Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Hylomorphism in Aristotle Author(s): Charlotte Witt Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 11, Eighty-Fourth Annual Meeting American Philosphical Association, Eastern Division (Nov., 1987), pp. 673-679 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026773 . Accessed: 17/12/2011 01:16
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

673

HYLOMORPHISM IN ARISTOTLE*
WA

HAT is the relationshipbetween form and matter in an

Aristotelian composite substance? The interpretation of hylomorphism I develop below is based on two ideas. First, matter and form should be understood in terms of potentiality and actuality; second, potentiality and actuality should be understood adverbially, as ways of being. Very briefly, my interpretation holds that matter is one way of being the composite substance, and form is another way of being it. This understanding of matter and form solves the problem of the unity of the composite substance, because actuality determines potentiality for Aristotle. The bulk of this paper is devoted to spelling out what might be meant by "ways of being," and how it is that actuality "determines" potentiality. In Aristotle's discussion of being in Metaphysics v, 7, the distinction between actual and potential being is presented last. Aristotle tells us that the distinction applies to the other three divisions of being: essential being, accidental being, and being as true and false (101 7a35). To see what Aristotle might have in mind, let us consider essential being. Essential being is mapped out by categorical predications, e.g., "Socrates is a human being." If we apply the distinction to the categorical predication, we get: "Socrates is potentially a human being," and "Socrates is actually a human being." But what does it mean to say that something is potentially a human being? Is it a human being or not? And what does it mean to say that something is actually a human being? How does that assertion differ from simply saying that something is a human being? In the brief text we are considering, Aristotle illustrates the potentiality/actuality distinction as follows: For we say both of that which sees potentiallyand of that which sees actually,that it is seeing, and both of that whichcan use knowledgeand of that which is using it, that it knows,and both of that to whichrest is in alreadypresentand of that whichcan rest, that it rests.And similarly the case of substanceswe say that Hermesis in the stone and the half of the line is in the line, and we sayof thatwhichis not yet ripe thatit is corn (1017b2-9).

* To be presented in an APA symposiumon Aristotle's Metaphysics,December 30, 1987. EdwardHalper will be co-symposiast,and Sarah W. Broadie will comment. See this JOURNAL, this issue, 666-672 and 679-681, respectively,for their contributions. 0022-362X/87/8411/0673$00.70 1987 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

674

THE JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY

The first set of contrasts is between a capacity and its exercise. A person who has knowledge has a certain capacity. In relation to the exercise of that knowledge, the person is a potential knower. Here, the person who is an actual knower is a person exercising that capacity. Let us group together these sorts of examples of potentiality and actuality under the label capacity and exercise (CE for short). In relation to these examples, what we mean when we say "Socrates is actually a human being" is that he is exercising his capacity for being human. He is in action. Aristotle next lists several examples of substances; unripe corn is potentially corn, when it ripens it is actually corn. This example invites us to think of, not a capacity and its exercise, but a continuum of directed development. Unripe corn is corn potentially-it is in process toward its end which is being corn actually. Mature corn is corn actually-it is in its end. If I were a German philosopher, I would call this application of potentiality and actuality beingtoward-its-end and being-in-its-end. Instead, I group together these examples of potentiality and actuality under the label process and end (PE for short). In relation to these examples, what we mean when we say "Socrates is actually a human being" is that Socrates has fully achieved that set of capacities which a mature human being has. Of the youthful Socrates, the Socrates who lacks the distinctively human capacity to philosophize, we would say "Socrates is potentially a human being." It should be noted that, in our text, Aristotle stresses the similarity of the PE examples to the CE examples rather than their differences (101 7b6). How is the relationship between unripe corn and mature corn like the relationship between a capacity and its exercise? Here we must distinguish two capacities: the capacity for becoming corn and the capacity for being corn. The capacity for becoming corn is the capacity the seedling has to grow, develop, and ripen. The capacity to develop into ripe corn is one which the seedling has only so long as it is potentially, and not actually, ripe. The potentiality for becoming corn is used up in the corn's development. Hence, the potentiality for becoming corn differs from the relationship between a capacity and its exercise. The potentiality for becoming corn perishes as the seedling ripens, but a person retains the capacity for sight even while she is seeing. This observation suggests that Aristotle is thinking rather about the seedling's capacity for being corn. The seedling's capacity for being ripe corn is a potentiality the corn has to achieve an end. This capacity is exercised when the corn is ripe and mature, just as a person's capacity for sight is exercised when she sees. The cases are

