BANK OFFICERS

HANDBOOK
OF
COMMERCIAL
BANKING LAW
WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES
CONTAINING THE SECRET RULES
TO AID IN TIlE CREATION OF MONEY OUT
OF TIIIN AIR!

My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge... and since knowledge

is power.. one then cannot be destroyed.. especially by the bartkers!
 To
Mary, Caroline, and Katherine Schroeder
and
Edna Taylor
 Preface to Sixth Edition
There are few aspects of commercial banking law that are not now in the
process of substantial change or that have not recently experienced substantial
change. A flood of federal legislation not only has affected traditional bank
regulatory issues but also has established a body of substantive law affecting
numerous types ofcommercial transactions ofimportance to commercial banks.
Expanded activity by the federal banking regulatory agencies has accompanied
many of these legislative actions. The enlarged responsibility given to the Fed-
eral'Reserve Board to manage the nation's check collection and payments
system in the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 is but one example.
Other examples exist in areas involving consumer issues, regulatory enforce-
ment authority, and the scope ofcommercial bank's powers, as a result ofefforts
by legislators and regulators to adjust to dramatic changes that have occurred in
the markets in which commercial banks compete and the technology goveming
the manner in which depository institutions conduct their business.
This book is designed to fumish general information about the law relating
to commercial banking in three important areas. Part I of the book discusses
federal banking regulation. This part describes the general regulatory system, the
primary federal regulators, the types of banking institutions that are regulated,
and some of the important areas of regulatory control. It discusses the major
federal legislation and principal case law to give the reader a general understand-
ing of the complex network of regulatory law that affects the activities of com-
mercial banks and similar depository institutions.
Part II of the book focuses specifically on payment systems and negotiable
instruments. It gives an introduction to the basic law governing the rights and
liabilities of parties to instruments such as checks, drafts, notes, letters ofcredit,
and other types of commercial paper. It discusses electronic fund transfers,
credit card transactions, and transactions involving other forms of payment. It
also discusses some of the basic legal principles that govern the relationship
between a bank and its customer. This pan of the book contains extensive
treatment of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions bearing on these sub-
jects, and describes the interrelationship ofthese VCC rules with other state and
federal laws.
Part III of the book covers the general rules applicable to secured lending
transactions involving personal property security_ This part of the book explains
the basic rules provided by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on
creation of a security interest, priorities among creditors, and enforcement of a
security interest. The interaction of Article 9 with other federal law, such as
bankruptcy and certain consumer credit regulations, is described.

v
 PREFACE TO SIXTH EDITION vi

The book is designed to give general information for bankers and commer-
ciallawyers. Given the broad scope ofthis book, it cannot provide complete, in-
depth coverage of all issues. The footnotes, where they have been inserted, are
not intended to be a comprehensive statement of all legal authorities on any
particular issue, but rather refer to cases and other authorities to illustrate the
principles being discussed in the text. For those who are interested in obtaining
more detailed information, there are references to supplemental texts, articles,
and other authorities. The major cases, statutes, and sources of regulatory action
are identified. As a result the book should be useful both as an introductory text
for those who seek a general understanding of these areas ofcommercial banking
law and as a general reference and research tool for those with more specific
interests. It should assist the banker in understanding the legal framework that
supports the activities of commercial banking, alert the banker to areas where
legal problems may exist, give notice of areas where the law is in the process of
change, and help the banker to discuss and raise questions about issues with legal
counsel in an informed manner. The book also should assist bank lawyers and
law students to gain a general understanding of the extensive and often exceed-
ingly technical body of state and federal laws that is relevant to commercial
banking transactions, to identify the principal sources ofstatutory and other law
bearing on particular problems, and to obtain additional information on numer-
ous subjects through the various references and other research aids provided. To
assist research, the abbreviations and citations in the text and footnotes gener-
ally conform toA Uniform System afCitation (14th ed. 1986), which is published
by The Harvard Law Review Association and is generally available in law
libraries.
This book is not a substitute for consultation with legal counsel but rather is
intended to assist bankers and others to become sensitive to situations where
consultation with legal counsel may be helpful. Such consultation is important
for several reasons. This book cannot provide a complete analysis or discussion
of each subject covered. The applicability of the law to particular situations
depends upon both the investigation of specific facts and the performing of
complete research and analysis of the particular law of the relevant jurisdiction
applicable to the situation. In the commercial banking law area, actions by
regulatory agencies are frequent and extensive. In addition, Congress and the
state legislatures are engaged in consideration of new laws on many aspects of
commercial banking, and state and federal courts are constantly issuing signifi-
cant decisions. Therefore, proper interpretation of the law is complex, because
of the intricate web of state, federal, and regulatory law that is applicable. In
general, the cutoffdate for the materials on which this book is based is July 1987
although in particular areas more recent developments ofsignificance are noted,
as in the case of certain key decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the action
by the Federal Reserve Board in enacting Regulation CC on the availability of
funds and collection of checks.
vii PREFACE TO SIXTH EDITION

This book benefited; from the outstanding assistance of many persons.

General help in research and preparing the manuscript for publication was
provided by Cherry Lee Croushore, Catherine R. Hardwick, Laurie Stewart, and
David A. Craze. Additionally, Catherine Hardwick contributed substantially in
the writing of Chapters 10 and 25, and Cherry Lee Croushore made significant
contributions to Chapter 26. The efforts of Fran Kendall and Kay Winn also
deserve special recognition. Their professional and diligent efforts made it
possible to process the many drafts and redrafts for this book and still maintain a
reasonable adherence to production deadlines. Thanks also go to others on the
staff at the College of Law, Arizona State University, who gave support to this
project: Rhonda Kirkeide, Monica Tineo, and Dean Paul Bender.

MILTO~ R. SCHROEDER
August 1988
 Summary of Contents

Part I The Nature and Regulation of Banking: An Overview

1. Introduction to Banking Regulation .....•.........•..... 1-1
2. U.S. Banking System ....•..........•.•.....•........ 2-1
3. The Federal Reserve System .•.•....•.........••...... 3-1
4. National Banks 4..1
5. Bank Holding Companies ....•.•......•.............. 5-1
6. Regulation of Bank Expansion Through Branching and
Interstate Banking ....•.......................•..... 6-1
7. Bank Examination and Supervision and Restrictions on Loans
and Investments 7..1
8. The Restrictions Against Banks Engaging in Certain Securities
Activities 8 1
9. Enforcement Powers of the Banking Regulatory Agencies
Under Federal Banking Laws 9-1
10. Liquidation, Reorganization, and Supervision of Failing Banks
and Thrift Institutions .•.•..............•............ 10-1
n. Deposits and Deposit Insurance .......•.•...........•.. 11-1
12. Financial Transactions Regulation, Money-Laundering
Controls, and Crimes Related to Bank Transactions 11-1
13. Bank Customer Privacy and Other Bank Activities Subject to
Special Regulation 13-1

Part II Bank Payments and Negotiable Instruments

14. Sources of Commercial Banking Law and Basic Principles
Governing Commercial Paper 14-1
15. Rights and Liabilities of Parties to Commercial Paper 15-1
16. Holders in Due Course 16-1

IX
 SUMMARY OF CONTENTS X

17.. utters of Cred.it 17-1

18. Altemative Payment Systems: Bank Cards, Credit Cards, and
Electronic Fund Transfers •.•••..•....•........•.•.... 18-1
19. Bank Accounts 19-1
20. Mutual Duties of the Bank and the Depositor .•...•..•.... 20-1
21. Collection and Payment of Instruments ...•.....•......•. 21-1

Part III Security Transactions in Personal Property and

Related Credit Practices
22. Creation of Security Interests in a Debtor's Personal Property 22-1
23. Priorities: Rights of Competing Creditors, Purchasers, and
Transferees 23.. 1
24. Debtor Default and Enforcement of Security Agreements .. .. 24-1
2S. Bankruptcy 25 1
26. Interest Rate Controls and Credit Practices Regulation .•••.. 26-1
Table of vec Sections T l
Table of USC Sections.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . T-17
Table of Cases . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... T-33
Index.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I.. J
 Table of Contents

Part I - The Nature and Regulation of Banking:

An Overview

1 Introduction to Banking Regulation

~ 1.0 I Defining "Commercial Banking" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-I
~ 1.02 History of Banking Regulation. . . . . . . ... . . . . .
... ... .. .. . 1-4
[I] First Bank of the United States. . . . ... . . . . .
... ... .. .. . 1-4
[2] Second Bank of the United States. . ... . . . .
......... .. . 1-5
[3) State-Chartered Banks. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .
......... .. . 1-6
[4] Federal Reserve Act of 1913 " '" 1-7
[5J Banking Since the 1950s. . . . . . . . . ... ................ 1-8

2 U.S. Banking System

11 2.0 I Classification of Commercial Banks and Thrift Institutions . . . . . 2-2
[l] National Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2
[2] State Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[3] State Member Banks .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[4] State-Insured Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[5] Other Depository Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
[a] Savings and Loan Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
TABLE 2-1 Number ofInsured Commercial Banks by Class
and Principal Assets and Liabilities of Each (1986) . . . . . . . . 2-5
TABLE 2·2 Number of Banking Offices in the United States
(1986) . 2-6
[b] Credit Unions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
[c] Savings Banks 2-8
~ 2.02 Definition of "Depository Institutions" 2-9
~ 2.03 Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
t 2.04 State Regulation of Banks .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-11
~ 2.05 Specialized Organizations With Banking Functions. . . . . . . . . .. 2-13
[I] Industria! Banks or Morris Plan Banks '. . . . . . . . 2-13
[2J Loan and Finance Companies 2-13'
TABLE 2-3 State Bank Commissioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Xl
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xii

[3 J Edge Corporations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2·17

[4] Export-Import Bank of the United States .. ...... 2·17
[5] International Finance Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
[6J Housing and Mortgage Credit Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.17
raj The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation , 2.18
(b I The Federal Housing Administration 2-18
[cJ The Federal National Mortgage Association , 2.18
[d] The Government National Mortgage Association. . . . .. . 2·18
[7] Special Purpose Federal Agencies with Financing Functions 2·19
[8J The Farm Credit System ........... .... 2·\9
[a] Federal Land Banks and Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
[bJ Federal Intermediate Credit Banks and Production
Credit Associations 2-21
leI Banks for Cooperatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
[dj Farm Credit Boards , 2-21
tel Farm Credit Administration " 2-22
[tl 1988 Restructuring of the Farm Credit System 2-23
[g] Borrowers' Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

3 The Federal Reserve System

'1 3.0 I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
~ 3.02 The Structure and Functions of the Federal Reserve System .... 3·2
~ 3.03 The Organization and Powers of the Federal Reserve System. . . . 3·5
[I] Board of Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
TABLE 3·) Federal Reserve Banks' Income and Expenses ... 3·7
[2] Open Market Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10
TABLE 3-2 Regulations of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J·II
[3] Federal Reserve Banks and Directors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J·14
[4] Member Banks 3-\ B
[5] The Relationship of the Federal Reserve System to
Nonmember Depository Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-20
~ 3.04 Banking Functions of the Federal Reserve System. . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
[I] Depository Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
[a] Reserve Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
[b] Fiscal Agents and Depositories for the United States. . . . 3·23
[2\ Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-24
[a] Reserve Requirements .. , .... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-26
TABLE 3-3 Reserve Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3·27
[b] Reserve Requirement Exemption . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-27
Ic] Reserves of Nonmember Banks '. . . . . .. 3-28
[dJ Reserve Requirements for Reserve Banks ., ,. 3-28
xiii TABLE OF CONTENTS

[e] Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy . . . . . . . . . . 3-28

[3] Currency Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
[4] Reserve Bank lending Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-30
[a] Advances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-31
[b] Discounts 3-32
[c] Federal Reserve System Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-32
[5] National Payments System: Fund Transfer and Check
Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34
[a] Check Collection ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34
TABLE 3-4 Number of checks, Total and Collected by the
Federal Reserve, Selected Years, 1920-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-35
[b] Fund Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36
[c] Regulatory Activities to Manage the Payment System ... 3-39
[61 Credit and Interest Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41
[a] Margin Requirements for Securities Credit 3-4 I
[b] Interest Rate Controls 3-42
[c] Credit Controls 3-45

4 National Banks
~ 4.01 Overview ............ ... 4-1
[I] Organization of National Banks .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 4-2
[2] Charters for Nonbank Banks 4-4
[3] Changes in Names and Locations of National Banks. . . . ... 4-5
[4J Suits Against National Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 4-5
~ 4.02 The Comptroller of the Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
TABLE 4- I Regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency . . . . . 4-8
[11 National Bank Holidays and Emergency Powers. . . . . . . . . . 4-9
[2] Unclaimed Property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
~ 4.03 Powers of National Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
[I] Express Powers of National Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
[a] Trust Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
[b] Real Estate Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
[c] Transactions in Coin and Bullion ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
[d] Financing by Leasing Personal Property 4-13
[e] Lotteries 4-14
[2] The Incidental Powers of National Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
[a] Borrowing Money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16
[b] Insurance Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16
[c] Computer Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
[d] Guaranty Agreements ,.......... 4-18
tel Other Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-19
[/] Ultra Vires Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4· I9
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xiv

5 Bank Holding Companies

II 5,01 The Evolution of Bank Holding Company Regulation. . .. . . . . . 5-2
[I J Definition of "Bank Holding Company" . , ,. 5-2
TABLE 5-1 Number and Deposits of Registered Bank Holding
Companies-Selected Years, 1957-1983 , , , 5-4
[2J The History of Bank Holding Company Regulation. , . . . . . . 5-5
[3J Nonbank Banks ,, ,... 5- 7
[4J Nonbank Banks Under the Competitive Equality Banking
Amendments of 1987 ... , , .. , ..... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
[a] Exceptions to the Definition of "Bank" . , , 5-12
[b] Immediate Divestiture for "New Bank" Acquisitions
Between March 5,1987 and Date of Enactment. .. ' ., " 5-14
[cl Grandfather Rights for Pre-March 5, 1987 Acquisitions 5-14
[d I Conditions for Retaining Control " ,.... 5-17
[e) Exception for Activities of Certain Savings Banks .. , . . . 5-17
If] Thrift Institutions' Bank .. , , , .. , , ,,,... 5-17
[g) Restrictions on Member Banks' Transactions With
Affiliates , .. , ,.,.,." , 5-17
II 5.02 Regulation of Bank Holding Company Activities 5-18
[I I Exemptions to Prohibition of Nonbank Activities .. , , . . . . . 5-18
[2J Activities Closely Related to Banking , , ... , , .... , , . . . . . 5-21
(a] Activities Allowed Under Board Regulation Y .. , , .. , , . 5-21
[bJ Deciding When an Activity Is Closely Related to Banking 5-26
[c) Approval of Nonbank Activities-Hearings and Judicial
Review ., "..... 5-29
[3] Other Authority for and Restrictions on the Activities of
Bank Holding Companies ... , .... , , .. , .... , . , .. , ... , 5-31
[a] 1987 Moratorium on Certain Nonbanking Activities . . . . 5-31
[i] Certain activities of foreign banks .. ,.,......... 5-31
Iii) Securities transactions of banks and bank holding
companies ,. , , 5-32
[iii] Insurance activities of banks and bank holding
companies , , .. , , , ,. 5-32
[iv) Powers to engage in real estate transactions ",.", 5-33
[bJ Securities Activities of Bank Holding Companies ,,, 5-33
[c] Insurance Activities ' , .. , . , , .. , . . 5-33
[d] Bank Service Companies ., ,, , , , .. , . . . . . . . 5-35
Ie] Bankers' Banks .. , , . , , , 5-35
If] Thrift Institutions' Bank ,., , 5-36
[g) Other Bank Holding Company Activities ,.,.,. 5-36
[4] Export Trading Companies ,................ 5-36
II 5.03 Savings and Loan Holding Companies , .. , , .' ,,.. 5-40
[I) Regulation of Savings and Loan Holding Companies in
General ,, ' ,, , .. , . , . . . . . . . 5-40
xv TABLE OF CONTENTS

[2] Effect of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on

Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-42
[a] Regulation of Business Activities of Savings and Loan
Holding Companies and Their Noninsured Institution
Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5·42
[b1 Regulation of Relationships Between Insured Institution
Subsidiaries and Affiliate Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-45
[c] Extension of Tying Prohibitions to State·Chartered
Insured Institutions ........ 5-46
[d] Interstate Activities 5·46
eel Affiliations With Securities Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5·46
[f] Treatment of FDIC-Insured State Savings Banks as
Insured Institutions for Regulation as Subsidiaries of a
Savings and Loan Holding Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-47

6 Regulation of Bank Expansion Through Branching and

Interstate Banking
116.01 Branch Banking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 6-2
[1] Definition of "Branch" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..... 6-2
[2] Establishing New Branches-The McFadden Act ... . . . . . . 6-6
[3] State Regulation of Bank Branching. . . . . . . . . . ......... 6-9
11 6.02 Interstate Bank Expansion by Bank Holding Companies . 0 • • • • • 6-10
[I] The Douglas Amendment 0 •••• 0 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6·10
[2] Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidiaries-The Douglas
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Other
Constitutional Considerations .. 0 •••• 0 0 ••••••• 0 0 • • • • • 6-14
[a] Lewis v. BoT. Investment Managers, Inc 0 6-14
[b] Northeast Bancorp. Inc. v. Board ofGovernors 0 • • • • • 6·16
[c] Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Brown 0 • 6-19
[3] Interstate Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidiaries 0 • • • 6-20
[4] Effects of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on
Nonbank Bank Interstate Expansion 0 •• 0 ••• 0 • 6-22
11 6.03 ATM Networks and the Restrictions on Interstate Banking 0 • • • • 6-24
11 6.04 Regulation of Branching by Savings and Loan Associations .... 0 6-26
11 6.05 Emergency Acquisitions of Financially Weak Banks . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
[1] Emergency Acquisition Authority 0 6-27
[2] Effects of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on
Emergency Acquisition Powers 0 ••••••• 0 • •• 6-30
[a] Enlarged Emergency Acquisition Powers of the FDIC 0.. 6-31
[b] Acquisition of a Bank in Danger of Closing. . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
11 6.06 Bank Holding Company Acquisition of Thrift Institutions .. 0 • • • 6-35
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xvi

7 Bank Examination and Supervision and Restrictions on

Loans and Investments
~ 7.01 Examination and Supervision Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
ll] Federal Bank Examination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
[2] Portfolio Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
[aj Loans and Extensions of Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
[b1 Exceptions to the Limitations on Loans to a Single
Borrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
[i] Bankacceptances 7-11
[ii] Real estate loans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7·12
[iii] Other investments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
[c] State Banks and Savings and Loan Associations. . . . . . . . 7-13
~ 7.02 Securities Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
[I) Scope of Federal Securities Laws Generally, as Applied to
Banks '" 7-]6
[2] Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws 7-19
[3] Definition of "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21
[a] Transactions in Stocks, Bonds, and Similar Securities ... 7-22
[b] Certificates of Deposit and Other Bank Deposits . . . . . . . 7-23
[c] Promissory Notes and Commercial Loan Agreements ... 7-25
[d] Investment Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27

8 The Restrictions Against Banks Engaging in Certain

Securities Activities
~ 8.0] The Prohibition Against Dealing in Securities-The Glass-
Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
[] I Basic Provisions of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3
[2] Scope of the Glass-Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5
[a] Application of the Act to National Banks, Member
Banks, Insured Banks, and Savings and Loan Associations 8-5
[b] Application of the Act to Bank Holding Companies and
Their Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7
[3 J Interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
raj The Subtle Hazards Analysis of the Camp Decision . . . . . 8-9
[b] Defining a Security for Purposes of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
[4] The Bankers Trust Case: Placement of Commercial Paper
and the Ban on Underwriting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
[5] Discount Brokerage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
[a] National Banks 8-16
[bl Bank Holding Companies :. . . . . . 8-17
[6) Collective Investment Funds 8-19
xVii TABLE OF CONTENTS

[a] The Comptroller's Citibank Decision 8-20

[b] Judicial Reaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
[7] Affiliations Between Banks and Securities Firms-
Determining When a Firm is "Engaged Principally" in
Securities Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-24
[8] Restrictions on Securities Activities Imposed by the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
[aJ Bank Holding Companies. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
[b] SaVings and Loan Holding Companies 8-29
[c] Moratorium On Certain Nonbanking Activities. . . . . . . . 8-30
11 8.02 The Government Securities Act of 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-31
[I] U.S. Government Securities Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-31
[2] Congressional Response-The Government Securities Act of
1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-34

9 Enforcement Powers of the Banking Regulatory Agencies

Under Federal Banking Laws
119.01 Regulating Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices ... , . . . . . . . 9-1
[I] Cease and Desist Orders ,............. 9-1
[2] Suspension and Removal of Officers and Directors .. , . . . . . 9-4
[a] Authority of the Federal Supervisory Agencies. . . . . . . . . 9-4
[b] Procedure for Removal or Suspension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
[3] CiVil Money Penalties ............ 9-9
[4] Special Liabilities of Officers and Directors ,... . 9-10
[5] Judicial Review of Agency Actions ,... 9-11
11 9.02 Transactions With Insiders and Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12
[I] Loans to or by Executive Officers of Member Banks 9-12
[2] Loans to Officers of Banks Where Correspondent Accounts
Are Maintained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9-15
[3] Transactions With Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9-15
[4] Restrictions on Transactions With Affiliates Under the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ..... ... . 9-16
[5] Tying Arrangements :, ,: . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 9-17
[6] Interlocking Management Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20

10 Liquidation, Reorganization, and Supervision of Failing

Banks and Thrift Institutions
11 10.01 Termination of Deposit Insurance ...... ........... 10-2

11 10.02 Receiverships :............ 10-4

[IJ Events That Justify the Appointment of a Receiver. . . . . . . . 10-4
[2] Discretion of the Agency and Scope of Judicial Review. . . . . 10-6
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xviii

[3] General Powers and Duties of the Receiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7

[al National Banks 10-8
til Liquidation and distribution of assets. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
[ii) Purchase and assumption agreements. . . . . . . . . . .. 10-10
[b j Savings and Loan Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-11
[4J Requirement of a Ratable Distribution " 10-12
[a] Preferences ... : ..................•......... " 10-13
[bJ Application to Purchase and Assumption Agreements. .. 10-15
(5) Enforcing Obligations; Defenses the FDIC May Avoid. . . . .. 10-15
[a] Holder in Due Course Status ,........ 10-16
[b] The Shield Statute .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-17
[c] Section 29(c) of the Securities Exchange Act. . . . . . . . .. 10-21
{6] Resolving Disputed Claims; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 10-22
[a] Banks 10-22
[b] Savings and Loan Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-23

~ 10.03 Financial Assistance to Weak Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-24

[J] Direct Financial Aid 10-24
[2] Merger Assistance , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-25
[a] Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act " 10·25
[b] Judicial Review of Agency Decisions to Give Merger
Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-27
[3J Net Worth Certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-28
~ 10.04 New Banks and Bridge Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-30
[I) Deposit Insurance National Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-30
[2) Bridge Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-30
~ 10.05 Other Regulatory Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-31

11 Deposits and Deposit Insurance

'1 11.01 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
[I] Insured Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
raj Definition of "Deposit" ................... 11-3
TABLE 11-1 Regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ,................ 11-4
TABLE 11-2 Maximum Limits on Insured Deposits . . . . . 11-6
[b] Mistaken Payment in Excess ofInsurance . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
[2] Computing the Amount oflnsurance: Rules for Multiple
Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
[3] The Deposit Insurance System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11-10
[4j General Regulatory Authority of the FDIC '. . . .. ll-ll
1111.02 Thrift Institution Deposit Insurance. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. 11-13
[I] Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation . . . . . . . .. II- t3
xix TABLE OF CONTENTS

[2] Financial Rescue of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance

System By the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 .. , 11-14
[3] Measures to Improve FHLBB and FSLIC Regulation of
Financially Weak Institutions , 11-18
[a] Accounting Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11-18
[b] Capital Forbearance Programs 11-19
[c] General Supervisory Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11-20
[d] Holding Corporation for Troubled Assets 11-21
~ 11.03 Credit Union Share Insurance , . .. 1\-21
~ 11.04 Deposit Insurance Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the
United States 11-24
~ 11.05 Withholding Tax on Interest Paid , 11-25

12 Financial Transactions Regulation, Money-Laundering

Controls, and Crimes Related to Bank Transactions
~ 12.01 Financial Transactions Offenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
[1] Financial Record-Keeping Requirements 12-2
[2] Reporting of Currency Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-3
[a] Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3
[b] Structured Transactions and Penalties for Reporting
Violations ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12- 7
[3] Money-Laundering Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
[a] Money-Laundering Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-9
[b 1 Monetary Transactions Involving Proceeds of Crime . . .. 12-12
[c] RICO and Other Enforcement Measures. . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-12
[4] Special Enforcement Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-12
[a] Authority to Investigate Violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-12
[b] Compelling Information About Foreign Bank Records
Protected Under Foreign Law , 12-13
[c] Forfeiture of Property ,. . 12-15
[dl Immunity for Reports of Violations 12-16
tel Change in Bank Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-17
11 12.02 Other Criminal Laws Relating to Bank Transactions. . . . . . . . .. 12-17
[l]BankBribery 12-18
[2] Misapplication of Funds 12-23
[3] False Entries " 12·27
[4] Other Federal Criminal Offenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-32

13 Bank Customer Privacy and Other Bank Activities

Subject to Special Regulation
11 13.0 I Privacy for Financial Records of Bank Customers. . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xx

[I] Rights to Privacy Under the U.S. Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . 13-2

[21 Right to Financial Privacy Act ,, ,.......... 13-4
[a] Conditions of Disclosure 13-4
[b] Special Circumstances and Procedures 13-5
[c] Scope and Operation of Act 13-6
[dJ Privacy Act of 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-8
[3J Privacy Rights Under Other Laws 13-9
, 13.02 Regulation of Political Activities " 13-1 J
'113.03 Anticompetitive Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13-12
[I) Antitrust Regulation 13-12
[2J Unfair Trade Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13-15
[3J Consolidations and Mergers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13-16
[4J Change in Control " 13-19
11 13.04 Local Credit Needs: The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 13-20

Part II - Bank Payments and Negotiable Instruments

14 Sources of CommerciaJ Banking Law and Basic Principles

Governing Commercial Paper
11 14.01 Sources of Commercial Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
[I] Federal Power Over Commercial Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
[2] State Commercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code. . . 14-5
TABLE 14-1 State Enactments ofUCC and Amendments. . . . . . . 14-7
[3] The Role of the Federal Government as the Source of
Commercial Law ,................ 14-9
TABLE 14-2 Legal Treatises on the Uniform Commercial Code
and Related Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-10
[a) Federal Administrative Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-11
[b] Preemption of Federal Over State Rules '" 14-12
TABLE 14-3 Hierarchy of Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-13
[cl Authority of Federal Reserve System To Regulate Certain
Payment Methods ,............... 14-15
[4) Conflict of Laws Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14- J 7
~ 14.02 Money 14-20
[I] Defining Money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-20
[2J Gold and Foreign Exchange , .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-24
~ 14.03 Commercial Paper , .. ' ' ' " 14-26
[l J Negotiable Instruments , 14-26
[2] Letters of Credit 14-28
xxi TABLE OF CONTENTS

[3] Securities , 14-28

[4] Documents of Title '" , 14-29
[5] Security Agreements 14-29
'14.04 Requirements for Instruments to Be Negotiable 14-30
[I] Advantages of Negotiability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-30
[2] Requirements for Negotiability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-31
[a] Promise or Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-31
[b] Unconditional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-33
leI In Writing and Signed 14-37
[dj Certainty as to Sum , 14-38
tel Payable in Money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-38
[f] Payable on Demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-39
[gl Payable at a Defmite Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-42
[hI Payable to Order or Bearer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-42-
til Designation of Payee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-43
[j] Drawee Must Be Certain " 14-44
[k] Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer " 14-44
[I] Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction 14-45
1114.05 Documents of Title and Securities " 14·45
[1] Documents of Title " 14-46
[al Negotiability of Documents of Title 14-47
[bl Liability of Bailee for Loss or Damage to or Failure to
Deliver Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-49
[cl Carrier's or Warehouseman's Lien. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-52
[2] Investment Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-53
[aj Investment Securities Under the Pre-1977 VCC 14-54
[bl Investment Securities Under the UCC-1977
Amendments and Uncertificated Securities 14-54

15 Rights and Liabilities of Parties to Commercial Paper

1115.01 Transfer and Negotiation of Commercial Paper .. . . . . . . . . . . . 15-2
[1] Transfer of Property Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-2
[2] Transfer of Negotiable Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-5
[3] Indorsements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-7
[a] Types ofIndorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-8
[il Blank indorsement 15-8
[ii] Special indorsement 15-9
[iii] Indorsement without recourse . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-10
[iv] Restrictive indorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-10
[vI Conditional indorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-11
[b] Rights and Duties of Restrictive Indorsees......... .... 15-12
[c] Bank's Power to Supply Missing Indorsement. . . . . . . .. 15-13
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxii

fdJ Transferees ofInstruments With Missing Indorsement. .. 15-14

(e] Limitation of Indorsees' Rights by Separate Contract. . .. 15-18
11 15.02 Liability of Parties on Negotiable Instruments 15.19
[l] Primary and Secondary Liability 15-20
[2] Liability of Maker and Acceptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15.20
(3] Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-22
[4) Indorser's Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-24
[5] Drawer's Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15.25
II 15.03 Liability in Warranty for Transfer and Presentment of Negotiable
Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-26
[I) Presentment Versus Transfer Warranties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-27
[2) Warranties of Customers and Collecting Banks. . . . . . . . . .. 15-30
'il 15.04 Liability of Agents and Representatives . . . . . . . . .. 15-31
[1] Rules Regarding Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-31
(2) Case Examples " , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-33
[a] Principal's Name Missing ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-33
[b) Agent Fails to Sign in a Manner That Shows Agency
Status 15-34
11 15.05 Bank's Liability on Negotiable Instruments Generally. . . . . . . .. 15-39
[ I] Certificates of Deposit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-39
[2] Cashier's Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-39
[3) Money Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-41
[4] Traveler's Checks , . . . . . .. 15-42
[5) Accepted Drafts and Certified Checks , . . . .. 15-44
la) Obligations of Acceptance or Certification. . . . . . . . . . .. 15-44
[b) Certifying or Accepting Forged or Altered Paper. . . . . .. 15-46
Ie) Mistaken Certincation , . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-47
'115.06' Sureties and Accommodation Parties. . . . . . . ... ..... ... 15-47
[I J The Rights of an Accommodation Party Against the Principal 15-49
[2) The Obligation of an Accommodation Party to Pay. . . . . . .. IS-52
[3] Defenses to Payment of an Accommodation Party. . . . . . . .. 15-55
[4] Accommodation Parties in Consumer Transactions... ..... 15-58
'I 15.07 Discharge of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-58
'115.08 Handling ofInstruments Involving a Fiduciary. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-61
[l] UCC Provisions Relating to Fiduciaries , . .. 15-62
[2] Uniform Fiduciaries Act Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-66
[3] Problems in Determining When There Is Knowledge of a
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-69

