Spring|2010

Indian Political Communication and Digital Technology

Priya Shah

Abstract:

India, the largest and most diverse democracy is the world, conducts elections every five years.
Political communication during these elections is fierce and fervent. This paper will study the
use of technology in past elections and examine its success and failure in India‘s diverse
landscape. The paper will conclude with suggestions to enhance the use of digital technology as
a potent political communication tool in India.

___________________________________________________________________________

Advisor: Helen Ostrowski, New York University.

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"In India, I found a race of mortals living upon the Earth, but not adhering to it, inhabiting cities, but not being fixed to
them, possessing everything, but possessed by nothing"
Apollonius Tyanaeu

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Table of Content

1) Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...1

2) Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….4

3) Political Communication in India ……………………………………………………….8

4) The 2004 Election Campaign in India…………………………………………………...12

5) Use of Technology in the 2004 Election………………………………………………...17

6) Growth and Changes in the Internet and Mobile technology Industry from 2004 to

2009……………………………………………………………………………………...22

7) Events Imprinting the Impact of Internet and Mobile technology

Communications…………………………………………………………………………25

8) The Indian Election 2009………………………………………………………………...29

9) Analyzing Use of Social Media for Political Communication in India………………….37

10) Best Practices …………………………………………………………………………...42

11) Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..47

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Introduction

Political communication in India is an intricate and complex balance: Intricate because it

is a logistical nightmare to conduct voting across the geographical and cultural landscape of

India, the second most populated country in the world; Complex because politicians have to

communicate to the largest and most diverse democratic electorate base in the world – a base that

consists of voters from 28 different states and seven union territories that are home to

approximately one billion Indians. Each state in India has its own language, culture, major

religion and certainly, its own problems. To solve these problems and to better serve the people,

each state has numerous parties at the local, district and state level. Given its size and diversity,

each state in its own right could be treated as a country in itself.

The process of elections in India is less than perfect. Every year there are news reports

about corruption, violence and the exchange of money and alcohol for votes during elections.

Dirty laundry and slanderous statements are aired by the dozen. However, what ultimately wins

an election is the promise of a better India that motivates the voters to cast their ballot. Before

understanding political communication in India and the use of technology in service to politics,

one must understand Indian voters and Indian political parties.

First, consider the Indian electorate landscape. Contrary to patterns in other major

democracies around the world, India‘s voter turnout has increased over the years. The highest

voter turnouts are in the local and district elections versus national elections. Minorities and

citizens at the lower end of the social-economical spectrum vote more often than those at the top.

This is because the elite, educated and business classes in India believe that their votes won‘t

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bring about positive change in an already corrupt Indian government system or they think their

votes will bring about insignificant changes to their lives.

Minority politics or identity politics--where ethnic groups are represented by an ethnic

party in a political system--further divide the diverse electorate base, making minority politics a

common practice before elections in India. Fragmenting the electorate base through identity

politics serves a strategic purpose in elections. Divided voters decrease the chance of forming a

majority government. This increases the chance of a coalition government, where a party that is

unable to win by a majority in parliament forms the government with the help of other national,

regional and local parties. This gives regional and local politicians a better probability of being

members of parliament.

On one hand, while minority politics are played, on another, the politics of the majority

are also played. The Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), a major political party, strongly advocates and

associates itself with Hindu nationalism. The concept of Hindu nationalism is rooted in ‗Hindu

Rashtra‘, which means a Hindu nation. (Jain, 1994) With 81 percent of India‘s population as

Hindus, this concept has a strong reach across many states in India.

However, the concept of a majority electorate base is skewed. Shashi Tharoor, current

Indian Minister of State for External Affairs and former UN Under-Secretary for Communication

and Public Information, underscores this idea with the example of a Hindu male from the most

populated and politically important state in India: Uttar Pradesh.

―(The Hindu male) may cherish the illusion that he represents the ‗majority

community,‘ an expression much favored by the less industrious of our

journalists. But he does not. As a Hindu, he belongs to the faith adhered to by 81

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 percent of the population. But a majority of the country does not speak Hindi. A

majority does not hail from Uttar Pradesh, though you could be forgiven for

thinking otherwise when you go there. And, if he were visiting say, my home

state of Kerela, he would be surprised to discover that the majority there is not

even male. Even his Hinduism is no guarantee of his majority-hood, because his

caste automatically puts him in a minority. If he is Brahmin, 90% of his fellow

Indians are not. If he is a Yadav, a ―backward cast,‖ 85 percent of his fellow

Indians are not. And so on.‖ (Tharoor, 2007)

Mr. Tharoor‘s example clearly indicates that, even though groups can be carved out of

the vast electorate base, those groups can further be fragmented. In recent times, the most

important electorate segment is the youth of India. Forty percent of Indians are under the age of

18 and seventy percent are under the age of 35. From the 1998 elections, the electorate

demographic majority has been centering towards the youth. This demographic grew up

watching more than one channel on television and was exposed to western culture through the

likes of MTV and Bollywood. Yet, it too is fragmented. While air conditioning costs may be a

problem for the urban youth, access to electricity is a problem for the rural youth. While getting

into a competitive MBA college may be a problem for the urban youth, decent education that

guarantees a decent job may be a problem for the rural youth. Besides accessibility and financial

status, these youth can further be divided by caste, creed and religion.

Now, consider the political party landscape. For every seat that was contested for the

2009 national election, 15 candidates campaigned to win it. For a political party to be considered

a national party, it must operate in more than four Indian states. As a result, the India National

Congress, Bharatiya Janta Party and The Communist Party of India (Marxist) among a few other

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national parties are prime runners for victory in an election. As much as a party has to

communicate with its audience, political parties have to also keep healthy alliances as coalition

politics is a common phenomena in India.

With such a complex political system and a huge diverse electorate base, political

communication in India is difficult. Each tool used has varied effects, depending on the targeted

audience and location. To understand the place of digital technology as a political

communication tool, it is important to study previous political campaigns and their use of

technology.

