Second

edition

RalphTench
Professor
LeedsMetropolitan
University

LizYeomans
Subject
GroupLeader,publicRelations
a n dCo m m u n ica tions
LeedsMetropolitan
University

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 ER 19 MartinLangford

outcomes
#ning
....:: ., t,

shouldbeableto:
andofthischapteryou
e anddescribecrisispublicrelations rt .-,1
t

isehowcrisesoccur
thekeyprinciptes ptanning
of crisispublicretations andmanagement
risunderstanding personally
to simple, scenarios
meaningful .1!
risispublicretations principles
andmanagement
planning scenarios'
to real-life
t".t.t',tt..'.'
'.j,ii.

cture
thecontext
management
;.frisispubticretations
' {rlsispublicrelations effectiveness
vs operational
management
do crises
Where comefrom?
ng during a crisis
eommunicati
crisismanagement
andpublicretations
the Internet
Howto preparefora crisis
in crisismanagement
Keyprinciples
 386 Part3 RELATIONS
PUBLIC SPECIALISMS

| . I r'

lnlroouclron
Crisispublicrelations(PR)management e.g. LehmanB rothers,H al i faxB ank Thekeyto Pli ( rlql?
is one of the mostcriticalaspectsof of Scotland(HBOS), AIG and others). preparedness. lt l',vtlsll{
moderncommunications. Effectivecrisis Thetistof companies whoseshareprice management thol ,r r ri*!t
management protects companies, their and marketcapitalisation have nose- beforeit happen,'nr*.|,
reputations and,at times,can salvage divedbecause of badtymanaged crises thatit doesnotgctortlr{
theirveryexistence.A crisisis an event woutdfillthisentirebook,tetalonethis ' i nformati on
andronrtr
that disruptsnormaloperations of a chapter. Ina crisis,
thereis alwaysmore whena crisisdor',,lrrlFlrff!.
companyor organisation and,if badty thanthe immediate issueat stake. to understand tht' trrlrr
managed, canruinhard-won reputations Thischapter willtookat examples of ptaysand particulirrlV lltr
in just daysand even,in somecases, effectively managed crisissituations
as Internet.Inthisclrirplpt rryf
destroy companies (notethedisastrous well as someof thosebadlyhandted the key principles frir
effectsin 2008 of the 'creditcrunch' crises.Wewill explore, in somedetail, crisissituationusinH.r
on established banksand businesses thecharacteristics of a crisis. studiesof bothgoorlarid

plan in their mediarelationsbook.All thr* tff

describingand dissecting crises.Sonrt ul llth
relates to the preparations before a clisr: li**
but generally
the listsand guidelines
r(!n(r'iir
the situation in a practical senscaitcr rl ttlin
pened. Reference should be made to OhilFl$l
dealswith issuesmanagement which is olteftt
ciatedwith the crisisplanningor prcpunrtirrtt
defining and undcrstaudingthe issucs.I Ic,rtiri i*ii
respqctedauditingcompanies in the world.lt was ports the link to crisis managementarrrl lrrglrlq*$
. .anestablishbd andtrustedbrand'Asit became caught managingissuescanhelp preventa crisis.l lc
upin,andassociated with,theproblems arising from
289): 'If a company is engaged in issrt* tl
, the EnronElergytompanycrisis(Enronexecutives
before, during, and after a crisis (in othcr wltrlo,
had beenm,ismanaging the businessand falsifuing
it can mitigate - perhaps prevent - the crirr lr,rti
its financialperformance), it sawits businessand
clientbaserapidlyanddnsticallyreduced. Mor€than ing an issueby working quicklyand respotrrrlhly lii
associated wittr Enronls mismanagen€nt, lish or re-establish
the levelofcontrol dcsirnl ltt
',iustteing
. ,:Andgmen wasirnplicated in an attemptedcover-up stakeholders.'In this chapterwe will ainr to htdld
: with reports,ofcodedinstructionsto ernployges to standingby applyingtheoreticaland pracliurl
'cleanout' Enron-related documents as USfederal crisisscenarios.
investigatorprepared to launchan lnvestigation. As a startingpoint it is important to tlelrn* lh*
Andersen'sboardwerequicklyinto a situationof Cornelissen (2008)describes crisismanagenlrtllt**
'tastdltchrescue talks'seeklnga merger with rival of greatdifficulty or dangerto an organinrtlhrll:
ffrms.Eventually, Andersen as a bnnd and as a
threateningits existence and continuity,thrtl
comrrercially operating company wasdestroyed as
poor.ly cisivechange.
' a consequence of a managed crisis. ,
Seymourand Moore (2000:l0) usea srlnk*'l
to arguethat crisescomein two formsl

Thecobra- the'sudden'crisis- thisis o dit$rl*i

suddenlyand takesthe companyconplrlrlr ht,
pubtic
Crisis relations and leavesit in a crisissituation.
Thepython- the'slow-burning' crisisot iliii*
manageffi
eflt:the context - a collectionof ksuesthat stealup on tlr( (r,r,ttt{*if
by oneand slowlvqush it,
PR crisismanagement literatureis filled with listsof 'dos'
and 'don'ts' togetherwith countlesschecklists, for exam- In 1989SamBlackbroke crisesdown into thr
ple Howard and Mathews(1985)includea l7-point crisis unknown' and the 'unknown unknown'. 'l'ltt'

I
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelationsmanagement ,t7
i*
confrontatiott(Shell Oil whosepetrol stationssuffered
a consumerboycottafterthe companywantedto sink
an oil platform in the North Sea- the Brent Spar,see
pythons alsoChapters6 and l8)
malevolence(product tampering by a private citizen,
tlmethinkingabout(andresearching) like the Tylenol casedetailedlater,or direct action by
,have affectedorganisationsand list animal rights campaigners,such as placing bombs
headingsof cobrasandpythonsas
under the carsof executiveswhosestoressell cosmet-
icstestedon animals)
skewedmanagementvalues(BaringsBank went out of
Lcrbinger'seighttypesof crisis(below) businessafter managerswere accusedof turning a
lpur list underoneof them. blind eyeto'rogue'trader Nick Leesonwho hid details
of his massivefinanciallossesin the currencymarkets.
An act repeatedin 2008by )€r6meKerviewhen work-
ing for the Frenchbank, SociCtd G6n6rale.Seelater in
the chapter)
lilthnps owing to the nature of the organisation
deception(examples include deceiving employees
, e.g. manufacturing or processingand
prr spillage.The'unknown unknowns' areevents about the amount of money in pensionfunds after it
hasbeenusedby executivesto supportthe business,a
be predictedand that can come about from
UK casebeingthat of RobertMaxwelland the Mirror
bchaviour,unconnectedevents or circum-
Groupof nationalnewspapers)
nrc unpredictable.Beforereadingfurther, see
management misconduct(Enron is one of thc mosl
eightgypesofcrisisthat he
( I 997)categorised shockingexamplesof this with both illegaland uneth-
l{t lwo causes:managementfailuresor environ- ical practicesrife in the senior managementof the
The eight categoriesare: practice- seealsoAndersen,Mini casestudy l9.l )

ilor example,the Asiantsunami,which affected businessund econonic(thc late 1990sbrronr/bustin

governments,corporations,businesses and numeroussmalllTltechnologycompaniesis an example
lves rrndsocialinfrastructureof millions) of how economiccyclescan impactan organisation).

4lca/(Mercedes
'A' Classcar had a designfault Fearn-Banks(2006)defines6ve stagesof a crisis,out-
{f$llrclover') linedin Table19.1.

' flve
fi crlsis
Detection Theorganisation
is watching
forwarningsignsorwhat
idapted Barton(1993)callsprodromes(warningsigns)
Banks
Preparation/preventionTheorganisation takesnoteofthe warningsignsand prepares
plansproactively to avoidthe crisis,or reactiveonesto cope
withthe crisisif it comes

Containment Takingstepsto limitthe lengthof the crisisor its effects

Recovery Thisis the stagewhereeffonis madeto getbackto the'normal'

operational conditions
or effectiveness
of the organisation

Learning Thisis whenthe organisation

reflectsandevaluates
the
experienceto consider
the negativeimpactsfortheorganisation
andanypossiblepositivebenefitsforthe future
 Part3 PUBLIC
RELATIONS
SPECIALISMS

publicrelations
Crisis act and act quickly.For the first'timein the
product,it issueda comprehensive produtl
management vs operational ally pulled off the shelvesa// the capsuh
the USA - not just in the Chicagoareawlrrf€
ness
effective occurred.The potential6nancialconsequcllcFl
leadingproduct,and the subsequent damngel.S
Howeverwell a crisisis managedfrom an operationalper- could not be exaggerated. But, at the shntf
spective,it is how an organisationcommunicatesabout municated exactlywhat it was doing, in n I
the crisis that makesthe real difference.There is evidence to a// stakeholders- shareholders, employcei,
that good communicationin a crisissituation can support the police, pressand consumers.How worrld ll
or increase a company's reputation (British Midland, How would it re-establish confidencein the
Tylenol,discussed later). Poor managementor a lack of the brand?How wasanyoneto trust a fohttrnn
communication skills can have a powerful negativeeffect product again?Could anyonewith a grievnllr*
on a company'sbusiness. or anotherrandom'madman'claim to lrnvr
Let us examinethe caseof the Exxon Valdezotl spill in product and effectivelyblackmailthenr?
March 1989.The spill took placein Alaska,one of the few Johnson& Johnson's nextresponse wnslrrrlh
true wildernessesin the world, and receiveda consider- decisive.It introducedtamper-evident prt(
able amount of global media coverage.Even though the in many ways, a very simple operationnlt
accident site was appropriately cleaned up (operational termsof production- a metalfoil to visilrly'rgeff
effectiveness),Exxon took far too long to addressits stake- duct plus two more physicalbarriersto cntry, hl
holders(seeChapterll for a definition of stakeholders) ity was its key. Now, without any douht, lll r
and, particularly, the media. As a result of this failure of could actually see that the product was srrlr,
communication, its reputation was substantiallytar- Johnson acted swiftly and effectivelyboth l*
nished. Insult was added to injury when the CEO finally operationand communication.Eventoduy"l
did talk to the media as he blamed them for exaggerating as one of the best-managed crisesand the btn$*J
'the public relationsdisaster'that was createdaround the priately)is still a success around the workl, 'l'lrlr
spill. Exxon's stock market capitalisationdropped $3 bil- so well handled that Iohnson & Iohnsurr'sr
lion in the two weeksafter the Exxon Valdezoll spill in actuallybenefited in the long term - Johnson*
Alaska.(Seymourand Moore 2000:-157) words and actionswere seento be in accofd,
Seymourand Moore (2000)describethe 'association' ity r9.2.)
or'parenthesis'factorthat lingerson aftera crisis.In dis-
cussing the mass poisoning of Minimata Bay in fapan,
causedby ChissoCorporation,when mercurywasdumped
into the seaover severaldecades,poisoning thousandsof
consumerswho ate polluted fish, Seymour and Moore
(2000:157)write:

For Chissothe hundredsof deaths and thousandsof

injuries representeda financial burden, asidefrom the '' tfiiit leisohs
fact that it would be linked with Minimata. The'asso- ' : l;
rr'l

ciation factor' lingerson over other companies;Union WhatcouldExxonhavedsnebetterln

thinkin termsof actionsandwords?
Carbideand BhopaNExxon, the Exxon Valdez and oil
environmentalist,whatwouldyou
spills;the Herald of Free Enterprise,ferry safety,and you had sharesin the company,
P60. react?lf youwerea newsreporterl
agendabe?
Now, considerthe frequentlydiscussedcaseat fohnson
& Johnson.Over 25 yearsago Johnson& Johnsonfaceda Theggod. ,.
potentially devastating crisis. Tylenol, the company's
Whatdoyouthlnkarethekey
trustedand leadinganalgesic(pain reliever)wascontamin- casethat makethls cfisls,fromov€f
ated with ryanide by a member of the public. This action still discussed What
!o, favourably?
directly causedthe deaths of six people in the Chicago the companygoi right?Howdid the
area. Could anything worse happen to an over-the- right?
counter product?|ohnson & Johnsondid not hesitateto

-.
 management
Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations tt9

bv tbc

BHOPAh,9O
)MiG
lrl tlrc

Ak,,!
VII

(sourcet
O Reuters/Corbis)
againstUnionCarbidefollowingthe Bhopalchemicalplantdisaster
I flrotests

comefrom?
elocrises It's notwhatYouknow,butwho
knowsit
u[ of sugar This is the information and communicationsage when
confidentialinformation somehowalwaysescapes
i.liririrounsellorsarguethat over 50% of crises highly
the boundsof its host organisation'Strictlyconfidential'
ih frrrductsthat areeitheringestedor swallowed
llod, drink and oral pharmaceuticals' We all paper-based hospitalrecordshavebeenfound on rubbish
andthe harddrivesof second-user computershave
lll - ir is easyto understandhow a damagedor d,r*pr,
or evgngovern-
$roil*tuffor pharmaceutical canbe a major cause beenfound to containsensitivecompany
On 18October, 2007 HM Revenueand
tl, ltul the sourceof a crisismight not alwaysbe mentinformation.
of Customs(HMRC) sent via unregistered mail two unen-
A r risis can hit any organisationregardless to
the entirechild benefitdatabase
whlttt it represents.Whatever manufacturing cryptedCDscontaining
theNationalAudit Office,but theydid not arrive'The data
i* rntployedor whateverinformation is dissemin-
The food dye scandals on the disks included name, address,date of birth'
ittgi rirtl and will go wrong.
numberand bank detailsof 25 million
r*tlK in early2005showedthe extentof impend- NationalInsurance
a conse-
xhen potentiallycancer-causing additivesresulted people.HMRC chairmanPaul Gray resignedas
of the crisis.Policebelievedthe CDs were thrown
tll of nearly500 products(seeFood Standards qu.n..
for out asrubbish,but over 7 million UK families were asked
t*ww.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2005/
to remainalertto fraudulentuseof their details'
l fri rrn ra ti o n ).
 390 Part3 PUBLIC
RELATIONS
SPECIALISMS

In today'sclimateit is nearlyimpossibleto keepconfid- the damagethat can be done to a

ential information confidential.Any organisationshould are minimal. Let's takea look at the real
expect that what is known on the inside is just as well
known on the outside. Management
distraction
Evenwhen a crisisis handledwell, key
ershipteam arepreoccupiedfor periodslhtt
Youwon'tbelievewhatso-and-so severaldaysto severalweeksand cannot
justtold me business.When a crisishits, the people
isation havea crisisto handle!
According to the Institute of Crisis Management,around
a quarter of global crises are caused or triggered by Labour/employee
concern
employees/members of an organisation.Employeesare a Employeeswill naturally be concernedalttl0l
company'sbest assetwhen they are effectivelymotivated, welfare,jobs and financialsecurity.Too fewr
remuneratedand appreciated.But loyaltymay turn - often municate effectivelywith their employeer
when leastexpected.The disaffectedemployeeor former Employeeswho areboth well informed and
employeetaking someform of revengecan trigger a crisis a powerfrrlforcein timesof crisis.Withoul i
- and when feelings are running high, their negative isation will not exist.With them, most thlngr
impact can be huge. One disaffectedemployeebrought
down the stock price of a leadinghealthcarefirmby 35o/o Politicalbacklash
by giving incorrect researchinformation to a leading Whether at country, EU or global level,
newspaper;how can we forget the one-man crisis caused content among regulatorsand 'the
by Nick Leesonwho brought down the merchant bank chancesofregulatoryor politicalpressure {,rtt*
Barings through his overzealousfinancial actions! These organisationare high. This may be driven hy
actionswerewell chronicledin a 1998film, RogueTrader. tion to the crisis.
On 24 fanuary 2008 French bank Soci6td Gdn€rale
reported it had fallen victim to the activities of another Legalactions
rogue trading fraud and as a result lost almost €5 billion. We live in a 'do or sue' world. Crises
The bank statedthat thesefraudulenttransactionswere behaviourin individuals,and injury or othet
conductedby I6r6me Kerviel,a trader with the company. tion claimscan inflict hugefinancialdemsndl,
After the initial investigationpolice statedthey lacked litigation,an organisationmust plan for thr
evidenceto chargehim with fraud and chargedhim with particularlyso in the areaofproduct liabilily,
abuse of confidenceand illegal accessto computers.
Kerviel statedthat his actionswereknown to his superiors Customer
reactions
as the transactionshad beengoing on for over two years. It is reassuringhow forgivingcustomers cln lrf ,
Seymourand Moore (2000: 142)outline the character- they feel their concernshavebeenadequatsly
isticsof rumoursundercrisisconditions: When an organisationfails to communicnl€
with consumers,it is likely to seeits supporl
I Accept that rumours alwaysgenerateinterestand are
and marketshareplummetoften irretrievnhly,
often more attractivethan the facts.
I Silence- or a vacuum causedby lack of communica- Marketconfidence and reputation
tion - will alwaysbe filled by rumour and speculation. This is the mostsignificantcostof all.Rebuilcllng
I Any organisationof 10or more peoplewill alwayshave tion with stakeholders, such as shareholderr,
a seriesof rumours circulating. and regulators,is not only costly,it can alsoInlg
Under thesecircumstances, rumour can contributeto achieve.Againeffectivecommunicationis key to
and exacerbate alreadyseriousproblems.Thus monitoring ing both public and market confidence.(See
and pickup systemsare required,especiallywhen a com- andB ox 19.1.)
pany is facingor handling a crisissituation.

Whatarethe realcostsof a crisis? Communicating

during
ac
With any crisis there are, as we have seen,clear financial The examplesand experiencesdescribedso lht
costsinvolvedin withdrawing a product, cleaningup after chapter dramatically demonstratethat today ll li
an industrial accident,oil spill, etc.However,comparedto and more evidentwhy a companyor organitntktn
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
management 391

wouldyou, as a traineePRcrisismanager, beginto

piecetogetherthe full impacton Shellof its crisls?
Whatshouldyoubethinking about? Whomshouldyou
and reputation bethinkingabout?Howdoesthefuturelook?Howhas
Shellwasoveroptimisticaboutits globaloit yourreputation
suffered? Whatis thewayforward?
'.bil stocks).This miscalculation
resulted
of the head of explorationand the
,f€Slgnations
Feedback
plusthe two resignationsYouneedsystematically
n. Theserevelations andanswerques-
to research
impacton sharepriceandreputation tionssuchastheseto buildanaccurate
iua-stantial picture,
Thinkaboutthe pointsjust examined- how

deadline andwhatever yousayis goingto be quoted,

Asyouarethinkingon yourfeet,so yourorganisation
mayfeeltheydon'thaveenoughinformation to deal
withthe crisis.Whatarethe facts?Whohasthat ln-
formationand howis it bestunderstood and repres-
ented?Bothyouandyourorganisation feelthereis an
escalatingflow of events.Withinwhat mayfeel like
moments, the mediaaretalkingaboutthe situation,
investment analystsareasking awkward questionsand
NGOs aregettinginvolved.Everyone seemsto be look-
descriptionof o crisisis based on the ex- ingin ontheorganisationyou
- arein a goldfish
bowl
af a senior crisisconsultantwho describes and everyone is peering
in. lt's highlyprobable that
hapgens andhowit feels. youandyourorganisation willfeela lossof controlover
thesituation- therearesomanydifferent stakeholders
lg a distinctpatternof eventsand behaviourthat
andtheywantto knownghtnow whathas actually
duringa crisis.Let'stakea lookat them.
happened andwhat'sbeingdone,orgoingto bedone,
andsaidaboutit,
rise!
happenat the mostinopportune times- Easter, Rolldownthe shutters - crisis
bankholidays or8 o'clock on a Fridaynight leads
l| weekof hell,whenyou'reenjoying a lgoodnight
to drama
, lt's almostguaranteed that if a crisiswereto There is immenseandintense scrutinyfromoutside the
in Japanit will be duringthe GoldenWeek company. Thiscanleadto a siegementalltywhere indi-
In Chinait will happenduringChineseNew vidualsfeeleveryone is agalnstthemandtheirorgan-
nroverThanksgiving in theUSA.Andthecompany isation.Thlsreaction invariably and rapidlyleadsto
llsuallyunaware of the situationuntilthe issueis panic.'ldon'tknowwhatyou'reon aboutl'you tellthe
by someone else- be it a regulator,'authority', caller.'l don'tbelievea wordof it - you'rejust after
tlu$tomer or media.Yourmobilephonerings.You a story.I suggestyou go and pick on someoneless
recognise thenumber, butit'sa workphone,so gullible.' Oncepanicsetsin rational decision making
enswer it. Whatnext? goesoutof thewindow. Butapplying rationalthinking
to irrotionaleventsis exactlywhat'scalledfor. 'Those
on yourtoesandyou canguarantee that your areveryserious allegations.lt is notappropriatefor me
is notwhereyouleftit andyoucan'tfindthe to comment immediately. I will returnyourcallwithin
for the out-of-hours PRofficer.Youthinkyou 15 minutes.Beforethis time,l'm aftaldI'm unableto
whatto sayand the callertellsyou they'vegot a comment.' Whathappens next?

