National Infrastructure Protection Center: Risk Management: An Essential Guide To Protecting Critical Assets
National Infrastructure Protection Center: Risk Management: An Essential Guide To Protecting Critical Assets
National Infrastructure Protection Center: Risk Management: An Essential Guide To Protecting Critical Assets
November 2002
Summary
Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 made security an urgent issue in both
the public and private sectors. Any organization that plays a role in the nation’s critical
infrastructure is seeing a new level of threat. For example, one security issue that has re-
ceived heightened attention is the cyber threat, as many analysts indicate that future at-
tacks could involve an attack on computer networks. Many modern security programs,
including those for national computer networks, are adopting a risk management ap-
proach as a means to counter this growing threat within the context of dwindling re-
sources.
Risk avoidance, the model used by professionals to address security in the past,
focused only on preventing loss or damage without reference to the degree of risk. Risk
management, in contrast:
Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
This document will help managers considering security reviews or risk assess-
ments by providing guidance on how to review those assessments for thoroughness. Es-
sentially, the Risk Management model is a threat appropriate response. The following
sections define the terms used in the risk management cycle and describe the basic steps
of such a cycle. Whether an organization plans to conduct risk management itself or hire
a company to do it, the assessment should follow the steps in this guide.
Raymond J. Decker
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Testimony before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, October, 31 2001
(GAO-02-208T)
Definitions1
Risk is a function of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. These terms are com-
monly used in a variety of ways in analysis. Therefore, it is useful to define how these
terms are used and how they relate to each other in a risk management context. Risk is the
1
These definitions were derived from material used by the Information Solutions Division of Veridian in
presenting its course on Continuous Risk Management.
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
potential for some unwanted event to occur. Examples of unwanted events include the
loss of information, money, organizational reputation or someone gaining unauthorized
privileged access to your system. Risk is a function of the likelihood of the unwanted
event occurring and its consequences; therefore, the higher the probability and the greater
the consequences, the greater the risk. The likelihood of the unwanted event occurring
depends upon threat and vulnerability.
Threat is the capability and intention of an adversary to undertake actions that are
detrimental to an organization’s interests. Threat is a function of the adversary only; it
cannot typically be controlled by the owner or user of the asset. However, the adversary’s
intention to exploit his capability may be encouraged by a vulnerability in an asset or dis-
couraged by an owner’s countermeasures.
Prior to beginning the analysis some time should be spent in preparation. The ana-
lyst should interview or brief the requestor (asset owner) to identify any constraints on
the study and determine the goals and focus of the effort. The asset owner will best know
what and where his or her assets are and their criticality to the organization. The analyst
should also identify the stakeholders and determine their goals. Stakeholders are people
or organizations that have a vested interest in the protection of an asset. For example, al-
though an organization’s Chief Information Officer may “own” his or her company’s
network, division or department heads have an interest in the availability and integrity of
that network. With that knowledge, an analyst can begin the five steps of the Risk Man-
agement Model2:
1. Asset Assessment
2. Threat Assessment
3. Vulnerability Assessment
2
E. Jopeck, The Risk Assessment: Five Steps to Better Risk Management Decisions, Security Awareness Bulletin, No.
3-97: 5–15.
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
4. Risk Assessment
5. Identification of Countermeasure Options.
Asset Assessment
In the Asset Assessment step, the security specialist (with the assistance of the
asset owner) identifies and focuses only on those assets important to the mission or op-
eration. By identifying and prioritizing these assets, an organization takes the first step
towards focusing their resources on that which is most important. Most assets are tangible
(e.g., people, facilities, equipment) others are not (e.g., information, processes, reputa-
tion). In infrastructure operations, information and automated processes may be more im-
portant than many tangible assets. Organizations need to protect sensitive or proprietary
information—including information about the functions of the organization and its em-
ployees—as well as critical processes such as power generation, water purification, or
financial transfers. For each individual asset, identify undesirable events and the effect
that the loss, damage, or destruction of that asset would have on the organization. The
overall value of the asset is based upon the severity of this effect. A worksheet is used to
record the results of the Asset Assessment (see Table 1). Asset Assessment is the most
important step of the risk management process as the next three steps build upon it.
Threat Assessment
In the Threat Assessment step, the security specialist focuses on the adversaries or
events that can adversely affect the previously identified assets. The analyst or security
specialist must replace intuition with a reliance on data and information obtained from
research and interviews. As stated, the threat is considered in terms of adversaries. Com-
mon types of adversaries include criminals, business competitors, hackers, foreign intel-
ligence services, terrorists, and others. In order to assess whether an adversary poses a
threat the analyst or security specialist must determine if they have the intent and capabil-
ity to cause an unwanted event and their history (proven track record) of successful at-
tacks against the types of assets identified in Step 1. As above, information and auto-
mated processes must be considered.
Just as natural disasters and accidents are treated as threats even though they do
not possess intent, cyber events (e.g. viruses and denial-of-service attacks) may also be
treated as independent threats. Any organization that connects critical networks to the
Internet must be aware of events in the larger environment. When short-term periods of
intense politically-motivated protests take place, the infrastructure community can expect
that it may be attacked, physically or via cyber means, regardless of the individual or-
ganization’s involvement in the event being protested. Protesters often view utility com-
panies as part of the government, regardless of whether they are privately operated.
Companies or banks may also be attacked as symbols of globalization. Even protests be-
tween two foreign nations can spill over into the United States. Because the United States
is a multicultural nation with a large global presence, U.S. organizations may suffer from
attacks for any number of misguided reasons.