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Political Communication in India

The most common form of political communication in India is public meetings. Initially

used during India‘s freedom struggle, this form of communication overcomes two of the biggest

barriers of communicating in India: diversity and language. It wouldn‘t be too farfetched to state

that these public meetings, which most often take place in rural India, are mini-festivals. The

festival begins as soon as the trails of jeeps are spotted making the first curve into the village.

Political supporters half run, half sprint alongside shiny bullet-proof vehicles, hoping to get a

glimpse of the politicians within. The mini-festival ends when the speech is over, promises are

made and new rays of hope flirt within voters‘ minds. Myron Weiner, in his book, India Votes

1978, wrote:

―In a country with a high level of illiteracy and a correspondingly low newspaper

circulation, a radio system that is controlled by the government and reaches only a

fraction of the population, and a government-controlled television system that

broadcasts only to selected urban areas and a handful of villages, participation in

an election campaign largely takes the form of attendance at public meetings.

Public meetings for political purposes had been banned before the relaxation of

emergency, and after the ban was lifted they proliferated like mushrooms after

rain‖. (Weiner, 1978)

Up until the 1980s, political communication in India was largely grassroots, door-to-door

campaigns, print ads, graffiti and public meetings. However, the 1989 election introduced the use

of technology for mainstream campaigning. Rajiv Gandhi today recognized as the man who led

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the technology revolution in India and the grandchild of Jawaharlal Nehru, India‘s first Prime

Minister, was contesting to be re-elected. During this election, the majority of the population had

televisions that broadcasted Doordarshan, a government-controlled channel; in fact, it was the

only broadcasted channel on television. Mr. Gandhi overtly used this medium to campaign

during the 1989 election and populated it with campaign messages. The repetition of the same

message by Rajiv Gandhi and the absence of any alternative message on television produced a

lack of credibility, boredom and indifference due to overexposure and disbelief. (Rudolph,

1993)

It was also during this time that Rajiv Gandhi first employed the help of advertising and

public relations firms, adding a miniscule amount of corporate behavior to a political system

known for its volatility and lack of coordination, a trend that has since been continued.

Political parties that had no control over radio or television broadcasts resorted to video

and audio cassettes. These mediums were used to play key messages and slogans, party songs

and symbols and often relayed party speeches. Trucks filled with equipment, known as Video-

on-Wheels, showed these video cassettes to villagers that did not have equipment to do so

themselves. They were like theaters-on-wheels, often acting as a form of escapist entertainment

for the rural population of India who rarely got to view recorded material of any sort. With

limited or no other source of information, these people often believed what was being shown to

them regardless of whether it was true or not.

Some political parties even resorted to using Bollywood actors to campaign for their

parties, a strategy that is still being used and perceived as an effective crowd-pulling technique.

The 9th General Election of 1989 incorporated the use of television, radio, video-audio cassettes

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and even celebrity endorsements. Even with the use of technology and experts, Mr. Gandhi lost.

As India Today, a weekly magazine, published, ―The Irony is that television is what made Rajiv.

It also unmade him. The message became the tedium.‖ (Rudolph, 1993) The biggest users of

technology in the 1989 elections were the ones who lost in the general elections. This is not to

say that they lost because of technology, but to say that technology did not aid their campaigns.

To reiterate, mass media cannot be used to target a diverse population. Technology can

be used as a tool but not as the core tool in a political campaign. Most important, regardless of

the tools used, if the voters are unable to resonate with the party‘s promises and trust its leaders,

no amount of campaigning can help win an election.

From 1989 to 2000, the use of technology had been static. Tools such as grass-root, door-

to-door, print, billboard and television campaigns were being tapped by parties of all statures.

What had changed, however, were political messages. They reflected the instability and

volatility in India as seen in events such as the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, grandson of Indira

Gandhi (who too was assassinated), economic liberalization in 1991, communal riots in 1992,

the fall of a government in 1996 and relapse of communal riots in 2002. The country was

changing, but the means to speak to her were still stagnant. This would soon change. Old

mediums were used with new vigor and new mediums were introduced. The 2004 election

changed the future of political communication in India.

The voters, too, were more informed due to the liberalization of media. The newspaper

industry was booming, and information was being disseminated widely and at a much quicker

pace. With a more informed voter base, political strategies of the past were less likely to work.

People were actively consuming information, leading to a shift in the way political

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communication was conducted in the 21st century.

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The 2004 Election Campaign in India

The 2004 national election is best described by, Gopaljayal N:

―The Indian parliamentary election of 2004 was an election of many firsts: it was the first

Lok Sabha (national) election of the twenty-first century; it was the first election in which

political communication came to be conducted in the corporate vocabulary of image-

making, branding and marketing; it was the first election after the first ever non-Congress

government completed a full term in office; and it was the first election after which the

elected leader of the single largest party declined the Prime Ministership and nominated

another.‖ (India Review, Volume 3, Issue 3, 2004)

This election brought about a significant change in the political communication arena in

21st century India. The Election Commission of India, a permanent constitutional body entrusted

to overlook the election process, had for the first time laid down strict guidelines for the use of

media in political communication. It instituted a huge penalty for misuse of television and illegal

placement of party posters in public spaces, a practice that, despite the regulation, continues to be

rampant in all parts on India. It also regulated the size limits for billboards and poster cut-outs.

With such strict regulations, political parties turned to the internet and mobile technology -- the

two mediums that were neither used in any prior election, nor regulated. With limited to no

regulation, political parties were free to convey their messages in any manner they saw fit

through these mediums. (Kavitha Shetty, Shyam Tekwani, 2007)

Another significant aspect of the 2004 election was the BJP‘s India Shining campaign,

India‘s first 360-degree political communication exercise that introduced political advertising

with a new vigor. It was the first unified communication exercise in politics that mimicked

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strategies of corporate branding. The BJP was contesting to be re-elected in 2004. The campaign

strategy centered on their achievements in the prior term and their current promises to continue

to keep ‗India Shining‘. Messages of India as an IT superpower, highway development and

mobile technology mass market were relayed in public meetings, posters, print ads, television

ads, mobile technology SMS‘ and on the internet. (Zora & Woreck, 2004 )

The campaign put together by Grey Global Group Inc, cost the BJP $100 million.

