Demurrer to Evidence (2001) Carlos filed a complaint against Pedro in the RTC of Ozamis City for the recovery

of the ownership of a car. Pedro filed his answer within the reglementary period. After the pre-trial and actual trial, and after Carlos has completed the presentation of his evidence, Pedro moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that under the facts proven and the law applicable to the case, Carlos is not entitled to the ownership of the car. The RTC granted the motion for dismissal. Carlos appealed the order of dismissal and the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court. Thereafter, Pedro filed a motion with the RTC asking the latter to allow him to present his evidence. Carlos objected to the presentation of evidence by Pedro. Should the RTC grant Pedros motion to present his evidence? Why? (5%) Answer: No. Pedros motion should be denied. He can no longer present evidence. The Rules provide that if the motion for dismissal is granted by the trial court but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (Sec. 1 of Rule 33, Rules of Civil Procedure) Alternative: No, because when the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court it should have rendered judgment in favor of Carlos. (Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 1996) Demurrer to Evidence; Civil Case vs. Criminal Case (2003) Compare the effects of a denial of demurrer to evidence in a civil case with those of a denial of demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. 4% Answer: In a civil case, the defendant has the right to file a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. If his demurrer is denied, he has the right to present evidence. If his demurrer is granted and on appeal by the plaintiff, the appellate court reverses the order and renders judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant loses his right to present evidence. (Rule 33). In a criminal case, the accused has to obtain leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. If he obtains leave of court and his demurrer to evidence is denied, he has the right to present evidence in his defense. If his demurrer to evidence is granted, he is acquitted and the prosecution cannot appeal. If the accused does not obtain leave of court and his demurrer to evidence is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and the case is decided on the basis of the evidence for the

prosecution. The court may also dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. (Sec. 23 of Rule 119) Actions; BP22; Demurrer to Evidence (2003) In an action for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, the court granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence which he filed without leave of court. Although he was acquitted of the crime charged, he, however, was required by the court to pay the private complainant the face value of the check. The accused filed a Motion of Reconsideration regarding the order to pay the face value of the check on the following grounds: a) the demurrer to evidence applied only too the criminal aspect of the case; and b) at the very least, he was entitled to adduce controverting evidence on the civil liability. Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. (6%) Answer (a) The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. The ground that the demurrer to evidence applied only to the criminal aspect of the case was not correct because the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 included the corresponding civil action. (Sec. 1(b) of Rule 111). (b) The accused was not entitled to adduce controverting evidence on the civil liability, because he filed his demurrer to evidence without leave of court. (Sec. 23 of Rule 119). Demurrer to Evidence; Contract of Carriage (2004) AX, a Makati-bound paying passenger of PBU, a public utility bus, died instantly on board the bus on account of the fatal head wounds he sustained as a result of the strong impact of the collision between the bus and a dump truck that happened while the bus was still travelling on EDSA towards Makati. The foregoing facts, among others, were duly established on evidencein-chief by the plaintiff TY, sole heir of AX, in TYs action against the subject common carrier for breach of contract of carriage. After TY had rested his case, the common carrier filed a demurrer to evidence, contending that plaintiffs evidence is insufficient because it did not show (1) that defendant was negligent and (2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Should the court grant or deny defendant's demurrer to evidence? Reason briefly. (5%) Answer: No. The court should not grant defendant's demurrer to evidence because the case is for breach of contract of carriage. Proof that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision is not required. (Articles 1170 and 2201, Civil Code; (Mendoza v. Phil. Airlines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836 [1952]; Batangas Transportation Co. v. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA171 U 968]; Abeto v. PAL, 115 SCRA 489 [1982]; Aboitiz v. Court of

Appeals, 129 SCRA 95 [1984]). Demurrer to Evidence; w/o Leave of Court (1998) Facing a charge of Murder, X filed a petition for bail. The petition was opposed by the prosecution but after hearing the court granted bail to X. On the first scheduled hearing on the merits, the prosecution manifested that it was not adducing additional evidence and that it was resting its case. X filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court but it was denied by the court. 1. Did the court have the discretion to deny the demurrer to evidence under the circumstances mentioned above? (2%) 2. If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, can X adduce evidence in his defense after the denial of his demurrer to evidence? [1%] 3. Without further proceeding and on the sole basis of the evidence of the prosecution, can the court legally convict X for Murder? (2%) Answer: 1. Yes. The Court had the discretion to deny the demurrer to the evidence, because although the evidence presented by the prosecution at the hearing for bail was not strong, without any evidence for the defense, it could be sufficient for conviction. 2. No. Because he filed the demurrer to the evidence without leave. (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Rules of Criminal Procedure.) However, the trial court should inquire as to why the accused filed the demurrer without leave and whether his lawyer knew that the effect of filing it without leave is to waive the presentation of the evidence for the accused. (People vs. Fores, 269 SCRA 62.) 3. Yes. Without any evidence from the accused, the prima facie evidence of the prosecution has been converted to proof beyond reasonable doubt. Alternative: If the evidence of guilt is not strong and beyond reasonable doubt then the court cannot legally convict X for murder. Demurrer to Evidence; w/o Leave of Court (2001) Carlos, the accused in a theft case, filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. The court

denied the demurrer to evidence and Carlos moved to present his evidence. The court denied Carlos motion to present evidence and instead judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Was the court correct in preventing Carlos from presenting his evidence and rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution? Why? (5%) Answer Yes, because the demurrer to the evidence was filed without leave of court. The Rules provide that when the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Sec. 23 of Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) Demurrer to Evidence; w/o Leave of Court (2004) The information for illegal possession of firearm filed against the accused specifically alleged that he had no license or permit to possess the caliber .45 pistol mentioned therein. In its evidence-in-chief, the prosecution established the fact that the subject firearm was lawfully seized by the police from the possession of the accused, that is, while the pistol was tucked at his waist in plain view, without the accused being able to present any license or permit to possess the firearm. The prosecution on such evidence rested its case and within a period of five days therefrom, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence, in sum contending that the prosecution evidence has not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and so prayed that he be acquitted of the offense charged. The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence and deemed the accused as having waived his right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution evidence. In due time, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly imposing on him the penalty prescribed therefor. Is the judgment of the trial court valid and proper? Reason. (5%) Answer Yes. The judgment of the trial court is valid. The accused did not ask for leave to file the demurrer to evidence. He is deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. (Sec. 23 of Rule 119; People v. Flores, 269 SCRA 62 [1997]; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 782 [1997]. However, the judgment is not proper or is erroneous because there was no showing from the proper office like the Firearms Explosive Unit of the Philippine National Police that the accused has a permit to own or possess the firearm, which is fatal to the conviction of the accused. (Mallari v. Court of Appeals &People,265 SCRA 456[1996]). Jurisdiction Jurisdiction (1997) What courts have jurisdiction over the following cases filed in Metro Manila? a) An action for

specific performance or, in the alternative, for damages in the amount of P180,000.00 b) An action for a writ of injunction. c) An action for replevin of a motorcycle valued at P150,000.00. d) An action for interpleader to determine who between the defendants is entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 from the plaintiff. e) A petition for the probate of a will involving an estate valued at P200,000.00. Answer (a) An action for specific performance or, in the alternative, for damages in the amount of 180,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila. Although an action for specific performance is not capable of pecuniary estimation, since the alternative demand for damages is capable of pecuniary estimation, it is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila. (Sec. 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA No. 7691: Cruz us. Tan, 87 Phil. 627]. (b) An action for injunction is not capable of pecuniary estimation and hence falls within the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (c) An action for replevin of a motorcycle valued at 150,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila (Sec. 33 of BP 129. as amended by RA No. 7691). d) An action for interpleader to determine who between the defendants is entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila. (Makati Dev Corp. v. Tanjuatco 27 SCRA 401) e) A petition for the probate of a will involving an estate valued at 200.000.00 falls within the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts in Metro Manila (Sec. 19[4] of BP 129, as amended). Additional Answer (b) An application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted by a Municipal Court in an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. (Sec.33 of BP 129; BP 129. as amended by RA No. 7691). Jurisdiction vs. Venue (2006) Distinguish jurisdiction from venue? (2%) Answer: JURISDICTION treats of the power of the Court to decide a case on the merits, while VENUE refers to the place where the suit may be filed. In criminal actions, however, venue is

jurisdictional. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law. Jurisdiction may be not be conferred by consent through waiver upon a court, but venue may be waived, except in criminal cases (Nocum et al. v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005; Santos III v. Northwest Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992). Jurisdiction; CTA Division vs. CTA En Banc (2006) Mark filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue a complaint for refund of taxes paid, but it was not acted upon. So, he filed a similar complaint with the Court of Tax Appeals raffled to one of its Divisions. Mark's complaint was dismissed. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over Mark's petition? (2.5%) Answer: No. The procedure is governed by Sec. 11 of R. A. 9282. Decisions of a division of the Court of Tax Appeals must be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals en banc. Further, the CTA now has the same rank as the Court of Appeals and is no longer considered a quasi-judicial agency. It is likewise provided in the said law that the decisions of the CTA en bane are cognizable by the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Jurisdiction; Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation (2000) A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason. (3%) Answer The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the action for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russell v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738,[1999]). However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence of either A or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties resides. Jurisdiction; Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation (2000) A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of As father, for the partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of P20,000.00. B moves to dismiss the action on the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC because the action is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a

determination of hereditary rights and not merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the motion. (2%) Answer The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of the hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the assessed value of the land is P20,000.00, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction. (Russell v. Vestil, supra)

