Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88373 May 18, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG and AYER
PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD., Respondents.

G.R. No. 82330 May 18, 1990

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD and McELROY & McELROY FILM

PRODUCTIONS, Petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 82398 May 18, 1990

HAL McELROY, Petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity

as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, and
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondents. chanrobles virtual law library

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner filed this Petition to stop the respondent court from acting on the
private respondent's application for damages arising from the wrongful issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction by that court, later nullified by this Court in Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong. 1 Ayer's findings are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with

application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners
from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint
alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private
respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious
violation of his, right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court
issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the
application for preliminary injunction.
chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that
the mini-series film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce
Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would
amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner
Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

In an Order dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of

Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be

issued, ordering defendants, and all persons and entities
employed or under contract with them, including actors,
actresses and members of the production staff and crew,
as well as all persons and entities acting on defendants'
behalf, to cease and desist from producing and filming
the mini-series entitled "The Four Day Revolution" and
from making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears remote,
substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to, or is
otherwise identifiable with, plaintiff in the production and
filming any similar film or photoplay, until further orders
from this Court, upon plaintiffs filing of a bond in the
amount of P2,000,000.00, to answer for whatever
damages defendants may suffer by reason of the
injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff
was not entitled thereto.

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

(Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtual law library

On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a

Petition for Certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was
docketed as G.R. No. L-82380. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy also filed a

separate Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining
Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as
G.R. No. L-82398. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated

and private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer.
Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a limited
 Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of
the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to
resume producing and filming those portions of the projected
miniseries which do not make any reference to private respondent or
his family or to any fictitious character based on or bearing substantial
resemblance or similarity to or identifiable as private respondent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April

1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy.2 chanrobles virtual law library

On April 29, 1988, this Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, chanrobles virtual law library

a) The Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the
Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary
Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby
MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent
Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and chanrobles virtual law library

b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and

4 April 1988 as separate Petitions forCertiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise
of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge
Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147,
forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET
ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March
1987 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No pronouncement as to costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

3
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library

On May 16, 1988, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 4 On June 9,
1988, this Court denied the Motion with finality.5 On June 20, 1988, our Decision
was entered in the Book of Entries. 6 chanrobles virtual law library

On November 24, 1988, the private respondent filed a "Motion to Resolve" with the
respondent court, in connection with its Motion to Dismiss filed on March 9,
1988. 7chanrobles virtual law library

On January 19, 1989, the respondent court issued an Order, granting the Motion to
Dismiss. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
On February 10, 1989, the private respondent filed a "Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Application to Hold Plaintiff and the Surety Bond Company the First
Integrated Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. Jointly and Severally Liable on the
Bond." 9 The private respondent claimed that as a consequence allegedly of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, it was forced to "[move] the filming of the picture to
Sri Lanka after an extensive locational survey," 10 that "[the] move caused over
[sic] budget travelling costs of entire cast and crew from Manila to Sri Lanka and
Australia; additional days of shooting in excess of original schedule; additional
communications costs; costs for building additional sets and decorations in Australia
and Sri Lanka; insurance costs; location survey costs, accommodations; and special
unit shooting , cost," 11 and that "as a direct result of [the] preliminary injunction
issued in this case, [it] suffered losses and damages totalling FOUR HUNDRED
THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SEVENTY-THREE AUSTRALIAN DOLLARS . . ." 12 It also
sought to hold the petitioner (along with its surety, the First Integrated Bonding
Insurance Company, Inc.) liable on his (the petitioner's) bond, FIBICI Board No.
JCL-(8)00323, in the sum of P2,000,000.00, Philippine Currency. 13 chanrobles virtual law library

Subsequently, on February 12, 1989, the private respondent filed a "Notice to Take
Oral Deposition," in support of its claim for damages, of four witnesses, all residents
of New South Wales, Australia, before Consul Petronila Carbonell of the Philippine
Consulate General of Australia, Sydney,
Australia. 14
chanrobles virtual law library

On February 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a "Motion to Suppress Notice to Take
Deposition and/or For Protective Order," on the ground, inter alia, that the private
respondent's right to damages under the bond was not indubitable and prayed that
pending the determination thereof, the deposition-taking be postponed. The private
respondent opposed the Motion. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