(Krishna, 2004) The campaign which was initially supposed to be just a 60-second advertisement

witnessed massive adoption from all audience--so much so that the ‗India Shining‘ slogan made

inroads into daily language usage and became the core message of one of the biggest political

communication exercises in India. Journalists too, were using ‗India Shining‘ to describe

different current affairs like India‘s victory over Pakistan in cricket. According to TV

monitoring company Television Audience Measurement (TAM), this new-age political ad was

aired 9472 times from December 2003 to January 2004. Prior to the election results, most

pundits and advertising gurus had predicted an easy win for BJP. Ashutosh Khanna, then Chief

of Grey Worldwide, said,

"We treated it as a societal-change campaign but now we feel awesome. (Such success)

does not happen in a lifetime. India Shining should be worth $1 billion because of the

publicity generated from all the chat shows, articles and seminars on the subject.‖ (AFP,

2004)

Atul Phadnis, Director, S-Group, TAM India, further illustrated the campaign‘s

omnipresence as BJP had bought airtime on the most basic television channel Doordarshan, as

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well as regional channels, mass private entertainment channels and specialist channels such as

National Geographic and Discovery.

Besides being ubiquitous on television, the BJP was also ranked second among top

brands for their use of advertising per centimeter square in print media from December 2003 to

January 2004. BJP‘s rationale was to reach everyone through all available media outlets with one

consistent message: India Shining.

On the other hand, the Congress Party was scrambling to get some footing in the pre-

election environment, which was dominated by the buzz of the India Shining campaign. For a

fraction of BJP‘s budget, the Congress Party hired Orchard Advertising and Perfect Relations.

Their messages were primarily centered on attacking the current government‘s prior efforts with

ads that ran slogans such as ―5 crore jobs were promised. Aam Admi Ko Kya Mila?‖ (50 million

jobs were promised, what did the common man get?) . (Subramanian N. , 2004)

While the Congress Party‘s campaign was modest, it primarily did two things: it spoke

specifically to ‗aam admi‘ (common people) and picked on unfulfilled promises made by the

BJP. Another advantage that Congress was banking on was the Gandhi family‘s return to

politics. After ending her political hiatus in 1998, Sonia Gandhi, window of Rajiv Gandhi, had

made concrete changes within the Congress. Her children, Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi, too, were

involved in politics and actively campaigned for the Congress Party, during the 2004 election.

Sonia Gandhi, who was born in Italy and only given Indian citizenship after her marriage

to Rajiv Gandhi, was strongly attacked by opposition political parties on her foreign origins. In

India, where cricket and Bollywood are religion, this concept of a foreigner being Prime Minister

created a life of its own. Towards the end, politicians from opposition political parties even went

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out on a limb to say that they would fast to death but never again let a foreigner rule India.

Amidst all these controversies and the gaining popularity of BJP‘s ‗India Shining‘ campaign,

political pundits and exit polls predicted BJP would win.

The final election brought a wave of disbelief. Political pundits were dumbfounded by the

fact that the Congress Party, along with its allies, was able to defeat the BJP and form a coalition

government. Disbelief soon transferred to disappointment and finally to in-depth analysis. The

most glaring question at that time was: how could a campaign set to cut across all social-

economical classes of Indian society have failed so miserably?

Post-election results showed that Indian voters were not worried about the nationality of

their leader, hence pulling the air out of BJP‘s foreign origin bubble. Results also showed that

messages about India as an IT superpower, road and highway development and the growth in the

mobile technology industry came across as elitist messaging to Indian voters. (Zora & Woreck,

2004 ) To reiterate: the Indian electorate base is diverse and cannot all be reached at the same

time with the same message, regardless of the medium.

The 2004 elections revealed interesting facts about the educated, so-called elitist base,

too. The BJP aggressively broadcasted its messages in metropolitan cities like Bengaluru

(Banglore), Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata (Calcutta) and the then emerging IT hub,

Hyderabad. However, the BJP that relied on these educated young audiences lost these

constituencies. The biggest shock came from the city of Hyderabad that was considered as

India‘s emerging IT outsourcing hub and was considered a high probability winning state for the

BJP.

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 Chandrababu Naidu, the Chief Minister of Andra Pradesh, the state Hyderabad belongs

to, was well recognized and had backing from the World Bank for his vision of globalization for

the state. He aggressively campaigned for IT development in the state--so much so that he carved

out a part of the state and renamed it ‗Cyberabad‘.

While Hyderabad, was being projected as an IT hub, rural places in and around it were

not even equipped with basic amenities. The problems of water, electricity and crop failure had

caused many farmers who heavily relied on corps to support themselves, committed suicide. In

one year, some districts recorded up to 2000 suicides. In a way, this is an example of many

states in India, where thriving cities are bustling with life and energy and at the same time rural

areas, often located only miles away from these cities, are laden in debt and disparity. (Kavitha

Shetty, Shyam Tekwani, 2007)

The loss of an ‗epic‘ political campaign taught political parties one big lesson--which

hype cannot be sold to the Indian electorate base. Further, the 2004 election indicated that the

Indian political and its electorate landscape were extremely diverse. It also clarified that

communication to these diverse audiences had to be personal. In conclusion, it taught political

parties that they had to communicate with and not to the audiences.

There were plenty of tools to communicate to the audience, but tools to communicate

with an audience were limited to the internet and mobile technology. The 2004 elections laid the

foundation for the future use of these tools to foster interactive communication in the elections to

come.

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Use of Technology in the 2004 Elections

The internet and mobile technology were important tools in the 2004 elections both in

terms of their use and the lessons derived. These elections also marked the first time India used

electronic voting machines across her length and breadth, as compared to previous paper ballots

that could be easily rigged. Technology as a tool to ease governance was slowly beginning to

catch wind, with the launch of government websites that helped address citizen problems and

actively gave information about the elections, voting centers and registration process. Internet

and mobile technology as tools for

political communication were debuting on

Indian soil. From 2000 to 2004, India saw

a 684% increase in internet usage, as seen

in the graph. (IndiaStat, Circle-wise

Number of Internet Subscribes in India

2009) The growing adoption and lack of regulation of both mediums were reason enough for

politicians to use these tools to communicate. Even the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan

Samajwadi Party (BSP), who have a large support base amongst the poor and uneducated, had

websites. But the two parties with the most heavily funded online campaigns in 2004 were BJP

and Congress.

