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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350. 05/56(DOCI)(C)(29 Aug 52} 29 August 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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ARMY WAf{ C~SC See distribution •

PERIODICALS SSCT10~ \ ) :.::: !,' l i :232

SE? 2 S 1952 \ \ l I/,'o,;i L' lc ;.LfGE

\ copy, ... \ ..... 1. ' ,lIn accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat In­
L.::'::":'_':';"-~£~Or:rl'Tlni1~a::rhlcon,
the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of

the Army, Army Field Forces and the service schools for evaluation

and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for

these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others,

it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts

on a particulqr subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted

item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep

them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the
logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are clas­

sified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office
downgrades each extended item to the lowest classification compatible
with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion
of the extracted remarks, so that none 0f the original intent is lost.

4. Combat information E.XTRACTS herein which are applicable

to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field
Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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/~llICl BY~~ .- A. B. CHATHAM

Extracts from sources Lt Col, AGC
440 thru 455 Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIB UTION: CN 26635

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UNCLASSIFIED
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~J ) Y INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - 223d Infantry Regiment

DATE: March 1952 Source No 440

(RESTRICTED)
FINDING WIRE LINE BREAKS. - The oscillator, built by the Radio Sec­
tion, has proven extremely helpful in finding a line break with minimurr: dif­
ficulty and time. When wire is out, the switchboard operator plugs the oscilla­
tor into that particular jack. A lineman in checking the line will hear the oscilla­
tor tone. When he no longer hears the tone, he has the break bracketed.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Inf Div Arty

DATE: April 1952 Source No 441

(CONFIDENTIAL)
PREPARATION FOR ATOMIC ATTACK. - This Headquarters was one of
those selected to participate in "Exercise MUSHROOM, " a program designed
to determine the capability of a unit engaged in operations against an enemy to
prepare installations adequate for passive defense against atomic bombing; to
familiarize personnel with the effects of atomic weapons and the means of
defense against them; and to dispel the fear of atomic attack by education.

Construction of shelters to include adequate overhead cover for all vital

installations, roof high walls and revetments for nonvital installations, and
suitable shelters providing all-round and overhead protection for all personnel
was undertaken, and the entire project completed on 30 April. Although the
exercise was successfully completed within the time prescribed and current
tactical and administrative functions were conducted without impairment, it
is obvious that an installation as elaborate as this would not be possible in a
fast moving situation nor under conditions less static than the present.

A solution, when threatened by atomic attack, would be to assign high

priority to construction of, first, the minimum vital installations and, sec­
0ndly, the necessary personnel shelters and to continue less vital construction
as time and the tactical situation permit.

UNCLASSIFIED Over

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A portion of the final statistics on the exercise follows:

~an-hours required 13,797

Sandbags used 56,384

Logs used
3,278 (average 6" x 16 1 )

Steel pickets used 574

Bulldozer operator III hours

It is apparent that construction of a complete defensive installation affords

excellent training opportunities, and in many cases has permitted the demonstra­
tion of noteworthy examples of ingenuity.

In keeping with the design of the installation to permit operations during

or immediately following an atomic attack, it was neces sary to install all
wire circuits underground. Ditches were dug to cover all local wire lines as
well as incoming and outgoing lines: the switchboard was placed in a bunker
and all wire heads placed underground. The radio stations were placed under­
ground with only the antenna exposed, and a remote relay station established
one and one half miles from the FSCC.

~aintenance of wire circuits required 891 man-hours during the period

exclusive of the special requirements of Exercise MUSHROOM.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: January 1952 Source No 442

(RESTRICTED)
BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION. - 5-gallon flare. This expedient consists
of a 5-gallon lubricating oil can filled with 6% napalm; and M15 incendiary gre­
nade, WP; prima cord; and two electric blasting caps, No 8. Put the 5-gallon
oil can (filled with 4-1/2 gal napalm) in a hole which permits the can to protrude
approximately 2 inches above the ground level. Wind single strand of prima
cord inside the lip of the 5-gallon oil can with one end free; attach to this loose
end a No 8 electric blasting cap. Remove the fuze from the MI5 Incendiary
grenade, WP and insert a No 8 electric blasting cap into the fuze well in the gre­
nade. Secure the blasting cap to the grenade by making a half-hitch around the
grenade with the wire attached to the blasting cap. Secure the grenade and blast­
ing cap "to the 5 -gallon oil can carrying handle with wire. Join one end of the

UNCLASSIFIED

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wire from the blasting cap in the grenade to one end of the wire of the blasting
cap that is attached to the prima cord. Attach the remaining two wires to the
double strand detonating wire. When connected with W 130 detonating wire and
battery BA70 or 10-cap blasting machine as an electrical source, the munition
is.ready for detonation. This expedient will burn approximately 30 minutes
and will illuminate an area 50 yards in diameter.

Other suitable containers utilizing the procedure outlined above include:

Signal Corps, Spiral Wire, No 4 Can; C:b..emical Corps, Chloride of Lime Can;
60 -mm mortar shell cans.

These flares should be emplaced a minimum of 100 yards forward of the

MLR so as to silhouette enemy troops and not blind friendly groups.

(RESTRICTED)
DEMONSTRATION OF VT OVER BUNKERS AND TANKS. - A firing
demonst:ration was presented by the 3d Infantry Di vision to show the negati ve
effect of VT fuze against personnel in tanks and bunkers. Purpose was to
emphasize that our own fires can be brought down on our own troops when the
enemy storms our positions. This permits us to remain in our positions. It
is felt that a similar exercise should be added to the battle indoctrination on
courses used in training in the United States.