$!*htrrurricateeffectively at the onset of a crisis (see also is often seen as an unnecessary luxury. Even when an
1i..,&$ llrrrkrn bombingscrisis,Casestudy 19.1).Yet many organisationis urgedto communicateabout its situation
r$fltlt,ttrics argue against it. Preparing for a crisis costs by experiencedcrisis managementcounscllors,there is
'.,. itr, trr,tncyand energy- and crisis preparednesstraining oftena list of reasonswhy it cannotcommunicatc,suchas:
 Part3 RELATIONS
PUBLIC SPECIALISMS

In 2004 followingthe Londonsuicidebombingsof

7 July,LeedsMetropolitanUniversity had to respond
to a mediafrenzyas journalists
trii:dto identifuand
aboutthe bombers.
revealinformation Theuniversity's
communications teamwereusedto dealingwith real.
andoftenrunexpected that attracted
situations media
attentionbutneverbeforeonthisscale.

Duringthe afternoonof 12 Jutythe world'smedia

to Leedsasthepolicehuntforsus-
turnedits attention
pectsto the7Julybombings closedin ona largely
Asian
community ln Leeds.
Atthlstimetheu'niversity's
Head-
ingleyCampus washostingin excessof 3,000people
eachdayduringa four-day festivalof graduation
cere-
monies, whichincluded well.known nameslikeDame
KellyHolmes, LucasRadebe, andloeSimpson aswell
as Brendan Foster
beinginstalledasthenewchancel-
lor;therewasalready a mediapresence on campus.
Picture19.2 TheLondon Bombings crisisis an
At approximately 5pmon Tuesday 12 July,oneof the example of howanorganisation cangetdrawn
university's
communications teamtooka callfroma jour: intoa crisisunexpectedly.Thishappened to Leedr
nalistsuggesting thatoneofthe Londonbombers was Metropolitan Universitywhenit fellunderthe medit.
a studentat LeedsMet.Thejoumalistgavea nameand spotlightafterit wasallegedbyjournalists that
thecourse theyhadstudied andwanted a comment from thebombers tivedin Leedsandhadmetat the
the university.Dataprotectionlegislation meantthe University(sourcetCorbis)
communications teamcouldnotcomment, whichgave
andprepare
cruciaItimeto investigate for a situation.
firsthome-grownsuicidebombers; associations
Thefirstcrisismanagementteammeetingtook place
the followingmorning,madeup of the headof corn- could impacton the university's
reputationandr
munications,headof security, vice-chancellormately, student
numbers and subsequentfundlng,
a deputy
himselfwaswetcoming thesefactorswerecrucialto the success
anda dean(thevice-chancellor of the
VlPsontoqampus fortheday'sceremonies). sity.Crisis
management objectivesthereforewere
I managethe flow of information
Withmobilesphonesswitched off,the crisismanage- I avoiddistortion
mentteamdiscussed theneedfordarnage
thesituation,
and the university's I
limitation,the keystakeholders, activelypromotepositivestoriesaboutthe
mainconcerns. I identifu withpriority
andcommunicate
I operateona'business
asusual'basis.
Mainconcerns
andobjectives
The main concernswere havingthe university'sname
associatedwith Muslimfundamentalism and the UK's

ffi
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
managernent 393
i'','i

19.1(continued)

a studentat theuniversity. pressstate"

Theuniversity's
ment led with offersof supportto the community
r*sponding requests,
to iournatists' thecom" affected.
n$teamcalledtheircontacts ontheregional
$nd out more- goodrelationswiththisstake' Newspaper coverage
meantthattheycouldcomfortably discuss Althoughteeds Met was mentionedin many of the
situation. nationaland regionalpress it was never headline
news; campusphotographswere nevershown; and
much of the coveragewas positive as the university
lice-chancellot'strust and knowledgein the was reportedas having providedaccommodationto
eommunications team,heauthorised them displacedresidents.Increasedsecurityon campus
whntever resources theyneededto bestmanage contributed to this. Following
the initial48 hourswhen
lrn. the journalistswerelookingfor any detailsthey could
regardingthe bombers,morelengthy,considered and
tontacts researchedarticlesappearedin the nationalpress
unlcationsteammadecallsto discuss devel' regardingMuslimfundamentalism on universitycam-
with otherstakehotders includingthe city puses.This led to furthermediaenquiriesby which
furthereducation collegesin the city,andthe time the universityhad beenableto verifiyits actions
of Leeds- all of whomwerereceivingsimilar in dealingwith fundamentalismover the previous
E fiom the media. Responseswere discussed 10 yearsand identifuthe protocolsand accessibitity
*ummunications teamgaveadvice. of campusfacilitiessuch as the prayerrooms and
studentgroups.

S-r*rlll that anycalls

wassentto all staffrequesting Furthercoverage
pressbe referred
tfrr.. to the communications team.
ensivestaffinductioninformsall staffof the Confidentin its actionsand 'policing'of facilities,the
fu referanycallsfrsmthepressto thepressoffice communications teamdecidedthat it was appropriate
rrvas thismessage, to provide some journalistswith accessto the vice"
simplyreinforcing
chancellor.Fufihernationaland regionalfeatureswere
publishedwhich were more consideredand demon-
uentcrisismanagement teammeetings included stratedtransparency, corporate citizenshipand ethical
fromthestudents' unionandthe pre" consideration of how to manage a large multicuttural
of the university'slslamicSociegto reassure university.By way of contrast,the Universityof Leeds
lhat the namesof individualstudentswere not did not adhereto dataprotection lawswhenthe media
r.qedwith the media. gave details of an EgyptianPhD studentwho was
suspectedof rentingout the flat where the bombs
groups were made.He was laterclearedof any involvement
Universitylearnedofthenumber of displacedresid- but not beforehis photographand personatdetaits
fromthecommunities wheretheatleged bombers hadappearedon the frontpageof everynationatnews-
frsm.Theuniversity offeredits hallsof residence papet followingdetailsreleasedby the university.
ulherfacilities theirneedsduringthis
to support
of uncertainty. Conclusion
Leeds Metwasquickto implement a damagelimitation
governors including
strategy, tightsecurityandbeingverytough
headof communications advisedthe university'swithjournatists.
Asa resutt, theuniversity's
coveragein
fellorBrendan Fosterandotherkeygovernors of themediawas,onthewhole,passing comment onone
$ltuationand assuredthemthat the university wa5 of thebomber's association withLeeds Met.Coverage
with the policeinvestigation
and manag- wasconsiderably lessthanthat of the University
of
thesituation. Thegovernors andchancellor in turn Leeds andotherorganisations in Leedswho,it maybe
their support. considered,providedmoredetailand spokespeople
withnosecurityin placeto reduce impact.
the time the policeconfirmedthe namesof the
teamwasable
bersat 2pm,thecommunications
cpnfirmthat at leastone of the bombershad been
f*
);;
a,l
394 Pa T t3 PUBL ICREL AT IONS
SPECIALIS MS

casestudy19,1(continued)

In 2006 LeedsMet was awarded'gold'in the category The (London)Metropolitan

Policewereconl{tit*S
of 'outstandingcontributionto the local community they bookedan appointmentto visit ,nu ,nlve@f|*
of the year'categ-
award'and 'silver'in the 'university foltowingmorning
ory at the prestigiousTimesHigherEducationawards.
In the sameyearLeedsMet recordedthe highestper' Otherdepartmentsin the registrar's offictls
centageincreasein studentapplicationsin the UK, the communications team,with a secondtr-'Brll
whenmostuniversities wereexperiencing a decreasein ling callsat the CivicQuarterand issuingtlte
applications followingthe introductionof tuitionfees. statementand a third team searching the wr,l
medi amenti ons
The university'srelationshipwith the communities
affected has gone from strength to strength. Many consultedon a numberof orr aali
Vice-chancellor
studentscontinueto come from the ethnic minority
communitiesin Leeds,studentsengagewith these Thursdoy14 luly 2005
+l
communities as partof the citizenship of their
elements TheMetropolitan Policevisitedcampusand
"irs+rl t,

studies,and staff are engagedin researchactivities proximately2 hourswith the headof commtlrll
rangingfromhealthinequalities, employmentandskilts who gavean officialstatement andhandedovtrrtsi '"rt
4
audits,and deliveryof courseswithinthe communities of one suspectand his best friend,whitetlte ,,fil
to improveemployabitity and aspirations. systemwas checkedfor approximately 8 namt*4;
furtherrequeststhroughoutthe day - the adtn
;B
H
iveteamin FairfaxHallwerethe mainsourcl,il
-.4;.e:
Furtherinformation
searches,with the supportof theirSeniornt.til.r1i.'t*ru=et,.:
Timeline
Wednesdoyl3luly 2OO5 The uni versi tyrecei vedmenti onsi n .rt l, , u=i f f l
Followinga mediareportlate on Tuesday12 Jutythat regional,nationaland internationalnewspalrtr* rj$
-ffi!, r-.1#i
one of the bomberswas a LeedsMet studenta full websites,includingArab Newsand the Ner.rf**h#S '.4
searchof Banner(the university'sstudentdatabase) Herald,plus regularradioandtelevisionmettllrrtq . '
took place on Wednesday13 luly at 8am revealing
that att three suspectedbombers'names matched received
Theuniversity | ,'trqq!,,.,
around15 mediacalls.rrrr
recordson LeedsMet's database(somenameswere a Frenchcameramen from CivicQuarter,who ri:luig$j;
spettdifferently) with the headof humanresourcesspeaking to rfiete':{ ::;
j-J
t,t

A crisismanagement teamwas scrambled to identifya At 3.50pm a press statementissued by llrr hirii;;

damagelimitationstrategy: staffandsecurityidentified pol i tanP ol i ceconfi rmed
the namesof suspetl ', .ir r rl. t { - .
as priorityas well as governors
and students ing a LeedsMet studentShezhadTanweet, A frilift*i .:
statementwas issued confirmingShezhadl*rllffig*
By middaythe University had etiminatedall but one of was a LeedsMet studentand identifoing thr' '.i.rpffiJ:. -#
its students,but withoutpoliceconfirmation a holding the universitywas offeringto the evacuatetl t ttrrtftr#e' a Itl
statementwas issued itiesin Leeds