After a further exchange of pleadings, the respondent court, on May 2, 1989, issued
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's motion to suppress notice to take deposition

and/or for protective order be, as it is, hereby, DENIED. 15 chanrobles virtual law library

According to the respondent court, the private respondent had the right to an
award of damages, "resulting from [the Supreme Court's] ruling that [the
petitioner] is not entitled to the writ [of preliminary injunction]." 16 chanrobles virtual law library

On May 9, 1989, the petitioner was served a copy of another "Notice to Take Oral
Deposition." 17 On May 15, 1989, he filed a "Motion to Suppress Notice to Take Oral
Deposition." 18 On May 19, 1989, he filed a "Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Order
dated 2 May 1989). 19 The private respondent opposed it. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

On June 1, 1989, the respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff, is hereby
DENIED. 20 chanrobles virtual law library

According to the respondent court:

. . . The Court finds and resolves that the application or claim for
damages of the [private respondent] was filed within the reglementary
period of time, considering that the fifteen (15) day period should be
counted from the receipt of the Order of this Court dismissing this
case, dated January 19, 1989., and not from the receipt of [the private
respondent] of the decision of the Supreme Court dated April 29, 1988
. . . and this Court in effect recognizes the right of [the private
respondent] to file its application and claim for damages under the
injunction bond filed by [the petitioner]. 21 chanrobles virtual law library

On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The petitioner, as
we indicated, asks this Court to stop the respondent court from conducting further
proceedings below, specifically, to nullify its Order, dated May 2, 1989, and its
Order, dated June 1, 1989. He submits that both Orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion, to wit:

I chanrobles virtual law library

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ADMITTING AYERS APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION IN G.R. NO. 82380,
WHICH HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, OPERATED TO
DISMISS, OR RESULTED IN THE EFFECTIVE DISMISSAL OF, THE MAIN
CASE.

II chanrobles virtual law library

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION IN

G.R. NO. 82380 DID NOT OPERATE TO DISMISS, OR RESULT IN THE
EFFECTIVE DISMISSAL OF, THE MAIN CASE, RESPONDENT JUDGE
NEVERTHELESS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING
AYERS APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT AYER, IN
VIOLATING THE PREVIOUS INJUNCTIVE ORDER OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE, FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
THE BOND FOR THE VERY INJUNCTION WHICH AYER DEFIED IN THE
FIRST PLACE.

III chanrobles virtual law library

 ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT AYER HAD NOT FORFEITED THE RIGHT
TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE INJUNCTION BOND,
RESPONDENT JUDGE NEVERTHELESS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ADMITTING AYER'S APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT,
HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTING THE ALLEGATIONS IN SAID
APPLICATION, THE CLAIMED DAMAGES RESULTED NOT FROM
COMPLIANCE WITH THE INJUNCTION BUT RATHER FROM AYER'S
DEFIANCE THEREOF.

IV chanrobles virtual law library

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO SUPPRESS THE DEPOSITION PROCEEDING WHICH WAS PROPOSED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE INADMISSIBLE APPLICATION FOR
DAMAGES. 22 chanrobles virtual law library

On June 13, 1989, this Court issued the following Resolution:

G.R. No. 88373 (Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Hon. Ignacio Capulong, et al.). -
Acting on the special civil action for certiorariand prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the
Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require
the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within then (10) days from
notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering the respondent judge from implementing the
questioned Orders (dated May 2, 1989 and June 1, 1989) issued by
him in Civil Case No. 88-151, entitled "Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Ayer
Productions, Pty. Ltd.", from conducting further proceedings in Ayers
application for damages against the injunction bond and from taking
depositions or conducting other discovery proceedings, or any other
proceedings. 23 chanrobles virtual law library

On June 21, 1989, the private respondent filed its comment, holding that:

I chanrobles virtual law library

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN HE REFUSED TO

ACCEPT PETITIONER'S GRATUITOUS CLAIM THAT THE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 82380, "OPERATED
TO DISMISS" CIVIL CASE NO. 88-151, AND THAT THE 15-DAY PERIOD
FOR FINALITY OF THE DECISION SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION. 24
 II chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN IT ALLOWED [THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENT] TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION BY ORAL
INTERROGATORIES OF ITS WITNESSES TO PROVE THE DAMAGES IT
SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THAT INJUNCTION. THE CLAIM THAT
[THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT] VIOLATED THE INJUNCTION IS FALSE. 25

III chanrobles virtual law library

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN IT ALLOWED

[THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT] TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO TAKE ITS
WITNESSES' DEPOSITION BY ORAL INTERROGATORIES SINCE
PETITIONERS GRATUITOUS SPECULATION THAT [THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT] "CAUSED ITS OWN DAMAGES" IS A FACTUAL ISSUE
SUBJECT TO PROOF. 26

IV chanrobles virtual law library

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN ALLOWING THE DEPOSITION

TAKING. 27 chanrobles virtual law library

After exchanges of further pleadings, this Court issued a Resolution considering the
private respondent's Comment as an Answer, giving due course to the petition, and
correcting the parties to file their Memoranda. 28 chanrobles virtual law library

A rule firmly settled in this jurisdiction is that a claim for damages arising from a
wrongful injunction should be filed in the main case with notice to the surety. 29 If
the lower court's decision, denying injunction, is however appealed to the Appellate
Court, and the latter affirms the denial, the application may be commenced in the
Appellate Court, which may either direct a remand of the case for reception of
evidence or otherwise hear the claim itself. 30 So also, it must be commenced
before judgment attains finality. 31 Otherwise, it is barred. Thus, it is provided
under Section 9, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 20, Rule 57
thereof -

Sec. 9. Judgment to include damages against party and sureties. -

Upon the trial the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff,
or to the defendant, as the case may be, upon the bond of the other
party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same
procedure as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57.

It has been held that this procedure is mandatory, and the failure to observe it
deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against the surety bond. 32 chanrobles virtual law library

The Court finds that the single most important question that confronts it pertains to
whether or not the claim for damages was filed before finality of judgment.
Corollarily, whose "judgment" is to be considered, ours or the respondent court's?
library
chanrobles virtual law

The petitioner contends that the reckoning point should be prior to June 20, 1988,
the date our Decision became final by virtue of the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment. On the other hand, the private respondent insists that our Decision
delved alone on the incidental issue of whether or not a writ of preliminary
injunction was proper, and avoided the case on the merits, amongst others, as to
damages. Hence, so it is submitted, the departure point should be January 19,
1989, the date the respondent Judge issued the Order dismissing the case. The
issue then turns on whether or not our Decision was one on the merits of Civil Case
No. 88-151, for if it was so, it is the Decision to be considered, and the point of
reference should be prior to June 20, 1988, the date judgment was entered.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong, so we hold, is in the nature of disposition
of Civil Case No. 88-151 before Judge Ignacio Capulong on its merits. Hence, when
we held in that case that the petitioner was not entitled to injunctive relief, we
spoke in the clearest terms possible that the petitioner lacked any cause of action
for injunction, whether preliminary or permanent. It is notable that, as Ayer
decreed in part.

. . . The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on

24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the
implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and
made PERMANENT . . . 33 chanrobles virtual law library

If we made the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) of March 24, 1988 permanent,
it means that no injunctive writ may be issued in any manner whatsoever, because,
as we said there: "The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon [the petitionersl "right of privacy,"" 34 and
that injunction was a prior restraint to free speech and consequently, injunction was
not permissible. Accordingly, there is no doubt that when we gave due course to
the private respondent's Petition, and made the TRO permanent. we could not have
been any more clear that we were disposing of Civil Case No. 88-151 on the merits.
And when we granted the private' respondent's Petition, we also unavoidably
dismissed Civil Case No. 88-151. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

It is also to be noted that the petitioner's Complaint was in essence one for
injunction, and corrollarily for the issuance of preliminary injunction pending further
proceedings. The fact that it also prayed for damages, the question of which the
private respondent alleges has been left untouched, is insignificant, because
demands for damages customarily shadow actions for injunction. In the petitioner's
Complaint, it was prayed thus:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that: chanrobles virtual law library