Jurisdiction; Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation (2003) A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of p19,000.00. B received the summons and a copy of the Complaint on 02 January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court denied the motion. In due time, B filed with the RTC a Petition for Certiorari praying that the said Order be set aside because the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. 6% On 13 February 2003, A filed with the MTC a motion to declare B in default. The motion was opposed by B on the ground that his Petition for Certiorari was still pending. (a) Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct? (b) Resolve the Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default. Answer (a) The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the assessed value of the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the MTC of Manila, the action filed by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Conveyance of said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the action was within the jurisdiction of RTC. (Russel v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999]; Copioso v. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28,2002; Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction, 383 SCRA 353 [2002]). Alternative (a)If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

(b)The Court could declare B in default because B did not obtain a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order from the RTC prohibiting the judge from proceeding in the case during the pendency of the petition for certiorari. (Sec. 7 of Rule 65; Diaz v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302 [2002]. Alternative The Court should not declare B in default inasmuch as the jurisdiction of MTC was put in issue in the Petition For Certiorari filed with the RTC. The MTC should defer further proceedings pending the result of such petition. (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 421 [1988]). Jurisdiction; MTC (2002) P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC-Manila, the cause of action against A being on an overdue promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of P300,000.00 on the purchase price of goods sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Explain. (3%) Answer No, the RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined as defendants in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or fact common to both. (Rule 3, sec. 6). Hence, separate complaints will have to be files and they would fall under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. [Flores v. Mallare-Philipps, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)]. Jurisdiction; Office of the Solicitor General (2006) In 1996, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, providing for computerization of elections. Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC approved the Voter's Registration and Identification System (VRIS) Project. It issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the project. After the public bidding, Fotokina was declared the winning bidder with a bid of P6 billion and was issued a Notice of Award. But COMELEC Chairman Gener Go objected to the award on the ground that under the Appropriations Act, the budget for the COMELEC's modernization is only P1 billion. He announced to the public that the VRIS project has been set aside. Two Commissioners sided with Chairman Go, but the majority voted to uphold the contract. Answer Meanwhile, Fotokina filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus compel the COMELEC to implement the contract. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing Chairman Go, opposed the petition on the ground that mandamus does not lie to enforce contractual obligations. During the proceedings, the majority Commissioners filed a manifestation that Chairman Go was not authorized by the COMELEC En Banc to oppose the petition.

May the OSG represent Chairman Go before the RTC notwithstanding that his position is contrary to that of the majority? (5%) Yes, the OSG may represent the COMELEC Chairman before the RTC notwithstanding that his position is contrary to that of a majority of the Commission members in the COMELEC because the OSG is an independent office; it's hands are not shackled to the cause of its client agency. The primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld (COMELEC v. Quyano-Padilla, September 18, 2002). Jurisdiction; Ombudsman Case Decisions (2006) Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the Decisions in criminal and administrative cases of the Ombudsman? (2.5%) The Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases (Sec. 14, R.A. 6770). In administrative and disciplinary cases, appeals from the Ombudsman must be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 (Lanting v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005; Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Sec. 14, RA. 6770). Jurisdiction; Probate (2001) Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabini, a petition for the probate of the will of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the spouses. The probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed at P95,000.00 and in the petition for the allowance of the will, attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro, the next of kin of Martin, filed an opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the total amount included in the relief of the petition is more than P100,000.00, the maximum jurisdictional amount for municipal circuit trial courts. The court overruled the opposition and proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court correct in its ruling? Why? (5%) Answer: Yes, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed P100,000.00 (now P200,000.00). The value in this case of P95,000.00 is within its jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs; these are considered only for determining the filing fees. (B.P.Blg. 129, Sec. 33, as amended) Jurisdiction; RTC (2002)

P sued A in the RTC-Manila to recover the following sums: (1) P200,000.00 on an overdue promissory note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for damages to his car and (4) P100,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Can A move to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter? Explain. (2%) Answer No, because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter. P may sue A in one complaint asserting as many causes of action as he may have and since all the claims are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. [Rule 2, sec. 5(d)]. The aggregate amount claimed is P450,000.00, exclusive of the amount of P100,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Hence, the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction; Subdivision Homeowner (2006) What court has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance filed by a subdivision homeowner against a subdivision developer? Choose the correct answer. Explain. 1 The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission 3 The Regional Trial Court 4 The Commercial Court or the Regional Trial Court designated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide "commercial cases." Answer An action for specific performance by a subdivision homeowner against a subdivision developer is within the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Sec. 1 of P.D. 1344 provides that the HLURB has jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots and condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman (Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. v. Eddy Ng Kok Wei, G.R. No. 139791, December 12, 2003; Kakilala v. Faraon, G.R. No. 143233, October 18, 2004; Sec. 1, P.D. 1344). Rule 65 vs. Rule 45 Certiorari; Mode of Certiorari (2006) Explain each mode of certiorari: 1. As a mode of appeal from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. (2.5%) Answer Certiorari as a mode of appeal is governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which allows appeal

from judgment, final order of resolution of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, the RTC or other courts whenever authorized by law to the Supreme Court by verified petition for review raising only questions of law distinctly set forth. 2. As a special civil action from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. (2.5%) Answer Certiorari as a Special Civil Action is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when an aggrieved party may file a verified petition against a decision, final order or resolution of a tribunal, body or board that has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 3. As a mode of review of the decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Constitutional Commissions. (2.5%) Answer Certiorari as a mode of review of the decision of the NLRC is elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 65, as held in the case of St. Martin's Funeral Home v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998. Certiorari as a mode of review from the Commission on Audit (COA) and COMELEC is elevated to the Supreme Court within 30 days from notice of the judgment, decision or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, as provided for under the Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In the case of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), review of its judgments is through petitions for review under Sec. 5 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Certiorari; Rule 45 vs. Rule 65 (1998) Differentiate certiorari as an original action from certiorari as a mode of appeal. |3%] Answer Certiorari as an original action and certiorari as a mode of appeal may be distinguished as follows: 1. The first is a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, while the second is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and the RTC under Rule 45 1 The first can be filed only on the grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, while the second is based on the errors of law of the lower court.

2 The first should be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed (Sec. 4. Rule 65), while the second should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. (Sec. 2, Rule 45) 3 The first cannot generally be availed of as a substitute for a lost appeal under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45. 4 Under the first, the lower court is impleaded as a party respondent (Sec. 5 of Rule 65), while under the second, the lower court is not imp leaded. Certiorari; Rule 45 vs. Rule 65 (2005) May the aggrieved party file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 thereof for the nullification of a decision of the Court of Appeals in the exercise either of its original or appellate jurisdiction? Explain. To NULLIFY A DECISION of the Court of Appeals the aggrieved party should file a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI in the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 except under very exceptional circumstances. A long line of decisions of the Supreme Court, too numerous to mention, holds that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. It should be noted, however, when the Court of Appeals imposes the death penalty, or a lesser penalty for offenses committed on such occasion, appeal by petition for review or ordinary appeal. In cases when the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, appeal is by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. Pleadings; Amendment of Complaint; By Leave of Court (2003) After an answer has been filed, can the plaintiff amend his complaint, with leave of court, by changing entirely the nature of the action? 4% Answer Yes, the present rules allow amendments substantially altering the nature of the cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 10, 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure; Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 870 [1997]). This should only be true, however, when the substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 779 [2001]). Pleadings; Amendment of Complaint; By Leave of Court; Prescriptive Period (2000)