16 Holders in Due Course

II 16.0 I Holder in Due Course Requirements 16-2
xxiii TABLE OF CONTENTS

[1) The Holder Requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-3

[2) Taking Without Notice of Defects or Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . 16-3
[a) Definition of "Notice" .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-5
[b] What Constitutes Notice ofa Claim or Defense. . . . . . . . 16-5
[3) Good Faith 16-II
[4]GivingValue 16-15
[5] Persons Who Cannot Qualify as Holders in Due Course. . .. 16-19
~ 16.02 Rights of a Holder in Due Course. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-20
[1) Freedom From Conflicting Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-21
[2] Freedom From Defenses 16-21
[a] Defenses of Parties With Whom the Holder Has Dealt. .. 16-21
[b] Real and Personal Defenses 16-23
Ic] Categories of Real Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-24
[i] Incapacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-24
[iiI Duress or illegality 16-25
[iii] Fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of the
instrument .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-26
[iv] Discharge in insolvency proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-27
[v] Other discharges when the holder has notice. . . . . .. 16-27
11 16.03 Rights of a Holder Who Is Not a Holder in Due Course 16-28
~ 16.04 The Shelter Principle-Acquiring the Rights of a Holder in Due
Course by Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-31
'II 16.05 Defenses to the Instrument Based Upon Separate Conditions or
Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-33
~ 16.06 Preservation of Claims and Defenses in Consumer Transactions 16-35
[I] Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status by FTC. . . . . . . .. 16-37
[2] Transactions Covered by FTC Rule 16-38
[a) Financed Sale and Purchase Money Loan 16-38
[b] Impact of FTC Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-39
[c] Case Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-40
[3] Preservation of Claims and Defenses Under the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-42
[a] Section 3.307: Use of Negotiable Instruments. . . . . . . .. 16-43
[bJ Section 3.403: Credit Card Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-43
[c) Section 3.404: Waiver of Defense Clauses. . . . . . . . . . .. 16-44
[d) Section 3.405: Availability of Claims and Defenses
Against Lender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-44
[4J Other State and Federal Restrictions on Holder in Due
Course Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-45

17 Letters of Credit
11 17.01 Rights and Duties of Parties in Letter of Credit Transactions. . . . 17-1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiv

[1] Scope of UCC Letter of Credit Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-4

(21 Form of Letters of Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 17-5
[3) Letters of Credit Are Not Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-7
[4J International Letters of Credit and the Uniform Customs. . . 17-8
1117.02 Obligations of an lssuer ofa Lelter of Credit. 17-9
[ 1J Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-9
[2] Issuer's Obligation to Pay the Beneficiary . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-11
raj Indemnities 17-12
[b} Relationship of Letter of Credit to the Underlying
Contract 17-14
[3] Standby Letters of Credit 17-17
1117.03 Documentary Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-19
[I] Bank's Duty to Present Draft and to Notify Customer of
Nonpayment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-21
[2} Bank's Responsibilities for the Documents and the Goods. .. 17-22
~ 17.04 Letters of Credit and Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-24

18 Alternative Payment Systems: Bank Cards, Credit Cards,

and Electronic Fund Transfers
'I 18.01 Alternative Payment Systems Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-3
[1) Types of Transactions 18-3
[a} Check Truncation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-3
[b] Automated Clearinghouse Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-4
[c] Book Entry Securities and Safekeeping Services. . . . . . . 18-5
[d] Wire Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill-5
[e J Automated Teller Machines .. ..... ......... 18-6
(I] Point of Sale Terminals 18·6
[g) Home Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-6
[h} Credit Cards 18-7
[2] Sources of Law 18-7
~ 18.02 Electronic Fund Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18·8
[I] Scope of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 18·9
[2] Error Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-12
[3] Failure to Execute a Transfer or Stop Transfer Order
Properly 18-13
[4 J Preauthorized Transfers and Stop Payment Rights. . . . . . .. 18-14
[5] Suspension of Obligations to Third Parties. . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-15
(6] Disclosure and Notice Obligations 18-15
[Ii] Initial Disclosure and Notice of Changes .. 18·16
[b] Documentation of Transfers Made Through an
Electronic Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18·16
[cJ Preauthorized Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-17
xxv TABLE OF CONTENTS

[d] Periodic Statement of Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-18

tel Notice of Error Resolution Procedures 18-19
[I] Documentation as Proof of Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-19
[7] Miscellaneous Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-19
(8) Issuing Access Cards 1\\-19
[9] Relation to State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-21
[10] Enforcement Powers and Private Remedies. . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-22
[a] Administrative Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-22
[b] Criminal Enforcement 18-22
[c) Liability of Institutions , . . . . . . . . .. 18-23
'I 18.03 Bank Credit Cards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-24
[I] Truth-in-Lending Act Provisions 18-27
[2] Issuing Credit Cards " 18-28
[3] Preservation of Cardholder Claims and Defenses. . . . . . . .. 18-28
[4] Prohibition Against Setoff of Obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-31
[5] Wrongful Refusal to Extend Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-31
[6] Terms of Credit Card Plans Affecting Merchants and Others
Who Honor the Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-32
[7] Duty of Sellers to Notify Issuers of Returned Goods and
Other Credits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-32
[8] Credit Card Fraud , 18-33
~ 18.04 Unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers and Credit Card
Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-33
[I) Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-34
[a] Statutory Rules and Regulation Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-34
[b] Definition of "Unauthorized Use" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-35
til Loaning of the credit card " 18-37
[ii] Estranged spouses and other family members. . . . . . . .. 18-38
[iii] Lost and stolen cards 18-41
[iv] Employer-employee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-41
[2] Unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-42
[a] Statutory Rules and Reguiation E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-42
[b] Definition of "Unauthorized Transfer" . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-45
~ 18.05 Fund Transfers Not Regulated by the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, or the VCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-47
[1] Regulation of Wire Transfers by tile Federal Reserve System 18-50
[a] Basic Definitions 18-50
[b] Authority of the Reserve Bank to Process Transfer. . . .. 18-52
[c] Procedures Governing Reserve Bank Transfers 18-53
[d] Liability of the Reserve Ba:J.k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-54
[2] Bank Liability for Erroneous or Wrongful Fund Transfers .. 18-56
[3] Proposed Revision ofUCC to Cover Moderp Payment
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-60
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxvi

[4J Check Truncation and Other Electronic Processing Methods

of Check Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-61
[5) Regulation of ACH Transactions 18-64
[6J Regulation of Direct Deposit Payments and Book Entry
Securities Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-66

19 Bank Accounts
'I 19.0 I Basic UCC Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-2
1119.02 Nature of Bank Accounts... . .. . . . .. 19-4
[I] Legal Relationship Between Bank and Depositor. . . . . . . . . . 19-4
raj Bank as Debtor to Its Depositor . . . . . .. 19-4
[b J Bank as Bailee or Trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-5
[cJ Accounts at Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-7
[dj Bank Ownership of Deposited Funds 19-9
[2] Kinds of Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-9
[a] Checking Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-11
[b] Savings Accounts " 19-11
[c) Special Deposits " 19-12
[dJ Certificates of Deposit 19-12
Ie] NOW Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-13
[f] Automatic Transfer Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-14
[g) Share Draft Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-15
[hl Money Market Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-15
[3J Opening an Account....... .. 19-15
[4] Unconscionable Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-16
[5] Termination of Relationship 19-17
t 19.03 Forms of Accounts 19-20
[l] Individual Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-20
[2J Joint or Multiple Party Accounts . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-20
{a] Common-Law Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-21
[bJ Uniform Probate Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-22
[c] Creditors' Rights Against Joint Account 19-23
[d] Ownership Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-25
Ie] Bank Payment of Joint Account Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-26
If] Liability for Overdrafts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-27
[g] Conflicting Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-28
[3J Partnership Accounts " \9-29
[4] Corporate Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-30
11 19.04 Signatures _. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-30
[I] What Constitutes a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .. 19-31
[2] Single, Multiple, and Facsimile Signatures 19-32
11 19.05 Nondeposit Liabilities " 19-35
xxvii TABLE OF CONTENTS

20 Mutual Duties of the Bank and the Depositor

~ 20.01 Bank's Right to Charge Customer's Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-2
~ 20.02 Improper Payment and Bank's Rights of Subrogation . . . . . . . . . 20-4
~ 20.03 Liability of Bank for Refusal to Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-5
~ 20.04 Postdated Checks and Stale Checks 20-10
~ 20.05 Stopping Payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-11
[1] Basic Rules on Stopping Payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-11
[a] When Is a Stop Payment Order Timely? . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-12
[b] Subrogation Rights and Proof of Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-13
[2] Claims of Third Parties to Checks 20-17
[3] Stopping Payment on Cashier's Checks, Bank Drafts, and
Certified Checks 20-18
~ 20.06 Bank's Duty to Pay the Holder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-21
[1] Order Paper and Identification of Payees and Indorsers . . . .. 20-22
[2] Bearer Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-23
[3] Fictitious or Nonexisting Payees ,. . . . .. 20-23
11 20.07 Miscredited Proceeds and Restrictive Indorsements . . . . . .. 20-28
1120.08 Checks With Forged or Unauthorized Signatures 20-37
[1] Breach of Warranty by Customer Obtaining Payment of
Check With Forged Indorsement 20-43
[2] Conversion of Check When Bank Pays Over a Forged
Indorsement 20-43
[3] Customer Negligence As Defense to Bank's Payment of
Check With Unauthorized Signature or Alteration. . . . . . . .. 20-45
[4] Bank's Improper Payment of Check as Cause of Customer
Loss ,........................ 20-49
t 20.09 Alteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-50
[1] Altered Checks That Were Complete When Signed. . . . . . .. 20-52
[2] Instruments Issued With Blanks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-54
~ 20.10 Depository Bank's Obligation of Good Faith 20-55
~ 20.11 Bank's Right to Revoke Credits to Customer's Account and to
Charge Customer for Items Not Paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-56
[I] Customer's Right to Withdraw Against Items Deposited. . .. 20-60
[a] Customer's Right to Withdraw Against Deposited Items
Under the UCC , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-61
[b] The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 . . . . . . . .. 20-63
[i] Definitions and scope of EFAA 20-64
[ii] Funds availability requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-64
[iii] Accrual of interest on deposits ... '.' . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-73
[iv] Calculation of business days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-74
[v] Administrative enforcement and private remedies .. 20-74
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxviii

[vi] Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC ... _. . . . . .. 20-75

1120.12 Customer's Duty to Examine Statements of Account. . . . . . . . .. 20-81
[I] Duty to Examine Statements and to Report Improper
Payments ...............................•...... 20-81
[2] Duty to Report Forgeries and Alterations When Bank Retains
Checks 20-86
[3] ~egligence and the Duty of Due Care Under the UCC 20-87
11 20.13 Liability of Bank on Promises and Representations With Respect
to Its Customer's Account '" _. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-88

21 Collection and Payment of Instruments

t 21.01 Responsibilities of Banks in Collecting Payment of Checks and
Other Negotiable Instruments _.................•....... 21-2
[I] Liability of Depositary Bank for Collecting Payment . 21-3
[2] Bank's Duties in Choosing Other Collecting Banks . 21-5
[3] Duties of Intermediary . 21-5
[4] Effect of Private Agreements on Banks' Duties . 21-7
11 21.02 Failure to Act Properly in Collecting the Item . 21-9
[I] Duty of Holder to Present Instrument Promptly . 21-9
[2] Duty of Collecting Bank to Act Promptly . 21-10
[3] Form of Payment . 21-11
[4] Delay From Misroutings . 21-12
1: 21.03 Payment of Items by Payor Bank . 21-15
[1] Accountability of Payor Bank for Payment of Items . 21-15
[2] Legal Consequences and Timing of Payment . 21-18
[3) Notice to Payor From Notations on Checks . 21-20
[4] Effect of Payment on the Underlying Transaction . 21-21
[5] Payment by Remittance Instrument . 21-23
[6] Payor Bank's Right to Cancel Payment and Recover Proceeds 21-24
[7] Application of Final Payment Rule . 21-28
[8] Method of Return ofltems Not Paid Under UCC and
Federal Reserve Board Rules . 21-30
'1 21.04 Instruments Payable at or Through Banks . 21-32
f 21.05 Errors in Handling Computer-Encoded Checks . 21-34
\ I] Errors in Check Amounts . 21-35
[2] Errors in Routing Directions . 21-36
1/21.06 Collection and Return of Checlcs Under Feceral Reserve Board
Regulation CC : . 21-39
1121.07 Use of Central Data Processing Center for Payment of Checks by
Bank With Multiple Branches . 21-42
11 21.08 Payment of Lost or Stolen Checks . 21-45
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxx

Part III - Security Transactions in Personal Property

and Related Credit Practices

22 Creation of Security Interests in a Debtor's Personal

Property
II 22.01 Security Interests in Personal Property Under the VCC . . . . . . .. 22-2
[l J Scope of VCC on Security Interests 22-3
[2] Leases and Consignments as Security Transactions . . . . . . .. 22-6
[a) Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22.6
[bJ Consignments 22-9
'1/22.02 Creating a Security Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·) 0
[1] The Security Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·10
[2] Purchase Money Security Interests. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-16
11 22.03 Perfection, Termination, and Transfer of Security Interests " 22-18
[I] Filing Requirements 22-19
[2] Requirements of Financing Statements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·22
[a] Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·22
[b] Other Requirements as to Effectiveness " 22·25
[3J Termination Statements and Partial Releases of Collateral. .. 22·27
[4] Transfer of Security Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·211
[5] Place of Filing UCC Financing Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-30
TABLE 22-1 1972 and Pre-I 972 Versions ofUCC 22·32
TABLE 22-2 State Filing Systems for Article 9 Security
Transactions (UCC § 9-401). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·34
TABLE 22-3 State Filing Locations for Article 9 Security
Transactions (VCC § 9-401) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·40
11 22.04 Security Interests When the Secured Party Has Possession ofthe
Collateral . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-45
[)] The Pledge 22·45
[a] Creating a Security Interest by Pledging Collateral . . . . .. 22·45
Ib] Perfecting the Security Interest in Pledged Collateral . . .. 22-46
[2J Field Warehouse Systems " 22·49
[3] Duties of a Pledgee 22·50
1: 22.05 Automatic Perfection and Perfection of Security Interests in
Collateral Governed by Systems Other Than the UCC. . . . . . . .. 22-51
11 22.06 Security Interests in Goods and Chattels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-52
[l] Consumer Goods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·53
(2] Equipment 22-54
[3] Farm Products. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-54
14] Inventory ..... ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-56
xxxi TABLE OF CONTENTS

[5] Fixtures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-59

[6] Motor Vehicles . . . . . . .. 22-60
~ 22.07 Security Interests in Intangibles and Like Property . . . . . . . . . .. 22-61
[I] Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. 22-61
[2] General Intangibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-66
[3] Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-67
[4] Chattel Paper 22-68
[5] Documents of Title 22·69
[6] Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·70
[a] Certificated Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-72
[b] Cases Involving Certificated Securities 22·73
[c] Uncertificated Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-77
[d] U.S. Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-78
[7] Bank Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-78
[8J Insurance Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·80
[9] Real Estate-Related Interests . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·81

23 Priorities: Rights of Competing Creditors, Purchasers,

and Transferees
~ 23.01 Priorities Between Parties With Security Interests in the Same
Collateral 23-2
[IJ Unperfected Security Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-2
[2] Perfected Security Interests 23-4
[a] Purchase Money Security Interests ...... 23-5
[b] Security Interests in Crops ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-7
~ 23.02 Rights of Buyers and Purchasers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-8
[I] Buyers of Goods .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-8
[a] Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business 23-8
[b] Buyers From Debtors Who Have Authority to Sell. . . . .. 23-11
[c] Scope of Protection for Buyers in the Ordinary Course of
Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-15
[2J Buyers of Farm Products-The Food Security Act of 1985 .. 23-16
[a] Reasons for Enactment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-16
[b] Provisions of the Act ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-18
[c] Presale Notice Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-19
[d] Notification Through a Central Filing System 23-22
[e] Debtor's Duty to Identify Buyers, Commission
Merchants, and Sales Agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-26
[f] Scope of the Act and Federal Preemption 23-27
[3] Purchasers of Instruments, Chattel Paper, and Documents. .. 23-31
~ 23.03 Special Priority Rules 23-32
[I] Proceeds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-32
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxii

[2] Fixtures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 23-34

[3] Rights of Unpaid Sellers of Goods ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 23-36
[4] Conflicts With Liens Arising Under Other Laws ..... ... .. 23-38
[5] Commingled or Processed Goods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 23-39
[6] Subordination Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. 23-40

24 Debtor Default and Enforcement of Security Agreements

1124.01 General Rules on When an Obligation Is Due. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-2
[I] Obligations Based on Promissory Notes 24-2
[a] Notes Payable on Demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-2
[b] Acceleration Clauses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-4
[i] Good faith requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-4
[iiI Types of acceleration provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-5
[iii] Scope of UCC § 1-208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-6
[c] Due-on-Sale Clauses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-9
til Enforceability in real estate transactions. . . . . . . . . . 24-9
Iii] Gam-St Germain Act 24-11
[2] ::\'otes With Special Contract Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-14
[3] Waiver or Cancellation of Debts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-15
[a] Problems With Renewal Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-16
[b] Full Payment Checks ; . .. 24-17
'/24.02 Special Duties of Good Faith and Fiduciary Responsibility of
Bank to Customer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-21
[I] The Bank as a Fiduciary. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-21
[a] Fiduciary Relationships Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-21
Ib] Transactions Where a Bank Is a Fiduciary. . . . . . . . . . .. 24-23
[2] A Bank's Duty of Good Faith and Related Obligations. . . .. 24-26
[a) Theories Underlying Lender Liability Cases. . . . . . . . . .. 24-27
Ib] Liability Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-30
11 24.03 Enforcement of Security Interests Under UCC Anicle 9 24-31
[I] Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-31
[2] Repossession of the Collateral 24-32
[3] Constitutional Limitations on Secured Pany Remedies. . . .. 24-34
[a] Supreme Court Due Process Decisions 24-34
Ib] Self-Help Repossession and the Issue of State Action. . .. 24-36
[4] Disposition of Collateral After Default. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-39
[a) Requirements for Disposal of Collateral 24-39
[b] Cases Illustrating Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24-41
[5] Retention of Collateral in Discharge of the Obligation. . . . .. 24-44
[6] Creditor Liability for Failure to Comply With UCC
Procedures :... 24-45
11 24.04 Special Consumer Credit Rules 24-48
xxxiii TABLE OF CONTENTS

25 Bankruptcy
~ 25.01 Source of Law, Jurisdiction, and Procedure 25-2
~ 25.02 Different Types of Bankruptcy Proceedings . 25-5
[1] Chapter 7: - Liquidation . 25·5
[2] Chapter 13: - Debt Adjustment . 25-6
[3] Chapter II: - Reorganization . 25·8
[4] Chapter 12: - Family Farmer . 25-11
t 25.03 Voluntary Versus Involuntary Proceedings . 25-14
f 25.04 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate . 25-15
[1] Determining What Constitutes Properly . 25-15
[2] Exemptions . 25-16
[3] Lien Avoidance for Exempt Property . 25-17
[4] Turnover of Property Belonging to the Estate . 25·18
~ 25.05 The Automatic Stay . 25-19
[ I J General Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25·19
[2] Exceptions , , , , . 25-21
[3) Procedure for Obtaining Relief From the Stay . 25-23
[4J The Secured Creditor, the Collateral, and Adequate
Protection , . 25-24
~ 25.06 Creditors' Claims: Procedures and Priority of Distribution " 25-26
~ 25.07 Powers and Duties of the Bankruptcy Trustee '. 25-28
(I J Trustee as Lien Creditor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25·29
[2] Trustee as Successor to the Rights of Actual Unsecured
Creditors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-30
[3) Power to Set Aside Statutory Liens " 25-31
[4] Power to Set Aside Preferences _ , . .. 25-32
[a] Elements of a Preference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25·32
[b] Statutory Exceptions ' 25-36
[5] Power to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances. . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-39
[6] Rights of Transferees in Avoided Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-41
[7] Other Specific Powers of the Trustee. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-42
[a] Executory Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-42
[b] Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-43
[c] Abandoning Property of the Estate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-44
~ 25.08 Discharge of the Debtor , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-45
[I] Nondischargeable Debts _. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-45
[2J Objections to Discharge , , .. , . . . . .. 25·49
[3] Reaffirmation of Debt by the Debtor , .. , , " , . . .. 25·50
~ 25.09 Issues Involving the Rights and Duties of a Bank ,.'..... 25·52
[I] Checks in the Process of Collection .... , ... , , . . . . . . . . .. 25-52
 TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxiv

[2] Letters of Credit as Preferences 25-53

[3] The Bank's Right of Setoff and the Automatic Stay . . . . . . .. 25-57
fa] Requirements of General Right of Setoff " 25-57
fbJ Prepetition Setoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-58
[c] Postpetition Setoff; "Freezing" Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-60
Id} Setoffs and the Involuntary Bankruptcy. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-61
[4] Credit Card Purchases as Nondischargeable Debts. . . . . . . .. 25-62
f5J Employees Who File Bankruptcy ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-65
[6J Environmental Protection, Hazardous Wastes, and the
Bankrupt Debtor " 25-66
(a] Environmental Proceedings and the Automatic Stay 25-67
(bJ Dischargeability of Orders and Fines Arising From
Environmental Violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25-67
[c] Abandonment of the Property and Liability for
Cleanup " 25-68
[dJ Priority Status for Claims Resulting from Cleanup. . . . .. 25-70

26 Interest Rate Controls and Credit Practices Regulation

~ 26.0 I Sources of Law ". . . . . . . . . . 26-2
~ 26.02 Interest and Usury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-4
[l] State Law Regulating Interest Rates ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-5
fZ] National Banks .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-8
Ia] Role of State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-9
fb] Most Favored Lender Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-11
leJ Interstate Credit Activities .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-12
[3} Federal Preemption of State Usury Law ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-13
[a] Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act " 26-13
[b] Preemption Provisions for Specific Categories Under the
Act 26-14
(i] Residential real property loans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-14
[ii] Obligations of depository institutions. . . . . . . . . . .. 26.15
[iii] Business and agricultural loans of $1 ,000 or more. .. 26·16
[iv] Other loans by federally ins'Jred depository
institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-16
[c] State Laws Overriding Federal Interest Limits. . . . . . . .. 26·18
[4] The Prime Rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-19
[5] Variable Rate and Other Nontraditional Mortgage
Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26·23
t 26.03 Credit Disclosure Regulation: Truth-in-Lending Act . . . . . . . . .. 26·25
[1] Scope and Requirements of the Act ,................... 26-26
[2] Closed-End and Open-End Credit Arrangements " 26-31
[a] Closed-End Credit Disclosure Requirements. . . . . . . . .. 26-31
xxxv TABLE OF CONTENTS

[b] Open-End Credit Disclosure Requirements " 26-35

[3] Consumer Leases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-40
[4] Disclosures and Rescission Rights in Real Estate
Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-4 \
[5] General Provisions of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-44
[a] Duty to Revise Prior Disclosures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-44
[b] Regulation of Credit Advertising , 26-44
[c] Effect of Truth-in-Lending on State Law 26-46
[d] Credit Billing , 26-46
[6] Civil Liability and Administrative Enforcement 26-49
[a] Creditor Liability for Damages , 26-49
{i] Creditor defenses 26-50
[ii] Liability of assignee from a creditor , 26-51
[bi Administrative Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-52
(e] Reliance on Model Forms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-53
t 26.04 Consumer Credit Protection Act 26-53
[I] Restrictions on Garnishment ., , 26-54
[2] Debt Collection Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-55
[3] Credit Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-57
~ 26.05 Other Consumer Credit-Related Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-61
[I] Unfair or Deceptive Practices-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-61
[2] Plain English Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-62
11 26.06 Credit Discrimination and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 26-63
[I] Scope of the Act , 26-63
[2] What Constitutes Discrimination Under ECOA 26-67
[3] Prohibited Discrimination in Credit Application and
Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-70
[4] Special-Purpose Credit Programs .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-71
[5] Notice Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-72
[6] Civil Liability for Violation of ECOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-74
[7] Relationship to State Laws Establishing Marital and Other
Property Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-75
[8J Relationship to Other State Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-79

Table of UCC Sections T-t

Tab]e of USC Sections " T·17
Tab]e of Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. T-))

Index :...... I-I

 I
The Nature and
Regulation of Banking:
An Overview
 1
Introduction to Banking
Regulation
~ 1.01 Defining "Commercial Banking" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-[
~ 1.02 History of Banking Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
[1] First Bank of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
[2] Second Bank of the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
[3] State-Chartered Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
[41 Federal Reserve Act of 19 I 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
[5) Banking Since the I 950s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-g

~ 1.01 DEFINING "COMMERCIAL BANKING"

"Commercial banking" was defined in the previous edition of this book as
the activity of a banking institution whose "principal business is to accept
deposits, make loans, collect commercial paper, and arrange the transfer of
funds.'" Under the banking law from the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act in
the 1930s until the beginning of the 1980s, there was a distinct demarcation
between commercial banks and other financial institutions, such as investment
banks, securities firms, and commercial financial services conglomerates.
All this is changing. The types of institutions that can engage in traditional
commercial banking functions have enlarged as a result of legislation giving
additional powers to thrift institutions. The types ofactivities commercial banks
engage in have expanded as a result of legislation at both the state and federal
levels and as a result ofjudicial decisions dismantling parts of the wall erected by
the Glass-Steagall Act to keep commercial banks insulated from the risks of
dealing in securities. The "nonbank bank" explosion has started a restructuring
of the banking market into holding companies capable of offering an array of
financial services. In light of these developments, perhaps the most suitable

1 F. Beutel & M. Schroeder, Bank Officer's Handbook of Commercial Banking Law 3

(5th cd. 1982).

I-I
, 1.01 OVERVIEW 1-2

definition is one offered by an English text: "[Blanks come in all shapes and
sizes, with different name tags applied indifferent countries, often quite loosely.
Banks make most oftheir money from the difference between interest rates paid
to depositors and charged to borrowers." Commercial banks are "publicly
quoted and profit oriented. They deal directly with the public, taking deposits,
making loans and providing a range of financial services from foreign exchange
to investment advice. Most countries have settled for between four and ten;" but
in the United States there are nearly 15,000 because of "banking laws that have
prevented banks qperating in more than one state, and in different types of
business .... "2
In addition to commercial banks, there are many specialized depository
institutions that have been established to perform specialized roles. Thrift insti-
tutions such as savings and loan associations and credit unions are important
examples. At their inception, savings and loan associations primarily engaged in
home mortgage lending and offering passbook-type savings to consumers. With
the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980, thrifts gained expanded authority to engage in commercial
banking activities. Further incorporation into the general banking market has
occurred as a result of the restructuring brought about by the financial failures
and weakened condition ofthrift institutions in the I 980s, which led to changes
in the law to encourage the acquisition and merger of weak institutions with
stronger financial institutions, including banks. These developments are dis-
cussed in Chapters 6 and 10. To a great extent, thrift institutions are subject to a
regulatory regime similar to that governing commercial banks, and engage in
banking functions similar to those of commercial banks. Subsequent chapters
discuss how thrifts fit into this regulatory scheme.
There are other specialized consumer-oriented financial companies. Credit
unions may be organized under state and federal statutes with the power to
maintain customer share accounts against which drafts may be drawn payable in
a manner similar to checks. Credit unions are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
There are also personal finance Joan organizations authorized under the laws of
the several states that loan small amounts of money to consumers, often at
specially regulated rates that are higher than the usual interest rates allowed.
These organizations normally are not deposit-taking institutions but operate
with their own capital and credit. Banks often have their own small loan depart-
ments to make the same type ofloans, and holding companies may have special
consumer loan subsidiaries or affiliate companies. 3
Although trust activities have become a part of the activity of many com-
mercial banks,' this book does not deal with the laws that govern these trustee

2 R. Pennant-Rea & B, Emmoll, The Pocket Economist 9 (1983)

3S ee \2 CFR § 22S,25(b)(l) (1987),

4 See 12 USC § 92a (1982). which gives authority to national banks to engage in trust
1-3 BANKING REGULATION 111.01

relationships and activities. The competition for funds has led some banks to
offer managed investment accounts through their trust departments similar to
those offered by mutual funds and other securities firms. These developments
are discussed in Chapter 8. Again, there are trust companies organized under
state law that operate by accepting money for the purpose of investment where
the beneficial interest in the funds remains in the original owner. This book does
not address trust companies as such, but these firms may become part of a
banking company's corporate structure through affiliation as a subsidiary or
other affiliate organization. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this issue.
There are other types of banking functions and specialized banks: for exam-
ple, reserve banks, which are really bankers' banks; investment banks, whose
chief business is underwriting and dealing in securities, and providing fmancial
advice and aid in corporate acquisitions and mergers; agricultural banks; foreign
trade banks; and other specialized banks that have charters to engage in particu-
lar types ofbusiness. Some examples of these organizations are briefly described
in Chapter 2. Further, the peculiarities of federal laws regulating bank holding
companies have encouraged the proliferation of various financial institutions
that have been chartered as full-service banks but that limit their functions to
activities such as consumer lending and credit card operations. These develop-
ments are discussed in Chapter 5.
Because ofthe diversity offunctions of commercial banks and the variety of
depository institutions involved in them, this book does not attempt a compre-
hensive survey ofall banking acti vity. Rather, it emphasizes the basic regulatory
structure that governs traditional commercial banking institutions and the com-
mercial activities associated with accepting deposits, collecting commercial
paper, making payments and transferring funds, and engaging in certain credit
transactions. Thus, Part I consists of a review of the body of regulatory law
affecting the organization, authority, and supervision of commercial banks and
a description of the primary federal banking regulatory agencies-the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Part II examines the
law that defines the rights and duties related to various types of commercial
paper-checks, notes, cashier's checks, letters of credit, documents of title, and
other paper, and describes the law affecting bank and customer relations. Part
III outlines some of the fundamental law applicable to security transactions in
personal property and related credit practices.
As this introduction indicates, the laws and regulations that govern com-
mercial banking are numerous and complex. The various types of financial
institutions engaging in commercial banking activities are matched by an equal

activities. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
also gave thnft institutions chartcred by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board the author-
ity to engagc in trust activities under certain conditions. 12 USC § 1464(n) (1982).
'1.02 OVERVIEW 1-4

diversity of statutes and regulations controlling the activities of these institu-

tions. At the federal level alone, responsibility for regulating banking activities
has been parceled out among a number of separate agencies; when regulatory
authority is shared by state and federal agencies, the complexity of the law is
compounded.
In addition, the law governing the transactions of commercial banks is
complex. The Uniform Commercial Code has brought a desirable uniformity to
the law in many areas, but there are many special purpose statutes, frequently
intended to give special consumer protection, that must be taken into account in
analyzing banking transactions. There is a growing body of federal law that must
be considered along with the state commercial law ofthe UCC and common law.
This book is intended to serve as a beginning guide for the bank officer engaged
in these commercial banking transactions and the attorneys called upon to
advise in banking matters. It is not a substitute for careful legal counsel, how-
ever, and such assistance should be obtained because this book can neither cover
all the details applicable in particular matters, especially at the regulatory level,
nor report on all the local variations, changes, and new developments. More-
over, the facts ofa particular situation will vary in ways that may introduce new
legal problems or otherwise affect the legal analysis. Obtaining the advice of
competent legal counsel is essential.

~ 1.02 HISTORY OF BANKING REGULATION

Il) First Bank of the United States
The complex structure of the modern banking system is the product of
controversies accompanying the development of banking, and particularly fed-
eral involvement in banking, that date from the first days ofthe nation.' Contro-
versy first emerged over the creation of a central national bank. The first
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, supported creation ofa national
bank. The first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, opposed it. Hamilton
prevailed, and Congress created the First Bank of the United States, giving it a
charter of twenty years. The bank was not only the largest bank of its time; it was
also the largest corporation in the United States. The bank was located in
Philadelphia, but had branches in other major cities.'

