This is not an academic study. So far I have never come across with a Proutistic analysis of historical cycles.

Prout is an acronym for Progressive Utilization Theory, a economic and political theory propounded by an Indian philosopher P.R. Sarkar in 1959. See more about Prout: www.prout.org P.R. Sarkar, the founder of Prout sees any era in history always dominated by a particular class. Here, class, does not mean a class in a marxist ideology but according to his idea, a class is based on varna psychology. Varna (sanskrit) is a mental colour rather than an occupation. Varnas (classes) are four in number, namely toiler (shudra), warrior (kshattriya), intellectual (vipra ) and acquisitor (vaeshya). Each age is dominated by a particular class according to social cycle theory of Prout. Social cycle progresses from toiler to warrior society, from warrior dominated society to intellectual, and from intellectual dominated society to acquisitor era. Then cycle repeats from the beginning. A short description of the varnas are given here: shudra: simple minded person whose only concern is what is right now here. Controlled by fears and other varnas. Worships the heros. Cannot think the past and do not have an ability to foresee the future. Kshattriya: who wants to conquer one's fears. Always ready to control one's environment through one's physical prowess. Worships the past, cannot think about the future. Is vain and proud. Robust mind thrusts such a person to glory and success in times of tremendous turmoil. Vipra: the one who controls one's environment through one's intellect. Physically lazy but intellectually enjoys debates. Is future oriented so much that the present conditions may sometimes elude. Megalomaniac and intellectual vanity. Can grasp deep ideas. Is a system builder. Vaeshya: controls environment by monetary means. The sum bonum of life is wealth. Likes to hoard wealth. Ability to take tremendous risks in economic arena. Good at mobilizing and organizational activity but loses interest if no monetary rewards. Modes of progression from one era into another: Evolution: application of mild force. Society evolves slowly towards the next era. Revolution: application of tremendous amount of force. Society jumps into next era. May involve blood shed and violence. Counter-evolution: society revolves slowly backwards. This stage is only temporary and again either through evolution or revolution advances into next stage. Counter-revolution: society return to the previous era through the use of tremendous force. I took China as an example of social cycle analysis as China's history is long and well documented. In order to understand what particular class dominates a society, one needs to review at least one complete cycle. If one has a thorough understanding of the theory of social cycle, history can be understood in a better way. One may also predict the future. This does not intend to be a complete text of China's history. Only such chapters have been chosen from various books which shed light on progression of social cycle in China. I have not finished it yet and intend to continue research publishing ever new editions. I hope my research inspires other kindred souls to do similar analysis of other civilizations. I would be most glad to receive your comments: [email protected]

Before Xia dynasty Near modern Xi'an, the largest Neolithic site in China was discovered. There, the foundations of forty-six houses and the accompanying burial sites suggested that the inhabitants, flourishing about 6000 years ago, lived a communal life in a matriarchal order. They left potteries with decorative motifs, often in geometrical patterns, sometimes in fish design. The Banpo people who lived here were farmers; but they supplemented their agriculture with fishing and hunting, as their tools and storages indicate.

Xia Dynasty, ca. ---1600 BCE

Yu the Great, the founder of Xia was the ruler who built the country's first dikes and canals. Yu's achievements were so popular that the lords around him insisted that his son succeed him. And so was founded the dynastic principle of primogeniture. The Xia, still considered by many to be a legendary dynasty, were probably nothing more than the paramount tribe in a tribal period. When Shang who succeeded them and are regarded by most historians to be a kingdom, they controlled their alliance of tribes by periodic hunts and a loose feudal relationship. The earliest dynasty on record is a ruling house called the Xia, which, if verifiable, would extend the upper ceilings of Chinese history to about 2000 BCE. But until today, aside from certain archaeological sites which because of their radio carbonic dates, could possibly be related to the Xia, the many interesting stories about the dynasty found in the classical records are still awaiting verification.

Shang Dynasty, 1600-1027BCE, warrior era, near modern Anyang, Henan Area 1122 BC est. 1,250,000 km2 Population - est.13.7 million (2)
Shang appear to be people who, with their mastery of bronze technology, assumed overlordship over many other peoples on the strength of their military superiority and religious cohesion. The extant bronze objects of the Shang, with few exceptions, are weapons and sacrificial vessels. They were produced in centralized manufacturing plants under state sponsorship. Although it was a patriarchal society, the Shang allowed its aristocratic women a degree of freedom and equality with men not attained by the daughters of China many centuries and even millenniums later. The Shang people were cheerful and robust, and they consumed large quantities of alcoholic beverages. They practised human sacrifice and felt no qualms about it, as they routinely and unsentimentally recorded such deeds on the oracle bones. They were able to dispatch an army of 3,000 men on a marching expedition of 100 days. And this army could be augmented by forces contributed by Shang vassals. Sometimes they waged war for profit. We believe that the Shang people, while versed in agriculture, maintained a strong pastoral tradition. In their 500- odd years of history, they moved their capital more than half a dozen times, and hunting is often mentioned on the oracle bones. Engravings on the oracle bones indicate that the Shang kings had a special concern for the weather. Calendar making was an essential function of the royal court, and in fact, all the Shang kings were named after the index divisions that formed a calendar cycle.

The succession of the kings is known to have taken place by and large from brother to brother and, on fewer occasions, from father to son, always within the extended family. (4)

Zhou Dynasty, 1122-771 BCE, around Xi'an. Budding intellectual ideas but still warrior era.
Zhou was a feudal state where the emerging intellectuals were under the warrior kings. In the Chinese historical tradition, the Zhu defeated the Shng and oriented the Shng system of ancestor worship towards a universalized worship, away from the worship of Shng D and to that of Tin or "heaven". They legitimized their rule by invoking the "Mandate of Heaven," the notion that the ruler (the "Son of Heaven") governed by divine right and that his dethronement would prove that he had lost the Mandate. Disasters and successful rebellions would thus show that the ruling family had lost this Mandate. The doctrine explained and justified the demise of the Xi and Shng dynasties and, at the same time, supported the legitimacy of present and future rulers. Before conquering Shng, Zhu was a state in Shaanxi. Gernet (1996:51) describes the Zhu state as a "city" which was in contact with the barbarian peoples of the western regions and more warlike than the Shng. The Zhu dynasty was founded by the J family and operated from four capitals throughout its history.[19] Sharing the language and culture of the Shng, the early Zhu rulers, through conquest and colonization, established a large imperial territory wherein states as far as Shndng acknowledged Zhu rulership and took part in elite culture. (5) Zhou was one of the tribal states under Shang suzerainty, with an agrarian base in he Wei river region around modern Xi'an. During the reign of the last Shang king, the Zhou either by overbearing power or by impartial arbitration, had won the allegiance of a number of states that were supposedly subordinate to the Shang. Zhou took over either in 1027 BCE or 1122 BCE. The heroic figure who became the progenitor of a royal house that was to last for 800 years, however, never claimed to be dynastic founder. That honour was given to his father, Xibai, who was posthumously proclaimed King Wen, or the 'cultured king,' in commemorating of his humility and statesmanship. His son, the leader of the military expedition who organized eastward expedition to terminate the Shang overlordship and replace it with the Zhou dynasty, whose personal name is Fa, is in turn known to history by his posthumous title, King Wu, or the 'martial king'. The moral lessons that sons should never make claims so grand as to overshadow their fathers and that virtue and the doctrine of harmony must triumph over military exploits became a tradition ever after. With the rise of new rulers from the loess land, China developed a large body of classical literature. Primogeniture now replaced the Shang practise of fraternal succession. Religious differences between the two cultures were sharp. The animism of the Shang disappeared with the emergence of the Zhou, and even though ancestor worship continued, the earlier beliefs and expectations that made individual ancestors responsible for their descendants' success and failures across a wide range of activities, from winning a war to nursing a troublesome tooth, were replaced by the honouring of lineage origin and the guaranteeing of its perpetuation as an obligation of posterity. The culture developed in the loess land had a greater agrarian influence. Zhou might have been inferior to the Shang in bronze technology. Zhou founders proved to be the greatest system builders of China's formative age. The Duke of Zhou, son of King Wen and younger brother of King Wu, is credited with being the chief architect of the state institutions under the new dynasty. Duke's organization was schematic. The preconceived mathematical concepts usually came with geometric patterns. Sweeping yet simple, the audacious designs were superimposed on a vast country before a single land survey was made or

a census taken to test their feasibility. Moreover, all the subdivisions within the states, including the counties and townships, would be perfectly square in shape. In practise such a plan, as it might be envisioned by a bricklayer, could never be carried out completely; nevertheless, inconsistencies could be tolerated at a time when space was abundant and population sparse. Conceptually, this approach would quickly put the masses of a large country in order. The Zhou system, called fengjian in Chinese, is always rendered 'feudal' in English. Generally speaking, against an agrarian background they both entrusted local government to the hands of hereditary lords. Aside from such bold but unrealistic concepts, however, many innovations of the Duke of Zhou can be verified, sometimes in detail. The overarching principles of state-building are expected to bring fort hand an ideal perfection in confirming with the Natural Law. While deviations are as a rule accepted, the lower echelon nonetheless must at first strive to achieve the projected symmetry and balance to the best of its ability. For that pressure is constantly exerted from the top. In the long run, however, it is fitting that China is becoming a country of political thinkers under the influence of a bureaucratic management that habitually gives a priori recognition to form rather than to substance. Another example of the Duke of Zhou's innovations was the alignment of his type of feudalism with kinship relationships. In every fief the family temple of the lord functioned as a kind of territorial shrine. The patron ancestor held the entire population together to form a pseudo-kinship. A legacy from this arrangement is that today dozens of Chinese surnames trace their origin to those tribal states. Within each unit, not only was the position of the lord hereditary, but also, his councillors and ministers always came from the designated noble lineages, who took possession of estates within the fief mandated at the founding of the dynasty. Those nobles assumed military leadership as well. In the early phase of the Zhou, the warrior-administrator caste was separated from the general population. With Fengjian the new dynasty installed a mode of government that was congenial to the spread of agriculture at the time. The alignment with kinship relationships contributed to its stability. The devotion to ritual and obsession with form rather than substance were to be passed on to agrarian China for millenniums to come. Indeed, the Zhou did not take hold of China for 800 formative years without leaving a permanent imprint. (4)

Eastern Zhou, 771 BCE- 221 BCE.

Population 273 BCE est. 30,000,000 230 BCE est. 38,000,000 (2) The first part, Spring and Autumn was clearly still a warrior era but then the tremendous pressure of survival of the fittest during the Period of Warring States caused a social revolution where intellectual ideas came to dominate increasingly. Spring and Autumn was a warrior era, revolution into intellectual era during Warring States period. During the Warring States, the hereditary nobility as a warrior-administrator caste had been replaced by the bureaucrats. It was the unlucky period of Spring and Autumn, when Confucius (551-479 BCE), the greatest Chinese thinker of all times were born. I say unlucky as he truly was an authentic intellectual but having warrior era old fashioned ideals. That is why it's not surprising to hear that Confucianism wasn't heeded by any of the contemporary kings. Confucius was born in a critical juncture when warrior era changed into intellectual era. His value system was of the warrior era which explains why rulers considered him old fashioned and useless. Intellectuals time concept orients them towards the future whereas warriors worship the past. Confucianism became accepted philosophy only when the intellectual era changed into an acquisitor era in later Han dynasty. Interesting note,

Mao Zedong, who was also a product of an intellectual era, rejected Confucianism. The emerging intellectual era rejected the past oriented ideas of Confucianism and embraced the ruthless real politik of Legalism. During the early centuries new fields were opened; 'barbarian' tribes that continued fishing and hunting as their major methods of gathering food were converted and brought within the pale of civilization. From its vassals the Zhou collected tribute, and the arbitration of disputes by the court was effective. But by the early eight century BCE the Zhou capital at modern Xi'an was ransacked by an invading tribe, which also killed the king. When the crown prince resettled in the east, the dynasty, now known as the Eastern Zhou, was set for a long period of decline. Traditionally, this era of diminishing royal power is presented in history in two distinctive but not chronologically connected segments. They are the 'Spring and Autumn' (770- 481 BCE) and the 'Period of the Warring States' (403-221 BCE). Iron Age period from about 475 BC. During these two periods a social revolution which took centuries to reach a conclusion evolved. The Zhou king, already deprived of his own territorial base to sustain his military power, found his orders no longer heeded by the vassal states. To make things more difficult for the royal house, tribute from those states stopped coming. Although Zhou continued to reign, it no longer ruled the country. Its control was no longer based on its military might but rested merely on its people's reverence for the awesome rituals it performed. Gradually, however, its influence further waned, and in 256 BCE the House of Zhou became extinct when it was snuffed out by the State of Qin which had become a mighty military power. The other states, which still retained a reverence for the Zhou heritage, were appalled at Qin's domination and one of their officers wrote to his leaders about the Qin state: Qin customs are those of the Rong and Di (barbarians). She has the heart of a tiger or a wolf...and is ignorant of propriety, integrity and virtue. Initially equal in power, the Warring States slowly exhausted themselves as they mounted ever more deadly experiments in warfare. In Qin, the reforms which made the state truly strong took place only about a century before Shihuang became king. The architect of Qin's change was Shang Yang (390-338 BCE), a man of some military reputation. Also a man of great political acumen, Lord Shang transformed the face of Qin by dividing part of it into 31 counties, each administered by a centrally-appointed magistrate instead of a feudal lord. He also raised the status of the peasants, allowing them to buy and sell land, thus attracting new immigration from the surrounding states. Because of these policies, the population grew larger and provided more soldiers for Qin's army. But the story is not entirely one of decadence and decay. Obviously social mobility accelerated the changes, at first working within the greater and lesser nobility lineages, this making the status quo difficult to maintain, and then breaching the barrier that separated the commoners from the nobility altogether. Productivity expanded. Bronze coins began to circulate. Education advanced so far that toward the end of the Eastern Zhou, scholars from the plebeians class began to frequent the courts of the contesting states to give counsel to the lords, who, as was the fashion, now called themselves kings: The Eastern Zhou, especially the Period of the Warring States, is sometimes referred to as an era in which 'one hundred schools contended'. The richness and diversity of political philosophy reached such heights that the achievement, as if to have overtaxed China's brain power, was not to be repeated for the next 2,000 years. Aside form the Confucian school, The Daoists and Legalists were the most prominent schools among the so-called 'hundred', which actually numbered no more than a score. The Daoists had little respect for mundane authority. Their acceptance of cosmic unity and readiness to return to primitive simplicity were reinforced by their resistance to the curtailment of freedom, either through enticement or through cohesion. Daoism therefore gave comfort to pantheism, romanticism, and not least anarchism. Those sentiments, however, provided no immediate cure for the current political turmoil except to turn wise men into recluses. Later, Daoism inspired poets and painters over the

ages, favoured limited government in peacetime, and supplied a levelling ideology for peasant rebels on numerous occasions. The Legalists may have come close to the eighteenth century positive school of jurists in the West. They held that law reflected the sovereign's will, unhampered by convention or any conventional sense of morals. But Chinese Legalists put themselves in a far worse light because their platform, proclaimed at a time when China was struggling desperately to achieve unity, sanctioned only the awards and punishments of despots whose idea of justice was usually embodied in martial law. The first and the greatest of the Chinese thinkers was called Confucius. His life, traditionally considered to be from 551-479 BCE, was an undramatic one and, perhaps in his own eyes, a failure. Either because he felt unappreciated in his home state of Lu, or because his vision was a wider one, he set out to become one of the many roving scholars who sought to gain audience with the contending lords, and to advise them on how best to govern their people. But he was dismissed from Qi, driven out of Song and Wei, and ran into trouble between Chen and Zai. He was uncompromising in his devotion to rectitude, wholly devoted to the lessons of history. Most of the Confucian Classics (music, the Book of Changes, the Book of History, the Book of Poetry, the Spring and Autumn Annals, and the Book of Ritual contained the message that the past was superior to the present, it is easy to see why Qin Shihuang (a vipra par excellence) wanted to have them destroyed. In his own lifetime, Confucius received little honour. China did not become Confucian until five centuries after his death. Confucius saw the past as a better and more genteel time, and idyllic period when the world was shared by all alike. By preserving and replicating the old forms of ritual and etiquette, he hoped that a better world would be restored. In his own time, Confucius was but one of many itinerant scholars who travelled from state to state. For example, Sun Zi, the reputed author of The Art of War, made his reputation as and advisor to the ruler of rival state. How can we account for the great turmoil of the Zhou age? How can we explain the great contradictions of this era, that on the one hand there was the entreaty that rulers and statesmen must have hearts as gentle as that of H.C. Andersen, and on the other there was the argument that the end justified all means, springing from super-Machiavellian political reality that contrived the rooting out of opposition by burning books and burying dissidents alive. If a single development in Chinese history sets it far apart from other civilizations in the world, it is the imperial unification of the Qin in 221 BCE, The political maturity that this feat required, fixed the pattern of centralization that was to be followed for millenniums. It is said that when King Wu crossed the Yellow river to put an end to the Shang dynasty, some 800 vassals of the Shang joined forces with him. The number is an indication of the multitude of autonomous units then extant. During the Spring and Autumn period 170 states were mentioned. By the time the all-out war of annexation was under way, the Chu, the power in the south, eliminated forty of these. By the time of Mencius, only about a dozen could still be plotted on a map. Among them only seven were powerful enough to be reckoned with. But the process of reduction continued inexorably, until all the barriers of the former Zhou feudatories were razed and the territory, ruled by one man, stretched over a good portion of eastern Asian continent. The 550 years of the Eastern Zhou also saw the nature of warfare change drastically. During the Spring and Autumn period, armies were small, engagements often lasted only one day, and a sense of chivalry usually prevailed. The devotion to rituals by the belligerents kept warfare artistic and in conformity with the feudal code of ethics. Battles were carefully conducted according to recognized codes, complete with chivalry and a good deal of ceremony. Actual combat involved far more propriety than savagery, and there are many documented episodes or archers courteously exchanging arrows with one another until one of them was finally killed. One of the other codes of battle at that period was the unwritten rule that one could never take advantage of an adversary in distress. The Shiji also speaks of the soldiers' boldness and resolution:

When one takes up arms he must heed the code of war, which calls for them. To kill the enemy is resolute, and to display resolution in the highest degree is boldness. If one does otherwise, he should be killed in disgrace. During the Shang Dynasty and throughout most of the Zhou dynasty, the war chariot was a principal weapon of war. Historical records tell of many battles in which large numbers of chariots were involved. For example, a battle between the states of Qi and Jin in 589 BCE involved some 800 chariots and 12,000 troops. Large and difficulty to manoeuvre, this symbol of strength and military authority required open country with flat, dry expanses of land for it to be useful, making the chariot an impractical vehicle for the rough terrain battles of the Warring States Period. By the 3rd to 2nd centuries BCE, therefore, the chariot took a lesser role in tactics and served only as a symbol of power and authority. Battles were not engaged in lightly during the Spring and Autumn Period. The spirits were consulted through omens, dreams or professional diviners and if the signs were unfavourable the attack was sometimes aborted. It was also necessary for the state leaders to justify military action and to show that right was on their side before they moved into action. If an army had been victorious, the defeated troops were pursued and, if captured, held for ransom or enslaved. There was little indiscriminate slaughter and if territory had been annexed, few of the vanquished nobles were killed, nor was the royal line ever extinguished. Such civility disappeared without a trace when the Warring States period began in 481 BCE; as the states grew to a size similar to today's European nations, war were waged with no less ferocity than those known to modern man. Toward the end of this period, opposing armies of close to half a million men each were often mentioned. Field operations followed by sieges could last for months. Some of those states achieved the level of total mobilization; in one instance at least, a king ordered all able-bodied males over fifteen years of age to report to a frontier town. The numbers of war dead and the atrocities committed against prisoners in this age would cause a modern reader to shudder. Brutality and cruelty became the norm and chivalry was increasingly disregarded. Wholesale slaughter of the conquered often followed a large-scale battle. It is clear that no tactic was too vicious to use and, on more than one occasion, dikes were deliberately breached which not only drowned great numbers of the enemy but innocent civilians as well. Qin had quickly realized that the expensive, heavy and slow chariots were not contributing to their campaigns, and as early as 644 BCE, there are indications that the state had switched extensively to cavalry and was flouting the rules of ceremonial warfare. Earlier, Qin had also realized the importance of reliable sources of manpower, and it was among the first of the states to impose universal conscription which made possible the astonishing size of its armies. Qin's men were virtually all rough peasants trained at an early age for battle. When they fought, their lighter armour and cavalry permitted the troops to out-manoeuvre the more traditionally outfitted soldiers of the other states who were still slowed down by their heavy armour and cumbersome chariots. Qin had gained lot of experience fighting the nomads like Rong and Xiongnu. Later on the defeated Xiongnu (also called Hu, huns) invaded heavily armoured Romans. During his campaign in Britain, Gaius Julius Caesar was surprised to find the Celts still using the ancient chariots). The use of massed infantry made warfare more bloody and reduced the importance of the aristocracy which in turn made the kings more despotic. From this period onward, as the various states competed with each other by mobilizing their armies to war, nobles in China belonged to the literate class, rather than to the warrior class as had previously been the case. This period is also notable for the development of complex bureaucracies and centralized governments, as well as a clearly established legal system

Mencius lived during the waning days of the Zhou dynasty, around 300 BCE, more than 700 years after the Zhou dynasty was established. His birthplace is in Shandong. He lived in one of the most unstable periods of Chinese history: during the waning days of the Zhou dynasty, the ruling house fell into oblivion; its vassal states were caught up in incessant wars of annexation, which were to extinguish all but one of them, the Qin. Mencius went to see the Qi, one of the dozen states that had survived the struggle up to this point. He was given audience by the king. Mencius gave the king of Qi no counsel on strategy or diplomacy; he neither supported the annexation nor urged a retreat. He did mention public opinion. He might have advocated some form of plebiscite to allow the Yan people to decide the issue themselves. His aloofness from political reality made him unwelcome in the king's court, so he moved on and offered his services to other states. But preaching the same 'kingly' way, he had no success in those rival states either. Focusing on the administering of millions of peasants by the hereditary lords, the Second Sage summed up his concept of government with the statement that 'those who perform manual labour are to be governed, and those who toil with their minds will do the governing.' Even though Mencius sometimes may have come close to the idea of a 'general will' of the people, or, to stretch the interpretation slightly further, 'popular sovereignty,' he made it unmistakably clear that their right to self-determination was not unconditional. Strictly speaking, it was limited to the right to survival. He defined the general entitlement of the people as 'sufficient to eat in good years and escape from extinction in bad years.' He developed the theme of universal compassion to the point of identifying it as the essence of human nature. Mencius, like Confucius before him, credited his ideas origin to King of Wen of the Zhou, some 700 years before his time. The concept of government by heart. In the short term, Mencius seems to have lost out. By the time he urged the lords of the Warring States to return to the humanism of King Wen, the Zhou fengjian had been revised beyond recognition. The well-field system had been abandoned. The hereditary nobility as a warrioradministrator caste had been replaced by the bureaucrats. The mood of competition was further advanced by a growing commerce which, though in its infancy, thrived because of the extraordinary effort of certain prominent individuals involved in interstate politics. One philosopher named Yang Zhu, slightly younger than Mencius, advised everyone to adhere to his self-interest. He apparently felt that moral exhortations, pressing individuals to act against their own wishes, only led the public to further confusion. Everyone should follow his natural instinct to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Toward the end of the Warring States period, iron tools had been introduced. The resultant increase in productivity brought social sophistication to the top layer of society. The demand that the empire act as an integral whole was at no time relaxed. (4)

Qin Dynasty, Xi'an, 221 BCE- 206 BCE.