1. Upon the filing of this Complaint, this Court issue a temporary

restraining order enjoining defendants and all persons and entities
 employed or under contract with them, including actors, actresses and
members of the production staff and crew, as well as all persons and
entities acting on defendants' behalf, from producing, filming,
distributing and exhibiting the aforesaid mini-series and from making
any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his family or creating any
fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or
bear remote, substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to, or is
otherwise identifiable with, plaintiff, in the production, filming,
distribution, promotion, airing or exhibition of any similar film or
photoplay. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. After notice and hearing, and the filing of such bond as may be
required, this Court convert the foregoing temporary restraining order
into a writ of preliminary injunction. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

3. After trial of the issues, this Court convert the writ of preliminary
injunction into a permanent injunction and, further, order defendants
to pay plaintiff the following:

a) P1 Million by way of moral damages; chanrobles virtual law library

b) P1 Million by way of exemplary damages; and chanrobles virtual law library

c) P300,000.00 by way of attomey's fees and costs of

litigation

Plaintiff prays for such further and other relief as may be deemed just
or equitable. 35 chanrobles virtual law library

Again, when this Court declared that the petitioner had no cause of action for
injunction because, first, of an insufficient showing of invasion of his privacy, and
second, because injunction operated as a prior restraint to the guaranty of free
expression, we declared to all intents and purposes, that he, the petitioner, had no
right of relief whatsoever, preliminary or permanent injunction or damages. And
when we declared so, there was therefore absolutely nothing else for Judge
Capulong to hear and decide. Certainly, His Honor could not have further acted on
petitioner Enrile's right to stop the motion picture in question, when we had already
spoken: petitioner Enrile had no right. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is not indeed surprising that in its "Motion to Resolve" (the Motion to

Dismiss) 36 the private respondent relied on our very Decision to portray the
invalidity of the Complaint, thus: chanrobles virtual law library

ASSUMING THAT THE FILM THE FOUR-DAY REVOLUTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED,
NEVERTHELESS THE COMPLAINT WOULD STATE NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 37 chanrobles virtual law library

For if there was indeed something left for the court a quo to try, the private
respondent should have asked for trial. Obviously, however, this would have been
poor strategy because in that event, it would have been hard put to justify a
request for trial after having moved for dismissal from the beginning. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

The Court's ruling, therefore, is that the private respondent's claim for damages
brought about by a wrongful function should have been commenced prior to June
20, 1988 (the date Ayer judgment was entered) either with this Court or with the
court below. What is plain is that it had neglected to file its claim speedily and
seasonably, and for what clearly emerges as an effort to revive a lost opportunity, it
sought a court order to raise the case long decided by this Court as having had no
leg on which to stand. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The private respondent can not deny the application of Rivera v. Talavera, 38 where
we said that the request for damages arising from injunction may be ventilated in
the Appellate Court, because although Talavera involved an appeal, whereas Ayer
was one for certiorari (special civil action), the distinction is, for purposes hereof,
tenuous because, in both cases, there was a final resolution on the merits that left
nothing for the trial court to adjudicate. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Because the case had achieved a character of finality, it follows that all proceedings
below, including the request for deposition, after June 20, 1988, are void and of no
effect. The challenged Orders, dated May 2,1989 and June 1, 1989, respectively,
are equally null and inexistent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE the Petition is GRANTED. The Order, dated May 2, 1989, and the
Order, dated June 1, 1989, are declared NULL AND VOID. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

Costs against the private respondents. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino

and Regalado, JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Medialdea, J., took no part. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

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chanrobles virtual law library

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM

PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,
vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988

HAL MCELROY petitioner,

vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), 1 envisioned,
sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer
Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate government
agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile,
who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.

The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed
by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel as the other
government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval
of the intended film production.

In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private

respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a
synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People
Power—a unique event in modern history that-made possible the
Peaceful revolution in the Philippines in 1986.

Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events,

screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have
chosen a "docu-drama" style and created [four] fictitious characters
to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the Feb
revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country.

These character stories have been woven through the real events to
help our huge international audience understand this ordinary period
inFilipino history.