TheUniversity receivedover50 mediacallsandsecurity BBCtelevision'sLook North's5pm bulletinrtrtl ft*€!*.=.

turnedawayat leastfive journalists/cameramen (BBC FiveLivereportedthat LeedsMetwas providingtirtsff:-*i-
Radio 4's Today programmewas escorted off the modationfor evacuated residents . --:a *
s mi n i mu mo f threeti mes,w i ththe
He a d i n g l eCya mp u a -i
Daily Moil and Mirrar caught trying to accessFairfax TheYorkshireEveningPosfalso carriedporlllv,', tlxt!-l*
Hall) - no accessto a spokesperson or campuses graduations,
age of the University's includirrgt,ii:;.}*,,''
was permitted;the briefholdingstatementwas issued graphsof honorarydoctoratesand Kids@Unil+r*:,lj*= !
on requesl scheme)

All but the main accessto the halls at Headingley Theuse of the officialstatementwith no furlltet
i
campuswerelockedwith securitybasedat eachof the mentavailable seemedto reduce theamountof rrrvgr66
mainentrances to preventjournalistsintruding LeedsMet receivedin the nationalmedia

Theuniversityreceivedmentionsin at least15 regional,

nationaland international
newspapers and websites
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
managemenl 395

,#:, -,.
Is.1(continued)
ffi' b.T* ',,,,r0
'$i,,
#,,b**r,,ifyof LeedsandThomasDanbyissuedstate. Saturdoy16luly 2005
g, tlrrrtrr/ere
shared thepressoffices
among LeedsMet staff member quoted in the lndependent
fi*+ot' saying: you
.9.8.- *r"i,, 'l can tell categorically
that at Leeds
5, ' ; ' ,$** , l r;rrc e l l ocro n s u l te o
d n a n u mb erof occasi ons Metropolitan University
and LeedsUniversitythereare
;F; ff,. no radicalgroupsthere.lf therewasa problem,I would
rfli 6.. !:#davl5 luly2oo5 reportit. I'veneverhadto.'
$, i1...;fi* stlt'ntionfirmlyshiftedto the University
of Leeds
,Fi City
1r'r,tls but
Council the university
was aware Overten mentionsin the media,includingmostof the
.{:,++t
,T , lr.#-* tt ,,trr:uldbe readyfor otherdevelopments should broadsheets.
i,l .ikevitrvolve
Leeds Met.
'l:
:it "l1 Reportedin the Sunthat ShezhadTanweerwas report"
,;;i : #!ltll, press:briefmentionsof LeedsMet in the Daily edtyinvolvedin a race-hatestreetmurderbut no evid-
tl *gil ;,r,rlDailyMirror; the Mirror mentionedthat the enceto take him to court.
rl -
,fj. l. tsryorrurtmat the Universityof Leedswas underscrutiny
q, ;:. Sundoy 77 luly 2005
3.. ; -Hfrli.rrronalpress: brief mentionsin the Brisbane
The lndependenton Sundoy claimed Mohammed
jj -:' t:rttul* Mail andNewsday,Longlsland,NewYork SadiqueKhanandHasinaPatelmetat LeedsMet(Satur-
;- day'slndependenfclaimedthey had met at Dewsbury
f'ress:a varietyof mentions
r...1gr+l positive College)
including
-l:. : .r
,.
r.-:
fromgraauation
,arA.iJi,l"t
-^l

:
andourcommunity
support
,i
:+:
:''
.
t:,1***, The Sunday l"elegraphopinion (Niall Ferguson)said
rr,r.luests
forthe lateststatementinctudingGMW aboutTanweer: 'Hewasnot uneducated, assumingyou
: ' ili4ri\tu,rntecl
to film the universityprovidingsupportto regarda degreein sporlsseiencr-.
from LeedsMctro-
' svd'r.rlt:d residents politanUniversity
r:I . as education.'
,:rit i;r* :,', ;
' *** ',l.rtement sent out proactively
1.
l; 1 t lc
-:_ l, to local contacts The SundayTelegraphran a separatearticlewith the
-11
.a, i: .lultllh,' university had not cooperated fullywith in the headline'lslamicextremism goesunderground at Brit'
".
r,,1.,:!+-d ish universitles.'
;?,i:r, i.i:ii .
r,1. , r, - r 4
iiiu*,.lligher Educationa! Supplementrequestedinter- Monday 18
;:: ;; luly 2005
r rt*,vu errltr Professor Simon Lee(vice-chancetlor) Two mentionsin the YorkshirePost,includingsome
. td!tt4f:-
:'':: " r:
,:..:
1:
goodpressaboutVerityJenning's thesison 'Chavs'.
rf irf H *: .:. 'i; ; llr M;rx Farrarspoke to the lndependenton Sunday
r 1 th ei s s u ei n L e e d sg e n e ra tl(a
*l. , , rrr y skednotto speak
'i f11rilllij S ome j ournal i stsw ere sti l l requesti ngmor e on
i, rrrrr+ C r 6lr lr rr!te e d sMe ts p e c i fi c a tl y ) Shezhad Tanweer and LeedsMet'sviewon Muslimfun.
, r1; 11 ' . : i ! : : , ,i:,' :.:.i,'
damentalism the BBCR4Todayprogramme
- inctuding
,',r,,rtt".,1,r..,r. :r lhr ' r rr.,i sm a n a g e m e ten t a mc o n ti n ued to meeti n the
..:-. 7 ?iilirrlrrg havingmettwiceeachdayof the previoustwo
,1,'y.,with securitystitlon full alertto evictjournalists
Lookingforward
'l
'
:i '::
t,l ll+,&+ I Continueto keep an eye on devetopments in the
( : li, ir r t r . - : ;,.,,:i1*rlrit* staffbeingadvisednot to speakto the press, press
'i..1gprrrr" c.ame throughof a memberofstaffinthe Schoot I Downgrade
:1,)..
but keepvigilantmessage to security
,: ...,,: ; , ' , t { llr rri s m a n d H o s p i ta l i tyMa n a gementspeaki ng
! i *r1gg . .',,!4t ltrtl'presswith two 'hats'on - one as a memberof I Promotepositivemessages- summerschools,
r..,J!trMuslimcommunityin Leedsand as a LeedsMet Larkia,regionalcollegenetwork,Harrog4t'e festival
t t,fux*&. sponsorship, communitywork,graduationstories
p i t*+ rt& .r,: *i?llt{ivce. The head of communications spoke to him
?:'4iltiintnot doingfurtherstatements, which he agreedto. for the regionaland localpress,broadercomment
:'-
f. . : ',. : :, '. :i.i:: '
on the issuesof integration and diversity
i i.i'..1.,$*nr'' lggressive journalists still soughtstatements-
p' ;;,,;i2,.,,. I Somecontactsin the regionalpresskeento gener"
ot,*t+,.. .',rjrfi,,rom theSundayTelegraph persistentand rude. ate positivestories.
i
r,hancellor
it:,':?it.e consultedon a numberof occasions Source:Laville(2008)
396 Part3 PUBLIC SPECIALISMS
RELATIONS

ilifih',iffi
19.1 whathappens
'Nocomment'-
wiltnotrespond
companies
when

lf a companyspokespersonrefusesto comment,what other politicians;social services;neigh

Whatwouldyou think if you werethe
is yourreaction? nesses,
security,
business
and othera
journalistaskingthe question?or a customerof the yourcustomers
demics; andclients;
charltls*
c om pa n y ? psychologists
organisations; and'disaster'
specialistwritersand correspondents; f
Feedback nalistslnewspapercuttings;film; picturellbrarlt{|,
records;annual and other reportsand
Thesequenceof eventsmaygo somethinglikethis:
membersof the pubticand 'eyewitnesse$'i
I Thecompanychoosesto say:'No comment.' companiesand organisations; trade unlotill
fessionalbodiesand pressure groupsandolhpi
I Themediasay:'Thecompanywas unwillingto take
partin this programme.'
Themediawill atsotatk to the company
I think:'No smokewithoutfire.'
Consumers
the friendlyfacewho's beenon the frontdsik
'They'rehidingsomething.'
enting the organisationfor the tast 25 ysfrr-*l
'Guilty!'
speakto the nightsecurityofficeror the perunfl
Whenan organisation doesnot take controlof a crisis panyoverallswho keepsthe boilergoingutrrllt
situationand faits to communicate immediately, the leavingthe plant at 6 o'clockin the mornln6,{
mediawitl go to a wholerangeof othersourcesto get toyalanddependable; theyarethefaceof thr,r ri
the information theyneed.Takea look at the foltowing . . . But how muchdo they reallyknow?How
list - they are all readilyavailablesourcesof informa" youthinkthey know?Maybetheyknowmots
tion and 'expert' opinion in a crisis situation:the think. Havethey beenpreparedfor crisis
companywebsite;the Internet;emergency services- for the leadingquestionsof journatistswhn
police,ambulance, fire,coastguard,mountainrescue, appearto be their bestfriend?Theyhaveir vuh.*
etc.;hospitalauthorities; medical,scientificand other the mediawilt let them soeak;ot 11lumgelve! f?
experts;formeremployees; localauthorities;
directors; arepreparedappropriately, theytoo arean inyeisj
governmentdepartments; governmentministersand resource to a company.