Population 210 BC est. 20,000,000 (2)

Intellellectual era continues. When Lu Buwei (a rich merchant) was the defacto ruler, intellectual era was in its prime. He had to hide his real varna and try to camouflage as an intellectual as per fitting to the era. During that time acquisitor values were despised. He was in control of the kingdom until a usurper came, a brilliant scholar named Li Su, who became the counsellor of the young king. Qin dynasty continued the traditions of intellectual age. It is an interesting notice that wars are bloodiest during intellectual era. How can we explain the counter intuitive idea of book burnings and burying of the scholars during Qin dynasty? Qin was a

police state that wanted to control all ideas and thoughts. Similar policies were wielded during the much later Ming dynasty emperor Qianlong and Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. Those were intellectual era dominated as well. There are many similarities between Mao Zedong and Qin Shihuang. In fact Mao cited Qin Shihuang few times and admired him. Mao, like Qin Shihuang, also held some daoist esoteric practises dear in his personal life. Qin Shihuang was the First Emperor of China- the first in the long line of 210 men and one woman. In fact, the very word emperor (huangdi) we owe to Qin Shihuang, and it is from the name of his dynasty called Qin that we are given the word for the country we call China. He was also a visionary who united the Warring States of his time, imposed order and conformity upon them, and so founded China's 2200-year-old Imperial System- the longest-enduring of all human political systems. One of the most amazing rulers of all time, he was a conqueror, a unifier, a centralizer, a standardizer, a builder and a destroyer. He cracked his great whip to bend the world to his will, and placed deceit and violence above kindness and justice, making tyranny the foundation of his Empire. These are the words of his earliest critic, a scholar called Jia Yi. Mao Zedong expressed his admiration both for the success and ruthlessness of the First Emperor. It is obvious that Shihuang was a man with a complex personality. As he grew older, like all of us, certain aspects of his character intensified while others became weaker. What had once been justifiable pride turned into megalomania, firmness into cruelty and a calm and rational approach towards the religious beliefs of his times became a frenzied and superstitious search for sacred herbs which would ensure his immortality. He was a man with a deep interest in the sacred and a profound reverence for the supernatural. History of the state of Qin originates back to 897 BCE when the House of Zhou gave land to a tribal chieftain so he could breed horses. From its very beginnings, then, the horses of Qin and the horsemanship of its people were a part of the state's tradition and its cavalry would later make a great contribution to its military might. From 677 BCE they had advanced their capital eastwards by stages until they had occupied most of the lands formerly owned by the Zhou. In 350 BCE they finally came to rest in Xianyang which is only 16 km away from the present-day city of Xi'an. Their advance had been carried out in the midst of large-scale warfare with their nomadic neighbours, the Rong, whom they eventually subdued. This constant battling with the war-like nomads had one very positive result for the state of Qin it sharpened their warrior's skills. However, the inter-marriage with the Rong women that was the inevitable result of victory over the nomads had a negative aspect according to the more civilized states of the Central Plain who felt that the people of Qin had learned distressingly bad manners from their barbarian kinfolk. Even Li Su, Shihuang's chief advisor, could no refrain from complaining about the barbaric music of the Qin to his master. The state of Qin enjoyed a consistent succession of capable leaders. Around 300 BCE was king Zhaoxiang, an ambitious but careful ruler who summoned to his court the renowned advisors of his enemy rulers, and was not ashamed to kneel (in private) before them. It was he who charted Qin's course through the crucial period when it was emerging as one of the seven paramount states. Perhaps he was able to manage this difficult task because he was in the habit of listening to his advisors. We can see, then, that Shihuang was heir to a tradition of strong, courageous leaders who were also clever statesmen. One of the more striking features possessed by the state of Qin was that its rulers were not only talented military leaders but brilliant strategists, as well. The period of the Warring States of which the First Emperor was a product was a fluid, restless, brutal time, an era of fierce and unrelenting inter-state competition. The competing states vied with one another not just for supremacy but for actual survival, for all it took was one, single, fatal mistake for a state to be annexed by its more powerful neighbours. As the states became fewer and

fewer, each one scrambled to adopt the newest techniques of agriculture, warfare, diplomacy and state organization anything which would strengthen themselves and weaken or deter their neighbours. Men of ideas were eagerly sought after, and travelled freely from state-to-state, offering their advice or plans to the highest bidder. The intense competition resulted in astonishingly rapid technological progress, and by the time Shihuang had become emperor in 221 BCE, China probably exceeded the Mediterranean world in almost every measure of material civilization. The darker side of this period was, however, an exceedingly grim one. The Warring States Period (481-221 BCE) produced a degree of bloodshed and misery which was to have few parallels throughout the remainder of Chinese history. One scholar of the period has calculated that in the 241-year period between 463-222 BCE, there were only eighty-nine years which saw no major wars. And as time wore on, moving ever closer to Shihuang's birthdate of 259 BCE, the wars grew even more brutal and longer in duration. The number of troops engaged in each campaign reached figures that stagger the imagination. The state of Qin engaged in fifteen major campaigns between 364- 234 BCE, and the number of casualties among enemy states alone is placed by the Shiji at almost 1.5 million! As the population of China at that time was about 40 million, it can be seen that the devastation was terrible and the loss of life staggering. With the cost of war so great, it would be surprising if alternatives were not sought, and they were. The diplomatic manoeuvering among the seven major states at the time of Shihuang's birth seems similar to our own century. There were alliances, north-south versus east-west, the horizontal versus the vertical. Sometimes, two or three states allied against one, and betrayals were frequent, as today's ally became tomorrow's enemy. Diplomats travelled from state to state, announcing deterrent capabilities, offering bribes and convening disarmament conferences. Spies were everywhere and women were turned into pawns, used at the highest levels for strategic marriage alliances. Lord Shang Yang, a Qin statesman, introduced a number of militarily advantageous reforms from 361 BC until his death in 338 BC, and also helped construct the Qin capital, Xianyang. This latter accomplishment commenced in the mid-fourth century BC; the resulting city greatly resembled the capitals of other Warring States. Of Shang Yang's reforms, the most notable one was advocating the philosophy of Legalism, which encouraged practical and ruthless warfare. In contrast, during the Zhou Dynasty and the ensuing Warring States Period, the prevalent philosophy had dictated war as a gentleman's activity; military commanders were instructed to respect what they perceived to be Heaven's laws in battle. The Qin disregarded earlier military tradition of honour, taking advantage of their enemy's weaknesses. A nobleman in the state of Wei accused the Qin state of being "avaricious, perverse, eager for profit, and without sincerity. It knows nothing about etiquette, proper relationships, and virtuous conduct, and if there be an opportunity for material gain, it will disregard its relatives as if they were animals." It was this Legalist thought combined with strong leadership from long-lived rulers, openness to employ talented men from other states, and little internal opposition that gave the Qin such a strong political base. Qin Shihuang's origin is listed as follows: about 250 BCE, a prince of blood from the Qin, took residence in the royal court of Zhao as hostage to guarantee the armistice between the two states. A rich merchant by the name of Lu Bu Wei noticed that the situation could be worked to his own advantage. Lu Bu Wei was able to convince the childless heir of the Qin to adopt the prince in Zhao court. The scheme worked, and the overlooked prince upon his return to Qin and the death of the king was himself installed as heir apparent. Lu Bu Wei's one concubine who was already pregnant by him married this new heir. Within a year she gave the new heir apparent a son, who thirteen years later became the King of Qin. Another quarter of a century later he was to rule China as the First Emperor. His natural father, the shrewd merchant, acted as a counsellor. Buwei soon became immensely rich and powerful, with as many as ten thousand household retainers. Ashamed of his

merchant origins, he surrounded himself with scholars and had them produce an encyclopedia to encompass all human knowledge. That time a merchant profession was considered contemptible. Later on he fell into disgrace. Li Su was a southerner from the state of Chu. Soon realizing that Qin was emerging as the strongest of the states, he travelled there in 247 BCE, the year before the thirteen-year-old Shihuang succeeded to the throne. Later on he became the Grand Councillor engaged in secret diplomacy, manipulating a network of agents and spies, and found time to continue the studies he had earlier begun under the great Confucian philosopher, Xun Zi. He was the most powerful of state ministers, although he never did achieve dominance over Shihuang who always made sure that the final decisions during his rule would be his alone. However, many of Shihuang's policies are attributed to Li Su, like systematization of the variant scripts and the composition of China's first dictionary. He accompanied Shihuang on all of his inspection tours. But he is remembered, above all, as the man who advised Shihuang to decree the Burning of the Books. The age into which Shihuang was born was both philosophically and religiously eclectic, a time of intellectual ferment during which rapid social mobility brought the rawest forms of folk belief into the upper levels of society at the same time that their own elevated and agnostic moralism filtered gradually down into the hut of the meanest peasant. It was a time of confusion, a time when differing ideologies competed for primacy every bit as fiercely as the bloodthirsty states competed in war. It was also a time when the greatest struggle was between those loyal to the past, those who harboured a nostalgic vision or restoring the Golden Age of the legendary sage-kings, and their rivals, those who had long tired of this vain and empty longing for long-gone utopia. And they were ready and eager to deal with present-day realities and crash headlong into the future. Shihuang was one of the latter, a realist interested in the solutions for his own period of time and the legacy he would leave for future generations of the Qin Dynasty. While he was conversant with all the currents of thought in his time, and demonstrated an astonishing ability to blend and use them to validate his actions, his greatest loyalty was to the new, the novel and the first. And that meant rejecting the past, rejecting the constant and irritating calls with which his scholars frequently plagued him: Restore the feudal system of feoffdoms! Learn from the books of the past! Rule by virtue and benevolence, not harsh law. For these are the ways of the sages, and their rules were long! But Shihuang ignored them and, instead, concentrated on the words of his most influential teacher, Han Feizi. History does not repeat itself, contended Feizi, and more than anything else, it was Shihuang's grasp of that essential fact which made him the First Emperor. He was almost alone among the rulers of the time in acting on this belief. After the unification Shihuang demands that his ministers suggest for him a new title, one commensurate with his great deeds, so that they might be transmitted to later generations. Clearly, he sought a title which would set him apart from all earlier rulers, since his achievements surpassed those of all his predecessors, including even the legendary sage-kings of antiquity. After some deliberation, he made the choice himself. He announced that he would henceforth be known as August Emperor or huangdi. The overall effect of his new title was that Shihuang had made himself almost superhuman. At that time a certain theory existed called the Five Elements. According to it, fire, water, earth, wood and metal succeeded each other in an endless cycle, each destroying its predecessor to give a dominant element and used it along with its associated colour and number to legitimize his reign. Since Zhou dynasty had ruled by the virtue of fire, Shihuang chose water as his element, the colour black for his court robes, pennants and flags, and the number six, the water number, as the standard measurement for such things as caps, axle-widths and even a man's regular pace. He renamed his people the Blackhaired ones, and since water was considered a cold and harsh element, he determined that his law would also be harsh and repressive and his rule, severe.

The conversion from the Zhou system to a state structure that put the entire population directly under the command of a single king administering through a bureaucracy was by no means a Qin invention. The Qin was no pioneer. But while other states moved toward reorganization piecemeal, the Qin introduced a program to effect sweeping changes that were coordinated beyond any compromise. The steps taken included the total abolition of the aristocracy, the introduction of a system of merit appointments, dismantlement of the well-field system, taxation by acreage on transferable landownership, military service by conscription, and promotion of food production and the textile industry at the expense of all other pursuits. As the records show, these measures had taken effect about a hundred years before Shihuang was installed as the Qin king. The ultimate centralization that consciously made the state a kind of collective personality of all the royal subjects amounted to nothing less that a 'totalitarian system.' Indeed, the Qin was a police state. Nationalism played no part in Qin conquests. All the important advisers who gave counsel to the Qin kings were alien, and under Shihuang's unification, in no instance was the citizenry discriminated against because of state origin. This all made China one of the world's first centralized bureaucracies. Henceforth, the educated administrator would increasingly supplant the warrior as the dominant figure in society, and the imperial institution would be immensely strengthened. The centralization of political power in the case of unity is perhaps Shihuang's greatest accomplishment. Qin Shihuang also improved the military, despite the fact that it had already undergone extensive reforms. The military used the most advanced weaponry of the time. The invention of the sword during the Warring States Period was a great advance. It was first used mostly in bronze form, but by the third century BC, the Qin were using stronger iron swords. The demand for metal this produced resulted in improved bellows. The crossbow had been introduced in the fifth century BC and was more powerful and accurate than the composite bows used earlier. It could also be rendered ineffective by removing two pins, which prevented enemies from capturing a working crossbow. Xun Zi (298-238 BCE) was also Confucian, but far more rationalistic than Mencius. In his view, all human beings were in need of regulation, but in the societal hierachy, the forms or regulation differed. For the princely men, the rules of propriety and decorum were sufficient, but for the vast majority, only strict law and heavy punishment would work. Xun Zi is sometimes called a left-handed Confucian because of his rejection of some of the Master's teachings, particularly the views that law and punishment were unnecessary under a virtuous ruler, and that man learned from history. Very much a rationalist, he also said that he hated corruption of the governments of his time, the decadent states and the bad rulers who did not follow the Way but devoted themselves to magic and prayers, and to omens and portents. It was because of his teachings, more than the work of any other philosopher, that the victory of Qin came about. It is often said that Xun Zi had two famous students, Han Feizi and Li Su. It would be more accurate to say that he had three famous students, for it was from these two men that Shihuang learned his philosophy. From them, he learned that man was by nature evil, and that harsh law was the most effective regulator of human behaviour. These were Legalist tenets. The philosophy of Legalism was the last of the Hundred Schools to develop a coherent theoretical position. For the Legalists, all morality was tied to the state which was the highest good, and anything done to preserve, strengthen and expand it was, by definition, good. To achieve their statist aims the Legalists used three principles supreme power vested in an absolute ruler, subtle techniques of state-craft to manipulate officials, and harsh, detailed law applied regularly and without distinction to everyone below the ruler. They believed the position of the ruler, his status and authority, had to be beyond challenge, if the regicides and usurpations so common in the period were to cease. And the first step in this process was the elevation of the ruler to that of a mysterious and god-like figure.

The best ruler would brook no criticism, nor would he accept advice unless it had been specifically requested. Han Feizi taught, The enlightened ruler does not govern his people, but rather his officials. In Legalists theory it was the officials who constituted the greatest threat to the ruler and his position. Han Feizi offered certain techniques by which a ruler could bring them under control, which are often compared to the work of the sixteenth-century statesman, Nicolo Machiavelli. Qin Shihuang learned his lessons well. No minister ever succeeded in dominating him. The rule of law was the fundamental principle of Legalist philosophy. And the laws were used to manipulate his people for two purposes: war and agriculture. Shihuang's laws for his bureaucrats also included a regulation which may make modern readers envious. When forwarding royal commands, as well as documents marked 'urgent', there are to be forwarded immediately. Those that are not urgent are to be dealt with in one day... In a famous passage, called the Five Vermin of the State, Han Feizi demonstrates a view unique in all of Chinese antiquity, and one to which Shihuang surely subscribed. It it he called for the elimination of five classes of people men of learning, itinerant scholars like Confucius, mercenary soldiers, nobles and courtiers, and merchants and artisans. In short, he wished to expunge from the state all distractions such as learning, culture and mercantile activity, and create a nation of soldiers and farmers, rather in the mould of ancient Sparta. This is the context agriculture and war into which we must put so many of Shihuang's activities. The Chinese historians who, in later centuries, wrote about Shihuang's Blackhaired people, portrayed them as a nation of dumb, militarized farmers. Legalism, which supplied the ideological underpinnings of the streamlined state of Qin, holds that man's nature is evil. Goodness, however, could be generated by concerted action directed by the state. Their concept of law gave no consideration to tradition, custom, ancient privilege, conventional ethics, kinship preference, or even compassion. It reflected the sovereign's will, codified, comprehensively and precisely written, and universally and impartially applied. Insofar as they valued nothing materialistic except the power and wealth of the state, the legalists could not hold to any jurisprudential concept even remotely akin to the civil law of the modern Western tradition, their ideas must have had a great deal of egalitarian appeal within the contemporary context. The Legalists, too, saw themselves as adherents of Natural Law. Their vision that once the laws were proclaimed the ruler could rest at the hub of the wheel from which the bureaucratic spokes radiated is not an entirely inaccurate picture of the Chinese system of bureaucratic management what was to prevail for the next two millenniums. The Qin Dynasty has always been regarded as the supreme embodiment of Legalism in action. And Shihuang, as its head, has always been seen by later historians, Confucians to a man, as a singleminded devotee of that philosophy. Shihuang may have been many of the things he was accused of by the historians, but stupid he was not. He had at his disposal the finest minds of his age, his seventy scholars of wide learning and his three hundred observers of the Heavens. His biography shows that he consulted them on a wide variety of matters, all the way from the interpretation of his dreams to the question of abolishing feudalism. And the very fact that these advisors possessed such a wide range of expertise makes clear the eclectic nature of thought in his time. The labels Confucian and Legalist are little more than helpful conventions, and in many cases, they mislead us rather than inform. No one would deny that his laws and his armies, his book-burning and his forced labour conscriptions were more closely identified with Legalism. What emerges most clearly from seeming contradictions is that like most brilliant men, Shihuang was adaptable, able to select and fashion for his own use the philosophies of the time. For ruling the state, he selected Legalism with the emphasis on strength, discipline and organization. For ruling his Blackhaired people, he chose Confucianism, with its emphasis on a humane ruler who cared for the common people. And for his personal spiritual satisfaction, the emperor turned to Daoism and the folk beliefs which had become a part of it.

