Labor Case Digest
Labor Case Digest
Labor Case Digest
January 1, 2010
Serious Misconduct
Maribago Resort vs. Dual, July 20, 2010
G.R. No. 180660 July 20, 2010
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
just cause for termination under the law. Theft committed by an employee is
a valid reason for his dismissal by the employer. Although as a rule this Court
leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their
employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of
dishonesty in the handling of company property, petitioner’s income in this
case, are a different matter.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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serious misconduct because there was a deliberate act of stealing from the
company.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint of illegal
dismissal. He brushed aside petitioners’ argument that the penalty imposed
on Helen was disproportionate to the offense committed, and held that she
indeed committed a serious violation of the company’s policies amounting to
serious misconduct. The Labor Arbiter further held that Keihin observed the
requirements of procedural due process in implementing the dismissal of
Helen. He ruled that the following circumstances showed that the company
observed the requirements of procedural due process: a) there was a show
cause letter informing Helen of the charge of theft and requiring her to
submit an explanation; b) there was an administrative hearing giving her an
opportunity to be heard; and c) the respondent company furnished her with
notice of termination stating the facts of her dismissal, the offense for which
she was found guilty, and the grounds for her dismissal.20
On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and affirmed in
toto the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that petitioners admitted in
their Position Paper that Helen took the packing tape strewn on the floor
near her production line within the company premises. By the strength of
petitioners’ admission, the NLRC held that theft is a valid reason for Helen’s
dismissal.
However, in a Resolution dated November 2, 2005, the CA dismissed the
petition outright for not having been filed by an indispensable party in
interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether, in taking the packing tape for her own personal use, Helen
committed serious misconduct, which is a just cause for her dismissal from
service. (substantive aspect of the case)
2. Whether the petition of petitioners is out rightly dismissible for not having
been filed by an indispensable party in interest (procedural aspect of the
case)
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination. Misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For
serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, "(a) it must be serious,
(b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer."
In the case at bar, Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she
could use it for her own personal purposes. When Helen was asked to explain
in writing why she took the tape, she stated, "Kumuha po ako ng isang
packing tape na gagamitin ko sa paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong
lilipatang bahay." In other words, by her own admission, there was intent on
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring home the packing
tape in question.
It is noteworthy that prior to this incident, there had been several cases of
theft and vandalism involving both respondent company’s property and
personal belongings of other employees. In order to address this issue of
losses, respondent company issued two memoranda implementing an
intensive inspection procedure and reminding all employees that those who
will be caught stealing and performing acts of vandalism will be dealt with in
accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct. Despite these reminders,
Helen took the packing tape and was caught during the routine inspection.
All these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just an error of
judgment on the part of Helen, but a deliberate act of theft of company
property.
The petitioners also argue that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh and
disproportionate to the offense committed since the value of the thing taken
is very minimal. Petitioners cite the case of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission where Arnelio M. Clarete
(Clarete) was found to have willfully breached the trust and confidence
reposed in him by taking a bottle of lighter fluid. In said case, we refrained
from imposing the supreme penalty of dismissal since the employee had no
violations "in his eight years of service and the value of the lighter fluid is
very minimal compared to his salary.
After a closer study of both cases, we are convinced that the case
of Caltex is different from the case at hand. Although both Clarete and Helen
had no prior violations, the former had a clean record of eight years with his
employer. On the other hand, Helen was not even on her second year of
service with Keihin when the incident of theft occurred. And what further
distinguishes the instant case from Caltex is that respondent company was
dealing with several cases of theft, vandalism, and loss of company and
employees’ property when the incident involving Helen transpired.
Regarding the requirement of procedural due process in dismissal of
employees, petitioners argue that the first notice failed to explain the charge
being leveled against Helen. According to the petitioners, the notice was
vague and lacked sufficient definitiveness.
2. It is clear that petitioners failed to include the name of the dismissed
employee Helen Valenzuela in the caption of their petition for certiorari filed
with the CA as well as in the body of the said petition. Instead, they only
indicated the name of the labor union Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
sa Keihin (NLMK-OLALIA) as the party acting on behalf of Helen. As a result,
the CA rightly dismissed the petition based on a formal defect.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an indispensable
party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.31 It is "precisely
‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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FACTS:
Respondent, on May 24, 1999, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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and attorney's fees against petitioner and its officers before the Labor Arbiter
(LA).
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
Petitioner's main allegation is that there are factual and legal grounds
constituting substantial proof that respondent was clearly involved in the
forgery of the CAPEX form. Petitioner insists that the mere existence of a
basis for believing that respondent employee has breached the trust and
confidence of his employer suffices for his dismissal. Finally, petitioner
maintains that aside from respondent's involvement in the forgery of the
CAPEX form, his past violations of company rules and regulations are more
than sufficient grounds to justify his termination from employment.