(CONFIDENTIAL)
TANK FINAL DRIVE OUTPUT SHAFTS. - Two exper:imental type final
drive output shafts are to be field tested in the near future by the 64th Tank
Battalion. Four M46 tanks having the new type output shafts were is sued to
the 3d Division 30 January for field testing by this tank battalion.

Two tanks have output shafts which have been "shot peened." This process
compresses the molecular structure of the shaft which should make it more
resistant to fatjg ue cracks which usually radiate inward from the outside splined
surfaces.

The remaining two tanks have hollow output shafts. A hole one-inch in
diameter has been drilled in the center of the shaft to a depth of 18 inches. This
shaft is being tested on the theory that hollow shafts will have more torque which
should reduce the failures of this unit.

The 64th Tank Battalion is to give the tanks normal Korean usage and perform
routine preventive maintenance of them. Records on length of time operated and
distance travelled are to be kept by the battalion. Monthly inspections are to

Over
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be pulled by the 703d Ordnance Company (3d Di v). This ir.cludes tearing
down the final drive assemblies and inspecting the shafts for indications of
fatigue cracks or failures.

Output shaft failures have been one of the major troubles experienced
with M46 tanks operating in the Korean theater.

SOURCE: Command Report I US Corps

DATE: February 1952 Source No 443

(CONFIDENTIAL)
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF M46 TANK. - The following points
about maintenance, and operation of the M46 tank are presented for informa­
tion:

1. Final drive gear teeth shear or break ..

2. Final drive output shafts develop radial cracks and shear. Replace­
ment output shafts are received without the output shaft spacers. These
spacers are a press fit and it is virtually impossible for using units to remove
the spacers from broken output shafts without damaging the spacers. Replace­
ment output shafts complete with spacers should arri ve at the units.

3. Master junction boxes fail to operate because of sticking reverse

current relays. sticking circuit breakers, and burning out of ballast bulbs.

4. Muffler exhaust pipe clamps break because of the intense heat to

which they are subjected. When clamps break, flames escape from muffler
pipes and increases danger of engine fires.

5. Gas tanks develop cracks along one or more of their too numerous
seams.

6. Track center guides are too narrow. too. pointed. and too short to
prevent thrown tracks on rough or hilly terrain.

7. Auxiliary generators develop rod and piston failures particularly

during cold weather. In static situations the auxiliary generator is run a
great deal to keep the battery charged. Since the speed of the auxiliary

UNCLASSIFIED
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 UNCLASSIFiED
generator is governor controlled. it speeds up to the governor RPM upon
starting and takes over the load of the main generator. This high initial
RPM is hard on a cold engine. It is recommended that a hand throttle be
installed on· the auxiliary generator to keep down the RP M during the warm
up period.

(CONFIDENTIAL)
COMPARISON OF CENTURIAN III AND M46.

POWER

CENTURIAN III. - Engines are considered good but not powerful enough
for the weight of the tank; however. it has been noted that this tank does have
a good cruising speed on hard surface roads and has been able to climb steep
hills.

M46. - The power of the engine is adequate to propel the tank at relatively
high speeds on flat or gently rolling terrain. When climbing steep hills or
when towing another M46 tank the power of the engine is not fully utilized
because of the gear ratio in the final drive and slippage in the transmission.

MOBILITY

CENTURIAN III.

1. The tank has adequate speed on flat or gently rolling terrain.

2. The hill climbing ability of the tank is excellent.

3. The tank has forded water approximately 4 feet deep. Rice paddies
with mud 10 inches deep were easily traversed. Four tanks were seen to
maneuver over an earth dyke with a vertical face 4 feet high. The top of the
dyke was 7 feet wide with a gully 2 feet deep running through the middle. The
far side of the dyke was approximately 12 feet high with a 65 0 slope leading
into a soft rice paddy 10 inches deep. The four tanks in trace negotiated
this obstacle with no difficulty.

4. The tank makes gradual turns as compared with the sharp abrupt
turns of which the M46 tank is capable.

5. The Centurian III Tank has safely traversed the US M2 Treadway

Bridge; however. because of the weight of the tank. the safety factor for the
bridge has been materially reduced. When a Centurian III crosses a pontoon
bridge. the bridge almost submerges.

UNCLASSIFIED

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M46.

1. The tank has cor.siderable speed on flat or gently rolling terrain.

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2. The tank has climbed hills approximately 30 ; however, when nego­
tiating turns on steep slopes all the power is di verted to one track which then

spins in place. It is then necessary to back the tank in a direction tangent

to the turn and then start uphill in the direction of the turn.

3. When climbing long steep hills the transmission tends to overheat.

The transmission is cooled by braking the tank and running the engine for a

few minutes.

4. Neutral steer for pivoting the tank in place is seldom used because

it places a severe strain on final drives and output shafts and tends to cause

thrown tracks.

5. Traction is fair on muddy hills, in rice paddies or in heavy muddy

ground. Traction would be improved if the per-square-inch ground pressure

were decreased and if the track blocks had deeper chevrons.

6. Tracks. are thrown easily when traversing lateral slopes. The center
guides of the track are considered to be too narrow and too pointed for securing
the tracks.

ARMOR PROTECTION

CENTURIAN III. - Unknown but believed to be good.

M46. - See page 13, TM 9-718, April 1951.

FUEL ECONOMY

CENTURIAN III.

1. Unknown but reportedly by a British Officer to compare favorably

with the M46 tank.

M46.

1. ,Approximately 3 gallons per mile under average conditions.

2. Because of cold weather warm up periods and maneuvering over hilly

and difficult terrain average gasoline consumption is approximately 4 gallons
per mile.

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3. Because of relatively high rate of fuel consumption, the range of

tank operation is limited for extensive operations. Refueling requirements

for tank units are high and must be carefully planned and anticipated.

EASE OF MAINT ENANC E

CENTURIAN III.