During Shihuang's reign there was, as yet, no imperial religion as it was still in the process of formation, and the local religious observances of the conquered states were far more prominent. When it came to his own salvation, he left no stone unturned, trying to cover all his bets. The dominant religious belief in China during the reign of the Qin, and, in fact, during much of early imperial China, was focused on the shen (roughly translating to "spirits"), yin ("shadows"), and the realm they were said to live in. The Chinese offered sacrifices in an attempt to contact this other world, which they believed to be parallel to the earthly one. The dead were said to simply have moved from one world to the other. The rituals mentioned, as well as others, served two purposes: to ensure that the dead journeyed and stayed in the other realm, and to receive blessings from the spirit realm. Religious practices were usually held in local shrines and sacred areas, which contained sacrificial altars. During a sacrifice or other ritual, the senses of all participants and witnesses would be dulled and blurred with smoke, incense, and music. The lead sacrificer would fast and meditate before a sacrifice to further blur his senses and increase the likelihood of perceiving otherworldly phenomena. Other participants were similarly prepared, though not as rigorously. Such blurring of the senses was also a factor in the practice of spirit intermediaries, or mediumship. Practitioners of the art would fall into trances or dance to perform supernatural tasks. These people would often rise to power as a result of their artLuan Da, a Han Dynasty medium, was granted rule over 2,000 households. Noted Han historian Sima Qian was scornful of such practices, dismissing them as foolish trickery. Divinationto predict and/or influence the futurewas yet another form of religious practice. An ancient practice that was common during the Qin Dynasty was cracking bones or turtle shells to gain knowledge of the future. The forms of divination which sprang up during early imperial China were diverse, though observing natural phenomena was a common method. Comets, eclipses, and droughts were considered omens of things to come. Rarely mentioned is the fact that the Qin also benefited from its economic backwardness. Its undiversified agriculture provided the internal cohesion that made mobilization easier. This was an age when numbers counted; military technology being more or less in equilibrium, did not confer on any contestant a qualitative edge over the others. When possible, the early Qin strategists demanded that fortifications vital to the frontier defence of potential enemies be surrounded or razed, at times not hesitating to resort to slaughter to reduce the male population of service age in an opponent's territory. Diplomatic manoeuvres, especially those designed to split the nexus of Qin's rivals softened the resistance. Strong suspicions that the Qin legions were often turned loose to live off the enemy. In this connection, several major natural disasters that seemed to bolster Qin's cause occurred after Shihuang was installed as king. Nevertheless, the military triumphs of Shihuang were impressive. The unification was cemented by deeds. Boundaries were redrawn to divide China into thirty-six commanderies. After all the hereditary lords were eliminated, each commandery was jointly administered by a civil governor, a military commander, and a censor-in-chief. The Chinese writing system, beginning to manifest regional diversity during the Warring States period, was unified by the proclamation of a Qin script. Units and measurements were likewise standardized, as was the width of axles on carriages. To root out local interests in the provinces, 120 000 prominent households from the conquered states were relocated to take up residence on the outskirts of the capital. Weapons except those in the possession of the imperial army were confiscated and recast into twelve gigantic bronze statues. In 213 BCE it was decreed that certain books be burned. The First Emperor, in an attempt to consolidate power, ordered the burning of all books on non-Legalist philosophical viewpoints and intellectual subjects. A reader-in-waiting, a good Confucian, suggested that the emperor pay attention to the ancient models of governance. When Shihuang referred the matter to court

discussion, the Legalists chancellor Li Su countered that the practice of allowing men to indulge themselves in antiquity to give opinions on current affairs would ruin the state. He went on to suggest that the prohibition of private learning altogether would protect the Qin reform from 'seditious libel.' The burning of books was part of this program, other methods included the death penalty for citing classical works in daily conversations and applying historical examples to criticize current policies. It was the first universal act of philistinism among a people who venerated literature and philosophy and it came at a time when books were rare and precious things handcopied with painstaking care. The next year brought the infamous 'burying scholars alive.' The accounts in the recorded history portray the First Emperor as vain and, at times, even whimsical and superstitious although defiant and less fearful of supernatural powers. His adaptation of black as the imperial colour was epochal in his day. He greatly valued sexual morality, which he regarded as essential to the well-being of the populace. During his inspection tour to Mount Tai, Shihuang met a group of magicians who begged for permission to mount an expedition to the fairy islands of Penglai to find the elixir of immortality. Delighted with the idea, Shihuang sent the magicians out with a conscripted force of thousands of youths and maidens to find the mysterious potion. To the best of our knowledge, they never returned. If, as the legend said, the islands were lands of milk and honey, where all creatures, the birds and the beasts, were white and the gates and palaces were fashioned of gold and silver, it is understandable why this expedition decided to remain. Legend also has it that the comely youths sent on this expedition were the founders of the Japanese race. The First Emperor travelled extensively. He toured the capital city incognito at night. Although proud of his military exploits, Qin Shihuang is not known to have ever commanded troops personally. He survived three assassination attempts. In one of those, the assassins deadly blade missed Shihuang by inches, it lodged in the pillar, and Shihuang, it is said, fainted dead away. On the other hand he was tireless worker. He set quotas for the amount of documents, by weight, that he must dispose of daily, not resting until his work was done. On issues of state affairs he always consulted his advisers first; but the final decisions were always his own. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Qin Shihuang is that for twelve years his iron-fisted rule never caused a major incident, this over an immense country that had been ravaged by war for decades, and indeed for centuries. He left a position that no one could fill. Immediately after his death, palace conspiracies and machinations set the emperor's chief advisers, chamberlains, and sons to plotting against one another. Within a year popular uprisings erupted in the commanderies, and in another three years the Qin fell and all those close relatives of Shihuang and all the key personnel on his staff perished. Legalists doctrine can be summarized that a national life purpose could be created by the will of the state. Shihuang failed, fatally, as it later turned out, to recognize the distinction between obtaining and maintaining an empire.

Han Dynasty Former Han, 202 BCE- 8 CE, intellectual era, slowly moving towards acquisitor era. Later Han, 25 CE- 220 CE, acquisitor era.
Area - 50 BCE est. 6,000,000 km2 Population 2 CE est. 57,671,400 (2) For all practical purposes, when Shihuang died the Qin dynasty vanished; but his achievement of imperial unification was not to be undone. Within a decade there emerged a new dynasty, which

endured for more than 400 years. Han population was estimated to be close to sixty million with the aid of some 130,000 bureaucrats. The new dynasty is idealized by Chinese writers as marking the first time that commoners took up imperial roles. The dynastic founder, Liu Bang (known posthumously as emperor Gaozu), was a minor police officer under Qin. The plebeian composition of the new imperial court, however, only reflected that the territorial lordship had been so thoroughly uprooted that for the national reconstruction it was neither necessary nor even possible to rally behind the old aristocracy. Having inherited the broad and levelled base of the Qin, the imperial organizers of the Han demonstrated their acumen at making amends for the excesses of their predecessor. They worked toward a centralized bureaucratic management that took several generations to reach its fulfillment and that eventually emerged as the prototype of China's imperial rule for ages to come. The consolidation of central power reached a high point under Liu Che, the fifth emperor (Han Wudi). Liu Che proclaimed the first ideological platform for imperial rule, which was summarized as 'promotion of Confucianism to the disparagement of all other schools.' Curb of mercantile interests in deference to food production, a Legalist principle, inevitably became a part of Wu-di's officially sanctioned ideology, as did the practice of state monopoly on major commodities such as salt and iron. Reliance on the penal code to discipline the governed remained intact. Certain beliefs, either unsanctioned or not directly mentioned by Confucius, were also included in this package. Wu-di, the emperor himself, performed the mystic sacrificial services on the high mountains to seek communion with deities. His court erudites expounded a theory that the five material agents (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water) retained certain corresponding values with the four directions plus the center, with five principal colours, with the pentatonic musical scale, with the five key personal virtues, and even the five governmental functions. Its origin can be traced to an ancient classic, the Yijing, or the Book of Changes. The pseudo-scientific approach to problems, often bordering superstition, revealed the fact that learned men of the age were under great pressure to quickly assess a mass of date embracing both the knowable and the unknowable. Han courtiers persistently applied their vision of poetic association to drive home the message of sound government based on ethical harmony. In this way they rationalized the absolute power of the imperial throne yet at the same time tempered it, giving confidence to the bureaucrats by endowing them with a feeling that Natural law was within their grasp, thus enabling the hereditary monarch and literary bureaucracy to work as a team. Although this mixing of cosmology with political science seems to have served a purpose, the drawback of this formation, a cult of the state that is confusingly called Confucianism, is that once it was set up it remained virtually immovable for the next 2,000 years. Indeed its effects lingers on even today. Wu-di of the Han made an audacious and relentless effort to terminate the nomadic problem of the frontier once and for all. Despite many victorious campaigns, his goal was never realized. Wu-di died in 87 BCE, and by then the severe strain put on the state coffers by the Xiongnu Wars was becoming a major contributing factor in the decline of the Former Han, as the earlier half of the dynasty is called. Wu-di's strategy was to consolidate the frontiers and then, once the threat of the enemy was removed, relocate the population on a large scale to secure the territory; this of course added to the costs. As a result, a new range of fund-raising devices were put to work, including property tax on merchants, a license tax on boats and carriages, commutation from punishment to fines, a state monopoly on wine, salt and iron, and government participation in trade. All these measures, together with the conduct of the war itself, pushed the empire's centralization further. During Wu-di's reign, solution from Warring State taxation problem was adopted; governmental assistance in marketing the produce, purchasing the foodstuff when there was a surplus and offering it for sale in times of shortage, thus providing relief to the producers. During Wu-di's reign this policy was implemented under the direction of Minister of Revenue Sang Hongyang, who had a businessman's background, to make extra profit to help defray war expenditures. The same device was to be attempted by China's managers of public finance many times again in succeeding dynasties.

An inevitable consequence was that the agrarian population was driven to work on marginal land. Each peasant, in addition to his status as a self-employed labourer, was also a small businessman and therefore subject to the usury and cruelty of a very restricted local market. When the government attempted to take over marketing, it ushered in a new range of activities that the regular staff on the literary bureaucracy could not handle; nor were there even adequate laws to assure their proper functioning. Fundamentally, government participation in trade created many problems involving variable quantities, and this upset the agrarian mode of governance. The note of disharmony was to resonate tragically many times in Chinese history. It is worth noting that attempts made by subsequent dynasties to commercialize a part of the governmental operation always met strong resistance. None went very far or had an enduring effect. In the present case, Sang Hongyang's violent death ruled out the possibility that his effort would succeed. Successor regent Huo Gang was marked by a retrenchment from Wu-di's militancy, taxes were remitted or reduced and peace negotiations were begun with the Xiongnu chieftains. The semi religious setting of the court at Xi'an strengthened the position of the emperor as the final authority on earth; his arbitration carried the force of divine judgement. In 9 CE Wang Mang proclaimed himself emperor. Under his direction state monopoly widened and governmental participation in trade enlarged its scope, to embrace even banking. To enforce his programs he resorted to the extensive use of the secret police. Wang Mang failed. When his economic programs stalled, peasant rebellion broke out. At the same time, a number of war bands rallied behind Liu Xiu, a ninth generation descendant of the Han dynastic founder. In 25 CE Liu Xiu proclaimed himself emperor. Flying banners in red instead of the yellow of the Former Han, the new 'Later Han' regime installed its capital at Loyang, thereby to have some historians refer to it as 'Eastern Han.' The two halves of the Han dynasty lasted some 200 years each. Cultural and materialistic achievements during this period of peace were remarkable. For one thing, education advanced. The national effort to promote scholarship started with the Han. An imperial university was established by Wu-di, and toward the end of the pre, Christian era, the enrolment had already reached 3,000. Founder of the Later Han, Liu Xiu was one of those university students, as was his advisor Deng Yu. Moreover, half a dozen of the top generals were noted for being highly learned men, further evidence of the spread of scholarship. In 59 CE, the second emperor, Ming-di, lectured on ancient history at the new imperial university at Loyang. In the second century CE this university had 240 buildings comprising 1,850 rooms. By middle of the century this institution had 30,000 students. It became fashionable for renowned scholars to gather 500 or more disciples around themselves; the most accomplished had 3,000 followers. Enrolments of such magnitude are a measure of the general prosperity of the time. Although traditionally the Chinese dated the invention of paper to 105 CE, many years later, texts of the classics were still being copied on silk fabrics at great expense. Population of Xi'an was 250,000 and Loyang 200,000. The upper class in those days wore robes with long sleeves, and their headgear in the form of a kerchief was ubiquitous. They sat on floor mats to hold banquets, play musical instruments and games, and conduct lectures. Some of the monopolies were abolished in Later Han. Commerce was prominently represented by single-family stores engaging in retail trade. During the Later Han, the Xiongnu no longer remained a serious threat. In fact, the two Chinese expeditions in 73 and 89 CE are supposed to have pressured the nomads into waves of western movement, which as some historians suspect, might have had something to do with the eventual appearance of the Huns in European history. The founder of the Later Han, Liu Xiu, fits nicely the modern definition of the 'gentry class.' Its aristocratic influence had been progressively diminishing as the forefathers of his lineage, having branched out from the houses of a prince and marquis, took scaled-down positions as governors, district military commanders, and, as in the case of Liu's own father, a county magistrate. The first time Liu Xiu appeared in history he was a young man versed in farm management. At one time he represented his uncle in enlisting the aid of local officials to collect unpaid rent; on another occasion

he sold grain in a district where there was a food shortage. Because of his background and the similar outlook of his close followers, the Later Han government is sometimes referred to as a coalition of the well-to-do. In modern perspective, the ideology of the Later Han can be summed up as a political philosophy of the status quo and trying to get along with all sides. The founder of the Later Han was concerned with geomancy of public buildings. He also had a tendency to mix his pedantry with an interest in omens and prophecies. The blessings he was seeking were not for himself in another life but for his empire in this world, and this commitment is recorded in the state archives. In managing the empire, these two rulers, Liu Xiu and his son Liu Zhuang, did fairly well with public finance. Their strategy was to set the level of taxation at the lowest level possible; but within the statutory limits they would relentlessly press for its realization. The land taxes, according to the official proclamation, were reduced to one-thirtieth of the crop yield. The monopoly on major commodities was abolished. Liu Xiu's edicts also provided many ways for the manumission of slaves. The compilation of tax registers started in 39 CE. The next year more than ten governors died in prison for submitting falsified or inaccurate returns. Both stringent and calculating in particular instances, Liu Xiu, anal Liu Zhuang are noted by historians for their attention to details. An indication of their success was that the total number of taxable households, having gone through serious decline after Wang Mang, was brought up steadily toward the end of the century. But no serious shortage occurred even with the expensive campaigns against the Tibetans and the luxurious life-style within the palace. It was in dealing with the private wealth that the dynasty exposed its institutional inadequacy, and this eventually caused its downfall. The emergence of private wealth in a dominantly agrarian country always presents a problem. It can be instantly transformed into political power, and on many occasions it is compelled to take an active role in politics. To begin with, rural China was made vulnerable by the large number of small self-cultivators. Since all of them were small businessmen of a sort, the appearance of a few bigger businessmen inevitably led to imbalance and tension. Under the superficial harmony competition raged. There was a natural tendency for the wealthier and more powerful to displace the poorer and weaker. The government, unable to implement any plan of progressive taxation, would first face the loss of revenue, and then the effort to provide relief to the poor would also suffer. Another factor worth noting is that China achieved imperial unification well ahead of its time; local customs did not have an opportunity to develop and mature. The pattern of small holdings put any meaningful legal service further beyond the reach of the villagers. Thus rarely were cases of indebtedness, mortgage, foreclosure, and dispossession carried out under the orderly supervision of the law. As a rule it was the local ruffians who took matters into their own hands, conveniently under the direction of the rural wealthy. Yet the abuse did not end here. When cases could not be peacefully settled in the villages, rarely could they be handled better in governmental offices. Once the subordinate offices became bogged down in legal inexactitude, the higher offices would soon find themselves in the same predicament. This summary, in its spiral fashion, is a recurring theme in China's agrarian history. The ineffectiveness of the law could only be overcome by a discipline that applied both to officialdom and to the general population alike. The situation became unmanageable during the Later Han because it was a dynasty of 'restoration'. Them momentum had already built up. The complacency of the status quo and getting along with all sides and the quasi-religious outlook of seeking fulfillment in this world prevented it from moving in any single direction. A laissez-faire policy enabled the empire to recover and rehabilitate itself after the general disturbance caused by the Wang Mang interlude, but in the second century CE, the further accumulation of wealth in private hands, especially without and adequate outlet except reinvestment in land, disturbed rural tranquility to such an extent as to incapacitate the local government, which was long on ideology but short on administrative skills. The promotion of Confucianism during the two Han periods, while contributing to ideological cohesion among bureaucrats, also had an adverse effect. Learned men found few outlets for their talent other than government service. Knowledge for its own sake was not encouraged at all.

A pattern had been established: when provincial officials tried to check local ruffians, the most notorious were found to be under the protection of the rural wealthy, who in turn maintained connections with the holders of high offices, not infrequently palace eunuchs. From 153 to 184 CE, many events that were not to occur elsewhere until modern times took place in modern Han China. Students by the thousands demonstrated in the streets of Loyang and delivered petitions to the imperial court. Mass arrests endued; black lists were compiled. Hundreds of political prisoners died in confinement, some of them without any public notice. Because in its last stage of development the partisan controversy aligned eunuchs on one side against some outstanding bureaucrats supported by students on the other, one gets the impression that this was a struggle of good versus evil. Undeniably, the major problem of the dynasty in its last decades was the erosion of the power of local government. The national frontiers remained intact, and there were no policy debates at the national level even when things were clearly out of hand. The capital split because the eunuchs and their cohorts were well received by the upstarts in the countryside but rejected by the established gentry, both represented by the civil officials. Perhaps an imperial ruling of 135 CE, which permitted the eunuchs to pass on their ranks and estates to their adopted sons, complicated pecuniary matters in the local districts. The charges against them for obstruction of justice are logically convincing. With pervasive lawlessness came an ineffable feeling that everything was lost. In their final showdown in 189 CE, eunuch Zhang Rang asked Grand Commandant Ho Jin, who sided with the bureaucrats: 'You said that we inside the palace are corrupt. Please tell me, Sir, from the ministers on down who is loyal and honest?' Given the situation described above, the fall of the Han is hardly surprising. Imitating the Qin, the dynasty structured its imperial government in a tripartite system. The chancellor functioned as the head of the civil officials. The grand commandant was in charge of the army. A third component, the censorial-controlling branch of the government, was normally led by an imperial secretary. Sometimes different names were used, but this basic organizational structure was not altered. In the latter part of the second century CE, however, the ideal bore little semblance to reality. The chancellorship had lost much of its authority. The supervisory function had fallen on the shoulders of a second-echelon official called the 'colonel of censure,' who seemed most of the time to be the leader of an 'opposition' to the imperial court. The position of grand commandant, in the tradition of Former Han, was monopolized by the emperors' in-laws. And, following the precedent of Huo Guang, the holders of this office were kingmakers. The appearance of string of child emperors and even infant emperors sometimes happened incidentally but for the most part was owing to their efforts. The eunuchs rose to prominence for several reasons. As confidential managerial staff next to the throne, they were indispensable to the emperor and, when the emperor was a minor, to the empress dowager. Some of them had established reputations as guardians of the immediate imperial family. They also exercised control over the capital garrison, which even the grand commandant could rarely keep under his thumb. Subsequently, before the Han fell into anarchy, the eunuchs were all killed and palace burned. The throne itself became a pawn of a family quarrel. Dynasty hung on for another thirty years. China was to lose her symmetry and balance for more than three and a half centuries. Colonel of Censure, Yuan Shao (who purged the eunuchs) assumed leadership around CE 200. His sixth generation ancestor Yuan Liang had started the family fortune as an expert on the Book of Changes. After serving as a court academician, Yuan Liang passed his specialty onto his grandson Yuan An. The latter, on the strength of scholarship and recognized righteousness, rose from being a county magistrate to being a provincial governor and then a grand minister. From then on, not a single generation of the household was omitted from the highest court distinction, until those who claimed to be office subordinates and former disciples of the Yuans crowded every province. Opposing him was Cao Cao, whose background was more complex. His foster grandfather was a eunuch and the emperor's reader-in-waiting. But Cao Cao himself received the nomination of xiaolian. In the early stages of his career he went along with the bureaucrats and established a reputation for being capable. he built up his army from Yellow Turbans who had surrendered, and fed them with the produce from his own military farms. His declared aim of restoring the Han

central authority was one of the most controversial issues of the period. Cao Cao emerged victorious from the battle of Guandu, but the Han dynasty was not revived. Until the reappearance of a unified empire with the rise of the Sui dynasty in the late sixth century, China was going to witness many short-lived dynasties and the invasions of the barbarians. Chinese historians regard the disappearance of a unified empire from the fall of the Han in 220 to the rise of the Sui in 581 as a long period of forlorn hope and endless chaos. In certain parts of China depopulation occur. Without a central authority to handle relief, one could imagine the miseries when large-scale natural disasters struck wide areas. Although warfare was incessant in these centuries, large-scale engagements and decisive battles did not occur very often. Gentry influence, which had diffused the rural power during the Later Han period, also made general mobilization difficult if not altogether impossible. The record show that in the period of disunity armies were often made up of hired mercenaries. The presence of non-Chinese elements added to the complexity. Referred to by traditional Chinese historians as the 'five barbarians,' they were Tibetan and Altaic-speaking peoples, the latter including proto-Mongolians and early Turkic war bands. Along with a handful of Chinese adventurers, these several ethnic groups established sixteen kingdoms in north China from 304 to 439. In the last phase of this era, the Sinicized barbarian states in the north and the 'exiled' Chinese dynasties in the south fought seesaw battles that went nowhere. Trade relationships were established and envoys were exchanged. Cao Cao tried to establish a central authority but failed. He succeeded within the territory marked as the Wei. Then later on, in 263 Wei quickly annexed southwest kingdom of Shu Han. Then Jin China became unified under Jin. The reason for the continuing chaos maybe due to the traditional emphasis on jianbin, or the gentry's annexation of the small plots of the self-cultivators. Land tenure indeed had been a serious matter throughout. More than social justice, the pool of small taxpayers had provided the simplicity and homogeneity essential to bureaucratic management for rural areas. When the Han court promoted filial piety and incorruptibleness as guiding principles for its governance, clearly it derived its strength from cultural cohesion instead of managerial complexity. Such an organization could be subverted by landlordism. The Wei declared that it wished to recruit men of managerial ability to participate in its government, regardless of their virtue. The Jin tried to limit landholding for individual households. Both attempted to free themselves from the clutches of the local gentry, who, no matter who they were, usually had a claim for righteousness. Neither dynasty had much success. As the disorder became endemic, rural communities organized self-defence forces and erected fortifications under local gentry leadership -- a practice whose origins trace back to the second century CE and the rise of the Yellow Turbans. In the fourth century this phenomenon had become widespread in north China. In the late fourth century, the territory west of the Yellow River was said to be dotted with 3,000 of such autonomous self-defence units. A league of these units might boast a membership of as many as 100,000 households. As a rule an overlord was elected by the leaders of the subdivisions. The powerful local clans who assumed leadership roles within the selfgoverning units supplied elite troops and created an atmosphere of aristocratic presence. Had this trend been allowed to continue, a new form of feudalism might have taken root in China, or at least Chinese history in the later centuries would have paralleled that of medieval Japan. But mobile warfare over a large region, which favoured huge bodies of fighting men, settled the course in a different fashion. This brought China to a low point in the fourth and fifth centuries. An imperial system emphasizing universal self-restraint and mutual deference had come to a dead-end. As an alternative solution, local autonomy based on property holding might have transformed gentry landlordism to manorialism (see: http://web.nickshanks.com/history/medieval/manor). Neither was the second choice allowed to become reality.