However, the record of the case is bereft of evidence that would clearly
establish Ramil's involvement in the forgery. They did not even submit any
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Respondent alleged in his position paper that after preparing the CAPEX
form on 3 March 1999, he endorsed it to Marivic Villanueva for the signature
of the Executive Vice-President Ricardo T. Po. The next day, respondent
received the CAPEX form containing the signature of Po. Petitioner never
controverted these allegations in the proceedings before the NLRC and the
CA despite its opportunity to do so. Petitioner's belated allegations in its
reply filed before this Court that Marivic Villanueva denied having seen the
CAPEX form cannot be given credit. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court,
as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. When a party
deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory
in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
Thus, if respondent retrieved the form on March 4, 1999 with the signature
of Po, it can be correctly inferred that he is not the forger. Had the CAPEX
form been returned to respondent without Po's signature, Villanueva or any
officer of the petitioner's company could have readily noticed the lack of
signature, and could have easily attested that the form was unsigned when it
was released to respondent.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Santos vs. Shing Hung Plastics Co., Inc., Sept. 29, 2008
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD: No. There is no denying that loss of trust and confidence is a valid
ground for termination of employment. Hence, the basic requisite for
dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned
holds a position of trust and confidence or is routinely charged with the care
and custody of the employer’s money or property. Moreover, the breach
must be related to the performance of the employee’s function. Also, it must
be shown that the employee is a managerial employee, since the term “trust
and confidence” is restricted to said class of employees. The failure of
petitioners to report the cash shortage of teller Descartin, even if done in
good faith, nonetheless resulted in their abetting the dishonesty committed
by the latter. Under the personnel policies of respondent bank, this act of
petitioners justifies their dismissal even on the first offense. Even assuming
the version of petitioners as the truth, the fact remains that they willfully
decided against reporting the shortage that occurred. As a result, in either
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The Company may terminate this Agreement for any breach or violation of
any of the provisions hereof by the Agent by giving written notice to the
Agent within fifteen (15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach.
No waiver, extinguishment, abandonment, withdrawal or cancellation of the
right to terminate this Agreement by the Company shall be construed for any
previous failure to exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement.
Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his Agreement at any
time without cause, by giving to the other party fifteen (15) days notice in
writing.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Other issues were:"Some Managers are unhappy with their earnings and
would want to revert to the position of agents." And "Sales Managers are
doing what the company asks them to do but, in the process, they earn less."
Tongko was then terminated.
Therefrom, Tongko filed a Complaint dated November 25, 2002 with the
NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissalIn the Complaint. In a Decision
dated April 15, 2004, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of an
employer-employee relationship.
Issue:
1. WON Tongko was an employee of Manulife
2. WON Tongko was illegally dismissed.
Held:
1. Yes
In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control over Tongko that
would make him its employee. Several factors contribute to this conclusion.
In the Agreement dated July 1, 1977 executed between Tongko and Manulife,
it is provided that:
The Agent hereby agrees to comply with all regulations and requirements of
the Company as herein provided as well as maintain a standard of
knowledge and competency in the sale of the Company's products which
satisfies those set by the Company and sufficiently meets the volume of new
business required of Production Club membership.Under this provision, an
agent of Manulife must comply with three (3) requirements: (1) compliance
with the regulations and requirements of the company; (2) maintenance of a
level of knowledge of the company's products that is satisfactory to the
company; and (3) compliance with a quota of new businesses.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that
Tongko was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly,
these requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was
to achieve the company's goals.
More importantly, Manulife's evidence establishes the fact that Tongko was
tasked to perform administrative duties that establishes his employment
with Manulife.
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with
recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative
functions, leads to no other conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife.
2. Yes
In its Petition for Certiorari dated January 7, 2005[26] filed before the CA,
Manulife argued that even if Tongko is considered as its employee, his
employment was validly terminated on the ground of gross and habitual
neglect of duties, inefficiency, as well as willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of Manulife. Manulife stated:
In the instant case, private respondent, despite the written reminder from
Mr. De Dios refused to shape up and altogether disregarded the latter's
advice resulting in his laggard performance clearly indicative of his willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of his superior. As private respondent has
patently failed to perform a very fundamental duty, and that is to yield
obedience to all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the Company, as
well as gross failure to reach at least minimum quota, the termination of his
engagement from Manulife is highly warranted and therefore, there is no
illegal dismissal to speak of.
It is readily evident from the above-quoted portions of Manulife's petition
that it failed to cite a single iota of evidence to support its claims. Manulife
did not even point out which order or rule that Tongko disobeyed. More
importantly, Manulife did not point out the specific acts that Tongko was
guilty of that would constitute gross and habitual neglect of duty or
disobedience. Manulife merely cited Tongko's alleged "laggard
performance," without substantiating such claim, and equated the same to
disobedience and neglect of duty.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code mandates in explicit
terms that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests on the employer. Failure to discharge this evidential
burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and,
therefore, illegal.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an
employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence.
The settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an
employer's dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of
evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.
FACTS:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by
any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
of the test results. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result
as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm
a positive screening test. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing:
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations, for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
ISSUE:
Whether or not paragraph (d) Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of
the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard
Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise
reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should
they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a
co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella
pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to
immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They
stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the
company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of
whatever nature.
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia
allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in
view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that
she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as
a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that
he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid
dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an
accident and was advised by the doctor at the Orthopedic Hospital to
recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21,
1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She was
denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one
of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she
was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has
not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an
explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was
nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money,
she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth
month pay.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the
Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their
union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11, 2002.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC
in a Resolution dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via
Petition for Certiorari. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federico's permit form was unsigned.
Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to
join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with
her packed lunch and swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know
how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were
swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify
where they were going.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was
validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae
drowned because respondent had left the pupils without any adult
supervision. He also noted that the absence of adequate facilities should
have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming
pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that although respondent's
negligence was not habitual, the same warranted her dismissal since death
resulted therefrom.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Held: Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of
duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross
negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances.
Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been
grossly negligent. First , it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was
unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally
bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have
allowed their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot
simply ignore this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that
she was around when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have
requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at
least called her up to obtain her conformity.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority of the
pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils who sneaked
out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent should have considered
that those who sneaked out could not have left the school premises since
there were guards manning the gates. The guards would not have allowed
them to go out in their swimsuits and without any adult accompanying
them. But those who stayed at the pool were put at greater risk, when she
left them unattended by an adult.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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have departed from the requirements laid down by the law that neglect of
duties must be both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,
we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to
continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties although it was his first offense.
In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PAL's flight schedule due to
aircraft damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its
passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of special
landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts. In
another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held that
it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to continue
employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although the
teller's infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of money was lost.
The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and the amount
reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the bank's
balance sheet. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the
resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of
the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a
child.
Analogous Cases
John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. vs. Davis, September 3, 2008
G.R. No. 169549 September 3, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent Cantre, an agency administration officer of petitioner
corporation was accused of qualified theft for stealing Patricia Yuseco’s
credit card which the latter used to purchase items in various stores in the
City of Manila. The NBI identified Cantre in a security video obtained from
Abenson’s Robinsons Place where a proposed transaction was disapproved
for giving the wrong information upon verification. However, the complaint
was dismissed by the prosecutor because the affidavits presented by the NBI
was not properly verified.
Meanwhile, petitioner placed respondent under preventive
suspension and instructed her to cooperate with its ongoing investigation.
Instead of doing so, however, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her employment without cause.
The Labor Arbiter found that the respondent committed serious misconduct
thus there was a valid cause for dismissal. Respondent appealed to the NLRC
which affirmed the assailed decision. The CA found that the labor arbiter and
NLRC merely adopted the findings of the NBI regarding respondent's
culpability. Because the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did
not constitute substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have
assessed evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions,
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that
the latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was not
committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees,
respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not
be dismissed for serious misconduct.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised
him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March
4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet
the company's weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985.After meeting the required weight,
petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner's weight problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty
effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim
down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He
was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician
should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on
July 3, 1989.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose
weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous
weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment to reduce weight in a
letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one
more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked
to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen
submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given
another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner ignored the directive
and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was
required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.When petitioner
tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was
still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his
case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219
pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight
standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties. Assuming that it did,
petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his weight would not
be a negative factor. Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios,
Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be
reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should
have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain
his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail. Thus, PAL elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA reversed the NLRC. The CA opined that
there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it
"looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations" in evaluating the evidence of
the parties.
Our Ruling
The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code.
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of
expenses." However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of
PAL. He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report
when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His
obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA
correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or
controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."
First, the Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common
carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show
its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by
virtue of being a common carrier.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards
of PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to
know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. In fact, never did he
question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his
weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that
what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang
tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations
based on height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants.
A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules
obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
part of PAL.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
Sexual Harassment
Domingo vs. Rayala, February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831, 18 February 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
After the last incident, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be
immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, in the Department
of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint
to the Office of the President (OP), Rayala being a presidential appointee.
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Later the Committee found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO
250, which is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied. He then filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before the
Supreme Court. However, the same was dismissed for disregarding
thehierarchy of courts. Another Motion for Reconsideration was filed which
led to the referral of the Supreme Court of the petition to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that there was
sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala
committed the acts he was charged with. Rayala filed a Petition for Review
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Yes.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual
harassment – is the common factual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the Office of the President and the
Court of Appeals.
