1

Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in
the history of mankind. However, the half century that now sepa-
rates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowl-
edge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military
scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Ameri-
cans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social,
and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united
us as a people with a common purpose.
Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not
only about the profession of arms, but also about military prepared-
ness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war
against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will
participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World
War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various
materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works pro-
duced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride
in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called “the
mighty endeavor.”
World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over sev-
eral diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The
following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting
those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for fur-
ther reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s sig-
nificant military feats from that war.
This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military
History by Charles R. Anderson. I hope this absorbing account of
that period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements
during World War II.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

2
 Leyte
17 October 1944 1 July 1945

By the summer of 1944, American forces had fought their way

across the Pacific on two lines of attack to reach a point 300 miles
southeast of Mindanao, the southernmost island in the Philippines. In
the Central Pacific, forces under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, com-
manding the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas, had island-hopped
through the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Carolines. More than
1,000 miles to the south, Allied forces under General Douglas
MacArthur, commanding the Southwest Pacific area, had blocked the
Japanese thrust toward Australia, and then recaptured the Solomons
and New Guinea and many of its outlying islands, isolating the huge
Japanese base at Rabaul.
These victories brought American forces to the inner defensive line
of the Japanese Empire, and in the summer of 1944 they pushed through
that barrier to take the Marianas, the Palaus, and Morotai. With the con-
struction of airfields in the Marianas, US. Army Air Forces were within
striking distance of the Japanese home islands for the first time during
the war. Yet, despite an unbroken series of defeats during two years of
fighting, the Japanese showed no inclination to end the war. As American
forces closed on Japan, they thus faced the most formidable outposts of
the Japanese Empire: the Philippines, Formosa, and Okinawa.

Strategic Setting
Months before the Marianas and Palaus came under American
control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had addressed the question of objec-
tives beyond those island groups. Early discussions considered
Formosa and the Philippines. Domination of either would threaten
Japanese sea lines of communication between her fleet bases and
industries in the home islands and the resource-rich East Indies to the
south. In addition, a strong American beachhead in the Philippines
would jeopardize Japan’s internal communications within the archipel-
ago, the location of the largest concentration of Japanese ground
strength outside the home islands and China. Although possession of
Formosa would give American forces an ideal springboard for opera-
tions on the Chinese mainland it would place those forces between
Japan and the huge enemy garrison in the Philippines. The Philippine
archipelago thus seemed a more logical objective.

3
 120° 140°
THE PACIFIC
AND ADJACENT THEATERS 60° UNION OF SOVIET
October 1944 SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Japanese Limit of Control
0 1600

Miles at the Equator

80° 100°
USSR MANCHURIA
MONGOLIA

40°
KOREA
C H I N A
TIBET A
J
NEPAL BHUTAN

Iw

I N D I A FORMOSA

BURMA Hong Kong

20°
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MARIA
LUZON ISLAN
SOUTH
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
FRENCH CHINA
INDOCHINA
SEA
MINDANAO
NORTH PALAU
BORNEO ISLANDS C
MALAYA SARAWAK
CENTRAL P
S
U

0° Singapore
M

BORNEO CE LE BE S
A
TR

NEW G
A

INDIAN NETHERLANDS INDIES

JAVA PA
OCEAN

SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

20° A U S T R A L I
80° 100° 120° 140°

4
 160° 180° 160°

BERIN G SEA
USSR 60°

Attu
S
D
A N
L E L A
U T I S
I A N
N

NORTH PACIFIC AREA

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
40°
A
P

A PACIFIC
OCEAN
M IDWAY
wo Jima ISLANDS
H A W A IIA N
ISLA ND S

20°
Wake
ANA
NDS
MARSHALL
ISLANDS
Guam

Truk

CAROLINE
ISLANDS Makin
PACIFIC AREA Tarawa
BISMARCK GILBERT SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 0°
ARCHIPELAGO ISLANDS

UINEA
SOLOMON
APUA ISLANDS ELLICE
ISLANDS
Guadalcanal
C
O

R
A
L NEW FIJI
S HEBRIDES ISLANDS
E
A
TONGA ISLANDS
A NEW 20°
CALEDONIA

160° 180° 160°

5
 BATAN IS

THE PHILIPPINES
1944
0 150

BABUYAN IS Miles

Aparri

Lingayen
S O U T H Gulf P H I L I P P I N E
Dagupan

LUZON
S E A
C H I N A
MANILA
Bataan
Cavite
Corregidor

S E A
MINDORO ar d i n o Strai
t
Bern
n
Sibuyan
Sa

MASBATE
Sea SAMAR

Visayan
Sea Tacloban
CUYO PANAY
IS LEYTE SULUAN
Leyte
Iloilo HOMONHON
Gulf
CEBU DINAGAT
S t rait

PALAWAN o
BOHOL i ga
NEGROS ur
S

MINDANAO SEA

S U L U S E A

M I N D A N A O

Davao

o
g
la
N O R T H e
ip
B O R N E O h
rc
A
lu C E L E B E S S E A
u
S

6
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not afford to ignore the political
implications of its military planning. A return to the Philippines
involved a compelling political dimension that did not apply to
Formosa. The Philippine Islands had been a special concern of the
United States since 1898, and the inherent politico-military responsi-
bilities arising from that relationship could not be discarded so easily.
General MacArthur and others insisted that the United States had a
moral obligation to liberate the Republic’s 16 million citizens from
harsh Japanese occupation as soon as possible.
On 12 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General
MacArthur to plan an invasion of Mindanao, the southernmost island
of the archipelago, starting on 15 November. The general responded
in June with a two-phase operational plan which included the seizure
of southern Mindanao on 25 October to serve as a staging area for a
larger amphibious assault against Leyte three weeks later. Luzon, the
largest island in the archipelago and the location of the headquarters
for Japanese forces in the islands, would eventually have to be taken
to secure the Philippines. However, Mindanao and Leyte had features
that made them desirable, if not necessary, preliminary operations to
the liberation of Luzon. For one, both islands were accessible.
Generally exposed coastlines—Mindanao to the south and Leyte to
the east—would allow American forces approaching from either
direction to preserve uninterrupted lines of communication from
recently secured bases. In contrast, an amphibious strike directly
against Luzon in the northern Philippines would be more difficult to
support. Second and critical to forces operating together for the first
time, both islands were known to be defended by garrisons much
smaller than that on Luzon. MacArthur’s staff estimated Japanese
combat strength on Mindanao to be 50,000 with another 50,000 in
the Visayas, the central Philippine Islands which included Leyte.
They estimated that Luzon had 180,000 defenders.
Preparation for the invasion of the Philippines was greatly assist-
ed by ULTRA, the Allied top secret interception, decryption, and dis-
semination program against Japanese radio traffic. Acting on tip-offs
from ULTRA, American submarines and aircraft had been ambushing
Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific and interfering with enemy
exploitation of resources in the East Indies for many months. In June
1944 ULTRA revealed that Tokyo had decided to greatly strengthen its
Philippine defenses to block the expected American route of advance
northward toward the home islands. That knowledge and subsequent
intercepts had allowed the Allied high command to focus submarine
and air attacks against Japanese shipping routes and flight paths to