, For a history of the development of banking, see generally J. Norton & S. Whitley,
Banking Law Manual (1981); R. Johnson, Historical Beginnings-The Federal Reserve
(1980); G. Fischer, American Banking Structure (1968); J. Knox, A History of Banking in
lhe United Slates (1903). See also Scott, "Patchwork Quilt: Slate and Federal Roles in
Bank Regulation," 32 Stan. L. Rev. 687-742 (1980); Wayne & Spagnola, "The Myth of
Bank Deregulation: for Every Action There Is an Equal and Opposite Reaction," 42
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 383-403 (1985).
'Johnson, Historical Beginnings-The Federal Reserve 8 (1980).
1-5 BANKING REGULAnON 'I 1.02[2]

The First Bank of the United States was a success because it was able to
provide a uniform and reliable currency.' Before the establishment of the bank,
the currency in circulation (except for coins and some greenbacks) consisted
mainly of notes issued by state banks. The notes of the First Bank ofthe United
States came to account for about 20 percent ofthe notes in circulation. However,
some hostility to a central bank existed, and added to this hostility were com-
plaints of foreign domination and charges of unconstitutionality. The growing
number of state banks joined the cause against the First Bank of the United
States, arguing that the national bank was not necessary in view of the increased
number of state banks. The state banks resented the practice followed by the
First Bank of retiring from circulation all state bank notes it received by
returning them to the issuing bank for payment. This practice required the state
banks to maintain larger reserves of funds than otherwise would have been
needed. Opposition to the first bank became so strong that when Jefferson's
Republican party came into power in 180l, a bill to recharter the bank failed,
and the bank died when its charter expired in 181 J..
After the first bank's charter expired, the nation experienced serious eco-
nomic problems because of the lack of an effective banking system. Although a
number of state banks existed, the bank notes they issued were often of dubious
quality. The disruptions of the War of 1812 heightened this problem. Bank
failures became common after 1809,s and, with the expiration of the First Bank
in I 811, there was no central bank to come to the assistance of the weaker
banks." These and other difficulties in managing the federal government's
financial affairs without a national bank mechanism persuaded a narrow major-
ity of Congress of the desirability of a national bank, and in 1816 Congress
chartered the Second Bank of the United States."

[2] Second Bank of the United States

The Second Bank of the United States was larger than the first, and many
came to view it as too powerful, including President Andrew Jackson. During
Jackson's first term as President, his political rival, Henry Clay, convinced
Congress to pass a bill extending the charter of the bank. Clay, as a presidential
aspirant, hoped to exploit Jackson's expected veto of the bill as a political issue
in the 1832 presidential election. The plan backfired when Jackson's veto,
accompanied by a ringing message attacking the constitutionality of the bank,
brought him widespread popular support, a:Jd he was reelected by a substantial

'E, Symons, Jr. & J. White, Banking Law 11-13 (2d ed. 1984).
, Ie.
sId,
"[d. at 13.
11 Johnson, supra note 6, at 8,
11 1.02131 OVERVIEW 1-6

margin. Four years later, in 1836, the charter of the Second Bank of the United
States expired. 12
Although the constitutionality of the bank was attacked during this period,
the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the power ofCongress to establish a national
bank as early as 1819. ChiefJustice Marshall, in the historic case of McCulloch v:
Maryland, ruled that the chartering ofthe First Bank of the United States was a
measure "necessary and proper" to the exercise of Congress's fiscal powers
under the Constitution to raise revenue, borrow money, and regulate com-
merce. 13 Under the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, which makes the
laws of the United States superior to state law, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the establishment of the bank could not be restricted by inconsistent state
legislation. This decision was reaffirmed five years later in Osborn v. Bank ofthe
United States. 14

[3] State-Chartered Banks

After the demise of the Second Bank of the United States, banking was
carried on through state-chartered banks. This period saw the enactment ofstate
legislation authorizing "free banking." Much of this legislation, which made it
easier to incorporate state banks, was patterned after the New York Free Bank-
ing Act of 1838 . Under these statutes, it was no longer necessary to obtain a
special state charter; anyone who met the minimum incorporation requirements
could establish a bank. As a result, the number of state banks grew.
The system oflocal state banks that subsequently emerged led to problems.
Banks varied greatly in the adequacy of their capital and the reserves retained
against bank notes and demand deposits. Some banks engaged in risky lending
policies. The bank notes issued by the individual banks were of disparate qual-
ity. The amount of credit extended by banks fluctuated erratically without
regard to the needs of the economy. IS
Finally, in 1863, the Civil War increased pressure for a sound financial and
monetary system, forcing Congress to adopt the National Bank Act of 1863. This
act, together with amendments in 1864 and 1865, reestablished a national
banking system. It did not create a central national bank, but it did provide for
the charter of national banks. To ensure the strength of the new national banks,
the act imposed requirements relating to reserves and to the number of notes
that could be issued, as well as restrictions on lending policies. In 1865, Congress
•.'1posed a tax on the notes issued by state banks in order to make the notes

12ld. at 10; Symons & White, supra note 7. at 21.

" 17 US 316 (1819).
14 22 US 73B (1824). The applicability of the supremacy clause in banking law is
discussed in Chapter 14.
'5 Johnson, supra note 6, at 10.
1-7 BANKING REGULATION 111.02[4]

issued by the national banks the currency ofthe United States. The constitution-
ality of this tax was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision upholding in
broad terms congressional power to adopt appropriate legislation to "secure a
sound and uniform currency for the country.",. After this decision, state banks
were expected either to convert to national charters or to disappear. However,
neither event occurred. Instead, the increased use of checks as a means of
payment provided an alternative source offunds for the state banks in the form
of demand deposits, and state banks continued to exist alongside the national
banks."

[4] Federal Reserve Act of 1913

The lack of a central banking system continued to be a weakness in the
national economy in the late l800s. It was difficult to shift bank reserves to meet
the credit needs of the country, and the currency provided by the banks was not
flexible enough to meet demands for it. The financial panic of 1907 led to
extensive examination of the nation's banking structure, and finally, after pro-
longed political debate and compromise, Congress enacted the Federal Reserve
Act. Under the act, Congress authorized the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System. However, the act did not create a central national bank.
Instead, Congress established a system ofregional Federal Reserve Banks, with a
central Federal Reserve Board to supervise the system. The act required national
banks to become members of the system and gave state banks the opponunity to
become members.
The national banking system continued to come under pressure despite the
improvements stemming from the Federal Reserve Act. With the onset of the
Great Depression, a large number of bank failures occurred. For example, from
the beginning of 1930 to the end of 1933, 11,491 commercial banks ceased
operations. '. These pressures on the banking system prompted President
Roosevelt to declare an emergency bank holiday in March 1933. When the banks
reopened, a series of efforts to increase national regulation and control of the

I.
banking industry occurred. In the Banking Act of 1933 Congress created a
program of deposit insurance for qualified banks. This act established the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, provided insurance for bank deposits,
and imposed regulatory requirements designed to strengthen the banking sys-
tem. Although the insurance was originally limited to member banks of the
Federal Reserve System, Congress later extended it to state banks.

,. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 US 533 (1859).

17 Johnson. supra note 6, at II.

I.
"A. Phillips, Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets 346 (1975).
Banking Act of t933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (distributed throughout chapters 2, 3, and
6 of :2 USC).
111.02(5) OVERVIEW 1-8

The legislative reforms stimulated by the depression were enacted to deal

with perceived widespread abuses in securities activities and conflicts of interest
of banks participating in securities underwriting and other brokering and deal-
ing transactions. The Glass-Steagall Act, which was adopted as part of the
Banking Act of 1933 and which is discussed in Chapter 8, sharply curbed the
authority of banks to engage in securities underwriting and dealing and forced
the separation of securities dealers and investment firms from commercial
banks. While the Glass-Steagall Act affected banking practices directly, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 brought federal
regulation to the securities markets generally!O The Banking Acts of 1933 and
1935 also made the payment ofinterest on demand deposits (checking accounts)
illegal and established regulatory control over interest rates on other types of
deposits, such as certificates of deposit and savings accounts.
The leg'slative outburst of the depression years also produced the Federal
Home Loan Bank System,21 the authority in the FHLBB to charter federal
savings and loan institutions,22 and the FSLIC.23
Although substantial changes have occurred since the 1930s, the basic
regulatory framework of the U.S. banking system was put in place. The major
components of federal regulatory control over banking were established: char-
tering of national banks, administering the Federal Reserve System, and super-
vising banks insured by the FDIC.

[5] Banking Since the 19505

The 19505 and 1960s saw the passage offurther federal legislation to control
the activities of banks in merging and establishing bank holding companies.
These measures are described in detail in Chapter 5.
The 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning of efforts to wrestle with two
quite different problems. One problem is the need to accommodate the regula-
tory structure to the demands ofthe marketplace as the flow offunds from banks
and thrift institutions to other nonbanking competitors places pressure on the
depository institutions to become more competitive in the services and products
offered to their customers. As this is occurring, the new banking, money manage-
ment, and electronic fund transfer techniques made possible by computers and

20 Securities Act of J 933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (] 5 USC §§ 77a-77aa (J 982 &
Supp.1lI 1985»; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1,48 Stat. 881 (J 5 USC
§§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. 111 1985».
2' Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, § I, 47 Stat. 72S (12 USC
§§ 1421-1449 (1982 & Supp. III 1985».
" Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, § 1,48 Stat. 128 (12 USC§§ 1461-1470
(1982 & Supp. 111 1985».
23 National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847,48 Stat. 1246 (12 USC §§ 170 1-1750g (1982
& Supp. 111 1985».
1-9 BANKING REGULATION l[ 1.02[51

electronic technology have contributed to the pressures for change by bringing

dramatic changes in the costs of providing many financial services.'" The other
problem concerns the increasing need to police misconduct in the business of
banking and in transactions to which banks are panies.

"See A. Phillips, "The Metamorphosis of Markets: Commercial and Investment

Banking," 1 J. ofComp. Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 227, 236-239 (1978); Note, "Savings and
Loan Insolvency in the '80's," 15 Akron L. Rev. 441-541 (1982).
 2
u.s. Banking System
t 2.0 I Classification of Commercial Banks and Thrift Institutions. . . . . 2-2
(I] National Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2
[21 State Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[3] State Member Banks ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[4] State-Insured Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
[5] Other Depository Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
[a] Savings and Loan Associations ,....... 2-4
TABLE 2-1 Number ofInsured Commercial Banks by
Class and Principal Assets and Liabilities of Each (1986) 2-5
TABLE 2-2 Number of Banking Offices in the United
States (1986) ., ,.......................... 2-6
[b] Credit Unions , , ,. ........... 2-7
Ie] Savings Banks , .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
~ 2.02 Defmition of "Depository Institutions" ' ,....... 2-9
"2.03 Federal Banking Regulatory Agencies .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
~; 2.04 State Regulation of Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-11
',2.05 Spccialized Organizations With Banking Functions. . . . . . . . . .. 2-13
[I] Industrial Banks or Morris Plan Banks , 2-13
[2] Loan and Finance Companies ., .. "" , ,. 2-13
TABLE 2-3 State Bank Commissioners 2-14
!3] Edge Corporations ' , 2-17
[4J Export-Import Bank of the United States .. , , .. , . . . . . 2-17
is] International Finance Organizations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-17
[6] Housing and Mortgage Credit Agencies , . . . .. 2-17
fa] The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. . . . . . . . 2-18
Ib] The Federal Housing Administration '........ 2-18
Ie] Thc Federal NatiOnal Mortgage Association , 2-18
Id] The Government National Mortgage Association '... 2-18
[7] S;Jccial Purpose Federal Agencies with Financing Functions 2-19
IS] The Farm Credit System ... , , .. " '" . .. ... ... 2-19
la] Federai Land Banks and Associa\io:\s '. . . . . . . 2-20

2-1
112.01 OVERV1EW 2-2

[b J Federal Intermediate Credit Banks and Production

Credit Associations 2-21
[c] Banks for Cooperatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
[d] Farm Credit Boards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
[e] Farm Credit Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
[f] 1988 Restructuring of the Farm Credit System 2-23
[g] Borrowers' Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

112.01 CLASSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS AND

THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
As described in Chapter I, apart from the country's brief experience with
the First Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United States,
banking was conducted through state banks until the National Bank Act of 1863.
Although that act began the system of federal chartering of national banks, the
commercial banking system was a "dual banking" system with both state-
chartered and federally chartered banks operating in the same markets and
conducting the same types of business but with responsibility to different super-
visory authorities and organized under separate legal regimes. Some of the
complexity of modern banking law stems from measures adopted to maintain
this dual system by keeping a competitive parity between both types of banks.
The laws governing the ability of national banks to establish branches and to
engage in interstate operations are primary examples. See Chapter 6 for a
detailed discussion of branching and interstate activities.

II} National Banks

National banks are banks organized under the laws of the United States.
These banks receive their banking charters by meeting the standards and qualifi-
cations for capital structure, management organization, and other criteria set
forth in national banking laws. There are three regulatory agencies having
authority over national banks: (1) The chartering and supervision of all national
banks is thc responsibility of the Comptroller of the Currency;' (2) all national
banks are automatically members of the Federal Reserve System' and are sub-
ject to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board; and (3) all national banks are
automatically insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." See
Chapter 3 for a discussion of the Federal Reserve System and Chapters 9 and 10
for the FDIC.

'See 12 USC §§ 27, 481 (1982). For a study of changing charters, see Richard A.
Spanogle, Jr" "Accountability and Decision-Making: A Study of Bank Charter Conver-
sions," 12 U. Tal. L. Rev. 269-304 (1981).
212 USC § 222 (1982).
, (d.
 U.S. BANKlNG SYSTEM 11 2.01 [4]
2-3

(2) State Banks

State banks are organized under the laws of the states in which they are
chartered. Although there was originally a common-law right to enter the bank-
ing business,' banking is now universally recognized as an activity requiring
regulatory control.' The state regulatory .author~ty is usually called a state bank-
ing commission. Thus, state banks receive thelr corporate charter under state
banking laws. The scope of their activity is defined in the first instance by these
laws and the regulations of the state banking commission. The requirements for
capital, management, and other conditions of chartering are defined by the
state's law and regulations.

[3} State Member Banks

State banks may elect to become members of the Federal Reserve System.·
If a state bank applies for membership, then the bank must meet the standards
for member banks, and becomes subject to supervision by the Board of Gover-
nors and the Federal Reserve System. As in the case of national banks, a state
member bank is also insured by the FDIC. It is not necessary for a state bank to
become a member of the Federal Reserve System, and state banks can use the
services provided by the Federal Reserve System for check collection and pay-
ment transfer on payment of a fee without being a member bank.'

14} State-Insured Banks

A state bank may become insured by the FDIC without being a member of
the Federal Reserve System.' Most state banks have found FDIC insurance
attractive and have become part of the FDIC insurance scheme. These banks
must qualify under the requirements established by the FDIC and must submit

• See Slate v. Scougal, 3 SD 55, 51 NW 858 (1 892); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sanford, 284
US 660(1931); Nonheast Factor & Discount Co. v. Jackson, 223 Ga. 709,157 SE2d 731
(1967). See also Michie, Banks and Banking I (1986).
'Foe a history of the development of banking, see generally J. Nonon & S. Whitley,
Rankmg Law Manual (1987); G. Fischer, American Banking Structure (J 968); J. Knox, A
HIStory of Banking in the United Slates (1903).
'See 12 USC § 35 (1982). See also Chapter 3 for funher discussion of the Federal
Reserve Syslem.
7 The Depository Instilutions DeregUlation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 gener-
ally opened the Federal Reserve System check clearance and colleclion mechanisms, as
well as al,1 other Federal Reserve services, to all depository institutions on the same lerms
as Ihose lor member banks. The Federal Reserve is required 10 eSlabllsh pricing schedules
;~~~~~se servIces. 12 USC § 248a(a) (1982). For services CQvered, see 12 USC § 248a(b)

'See 12 USC § 1815(a)

depOSlI msurance syslem.
(J 982). See also Chapter II for a ~iscussjon of the federal
11 2.01 [5] OVERVIEW 2-4

to regulation by the FDIC with regard to their banking practices and corporate
structure.
As a result of the different ways in which state banks are organized, there are
four different types of banks: national banks, state member banks, state non-
member FDIC-insured banks, and state banks that are neither FDIC insured nor
members of the Federal Reserve System.
Table 2-1 shows the number of banks in each category and gives informa-
tion on their assets and liabilities; Table 2-2 shows the number ofbanking offices
in the United States.

[5] Other Depository Institutions

There are different types of savings institutions that engage in banking
functions similar to those of commercial banks. They may make both commer-
cial and consumer loans, have credit card operations, accept deposits with
payment rights like checking accounts, establish electronic terminals for cash
and payment transactions, and have trust activities. The most common types of
these institutions, referred to as thrifts, are savings and loan associations, credit
unions, and savings banks. These institutions may be chartered under state or
federal law and are regulated by both state and federal agencies.
At one time, these savings institutions were narrowly limited by their
charters and applicable law as to the types of deposits they could accept and the
types of loans and investments they could make. These legal restrictions pre-
vented thrift institutions from competing with ba:1ks in the performance of
commercial banking activities. For example, savings institutions could not
allow their customers to draw checks against their accounts.
Enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980' authorized savings institutions to engage in a wider range of
activities that permit them to compete more directly with commercial banks. As
a result, many savings institutions began engaging in activities that formerly
only commercial banks could provide. For example. savings institutions could
provide checking privileges to their customers.'· However, these institutions are
subject to banking laws pertaining to the payment and collection of checks,
drafts, and other forms of commercial paper, including regulations governing
the new electronic fund transfer systems that are described in Chapters 14, 18,
and 21 of this book.

la] Savings and Loan Associations. The major impetus behind the establish-
ment of savings and loan associations was the inability of commercial banks to

• 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections ofTitJes 12 and J 5 USC (I 982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
'·See ~ 3.04[5].
2-5 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 11 2.0115)[a)

TABLE 2-1 Number of Insured Commercial Banks by Class and Principal

Assets and Liabilities of Each (1986)*

Asset and liability items shown in millions of dollars

June 3D, 1986
Member banks Nonmember
lIem Total 1'0101 National State banks
Loans and investment 1,847,784 1,362,285 1,088,052 274,233 485,499
Gross loans 1,429,545 1,086,417 869,696 216,721 343,128
Net loans 1,415,173 1,076,351 861,926 214,426 338,822
Investments 418,239 275,868 218,356 57,512 142,371
U.S. Treasury and federal
agency securities 253,205 161,648 131,632 30,016 91,557
Other 165,034 114,220 86,724 27,496 50,814
Cash assets 220,219 170,583 134,379 36,205 49,636
Deposits, total 1,805,885 1,298,430 1,048,265 250,166 507,454
Interbank 63,279 56,234 39,356 16,878 7,045
Other transaction 539,334 402,206 318,165 84,041 137,127
Other llontransaction 1,343,692 934,080 770,128 163,952 409,611
Equity capital 173,666 127,109 98,472 28,637 46,557
Number of banks 14,186 5,954 4,866 , ,Og8 8,232

'All insured commercial banks in the United States. Details may not add to total because ofrounding.
Information not available for noninsuft-d, nonmember banks.
SourC': 73d Annual Report. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Table 16, p. 247
(1986).

meet the increasing consumer demand for home financing. These institutions
are sometimes known as savings associations, building and loan associations,
homestead associations, and similar names. Savings and loan associations may
be state or federally chartered. The earliest savings and loan association in the
United States was the Oxford Provident Building Association of Philadelphia,
which was organized in 1831." This association was patterned after the English
Building Society, which consisted of a voluntary association of members who
pooled savings in order to create a fund for home loans to the members.
There are two forms of organization of savings and loan associations, the
mutual association and the stock association. In mutual associations, the voting
rights and control of the association reside in the depositors and borrowers of the
association. Thus, in a technical sense, the accounts created in a mutual assooia-
tion are not deposits but arc shareholder accounts on which dividends, as
opposed to interest, are paid. For most practical purposes, however, this charac-

11 See G. :'viunn, Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance 661 (1962).

 ='l
N
TABLE 2-2 Number of Banking Offices in the United States (1986)* ...
~

--
U;
Commercial banks (including stock savings banks and iD'
nondeposit trusl companies)
--
All -~.
Member Nonmember Mutual savings
T"/le rJ(rJ/lic" alld change hanks Total Tolal Nalional Slale Insured Noninsured Insured Noninsured
Banks. Dec. 31. 1985 15,442 15,068 6.050 4.967 1.083 8,392 626" 358 16
Changes during 1986
New banks 307 304 154 105 49 90 60 3 0
Ceased banking operation -148 -148 -56 -46 -10 -78 -14 0 0
Banks converted into branches -305 -300 -133 -III -22 -167 0 -3 -2
Other*-* -88 -76 -23 -33 10 -4 -49 1 -13
Net change -234 -220 -58 -85 27 -159 -3 I -15 0
Banks, Dec. 31, 1986 15,208 14,848 5,992 4.882 1,110 8.233 623 359 I ;;;
Branches and additional offices, ~
Dec. 31. 1985t 45,352 43,092 27.595 22,661 4,934 15,409 88 2,219 41 :;
ttl
Changes during 1986 ~
De novo 1,226 1.098 646 490 156 448 4 128 0
Banks converted 305 300 133 III 22 167 0 3 2
I)isu'llti lllit'd -615 601 -411 -342 -69 -190 0 -14 0
Sale of branch U 19 /6 -8 24 3 0 -19 0
Other'" 4 9 419 307 112 -405 -5 33 -38
Net change 920 825 803 558 245 23 -1 131 -36
Branches and additional offices.
Dec. 31. 1986t 16.272 43,917 28,398 23,219 5,179 15.432 87 2,350 5
-
·Prclirninary. Final data will bl.: a·.. ailablc in the ..r"///lal Slalir;/lCu! DigC'sf. 1986. forthcoming.
**As of Dec. 31. 1986. includes 14 nooinsured state mcmhcr hanks and 2 nooinsured national trust companies.
"""ndudes interclass changes.
tExdudcs banking facilities.
SOllrce: 7Jd Annual Report. Board of Governors of .he Feder"1 Reserve System. Table 18, p. 252 (1986). to..>
•
'"
 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 11 2,Ol{Sllbl
2-7

terizalion makes little difference, since the accounts are eligible for deposit
insurance.12 In stock associations, the association is controlled by its stockhold-
ers as in the typical stock corporation.
Federal savings and loan associations may organize as either mutual
associations or stock associations. 13 Federal law provides that "holders of
accounts and obligors of an association shall, to such extent as may be provided
by its charIer or by regulations of the Board, be members ofthe association, and
shall have such voting rights and such other rights as are thereby provided.""
Under regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the holders of
accounts and borrowers from a mutual association have voting rights. '5 They
may, however, give proxies to the directors of the association." The FHLBB's
regulations also permit associations to organize as stock associations. In this
form of organization, the stockholders hold the voting rights." In addition,
federal mutual associations may convert to stock organizations. lI In fact, there
has been increased activity in converting to stock organizations as thrift institu-
tions have changed in order to facilitate their acquisition by other firms.

fbI Credit Unions. Credit unions are cooperative financial institutions that are
organized by groups of persons who usually are interested in saving small
amounts on a regular basis in order to have access to the instaUment credit made
possible by their pooled savings. Quite often credit unions are organized among
persons with a common bond of association, such as common employment. In
fact, it is a requirement to the establishment of a federal credit union that the
membership "be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or
association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community or
rural district.",. Credit unions may be organized under state or federal laws.
Although credit unions have been traced back to as early as 1848 in Ger-
many"· authority to establish federal credit unions did not exist in the United
States until 1934." Federal credit unions originally were established as part of

" (d.
" 12 CFR §§ 543, 552 (1987).
"12 USC§ 1464(b)(I)(B)(1982).
1; 12 CFR § 544.1 (1987).

"ld. See also 12 CFR § 544.5 (1987).

" 12 CFR § 552.3 (1987).
. ) "12 USC § 1464(i)(2) (1982); see also (2 USC§ 1.725(j)( I) (1982); 12 CFR §§ 552.2-
) 5_.5 (987). An aSSOcIatIOn that was formerly organtzed as a mutual association under
slate,law also may convert to a federal stock form of association, 12 USC § 1464(i)(I)
(198_). See generally Goldberg & Marcotte, Jr., "Mulualto Stock Conversions by Savings
and Loan ASSOCiatIOns: All Update'" 37 Bus. Law. 856-868 (1982).
" 12 USC § 1759 (1982). .
20"
.yo unn, supra note II, at 172.
" Id.
112.0IIS][e] OVERVIEW 2-8

the Farm Credit System, but the Federal Credit Union System is now adminis-
tered by the National Credit Union Administration, which is an independent
agency in the executive branch of the government. 22

reI Savings Banks. Savings banks are financial institutions that originally were
formed to encourage savings among persons of modest means. These institu-
tions originated at a time when commercial banks did not serve this function
and other thrift institutions such as savings and loan associations and credit
unions were not as prevalent. The concept of a savings bank originated with
Daniel Defoe in 1767, who suggested the organization of "friendly societies for
provident habits in generaL"" Savings institutions did not develop in the
United States until the early I 800s.··
Savings banks may be organized as mutual savings banks. Under this form
of organization, there is no stock, although the institution is a corporate entity.
Some mutual savings banks are governed by a board of self-perpetuating trust-
ees. The depositors in the institution under this approach are viewed as creditors
of the bank, and they have no voting power.· 5 When the institution is chartered
as a federal mutual association, the federal charter gives the account holders of
both savings and demand accounts the right to vote based on the value of their
accounts.·5 Savings banks can also be organized as stock corporations.
Savings banks may be organized under state or federal law. Federal law
recognizes both mutual savings banks and stock savings banks." Federallegisla-
tion governing savings and loan associations also applies to federal mutual
savings banks.' s Any state or federal savings bank may qualify to become a
member of a Federal Home Loan bank.'! Federal Savings banks, except those
insured by the FDIC, may obtain deposit insurance through the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation. 3D State savings banks, except mutual savings
banks, may qualify for FDIC insurance." A state or federal mutual savings bank
may qualify for membership in the Federal Reserve System, even though it is not

•• See 12 USC § 1752a(a) (1982).

•• Munn, supra note 11, at 665.
'4/d.
2. Id.

,. 12 C'FR § 544.1 (1987) .

•, 12 USC' § 1464(i) (1982). See generally Allister, "Federal Charter v. State Charter:
New Opportunities for Savings Banks." 98 Banking LJ 908-923 (198 i).
'·12 USC' § l462(d) (1982) .
•912 USC § 333 (1982). For insurance of banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System, see 12 USC § 18/4 (/982).
•012 USC § 1424 (1982).
" 12 USC' § 1726(a) (1982).
 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 112.02
2-9

organized as a stock company, but it will have to satisfy substitute capital

.
reqUlremen ts .32

l' 2.02 DEFINITION OF "DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS"

For some purposes, federal banking laws apply to a broader class of deposi-
tory institutions than that of commercial banks. As a result of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, the term "deposi-
tory institution" is used in some federal laws and regulations. 33 The following
institutions are embraced within this term.
I. Insured Banks (12 USC §§ 1813,1815). These are banks insured by the
FDIC. The term "depository institution" also includes "banks eligible to make
application to become an insured bank," which include certain qualifieil state
banks and branches of foreign banks and any national nonmember bank engaged
in receiving deposits (these are banks located in a U.S. Territory, such as Puerto
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands, which banks are not
members of the Federal Reserve System).
2. Mutual savings banks (12 USC §§ 1813, 1815). These are banks that are
engaged in the business of a savings bank, as defined by the federal banking laws
relating to federal deposit insurance," but that do not have any capital stock.
The earnings of a "mutual" savings bank must go to the benefit of its depositors
after payment of the bank's obligations.
3. Savings banks (12 USC §§ 1813, 1815). These are banks organized under
slate laws that limit the banks' activities to operation as a savings bank. The
bank must maintain its deposits as time deposits or deposits where the bank
reserves the right to require written notice before withdrawal. This term does not
include a mutual savings bank. The bank must be subject to regulations of the
FDIC on withdrawal of deposits.
4. Insured credit unions (12 uSC §§ J 752, 1781). These are all credit unions
that are insured under the National Credit Union Insurance Fund. The defini-
lion of the term "depository institution" also includes credit unions eligible for
such insurance.
S. Members (12 USC § 1422). Members are institutions that are members
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System by having subscribed to stock in a
Federal Home Loan bank.

":2 USC§§ 1813(a), 1813(1), 1813(g). 1814. 1815(a) (1982).

"See 12 USC §461(b)(' )(A) (1982).
"See t 2 USC §§ 1813(1). (g) (1982).
11 2.03 OVERVIEW 2-10

6. Insured institutions (12 USC §§ 1724, 1726). These are institutions

insured by the FSLJC. The term "depository institution" includes institutions
eligible for such insurance, which includes certain building and loan associa-
tions, savings and loan associations, homestead associations, cooperative banks,
and savings banks chartered under state law.
7. Other. Institutions that are wholly owned by any ofthe previously named
institutions or that are made up of only institutions in the previous categories are
"depository institutions" for limited purposes.