Rayala insists, however, that his acts do not constitute sexual harassment,
because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued
employment or for her promotion to a higher position.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of
absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Redundancy
AMA Computer College v. Garcia, April 14, 2008
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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It is extremely difficult to believe that SMART would enter into a joint venture
agreement with NTT, form SNMI and abolish CSMG/FSD simply for the sole
purpose of easing out a particular employee, such as Astorga. Moreover,
Astorga never denied that SMART offered her a supervisory position in the
Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position
carried a lower salary rank and rate. If indeed SMART simply wanted to get
rid of her, it would not have offered her a position in any department in the
enterprise.
Astorga also states that the justification advanced by SMART is not true
because there was no compelling economic reason for redundancy. But
contrary to her claim, an employer is not precluded from adopting a new
policy conducive to a more economical and effective management even if it
is not experiencing economic reverses. Neither does the law require that the
employer should suffer financial losses before he can terminate the services
of the employee on the ground of redundancy.
However, as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the
mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination. The record is clear that
Astorga received the notice of termination only on March 16, 1998 or less
than a month prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998. Likewise, the
Department of Labor and Employment was notified of the redundancy
program only on March 6, 1998.
Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly provides:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof x x x.
SMART’s assertion that Astorga cannot complain of lack of notice because
the organizational realignment was made known to all the employees as
early as February 1998 fails to persuade. Astorga’s actual knowledge of the
reorganization cannot replace the formal and written notice required by the
law. In the written notice, the employees are informed of the specific date of
the termination, at least a month prior to the effectivity of such termination,
to give them sufficient time to find other suitable employment or to make
whatever arrangements are needed to cushion the impact of termination. In
this case, notwithstanding Astorga’s knowledge of the reorganization, she
remained uncertain about the status of her employment until SMART gave
her formal notice of termination. But such notice was received by Astorga
barely two (2) weeks before the effective date of termination, a period very
much shorter than that required by law.
Be that as it may, this procedural infirmity would not render the termination
of Astorga’s employment illegal. The validity of termination can exist
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Constructive Dismissal
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club vs. NLRC, February 29, 2008
G.R. No. 154503 February 29, 2008
FACTS:
Amalia Kawada, a Full Assistant Store Manager received a
Memorandum issued by the Store Manager Apduhan summarizing the
various reported incidents signifying unsatisfactory performance on the
latter's part which include the commingling of good and damaged items, sale
of a voluminous quantity of damaged toys and ready-to-wear items at
unreasonable prices, and failure to submit inventory reports. Another
Memorandum was issued which claimed that the answers given by the
private respondent were all hypothetical and did not answer directly the
allegations attributed to her. Apduhan sent another Memorandum seeking
from the private respondent an explanation regarding the incidents reported
by Uniwide employees and security personnel for alleged irregularities
committed by the private respondent such as allowing the entry of
unauthorized persons inside a restricted area during non-office hours,
falsification of or inducing another employee to falsify personnel or company
records, sleeping and allowing a non-employee to sleep inside the private
office, unauthorized search and bringing out of company records, purchase
of damaged home furnishing items without the approval from superior,
taking advantage of buying damaged items in large quantity, alteration of
approval slips for the purchase of damaged items and abandonment of work.
In a letter, private respondent answered the allegations made against her.
On July 27, 1998, private respondent sought medical help from the company
physician, Dr. Zambrano, due to complaints of dizziness. Finding private
respondent to be suffering from hypertension, Dr. Zambrano advised her to
take five days sick leave.
Subsequently, private respondent was able to obtain from Dr. Zambrano a
certificate of fitness to work, which she presented to Apduhan the following
day. It turned out that Dr. Zambrano inadvertently wrote "Menia," the
surname of the company nurse, in the medical certificate instead of private
respondent's surname. Thereafter, private respondent claims that Apduhan
shouted at her and prevented her from resuming work because she was not
the person referred to in the medical certificate. After private respondent left
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not resondent was constructively dismissed.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
Private respondent's failure to report for work despite the August 8, 1998
letter sent by Apduhan to private respondent advising the latter to report for
work is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. It is a settled rule that
failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served
does not necessarily constitute abandonment.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the findings of the LA that the
termination of private respondent was grounded on the existence of just
cause under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed on him by his employer or a duly authorized
representative.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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In his August 15, 2001 decision, the labor arbiter found that Peñaflor had
been illegally dismissed. Outdoor Clothing was consequently ordered to
reinstate Peñaflor to his former or to an equivalent position, and to pay him
his illegally deducted salary for six days, proportionate 13th month pay,
attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
Outdoor Clothing appealed the labor arbiter’s decision with the NLRC. It
insisted that Peñaflor had not been constructively dismissed, claiming that
Peñaflor tendered his resignation on March 1, 2000 because he saw no
future with the corporation due to its dire financial standing. The NLRC
apparently found Outdoor Clothing’s submitted memoranda sufficient to
overturn the labor arbiter’s decision. It characterized Peñaflor’s resignation
as a response, not to the allegedly degrading and hostile treatment that he
was subjected to by Syfu, but to Outdoor Clothing’s downward financial
spiral. Buenaobra’s appointment was made only after Peñaflor had submitted
his resignation letter, and this was made to cover the vacancy Peñaflor’s
resignation would create. Thus, Peñaflor was not eased out from his position
as HRD manager. No malice likewise was present in the company’s decision
to dismiss Peñaflor’s two staff members; the company simply exercised its
management prerogative to address the financial problems it faced.