I The need to assembleall the factsbefore it communicates. Tatkingto the media

I l'he desire to avoid panic, for instance it fears that by
The way a company communicatesto thc lnr'(lt,ri, I 'inqq
mentioning the individual brand, peoplewill think the
Selectinga spokespersonor spokespeoplcir tq..€
-'{
corDorate brand is 'infected' as well. most important decisionsin the effectivclr;ur.r'i'.,.'.' .i
T not have a trained spokesperson and is not any crisis.Whoever actsas spokesperson shotrlrll,,ii:'r,,+i
going to put anyoneup againsta seasoned television p r o p o s e d5 C s m o d e l ( F i g u r c l 9 . l ) t o b e c l l t 'r l l r r !l :r r .- r
intervicwersuchasf eremyPaxmanon the BBC'sNews- basedon consultancyexperienceof seniorcrislr ttt:rrtr#v;iL
night(a late-evening
'hard'newsprogramme).
I lt has had other problemsrecentlyand cannot talk
about this problembecauseit will impacton its over-
all corporatereputation.
I The issueof how to solvethe crises- no one knows Concern
how to solvethe problemat the outbreakofthe crisis; Clarity
everysinglecrisissituationcompaniesface,and their Control
different.
solutions,will be substantially Confidence
I The fear of revealingproprietary information or Competence
revealingcompetitiveinformation that may give the
companynew competitive problems.
SeeThink about F i g u r e1 9 . 1 T h e 5 C s e f f e c t i v ec o m m u n i c a t i o nn t i r tl r l
 ltr

rrrliorrs of the 5Cs model in F'igure can be While theseinitial questionsare generallyprcdictablc'
lr lirllows. how the mediawill act and how they will report a crisis
should neverbe assumed.Everyoneasksquestionsfronr
'their own perspective' and everyone, especially the news-
br confusedwith legal liability, concernis a simple hungry media, will have their 'own take' on the crisis
€filotion. The organisation's spokesperson needs situation. As well as general reporters,there may also be
lrue concern about the problem, concern about very well-informed specialistcorrespondents to consider.
hrr hnppenedand concern for the people affected (SeeActivity 19.4.)
Itfl in the future - including potential customers/
llrfr$,

ions needto talk with clarity. Starting from the

futturrof the crisis,they needto havevery clearmes-
Whnt the spokespersonsaysat the outset will be A crisisfroma journalist's
lltroughoutthe durationof the crisis. perspective
Put yourselfin the positionof a iournalistbelng
saya maforrail
asked'toreporton a crisisscenario,
lelkingto the media,spokespeople must takecon-
crash.Howmightyoureactasa iournallst in a crisls?
the situation,the environmentand
thr tnessages, Whatmightyoil wantto knowif youwereln their
Towhomwouldyouwantto speak?
situation? What
doyouneedto getyourstoryonthefrontpage? How
d e n ce wouldyourquestions
different be if youworkedfor
acrosswith
lixrlrrtpcrson must get the key messages thelocalpaperor a transportpublicatlon?
e, trut without appearingcomplacent or arrogant
Feedback
enc e whatkindof media
lf youwerein this situation,
Itttrt nlso demonstrate competence and reflect how, coverageshouldyouexpect? Youcouldexperience
trllrcsentative of the organisation, they will handle thefollowing:
hla,
I Theinitialmediareportswilt be speculatlve,
wrong,exaggerated, sensationallsed, oftenvery
personalised, spitefulor hurtful- andpossibly,
will the mediareact? even,right!Expectthe mediato'roundup' the
scaleof theproblem slmplybecause it makesfor
fu lir.t instance,the mediawill want to know the facts.
a betterstory.Expectthe media to make a drama
iitll tluestionsarelikelyto be thosein Box 19.2. outof yourcrisis.
I ' Experts willbecalledin to comment ontheprob-
lem.These'specialists' in various'fieldsof
' expertise'willdiscuss ldeasof whatwentwrong
andhowit haPpened.
I An exclusive afticle,containing sensitlve infor'
mationthat,of course, theorganisation did not
wanttohavemadeknown.
I Someone wittsaythisdisaster hasbeenwalting
to happen.
Thetimingwitl'bewrong,thecrislsteamwlll be
outoftown,theirdeputies ab?oad orthespokes'
person'smobllephonewlllhavebeenstolenl
f Opinlons andrumours wlll dominate mediare'
porting- especially if theorganlsation doesnot
aans1oprevdntlt;fhamenf1s respond Expect
effectively. rumours to become fact
lie u andexpectrumour to chase rumour.
398 Part3 PUBLIC
RELATIONS
SPECIALISMS

a tn dp u blic
T heIn te r n e
re l at ions
c r is ism ana g e m e n t
Sincethe daysofthe Tylenol crisisreferredto earlierin this
chapter,the mediaenvironmenthaschangeddramatically.
The once limited media market has becomeglobal and
highly sophisticated.The impactthe Internethason crisis '': :._'- . : : r:. l-:,
managementtoday is enormous. The speedwith which -Thetpeed dfupread,:of
lnbrmatioir:
communications can be delivered is phenomenal and newcommunication era is well
availableto so many people- from home computers,via PaddingtonAadbrokeGroveaccldent
Internet caf€s,through to corporatecommunicationsin- 5 October
1999.
frastructure.If somethinghappens,someonesomewhere
At 08.06, Michaelflodder,the
will be giving their own, often live, version of events.
pulledoutof the platformat
From individuals,through online communities,adversarial
organisationsand NGOs, the Internet is very effective At 08.11, havinggone throughthree
in putting a message out. It is impossibleto censorthe stop'signals,:the
ThamesTralnploughi{,
Internet - which is both its strengthand its weakness - frontof inboundGNERexpress
traln. .
but it is a highly effectivevehiclefor the dissemination
of information and opinion that may masqueradeas It tookuntil08.32fortheOberatidflal
information. ing to'estabushfrsm the.contfolllng
Sefmour and Edelman(2004)describethe new chal- at Sloughthata serious accident had
lengesposedby the lnternet: involvingoneof theirtrains,thata 6er!qt8
brokenout (mostunusualin train
But when consideringhow to turn around a crisistoday, andthattherewereprobably many
managementteamsmust acceptthat the mediarepresent fatalities.
only part of an array of communicationchannels- albeit
onc of the mostnoisyand demanding.[n a world dom- Butifanyonehad beenon the lnterneta
inated by low trust and the corrosivefficts of cynicism, wouldhavebeenableto read'breaking
corporatevoicescan quickly be ignored, distorted or of a railaccidentat LadbrokeGrove
each seriousinjuriesand a severefire.
drownedout by theincessant noisethat characterizes
and everycrisissituation. . . Overthe last tenyears,cisis
tnanagementand communicationshave beenforced to
developin response to a seriesoftechnologyand IT-driven
changes. . . . At the same time single-issuegroups and
puter. As technologies advance, so these vinrrr ,tiid
NGOs were recognizingthe potential of the internet.
impact they have on our day-to-daylives bcr,rnr; 1ffi.
Now it is possiblefor a small group to drive campaigns
apparent - they are, at best, an annoyance.
acrossthe internet,while at the sametime empowering
At a corporatelevel,thereare a host of bollt I
individuals to expresstheir opinions at the click of a
and securityissuesthat affectthe operationand
tnousc.
nessof an organisation,Considerwebsitelurrr
( S eeB o x 1 9 .3 .) whereindividualscan gain access to a company'r
The totally unregulatednature of the Internet thus - a maliciousindividual or organisationcan rtrlft
givesorganisations huge causefor concern.The Internet views,enforcesome new policiesor give spurluur
has becomethe new rumour mill where peoplecan say ments,interferewith emailand raiseall mannerof
anythingtheywant or createwebsitesthat criticisespecific This costsa considerable amount of time and nlrlt$f
organisations, companiesand specificindustries(see,for can becomeunmanageable. In September20()4,U|{
example,www.untied.com,which is dedicatedto prob- phone company NTL had its systemssaboltgnt
lems with United Airlines, or www.mercedes-benz-usa.a hackerchangedthe outgoingmessage on ilr lurlr
com/, a sitewhoseagendais obviousl).On a basiclevel,we servicephonenumberto tell callersthat NTL clid trd
seevirusescrippling so many of our computer systems, about their problem and they shouldjust get n lll+l
from worms to Trojans,and the averageusergetsincreas- need only think back to the resourcesdeploycd lru
ingly concernedabout losing control of their own com- parationsfor the 2000newyear(Y2K,the new
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
management r9t
,#
lhcr was a fear that all computer systemswould
Irr r*' how many companieschoseto spendlarge
*f tlt{incy'on IT, rather than take any chances.The
{iloup estimatesthat global spendingon Y2K
Doinga crisisaudit
ilrdxlhillion.
lrrcc-to-facecommunicationgenerally,and par- lf youwereconducting a crisisauditforyourplaceof
y rlurirrg a time of crisis, is thereforea positive studyor:work, whatwouldyouneedto know?Make
whetherthat be two individualsfaceto facein a list of the keyareaswheresomething mightgo
icw or the CEO of a 'megacorp' (major multi- wrong.Howcouldyoufindoutwhetheryourorgan.
utg,unisation) addressingtheir staff directly at a isationhasa crisisplan?Whatwouldyouexpectit
to contain?

Feedback
Theauditoftehshowscompanies a needforchange.
to prepare
for a crisis It mightbe an operational
change,a change
a productis labelledor howthe company
in how
is mar-
keted,or a changein whatresearch is openlydis-
drr(ome asa surpriseand at unexpected times,but cussedwiththeregulator.
irirtion- commercialor public sector- canpre-
tixll lirr the inevitableand everycompanyshould. Aneducationalorganisation,
forexample,wouldhave
le *rch as researchin the form of crisis audits, potential
to consider problemsoriginating
fromstaff
il1ia crisismanual and conductingcrisis simula- or students,suchas scandals,courtcases,exam
*t training will ensure that organisationsare better protests.
results, Somecolleges have
anduniversities
I to handle any crisis. (SeeBox 19.4.) also had crisesdue to outbreaksof meningitis,
forexample, guidance
whichhaveledto clearer to
newstudents aboutsymptoms andproperactions
to take.
audit
Ftrt rtcp in preparationis to conductan audit that
lhe current vulnerabilitiesand strengthsof the
!' ol organisation.The audit will researchkey
lrr lr ls operations, marketing, employee relations,
? r,*F1'115, environmental experts, government, legal
The audit resultscan then be usedto identilythc kcy
r**lrnunicationspeople.It will asktoughquestionsto
rr lhe most likely scenario that could happen,
trouble spots, identify which stakeholders woulcl bc
Itnw well prepared the company is to deal with it
affectedand help managementbuild sccnariosto train
a key crisis team with the techniquesof effectivecrisis
*lrr,llrcrit hasall the necessary
resources.
management. ln additionto beingableto train a crisis
team, the assessment can help build a comprehensive
systemfor managingcrisiscommunications. (SccActivity
l e.s.)