X, an illegitimate child of Y, celebrated her 18th birthday on May 2, 1996. A month before her birthday, Y died. The legitimate family of Y refused to recognize X as an illegitimate child of Y. After countless efforts to convince them, X filed on April 25, 2000 an action for recognition against Z, wife of Y. After Z filed her answer on August 14, 2000, X filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and a motion to admit the said amended complaint impleading the three (3) legitimate children of Y. The trial court admitted the amended complaint on August 22, 2000. What is the effect of the admission of the amended complaint? Has the action of X prescribed? Explain. (5%) Answer No. The action filed on April 25, 2000 is still within the four-year prescriptive period which started to run on May 2, 1996. The amended complaint impleading the three legitimate children, though admitted on August 22, 2000 beyond the four-year prescriptive period, retroacts to the date of filing of the original complaint. Amendments impleading new defendants retroact to the date of the filing of the complaint because they do not constitute a new cause of action. Verzosa v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100 [1998]). (Note: The four-year period is based on Article 285 of the Civil Code) Alternative Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, if an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him on the date of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court. (Sec. 5 of Rule 1). Consequently, the action of X has prescribed with respect to the three (3) legitimate children of Y who are indispensable parties. Another Alternative Under Article 175 of the Family Code, the action must be brought within the lifetime of X if the action is based on a record of birth or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by Y. In such case, the action of X has not prescribed. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action should have been brought during the lifetime of Y. In such case, the action of X has prescribed. Pleadings; Amendment of Complaint; Matter of Right (2005) On May 12, 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the collection of P250,000.00. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the action since the claimed amount of P250,000.00 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, of Quezon City. Before the court could

resolve the motion, the plaintiff, without leave of court, amended his complaint to allege a new cause of action consisting in the inclusion of an additional amount of P200,000.00, thereby increasing his total claim to P450,000.000. The plaintiff thereafter filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss, claiming that the RTC had jurisdiction, over his action. Rule on the motion of the defendant with reasons. (4%) Answer The motion to dismiss should be denied. Basic is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Under the Rules, a pleader may amend his pleading as a matter of right before the other party has served his responsive pleading. (Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court) The court, in allowing the amendment, would not be acting without jurisdiction because allowing an amendment as a matter of right does not require the exercise of discretion. The court therefore would not be "acting" and thus, could not have acted without jurisdiction. It would have been different had the amendments been made after a responsive pleading had been served. The court then would have been exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing the amendment. It cannot do so however, because it would be then acting on an amendment of a complaint over which it has no jurisdiction. (Soledad v. Mamangun, G.R. No. L-17983, May 30, 1963; Gumabay v. Baralin, G.R. No. L-30683, May 31, 1977; Prudence Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 110274, March 21, 1994) Alternative The motion to dismiss should be granted. Jurisdiction must be conferred by the contents of the original complaint. Amendments are not proper and should be denied where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. (Rosario v. Carandang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955) While a plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint before a responsive pleading is served (Sec. 2, Rule 10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002), still, a complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction on a court where there was none to begin with. Pleadings; Amendment of Complaint; To Conform w/ Evidence (2004) During trial, plaintiff was able to present, without objection on the part of defendant in an ejectment case, evidence showing that plaintiff served on defendant a written demand to vacate the subject property before the commencement of the suit, a matter not alleged or otherwise set forth in the pleadings on file. May the corresponding pleading still be amended to conform to the evidence? Explain. (5%) Answer Yes. The corresponding pleading may still be amended to conform to the evidence, because the written demand to vacate, made prior to the commencement of the ejectment suit, was presented by the plaintiff in evidence without objection on the part of the defendant. Even if the demand to

vacate was jurisdictional, still, the amendment proposed was to conform to the evidence that was already in the record and not to confer jurisdiction on the court, which is not allowed. Failure to amend, however, does not affect the result of the trial on these issues. (Sec. 5 of Rule 10). ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: It depends. In forcible entry, the motion may be allowed at the discretion of the court, the demand having been presented at the trial without objection on the part of the defendant. In unlawful detainer, however, the demand to vacate is jurisdictional and since the court did not acquire jurisdiction from the very beginning, the motion to conform to the evidence cannot be entertained. The amendment cannot be allowed because it will in effect confer jurisdiction when there is otherwise no jurisdiction. Pleadings; Answer; Defense; Specific Denial (2004) In his complaint for foreclosure of mortgage to which was duly attached a copy of the mortgage deed, plaintiff PP alleged inter alia as follows: (1) that defendant DD duly executed the mortgage deed, copy of which is Annex "A" of the complaint and made an integral part thereof; and (2) that to prosecute his complaint, plaintiff contracted a lawyer, CC, for a fee of P50.000. In his answer, defendant alleged, inter alia, that he had no knowledge of the mortgage deed, and he also denied any liability for plaintiffs contracting with a lawyer for a fee. Does defendant's answer as to plaintiffs allegation no. 1 as well as no. 2 sufficiently raise an issue of fact? Reason briefly. (5%) Answer As to plaintiffs allegation no. 1, defendant does not sufficiently raise an issue of fact, because he cannot allege lack of knowledge of the mortgage deed since he should have personal knowledge as to whether he signed it or not and because he did not deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the mortgage deed, which is an actionable document. As to plaintiffs allegation no. 2, defendant did not properly deny liability as to plaintiffs contracting with a lawyer for a fee. He did not even deny for lack of knowledge. (Sec. 10 of Rule 8). Information; Amendment (2001) Amando was charged with frustrated homicide. Before he entered his plea and upon the advice of his counsel, he manifested his willingness to admit having committed the offense of serious physical injuries. The prosecution then filed an amended information for serious physical injuries against Amando. What steps or action should the prosecution take so that the amended information against Amando which downgrades the nature of the offense could be validly made? Why? (5%) Answer

In order that the amended information which downgrades the nature of the offense could be validly made, the prosecution should file a motion to ask for leave of court with notice to the offended party. (Sec.14 of Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). The new rule is for the protection of the interest of the offended party and to prevent possible abuse by the prosecution. Information; Amendment; Double Jeopardy; Bail (2002) A. D and E were charged with homicide in one information. Before they could be arraigned, the prosecution moved to amend the information to exclude E therefrom. Can the court grant the motion to amend? Why? (2%) B. On the facts above stated, suppose the prosecution, instead of filing a motion to amend, moved to withdraw the information altogether and its motion was granted. Can the prosecution re-file the information although this time for murder? Explain (3%) Answer A. Yes, provided notice is given to the offended party and the court states its reasons for granting the same. (Rule 110, sec. 14). B. Yes, the prosecution can re-file the information for murder in substitution of the information for homicide because no double jeopardy has as yet attached. [Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685 (1994)]. Information; Amendment; Supervening Events (1997) A was accused of homicide for the killing of B. During the trial, the public prosecutor received a copy of the marriage certificate of A and B. (a) Can the public prosecutor move for the amendment of the information to charge A with the crime of parricide? (b) Suppose instead of moving for the amendment of the information, the public prosecutor presented in evidence the marriage certificate without objection on the part of the defense, could Abe convicted of parricide? Answer (a) No. The Information cannot be amended to change the offense charged from homicide to parricide. Firstly, the marriage is not a supervening fact arising from the act constituting the charge of homicide. (Sec. 7[a] of Rule 117). Secondly, after plea, amendments may be done only as to matters of form. The amendment is substantial because it will change the nature of the offense. (Sec. 14 of Rule 110; Dionaldo us. Dacuycuy. 108 SCRA 736). (b) No. A can be convicted only of homicide not of parricide which is a graver offense. The accused has the constitutional rights of due process and to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. (Secs. 1, 14 (1) and (2} Art. III. 1987 Constitution),