1. To replac e a bogie wheel, the bogie wheel rocker arm is raised by

a hydraulic jack applied from underneath the tank. This method is slower

than the standard US method of removing bogie wheels.

2. The tracks are hard to break due to the difficulty in removing the

track pin. To expedite maintenance on the track it has been broken by cutting

it with an acetylene torch or breaking it by using small demolition charges.

M46.

1. In general, testing the main engine or replacing certain accessories

to the main engine are best accomplished by removing the engine from its
compartment and making the necessary repairs while the engine is on the
ground. It takes an average crew about 3/4 of an hour to remove the engine
and about one hour to replace the engine. Removal and replacement of the
engine requires a wrecker truck.

2. The main engine must be removed to replace the following accessories

of the main engine: bevel gears in the oil cooler fan assembly, fan shaft of
the oil cooler fan assembly, lower magneto on the lower left hand side of the
engine compartment, intake manifold clamps on the side next to oil cooler
radiators, oil lines leading from the bottom of the oil cooler radiators along
the bottom of the engine to the oil filter, and the transmission.

3. The following maintenance can be accomplished quicker by removing

the engine: changing the main engine generator, 100 hour checks, and changing
or adjustment of carburetors.

4. Spark plugs can be best changed by removing the heavy steel grill
work from the back deck of the tank.

5. After engines are removed they are tested by "ground hopping. II If

the engine is defective and requires repair by Ordnance, the engine must be
reinstalled, the tank delivered to Ordnance, and then Ordnance must repeat
the process of removing the engine before effecting repairs.
 8
UNCLASSIFIED
MECHANICAL RELIABILITY

CENTURIAN III. - Based on the tank deadline rates. the Centurian III
Tank appears to be as mechanically reliable as the M46 tank.

M46.

1. In general. the tank is not mechanically reliable; however. the mechan­

ical unreliability can be pinpointed to the following features: final drives. out­
put shafts, oil cooler fan assemblies, and master junction boxes.

2. Final drive gear teeth shear or break.

3. Output shafts develop radial cracks and eventually shear. It is

believed that this shaft is under designed in strength.

4. Oil cooler fan assemblies are the most unreliable assembly of the
tank. The parts of the oil cooler fan assembly which frequently fail are the
shafts, magnetic clutches, and beveled gears. Oil cooler fan assembly
failures if not promptly detected cause overheating and damage to the main
engine and transmission.

5. Master junction boxes fail frequently. It is believed that the junction

box is too complicated and controls too many of the electrical features of the
tank. The chief failures in the junction box are sticking reverse current relays.
sticking circuit breakers and burning out of ballast bulbs.

ENGINE

CENTURIAN III. - Unknown

M46. - The engine is the most reliable major a~sembly of the tank.

TRANSMISSION

CENTURIAN III. - Unknown.

M46.

1. The transmission by itself is generally reliable; however. it tends

to overheat when climbing steep hills or when towing other M46 tanks. The
transmission quickly overheats when an oil cooler fan assembly becomes
inoperative. This overheating burns out a babbit bearing in the transmission.

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2. When the shift linkage is out of adjustment slippage and wear of
transmission bands occur because the transmission is trying to drive in more
than one gear at a time.

3. Leaking oil seals are a moderately recurring defect in the transmission.

EASE OF HANDLING

CENTURIAN III. - The tank is reported to handle very well. Turns are
relati vel y long and gradual.

M46.

1. The manual control driving lever makes driving of the tank easy and
simple. New drivers learn to drive the tank in a relatively short time.

2. The dual dri ving controls in the as sistant dri ver s compartment are
net necessary. Because of the simplified driving control the driver is not
subject to extreme driver fatigue and, therefore, assistant driver controls
are not needed.

FIRE POWER

CENTURIAN III.

1. The tank cannon is considered an excellent antitank weapon. It is

very effective as an artillery weapon against personnel and bunkers.

2. Lack of a bow machine gun reduc es the effecti venes s of the tank for
close in fighting. This defect can be partially overcome by mounting. 30 Cal
machine guns on the tank commanders cupola.

3. .The life of the tube is reported to be approximately 100 rounds.

M46.

1. The 90-mm cannon is considered an excellent weapon against all

types of targets.

2. The coaxial machine gun, antiaircraft machine gun, and bow machine
gun furnish excellent small arms fire support for close in and distant firing.

Over
9
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(CONFIDENTIAL)
FLAIL TANK.
CNCLASSIFIEO
1. A conference was held in Tokyo on 31 January to decide the mechan­
ical details to be incorporated in flail tanks to be constructed by the Engineers
Rebuild Depot of JLC.

2. The following mechanical modifications will be tried and incorporated

in the flail tank:

a. An auxiliary engine with a fluid transmission. It is expected that

the fluid transmission will be effective in absorbing and countering any reverse
rotation which might occur when the flail drum is caused to rotate in reverse
direction upon detonation of a mine.

b. Reverse type worm gears will be used to transfer power from drive
shaft to flail drums. This type gear can absorb some reverse motion if blast
causes flail drum to rotate in reverse.

c. Disc-type clutches will be used on ends of flail drum. The disc s

will slip if drum rotates in reverse thus helping absorb the reverse drum
motion along with the reverse type worm gears and fluid transmission of
auxiliary motor

d. A prestone high pressure cooling system will be used in auxiliary

motor s to handle expected high operating temperature s.

e. Auxiliary motor will use two air cleaners because of excessive

dust caused by the flail.

f. The flail drum will rotate forward so that flail chains detonate
mines in front of the flails. Opposite rotation of drum would have caused
mine detonation between the flail and the tank which was considered unsatisfac­
tory.

g. The flail is to be designed to carry 5-pound pear shaped weights

at end of flail chains.

h. Round tubing will be used if available to mount the flail drum on

tank hull. The tubing will be mounted on the tank hull rather than on the tank
suspension. This will allow repairs to the tank suspension system without
interference from the flail attachments. It was also believed that circular
tubing would be less susceptable than box-type beams to damage from mine
blasts.
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
Recoil springs of 155 guns will be used to absorb shock when

i.
flail system is blown upward by mine blast.

j. Fuel for the auxiliary motor will be piped from main fuel tanks of

vehicle.

k. Disc-type wire cutters will be placed on both ends of flail drum to

cut barbed wire and telephone wire which may wind up on the drum.