7
the Philippines. But despite increasing losses, the Japanese buildup
in the islands continued through the summer and fall of 1944.
For the Allies, the sooner the invasion began, the better. But the
availability of amphibious shipping, fleet fire support, and air sup-
port became major obstacles to accelerating the invasion date.
Logistical studies by different headquarters gave conflicting answers
to the question of whether or not there was enough shipping in the
Pacific to support major landings on both Mindanao and Leyte. By
the end of summer the Joint Chiefs of Staff could no longer wait to
fix the timetable for the assault. On 8 September the chiefs directed
MacArthur and Nimitz to take the Leyte and Surigao Strait area
beginning 20 December.
The issues of objectives and operational scheduling were finally
settled by fleet-covering operations in support of the invasion of the
Palaus and Morotai. Beginning on 7 September 1944, carrier task
forces from Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet struck Yap and
the Palaus, as well as Mindanao and islands in the central
Philippines. Air strikes continued in October against Japanese air-
fields on Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon, as well as enemy shipping
in adjacent waters. American planners estimated that these attacks
destroyed more than 500 enemy aircraft in the Philippines and a sim-
ilar number elsewhere, in addition to about 180 seagoing merchant
ships. The aerial successes convinced them that a major landing on
Mindanao was no longer necessary and that available shipping and
logistical strength could now be concentrated on Leyte. Accordingly,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur and Nimitz to cancel
intermediate operations and accelerate planning to carry out an inva-
sion of Leyte on 20 October.
Meanwhile, Japanese Imperial headquarters received a complete-
ly different impression of what had been occurring. With their naval
pilots forwarding wildly exaggerated reports of downing 1,200
American aircraft and sinking eleven aircraft carriers, Tokyo became
increasingly optimistic. Although senior naval officers grew suspi-
cious of these claims, other military authorities in Tokyo accepted
them. In their eyes, the supposed American losses made it possible
to decisively defeat the Americans wherever they landed in the
Philippines—if Japan could concentrate its resources there.
American planners, however, continued to regard Leyte as a mere
stepping stone to the more decisive campaign for Luzon. This con-
ceptual difference would greatly increase the stakes at Leyte or
wherever the Americans landed first.

8
 Operations
One of the larger islands of the Philippine archipelago, Leyte
extends 110 miles from north to south and ranges between 15 and 50
miles in width. The land surface presented features both inviting and
forbidding to U.S. military planners. Deep-water approaches on the
east side of the island and sandy beaches offered opportunities for
amphibious assaults and close-in resupply operations. The interior of
the island was dominated by a heavily-forested north-south mountain
range, separating two sizable valleys, or coastal plains. The larger of
the two, Leyte Valley extends from the northern coast to the long east-
ern shore and at the time, contained most of the towns and roadways
on the island. Highway 1 ran along the east coast for some forty miles
between the town of Abuyog to the northern end of San Juanico Strait
between Leyte and Samar Islands. The roads and lowlands extending
inland from Highway 1 provided avenues for tank-infantry operations,
as well as a basis for airfield construction.
The only other lowland expanse, Ormoc Valley is on the west side
of the island connected to Leyte Valley by a roundabout and winding
road. From the town of Palo on the east coast, Highway 2 ran west and
northwest through Leyte Valley to the north coast, then turned south
and wound through a mountainous neck to enter the north end of
Ormoc Valley. The road continued south to the port of Ormoc City,
then along Leyte’s western shore to the town of Baybay. There it
turned east to cross the mountainous waist of the island and connected
with Highway 1 on the east coast at Abuyog. Below Abuyog and
Baybay, the mountainous southern third of Leyte was only sparsely
inhabited and contained no areas suitable for development.
Mountain peaks reaching to over 4,400 feet as well as the jagged
outcroppings, ravines, and caves typical of volcanic islands offered
formidable defensive opportunities. In addition, the late-year schedule
of the assault would force combat troops and supporting pilots, as well
as logistical units, to contend with monsoon rains. On a favorable note,
the population of over 900,000 people, most of whom engaged in agri-
culture and fishing, could be expected to assist an American invasion,
since many residents already supported the guerrilla struggle against
the Japanese in the face of harsh repression.
The Imperial Japanese Army administered all garrisons and forces
in the Pacific and Southeast Asia through its Southern Army, which
included four area armies, two air armies, and three garrison armies.
The 14th Area Army was responsible for the defense of the
Philippines. Commanded by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the 14th

9
Area Army delegated responsibility for defense of Mindanao and the
Visayas to the 35th Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki.
From an order of battle that included four complete divisions and ele-
ments of another, plus three independent mixed brigades, Suzuki
assigned the 16th Division, under Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, to defend
Leyte and designated the 30th Division, posted to Mindanao, as field
army reserve. By October Japanese strength in the Philippines, includ-
ing air and construction units, totaled about 432,000 troops, with
General Makino’s 16th Division controlling somewhat over 20,000
soldiers on Leyte.
The 14th Area Army was supported by sizeable air and naval
forces. Both the 4th Air Army and the 1st Air Fleet were headquartered
in the Philippines, and could call on reinforcement from task forces in
the Borneo and Formosa areas totaling 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 2 bat-
tleship-carriers, 19 cruisers, and 33 destroyers. American intelligence
estimated the Japanese still had between 100 and 120 operational air-
fields in the Philippines, with 884 aircraft of all types. The largest of
six airfields on Leyte—at Tacloban, the provincial capital—could
accommodate medium bombers.
To take Leyte, American and Allied forces mounted the largest
amphibious operation to date in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
designated General MacArthur supreme commander of sea, air, and
land forces drawn from both the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific
theaters of operation. Allied naval forces consisted primarily of the
U.S. Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid.
With 701 ships, including 157 warships, Kinkaid’s fleet would trans-
port and put ashore the landing force.
The U.S. Sixth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger,
and consisting of two corps of two divisions each, would conduct
operations ashore. Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert’s X Corps included
the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division, the latter less
the 21st Infantry, which had been temporarily organized as an inde-
pendent regimental combat team (RCT). Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge’s
XXIV Corps included the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions, the latter
less the 381st Infantry, also organized as an RCT in army reserve. The
Sixth Army reserve would include the 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions
and the 381st RCT. Of the six divisions, only the 96th Infantry
Division had not yet seen combat.
Supplementing these forces were a battalion of Rangers and a sup-
port command specially tailored for large amphibious operations. The
task of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion was to secure outlying islands
and guide naval forces to the landing beaches. The new Sixth Army

10
Service Command (ASCOM), commanded by Maj. Gen. Hugh J.
Casey, was responsible for organizing the beachhead supplying units
ashore, and constructing or improving roads and airfields. General
Krueger had under his command a total of 202,500 ground troops.
Air support for the Leyte operation would be provided by the
Seventh Fleet during the transport and amphibious phases, then trans-
ferred to Allied Air Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen. George C.
Kenney, when conditions ashore allowed. More distant-covering air
support would be provided by the four fast carrier task forces of
Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, whose operations would remain under
overall command of Admiral Nimitz.
The Sixth Army mission of securing Leyte was to be accom-
plished in three phases. The first would begin on 17 October, three
days before and some fifty miles east of the landing beaches, with the
seizure of three islands commanding the eastern approaches to Leyte