Appeals Appeals; Period of Appeal; Fresh Period Rule (2003 Defendant X received an adverse Decision of the RTC in an ordinary civil case on 02 January 2003. He filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 January 2003. On the other hand, plaintiff A received the same Decision on 06 January 2003 and, on 19 January 2003, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. On 13 January 2003, defendant X filed a Motion withdrawing his notice of appeal in order to file a Motion for New Trial which he attached. On 20 January 2003, the court denied As Motion for Reconsideration and Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal. Plaintiff A received the Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on 03 February 2003 and filed his Notice of Appeal on 05 February 2003. The court denied due course to As Notice of Appeal on the ground that he period to appeal had already lapsed. 6% (a) Is the courts denial of Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal proper? (b) Is the courts denial of due course to As appeal correct? Answer (a) No, the courts denial of Xs Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal is not proper, because the period of appeal of X has not yet expired. From January 2, 2003 when X received a copy of the adverse decision up to January 13, 2003 when he filed his withdrawal of appeal and Motion for New Trial, only ten (10) days had elapsed and he had fifteen (15) days to do so. b) No, the courts denial of due course to As appeal is not correct because the appeal was taken on time. From January 6, 2003 when A received a copy of the decision up to January 19, 2003 when he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, only twelve (12) days had elapsed. Consequently, he had three (3) days from receipt on February 3, 2003 of the Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration within which to appeal. He filed is notice of appeal on February 5, 2003, or only two (2) days later. Alternative Since As Motion for Reconsideration was filed on January 19, 2003 and it was denied on January 20, 2003, it was clearly not set for hearing with at least three days notice. Therefore, the motion was pro forma and did not interrupt the period of appeal which expired on January 21, 2003 or fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision on January 6, 2003. NOTE: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a FRESH PERIOD of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [Neypes et. al. vs. CA, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005]

Default Default (2000) Defendant was declared in default by the RTC (RTC). Plaintiff was allowed to present evidence in support of his complaint. Photocopies of official receipts and original copies of affidavits were presented in court, identified by plaintiff on the witness stand and marked as exhibits. Said documents were offered by plaintiff and admitted in evidence by the court on the basis of which the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the relief prayed for. Upon receipt of the judgment, defendant appeals to the Court of Appeals claiming that the judgment is not valid because the RTC based its judgment on mere photocopies and affidavits of persons not presented in court. Is the claim of defendant valid? Explain. (3%) Answer The claim of defendant is not valid because under the 1997 Rules, reception of evidence is not required. After a defendant is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence, which may be delegated to the clerk of court. (Sec. 3, Rule 9) Alternative The claim of defendant is valid, because the court received evidence which it can order in its own discretion, in which case the evidence of the plaintiff must pass the basic requirements of admissibility. Default (2001) Mario was declared in default but before judgment was rendered, he decided to file a motion to set aside the order of default. a) What should Mario state in his motion in order to justify the setting aside of the order of default? (3%) b) In what form should such motion be? (2%) Answer a) In order to justify the setting aside of the order of default, Mario should state in his motion that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. [Sec. 3(b) of Rule 9,]. b) The motion should be under oath. (Id.) Default; Order of Default; Effects (1999) 1 When may a party be declared in default? (2%) 2 What is the effect of an Order of Default? (2%) 3 For failure to seasonably file his Answer despite due notice, A was declared in default in a case instituted against him by B. The following day, A's mistress who is working as a clerk in the sala of the Judge before whom his case is pending, informed him of the declaration of

default. On the same day, A presented a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud and he has a meritorious defense. Thereafter, he went abroad. After his return a week later, with the case still undecided, he received the order declaring him in default. The motion to set aside default was opposed by B on the ground that it was filed before A received notice of his having been declared in default, citing the rule that the motion to set aside may be made at anytime after notice but before judgment. Resolve the Motion. (2%) Answer 1. A party may be declared in default when he fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, and upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure. (Sec. 3, Rule 9) 2. The effect of an Order of Default is that the court may proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence (Id.) The party in default cannot take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. (Sec. 3[A]) 3. Assuming that the motion to set aside complies with the other requirements of the rule, it should be granted. Although such a motion may be made after notice but before judgment (Sec. 3[B] of Rule 9), with more reason may it be filed after discovery even before receipt of the order of default. Default; Remedies; Party Declared in Default (1998) What are the available remedies of a party declared In default: 1 Before the rendition of judgment; [1%] 2 After judgment but before its finality; and [2%1 3 After finality of judgment? [2%] Answer The available remedies of a party declared in default are as follows: 1. BEFORE THE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT (a) he may file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3[b], Rule 9); and if it is denied, he may move to reconsider, and if reconsideration is denied, he may file the special civil action of certiorari for grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of the lower court's jurisdiction. (Sec. 1, Rule 65) or (b) he may file a petition for certiorari if he has been illegally declared in default, e.g. during the pendency of his motion to dismiss or before the expiration of the time to answer. (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768; Acosta-Ofalia vs. Sundiam, 85 SCRA 412.)

2. AFTER JUDGMENT BUT BEFORE ITS FINALITY, he may file a motion for new trial on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a motion for reconsideration on the ground of excessive damages, insufficient evidence or the decision or final order being contrary to law (Sec. 2, Rule 37): and thereafter. If the motion is denied, appeal to available under Rules 40 or 41, whichever to applicable. 3. AFTER FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT, there are three ways to assail the judgment, which are: a) a petition for relief under Rule 38 on the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; b) annulment of judgment under Rule 47 for extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction; or c) certiorari if the judgment to void on its face or by the judicial record. (Balangcad vs. Justices of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83888. February 12, 1992, 206 8CRA 171). Default; Remedies; Party Declared in Default (2006) Jojie filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a complaint for damages against Joe. During the pretrial, Jojie (sic) and her (sic) counsel failed to appear despite notice to both of them. Upon oral motion of Jojie, Joe was declared as in default and Jojie was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the court rendered its Decision in favor of Jojie. Joe hired Jose as his counsel. What are the remedies available to him? Explain. (5%) Answer The remedies available to a party against whom a default decision is rendered are as follows: 1. BEFORE the judgment in default becomes final and executory: Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 37; Motion for New Trial under Rule 37; and Appeal under Rule 41. 2. AFTER the judgment in default becomes final and 1 Petition for Relief under Rule 38; 2 Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47; and 3 c. Certiorari under Rule 65. See Talsan Enterprises, Inc. v. Baliwag Transit, Inc., G.R. No. 126258, July 8, 1999) 4 Default; Remedies; Substantial Compliance (2000)

For failure of K.J. to file an answer within the reglementary period, the Court, upon motion of LM, declared KJ in default. In due time, KJ filed an unverified motion to lift the order of default without an affidavit of merit attached to it. KJ however attached to the motion his answer under oath, stating in said answer his reasons for his failure to file an answer on time, as well as his defenses. Will the motion to lift the order of default prosper? Explain. (3%) Answer Yes, there is substantial compliance with the rule. Although the motion is unverified, the answer attached to the motion is verified. The answer contains what the motion to lift the order of default and the affidavit of merit should contain, which are the reasons of movants failure to answer as well as his defenses. (Sec. 3 [b] of Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 679, [1999]; Consul v. Consul, 17 SCRA 667, 671 [1966]; Tolentino v. Carlos, 66 Phil, 1450, 143-144 [1938], Nasser v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783 [1992]). Joinder Actions; Cause of Action; Joinder & Splitting (1998) Give the effects of the following: 1 Splitting a single cause of action: and (3%| 2 Non-joinder of a necessary party. [2%] Answer 1. The effect of splitting a single cause of action is found in the rule as follows: If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec. 4 of Rule 2) 2. The effect of the non-joinder of a necessary party may be stated as follows: The court may order the inclusion of an omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion without justifiable cause to a waiver of the claim against such party. The court may proceed with the action but the judgment rendered shall be without prejudice to the rights of each necessary party. (Sec. 9 of Rule 3) Actions; Cause of Action; Joinder of Action (1999) a) What is the rule on joinder of causes of action? (2%) b) A secured two loans from B? one for P500,000.00 and the other for P1,000,000.00, payable on different dates. Both have fallen due. Is B obliged to file only one complaint against A for the recovery of both loans? Explain. (2%)

Answer a. The rule on JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION is that a party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise join as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, provided that the rule on joinder of parties is complied with; 1.] the joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules, but may include causes of action pertaining to different venues or jurisdictions provided one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of a RTC and venue lies therein; and 2.] the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for the recovery of money. (Sec. 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules) b. No. Joinder is only permissive since the loans are separate loans which may be governed by the different terms and conditions. The two loans give rise to two separate causes of action and may be the basis of two separate complaints.