Peñaflor, in fact, drafted the dismissal letters of his staff members. In the
absence of any illegal dismissal, no basis existed for the monetary awards
the labor arbiter granted.
In a decision dated December 29, 2006, the CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision,
stating that Peñaflor failed to present sufficient evidence supporting his
claim that he had been constructively dismissed. The CA ruled that
Peñaflor’s resignation was knowingly and voluntarily made.Faced with these
CA actions, Peñaflor filed with us the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE ISSUE and THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The petition turns on the question of whether Peñaflor’s undisputed
resignation was a voluntary or a forced one, in the latter case making it a
constructive dismissal equivalent to an illegal dismissal. A critical fact
necessary in resolving this issue is whether Peñaflor filed his letter of
resignation before or after the appointment of Buenaobra as the
new/concurrent HRD manager. This question also gives rise to the side issue
of when Buenaobra’s appointment was made. If the resignation letter was
submitted before Syfu’s appointment of Buenaobra as new HRD manager,
little support exists for Peñaflor’s allegation that he had been forced to
resign due to the prevailing abusive and hostile working environment.
Buenaobra’s appointment would then be simply intended to cover the
vacancy created by Peñaflor’s resignation. On the other hand, if the
resignation letter was submitted after the appointment of Buenaobra, then
factual basis exists indicating that Peñaflor had been constructively
dismissed as his resignation was a response to the unacceptable
appointment of another person to a position he still occupied.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The first is the settled rule that in employee termination disputes, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal was for
just and valid cause. That Peñaflor did indeed file a letter of resignation does
not help the company’s case as, other than the fact of resignation, the
company must still prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. There can
be no valid resignation where the act was made under compulsion or under
circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employee’s act
of handing in his resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him no
alternative but to resign. In sum, the evidence does not support the
existence of voluntariness in Peñaflor’s resignation. Last but not the
least, we have repeatedly given significance in abandonment and
constructive dismissal cases to the employee’s reaction to the termination of
his employment and have asked the question: is the complaint against the
employer merely a convenient afterthought subsequent to abandonment or
a voluntary resignation? We find from the records that Peñaflor sought
almost immediate official recourse to contest his separation from service
through a complaint for illegal dismissal. This is not the act of one who
voluntarily resigned; his immediate complaints characterize him as one who
deeply felt that he had been wronged.
Floating Status
FEDERITO B. PIDO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CHERUBIM
SECURITY AND GENERAL SERVICES, INC., AND ROSARIO K. BALAIS
G.R. No. 169812, 23 February 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Like the other guards deployed by respondent at the Ayala Center, petitioner
was under the operational control and supervision of the Ayala Security
Force (ASF) of the Ayala Group of Companies.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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On January 23, 2000, petitioner reported for work at the Ayala Center but he
was not allowed to stay in the premises, a Recall Order having been issued
by respondent through its Operations Manager. Petitioner thus filed an
information report wherein he narrated that Alcantara confronted him on
January 21, 2000 about his right to carry a firearm and afterwards tried to
grab it from its holster, resulting in a heated argument between them.
As more than nine months had elapsed since the investigation was
conducted by respondent with no categorical findings thereon made,
petitioner filed on October 23, 2000 a complaint for illegal constructive
dismissal, illegal suspension, and non-payment and underpayment of
salaries, holiday pay, rest day, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, meal
and travel allowance and night shift differential against respondent, along
with its employee Rosario K. Balais (Rosario) who was allegedly responsible
for running the day to day affairs of respondent’s business. Petitioner
likewise prayed for reinstatement and payment of full backwages, attorney’s
fees and other money claims.
In its position paper, respondent denied that it dismissed petitioner from the
service, it claiming that while it was still in the process of investigating the
January 21, 2000 incident, it offered petitioner another assignment which he
declined, saying “pahinga muna ako [I will in the meantime take a rest].”
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner’s suspension for more than nine
months had ripened into constructive termination, on account of which he
ordered the payment of separation pay equivalent to one month salary of
P8,000 for every year of service, or for the total amount of P32,000. The
Arbiter, however, found that there was insufficient evidence to support
petitioner’s assertion that he was entitled to his money claims.
The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter. While it found that
petitioner was indeed constructively dismissed, it set aside the award of
separation pay, given respondent’s willingness to assign petitioner to
another post which he declined. On the same ground, the NLRC denied
petitioner’s claim for backwages. It merely ordered his reinstatement.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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maintaining that his suspension for more than nine months amounted to
constructive dismissal to entitle him to separation pay and backwages.
