1

El Banco ESPAOL-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca Judicial Due Process Requisites Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracionever received the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are; 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. 4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85) Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. Held: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passersby; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580) Facts: The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case? Held: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." "The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

2
regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held: It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco. In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception of instutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process. We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us now, was only a summary action for ejectment that: In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's evidence, should be avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be imputed to the judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988 GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, Petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, Respondents. PADILIA, J.: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary principles of due process.

3
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. PBM EMPLOYEES VS.PBM [51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993] Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and RodulfoMunsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizersof the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated. Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

http://uber2002.wordpress.com/ http://www.uberdigests.info/ http://niceyusclaw.blogspot.com/2010/12/churchill-vsrafferty-gr-no-l-10572.html