Crisismanual
Another meansof preparationis a crisismanual.A good
crisismanualcontainsa simplesystemof rapiclcommun-
ications,basicmessages and audienceidentificationand
shouldnot be more than 10 pageslong.Anythinglonger
will not be usedin a crisis.A well-preparedcrisismanual
a crlsibaridit.
: can serveas a guide for many of the basictasks,such as
airlsismanual.l' :;,.
activatingthe crisisteam and facilities,and allowsmore
regular crisissimulation
training. time for the crisisteamto focuson the more criticalissues
(seeFigure19.2).
400 Part3 PUBLIC
RELATIONS
SPECIALISMS

Crisisor Dotentialcrisis identified

Initialanalysis
Stage 1
Completetemplate1: Initialcrisis assessment

Highrisk

Completetemplate2:
Externalcommunications
strate$/
Template3:
Internalcommunications
strates/

j ConveneCCT
Stage 2 i
[g':::l
I
Crisis Initialcrisis
I
management I management
at local level I at locallevel
Keep ECT
informed

Stage 3

Key:ECT- External Team;CCT- CrisisCommunications

Communications Team

Figure79.2 Crisiscommunicationsaction plan

Crisissimulationandtraining A usefulmethodthat canalsohelp preparcir rurrriigsil

is to incorporatedebriefingsessionsinto the col,lrnu,!t!
{
The final stepin crisisplanningis to conductsimulation tions plan to make surethe team understandstlrc r.liet
training. Crisis simulationtraining is designedto create ging issues,what they are doing in terms of cornrrnrtfil;
a real atmosphereof crisis.It integratesgroup and indi- relationsand how they areworking with the ncwctt l+:q}1:
vidual exercises, teststhe skills of the spokesperson or niquesin crisismanagement. Theyshouldalsobc irw,rrrr*{
spokespeople, teststhe crisisplan and finallyexaminesand the importanceof communityand employeerclatiorrt.
evaluatesthe communicationstools to find weak spots. Today in the UK, just over one-quarterof corrrPiurlF*
Suchexercises rangefrom desktopexercises to full-blown (27o/o)researchpossiblevulnerabilitiesbut only ln&
globaltestsof the team.Repetitionof crisissimulationand conductregularcrisispreparedness workshops(Wsl*r,'ry*
exercisesare crucial to ensurethat any weaknesses are SolutionsLtd, www.webservesolutions.net). l'host' rclti
addressed. panieswho havenot preparedor trainedwill bc relrrorr
1

lhrir .risis strategyin the middle of their first major

Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
management {01
w
L. Paul Bremer, former Chairman of the
lonulTerrorismCommissionbeforehe wasassigned
tllifttiion in Iraq, stated in an article in the Harvard
ReviewAprtl2O02:
9/11,a poll of CEOsin the US showedthat 85o/o
'lul to managea crisisduring their time in ffice but
50t)toadmitted to having a plan. However 970/owere
that they could handlea cisis. This soundsto x
Definethe realproblem.
I hopethat more businesses
likr over-confidence. are
'7
Centralise
or at leastcontrolinformatlon
flow.
u hard lookat theirDlans. 't:

, ' 3 lsolate
a crislsteamftomdailybusinessconcerns.
is no doubt that physicaland IT aspectsofplans
i: , 4 Assume a worst-case planningposltlon.
itrgcncyplans, businesscontinuiry security and
interruption- havecome under closerscrutiny lr I ::5. Donotfullydepend ononeindividual.
thr 9/ll tragedy.However,the main focushas been ;6 Alwaysresistthecombative instinct.
ftllfrationalfactorsand often the key aspectsof com- a,,i'i Understand
whythemediaarethere.
nlion readinessand planning have been neglected.
I Remember (stakeholders).
all constituents
Itrr of I he hallmarksof a well-managedcrisisis know-
, A r'ompanyis better prepared when it knowswhat theproblem.
9 Contain
,$$kr,itoldersthink about the product, the brand and x0 Recognise
thevalueof short-term
sacrifice.
$nrp{lriltion. Both MattessonsWalls (seethe Peperamr
{iir:;cstudy 19.2) and Johnson & Johnson (in the
rl crisis coveredearlier in the chapter) commis-
rcscarchthroughout their situation to find out
iuly' what their key audienceswerethinking.Thereis
the situationright now - and thc long-tcrnrproblctrtIn
it tlrtdcncl'to judge what the audience thinks on the
gl'nredia headlines, which can lead to overreaction ensurethe brand/corporationrecoversin ternrsof both
marketshareand reputation.
olisnlilnagementof a crisis.

Centralise
or at leastcontrol
information
flow
principles tn crisis This appliesto itemsof informationboth comingin and
goingout. If thereis a multi-countryissue,haveone 'cen-
ilnagement tral place'as the focus.This, in very practicalterms,will
makecommunicationwithin the organisationeasier.If it
dtrrw this chapter togetherand support students tn is not feasibleto haveone centre,then all spokespeople
lrrding how to manage crisis PR situations,the mustbe rigorouslytrainedso asto communicatethe satne
rg t0 key principles have been identified.These message. Be awareof languagesensitivities and terrnsof
Iru*'d on the experience of leading crisisconsultants referencethat may not translate
readilyfrom onelanguage
s) over three decades and influenced by the to another.
rir ol'crises in a range of international settings,with
,:,pthrrrrcommercialand non-commercial situations.These lsolate a cr isisteamfr omdaily
,i'$;tt,irlesare summarised in Box 19.5 and described in business concer ns
;r$lhtt elctailbelow, Crises,as we have seen, are by their very nature all
enveloping. While managinga crisis,the dayjob hasto be
put on hold. In the caseofTylenol, lim Burke,Johnson&
fglsmanagement principles fohnson CEO, insistedhe becamethe brand managerfor
Tylenol.He wasableto delegate his many leadership tasks
nethe realproblem and this enabledhim to focuson doing the right thing for
ir lhc most critical aspect of effective PR crisis man- Iohnson& Johnsonwhile relievinghim of his day-to-day
,f$*tlnrt. l)efine both the short-termproblem - address responsibilities.

,.**-*--,-rfl
402 Part 3 SPECIAL IS MS
PUBL ICREL AT IONS

schoolchildrenbeinghospitatisedafterdrinklng
Colasurfaced.Morecasesfrom otherpartsof E
were found and Coca-Cola productswere ba
severaI Whitethe publicspeculated
countries. as
cause,rangingfrom rat poisonto extortion,th€
panydelayedfutl apologiesandtriedto denythe
Coca-cola representatives in 1999 acknowledged that lemand its responsibility.
the crisisdescribedbelowwas biggerthan any worst-
case scenariothey could have imagined.They atso Coca-Cola sourcesspeculated that the problem
pubticlyadmittedthat perhapstheyhad lostcontrol. be due to contami natedC O" and creosot€- l
palletsand werequotedas saying:'lt may mElE
PhilippeL'Enfant,a seniorexecutivewith Coca-Cola feel sick,but it is not harmfut.'Meanwhile, Cocd
Enterprises in 7999,in an interviewon Belgiantelevi' was losingan estimated mittionin revenue
$3.4
sionsaid:'Perhaps[we]lost controlof the situationto day and 79o/oof consumershad 'reservations'
a certainextent.' drinkingCoke.
T he p o p u ta ti o no f Be l g i u mw a s s ti l l reel i ngfrom
fears about mad cow diseaseand the presenceof Coca-Cola most definitetyhad a crisis mansgti
the carcinogen dioxin in animal feed when reports of strategybut it stitlfounditselflosingcontrol.

A s s u mea wo rs t -c a s ep la n n in gp o ' , il t r i 1 r :!,::'

[ : i n s u r ct l r c c t i s i st t 'l r t t rt h i r t l <si l l r , , L rt1l t t w o t s l , , , ' '
in terms of what could happcn to 1hc bralrtl ,trr.ll" i::;i
organisatiort.More often than not, PeoPlc (rlltlrrltc tli ;#
:#
worst from their own perspectivc,tlr wlrlt llti r ,rr' al':: tr
to l i atr dl r , i .i tl tei . tl i .ttr .! l l tl L \\'oi s i u.i s t. li r .. : i ,

i m p o r t a n t t o b r a i n s t o r n r a n d g c t a s n l t t c l t r r r l r '1 i ' -
:a:
o t h e r sa sp o s s i b l e(. S e eM i n i c a s e s t u c l y1 9 . 2a r r t lli r i ; r " :
'S1
,3.
:{s
Factsdo notatwaysrule- emotions,speculations/
Donotfullydependon oneindividui r l 5S.
"g

The personmanagingthe crisismusl dc1-rctltl tttt llt' r !' ' Sr

rumoursarestrongcomplicating factors. 'in
t e a m f o r i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t n e v e r r e l y o t t i r rl """"''
I T h i n k ' o u ts i d ien ' - p l a nm e s s a g eand
s acti ons
from just one individual. Son-re team nlenlbcts rrr'!rr''
ba s e d o n s ta k e h o l d e rsp' e rs p ecti ves. H ere'
v e s t e di n t e r e s t i n a p a r t i c u l a r a r e a a n d w i l t r l lr ' l "i 'i '
Coca-Cola was caughtout by a combinationof
extremelysensitiveregulatoryauthoritiesand t h e i r o w n o r t h e i r d e p a r t m e n t 'sr e p u t a t i o l l .I t t s tttl l ":i i * :"
parentskeento protecttheirchitdren. t h a t t h e m e s s a g epsu t o l l t d u r i n g a c r i s i sa r c t l t t l r ttl "+r r r I
by the influence of one departn-rentovcr itttollt' t ll;::
I TheCEOmustbe visible.
subtletiescan be worked out at a laler datc' llrt I' r' '- '
I D o n o t l e t o th e r s ta k e h o l d e rsshape your a l l y m o r e t h a n o n e d e p a r t m c n l 's i n t c r n a l t ( l l t rl .r l t";
reputation. t h c l i n e w h c n a c r i s i sh i t s .
I Callon yourallies(thesecouldbe otherproducers
or suppliersof materials or packaging)' instinc t
Alwaysr esistthe combative
I Message alignment andinternalcommunications D o n o t g o i n t o b a t t l c w i t h t h c m e d i a , N ( i O s ' r o tl 1 "'ti i ""
are key (to maintainconsistency in messages o r s u p p l i e r s .A n o r g a n i s a t i o nm u s t d e m ( ) l l s t ti r l ' l l i " i l
c i rc u l a ti nign s i d ea n do u ts i d eth e organi sati on). c o n t r o l d u r i n g t h c c r i s i s .T h e o u t c o t l l eo f b c i n l l t ti ti tl ''''
I Regret, resolutionand reform(demonstrateregret' could well destroy the brand or reputatiotl. \\'ritrl' i-r-:
to the problemand howto reform
find a resolution in anger, or defencc,may bc temporarily salisll'rrr1'l'"
whatthe companyis doing). they n-raynot rePresentthe best position firr tltr r tiri; fi*;
I Be betterprepared- think'worstcase',not just manageror the organisation.When Ronald l,i, ( llr,itrri*+"'
precedent. of the Hong Kong Stock Exchangesuspcndcrllr,t'lltllrlil
1987 in an attempt to defusc a run on the cxtltittrli, !i'o
 Chapter19 Crisispublicrelations
managemcnl 40t

holders(publics) Consumer
reaction
to a crisis
youknowwellor areinter-
sn organisation thesequestions
Consider relatedto the Peperami
..ln and note down all the stakeholders case(Case
study19.2).
SeealsoChapter11 for furtherinforma-
stakeholders.
Youcouldthinkaboutthe Whydidconsumers reactsopositively
to Mattessons
or collegeyou considered
in Activity19,5. Walls'handling
of thiscrisis?