Actions; Cause of Action; Joinder of Action (2005) Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City. They are the coowners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed value of P100,000.00. Perry borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on or before December 1, 2004. However, Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky and Marvin's proposal to partition the property. Ricky filed a complaint against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the property. He also incorporated in his complaint his action against Perry for the collection of the latter's P100,000.00 loan, plus interests and attorney's fees. State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his complaint for partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City. (5%) Answer 1. The effect of splitting a single cause of action is found in the rule as follows: If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec. 4 of Rule 2) It was not proper for Ricky to join his causes of action against Perry in his complaint for partition against Perry and Marvin. The causes of action may be between the same parties, Ricky and Perry, with respect to the loan but not with respect to the partition which includes Marvin. The joinder is between a partition and a sum of money, but PARTITION is a special civil action under Rule 69, which cannot be joined with other causes of action. (See. 5[b], Rule 2,) Also, the causes of action pertain to different venues and jurisdictions. The case for a sum of money pertains to the municipal court and cannot be filed in Pasay City because the plaintiff is from Manila while Ricky and Marvin are from Batangas City. (Sec. 5, Rule 2,)

Counterclaim Actions; Counterclaim vs. Crossclaim (1999) a) What is a counterclaim? (2%) b) Distinguish a counterclaim from a crossclaim. (2%) c) A, who is engaged in tile installation business, was sued by EE Industries for breach of contract for installing different marble tiles in its offices as provided in their contract. Without filing any motion to dismiss, A filed its Answer with Counterclaim theorizing that EE Industries has no legal capacity to sue because it is not a duly registered corporation. By way of counterclaim, A asked for moral and actual damages as her business depleted as a result of the withdrawal and cancellation by her clients of their contracts due to the filing of the case. The case was dismissed after the trial court found that EE Industries is not a registered corporation and therefore has no legal capacity to sue. However, it set a date for the reception of evidence on A's counterclaim. EE Industries opposed on the ground that the counterclaim could no longer be prosecuted in view of the dismissal of the main Is the stand of EE Industries sustainable? Explain. [2%] Answer a) A COUNTERCLAIM is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. (Sec. 6, Rule 6) b) A counterclaim is distinguished from a CROSSCLAIM in that a cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. A counterclaim is against an opposing party while a cross-claim is against a co-party. (Sec. 8, Rule 6) c) No, because if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer which may include a counterclaim. This is what A did by filing an Answer alleging the lack of legal capacity of EE Industries to sue because it is not a duly registered corporation with a counterclaim for damages. The dismissal of the complaint on this ground is without prejudice to the prosecution of the counterclaim in the same action because it is a compulsory counterclaim. (Sec. 6 of Rule 16.) Actions; Cross-Claims; Third Party Claims (1997) B and C borrowed P400,000.00 from A. The promissory note was executed by B and C in a Joint and several capacity. B, who received the money from A, gave C P200,000.00. C, in turn, loaned P100,000.00 out of the P200,000.00 he received to D. a) In an action filed by A against B and C with the RTC of Quezon City, can B file a cross-claim against C for the amount of P200,000.00? b) Can C file a third party complaint against D for the amount of P 100,000.00? Answer a) Yes. B can file a cross-claim against C for the amount of 200,000.00 given to C. A cross-claim is a claim filed by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or a counterclaim therein and may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted against the cross-claimant. (Sec. 8 Rule 6)

b) No, C cannot file a third-party complaint against D because the loan of P100,000 has no connection with the opponent's claim. C could have loaned the money out of other funds in his possession. Alternative Yes, C can file a third-party complaint against D because the loan of 100,000.00 was taken out of the P200,000 received from B and hence the loan seeks contribution in respect to his opponent's claim. (Sec. 11 of Rule 6) Double Jeopardy Actions; Commencement of an Action; Double Jeopardy (2004) SPO1 CNC filed with the MTC in Quezon City (MeTC-QC) a sworn written statement duly subscribed by him, charging RGR (an actual resident of Cebu City) with the offense of slight physical injuries allegedly inflicted on SPS (an actual resident of Quezon City). The Judge of the branch to which the case was raffled thereupon issued an order declaring that the case shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure in criminal cases. Soon thereafter, the Judge ordered the dismissal of the case for the reason that it was not commenced by information, as required by said Rule. Sometime later, based on the same facts giving rise to the slight physical injuries case, the City Prosecutor filed with the same MeTC-QC an information for attempted homicide against the same RGR. In due time, before arraignment, RGR moved to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy and after due hearing, the Judge granted his motion. Was the dismissal of the complaint for slight physical injuries proper? Was the grant of the motion to quash the attempted homicide information correct? Reason (5%) Answer Yes, the dismissal of the complaint for slight physical injuries is proper because in Metropolitan Manila and in chartered cities, the case has to be commenced only by information. (Sec. 11, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure). No, the grant of the motion to quash the attempted homicide information on the ground of double jeopardy was not correct, because there was no valid prosecution for slight physical injuries. Double Jeopardy (2002) D was charged with slight physical injuries in the MTC. He pleaded not guilty and went to trial. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, the trial court set the continuation of the hearing on another date. On the date scheduled for hearing, the prosecutor failed to appear, whereupon the court, on motion of D, dismissed the case. A few minutes later, the prosecutor arrived and opposed the dismissal of the case. The court reconsidered its order and directed D to present his evidence. Before the next date of trial came, however, D moved that the last order be set aside on the ground that the reinstatement of the case had placed him twice in jeopardy. Acceding to this motion, the court again dismissed the case. The prosecutor then filed an

information in the RTC, charging D with direct assault based on the same facts alleged in the information for slight physical injuries but with the added allegation that D inflicted the injuries out of resentment for what the complainant had done in the performance of his duties as chairman of the board of election inspectors. D moved to quash the second information on the ground that its filing had placed him in double jeopardy. How should Ds motion to quash be resolved? (4%) Answer Ds motion to quash should be granted on the ground of double jeopardy because the first offense charged is necessarily included in the second offense charged. [Draculan v. Donato, 140 SCRA 425 (1985)]. Alternative Ds motion to quash should be denied because the two dismissals of the case against him were on his motion (hence with his express consent) and his right to a speedy trial was not violated. Double Jeopardy; Upgrading; Original Charges (2005) For the multiple stab wounds sustained by the victim, Noel was charged with frustrated homicide in the RTC. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty to said crime. Neither the court nor the prosecution was aware that the victim had died two days earlier on account of his stab wounds. Because of his guilty plea, Noel was convicted of frustrated homicide and meted the corresponding penalty. When the prosecution learned of the victim's death, it filed within fifteen (15) days therefrom a motion to amend the information to upgrade the charge from frustrated homicide to consummated homicide. Noel opposed the motion claiming that the admission of the amended information would place him in double jeopardy. Resolve the motion with reasons. (4%) Answer The amended information to consummated homicide from frustrated homicide does not place the accused in double jeopardy. As provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 7, Rule 117,2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information when: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge; or (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information. Here, when the plea to frustrated homicide was made, neither the court nor the prosecution was aware that the victim had died two days earlier on account of his stab wounds. Pre-Trial Pre-Trial Agreement (2004) Mayor TM was charged of malversation through falsification of official documents. Assisted by Atty. OP as counsel de parte during pre-trial, he signed together with Ombudsman Prosecutor TG a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," which was presented to the Sandiganbayan. Before the court could issue a pre-trial order but after some delay caused by Atty. OP, he was

substituted by Atty. QR as defense counsel. Atty. QR forthwith filed a motion to withdraw the "Joint Stipulation," alleging that it is prejudicial to the accused because it contains, inter alia, the statement that the "Defense admitted all the documentary evidence of the Prosecution," thus leaving the accused little or no room to defend himself, and violating his right against selfincrimination. Should the court grant or deny QR's motion? Reason. (5%) Answer The court should deny QR's motion. If in the pretrial agreement signed by the accused and his counsel, the accused admits the documentary evidence of the prosecution, it does not violate his right against self-incrimination. His lawyer cannot file a motion to withdraw. A pre-trial order is not needed. (Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, 391 SCRA 415(2002}). The admission of such documentary evidence is allowed by the rule. Sec. 2 of Rule 118; People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 [1996]). Pre-Trial; Criminal Case vs. Civil Case (1997 Give three distinctions between a pre-trial in a criminal case and a pre-trial in a civil case. Three distinctions between a pre-trial in a criminal case and a pre-trial in a civil case are as follows: 1. The pre-trial in a criminal case is conducted only "where the accused and counsel agree" (Rule 118, Sec. 1): while the pre-trial in a civil case is mandatory. (Sec. 1 of former Rule 20; Sec, 1 of new Rule 18 2. The pre-trial in a criminal case does not consider the possibility of a compromise, which is one important aspect of the pre-trial in a civil case. Sec. 1 of former Rule 20; Sec. 2 of new Rule 18). 3. In a criminal case, a pre-trial agreement is required to be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his counsel (See; Rule 118, Sec. 4); while in a civil case, the agreement may be contained in the pre-trial order. (Sec. 4 of former Rule 20; See 7 of new Rule 78). Arrest Arrest; Warrantless Arrest; Preliminary Investigation (2004) AX swindled RY in the amount of P10,000 sometime in mid-2003. On the strength of the sworn statement given by RY personally to SPO1 Juan Ramos sometime in mid-2004, and without securing a warrant, the police officer arrested AX. Forthwith the police officer filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for estafa supported by RY"s sworn statement and other documentary evidence. After due inquest, the prosecutor filed the requisite information with the MM RTC. No preliminary investigation was conducted either before or after the filing of the information and the accused at no time asked for such an investigation. However, before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the information on the ground that the prosecutor suffered from a want of authority to file the information because of his failure to conduct a preliminary investigation before filing the information, as required by the Rules of Court. Is the warrantless arrest of AX valid? Is he entitled to a preliminary investigation before the filing of