First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working

for major network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the
Phihppinence —once a colony, now the home of crucially important
military bases. Although Tony is aware of the corruption and of
Marcos' megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative to
Marcos except the Communists.

Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in

town,' she is quickly caught up in the events as it becomes dear that
the time has come for a change. Through Angle and her relationship
with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels (a fictitious
character), we follow the developing discontent in the armed forces.
Their dislike for General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense Minister
Enrile, and ultimately their defection from Marcos.

The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of

a Manila newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a
supporter an promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters,
Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of the New People's
Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl, politically moderate and very much in
love with Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her love and
the revolution.

Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters,

we show the complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining
series of events and characters that triggered these remarkable
changes. Through them also, we meet all of the principal characters
and experience directly dramatic recreation of the revolution. The
story incorporates actual documentary footage filmed during the
 period which we hope will capture the unique atmosphere and forces
that combined to overthrow President Marcos.

David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14

hugely successful plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,'
Travelling North) and 11 feature films (The Year of Living
Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').

Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American

historian with a deep understanding of the Philippines, who has
worked on the research for this project for some 18 months.
Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have developed a script we
believe accurately depicts the complex issues and events that
occurred during th period .

The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with

Home Box Office in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation
in Australia and Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom

The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the events
that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour
mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4)
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background.

On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and
will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television
production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and
further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or
exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal
or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to
any matter purely personal to them.

It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded
to film the projected motion picture.

On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for

Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to
enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The
complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private
respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of
his right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a
Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary
injunction.

On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the
Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series fim would not
involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a
preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss
alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.

In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary

Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering

defendants, and all persons and entities employed or under contract
with them, including actors, actresses and members of the
production staff and crew as well as all persons and entities acting
on defendants' behalf, to cease and desist from producing and
filming the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution" and from
making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his family and from
creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless
is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or
similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with, plaintiff in the
production and any similar film or photoplay, until further orders from
this Court, upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P
2,000,000.00, to answer for whatever damages defendants may
suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide
that plaintiff was not entitled thereto.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a Petition

for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-
82380.

A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed separate
Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary
Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as G.R. No. L-82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and
private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. Further, in the
same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially
enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners
to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-series which
do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious
character based on or respondent.

Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988

invoking in the main a right of privacy.

The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply
drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they
are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our
Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy
and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would
constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.

Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the

Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to
diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a
univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Along
with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium
of mass communication for information, education and entertainment.
In Gonzales v. Katigbak,3 former Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court,
explained:

1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and
the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the perception by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is
considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they
are designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line
between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were
sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. ... 4

This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-

owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of
expression. In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are
owned either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-
owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in
whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media
constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude
commercially owned and operated media from the exerciseof constitutionally
protected om of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic
contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.

The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was

demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law,
constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. 5 It is left to case law,
however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types
of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the
right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about
him constitute of apublic character. 7Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The
interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free
from unwarrantedpublicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern. 9

Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies heavily,

recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a claim to freedom of
speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion picture producer as
licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as licensors. This
agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying the
life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental during the November 1951 elections
and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party
then in power and his men were tried and convicted. 11 In the judgment of the
lower court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had
produced the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated
royalties, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:

Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing

Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause
or consideration, while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to
the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense
with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased
heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that
of his mother and the member of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
 Curtis, ([1895],147 NY 434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am St Rep 671),
'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deperson to
protect his memory, but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living,
to protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights
in the character and memory of the deceased.'

Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life
of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public
figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The
right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a
fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a he or she may
be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F. Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In the case at
bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life Story Of Moises
Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it
would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 12

In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to deal with
contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression and to privacy.
Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name of freedom of speech and
expression, a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly
"fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-
agreed royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the licensee's
claim, the Court said:

Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the

Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in film on
the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint.The right
freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191
[1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:

xxx xxx xxx

The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on
the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in given situation or type of situation"
 (Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern." 13

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be
applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different
conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of
the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."

1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a
prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of
speech and of expression by petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained
petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is
important to note that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind
imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film
biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the speech and of expression, a weighty
presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint
doesnot, of course, mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed
upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent
Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary
Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent
and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected
motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and
present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent
could lawfully assert.