II 2.03 FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORY AGENCIES

As a result of the historical development of banking in the United States,
there are three principal federal agencies that regulate commercial banks: the
Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (discussed in Chapters 3
and 4), and the FDIC (discussed in Chapters 9 and 10). There is some overlap of
functions between these agencies, overlap that at times has led to differing views
on the policies to be followed in bank regulation. For the most part, however, the
agencies have cooperated in exercising their responsibilities. 35Additionally,
there are separate federal regulatory agencies with authority over savings and
loan associations, credit unions, and other thrift institutions.
The primary responsibilities of the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency are supervising the activities of the national banks and chartering national
banks. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has regulatory
authority over all the banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and
has some authority over depository institutions that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System. In this respect, the authority of the Board of Governors
overlaps to some extent the authority of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, since all national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve
System. Insofar as supervision of the banking acti,'ities of the member banks is
concerned, however, the Board of Governors has generally pursued a policy of
allowing the Comptroller of the Currency to be responsible for the examination
of member national banks. The Board of Governors, through the individual
Federal Reserve banks, is responsible for examining state member banks. The
Federal Reserve Board also has regulatory control over the formation and
activities of bank holding companies. These issues are discussed in Chapter 5.
The FDIC has regulatory authority over the banks and other depository
institutions whose deposits it insures. Since the FDIC insures the deposits of all
member banks, there is an overlap of authority between the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-

35 Hackley, "Our Baffling Banking System", 52 Va, L. Rev, 565, 771 (1966).
 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 'If 2.04
2-11

reney. To avoid duplication of effort, the FDIC limits its supervision to those
state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System but whose
deposits are insured by the FDIC.
There are also state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve
System and that do not have their deposits insured with the FDIC. These state
banks are regulated by the appropriate state banking agency. However, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 on the Federal Reserve System. the Board of Governors has
some regulatory authority over even these institutions. In addition. state bank-
ing agencies also have authority under their state banking laws to supervise the
state banks that have become members of the Federal Reserve System or that
have become insured by the FDIC. In these cases, state regulation cannot
interfere or conflict with federal requirements.
Additional agencies have regulatory responsibility for savings and loan
associations. Federal savings and loan associations are chartered and regulated
by the Federal Home Loan Bank System. to which they must belong. The
FHLBB is the head of this system. Additionally, all federal savings and loan
associations must have their deposits insured by the FSLIC, which is responsible
for determining that the associations it insures are following safe and sound
practices. Since the members of the FHLBB serve as the trustees of the F'SLlC,
the two agencies pursue complementary policies. The FSLIC, however. has the
power to insure the deposits of savings and loan associations that are not
members of the FHLBB. When such state associations obtain insurance fnilm the
fSLlC. they submit to the authority of the corporation to examine and supervise
their activities.
The manner in which credit unions are regulated is described in Chapter 11.
The primary federal regulator for insured credit unions is the National Credit
Union Administration Board.
Representatives of the federal banking regulatory agencies make up the
Financial Institutions Examination Council, which was established by law in
1978 to create uniform standards for the examination of depository institu-
tions." The council is discussed in Chapter 7.

r 2.04 STATE REGULATION OF BA:"o'KS

Comprehensive federal banking legislation was not adopted until passage of
the National Bank Act of 1863 and subsequent amendments to that act. Origi-
nally, all banks were controlled by state law, either common or statutory, and
many states had constitutional provisions governing banking. As experience
wilh banking grew, state laws proliferated 10 the point w!lere there is now a

",The council was established by the FinanciallnSlitutions Regulatory and Interest

Rate Control Act of 1978,12 USC § 3301 (1982). and is discussed in II 7.01[IJ.
'12.04 OVERVIEW 2-12

myriad ofstatutes enfranchising banking corporations and creating departments

of state government to regulate, supervise, and inspect them.
Today there is a dual, state and federal, system of banking regulation. State
law governs the regulation of state banks unless preempted by federal law as a
result of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. (Under the supremacy
clause, federal law overrides conflicting state law.) Thus, in the case of state
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and state banks that are
insured by the FDIC, there is both state and federal regulation of the banks'
actions. State law covers all aspects of the banking business conducted by state
banks: issuing charters, which set out in detail the powers necessary to carry on
daily banking activities such as receiving deposits; prescribing the size of
reserves to protect depositors; making loans; investing in specified securities;
owning and managing real estate; trading in commercial paper; issuing circulat-
ing bank notes; and financing businesses. In the competitive environment of the
1980s, some states have adopted banking laws that permit state banks to engage
in activities that are not permitted to national banks. When state banks
chartered under these laws are also insured by the FDIC or are part of a bank
holding company structure, they are then subject to regulation by the FDIC, in
the case of insured banks, as discussed in Chapters 9-ll, and by the Federal
Reserve Board, in the case ofbank holding companies, as discussed in Chapter 5,
which regulation may limit the banks' abilities to engage in the transaction
allowed by the state law.
Each state has a department of banking under various titles that supervises
and regulates state banks within its jurisdiction. These departments are usually
headed by the state banking commissioner, and employ bank examiners and
other officials to inspect the operation of state banks. The books of these banks
are subject to periodic audits, and the banks themselves are required to issue
annual or semiannual financial statements, which are reported to the banking
department and which may later be made public.
State banking commissioners, in addition to chartering banks, supervise
and regulate banks to ensure their solvency and liquidity. If audits disclose that
the banks are not sound, the commissioner may demand that more capital be
raised either by assessment of the stockholders or from outside sources. If the
commissioner deems the bank to be beyond solvency, he may close and liquidate
it, distributing the assets according to law to creditors, depositors, and, if any-
thing remains, to the stockholdersY
State banki:lg commissioners also have the power to make rules and regula.
tions to carry out their duties and to implement the statutes. Thus, the binding
state rules governing the operation of banks may be found in three sources: (l)
the constitution of the state; (2) the statutes passed by the legislature; and (3) the

37 See generally Chapter 10. For capital rcquirements for state banks, see Annotation,
"Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutory Provisions Concerning Capital Requi.
sites of State Incorporation of Bank." 79 ALR3d 1190 (1977).
 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM \12.05[2)
2-13

rules promulgated by the banking commission~r. The constituti~ns a~d the

statutes are regularly published and should be available a~ most l~w l~bran~s;~he
regulations are a different I?at~er.A few st~tes have official pubhcatlOns Similar
to the Federal Register, which IS discussed m Chapter 14, or keep central files, as
required by statute, that contain the text of all the administrative regulations
having the force of law. However, some states have no such requirements. In
these states the regulations are kept on file in the bank commissioner's office,
which will usually send, on request, copies of the rules desired. The addresses of
the bank commissioners' offices are contained in Table 2-3.

~ 2.05 SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS WITH BANKING

FUNCTIONS
There are many organizations established under state and federal law that
perform specialized credit and fmancing functions. Some ofthese may engage in
transactions similar to those ofcommercial banks and may generate commercial
paper that is purchased by commercial banks. This section briefly describes
some of these specialized institutions.

11) Industrial Banks or Morris Plan Banks

These banks were originally established to provide'credit on an installment
Joan basis to wage earners, and take their name from the founder of the first such
bank, Arthur Morris, who established such a bank in Virginia in 1910. These
banks are the creatures of state law in the states that authorize them. They may
have the power to solicit deposits, issue investment certificates, and make
installment loans. Industrial banks are eligible for membership in the Federal
Reserve System" and for deposit insurance."

12] Loan and Finance Companies

Many organizations engage in the business of lending money, including
small loan companies, business finance companies, and mortgage companies.
While these companies may compete with banks where both are engaged in the
same functions (e.g. consumer lending) the loan and finance companies gener-
ally do not accept deposits but obtain their funds from investors and creditors.
These companies are often subject to specialized regulatory regimes established
by the states to control these activities through licensing and supervision. Many
of these organizations generate large amounts of commercial paper, which are
(Iext continues on p. 17)

"12 USC § 321 (1982).

" 12 USC §§ 1813(a), 1814(b) (1982).
11 2.05(21 OVERVIEW 2-14

TABLE 2-3 State Bank Commissioners

Alabama Georgia
Superintendent of Banks Commissioner
Department of Banking Department of Banking and Finance
Montgomery, AL 36130 Atlanta, GA 30341
Alaska Hawaii
Director Commissioner
Division of Banking, Securities, and Division of Financial Institutions
Corporations Department of Commerce and
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
Economic Development Honolulu, HI 96805
Juneau, AK 99811-0800
Idaho
Arizona Director
Superintendent of Banks Department of Finance
Banking Department Boise, ID 83720
Phoenix, AZ 85012
Illinois
Arkansas
Commissioner
Commissioner Banks and Trust Companies
Bank Department Springfield, IL 62701-1291
Little Rock, AR 7220 I
California Indiana
Supervisor
Superintendent of Banks Banks and Trust Companies Division
Banking Department Department of Financial Institutions
San Francisco, CA 94104-2980 Indianapolis, IN 46204
Colorado
Iowa
Commissioner
Division of Banking Superintendent
Department of Regulatory Agencies Department of Banking
Denver, CO 80204 Des Moines, IA 50309

Conneclicur Kansas
Commissioner Commissioner
Department of Banking State Banking Department
Hartford, CT 06106 Topeka, KS 66603
Delaware Kentucky
State Bank Commissioner Commissioner
Department of State Department of Financial Institutions
Dover, DE 19903 Public Protection and Regulation
Cabinet
Florida Frankfort, KY 4060 I
Comptroller
Department of Banking and Finance Louisiana
Tallahassee, FL 32304 Commissioner
Office of Financial Institutions
Department of Commerce
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095
2·15 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 11 2.05[2]

Maine Montana
Superintcndcr.t Commissioner of Financial
Bureau of Banking Institutions
Department of Business, Financial Division
Occupational and Professional Department of Commerce
Regulation Helena, MT 59620
Hallowell, ME 04347 Nebraska
Maryland Director
Bank Commissioner Department of Banking and Finance
Division of Financial Regulation Lincoln, NE 68509
Department of Licensing and
Regulation Nevada
Baltimore, MD 21202 Administrator
Financial Institutions Division
AIassachusetts Department of Commerce
Commissioner Carson City, NY 89710
Division of Banks and Loan Agencies
Department of Banking and New Hampshire
Insurance Commissioner
Boston, MA 02202 Banking Department
Concord, NY 03301
Michigan
Commissioner New Jersey
Financial Institutions Bureau Commissioner
Department of Commerce Department of Banking
Mail to; P.O. Box 30224 Trenton, NJ 08625
Lansing, MI 48909
New Mexico
Minnesota Director
Deputy Commissioner Financial Institutions Division
Financial Examinations Division Regulation and Licensing
Department of COl.lmercc Department
S:. Paul, MN 55101 Santa Fe, NM 87503
Mississippi New York
Commissioner Superintendent
Department of Banking and Banking Department
Consumer Finance New York, NY 10006
Jackson, MS 39205
North Carolina
.\fissouri Commissioner
Division of Finance Banking Commission
Department of Economic Department of Commerce
Development Dobbs Building
JefTerson City, MO 65102 Raleigh, NC 27626-0512
North Dakota
Commissioner
Department of Banking and Financial
Institutions
Bismarck, ND 58505

(continued)
11 2.05[2) OVERVIEW 2-16

TABLE 2-3 (cont'd)

Ohio Texas
Superintendent Commissioner
Savings and Loan Associations Banking Department
Division Austir., TX 78705
Department of Commerce Utah
Columbus, OH 43266-0549
Commissioner
Oklahoma Department of Financial Institutions
Commissioner Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0089
Banking Department Vermont
Oklahoma City, OK 73105 Commissioner
Oregon Department of Banking and
Administrator Insurance
Financial Institutions Division Montpelier, VT 05602
Department of Commerce Virginia
Salem, OR 97310 Commissioner
Pennsylvania Bureau of Financial Institutions
State Corporation Commission
Secretary Richmond, VA 23205
Department of Banking
Harrisburg, PA 17 101-2290 Washington
Supervisor
Rhode Island Di vision of Banking
Assistant Director Department of General
"Banking and Securities Administration
Administration Olympia, WA 98504
Department of Business Regulation
Providence, RI 02903 West l'irginia
Deputy Commissioner
South Carolina Department of Banking
State Treasurer and Chairman Charleston, WV 25305
Offtce of the State Treasurer
Columbia. SC 2921 I Wisconsin
Commissioner
SOUTh DakoTa Office of Commissioner of Banking
Director Madison, WI 53707
Division of Banking and Finance Wyoming
Department of Commerce and
Regulation State Examiner
Pierre. SD 57501 Offtce of the State Examiner
Cheyenne, WY 82002
Tennessee
Assistant Commissioner for Bank
Examinations
Department of Financial Institutions
Nashville, TN 37219

Source: 1986 l':ationa: nirec~ory of State Agencies

2-17 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM ~ 2.0516)

purchased and dealt with by commercial banks. Some of these organizations

may be part of a bank holding company structure. Bank holding companies are
discussed in Chapter 5.

13] Edge Corporations

Edge corporations are specialized corporations for international banking
transactions, although they are also permitted to engage in some domestic
activities that relate to their international business.,. The Federal Reserve Board
regulates the organization of Edge corporations and supervises their activities.

[41 Export-Import Bank. of the United States

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM Bank) is an "indep¢n-
dent agency" ofthe United States whose directors and officers are appointed by
the president with the advice and consent of the Senate." The purpose of the
bank is to facilitate and aid in financing exports and imports of the United
States. It is authorized to engage in general banking functions but has the special
function ofarranging financing and guarantees on terms that enable U.S. export-
ers to compete with foreign competitors."

[5] International Finance Organizations

There are international finance organizations created by treaties or as part
of the United Nations with which the United States cooperates and over which
the United States has some participation in regulating. Examples are the Asian
Development Bank,43 the Inter-American Development Bank," and the World
Bank (known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).45

[6) Housing and Mortgage Credit Agencies

The federal government has established many programs that use various
financial techniques and create financial institutions to make credit available to
those who need housing. There are programs for direct government loans,
programs for insuring and guaranteeing loans, and subsidy programs, as well as

40 12 USC § 611 a (1982). See generally McPheters. "Formation of Edge Act Corpora-
tions," 37 Bus. Law. 593-612 (1982); Satola, "Recent Developments in Edge Act Corpo-
rations," 1985 U. Wis. Inl'l U 115-133 (1985).
" 12 USC § 635a (1982).
" 12 USC §§ 635, 635a-3, 635a-4 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
" 22 USC § 285 (1982).
"22 USC § 283 (J 982).
" 22 USC § 286 (1982).
~ 2.05[6][a] OVERVIEW 2-18

other assistance programs. In addition, a number of financial agencies assist in

the financing of housing and the flow of credit into mortgage markets. Some of
the more important agencies are discussed in the following text.

raJ The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. This corporation was
established to purchase residential mortgages from federally insured savings and
loan associations and other financial institutions whose depositor accounts are
federally insured. The board of directors of the corporation is composed of the
members of the FHLBB.46 The corporation engages in purchasing and selling
mortgage interests in order to channel credit in to the housing market.

[bl The Federal Housing Administration. The Federal Housing Administra-

tion (FHA), which is a unit of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, administers programs of mortgage insurance under the National Housing
Act and certain other housing assistance programs. The FHA is directed by a
commissioner who reports to the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Developmem.'1

leJ The Federal National Mortgage Association. The Federal National Mort-
gage Association was established in 1938 to purchase and sell FHA-insured and
Veterans Administration (VA)-guaranteed mortgages. By engaging in these pur-
chase and sale transactions, the association channels funds for home mortgage
financing from the investors, to whom it sells the mortgages, to the lending
institutions from whom it purchased the mortgages. The association is owned by
private investors, but is subject to regulation in some respects by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development. 46

[dJ The Government National Mortgage Association. The Government

National Mortgage Association was created in 1968 as a spin-off from the
Federal National Mortgage Association. It carries out various programs of the
Department of Housing and Urban Developmer.t involving special loan pro-
grams and the management of certain government-held mortgage portfolios and
other securities. It also purchases mortgages that arise under federal programs
for providing housing for low- and moderate-income families.·'

46 Sec 12 USC §§ 1451-1459 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also ~ 2.03.
47
42 USC § 3533(a) (1982). Sec also 24 CFR § 200.4(b) (1987).
•8 Sec 12 USC §§ 1716-1 723e (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
·'Id.
2-19 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 112.05[8)

171 Special Purpose Federal Agencies with Financing Functions

Often the federal government will establish a loan program to be adminis-
tered by a special agency to carry out the purposes of some federal program. It is
impossible to list all of these federal agencies. They include the Small Business
Administration, which makes loans and participates in lending agreements with
other financial institutions to assist small business enterprises;'· the VA, which
admlOisters some loan programs for veterans;" the Solar Energy and Energy
Conservation Bank, which Congress established in [980 and which promotes
energy conservation and the use of solar energy;'1 and the National Consumer
Cooperative Bank, which was established in 1978 to assist in the development of
consumer and other self-help cooperatives. 53

[8] The Farm Credit System

The Fann Credit System is the result of federal legislation intended to
provide for the special credit needs offarmers, ranchers, and commercial fishing
operators. The special federal interest in fann credit stretches back to 1916. 5 '
The system was consolidated under the supervision ofthe Farm Credit Adminis-
tration by the Farm Credit Act of 1971.55 Additional features have been added
by subsequent legislation. As a result of the financial losses agricultural lenders
suffered in the mid-1980s, losses that left the farm credit system in a financially
weakened condition, Congress made further changes to strengthen the system."
Congress adopted farm credit legislation to encourage agriCUltural producers to
participate in the management, control, and ownership of a credit system for
their business requirements." Federal law establishes a network of thirty-seven
interrelated organizations in twelve geographical districts to provide credit for
farming and ranching operations. Commercial fishermen and others who har-
vcst aquatic products are also entitled to participate in the system. As explained
latcr, federal legislation in 1988 set in motion an extensive restructuring of the
system and its institutions.

50 15 USC § 631 (I 982).

" 38 USC § 20 I (1982).
" 12 USC § 360 I (1982).
53
12 USC§ 3001 (1982).
"Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245. 39 Stat. 360.
"Farm Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-181. 85 Stat. 583 (12 USC
;§ 2001-22 79aa-14 (West 1982 & Supp. VI 1986).
,. There were significant amendments in 1985. 1986, and J 988. Farm Credit Amend.
ments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985); Farm Credit Act Amend.
,;,enlsof 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1877 (1986); Agricultural Credit Act of' 987,
Fub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568(1988).
"12lJSC § 2001(b) (1982).
11 2.05(8](aJ OVERVIEW 2-20

The institutions that make up the Farm Credit System are the Farm Credit
Administration, which supervises and regulates the system, Federal Land banks,
Federal Intermediate Credit banks, Banks for Cooperatives, Federal Land Bank
Associations, and Production Credit Associations. These institutions are organ-
ized into twelve Farm Credit Districts, each with its own governing Farm Credit
Board composed of seven members. s8 Each district has a Federal Land bank, a
Federal Intermediate Credit bank, and a Bank for Cooperatives. There also is a
Central Bank for Cooperatives. Thus, as of the beginning of 1988, there were
thirty-seven banks in the farm credit system. In addition, there are about 400
local associations (Production Credit Associations and Land Bank Associations)
that are the vehicles for delivering credit directly to the farmers and ranchers.'·

[aJ Federal Land Banks and Associations. The Federal Land banks are feder-
ally chartered institutions and date back to the Farm Loan Act of 1916. 80 They
are authorized to make real estate mortgage loans to farmers, ranchers, and
aquatic products harvesters for any "agricultural or aquatic purpose and other
credit needs .... including financing for basic processing and marketing .... "8'
The loans are medium to long term, from five to forty years," and are usually
secured by a first lien on farm real estate. 83
The Federal Land banks make loans to Federal Land Bank Associations."
These associations are chartered under federal :aw and are made up of the
farmers and ranchers who desire 10 borrow money from the Federal Land bank.
The members of the association must subscribe to stock in the association in
amounts depending upon the size of their loans. es The Federal Land banks are

58 The Federal Land Bank Associations, the Production Credit Associations, and the
borrowers of the Banks for Cooperatives within each dis:rict each elect two members. The
seventh member is elected by the borrowers at large in a district. Thus, the farmers and
ranchers participating in the system determine who will be the members of the board. 12
USC § 2223 (Supp. III 1985). The 1988 amendments repealed these provisions and
substituted new procedures for electing the directors of system institutions.
SOH. Rep. No. 295 (I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 2723, 2726 (hereafter H. Rep. No. 295 (1)).
'012 liSe §§ 2011, 2012 (1982 & Supp.1Il1985). The 1988 act repealed these
provisions and replaced them with ones creating the Farm Credit banks, 12 USCA
§§ 2011-2023 (West Supp. 1988), which are discussed at ~. 2.05[8][f].
" 12 USC § 2018 (1982). The relevant successor to this provision is 12 USCA § 20 19
(West Supp. 1988).
62 12 USC §§ 2014,2015 (1982). The relevant successor provisions are 12 USCA

§§ 2015, 2016 (Wes'. Supp. 1988).

'3H. Rep. No. 295 (I), at 2727.
64
12 USC § 20 J 2 (i 982 & Supp. III J 985). The relevant successor provision is 12
USCA § 2013 (West Supp. 1988).
55 12 USC § 2031 (Supp. III 1985). The relevant successor provision is 12 USCA
§2091 (WestSupp. 1988).
2-21 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 11 2.0SI8)(d}

the dominant holders offarm mortgage credit in the United States. As of 1986,
these banks held about 43 percent of all outstanding farm real estate loans."
,

(bl Federal Intermediate Credit Banks and Production Credit Associations.

Each district also may have a Federal Intermediate Credit bank. These banks,
which were authorized by federal legislation in 1923 and which are federally
chartered institutions, are authorized to make short-term loans and to discount
agricultural paper from other institutions and associations. These loans gener-
ally are repayable in not more than ten years, 67 The banks do not loan directly to
farmers or otherwise conduct a general banking business but channel ciedit to
fanners and ranchers through their purchase of loans from institutions that
extend credit directly to agricultural producers. The voting stock of the Federal
Intermediate Credit banks is held by Production Credit Associations. Farmers,
ranchers, and aquatic products harvesters may organize Production Credit
Associations. The associations engage in lending on a short- and intermediate-
term basis for agricultural operations and rural housing to their members. The
associations obtain funds for these financing activities by discounting and sell-
ing the loans made to Federal Intermediate Credit banks. Each Federallnterme-
diate Credit bank also acts as a supervisor of the associations in its district. 68

Ie) Banks for Cooperatives. Banks for Cooperatives are made up of a central
bank and twelve district banks. These banks were created initially in 1933 to
provide a source of credit for agricultural cooperatives, so The central bank
makes loans directly to the district banks and also to large national and regional
cooperatives. The district banks serve local agricultural cooperati ves. They may
also engage in certain financing activities on an international basis to assist the
export of agricultural products by their cooperative members.'·

Id) Farm Credit Boards. The Farm Credit Board for each district serves as the
governing board of directors for the Federal Land bank, Federal Intermediate
Credit bank, and Bank for Cooperatives in the district, which coordinates policy
and management for these various institut:::Jns."

66 H. Rep. No. 295 (I), at 2737,

61
12 USC §§ 2074, 2075 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), The relevant successor provisions
are 12 USCA §§ 2011-2023 (West Supp. 1988). on Farm Credit banks.
68
12 USC §§ 2093, 2096 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985). The relevant successor provisions
are 12 USCA §§ 2073, 2075 (West Supp. 1988),
"Farm Credit Act of 1933, ch, 98, 48 Stat. 257.
"12 USC § 2128 (1982).
"12 USC § 2224 (1982), The 1988 act repealed these provisions and replaced them
with 12 USCA §§ 2012, 2142 (West Supp, 1988).
 1I2.05181le) OVERVIEW 2-22

lei Farm Credit Administration. The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) has
overall responsibility for regulating the system." It is an independent agency in
the executive branch of the government. This agency is controlled by the Farm
Credit Administration Board, which consists of three members appointed by the
president of the United States!' Not more than two members of the board may
be members of the same political party, and the president designates one of the
members to serve as chairman." The chairman is the executive officer of the
board and the chiefexecutive officer of the Farm Credit Administration" and is
responsible for administering the system. There is no express authority in the act
allowing the president to remove a member or the chairman. The Farm Credit
Administration has regulatory authority over the various institutions within the
Farm Credit System and has powers to examine them, establish rules and
regulations, and take action to prevent unsafe and unsound practices."
In 1985, Congress directed a major restructuring of the Farm Credit Admin-
istration that put in place the three member Farm Credit Administration Board
described previously and that substantially enlarged the role of the FCA as an
independent regulatory agency for the Farm Credit System similar to the role of
other federal banking regulatory agencies.?? Changes in 1988 further strength-
ened the regulatory role of the FCA. 78 As a result, the FCA has cease and desist
enforcement authority to prohibit unsafe or unsound practices and to compel
adherence to its regulations. 78 In addition, the FCA also has the power to
conduct examinations of and to require reports from Farm Credit System
institutions,'· the ability to suspend directors and officers of system institutions
and to initiate procedures to remove them from office when they have partici-
pated in unsafe or unsound practices or breached their fiduciary duties as

"See;2 USC §§ 200,-2260 (1982 & Supp.1II19851. The relevan: suecessor provi-
sions are 12 USCA §§ 2241-2276 (West Supp. 1988).
73
12 USCA § 2242(a) (West Supp. 1988).
74Id.
75
12 USCA § 2244 (West Supp. 1988).
76 12 USCA § 2252-2274 (West Supp. 1988).
"Farm Credi: Amendments Act of 1985. Pub. L. ~c. 99-205, 99th Cong., 1st Sess..
99 Stat. 1678. reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Congo & .-\dmin. News ]678 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 USC); H. Rep. No. 425. 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985
U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 2588-2590.
"Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. ]00-233, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 101
Stat. 1568, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. :"ews 1568 (codiftec in scattered
sections of 12 USC); H. Rep. No. 295(1), lOath Cong., 1st Sess., reprin~ed in 1988 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. c;ews 2723.
70 12 USCA § 2261 (West Supp. 1988).

··Id. § 2254.
2·23 U.S. BANKlNG SYSTEM 11 2.05(8)(1]

officers of their institutions,81 and the authority to impose civil penalties on

institutions or officers who violate orders of the FCA. 12 The FCA may regulate
system institutions to require minimum levels of capital" and may appoint a
conservator or receiver for system institutions that become insolvent Or other-
wise are appropriate for such treatment. 84
When the FCA first came into existence, it approved the interest rates set by
system institutions. Congress eliminated this authority in 1986 and expressed its
intent that market interest rates should prevail."' At the same time, Congress

I.
provided that the interest rates on loans from system institutions are not subject
to state usury laws and interest limitations.

111 1988 Restructuring of the Farm Credit System. The congressional restruc·
17
luring of the Farm Credit System in 1988 will bring about the merger ofsystem
institutions to consolidate and strengthen the system. The provisions are com-
plex and include both mandatory merger requirements and procedures for
voluntary consolidations. The basic approach is as follows: The Federal Land
bank and the Federal Intermediate Credit bank of each district must merge into
a new Farm Credit bank for the district. After these consolidations, the institu-
tions in the Farm Credit System will consist of Farm Credit banks, the Federal
Land Bank Associations. the Production Credit Associations, and the Banks for
Cooperatives. 88 After the formation of the Farm Credit bank in a district, a
proposal must be submitted to the stockholders of each Federal Land Bank
Association and Production Credit Association in the district for merger ofthe
associations. I. The legislation also establishes a procedure for formulating a plan
of merger forthe voluntary merger of the banks for cooperatives into a combined
National Bank for Cooperatives." Additionally, the \ 988 act encourages volun·

., Id. § 2264. The statute details the circumstances under which the FCA may seek
removal or suspension and the procedures to be followed in such cases. See also 12 USCA
§2265 (West Supp. 1988), on the suspension or removal ofofficers charged with a felony.
02 12 USCA M 226&, 2269 (West Supp. 1988).

"ld.§2154.
"\d. § 2183(b) (West Supp. 1988). Eventually, the Farm Credit System Insurancc
Corporation will be the statutorily prescribed receiver or conservator. Id.
•• Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 1033. 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 100 Stat. 1877, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Cod~ Congo & Admin. News 1877 (amending
12 USC §§ 2015, 2075, 2131{a».
'·12 USCA § 2205 (West Supp. 1988).
17 Pub. L. No.1 00-233, § 41 O(a), I OOth Cong., 1st Sess.. 101 Stat. 1637, reprinted in
1988 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1637 (hereafter Pub. L. No. 100-233).
··See 12 USCA § 2002 (West StiPp. 1988) (effective six months after January 6,
1988).
··Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 411.
"Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 413.
1) 2.05[8][!1 OVERVIEW 2-24

tary mergers of banks within a district 9 ' and between banks of the same type that
operate in different districts. 92 A special committee will submit a proposal to
consolidate the twelve Farm Credit System districts and the Farm Credit System
banks formed as a result of the previously described mergers into "no less than
six financially viable farm credit banks through inter-district mergers. "s3
The reorganized Farm Credit System enjoys increased powers to finance its
activities. Historically, the banks in the system raised most of their money from
the sale of Farm Credit securities in the national money markets. Until 1977,
Land Banks, Intermediate Credit Banks, and Banks for Cooperatives sold their
securities separately. In 1977, the use of systemwide bonds and notes began.
These obligations, although systemwide, are the joint and several obligations of
all thirty-seven separate Farm Credit System banks. so The 1988 federallegisla-
tion included measures to assist in the issuance ofsuch systemwide obligations. 9s
In addition, the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation was created to
assist system banks in issuing and marketing obligations to obtain funds and in
arranging for the issuance of joint and systemwide obligations. ss A system is
established for encouraging the banks in the system to create pools of mortgages
and other obligations to back securities that may then be sold in the secondary
market. s7 The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation was established to
assist in the marketing of the securities. 98
The revamped Farm Credit System also includes special mechanisms to
supply financial assistance to financially troubled system institutions. In 1985,
Congress created the Farm Credit System Capital Corporation to assist in
channeling funds to distressed system institutions. However, because of litiga-
tion over the ability of the corporation to assess healthy institutions to provide
aid to distressed ones and opposition to the manner in which the corporation
operated, Congress eliminated the Capital Corporation in 1988. 99 The Farm
Credit Assistance Board was created as the successor to the Capital Corporation.
When certain conditions are met, the board may authorize a system institution
to issue preferred stock to obtain additional capital or to facilitate a merger,'OO

"12 USCA § 2279a (West Supp. 1988).

92
12 USCA § 2279f(West Supp. 1988).
.. Pub. L. No. 100-233. § 412(a)(2) .
.. H. Rep. No. 425. 99th Cong.• 15: Sess., reprir.ted in 1985 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 2592.
os 12 USCA §§ 2; 55, 2159 (West Supp. 1988).
0'ld.§2160.
97
12 USCA §§ 2279aa-2279aa-14 (West Supp. 1988).
9S Id. §§ 2279aa-, -2279aa-3. See 1-1. Rep. No. 295(:). IOOth Cong., lSI Sess., reprinted
in 1988 U.S. Code CO:lg. & Admin. News 2737-2740.
0. Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 207(a)(3), 100th Cong., lSI Sess., 101 Stat. 1607, reprinled
in 1988 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1607 (repea1ir.g 12 USC §§ 2216-22161).
100
12 USCA § 2278a-5(a) (West Supp. 1988).
2-25 U.S. BANKING SYSTEM 11 2.05[8I1gJ

and it may exercise special powers to restore the institution to a financially

sound condition.,01 To fund this assistance, the Financial Assistance Corpora-
tion '02 was created. This corporation, subject to the approval of the board, may
issue certain debt obligations that are guaranteed (as to the payment of principal
and interest) under a complex procedure by the Secretary of the Treasury. 103
There is a complicated arrangement for funding the Financial Assistance Corpo-
ration and channeling that assistance to the distressed institutions. The Finan-
cial Assistance Corporation purchases the preferred stock authorizeq by the
board, as described previously, that is issued by the distressed institution.'·'
The 1988 legislation also creates a Fann Credit System insurance fund to
insure the obligations issued by the system banks.'1lS The fund is operated
through the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation.· lMI The insurance is
financed by premiums assessed against system banks based upon the loans made
by the banks. '.7 The Insurance Corporation has various powers to deal with
troubled insured system banks, including providing assistance to prevent a bank
from entering receivership and facilitating mergers or consolidations.,oa

[g] Borrowers' Rights. Borrowers from Fann Credit System institutions

obtained special rights as a result of federal legislation in 1985 and 1988.
Lenders are required to disclose interest rates and to make a special disclosure
when the loan is a variable rate loan. 10. Borrowers have the right to require
lenders to review loans to determine ifa proper interest rate was charged and to
explain how the borrower might improve his or her credit status to obtain a
lower interest rate. no At the time the loan is executed, the lender must ptovide to
the borrower copies of all loan documents, copies ofappraisals of the borrower's
assets, and other documentation."! Procedures exist for giving borrowers writ-
ten notice of action taken on loan applications and a right to obtain review and
reconsideration.11?

I.' Id. § 2278a-6.

102 (d. § 2278b.
10' Id. § 2278b-6.
10' Id. § 2278b-7(b).
'·'Id. § 2277a-1.
'0' Id. § 2277a-1 .
'07 Id. § 2277a-4.

'oa Id. § 2277a-10.

'09Id. § 2199.
"old. § 2199(b).
'11 Id. § 2200.

'" Id. §§ 2201, 2202.