Themarketshareof the productincreased

by 7Lo/o
* whydoyouthinkthishappened?
post-retaunch
b* usefulto breakstakeholders
down into
aRdexternalas follows.
Feedback
stokeholders Nowthinkaboutcompanies
andproducts
youexpe-
andtheir families,medicaldepartment, rience
everyday.
supervisors,managers andcorporateman-
Sfidunionsif applicable.
Ina university,
there Asa consumer, whatdoyouwantto knowaboutthe
be employees- academics,administrators products youbuy?Makea listandtryto organisethe
ffirviceworkers,each groupwith its own hier- issuesyou are interestedin. Putthemin themes
and unions.as well as studentsand their or categories,
e.g.safety,the manufacturing pro-
cess,locationof production, who ownsthe com-
pany,etc.Youmayfindit usefutatthisstageto refer
stakehslders to otherchapters
in thebookaboutissues manage-
ment(Chapter 18)andimage,identity andreputa-
F*nllne community, localauthorities,
factories
tion(Chapter
(in the localcommunity), 12).
Ygrllltles community
government,
and leaders,regulator(s), con-
customers,
suppliers, distributors,
shippers,
experts,
thefinancial
community andrel-
relate to. A firm can assertthe factsas il seesthcnt and thus
NGOs.A university
is accountable to the
defuse an'on-the-face-of-it' story.
Rfilent,research bodies,grant-making
bodies,
le'rs,students'parentsand local authorities,
?Sll as the localcommunity.
Rem ember ( stakehol der s )
al[ constituents
It is not just the media that need {hst and relcvanl
responsesduring a crisis.The crisisplan has to lakc all thc
stakeholdersinto consideration.(SeeActiviry '|9.6.)

rv,r'r'nadeworsewhen he lost his cool with a jour- Contain the pr oblem

*t llte subsequent pressconference.The journalist Reducethe problemto assmalla geographical arcaaspos-
tr.rltlrat closingthe exchangewas outsideMr Li's sibleto preventit becominga biggerproblem- fronr local
li.rw.r's. Mr Li responded by demanding his name to nationalor nationalto international. ln thescdaysof
' *l llrtt'ltctringto suehim. He actuallyendedup in prison the internatiorral rnediaand thc lnternel,localisingan
,,*$81&.lt (firr unrelatedchargesof insidertrading). issueis a major challenge.hlowever,it shouklbc an objcct-
i.. llttling the 2001generalelectioncampaignin the UK, ive.For example,in the Peperami case(Casestudy 19.2),
l.l.ltuly Prime Minister John Prescottfound out only the affectedbatch was only beingsold in the UK. Efforts
i l+r,ll the impact of a violent reaction from someone to focus the problem led to the subsequent recall being
tlr prrlrlic eye. When a heckler threw an egg at Mr limited to just the UK despitethe productbeingwidely
lll, il was not particularlv newsworthv. But when availablethroughoutEurope.
l'tl*:ott repliedwith a left-hookpunch,it wasin all the
r lirr days. Recognise the valueof shor t- ter m sac r i fi c e
: This might involverecallingthe productor disrnissingrhe
,i
t,
rsta n dw h yth e me d i aa r ether e personresponsible for causingthe problem.
|rlg nrr',liiraresearching for a goodstory.Theyneedfocus, The valueofshort-term sacrificecan be well illustrared
:* Lnrcr' and effect'- somethingthat their audiencewill by Casestudy I 9.2on Peperami(seealsoCasestudy I 9.3).
404 Pa r t 3 SPECIALIS MS
PUBL ICREL AT I0 NS

Actions
A mediacontrolcentrewas set up, mannedbY
encedmediarelationspeople24 hoursa day,I
w eek.A consumertel ephonecentrew as alg$
lishedwith telephoneoperatorsgivendaily
ln 7987the UKDepartment of HeatthlinkedPeperami Trackingresearch
briefings. was initiatedto d
to an outbreakof salmoneltapoisoning,a notifiable exacttyhow consumersthoughtthe crisis$r.r!
illnessin the UK. The decisionwas taken to recall handl edandanal ysethei rpercepti ons
of the
affectedproducts,but due to the packagingused for brand,givingthe management teamcruciali
the product,the affectedbatchcouldnot be precisely on theimpactit washavingbeyondthe medln
identifiedby consumers fromthe bar code.The recatt
wastherefore extended the wholeof the UK.
to Employee wereprepared
statements for atl Matt
Wallsemployees
and regularupdateswersSfvf{t
meat snacks
P e p e ra mdi o mi n a te dth e s a l a mi - styl e Unilever, Walls'parentcompany,
Mattesons to hgfr*,
market,with 80o/oof marketshare and widespread up to datewith developments.
productdistributionacross40,000 outlets.Peperami
couldbe foundin a hugerangeof retailoutlets,includ- Duringthe recal[and the time the productwrtt t]ff
ing supermarkets, cornerstores,clubsand pubs. market.eachmediarelationsexecutive workert
individualheattheditorfromeachnationalngw
Strategy and a memberof the teamwasappointedto lidt&f
the D epartment of H eal th.
P e p e ra mi si i u s to n eo f m a n yme a tp roductsproduced
by Mattessons Wallsanda keyearlyprioritywasto limit Result
t he i m p a c to f th e s a l mo n e l lparo b l e mto the P eperami
brand.Mattessons Wallswaspositioned as an importer Mattessons W atl srecei ved publ i ccommen4 '3; 1l1',f f f t i.
Health for the way it had h{ilffi
the Department of
g
t*
and not a manufacturer, distancingPeperami fromthe
parentcompanyto stopa productproblembecominga the situation,and research showedthat morefhuti.ffffi
maiorcorporate problem. Meanwhile, it was crucial to of consumers were impressed with the way the w#5, ,#
s h a reth e fa c tsi n th e c a s ea n dc o m m uni cate ful tyto al l draw aIw as handted. W i thi nthreemonths 6f 1, : 1, 1'; ; 1; . S: : ':
stakeholders. Peperami'sshareof the satamisnackfoorl:,rrr'l,llt
stoodat 94o/o,a 14olo increase, despitethe intrridur l4$. ;
of a competitiveproductfroma national5uperrrre*ffi *;
(Sainsbury) own label.(SeeActivity19.7.) t'tffi 'e;l
-F,
'}i r,;l'
.-!

-!

:i*

,lilo ,.1,&
workersand cuttinggassuppliesto factori€s,
bl,'tir*'****{' '$
'ta.:
and privatehomesacrossthe state.

Effects
Thestateof Victoria washighlydependent on ehe,rirS*#'i
Finatty,let us take a look at a crisis that puts alt and its populationof morethan 3 mitlionw*rcalffrd.li
these key principtesinto perspective: the Melbourne totallydependent onthisoneplant.Ninety-elghl trett*a*'=
of Victoria'sgas customers would haveno gat titiiffi','-
Gas crisis that threw the entire state of Victoria,
intochaosfor a fortnight,but is remembered for the foreseeablefuture,Manufacturing inrlirtlrt**i
Austratia,
stooddown150,000emptoyees andthe estimdterf+r*ts-:
for beingone of the bestmanagedcrisesin Australian
history. to industrywas $At00 mitliona day.VENCorp, lltr df*-*"
tributorof gas for Victoria,invokedemergen(ypl,ttffi:+:
Event to restrictgasuse,andmediareporting hightlghtrdrh*-;-;
miltionsof peoptefacedthe prospectof cold shi'wct*1 -i;
A major explosionat the Exxonrefineryat Longford, .:€
Melbourne,on Friday25 September7998 destroyed
partof the plant,killingtwo and injuringeightrefinery
 C hapter 19 C ri si spubl i c rel ati onsnti l t.rti ('nti ' rrt 405

Assessment
Whenthe gas supplywas restoredtherewere only 9
rel i ghtacci dentsand 12,000appl i ancerepa ir s.Alan
Stockdale, Treasurerof Victoria,said at a government
pressbriefingon Friday9 October1998:

I think every Victoriancan takepride in the fact thot

our communityhas respondedso well,and that the
reconnectionprogram, on the massivescale,is tak-
*i.lJrF *,trl,i and bothconsumers and the systemneeded
i' fu tr* 1,'r,pared ing place in such a safe and orderly monner.
to be protectedfrom retightingaccid-
' i' . + *l+ ,l l rt c ri s i ste a m ma d e e d i to riatcontentand a We estimatethat 1.1 million domesticcustomers,
.: 4i*rltiLrrrffu0g€ brochurethe focus of a safe retight
i,{clrtnrrrnications out of a total of 1.35million,havebeenreconnected
programme. Operationalty, when the to the gas supply now.
.r:,i:{iriirilvwas readyto be reintroduced, the odd/even
r trumbers
., {i..i++il. wouldbe usedto phasegas supplyin Eighty-fivepercentof domesticcustomershave been
j.o**l*tv,lrd particularly to protectthe gas network. able to reconnectwithout assistance,indicating
:. ii'
that the wide-rangingsafetyprogram has been very
, ,lfi111ont successful.
.:
;11
'. I considerthis to be the best-handled
issuethat I
. : l, ; 5i?r,l r,ri r.,,tn d rg e n csye rv i c veo l unteers
e me w ereused
lt i:-*lilgir'ufl gasmeters,andcal[centreswereestabtished have seen since I have been interestedin public
E*
. i$, t ' ri tr ,rtth e c ri s i sp e a k ,re c e i v e 1
d 3 7,567cal l sa day. affoirsissuesin this state.
Iri ' I llt;rrtw;rsin-housecoordination
[s* r$ :llii1ll1a,11116
and development
scriptsand the top 10 frequentlyasked
of
I havebeentold by many,includingmy wife,that this
ffi, ,'i' gi,i..li',trsfrom the call centreswere advertiseddaily fholdingup the brochure]was the ftrstdocumentof
F
rtr
;
" . . : . , : i r r tJt.tli'
mte d ia .
the kind thot theyhavereadand clearlyunderstoad
what they rreededto do and what they shouldn't
19' do.
E,'
', i+pr,,1'rr11'
seamless communication, thecommunications
K.-. .- l*,J!rr'.,rl on the governmentgas supply emergency
l ; nt t l i rr,rl i o nc o m m i tte ea n d c ri ti c a servi
Thisincidenthas been monagedas well as it could
havepossiblybeendone - thereis no higherproise
Fi:-
Li'. l cesw orki ng
F+ ,.'*irrflii.i,-stablished
jr rrlilri,rFrl
a 24-hourmedia responsecentre than that.
hy a team of 15 peopleand arrangedtwice-
" , ils llyrrrrd i ab ri e fi n g sa t 1 O a ma n d 3 p m. K eyspokes- DavidGuthrie-.lones, Manager Communications V[NCorp,
-.rtitsrrrrr{, weregivenmediatraining. sai dat an A ustral i an
GasA ssoci ati on
meeti n gon 16
N ovember 1998:
*;. ri1 :::'