2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody
change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in
February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly,
such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners'
argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of this countryand as such, must be regarded as having passed into
the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater, as set out in the
synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce
Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla
necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a
film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
"The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the
man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the
role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events
of the change of government in February 1986.

3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce
Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day
Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion,
as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened
to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private
respondent or that of any member of his family.

4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent
was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:"

A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his

accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in
his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be
included in this category are those who have achieved some degree
of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes
public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and
even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage
than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone
who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon
him as a person.

Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less
indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received
it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and
 could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that
the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public
about those who have become legitimate matters of public
interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it
was held that there was no liability when they were given additional
publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public
interest they had aroused.

The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public

interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public
to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press
and other agencies of information to tell it. "News" includes all
events and items of information which are out of the ordinary hum-
drum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information
which arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press,
with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has
succeeded in making its own definination of news, as a glance at
any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide
and othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages and
divorces, accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with
a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the
reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago,
and undoubtedly many other similar matters of genuine, if more or
less deplorable, popular appeal.

The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the dissemination of
news in the scene of current events. It extended also to information or education, or even
entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of
the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the
courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be
permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the
doubt. 15

Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his

participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in
character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make
reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical.
The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple
private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political
campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or
indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation
of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no
revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed motion
picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad
referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." 18 To the extent that "The
Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and
reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into
private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and
actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private
respondent.

II

In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy informed this

Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988, was issued by
Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil
Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd.,
McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP Motion for
Pictures Production" enjoining him and his production company from further
filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film. Petitioner alleged that
Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading, cut out straight grom
the complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. 88-151.
Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988,
brought to the attention of the Court the same information given by petitoner Hal
McElroy, reiterating that the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially
identical to that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to
join Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent, with
whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated, deliberately
engaged in "forum shopping."

Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating that the

"slight similarity" between private respondent's complaint and that on Honasan in
the construction of their legal basis of the right to privacy as a component of the
cause of action is understandable considering that court pleadings are public
records; that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of privacy is
separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although they arose from the same
tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on permissive joinder of parties is not
mandatory and that, the cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in point
because the parties here and those in Civil Case No. 88-413 are not identical.

For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the Court to
deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private respondent Ponce
Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is, however, important to dispose to
the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who, having refused to subject
himself to the legal processes of the Republic and having become once again in
fugitive from justice, must be deemed to have forfeited any right the might have
had to protect his privacy through court processes.

WHEREFORE,

a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated
16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this
Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the
implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made
PERMANENT, and

b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April

1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory
jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and
accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order
dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued
by him.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 On April 7, 1988, petitioners, in G.R. No. 82380 asked for deletion

Production's as party petitioner qqqt company but merely a
corporate tradename used by Ayer Productions. "McElroy and
McElroy Film Production's" will therefore be disregarded in this
Decision.

2 Annex "A" of the Petitions.

3 137 SCRA 717 (1985).

4 137 SCRA at 723.

5 The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy," in Cortes, Emerging

Trends in Law, pp.1-70 (Univ. of the Philippines Press, 1983). This
lecture was originally delivered in 1970.

6 See Cortes, supra, Note 5 at 12 et seq. where she traces the

history of the development of privacy as a concept

7 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed., pp. 854-863 (1984); and
see, e.g., Strykers v. Republic Producers Corp., 238 P. 2d 670
(1952).

8 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 63 L Ed.

2d 867 (1977).

9 Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 292 P 2d 600 (1956);

underscoring supplied.

10 92 SCRA 476 (1979).

11 People v. Lacson, et al., 111 Phil. 1 (1961).

12 92 SCRA 486-487.

13 92 SCRA at 488-489; Emphasis supplied.

14 Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 (1970); New

York Items Co. v. United States,403 U.S. 713, 29 L Ed, 2d 822
(1971); Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 5 L
Ed. 2d 403 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 67 L Ed. 1357
(1931).

15 Prosper and Keeton on Torts, 5th ed. at 859-861 (1984);

underscoring supplied