The appellate court upheld the NLRC decision and accordingly dismissed
petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court sustained the findings of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC that while a security guard, like petitioner, may be
lawfully placed on a “floating status,” the same should continue only for six
months, otherwise the security agency could be liable for constructive
dismissal under Article 286 of the Labor Code, viz:
ART. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. - The bona fide
suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not
exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment of the employee of a military or
civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer
shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority
rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1)
month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief
from the military or civic duty.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Article 286 applies only when there is a bona fide suspension of the
employer's operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding
six (6) months. In such a case, there is no termination of employment but
only a temporary displacement of employees, albeit the displacement should
not exceed six (6) months. The paramount consideration should be the dire
exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its
employees temporarily out of work. In security services, the temporary "off-
detail" of guards takes place when the security agency's clients decide not to
renew their contracts with the security agency, resulting in a situation where
the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of
guards in its roster.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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Verily, a floating status requires the dire exigency of the employer's bona
fide suspension of operation of a business or undertaking. In security
services, this happens when the security agency’s clients which do not
renew their contracts are more than those that do and the new ones that the
agency gets. Also, in instances when contracts for security services stipulate
that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards
assigned to it even for want of cause, the replaced security guard may be
placed on temporary “off-detail” if there are no available posts under
respondent’s existing contracts.
As per the Recall Order, it can be gathered that respondent intended to put
petitioner under preventive suspension for an indefinite period of time
pending the investigation of the complaint against him. The allowable period
of suspension in such a case is not six months but only 30 days, following
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code (Implementing Rules). Hence, in the event the employer
chooses to extend the period of suspension, he is required to pay the wages
and other benefits due the worker and the worker is not bound to reimburse
the amount paid to him during the extended period of suspension even if,
after the completion of the hearing or investigation, the employer decides to
dismiss him.
Respondent did not inform petitioner that it was extending its investigation,
nor did it pay him his wages and other benefits after the lapse of the 30-day
period of suspension. Neither did respondent issue an order lifting
petitioner’s suspension, or any official assignment, memorandum or detail
order for him to assume his post or another post. Respondent merely chose
to dawdle with the investigation, in absolute disregard of petitioner’s welfare.
At the time petitioner filed the complaint for illegal suspension and/or
constructive dismissal on October 23, 2000, petitioner had already been
placed under preventive suspension for nine months. To date, there is no
showing or information that, if at all, respondent still intends to conclude its
investigation.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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January 1, 2010
Retirement
Kimberly Clark Phils. Inc. vs. Dimayuga, September 18, 2009
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
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The Court of Appeals granted the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, while at the same time finding that petitioner’s retirement was
tantamount to illegal dismissal.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner voluntarily applied for the SSIP. The
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner could not claim to have been illegally
dismissed just because the date of effectivity of his retirement did not
conform to his preferred retirement date.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 December 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner was illegally dismissed from
employment.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter,
after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the
former. Retirement is provided for under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7641, or is determined by an existing
agreement between the employer and the employee.
In this case, respondent offered the SSIP to overhaul the bank structure and
to allow it to effectively compete with local peer and foreign banks. SSIP was
not compulsory on employees. Employees who wished to avail of the SSIP
were required to accomplish a form for availment of separation benefits
under the SSIP and to submit the accomplished form to the Personnel
Administration and Industrial Relations Division (PAIRD) for approval.
Petitioner voluntarily availed of the SSIP. He accomplished the application
form and submitted it to the PAIRD. He only questioned the approval of his
retirement on a date earlier than his preferred retirement date.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed from the
service. Even the NLRC ruled that petitioner could no longer withdraw his
application for early retirement under the SSIP. However, the NLRC ruled that
respondent could not accelerate the petitioner’s retirement date. The NLRC
ruled that it could not imagine how petitioner’s continued employment until
31 December 1999 would impair the delivery of bank services and attribute
bad faith on respondent when it accelerated petitioner’s retirement.1avvphi1
We do not agree. Whether petitioner’s early retirement within the SSIP
period will improve or impair the delivery of bank services is a business
decision properly within the exercise of management prerogative. More
importantly, the SSIP provides:
7. Management shall have the discretion and prerogative in approving the
applications filed under the Plan, as well as in setting the effectivity
dates for separation within the implementation period of the Plan.
(Emphasis supplied)
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
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FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Serrano has been an employee of Severino Santos Transit
for 14 years. Petitioner applied for optional retirement from the company
whose representative advised him that he must first sign the already
prepared Quitclaim before his retirement pay could be released. As
petitioner’s request to first go over the computation of his retirement pay
was denied, he signed the Quitclaim on which he wrote "U.P." (under protest)
after his signature, indicating his protest to the amount of P75,277.45 which
he received, computed by the company at 15 days per year of service.
