Dow Gold Ratio
Dow Gold Ratio
Dow Gold Ratio
INTRODUCTION
The three great bull markets of the Twentieth Century are dramatically reflected in a chart of the Dow/Gold ratio, which is simply the quotient of the Dow Jones Industrial Average divided by the gold price in US Dollars. It is basically the price of the leading index of paper claims on productive assets, divided by the dollar price of an ounce of gold.
When the ratio is high, as it is in a boom, equities are expensive and gold is cheap. When the ratio is low, as it is in a bust, equities are cheap and gold is dear.
Today, the Dow/Gold ratio is at its highest level ever. We believe this signifies the financial world is on the cusp of a huge inflection point, similar to that of the two prior peaks.
Just as at those prior peaks, financial assets are grossly overvalued, and gold is grossly undervalued. Just as those prior valuation extremes resolved themselves through dramatic reversals in both the numerator and the denominator of the Dow/Gold ratio, so will todays, and soon.
DECEMBER 2000
INTRODUCTION
At about 40, the Dow/Gold ratio is at a record high:
1999: 39.61
Dow/Gold Ratio
1965: 27.30
1928: 14.51
1932: 2.90
1980: 1.65
1915
1925
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
DECEMBER 2000
INTRODUCTION
The key to understanding the Dow/Gold ratio and what it portends lies in isolating the principal factors that affect the numerator (equity prices) and the denominator (the price of gold).
At every peak, we find the same phenomena:
Overvaluation of equities Over-ownership of equities Excessive liquidity Excessive credit
At every trough, we find their opposites. And at each extreme, we find a background of breakdown in the global monetary system:
Collapse of gold exchange standard (1929 - 1934) Collapse of Bretton Woods standard (1961 - 1971) Collapse of floating rate standard (pending)
Today, gold is dead. In 1980, equities were dead. We know how this chapter ends.
DECEMBER 2000
THE NUMERATOR
Price/Earnings Ratio: S&P 500
35
1933: 32.3
1999: 33.4
30
1961: 22.4
By every rational measure, equity values are off the charts, exceeding their 1929 and 1966 highs. Here are just a few examples.
25
1904: 17.4
20
AVG = 14.8
15
10
1917: 5.2
1948: 6.6
1979: 7.4
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
5.0
4.0
Price/Book Value
3.0
2.0
1.0
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE NUMERATOR
Percent Household Participation in US Equities
45% 40% 35% 30%
1968: 38%
Billions
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Relative to GDP, the aggregate capitalization of the stock market is at an all-time high
Billions
1930: 76%
1965: 75%
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE NUMERATOR
Cumulative Growth: M3 and the Monetary Base
2100% 1900%
M3
1700%
A peak in the Dow/Gold Ratio is at heart a monetary phenomenon. The fuel for the imbalance is always the same: excessive liquidity and excessive credit.
Since 1960, the aggregates known as M3 and the Monetary Base have increased by over 2000% and 1300%, respectively.
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
60%
During the same period, Household Debt as a percentage of GDP has grown by more than half to over 65%.
Household Debt/GDP
50%
40%
30% 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE NUMERATOR
Total Debt (All Sectors)/GDP
2.75
2.50
Despite the fanfare associated with the recent paydown of the long bond, the United States economy is saturated with debt.
TOTAL DEBT/ GDP
2.25
2.00
1.75
1.50
1.25
SOURCE: CITADEL RESEARCH & ANA LYTICS
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Margin debt has grown by over 300% to more than $250 billion since 1993.
12/93
12/94
12/95
12/96
12/97
12/98
12/99
12/00
DECEMBER 2000
THE NUMERATOR
US Quarterly Current Account Deficit
$40
The US economy and its capital markets are increasingly reliant on the kindness of strangers.