1. The flail drum will be built one foot wider on each end than the
width of the M4A3E8 tank.

m. The M4A3E8 tank instead of the M-46 will be used to mount the

flail.

n. The representatives of JLC estimated that the first flail tank

would be completed in one month after necessary material was assembled.
Subsequent flail tanks would follow at the rate of one a week.

(RESTRICTED)
FIELD EXPEDIENT BRIDGE LAYING TANK. - At the request of I Corps
G3 steps were taken to develop a bridge laying tank. Such a tank would be
used during an advance to cross blown bridges, or AT ditches. During WW II
a bridge laying tank had been developed from the old M31 recovery tank.
Present plans were to adopt the M32 recovery tank to lay standard engineer
M2 steel treadway and it was decided to build a steel adapter for the M32
recovery tank. This adapter would be designed to fit and be secured by steel
pins to the two front lifting hooks and the two front towing shackles of the
tank. With this pin arrangement the adapter could be easily removed when the
tank was not needed for laying a bridge. The purpose of the adapter was to
serve as the rear support for the forked ends of the steel treadway when the
bridge was in the carrying position.

To provide stability to the bridging when being carried by the tank an

8" I beam was bolted across the treadways approximately seven (7) feet from
the forward end of the treadways. On the center of this I beam was welded
a lifting hook to which was attached the winch cable of the tank for lifting the
bridge. For use of the bridge carrying tank during a tactical operation it was
agreed that the winch cable would have to be attached to the lifting hook by
means of a quick release clevice or pin. The clevice or pin would be released
by pulling on a string or wire from inside the tank. Thus it would be unnec­
essary for any crew member to dismount to release the winch cable while the
bridge was being laid in position. The treadway spacer bars were modified

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UNCLASSIFIED Over

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so that they could be pinned securely at each end to the steel treadway; however,
it was agreed that this modification was not necessary.

The plans called for the M32 recovery tank to lift and carry twenty-four
feet of double track M2 steel treadway. Because of the weight of the bridging
(about 5 tons) and the leverage exerted on the boom the front bogie steel volute
springs compressed considerable and the back end of the tank raised slightly
and the rear end of the tracks lost firm contact with the ground. To prevent
damage to the volute springs, standard plates were bolted to volute spring
housing to prevent complete compression and failure of the volute springs.
The tendency of the rear end of the tracks to raise off the ground was more
pronounced when the tank was going down hill or into depressions. This
tendency places the entire weight on the front part of the track and increases
the per-square-inch ground pressure of that part of the track in contact with
the ground; therefore, it is believed that the tank carrying the bridging would
bog down in soft ground. However, the tank could carry the bridging on
fairly level and firm roads.

To make the tank more maneuverable, experiments were conducted with

the tank carrying twenty-four feet of single track steel treadway. The twenty­
four feet of single track treadway was mounted with the rear forked ends in
the center of the steel adapter. The front end of the treadway was lifted by
attaching the winch cable to a chain fastened to the treadway at a point about
seven feet from the front end of the treadway. With the load to be carried
thus cut in half, the tank became more stable and maneuverable and the entire
tank track remained in firmer contact with the ground. With training and
experience a crew should be able to carry and place separately, across a
ditch or blown bridge, the two separate twenty-four foot sections of the steel
treadway. Training will enable the tank crew to space the two treadways so
that an M4A3E8 or M46 tank can fit on and cross the bridge.

Although no work was done on carrying or placing the center planking

for the treadway it was agreed and deemed advisable to have engineer troops
prepared and ready to install center planking on the bridge so that all types of
vehicles could cross the bridge.

CONCLUSIONS

1. An M32 recovery tank equipped with an adapter can carry and lay
across a gap twenty-four feet of double track M2 steel treadway. The ground
must be fairly firm due to high ground pressure on the forward end of the
tank tracks.

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2. An M32 recovery tank can carry and lay separately, two single
track sections of M2 steel treadway each section being twenty-four feet long.

3. A recovery tank of the weight and size of an M46 tank could carry,
with more facility than an M32 recovery tank, twenty-four feet of double
track M2 steel treadway.

(RESTRICTED)
INFANTRY-TANK COMMUNICATION. - Undue reliance must not be
placed on the SCR 300 radio for Infantry-Tank Communication. Alternate
means of communication must be provided. A 510 radio accompanying the
infantry could provide direct and alternate means of communicatinn with
the tanks.

(RESTRICTED)
RADIO T /O&E CHANGE, MP COMPANY.

1. Radio equipment currently authorized by T /O&E 19-37, for the most

part, (SCR 610 and SCR 619) is inadequate because:

a. Limited range in miles. The road net now patrolled extends well
over one hundred and fifty miles.

b. All roads in the area are extremely rough, making it impossible

to keep the SCR 610 and SCR 619 in alignment. It is normal to have a radio
fail after less than an hour on the road, although several hours may have been
spent getting the radio into operation.

c. The excessive amount of maintenance required in keeping the SCR

610 and SCR 619 in alignment and adjustment limits their availability for use
and ties up unit and higher echelon repair facilities.