1) 2.05181fg] OVERVIEW 2-26

There is an extensive procedure that requires lenders to consider restructur-

ing distressed loans prior to initiating any foreclosure proceeding. 113 A qualified
lender is required to restructure the loan if the lender "determines that the
potential. cost ... of restructuring the loan in accordance with a proposed
restructuring plan is less than or equal to the potential cost offoreclosure .... "114
There also are limitations on a lender's ability to require a borrower to post
additional collateral, to reduce the amount of principal outstanding, or to accel-
erate the payment of the loan." 5

113Id. § 2202a(b).
114ld. § 2202(e)(J).
mId. § 2202d.
 3
The Federal Reserve System
, 3.01 Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3·2
11 3.02 The Structure and Functions of the Federal Reserve System .... 3-2
11 3.03 The Organization and Powers of the Federal Reserve System. . . . 3·5
[I) Board of Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3·5
[2] Open Market Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10
TABLE 3-1 Federal Reserve Banks' Income and Expenses ... 3-7
TABLE 3-2 Regulations ofthe Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11
[3] Federal Reserve Banks and Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
[4] Member Banks 3-18
[5J The Relationship of the Federal Reserve System to
Nonmember Depository Institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-20
11 3.04 Banking Functions of the Federal Reserve System. . . . . . . . . . .. 3-22
[I J Depository Functions , 3-22
[a] Reserve Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
[b] Fiscal Agents and Depositories for the United States. . .. 3-23
[2] Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24
[a] Reserve Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-26
TABLE 3·3 Reserve Ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3·27
[b] Reserve Requirement Exemption .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3·27
[c] Reserves of Nonmember Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-28
[d] Reserve Requirements for Reserve Banks .... . . . . . . . . 3-28
[e] Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy. . . . . . . . . . 3-28
[3] Currency Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3-29
[4] Reserve Bank Lending Authority .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . )·30
raj Advances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. )-)1
[b] Discounts )-32
[cJ Federal Reserve System Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-32
[5J National Payments System: Fund Transfer and Check
Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34
tal Check Collection :.... ...... 3-34
TABLE 3-4 Number of Checks, Telal and Collected by the
Federal Reserve, Selected Years, 1920-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-35

3-1
f 3.01 OVERVIEW 3-2

[b] Fund Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36

[c] Regulatory Activities to Manage the Payment System .,. 3-39
[6] Credit and Interest Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41
[a] Margin Requirements for Securities Credit ........ 3-41
[b] Interest Rate Controls 3-42
[c] Credit Controls 3·45

~ 3.01 INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter I, the United States has continuously chartered
national banks since the National Bank Act of 1863. After the demise of the
Second Bank of the United States in 1836, however, the country did not have a
central nati{lnal bank. During the recession of 1907, it became apparent that
because of this lack of a central bank, the national banking system was seriously
flawed. The banking system did not possess the flexibility to channel funds from
one region ofthe country to another when necessary to meet the requirements of
national commerce. Problems arose not only because of the difficulty in arrang-
ing loans and extensions of credit between areas with excess reserves and those
with shortages, bu t also because currency shortages inhibited the economic
growth of some regions. Accordingly, after extensive study and intense political
maneuvering, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act' in 1913, which created
the Federal Reserve System.'

~ 3.02 THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCfIONS OF THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYSTEM
The Federal Reserve Act created a three-part structure: the Board ofGover-
nors, the Federal Reserve banks, and the member banks. The Board of Gover-
nors acts as the governing body of the Federal Reserve System. There are twelve
reserve districts in the United States, with each district having one Reserve
bank, which may have branches as well. The Reserve banks are bankers' banks in
that their capital stock is held by the banks making up the Federal Reserve
System. 3 Both state and national banks are members of the Federal Reserve

'Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § I, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (current version at 12 USC
§§ 221-522 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2 See R. Johnson, Historical Beginnings- The Federal Reserve (1980); H. Prochnow,
The Federal Reserve System (1959). See also Chapter 1 for a discussion of the history of
banking regulation in the United States. .
3 The requirements and restrictions on the capita} stock of the Reserve Banks are set
forth in 12 USC §§ 281-290 ([ 982). The stock has a par value of $1 00 per share. Each
member bank, whether state or national, must subscribe to the capital stock ofthe Reserve
bank in its district to the extent of 6 percent of its paid-up capital and surplus and must
3-3 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 113.02

System. National banks must be members; state banks may elect to become
members. The following sections of this chapter describe the organization and
functions of the Federal ReselVe System.
The Federal ReselVe System provides the institutional framework \n which
a national banking system can operate; it regulates banks, provides selVices to
improve banking efficiency, regulates the amount of credit and currency in the
banking system, and has a substantial voice in establishing the country's eco-
nomic policy. The role ofthe Federal Reserve System in setting monetary policy
for the United States is not within the scope of this book.' Instead, the focus of
this book is on the banking functions ofthe Fed eraJ Reserve System. Some ofthe
specific functions of the Federal Reserve System are listed below. These are
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.

1. Reserve requirements. Member banks and other financial institutions are

required to keep reserves at the Federal Reserve banks. The power of the Board
of Governors to adjust reserve requirements gives the Board a mechanism for
influencing the supply of money in the economy. s

2. Loans to member banks and other depository institutions. The Federal

Reserve banks are a source of funds for the member banks. The Federal Reserve
System affects economic policy by adjusting the interest rate on loans and by
setting the terms under which such loans are made. By making loam to deposi-
tory institutions, it can provide credit to institutions that have liquidity prob·
lems or other credit needs. It can provide short-term, "overnight" credit to
relieve temporary credit needs, supply longer term credit to smooth seasonal
fluctuations, and can act as a lender of last resort when the national interest
requires credit assistance to deal with a financial crisis.

adjust the amount of stock for which it has subscribed as its capital and surplus increases
or decreases. 12 USC §§ 282, 287, 321 (1982); 12 CFR § 209 (1987). The member banks
may not transfer or pledge their shares. 12 USC § 287 (1982). By statute, dividends on the
stock are limited to an annual cumulative dividend of 6 percent of the amount ofthe paid-
in capital stock, after the expenses of the Reserve bank have been satisfied. 12 USC § 289
(! 982). When a member bank becomes insolvent. the Reserve bank has an offset against
the stock held by the member bank for debts owing to the Reserve bank, and the Reserve
bank need pay the receiver of such a member bank only the value of the stock in excess of
the debts owed. 12 USC § 288 (1982). Although the act authorized the public to hold a
restricted amount of the stock, 12 USC § 283 (1982), this stock is nonvoting. 12 USC § 285
(1982). However, no stock has been issued to the public. It is all held by the' member
banks. See generally discussion of lhe Federal Reserve banks at ~ 3.03[3].
• The role of the Federal Reserve System in making economic and monetary policy is
discussed in such standard economics texts as P. Samuelson, Economics (lOth ed. 1976):
T. CargiJl, Money, the Financial System and Monetary Policy.(2d ed. 1983); J. Sinkey,
Commercial Bank Financial Management in tne Financial Services Industry (2d ed.
1986); J. Cochran, Money, llankmg, and the Economy (1967)_
• See ~ 3.04[2]_
113.02 OVERVIEW 3-4

3. The supply ofcoin and currency. When additional coinage or currency is

needed, it is supplied through the Federal Reserve System. In fact, most of the
nation's currency consists of Federal Reserve notes issued by the Federal
Reserve banks.
4. Interest rate regulation. The Federal Reserve System established the
interest ceilings that member banks could pay on customer accounts. However,
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
mandated the deregulation of interest rates, which became fully effective in
1986.
5. ."-fargin requirementsfor stock purchase. The Federal Reserve System has
the authority to regulate the "margin requirements" for stock purchases. These
requirements determine the extent to which stock may be purchased with bor-
rowed funds.·
6. Check collection and fund transfers. The Federal Reserve System pro-
vides procedures for the collection and payment ofchecks and other instruments
as well as electronic procedures for rapidly transferring funds from one region of
the country to another. 7 Because these services are a vital component of the
national payment system, the rules and policies established by the Board of
Governors in Regulations J and CC and other policy statements for the opera-
tion of these services have a major effect on :he way banks handle such
payments.
7. Open market actions. The Federal Resen'e System can influence the
national economy by taking actions that expand or contract the money supply.
This is accomplished by the purchase and sale of U.S. government securities.
The Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System is responsible for
the operation of this policy.'
8. Banker for the government. The Federal Reserve System acts as the
banker for the U.S. government. It handles financial transactions for the U.S.
Treasury and provides the various services for transactions involving U.S.
government and agency securities.
9. Bank supen'ision. The Federal Reserve System has the authority to
supervise the activities of all member banks. Since the Comptroller of the
Currency exercises supervisory responsibility for national banks, the Federal
Reserve System exercises primary supervision over the state banks that are
members of the system'

• 15 USC § 78g (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

7 Sed 3.04[5).

'See ~. 3.0312J.
9 See ~ 2.03.
3-5 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.03(11

10. Bank holding companies. The Federal Reserve System has authority to
regulate the activities of bank holding companies. See Chapter 5 for a detailed
discussion of bank holding companies.
11. Foreign banking. The Federal Reserve System has authority to regulate
the foreign transactions of its member banks as well as the actions of foreign
banks in the United States."
12. Consumer credit control. The Federal Reserve System, at various times
in the past, has been given the authority to regulate credit under certain condi·
tions to prevent an excessive expansion of such credit from injuring the
economy."
13. Truth in lending. The Federal Reserve System is responsible for issuing
regulations that interpret and enforce the legislation dealing with consumer
credit transactions, popularly known as truth in lending provisions. See Chapter
26 for a detailed discussion of consumer credit transactions.
14. Unfair and deceptive practices. The Federal Reserve System has the
authority to define unfair and deceptive practices by banks, and to adopt appro-
priate regulations to prevent them."

~ 3.03 THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYSTEM
[I] Board of Governors
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System consists of seven
members appointed by the president by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. No more than one member may be from any Federal Reserve district, as
explained later, and their numbers are distributed among agricultural, indus-
\rial, and commercial interests. The members are required to devote fuJI time to
tl~eir duties on the Board at salaries and expenses prescribed by law," and serve
for a term of fourteen years. Appointments are staggered by the president so that
no more than one member's term will expire every two years,14 and members are
not eligible for reappointment."

10 This book does not cover the regulation of foreign banks or of the foreign activities
of U.S. banks.
"Sec < 3.04[6][c],
., 15 USC § 573(1) (1981). See also ~ 16.05 ~ I].
" 12 USC § 241 (1982)
" 12 USC § 242 (1982).
"I d.
Because the statute prOVIdes that a memlJer shall not be eligible for reappoint-
ment "after he shall have served a full term of fQ'Jrteen years," this prohibition has been
~ 3.03(1] OVERVIEW 3-6

The president, again with the advice and consent of the Senate, designates
.two members of the Board to serve as chairman and vice-chairman, each for a
four-vear term. The chaiiman is the "active executive officer" of the Board.'"
The I~ngth ofterm and method of appointment is intended to insulate the Board
from temporary swings of political sentiment that might influence its policies.
The Board is required to make an annual report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives." The Board and the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) must also report to Congress annually on the condition ofthe monetary
and credit areas of the economy.'·
The Board does not depend on Congress for appropriations to support its
activities. The Board finances its operations from the earnings of the system, and
it may assess the district Federal Reserve banks to meet expenses." Table 3-1
summarizes the income and expenses of the Federal Reserve banks for 1985 and
1986. 20
The Board controls the operations of the Federal Reserve banks and makes
rules and regulations that have the force ofJaw for the operation of the entire
Federal Reserve System. These regulations are initially published in the Federal
Register and are subsequently codified in the Code ofFederal Regulations.l'he
Board also publishes a looseleaf, multivolume Federal Reserve Regulatory Ser-
vice, which contains copies of the Board's regulations and interpretations and is
updated frequently. Before the Board may adopt a regulation, it must comply
with the procedures prescribed by law for rule-making. When the Board acts in
accordance with the proper procedures and adopts regJlations within its area of
authority, the regulations have the force oflaw.
The Board also makes numerous administrative decisions and rulings.
These materials appear in the Federal Register and in the monthly publication of
the Board, the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The Board publishes nllmerolls studies
and data pertaining to the nation's economy and financial institutions. Much of
this information is published in the Federal Resen'e Bulletin, which contains a
running summary of all the business of the system and many statistics on general
economic conditions. The Board also issues federal publications that are listed
as they appear in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
As explained in Chapter 2, the Board shares authority to regulate banks with
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. Each of these agencies has independent statulOry authority under federal
law, which in some cases has resulted in an overlapping of responsibility.

avoided by having the member resign before the term expires and then be reappointed toa
new term.
"12 USC § 242 (1982).
" 12 USC § 247 (1982).
1·12 USC § 22Sa (1982).
19 12 USC §§ 243, 244 (1982).

"73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 213 (1987).
3-7 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM II 3.03[1)

TABI.E 3-1 Federal Reserve Banks' Income and Expenses (thousands of

dollars)

Item /986 1985

Current income 17.464,528 1&,1;31,983
Current expenses 1,156,868 1,127,744
Operating expenses 1,049,159 1,022,527
Earnings credits granted 107,709 105,217
Current net income 16,307,661 17,004,238
Net addition to (deduction from) current net income 1,975,893 1,301,624
Assessments by the Board of Governors 278,118 251,116
For expenditures of Board 97,338 77,378
For cost of currency 180,780 173,739
Net income before payments to U.S. Treasury 18,005,437 1&,054,746
Dividends paid 109,588 103,029
Payments to U.S. Treasury (interest on Federal
Resel'Ve notes) 17,803,895 17,796,464
Transferred to surplus 91,954 155,253

Details may not add to tOlals because of roundmg,

SOl/Ice: 73 Bd. of Governors. Fed. Reserve S!s. Ann. Rep. 2l.l (198J).

The Federal Reserve Act, as amended, gives the Board of Governors the
following "enumerated" powers:"

I. To examine the "accounts, books, and affairs" of the Federal Reserve

banks and member banks. This includes a responsibility to publish
reports on the condition of the Federal Reserve banks showing the
reserves held and the nature of their investments.
2. To require reports of the member banks, FDIC-insured institutions,
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation-insured institutions,
National Credit Union Administration Board-insured institutions, and
other depository institutions.
3. To set the interest rate and regulate the rediscounting by the Federal
Reserve banks of paper discounted by other Federal Reserve banks.
4. To give short-term suspension of reserve requirements.
5. To supervise and regulate the issue and retirement of Federal Reserve
notes.

21 12 USC § 248 (1982).

11 3.03(1) OVERVIEW 3-8

6. To designate reserve cities for the purpose of setting reserve

requirements. 22
7. To suspend or remove officers and directors of the Federal Reserve
banks.
8. To require the Federal Reserve banks to write off "doubtful or worth-
less assets."
9. To exercise supervisory authority over the Federal Reserve banks,
including the power to act when there is a violation of the act to suspend
the bank's operations; this action includes taking possession of the bank
and administering its pending liquidation or reorganization.
10. To establish rules for the safeguarding of collateral, money, and other
property held by Federal Reserve agents.
11. To supervise the Federal Reserve banks.
12. To delegate functions other than rulemaking and policy making relating
to monetary and credit policies.
13. To employ persons, including attorneys and experts, to assist in con-
ducting the Board's business.
14. To regulate within limits the amount of capital of member banks that
may be based upon certain types of secured loans.
15. To regulate the transfer of funds among the Federal Reserve banks,
establish clearing house services for the Federal Reserve banks and at
the Federal Reserve banks for other depository institutions, and estab-
lish charges for these activities.

In addition to the preceding enumerated powers set forth in 12 USC § 248

(1982), the Board exercises powers granted by other statutes. Some ofthe major
areas are as follows:

1. Equal credit opportunity regulations under the Equal Credit Opportu-

nity Act. 23
2. Home mortgage disclosure regulations under the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act of 1975."

22 The Board classifies banks for reserve requirements on the basis of the assets the
banks hold rather than the geographical areas or cities in which the banks are located. 12
USC § 141 (1982); 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)'I 19,507.01 (1987).
23
15 USC §§ 1691-1691f(l982 & Supp. III (985). The regulations are at 12 CFR
§ 202 (1987) (Regulation B).
2. 12 USC §§ 2801-2811 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 203
(1987) (Regulation C).
3-9 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM \I 3.03[1]

3. Electronic Fund Transfer regulations under the Electronic Fund Trans-

fer Act. os
4. Regulation of international banking and foreign banking in the United
States under the Federal Reserve Act"· the Bank Holding Company
Act,"the International Banking Act of 1978,2' the Bank Export Services
Act," and the International Lending Supervision Act.'·
5. Regulation of interlocking management among depository institutions
and holding companies under the Depository Institution Management
Interlocks Act. 31
6. Regulation of consumer credit disclosures and consumer leasing disclo-
sures under the Truth in Lending Act.·2
7. Regulation of loans to executive officers, directors, and principal share-
holders of member banks and related companies."
8. Regulation ofthe circumstances when a member bank may employ as an
officer, director, or employee a person who is a dealer in securities."
9. Regulation of the circumstances for reimbursement of costs incutred by
financial institutions in providing customer financial records to govern-
mental authorities under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 35
10. Regulation of the extension of credit for the purchase of securities by
brokers and dealers, banks, and o\her ~ersons under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 3•

25
15 USC§§ 1693-1693r(l982& Supp. 1985). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 205
(1987) (Regulation E).
2. 12 USC §§ 221-522 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The regulations are at 12 CFR §§ 211,
214 (1987) (Regulations K, N).
21
12 USC §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
" 12 USC §§ 3101-3 t 08 (1982).
,. 12 USC: §§ 372. 635 a-4, 1843 (1982 & Supp. 1lI 1985).
3·12 USC §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. III 1985).
31 12 USC §§ 320 J -3208 (1982 & Supp. 1II 1985 I. The regulations are at 12 CFR § 212
(1987) (Regulation L).
"15 USC: §§ 1601-1667e (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The regulations are at 12 CFR
§§ 2 J 3,226 (1987) (Regulations M, Z).
33 12 USC §§248(i), 375a, 375b, 18 i 7(k)( 1982}. The regulations are at 12 CFR § 21 5
(Regulation 0).
". 12 USC § 78 (1982). See also 12 USC § 248 (1982). The regulations are at 12 CFR
§ 218 (1987) (Regulatio'l R). .
35
12 USC § 341 5 (1982). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 219 (1987) (Regulation S).
36 15 USC §§ 78c, 78g. 78h, 78q, 78w (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The regulations appear
at 12 CFR §§ 2G7. 220, 221. 224 (I 987)(Regulations G. T, lI, X).
II 3.03[21 OVERVIEW 3-10

11. Regulation of bank holding companies and changes in bank control."

12. Regulation of unfair or deceptive practices under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 38
13. Regulation of state member bank compliance with the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977. 39
14. Regulation of the prices charged to depository institutions for services
provided. 40
15. Regulation of the process for the collectio:1 and return of checks and
other methods of payment under the Expedited Funds Availability Act.
As a result of the 1980 act, the Federal Reserve Board is obligated to make
its services available to both member and nonmember depository institutions."
These services expressly include currency and coin services, check clearing and
collection services, wire transfer services, automated clearinghouse services,
settlement services, securities safekeeping services, Federal Reserve float, and
"any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, including but not
limited to payment services to effectuate the electronic transfer of funds. »'2
Table 3-2 is a complete list of the regulations issued by the Board of
Governors showing the part of the Code of Federal Regulations in which the
regulation may be found.

[21 Open Market Operations

Open market transactions are probably the single most important proce-
dure available to the Federal Reserve System for implementing monetary policy.
These transactions are conducted by the FaMe. Although the statutory authori-
zation for the committee did not exist until 1933, the history of the committee
goes back to 1921. At that time, the separate activities of the individual Federal
Reserve banks in buying and seIling government securities, primarily in the New

37 Authority to regulate is found in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. as

amended. 12 USC § I844(b) (1982); the International Banking Act of 1978, 12 USC
§§ 3106, 3108 (1982); the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. as amended by the Change in
Bank Control Act of 1978,12 USC § 1817(j)(13) (1982): the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, 12 USC § 1818(b) (1982); and the International Lending SupervIsion Act of 1983. 12
USC §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. III 1985). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 225 (1987) (Regula-
tion V).
3'15 USC § 57a(t) (1982). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 227 (1987) (Regulation
AA).
39 12 USC §§ 2901-2905 (1982). The regulations are at 12 CFR § 228 (1987) (Regula-
tion BB).
'0 12 USC § 248a (1982).
41 12 USC § 248a (c)(2) (1982).
42
12 USC § 248a(b) (1982).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 113.03(2)
3·11

TABLE 3·2 Regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System

12
CFR Reg.
Pt. Subjl'ct Malll'r
SUBCHAPTER A-BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
201 Extensions of credit by Federal Reserve Banks A
202 Equal credit opportunity B
203 Home mortgage disclosure C
204 Reserve requirements of depository institutions D
205 Electronic fund transfers E
206 [Reserved]
207 Securities credit by persons other than banks, brokers, Dr
dealers G
208 Membership of State banking institutions in the Federal
Reserve System H
209 Issue and cancellation of capital stock of Federal
Reserve banks I
210 Collection of checks and other items and transfers of
funds J
211 International banking operations K
212 Management official interlocks L
213 Consumer leasing M
214 Relations with foreign banks and bankers N
215 Loans to executive officers, directors, and principal
shareholders of member banks o
216 Minimum security devices and p~ocedures for Federal
Reserve banks and State member banks p
217 Interest on deposits Q
218 Relations with dealers in securities under Section 32,
Banking Act of 1933 R
219 Reimbursement to financial institutions for assembling
or providing financial records S
220 Credit by brokers and dealers T
221 Credit by banks for the purpose of purchasing 0,
carrying margin stocks u
224 Borrowers of securities cred it X
225 Bank holding companies and change in bank control y
226 Truth in lending Z
227 Unfair or deceptive acts or practices AA
228 Community reinvestment BB
229 Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks CC
(continued)
'» 3.03(2] OVERVIEW 3-12

TABLE 3-2 (cont'd)

12
CFR
Pt. Subject Mateer Reg.

245 Loan guarantees for defense production

250 Miscellaneous interpretations
261 Rules regarding availability of information
261a Rules regarding access to and review of personal
information in systems of records
261b Rules regarding public observation of meetings
262 Rules of procedure
263 Rules of practice for hearings
264 Employee responsibilities and conduct
264a Reserve Bank Directors-actions and responsibilities
264b Rules regarding foreign gifts and decorations
265 Rules regarding delegation of authority
266 Limitations on activities of former members and
employees of the board
267 Rules of organization and procedures of the Consumer
Advisory Council
268 Rules regarding equal opportunity
269 Policy on labor relations for the Federal Reserve Banks
269a Definitions
269b Changes of unfair labor practices

SUBCHAPTER B-FEDERAL OPEN MARKET

COMMITTEE
270 Open market operations of Federal Reserve Banks
271 Rules regarding availability of information
272 Rules of procedure
281 Statements of policy

SUBCHAPTER C-FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

LABOR RELATIONS PANEL
290-299 [Reserved]

Source: 12 CFR plS. 200-299 (1988); 3 Fed. Reserve Regula:ory Service. ch. 9 (198B).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ~ 3.03[2)
3-13

York City market, tended to disrupt the securities marke.t, much to the concern
of the U.S. Treasury and the banking system. The committee was estabhshe~ to
coordinate the open market actions of the Reserve banks. 43 The statute, whIch
now applies to the committee, provides that the open market operations of the
Federal Reserve System "shall be governed with a view to accommodating
commerce and business and with regard to their bearing upon the general credit
. . 0 f the country ." ••
sItuation
There are twelve members on the FOMC. The seven members of the Board
of Governors are automatically members of the committee. The other five
members are representatives of the twelve Reserve banks. One member is
elected by the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; one
by the boards of directors of the Reserve banks of Boston, Philadelphia, and
Richmond; one by the boards of directors of the Reserve banks ofCJeveland and
Chicago; one by the Boards ofDirectors of the Reserve banks of Atlanta, Dallas,
and St. Louis; and one by the Boards of Directors of the Reserve banks of
Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San Francisco. The committee meets in Wash-
ington, D.e., at least four times a year." By tradition, the chairman ofthe Board
of Governors serves as chairman of the FOMe. The president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York serves as vice-chairman.
The FOMC has withstood several challenges to the constitutionality of its
organization. In Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,'s a U.S. senator
challenged the constitutionality of the procedures for making appointments to
the FOMC, but the court held it should not interfere with the legislative process
by taking action but rather should exercise its discretion to dismiss the action. In
Open Markel Committee/or Monetary Reform v. Board a/Governors," the court
held that private persons who allege damage from the monetary policy estab-
lished by the Board do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
FOMe.
Decisions by the FOMe: involve sensitive questions of monetary policy.
Premature disclosure of the actions taken by the committee could encourage
speculation and other responses that might frustrate achievement of the objec-
lives of the FaMe:. The secrecy of the committee has been challenged, but a
federal district court ruled that the federa! Freedom of Information Act" does
not require the FaMe to publish its actions immediately. The committee may

3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CeEl \i 35,590 (1983).

43

44 12 USC § 263(c) (1982).

45 12 USC § 263(a) (1982).

"656 F2d 873 (Of: CiL), cel1. denied, 454 US 1082 (1981). See also Melcher v.
Federal Open Markel Comm., 644 r. Supp. 5 I() (DOC 1986).
"766 F2d 538 (DC Cr. J 985). See also Reuss v. Balles, 584. F2d 46/ (DC Cir), ecrt.
denied, 439 US 997 (1978)
4' See 5 USC §§ 552-552b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
~ 3.03[3] OVERVIEW 3-14

delay the public release of its actions until one month after they become
effective."
The FOMC directs all the open market operations of the Federal Reserve
banks. The Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Federal Reserve banks to engage
in open market transactions in government securities and other commercial
paper subject to the regulations of the Board of Governors;' but the FOMC
controls when, how, and who may enter into these transactions. 51 The commit-
tee sets guidelines for the purchase and sale of government securities, bankers'
acceptances, bills of exchange, bonds, notes, and other types of commercial
paper. These purchase transactions are made for the account of the separate
Federal Reserve banks but are generally executed by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, which acts as agent for the Federal Reserve banks.
Open market activities have an important impact on the economy because
they may be employed to expand or contact the amount of bank credit in the
monetary system. When the Federal Reserve System engages in purchases of
government securities or other assets, the system is injecting additional bank
credit into the economy. The funds paid by the Federal Reserve System to the
sellers of the securities eventually adds to the deposits of the member commer-
cial banks. This increase in deposits permits those banks to expand their reserve
accounts and their lending capacity. When the Federal Reserve System sells
securities, the reverse process occurs. The buyers of the securities withdraw
funds on deposit with the member banks in order to acquire them. Therefore,
funds are drained from the banking system and the reserve position of the
member banks shrinks. s2 The FOMC is required to include in its annual report
to Congress details of its open market transactions."

[3) Federal Reserve Banks and Directors

The backbone of the Federal Reserve System is the twelve Federal Reserve
banks and their branches. These Reserve banks are located in tweive Reserve
districts covering the entire United States; each Reserve bank has territory and
branches as authorized by the Board of Governors" :ocated for the can venience

,. Merri:1 v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 516 F. Supp. 1028 (DDC 1981) (on remand
from the U.S. Supreme Court, 443 US 340 (1979)).
50 See 12 USC §§ 353-359 (1982).

" 12 USC § 263(b) (1982), "No Federal Reserve bank shall engage or decline to
engage in open-market operations under [12 USC §§ 353-359] ... except in accordance
with the direction of and regulations adopted by the Carr.minee." See also 12 CFR § 270
(1987).
52 See generally Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Func-
tions (1984).
": 2 USC § 247a (1982).
":2 USC§§ 222. 521 (1982).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.03(3)
3-15

of the banking community. The boundaries of these districts and their b.ranch
territories do not follow any political subdivisions but are set for the maxImum
efficiency of the Reserve banks. 55 A map of the Federal Reserve districts is set
out on the next page.
The Federal Reserve banks themselves are corporations chartered by the
federal government; their certificates of organization are filed with the Comp-
troller of the Currency.56
Each Reserve bank is a banker's bank. Its capital stock is held by the
national banks and state banks that are members ofthe Federal Reserve System.
Each state and national bank may become a member of the system by subscrib-
ing to an amount of stock equal to 6 percent ofits capital and surplusY National
banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System and therefore
must subscribe; a state bank may choose to become a member of the Federal
Reserve System, but in order to become a member it must subscribe to the stock
in the same manner as national banks. State member banks can withdraw from
the system and submit their stock for cancellationS' Although the original
provisions of the Federal Reserve Act provided for the sale of nonvoting stock to
the public, no stock was ever sold, All the stock of the Reserve banks is held by
the member banks, National and state bank members are subjecl to examina-
tions prescribed by the Board of Governors, who has the power to delegate its
duty to the states for state banks, 59 Because the Comptroller of the Currency has
statutory authority to examine national banks, the Board follows the practice of
having the comptroller exercise primary responsibility for examination of
national banks while the Board takes responsibility for examining state member
banks. However, the Board has general supervisory power over the Reserve
banks,"
Proftts from the operation of the Reserve banks, up to 6 percent of the face
value of its capital stock, are paid to the stockholder banks; other surplus
earnings go into each Reserve bank's surplus account." The stock also carries
double liability for the debts of the Reserve bank," but so far the operations have
been profttable and no assessment has been necessary. The Reserve banks are
exempt from taxation by federal and state governments except for real estate
taxes,"

" 12 USC § 222 (1982), The Board has the power to revise district boundaries,
"12 USC § 341 (1982),
57 12 USC § 282 (1982),
58 J 2 USC §§ 321. 328 (1982).
59
12 esc §§ 325. 326 (1982).
50 J2 USC § 2480) (1982),
61 12 USC § 289 (1982)
" 12 USC § 502 (1982)
., 12 USC; 53\ (1982).
~ 3.03[3} OVERVIEW 3·16

The Federal Reserve System

Boundaries of Federal Reserve Districts and Their Branch Territories

LH,if..\ lJ

BJundaries uf Federal Resene Di~trkl" Federal Reserve Bank Cities

B,;uoI.hlrlt"s l)f Federal Reserve Bram:h • Federal Re~erve Branch Cties

TerTltone~
Federal R~~en:e Bank Facility
() Board \\~Gl)\eTnL'r" \,fthe f-edcral Reserve
S~ :.tCr:1

Each Federal Reserve bank has a nine-merr.ber board of directors that

guides the daily business of the bank under the regulation of the Board of
Governors. Each board of directors is divided into three classes of directors,
with each class containing three directors. Class A directors may" be bankers.
Class B directors are required to be persons engaged in agriculture, business, or
industry. A and B members are elected by the stockholding member banks. Class
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ~ 3.03[3]
3-17

C directors are named by the Board of Governors. The chairman an~ vice-
hairman of the board of directors of each Federal Reserve bank are desIgnated
~y the Board of Governors from the class C directors." The chairman also serves
as the Federal Reserve agent and is required to maintain a local office of the
Board of Governors at the Federal Reserve bank. The Federal Reserve agent is
the official representative of the Board of Governors.'s Each director's term of
office is three years; one third of the terms expire each year."
Each branch of a Federal Reserve bank has its own board of directors. A
majority of the directors for the branch are appointed by the Federal Reserve
bank, with the remaining directors appointed by the Board of Governors.
The twelve Federal Reserve banks and their branches, operating under the
supervision of the Board of GovernoTS, perform a number ofbanking functions.
Some of the more important functions include the following:

1. Holding the reserves of the member banks;

2. Loaning funds to member banks by advancing funds and discounting
commercial paper;
3. Serving as a lender of last resort for the banking system, generally in
order to provide a source of emergency relief;
4. Issuing Federal Reserve notes that circulate as currency;
5. Providing mechanisms and procedures for collecting checks and trans-
ferring funds from one region of the country to another;
6. Engaging in the examination of member banks to assure their business is
conducted in accordance with safe and sound banking principles; and
7. Serving as the banker for the U.S. Government by handling the financial
transactions of the U.S. Treasury and other governmental agencies."

These functions are described in further detail in other sections of this chapter.
The powers of the Federal Reserve banks are conferred by federal statute.
When these provisions conflict with state law, federal law prevails unless it is

'< 12 USC §§ 304, 305 (1982).