Petitioner soon after filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that
the company erred in its computation since under Republic Act No. 7641,
otherwise known as the Retirement Pay Law, his retirement pay should have
been computed at 22.5 days per year of service to include the cash
equivalent of the 5-day service incentive leave (SIL) and 1/12 of the 13th
month pay which the company did not. The company maintained, however,
that the Quitclaim signed by petitioner barred his claim and, in any event, its
computation was correct since petitioner was not entitled to the 5-day SIL
and pro-rated 13th month pay for, as a bus conductor, he was paid on
commission basis.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano. In the same Labor Advisory on
Retirement Pay Law, it was likewise decisively made clear that "the law
expanded the concept of "one-half month salary" from the usual one-month
salary divided by two. However, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) to which respondents appealed reversed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling
and dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the computation of retirement
pay as given by RA 7641
HELD: Yes. Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for the bus company
which did not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus
conductor was paid on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of
R.A. 7641 and its implementing rules. As thus correctly ruled by the Labor
Arbiter, petitioner’s retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the
5-day SIL and 1/12 of the 13th month pay.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
In practice, taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages. They retain only those
sums in excess of the "boundary" or fee they pay to the owners or operators
of the vehicles.7 Conductors, on the other hand, are paid a certain
percentage of the bus’ earnings for the day.
A careful perusal of said provisions of law will result in the conclusion that
the grant of service incentive leave has been delimited by the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code to apply only to those employees
not explicitly excluded by Section 1 of Rule V. According to the Implementing
Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply to employees classified as
"field personnel." The phrase "other employees whose performance is
unsupervised by the employer" must not be understood as a separate
classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be
granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the
definition of field personnel under the Labor Code as those "whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
The same is true with respect to the phrase "those who are engaged on task
or contract basis, purely commission basis." Said phrase should be related
with "field personnel," applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they
follow. Hence, employees engaged on task or contract basis or paid on
purely commission basis are not automatically exempted from the grant of
service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of field
personnel.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
Facts:
AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based
education in the country. One of AMACC’s biggest schools in the country is
its branch at Parañaque City. The petitioners were faculty members who
started teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioner Mercado was
engaged as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog was engaged as an
Assistant Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon, Lachica and
Alba, Jr., were all engaged as Instructor 1. The petitioners executed
individual Teacher’s Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were
engaged to teach.
For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty
screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on the Implementation of
AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under the new screening guidelines, teachers
were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching
experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and
research background. The performance standards under the new
screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty
members’ entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to
obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards; hence
AMACC did not give them any salary increase.
Because of AMACC’s action on the salary increases, the petitioners
filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload
compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices.
On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a
memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor Mary
Grace Beronia, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to
teach, their contract would no longer be renewed.
The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include
the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In their Position Paper, the
petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in
retaliation for their complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory
practices against AMACC. The petitioners also contended that AMACC failed
to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual. AMACC
contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted term
under a non-tenured appointment and were still within the three-year
probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the
following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System
for Teachers (PAST) while others failed to comply with the other
requirements for regularization, promotion, or increase in salary. This move,
according to AMACC, was justified since the school has to maintain its high
academic standards.
On March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter declared in his decision that the
petitioners had been illegally dismissed, and ordered AMACC to reinstate
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay
them full backwages, attorney’s fees and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that
Article 281 of the Labor Code on probationary employment applied to the
case; that AMACC allowed the petitioners to teach for the first semester of
school year 2000-2001; that AMACC did not specify who among the
petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who among them did not comply with
the other requirements of regularization, promotions or increase in salary;
and that the petitioners’ dismissal could not be sustained on the basis of
AMACC’s “vague and general allegations” without substantial factual basis.
On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 2005 denied
AMACC’s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the LA’s
ruling. The NLRC, however, observed that the applicable law is Section 92
of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (which mandates a
probationary period of nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for
academic personnel in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered
on a trimester basis), not Article 281 of the Labor Code (which prescribes a
probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled. The NLRC ruled that the
new screening guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 cannot be imposed
on the petitioners and their employment contracts since the new guidelines
were not imposed when the petitioners were first employed in 1998. In a
decision issued on November 29, 2007, the CA granted AMACC’s petition
for certiorari and dismissed the petitioners’ complaint for illegal
dismissal. The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private
Schools, a teaching personnel in a private educational institution (1) must be
a full time teacher; (2) must have rendered three consecutive years of
service; and (3) such service must be satisfactory before he or she can
acquire permanent status.The CA noted that the petitioners had not
completed three (3) consecutive years of service (i.e. six regular semesters
or nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service) and were still within
their probationary period; their teaching stints only covered a period of two
(2) years and three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their
contracts on September 7, 2000.
ISSUE:
1) WON CA gravely erred in not ordering their reinstatement with full,
backwages.
HELD:
We find the petition meritorious.
