Notes On Network Security Issues: From Security Courses At: Stern School of Business, NYU Georgia Tech
Notes On Network Security Issues: From Security Courses At: Stern School of Business, NYU Georgia Tech
Issues
S R
Eavesdropper
Integrity Attack - Tampering With
Messages
Stop the flow of the message
Delay and optionally modify the message
Release the message again
S R
Perpetrator
Authenticity Attack - Fabrication
Unauthorized assumption of other’s identity
Generate and distribute objects under this
identity
S R
Masquerader: from S
Attack on Availability
Destroy hardware (cutting fiber) or software
Modify software in a subtle way (alias commands)
Corrupt packets in transit
S R
Tokens (transponders, …)
Speedpass, EZ-pass
Smartcards
DNA
Can be extremely accurate and fast
systems
Encryption algorithm
Algorithm used to make content unreadable by
all but the intended receivers
E(plaintext,key) = ciphertext
D(ciphertext,key) = plaintext
D( E(p,k1), k1 ) = p
64-bit Output
Cryptanalysis of DES
DES has an effective 56-bit key length
Wiener: 1,000,000$ - 3.5 hours (never built)
July 17, 1998, the EFF DES Cracker, which was built for
less than $250,000 < 3 days
January 19, 1999, Distributed.Net (w/EFF), 22 hours and
15 minutes (over many machines)
We all assume that NSA and agencies like it around the
world can crack (recover key) DES in seconds
What now? Give up on DES? Try variants Triple
DES etc.
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
g and p known to both
Alice Bob
pick secret Sa randomly pick secret Sb
randomly
compute TA=gSa mod p compute TB=gSb mod p
send TA to Bob send TB to Alice
compute TBSa mod p compute TASb mod p
Alice and Bob reached the same secret gSaSb mod
p, which is then used as the shared key.
Diffie-Hellman Scheme
Security factors
Discrete logarithm very difficult.
Shared key (the secret) itself never
transmitted.
Disadvantages:
Expensive exponential operation
DoS possible.
The scheme itself cannot be used to encrypt
anything – it is for secret key establishment.
No authentication, so you can not sign
anything …
Bucket Brigade Attack...Man In The
Middle Attack
Alice Trudy Bob
gSa=123 gSx =654 gSb =255
123 --> 654 -->
<--654 <--255
654Sa=123Sx 255Sx=654Sb
Trudy plays Bob to Alice and Alice to Bob
Public Key Cryptography
Public Key cryptography
Each key pair consists of a public and private
component: k+ (public key), k- (private key)
D( E(p, k+), k- ) = p
D( E(p, k-), k+ ) = p
Public keys are distributed (typically) through
public key certificates
Anyone can communicate secretly with you if they
have your certificate
E.g., SSL-base web commerce
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman)
A dominant public key algorithm
The algorithm itself is conceptually simple
Why it is secure is very deep (number thoery)
Use properties of exponentiation modulo a product of
large primes
"A method for obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public Key Cryptosystems“, Communications of
the ACM, Feb., 1978 21(2) pages 120-126.
The symmetric/asymmetric key tradeoff
Initial
128-bit vector
128-bit result
Hashed Message Authentication Code
HMAC
Authenticates/integrity for data d
Uses some key k and hash algorithm h
To simplify,
hmac(k,d) = h( k+d )
Why does this provide authenticity?
Can not produce hmac(k,d) unless you know k
and d
If you could, then can invert h
Used in protocols to authenticate content
Digital Signatures
Models physical signatures in digital world
Association between private key and document
… and indirectly identity and document.
Asserts that document is authentic and non-reputable
To sign a document
Given document d, private key k-
Signature S(d) = E( k-, h(d) )
Validation
Given document d, signature S(d), public key k+
Validate D(k+, S(d)) = H(d)
Q: Are Digital Signatures Legally binding?
Web security: the high bits
The largest distributed system in existence
threats are as diverse as applications and users
But need to be thought out carefully …
The stakeholders are …
Consumers (users, businesses, agents, …)
Providers (web-servers, IM services, …)
Another way of seeing web security is
Securing the web infrastructure such that the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of content and user
information is maintained
Web Authentication
Authentication is a bi-directional process
Client
Server
Mutual authentication
Several standard authentication tools
Basic (client)
Digest (server)
Secure Socket Layer (server, mutual)
Cookies (indirect, persistent)
Basic Authentication Problems
Passwords easy to intercept
Passwords easy to guess
Passwords easy to share
No server authentication
Easy to fool client into sending password to
malicious server
One intercepted password gives
eavesdropper access to many documents
Challenge and Response
Challenge (“nonce”): any changing string
e.g. Random Number, Timestamp etc
Response: challenge encrypted with hashed
password
IP
SSL Operation
Confidential session
Server authentication*
GUI clues for users
Built into every browser
Easy to configure on the server
Protocol has been analyzed like crazy
Seems like you are getting security “for free”
Secure Electronic Transaction
An open encryption and security
specification for credit card transaction on
the Internet
Main requirements
Confidentiality of payment and ordering
information
Integrity of all transmitted data
Authentication of cardholder
Authentication of merchant
Basic Workflow
Untrusted Networks
Trusted Networks Firewall & Servers
Untrusted Users
Internet
Router
Intranet
Source Destination
Protocol Flags Actions
Address Port Address Port
* * * 80 TCP Accept
* * * * TCP Deny
Packet Filters / Application Gateways
(SPS)
(SPS) (ESP)
(ESP)
Security
SecurityPolicy
Policy Manual
Manual Encapsulating
Encapsulating
System
System Security
SecurityPayload
Payload
(IKE)
(IKE) (AH)
(AH)
Internet
InternetKey
Key Authentication
Authentication
Exchange
Exchange Header
Header
IPsec in Tunnel Mode
Encrypted Tunnel
Gateway Gateway
Encrypted Unen
ry pted crypt
ed
A Une
nc B
Intrusion Detection
Anomaly Detection
Compares profile of normal systems operation to
monitored state
Hypothesis: any attack causes enough deviation from
profile (generally true?)
Q: How do you derive normal operation?
AI: learn operational behavior from training data
Constructive: construct profile from domain knowledge
Q: Will a profile from one environment be good
for others?
Misuse Detection
Profile signatures of known attacks
Monitor operational state for signature
Hypothesis: attacks of the same kind has enough
similarity to distinguish from normal behavior
Q: Where do these signatures come from?
Record: recorded progression of known attacks
Comprise: domain knowledge
AI: Learn by negative and positive feedback