{ r } , 1 l i r} n \i a
ven dp re -e mp ti vi ses u e sm anagement pro-
ffi,
fij::
i
.L gi;lirrilr'wasdeveloped and as a keyelementof a safe
So we called in communicationsexperts,who sent
on excellentteam of experienceand enthusiasm
F:. ,, r s lii i l rit,ro g ra mme 2 .3
, mi l ti o nb ro c hures w eresentto
,', a:.
$'r' to help with aur crisiscommunication
strategyond
,. !, *ll lr rl ,.t' h o l dasn ds ma l b l u s i n e s s eal a maj or
s ongsi de
t.E )|,
ii: ,
.rrr(l
';:,t r r r , tr te l e v i s i oand c a m p a i g n .
implementation.

I contellyou this.Havingback-upcommunication
s,,, :l
;:r'
,::::
:
i r r r rrrrrrn i c a tiwng
i th th e e th n i c c o mmuni ti esw as public relations consultontsexperienced,
or
in crisis
S". ..' r' !rlt:rrtif ir.dearlyas a challenge in Victoria;the brochure managementis absolutelycruciolto the successof
* ,: l:i

tslrelr,tnilatedinto 20 languages and distributed,and hondling large scale emergencies, . . this is what
f, ,.., ; i{!i lrllr.rfrnation
; line was set up offeringinterpreter helped make the differencebetween successand
f, '.: it
ifivir *:.'in 100 languages.
& failure for us at the end of the day.
F
**
ffi$
F+
9'
406 Part3 RELATI0NS
PUBLIC SPECIALISMS

anda rangeof politicians

withvariausfftgl
rangeof issuesbelow).

Thewaterswerefurthermuddiedby the co
informationbehindthe trial.TGN141? sfi*
monoclonal antibody,oneof a relatively'tr*H
treatments,and the effectson the volunfg€f$
to be dueto cytokine
releasesyndrome *
Ctinicaltrial of TGNl412 (intendedfor treatmentof
systemgoinginto overdrive- but the fgit*
multiptesclerois,leukaemia and rheumatoidarthritis).
clearand neitherwasit easyto establl*h
Trialwas conductedby researchcompanyParexelon
due to the condition
of the volunteer3.
six volunteersin premisesleasedfrom NorthwickPark questionssoughtinformationon the dcv6
Hospitat.The clinicaltrial beganon 13 March 2005
TGN1412,muchof whichwashighlycompler
(excluding
and atl trialvolunteers two who weregiven
someof whichwas confidential. ,,:.
placebo)experienced inflammatoryreactionswithin
90 minutesof receiving the antibody.Within12 to 16
hoursthe participantswerecriticallyill.
Speculation
andapplication
of 'common
sense'
TheTGN1412 crisisis a clearexamplethat majorcrises Ledbya selection
of bio-technology
expert$
cancomeout of nowhereand affectthe smallestof com' developedquicklyas to whatcouldhnv*'r
panies.At thetimeof the crisisTeGenero employediust sideeffects,
andhowtheymighthavebeen
15 people.The companyhad a portfolioof products or evenprevented (several
investigations
havet-
in developmentbut TGN1472was by far the most that, without the benefitof hindsightafl:l
advanced.In the development of TGN1412the com' standardprocedures,it is reasonablethal
pany had compliedwith the extensiveregulatory effectswerenot predicted).
requirements in orderto proceedto a phase1 ctinical
triat.Thisincludedresponding to detailedquestionsto Atongside weremanyanalyra*
expertcommentary
establishthe appropriateness of the speciesof animal i ng on that mostuncommonof thi ngs,,o' nlr r r r i
I
used in safetytests.The side effectswere completely (you shoutdsuretygivedosesoneat a time|,j
unexpected, therehavingbeenno evidenceof risk in the commonpractice;'shouldn'tit have b*gl!r.
pre-clinicattests. to patientsratherthanheatthy volunteerf?r
s1
not commonpractice for a treatment
whh fg{rh
Theeventswereimmediately a leadmediastorymixing clinicalprofite).In this casethe common*eii**
elementsof tragedy,humaninterestand horror.The mixedwith the benefitof hindsight.
exposurewas heightenedfoltowinga powerfulearly
interviewwith a girlfriendof one of the participants Initialstatements
abouthowthis wasthe f{f?},
(whohappened to be a BBCemployee). sucheventshad happenedin a clinicalfflal frlr
longtime quicklydevetoped into notionsthfrtt!1$.
Stakeholders tem was clearlydeficient.Theimplication wirr,lhn!
All crises,by theirverynature,involvea rangeof stake- 99.9o/oof trials which were safe were safe bv *:
holders. The clinicaltrial crisis includedthe added whilethis one was
trial thereal marker of ths I
comptexity of six separatepartieslinkedto the condi- oftheapproval system.
tion of the volunteers:the hospitaldoctorstreating
them; Parexel who conductedthe triah TeGenero who Range of issuesandconflictingvl*l**
developedthe antibody; Medicines and Healthcare on them
productsRegulatory Agency(MHM) who approvedthe
A wide rangeof issueswereinvolvedin the erisig:
trial; the local ethicscommitteewho also approved
the trial; and a Germancompanywho manufactured I Animaltesting - the eventsin thetriatwsl8
the antibody.Thereis alwaysconfusionin the early bothasanexample ofwhyanimaltestingl*
stagesof a crisis;this complexity addedto that. andasanexample ofwhyanimaltesting ises
I Ethicsof humantrials- should volufi!€ef*
ln additionto thesepartiesa greatnumberof further paidfor theirtime?Howwouldtheybe r€(
stakeholdersbecameinvolvedincludingthe famity otherwise?
membersof the volunteers,]awyersrepresenting the
volunteers,the management of the hospital,the phar-
maceuticaland biotechnology industryassociations
 Chapter19 CrisispublicrelationsmanaSement 407

19.4(continued)

volunteers .continueto come forward? conference aloneon the afternoon of the flrst day of
kding a very personal interview with Margaret media:attention.,Many peoplehavebeensurprised to
MPabouthowimportant suchtrialsare) learnofthescientific officeds inexperience at handling
government suchas the MHRA'up the mediahavingseenthe pressconfefence.
institutions Further-
facingpowerful privatecompanies? mor€r. at the time lt was alsorunknown whether the
Job'when
adapted the well-known phraseto eventshad beencausedby incorrect conduct of the
fournalist
'thosethat cando, thosethat can'tregulate'. trial,:by an errorin the production of the drugbeing
this question was asked it was overlooked tested,or by TGN1412 itself.
TeGenero couldnotbe seenas an example of
pharma') Rebutting rumourwasa majoractivityalongsidepro-
viding information as it becameavailable. On the
baslchumaninterestin why thesepeoplehad
firstday it was widely reported that a dog had diedin
involvedin trials(studentdebt etc.)and
testing.TGNl412 had never been tested on dogs and
theywouldrecover.
in fuctno animalshaddiedas a resultof beinggiven
:oulcklyapparentthat the implicationsof the TGNl/+12. Although thesource oftherumourwas never
wouldbringimplications for similartreatments confirmed, sometime laterit was suggested that it
(whichwould receivecloserand tracedbackto a ioke madeby one of the volunteers
$crutiny) butalsoforctinicaltrialsgenerally. to hisgirlfriend whendiscussing hisparticipation in the
trial,Shehadasked'is it safe',to whichhejokedthat
onlya doghaddied.
mediatepriorityfor the chief scientificofficerof
Arguably
8f0was to workwith the doctorstreatingthe triai a particularly interesting
elementof thiscrisis
eet5.However,he was also the main sourceof is the difference betweenthe approaches of the two
stlonto respondto mediaand otherstakeholdercompanies primarlly involved.WhlleTeGenero commun-
$. Such a small staff was imrnediatelyim-icatedquicklyand openty(withlnlimltedresources),
by the magnitudeofthe eventsand
stretched Parexel choseto offeronlylimitedcomment bywritten
{$verage. statements. In the shorttermthis difference led to
themainassociation beingwithTeGenero ratherthan
(entrewasestablishedto receiveand process Parexel. However, overtimeandparticularly following
hrye volume of calls. TeGenero's insolvency, Parexel's
refusal
to commun-
icateopenlyhasleftthemin an exposed positlon wlth
independently,
dy decisionwas to communicate no historyof engagement.
than remain part of the Parexelresponse.lt
forTeGenero
tmBortant to present
a faceasquickly Somehaveargued research
thatclinical organlsations
bleto answerquestions butalsoto showhow donotneedto paycloseattention to theirpublicprofite
thecompanywas, andhowstunned by butastheindustry develops thismaychange, particu-
*ysnts.Despitehavingreceivedno previousmedia larlyas the ethicsrelating
to recruitment comeunder
the chief scientificofficerconducteda press futurescrutinv.

comefrom a crisis.They may even help to find the

opportunitythat cancomefroma crisis(thecharacters
that represent'crisis management' in both Chinese
is no guaranteed recipefor successfulcrisis and Japaneseactuallymean'danger'and 'opportun-
r$.*irsgementbut thereare keyingredients:knowledge, ity). Preparingfor the unexpected
but inevitableen-
il Bepctalion,calmness, controtand communicationsuresthat any organisation cantakethe dramaout of
i-*,tll*c an organisation secure the bestpossibleout- a crisis.
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RELATIONS
SPECIALISMS

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TheGuardian:www.guardianunlimited.co.uk