Wright
3
INVASION OF LEYTE
20 October 1944
NUMBERS 1, 2, 3 INDICATE
BILIRAN OBJECTIVES FOR THE
S A M A R THREE PHASES
0 30

Carigara Bay 2 La Paz Miles

Carigara
2 TACLOBAN
2
Jaro HWY
X
XX

Palo
X

2
X
X
IV
HW

Palompon Tanauan
Dagami
Y2

X CORPS
Ormoc 3 2 1st Cav Div
24th Div
Burauen
Dulag
XXIV CORPS
96th Div
HWY

7th Div HOMONHON

SULUAN
1

Abuyog 1
3 1
L E Y T E G U L F
3
Baybay

6th SIXTH
21st Inf Reg Ranger Bn ARMY
SU
RI

1
GA

C A M O T E S S E A
O
STR

DINAGAT
AIT

2 Panaon
Striat
PANOAN
B O H O L

11
Gulf. On 20 October, termed “A-day,” the X and XXIV Corps would
land at separate beaches on the east coast of Leyte, the former on the
right (north), the latter fifteen miles to the south. As quickly as possi-
ble, the X Corps would take the city of Tacloban and its airfield both
just one mile north of the corps beachhead secure the strait between
Leyte and Samar Islands, then push through Leyte Valley to the north
coast. The XXIV Corps’ mission was to secure the southern end of
Leyte Valley for airfield and logistical development. Meanwhile, the
21st RCT would come ashore some seventy miles south of the main
landing beaches to secure the strait between Leyte and Panaon Islands.
In the third phase, the two corps would take separate routes through
the mountains to clear the enemy from Ormoc Valley and the west
coast of the island at the same time placing an outpost on the island of
Samar some thirty-five miles north of Tacloban.
Preliminary operations for the Leyte invasion began at dawn on 17
October with minesweeping operations and the movement of the 6th
Rangers toward three small islands in Leyte Gulf. Although delayed by
a storm, the Rangers were on Suluan and Dinagat by 1230. On Suluan
they dispersed a small number of Japanese defenders and destroyed a
radio station, while they found no enemy on Dinagat. On both, the
Rangers proceeded to erect navigation lights for the amphibious trans-
ports to follow three days later. The Rangers occupied the third island
Homonhon, without opposition the next day. Meanwhile, reconnais-
sance by underwater demolition teams revealed clear landing beaches
for assault troops on Leyte itself.
Following four hours of heavy naval gunfire on A-day, 20 October,
Sixth Army forces landed on assigned beaches at 1000 hours. Troops
from X Corps pushed across a four-mile stretch of beach between
Tacloban airfield and the Palo River. Fifteen miles to the south, XXIV
Corps units came ashore across a three-mile strand between San José
and the Daguitan River. Troops in both corps sectors found as much or
more resistance from swampy terrain as from Japanese fire. Within an
hour of landing, units in most sectors had secured beachheads deep
enough to receive heavy vehicles and large amounts of supplies. Only
in the 24th Division sector did enemy fire force a diversion of follow-
on landing craft. But even that sector was secure enough by 1330 to
allow General MacArthur to make a dramatic entrance through the
surf and announce to the populace the beginning of their liberation:
“People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty
God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil.”
By the end of A-day, the Sixth Army had moved inland as deep as
two miles and controlled Panaon Strait at the southern end of Leyte. In

12
 General MacArthur wades ashore in the 24th Infantry Division
sector, 20 October 1944. (National Archives)

the X Corps sector, the 1st Cavalry Division held Tacloban airfield
and the 24th Infantry Division had taken the high ground commanding
its beachheads Hill 522. In the XXIV Corps sector, the 96th Infantry
Division held the approaches to Catmon Hill, the highest point in both
corps beachheads; the 7th Infantry Division had taken the town of
Dulag, forcing General Makino to move his 16th Division command
post ten miles inland to the town of Dagami. These gains had been
won at a cost of 49 killed 192 wounded and 6 missing.
In the days that followed the Sixth Army made steady progress
inland against an enemy which resisted tenaciously at several points
but was unable to coordinate an overall island defense. In the process,
the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge,
secured the provincial capital of Tacloban on 21 October. Two days
later General MacArthur presided over a ceremony to restore civil

13
 1st Cavalry Division troops advance inland through swampy
terrain. (National Archives)

government to Leyte. To prevent a Japanese counterattack from the

mountainous interior, the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments, 1st Cavalry
Brigade, established blocking positions west of the city, while the 7th
and 8th Cavalry Regiments, 2d Cavalry Brigade, cleared the fourteen-
mile-long San Juanico Strait between Leyte and Samar Islands,
mounting tank-infantry advances on one side of the narrow body of
water and amphibious assaults and patrols on the other. Opposition
was light, and the cavalrymen continued advancing around the north-
east shoulder of Leyte toward a rendezvous with the 24th Division.
On the X Corps left, the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by
Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, drove inland’ meeting more determined
enemy resistance. During five days and nights of hard fighting, troops
of the 19th and 34th Infantry Regiments killed over 800 enemy in the
effort to expand their beachhead and take control of high ground com-
manding the entrance to the northern Leyte Valley. By 1 November,
after a seven-day tank-infantry advance supported by the fire of three

14
artillery battalions, the division’s two regiments had pushed through
Leyte Valley and were within sight of the north coast and the port of
Carigara. The next day, while the 34th Infantry guarded the southern
and western approaches to the port, the 2d Cavalry Brigade entered
and cleared the city. In the victorious drive through Leyte Valley, the
24th Division killed nearly 3,000 enemy. These advances left only one
major port on Leyte—at Ormoc City on the west coast of the island—
under Japanese control.
From the XXIV Corps beachhead on the Sixth Army left, General
Hodge had sent his two assault divisions into the southern Leyte
Valley, the area in which General MacArthur hoped to develop air-
fields and logistical facilities for subsequent operations against Luzon.
The area already contained four airfields and a large supply center.
The mission of the 96th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj.
Gen. James L. Bradley, was to clear the most prominent terrain feature
in the entire Sixth Army landing zone, Catmon Hill. From the 1,400-
foot heights of this promontory, the Japanese had observed and fired
on landing craft approaching the beach on A-day. Keeping the enemy
on Catmon Hill occupied with intermittent artillery and naval gunfire,
Bradley’s troops made their way through the swamps south and west of
the high ground. On 28 October, the 382d Infantry took a key
Japanese supply base at Tabontabon, five miles inland, after a three-
day fight in which the Americans killed some 350 enemy. As the battle
for Tabontabon raged below, two battalions each from the 381st and
383d Infantry Regiments went up opposite sides of Catmon Hill. The
Japanese resisted fiercely, still manning fighting positions after several
heavy artillery preparations, but could not stop the tank-supported
American advance. By the 31st, when the mop-up of Catmon Hill was
completed, American troops had cleared fifty-three pillboxes, seven-
teen caves, and many other prepared positions.
On the XXIV Corps left, or southern flank, the 7th Infantry
Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, moved inland
against an unusually dense concentration of enemy facilities and defens-
es. The Japanese had built or improved four airfields in a narrow, ten-
mile strip along the east-west road between the small towns of Dulag
and Burauen. On 21 October the 184th Infantry took Dulag airfield
south of the road while the 32d Infantry cleared both sides of the
Calbasag River. Three more days of fighting swamps, extreme heat, and
Japanese supported by artillery and armor brought 7th Division regi-
ments to within three miles of Burauen, where three airfields were clus-
tered. The fight for the airfields and village was bloody but flying
wedges of American tanks cleared the way for the infantrymen.