The primary purpose of these websites was to disseminate information. Their information

flow consisted of party ideology, biographies, mission statement, photographs, information on

elections and voting. The content, due to technical limitations at that time, was limited to a

one-way communication system. Engagement came in the form of contact details and

registration forms.

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 Shyam Tekwani and Kavitha Shetty, in the book ―The Internet and National Elections”,

conducted comprehensive research on the use of internet in the 2004 elections, surveying 100

websites of different political parties, candidates, NGOs, the government and press. As seen in

the image below, political parties, the government and press were most active in uploading

information regarding issues being debated publicly, images, campaign and election information.

Engagement on most websites was limited to contact forms and rarely provided an option

to either volunteer or register to vote. On the contrary, in the United States, the primary focus of

political websites during the 2004 elections was to encourage visitors to volunteer. As seen in the

image below even fewer websites provided visitors with the possibility of donating, sharing

information with friends via email or proactively receiving information from these websites.

(Kavitha Shetty, Shyam Tekwani, 2007)

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 From Tekwani and Shetty‘s research it is safe to conclude that the primary reason for the

existence of these websites was to provide information to the educated, business-class voters

who had access to the internet. Another reason that political parties used the internet was because

it was an unregulated medium and could be used to air an opposition‘s dirty laundry. The

Congress Party set up www.nationbetrayed.com, a website that was used to denounce the

opposition BJP party.

The BJP used the internet as a logical brand extension of the ‗India Shining‘ campaign.

Even the Congress Party, which had positioned itself as the party that worked for the welfare of

the ‗aam admi‘ (common man), extensively used the internet.

Tekwani and Shetty, conclude that even though in 2004 India was considered an

emerging IT hub, the use of digital technology for politics did not have any significant impact.

Considering the digital divide in India a huge factor for the failure of internet as a political

communication tool, they said,

―India has always been a nation of large contrasts. The economic divide between

rich and poor, between haves and have-not, in India is wide and the recent

technology-inspired economic growth has not helped bridge this gap. It may, in

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 fact, have widened it further. Research suggests that IT growth can often cause

income inequality to rise if incomes in the IT industry rise faster than other

sectors, and if the IT sector does not have strong linkages with other sectors,

which limits the trickledown effect.‖

Besides this digital divide, the penetration of the internet in India, language and education

were major factors that contributed to its failure as an influential medium. In 2004 the internet

penetrated only 3.6 percent of the total population of India. Besides the barrier of reach, the static

nature of the internet failed to aid the use of these mediums as political communication tools.

Content was available mostly in English, and only a small percent of the content was in Indian

languages such as Hindi, Malayalam and Tamil. This further limited the reach of the message to

those voters who were fluent English readers, were computer literates and had access to the

internet. (Kavitha Shetty, Shyam Tekwani, 2007)

Similar to the internet, mobile

technology too saw a sharp increase in

penetration from 2000 to 2004. (IndiaStat,

2009) While the Congress Party did not

fully explore this medium, the BJP drove a

full-scale mobile technology campaign.

The campaign found its core in direct personal communication with the Prime Minister himself.

A one-minute election message of the BJP leader and then prime-minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,

was recorded and relayed to millions of Indians through either their fixed line or mobile

technology phones. It is estimated that the BJP called close to 72 million people--46 million on

fixed lines and 26 million on mobile technology lines. (Prabhat, 2004) This tactic by the BJP

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caused a media frenzy. Leading English dailies in India carried headlines such as ―Pick up the

phone, it may be PM‖. Neena Vyas, journalist for English daily, wrote:

―Pick up your telephone when it rings the next time and you may hear the Prime

Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, delivering his one-minute election campaign

message. Open your e-mail account and you may be flooded with messages from

the Bharatiya Janata Party. And when your mobile technology telephone goes

"ting,'' you may find an SMS message from the party.‖ (Vyas, 2004)

Besides phone calls, SMS and emails, mobile technology users even had the option of

downloading the party anthem as their ringtones and images as their screensavers.

It would be incorrect to say that the strategies implemented for the use of internet and

mobile technology by political parties in the 2004 elections were wrong or flawed. Even with a

few short- comings, most digital strategies were rooted in logic and executed practically. The

question that rose then was: Was the effort, time and money applied to a medium that caters only

to a small percent of the total population worth it?

While political strategists would examine their efforts for the 2004 general elections, they

would also have to keep a keen eye on the technology changes taking place. While the internet

and mobile technology industry were predicted to continue to grow, the changes they would

bring were uncertain. Understanding these changes would be the key to effectively using the

internet and mobile technology as potent political campaign tools in the 2009 elections.

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Growth and Changes in the Internet and Mobile technology Industry from 2004 to 2009

The internet had changed since 2004. There has been a visible increase in not only

internet penetration but also in computer literacy and adaption of the Internet in small cities and

town. There were 54 million computer- literate Indians in 2004, while in 2009 that number

increased to 95 million. Compared to 11 million active internet users in 2004, there were 52

million in 2009. This boost in computer literacy and internet use was due to the rise in cyber

cafes, government initiatives of e-kiosks, and the decrease in the retail price of computers.

(IAMAI, 2010) Moreover, while the internet was once considered the privilege of the educated

and elite class, it was now available to the common man. The areas in India that were most

affected by this transformation were the small cities and towns, as seen in the image below.

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 Besides penetration of the internet, the amount of time spent on this medium also

exponentially increased. By 2009 nearly half of the internet users in India were online at least

four to six times a week. While in 2004 the internet was being used at an average of 6.2 hours

per week, in 2009 this time had doubled to 15.7 hours per week. (IAMAI, 2010) These changes

were a logical extension of the evolution of the internet itself. The internet had seized evolved

from being just a closed to an open, multi-way

communication tool. Google had changed the way

information was being accessed. Websites were

created with the intention to encourage user-

generated content on blogs and social networks. This

changed the way the world began to communicate.