2. In view of the above, it is requested that the eleven SCR-610 and the
six SCR-6l9 currently on hand in this organization be replaced by Radio Set
AN/GRC-9 and the 622d Military Police Company be authorized to draw an
additional six AN/GRC-9Is for installation in those patrol vehicles not now
authorized any communications equipment.

3. Approval of the request contained in paragraph 3 above would authorize

the 622d MP Company to have a total of twenty-eight AN/GRC -9 's. Since the
company already has authorization for five AN/GRC-9's all twenty-eight patrol
vehicle s would be similarly equipped with a radio which has already proven
its dependability in this organization.

Over
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(CONFIDENTIAL) .
F AlLURE OF OIL COOLER FAN ASSEMBL Y ON M46 TANK.

1. The principal cause for deadlined M46 tanks in units of this head­
quarters is failure of parts of the oil cooler fan assembly.

2. Contrary to the report to GHQ Ordnance Officer by Mr F. Blair,

Technical Representative of Allison Division GMC, and Mr L. Casso Technical
Representative of Continental Motors Corp. failures are also occuring in the
oil cooler fan assembly of the M46Al tank.

3. As an example of the large number of failures of the oil cooler fan

assembly, the following figures are quoted:

UNIT Number of Failures NOV DEC JAN

64th Tank Battalion 23 22 32

73d Tank Battalion 16 27 35

4. The parts of the oil cooler fan assembly which fail most frequently
are the magnetic clutches, fan shafts, and beveled gears.

5. It is the ansida-ed opinion of staff officers and the using units of this
headquarters that the present performance and design of the oil cooler fan
assembly for the M46 and M46AI tanks are unsatisfactory.

6. It is recommended that:

a. Urgent steps be taken to redesign the present oil cooler fan

assembly and that redesigned assemblies be shipped promptly to Korea.

b. That steps be taken to insure an adequate supply for Korea of

the principal parts of the oil cooler fan as sembly now in use.

(RESTRICTED)
2-INCH CHEVRON BLOCKS AS TRACK GROUSERS. - It was finally
decided that spacing 2-inch steel chevron blocks every fourth block into a
regular steel track offered the best solution to the problem of more traction.
The battalion was issued two complete sets of T-80E4 steel tracks with 2­
inch chevrons. The tracks were taken apart and the track blocks were spaced
into the regular steel tracks. The battalion reports that the 2 -inch chevrons
serve as track grousers and the traction has been materially increased. It
was pointed out, however, that the 2-inch chevron blocks do cause a vibration
in the suspension system if the tank is driven on a hard surface road.

UNCU\SS\F\ED
l%\\jrj~"AM l
.r. • 3d 2
(CONFIDENTIAL)
IMPROVING HILL-CLIMBING ABILITY OF M46 TANK. - The following
notes, for improvement of the hill climbing ability of the M46 tank, are
recommended:

1. Final Drive.

a. The final drive gear:5 should be geared lower to give greater driving
power but at slower speeds. The present final drive gear ratio gives the tank
speed on flat or gently rolling terrain but does not gi ve ideal or maximum
power for climbing hills.

b. Final drive gears have sheared or stripped while climbing hills

or making turns in rough terrain. A lower final drive gear ratio as mentioned
in paragraph a above and stronger final drive gears are recommended.

c. The output shafts of the final drive develop radial cracks and
shear. The output shaft has been known to shear when the tank is climbing
a hill or rolling along a level road. It is virtually impossible to drive the
tank if one of the output shafts breaks. The exact cause for failure of the
output shaft is not known. A stronger output shaft is recommended.

2. Tracks.

a. The track blocks should have chevrons 2" deep. A 2-inch chevron
will dig or scoop deeper into the ground and give better traction. About five
sets of 2-inch chevron tracks have been received to date. Units are disassem­
bling these tracks and spacing individual blocks in their old I-inch chevron
tracks. A larger supply of tracks with Z-inch chevrons is recommended.

b. The M46 tank has a tendency to throw tracks when making turns
on hills or when traversing the lateral slopes of hills. The track center guides
are too narrow, too pointed, and too short to prevent the toad wheels from
riding over them when the tracks dig in or slip on lateral slopes.

3. Transmission. - The transmission oil tends to overheat when climbing

long steep hins. The oil can be cooled by stopping the tank and running engine
in neutral for 2-5 minutes. Crews in combat can not afford to stop and wait
that long. A more efficient oil cooling system than the present troublesome
oil cooler fan assembly is recommended.

Over
15

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4. Oil Cooler Fan Assembly. - The shaft, beveled gears, and

magnetic clutch of the oil cooler fan assembly frequently fail especially when
the engine is "revved up" to negotiate obstacles or hills. When these parts
fail on an M46Al tank, the tank can not be driven under its own power and must
be towed; when these parts fail on an M46 tank, the tank can be driven for short
distances and at slow speeds only if extreme caution is exercised. A redesign
of the oil cooler fan assembly to correct the weakness in the shaft, beveled
gears, and magnetic clutch is recommended .

.5. Driving. - When making turns on steep hills much of the power is
transmitted to one track which either spins in place .-:>r digs into the ground. It is
then necessary for the driver to back the tank in a direction tangent to the turn
and then start climbing straight into the turn with both tracks pulling. A
modified transmission to keep power in both tracks when making turns on
steep hills is recommended.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: March 1952 Source No 444

(RESTRICTED)
SKID FOR TANK RECOVERY. - To facilitate tank recovery, the 245th
Tank Battalion built a metal skid to replace a tank track which had been
broken by an enemy mine. Initial experiments in towing a disabled tank on
the skid have proved successful. This method of recovering tanks with one
track broken is apparently faster than attempting to repair the tank on the
battlefield. The use of a skid also prevents additional damage to the suspension
system.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps, Artillery

DATE: March 1952 Source No 445

(RESTRICTED)
ARTILLERY-AIR FIRE COORDINATION. - The concept of a Fire Support
Coordination Center has been put into practice within the divisions and corps
in Korea; however, the idea is relatively new and many problems are yet to
be solved. Infantry and artillery fire coordination has had a long background

UNCLASSIFIED
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 •£!i!c. SlYli
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2,

of successful operating experience. This is not the case, however, with

artillery and air coordination. The problems of planning airstrikes, deter­
mining a flak suppression program, safe flying areas for aircraft operating
in conjunction with artillery concentrations, and areas being shelled with
VT fuzed projectiles, the timing and duration of silencing artillery fire to
permit air strikes, all these and others are problems which have presented
difficulties and which have limited the degree of effective coordination from
being as effi cient as desired between artillery and the Air Force.