15
 Infantrymen cautiously move toward an enemy machine gun
position. (National Archives)

In Burauen itself, troops of the 17th Infantry overcame fanatical

but futile resistance, with some enemy popping up from spider holes
and others making suicidal attempts to stop the American tanks by
holding explosives against their armored hulls. One mile north, troops
of the 32d Infantry killed more than 400 Japanese at Buri airfield.
With two battalions of the 184th Infantry patrolling the corps left
flank, the 17th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, attached,
turned north toward Dagami, six miles above Burauen. Using
flamethrowers to root their enemy out of pillboxes and a cemetery,
American troops brought Dagami under control on 30 October, forc-
ing General Makino to move his command post yet further to the west.
While most of its units were occupied in the Dulag-Burauen-
Dagami area, the 7th Division also probed across the island. On 29
October, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, preceded by the 7th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Troop, moved fifteen miles south along the east coast
to Abuyog and then, over the next four days, patrolled west through
the mountains to bring Ormoc Bay under observation. Neither advance
encountered any Japanese defenders.

16
 As the Sixth Army pushed deeper into Leyte, the Japanese struck
back in the air and at sea. On 24 October, an estimated 150 to 200
enemy aircraft, most of them twin-engine bombers, approached
American beachheads and shipping from the north. Fifty American
land-based aircraft rose to intercept, claiming to have shot down
somewhere between sixty-six and eighty-four of the raiders.
Nevertheless, day and night air raids continued over the next four
days, damaging supply dumps ashore and threatening American
shipping. But by 28 October, American air attacks on Japanese air-
fields on other islands so reduced enemy air strength that conven-
tional air raids ceased to be a major threat.
As Japanese air strength diminished, the defenders began to use a
new and deadly weapon, a corps of pilots willing to crash their bomb-
laden planes directly into American ships, committing suicide in the
process. Termed kamikaze or “divine wind” to recall the 13th century
typhoon that scattered and sank a Mongol invasion fleet off southern
Japan, these pilots chose as their first target the large American trans-
port and escort fleet that had gathered in Leyte Gulf on A-day.
Although Japanese suicide pilots sank no capital ships and only one
escort carrier, they damaged many other vessels and filled with fore-
boding those American soldiers and sailors who witnessed their stun-
ning acts of self sacrifice.
A more serious danger to the American forces developed at sea.
To destroy U.S. Navy forces supporting the Sixth Army, the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) decided to commit nearly its entire surface fleet
to the Leyte Campaign in three major task groups. One, which includ-
ed four aircraft carriers with no aircraft aboard, was to act as a decoy,
luring Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet north away from Leyte Gulf. If the
decoy was successful, the other two groups, consisting primarily of
heavy surface combatants, would enter the gulf from the west and
attack the American transports.
The approach of the surface vessels was revealed on 23 October,
when American submarines sank two cruisers. The next day, Seventh
Fleet units blocked the southern approaches to Leyte while Third Fleet
aircraft began attacking the main surface task force. But when his air-
men spotted the four enemy carriers far to the north of Leyte that
afternoon, Admiral Halsey took his Third Fleet carriers and battleships
in pursuit. That night, the two Japanese surface task forces, unmolest-
ed by air attacks, moved toward Leyte Gulf and MacArthur’s trans-
ports and escort carriers. Seventh Fleet battleships sank or turned back
units of the smaller Japanese attack force moving through Surigao
Strait south of Leyte. But the second and larger task force, which

17
BILIRAN S
A

M
San Juanico Strait

A
C A R I G A R A B A Y

t
Oc
-29
24 Oct

R
Santa Cruz

28

AY 1
HIGHW
Barugo 31 Oct
Carigara
Pinamopoan 2 Nov 23 Oct
San Miguel
2 Nov 1
CA
X V
24 X HW
Y2 TACLOBAN
HIGHWAY 2

Cavite
1st Cav Div
Jaro 20 Oct
29 Oct 30 Oct XX
Palo
Kananga 24th Div
26 Oct 20 Oct

X Tanauan
X
Valencia 30 Oct XX IV
ORMOC X
X
VALLEY Dagami 30 Oct
29 Oct
Tabontabon
96th Div
20 Oct
CATMON
Ormoc Buri HILL
Ipil
Burauen XX
24 Oct Dulag
Mahonag
7th Div
20 Oct
AY 1
HIGHW

PONSON I

Abuyog

SITUATION ON LEYTE
20 October–2 November 1944
Baybay
Axis of Advance, Date

Form Lines Only

0 15

Miles

18
included the superbattleships Yamato and Musashi, successfully
moved through the San Bernardino Strait, then south along the east
coast of Samar Island, northeast of Leyte, to within range of the soft
support shipping.
On the morning of 25 October, after two and one half hours of
desperate fighting by light U.S. Navy escorts, the Japanese battle
fleet mysteriously broke off the engagement and withdrew from the
gulf, thereby leaving unexploited the opportunity presented by the
Third Fleet’s departure. To the north, the Third Fleet caught up with
the Japanese carriers and sank all four of them. These encounters,
later known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, represented the largest naval
battle in the Pacific. The battle cost the IJN most of its remaining
warships, including 3 battleships, one of which was the huge
Musashi, 6 heavy and 4 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers, in addition
to its remaining carriers.
Americans and Japanese came away from the battle of Leyte
Gulf with extremely divergent views of what had occurred. These
different assessments provoked planning revisions which completely
changed the character and duration of the battle for Leyte. The
Americans believed they had dealt the IJN a severe blow; events later
proved them correct. But in the immediate aftermath of the sea bat-
tle, Japanese commanders believed they had ruined the American
carrier force. In fact, they had sunk only one light and two escort
carriers and three destroyers. Nevertheless, convinced that they had
won a major naval victory and bolstered by reports of air victories in
the ten days before A-day, Southern Army resolved to fight the deci-
sive battle on Leyte. Believing MacArthur’s ground forces were now
trapped on the island, the Japanese command moved to wipe out the
Sixth Army. Marshaling available shipping, the Japanese began mov-
ing units to Leyte from other islands in the Philippines as well as
from Japan and China. The first convoy brought units of the 102d
and 30th Divisions during 23–26 October. Over the next six weeks,
eight more convoys brought troops from the 1st, 8th, and 26th
Divisions, and the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade.
ULTRA intercepts reported the approach of this shipping, but
MacArthur’s staff at first thought they indicated the beginning of an
enemy evacuation. The necessary diversion of Third Fleet and Seventh
Fleet aircraft for operations against surviving Japanese fleet units and
the incomplete buildup of the U.S. Fifth Air Force on Leyte itself also
weakened Allied reconnaissance and offensive capabilities in the
immediate vicinity of the battle. Not until the first week in November
did MacArthur’s staff realize that an enemy reinforcement was under

19
 Japanese transport under attack. (National Archives)

way. Thereafter, American forces inflicted severe damage on local

Japanese merchant shipping, sinking twenty-four transports bound for
Leyte and another twenty-two elsewhere in the Philippines, as well as
several warships and smaller vessels. By 11 December, however, the
Japanese had succeeded in moving to Leyte more than 34,000 troops
and over 10,000 tons of materiel, most of it through the port of Ormoc
on the west coast.