Sui Dynasty, 581-618, warrior era Area - 612 est. 4,100,000 km2
Population 609 est. est. 46,019,956 (2)

The Tabas were a prominent clan of the Xianbei people who played an important role in China's unification. Scholars are not entirely certain about their ethnic composition or origin. They seem to have spoken a pre-Turkic language, but there were also pre-Mongol and pre-Tungusic words in it. According to Chinese historians, when the Tabas arrived on China's northern frontier in the late third century, the tribe has just evolved from a primitive communal society. It still had no housing, no written language, and no law code. And probably nor did they, before the tribesmen made contact with Chinese traders, possess any private property. In the second century the Tabas and other Xianbei groups had started their migration from Manchuria. In the early fourth century they boasted that they were able to put 200,000 archers into combat. Their population seemed to be only about 600,000. In 310 agreement, Chinese authorized the Tabas to settle in today's Shanxi. This marked the first time that the tribe had an agricultural base. It was only after the failure of the Tibetan attempt to overrun the south in 383 (Tabas were under the Tibetans that time), that the Tabas reasserted their independence. In 386 their leader, Taba Gui, proclaimed himself the King of Dai, later redesigned as Wei. This is one of the many early Zhou states that the rising dynasties a millennium later chose to name themselves after, mainly for occupying the same geographical areas. Some are even duplicated. Following traditional Chinese historians, we will refer to the state under discussion as the Northern Wei or Taba Wei. In the capital district the Tabas organized themselves into eight departments to supervise the agricultural workers, the farm units being state owned and state operated. From the incidents one can see that if the agricultural workers had started out as state serfs, they gradually became independent self-cultivators. Some of the Tabas who had been sent to supervise them might have made themselves large landowners; but they did not divide the bulk of the estates or turn the majority of the population into their tenants. It was the ability to tax the agricultural population directly that enabled the Northern Wei to extend its control over a large area. At first it dispatched army officers to register the newly absorbed population. In 426 it was decreed that all taxation matters were to be handled by the civil government. Numerous commissions and agents were abolished. This could not have been attempted unless obstructions in the middle echelons, such as clan and gentry influences inside the Chinese population and the skeletal tribal structure remaining among the non-Chinese elements, had been neutralized. The annals of the Northern Wei of the early fifth century are crowded with entries noting local leaders surrendering with the populations under their control, typical examples being 5,000 households in one case and 3,000 in another. Apparently the tendency toward local autonomy that had been developing since the Later Han had finally been broken. Wherever the Tabas did not conquer they cold apply pressure to win over. The fact that their dynasty was able to shield the northern frontier against a new menace, that of the Avars, and was ready to distribute relief in time of famine must have enhanced their influence. But the initial decision to create a logistical base with farm labour under their own exclusive control, cruel but ingenious, was the pivotal factor. Owing to their primitive simplicity and lack of prior commitment, the invaders from the steppe land were more suited to performing this task; it took time, however, for them to become acquainted with the agrarian milieu and things Chinese. Before its own demise in the sixth century, the Northern Wei managed to register some five million tax-paying households consisting of no less than twenty-five million persons. This was an extraordinary achievement, especially during the time of turbulence. The most important legislations of this alien dynasty were proclaimed in the late fifth century. A

salary schedule for all bureaucrats was announced in 484, implying that before that date governmental finance was still geared to decentralization. Taxation took the household as an accounting unit. Households were classified into nine grades ranging from the upper-upper to the lower-lower. The new announcement marked an effort at tightening up the operation. A year later the decree on the Equalization of Land Utilization (juntian) was proclaimed. It took the position that all land belonged to the emperor; individuals derived the right to use it at the sovereign's pleasure. All this was to ensure the planting of staple crops, and all reverted to the government upon the death or retirement of the grantee. The statute stands as a milestone in Chinese history. With only numerical adjustments and revisions, this juntian edict of 485 was later copied by all succession dynasties and through them passed on to the unified empires of the Sui and Tang; it remained in force as an institutional arrangement until the late eight century, a period of close to 300 years. Similarly, the Northern Wei taxation and militia system was also a prototype for institutions of later dynasties. The primary purpose of creating an infrastructure on the basis of a large pool of self-cultivators to pay taxes and to answer the call for military service, it was an outstanding success. Unlike the paper schemes of Wang Mang's reforms, it was pushed through by a nascent military power during a time when restitution and rehabilitation were looked forward to by all quarters as a deliverance. In practise, the proclamation of 485 never took the position that an entitlement was a guarantee. it included and 'escape clause' that in those districts where land was insufficient for allocation the acreage allowance could be lessened, or the unsatisfied peasants could apply for resettlement in other regions. The nationalization of agricultural land provided a legal basis for the bureaucrats to apply maximum effort toward implementing the sweeping reform, State ownership was not seen as a primary aim in itself. (Note. Only outsiders could carry such sweeping reforms as to reallocate rich landowners land. A true revolution of the warrior class over merchant class). Another measure the Taba state of Northern Wei implemented to break the local clan influence was to initiate a communal organization of its own. The degree 486 called for every five taxpaying households to form a neighbourhood, every five neighbourhoods to form a village, end every five villages to form a communal association. Leaders in charge of those units were appointed by the local officials. In this way the government maintained a channel of command to reach the general populace. Clearly enough, the enactments on communal organization, taxation, and land tenure were interlinked. Their combined effect restructured an empire, conceptually, from the bottom up. Of course, bureaucratic management of agrarian masses was an indigenous device. It could not have been invented by the nomads. The enormous gap between the two modes of life helps explain why the Tabas took so long before they mastered the technique of managing their Sinicized empire. When the proclamation of 486 took effect, it was exactly 100 years since Taba Gui had made himself the King of Dai. The establishment of an imperial university at Datong and the sacrifice to Confucius by the Northern Wei had also been on the record for several decades. By this time, against a background of intermarriages, the imperial family itself had become more Chinese than Xianbei. For the major reforms in the 480s, the most vital decisions were made by a Chinese woman who has come down in history as Empress Dowager Wenming, nee' Feng, the titular grandmother of the reigning emperor. It was only after the empress dowager's death in 489 that the emperor took over the reins of the government. But once in control, Taba Hong further amazed his contemporaries and later historians alike by an enthusiasm for Sinicization that knew no bounds. In 494 the imperial capital was moved from Datong to Loyang, a city that had to be reconstructed from ruins. The Xianbei costume was proscribed. Next came the prohibition of the use of the Xianbei language. Intermarriage always pleased the sovereign. It was precisely their avoidance of instant ascendancy and quick profit that had enabled them to escape the fate of the Tibetan leadership and of the sixteen transit kingdoms, the last four of which their state absorbed. Empress Dowager Wenming's and her advisor Li Chong's reforms became feasible because of the broader preparations that went before. After emperors death the kingdom split into two. The bulk of the agricultural resources and the peasant manpower could be mobilized to sustain an imperial drive. What was lacking was a disciplined bureaucracy, or

a similar homogenous body on the top not spoiled by vested interests. The split of 534 occurred when a Northern Wei emperor, afraid of the army officers who could dethrone and execute him, fled to Xi'an to seek protection from another general, only to be murdered by this man. With this the Taba state in fact ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the military men in the east and the west each competed to install his own puppet emperor. The Eastern Wei lasted sixteen years and the Western Wei twenty-three years. Both were mixed Xianbei and Chinese blood. While all this was going on, the Taba taxation and household registration system was beginning to pay off, With it, universal conscription could be put into effect. There was a competition for general mobilization. Both the non-Chinese nobility, who claimed their hereditary privilege on the strength of their tribal affiliation, and the large Chinese households, who built up their local influence by extending a protective umbrella over the general population, had lost their commanding position and with it their ability to tip the balance. The tension between these two groups had been largely responsible for China's disunity over three and a half centuries. When their power diminished, the reintroduction of imperial management was not far off. With the entire stretch of history of the Taba state in view, we can also see a definite pattern in the making, On the road to reunification the driving force started from the north to reach the south, and subsequently from the west to absorb the east, or as a whole from the inland sector and economically less developed areas to absorb the regions more accessible to water transport and laden with more internal complexities. The requirement of homogeneity and broadness in organization enabled the Xianbei people to assume the leadership role. Once they relocated their capital at Loyang, however, they also constructed fancy gardens and tall buildings. Yuan Hong's Sinification program clearly damaged the organizational simplicity which the Taba leadership still needed. The endless palace coups and plots that dominated several decades of the mid-sixth century, therefore, allowed the divergent elements at the top to purge and purify themselves. Now on the road to reunification, a considerably integrated countryside demanded a streamlined government at the top to deliver an imperial rule of substance. The man who read the message correctly was Yang Jian, Duke of Sui and later founder of the Sui dynasty. Yang inherited his father's position as a leading military commander serving under the Northern Zhou dynasty. The fact remains that before he proclaimed his Sui dynasty in 581, fiftynine Yuwen princess had met violent deaths. Truly Machiavellian, Yang Jian could weep in front of his retinue when he was shown the coarse food of the people. His bureaucrats wore cloth robes. An early practitioner of 'sting operations,' he let his undercover agents offer his officials bribes and sentenced to death those who yielded to the temptation. The founder of the Sui has been sufficiently praised and condemned by historians in the past. His type of cruelty and his moral tone being nothing new to us, we pick up the pieces of information here merely to show how far China had to go to create a disciplined bureaucracy at the rebirth of an empire. Only by understanding this background can we appreciate the fact that once the groundwork was laid, military operations that accomplished the reunification itself were relatively simple matters. A civil service familiar with rural affairs provided the best personnel procurement program and commissary supplies that a peasant army could ask for. Reunification was achieved in 589.

Tang Dynasty, 618-906, intellectual era, Xi'an

Area - 663 est. 11,000,000 km2 - 715 est. 5,400,000 km2 866 est. 3,700,000 km2 Population - 7th century est. 50,000,000

- 9th century est. 80,000,000 (2) The early Tang dynasty in the seventh century marked the most splendid and satisfying period in the history of China's imperial era. Confidence continued to build as the nation increased its prestige abroad and brought its domestic institutions to near perfection by the standard of the day. It was the period of system making. The juntian, or the organization of land utilization introduced by the Taba Wei, was renewed. Nationalization of agricultural land therefore remained in force. Under the Tang every able-bodied male was eligible to receive 100 mu of land. A census was taken every three years. With the acreage allocation came a streamlined taxation system. The rates appeared to be remarkably low. Because of these provisions the population registration continued expanding for over a century. The increased receivables at the state granaries and warehouses contributed to the era of good feelings. Conscription coalesced with the population registration. A selective service provided soldiery for the militia. The Xiongnu and Avars who had long troubled China's northern frontier were gone. In 630 a Tang general inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turks. The Tibetans were pacified when the Chinese Princess Wencheng was married to their king. The central government of the Tang was organized into six departments: personnel, revenue, rites, defence, justice, and public works. Its division of labour it was characterized by method and order. A major departure from the administration of the Han was that the government from the Sui onward, which hereafter we shall characterize as 'the Second Empire,' assigned local officials to the lower echelons. The recommendation system was discontinued. The Sui began to conduct civil service examinations open to all candidates. The Tang followed the practice. A social impact of the open-examination system was the breaking of the domination of governmental offices by the powerful clans. The standard literature requirement in preparation for the examinations probably helped stimulate the invention of block printing in about 600 CE. An unhappy consequence, however, was the tightening of the bureaucratic grip on Chinese life. The Tang had 18,805 positions within its civil service proper. The governmental payroll, to include local auxiliaries, clerical assistants, and army officers, carried 368,668 salary recipients-- an alarming figure in the Middle Ages when China's total population was perhaps approximately 50 million. The early Tang continued the internal expansion of China. The development of the south, stimulated during the period of disunity, continued to absorb the energy of the Second Empire. The short-lived Sui dynasty was noted for its ruthless efforts at canal construction. Sizable cities were abandoned so that the residents could be relocated along the new waterfronts. This relentless drive in public works with no regard for human cost, as well as its unsuccessful campaign in Korea, caused the Sui to fall as quickly as it rose. It was during the Tang that Guangzhou and Quanzhou became important seaports. Inspired by visions of grandeur, the Sui and Tang reconstructed Xi'an as a planned city in a checkerboard pattern. The Tang were cosmopolitan. The imperial Li family claimed a traditional aristocratic Chinese lineage of long standing. But during the period of disunity the ancestors of the Tang emperors served under several alien dynasties and frequently married into families of nonChinese origin. When the prestige of the Chinese empire was high, Indian princess in the Indus valley acknowledged its suzerainty. A usurper in Assam was arrested and delivered to Xi'an for punishment. The Chinese capital was visited by Syrians, Arabs, Persians, Tibetans, and Tonkinese. The imperial university enrolled students from many of those foreign lands. Among the most enthusiastic were the envoys of Japan. Some Japanese cultural attaches of a sort, lived and studied in China for decades. Upon their return to their homeland they played an important role in organizing Japanese state institutions and in so doing made their country culturally a replica of Tang China. From the bronze coinage to women's hairdos, from interior design to the game of go, Japanese culture has ever since borne an ineradicable continental imprint. Korea and Vietnam followed the same pattern with reduced intensity. Religious tolerance came with the high watermark of security and self-confidence of the Tang. When the Buddhist scholar Xuanzhuang returned from India in 645 after an absence from China for sixteen years, he was interviewed by Li Shimin, the second emperor of the dynasty. Enormously

pleased, the sovereign then made available living facilities and the editorial and clerical assistants that the great travelling monk needed to translate the 657 Sanskrit texts that he had brought back. The proselytization of Nestorian Christianity was authorized by an imperial edict dated 638. What happened to this period of splendour and satisfaction? Put in its simplest terms, it may be said that the ideal state did not endure because, gradually, the central leadership became indolent and irresponsible. Palace attendants increased to uncontrollable large numbers. Toward the mid-eight century, musicians and performers alone counted more than 20,000. Palace women were probably twice that number. The bureaucracy not only expanded its membership but also multiplied its pay scale. Emperors and ministers degenerated in character. Practically everything earlier described was now reversed. In 751 the Chinese army was defeated in Central Asia by a league of Arabs. Even a Thai state in the southwest forced Tang forces to retreat. The Tibetans revolted. The ninth century saw the further development of warlordism within the frontier commands. Peasant rebellions erupted in the inland provinces. The eunuchs, who had aroused little attention earlier, now wielded power within the capital, enthroning and deposing emperors. At the same time, the growing influence of Buddhist monasteries and their accumulated wealth finally alarmed the state. In the 840s came a series of measures of persecution; an edict of 845 set out to destroy 4,600 temples and forcibly secularize 260,500 monks and nuns. The reversal was complete and thorough. Some historians suggest that the Tang dynasty can be divided into two parts. It seems that An Lushan's rebellion in 755, close to the chronological midpoint, serves as an appropriate dividing line. That would give us a period of grandeur and prosperity, which lasted for 137 years, to be followed by a period of ruin and disorder, which lingered on for 151 years. Among China's prominent monarchs, Li Shimin may have the most personal appeal. In the last years of the Sui, when rebels and bandits took possession of many parts of China, he persuaded his father, Li Yuan, Duke of Tang, to proclaim himself emperor. At that time Shimin was only sixteen years old. From the until he was twenty-four, he mostly fought to secure the dynasty and regain peace. He had compassion and curiosity. He was fearless and tireless. Often he directed battles personally and sometimes appeared in front of his troops with several mounts to negotiate with the enemy commanders. As a political leader he gathered around himself a group of learned men of broad vision. Even though most of the Tang institutions followed the Sui designs, the operating procedures were derived from Li Shimin's management, which covered a reign of twenty-three yeas. Tang institutions reached near perfection by the standard of the times; most of the credits should go to the youthful ruler who was the dynastic founder in all but name. An outstanding feature of the central government of the Tang was the division of labour, which gave the impression of some form of checks and balances. A council of state encompassed the six ministerial departments, which carried most of the work load. A design board initiated edicts, proclamations, and policies of significance. A review board examined state papers, raised questions, and called for inquiries. Together with the Tang practice of dividing the realm of law into four broad departments, i.e., the penal code, administrative statutes, office procedures, and operative bylaws, the organization showed sufficient neatness to fit the regenerated empire. When the Japanese transplanted those institutions to their land, they called the whole system 'government by law' (ritsuryo seiji). These are not of course the kind of checks and balances that we are accustomed to nowadays. No component of the Tang government represented the divergent interests of the constituencies, and therefore an independent judiciary could not have emerged form such a matrix. No matter how enlightened Li Shimin was, is government was perforce a form of absolutism. Only with the discipline of Confucianism did the Son of Heaven create some inner checks within himself. Li's annals disclose that one day, after meeting his courtiers, he returned to his quarters angrily mumbling: 'One of these days I'm going to kill that old farmer!' The empress asked him who he was talking about. It happened to be Wei Zheng, an outspoken adviser who, with the indulgence of the emperor himself, had repeatedly contradicted him in public. On this occasion the empress saved the day by changing into ceremonial robes to congratulate the sovereign for having so devoted a

counsellor who was willing to risk his life to give him loyalty. The episode nevertheless indicated that the rationality of the Tang institutions had a narrow base. More personal than institutional, it basically represented the will of the emperor. Yet it was not that the Chinese were by nature averse to representative government. We have already noted that the Han had tried through its recommendation system, to spread its recruitment of officials to wide geographical regions. Government by virtue always implies a form of despotism. All this underlies the notion that morality is an absolute quality, indivisible and nonnegotiable, and its highest personification in office tolerates no competition. This rigid rule was to be tested more than once during the Tang. After consolidating the power of appointment, the Tang increased the volume of office activities. But as a rule the paperwork became a formality. Without parallel civil components that would provide the extra sinews, bureaucratic management of the Chinese type functioned on the strength of the code of honour of officialdom. Frequently at the top, on the other hand the administrative apparatus tended to remain perfunctory and nominal. In order to keep the system operative at all, pressure had to be exerted from the very top all the way downward. As Tang writers themselves suggested, the dynasty had no better ways to administer the empire than applying the penal code and using its power of appointment. Even in Wu Zetian's (674-695) time, fraud and deceit among government officials must have been widespread. In sum, despotism did not come by choice. The tragedy of China was that the unification of an enormous empire was realized before local institutions and technological capacities had an opportunity to develop and mature. The lack of functional capability at the middle echelon deprived the government of an effective grip, for which despotic rulers had to compensate with their personal vigilance. Empress Wu's revolution may be less than a revolution from our present-day point of view, as, it did not really alter the working of the traditional Chinese state. Yet it remained a solid reform, substantial enough to be remembered by the coming generations. Her purge of the Tang princes and veteran courtiers eliminated the aristocratic influence that was about to overshadow the imperial court. If she did not change the structure of government, she added vitality to it. By lining up sufficient numbers of young and competent officials to service her new regime, she gave the bureaucracy new life. A recurring paradox that troubled many dynasties of China surfaced at the mid-point of the Tang. Having fostered rehabilitation and recovery of the empire from war-torn conditions, the dynasty found it difficult to live with the prosperity created by its own power. This awkwardness was amplified under the Tang. Since its rural population had been organized according to neat formula, the structural simplicity at the beginning allowed the management plenty of freedom of action. Once the complexities set in, the organizational discrepancy was more difficult to rectify at a time when bureaucratic management was increasingly stylized. Traditional historians blamed the high living of the imperial court. After the An Lushan rebellion during the mid-point of the dynasty, regional autonomy in various degrees over the next one and a half centuries prevailed. This, however, was not a repetition of the period of disunity prior to the founding of the Second Empire. Powerful clans played no part in this later era. In general, military men were in command. Whoever had the taxation power controlled the territory. In the ninth century large-scale internal rebellions arose, culminating in the case of Huang Chao. Much talked about, much of his life still a mystery. He had been engaged in the salt trade or perhaps a peddler or smuggler, but the other asserts that his family had been in the business for generations and was quite wealthy. It was sometime after 875 in response to the rise of another rebel leader that Huang took up arms and thenceforth gained notice. It seems that the disintegration of central leadership and the lack of coordination among the provincial authorities enabled him to maintain his drive even after several setbacks. From central China he turned toward the south-eastern coast, gathering brigands followers along the way and converting government troops to his cause, which can be summarized as the termination of

official inefficiency and corruption. An Arabic source says that in Guangzhou Huang's followers slew 120,000 Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Persians (eliminated foreign traders). In the summer of 884 the rebel leader was beheaded in today's Shandong province to end the great disturbance. Nevertheless his feat cannot be dismissed as banditry on a colossal scale. It reveals that although imperial China still had plenty of organizational discipline, what it lacked was a workable organizational logic to put things in order. The infrastructure of the Tang dynasty had far outgrown its original blueprint. It now required a different kind of overarching authority. While Huang did not pull down the dynasty, it collapsed in the wake of his rebellion. With increasingly less revenue being delivered by the provinces the imperial court only hung on for another two decades. In 904 Zhu Quanchong, a former commander in Huang Chao's forces who had switched his allegiance to serve the dynasty, now ordered the hapless emperor to pack and go with him to Loyang, an area over which the warlord Zhu had firm control. This act was only one step removed from outright usurpation, and indeed Zhu did just that two years later when he formally terminated the dynasty of Li Yuan and Li Shimin. Nor after 906 was Xi'an ever again to be imperial capital. As China approached the present millennium, it became increasingly clear that the national capital had to be serviced closely by areas from which economic benefits were derived. The center of gravity had shifted to the east. The southeast was attractive for its fertile soil and excellent waterways.