Rule on Employment on Probationary Status
Fixed-period Employment
The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers’ probationary
period is likewise an accepted practice in the teaching profession. We
mentioned this in passing in Magis Young Achievers’ Learning Center v.
Adelaida P. Manalo, albeit a case that involved elementary, not tertiary,
education, and hence spoke of a school year rather than a semester or a
trimester. We noted in this case:
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract,
effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the employer has the option not to
renew the contract, particularly considering the teacher’s performance. If the contract is not renewed,
the employment relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another school year,
the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of that period, the parties may opt to
renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another school
year would then be the last year – since it would be the third school year – of probationary
employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may now decide whether to extend
a permanent appointment to the employee, primarily on the basis of the employee having
met the reasonable standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. For the
entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation. Upon the
expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on probation, he cannot
automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment
contract. It is when the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual
becomes operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status.
It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its
effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is
binding for the full three-year probationary period.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
were employed on May 25, 1998 and until the expiration of their Teaching
Contracts on September 7, 2000. As the CA correctly found, their teaching
stints only covered a period of at least seven (7) consecutive trimesters or
two (2) years and three (3) months of service. This case, however, brings
to the fore the essential question of which, between the two factors
affecting employment, should prevail given AMACC’s position that
the teachers contracts expired and it had the right not to renew
them. In other words, should the teachers’ probationary status be
disregarded simply because the contracts were fixed-term?
On the one hand, employment on probationary status affords management
the chance to fully scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before the full force
of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into play. Based on
the standards set at the start of the probationary period, management is given the
widest opportunity during the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to
meet its own adopted but reasonable standards. These standards, together
with the just and authorized causes for termination of employment the Labor Code
expressly provides, are the grounds available to terminate the employment of a
teacher on probationary status. For example, the school may impose reasonably
stricter attendance or report compliance records on teachers on probation, and
reject a probationary teacher for failing in this regard, although the same
attendance or compliance record may not be required for a teacher already on
permanent status. At the same time, the same just and authorizes causes for
dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary teachers, so that they may be
the first to be laid-off if the school does not have enough students for a given
semester or trimester. Termination of employment on this basis is an authorized
cause under the Labor Code.
Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of
knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from
the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve permanent
status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known
to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or at
the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the
semester or the trimester during which the probationary standards are to be
applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary
standards, is that the school should show – as a matter of due process – how
these standards have been applied. This is effectively the second notice in a
dismissal situation that the law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the
security of tenure provision, and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee
dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a dismissal. These rules
ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure guarantee the law extends to
probationary employees.
When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above
probationary period rules, the situation – as in the present case – may at first blush
look muddled as fixed-term employment is in itself a valid employment mode under
Philippine law and jurisprudence. The conflict, however, is more apparent than real
when the respective nature of fixed-term employment and of employment on
probationary status is closely examined.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the
school apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient arrangement
dictated by the trimestral system and not because the workplace parties really
intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this
relationship at the end of that term. If we pierce the veil, so to speak, of the
parties’ so-called fixed-term employment contracts, what undeniably comes out at
the core is a fixed-term contract conveniently used by the school to define and
regulate its relations with its teachers during their probationary period.
Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude
that in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term
contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should
assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give
way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners’ and the
AMACC’s hardly concealed expectation that the employment on probation could
lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are renewable unless the
petitioners fail to pass the school’s standards.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao
CASE DIGESTS
January 1, 2010
If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it did
in the present case), these standards must not only be reasonable but must have
also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or
at the very least, at the start of the period when they were to be applied. These
terms, in addition to those expressly provided by the Labor Code, would serve as
the just cause for the termination of the probationary contract. As explained above,
the details of this finding of just cause must be communicated to the affected
teachers as a matter of due process.
While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the
petitioners and could be applied beginning the 1 st trimester of the school year 2000-
2001, glaring and very basic gaps in the school’s evidence still exist. The exact
terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does the
evidence show how these standards were applied to the petitioners. Without these
pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of just cause for the non-renewal of the
petitioners’ contracts), we have nothing to consider and pass upon as valid or
invalid for each of the petitioners. Inevitably, the non-renewal (or effectively, the
termination of employment of employees on probationary status) lacks the
supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is illegal. In this
light, the CA decision should be reversed. Thus, the LA’s decision, affirmed as to
the results by the NLRC, should stand as the decision to be enforced, appropriately
re-computed to consider the period of appeal and review of the case up to our
level.
Given the period that has lapsed and the inevitable change of circumstances
that must have taken place in the interim in the academic world and at AMACC,
which changes inevitably affect current school operations, we hold that - in lieu of
reinstatement - the petitioners should be paid separation pay computed on a
trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the end of the
complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision. The separation pay shall
be in addition to the other awards, properly recomputed, that the LA originally
decreed.
By: Louie Limcolioc, Ramil Austria, Jai Castillo, Mikhail Tumacder, Patrick Maglinao