20
 For both Krueger and MacArthur the Japanese reinforcement
caused severe problems. Instead of conducting mop-up operations
after clearing the east side of Leyte, the Sixth Army now had to pre-
pare for extended combat in the mountains on its western side. These
new preparations included landing three reserve divisions on Leyte,
which pushed back General MacArthur’s operations schedule for the
rest of the Philippine campaign, as well as the War Department’s
deployment plans in the Pacific.
On the ground the picture still looked bright. The linkup of the
1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions at Carigara on 2 November
closed the highly successful opening drive of the campaign. After
seventeen days of combat operations, the Sixth Army had all of its
first and second phase objectives under control, as well as one third-
phase objective, Abuyog. In addition, elements of the 7th Division
had pushed across the island from the southern end of the XXIV
Corps sector and controlled approaches to the town of Baybay on the
west coast. Only one key area, Ormoc Valley on the west side of the
island, remained to be taken.
To clear Ormoc Valley, General Krueger planned a giant pincer
operation, with X Corps forces moving south through the mountains
and XXIV Corps units pushing north along the western shore. To
overcome the expected increased resistance, especially in the mountain
barrier to the north, Krueger planned to commit his reserve forces, the
32d and 77th Infantry Divisions, and MacArthur agreed to contribute
another, the 11th Airborne.
In this final phase, units of both corps would be operating on ter-
rain much more rugged than that encountered on the eastern coast of
the island and in Leyte Valley. North of Ormoc Valley, units of the X
Corps would have to make their way south along a ten-mile stretch
of Highway 2 through the dense mountainous neck at the northwest
shoulder of the island. South of Ormoc Valley, elements of the XXIV
Corps would have to advance northward some thirty miles along the
coast from Baybay to Ormoc City, all the while under observation of
ridgelines only a few hundred yards inland, and then continue north
another twelve miles to link up with units of the X Corps. The moun-
tainous terrain north and south of Ormoc Valley offered excellent
opportunities for the Japanese to again display the formidable defen-
sive skills for which they were now well known.
For the initial drive on Ormoc Valley, General Sibert’s X Corps
had the dual missions of opening Highway 2 south through the moun-
tains and closing several other mountain passes through which
Japanese forces might counterattack American positions in Leyte

21
 BILIRAN
S
A
M
A

R
San Isidro
C A R I G A R A B A Y
28 Dec

HWY 1
Santa Cruz
24th Div 10 Nov
Barugo
Tabango Carigara
32d Div
29 Dec L San Miguel
Pinamopoan
24th Div E
Antipolo Pt. 1st Cav Div Y
29 Dec 32d Div 13 Nov TACLOBAN
T
1st Div E
Villaba Cavite
29 Dec
12 Nov HIG
1st Cav HW
Jaro AY
2

V
Tibur Div P S
Kananga OR

A
C S
28 Dec 21 Dec X XXX RP Palo
CO

L
77th(-) IV
102d Div

L
XX

E
Tanauan
HW

Y
96th Div
Y2

18 Dec
ORMOC Valencia
31 Dec VALLEY
Palompon Dagami
Tabontabon

Ormoc 16th Div

10 Dec 6 Dec
77th (-) 149th
25 Dec Ipil Inf Reg
Mahonag Burauen
11th Abn Div Dulag
26th Div
77th Div
7 Dec

7th Div
HIGHWAY 1

PONSON I

Abuyog
SITUATION ON LEYTE
7 November–31 December 1944
Axis of Advance, Date Baybay
Front Line, 7 Dec
Japanese Attack
Form Lines Only
0 15

Miles

Valley along the east side of the island. To carry out all these missions,
Sibert required additional forces, and on 30 October General Krueger
directed General Hodge to return the 21st RCT from the Panaon area
to the 24th Division and replace it with a battalion of the 32d Infantry.
While awaiting the return of its third regiment, Irving’s 24th Division

22
prepared to sweep the rest of the northern coast before turning south
into the mountains.
On 3 November the 24th Division’s 34th Infantry moved out from
its position two miles west of Carigara. The 1st Battalion soon came
under attack from a ridge along the highway. Supported by the 63d Field
Artillery Battalion, the unit cleared the ridge, and the 34th Infantry con-
tinued unopposed that night through the town of Pinamopoan, halting at
the point where Highway 2 turns south into the mountains. Along the
five-mile advance west from Carigara, the infantrymen recovered
numerous weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including three 75-mm.,
one 40-mm., and five 37-mm. guns, as well as much ammunition, equip-
ment, and documentation. Then, after a short delay necessitated by
Krueger’s concern over a possible seaborne Japanese counterattack
along Leyte’s northern coast, the 24th Division, strengthened by the
return of the 21st Infantry, began its drive south.
On 7 November the 21st Infantry went into its first sustained com-
bat on Leyte when it moved into the mountains along Highway 2, less
than one mile inland of Carigara Bay. The fresh regiment, with the 3d
Battalion, 19th Infantry, attached immediately ran into strong defens-
es of the newly arrived Japanese 1st Division, aligned from east to
west across the road and anchored on fighting positions built of heavy
logs and with connecting trench lines and countless spider holes. The
entire defense complex soon became known as “Breakneck Ridge.”
Three days later, American progress was further impeded by a
typhoon, which had begun on 8 November, and heavy rains that fol-
lowed for several days. Despite the storm and high winds, which
added falling trees and mud slides to enemy defenses and delayed sup-
ply trains, the 21st Infantry continued its attack. Progress was slow
and halting, with assault companies often having to withdraw and
attack hills that had been taken earlier. Fortunately, the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, had seized the approaches to Hill 1525, two miles east
of the road enabling General Irving to stretch out the enemy defenses
further across a four-mile front straddling Highway 2.
After five days of battering against seemingly impregnable posi-
tions atop heavily jungled hills and two nights of repulsing enemy
counterattacks, Irving decided on a double envelopment of the
defending 1st Division. He ordered the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,
to swing east around Hill 1525 behind the enemy right flank, cutting
back to Highway 2, three miles south of Breakneck Ridge. To envel-
op the enemy left flank on the west side of the road Irving sent the
1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, over water from the Carigara area to a
point two miles west of the southward turn of Highway 2. Lt. Col.