Northern Song Dynasty, Kaifeng, 960-1126, acquisitor era

Area -- 962 est. 1,050,000 km2 1111 est. 2,800,000 km2 1142 est. 2,000,000 km2 Population - 1120 est. 118,800,000 (2) With the rise of the Song in 960, China seemed to enter the modern era with a materialistic culture in evidence. The circulation of money became more widespread. The use of gun powder, the flame thrower, compass navigation, the astronomical clock, the blast furnace, water power in spinning, and bulkheads and watertight compartments in shipbuilding emerged with the Song. During the first two centuries of the millennium, the standard of living in prominent Chinese cities must have compared favourably with that of any other city in the world. The founder of the Song dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin, was an army officer. He made no efforts to redistribute agricultural land; nor did he design a universal conscription program. The Song was the only major dynasty in Chinese history to rely on recruited soldiers to fill out army ranks. Immediately after his accession, Zhao Kuangyin built an artificial lake in the southern suburbs of Kaifeng.- the city that was to become the site of the imperial capital of the Song but that of no other major dynasty. Instead of giving lectures and attending Confucian seminars, the sovereign often visited the lake to watch naval and marine exercises and inspected the nearby dockyards, where warships were built. Aware of the fact that military sinew had to be backed up by economic strength, Zhao was determined to accumulate two million of silk fabrics in his warehouses as financial reserves in dealing with the semi-Sinicized states on the northern frontier. The shifting of administrative emphasis from orthodox abstractions to reality, from a preoccupation with agriculture to new interests in commerce, and from passive to dynamic management, gave the Song a new image, which in many respects marked a breaking away from the doldrums of traditional China. This new trend was also confirmed by governmental organizations. To maintain outward continuity, the Song revived virtually all the departments and bureaus of the Tang. But it also created new agencies, which, more functional flexibility, could bypass or work in tandem with the old agencies. Among them the most prominent were the Privy Council and the Financial Commission. Their institution made it clear that the new dynasty intended to govern with physical

power instead of some ritualistic approximation of it. When the throne was at least partially freed from moral pretensions, it was able to become more humanistic. The dynastic founder made a vow never to apply the death penalty to those who disagreed with him. To prevent the issue of succession from becoming a focus of contention, Zhao Kuangyin arranged beforehand that he would be succeeded by his younger brother Kuangyi, and this way he distanced himself admirably from the example set by Li Shimin some 350 years earlier. These efforts produced mixed results. In the area of the national economy, the Song witnessed the most spectacular expansion ever in Chinese history. Cities thrived. Inland waterways were filled with traffic. Ship construction progressed. Both domestic and foreign trade reached unprecedented heights. The use of metal coins expanded beyond any preceding period and was not to be surpassed by the succeeding dynasties. Owing to public interest, mining and smelting received a new impetus; so did the distillery and textile industries. In the area of the operation of the government, most obvious was that the atrocities that Zhao Kuangyin was determined to avoid were on the whole avoided; even palace intrigues were reduced in scale and intensity. After sustaining economic growth for more than 300 years, the Song could not go down in history as not having made an outstanding contribution to China's well-being. But within its duration factional quarrels among civil officials worsened. This time, however, the controversy did not follow the traditional pattern. Governmental policies were debated as matter of public concern, and genuine disagreements were the result. Only after the contention had reached a deadlock did opportunists rush in to reap personal benefits from the impasse, thus giving the disputation bad publicity and bringing worse consequences. There were other ironies. While founder Zhao Kuangyin showed so little interest in ideology, during the Song new schools of thougth, inevitably closely related to political philosophy, emerged stronger than ever. From the very beginning the dynasty's rulers and statesmen decided to take a more realistic approach to military affairs, foreign relations, and financial management. In the end it was in those areas that the Song fared the worst. These paradoxes can only be fully understood with the benefit of modern hindsight. The case of the Song enables us to see what happens when a country that has strong bearings on the Asian continental land mass attempts to govern itself with techniques of monetary management before the society itself is ready for it. In the previous chapter we noted that the Tang dynasty collapsed not because of moral decay, or entirely owing to a lack of discipline, but because the earlier structural arrangement of the empire had been overtaken by events while the stylized administration of the bureaucracy could not adjust to the change. Toward the end of the dynasty, decentralization ushered in warlordism. A military governor could carve out a territory as vast as a province and remain virtually autonomous. When he had to personally lead a campaign, he would appoint a deputy to oversee his government seat and thus keep the powerbase intact. In time his position became hereditary, as did those of his subordinates. Within his domain, army officers took over tax collection, imposing new levies and fixing rates on the old ones. When Zhu Quanchong seized the imperial throne in 907 it did not cause a stir because by then the dynasty of Li Yuan and Li Shimin, after being in existence for 288 years, had long since forfeited its raison d'etre. Yet, Zhu Quanchong couldn't pick up the pieces either. For fifty-four years from 906 to 960, China fell into a period that historians refer to as the 'Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. As if to reverse the order of the period of prolonged disunity preceding the Sui and Tang, this time five transient dynasties replaced one another in the north, while, with only one exception, ten simultaneous and overlapping kingdoms appeared in the south. In its simplest terms, while the dynasties tried one after another to establish a universal order but fell short of the goal, the military governors in the south took advantage of the situation to proclaim themselves independent. The fact that the entire period of disunity lasted for only fifty-four years indicates that the remnants left by the Tang were not beyond salvaging. China remained basically a nation of small selfcultivators. This was no longer such a situation that public finance could be managed from the center by any conceptual scheme, or that local clans could extend their control over small areas to

form pockets of autonomy. Warlordism was in fact history's answer for such a particular situation. As it developed, a regional lord could, with what legitimacy he claimed, impose universal conscription over his territory. In reality few soldiers were drafted from the population. Instead, mercenaries were recruited. The expenses, however, were borne by the public. In this way tax assessment was pushed to the highest point in many districts, as the local gazetteers attest. But the positive side was that when it was handled by hereditary lords who had a vested interest in the locales, more likely consideration was given to each individual's ability to pay, which a universal system imposed from the top would have ignored. Another technique developed by these territorial lords during the interregnum was the constant transfer of the officers and men among the battle formations. The best personnel were absorbed by the center to form an elite corps, the subordinate contingents having to be content with inferior supplies and manpower. The senior commanders were taken by the lords as sworn brothers or adopted sons. With this arrangement, an interlink was established between the authority on the top and the governed below. China during the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms showed a certain semblance to medieval Japan. Was this state of affairs undesirable? Traditional historians inevitably deplored the absence of a respectable authority during the period, when 'criminal, bandits, and peddlers were crowned in assumed pomp,' and men of character and fortitude had little chance. The high tax rates were often bemoaned. What those writers failed to recognized was that with the government's center of gravity shifting down to the provincial level, the governance was more responsive to the local situation. Financially, the omission of a two-tier government also provided considerable savings. The benefit was more likely to be felt by the whole area south of the Yangtze river, where a period of relative peace reigned. Efforts at promoting regional economy, such as by the Ma family in Hunan, who made native tea available for export; and the Wang family in Fujian, who encouraged foreign trade, could hardly be equalled by a centralized bureaucratic management whose attention was inevitably occupied by the least advanced sectors of the economy in order to ease the internal tension. In the spring of 960, Zhao Kuangyin was the commanding general of the imperial forces of the last short-lived dynasty within the interim period, which also confusingly designated as the Zhou. The army encamped near Kaifeng, the Zhou capital. The next day before dawn Zhao was awakened by his officers and men, who put a yellow robe on his shoulders and made him emperor. Such coups had occurred before during the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. Zhao Kuangyin, however, stands out in all annals of history for his effort to consolidate an uncoordinated movement that had been worked out by provincial strongmen ever since the decline of the Tang. In the end he turned it into centralized bureaucratic management. No other Chinese dynasty arose under similar circumstances. When Zhao's army command returned to Kaifeng, the takeover from the Zhou was acted upon with ease. The original scheme to eliminate the alien groups in the north was shelved; the new dynastic founder realized that a divided China was in no position to challenge its northern adversaries. For the rest of his life, Zhao Kuangyin concentrated on annexing the southern states that still remained autonomous. But in the areas which Zhao Kuangyin could lay his hands on, the policy of centralization was worked out with swiftness and firm resolve. The emperor's tact, moderation, and generosity in pecuniary matters facilitated his skilful manoeuvring. Only a year and a half after his accession, Zhao personally negotiated an arrangement with several of the generals in command of his elite troops who had engineered the plot to enthrone him whereby they would voluntarily request retirement; the emperor promised them in return pensions and honorary posts. The potential danger of kingmakers around the throne was thereby removed. Tax collection within the territories was taken over by the bureaucrats. Ledgers and receipts were scrutinized with meticulous care. For the transferring of revenue, which always involved large quantities of moveable goods, the empire was divided into six fiscal districts. Yet, even with such preparations, the Song goes down in history as a weak dynasty. Its battle

banners were never hoisted over the northern steppes, not to say Manchuria to the east of Central Asia to the west. In 1067 Zhao Xu became the emperor. At eighteen, this sovereign had already established a reputation for his diligence and devotion to state affairs. His driving ambition was to wipe out the humiliations that the dynasty had suffered from the two peripheral states in the north, aiming at nothing less than a recovery of the territories that were considered to be a part of China. Zhao Xu believed that the empire's financial resources could be mobilized to attain this goal. When he and Wang Anshi, a literati-official who had achieved a reputation for being talented but unorthodox, met to settle the issue of the first priority, their shared purpose drew them together. The new package of Wang Anshi's reform program was referred to as the 'New Policies,' One of his innovations was the Green Crop Money, by which the government loaned to the peasants in the planting season. The return of the loan after the autumn harvest carried a 20 percent interest. Another program had to do with the commutation of service. The Song local government enlisted the service of a number of office attendants, including runners, scribes, jailers, etc. Hitherto those positions were unpaid; people were drafted from the general population, which shared the expenses. Wang ordered that a new tax be collected to pay for these jobs. Goods stored in government warehouses, sitting idle, were unproductive. Under Wang's direction they were made available to merchants on credit; interest was charged when the account was settled. In the interim, precious metals and real estate could be used as collateral. In a similar manner the transportation intendants who carried native merchandise to the capital as tax proceeds could dispose of the cargo en route to make profit, replacing it with other commodities that had more resale value at Kaifeng. To restructure the land taxes, Wang Anshi planned to conduct a sweeping land survey in which taxable land was to be gridded into squares of 5,000 feet on each side. Within each unit soil productivity was classified into five grades, on which differentiated tax rates were assessed accordingly. From the very beginning the New Policies met strong bureaucratic opposition. None of Wang's programs produced tangible results. The reformer himself was dismissed, recalled, and dismissed again. Zhao Xu was succeeded by his son Zhao Xi. In 1093, when he was seventeen, made another reversal. He revived the New Policies and banished the anti-reform group. The reputation of Wang Anshi rose and fell with the policy fluctuations. His reputation reached its zenith in 1104: an imperial decree made him the Third Sage, allowing him a place inferior only to Confucius and Mencius in the Confucian temple. When the Wang Anshi episode is considered now, we are amazed by the fact that some 900 years before our time, China had already made the first attempt to institutionalize the monetary management of state affairs, in a scope and degree unheard of anywhere else in the world. When Wang Anshi told Emperor Zhao Xu that state income could be widened without tax increases, he apparently understood that the advance of capital could stimulate production, and the greater productivity would in turn generate more public revenue. This expansionist view differed from the traditional economic perspective, which saw everything as a fixed quantity.

Southern Song, Hangzhou, 1127-1279, acquisitor era continues

When the Grand Canal was constructed in Sui dynasty, the city became its southern terminus. Unlike Kaifeng, the Northern Song capital, which remained more or less a consumers' market, with government functionaries and their associates providing most of the purchasing power, Hangzhou, the capital of the Southern Song, became a major manufacturing center. Shipbuilding, silk production, and porcelain- and paper-making increased dramatically in this city during the Southern Song. Zhao Kuangyin arose in 960 when a central authority, with taxation in the hands of army personnel in the field, maintained an interlink between the superstructure of the state and its infrastructure. The concentration of power in the capital of Kaifeng gradually modified this and caused the

interlink to vanish. The financial resources, although enormously large, could not be adequately organized and serviced. This institutional flaw, which was fundamental, outweighed the many blunders and moments of indecision in the 319-year duration of the dynasty. The theory of 'commercial revolution' and even a 'renaissance' arising during the Song, at first advanced by a few Japanese scholars and later picked up by Chinese and Western students of Chinese history, deserves a closer look. Often cited in the current literature about the Song is that in the year 1021 the state income reached 150 million units. According to the contemporary conversion ratio, this sum would have had a value of 15 to 18 million ounces of gold. Restated in current value, this would be about 6 to 7 billion dollars. Nowhere else in the world was wealth circulated in such a prodigious sum. As we move into the history of the early modern era, instead of 'key economic areas', we now become aware that China is divided more by latitude into several major sections. There is a belt of pastoral land in the far north. Contiguous with it in north China is an agricultural zone noted for its relative simplicity. In contrast, the south, the region of rice and tea and water transport, was an area of complexity even before the industrial era. 'Flying money' was originally authorized by the government as a draft that permitted merchants who sold commodities in Sichuan to receive payments elsewhere, thus to save them the burden of carrying the native currency of iron cash. During the Northern Song, the negotiable notes were printed in quantity for the first time in 1024. After extensive circulation, the paper currency was printed intermittently. Like government bonds, each issue had a maturity date, usually three years, at which time it was retired. The Southern Song pledged the proceeds from its inland customs houses against its issue. In 1247, money was issued for permanent circulation, not to be redeemed. Without adequate security in its backing, its value dropped precipitously. The inflationary influence distressed the public and made the government's own position more difficult. It must be considered as a contributing factor to the dynasty's decline and fall. The Song dynasty was a period of technological innovation. Movable type in printing was first mentioned in the records in 1086. The astronomical clock at Kaifeng was installed between 1088 and 1092. The use of compass for navigation was mentioned in a book with a preface dated 1119. Song ocean-going junks carried four to six masts and had as many as twelve sails and four decks. As for armaments, a flame thrower operated by a pump came into existence before 1044. The first paddle-wheel warships with rams were commissioned by a brigand leader by the name of Yang Tai. Catapults launching explosive grenades appeared in 1161. The inability of the Song national economy to lead the way to social reconstruction cannot be discounted as a major reason for the lack of systematic follow-up. In the experience of Western Europe, such a breakthrough came at a moment when the influence of commerce outweighed that of agricultural production by some margin. China in the early modern era did not come close to this jumping-of point. Commerce, even though large in volume by world standards, was spread thin over the mass of peasants. Military operations, moving inward from the peripheral areas, became a contest for control over agricultural land and agrarian populations, which put a premium on quantity over quality, on homogeneity over diversity, on endurance over ephemeral flashes of brilliance. These conditions worked against further efforts to widen the uses of inventions. The large number of small self-cultivators continued to keep China bound to its traditional character--a fact that was clearly revealed during the debate over Wang Anshi's reforms. The smallscale production kept farm wages at a very low level. The incessant warfare, which created large numbers of displaced persons, some of whom became indentured labourers, did not help the situation. The last important prime minister of the Southern Song was Jia Sidao. In the last years of the dynasty the supply problem worsened, as both currency inflation and tax increases reached their limits. Jia's last resort was the government purchase of private land, one-third the amount in excess of 200 or 300 mu within each household. The order was put into effect in six prefectures in the Yangtze Delta, where the concentration of ownership was exceptional for the empire, and where the Hangzhou government still maintained effective control. The purchase, paid with miscellaneous

notes along with some cash, was perhaps little more than commandeering. It seems that the income from the land shored up the dynasty for at least a dozen years.

Yuan Dynasty, 1271-1368, warrior era, second complete turn. Khubilai khan only removed the
previous administration but was not able to create a truly functional new warrior administration. In this respect Yuan Dynasty can be seen as a transitional period only. Population - 1290 est. 75,306,000 - 1293 est. 79,816,000 - 1330 est. 84,873,000 - 1351 est. 87,587,000 (2) Khubilai Khan was apparently a leader of great intelligence with and alert mind. Obsessed with conquering, he nevertheless maintained a genuine desire to see the basic wants of all men and women under his reign satisfied. He regarded religion more or less as a utility: faith could provide the cohesive power to consolidate his empire of the subversive influence to wreck it. Clannish cohesion and the rugged character of cattlemen provided the Mongol's fighting forces with excellent soldiery. Cavalry tactics for large battle formations had been worked out by the Qidan Liao and the Jurched Jin, but Genghis Khan and his followers added new elements to the war machine that made it irresistible. The troops moved with lighting speed and with discipline. War plans were drawn up ahead of time and adhered to in every detail. Individual soldiers could live on the milk of their mares for days or even weeks. Psychological warfare was broadly employed, from rumours disseminated by refugees who ran ahead of the advancing columns to atrocities and the wanton destruction inflicted on the cities that dared to resist the invaders. Military and technical talent among the subjected was utilized to the most. In 1271 on the advice of his Chinese counsellors he proclaimed the Yuan dynasty. But it was not until eight years later, in 1279, at the final elimination of the Song that he was confirmed as Son of Heaven with no more contention. The Chinese used to say that the Mongols. after conquering the world on horseback, intended also to rule it on horseback. It would be misleading, however, to assume that the descendants of Genghis Khan ignored the problem of administration altogether. Khubilai, for instance, spent a good portion of his life pondering how to manage his sprawling empire. Despite the poor racial relationship described by Marco Polo, Khubilai was tutored to respect Chinese culture. Khubilai was surrounded by a large number of Chinese advisors, many of whom served him for decades. But it is also true that in his later years Khubilai Khan drifted away from his Chinese counsel Several reasons help account for this. After the fall of the Song, Chinese loyalists would not give up. The Mongols were bickering among themselves. The khan had to explain to his close followers that he was making vital decisions on his own and was at no time under undue Chinese influence. The Mongols, few in number and culturally inferior to their Chinese subjects, had no chance to maintain their identity unless they retained their martial spirit and organization; their rough riding was inseparable from their unmannerly living habits. They remained an elite corps in the Yuan army and were expected to deliver the main thrust in most field campaigns. North China, which by then had been under Qidan and Jurchen control for several centuries, featured a mixed population. Although unable to withstand the Mongol cavalry charges, they proved sturdier than the Song southerners. Under the Yuan they were drafted into military service and saw action in the conquest of the Song. Contemporaries referred to them as the 'Han' people, although, they included Koreans and many other ethnic groups. Throughout Kublai Khan's reign no attempt was made to create a Chinese-style literary bureaucracy. He never held a civil service examination. As a rule, top officials in charge of all

governmental departments were Mongols. The sovereign harboured strong misgivings toward Confucian scholars who indulged in abstract polemics. His instructions that officials must familiarize themselves with clerical work underlined his emphasis on paying attention to technical details, a demand that he made on himself as well. This new direction not only characterized Khubilai's reign but was also carried forward by his successors. At a glance, this seems to be a major improvement from the practice of previous dynasties. Also, it was fitting that it was the Mongols that made the change, since their armed conquest had amounted to an undisguised show of force with little attempt at moral justification. China under Mongol rule made further technological advances. Shipbuilding reached its zenith, only to decline in the late fifteenth century under the Ming. Many stone bridges, especially south of the Yangtze, bear inscriptions testifying that they were constructed during the Yuan period. Yuan hydraulic engineers performed the feat of executing the modern Grand Canal, which, connecting Beijing with the region south of the Yangtze, was an artificial waterway running over a summit. Both Marco Polo and Japanese observers were impressed by the fire bombs and projectile grenades used by the Yuan army. Guo Shoujing, astronomer, mathematician, and hydraulic engineer, whom many writers still consider to be the world's foremost scientist of his day, served Khubilai. The alien dynastic founder also authorized the compilation of the Basic Elements of Agriculture and Sericulture, which was to appear in many editions. It was during the Yuan that the two important -cotton and sorghum -- were introduced to China. But Khubilai and his followers failed to create a social atmosphere to sustain this progress. Unwilling to surrender to Confucian supremacy, which from his point of view would inevitably lead to Chinese supremacy, Khubilai Khan was searching for a common spiritual denominator for the people under his rule, who varied not only in racial stock but also in life-style. His embracing of Lamaism showed a clear political motive. In addition to commissioning the Tibetan monk Phags-pa to be 'Imperial Mentor', Khubilai also ordered that the surviving boy Song emperor, who had surrendered with his mother at Hangzhou, be taken to Tibet to study Lamaism. As it was, Phags-pa and Lamaism had no more influence on the Chinese than Confucianism had on the Mongols and Tibetans. But to serve a political purpose it implied theocracy, which would have to do away with the middle-echelon intellectuals altogether. History proves that such a system functions better in a primitive economy, in which both the division of labour and social mobility are severely restrained. These were not the conditions of China in the thirteenth century. To neutralize and dilute the overwhelming Chinese influence, Khubilai sought talent from many quarters. Persians, Uighurs, Kipchaks, and many others -- lumped together by the contemporaries as the Semu, which means 'various kinds' - served in this government. On balance, however, their influence was not great. Several of them being Khubilai's favourites, met violent deaths. We ourselves need to study many similar cases to understand that bureaucratic management of the Chinese type necessitated tolerance toward inefficiency at least to a point in order to accommodate the benevolent tone of governance. Because of the ineffective control in those days, if the platform of magnanimity was abandoned on the top, the excessiveness of the functionaries at the lower level could be appalling. Very likely in their effort to achieve a higher level of efficiency, they had gone beyond the tolerance limit. Their foes could then turn their technical errors into moral offences to claim their lives. After a series of failures, public finances under the Yuan dynasty were never settled Khubilai himself has been showered with compliments by historians for his kindness. In reality, his failure to either institutionalize a system or make sweeping changes handicapped his successors. In macro history, the Mongol period appears as a transition between China's Second and Third Empire. The Yuan carried on the mood of growth and expansion established by the Tang and Song, and it continued the technical advances. Yet it supplied no additional fuel to sustain the drive. When it achieved no breakthrough in governmental finance and, statutorily, set taxation at a lower level, and with its 'agricultural first' policy, it virtually ushered in the general trend of retrenchment of the Third Empire. Nature had offered the hard-riding Mongols an opportunity to subdue the millions of agricultural Chinese working on small plots, But it was beyond their skills and power to organize

the conquered populace for mutual progress without sacrificing the conquerors' own cultural identity. Perhaps the only major decision of Khubilai's successors independent of the dynastic founder's empire-building was the resumption of the civil service examination in 1315. Yet, the purpose was not to create a literary bureaucracy of the Chinese type. During the examinations the Mongols and the Semu were treated as separate classes, and the successful candidates, most of them Chinese, were given minor positions within insignificant offices. Many frustrated literati, finding no adequate outlet for their talent, became playwrights. Eventually Yuan drama, mixing literary expression with colloquialism and state jargon, opened up a new vista in Chinese literature and ushered in a golden age of Chinese theatre.

Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Nanjing and later Beijing, warrior era, then gradual evolution into
intellectual era Area - 1415 6,500,000 km2 Population - 1393 est. 65,000,000 - 1403 est. 66,598,337 1600 est. 160,000,000 1630 est. 192,510,000 (2) Of all the dynastic founders in Chinese history, Zhu Yuanzhang came from the humblest origins. When drought and famine afflicted his home locale in 1344, his parents and an elder brother perished within weeks. Unable to afford coffins, Zhu and another brother buried them hastily with their own hands. The future emperor of the Ming dynasty, then not yet sixteen, turned up as a novice in a Buddhist monastery performing menial work. Not long after, he became a mendicant, begging for food while wandering around the Huai River region. In this way he got in touch with the peasant rebels and secret societies that were to be instruments of dynastic reconstruction. In the last decades of the Mongol period, famine relief was not properly undertaken, public works gathered large numbers of labourers who were poorly treated, and Yuan generals were bickering among themselves - ripe conditions for insurgents to entertain imperial aspirations. Self-taught and a skilful manipulator, Zhu Yuanzhang was able to use his organizational talents to pick up the pieces. With a combination of hard fighting and clever finesse, it took him a dozen years to consolidate the territories of a host of self-made men like himself. Once that was done, his position became unchallengeable, In 1368 his holding in the Yangtze River region were secure enough for him to proclaim the Ming dynasty. The Mongols were dislodged with surprising ease. At the fall of the Yuan dynasty the last Mongol emperor also did something unusual: He escaped death and ritualistic surrender by fleeing to the steppes where his ancestors had come from. Zhu Yuanzhang situated his imperial capital at Nanjing. Previously called Jiankang or Jinling, this is an 'unlucky' national capital. No dynasty that took it as the seat of government managed to remain in existence for long - a jinx that in modern times was not broken by the Taiping rebels or by Chiang Kai-shek. Zhu Yuanzhang left a permanent imprint on Chinese political, economic, and social history whose effect can still be felt nowadays. Centralization of power was the most striking feature of his style of management. We cannot think of another case in world history where such tight control over such a large country was ever exercised by the center. This stringency derived its justification from the failures of previous dynasties. When the Mongols were expelled, the alien dynasty was of course discredited. The laxity of the Song was also under criticism. It was argued that China would never have been subjected to the domination of foreign

minorities if discipline and solidarity had been maintained by the bureaucracy and by the population. Despotism always has its way of finding moral sanction. In the case of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang was his own spokesman. Several pamphlets authored by the dynastic founder spoke of his own cruel and tyrannical rule as his solemn duty under heaven. Certainly, it required more than just discipline to realize his type of centralization. In fact, a reign of terror accomplished most of it. During the thirty years when he was emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang is known to have conducted four waves of political purges, running from 1376 to 1393. The victims were high officials, ranking army officers, ordinary bureaucrats, government students, local landowners, and clan leaders. The proceedings established a pattern. At first the principal offenders were charged with treason and corruption. Justified or not, the investigation extended the scope of the case until accomplices and suspects were rounded up en masse. Affiliation with the accused was proof of guilt. A general moral charge could send the defendant to death. Specialists have estimated that no less than 100,000 persons lost their lives in these trials, and when the dust settled, the emperor also found sufficient charges to send the presiding judges to their deaths. State and society after the bloody inquisition appeared unusual even by Chinese standards. The emperor himself dealt with a large number of officials on matters both significant and trivial. The censorial branch of government was empowered to speak up to challenge policy inadequacies and bureaucratic irregularities and, as circumstances warranted, to remonstrate against the emperor himself. Imperial subjects of the Ming were not allowed to take to the sea. He left a permanent injunction to his descendants against sending expeditions to fifteen states, starting the list with Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. But contact with foreign nations, including limited volumes of trade, was maintained through the tributary relationships and was closely supervised. On the northern frontier the construction of walled barriers was a serious undertaking. Most sections of the Great Wall being visited by tourists these days were built by Zhu Yuanzhang's general Xu Da. For the Mongols and Semu people remaining inside China, the founder of the Ming had a special ruling: They were forbidden from marrying within their own ethnic groups; in other words, they had to take Chinese wives and husbands. The military establishment followed the Yuan pattern. But instead of setting up a caste system based on ethnic division, the Ming divided the population into military and civil registrations. In principle the households under military registration paid fewer taxes or no taxes at all and, where possible, were granted small parcels of public land. At the high point of Zhu Yuanzhang's reign, some 1.7 to 2 million households were placed under military registration. Still more far-reaching in effect were Zhu Yuanzhang's tax plan and his fiscal management. After his purges, it was confirmed that the entire country was packed with small self-cultivators. Minimum rates of taxation were assessed. Office attendants, including messengers and jail keepers, were unpaid; local communities furnished them. A chain of public hostels dotted the empire, each supported by a local community, which provided free food, lodging, and transportation to the next station when the traveller produced his pass. Every county has a ledger of the authorized requisitions; the entire population was organized into platoons and companies to answer calls for service. In 1397, the Ministry of Revenue reported that there were still 14,341 households across the empire that possessed 700 mu of land (about 60 ha) or more. A list of landowners was kept by Zhu Yuanzhang himself. Apparently, while under imperial scrutiny, those households were expected to undertake a substantial portion of the load of governmental maintenance in their communities, thus effecting progressive taxation of a sort. When the system is studied close to 600 years later; we are not so much impressed with its procedural details as we are amazed that such a general scheme could have been put into effect at all. Clearly enough, the dynasty Ming built up by Zhu Yuanzhang had certain utopian features. It seemed more like a huge village community rather than a nation. Centralization was feasible because structurally the organization had been simplified. When a country of millions of square miles was rendered into a compact and homogenous whole, certain administrative controls could

substitute for the complex division of labour and interchangeability of services and goods that normally would have been determined by the works of the national economy. Mere praise or condemnation of Zhu Yuanzhang the man does not even begin to answer the most crucial question here: How could such a grotesque management system be introduced and proved workable, regardless of whether its implementer was the vilest conspirator of the sanest inventive genius? The need for retrenchment and integration also marked a reaction to the policies of the Song, which had attempted to use the criteria of the advanced sector of the national economy to integrate the empire's fiscal resources, which only led to disastrous consequences. At the founding of the Ming, the only major dynasty in Chinese history that owed its origin to peasant rebellions, the adaptation of a primitive economic base as the national standard and the doit-yourself type of service procedures met the requirements of the time. Zhu Yuanzhang was by no means unlettered, being an author of several books on a wide range of subjects. He was also advised by a host of learned men. Intellectually unattractive, his schemes were nevertheless effective at least for the short term. Sacrificing quality for quantity, he united a nation of peasant masses. But the long-term effect of his creation was depressive. It virtually announced to the nation that China, as a large conglomeration of village communities, could be content and happy without the complications of commerce. Not interested in developing service facilities of its own, the dynasty also remained thoroughly apathetic toward diversifying the nation's economy. There was even less for providing a legal apparatus to facilitate diversification. Bureaucratism under the Ming thus appeared to be the most rigid of its kind. The reliance on social values as the basis of governance deepened. That man was superior to woman, the aged superior to the young, the educated elite superior to the illiterate was more than ever held as self-evident as a part of the Natural Law. Their universality strengthened the empire's solidarity. But reliance of cultural cohesion made the Ming empire static. Its timeless and changeless outlook forbade development in any new direction. Toward the end of the dynasty, genuine clashes of interest could not be stated in explicit terms. Power struggles, even arising from disputes that were technical in nature, had to be disguised as moral issues. For some time in the early fifteenth century, all the work of Zhu Yuanzhang seemed to have been undone by Zhu Di, his fourth son. He dispatched an invasion force to Vietnam and personally led five successful expeditions against the Mongols beyond the steppes. Before him no Chinese emperor had ventured so far with such a personal command. It was while he was returning from this fifth expedition that Zhu Di succumbed to illness and died. The construction of Beijing by his orders proceeded for fourteen years. It engaged 100,000 artisans and a million workmen. At present the Imperial City halls and the residential quarters of the Forbidden City are well preserved. With this work the third emperor of the Ming dynasty made 1421 Beijing the national capital. Zhu Di had already reconstructed the Grand Canal, built by the Mongols, widening and deepening the channel and adding watergates to it. While all this was taking place, Zheng He, a eunuch commissioned as an admiral, as repeatedly sailing to the South Seas. The first voyage began in 1405. Sixty-two large ships and 225 small ones participated, with 27,800 men on board. After Zheng He, never again were the expeditions resumed. The personnel were dispersed, the ships laid waste, and the navigation charts burned by a minister of war by the name of Liu Daxia. It seems absurdly frustrating that not much longer than a hundred years after the voluntary suspension of the seafaring enterprise China had to suffer the presence of Japanese pirates on the eastern coast and see Macao taken over by Portugal; at best the nation was not to have any navy worth the name until the late nineteenth century, and even then the purchased ironclads were sunk and towed away by the Japanese in short order. Zhu Di's empire had overextended herself. Empire had been overtaxed nearly to the braking point, and his successors had to make a drastic retreat in order to save the dynasty. Being a shrewd man with a certain charisma, Zhu Di gathered around himself a large company of literati who skilfully graced his annals and polished his formal pronouncements for publication.

But the traces of his misrule were so widespread they could not be covered up. Local gazetteers complained that when the capital was moved to the north, surcharges on tax payments suddenly jumped prodigiously to cover the transportation costs for the 800-mile journey. For merely trying to persuade the emperor to cancel his desert campaign, Xia Yuanji, Zhu Di's minister of revenue for twenty years, was imprisoned for close to three years. A maritime nation becomes a sea power by natural instinct. The enterprise is commercially profitable, and the savings from the exchange of goods lower production costs. The mutual benefit of trade allows specialization in manufacture on both sides, which in turn brings up real wages and stimulates technological inventions. The cost of maintaining a navy is therefore more than compensated for by a general higher standard of living, as the revenue is recycled through the national economy. In contrast the benefit of the Ming voyages was largely one of prestige and ceremony; materially, it only fed into palace consumption. Thus the splendours of Zheng He's voyages were a drain on the nation. When Zhu Yuanzhang was in control, the society was plastic enough for him to institutionalize his austerity program. The principles of rural organization, however, were basically village autonomy and non-interference, and an atmosphere of simplicity and frugality prevailed. The entire civil bureaucracy had fewer than 8,000 positions. Their salary was set at the lowest level even by the Chinese standard because, according to the peasant emperor's theory of governance, a civil servant had literally to be servant. Many of the clerical workers were drafted into service and not paid, and for those who were paid, the salary amounted to no more than food rations for their families. Under imperial direction, each village drew up its own charter patterned after the model set up by central government. In every community two pavilions were erected, one to commend the good deeds of the residents and the other to reprove evil-doers. In these pavilions the village elders arbitrated disputes over inheritance, marriage, property holdings, and cases of assault and battery. The good and bad deeds of the villagers were also posted here. After close to seventy years, most of these bylaws and procedures had slipped into disuse. The membership of the civil service had been grossly expanded, on its way to double and triple the original size. Officials in fact lived comfortably, deriving quasi-legal income by a variety of means. The 14,341 households whose landholdings warranted the personal attention of the throne were no longer mentioned. They had been replaced by a 'gartered and sashed' class, usually referred to by Western scholars as the 'gentry.' By definition the gentry included members of the civil service and their immediate families and associate degree holders, who were also authorized to wear a special kind of cap and belt. Far more numerous than the names on the dynastic founder's roster of the rural affluent, they did not seem at any time during the dynasty to have exceeded two percent of the population, and this uncharacteristic high was probably reached only toward the end of the dynasty, when both the concentration of landownership and government-authorized purchases of rank had accelerated. We can estimate that those families, perhaps less than a quarter of a million of them, owned anything from less than 200 mu of land (about 15 ha) upward to 2,500 mu (slightly more than 200 ha). Maintaining close ties with the civil service or even as members of it themselves, those medium and large landowners served as functionaries of the dynasty yet commanded local influence in their home districts. Serving as an interlink between the empire's superstructure and infrastructure, they were noted for their political consensus in recognizing that good government hinged on the upholding of traditional social values. The membership of this gentry group was moreover periodically renewed by the power of social mobility. The rise and fall of families, usually in parallel with success and failure in the civil service examinations, added new names to the roster and weeded out some old ones. Since the bureaucrats were preoccupied with the concept of governance through cultural cohesion and maintained a fixed vision of a multitude of self-cultivators engaged in intensive farming, they could hardly appreciate the mechanics of modern economics, which works on imbalances and thrives on particularity. They managed to make all districts appear artificially identical. Against the trend of the world, they turned inward and acted in a way opposite to the Song reformers.

The taxation system was a handicap. It could be said that the first emperor of the Ming had created a fiscal framework that was too crude and simple for its time. After being overburdened by the third emperor to serve the purposes for which it had not been designed, this system was rescued by the fifth emperor of the dynasty from a total collapse. But by then any possibility for a restructuring had slipped away. The Ming the lack of control of the economy was complete: it had no knowledge of the money in circulation; much less did it have the ability to manipulate it. Its separation from the natural power of the national economy was a characteristic of the Ming administration. As the government had little functional manoeuvrability, its reliance on Confucian ideology intensified, and its exercise of political power became excessive. In many respects it turned into a negative influence. The emperor could punish any official or group of officials; but he would have great difficulty promoting a favourite or putting him in a responsible position. He could authorize exceptions to existing laws; but he had no such power when it came to introducing a piece of legislation that could invoke a sweeping change over his empire. If there was a general proclamation, it was either a ritualistic gesture or an official acknowledgement of something that had already taken place without imperial auspice. The Ming had sixteen emperors. The first emperor was buried near Nanjing. All remaining except second and seventh were buried west of Beijing in 'Ming tombs'. When we look at the historical records, we find something quite unusual about these emperors. After Zhu Zhanji, few of them were seriously involved in the decision-making process that affected the destiny of their empire as a whole. Only the last emperor, Zhu Youjian, was an outstanding exception; but by then it was all too late. For most of them, there was little difficulty in reaching agreements with the bureaucrats on issues of peace and war. But their private lives were constant public issue. The bickering among the civil officials went up to and included the sovereign's personal and family matters. What is embarrassing about working through the records of the Ming dynasty, however, is that the trifling detours are endless. Sometimes the account of a whole decade consists of nothing else but fribbles. On reflection, we sense that there was something never explicitly brought up by the contemporaries: Once the Ming dynasty had become settled, the mainstay of the government was the bureaucracy, not the monarchy. The civil service elected its own members through open examinations, and it evaluated and disciplined them according to established procedures. Originally scholars who had been appointed to draft the emperor's edicts and proclamations, the grand secretaries gradually attained rank and influence as coordinators and spokesmen for the entire civil service. They nevertheless needed the emperor's authority to finalize decisions and policies. Before enthronement, the heir apparent was tutored by the literary-educational branch of the bureaucracy to be familiar with the principles of self-restraint and mutual deference. In the milieu of the late fifteenth century and onward, perhaps the emperors realized that their only effective authority resided within the power of punishments, which could only be used sparingly. On the other hand, ritualistic exercises were repeatedly and relentlessly conducted in the court to promote the mystique of the throne, until an atmosphere of make-believe prevailed. The tenth emperor Zhu Houzhao tried to separate himself as a person from the monarchy as an institution when he conferred on himself ranks and titles The bureaucrats, however, did not take his frivolity lightly. Unable to revolt openly, they resorted to passive resistance. Then there was a case of another extreme: A cloistered Zhu Youtang, bland and colourless, suited the role of the Ming monarchy well. In a sense, his lack of talent was a virtue. Other cases indicate that the bureaucracy were intensely concerned with the inheritance of the throne. They defended the principle of primogeniture almost religiously. The matter became sensitive because the security of the civil officials themselves was at issue; if emperors could be made and unmade, or manipulated on all matters, the mystique of the throne would be punctured, the power of belief among the civil officials would begin to waver, and no one could predict the consequences. So many learned men risked their lives in the controversies - they were struggling by

clumsy means over what they considered to be constitutional issues during an awkward age. The Ming empire became mathematically unmanageable for two principal reasons: Its hereditary military system declined quickly, and its taxation system, aligned too closely with the village economy, could not be overhauled. The early practice of assessing service obligations on the rich was abandoned. The burden was at first split among the middle-level landowners and then apportioned to the entire pool of taxpayers. The government's lack of logistical capabilities at the middle echelon was a striking feature of the Third Empire. The untaxed surplus of the affluent was rarely reinvested in constructive ways; it either turned to usury or vanished in consumption. While the era seems stagnant and uninspiring to us, this may not have been the feeling of those who lived through it. Especially for the members of the gentry- official class who were content with the status quo, the social tranquillity and atmosphere of changelessness were not unrewarding. Once he had reached prominence through the civil service examinations, a member of the social elite was rather secure, with the income of a middle-level landowner or above. On the other hand, honesty in pecuniary matters in office-holding was only relative. In the absence of an economic pulsation to compel everybody to better himself ceaselessly as we modernists are subjected to, one could fulfil several years' public service and then retire early to live in comfort if not in extravagance. These conditions created a world of introspection, a mood revealed in the prose, poetry, painting, and philosophical discourses of the period. With few exceptions, Ming artists and men of letters belonged to the gartered and sashed class. These gentlemen of leisure, freed from mundane struggles, tended to see the outside world from flashes of their own intellect. Novel writing was a great accomplishment in Ming times. For the gentry-official class, being cultured came before being rich. Scholarship and taste and manners were stressed. That was why the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, who went to China in 1583, marvelled that the nation was governed entirely by a large number of 'philosophers.' Art connoisseurship became popular; antiques were valued. Sometimes a writing ink slab could fetch thirty or forty ounces of silver, sufficient for a peasant family to live on for a year. But there is little substance to the theory that a capitalist class was rising during this age. Although some salt merchants became enormously rich, they were extremely few. Commercial farming was limited to a handful of scattered cases. Cotton-cloth manufacturers remained a cottage industry. There were no credit and banking institutions, and insurance was unheard of. In their place, pawn shops appeared by the thousands. Now were there civil laws or court proceedings that might encourage the growth and development of capital. Indeed, legal practices essential to modern commercial operations, anchored in property rights, would have contradicted the teachings of Mencius and challenged the theoretical foundation of the bureaucratic management. Technological advances, after reaching a high point during the Song, did not show signs of a vigorous continuation under the Ming. Craftsmanship excelled but science lagged behind. In agriculture, the major events were the introduction of tobacco, maize, the sweet potato, and the peanut into China from the New World. Nevertheless, more than any other dynasty, the Ming rendered the core of China homogenous and uniform. After the middle period, the population in north China no longer showed noticeable traces of alien components. Around 1600 the total population might have reached 150 million - an all time high. The fifteenth emperor Zhu Youjiao started harassing the civil officials with the secret police, a turn of events that made the public angry. Yet when the modern researcher looks at the records closely, he has to recognize that by then the bureaucracy was a completely ungovernable body, and the civil officials, quarrelling without a clearly defined aim, were by no means completely free from blame. There was also a steady decline of the quality of local government nationwide. In April 1619, not long before the death of emperor Wanli, his army of 100,000 men was routed by Nurhaci in Manchuria, a campaign in which the latter could not have had more than 60,000 mounts. He in fact dared to use cavalry charges against Ming forces equipped with firearms. Extant

documents show that the founder of the future Manchu dynasty had the vision to see through to every weakness of his rival, whose Mandate of Heaven he challenged. Nurhaci was to die in battle on another occasion. Zhu Yijun, or the Wanli Emperor, had a little over a year to live. Then his throne was to pass to the son whom he had tried so hard to disqualify. A month later it went to one of Wanli's grandsons, who occupied it for seven years. Another grandson survived for seventeen more years before he ended his own life at the fall of the dynasty.