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

675

similar, because in neither is the capacity used up in the exercise. These points suggest that potentiality and actuality in connection with being are not used in an analysis of the changes or motions that entities undergo. It is not the motion of ripening which Aristotle is trying to explain by contrasting unripe and ripe corn, and calling one "potential" and the other "actual," but rather different ways of being corn. This is an important point, because potentiality and actuality do figure centrally in Aristotle's analysis of motion, and so it would be easy to misunderstand his point. If the ripening corn example of potentiality and actuality is not understood in terms of an analysis of the motion of ripening, then another set of questions arise concerning the meaning of the distinction. What does Aristotle mean by distinguishing different ways of being corn or being human? Why does he make this distinction? Why not just stick to austere categorical being, and say of the unripe corn and the child what we would say, namely that it is corn or a human being? The answer to this question is that Aristotle thinks of these sorts of beings-composite substances-as being en route to their respective ends. Beings that are en route are just beings at differing levels of potentiality or actuality. Here again it is important not to take his point as being about the route, the series of motions which accomplish the perfection of the corn or the human. Rather, with the notions of potentiality and actuality, Aristotle expresses ontological relations among the beings at different stages, from a perspective in which the stages are all directed toward a series of ends. The phrase 'directed toward a series of ends' is important. For, viewing the life of a human being as comprised of a succession of stages, youth, middle age, old age, does not have any obvious ontological implications. If all you mean by saying that a youth is potentially middleaged is that the former stage preceeds the latter, then a young person differs from an older person only by temporal position. On this view, the earlier stage is fully what it is quite independently of the later stage. For Aristotle, however, there is a connection between the stages, because the way the entity is what it is in the earlier stage is determined by a later stage, an actuality. The stages are determined by the overall end of the progression. So, the youthful Socrates is potentially human, where what it is to be human is given in the final actuality, the activity of a mature human being. I said that the being of the entity in the earlier stage is determined by a correlated end. What sort of determination is in question here? In Metaphysics IX, 9, Aristotle tells us that actuality is prior to potentiality in several ways. Two priorities, priority in being and in defini-

676

THE JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY

tion, are what I have in mind in saying that potential being is determined by actual being. Concerning the priority in being of actuality in relation to potentiality, Aristotle says that "everything that comes to be moves towards a principle and end. For that for the sake of which a thing is is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end" (1050a7-9). Beings that are en route, exist toward their ends. They are for the sake of their ends. The principle of being for the youthful Socrates is an actuality, namely Socrates actively being human. But, in the young Socrates, the principle that governs his being, his form or end, is not actually or fully present. So, the youthful Socrates is potentially human, precisely because his being is determined by an end or actuality that he has not yet achieved. Being potentially human is one way of being human, a way in which what you are is not yet realized; your principle or end is not yet realized in you. Being actually human is another way of being human, a way in which what you are, the principle of your being, is fully realized in you. Actuality is also prior to potentiality in definition, because a potentiality is defined in relation to its correlative actuality. For example, having the capacity of sight is defined as being able to see, to engage in a certain activity (1049bl 3-15). Similarly, when we say what the youthful Socrates is, we say he is potentially human, he is potentially a being that engages in a certain characteristic range of activities. The priority of actuality over potentiality in definition is really a consequence of the priority in being. Since an Aristotelian definition says what a thing is and since the principle of being of a potentiality is the corresponding actuality, it follows that the statement of what the potentiality is, its definition, will refer to the end or actuality. Potential and actual being describe the ways in which things are what they are. In Aristotle's system, they are a necessary addition to the more familiar picture of categorical being, since they describe a basic feature of reality, namely that it is directional. What something is is determined by its form or end, and its relationship to that form or end. Potentiality and actuality admit of degrees, because an end can be realized in different ways, i.e., to a greater or lesser extent. The way of being of an entity, namely the degree to which it has realized its form or end, has two varieties. The mature Socrates is fully in his form and the immature Socrates is not; Socrates in action is more fully realizing his form than Socrates asleep. In my Socrates example, I have been thinking of a human being as existing in different ways, at various degrees of actuality. Human beings, composite substances, have this sort of being, because they are composites of matter and form. "Further matter exists in a po-

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

677

tential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists actually then it is in its form" (1050al5-16). Underlying the process of the composite substance realizing its form more and more, is matter, which at one moment "may attain to its form" and at another moment is "in its form." Even when matter is in its form, however, the composite substance that results has two aspects, two ways of being. One is potential being associated with matter, and the other actual being associated with form. If it did not have these two aspects, then it would not be a being capable of degrees of actualization. But how ought we to think of this fundamental duality of aspect in the composite? And how does it mesh with the other applications of potentiality and actuality? And what kind of unity results? What we are looking for is a level that underlies PE and CE potentiality and actuality. For Aristotle, a human being's form is his or her soul, and in the De Anima soul is defined as "the first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially" (41 2a20-2 1). The matter of an ensouled entity is "a natural body that has life potentially"; the matter of a human being is a natural body that has human life potentially. Form or soul is the first grade of actuality which corresponds to the capacity for life, in our example, for human life. A composite substance like a human being has two ways of being; its matter is a body that is potentially alive and its form is a soul or a set of capacities that constitute human life. Now these capacities are developed throughout life, from the immature specimen of a human being to a mature exemplar. This development, what I called PE potentiality and actuality, is possible, because one aspect of the composite is material, potential, has a potentiality for those capacities whose principle is soul or form. If the matter did not have the right set of potentialities, then the process of maturity or actualization would not occur. On the other hand, if the composite did not retain its potentiality, its being as matter, then there would be no process of maturity, no gaps in activity, no eventual death, and no problem of unity (Metaphysics VIII, 6 1045b23-24). In living out his or her life a human being is sometimes active and sometimes at rest. Human life is a set of capacities that we exercise intermittently. Life and living are an example of a capacity and its exercise. And, according to Aristotle, soul is the source or origin of these human capacities. It is that aspect of the composite which causes it to be alive, to have that set of capacities. The matter, as I have said, is only potentially alive. It is the capacity for the capacity to live. One might then think of matter and form in the composite on the model of a capacity and its exercise, where the exercise is just the actual having of the capacity. The difference between the two cases is