the information? Explain. (5%) Answer No. The warrantless arrest is not valid because the alleged offense has not just been committed. The crime was allegedly committed one year before the arrest. (Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113). Yes, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation because he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant (See Sec. 7 of Rule 112). He can move for a reinvestigation. Alternative He is not entitled to a preliminary investigation because the penalty for estafa is the sum of P10,000 does not exceed 4 years and 2 months. Under Sec. 1, second par., Rule 112, a preliminary investigation is not required. (Note: The penalty is not stated in the question.) Arrest; Warrantless Arrests & Searches (1997) A was killed by B during a quarrel over a hostess in a nightclub. Two days after the incident, and upon complaint of the widow of A, the police arrested B without a warrant of arrest and searched his house without a search warrant. a) Can the gun used by B in shooting A, which was seized during the search of the house of B, be admitted in evidence? b) Is the arrest of B legal? c) Under the circumstances, can B be convicted of homicide? Answer a) No. The gun seized during the search of the house of B without a search warrant is not admissible in evidence. (Secs. 2 and 3[2], Art. III of Constitution). Moreover, the search was not an incident to a lawful arrest of a person under Sec. 12 of Rule 126. b) No. A warrantless arrest requires that the crime has in fact just been committed and the police arresting has personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed it. (Sec. 5, Rule 113). Here, the crime has not just been committed since a period of two days had already lapsed, and the police arresting has no such personal knowledge because he was not present when the incident happened. (Go vs. Court of Appeals. 206 SCRA 138). (c) Yes. The gun is not indispensable in the conviction of A because the court may rely on testimonial or other evidence. Arrest; Warrantless Arrests & Seizures (2003) In a buy-bust operation, the police operatives arrested the accused and seized from him a sachet of shabu and an unlicensed firearm. The accused was charged in two Informations, one for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and another for illegal possession of firearms.

The accused filed an action for recovery of the firearm in another court against the police officers with an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin. He alleged in his Complaint that he was a military informer who had been issued a written authority to carry said firearm. The police officers moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the subject firearm was in custodia legis. The court denied the motion and instead issued the writ of replevin. (a) Was the seizure of the firearm valid? (b) Was the denial of the motion to dismiss proper? 6% Answer a) Yes, the seizure of the firearm was valid because it was seized in the course of a valid arrest in a buy-bust operation. (Sec. 12 and 13 of Rule 126) A search warrant was not necessary. (People v. Salazar, 266 SCRA 607\ b) The denial of the motion to dismiss was not proper. The court had no authority to issue the writ of replevin whether the firearm was in custodia legis or not. The motion to recover the firearm should be filed in the court where the criminal action is pending. Arrest; Warrantless Arrests; Objection (2000) FG was arrested without a warrant by policemen while he was walking in a busy street. After preliminary investigation, he was charged with rape and the corresponding information was filed in the RTC. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. The court rendered judgment convicting him. On appeal, FG claims that the judgment is void because he was illegally arrested. If you were the Solicitor General, counsel for the People of the Philippines, how would you refute said claim? (5%) Answer Any objection to the illegality of the arrest of the accused without a warrant is deemed waived when he pleaded not guilty at the arraignment without raising the question. T is too late to complain about a warrantless arrest after trial is commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. (People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199, Summons Seven years after the entry of judgment, the plaintiff filed an action for its revival. Can the defendant successfully oppose the revival of the judgment by contending that it is null and void because the RTC-Manila did not acquire jurisdiction over his person? Why? (3%)

Answer The RTC-Manila should deny the motion because it is in violation of the rule that no judgment obligor shall be required to appear before a court, for the purpose of examination concerning his property and income, outside the province or city in which such obligor resides. In this case the judgment obligor resides in Bulacan. (Rule 39, sec.36). 1999 a) What is the effect of absence of summons on the judgment rendered in the case? (2%) b) When additional defendant is impleaded in the action, is it necessary that summons be served upon him? Explain. (2%) c) Is summons required to be served upon a defendant who was substituted for the deceased? Explain. (2%) d) A sued XX Corporation (XXC), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, for specific performance when the latter failed to deliver T-shirts to the former as stipulated in their contract of sale. Summons was served on the corporation's cashier and director. Would you consider service of summons on either officer sufficient? Explain. (2%) Answer a) The effect of the absence of summons on a judgment would make the judgment null and void because the court would not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but if the defendant voluntarily appeared before the court, his appearance is equivalent to the service of summons. (Sec. 20, Rule 14) b) Yes. Summons must be served on an additional defendant impleaded in the action so that the court can acquire jurisdiction over him, unless he makes a voluntary appearance. c) No. A defendant who was substituted for the deceased need not be served with summons because it is the court which orders him as the legal representative of the deceased to appear and substitute the deceased. (Sec. 16 of Rule 3.) d) Summons on a domestic corporation through its cashier and director are not valid under the present rules. (Sec. 11, Rule 14) They have been removed from those who can be served with summons for a domestic corporation. Cashier was substituted by treasurer. (Id.) Summons; Substituted Service (2004) Summons was issued by the MM RTC and actually received on time by defendant from his wife at their residence. The sheriff earlier that day had delivered the summons to her at said residence because defendant was not home at the time. The sheriffs return or proof of service filed with the court in sum states that the summons, with attached copy of the complaint, was served on defendant at his residence thru his wife, a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over his person as there was no valid service of summons on him because the sheriffs return or proof of service does not show that the sheriff first made a genuine attempt to serve the summons on

defendant personally before serving it thru his wife. Is the motion to dismiss meritorious? What is the purpose of summons and by whom may it be served? Explain. (5%) Answer The motion to dismiss is not meritorious because the defendant actually received the summons on time from his wife. Service on the wife was sufficient. (Boticano v. Chu, 148 SCRA 541 [1987]). It is the duty of the court to look into the sufficiency of the service. The sheriffs negligence in not stating in his return that he first made a genuine effort to serve the summons on the defendant, should not prejudice the plaintiff. (Mapa v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 417/1992). The purpose of the summons is to inform the defendant of the complaint filed against him and to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person. It maybe served by the sheriff or his deputy or any person authorized by the court. Alternative Yes. The motion to dismiss is meritorious. Substituted service cannot be effected unless the sheriffs return shows that he made a genuine attempt to effect personal service on the husband. Bail (2002) D was charged with murder, a capital offense. After arraignment, he applied for bail. The trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence in full on the ground that only on the basis of such presentation could it determine whether the evidence of Ds guilt was strong for purposes of bail. Is the ruling correct? Why? (3%) Answer No, the prosecution is only required to present as much evidence as is necessary to determine whether the evidence of Ds guilt is strong for purposes of bail.(Rule 114, sec. 8). Bail; Appeal (1998) In an information charging them of Murder, policemen A, B and C were convicted of Homicide. A appealed from the decision but B and C did not. B started serving his sentence but C escaped and is at large. In the Court of Appeals, A applied for bail but was denied. Finally, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting A on the ground that the evidence pointed to the NPA as the killers of the victim. 1 Was the Court of Appeal's denial of A's application for bail proper? [2%] 2 Can B and C be benefited by the decision of the Court of Appeals? [3%] Answer 1, Yes, the Court of Appeals properly denied A's application for bail. The court had the discretion to do so. Although A was convicted of homicide only, since he was charged with a capital offense, on appeal he could be convicted of the capital offense. (Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281.)