Moreover, corporations in India mandated the use

and knowledge of the internet, making the working

class a new active, internet-using demographic.

By 2009 the internet was the playground of young Indians. School and college students,

young adult men and women had rigorously

adopted the medium and were active

advocates. Use of social networking sites such

as Orkut and Facebook had increased. By

2009, Juxt Consult, an online market research

agency, stated that there were two to three

million blogs in India. The Indian online

community had started to adapt social media

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extensively and widely, as seen in the image. (Mishra, 2009)

Besides dominating the internet, the youth of India were also a dominant demographic in

the mobile technology industry. According to Juxt Consults, India Mobile technology 2009

report, the single largest mobile technology age group in India was between 25 -35 years, while

the age group between 19-24 had the highest penetration as well as propensity to own mobile

technology phones. The occupation that dominated the most use of mobile technology phones

were students, followed by the self-employed. (Consult, 2009)

Mobile technology phones in 2004 were primarily for texting and making calls; since

then the device has evolved. By 2009, mobile technology phones were equipped with cameras,

GPS and, most important, the internet. Today in India, one in every five mobile technology

users uses their phones to access the internet, and half of these users go online daily. (Consult,

2009)

Since 2004, mobile technology technology has cut across class and economic strata

mobile technology technology across class and economic strata. It has changed the way Indians

communicate. Everybody from big business tycoons, executives, students, the local milk men,

the newspaper boy, local grocery vendors and farmers are equipped with mobile technology

phones. The rise in the mobile technology industry, along with the success of its adaption by

Indians, is remarkable. Beside the rise in technology iself, there were three basic events that led

to the use of these tools in the 2009 Indian General Election: the 2008 Mumbai attacks and

Obama‘s US Presidential win and increased innovation in the social media world.

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Events Imprinting the Impact of Internet and Mobile technology Communications

The first—and perhaps most significant—event that changed the way the public (and

hence voters) viewed the reach and use of both the internet and mobile technology technologies

was the Mumbai terrorist attacks. On November 26, 2008, lives were lost, properties damaged

and people‘s spirits were dampened in the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

Seized in their own houses, people were scared, panicked and most importantly overcome

with the feeling of hopelessness. Knowing that their friends and families were in danger,

television, radio, internet and mobile technology phones where the only way for people to stay

informed. Social networks such as blogs, Facebook and Twitter were filled with messages

relaying information people were hearing first hand.

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 The best source of real-time citizen news was on Twitter. As seen in the image below,

Mumbai had become the top trending topic on Twitter.

Twitter calculates these trending topics by the volume of its use by users at a given time.

Vinukumar Ranganathan, a resident of South Mumbai, the epicenter of the attack, took first-hand

pictures which he later posted on Flickr, a photo-sharing service by Yahoo. These photos were

soon picked up by American news channels such as CNN and Fox News and relayed to the rest

of the world.

Blogs were set up to help people get in touch with their loved ones. Reports of blood

donations were actively reported on Twitter and relayed through other social networks. (Mishra,

Gauravonomics, 2008)

Gaurav Mishra, a leading Indian blogger who was at the forefront of reporting online

during the attacks rounded summarized the use and credibility of the use of the internet during

the Mumbai attacks:

26
 ―New media played an important role in the Mumbai terror attacks. Twitter was

the first and fastest updated source of news related to the terror attacks. Vinu‘s

photographs on Flickr were some of the first photographs from the scene. Then

Global Voices, DesiPundit and I, amongst others, spent sleepless nights curating

new media content related to the attack. Dina Mehta, Peter Griffin and others also

stayed awake coordinating the work at the MumbaiHelp blog, directing and

making sense of the conversation on Twitter.‖ (SHARMA, 2008)

In a matter of 24 hours from the time the attacks began, a strong online community was

built with one purpose in mind: helping others in the city they all loved. The reason the online

community during the Mumbai attacks was successful was due to its focus on the local

community of South Mumbai and the well being of its people. It all boiled down to local

community connectivity.

After the Mumbai attacks, brands witnessed how influenitial online communities could

be. They actively started using social media and mobile technology marketing for their

campaigns, indicating the wide spread use and acceptance of these mediums in India and the

success of marketing to online communities. Obama‘s use of these technologies in the U.S. 2009

elections sealed the deal for many political strategists who had tried and failed to use them

successfully in the Indian 2004 elecions. His campaign used the online medium in a way that it

brought about measurable change and helped him win the U.S. Presidential election.

While the foundation was laid to use these tool in India for political communication, the

issues they would address would not be as simple as a consumer brand marketing campaigns.

Even though these technolgies had made considerable penetration, many argued that the

country‘s problems would outweight the use of this open technology. Take, for example. the UN

27
report that stated there were more mobile technology phones in India than toilets. (IANS, 2010)

Accounting a similar sitution, Mr. Tharoor recalled seeing a picture [Similar to the picture seen

here. (EPA, 2010)] of a holy man half naked talking on a mobile technology phone in India‘s

Kubhmela, one of India‘s many religious events, he stated:

―This contrast says so much about the land of paradoxes that is

today‘s India – a country that, as I wrote many years ago,

manages to live in several centuries at the same time.‖

(Tharoor, 2007)

The challenge for political strategists then would be to bridge

the ‗several centuries‘ that India lives in with the use of these

mediums. The 2009 elections witnessed the use of these mediums as tools for political

communications; whether they were used effectively is a subject that is still being debated by

many political pundits and marketing gurus.

28
Indian Elections 2009

By the time the 2009 elections rolled around, the Indian voter base was more intelligent,

inquisitive and informed. L.K. Advani, BJP‘s Prime Ministerial candidate, acknowledged this

shift in electorate mindsets in his first blogpost. His blog would later become one of the many

tools used for communication during the elections. He wrote:

―Indian voters, both collectively and individually, have become mature.

Democratic consciousness and awareness about the power of the vote have grown

immeasurably. No political party and no candidate can take the voter for granted.

