable of imparting their version of the truth.27 When McCarthy had made accusations, they had become news whether or not his evidence was valid, and oftentimes journalists did not have enough time to verify his claims before they were published. As a result, these reporters were trapped in a cycle of what they believed to be dishonesty. Oshinsky, therefore, more completely understands the relationship between Joseph McCarthy and the press because he sees through an unbiased lens.

25

Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 102. 26 David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy so Immense (New York: Free Press, 1983), 183. 27 Ibid, 186.

That Joseph McCarthy became such an influential figure and had such strong connections with the press does serve as evidence of the fact that McCarthy understood the inner workings of the press, and how to manipulate it. Yet, one can only learn from this relationship that journalists must stick to their convictions. Instead of fueling and tolerating falsehoods, they should be bold and acknowledge dishonesty. Although the public should be able to decide for themselves what is just, they should be entitled to knowledge of what is the truth. They should not, as Drew Pearson did, smear figures they did not like with scandalous stories that may or may not be true. Instead, journalists should use the most powerful tool: reason.

Bibliography
Herman, Arthur. Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. Arthur Herman is an American historian who is less critical of McCarthy than other historians are. He does not believe McCarthy's actions are fully justified, but he acknowledges that there were communists in the government at the time and they did pose a threat to American society.

Hillstrom, Kevin. McCarthy and the Communist Threat. Detroit: Omnigraphics, 2011. This source provided as a reference for my study of McCarthy. It laid out the information in a clear and unbiased manner, which allowed me to understand the McCarthys background and see how the historians opinions affected how they wrote his biography.

Oshinsky, David M. A Conspiracy so Immense. New York: Free Press, 1983. David Oshinsky is an American historian and a graduate from Cornell who shares with most other historians the generally severe view of McCarthy. Oshinsky still shows some sympathy for McCarthys plight and what he sees as his need for attention.