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Public-Key Cryptanalysis:: Nguyen Dinh Thuc University of Science, HCMC Ndthuc@fit - Hcmus.edu - VN

This document introduces public-key cryptanalysis and discusses flaws in textbook RSA and Elgamal encryption schemes. It notes that RSA deterministically leaks one bit of the plaintext's Jacobi symbol and Elgamal leaks the Legendre symbol. Both schemes are also vulnerable if the group order has smooth factors, allowing discrete logarithm attacks. The document concludes that encryption must be probabilistic but done carefully, and defining security for encryption properly took many years.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
70 views11 pages

Public-Key Cryptanalysis:: Nguyen Dinh Thuc University of Science, HCMC Ndthuc@fit - Hcmus.edu - VN

This document introduces public-key cryptanalysis and discusses flaws in textbook RSA and Elgamal encryption schemes. It notes that RSA deterministically leaks one bit of the plaintext's Jacobi symbol and Elgamal leaks the Legendre symbol. Both schemes are also vulnerable if the group order has smooth factors, allowing discrete logarithm attacks. The document concludes that encryption must be probabilistic but done carefully, and defining security for encryption properly took many years.

Uploaded by

gacon119hp
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Public-key cryptanalysis: introduction

Nguyen Dinh Thuc University of Science, HCMC [email protected]

outline
Textbook RSA Textbook Elgamal Conclusion

Textbook RSA
Public-key: N=pq where p and q are large primes, and exponent e co-prime with (N)=(p-1)(q-1) Private key: d such that ed1 [mod (N)] RSA is a permutation over N : x xe mod N Trapdoor one-way permutation is inverse RSA: x xd mod N

One-way function
A function f is one-way if when we choose a random input x and publish f(m), an attacker fails to recover x. Clearly, this must be satisfied by the encryption function of a secure asymmetric scheme But this is not enough

Flaws in one-way function


Average-Case assumption A one-way function refers to the uniform distribution over the input space. But message may have a very special distribution making decryption easy For example: we encrypt a 128-bit AES session key using textbook RSA with exponent e=3 and a 1024-bit modulus Hastads broadcast attack is based

Flaws in one-way functions


Information leakage The definition of one-way says nothing about the hardness of recovering partial information on the input RSA is assumed to be one-way, but it also provably leaks one bit of information: the Jacobi symbol of the plaintext. Because e is odd:
e

c m m = = N N N

if encryption was carefully randomized, this leakage would

Deterministic encryption
RSA is a deterministic encryption scheme. Deterministic encryption is not secure: In asymmetric encryption, anyone can encrypt. So if encryption is deterministic, any one can check whether or not a given cipher-text corresponds to a given plaintext This allows brute-force attacks on the message, if the message space is

Textbook Elgamal
Let g be a generator of *p Private key: 0 x < p-1, where p is a large prime Public key: y = gx mod p To encrypt a message m p :
(1) (2)

Select a random k {0,1,,p-2} Cipher text is a pair (gx mod p, myk mod p) *-p x p

Probabilistic encryption
Elgamal is probabilistic encryption scheme. This probabilistic encryption still leaks one bit of information: the Legendre symbol (m/p) of the plaintext More generally, if p-1 = qs where s is smooth, then logm mod s can be recovered

On the discrete logarithm problem


The discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group of order n is easy if n is: Small: brute-force or square-root attacks A power of a small prime: Pohlig-Hellman Smooth: use CRT It follows that the discrete logarithm modulo any smooth factor of n can easily be computed

Conclusion
Encryption must be made probabilistic But it must be done carefully Defining security for encryption is tricky: it took more or less twenty years to find the right notion!

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