Alternative Under Circular No. 2-92, A is entitled to bail because he was convicted of homicide and hence the evidence of guilt of murder is not strong. Answer 2. B, who did not appeal, can be benefited by the decision of the Court of Appeals which is favorable and applicable to him. (Sec. 11 [a]. Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure.) The benefit will also apply to C even if his appeal is dismissed because of his escape. Bail; Application; Venue (2002 If an information was filed in the RTC-Manila charging D with homicide and he was arrested in Quezon City, in what court or courts may he apply for bail? Explain. (3%) Answer D may apply for bail in the RTC-Manila where the information was filed or in the RTC-Quezon City where he was arrested, or if no judge, thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (Rule 114, sec. 17). Bail; Matter of Right vs. Matter of Discretion (1999 When is bail a matter of right and when is it a matter of discretion? (2%) Answer As a matter of right All persons in custody shall (a) before or after conviction by the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, and (b) before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or Rule 114. (Sec. 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended by Circular No. 12-94.) As a matter of discretion Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, on application of the accused. If the penalty of imprisonment exceeds six years but not more than 20 years, bail shall be denied upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: 1 That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-re-cidivist or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2 That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

3 That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; 4 That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5 That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. (Sec. 1, Id.) 1999 May the Court require a witness to post bail? Explain your answer. (2%) Answer Yes. The court may require a witness to post bail if he is a material witness and bail is needed to secure his appearance. The rules provide that when the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after his testimony is taken. (Sec. 6, Rule 119) Attachment In a case, the property of an incompetent under guardianship was in custodia legis. Can it be attached? Explain. (2%) Answer Although the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis, it may be attached as in fact it is provided that in such case, a copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed with the proper court and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property. (Sec. 7, last par., Rule 57) May damages be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the judgment is adverse to him? Explain. (2%) Answer Yes, damages may be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the judgment is adverse to him. This is authorized by the Rules. A claim, for damages may be made on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment, which shall be heard with notice to the adverse party and his surety or sureties. (Sec. 20, Rule 57; Javellana v. D. O. Plaza Enterprises Inc., 32 SCRA 281.) 2001

May a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex-parte? Briefly state the reason(s) for your answer. (3%) Answer Yes, an order of attachment may be issued ex-parte or upon motion with notice and hearing. (Sec. 2 of Rule 57) The reason why the order may be issued ex parte is: that requiring notice to the adverse party and a hearing would defeat the purpose of the provisional remedy and enable the adverse party to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. (Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480). 2005 Katy filed an action against Tyrone for collection of the sum of P1 Million in the RTC, with an ex-parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Upon posting of an attachment bond, the court granted the application and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Apprehensive that Tyrone might withdraw his savings deposit with the bank, the sheriff immediately served a notice of garnishment on the bank to implement the writ of preliminary attachment. The following day, the sheriff proceeded to Tyrone's house and served him the summons, with copies of the complaint containing the application for writ of preliminary attachment, Katy's affidavit, order of attachment, writ of preliminary attachment and attachment bond. Within fifteen (15) days from service of the summons, Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (i) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the writ was served ahead of the summons; (ii) the writ was improperly implemented; and (iii) said writ was improvidently issued because the obligation in question was already fully paid. Resolve the motion with reasons. (4%) Answer The motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment should be denied. (1) The fact that the writ of attachment was served ahead of the summons did not affect the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It makes the writ, unenforceable. (Sec. 5, Rule. 57) However, all that is needed to be done is to re-serve the writ. (Onate Abrogar, GM. No. 197393, February 23, 1985) v. 2) The writ was improperly implemented. Serving a notice of garnishment, particularly before summons is served, is not proper. It should be a copy of the writ of attachment that should be served on the defendant, and a notice that the bank deposits are attached pursuant to the writ. (Sec. 7[d], Rule 57) 3) The writ was improvidently issued if indeed it can be shown that the obligation was already fully paid. The writ is only ancillary to the main action. (Sec. 13, Rule 57) The alleged payment of the account cannot, serve as a ground for resolving the improvident issuance of the writ, because this matter delves into the merits of the case, and requires full-blown trial. Payment, however, serves as a ground for a motion to dismiss Hearsay 2002

Romeo is sued for damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a vehicular accident. Julieta, a witness in court, testifies that Romeo told her (Julieta) that he (Romeo) heard Antonio, a witness to the accident, give an excited account of the accident immediately after its occurrence. Is Julietas testimony admissible against Romeo over proper and timely objection? Why? (5%) Answer No, Julietas testimony is not admissible against Romeo, because while the excited account of Antonio, a witness to the accident, was told to Romeo, it was only Romeo who told Julieta about it, which makes it hearsay. 2004 Distinguish Hearsay evidence and opinion evidence. Answer Hearsay evidence consists of testimony that is not based on personal knowledge of the person testifying, (see Sec. 36, Rule 130), while opinion evidence is expert evidence based on the personal knowledge skill, experience or training of the person testifying (Sec. 49, Id.) and evidence of an ordinary witness on limited matters (Sec. 50, Id.). 2001 Maximo filed an action against Pedro, the administrator of the estate of deceased Juan, for the recovery of a car which is part of the latters estate. During the trial, Maximo presented witness Mariano who testified that he was present when Maximo and Juan agreed that the latter would pay a rental of P20,000.00 for the use of Maximos car for one month after which Juan should immediately return the car to Maximo. Pedro objected to the admission of Marianos testimony. If you were the judge, would you sustain Pedros objection? Why? (5%) Answer No, the testimony is admissible in evidence because witness Mariano who testified as to what Maximo and Juan, the deceased person agreed upon, is not disqualified to testify on the agreement. Those disqualified are parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against the administrator or Juans estate, upon a claim or demand against his estate as to any matter of fact occurring before Juans death. (Sec. 23 of Rule 130) 1998 Requisites of Dying Declaration The requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration are: (a) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (b) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (c) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and (d) the declaration is offered in a (criminal) case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. Alternative The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be

received in any case wherein his death is the subject of Inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (Sec. 37 of Rule 13O.) 2005 Dencio barged into the house of Marcela, tied her to a chair and robbed her of assorted pieces of jewelry and money. Dencio then brought Candida, Marcela's maid, to a bedroom where he raped her. Marcela could hear Candida crying and pleading: "Huwag! Maawa ka sa akin!" After raping Candida, Dencio fled from the house with the loot. Candida then untied Marcela and rushed to the police station about a kilometer away and told Police Officer Roberto Maawa that Dencio had barged into the house of Marcela, tied the latter to a chair and robbed her of her jewelry and money. Candida also related to the police officer that despite her pleas, Dencio had raped her. The policeman noticed that Candida was hysterical and on the verge of collapse. Dencio was charged with robbery with rape. During the trial, Candida can no longer be located. (8%) a) If the prosecution presents Police Officer Roberto Maawa to testify on what Candida had told him, would such testimony of the policeman be hearsay? Explain. Answer No. The testimony of the policeman is not hearsay. It is part of the res gestae. It is also an independently relevant statement. The police officer testified of his own personal knowledge, not to the truth of Candida's statement, i.e., that she told him, despite her pleas, Dencio had raped her. (People v. Gaddi,1989) b) If the police officer will testify that he noticed Candida to be hysterical and on the verge of collapse, would such testimony be considered as opinion, hence, inadmissible? Explain. Answer No, it cannot be considered as opinion, because he was testifying on what he actually observed. The last paragraph of Sec. 50, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Evidence, expressly provides that a witness may testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. 1999 The accused was charged with robbery and homicide. The victim suffered several stab wounds. It appears that eleven (11) hours after the crime, while the victim was being brought to the hospital in a jeep, with his brother and a policeman as companions, the victim was asked certain questions which he answered, pointing to the accused as his assailant. His answers were put down in writing, but since he was a in a critical condition, his brother and the policeman signed the statement. Is the statement admissible as a dying declaration? Explain. (2%) Answer Yes. The statement is admissible as a dying declaration if the victim subsequently died and his answers were made under the consciousness of impending death (Sec. 37 of Rule 130). The fact that he did not sign the statement point to the accused as his assailant, because he was in critical condition, does not affect its admissibility as a dying declaration. A dying declaration need not be in writing (People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1)

2003 X was charged with robbery. On the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the court, X was arrested by police operatives. They seized from his person a handgun. A charge for illegal possession of firearm was also filed against him. In a press conference called by the police, X admitted that he had robbed the victim of jewelry valued at P500,000.00. The robbery and illegal possession of firearm cases were tried jointly. The prosecution presented in evidence a newspaper clipping of the report to the reporter who was present during the press conference stating that X admitted the robbery. It likewise presented a certification of the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that the accused had no license to carry any firearm. The certifying officer, however, was not presented as a witness. Both pieces of evidence were objected to by the defense. (6%) a) Is the newspaper clipping admissible in evidence against X? b) Is the certification of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Office without the certifying officer testifying on it admissible in evidence against X? Answer a) Yes, the newspaper clipping is admissible in evidence against X. regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown where the fact that it is made is relevant. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such fact. (Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18 [1992]) b) Yes, the certification is admissible in evidence against X because a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (Sec. 28 of Rule 132). Privileged Communication 1998 C is the child of the spouses H and W. H sued his wife W for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. In the trial, the following testified over the objection of W: C, H and D, a doctor of medicine who used to treat W. Rule on W's objections which are the following: 1. H cannot testify against her because of the rule on marital privilege; [1%] 2. C cannot testify against her because of the doctrine on parental privilege; and [2%] 3. D cannot testify against her because of the doctrine of privileged communication between patient and physician. [2%] Answer