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
An efficient way for the analyst or security specialist to organize the threat data is
by using a Threat Assessment Worksheet (see Table 2). This worksheet lists assets and
undesirable events from the asset assessment worksheet. Each adversary that poses a
threat to the organization’s assets is listed next to each undesirable event that the adver-
sary could cause. Next, the analyst enters what is known about the adversary’s intent and
capability to carry out the undesirable event. In addition, the analyst documents the ad-
versary’s history of causing the undesired event. The result is an overall threat level for
that adversary. This worksheet allows the assessment information to be efficiently organ-
ized, documented, and later integrated into the complete analysis.
Vulnerability Assessment
When designing and installing security systems security specialists should not
count on vendors alone to build in appropriate levels of security. An assessment provided
by an independent contractor that specializes in vulnerability surveys can provide the or-
ganization with an objective portrait of its vulnerabilities. It is essential that security spe-
cialist be, and stay, involved in the process—cradle to grave.
This step requires the security specialist to look at an asset from the outside in-
ward as each of the potential adversaries might look at it. Specifically, the specialist
should begin by studying the asset and asking questions such as: “If I wanted to physi-
cally harm this facility, I would…” or, “If I were a hacker, I would break into this by…”
and so on down the list of adversaries and undesirable events. The severity of each vul-
nerability, when considered against the adversaries who might exploit them, and the as-
sets they may attack, will then increase or decrease in importance. Therefore, the analyst
or security specialist will be able to identify the relevant vulnerabilities most likely to be
exploited by the adversary (see Table 3).
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
Risk Assessment
The Risk Assessment step is the point in the model where all of the earlier as-
sessments (asset, threat, and vulnerability) are combined and evaluated in order to give a
complete picture of the risks to an asset or group of assets. Using the worksheets in steps
1 through 3 the security specialist has arrived at individual category ratings by systemati-
cally analyzing the following questions:
• What is the likely effect if an identified asset is lost or harmed by one of the
identified unwanted events?
• How likely is it that an adversary or adversaries can and will attack those identi-
fied assets?
• What are the most likely vulnerabilities that the adversary or adversaries will
use to target the identified assets?
The purpose of this step is to evaluate how each of these ratings interacts to arrive
at a level of risk for each asset. A risk analysis worksheet is extremely helpful in aligning
all of this information into a readable and easily understood format that summarizes the
previously collected information. Using the risk analysis worksheet (see Table 4) as a
guide, the specialist should review all of the important factors associated with that single
asset, referring back to the earlier worksheets and supporting data when necessary to un-
derstand how each increases or decreases the overall risk. By reviewing these ratings the
specialist or analyst can begin to make an informed judgment of how “at risk” each asset
is from its corresponding unwanted event(s). Looking across the worksheet, the analyst
should be able to determine where the major vulnerabilities and threats lie, and compare
risks across the spectrum of assets. At this point, an analyst is able to determine the major
physical and cyber risks as well as which of these risks require immediate attention.
The terms used in the ratings may be imprecise. Although verbal ratings (low,
medium, high, etc.) are subjective and hard to combine, they may be more comfortable to
brief, depending on the audience. In situations where more precision is required, a nu-
merical rating on a 1 to 10 scale can be used. A numerical scale is easier for an analyst to
replicate and combine in an assessment with other scales.
A simple equation provides the underpinnings of the numerical system for rating
risks and is expressed by the following: Risk = consequence × (threat × vulnerability). In
this formula the “threat × vulnerability” segment represents the probability of the un-
wanted event occurring, and the “loss effect” represents the consequence of the loss of
the asset to the organization.
When the needs of the risk acceptance authority (the person with the authority,
financial and organizational, to reduce, retain, or transfer the risks identified on behalf of
the organization) require only an assessment of risk to an asset, some analyses will end at
this point. In most cases, however, the analyst will also recommend countermeasures or
other options to the risk acceptance authority. In such cases, the following step is also
included in the Risk Management Model.
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
Continuous Assessment3
This model is a continuous process and not intended to result in a one-time “snap-
shot” of an organization’s risk profile. Organizations that embrace an intelligent approach
to risk management will constantly monitor any changes in their assets, the threat, and
their vulnerabilities, as well as the larger infrastructure of which the organization is an
element. As changes appear, the analyst will return to the model, enter the changes, pos-
sibly arrive at a new risk assessment, and recommend new countermeasure options. The
continuous nature of risk assessment allows organizations to develop a risk-aware culture
that understands, validates, and implements the decisions of the risk acceptance authority
and the resulting countermeasures. New threats will emerge, some from new sources,
which may be low-tech as well as high-tech. The resulting risks may appear too quickly
to be addressed in a traditional top-down fashion. Organizations using a process of con-
tinuous assessment will be better able to manage these new risks in a timely manner, and
for a longer period of time.
Conclusion
3
Derived from material used by the Information Solutions Division of Veridian in presenting its course on
Continuous Risk Management.
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
General Accounting Office (GAO), successful risk management organizations have sen-
ior management who support and are involved in the process, employ the concept of
“Risk Acceptance Authority” and create procedures for establishing and tracking ac-
countability. This general approach is used or endorsed by federal agencies, government
commissions, and multinational corporations (GAO-02-208T Homeland Security). By
following the steps in this risk management guide, the security specialist and asset stake-
holder can assess physical and cyber risks to their organization and address them appro-
priately. Furthermore, this reduction in their organization’s overall risk can be accom-
plished in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
This product was completed with support from the CRUCIAL PLAYER project.
CRUCIAL PLAYER is an interagency project initiated in 1999 by the Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Deputy Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and funded by DoD and FBI. The project is managed by
the National Infrastructure Protection Center, Washington D.C. Major contri-
butions to this product were made by Ed Jopeck, Paul Ruehs, and Scott
Curthoys. Forward comments or questions to NIPC at 202-324-2084.
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HOW SEVERE ARE YOUR CYBER RISKS? A GUIDE TO RISK MANAGEMENT
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
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Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets
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