RECOMMENDATION. - That a program of practical research and instruc­

tion be undertaken by the Army Field Forces together with the Air Force .to
produce practical teaching doctrine in air and artillery coordination in conjunc­
tion with the activities of Fire Support Coordination's Centers. Further that
the instruction in Fire Support be included in the curriculum of The Artillery
School. The idea of Fire Support is presented to students in conferences at
The Artillery School, but it is felt that more emphasis on the practical applica­
tion of a functioning Fire Support Coordination Center should be included in the
School's curriculum. It is further recommended that Air Force-Artillery
teams be trained to serve as instructors in this subject both at Service Schools
and at di vision training in the field.

* * *
(RESTRICTED)
DEBRIEFING OF AR TILLER Y AIR OBSERVERS. - The Corps Artillery
Air Section maintains continuous daylight surveillance of the corps front.
Adjusting artillery is its primary mission; however, it is also an excellent
intelligence gathering source. Corps G2 personnel also fly regularly, though
not continuous, reconnaissance missions over portions of the front.

RECOMMENDATION. - It is recommended that Corps G2 coordinate with

the Corps Artillery Air Officer on establishing a routine debriefing program
for artillery air observers. Having trained debriefing personnel at the Corps
Artillery Air Strip would make available a wealth of additional information
assisting materially in forming the intelligence picture. It is further rec­
ommended that more emphasis be placed on training within the Zone of the
Interior in intelligence collection and coordination between artillery air sec­
tions and division and corps intelligence sections on the extraction of such
information from air observers.

(RESTRICTED)
SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS ON A STABILIZED FRONT.
It is recommended that allowances of Quartermaster cleaning and preserving
materials be greatly increased to more nearly approach garrison standards.
Over
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 UNCLASSIFIED
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II.
Because all organizations are more stabilized and are closer to garrison
living than is normal in combat, the allowances of Quartermaster cleaning
and preserving expendable supplies for combat conditions have proved to
be greatly inadequate. In most cases, unit messes now occupy prefabricated
buildings, many with concrete floors. The issue of soaps, brushes, steel
wool, trisodium phosphate and other cleaning materials cannot meet the
requirements.

Also, because of the stabilized situation, all organizations are using

equipment not authorized by pertinent tables of organization and equipment,
such as squad tents, electric generators, etc. This equipment is authorized
on an individual case basis.

It is also recommended that tables of allowances be established by higher

headquarters, to standardize such issues and prescribe the allowances.

SOURCE: Command Report - 14th Infantry Regiment

DATE: March 1952 Source No 446

(CONFIDENTIAL)
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. - Psychological Warfarerin our present
situation, is worthwhile. It is difficult to determine if the propaganda leaflet
is the main reason for the number of North Korean prisoners taken for the
period; however, interrogation of PW's revealed that leaflets are being read
and have produced the desired results. PW's have informed us that it is very
risky to be caught with our propaganda leaflet; therefore, any leaflets resembling
"Script, " would be more effective. Suggest something that looks on one side
like the money used to pay North Korean or Chinese troops. Continued use
of this type of warfare is definitely desired by the regiment.

Apparently the enemy feels that the use of propaganda leaflets has merit,
for during the period the 14th Infantry received approximately 410 enemy
propaganda shells. Some enemy leaflets were well written and some were
very poorly written. The only effect these leaflets had on our troops was to
keep them amused, and possibly to make them a little more cautious of the
enemy's cunning.

UNCLASSIFIED
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 UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - 140th Antiaircraft Artillery AW Battalion (SP)

DATE: March 1952 Source No 447

(RESTRICTED)
WIRE COMMUNICATION. - In the present static situation to insure positive
communication, telephone lines are laid to all gun positions. In addition, lines
are laid from indi vidual tracks to supported infantry-artillery units. The
T /O&E authorization is eighteen per line battery which is entirely inadequate
under present conditions. A minimum of eight more telephones per line battery
are needed.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade

DATE: January 1952 Source No 448

(RESTRICTED)
COST CONSCIOUSNESS. AAA. - Supply economy measures continued to
be stressed in this command.

Organizations are conducting campaigns to salvage and effect turn-in of

ferrous, as well as nonferrous, strategic materials to appropriate disposal
officers. Continued emphasis and constant surveillance is being maintained
to assure prompt return of scrap brass and serviceable ammunition packing
containers. Operations are continually analyzed with a view to reducing cost
of operations, and returning to appropriate supply channels those items which
are not required for performance of the present mission.

* * *
(RESTRICTED)
All motor pools in this command are consolidated to effect maximum
utilization of motor vehicles. This program continues to result in more econom­
ical operation and increases the effectiveness of organizational maintenance.
During the past month a total decrease of 32,211 miles was effected in this com­
mand as compared to the average month prior to consolidation. This was accom­
plished without decreasing effectiveness of organizations in their assigned mission,
and amounted to a monetary savings of $685.30 in POL supplies alone.