23
 Filipino volunteers carry supplies into the mountains to reach
1st Cavalry Division troops. (National Archives)

Thomas E. Clifford moved the battalion inland. They crossed one

ridge line and the Leyte River, then swung south around the enemy’s
left flank and approached Kilay Ridge, the most prominent terrain
feature behind the main battle area.
Although encountering strong opposition and heavy rains, which
reduced visibility to only a few yards, both American battalions had
reached positions only about 1,000 yards apart on opposite sides of the
highway by 13 November. On that day, Clifford’s battalion attacked
Kilay Ridge on the west side of the highway while the 2d Battalion,
19th Infantry, assaulted a hill on the east side. Neither unit was able to
carry out its objective or close Highway 2.

24
 For two weeks Clifford’s men struggled through rain and mud,
often dangerously close to friendly mortar and artillery fire, to root the
enemy out of fighting positions on the way up the 900-foot Kilay
Ridge. But on both Kilay and Breakneck Ridges the Japanese conduct-
ed a bitter, skillful defense. On 2 December Clifford’s battalion finally
cleared the heights overlooking the road and began turning over the
area to fresh units of the 32d Division. During the struggle, the 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry, lost 26 killed, 101 wounded and 2 missing,
but accounted for an estimated 900 enemy dead. For their arduous
efforts against Kilay Ridge and adjacent areas, both flanking battalions
received Presidential Unit Citations. Clifford himself received the
Distinguished Service Cross for the action.
While the struggle for the Kilay Ridge area was taking place, other
operations in the X Corps zone proceeded apace. To assist Sibert,
General Krueger transferred the 32d Division to the X Corps on 14
November; Sibert in turn began replacing the exhausted units of the
24th Division with those of the 32d, commanded by Maj. Gen.
William H. Gill. Meanwhile, operating east of the Breakneck-Kilay
Ridge area, the 1st Cavalry Division had fought its way southwest of
Carigara through elements of the defending 102d Division to link up
with 32d Division infantrymen near Highway 2 on 3 December. But it
was not until 14 December that the two divisions finally cleared all of
the Breakneck-Kilay Ridge area, placing the most heavily defended
portions of Highway 2 between Carigara Bay and the Ormoc Valley
under X Corps control.
Throughout this phase, American efforts had become increasing-
ly hampered by logistical problems. Mountainous terrain and
impassable roads forced Sixth Army transportation units to impro-
vise resupply trains of Navy landing craft, tracked landing vehicles,
airdrops, artillery tractors, trucks, even carabaos and hundreds of
barefoot Filipino bearers. Not surprisingly, the complex scheduling
of this jerry-built system slowed resupply as well as the pace of
assaults, particularly in the mountains north and east of Ormoc
Valley and subsequently in the ridgelines along Ormoc Bay.
While the X Corps was making its way through the northern
mountains, the XXIV Corps had been attempting to muster forces
around Baybay for its drive north along the west coast through the
Ormoc Valley. Yet, in mid-November the XXIV Corps still had only
the 32d Infantry in western Leyte, with the remainder of the 7th
Division still securing the Burauen area. Only the arrival of the 11th
Airborne Division on Leyte in strength around the 22d allowed the
corps commander, General Hodge, to finally shift Arnold’s entire 7th

25
Division to the west. But almost immediately, further delays ensued.
As the 32d Infantry consolidated the division’s jump-off positions
about ten miles north of Baybay, it suddenly came under attack by the
Japanese 26th Division on the night of 23 November. The regiment’s
2d Battalion was pushed back, then regained lost ground the next day.
To prevent another setback, General Arnold attached the 1st Battalion,
184th Infantry, to the 32d Infantry. Also supporting the American
defensive effort was a platoon from the 767th Tank Battalion, two 105-
mm. batteries from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and one Marine
Corps 155-mm. battery. The larger caliber unit was from the 11th Gun
Battalion, one of two Marine Corps artillery battalions originally
scheduled for the invasion of Yap but transferred to Sixth Army con-
trol when that operation was canceled. Pummeled by heavy fire from
these artillery units, the Japanese went straight for them the night of
the 24th, putting four 105-mm. pieces out of action. By cannibalizing
parts, the American gunners minimized the loss, and the next day part
of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion arrived, giving the 7th Division
one 155-mm. and four 105-mm. batteries to support what had now
become a major defensive effort.
Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese mounted two more
attacks on consecutive nights. Not until the morning of 27 November
were American troops able to take the offensive, counting at the time
some 400 enemy dead outside of their perimeter and discovering
over 100 more along with 29 abandoned machine guns as they
advanced farther northwards that day. The 7th Division soldiers
dubbed the successful defense of the Damulaan area “the Shoestring
Ridge battles” after the precarious supply system that supported
them rather than after the terrain fought over.
After a few days’ rest and a rotation of units, General Arnold
finally began in earnest his advance toward Ormoc with a novel tac-
tic. On the night of 4 December vehicles of the 776th Amphibian
Tank Battalion put to sea and leaped-frogged north along the coast
1,000 yards ahead of the ground units. The next morning, the tanks
moved to within 200 yards of the shore and fired into the hills in
front of the advancing 17th and 184th regiments. This tactic proved
effective, greatly disorganizing the defenders, except where ground
troops encountered enemy pockets on reverse slopes inland, shielded
from the offshore tank fire.
As the 7th Division pushed north with a two-regiment front, the
17th Infantry inland encountered heavy enemy fire coming from Hill
918, from which the entire coast to Ormoc City could be observed. It
took two days of intense fighting against enemy units supported be

26
mortar and artillery fire for the 17th and 184th regiments to clear the
strongpoint, after which the advance north accelerated. By 12
December, General Arnold’s lead battalion was less than ten miles
south of Ormoc City.
While the advance on Ormoc continued events both alarming and
reassuring occurred at other locations on Leyte. In early December,
elements of the Japanese 16th and 26th Divisions in the central moun-
tains combined with the 3d and 4th Airborne Raiding Regiments from
Luzon to attack the airfields in the Burauen area, which the 7th
Division had taken in October. Some 350 Japanese paratroopers
dropped at dusk on 6 December, most of them near the San Pablo
airstrip. Although the Japanese attacks were poorly coordinated, the
enemy was able to seize some abandoned weapons and use them
against the Americans over the next four days. Hastily mustered
groups of support and service troops held off the Japanese until the
11th Airborne Division, reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry,
and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 149th Infantry, 38th Infantry Division,
concentrated enough strength to contain and defeat the enemy para-
troops by nightfall of 11 December. Although the Japanese destroyed a
few American supply dumps and aircraft on the ground and delayed
construction projects, their attacks on the airfields failed to have any
effect on the overall Leyte Campaign.
Meanwhile, on the west side of Leyte, the XXIV Corps received
welcome reinforcements on 7 December with the landing of the 77th
Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, three
and a half miles south of Ormoc City and one mile north of 7th
Division positions. The 77th Division’s 305th, 306th, and 307th
Infantry Regiments came ashore unopposed’ although naval shipping
was subjected to kamikaze air attacks. As the newly committed unit
landed and moved inland’ the 7th Division resumed its march north,
and the defenders were quickly squeezed between the two forces.
The commitment of the 77th Division proved decisive. As soon as
he learned of the new American landing, General Suzuki ordered
those forces then attacking the Burauen airfields to break contact and
cross the mountains to help hold Ormoc Valley. Only small groups of
these troops, exhausted and malnourished, reached the west coast in
time to be of any great use. The strongest opposition facing the 77th
Division came from a force of about 1,740 soldiers, sailors, and para-
troops at Camp Downes, a prewar Philippine constabulary post.
Supported by the 305th and 902d Field Artillery Battalions, General
Bruce’s troops pushed through and beyond Camp Downes to enter
Ormoc City on 10 December, just three days after landing. In the final

