THE FOUNDATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE By K. L. Reinhold Together with some comments concerning the Theory of the faculty of Representation Jena: At Johann Michael Mauke's, 1791 Translation and Notes By George di Giovanni ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge 53 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823) developed his Philosophy of the Elements in Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermégen, (Essay towards a New Theory of the Fac volumes of Beitrage zur B a Philosophen (Contributions to the Rectification of Misconceptions Hitherto Held by Philosophers), Jena, 1790 and 1794, and in Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens, Jena. 1794. What follows is the translation of a substantial exert from this laner work. Reinhold begins by claiming that philosophy has +0 far lacked a proper foundation, and proceeds o examine the attempt to, aground it on the principle of contradiction. The translation is from the orginal edition which snow ali valle in photo mecarzal oroducon (a uthot to two reviews of Volume I ofthe Beitrige which were included in the tion), ed. Wolfgang H. Schrader, Hamburg: Meiner, 1978 poet _ ., THE PROPOSITION, ‘all that comes to be must have a cause or (what amounts to the same thing) must be an effect, has been demonstrated by a great many from the principle of contradiction, All the proofs so far mustered for it, however, have always presupposed nothing short of what they were supposed to prove, namely, “that the concept ‘what comes to be’ can only be thought by being characterized as effect.” This can never be deduced from the principle , which says nothing either about the concept ‘coming the concept ‘effect’; rather, it presupposes 3t ‘effect’ is already contained in the concept ‘cor that there is some ground external to the lat sue of an external ground. And since the principle of coniradicion has demonstrative force only in those cases where the predicate is already thought its demonstrative force is exhau: dicate is exhaustively thought in the subj to the demonstration of analytical judgemeB9] [40] 54 KL. Reinhold Whether the concept ‘effects already included in the concept ‘coming to be’ has been one of the most important issues of contention in philosophy so far.’ The question is answered in the negative by the defenders of widely different systems, eg., by Spinoza, Crusius, Hume, and Kant, all of whom deny that ‘effect is included in their respective concepts of ‘coming to be’. Others instead, eg,, the Leibnicians, claim to have no other concept of ‘coming to be’ save one that includes ‘effect’. The dispute makes clear this much, however: the principle of contradiction cannot supply the right concept of ‘coming to be' rather, i presupposes it, for all the proofs by // which each disputing party wants to establish the necessity or non-necessity of thinking ‘coming to be’ as ‘effect’ are derived in each case from the party's concept of ‘coming to be’. [It so happens that] the Leibnisian finds the concept of ‘effect’ in his concept of ‘coming to be’ consequently, whether he confuses the principle of sufficient reason which is merely logical with the metaphysical principle of generation, as he sometimes does, or distinguishes between the two as he does at other times, in either case he demonstrates both principles from the principle of contradiction. Hume, instead, does not find the concept of ‘effect’ in his concept of ‘coming to be', and from this he concludes that the proposition, ‘All that comes to be has a cause’, is not demonstrable. But of course, in doing this he assumes with the Leibnicians that the demonstrability of the proposition depends on whether the concept ‘effect’ is already contained in ‘coming to be’, Crusius and Kant, on the other hand, although they too fal to find the one concept included in the other, conclude from this no more than that the principle of generation, if it is to be demonstrable, must be demonstrated not from the mere concept ‘coming to be’ through the principle of contradiction, but on some other basis. The use of the principle of contradiction presupposes in every case that what is being predicated of a subject as pertaining to // it on the strength of the principle must have already been thought in the concept of the subject; the ', ‘coming to the contrary of these given predicates is to contradict if the necessity of the predicates isto follow from the impossibility of conceiving a contradiction. From the mere fact, however, that the said subjects are being thought with the said predicates, the correcmess of their being so thought cannot be inferred. I have no basis, besides my or somebody else’s arbitrary concepts, for thinking that an actual horse has wings; | am not able, therefore, to establish the realty of ‘winged horse’ from the principle of contradiction either. But I have grounds in actual experience for thinking that a The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge 55 bear is white, quite apart from its mere concept; hence I can prove the reality of ‘white bear’, not indeed from the principle of contradiction, but from experience. It might be that in actual fact I think ‘coming to be’ as ‘effect’. But if I have no reason to justify my concept save the fact that I have it—if there is no ground for it besides the concept itself, then the principle of contradiction will be // of no help to me to prove itis real. For the principle presupposes this reality, since Tcan only apply it insofar as I actually think the concept ‘effect in the concept ‘coming to be’. If [cannot give the reason why I think ‘coming to be’ as ‘effect, then I do not know whether my proposition, ‘every coming to be is an effect’, which is otherwise very much in conformity to the principle of contradiction, has any more reality than the proposition, ‘Every winged horse has wings’. The reason why I think ‘circle’ to be ‘round’, ie., why I conceive ‘roundness’ and ‘circle’ in the representation of one and the same object, lies in the immediate representation ot intuition of a circle; and since this intuition is inseparable from the concept ‘circle’, everyone can find in it the reason why I think ‘circle’ as ‘round’; my judgement is thus universally binding? But the reason why I think ‘coming to be’ as ‘effect’ at all is not be found in any intuition which would be inseparable from the concept of ‘coming to be’—in an intuition, that is, that would give everyone access to the justification of my concept, and would thus raise it to [the level of] one which is universally binding. For many of the leading independent thinkers have found nothing like ‘effec’ in their concept of ‘coming to be’. If I want to justify my // concept, appealing to the principle of contradiction, I must cling to the way 1 ‘actually think it, and conclude from the fact that I the characteristic ‘effect’ that it must be thought in this way. I must also grant, however, to anyone else whose concept is opposed