Qing Dynasty, 1644-1911, Beijing, counter revolution, warrior era, then long gradual shift
towards intellectual era Area - 1760 est. 13,150,000 km2 - 1790 est.(include vassal kingdoms) Population - 1740 est. 140,000,000 - 1776 est. 268,238,000 - 1790 est. 301,000,000 (2)

14,700,000 km2

There is no easy way to explain how the Manchus, with a population about one million, could by 1644 seize the throne of China. They had devised a writing system for their spoken language only in 1599. In 1635 they began to call themselves Manchus. Another year lapsed before the Qing dynasty was formally proclaimed. It took less than a half century for this loosely constructed confederation of tribes to elevate itself to be the governing body of an enormous empire with a profound cultural heritage. The Qing conquest of China differed from the experience of previous alien dynasties. Earlier invaders took advantage of China's disunity to become one of the contenders. They gained a foothold inside the Great Wall and governed a mixed population before moving south. The Manchus took China from the outside in one sweep. For the Manchus, the seizure of Beijing on 1644, marked only the beginning of the dynastic change. In order to confirm that the Qing was here to stay, they had to anchor their power in the population, and a sequence of arrangements during the organizational phase accomplished this. These measures also demonstrated that with the assistance of their Chinese collaborators, the Manchus knew how to rejuvenate a decadent empire. Once a foothold was secured, they transplanted their banner system to north China. A 'banner' was not a combat formation but an administrative umbrella over a number of military colonies that furnished manpower quotas to the army when needed. Landowners within the cordoned-off areas were relocated, so that the vacated farms could provide support to the new hereditary military households, most of them having recently arrived from Manchuria. The problems of military manpower and army logistics that had troubled the previous dynasty so much were thus eased, especially when the bannermen, formerly raiders of China's frontier, were now transformed into its protectors. When Taiwan was taken from the Ming loyalists in 1683, was the entire country occupied. In governmental finance, one of the reasons why the Qing succeeded where the Ming had failed was that the direction of expenditure was reversed. Instead of extending the influence into peripheral areas, the new dynasty compressed the circulation of the precious metal within its own familiar ground. Furthermore, the disentitlement of Ming rank-holders cleared a major obstacle to local tax administration, at the same time opening the door for new forced contributions and fresh sale of ranks. The latter practice would eventually become a serious handicap for the Qing. In the meantime, as alien conquerors the Manchus had the power and influence to enforce the tax laws. In 1661 the prosecution of tax delinquency in the Yangtze Delta area listed 13,617 offenders, meaning

that virtually all gentry households were affected. Some of the offenders were accused of owing back taxes of such preposterously infinitesimal amounts as several thousandths of an ounce of silver. This action was effectively intimidating, which was perhaps its original purpose. During the first decade of the new dynasty China produces more bronze coins than the previous dynasty had in its entire 276 years. Thus cheap money was made available to the populace. Most of the Chinese advisers who went over to the Manchus prior to 1644 had been captured and forced to give service. In an age when the code of war held that captives could die or change allegiance, and the reprisals for desertion were not only severe but also extended to one's kin, individuals who fell into enemy hands and became prisoners-of-war had little choice. On the other hand, the Manchus, physically hardly distinguishable from the northern Chinese, had an immense drive and aptitude for Sinicization. The Manchus formed a military caste of a sort; yet special banners were organized for the Mongols and the Chinese. When the Manchus took Beijing in 1644, they ordered all Ming officials to remain in office. The civil service examination was resumed the next year. It was the Manchus who made the effort to speak and write in Chinese, rather than the other way around. The Qing emperors, on the whole, lived much closer to the expectation of the Chinese tradition than did numerous indigenous rulers of proceeding dynasties. From the historian's point of view, the Manchus succeeded because they broke a constitutional deadlock. They effectively provided the arbitrating power required on China's monarchy that in the mid-seventeenth century the Chinese were unable to supply themselves. In practical terms, the Qing dynasty regained the empire's financial solvency without institutional change. It merely imposed the Ming laws with the kind of discipline that had one time been imposed by Zhang Juzhen. Anti-Manchu sentiments did not die easily. For those who refused to give in, national pride was entwined with personal and dynastic loyalties. Some felt that their manhood was being tested. An immediate issue that sparked waves of resistance in the Yangtze Delta had to do with an order that all men had to trim their hairlines. Regulating hairdos was in fact a traditional dynastic practice. The Ming had demanded that all males roll their long hair into buns on the back of the skull and affix them with hairpins. For some reason, it was Manchu practice for men to shave off the front part of the hair up close to the crown. Failure to comply was to be regarded as open defiance of the throne. The more the Chinese took the decreed haircut as slavishly degrading the more determined were the Manchu authorities to enforce it, as if the destiny of the empire were hanging in the balance on the badge of obedience made out with the hairline of the citizenry. A court academician who merely criticized the policy in private was condemned to death by beheading. Another infamous Qing deed was the literary inquisition. Any published item suspected of being seditious was investigated by the official at length. Most works involved historical references that were considered to make insinuations about the present dynasty - satirical poems, forbidden characters, unorthodox expressions, puns, etc. When an item was judged to be subversive, not only were the author and the sponsor of the publication punished, but so were the readers, plate engravers, printers, and book sellers. In the most serious cases the offenders were tortured to death and their family members executed, exiled, or enslaved. Deceased offenders were dug out and their graves desecrated. When the imperial vengeance raged, an inquiry could involve several hundred persons. Scattered cases ran through about half the duration of the Qing period, until the closing of the eighteenth century. But all the atrocities and provocations did not lead to 'racial tensions' in the modern sense. The absence of a permanent grudge helps us to understand that nationalism in its present form and as we experience it today is a product of modern society, where cultural influence and economic interest make the individual feel so conscious of the corporate uniqueness of which he is a part that a drastic alteration of those values by a foreign intervention inevitably incites massive and intense reactions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries neither did the Manchus make a serious effort at alteration nor did the Chinese feel that their cultural tradition was in fact threatened. Only a small segment of the population was incited. For the majority of the people, this one and a half centuries (from the Qing takeover to about 1800)

was a period of prolonged peace and prosperity. Traditionally, the first four Qing emperors received credit for this turn-around. Kangxi ( Xianye, reigned 1661-1722) was every inch a model emperor of the Chinese image. Kind, gentle, yet resolute, he made vital decisions in internal affairs and led expeditions beyond border. His reign, which lasted for sixty-one years, did much to solidify the dynasty. While Kangxi was magnanimous, his son Yongzheng was stringent and calculating. His emphasis on discipline might have been necessary for officialdom, but the sovereign's surveillance of the bureaucrats, in part motivated by personal and family intrigues, led to the extensive use of the secret police. At no other time in Chinese history did so many emperors have consecutively linked reigns of benevolent despotism over such a long period. Although they had distinct personalities, the first four were all energetic and distinguishably capable. Their devotion to their office was also unprecedented. At the founding of the dynasty, staffs for interpretation and translation were provided for the throne; before Shunzhi's reign was over, they were no longer needed. The throne was versed in the Chinese language. Yongzhen used Manchu only to curse. Kangxi and Qianlong were scholars of Chinese studies in their own right. In these one and a half centuries, international trade worked to the best interest of China. Tea was in demand in Russia, Silk and raw silk had been exported to Japan since the early Tokukawa period. Chinese porcelain, rugs, lacquerware, jewellery, and furniture gratified European capitals. Unbleached cotton goods were exported to Europe and later to the United States. Before being overtaken by the West and its industrial revolution, China's cottage industry and handicrafts enjoyed a twilight of qualitative superiority. Overall, the Qing made few changes of Ming governmental institutions. Office salaries were only nominal, and the supplementary income of the officeholders derived from a variety of irregular sources. Yongzhen demanded that this quasilegal income be regularized. But if the Qing copied the organizational chart of the Ming, the new dynasty also made the offices function somewhat differently. For one thing, the Manchu emperors, during the time of fiscal expansion, exercised more authority than the ritualistic figureheads of the late Ming. The Qing monarchs held that the imperial succession was a family matter, not for public discussion. They institutionalized a system of allowing princes of the blood to give counsel to the throne. To do away with the Ming fiction of letting child emperors make state decisions, a regent was formally appointed when the emperor was a minor. This effectively put an end to partisan controversies among Chinese bureaucrats, and debates on abstract matters by censorial officials were no longer allowed. Eunuchs were kept under control within the palace. After the initial wave of resistance, Manchu relations with the Chinese improved. Intermarriage, forbidden by law, actually went on all the time. Indeed, several Qing emperors had Chinese concubines. Opportunities for the Chinese to participate in government were theoretically unlimited, the only condition being that at the highest levels they had to share power with the Manchus. It is not surprising, then, that when modern-minded historians search through the Qing records for the causes of Chinese nationalism, they find none. For imperial subjects who were born after the Manchu conquest were not even collaborating with an alien dynasty; they were serving their empire, which to them was a duty. In 1799 when the Qianlong emperor died, the Qing Empire had already exhausted its growth potential. The martial spirit of the bannermen had evaporated. Yongzhen's 'honesty-nourishing' allowances, although increasing the salaries of key personnel by several times, were insufficient to cover the administrative costs of their posts, not to mention the personal expenses necessitated by the living habits of the bureaucrats, and not to mention the fact that numerous middle and lower officials were still paid with little more than nothing. As a result, corruption ran rampant. In the wake of misgovernment came neglected public works and unrelieved natural disasters, and, therefore, banditry and peasant rebellions. The chain reaction followed earlier patterns that had unfolded in history over and over again. Before facing the Western powers, China had weakened itself.

Today, almost 200 years later, we may have to expand on this observation. The combined reigns of the four early Qing emperors, splendidly successful as they seemed to be, were in the vision of macro history anachronistic. With all the fiscal surpluses passing through their hands, those rulers did little to revamp the superstructure of the empire or to strengthen the middle echelon of the government. A central treasury was still missing. The empire's financial resources were still handled by lateral transactions, thus yielding vital statistics always of doubtful quality. Civil laws that could have linked governmental operation with the rising economic trends were still not in place. China remained a conglomeration of village communities. China did not have the structural strength to qualify as a modern nation. It did not posses the needed functional manoeuvrability. The Manchus, diverted from innovation as they were, at least liberalized the most rigid features of the management of their predecessors, such as letting more money go into circulation, taking fiscal matters realistically up to a point, and permitting the widening of trade at Guangzhou. But as a whole, the pattern was established. the regime's primary function was to hold the village communities together. Ideology came before technology, cultural influences were valued more than economics, and the passiveness of the bureaucrats as a rule took precedence over adaptability. The Third Empire was clearly immobile. The Qing emperors, with their merits and faults re-examined in the light of the long-term rationality of history, could now be seen as having been invited to break a constitutional deadlock. Their relatively uncultured background actually appeared to be a advantage: Being uncommitted, they could be impartial. They had more aptitude and capacity to learn within a social environment supporting a statecraft that always stressed the fundamentals and basics of human values. The population of China around 1800 was around 300 million. China experienced a phenomenal population growth. The number had doubled during the combined reigns of the four early Qing emperors. In agrarian China, labour was capital. The farm surplus, unable to be transformed into other kinds of materialistic benefit, was utilized to support a large population. Toward 1800, the draft banks of Shanxi appeared and established branches in the principal cities. Silk looms counted by the tens of thousands were reported in Suzhou and Nanjing. Salt-making, copper-mining, and porcelain manufacture were supposed to have employed prodigious numbers of workers. China might still have had a few cases of concentrated wealth unattained by Westerners. But those exceptional cases in no way constituted a social system. China by 1800 was nowhere close to entering capitalism. The Qing was a period of scholarly pragmatism. Before 1800, several great novels were produced. But by pragmatism we mean that the philosophers of the age merely stayed away from the metaphysical speculation of the Song and the ideas of the Ming. Lacking a physical environment that truly encouraged independent thinking, they could never depart from the social values anchored in the literary bureaucratic management, which they took so much granted. But the pragmatists, working closely with the Confucian classics and historiography, could not develop a penetrating vision to see what eyes could not see. What's the point of having pragmatism? Essentially it is to break away from one system as a step toward building another. 1800 was only forty years away from the Opium War, when Manchu and Chinese soldiers had to carry swords and spears against a foe who came with 540 canons mounted on sixteen ships. The war itself was a simple matter of first puncturing the formidable facade of the Celestial Empire with an expeditionary force of 4,000 men, enormously better organized and better equipped than their Chinese counterparts. The expeditionary force was gradually built up to 10,000 men and fourteen steamers. In 1842 the Treaty of Nanjing was signed. The Qing was not as introverted and non-competitive as the Ming; but as a succession dynasty it inherited certain characteristics of its predecessor. Its reluctance to realized fiscal innovations and technological progress reflected an unspoken wish not to disturb the delicate balance that had up until then kept millions of peasants in place and thousands of literati-officials placidly employed. We may note here that after the Opium War the court in Beijing never conducted an inquiry to determine what happened, or sent observers overseas, or made institutional readjustments. The blueprints of modern military equipment offered by the American envoy were politely declined.

The term 'Self-Strengthening Movement' comes from a sentence in the Book of Changes: 'Heaven moves on strongly; the gentlemen therefore incessantly strengthen themselves.' This motto, applied to the imitation of the West by the Chinese in the 1860s and 1870s, does reveal some kind of defence mechanism at work. As the promoters of this movement never felt completely assured that they were beyond criticism, they quoted the classics to stress that there was a change of time and circumstances that justified their following the foreign lead. Another argument that they made defensively was that they borrowed Western learning for its utility; for the fundamentals they never deviated from China's cultural tradition. With all the combined effort of the Self-Strengthening Movement demonstrated a single-minded purpose: China wished to take advantage of Western technology to boost its military strength, but for nothing else. So there was no change in the regular education system and the civil service examinations. The Self-Strengthening Movement was based on technological application. More than three decades later, however, in 1898, the Hundreds Days' Reform attempted to rewrite the constitution and introduce institutional changes. Another twenty-years later, during the Republican era, China's intellectuals came to the realization that change had to come not only from themselves, but also from within their minds. Even though unplanned and uncoordinated, the progression of these events causes us to marvel at the power of history. It has logic; its long-term rationality also allocates the Chinese Revolution sufficient time for preparation and applies enough pressure to it to enable it to follow through.

Republic of China, 1911-1949, Beijing, intellectual era. As the intellectual era was preceded by
warrior counter revolution and then evolved back to intellectual, this second phase of intellectual era will naturally be short lived. Extremely difficult times. Imposition of foreign merchant influences (which were too early), total chaos at times but in the midst of it all, intellectual era got started, then later, again, chaos ensued during the war. Before the Sino-Japanese war 1894-95, China had negligible external debts. Thereafter, its public finance was thoroughly under the control of foreign banking consortiums. The proceeds from import and export duties, the salt gabelle, and inland transit taxies became collateral for the loans. It was the issue of financing the railroads that sparked the Revolution of 1911. The situation hardly changed during the early Republican era. It was the dispute over the disposition of customs revenues that led Dr. Sun Yat-sen to break off his alignment with the Western powers to befriend the Soviets. At the turn of the century China was subject to the domination of a host of foreign powers. In the summer of 1898, official circles in Beijing experienced something that they had never experienced before. From June 11 to September 21, for a period of 103 days, more than 200 rescripts, decrees, and edicts came down from the throne proclaiming that governmental offices would be reorganized, a budget prepared, the army and navy modernized, the entire educational system and civil service realigned, and agriculture, industry, and commerce promoted and brought up to the world's standards. Although reformers were not entirely unaware of the fallacy of their approach, they went ahead regardless. At the abrupt suspension of the movement after 103 days, the emperor was put under house arrest for life, never to regain his freedom. A half dozen of the reformers were executed. The Guangxu Emperor, reigned 1875-1908. He did not gain control of the government until 1889, yet until her death in 1908, Cixi never relinquished her position as de facto ruler. Whenever she was not regent she was pulling strings behind the scene. Guangxu was an intelligent and sensitive person. The cloistered life within the palace and the lack of an opportunity to exercise his own will since childhood were serious handicaps for a monarch whose ambition was to reshape the destiny of a large nation. His advisers in the reform were Kang

Youwei and Liang Qichao, both from Guangdong. Kang was the classic scholar, Liang more pragmatist, was a writer of popular appeal and eloquence whose erudition went beyond the classical sources. Before 1898 they had been agitating for the reform for at least three years. They organized meetings, gave lectures, published journals, and solicited funds to popularize their cause as a form of public education. After the purge everything was to return to status quo ante. The Hundred Days' Reform antagonized the entire corps of army officers who had risen through the ranks of the banner system and Green Standard, no less than the whole body of the literary-bureaucrats who had distinguished themselves through the old-fashioned education and examinations. Those groups were more than vested interests; they represented the logic of the Chinese state and society. For several hundred years, China had relied on the professional military caste who had a minimum of technological exposure, and a civil service hierarchy, whose ideological cohesion stood as a cornerstone of a permanent constitution. Before 1911, Sun Yat-sen had attempted to overthrow the Qing dynasty ten times. His party was essentially made up of the educated elite and thus lacked means to address the masses in those days. The martyrs-to-be involved themselves in the classical approaches of disseminating incendiary literature, assassination, and seizure of governmental offices; but gradually they learned to make use of the secret societies and infiltrate the modern army and navy being organized by the Qing. From 1916 when the ex-general Yuan Shikai, having declared himself an emperor died, China sank into a period of warlordism until to the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanjing under Chiang Kai-shek in 1928. The overall damage done by warlordism was serious. Its adverse effect on the Chinese economy was immeasurable. If the warlords served any historical purpose at all, it was that they had intensified the internal pressure, which, combined with eighty years of foreign aggression, compelled the educated youth of China to work out a formula for national salvation by themselves. With the 'May Fourth Incident' the young people found a line of action; and the 'May Fourth Movement' furnished the ideological support to their acts. May 4, 1919, some 3,000 students from thirteen universities in Beijing gathered for a demonstration against the decision of the Versailles Peace Conference to award to Japan the treaty rights previously held by the Germans in Shandong province. China, by declaring war against Germany in 1917 was supposed to have been on the winning side of the war. Yet at Versailles China found that instead of sharing the fruits of victory, its representatives had to sign away rights affecting its territorial integrity to satisfy another victor. This was unprecedented and outrageous. Yet with the disclosure of the secret treaties of several years before, China's position was compromised. Previously, to induce Japan to enter the war, the great powers had agreed to, on separate occasions, the transfer of those rights. The news soon spread throughout the nation. The Beijing government yielded, the cabinet was compelled to resign, and the Chinese delegation at Versailles refused to sign the peace treaty. It is difficult to imagine how unusual the May Fourth Incident was, occurring at a time when modern communications were in their infancy. By 1919, it was estimated that there were from one million to two and a half million factory workers in China - still a drop in the bucket. On the whole, agrarian China remained unchanged. Professional jobs were likely to be concentrated in the treaty ports under the municipal administration of foreign powers. Those we refer as 'intelligentsia' found themselves by circumstances a class of misfits. Few of them could identify comfortably with any existing socioeconomic group. The May Fourth Incident was more than a demonstration and a protest. It demanded commitment. When this message began to spread, for the first time the large and undifferentiated educated class, an institution of 2,000 years' standing, showed signs of being converted to an instrument to carry on China's long revolution over the next half century. This was possible owing to an environment of intellectual agitation and ferment. To trace its origin further, we should cite the work of foreign missionaries and the contact with foreign concessions in the Chinese cities, the preparation of new textbooks and sending students overseas after the SelfStrengthening Movement, and the contributions by great translators who made the works of

Montesquieu, Smith, Dumas, Balzac, Dickens, and others available to Chinese readers. But since the May Fourth Incident came to be seen as a student action, historians maintain that the 'May Fourth Movement' was an action-oriented preparation, mainly organized by professors within the educational institutions, with Beijing University as its citadel and 1917 as its clear starting point. After May 4, 1919, the movement spread far and wide. But as the momentum continued to build, this period of preparation could be said to have run its course by about two years later, or mid-1921. The major credit for creating the appropriate intellectual atmosphere should go to Cai Yuanpei, chancellor of Beijing University since 1917. He had studied in Germany. After the founding of the Republic he served as minister of education. At the university he appointed as dean of letters Chen Duxiu, who studied in Japan and France. A veteran revolutionary, in 1915 Chen had founded a monthly magazine call New Youth. Chiang Kai-shek was a regular reader. Mao Zedong admitted that he was influenced by New Youth and even contributed an article to it. In an often-cited editorial in the 1919 issue, Chen argued that if the magazine had any constant guiding principles at all, they were no more than science and democracy. The editorial created far more of a sensation than this brief summary might suggest. And, as several faculty members of the university interpreted it, they were to be held as methodical and persistent ways of disbelieving, not fundamentally different from the standpoint of Bacon or even of Descartes. When cast against the Chinese background, which asserted that the moral code was immutable, truth always came down from the authorities at the top, and when that was not enough, make-believe was brought in to fill in the gaps, Chen Diuxiu's platform did not lack revolutionary implications. Even democracy, before being elaborated to mean representative government, was seized on by this editorial writer as an iconoclastic tool to do away with tradition and Confucianism. Several writers joined in the attack on China's 'quintessence.' Serving on the editorial board of New Youth was Li Dazhao, a Japanese educated librarian who was exposed to Marxism through Japanese writers. He contributed a series or articles on Marxism and the Soviet revolution to the New Youth. Unlike Chen Duxiu, he had never fully abandoned nationalism; Li anticipated a strong peasant movement in the revolutions. He justified violence as means to overthrow a regime that itself was founded violently. And he went on to interpret freedom and democracy with a bend toward moral coercion reminiscent of Rousseau. In all these he exercised a significant influence on Mao Zedong, whom he hired as a temporary office assistant. That age most of the young people, being revolutionary romantics, were seeking an ideological formula for quick salvation. During the May Fourth period the intellectuals showed their readiness to bring out the entire stock of China's cultural elements for re-examination and for possible liquidation was the furthest any Chinese had entertained going. After the May 4, 1919, events moved faster. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in July 1921. Sun Yat-sen's party was finally settled on as the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT). At the convening of its first national congress in January 1924, the KMT was reorganized to follow the Soviet line, and Russians and the Comintern began to play an important role in Chinese politics. Sun's policy of allying with the Soviet Union and the admission of CCP members to his party as individuals was put into effect. Many students who had been active in the May Fourth Incident by this time had left school to participate in the movement in the south. The first KMT-CCP alliance worked for a little over three years. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and his role as the most prominent Chinese leader was taken by Chiang Kai-shek, whose Northern Expedition started the next year. This campaign to eliminate warlordism was militarily successful. But in April 1927 Chiang launched a 'party purification'. Soon the hunting down of CCP members took place in all KMT controlled cities. They maintained that the Communists had conspired to take over from within. Now he had the financial support from banking interests in Shanghai and could act without Russian help. (KMT remained to be thoroughly infiltrated by communist moles until 1949 whereas CCP held constant and bloody purges every now and then).