27
drive on Ormoc, the 77th Division killed some 1,506 enemy and took
7 prisoners while losing 123 killed wounded and 13 missing.
With the entrance of the 77th Division into Ormoc City, the XXIV
Corps and X Corps stood only sixteen miles apart. In between, the
12th Independent Infantry Regiment, with its defenses anchored on a
blockhouse less than a mile north of the city, represented the last orga-
nized Japanese resistance in the area. For two days the enemy posi-
tions resisted heavy artillery fire and repeated assaults. Finally, on 14
December, the 305th Infantry, following heavy barrages from the
304th, 305th, 306th, and 902d Field Artillery Battalions, and employ-
ing flamethrowers and armored bulldozers, closed on the strongpoint.
Hand-to-hand combat and the inspiring leadership of Capt. Robert B.
Nett cleared the enemy from the blockhouse area. For leading
Company E, 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, forward through intense fire
and killing several Japanese soldiers himself, Captain Nett was award-
ed the Medal of Honor.
Once out of the Ormoc area, the 77th Division rapidly advanced
north through weakening resistance. Moving along separate axes
through Ormoc Valley, its three regiments took Valencia airfield, seven
miles north of Ormoc, on 18 December, and continued north to estab-
lish contact with X Corps units
At the northern end of Ormoc Valley, the 32d Division had met
continued determined opposition from the defending 1st Division
along Highway 2. Moving south past Kilay Ridge on 14 December,
General Gill’s troops entered a heavy rain forest, which limited visi-
bility and concealed the enemy. Because tree bursts in the dense
foliage reduced the effectiveness of artillery, assaults were preceded
by massed machine-gun fire. Troops then used flamethrowers, hand
grenades, rifles, and bayonets to scratch out daily advances measured
in yards. In five days of hard fighting, the 126th and 127th Infantry
advanced less than a mile south of Kilay Ridge. On 18 December,
General Sibert ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to complete the
drive south. The 12th Cavalry Regiment pushed out of the mountains
on a southwest track to Highway 2, then followed fire from the 271st
Field Artillery Battalion to clear a three-mile stretch of the road.
Contact between patrols of the 12th Cavalry and the 77th Division’s
306th Infantry on 21 December marked the juncture of the U.S. X
and XXIV Corps and the closing of the Sixth Army’s pincer maneu-
ver against Ormoc Valley.
While the 77th and 32d Divisions converged on the valley, the
11th Airborne Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing,
had moved into the central mountain passes from the east. After estab-

28
lishing blocking positions in the southern Leyte Valley on 22–24
November, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment pushed farther west
into the mountains on the 25th. After an arduous advance through
steep gorges and hills, heavy rains, and enemy pockets, the regiment
reached Mahonag, ten miles west of Burauen, on 6 December, the
same day Japanese paratroops landed at the Burl and San Pablo air-
fields. On 16 December, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved into the
mountains from the Ormoc Bay area to meet the airborne regiment
and assist its passage westward. The 2d Battalion made slow but
steady progress first through stubborn enemy pockets and at higher
elevations, the same nearly impassable terrain that was slowing the air-
borne troops. But on the 22d3 after two days of battling scattered
Japanese defenders on ridges and in caves, the 7th Division infantry-
men met troops from the 2d Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry
Regiment, which had passed through the 511th, to complete the cross-
island move. Seven weeks of hard fighting through the central and
northern mountains had come to an end and the defeat of Japanese
forces on Leyte was now assured.
The successful X Corps drive south from Carigara Bay and the
XXIV Corps drive north through Ormoc Valley and across the island
left only the bypassed mountains west of Ormoc Valley under
Japanese control. Most enemy troops in that sector were from the 5th
Infantry Regiment, but remnants of at least four other units had also
made their way there. These surviving troops were in poor condition,
having to subsist largely on coconuts and grasses, and their numbers
had been slowly reduced by disease and desertion. To destroy this final
pocket of Japanese resistance, Krueger ordered the 77th Division to
clear the road connecting the northern Ormoc Valley and the port of
Palompon on the northwest coast, while to the north and south other
units policed up remaining Japanese forces along the coast.
General Bruce opened the drive on Palompon by sending the 2d
and 3d Battalions, 305th Infantry, with armor support, west along the
road on the morning of 22 December. The 302d Engineer Battalion
followed repairing and strengthening bridges for armor, artillery, and
supply vehicles. Assault units progressed rapidly through sporadic
enemy fire until they hit strong positions about eight miles short of
Palompon. To restore momentum, General Bruce put the 1st Battalion,
305th Infantry, on Navy landing craft and dispatched it from the port
of Ormoc to Palompon. Supported by fire from mortar boats of the 2d
Engineer Special Brigade and from the 155-mm. guns of the 531st
Field Artillery Battalion, the infantrymen landed at 0720, 25
December, and secured the small coastal town within four hours.

29
Learning of the seizure of the last port open to the Japanese, General
MacArthur announced the end of organized resistance on Leyte. But
Japanese defenders continued to fight as units until 31 December.
Farther north, other American forces made faster progress against
more disorganized and dispirited enemy troops. Elements of the 1st
Cavalry Division reached the coast on the 28th, and two days later met
patrols of the 32d Division. Also on the 28th, companies of the 34th
Infantry, 24th Division, cleared the last enemy positions from the
northwest corner of Leyte. On 26 December, as these sweeps contin-
ued3 General MacArthur transferred control of operations on Leyte
and Samar to the Eighth Army. Although Japanese forces no longer
posed a threat to American control there, the mop-up of stragglers
continued until 8 May 1945.
The campaign for Leyte cost American forces a total of 15,584
casualties, of which 3,504 were killed in action. In their failed defense
of Leyte, the Japanese lost an estimated 49,000 troops, most of them
combat forces. Although General Yamashita still had some 250,000
troops on Luzon, the additional loss of air and naval support at Leyte
so narrowed his options that he now had to fight a defensive, almost
passive, battle of attrition on Luzon, clearly the largest and most
important island in the Philippines. In effect, once the decisive battle
of Leyte was lost, the Japanese themselves gave up all hope of retain-
ing the Philippines, conceding to the Allies in the process a critical
bastion from which Japan could be easily cut off from her resources in
the East Indies and from which the final assaults on the Japanese home
islands could be launched.