's 12 USC § 305 (1982).
"12 USC § 308 (1982).
"The powers of the Federal Reserve banks are set forth in 12 USC j§ 341-360
(982). These sections enumerate the specific types of commercial paper that may be
dIscounted or purchased hy the banks and Ihe circumstances under which loans and
advances may be made by the banks. This topic is covered in 1:~ 3.04[4], 4.03, 7.0 J [2]. The
Federal Reserve banks have, in addition 10 the specific powers granted by the Federal
Reserve ACI and other statutes, "such incidenlai powers as shall be necessary to carry 011
the business of banking" within the limitations set by statute. 12 USC § 341 Seventh
(1982). See Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Duffy, 210 N'C 598, 188 SE 82 (1936):
Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 468 F. Supp. 674 (D. Mass, 1979). This grant
of authority is similar to Ihal for national banks. See discussion of Ihe authority of
national banks at 1; 4.03.
~ 3.03[4] OVERVIEW 3-18

clear that Congress intended to defer to the state law. Thus, state law procedures
have been found ineffective to limit the exercise by the Federal Reserve banks of
their authority to terminate employees, Under 12 USC § 341 Fifth (1982),
Federal Reserve bank employees are subject to dismissal at the pleasure of the
bank. Because ofthis statute, procedural protections under state law for employ-
ees are not available to bank employees and the employees can claim no "process
or tenure rights."·'

[4] Member Banks

As discussed previously, all national banks automatically are members of
the Federal Reserve System. The Comptroller of the Currency supervises the
granting of charters for national banks and is the primary federal regulator. As a
result, the Federal Reserve Board concentrates its examinations and supervisory
activities on the state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.
This section discusses the requirements for state bank membership and how
membership may terminate. Subsequent sections discuss national banks.
Federal law permits "any bank" incorporated under the special or general
laws of a state, including "Morris Plan banks and other incorporated banking
institutions engaged in similar business" to apply to the Board of Governors for
membership in the Federal Reserve System.· 9 The statute directs the Board of
Governors to consider "the financial condition of the applying bank, the general
character of its management, and whether or not the corporate powers exercised
are consistent with the purposes of" the Federal Reserve Act. '0 The bank must
be insured by the FDIC in order to become a member of the system," and must
agree to subscribe to capital stock in the Federal Reserve bank in its district
under the same terms applicable to national banks." When a state bank is
admitted to the system, it becomes subject to the capital and reserves require-
men1s under federallaw. 73 Member banks are bound by federal laws that limit

•• Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
1981). cert. denied, 455 US 948 (1982) (employment contract of Federal Reserve bank
employee would be void and unenforceable against the bank) .
•912 USC § 321 (1982).
70
12 USC § 322 (1982). The Board's regulations on the membership of state banks in
the Federal Reserve system (Regulation H) are in 12 CFR § 208 (1987).
" 12 esc § 1814(b) (1982). The Board of Governors must certify to the FDIC that it
has considered "the fmancial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy ofits capital
structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the
convenience and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether or not its
corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of [the FDIC Act]." 12 USC § 1816
(1982).
"12 USC § 321 (1982). The capital stock requirements are discuss~d at ~ 3.03[3].
73 12 USC § 324 (1982). The Federal Reserve Board e~ercises a continuing supervi-
sion of the adequacy of the state bank's capital and reserve position, Continental Bank &
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ~ 3.03[41
3·19

the payment of dividends and also restrict th~ bank's engaging in .transac.ti?ns in
its own stock.74 Member banks must submit reports as to their conditIOn as
required by the Board ofGovernors. 75 These reporting responsibilities extend to
information on their relationship with affiliates. 7 • The Board of Governors and
the Federal Reserve banks have authority to conduct examinations of the state
member banks. 77 There is also a specific prohibition against state banks engaging
in lotteries." State member banks can establish branches under the same rules
and in the same manner as national banks.79
State member banks may only engage in securities dealing and underwriting,
to the extent allowed national banks'o under the provision of the Natiortal Bank
Act, which provides the following:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for
its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities or stock: Provided, That the association may purchase for its own
account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the
Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe ...."
State member banks are expressly prohibited from certifying checks with-
out having on deposit funds to cover the amount of the check, and the bank may
forfeit membership in the Federal Reserve System for violations of this
prohibition.••
In general, state member banks are subject to an the requirements the
Federal Reserve Act, as amended, establishes for "member banks" other than

Trust Co. ofSatt Lake City v. Woodall, 239 F2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 US 909
(1957). See also 12 USC § 329 (1982) which provides thai no bank may be admitted 10
membership in the Federal Reserve System "unless it possesses capital stock and surplus
which, in the judgment of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are
adequate in relation to the character and condi:ion of its assets and to its existing and
prospective deposit liabilities and other corporate responsibilities ...."
14 12 USC § 324 (1982).

75 Id. The section imposes a $100 per day penalty for failure to file reports required by
the Board of Governors. Id.
76 12 USC § 334 (1982).

n 12 USC § 325 (1982). Bank examinations are discussed at' 7.01.

78
12 USC § 339 (1982).
,. 12 \.JSC § 32 i (i 982).
• 0 "State member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with
respect to the purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securities and
stock as are applicable in the case of national banks under paragraph "Seventh" of section
24 of this title." 12 USC § 335 (1982). See generally the discussion at , 8.01.
81 12 USC § 24 Seventh (Supp. III 1985).

" 12 USC § 331 (1982).

~ 3.03[5) OVERVIEW 3-20

the provisions for examination by the Comptroller ofthe Currency.83 Subject to

these limitations, the state bank, although a member of the Federal Reserve
System, "shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a State bank or trust
company, and may continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by the
State in which it was created, and shall be entitled to all privileges of member
banks ....",. However, the Board imposes as a condition of membership that,
except as permitted by the Board, "the bank shall not cause or permit any change
to be made in the general character ofits business or in the scope ofthe corporate
powers exercised by it at the time of admission to membership. ",.
State banks may voluntarily withdraw from membership in the system by
giving six months' written notice and surrendering their holdings ofcapital stock
in the Federal Reserve bank for cancellation. as The Board of Governors may
terminate the membership of a state bank for noncompliance with the Federal
Reserve Act or the Board's regulations or when the bank ceases to exercise its
banking functions without a receiver having been appointed for the bank. a7 Ifthe
FDIC terminates the bank's status as an insured bank, the bank automatically
loses membership in the system.as

[51 The Relationship of the Federal Reserve System to Nonmember

Depository Institutions
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which established the Federal Reserve
System, viewed the system it was creating as a network of commercial banks.
The Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve banks were given responsibil-
ity for the regulation and control ofthe network of commercial banks that make
up the Federal Reserve System. The act did not provide for the Board or the
Reserve banks to exercise any responsibility with respect to other depository
institutions.
With the growth of the nation's economy, the Federal Reserve System, and
the Board of Governors in panicular, came to serve an increasingly important
role in determining the economic policy of the country. Yet the existence of state
banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve System and of savings
institutions that were not subject to the regulatory authority of the Board of
Governors, which in modern times have come to represent a substantial portion
of the banking market, limited the ability of the Federal Reserve System to
control monetary conditions in the economy. At the same time, concern devcl-

8J 12 USC § 330 (1982).

" Id.
,. 12 CFR § 208.7(a)(I) (1987).
,. 12 USC § 328 (1982).
"12 USC § 327 (1982).
" 12 USC § 1818(0) (1982).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.03[5J
3-21

ed that the obligations placed on member banks to maintain reserves, as

O~quired by the Board of Governors, enco:lraged banks to withdraw from the
~ederal Reserve System. In addition, a movement began to reduce the differ-
ences in functions between commercial banks and savings institutions, allowing
for competition in areas such as checking and payment services, savings
accounts, and consumer lending.
These developments are reflected in the terms of the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. The 1980 act fundamen-
tally changed the role of the federal government in banking. It expanded the
powers of thrift institutions and enlarged the role of the Federal Reserve System
by opening the system's network of services to other depository institutions."
The specific provisions of the 1980 act are outlined in the following text.

1. All depository institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, savings

and loan associations, and credit unions) are permitted by the act to
engage in providing customers with checking services or their
equivalents through Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts,
and to enter the growing area of electronic payment mechanisms. 90
2. The Federal Reserve System acquired increased dominance over all of
the nation's depository institutions through both the reporting require-
ments, which the act imposes, and the reserve requirements, which must
be met by all depository institutions having transaction accounts or
nonpersonal time deposits. 91

'9In 12 USC § 248a (1982), Congress pro\';des that the Board of Governors must
establish a fee schedule for its services. These services must include the following:
I. Currency and coin services;
2. Check clearing and collection services;
3. Wire transfer services;
4. ACH services;
5. Settlement services;
6. Securities safekeeping services;
7. Federal Reserve floal; and
8. Any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, including but not
limited to payment services to effecluale ,he eleclronic transfer of funds.
The acl also provides Ihal "All Federal Reserve bank services covered by Ihe fee
schedUle shall be available to nonmember depository inslitutions and such services shall
be pnced at the same fee schedule applicable 10 member banks, except Ihal nonmembers
shall be subject 10 any other terms. including a requiremenl of balances sufficient for
cle,aring purposes, tbat the Board may determine are applicable to member banks." 12
USC § 2~.8a(c)(2) (1982). The fees are 10 be based on "all direct and indirect com actually
Incurred In proVldmg the servIces plus cerlain "imputed COSls". 12 USC § 248a(c)(31
(1982) . .
'OSee r 2.01[5J.
91 See ~ 3.04[2].
113.04 OVERVIEW 3-22

3. The availability to all depository institutions of the services of the Fed-

eral Reserve System and those provided by the Reserve banks, such as
the procedures for the collection of instruments and transfer of funds,
makes it possible to create an integrated national payments and funds
transfer network that encompasses a broad range of depository
institutions. 92
4. The ability of other depository institutions, which must maintain
reserves under the act, to use the borrowing privileges offered by the
Federal Reserve System may also draw such institutions as savings and
loan associations and credit unions more closely under the wing of the
Federal Reserve System. 93

11 3.04 BANKING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

SYSTEM
The Board of Governors has a major role in determining monetary policy
for the United States and devising strategies to manage the supply of money and
credit to achieve the nation's economic objectives. The Federal Reserve System
also exercises various banking functions. This section describes some of the
most imponant of these banking functions.

[I] Depository Functions

The Federal Reserve banks function as depositories for the reserves of
member banks. Each member bank maintains a deposit account in its regional
Federal Reserve bank. Member banks may draw checks against this account.
transfer funds through this account, or employ the account for various other
transactions." In addition, financial institutions that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System may be required to maintain reserves if they have
transaction accounts. 95

[a) Resene Accounts. The reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve banks
may be used for depositing advances frorr. the Reserve bank to the member
bank, for crediting the proceeds of collection of corr.mercial paper, for deposit-
ing the proceeds on the rediscount of paper with the Reserve bank, for handling
deposits of coin and currency, and accruing credit for other assets that the
member bank may turn over to the Reserve bank for liquidation or collection .

., See 3.04[5J.
<
93 See '"'<
"4[4] •
j.u
94
12 USC § 464 (1982).
95 See ~. 3.04[2].
3-23 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM " 3.04[1J[b]

The Reserve bank may charge the member bank's account for various obliga-
tions of the member bank. This ability to charge or credit the member banks'
accounts permits the Reserve banks to establish a national network for transfer-
ring funds between such banks both by check and by electronic order. It also
assists the Reserve banks to carry out other duties in handling the financial
affairs of the government, including the purchasing and selling of government
securities and the transferring of funds to pay obligations of the government to
Social Security benefit recipients, pension recipients, taxpayers, and other bene-
ficiaries. It also enables the Federal Reserve to operate a "net settlement"
service for clearinghouses and ACHs. These systems settle the net positions of
the participants at the end of the day by debiting and crediting the participants'
accounts with the Federal Reserve banks."

[bl Fiscal Agents and Depositories for the United States. The Secretary of the
Treasury is responsible for determining who may act as depositories and fiscal
agents of the United States and the procedures that must be followed in con-
ducting these activities on behalf of the United States. The Federal Reserve Act
gives the Federal Reserve banks general authority to receive deposits of govern-
ment funds and to act as fiscal agents of the United States when directed to do so
by the Secretary of the Treasury." Also, except for temporary accounts, most
government corporations must maintain their accounts with the Treasurer of
the United States, or with the permission of the Secretary of the Treasury, with a
Federal Reserve bank or other approved federal depository." There are addi-
tional statutes that make the Federal Reserve banks depositories for other
specific agencies, such as the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal Home
Loan banks, the Federal Land banks, and many others 09
Federal law also permits member banks and other depository institutions to
act as depositories of the United States. Under regulations of the Secre,ary of the
Treasury, the following institutions are eligible to act as deposito~ies and fiscal
agents of the United States:'''''

1. All banks insured by the FDIC;

2, All institutions insured by the FSLIC;

.. See ~ 3.04[5) and Chapter 18.

•' 12 USC §§ 342. 391 (1982).
98 31 USC § 9107 (1982). The Government Corporations Control Act, 31 USC
§§ 9101-9109 (1982), established general requirements for the banking and paymenl
activities of government agencies.
"See 12 USC §§ 393, 395, 1435 (1982). See generally the compilation at 1 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) II~ 16.110-16,133 (198-1).
10J 12 CFR § 201.2 (1987). See also 12 USC §§ 265,266, 1464(k), 1709(a), I 725(d).
3101,3102 (1982).
11 3.04[21 OVERVIEW 3-24

3. All credit unions insured by the Administrator of the National Credit

Union Administration; and
4. State depository institutions whose accounts are insured by the state or a
state agency, and certain branches of foreign banking corporations.
In order to be designated a depository and fiscal agent, the financial institution
must have the authority under the laws and regulations that control its organiza-
tion and powers to perform the services required by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury. The financial institutions also must be authorized to pledge collateral to
secure public funds because the Secretary may require the institution to post
collateral when public funds are deposited with tne institution in amounts that
exceed its insurance limits.,., By statute, the Secretary of the Treasury deter-
mines the security necessary "for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of the
public money" deposited with national banks. 102 The statute also authorizes
national banks to give security for the deposits of funds by state governments,
agencies, or political subdivisions "to the same extent" as the law of the state
permits for other banks in the state. 'OO The statute similarly authorizes national
banks to give security for deposits of federally recognized Indian tribes."<
Institutions that serve as depository and fiscal agents engage in a variety of
functions. One important function involves the handling of securities issues for
the government, such as the sale of U.S. savings bonds and notes and the issuing
of U.S. Treasury bonds, Treasury notes, and Treas:Jry bills. 'oo

[21 Reserves
All member banks of the Federal Reserve System are required to maintain
reserves for the payment of outstanding accounts. These reserves consist of (1)
cash in the member banks' vaults and (2) the balance on deposit with the Federal
Reserve bank. '"
Until enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, only banks that were members of the Federal Reserve
System had to observe the reserve requirements. The act dramatically enlarged
the Federal Reserve System's control over the nation's depository institutions.
The act defines depository institutions to include all state and national
banks (hat are insured by the FDIC and all banks that are eligible to apply for

'0' 12 CFR §§ 201.2, 201.3, 20104. 201.6 (1987).

02
' 12 USC § 90 (1982).
'03Id.
'"'Id. The security mal' be in the form of United States bonds or "otherwise" as the
Secretary of the Treasury prescribes.
105 See generally! 2 CFR §§ 306-354 (1987); I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 16,00 I
(1984).
'''12 USC § 461(c) (1982).
3-25 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.04(2]

such insurance; all savings and loan associations that are insured by the FSLIC
and all savings and loan associations that are eligible for such insurance; and all
credit unions that are insured or eligible to be insured under the Federal Credit
Union Act. 101
The provisions of the act that call for state-chartered banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System to post reserves with the Federal
Reserve Board have been upheld.'" The court found that the congressional
objective of stopping the flight of banks from the Federal Reserve System in
order to help the Federal Reserve System control the nation's money supply was
a rational and valid purpose. The court also upheld the act's scheme for phasing
in compliance with the reserve requirements.
Under the act, all depository institutions having "transaction accounts" or
"non-personal time deposits" must maintain reserves.'09 Transaction accounts
include checking acounts, NOW accounts, automatic transfer accounts, and
share draft accounts. 110
AU demand deposits are transaction accounts. "' A transaction account also
includes other types of accounts, such as accounts on which the depository
institution has reserved the right to require at least seven days' written notice
prior to withdrawal and that are subject to check, draft, negotiable otder of
withdrawal, or similar item except for qualifying money-market deposit
accounts. Thus, the term "transaction account" includes accounts that are not
"demand deposits." (The different types of accounts are discussed in Chapter
19.)
The result ofthis distinction between "transaction accounts" and "demand
deposits" is that member banks in the Federal Reserve System may be free to
pay interest on deposits that do not qualify as "demand deposits, "112 but banks
are required to maintain reserves against those accounts because they qualify as
"transaction accounts" under Regulation D. The Federal Reserve Board revised
Regulation D to incorporate into the definitions of accounts subject to j'eserve
requirements some of the distinctions that were previously contained in Regula-
tion Q, which specified the requirements for accounts on which banks could pay
interest. For example, under Regulation D, a depository institution must impose
an early withdrawal penalty of at least seven days' simple interest on amounts
withdrawn within the first six days after deposit on "time deposits," or they will
have to treat such deposits as "demand deposits" subject to reserve require-

101
12 USC § 461(b)( I) (1982). See discussion at 'I~ 2.02, 3.04[2][c].
108 First Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Board, 605 F. Supp. 555 (ED Ky. 1984).

109:2 USC § 461(b)(2) (1982).

110
12 USC § 461 (h)( I )(C) (1982). These ac~ounts are discussed in Chapter 19.
11112 eFR § 204.2(c) (1987) (Regulation DJ.
'" See ~ 19.02[21.
'1 3.04(2J[aJ OVERVIEW 3-26

ments.'" Similarly, in order to avoid classification as a transaction account for

purposes of the reserve requirements, the accounts must meet restrictions simi-
lar to the former interest-payment restrictions that limited the number of trans·
fers that may be made to third parties from the account.'" Eurocurrency
holdings are also subject to reserve requirements.

(aI Reserve Requirements. The act establishes reserve requirements that may
be adjusted within certain ranges by the Board of Governors. On transaction
accounts over $25 million, the range is 8 to 14 percent with an initial rate of 12
percent. Reserves on accounts below $25 million are initially set at 3 percent.
The original $25 million cutoff changes on the basis ofan indexed formula."s As
of 1988, the cutoff was $40.5 million.'" On nonpersonal time deposits, the act
establishes a range ofzero to 9 percent ofrequired reserves, with an initial rate of
3 percent. 117
The general reserve requirements for depository institutions as of Decem-
ber 31, 1987 are provided in Table 3-3.
When at least five members find that extraordinary circumstances are
present, the Board of Governors may impose resen'e requirements beyond the
statutory ranges for successive periods of 180 days."" The Board also may
impose a supplemental reserve requirement on transaction accounts within a
range of an additional zero to 4 percent on a finding that monetary policy cannot
effectively be implemented with reserves otherwise authorized."> Such reserves
must be uniform for all depository institutions and carry interest at the average
rate earned by the Federal Reserve securities portfolio."o
The 1980 act phases in these reserve requirements over eight years for
nonmember institutions and four years for member banks. To remove any
incentive for banks to withdraw from membership in the Federal Reserve
System, the 1980 act provided that any bank that was a member of the Federal
Reserve System on July 1, 1979 remains subject to the reserve requirements of
the system notwithstanding its withdrawal from membership.'" The Gam-St

113 12 CFR §§ 204.2(b)(3), 204.2(c)(I), 204.2(e)(l) (1987) (Regulation D).

11< The Federal Reserve Board's action in amending its regulations to accomplish
these results is reported at 5! Fed. Reg. 9629 (1986). See also r 3.04[6][b].
115 12 USC § 461 (b)(2) (1982).

116 12 CFR § 204.9 (l988).

111 12 USC § 461(b)(2) (J 982).

'" 12 USC § 461(b)(J) (1982).

119
12 USC § 46I(b)(4) (1982).
20
' ld.
121 12 USC § 461 (b)(8) (1982).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ~ 3.04\2JJbj
3-27

TABLE 3-3 Reserve Ratios (Regulation D, § 204.9, 12 CFR Pt. 204)

Categorv Reserve Requirelnent

._---_----:~~-----......;,;;;;;;.;.;..;..,;,,;,;,,;:=.;.;.;..;...-
I. Net Transaction Accounts
$0 to $40.5 million 3%
Over $40.5 million $1,215,000 plus 12% of
amount over $40.5 million
2. Nonpersonal Time Deposits (by original
maturity or notice period)
Less than 1-1/2 years 3%
1-112 years or more 0%
3. Eurocurrency Liabilities 3%
4. Reserve Requirement exemption
$3.2 million 0%

Source: 1 Fed. Reserve Bd. Regulatory Service ~ 2-207 (1988).

Germain Act of 1982'22 modified these requirements by establishing a.phase-in

period for banks that withdrew from the Federal Reserve System between July I,
1979, and March 31, 1980.'"
The 1982 act exempts institutions from reserve requirements when the
liabilities that are subject to reserve requirements are below a minimum
amount. 124 This provision eliminates the administrative and reponing expenses
for small institutions, such as credit unions and thrift institutions, that have
some accounts (e.g., negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts or other
transaction accounts) that would be subject to reserve requirements.

[bl Reserve Requirement Exemption. There are minimum amounts ofreserva-

ble liabilities of each institution that are exempt from reserve requirements.
Subject to some constraints, the institution may designate the reserves that will
receive the benefitofthe exemption. The amount of this exemption is shown In
Table 3-3 as the Reserve Requirement Exemption. The 1982 act initially set a
floor of $2 million for this exemption. Thc 1982 act directs the Board of
Governors to adjust this $2 million floor upwards in accordance with a stal1.:tory
formula relating to the percentage increase in the total reservable liabilities of all
depository institutions. Reservable liabilities are transaction accounts. non-

122 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codifIed in scallered sections of htles 12. 15,
and J8 USC).
123 12 USC § 461 (b)(8)(D) (1982).
'24 12 uSC § 461 (b)( II )(A) (1982).
11 3.04[2][c) OVERVIEW 3-28

personal time deposits, and all net balances, loans, assets, and obligations that
are, or may be, subject to reserve requirements under the Federal Reserve Act. 12.

[c) Reserves of Nonmember Banks. The rules for how nonmember institutions
must hold reserves vary from the requirements for member banks. Subject to
Board regulation, member banks must hold reserves either in vault cash or in
balances maintained at the regional Federal Reserve bank. Nonmember deposi-
tory institution reserves may be held in the form of balances with other deposi-
tory institutions maintaining reserve balances at a Federal Reserve bank or a
Federal Home Loan bank or the National Credit Union Administration Central
Liquidating facility. The institutions where these balances have been deposited,
in turn, must pass them through to a Federal Reserve bank."6 In this fashion, all
reserves required under the Act will ultimately be held by the Federal Reserve
banks and will be subject to the control of the Federal Reserve System as it
establishes reserve requirements to carry out monetary policy.

Id) Reserve Requirements for Reserve Banks. At one time, the Reserve banks
were in turn required to maintain reserves covering their accounts with member
banks. These reserves originally were required to be in lawful money, gold, or
gold certificates. This requirement was later amended to include special drawing
rights as the rules on gold and gold certificate circulation changed. The reserve
requirements for the Reserve banks, which were originally 35 percent, were later
changed to 25 percent in gold, gold certificates, or special drawing right certifi-
cates. Currently, each Reserve bank is required to issue notes bearing a distinc-
tive letter and serial number assigned by the Board of Governors to each Reserve
bank.'" The notes must be backed by adequate colla,eral as described in the next
section. (The role of Federal Reserve bank notes as money is discussed in
Chapter 14.)

[e] Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy. The Board of Governors'

authority to adjust reserve requirements is an important tool in carrying out
monetary policy. Changes in reserve requirements produce corresponding
changes in the policies of the depository institutions that maintain the reserves.
When reserve ratios are lowered, depository institutions may increase their
volume of deposits and associated loans and investments. On the other hand.
when reserve ratios are increased, the volume of liabilities and credit the bank-
ing system can support on the reserve supply is reduced. Thus, when the Board of
Governors increases reserve requirements, it is acting to restrict the money

mId. See aiso 12 USC § 461(b)(l)(E) (1982).

126
12 USC § 461(c) (1982).
127 12 USC § 413 (1982).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM '13.04(3)
3-29

supply, and when it decreases reserve requirements, it is acting to expand the

money suppI y. '28

(3) Currency Issues

Like the national banks before them, the Federal Reserve banks are empow-
ered to issue notes that circulate as lawful money. Under the original Federal
Reserve Act, there were two classes of notes: Federal Reserve bank notes and
Federal Reserve notes. The Federal Reserve notes now constitute almost all of
the United States paper money and are the backbone of the currency.'" These
notes, printed by the Treasury or by the mints, may be issued by the Federal
Reserve agent, who is a member of the board ofdirectors ofeach Reserve bank.
Under the direction of the Comptroller ofthe Currency and the Secretary of the
Treasury, and upon the request ofthe Reserve bank, the Federal Reserve agent
issues the notes in return for 100 percent collateral. (Federal Reserve notes that
are held in the vaults of the Federal Reserve banks are not required to have
collateral backing them.)'30 The collateral may consist of the following items:
I. Drafts and other commercial bills of exchange;
2. Bills of exchange or bankers' acceptances purchased in open market
operations;
3. Special drawing right certificates;
4. Gold certificates; or
5. Other obligations of the United States.'" These government obligations
may include "any obligations which are direct obligations of, or are fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or any
agency thereof .... "'3'
The Reserve banks were once required to keep a portion of this collateral in gold
certificates, but that requirement was eliminated.""
The Federal Reserve notes thus issued may be held or paid out by the
Reserve banks as lawful money, and the collateral funds are held for their
redemption. The notes themselves, the obligation of the issuing Reserve bank
and the U.S. government, are redeemable at the U.S. Treasury or at any Reserve
bank.

"'s ee Board 0 f Governors, The Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions
.
78-80 (1984).
•" Id. at 48.
·30 12 USC § 412 (1982).
'''(d.
132 [d.
13' 12 USC § 413 (1982) (amended 1968).
~ 3.04[4J OVERVlEW 3-30

The collateral funds are required to be collected and replaced so that at all
times their total is 100 percent ofthe outstanding Federal Reserve notes owed by
each Reserve bank.'34 The number of notes that are issued and withdrawn is
monitored by the Federal Reserve agents. If the Board of Governors believes
additional security is needed for notes that have.been issued, the Board "may at
any time call upon a Federal Reserve bank for additional security to protect the
Federal Reserve notes issued to it."'35 The Federal Reserve agents are empow-
ered, under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Regulations of
the Board of Governors, and the Secretary of the Treasury, to redeem current
notes and to replace those no longer fit for circulation.'3'
The Federal reserve notes are "obligations of the United States and shall be
receivable by all national and member banks and Federal reserve banks and for
all taxes, customs, and other public dues. They shall be redeemed in lawful
money on demand at the Treasury Department ofthe United States ... or at any
Federal Reserve bank."'3]

[4] Reserve Bank Lending Authority

There are two methods by which a member bank borrows funds from its Federal
Reserve bank: by a discount or by an advance. Both methods are authorized by
statute, but the most common method today is the advance. 138
Both methods of borrowing require the member bank to give the Federal
Reserve bank full collateral for the loan. Discounts and rediscounts involve the
transfer of eligible commercial paper to the Reserve bank with the indorsement
of the transferring member bank. Technically, the Reserve bank purchases the
commercial paper from the member bank. The law and the regulations of the
Board define what constitutes eligible paper.
The Federal Reserve Act contains detailed descriptions of collateral the
Reserve banks may accept in making loans or may acquire in discounting or
rediscounting commercial paper. 139 There is also general authority to advance
funds to member banks on their "time or demand notes having maturities of not
more than four months and which are secured to the satisfaction of such Federal
Reserve Bank. "140

134
12 USC§§ 412. 416 (1982).
m 12 USC § 412 (1982).
m See 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) f~ 35,630-35,690 (1983).
137
12 USC § 411 (1982).
138
12 USC §§ 343-347d (1982). See generally Board 0: Governors, The Federal
I{eserve System, Purposes & Functions (1984).
'3' 12 USC §§ 343-347d, 355 (1982).
140 '2 USC § 347b (1982). See also 12 USC § 347 (1982). The extension of credit by the
Reserve banks is discretlonary. See Billings Util. Co. v. Advisory Comm., Bd. of Gover-
nors, 135 F2c 108 (8t;, Cir. 1943); Raich1e v. Federal Resen'e Bank of NY, 34 F2d 910 (2d
3-31 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.04[411a)

At one time, the Board of Governors required that commercial paper be

negotiable in order to be eligible for discounting, although the Federal Reserve
Act did not impose this requirement. In addition. the Board's regulations did
not allow the discounting of commercial, agricultural, or industrial paper that
was not negotiable.'" In 1970, however, the Federal Reserve Board eliminated
the negotiability requirement. 142 Member banks may still decide in individual
cases to decline to accept nonnegotiable paper.

(a) Advances. An advance is a loan evidenced by a promissory note of the

borrowing bank and secured by adequate collateral. The customary collateral for
these advances is U.S. government or agency securities. Since many member
banks maintain their holdings of these securities at the Federal Reserve bank for
safekeeping, it is a convenient form of collateral for such loans.
Member banks usually borrow for very short periods only, often no more
than a few days. Banks often take out these loans in order to make a temporary
adjustment in its reserves, enabling it to deal with unexpected increases i.n loan
demand or sudden deposit losses, or unanticipated problems in raising funds
from the money market. The Federal Reserve banks scrutinize the borrowing
precess carefully to make sure it is not for speculative purposes. Member banks
may also borrow from the Federal Reserve banks when seasonal credit demands
make it dimcult for them to satisfy the credit demands in their communities. In
addition, the Federal Reserve stands as a source ofemergency credit to banks in
times of financial crises. '43
Regulation A describes the circumstances under which the Board of Gover-
nors makes its credit facilities available. The regulation states:
(b) Purpose. This part establishes rules under which Federal Reserve
banks may extend credit to depository institutions and others. Extcnding
credit to depository institutions to accommodate commerce, industry, and
agriculture is a principal function of Reserve banks. While open market
operations are the primary means ofaffecting the overall suppl y of reserves,
the lending function of the Reserve banks is an effective method of supply-
ing reserves to meet the panicular credit needs of individual depository
institutions. The lending functions of the Federal Reserve System are con..

Cir. 1929); Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin :-.lat'\ Bank, 559 F2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977).
cert. denied, 434 US 1012 (1978). See also Corbin v. Federal Rcserve Bank of NY, 458 F.
Supp. 143 (SONY 1978).
'" See 12 USC § 343 (1982). Sce also 12 CFR § 20 l.3(a) (1970); 9 Fed. Reserve Bull.
559 (1923).
'" 35 Fed. Reg. 6116 (1970).
14' For a description
of the role of the Federal Reserve system,as lender to Continental
Illinois National Bank and to Maryland thrift institutions in order to prevent collapse of
these financial institutions, See F. Solomon. W. Schlichting. T. Rice & J. Cooper, 4
Banking Law §§ 82.03[8). 82.03[9] (1987).
t 3.04[4][b) OVERVIEW 3-32

ducted with due regard to the basic objectives of monetary policy and the
maintenance of a sound and orderly financial system. These basic objec-
tives are promoted by influencing the overall volume and cost of credit
through actions that affect the volume and cost of reserves to depository
institutions. Borrowing by individual depository institutions, at a rate of
interest that is adjusted from time to time in accordance with prevailing
economic and money market conditions, has a direct impact on the reserve
positions of the borrowing institutions and thus on their ability to meet the
credit needs of their customers. However, the effects of such borrowing do
not remain localized but have an important bearing on overall monetary
and credit conditions.'"