Voters judge an incumbent government by its performance and the contenders for

power on the basis of what they stand for vis-à-vis their own expectations. In

other words, the content of electoral communication carries far greater weight

today than when our candidate from Kotputli in Rajasthan (a state in west India)

advised me against the use of printed poll literature.‖ (Advani, 2009)

Much of this change was due to the possibility of rapid information exchange afforded by

digital technologies. With more than a handful of 24-hour news channels in multiple languages,

newspaper, radio, internet and mobile technology, information is available immediately. This

rapid exchange of information is further facilitated by the evolution and increased adaption of

platforms that enable the possibility of user-generated data such as blogs, social networks,

forums and microblogs.

The Indian online community, even though smaller than that in most other countries, was

recognized by people and politicians alike as an influential community. Whether this community

29
could bring about substantial change in election results would be tested in the 2009 national

elections. Obama, too, was widely credited for using social media to harness and mobilize youth

voters in the U.S.A, giving him an 80 percent approval rating among college students in the

winter of 2009. (Aubuchon, 2010) Having seen the U.S.A election and Obama‘s use of social

media and technology, Indian politicians were optimistic about the results that social media

could bring about.

Besides the change in voters‘ mindsets and politicians‘ outlook towards communication,

corporate India, too, were aware and actively pursuing corporate social responsibility projects

during the election campaign period. Tata, one of India‘s leading companies, started the ―Jaago

Re‖ (wake up) campaign, which targeted youth in India to cast their votes. Using a 360-degree

approach, they communicated with their audience through print ads, television spots and social

media channels such as Facebook and Youtube. (Image Source: Jaago Re! Website)

Citizen-driven initiatives also took off during this election. Vote Report India, was one of

the most prominent initiatives. Indian elections are so laden with corruption and fraud, that most

voting booths are protected by policemen for fear of either riots or ballot rigging incidents. In

such an environment, Vote Report India‘s purpose was to make the voting system transparent.

30
They tried achieving this by giving voters a platform to report these incidents and cross checked

them with news reports, videos, photos or other mentions online.

Jonathan Spollen, Assistant Foreign Editor for The National wrote: ―VRI and other election-

monitoring sites and media are forcing politicians to be more accountable and to think twice

about indulging in acts that might be seen as corrupt.‖ (Spollen, 2009)

Besides these citizen and corporate initiatives, the world at large was interested in the

Indian 2009 election because the world‘s largest democracy was about to undertake the biggest

voting exercise in history. Google, in partnership with Hindustan Time, leading English daily, set

up an exclusive page of aggregated content for the Indian elections; this made it easier for people

to stay informed, regardless of their location.

(Google Indian Election 2009)

Similarly Indian news channels, papers, radio and even exclusive online news outlets

devoted entire sections on their websites to cover, report and aggregate news on the 2009

national elections. Some news outlets even had sites compatible with mobile technology devices.

With so much conversation online even prior to the election campaign period, many

political strategists were certain of the influence the mediums would have.

31
 The party that started its campaign online first and continued aggressively through the

elections was the BJP. Their campaign was first visible in the form of paid online

advertisements. These online ad campaigns were primarily based on the concept of Google

search ads, and the party bought as many as 200,000 keywords, placement ads across 50,000

websites, and banner ads across 2,000 websites. (Rai, 2009) Since these ads were omnipresent,

they often appeared next to content that was critical of the BJP and the Advani online campaign,

diminishing their intended effect.

The strategy for placing these ads took that of a blanket approach. Mr. Prodyut Bora,

recognized as the man behind the BJP‘s online campaign, said in an article: ―We just listed the

most popular sites visited by Indians and served ads on all of those,‖ (Subramanian S. , 2009)

Besides the online banner ads, the BJP mimicked Obama‘s online campaign strategy,

hoping to recruit 10,000 youth volunteers online through BJP‘s candidate, L.K. Advani‘s

website. The thought behind this ‗Advani @ Campus‘ initiative was to recruit 100 college

students and equip them with publicity material that they could then use to influence and

hopefully convert their peers to the party‘s ideology. News reports indicated that 7000 volunteers

were recruited at the end of this campaign and were tasked with promoting L.K. Advani's

website and social media profiles, translating sections of the website to Indian languages,

designing banner ads, and helping out with other campaign work. (Aasha Khosa, K S

Manjunath, , 2009)

Similarly BJP supporters started initiatives such as ‗Bloggers for

Advani‘, where bloggers who supported BJP were asked to post a

‗Blogger for Advani button‘ on their online properties and encouraged to

32
promote the party in their blogs. This initiative, along with others such as Join BJP and BJP‘s

Facebook and Orkut profile, were managed by BJP supporters and were not official BJP online

properties or initiatives. There is still some uncertainty about the authenticity of BJP‘s twitter

account @bjp_ that relayed press information and actively conversed with people online. More

often than not, however, the conversations were either negative or aggressively defensive. In

addition to participating in overall online party initiatives, BJP leaders at the state and local level

maintained their own online identity.

The tone that BJP used while communicating online was often negative about the

opposition, similar to their 2004 campaign, where they paid most attention to what the opposition

party was doing wrong, as compared to what the BJP was doing right. To a much more informed

audience, such negative undertones did not resonate well. Also, the BJP‘s youngest candidate

and a member of the Gandhi family, Varun Gandhi, was accused and under investigation against

charges of attempt to ignite communal hatred through his speech. The BJP in the past was

blamed of causing communal riots and did not want to be rebranded along the same lines

again.(Page, 2009)

Overall, the BJP‘s online strategy was in sync with their campaign; however it was not

managed centrally and was executed mostly by volunteers. On the contrary, the Congress Party

hardly had any presence online. The Congress Party‘s strategy was still centered on the aam

admi (common man) but, it also had a new-found interest in the youth of India. Rahul, Gandhi,

son of Rajiv Gandhi, was made the Congress Party‘s Secretary and is said to have been the

master strategist behind the party‘s campaign. Besides claiming the power of India was with the

poor and common Indian man, he emphasized three basic concepts: secularism, good governance

and growth. (Mazumdar, 2009)

33
 While the BJP primarily resorted to new media to attract the youth, the Congress Party

took the opposite route. Rahul Gandhi, who was the face of the Congress Party but not its Prime

Ministerial candidate, travelled across India to recruit young Indians by holding public meetings.