1. The rule of marital privilege cannot be invoked in the annulment case under Rule 36 of the Family Code because it is a civil case filed by one against the other, (Sec. 22 , Rule 130. Rules of Court.) 2. The doctrine of parental privilege cannot likewise be invoked by W as against the testimony of C, their child. C may not be compelled to testify but is free to testify against her. (Sec. 25. Rule 130. Rules of Court; Art. 215, Family Code.) 3. D, as a doctor who used to treat W, is disqualified to testify against W over her objection as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in his professional capacity. (Sec. 24 [c], Rule 130. Rules of Court.) Alternative If the doctor's testimony is pursuant to the requirement of establishing the psychological incapacity of W, and he is the expert called upon to testify for the purpose, then it should be allowed. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 26S SCRA 198 1989 Ody sued spouses Cesar and Baby for a sum of money and damages. At the trial, Ody called Baby as his first witness. Baby objected, joined by Cesar, on the ground that she may not be compelled to testify against her husband. Ody insisted and contended that after all, she would just be questioned about a conference they had with the barangay captain, a matter which is not confidential in nature. The trial court ruled in favor of Ody. Was the ruling proper? Will your answer be the same if the matters to be testified on were known to Baby or acquired by her prior to her marriage to Cesar? Explain. Answer No. Under the Rules on Evidence, a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent, except in civil cases by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. Since the case was filed by Ody against the spouses Cesar and Baby, Baby cannot be compelled to testify for or against Cesar without his consent. (Lezama vs. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166). The answer would be the same if the matters to be testified on were known to Baby or acquired by her prior to her marriage to Cesar, because the marital disqualification rule may be invoked with respect to testimony on any fact. It is immaterial whether such matters were known to Baby before or after her marriage to Cesar. 2000 Vida and Romeo are legally married. Romeo is charged to court with the crime of serious physical injuries committed against Selmo, son of Vida, stepson of Romeo. Vida witnessed the infliction of the injuries on Selmo by Romeo. The public prosecutor called Vida to the witness stand and offered her testimony as an eyewitness. Counsel for Romeo objected on the ground of the marital disqualification rule under the Rules of Court. a) Is the objection valid? (3%) b) Will your answer be the same if Vidas testimony is offered in a civil case for recovery of personal

property filed by Selmo against Romeo? (2%) Answer (a) No. While neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, one exception is if the testimony of the spouse is in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. (Sec, 22, Rule 130). The case falls under this exception because Selma is the direct descendant of the spouse Vide. b) No. The marital disqualification rule applies this time. The exception provided by the rules is in a civil case by one spouse against the other. The case here involves a case by Selmo for the recovery of personal property against Vidas spouse, Romeo. 2004 XYZ, an alien, was criminally charged of promoting and facilitating child prostitution and other sexual abuses under Rep. Act No. 7610. The principal witness against him was his Filipina wife, ABC. Earlier, she had complained that XYZ's hotel was being used as a center for sex tourism and child trafficking. The defense counsel for XYZ objected to the testimony of ABC at the trial of the child prostitution case and the introduction of the affidavits she executed against her husband as a violation of espousal confidentiality and marital privilege rule. It turned out that DEF, the minor daughter of ABC by her first husband who was a Filipino, was molested by XYZ earlier. Thus, ABC had filed for legal separation from XYZ since last year. May the court admit the testimony and affidavits of the wife, ABC, against her husband, XYZ, in the criminal case involving child prostitution? Reason. (5%) Answer Yes. The court may admit the testimony and affidavits of the wife against her husband in the criminal case where it involves child prostitution of the wife's daughter. It is not covered by the marital privilege rule. One exception thereof is where the crime is committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (Sec. 22, Rule 130). A crime by the husband against the daughter is a crime against the wife and directly attacks or vitally impairs the conjugal relation. (Ordono v. Daquigan, 62 2006 Leticia was estranged from her husband Paul for more than a year due to his suspicion that she was having an affair with Manuel their neighbor. She was temporarily living with her sister in Pasig City. For unknown reasons, the house of Leticia's sister was burned, killing the latter. Leticia survived. She saw her husband in the vicinity during the incident. Later he was charged with arson in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City. During the trial, the prosecutor called Leticia to the witness stand and offered her testimony to prove that her husband committed arson. Can Leticia testify over the objection of her husband on the ground of marital privilege? (5%)

Answer No, Leticia cannot testify over the objection of her husband, not under marital privilege which is inapplicable and which can be waived, but she would be barred under Sec. 22 of Rule 130, which prohibits her from testifying and which cannot be waived (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005). Alternative Yes, Leticia may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of Paul eradicate all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to offer the testimony of Leticia over the objection of her husband (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005). 1999 A overheard B call X a thief. In an action for defamation filed by X against B, is the testimony of A offered to prove the fact of utterance i.e., that B called X a thief, admissible in evidence? Explain. (2%) Answer Yes. The testimony of A who overheard B call X a thief is admissible in evidence as an independently relevant statement. It is offered in evidence only to prove the tenor thereof, not to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein. Independently relevant statements include statements which are on the very facts in issue or those which are circumstantial evidence thereof. The hearsay rule does not apply. (See People vs. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649) Habeas Corpus 1993 Roxanne, a widow, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals against Major Amor who is allegedly detaining her 18-year old son Bong without authority of the law. After Major Amor had a filed a return alleging the cause of detention of Bong, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution remanding the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial due to the conflicting facts presented by the parties in their pleadings. In directing the remand, the court of Appeals relied on Sec.9(1), in relation to Sec. 21 of BP 129 conferring upon said Court the authority to try and decide habeas corpus cases concurrently with the RTCs. Did the Court of Appeals act correctly in remanding the petition to the RTC? Why?

Answer No, because while the CA has original jurisdiction over habeas corpus concurrent with the RTCs, it has no authority for remanding to the latter original actions filed with the former. On the contrary, the CA is specifically given the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original jurisdiction. Alternative Yes, because there is no prohibition in the law against a superior court referring a case to a lower court having concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has referred to the CA or the RTC cases falling within their concurrent jurisdiction. 1998 A was arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the RTC in connection with an Information for Homicide. W, the live-in partner of A filed a petition for habeas corpus against A's jailer and police investigators with the Court of Appeals. 1. Does W have the personality to file the petition for habeas corpus? [2%] 2. Is the petition tenable? [3%] Answer 1. Yes. W, the live-in partner of A, has the personality to file the petition for habeas corpus because it may be filed by "some person in his behalf." (Sec. 3. Rule 102. Rules of Court.) 2. No. The petition is not tenable because the warrant of arrest was issued by a court which had Jurisdiction to issue it (Sec. 4, Rule 102 Rules of Court) 2003 Widow A and her two children, both girls, aged 8 and 12 years old, reside in Angeles City, Pampanga. A leaves her two daughters in their house at night because she works in a brothel as a prostitute. Realizing the danger to the morals of these two girls, B, the father of the deceased husband of A, files a petition for habeas corpus against A for the custody of the girls in the Family Court in Angeles City. In said petition, B alleges that he is entitled to the custody of the two girls because their mother is living a disgraceful life. The court issues the writ of habeas corpus. When A learns of the petition and the writ, she brings her two children to Cebu City. At the expense of B the sheriff of the said Family Court goes to Cebu City and serves the writ on A. A files her comment on the petition raising the following defenses: a) The enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus in Cebu City is illegal; and b) B has no personality to institute the petition. 6% Resolve the petition in the light of the above defenses of A. (6%) Answer

(a) The writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family Court in Angeles City may not be legally enforced in Cebu City, because the writ is enforceable only within the judicial region to which the Family Court belongs, unlike the writ granted by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals which is enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. (Sec. 20 of (b) B, the father of the deceased husband of A, has the personality to institute the petition for habeas corpus of the two minor girls, because the grandparent has the right of custody as against the mother A who is a prostitute. (Sectioins 2 and 13, Id.)