12/60
12/63
12/66
12/69
12/72
12/75
12/78
12/81
12/84
12/87
12/90
12/93
12/96
12/99
12/02
$80
Billions
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
Gold Valuation Index versus Gold Price
* SOURCE: CITADEL RESEARCH & ANALYTICS
$900 $800
2.00
1.50
Gold Undervalued
1.00
EL
TE E
PRICE OF GOLD (right) Gold Overvalued
$700
0.50
This chart compares the Gold Valuation Model (GVM; left scale) with the actual price of gold (right scale) since 1971. The GVM is derived by dividing the Federal Reserves Adjusted Monetary Base by the price of gold bullion. The model indicates that gold is as cheap today, relative to the Monetary Base, as in 1971.
12/55 12/58 12/61 12/64 12/67 12/70 12/73 12/76 12/79 12/82 12/85 12/88 12/91 12/94 12/97 12/00
3000
2500
New mine supply has peaked and will decline for the next few years irrespective of gold prices.
2000
Tonnes
1500
1000
500
SOURCE: W ORLD GOLD COUNCIL
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
And yet, while precise estimates vary, it is generally accepted that annual bullion demand substantially exceeds supply.
Gold Supply/ Demand - 1999 Tonnes (a) DEMAND (b) SUPPLY Mine Scrap Total SHORTFALL 2,500 600 3,100 (1,400) 4,500
Notes (a) One "tonne" is a metric ton containing approximately 32,150 oz. (b) Estimated total global demand for jewelry, bar, coin & other
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
Official Sector activity makes up much of the difference between annual demand and new mine production. This consists of outright sales of monetary gold reserves as well as leasing of physical gold by central banks. Gold leasing is basically gold banking in a new guise, and results in adding new supply to the physical market while at the same time creating a short physical position typically hedged with paper gold derivatives such as forward contracts, futures or options.
Central Bank
In a typical lease transaction, a central bank deposits gold with a bullion bank on a demand or other short term basis at the current lease rate (1). The bullion bank in turn lends the gold to a gold mine or a speculator such as a hedge fund (2), generally at a longer maturity and higher lease rate. In each case the leased gold is sold short (3) and the proceeds are expended or reinvested in financial assets. The central bank now holds the bullion banks promise to return its gold. Similarly, the bullion bank now holds its customers promise to deliver gold in the future. Both sets of promises are typically hedged through the use of derivatives. In the case of the gold mine, future delivery is presumed to be possible out of future production. In the case of the speculator, future delivery must be purchased in the spot market. In practice, most leases and related gold loans are rolled over, so the cumulative balance continues to increase. The gold, meanwhile, likely finds its way to India.
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
The cumulative exposures created as a result of leasing and related derivatives activity are substantial in relation to the worlds total supply of physical gold.
The Gold Derivatives Market: Fun Facts Tonnes Total Above Ground Supply of Physical Gold Total Physical Gold Nominally Held by All Central Banks Total Physical Gold Nominally Held by Central Bank Signatories & Other Observers of Washington Agreement Total Notional Amount of Gold Derivatives on Books of G-10 Banks, December 1999 (Source: BIS) Total Notional Amount of Gold Derivatives on Books of Chase/JP Morgan, December 1999 (Source: OCC) Total Physical Short Position (high estimate) Total Physical Short Position (low estimate) Notes (a) Conversions between tonnes and US $ expressed at $275/ ounce. (b) Veneroso Associates. (c) Gold Fields Minerals Services Ltd. > 125,000 33,500 28,500 27,485 7,352 10,000 (b) 5,000 (c) US $ (Billions) (a) 1,105 296 252 243 65 88 44
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
The cumulative effect of this activity has been devastating to the gold market and the shares of gold producers. In effect, Everybodys out, and many are short.
At under $40 billion, the market capitalization of the entire gold sector is a fraction of that of GE, Cisco or Microsoft as of September 30, 2000. Meanwhile, aggregate holdings of gold shares by mutual funds have declined to de minimis levels.