Analysis
The campaign for Leyte proved the first and most decisive opera-
tion in the American reconquest of the Philippines. The Japanese
invested heavily in Leyte, and lost. The campaign cost their army four
divisions and several separate combat units, while their navy lost twen-
ty-six major warships, and forty-six large transports and merchant-
men. The struggle also reduced Japanese land-based air capability in
the Philippines by more than 50 percent, forcing them to depend on
suicidal kamikaze pilots.
For the U.S. Army, the results of the campaign were mixed. The
fight for Leyte lasted longer than expected, and the island proved diffi-
cult to develop as a military base. These and other setbacks had their
basis in several intelligence failures. Most important, MacArthur’s
headquarters had failed to discern Japanese intentions to fight a deci-

30
sive battle on Leyte. Thus, not enough covering air and naval support
was available to prevent the substantial enemy troop influx between 23
October and 11 December. This reinforcement, in turn, lengthened the
fight on the ground for Leyte and forced the commitment of units,
such as the 11th Airborne Division, held in reserve for subsequent
operations. Of course, an ever present factor was the dedication of the
individual Japanese soldier, the tactical skills he displayed in defensive
warfare, especially in using the difficult terrain to his own advantage,
and the willingness of his commanders to sacrifice his life in actions
that had little chance of being decisive.
In their first combat test, the U.S. field army and corps headquarters
generally performed well, with only a few notable errors. One error
concerned the attack of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry, during
the typhoon of 8–9 November; the effort wasted troop energy and
morale in conditions that made a coordinated assault nearly impossible.
In contrast, the XXIV Corps’ use of amphibious assaults during the
campaign showed both innovation and flexibility. But there were also
shortcomings at the tactical level. Unit leaders, for example, discovered
many problems with available maps, which had distance discrepancies
as high as 50 percent. Patrolling and interrogations compensated only
partially for such inadequacies, and the thick vegetation and inclement
weather limited the value of aerial reconnaissance.
One of General Krueger’s operational decisions has also been a
topic of considerable debate. His 4 November order for X Corps to
remain on the north coast of Leyte to counter a possible Japanese
amphibious assault rather than immediately beginning the southward
advance through the mountains toward Ormoc gave the recently
arrived Japanese 1st Division two days to strengthen its defenses. Had
the advance taken place earlier, the X Corps might have taken the
defenders of Breakneck Ridge by surprise and avoided the typhoon as
well. But the unpredictable nature of the Japanese defenders—from
their use of kamikazes and airborne units to the commitment of almost
their entire surface fleet without air cover—was underlined repeatedly
during the campaign, at times making caution appear the wisest
American course of action.
Supply problems also plagued the Sixth Army throughout the
campaign. They actually began weeks before the invasion, when the
two-month acceleration of A-day resulted in the disorganized load-
ing of transports in staging areas. This in turn caused a disorderly
pile-up on beaches of items not yet needed as troops searched for
supplies of more immediate importance. In addition, enemy resis-
tance on A-day forced the diversion of the 24th Division’s LSTs to

31
32
33
the 1st Cavalry Division’s beaches, which disrupted shore party
operations and overloaded the cavalry’s supply dumps.
The progress of combat operations inland raised new problems as
the distance between combat units and beach depots steadily
increased. Many were solved by a combination of innovation and
labor-intensive methods, but more effective solutions would have to
await development of better air and ground delivery systems as well as
the organizational reforms necessary to accommodate them.
The largest single category of problems, however, were those the
engineers dealt with during the continuous struggle with terrain and
weather. Despite long U.S. Army experience in the Philippines, Sixth
Army construction planning proved deficient. Most areas thought to be
ideal for airfield and road development, especially those in the south-
ern Leyte Valley, proved too wet to sustain traffic. General Casey’s
ASCOM engineers began work on three airfields—Burl, San Pablo,
and Bayug—only to be halted by General Krueger on 25 November
when it became obvious they could not be made serviceable. The
Japanese had built the Tacloban airfield3 but in order for the Fifth U.S.
Air Force to make full use of it, the engineers had to undertake a huge
landfill operation to redirect and lengthen the runway. In the end only
one new airfield was built on Leyte—at Tanauan on the east coast, the
initial site of Sixth Army headquarters. Moreover, this project necessi-
tated moving and rebuilding General Krueger’s command post.
The situation was not much better for road construction. The best
existing routes were gravel, and quickly broke down under the weight
of American heavy weapons and equipment. The torrential rains of the
typhoon season, totaling thirty-five inches in forty days, accelerated
their deterioration and delayed all types of construction.
Finally, the slow progress of combat operations ashore also com-
plicated the construction program. As the assault inland and on the
west coast continued more engineer units had to be detached from air-
field and road construction on the east coast to maintain supply routes,
further delaying construction of not only airfields but hospitals, troop
shelters, and other projects as well. Thus, as a ready supply base or a
stepping stone to Luzon and the other Philippine Islands, Leyte proved
less than satisfactory.
Yet, in balance, the Sixth Army’s performance on Leyte had more
to commend than to criticize. Throughout the campaign Army units
demonstrated great skill at amphibious operations and combined arms
tactics in challenging terrain and climate. The rotation of combat units
ensured that the American ground offensive rarely lost its momentum,
while the Japanese Army commanders were never able to concentrate

34
for anything close to a serious counterattack, despite the size of the
combat forces that they committed. The only real threat to the cam-
paign occurred at sea, when the U.S. fast carrier task forces were lured
north and the Sixth Army’s support vessels lay briefly at the mercy of
the Japanese surface fleet.
In the end the Japanese decision to stake everything on the battle
for Leyte only hastened their final collapse as they lacked the ability to
coordinate the mass of air, ground and naval forces that they commit-
ted to the struggle. Even before the f ighting on Leyte ended,
MacArthur’s forces had moved on to invade Luzon and the rest of the
Philippines, thereby consolidating their hold on this former Japanese
bastion and completing a final major step toward Japan itself.

35
 Further Readings
The official history of the Leyte Campaign has been augmented by
many popular and scholarly accounts. The views of senior American
ground commanders on the campaign are presented in Douglas
MacArthur, Reminiscences (1964), and Walter Krueger, From Down
Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II (1953). The
strategic debate over objectives in the Western Pacific is explained by
Robert Ross Smith in “Luzon Versus Formosa,” Chapter 21 of Kent
Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (1960). A readable
overview of the campaign is Stanley L. Falk, Decision at Leyte (1966).
In the 1970s, the declassification of cryptanalytic documentation relat-
ing to the Pacific war allowed fuller treatment of the intelligence back-
ground to the Leyte Campaign. A scholarly example of such is “The
Missing Division: Leyte, 1944,” Chapter 6 of Edward J. Drea,
MacArthur’s ULTRA; Codebreaking and the War Against Japan,
1942-1945 (1992). The most extensive treatment of the campaign
itself remains M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the
Philippines (1987), a volume in the series United States Army in
World War II.

CMH Pub 72–27

Cover: U.S. Navy landing craft unload supplies.

(National Archives)

36 PIN : 072923–000