Over
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* * *
(RESTRICTED)
In furtherance of the supply economy program, the above mentioned
course includes a four-hour period devoted exclusively to supply economy,
its objective being to teach methods of conservation and economy.

(RESTRICTED)
RECOMMENDATIONS OF AAA BRIGADE. - That responsibility for
training AAA specialists be placed on either the theater commander or the
Zone of the Interior and that the means, materiel, personnel and accom­
modations essential for the purposes intended, be furnished to the authority
de signated.

Additional spaces and personnel be authorized to provide a centralized

AAA school for the training of AAA specialists, not now available through
pipeline sources.

Consideration be given to a review of T /O&E of AAA units to insure

capability of 24-hour operations.

That cellular type units, similar to currently authorized Signal Main­

tenance Radar Units, be provided each AAA battalion by Engineer and Ord­
nance.

Field maintenance capabilities for Engineer gasoline generators (MS,

M7, MIS, and MIS) be improved immediately to prevent further reduction
in operational effectiveness.

That a die sel-type mobile generator be furnished each AAA unit to replace
current gasoline-type mobile generators, and that insofar as practicable one
type replace the several types now issued.

(RESTRICTED)
SUPPORT DIFFICULTIES. AAA ON AIR FORCE BASES. - AAA units
stationed on or deployed in defense of Air Force bases have experienced
considerable difficulty in operations due to lack of adequate logistical support.
Support responsibilities of both Army and Air Force toward tenant Army units
have not been clearly defined. Directives should be amplified to clearly estab­
lish AF responsibility towards tenant Army units. Local AIO's should be fur­
nished funds to support AAA units at the required levels.

UNCLASSIFIED

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SOURCE: Command Report-Moji Port, 8156th Army Unit

DATE: March 1952 Source, No 449

(RESTRICTED)
COST CONSCIOUSNESS. - In our economy program, savings of over
$10,000 has been effected by use of salvage dunnage. The pooling of sedans
has likewise conserved gas, oil, and wear and tear. In one month we were
able to save 300 gallons of gas alone. Our management program has been
making continual surveys, and results in reduced manpower has been effected.

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st Inf Regt

DATE: January 1952 Source No 450

(RESTRICTED)
PATROLS. - Forty-eight security patrols were conducted during the
8 -14 January. Six light engagements were fought by the security patrols
with enemy squad to platoon size units. The most significant action occured
on 13 January. A Colombian Battalion patrol in position forward of Hill
observed an enemy patrol approaching at 2115 hours. The Colombian
- . , - -.....
patrol leader ordered his men to hold their fire until the enemy was within
twenty yards of their position. When the enemy closed the distance, the
patrol delivered simultaneous concentrated fires which resulted in an esti­
mated 5 KIA and 10 WIA.

SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Infantry Di vision

DATE: February 1952 Source No 451

(RESTRICTED)
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. - Recommend that the tremendous pressure
of reports and paper work be held to a minimum. All reports requirements
should be carefully considered periodically to ascertain if the results of the
report justify the requirement.

Over
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SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry Division

DATE: March 1952 Source No 452

(CONFIDENTIAL)
CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT. - When the 40th Division relieved the 24th
Division in place. it exchanged most of the weapons and equipment in place.
This had the disadvantage that equipment which was battle worn and in a very
poor state of repair was turned over to this Division. It was found necessary
to devote major attention to repairing and replacing numerous items of equip­
ment which were found to be entirely unserviceable. By the end of February
much progress had been made as a result of concentrated efforts but even then
a tremendous job still remained to be done to approach a satisfactory over­
all c ondition. Fortunately the stable defensive tactical situation allowed time
for rehabilitation program. Had an enemy offensive been launched in January
or F ebruary 1952 much equipment would have been inoperative and might have
been lost to the enemy.

(RESTRICTED)
SCOUT DOGS. - On the first of March. the 26th US Infantry Scout Dog
Platoon (-) was attached to the Division for operations and support. Division
then attached squads of this unit to the 223d and 224th Infantry Regiments.
Dogs worked effectively with patrols of these units and it is felt that the use
of dogs on patrols offers increased security without hampering activity. Best
results are obtained when dogs work with members of patrol at lease two days
prior to actual patro1. Some ambush patrols experienced difficulty due to
nervousness when the enforced inactivity neces sarily exceeded 3 hours.

(RESTRICTED)
GENERATOR FOR AVIATION SECTION. - The T/O&E makes no provIsIon
for generators for the aviation section, but it does authorize power tools.
Generators are also necessary to provide lighting facilities for the section.
The aviation sections work does not end with sunset. Planning must be done
for the next days operation; photo studies must be made; administration and
reports must be kept up to date. The T /O&E needs to be revised to take
cognizance of this.

(RESTRICTED)
QUARTERMASTER COMPANY ORGANIZATION. - Approximately three
months observation indicates that the scope of operations of a Quartermaster

UNCLASSIFIED

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company in a theater of this nature requires ad~itional operating and admin­

strative personnel. Following are three examples:

a. In view of the high morale factor resulting from the issue of ice
cream, it is probably safe to assume this product will continue to be issued
and distributed by Quartermaster companies at di vision level. The T /O&E
(10-l7N) does not provide personnel for this operation, it had been necessary
to draw personnel from other sections, who can ill afford such loss, in order
to provide sufficient amounts of ice cream to supply division troops.

b. The communication section of the Quartermaster company lacks

sufficient personnel to properly operate the normal Quartermaster establish­
ment in this theater, which in turn requires the drawing of personnel from
other sections.

c. In order to adequately perform its own security mission additional

filler personnel should be added to the existing T /O&E. With operations on a
twenty-four hours basis, guard duty cannot be properly carried on and efficient
operation maintained at the same time.

d. It is recommended that study be given to present T /O&E (10-17)

relative to the foregoing examples.

