Cawaling Vs COMELEC Digest

Cawaling vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001 Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No.
146342, October 26, 2001 Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional ,contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done. Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities. (2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon (3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution (4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical . 3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. (4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate d epartments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

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Cawaling vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001 Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No.

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