He spoke at 125 rallies across India in six weeks during the peak of the election season, actively

recruiting young ministers to run for election so the youth could relate to the congress party. This

was important and strategic as the BJP lacked young politicians.

While it looked like the Congress Party had a strong strategy in place, it was surprising to

see it did not have a robust online presence compared to the other parties. It had a static website

that played the role of a brochure. They launched VoteforCongress, a website that would hosts

blog entries from leaders. None of the Gandhi family members had websites, as most of their

domain names were registered with cyber squatters. (Singh D. K., 2007)

A few Congress politicians were

independently using the internet to

interact with their audiences. Among

these politicians, only Shashi Tharoor

used mediums such as Facebook,

Twitter and Orkut to their true potential.

He actively conversed with people on Twitter and held offline meetings with his Twitter

followers and bloggers. By the end of the election, Shashi Tharoor was sporting 700,000

followers on Twitter.

In addition to the BJP and the Congress Party, other political parties such as the CPI,

Samajvadi Party and a few others from the south also had websites. However, the only

34
interactive features that these websites had were newsletter sign-ups, donations and news

updates.

The results of the 15th General elections in India were surprising not only to Indians, but

the world at large. Rahul Singh, in an op-ed for the New York Times wrote:

―The pollsters had predicted a fractured verdict, like the last election in 2004.

They were wrong. To everybody‘s surprise, the electorate gave a thumping

endorsement to the governing alliance, led by the Congress Party. It will now be

able to sit out its five-year term without fear of being brought down by a fickle

ally. This was a new, largely young (60 percent of the electorate is under 35 years)

and forward-looking India sending out an unmistakable message: We want

stability and good governance, not the politics of caste and religion.‖ (Singh R. ,

2009)

While there was a lot of activity online by political parties, citizens and corporation, the

party that won the Indian General elections 2009 was the party that used the online medium the

least. It won the election not because the party didn‘t use technology as robustly as others, but

because they gave one consistent message and targeted this message to its audience well.

The BJP on the other hand was defeated not because of their use of technology, but

because of the lack of resonance in their messages. While digital technology, just like any other

tool is a medium to carry the message, each tool can have a different effect and end result.

With an increase in use of digital technology and previous evidence of its effectiveness, it still

did not have an efficient impact in political communication. If these technologies are to be used

35
as political communication tools in future elections, it is important to understand why they have

repeatedly failed in the past.

36
Analyzing the Use of Social Media for Political Communication in India

For the past decade, Indian political parties have been trying to use the internet and

mobile technology devices to communicate with their audience and have had varying degrees of

success and failures. There are several reasons why social media and mobile technology

marketing did not work in the past Indian elections.

1) Understanding the medium: While most political parties were present on different

mediums online and used different techniques in mobile technology marketing, they

lacked an understanding of the medium. Political strategists were unable to gauge the

extent to which these tools could be used, the percentage of people they could reach

versus the time and effort that would be needed and the emotions and actions these

mediums could evoke among different audiences, thus limiting the use and effectiveness

of these mediums.

2) Online Property Authenticity: Most accounts online did not specifically state that they

were official properties of a political party. Many accounts that looked official were

questioned as there was no way to verify their authenticity, thus creating confusion in the

minds of the voters. Fake profiles were considered real and hampered reputation and

spread incorrect news.

3) Consistency: There was lack of consistency in both messaging and tonality. Volunteers

with limited experience in the field were responsible for party accounts. Their tone of

messaging and replying was often defensive or negative, often taking feedback

personally. With no central briefing by the party‘s headquarters, the purpose and use of

the mediums was not aligned with that of the party‘s core strategy.

37
 4) Call to action: While political parties did have offline meetings with bloggers, the call to

action often centered on persuading them to ‗vote for the party‘. Even on their websites,

the call to action was either donations or propagation of party‘s ideology. The messages

were ―this is what we can do for you‖ and not ―together we can do this and change our

community‖; this made most of the messaging we-them, instead of ‗us‘, which did not

help build trust for politicians who already lacked credibility and trust.

5) Credibility: The Indian political scene is known to be corrupt. Social media, on the

other hand, has the ability to empower open, transparent and credible communication.

However, none of the political parties used these mediums to bring about transparency

and trust among the online community. Instead, they were used as broadcasting tools to

spread their messages or the opposition‘s dirty laundry.

6) Grassroots movement: The success of a social media campaign can be judged by the

difference it makes in the real world. None of the online campaigns in the India elections

were designed to bring about substantial grassroots changes. Rather they were designed

to influence the youth online. This, however, did not work as trust was missing.

Many have argued that the use of social media and mobile technology marketing in the 2009

election was a direct result of the success and widespread publicity of Obama‘s online campaign.

While the use of these digital technologies have proved to be successful in the USA and

European countries, it is difficult to mimic these techniques and expect similar results due to the

difference and diversity in Indian languages and culture. Political parties in India failed to

convert online presence to offline action. The key in any campaign that uses these mediums is

not only to converse and connect with people but also to convert them to actively advocate for

your organization

38
 Before deriving the best practices for the use of social media in Indian political

communication, understanding the growth and evolution of both the medium and the audience is

critical.

Internet Audience

The Indian internet using audience is educated, literate and, as seen from the Mumbai

attacks, influential. The Indian blogosphere mainly communicates in English and is based in the

major metropolitan areas in India. (Mishra, 2009)

According to a recent study done by Pingdom in March 2010, India ranked 4th in the world in the

number of Internet users, while Facebook and Twitter were ranked as the 4th and 11th most

visited websites. (Pingdom, 2010) These numbers, compared to those in 2004, showed

significant change in not only the use of the internet but also the level of participation.

39
 Knowing that these numbers will not decline, political parties must keep in mind the risks

and opportunities of being and interacting on a medium that is known to be viral and thrives on

transparency. As seen across the globe, digital technology can be used as a potent tool for digital

communication. A SWOT analysis of the situation will help understand and derive the way in

which India can best these tools for political communication.