$600
$564
$500
$395 Billions
$400
$300
$287
$200
$100
$30 $4
GE CISCO MICROSOFT 31 LARGEST GOLD STOCKS M UTUAL FUND GOLD STOCK HOLDINGS
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
A steady drumbeat of negative news and commentary captures the pessimism in the gold market: Precious Metals Funds Sinking - Associated Press, November 26, 2000 Gold Production from Yukons Placer Mines Hits 21-Year-Low - Associated Press, November 20, 2000 Gold No Longer Glitters for Investors - Chicago Daily Herald, November 15, 2000 In the Golden Sunset / Is gold the dog that barked and may even be dead? - Financial Times, October 6, 2000 Golds Slide Triggers Exit by Long-Patient Investors: Spotlight - Bloomberg, October 5, 2000 Homestake Announces Closure of the Homestake Mine; Expects Further Reductions in Overall Cash Costs - Homestake Press Release, September 11, 2000
DECEMBER 2000
THE DENOMINATOR
The first stirrings of change are evident. Liquidity to support further leasing/derivative activity will be severely restricted going forward. The text of the Washington Agreement, September 26, 1999:
Oesterreichische Nationalbank Banque Nationale de Belgique Banca dItalia Banque centrale du Luxembourg Banque de France Deutsche Bundesbank Banco do Portugal Schweizerische Nationalbank Banco de Espaa Bank of England Suomen Pankki De Nederlandsche Bank Central Bank of Ireland Sveriges Riksbank European Central Bank
In the interest of clarifying their intentions with respect to their gold holdings, the above institutions make the following statement: 1. 2. Gold will remain an important element of global monetary reserves. The above institutions will not enter the market as sellers, with the exception of already decided sales. The gold sales already decided will be achieved through a concerted programme of sales over the next five years. Annual sales will not exceed approximately 400 tonnes and total sales over this period will not exceed 2,000 tonnes. The signatories to this agreement have agreed not to expand their gold leasings and their use of gold futures and options over this period. This agreement will be reviewed after five years.
3.
4.
5.
DECEMBER 2000
The factors which inform the Dow/Gold Ratio do not operate in domestic isolation, but are instead a function of global monetary conditions. Each peak in the Dow/Gold Ratio corresponds to a backdrop of excess global credit and liquidity arising from progressive loosenings of constraints in the international monetary system.
The post-World War I boom of the 1920s occurred in the context of the gold exchange standard, which permitted a much larger expansion of credit than would have been possible under the classical gold standard in place prior to the Great War. The post-World War II boom of the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s occurred in the context of the US dollar-based gold exchange rate system of Bretton Woods, which allowed a similar unprecedented expansion. The post-Cold War bubble of the 1990s occurred in the context of the US dollar-based floating exchange rate system, which has permitted the greatest explosion in international credit and liquidity in history.
DECEMBER 2000
DJIA/Gold Ratio
1915
1925
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
DECEMBER 2000
$200
$100
1915
1925
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
DECEMBER 2000
20%
BRITISH POUND
Annualized Volatility
15%
The signs of impending monetary breakdown include increasing direct interventions in commodity and currency markets, bouts of extreme volatility in stocks, currencies and gold, and the emergence of the US Dollar as the dominant official reserve asset. With no anchor to windward, currencies have blown hither and yon since the collapse of Bretton Woods.
10%
5%
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
$1200
$1000
The buildup of US Dollar reserves corresponds to the decline in gold reserves among central banks.
Billions
$800
$600
$400
U.S. CLOSES GOLD WINDOW
$200
METAL RESERVES: Gold at Constant Price of $35/ oz. In 50 Years, Physical Reserves have Increased Only 12.3%
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
DECEMBER 2000
PROJECTION
Our message is really pretty simple. The broad investment and financial picture in late 2000 parallels quite closely the previous super bull market tops of 1929 and 1966. All our analytic studies show, and all our anecdotal evidence supports, the proposition that the world is on the cusp of a similarly huge investment inflection point today. We don't claim clairvoyance. We cannot yet tell precisely when or how quickly the Dow/Gold ratio will collapse to more normal levels. But we are convinced that it will, and that five years from now a Dow/Gold ratio chart is quite likely to look something like this:
Dow/Gold Ratio
1915
1925
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
DECEMBER 2000