SOURCE: Command Report - 89th Tank Battalion (Med)

DATE: March 1952 Source No 453

(CONFIDENTIAL)
USE OF TANKS ON MLR. - Of particular interest is the location of tanks
in the present division sector. Out of thirty-four firing positions on the MLR,
nineteen are located on the tops of ridges, in saddles between mountain peaks,
and on ground generally considered inacc essible to tanks. Fourteen tanks are
positioned on the ridges forming the west, north, and east edges of the Punch­
bowl and three tanks are in position on the northern extremities of Hearthbreak
Ridge.

In the present tactical situation the tanks are being used almost exclusively
as armor protected, direct fire weapons to reinforce other firepower on the MLR.
The mobility of the tank has been utilized only to the extent of placing the tank
in a firing position in some very difficult terrain. Although little if any maneuver

Over
UNCLASSIFIED 23

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is involved, the tank-infantry team still exists with the tanker I s position
beside the doughboy on the MLR. The tanks I fire support can thus be placed
in a rninirnurn arnount of tirne and with rnuch greater accuracy than artillery.

The tanks have become priority targets for enerny counterbattery fire,
and friendly infantry in vicinity of the tanks rnust be well dug in and be partic­
ularly careful about exposing thernselve s when the tanks are actually firing.
To date, the best solution has been for the tanks to have two positiOns; a
position which is out of sight of the enemy and a firing position. The firing
position should be well sand-bagged on the front and sides if it is at all possible.
This will materially reduce the arnount of damage to the suspension systern
by enemy fire. The tank should have no OVM or other equipment on the out­
side of the hull while actually firing since it is invariably destroyed by shell
fragrnents. It is also desirable to sand-bag the rear deck, the turrent and the
forward portion of the tank. In spite of thes e precautions darnage will be sus­
tained by direct hits. Recently a l20-rnm rnortar shell penetrated into the
engine compartrnent of a tank which had two layers of sandbags on the back
deck. In several positions the tank rnust remain constantly in firing position
and in these cases it has been found advisable to construct a trench under the
tank in order that it may be entered by the escape hatch. In these positions
maintenance is accornplished during the hour s of darkne s s.

During the month all tanks on the MLR have established a night fi!lng
schedule. Range cards are prepared during the day and firing is conducted
with or without use of flares at various periods during the night. This prograrn
was begun in an effort to harass enerny working parties since the vast rnajority
of their construction work takes place during the hours of darkness. Judging
frorn PW reports and the unusually heavy volurne of return fire the prograrn
is proving very effective.

The terrain and weather has created unusual difficulties in logistics.

Transporting the necessary amounts of amrnunition, fuel, food, and water
to the surnrnit of a rnountain some twelve hundred meters high has presented
a formidable problem at time s. This has been particularly true during the
past few weeks of the spring thaw. During much of this period the vast major­
ity of the tanks in position had to be supplied either by hand carry or in a few
instances by use of the M39 as a cargo carrier. In these cases the M39 hauled
supplies for adjacent infantry units as well as for the tanks. At one time an
entire infantry battalion plus the attached tanks were supplied for a period of
five days by two M39's. With the aid of the engineers and by use of tank dozers
the various tank positions were kept operable during the period.

UNCLASSIFIED

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«olflrr fNfOS:MATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - 2 13th Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: February 1952 Source No 454

(RESTRICTED)
HOWITZER TUBES AND HC AMMUNITION. - In view of relative large
number howitzer tubes changes necessitated by volumn of fire being delivered
under combat conditions, it is strongly recommended that Ordnance Technical
Services determine a relative calibration of tubes furnished as replacements
in order that organization may maintain an equitable distribution of howitzers
having similar characteristic s.

It is also recommended that consideration be given to production of projec­

tiles utilized for delivering HC smoke, manufactured with a fuze recess which
will accommodate present type fuzes to include the varible time M96 fuze. At
present, projectiles commonly known as "smoke shell, " will accommodate
only fuzes not having boosters or supplemental bursting charges.

(RESTRICTED)
VAN FOR SIGNAL REPAIR. - For purposes of providing an adequate place
for proper repair and adjustment of delicate signal communication equipment,
and for providing adequate storage facilities for such equipment when not in
use and for necessary spare parts and spare batteries for signal equipment,
it is strongly recommended that present T /O&E' s for all types of Field Artil­
lery Battalions be modified to provide for one van, Ordnance repair type, to
be available to the Headquarters and Headquarters Batteries of all Field Artil­
lery Battalions.

SOURCE: Command Report - 981 st Field Artillery Battalion

DATE: March 1952 Source No 455

(RESTRICTED)
REPLACEMENTS. - A problem exists due to the loss and anticipated loss
during the next two months of approximately 80% of the present strength. Per­
sonnel received to date are not trained or of the caliber to train rapidly to fill
key positions such as clerks, personnel specialists, fire direction, survey,
mess steward, supply, motoT. mechanics, and other technical qualifications.

Over
UNCLASSIFIED 25
 =CQA~Wi1l
QSECu,'ry "'ws"oncr
UNCLASSIFIED 26
The policy of not assigning personnel until the physical loss of personnel
seriously handicaps the training of the new man. An untrained specialist
should have at least one month training on the job prior to his relieving the
assigned man. Also semiqualified personnel should have at least 2 weeks on
the job training. Replacements have been received for critical MOS positions,
with an ETS date less than 30 days after the ETS of the man presently holding
the position. This does not allow the organization to consider such replace­
ment as a fully qualified or a suitable replacement because he will not be able
to serve sufficient time in this theater. This situation means that another
replacement must be requisitioned for the MOS immediately. The policy of
sending such personnel overseas in March 1952 with an ETS date in September
1952 is extremely wasteful, and gives a false impression of replacements
being received.

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