People's Republic of China, October 1, 1949, Beijing, continued as intellectual era, then
gradually after the reforms of 1978, evolved into acquisitor era, which continues as of now. The Chinese revolution was basically an affair of peasants led by educated youths. Once Mao Zedong became the chairman, he never relinquished his power. Mao was an intellectual who enjoyed comforts but demanded that others, including the whole nation be deprived of luxuries.

Major communists leaders: Mao Zedong. He loved comfort and hated physical labour. He loved to read and was good at delegating power. He advocated absolute egalitarianism. Absolute egalitarianism was Mao's idea that privilege was formally endorsed as inalienable part of Chinese communism to the top leadership. That run totally against the ideas of egalitarian military which has aversion to privilege. Mao had no understanding of economics, statistics or numbers. His basic character can be summarized as being insubordinate. He was foul tempered and mouthed and had lust for power by any means constantly scheming to purge his rivals. General idea of Mao being a military genius is totally false. His campaigns were mostly disastrous. Lin Biao was a professional soldier. He loved to loot and enacted preferential policies regarding himself. Had a crony relationship with Mao. Suffered from phobias, eg. water and air phobia and looked like a drug addict. Constant schemer thinking the basest things of others. Initiated coup d'etat and died while fleeing China. He is still considered to be the number one in the communist hierarchy by the Indian Communist Party. Zhou Enlai was organizer, a disciplined idealist but also ruthless apparatchik. He had no desire for personal power as he was not decisive. He was loyal to the party. He had fear of disgrace which Mao exploited to the fullest. Zhu De was a professional disciplined soldier. Peng De Huai was born in Shaoshan, Hunan, the same place as Mao. He cared about the poor and downtrodden and was hard critic of Mao. He was from poor family and an idealist. Purged. Po Ku spoke english and russian. He was extremely bright and decisive leader. He was loyal to the party. Zhang Guo Dao was the most successful of all the communists. He had no compunction about killing for power. He conducted bloody purges. Liu Shaoqi was extremely able and was second in command for long time. Mao promoted him number two in 1943. He was against persecution, a humanist who cared about people. He was serious person whose only hobby was reading. He had no ambitions to supplant Mao. He was the most able CEO of Mao constantly trying his best to raise the living standard while Mao's interest was to raise the military standard. Purged. Kang Sheng was in charge of the Chinese KGB. He was a sadist with twisted mind. Deng Xiaoping enjoyed eating French food. He conducted brief meetings and was decisive and cut straight through complicated matters. He was initially a joker and fireball of energy but learned to become reserved with few words. He became communist in France where he studied. Subsequently he was kicked out of the country and went to Russia. There he got party training. He was deeply loyal to Mao. During suppression of intellectuals in 1957-58, he was Mao's chief lieutenant. Yenan terror. During the 1940s, around 30-40,000 idealist young volunteers who were mostly students came to Mao's communist base in Yenan, Sha'anxi. Mao turned them into followers through continuous terror and personality cult. All independent thinking and expression was killed off by this campaign and turned into Mao worship stemming from terror. In 1943 the first Mao Badge was issued. During the Yenan years the CCP enjoyed two enormous external subsidies:

1. KMT subsidy for the first few years 2. clandestine sponsorship by Moscow, US 300,000 monthly then taxing the local peasants heavily like, grain tax, horse feed tax, exporting salt tax, opium tax. CCP in fact was very rich in 1941. CCP controlled areas issued a separate currency called Bianbi while the KMT controlled areas used Fabi. Mao learned from Stalin's duplicity about conducting an open, even apparently friendly relationship with a government while secretly trying to overthrow that same government. When he came to power, he was to copy Stalin in his dealings with other countries. During Mao's reign the politburo was not a team to make important decisions, but to serve as a sounding board for Mao. In 1954-1957 China's military and arms related industries expenditure was 61% of the total budget. Stalin called it unbalanced. The percentage even got higher later years. Spending on education, culture and health combined was only 8.2%. Military related industries were bought from USSR, not donated. It was paid back with food and basic essentials, nothing else. Those years the Hukou system was implemented. China in those times provided food for poor countries like, North Korea, North Vietnam but also richer Eastern European countries like DDR. Romania got one time 3,000 tons of vegetable oil while at the same time a peasant in China could only use 1 kg of oil per year for both cooking and lighting. In 1956 Mao sent to Hungary 30 million Rubles worth of goods and 3.5 million pounds loan without any need to pay it back. In 1953 food aid to DDR amounted to 50 million Rubles. China's foreign aid during the post-Staling Mao was 6.92% of the total budget in 1973 which is a world record. In 1970 China gave aid to 66 countries, for example Malta got US 25 million in April 1972. Many if not most of these recipient countries were far richer than China. In 1962 Liu Shaoqi attacked Mao's policies in Beijing CCP meeting of 7,000 delegates. Deng Xiaoping was a rising star. Due to new policies starvation stopped. Foreign aid was stopped as well as the Great Leap Forward. Mao became furious for Liu Shaoqi and started the Cultural Revolution to purge Liu and others. Mao became paranoid of the threatening nuclear war. He started massive relocation of thousands of war related factories in 1964 which was a colossal waste. Then he became obsessed of acquiring the nuclear bomb from the Soviets. That was to cost US 4.1 billion in 1957 prices. That was enough money to save every single of the 38 million people who died in starvation. Mao's bomb caused 100 times more deaths than the deaths in Hiroshima and Nagashagi. During the Cultural Revolution all kinds of art including gardens and cultural relics were banned. Its aim was to create totally arid society, devoid of human civilization and deprived of representation of human feelings, inhabited by a herd with no sensibility who automatically obey Mao's orders. A brain dead nation and to live in this state permanently. In 1967 Mao replaced the party members with 2,8 million army men. They became the new controllers and of these 50,000 took over the job of medium-to high ranking party officials. Public brutality became every day life. In 1968 state-sponsored killings reached their extreme in every province, in Guangxi alone 100,000. Mao's orders was to, 'Sort out class ranks', scrutinize every adult of the whole nation where tens of millions were persecuted. There were 23 different labels for outcasts. In 1969 Mao felt secure enough and new members were chosen for the central committee of CCP which 81% were new, almost half were army men. Killings continued until Mao's death, estimated to be over 3 million, and 100 million people suffered on one way or another. (3)

These days the main leaders are technocrats. In the highest leadership there has been nobody for long time from the military. The top leaders are engineers by education. Jiang Zemin, the previous chairman co-opted the emerging rich with his 'San ge Daibiao', or 'Three

Represents', where all the progressive forces must be represented by the Communist Party. So far they had been excluded. The new capitalists have joined en masse to the communist party. Mostly because it gives them even more opportunities. Roar Ramesh Bjnnes idea of architecture being one of the ways to determine which class controls the society could shed some light into modern Chinese society. Until now the highest buildings in China have been Japanese commercial buildings. CCTV tower, the party dominated broadcasting headquarters was to challenge the Japanese supremacy but before the building was inaugurated, there was a disastrous fire. Needless to say, the CCTV tower represents the CCP. But then which class the CCP represents? Another way of analyzing the situation is to see the different appreciations or depreciations of various professions. Military men these days are loathed at. Chairman Mao was able to generate sympathy for the military by propagating the idea of People's Liberation Army who never conduct warfare against its own citizens. That ideal was crushed during the Tian An Men Incident. Common soldiers are extremely poorly paid although PLA reserves the right to choose the best candidates of yearly college entrance exams. Higher officers are beyond the law living with luxury. Teachers in general are poorly paid. Many teachers have changed into business career. The age old adage that education is the most important thing in order to succeed has become even more important. But now the modern trend is that companies when choosing candidates for jobs, prefer the sons and daughters of the powerful and rich than those with the best education. Seems that everybody in China have become businessmen, including doctors and teachers. I remember back in 1998 when I first went to China to study Chinese language at the university. Those times certain words which had capitalist connotation were considered taboo, like, 'landlord, landlady, madame, mister, class, etc. Nowadays nobody has any compunctions of using such words. So has China entered the merchant era? Are the New Rich the new ruling elite of China? The south of China carries a lot of economic weight. Guangdong province alone has received huge amounts of foreign investments. Many Guangdong cities are controlled by the Hakka business clique. Hakkas are the entrepreneurial spirited people of Guangdong. Deng Xiaoping was a Hakka. But the South does not carry much political weight in China. Southerners are not trusted in the North where the political power lies. Deng Xiaoping's reform started from the South. Soviet educated old guard remained in Beijing and tried their best to block Deng and Zhao Zhiyang, the chief economist who was then directly in charge of enacting those reforms. Mao's time, many of the CCP leaders came from Hunan and Hubei, impoverished provinces of the hinterland. According to Sarkar's 'River and Civilization' theory, those provinces though more matured than the mountainous and wild border regions, still lacked business and managerial acumen of the delta people. Mainly three great delta areas cover China. The Pearl River delta, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the Yangtze River delta, Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu and the Yellow River delta, Beijing and Tianjin. Pearl and Yangtze river deltas constitute the main economic centers of China. Many if not most of the present leaders originate from Yangtze River delta. Shandong is said to be the birth place of many modern military officers. In my opinion Shandong is the core of China, without Shandong province it is impossible to think about China proper. It was the birth place of Confucius, Mencius and Zhu Geliang. The political elite who controls China now naturally requires an absolute loyalty from the military. People in the inner provinces are impoverished. They still cling to the ideas of Mao Zedong and his old style communism. When Mao established People's Republic of China in 1949, country was mainly agrarian society. More than 80% of China's 560 million citizens worked in agriculture. Developed industry and western style life style of the cities were concentrated in Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangzhou port cities with established foreign contacts or north-east coal and steel area center Shenyang build by the Japanese in 1930s. In late 1970s Deng Xiaoping allowed factories to be build in country side employing surplus farmers. Today most of the factory workers are farmers. Although People's Republic of China claims to be socialist, society in China has never been equal

but hierarchical. People's Republic is based on feudalism, a middle aged military, administrative and economical system. Deng Xiaoping's chance to suggest ideological change came in December 1978 during CCP national conference. This conference is considered to be the start of a significant change in modern China's history. Delegates to that conference raised economic goals ahead of anything else. From this day onward, when comparing methods and leadership qualities, only economic achievements were important. Conservative, Maoist vies, like class struggle, ideological purity and economic independence were discarded. Deng and his team included many specialists, like liberal economist Wu Jinglian, started to implement their market socialist ideas. In practise this meant that state always controls the important sectors, like heavy industry, energy production and infrastructure. Various government bureaus would do the administration. Those were organized just like the Japanese conglomerates (zaibatsu). At the same time private people were given scope to own and operate non-strategic industries. At the same time Deng was able to assure the nervous conservatives that even in market economy, the state would own most of the production and distribution channels. China's ex-prime minister and CCP chairman Zhao Ziyang is one of the most important and tragic characters in post-Mao period. When Deng was the strategist planner, Zhao was its real architect and CEO. Zhao was placed under home arrest when siding with the Tiananmen protesters and died in 2005. Zhao Ziyang was born in 1919 to a wealthy landowner in Central China. He was accepted to Communist party and quickly arouse in the ranks. Although Zhao became the most important decision maker in economic and political matters, he was the only key leader without any place in the party. He was able to operate only due to support Deng Xiaoping was giving him. Deng replaced Zhao with relatively inexperienced and unknown Shanghai CCP chief Jiang Zemin. Zhu Rongji was nominated as Jiang's assistant and prime minister of the nation by Deng. Zhu neglected the hinterland - the farmers- when he boosted urban consumption and export industries. The after effects of this policy can still be felt during the economic crisis of 2009. Chinese were encouraged to invest in stock market. Market economist Wu Jinglian compared Chinese stock trading to gambling without rules. 'In our stock trading privileged are allowed to see others cards. They can deceive without punishment, they can be involved in deceptions and gimmicks. They can and do manipulate the value of the stocks', he tells. This estimate comes from one of the most respectable Chinese economist and shows how authoritarian administration combined with financial ruling of the party can transform their political power into financial wealth and privilege destabilizing fairness, law and stable society. China follows authoritarian command economy which is mainly directed by the CCP. The key industrial players party bureaucrats rather than individual entrepreneurs. Communist party does not allow any powerful business man to rise, like Indian Laksmi Mittal. Elite of the party and finance consider banks as a private cash machine. Just pushing the button guarantees them and their friends secured loans without any reference whether such a loan has any business sense or not. Birth in China determines one's class although exception to this rule is private entrepreneurs whose class is determined by their success. Those who are born into the privileged class, can enjoy all that comes along, good education, wealth and position in society. Many of the lower class people the first step higher is to join the communist party. Without proper relations (guanxi) even a brilliant person's career may come to an unexpected end. That explains why corruption is endemic to the Chinese society. Chinese sociologists divide Chinese society into 49 social classes. Here only few are briefly elaborated.

Migrant workers have left their farms for temporary factory work in the cities. Many consider them to be the underdogs. Migrants workers consist a huge 250-300 million people who form the backbone of manufacturing and service industries in big cities. They are the most exploited class without basic rights. Due to low education they are not aware of their own rights. Farmers are the biggest class although their numbers had declined in the past few years. It is estimated that 56% of Chinese, or 730 million are farmers. As farming often is not enough, 30-40% take outside employment in the big cities and returning again back to their farms. Farmers don't have a right to settle down in cities. Also their children, while their parents might have lived many years in big coastal cities, does not have right to study in the better city schools. Wealth gap between the cities and the country has widened especially after the leadership of Jiang Zemin. Young city dwellers and angry educated citizens (fengqing). Well educated young people and angry city people are on average younger than 27 years. They are more or less pampered middle class, white and blue collar and lower level administrators off spring. They represent the internet generation and are the force within the possible social change. Sub-group of them are the politiced with western values demanding democracy, human rights and freedom of expression. Amongst them we can find intellectuals, avant garde artists, entertainers, environmental activists and hackers. Many of them have studied overseas and want to change China into multiparty system. One of their biggest enemies is the second subgroup: so called angry youth or fengqing. This group could be described as ultra-nationalist and west hating Mao idealists. According to them, anybody who criticizes China is by default enemy of the nation. Some of them are in their fifties and sixties. They grew up during the Cultural Revolution and heeded Old Mao's call for young people to engage with important national affairs. None of them went to college. They work at the most menial jobs in society and haven't had the benefits of the Reforms and Openess policies. Now they are laid-off or retired and they have learned how to go on the internet where they can vent their anger and dissatisfaction. Their language is the language of the Cultural Revolution, they especially revere Mao Zedong, are especially nationalistic, anti-American and bellicose. City middle class is one of the biggest class comprising from people who are older than 27 year labour and middle class. Local elite and those with good background. Local elite is those belonging to lower class communist party members as well as clerks and middle level administrators, like local army and police. They can be found from every city, province, country towns and villages. Several million belong to this group. This elite can control local areas and make them their private kingdoms without the lack of efficient direct administration. They are mostly beyond the law. Privileged elite and the owners of China. Privileged elite comprises the highest party members, their children and red capitalists. The 500 biggest entrepreneurs of China who also belong to the party form the apex of the pyramid. This rich and powerful class basically owns China. Class is comprised of the highest government administrators (guojia ganbu) and central leadership (zhongyang lingdao), who function in the CCP and PLA, also their families and close relatives. Also the highest leadership of some of the main cities like, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing and Shenzhen. Different ministries, PLA, Public Security Police and police highest leadership and those retired from those posts also represent this class. Most of the intellectuals and big entrepreneurs fled China in 1949, one of the most remarkable people who remained was Rong Yiren. Communists named him patriotic capitalist as he had given up his companies to the state. They let him lead the state companies. When Deng initiated the reform in 1979, Rong was given the charge to found the first state owned investment company CITIC. In the year 2007, Forbes magazine estimated Rong's son who inherited his father, to be one of the richest in China with net wealth of 2.2 billion dollars. Who leads PRC? According to China's constitution, article one, People's Republic of China is a socialist state controlled by people's democratic dictatorship. It is lead by labour class based on workers and

peasants union. First leader was Mao Zedong who had absolute control of the party whose authority nobody could challenge. After his demise pragmatist Deng Xiaoping rose to power. He too was an absolute dynastic leader until his death in 1997. After Deng's death situation has changed. Jiang Zeming became the leader but it took him few years to become the real number one in China. Deng Xiaoping's favourite Hu Jintao was made China's leader in 2002. But as like Jiang, Hu never had Mao's or Deng's absolute authority. Hu lead the country together with the eight members of the politbyro standing committee- China's highest decision making body. The power base has expanded remarkable although all the important decisions are still made secretly. They are all engineers by education. When Jiang Zemin propounded his theory of San ge Dai Biao to embrace the capitalists in 2002, communist party of China had 66 million members. That same year 67 million Chinese owned stocks. New leaders of China. Xi Jinping from Shanghai, most probably will be the new chairman and the highest leader. He studied law and is a protege of Jiang Zemin. Li Keqiang is a protege of Hu Jintao . Seems likely that he will be the new prime minister under Xi Jinping. He graduated from the prestigious Peking university with Ph.D on economics. According to recent survey done in one Beijing high-school. When 4000 students were asked if they respect the rich, 70% considered them to be immoral, thinking that they have gained wealth by illegal and immoral means. Only 4% thought the rich are good people. China's richest man could become the first private business owner to join the Communist Party's powerful central committee, state media reported. Construction tycoon Liang Wengen topped Forbes magazine's annual list of China's richest people list with wealth of $9.3 billion this year, moving up from third place in 2010. If Liang is chosen by the party at its congress next October 2011, he will become the first private entrepreneur to join the committee, made up of around 300 of the most senior party members from across the country. Liang, chairman and co-founder of machinery company Sany, has seen his personal wealth soar as China's building spree created demand for the company's cranes and excavators. The China Times newspaper said the powerful Central Organisation Department, which controls staffing positions in the party, had completed its examination of Liang. In 2001, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared private business owners would be welcome to join the party for the first time since its founding in 1921. China's economy has grown rapidly and is now the world's second largest, but most of the country's biggest companies are still state-controlled or headed by Communist party appointees and are often favoured over their private rivals. Many of those who were once critical of the regime are now part of the system. The party has absorbed the elites by handing out funding, positions, and employment. Those in universities are getting government projects so they don't want to be vocal. Many people depend on money from the state to build their careers. So the intellectual center is mainly employed by the state, which is now rich enough to attract it with apparently limitless funding. More and more people are buying into this now. It's very difficult to find people to make a challenge while critics of the government are becoming increasingly marginalized. Although Communist control might be far less visible in contemporary China than it was during,

say, the Maoist era, its is quietly ubiquitous: through public and private business, local politics, media and culture. The Party is the elephant in the room of contemporary China no one discusses it but it's always there. China's leadership remains a taboo subject on the Chinese internet, even writing the names of China's rulers is prohibited. As Michael Anti, a popular Chinese blogger and political commentator, told me, "The rich are becoming a dynasty." Now people in China recognize that "you get your position not by degree or hard work, but by your daddy." Anti added that though corruption and guanxi are hardly new concepts in China, there was previously a greater belief in social mobility through merit. "Before, university was a channel to help you to ruling class. Now the ruling class just promote themselves." There is a dark sense that something has changed. "It's not simply income equality that bothers people -- that's a misconception," Chovanec told me. "When Jack Ma makes a billion dollars for starting a successful company, that's OK. It's inequality of privilege. It's how people make their money. There's now a whole class of people getting wealthy because of who they are, not what they do -- and they follow a different set of rules." In today's China, the abilities to buy and sell real estate and to win government contracts are among the greatest drivers of wealth, and it's those who are already wealthy and wellconnected who have access to these opportunities. If their children are lazy or dull, they can use their stature to create opportunities and positions for them, cutting short the trajectories of more able aspirants. Social status is becoming further entrenched because, as Chovanec notes, "Government is so pervasive in China's economy. Government has great power in determining winners and losers, so who you are and who you know does more than anything else to determine success." And those at the top increasingly act above the law. "Privilege begets money, and money begets privilege." This, of course, runs counter to the optimistic, popular fairy tale of China over the past 30 years, duly promoted by the ruling Communist Party, that a rising tide and roaring economy inevitably lifts all boats; that the future will be better, materially, than the past; that hard work will get you ahead; and that education is the great leveler. Call it the Chinese dream. "Well, that used to be true, pretty much -- but not now," reflects Qiao Mu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. "Take myself. I was born in 1970 into a poor family in west China. There wasn't yet a large class of rich people in China, so the opportunities were more open. At that time, I could depend on my hard work and study to advance. I could change my position in society." But today, he says, sighing deeply, "It's much more difficult for these young guys, my students. You have to rely on your background, and those who already have connections and wealth help themselves and their children. The condition is getting worse, not better." Or, as my friend, the struggling reporter, put it: "People no longer believe you can win by working hard and honestly in China."(1)

Excerpts taken from the books, 'China, a Macro History' by Ray Huang (4) Nlkinen Lohikrme, by Petri Saraste and Frank-Rene Lehberger Jung Chang, Jon Halliday: Mao: The Unknown Story (3) Pekka Mykknen: Isonen Kurkistaa Kiinaan

P.R. Sarkar: Human Society, part II The First Emperor of China: R.W.L. Guisso, Catherine Pagani with David Miller (5) The Fat Years: Chan Koonchung Wikipedia (2) Yahoo News Foreign Policy Magazine: The End of Chinese Dream by Christine Larson. DECEMBER 21, 2011 (1)