[b] Discounts. Each Federal Reserve bank sets a discount rate, which is the
interest rate it will charge for member bank borrowing. This rate is established
by each Federal Reserve bank under the review and guidelines of the Board of
Governors. Of course, the Board of Governors can influence the extent of bank
borrowing by adjusting the discount rate.
Under the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980, the privilege of borrowing from the Federal Reserve banks was
extended to all depository institutions that are subject to the reserve require-
ments of that act. These institutions "shall be entitled to the same discount and
borrowing privileges as member banks."'" This provision opens up the Federal
Reserve banks' discount window to thrift institutions. Moreover, in administer-
ing the discount and borrowing privileges, the 1980 act directs the Board to take
into account "the special needs of saving and other depository institutions for
access to discount and borrowing facilities consistent with their long-term asset
portfolios and the sensitivity of such institutions to trends in the national money
market. 14'

Ie] Federal Reserve System Credit. Federal Reserve banks are authorized to
make credit available for the following purposes as described under Regulation
A: short-term adjustment credit, extended credit for seasonal needs, and other
extended credit. 14' Additionally, "in unusual and exigent circumstances," a
Reserve bank may give credit to persons who are not depository institutions if
necessary to protect the economy. The Board's regulation states:
§ 201.2 Availability and terms.
(a) Shorr-term adjusrment credit. Federal Reserve credit is available on a
short-term basis to a depository institution u:1der such rules as may be

14'12 CFR § 201.l(b) (1987).

145
12 USC § 461(b)(7) (1982).
14' Id.
'" 12 CFR § 201.3 (1987).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ~ 3.04[4I1cl
3-33

prescribed to assist the institution, to the extent appropriate, in meeting

temporary requirements for funds, or to cushion more persistent outflows
of funds pending an orderly adjustment of the institution's assets and
liabilities. Such credit generally is available only after reasonable alterna-
tive sources offunds, including credit from special industry lenders, such as
Federal Home Loan banks, the National Credit Union Administration's
Central Liquidity Facility, and corporate central credit unions have been
fully used. Under certain circumstances, a surcharge may be imposed above
the basic rate of interest normally charged by Reserve banks.
(b) Extended credit-(JJ Seasonal credit. Federal Reserve credit is
available for periods longer than those permitted under adjustment credit
to assist smaller depository institutions in meeting regular needs for funds
arising from a combination of expected patterns of movement in their
deposits and loans. Seasonal credit is available only if similar assistance is
not available from other special industry lenders. Seasonal credit will
ordinarily be limited to the amount by which the depository institution's
seasonal needs exceed certain percentages, established by the Board of
Governors, of the institution's average total deposits in the preceding
calendar year. Such credit will be available if the Reserve bank is satisfied
that the institution's qualifying need for funds is seasonal and will persist
for at least four weeks. Need for credit at depository institutions will also
be given consideration when institutions are experiencing unusual sea-
sonal demands for credit in a period of liquidity strain. To the extent
practicable, a depository institution should arrange in advance for sea-
sonal credit for the full period during which such credit is expected to be
requlfec. Under certain circumstances, a surcharge may be imposed
above the basic rate of interest normally charged by Reserve banks.
(2) Other extended credit. Federal Reserve credit is available to depos-
itory institutions under extended credit arrangements where similar
assistance is not reasonably available from other sources, including spe-
cial industry lenders. Such credit may be provided where there are excep-
tional circumstances or practices involving only a particular depository
institution. Exceptional circumstances would include situations where all
individual depository institution is experiencing financial strains arising
from particular circumstances or practices affecting that institu-
tIOn-including sustained deposit drains, impaired access to money map-
ket funds, or sudden deterioration in loan repayment performance.
Extended credit may also be provided to accommodate the needs of
depository institutions, including those with longer term asset portfolios,
that may by experiencmg difficulties adjusting to changing money market
conditions over a longer period, particularly at times of deposit dis-
intermediation. A special rate or rates above the basic discount rate
established by the Reserve banks. subject to review and determination by
the Board of Governors. may be applied to other extended credit.
(c) 1,mel'gel1cy credit/or Olhers. In unusual and exigent circumstances, a
Reserve bank may, after consultation with the Board. advance credit to
mdividuals, partnerships, and corporations that are not depository institu-
11 3.04[5I1a) OVERVIEW 3-34

tions if, in the judgment of the Reserve bank, credit is not available from
other sources and failure to obtain such credit would adversely affect the
economy. The rate applicable to such credit will be above the highest rate
for advances in effect for depository institutions. Where the collateral used
to secure such credit consists of assets other than obligations of, or fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or an agency
thereof, an affirmative vote of five or more Board members is required
before credit may be extended."s

[5] National Payments System: Fund Transfer and Check Collection

[a) Check Collection. The Federal Reserve System provides essential services
in check collection and electronic funds transfer systems, and in generally over-
seeing the national payments system. Through the Federal Reserve banks,
branches, and check clearing centers, the Federal Reserve System provides
facilities for processing checks for the depository institutions that choose to use
the Federal Reserve facilities. 14' The Board of Governors estimates that about
40 percent of the checks that are processed by the Federal Reserve System are
payable through an office located outside of the area where they were depos-
ited. 15<l A significant number of the nation's checks are processed through the
Federal Reserve System check clearing facilities. In 1986, the system processed
some 16.2 billion separate checks with a total value of over $11 trillion.'" Table
3-4 illustrates the importance of the system.
Checks are handled for collection as "cash" items under which credit is
made available in a prompt manner according to availability schedules estab-
lished by the Board. The system also provides a noncash collection service. This
service provides a mechanism for collecting payments for banker's acceptances,
bills oflading, documentary drafts, certain municipal securities, and checks that
cannot be processed through the normal check collection procedures.'s,

'''Id.
,.. The Board of Governors reports that there were 48 check clearing centers :n
operation at the end of 1983 at the various facilities mentioned in the text. They were
engaged in collecting some 57 million items each business day. Board of Governors, The
Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 106 (1984).
150 Id. at 107.

'" This broke down into 584 million U.S. government checks at a value of $606.0
billion, 140 m:llion postal money orders at a value of$ll.l billion, and 16.2 billion other
checks at a value of $11.1 trillion. 73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 244
(1987). These data report each check separately. In prioe years, the data recorded some
checks more than once if they were handled by more than one Federal Reserve check-
processing center. It is not kr.own whether the data in Table 3-4 count a d'ieck handled by
more than one Rese,-ve bank more than once.
mId. at 111.
3·35 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1I3.04{5][a]

TABLE 3-4 Number of Checks, Total and Collected by the Federal Reserve,
Selected Years, 1920-1983 '

Billions ofchecks
Total Collected by the Federal Resen'e
Year checks wruten Number Percent of TotaJ
1920 n.a, 0.5 n.a.
1930 n,a. 0.9 n.a.
1940 n.a. 1.1 n.ll.
1952 7.0 2.3 33
1967 17.9 5.4 30
1973 22.5 10.0 44
1981 35.5 15.9 45
1982 36.9 13,9 38
1983 38.4 14.3 37

n.a, = Not available.

Source: Board of Governors, Federal Rtserve System, Purposes & Functions 108 (1984).

The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of

1980 generally opened the Federal Reserve check clearance and collection mech-
anisms, as well as all other Federal Reserve services, to all depository institu-
tions on the same terms as member banks, The Federal Reserve is required to
establish pricing schedules for these services. m Some believe that h~ving the
Federal Reserve System "unbundle" its service pricing and charge. se.parately for
the services it makes available will encourage competition in the provision of
these services from private organizations. Because this act aims to equalize
competition with private enterprise, the prices charged by the Federal Reserve
must include a private sector adjustment factor for the overhead expenses that
private service suppliers would incur but that the Federal Reserve does not. '54
The Board has implemented the policies of the 1980 act by amending
Regulation J to define "bank" to include any depository institution within the
act. This amendment expands access to the Federal Reserve check collection
services by granting access to all depository institutions.'" The Board publishes
fee schedules for the check collection, wire transfer, currency and coin transpor-
tation and other services it makes available.

153 [2 USC § 248a (1982), See ~ 3.03[5),

1S4 12 USC § 248a(c) (1982),
ISS 12 CFR § 21 Q,2(b) (1987), incorporating the definition of bank in the Federal
Reserve Act, 12 USC § 461(0) (1982).
113.04[5J(bl OVERVIEW 3-36

Before the t 980 act opened up the Federat Reserve coUection facilities to all
depository institutions, the Board had refused to collect drafts issued by a
savings and loan association. The Board took the position that such drafts were
illegally issued and that the savings and loan association lacked the authority to
pay interest on demand accounts. When a savings and loan association sued the
Board to force the Federal Reserve to collect the drafts, the federal district court
granted the relief requested in a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that the
Board had no authority to enforce the provisions of the federal statute prohibit-
ing interest on demand accounts by denying access to its coUection facilities. 156
On one occasion when the Board of Governors revised its procedures for
check coUections in order to speed up the process, a group of private air couriers
objected to the changes. The couriers had contracted with banks to provide
transportation for the banks' check collections but the court ruled they did not
have standi:\g to challenge the changes made by the Federal Reserve System
under the 1980 act.'"

[bl Fund Transfers. The Federal Reserve System provides a mechanism for
transferring funds without using paper checks."· Through the use of telephonic
communication, computer processing, and other technological advances, the
system can quickly transfer funds in large amounts across the country. The
Federal Reserve facility for handling these transfers is called FedWire. In 1983,
FedWire handled an estimated 38 million transactions at a value of $84 tril-
lion.'" By 1986 the Board estimated it was processing approximately $500
billion every business day and handling as many as 50 million transactions for

'" Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 497 F. Supp. 370 (D. Colo. 1980),
aIT'd, 665 F2d 275 (10th Cir. 19B I). See 12 USC § 1B32 (1982). Compare Independent
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Board ofGovernors, 500 F2d 812 (DC Cir. 1974), where the court
permitted the Board to distinguish between member and nonmember banks in providing
check collection services as long as the Board did not act arbararily. The court held the
Board had a responsibility to nonmember banks not to unreasonably jeopardize or
prejudice their operations through changes in the way the service is administered, but that
responslbility did not require nonmember banks to be treated identically to member
banks. In this case, a nonmember bank charged the Board with unfair treatment because
the nonmember bank was not granted a lowering of reserve hmits as were member banks.
The court found, however, that reserve requirements of nonmember banks were estab-
lished by state law, and the Board had no power to lower :hem.
151 Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atiar. ta, 713 F2d 1221 (6th Cir.
1983).
,sa See generally Board of Governors, "The Federal Reserve and the Payments Sys-
tem: Upgrading Electronic Capabilities for the! 980's," 67 Fed. Reserve Bull. 109 (19B I);
N. Penney & D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (1980 & Supp.
1987); J. Vergari & V. Shue. Checks, Payments, and Electronic Banking (1986).
159 Board cfGovernors, Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 109 (1984).
3-37 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM '1 3.04(5Ilb]

the year with a value of about $124 trillion. '&0 The Board describes the FedWir¢
service as follows:
FedWire is typically used to transfer large dollar payments. All such trans-
fers are completed on the same day, usually in a matter of minutes, and are
guaranteed final when the receiving institution is notified of the credit to its
account. FedWire may be used by depository institutions to transfer funds
for their own account that result from purchases or sales offederal funds, to
move balances at correspondent banks, and to send funds to another institu-
tion on behalf of customers. Transfers on behalf of customers include flows
offunds associated with the purchase or sale ofsecurities, the replenishment
ofbusiness demand deposits, and other time-sensitive payments. The Trea-
sury Department and other federal agencies use FedWire extensively to
disburse and collect funds.

FedWire is a high speed, technologically sophisticated facility for transferring

large sums of money. The average transaction exceeds $1 milJion, and the
service handles billions of doUars in transactions each day. Its use has increased
as business customers have sought methods for obtaining close control and
management of their funds. Users can make transfers either by telephone or
through on-line computer linkups. In 1986, the number of funds transfers
increased by 10.6 percent over the prior year for a total of 49.9 million transac-
tions. 1&' This service and net settlement service (discussed later) earned revenues
of $82. 7 million against costs of $79.6 million in \986 illustrating the minimal
fees which customarily are charged for this service notwithstanding the large
dollar amounts of each transaction. 162 .

The Federal Reserve System also offers automated clearinghouse (ACH)

facilities, ACHs allow participating institutions to clear payments that are gener-
ated by electronically transmitted debits and credits. The Board describes the
operation of these ACH settlement and clearing networks as follows: 1&3
In an ACH operation, depository institutions, acting on a customer's
instructions, transmit debits and credits via delivery of magnetic tapes or
telecommunications links to the local ACH facility, much as they would
physically deiiver checks to a check-clearing facility. For example, with the
authorization of the payees, businesses and gO\'crnments can make many of

'60 Federal Reserve Bank ofDalJas. Financial Services Information, "Cross Roads," 4
(summer J 987).
61
' 73 ad. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep 210 (1987).
," Id. For addil10nal description of FedWi re and large <loBar eJectronic funds trans·
fer see N. Penney & D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fend Transfer Systems (1980 &
Supp. 1987). The law relating to the rights and liabilities of parties to these transactions is
discussed in Chapter 18.
,., Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Sys~e:n, Purposes & Functions
J 09-1 J 0 ( I984).
~ 3.04(5][b) OVERVIEW 3-38

their recurring payments for salaries, wages, commissions, interest, divi-

dends, annuities, social security, welfare, pensions, and the like through
ACHs, with the proceeds credited directly to the payee's account at his or
her depository institution without the prior issue ofa paper check. Consum-
ers may also authorize their depository institutions to make regular, recur-
ring payments through ACHs for such obligations as mortgages or utility
and insurance bills.
The Board reported that by 1986, the ACH systems "processed 363 million
commercial transactions, 28 percent more than in 1985,"'6' with the U.S. gov-
ernment being one of the largest users of this system.
The national and regional ACHs that are part ofthe Federal Reserve System
operate in cooperation with local ACHs and other private ACHs throughout the
country. A report from the Federal Reserve Bank ofDallas states that, "With the
exception of the second Federal Reserve District in which the ACH is operated
by a private group, each Federal Reserve bank operates one or more ACH
processing facilities in cooperation with local ACH associations. The Fed's roles
include acting as the processing agent, serving as the settling agency in regard to
ACH transactions, and acting as an originator of federal government payments
such as payroll, social security and certain military retirement funds and pay-
rolls.",., The Treasury also instituted a program for making payments to persons
who have supplied goods and services to the government through the ACH
network.'··
The following description from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas gi ves a
good explanation of how an ACH works:
There are at least five participants in an ACH transaction. They include
the customer or employee, the company or employer, the originating finan-
cial institution, the automated clearinghouse and the receiving financial
institution. The initial participant is the customer or employee who autho-
rizes electronic entries into his account. For payroll entries, the employer is
authorized to credit the employee's account each payday. Debits are also
preauthorized, allowing billing companies to coliect their payments on the
appropriate day.
The company or employer's financial institution originates the ACH
payments data through either a magnetic tape or :hrough a direct electronic
connection to the Federal Reserve. The originating financial institution
receives the data from the company. It retains entries pertinent to its
accounts and forwards the remaining data to the ACH. The autDmated
clearinghouse receives the entries from the onginating financial institu-
tions, creates new files of ACH credit and debit in:ormation and distributes

164
73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 210 (1987).
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Financial Services Information, "Cross Roads" 5
'65
(summer ,987).
,., Id. at 6.
3-39 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 11 3.04[S][c)

the electronic entries to the appropriate receiving financial institution. The

final participant in an ACH transaction is the receiving financial institu-
tion. It receives the data from the ACH and posts the entries to the accounts
of its customers. 1S7

The Federal Reserve System also provides "net settlement" service. This
service assists the participants in private check clearing houses or ACHs or wire
transfer systems to settle with each other at the end of the day. The Federal
Reserve bank will enter the net debits or credits of each participant resulting
from the day's clearings to the accounts these institutions have with the Federal
Reserve System. This gives the participants a prompt settlement in fedetal
funds. "a
The Federal Reserve System's communications and data processing ser-
vices are also used for the transfer and management of ownership of U.S.
government securities and some agency securities such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.
Most U.S. Treasury securities are now in "book-entry" form rather than in paper
certificates. For 1986, "the Federal Reserve processed 6.0 million transfers 6f
Treasury securities, 98 percent of which were on line." The Federal Reserve also
processed some 1.8 million federal agency securities in 1986, 98 percent of
which were on line.'·'

Ie) Regulatory Activities to Manage tbe Payment System. As a result of the

importance of the Federal Reserve System in the nation's payment system, the
Board of Governors is extensively involved in regulatory activities to manage
the payments system and in research and policy making for the development of
legislation. Regulation J contains the Board's rules for the Federal Reserve check
collection and wire transfer procedures."o These rules are superior to the provi-
sions of Article 4 of the uee on cheek collection as discussed in Chapters 14 and
18. "' The scope of these rules is discussed in Chapter 18.
The Federal Reserve System's authoritY to regulate the payments system
has been amended and expanded over the past few years. In 1987, the Expedited
Funds Availability Act of 1987'" greatly expanded the Board's authority to
regulate the payments system. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act 1T3 gave the

16'10. at 5.
16. Board of Governors. Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 110 (1984).
,a. 73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 211 (1987).
110
12 CFR § 210 (1987)
l11UCC § 4-103. .
'." The Expedited Funds Availability Act is Title VI of the Competitive Equality
Ranking".cl cf 1987, Pub. 1.. No. J 00-86, 101 Stat. 635 (1987).
"'15 USC §§ 1693-1693r(l982).
11 3.04(5I1c] OVERVIEW 3-40

Board authority over the payments system by conferring power to regulate

cenain electronic fund transfers. These rules are found in Regulation E. The
Electronic Funds Transfer Act and the Board's regulations are discussed in
Chapter 18.
In overseeing the operation ofthe payment system, the Federal Reserve has
addressed current issues of monetary and social policy in its research activities
and regulatory roles. One area of concern has been the extent of "float" created
by the system; the Board has developed rules for minimizing float and pricing it
for those who are advantaged by it. '" Federal Reserve "float" is credit that is
created as a result of the time it takes the check collection process to be com-
pleted. Because ofthis delay in collection, it is possible for credit for a check to be
on the books ofthe depository institution but not be removed from the books of
the payor institution. In 1986, daily average float was $446 million. This is a
significant reduction over previous years. Only five years earlier, float was at a
level of $4 billion per day.115
Another area of ongoing concern has been the management of risk on large
dollar wire transfer networks and ACHs. Because of the large dollar amounts
processed daily over these networks, the failure of an institution to settle its
liabilities to other panicipants on the network at the close of business could have
gravely serious ripple effects throughout the national banking system. To deal
with such potential problems, the Board has adopted a policy on large dollar
transfers and proposed additional rules for other areas. 176
Other examples of Board policies studies include the development ofexper-
imental programs for testing revised procedures for handling check returns of
small item checks dishonored for insufficient funds 117 and studies conducted in
consumer related areas. The Board is considering the need for requiring banks to
provide "basic banking" services and is studying techniques for speeding up the
time it takes to receive notice of dishonor of checks so that the delay that some
depository institutions require before customers may withdraw funds for depos-
ited checks in the process of collection may be reduced. 1T8

174 73 Rd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 212 (1987). See also Board of

Governors, Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 107-108 (1984).

175 Id.

116 73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 1')3-194, 205-206 (1987). See
also D. Baker & R. Brandel, The Law of Electronic Fun': Transfer Systems § 9.02[2]
(Supp. 1987).
177 The Board approved a policy authorizing collecting banks to automatically rede-

posit dishonored checks that are in small amounts. The vanous Federal Reserve banks
wit: each determine what amounts will qualify checks for the redeposit program. This
policy was adopted after a pilot study demonstrated a high percentage ofsucnchecks were
paid when re-presented. 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 566 (Mar. 25, 1987).
178 73 Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 210 (1987).
 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM " 3.04[6I1 al
3-41

[6J Credit and Interest Controls

The Board historically has exercised regulatory authority over interest a'nd
credit in three areas: (I) interest rates payable by member institutions on deposit
accounts' (2) by means of its margin requirements, the extent to which securities
may se~e as collateral for loans for the purchase and holding of stock; and (3)
use of broad controls in times of serious economic inflation to limit the exten-
sion of credit. As of 1988, the Federal Reserve is engaged only in regulating the
extension of credit in securities transactions. The control of interest on deposits
phased out in 1986 in accordance with federal law. The authority to exercise
general credit controls expired in 1982. As these functions may be of continued
interest, this section briefly describes the Board's powers in these areas.

[al Margin Requirements for Securities Credit. The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 gives the Board of Governors authority to regulate the use of credit for
the purchase and carrying of certain securities. The purpose of regulating securi-
ties' credit is to minimize fluctuations in stock values from speculative dealing
encouraged by easy credit arrangements. The Board explains its policy in the
following statement:
The main purpose of margin requirements is to inhibit undue fluctua-
tions in stock prices that might be fostered by the excessive use of credit in
the purchase of securities or by highly leveraged short sales or transactions
in options, Although sharp changes in stock prices are always possible,
restrictions on the use of credit may limit cumulative price increases and
decreases and reduce the risk that fluctuations in the stock market will have
destructive effects on financial markets and the economy generally, as well
as on the individual Investor, 179

The Board implements this policy through a set of regulations aimed at

different groups ofcredit extenders and users, Regulation T governs brokers and
dealers; Regulation U applies to banks; Regulation G covers other lenders; and
Regulation X extends the requirements of the thee regulations previously stated
to transactions in securities where credit was obtained outside the United States
and requires all persons in the United States who use securities credit to
comply, '"
Ur.der Regulation U, the Board exercises authority to determine the extent
to whicr. a bank may extend credit for the purchase of equity securities. The
amount of credit a bank may extend is based upon a percentage of the current

179 Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. Purposes & Fur.clions 72 (1984),
18
°12 CFR § 207 (Regulation G, Securities C,edit by Persons Other than Banks,
Hrokers, or Dealers); § 220 (Regulation T. Credit by Brokers and DeaJcrs); § 221 (Regula-
tion U, Credit by Banks for the Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stock); § 224
(Regulation X. Borcowers of Securities eredi:) (J 98~),
11 3.04[6J[bl OVERVIEW 3-42

market value of the stock as established by the Board. This percentage is called
the margin requirement. Thus, if the Board sets the percentage at 60 percent, a
purchaser of stock must pay for 60 percent of the stock based on its current
market value. This purchaser then would be able to borrow the remaining 40
percent of the value of the stock to finance the acquisition. In situations where
the bank has extended credit based on the market value of the stock at the time
the loan was made and the stock subsequently declines in market value, the
margin rules do not require the bank to demand additional collateral. The loan
remains in compliance with the margin requirements notwithstanding fluctua-
tions in the price of the stock as long as there was compliance at the time the
credit was extended.'I' The bank may have other reasons for requiring the
borrower to either reduce the indebtedness or provide additional COllateral, such
as the desire to have the loan adequately secured at all times. The regulations do
not prevent the bank from exercising such judgment in its lending
arrangements.'I2
The Regulation U margin requirements apply to "margin stock." This
includes, among others, equity securities traded on national securities exchanges
and certain over-the-counter stocks designated by the Board.'83
If the transaction involves margin stock and the extension of credit is
secured, directly or indirectly, by that stock, the Dank is prohibited from
extending credit in any amount in excess of the loan value of the stock under the
margin rules. The regulation states:'84 "No bank shall extend any purpose credit,
secured directly or indirectly by margin stock, in an amount that exceeds the
maximum loan value of the collateral securing the credit." The Board regulation
further defines how to measure the credit extended under different financing
situations.

[bl Interest Rate Controls. The Board of Governors previously exercised con-
trol over the amount of interest and dividends paid to customers by member
banks; the other federal banking regulatory agencies had similar authority for
the banks under their supervision, Federal law prohibits member banks from
paying interest on demand deposits "directly or inc.irectly, by any device what-
soever."'" A similar statutory prohibition exists with respect to the demand

'I' 12 CFR § 221.3(a)(2) (1987).

'" See the explanation of the margin requirements i~ Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 72-73 (1984): see generally, Annol., "What Con-
stitutes Violation of Provisions of Margin Requirements fo~ Banks Under § 7 of Securities
Exchange Act of 1954 (15 U.S.c. § 78(g») and Regulation L' Promulgated Thereunder (12
C.F.R. §§ 221 1 et seq.)," 34 ALR fed. 332 (1977) .
•83 12 CFR § 221.2(11) (1987).
18( 12 CFR § 221.3(a) (1987)

'85 12 USC § 371a (1982).

3-43 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM If 3.04[6Ilb]

deposits ofinsured nonmember banks.'" But interest may be paid on other types
of deposits that are not "demand deposits." In the past, the regulatory agencies
controlled the extent to which interest could be paid on those accounts. Federal
legislation required the agencies to establish interest rate ceilings that would
maintain a differential between the rates paid by insured banks and savings and
loan associations to permit savings and loan associations to pay a higher rate.
The Board regulations on the interest rate banks could pay on various time
deposits and savings accounts were contained in Regulation Q.'''
In 1980. Congress decided to terminate interest regulation over a phase-in
period. Congress accomplished this with the enactment of the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 188 This act affected the
former scheme of interest controls in two ways. Firstly, it permitted depository
institutions such as savings and loan associations, credit unions, and banks to
offer accounts that were not "demand deposits" but that were accounts that gave
the customer rights to make payments by cheek. It authorized the creation of
NOW accounts for eligible individuals and nonprofit organizations on which
interest could be paid but that also allowed checking privileges, and it liberalized
the rules on linkages between savings and checking accounts. ,., (The different
types of accounts are discussed in Chapter 19.) Secondly, the act put in place a
program for deregulating the control of interest rates.
In enacting the 1980 act, Congress responded to two problems that it
believed the regulation ofinterest rates created for savers and depository institu-
tions. These problems were (I) when the market rate for money was higher than
the legal rate for depository institutions, small savers were penalized to the
extent that they did not place their funds in alternative investments and the

186 12 USC § I 828(g) (1982).

117 Regulation Q is codified at 12 CFR § 217 (1987). The interest rate ditTaentlal
between banks and thrift institutions was eliminated by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of! 980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 207(b)( 1),94 Stat.
144 (1980) (codified at 12 USC § 3506(b)(l» and further repealed by the Gam-St
Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 326, 96 Stat. 1469
(1982) (codified at 12 USCA § 3503 note).
m Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. ! 32 (codified in scattered sections of titles 12, 15
USC) (J 982).
"'12 USC §§ l785(f), 1832 (1982). See also generally Anno\., "Power of Savings
Banks or Similar Institution to Provide Checking Facilities or Negotiable Orders of
Withdrawal (NOW) to Customers," 64 ALR3d 1314 (I 975); Annat., "Authority aCCredit
Union to Engage in 'Share-Draft' Business," \4 ALR4th 1155 (191l2). Prior to congres-
sional approval. there was some litigation o\·er etTorts by thrift institutions to otTer
checklike accounts on which interest was paid. See Hondo Nat'l Bank v. Gill Sav. Ass'n,
696 F2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal statute prohibiting paying interest on demand
deposits does not create an impiied cause of action enforceable by commercial banks);
Otero Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 665 F2d 279 (IOlh Cir.
1981 ).
t 3.04[6I1b] OVERVIEW 3-44

depository institutions were injured to the extent they were unable to compete
with the alternative investments and (2) the structure of different maximum
rates for different classes of depository institutions created competitive imbal-
ances. In Congress's view, the solution was to deregulate the control of interest
rates; thus, it created a process to eliminate interest rate controls by member
banks, insured banks, and other depository institutions by April I, 1986.'90 To
accomplish this, the Depository Institution Deregulation Committee was cre-
ated. This committee was responsible for the gradual elimination of controls
according to target rates set by the act.'"
The phaseout of interest rate regulation was accomplished on March 31,
1986; thus, there are no longer any limitations on the amount of interest that
depository institutions covered by the 1980 Act may pay for deposits other than
demand deposits. The Deregulation Committee went out of existence on the
same date and transferred whatever residual authority it had to the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury.'92
Although federal regulation of the amount of interest depository institu-
tions may pay was terminated, member banks of the Federal Reserve System
continue to be subject to the prohibition of the payment of interest on demand
deposits. Therefore, the distinction between demand deposits and other depos-
its remains relevant. In addition, the reserve requirements an institution must
maintain are based upon the type of accounts the institution holds. '93 When the
account has checking features, it is classified as a transaction account, for which
reserves must be maintained at a level set by the Board. If the account is a
"nonpersonal time deposit," the Board requires reserves as well. As a result,
many ofthe distinctions previously incorporated in the Board's Regulation Q on
interest rates have been carried forward into Regulation D on required reserves.
The Board of Governors continues to regulate the advertising of interest on
deposits. When advertisements refer to an interest rate, the rate must be the
annual rate of simple interest. In addition, advertisements must include a "clear
and conspicuous notice" of any penalties for early withdrawal that depositors
may be subject to. Advertisements must be accurate and may not mislead or
misrep~esent the nature of the bank's deposit contracts.'"

190 12 USC § 3506b (1982).

'91 The cOr.1mittee was composed ofthe Secretary of the Treasury, the chairman ofthe
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. the chairman of the Board of D,re,-
tors of the FDIC, the chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. and the chairman
of the National Credit Union Administration Board. The Comptroller of the Currency
was a nonvot,ng member. 12 USC § 3502 (1982).
", 51 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1986). Fora special report on the effectiveness of the Deregula-
tion Committee, see 49 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 154 (July 26. 1982).
19J See 11 3.04[2].
19'12 CFR § 217.6 (1987).
3-45 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 'i1 3.04{6J[e)

[e) Credit Controls. At various times Congress has made the Federal Reserve
System responsible for managing the availability of credit in the national econ-
omy. The Board exercised these controls during World War II and the Korean
War. '9S The most recent experience with credit controls occurred for a brief
period in 1980. Although there is no longer authority for the Board to exercise
such credit controls, a brief description of the 1980 experience is appropriate in
view of the importance of such regulatory measures.
On December 23, 1969, Congress enacted a statute giving the Board of
Governors authority to impose credit controls, including (upon presidential
authorization) the power to (1) establish license requirements for persons who
engage in credit transactions; (2) prescribe the maximum amount of credit that
may be extended in connection with any loan, purchase, or other credit transac·
tion; and (3) prescribe the maximum rate of interest, maximum maturity, mini-
mum periodic payment, or any other specification or limitation ofthe terms and
conditions of any extension of credit. 1M On March 14, 1980, President Carter
authorized the Board to exercise all the authority conferred by the statute.'97
Upon receiving this authority, effective the same day, the Board put into place a
broad program aimed at constraining the amount of credit. 198
The Board took a number of actions designed to make the extension of
credit more expensive. A major part ofthe program consisted ofconsumer credit
constraint measures that required various consumer lenders to maintain special
non-interest·bearing deposits of 15 percent on increases over a base amount on
many types of consumer credit. The program also included similar deposit
requirements for certain liabilities held by nonmember commercial banks,
deposit requirements for money market mutual funds, voluntary guidelines on
the growth of bank loans, and restrictions on access to the Federal Reserve
discount services. These controls were short-Ii vee , The president revoked the
Board's powers, which finally expired on October 31, 1980,19' The act itself
expired in 1982,
The program adopted by the Board in 1980 illustrates the extensive power
Congress had conferred on the Board. The voluntary credit restraint program
apphcd to domestic commercial banks, bank holding companies, finance com-
pames that extended business credit, and U.S. agencies and branches offoreign
banks financing U.S. residents. It provided that lending increases should be
consistent with announced growth ranges for money and credit, with growth in
bank loans conforming to an upper limit growth rate of 6 to 9 percent. Banks

"55ee Board of Governors, Federal Reserve SystelT., Purposes & Functions 71-72
(1984).
19'12 USC §§ 1901-1910(1982),
197 Exec, Order No. 12,201, 45 Fed, Reg. 17.123 (! 980),

'9'5ee 45 Fed. Reg. 17,924-17.936 (J980).