to mine the right to claim the same about it, vi, that just because he actual thinks the concept of ‘coming to be’ without the characteristic ‘effect itis possible to deny this characteristic of the concept without offence to the principle of contradiction. For its correct application, the principle of contradiction presupposes a ground different from it; hence its not a all the fundamental principle of philosophy. The ground that it presupposes concerns nothing less than the reality of the propositions to which it is applied; these propositions are demonstrable through it only insofar as they do not lack this They could never have reality if they contradicted the principle, but they do not have it just because they do not contradict it. A ‘white bear’ could not exist ifthe predicate ‘white’ contradicted the subject ‘bear’, but it does not exist just because the predicate does not contradict this subject. ‘Coming to be’ could not // be thought of as ‘effect’ if this second concept contradicted the first; but 41) (42) 43]44] [45] 56 K.L-Reinhold ‘coming to be’ need not be thought as ‘effect’, and will not actually be so thought, simply because the two can be thought together. Hence the principle of contradiction only expresses the ground of the mere possibility of thought, never of its actuality, it expresses the ground of its necessity, however, if, and only if, a subject is already actually being thought through a certain predicate on some ground other than the principle of contradiction. Through the principle of contradiction, therefore, a proposition acquires only logical truth; this ruth is indeed presupposed in every case of real truth, but by itself it never constitutes the later; on the contrary, it assumes it. Every proposition must conform to the principle, since none can be true that contradicts it. Any proposition that conforms to it can be false, however, for logical truth does not by itself yield real truth; and whenever and wherever the real ground for the application of the principle is missing, we cannot substitute a logical ground for it, ie., the simple possibility of being thought. In the Leibnizi sophy, however, it representations that constitute the foundation of philosop! knowledge. But since the criterion of an innate representation absolute necessity and // universality, and the criterion of these, tur, is the principle of contradiction, scientific foundation for that philosophy. The whole Leibnizian system, therefore, is built on a principle which it misunderstands, and which (in the sense it is used as foundation) is false. There is nothing the system is further from than auithentic science; and forall its wealth of however it does not prove) it is still an legitimate ‘ries on. the origin of representations offered by Locke® bnis? completed the analytical portion of the groundwork that philosophical reason had been busy preparing for the only two dogmatic systems that had hitherto been possible, vi, empiricism and rationalism. The two philosophers laid down, one in the simple representations drawn from experience and the other in innate representations (and their presumed criterion, viz, the principle of contradiction), the only foundation of philosophical’ knowledge possible for the empiricists fon the one hand] and the rationalists [on the other}. And while their followers were busy disagreeing about the external details and the refinements // of their systems, David Hume came along and undertook, and even completed, the work of analysis required for the grounding of skepticism. This he did without having had even one predecessor equal to those several whom Locke and Leibniz had (for what is Sextus Empiricus in comparison to a Plato or an Aristotle?) For Hume, representations consist originally in mere impressions and. their reproductions; hence he was able to show from the very nature of representation, as the source of all knowledge, that knowledge in general ‘The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge 57 and philosophical knowledge in particular is merely the product of the imagination, and that all [supposed] objective truth, ic., any real conformity of representations to their objects, lacks foundation and is quite undemonstrable. Locke as well had taken his simple represen- tations drawn from experience to consist only of inner and outer impressions; but he had assumed that they conformed to their objects, and that they provided therefore a solid basis for the knowledge that they made possible. Being more consistent than Locke, Hume confronted this crucial issue about the conformity of impressions to their objects; this was what everybody had taken for granted without proof before his time, and he demonstrated that no proof can be offered that is without contradiction. Every possible demonstration of objective truth would call for a // comparison between a representation and an. object different from it; but at the same time this comparison could only take place through representations, and indeed it would have to be between the one representation that consists in the impression itself, and the other through which this impression is represented; consequently, the comparison would never be set up between 2 representation and an object that is not already a representation. Our concepts of objects get their realty only from the original representations, that is to say, from the impressions. Where the impressions get their reality from, and whether they have any realty at all, simply cannot be known, for they are the ultimate thing that we cognize, and for that reason they cannot be derived from anything more primitive. The concepts of objects are originally only representations of the impressions themselves, and these do not present us with anything besides what they contain, Whether and to what extent there is anything objective outside this content that corresponds to it will remain forever unknown; to suppose otherwise would be only an illusion. Suppose that we compare a rose (considered as object) with its representation: then the rose, inasmuch as we think it as an object different from the representation, can be nothing else but a represented impression; on the other hand, its immediate // representation is nothing else but the impression itself. I can never reach out to a rose which would be different from my impression of it, which would not occur in my representation. And should I imagine for a moment that I have attained to the objective rose, I should immediately be overtaken by the reflection that I have simply put the content of a mere representation in place of that imagined object. In other words, if by knowledge we understand the consciousness of the agreement of representation with objects that are different from mere representations, then no knowledge is possible. And no principles are possible if by principles we understand propositions expressing the necessary and objects of this sort. And no philosophy is possible if we take philosophy 4) (47)