SWOT analysis of using technology for political communication

Strength

1) Increase in Numbers: For the past decade India has seen a constant increase in the use of

mobile technology, internet browsing on mobile technology and the internet.

2) Youth: The number of youth in India that use and engage with these mediums will

continue to grow in India, making them driving forces and advocates for these

technologies.

3) Influence: The online community as a collective force will be much more influential than

other forms of media as people are more likely to trust their online peers.

Weakness

40
 1) The illiteracy and poverty rate in India is still high, hence the reach of technology will

be limited to a small percent of the voting base.

2) Infrastructure in India will limit different web and mobile technology applications to

be used at its highest potential.

Opportunity

1) By the time the 2014 elections take place, the mobile technology and internet world

will be extremely evolved and interconnected.

2) Online communities trust their peers more than other forms of media, hence being a

highly influential medium.

3) These mediums will help political parties gain trust and credibility as they facilitate

and nurture transparency and open communication.

Threats

1) These mediums thrive on open communication; any corruptions and scandals will be

aired and spread publicly.

2) The online community is extremely tight knit, and any disrespectful behavior towards

the members of the community could spread anger from online to offline in a matter

of hours.

With an understanding of the audience, their behavior, the platforms and lessons from

past efforts, following are the derived best practices for the use of social media in Indian political

communication.

41
Best Practices for the Use of Digital Technology in Political Communication.

The recommendations and suggestions for the best practices for use of digital technology as

political communication tools are derived from three basic points about social media and digital

technology.

1) To influence local online community and increase trust.

2) To bring about substantial change in the offline world.

3) To build and nurture an environment that creates solutions for existing local problems

and concerns.

Best practices:

1) Understand the medium: Recruit professionals who understand the medium and are

digital natives. Obama, for example, hired Chris Hughes, co-founder of Facebook, to

head his Online Campaign. (McGirt, 2009) This would help political parties to better

use this medium.

2) Educate leaders: Besides hiring skilled proffesionals, it‘s important for party leaders

who plan to participate on this medium to be educated about it. A political leader who

is educated in the medium would be able to interact successfully with its audiences.

3) Own your online property: There

should be no ambiguity in the

minds of the voters regarding who

42
 owns the online profile. Each profile should have a uniform look and should be

officially verified by mediums that provide such service, for example Twitter. (Image

source: Twitter) Such openness would help cultivate trust and open dialogue.

4) Own your online property for a long period: One of the main advantages of using

digital technology is that is facilitates trust. If a political party begins to build and

interact only during the election time, the purpose of the medium is defeated. Trust

and community take time to build. Therefore prior to the election, parties should

begin interacting online. This would help gauge the mood of the community and help

build trust.

5) Consistency: There should be a central policy and purpose for the use of these

mediums. In addition, there should also be consistency in posting messages,

conversing and informing the audience, indicating the party is making an effort to

inform and interact

6) Messaging: With a consistent policy and consistent messaging in place, one must

also remember that conversations online are not filtered. While many people might

agree with your view, many others won‘t. It‘s not feasible to put out every fire that is

lit, nor is it feasible to always defend and try and convert people‘s point of view. The

beauty of social media is in its openness, which means accepting the good with the

bad. Therefore the party should have a digital policy that outlines its actions online.

This policy should be displayed publicly to leave no doubt in the mind of the readers.

i. All communication should be based on two-way conversation, not one-way

information dissemination.

43
 ii. In terms of content posting, the 80-20 rules should be followed: Post 80

percent of content on topics that concern the public; the remaining 20 percent

content should be to promote the party.

iii. Besides responding on the party‘s digital property, the party member should

actively comb the web to respond to queries posted on other sites or social

networking platforms.

7) Local politicians should encourage and actively seek and record public queries and

request on camera. Using sites such as YouTube they should record their replies and

show completed work or request. This would do two things, build trust and slowly build

an online community.

8) Personalization: The internet and mobile technology cannot be used in the same

capacity as mass media tools. On the contrary, these mediums have brought about

personalization to an extent never seen before, making it easier to target people according

to location, demographic and preferences. Therefore messages and outreach should be as

personalized as possible. Localization: In a country that is as diverse as India, reaching a

local constituency through mass media is not always effective. As a result, social media

and targeted mobile technology marketing can help reach people at the local level.

Besides having one central party presence online, it will be most effective to have online

properties that cater to the needs of specific constituencies.

9) Target youth: A special effort should be made to target the youth community online.

Parties should conduct research and analyze issues that matter most to this demographic.

It should then create an initiative for the youth and the youth. By addressing issues that

44
 matter to them and by giving them the means to make a difference, it would help build

trust and move online conversation to offline action.

10) Mobile technology and Technology: Parties should facilitate and even fund mobile

technology applications that bring value to the community such as local train and bus

services timetable application, safety information, tourist spots, emergency information

and applications to report crime or government faults. If parties do decide to charge for

these applications, they could use the money for their campaigns or towards a social

cause.

While we have developed recommendations and suggestions for the use digital

technology for political communication in India, the technology itself could will likely evolve by

the time the next elections occur. Regardless of the evolution of the medium, what will not

change is the trust, credibility and openness the medium thrives on.

In conclusion, although digital technology seems like a viable tool for political

communication, it only affects a small percentage of the population.

However, political strategists must keep in mind that regardless of how frequently and

broadly digital technology is used; its main purpose must be to initiate offline actions. It is this

conversion from the virtual world to the real world that will truly affect results in an Indian

political election. Previous digital campaigns were designed to spread brand awareness and take

part in conversation. They were not designed to initiate action.

The key to a successfully digital campaign for politics in India will depend on the way

parties connect, converse and convert voters to advocate for their parties. More importantly, its

45
success will depend on how many advocates physically vote in favor of the party, hence

completing the circle from connection to conversation and ultimately conversion to action.

_________________________________________***_________________________________

Let‘s Stay in Touch. Do contact me with your views, feedback or criticism.

Image: (RK, 2008)

46
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