678

THE JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY

that the matter itself is never actually alive; its potentiality for life is retained. The human being, the composite, is alive and intermittently active. Its material being is a drag on the system, and is not itself actualized by being in its form. In the De Anima, Aristotle illustrates this level of potentiality, the capacity for a capacity, with the example of a knower:
But we must make distinctions concerning potentiality and actuality; for at the moment we are speaking of them in an unqualified way. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a

knowermeaningthat man falls within the class of beings that know or have knowledge,or as when we are speakingof a man who possessesa (Eachof these is potential,but not in the same knowledgeof grammar. way,the one being a potentialknower,becausehis kindor matteris such and such, the other because when he wants to he can contemplate,if nothing external preventshim.) (417a22-28) The potential knower in the first sense has the capacity for a capacity. A human being, because he or she is a human being, has a capacity to have knowledge of various sorts. For Aristotle, the having of knowledge of various sorts is also a capacity, or potentiality, in relation to its exercise. It is an example of CE potentiality and actuality. A knower has the potentiality to have knowledge, Aristotle tells us, because "his kind or matter is of a certain sort." So the capacity for the capacity that is having, but not exercising, knowledge is retained by the knower so long as he or she is a human being. In the case I am interested in, the sort of potentiality associated with matter in a composite substance, a capacity for the capacity for actively living a human life, is retained so long as the matter is of the appropriate sort, i.e., potentially alive and human. As in the other examples of actuality and potentiality, in the case of matter and form, actuality determines potentiality. As before, the determination is of two sorts-actuality is prior in being and in definition to potentiality. Actuality or form is prior to potentiality or matter in being, because the matter exists toward the end or form. In discussing the priority in being of the actual over the potential, Aristotle says that "matter exists in a potential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form" (Metaphysics ix, 8 1050al5-16, also 1088bl, 1092a3-5). Furthermore, the matter of a composite substance is defined, in so far as it has a definition, by reference to a corresponding actuality. Why can we not define matter quite independently, in terms of its own material qualities? The answer to this question is that Aristotle

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

679

thinks that a definition should tell you what a thing is, and matter exists or is toward or for the sake of form. And so it should be defined as potentially enformed. In talking about various approaches to definition, Aristotle says: "And so, in defining, those who define a house as stones, bricks and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter" (1043a14-16). To view the matter as the potential house is a consequence of how Aristotle sees reality ordered; it is directional, which means in this instance that matter, potentiality as matter, is toward form, just as the substances themselves are directional, they exist toward their forms. Aristotle thinks that, viewed as potentiality and actuality, form and matter are one. Moreover, he states this conviction in a context in which he is discussing the problem of the unity of the object of definition. To see that matter and form are to one another as potentiality is to actuality, is to see that they are neither two definitionally independent objects nor two definitionally independent parts of a whole. It is because what a potentiality is is dependent upon what an actuality is, that composite substances are unified objects of definition. Matter is definitionally dependent upon form. There is, therefore, only one definition; matter and form as ways of being of the substance satisfy that definition to different degrees. According to my interpretation, Aristotle's hylomorphism is an application of his distinction between potentiality and actuality to composite substances, and so the intelligibility and plausibility of hylomorphism hinges upon whether or not it is plausible to think that there are ways of being in addition to kinds of being.
CHARLOTrE WIIT

University of New Hampshire

PROBLEMS OF ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF FORM* Edward Halper and Charlotte Witt are concerned with the same general topic, Aristotle's conception of form or essence in the central books of the Metaphysics. Both scholars seek to make sense of this in terms drawn from Aristotle himself-no doubt on the principle that an external assessment should be based on sound exegesis. Despite the common focus, their papers neither overlap nor conflict, since they deal with different difficulties. I shall summarize each and raise a few questions.
* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on Aristotle's Metaphysics, December 30, 1987, commenting on papers by Edward Halper and Charlotte Witt, this JOURNAL, this issue, 666-672 and 673-679, respectively.