19' Exec. Order No. 12,225, 45 Fed, Reg, 45,571 (1980),
11 3.04[6/[c] OVERVIEW 3-46

with slow growth patterns were supposed to confine their growth to the lower
percentage. Banks were also urged to restrain unsecured consumer lending,
including credit card and other revolving credit extensions, although no numeri-
cal guidelines were established. Automobile, home mortgage, and home
improvement credit extensions were treated in the usual manner. The program
discouraged financing for corporate mergers and takeovers except where justi-
fied by efficiency considerations, and discouraged financing for speculative
commodity and other transactions.
The program did not establish guidelines on the terms and pricing of bank
loans, but it did urge lenders to establish rates reflecting the marginal cost of
funds. Banks were expected to adjust their rates and terms to accommodate the
special needs of small businesses. The program also included extensi ve reporting
requirements. Banks and other financial institutions with assets over $1 billion
were required to supply monthly reports. Banks with assets from between $300
million to $1 billion were required to supply quarterly reports.
The consumer credit restraint program covered not only commercial banks
but also finance companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations, mutual
savings banks, retail establishments, gasoline companies, and travel/enter-
tainment card companies. A broad range of consumer credit was cov-
ered-credit cards, overdraft and check credit plans, unsecured personal loans,
loans secured by preowned borrower collateral, open accounts and thirty-day
credit arrangements. Automobile loans, mobile home loans, furniture and appli-
ance loans, and home mortgage and improvement purchase money financing
were not covered.
The experience of this period illustrates the far-reaching emergency powers
that Congress in the past has given the Board of Go\'ernors to manage the use
amount of credit in the economy.
 4
National Banks
1i 4.()\ Overview ... ............ .. ............ 4·[
[[] Organization of National Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4·2
[2] Charters for Nonbank Banks 4-4
[3] Changes in Names and Locations of National Banks. . . . . . . 4-5
[4J Suits Against "'ationa! Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
~ 4.02 The Comptroller of the Currency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
TABLL 4-[ Regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency . . . . . 4·8
[IJ National Bank Holidays and Emergency Powers. . . . . . . . . . 4·9
[2] Unclaimed Property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4·10
r, 4.03 Powers of National Banks ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4- I I
[I] Express Powers of National Banks 4·!2
lal Trust Authority .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4·[2
{b] Rea! Estate Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-12
[cJ Transactions in Coin and Bullion , 4·13
[dl Financing by Leasing Personal Property , 4-i 3
Ie] Lotteries 4-\4
[2] The Incidental Powers of National Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-14
faJ Borrowing Money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-16
[oj Insurance Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-16
j c] Computer Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-17
[d\ Guaranty Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-18
leI Other Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-J 9
[:] Ultra Vires Acts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4-19

~ 4.01 OVERVIEW

National banks. or national banking associations, as they are termed by the

National Bank Act, are chartered under federal law. This section. discusses the
organization, powers, and restrictions aflecting national banks.

4-1
~4,OI[11 OVERVIEW 4-2

(11 Organization of National Banks

The Comptroller of the Currency is the primary supervisor and regulator for
national banks and must approve the creation of a national bank. ' The comp-
troller has considerable discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an
application to establish a national bank. 2 Also, as described in Chapter 3,
national banks are members of the Federal Reserve System and so must comply
with the limitations placed upon member banks by the Federal Reserve Act of
1913 and its amendments. They must subscribe to the capital stock of the
Federal P.cscrve b2nk for their district,' and they are subject to the limitations
applicable 10 holding stock in a Federal Reserve bank.'
National banks must be insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion before they can engage in business as banks. sThus, restrictions applicable to
insured banks imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act also are applicable
to national banks.' Before a national bank can be approved for insurance, the
Comptroller of the Currency must certify to the FDIC that consideration was
given to "[t]he financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its
capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its man-
agement, the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the bank,
and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of [the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act].'"
The comptroller has adopted regulations to govern the procedures for
obtaining a national bank charter.· These procedures include the opportunity
for interested parties to submit written comments on the application, which
must be made available in a public file, and to request a hearing on the applica-
tion. The procedures also include a statement of potic)' by the comptroller on the
factors that win be considered in passing upon an application. This statement
includes the following comments:

1 The provisions of the U.S. Codc dealing with the Comptroller of the Currency are
found at J2 esc §§ 1-14 (1982), and those dealing with national banks as such are at 12
USC §§ 2 J -216 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Before a national bank can begin business, the
comptroi!er must approve. 12 USC §§ 26, 27 (1982).
2 Sec City Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 513 F2d 479 (DC Cir. J 975); Firs! Nat" Bank v.
Smith, 508 F2d 1371 (8thCir.1974),cert.denied,421 US 930 (1975); Bank of Commerce
v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F2d 284 (5th Cir. J973), cen. denied, 416 US 905 (1974); Sterling
Nal'l Bank Y. Camp. 431 F2d 514 (5th Cir. J970), ccrt. denied, 401 L:S 925 (J971).
, 12 USC §§ 282. 287 (1982).
'See d:scussion in ~~ 3.03[3], 3.03[4J.
'12 esc § 1814(b) (1982).
6 The provisions of federal law deaEng with the FD1C are found at 12 USC
§§ 1811-1832 (1982 & Supp. III /985). The ForC is discussed in Chaplers 10, 11.
'\2 USC § 1816 (1982).
'12 CFR pI. 5 (1<;87).
4-3 NATIONAL BANKS \l4.01{1]

The statutory factors the Office must consider in deciding whether to

approve or disapprove applications to establish new banks are:
(I) The bank's future earnings prospects;
(2) The general character of its management;
(3) The adequacy of its capital structure;
(4) The convenience and needs of the community to be served by the
bank;
(5) The financial history and condition of the bank; and
(6) Whether or not it has complied with all provisions of the National
Bank Act and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the
purposes of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
(d) Policy. The purpose of this policy statement is to set forth the am\lyti-
cal framework within which the Office seeks to fulfill its responsibilities to
determine whether a proposed bank is likely to be operated in a safe and
sound manner, possesses reasonable prospects for success and can be
expected to help meet the credit needs of its entire community. This policy
statement is also intended to facilitate applicant and public understanding
of the decision process, to aid in the structuring of new bank proposals and
the development of information necessary for the evaluation of proposals,
and 10 minimize the filing of unwarranted proposals. It should be empha-
sized at the outset that administration of :he statute necessarily involves a
rigorous appraisal and a weighing of the relevant statutory factors in the
context of the economic and competitive conditions of the community
(market) to be served. Because of complex relationships among the factors,
evaluation of the application is based upon both objective facts and subjec-
tive judgments that reflect the experience of the Office as the principal
supervisor and regulator of national banks. In making these judgments, the
Office is guided by the following principles: the Office has responsibility for
maintaining a sound banking system: the marketplace normally is the best
regulator of economic activity; and compet;tion allows the marketplace to
function and promotes a sound and more efficient banking system that
better serves customers. Accordingly, it is the policy of the Office to foster
competition through the chartering of national banks proposed by
organizers and proposed directors (hereinafter, "the organizing group")
whose experience and resources, plans for establishing and operating a bani<:
(hereinafter "the operating bank"), financial strength, competency and
honesty indicate that within the context of the economic and compet\tive
conditions in the market to be served, the proposed bank will ha\'c a
reasonable likelihood of success and will be operated in a safe and sound
manner. It is not the policy of the Office to ensure that a proposal is without
risk nor to protect existing competitors from the competition a new bank
will provide.'

, ; 2 CFR § 5.20 (1987)

IT 4.01[2J OVERVIEW 4-4

When the application is on behalf of a bank holding company or is on behalf of

applicants who have had previous experience in banking, the comptroller explic-
itly takes into account the applicant's record of past performance.'o
The comptroller determines the adequacy of the capital of the proposed
bank. Federal law requires that all of the capital stock of a national bank be paid
in before the bank begins business. 11 It also imposes limitations upon the use of
preferred stock and the payment of dividends. In addition, federal law contains
provisions to protect shareholders' rights to vote for directors of the bank." At
one time the shareholders in national banks had a double liability for the debts of
the bank, but the additional liability beyond the amount of their investment in
the bank's shares was eliminated in 1953."
There must be at least five directors" but not more than twenty-five direc-
tors for a national bank. 15 Directors must be U.S. citizens who reside in an area
near where the bank will be located, and they must invest a minimum of$1 ,DOD
in shares of stock in the bank. 16 There are additional restrictions on directors
that deal with management interlocks with other financial and commercial
firms."

121 Charters for Nonbank Banks

As discussed in Chapter 5, until the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, the Bank Holding Company Act defined a "bank" (for the purposes of that
legislation) such that corporate organizations were permitted to acquire finan-
cial institutions that were chartered as banks by the comptroller or other banking
agencies but that were not entities that came within the Bank Holding Company
Act definition. As defined under the Bank Holding Company Act, an enterprise
was not a bank unless it both accepted demand deposits and made commercial
loans. Therefore, a bank that did not make commercial loans was not regarded as
a bank for purposes of the act. Because of concern that these "nonbank banks"
represented a threat to the regulatory structure of the national banking system,
the comptroller initiated a moratorium on the granting of charters for such
banks." When Congress did not pass legislation addressing the issue, the comp-

10 12 CFR § 5.20(d)(iv) (1987).

11 12 USC § 53 (1982).
12 See 12 USC §§ 51 a, 51 b, 51 b-;. 60. 61 (1982).

13 12 USC § 64a (1982).

14 12 USC §§ 71, 71 a ( 1982).

'512 USC§7Ia(1982).
"12 USC § 72 (1982).
'7 See ~ 9.02[6]. Restrictions related to affiliations wnh firms engaged in securities

business are discussed at ~ 8.0 I.

16 The cDmptrDller's announcement is repDrted at 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
r 58,825 (Apr. 13, 1983).
4·5 NATIONAL BANKS 1i 4.01141

trDlIer ended the moratorium and began acting on pending applications to

establish nonbank banks. This stimulated litigatiDn tD prevent the comptroller
from issuing new charters for nonbank banks. An injunction was entered against
the comptroller in a Florida law suit.'· The litigation challenged the ability of the
comptroller to charter banks that did not engage in a full range of banking
functions, '0 However, this question may remain unresolved. After the passage of
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, the parties moved to withdraw
the litigation. The nonbank bank is discussed in Chapter 5,

[3] Changes in Names and Locations of National Banks

A national bank must have the word "national" in its name." Under earlier
legislation, a national bank could not change its name 22 or change the location of
its main office without obtaining the approval of the comptroller. Federal law
now provides that the name may be changed upon notice to the comptroller.
Likewise, the location of the bank's main office may be changed upon notice to
the comptroJler if the change is to an authorized branch location within the city
where the bank is situated; otherwise, the comptroller's approval is necessary for
a change in lDcation. 2J
Branch banking, mergers, and acquisitions are discussed in Chapters 6 and
13,

[4] Suits Against National Banks

Before the enactment of the Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
Df1982, Congress had limited the places where national banks could be sued.
The National Bank Act contained a special venue ;Jrovision that provided that

"Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am, v. Conover. :<0. 84-1403 (MD Fla. Feb. 15,
1985).
'0 The nonbank bank provisions oft he Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 are
discussed in Chapter 5. A similar argument was unsuccessfully made in Clarke v. Securi-
ties Indus, Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), where the court held that a discount brokerage
subsidiary was not engaged in "core banking" functions and so was not a branch bank
within the meaning of the federal statute. See the discussion of this case in 'i\ 6.01[11-
" 12 USC § 30 (1982).
"See North Dakota v, Merchants Nat" Bank & Trust Co., 634 F2d 368 (8th Cir.
1980), in which the court held the comptroller's approval of a name change by a national
bank preempted state unfair competi~ion law, which, it had been argued, prohibited the
use of the new name With the elimination of the comptroller's authority to approve name
changes, the results in such cases may well be different. See also Pioneer First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v, Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 98 Wash. 2d 853. 659 P2d 48 J (19,83), For a case
~pholding the discretion of the comptrollcr under the prior law. see First Nat'l Bank v.
National Bank, 667 F2d 708 (8th Cir. 1981).
"12 USC § 31 (1982).
H.Ol[4) OVERVIEW 4-6

national banks could be sued in federal court only in ,he district where the bank
was "established."" The general rule was that "the place specified in a bank's
charter as its home office is determinative of the district in which the bank is
'established' for purposes of§ 94. "25 This provision also limited the places where
a national bank could be sued in a state or local court to the place where the bank
was "located."26 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the word "located" to
mean wherever a branch office of the bank could be found. 27 However, a bank
may waive these rights if it so wishes'>'
With the adoption of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, the
special venue provision fo~ national banks was elimi:lated. 29 Under present law,
a national bank is subject to suit under the general venue provisions of the
procedural law, and parties suing national banks will not be limited to the places
where the bank was "established" or "located."
The 1982 act does, however, contain limitations on the places where receiv-
ers of national banks may be sued. The act provides that when the FDIC has
been appointed as receiver of a national bank, any legal action against that bank
or against the FDIC as receiver must be brought in the federal district court in
the district where the bank hasits principal place of business?O When a state or
local court has jurisdiction over an action against a national bank, the action
must be brought in the county or city where the bank's principal place of
business is located."
When a sua is brought against a national bank in a state court or local court,
12 USC § 91 prohibits the state court from entering an "attachment, injunction.

" 12 USC § 94 (1976 l.

25 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 US 148, 151 n.2 (1976).
25
12 USC § 94 (19761.
2' Citizens & S. :\'at'l Bank v. Bougas. 434 US 35 (19-ij.

"International Travellers Cheque Co. v. BankAmeriea Corp., 660 F2d 215 (7th Cir.
1981) (bank's appearance before the trademark trial and appeal board does not constitute
a waIver of venue); Hamelly bt'l, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank. 199 Mont. 221, 648 P2d 282
(1982) (i'ievada National Bank's relationship with a CUSlOmer in Montana was not suffi-
cientlO constetute a waiver of venue). In First Nat'[ Bank v. Distnct Court, 653 P2d 1123
(Colo. ; 982). a waiver of venue was found from the bank's prior suit i" the same county
against the same panics dealing with the same transacticn.
"Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406.96 Stat. 1469 (1982.) (amending J 2 USC § 94). Board of
Managers v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A .. 116 Ill. App. 3d 690, 452 NE2d 382 (1983),
held that the, 982 revisions to the venue provisions of troe National Bank Act could be
applied retroactively. This issue was clarified in Pub. L. 1"0 97-457, 20(b), 96 Stat. 2509
( I982 J. which provided that the 1982 venue changes "shaH be deemed to have taken effecl
upon the enactment ..." of the law that made the change. The enactment date was
October 15, 19~2. See generally Wolff. "Nat:onal Banks and the Vanishing Venue
Defense," 97 (Janking LJ 245-253 (1980).
'·'Pub. l.. No. 97-320. § 406.96 Stat. 1469 (1982). See discussion of suits against
receivers in Chapter 10.
J1 Id.
 NATIONAL BANKS ~ 4.02
4-7

or c,.;ecution" against the bank "before final judgment."" This section has been
interpreted to mean that the state court cannot take action to enforce its judg-
ment until the available appcal process has been completed."

'1 4.02 The Comptroller of the Currency

The Comptroller of the Currency is the chief officer of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, which is located in the Department of the Trea-
sury. The office is charged by law "with the execution of all laws passed by
Congress relating to the issue and regulation of a national currency secured by
United States bonds and, under the general supervision oflhe Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, of all Federal Reserve notes .... "3' Further
regulatory authority is given to the comptroller by specific statutes,
The comptroller is appointed by the president, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of five years unless removed sooner by the
presiden!." The comptroller serves under the general direction of the Secretary
of the Treasury," and is required to make an annual report to Congress}1
The comptroller's approval must be obtained before a bank may be organ-
ized to do business as a national bank.'· Before issuing a certificate of approval,
the comptroller must conduct an inquiry into the condition of the banking
association and determine that it is lawfully entitled to commence the business
of banking."
Once the bank becomes a national bank, the comptroller has extensive
powers to regulate its activities. Every national bank must make reports of
condition to the comptroller in such fOfm and containing such information as

"12 esc § 91 (1981).

"In United States v. Lemaire, 826 F2d 387 (5th Cir. 1987), a Texas state court
enteredjudgmenl against a national hank on behalfofcredilors of the bank. The creditors
then served a writ of garnishment on the Federal Reser"e Bank of Dallas ',0 collect their
jcdgment. This procedure was available to them undcr ;tate law. The FOre and the
comptroller then brought s'Jit in federal court to enjoin the creditors from enforcing their
Judgment. The federal court ruled in favor of the comptroller and the FDIC. The court
emphasized thc national interest in preventing the "premature. and potentially fatal,
sellure of assets of an operational bank ...." and indicated the comptroller would be
hi"dered in carryir.g out his responsibilities as supervisor of national hanks if il were
possible for nedilors to seize the national bank's assets pnor to the exhaustion ofappeal
rights.
34
12 l;SC § I (1982).
35
12 USC § 2 (1982).
,... 12 USC § 1(1982).
3i 12 USC § 14 (1982).

JB 12 USC § 26 (1982).

"12 USC 9 27 (1982).

~ 4.02 OVERVIEW 4-8

TABLE 4-1 Regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency*

12
CFR
Pt. Regula/ion

I Investment securities regulation

2 Disposition of credit life insurance income
3 Minimum capital ratios; issuance of directives
4 . Description of office, procedures, public information
5 Rules, policies, and procedures for corporate activities
6 [Reserved]
7 Interpretive rulings
8 Assessment of fees; national banks; District of Columbia banks
9 Fiduciary powers of national banks and collective investment funds
10 Municipal securities dealers
II Securities Exchange Act disclosure rules
12 Recordkeeping and confirmation requirements for securities
transactions
13-15 ~Reservedl
16 Securities offering disclosure rules
18 Annual financial disclosures to shareholders
19 Rules 0: practice and procedure
20 International operations regulation
21 Minimt:m security devices and procedures for national and district
banks
Loans in areas having special flood hazards
23-24 [Reserved]
25 Community Reinvestment Act regulations
26 Y1anagement official interlocks
27 Fair housing home loan data system
28 Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks
29 Adjustable-rate mortgages
30 Real estate loans
31 Extensions of cred~t to national bank insiders
32 Lending limits
33 Disposi:ion of unclaimed property recovered from closed natiOnal banks
34 Real estate lending
35-199 [Reserved]

'12 CFR pt,. 1-199 (19P). ;,ee Fed. Banking L. Rep. ICCH) for unuffici,1 reproduction of
rcgulatlom,
4-9 NATIONAL BANKS 1/4.02[IJ

the comptroller prescribes. The comptroller may can for 5pecial reports when-
ever he or she believes that such reports may be necessary to perform his or her
supervisory duties.'o The comptroller has the further authority to examine
national banks and, pursuant to that examination, "to administer oaths and to
examine any of the officers and agents thereof under oath" in order to make a
"full and detailed report of the condition" of tte bank." Examinations may be
made as often as the comptroller deems necessary." Any refusal of the bank to
permit such an examination or to supply the required information may result in
the forfeiture ofall rights of the bank. 43 The com;:>troller is authorized to publish
bank examination reports."
The comptroller is also authorized to regulate the conversion and merger of
national banks, the establishment of branch banks, and the dissolution ofbanks.
For a discussion of these topics, see Chapters 6, IO. and 13.
The comptroller may grant national banks the authority to engage in trust
activities. C5 This authority may be revoked by the comptroller if the national
bank "unlawfully and unsoundly" exercises the authority." Finally, the corr.p-
lroller has authority to issue rules and regulations to carry out the responsibili-
ties of the office.'''

[1\ National Bank Holidays and Emergency Powers

The president of the United States has emergency authority to suspend all
or part of the operations of banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System during "such emergency period as the President of the United States by
proclamatlOn may prescribe ....",. The comptrciler also has emergency powers
to declare legal 110lidays for national banks. The statute provides that "in the
event of national calamity, riot, insurrection, war, or other emergency condi-
tions occurring in any State whether caused by acts of nature or of man, ... " the
comptroller may declare a legal holiday by proclamation for national banks in
the statc or part of the state that is affected by the emergency.49
When a state authority declares a bank holiday for state banks for eithcr
emergency o~ ceremonial reasons, the holiday automatically applies to national

<012 ',;SC § 161 (1982).

"12 USC § 481 (1982).
'2 Id.
4J rd.

" ld.
" 12 USC § 92a(a) (1982).
" 12 USC § nark) (1982).
4i 12 USC § 93a (1982).

"12 USC § 95(a) (1982).

49 12 USC § 95(b) (1982).
11 4.02[2] OVERVlEW 4-10

banks located in the state. However, national ba:1ks may choose whether to close
or remain open during the holiday unless the comptroller gives specifIc direc-
tions on what to do. '0
When a bank is closed for a bank holiday, the closing may affect the
calculation of the time a bank has to give notice or take other action when checks
are collected or returned for nonpayment. The check collection process is dis-
cussed in Chapters 20 and 21. To the extent banks observe uniform holidays,
these problems are minimized. The Federal Reserve Board has promulgated
regulations designating specific dates as dates which are not to be considered
"bankin::; days" for the purpose of calculating the time for giving notice of
nonpayment of a check, for example."
The president also has broad powers during times of war to suspend various
transactions with foreign interests or involving property in which a foreign
country or national has an interest. 52 His powers include authority to:
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or t<l any banking
institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking
of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or pro-
hibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, trans-
portation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest. 53

[2) Unclaimed Property

Ordinarily the ownership of unclaimed property in the possession of
national banks will be determined according to state law governing escheat of
unclaimed property.54 However, state law may not interfere wit:'! the operation
of national banks. 55 The Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
permits state authorities to review the records of a national bank to determine

'0 Ie.
" 12 CFR § 210.1 2(c)( 10) (1987). Giving notice of dishonor is discussed at ~ 21.11.
52 12 USC § 95a (! 982). Before amendments in 1977. thiS statute also gave authority
to the president to act "during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President." P>.:b. L. No. 95-223, §§ 101(a). 102.91 Stat. 1625.1626 (1977).
" 12 USC § 95a (1982).
"See Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Callaway. 69 !'1M 119, 364 P2d 748 (196 I); Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency. Interpretive Letter No. 186. 1981-82 Dec. Vo: .. Fed. Bank-
ir.g 1.. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85.267 (1981).
55 See State by Lord v. First National Bank, 313 KW2d 390 (Minn 1981), appeal
dismissed, 456 US 967 (! 982).
4-11 NATIONAL BANKS 114.03

compliance with state unclaimed property laws. The examination must be "at
reasonable times and upon reasonable notice" to the bank. It may take place
only when the state authority has "reasonable cause to believe that the bank has
failed to comply" with the unclaimed property laws." Apart from this limited
right to review the records of a national bank, state authorities have no power to
conduct examinations of national banks. 57
When a national bank becomes insolvent and the comptroller succeeds to
the custody of property held in safe deposit boxes or other safekeeping arrange·
ments by the bank where the ownership of the property is unknown or disputed,
thefC ;, <l ;"Jl.:laj procedure for resolving questions of who holds title to the
property. The comptroller must give notice and allow time for the submission of
claims. If no valid claim is filed, the title vests in the United States. The U.S.
Claims Court is given jurisdiction to resolve disputes involving the comptrol-
ler's rulings on claims to the property. 58

114.03 POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKS

There is no single source to which one can turn to discover the powers and
limitations of national banks. There are specific powers conferred by various
federal laws. Many important subjects will be co\'ered in other parts of this text
as set forth in the following list.
1. Investment and lending limitations. See C,apter 7.
2. Loans to officers and directors. See Chapter 9.
3. Loans to bank afliliates. See Chapter 9.
4. Transactions in securities. See Chapter B.
5. Branch banking and mergers ane acquisitions. See Chapters 6 and 13.
6. Bank holding companies. See Chapter 5.
7. Membership in Federal Reserve System. See Chapter 3.
8. Deposits and deposit insurance. See Chapter II.
9. Interest and usury limits. See Chapter 26.
Th;s section describes the general aUlhority cO:lferrcd on natlonal banks
under the National Bank Act. These powers rnay be divided into two groups. The
first group comprises powers the act expressly enumerates. The second com·
prises "incidental" powers not expressly granted but "necessary to carry on the
business of banking."" All of the powers derive from the constitutional author·

" I? USC § 484(h) (1982).

51I! liSe Ij 484(a1 (\982)
" 12 USC §§ ?' 6a. 216b ( 1982)
"12 USC § 24 Seventh (Supp. f1j 1985)
If 4.03[11 OVERVIEW 4-12

ity of Congress to establish national banks. To the extent state law may be
inconsistent or in conflict with or may interfere with the exercise of the powers
Congress has prescribed, the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution makes
the federal powers supreme. There are areas, however, where state law does not
conflict with the federal scheme, and, to that extent, national banks are also
subject to state law.

[I] Express Powers of National Banks

The National Bank Act grants national banks basic corporate powers. These
are powers to organize as a corporation, to sue and be sued, to enter into
contracts, to conduct business through officers and directors, and to adopt
bylaws to govern its operations.'o Other provisions of the national banking laws
specifically grant and limit the powers of national banks. Some of the more
important ones are discussed in the following text.

[a] Trust Authority, The comptroller may grant special permission to national
banks to engage in trust activities when the laws ofthe state in which the national
bank is located allow "[s]tate banks, trust companies, or other corporations
which come into competition with national banks ... n to function in such
fiduciary capacity." The bank must keep its trust activities separate from its
other banking activities and must permit the state banking authorities access to
reports of examinations made by the comptroller reiating to the trust activities.
The federal law expressly stipulates that this permission shall not "be construed
as authorizmg the State banking authorities to exarr-ine the books, records, and
assets of such bank.""

[b] Real Estate Ownership. National banks are limited in the purposes for
which they can own real estate to circumstances where the real estate is used for
conducting business of the bank, is acquired through a conveyance in satisfac-
tion of debt, or is purchased at a judgment or foreclosure sale or to secure debts
due the bank, or where the real estate consists of property in which the bank
holds a security interest for loans.'3 The normal holding period allowed for real

60 12 USC § 24 (1982). See generally Dunn, "Expansion of National Bank Powers:

Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the National Bar.k Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and
Bank Holding Company Act:' 36 SWLJ 763-792 (1982): Glidden, "The Regulation of
National Banks' Subsidiaries," 40 Bus. Law. 1299-1317 (1985); "Construction and
Application of 12 U .S.c. § 2 t 4-214c, Au:horizing Conversion of N~tional Bank Into, or
Its Merger or Consolidation With. State Bank." 15 ALR Fed. 817 (1973).
"12 USC § 92a (1982).
• 2 t 2 USC § 92a(c) (I Y82).

'312 USC § 29 (1982).

4-13 NATIONAL BANKS 11 4.03[1Ild]

estate acquired as security for debts,i~ five years, but this may be extended by the
comptroller for up to an additional five-year period when there has been a good
faith effort to dispose of the property but disposal would be detrimental to the
bank'"

Ie] Transactions in Coin and Bullion. Federal law permits national banks to
buy and sell "exchange, coin, and bullion. , .""' The Comptroller of the Currency
has issued general guideli:les for national banks to follow in engaging in these
activities'£ The comptroller's guidelines JCli11C tbe term "coin" .,$ "cci11o hcl<:l
for their metallic value which are minted by a government, or exact restrikes of
such coins minted at a later date by or under the authority of the issuing
government." Under this definition, "national banks are prohibited from buy-
ing or selling coins the value of which is not based upon metallic content."
(Banks may acquire such coins as collateral for debts.) The term "bullion",
according to the comptroller, refers only to "uncoined gold or silver in bar or
ingot form.""
The comptroller's guidelines establish policies requiring reporting ane
accounting for transactions in coin and bullion, procedures assuring the purity
of assets acquired, and warnings regarding the possible applicability of Securi-
ties Act provisions. (The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 prohibits banks
from investing in or underwriting securities of companies engaged in gold
activities.)"
The comptroller views future and forward transactions concerning coin and
bullion as activities that are incidental to banking and that are permitted to
national banks."

Id] Financing by Leasing Personal Property. Congress amended the National

Bank Act in 1987 to permit national banks to lease personal property for
financing purposes. The authority is to invest in "tangible personal property.
including, without limitation, vehicles, manufactured homes, machinery, equip-
ment, or furniture .. , ." The investment must be "for lease financing transac-
tions on a net lease basis," and the investment cannot exceed 10 percent of the

" Id,
65 12 USC § 24 Seventh (Supp. III 1985).
66 Comptrolier of the Currency. Banking Circular ~o. 58 (revised) (Nov. 3, ) 981).
"ld, Consisten: with these guidelines. the comptroller has issued an interpretat:on
that national banks may not legally engage in investments in rare coins and currency,
although investments that adhere to the guidelincs cf Banking Circular No. 58 arc
perr.lissible. Comptroller of the Currency, Interflret"·c Let:er ;-';0. 2S2,.reprintcd ill Fed.
Banking L. Refl. (CCH) < 85,4 i 6 (Nov 24. 1982).
£012 USC § 24 Seventh (Sup;>. II I j 985).
£. Banking Circular No. 58, supra ~otl' 66.
~ 4.03[1Ile) OVERVIEW 4-14

bank's assets.'o Although a federal court interpreted the former version of the
National Bank Act to give national banks authority to engage in personal prop-
erty leasing transactions, the leases had to be the functional equivalent of a
10an. 71 The comptroller has applied a test for determining when this functional
equivalency exists, which test limits the extent to which the bank may rely on
any residual value in the property for recovering the bank's investment in the
leased property. The authority conferred by the new amendments permits
finance leases on a "net lease" basis without regard to the residual value of the
property. (Under a net lease, the bank cannot be responsible for maintenance,
repair, or servicing of the leased property.) The amendments are intended as an
expansion of the authority of national banks to enter into leasing transactions
beyond the scope of the M & M Leasing Corp. ruling."

Ie] Lotteries. A national bank may not participate in a lottery or permit the use
of its offices for a lottery. 73 The term "lottery" is broadly defined and includes
any "game, race, or contest" or "random selection" where participants give
money or credit with the possibility that some but not all will obtain in exchange
more than was given."

[2] The Incidental Powers of National Banks

Defining the scope of national bank's "incidental powers" is complex. The
National Bank Act, after enumerating the various general corporate powers
national banks enJoy, continues in a separate se\'enth paragraph to further
provide that national banks shaH have the power

to exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents.

subject to Jaw, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary 10 carryon the
business of bGilking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes.
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits;
by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on
personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according
to the p~ovisions of this chapter .... "75 (Emphasis added.)

70 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.1 00-86, § j 08, 101 Stat.
551,579 (1987) (to be codified at 12 USC § 24 Tenth).
71 Yl & M LeaSing Corp. v. Seatt,e First Nat'l Bank. 563 nd 1377 (9th Cir. 1977).
cert. denied. 436 US 956 (j 978).
72 H.R. ConI'. Rep. No. 261 on H.R. 27. 1OOth Cong .• lSI Sess., reprinted in 1987 C.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 533.
13
12 USC § 25a (1982)
" 12 USC § 25a(c) (1982).
75 12 USC § 24 Seventh (Supp. III 1985).
4-15 NATIONAL BANKS ~ 4.03[2)

Interpretation ofthis paragraph has been somewhat of a puzzle. The second

part of this paragraph lists specific banking functions that Congress obviously
intended national banks to have authority to engage in. The first part of the
paragraph contains a general provision stating that national banks shall have
"all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking .... " Although when considered alone it appears to be a general grant of
authority, this phrase is followed by the enumeration of specific activities in the
second part of the paragraph. What relationship do the activities listed after the
phrase that begins "by discounting and negotiating" have to the scope of the
incidental powers granted by the first part oflhe paragraph? Do they operate asa
limitation, or are they merely illustrative of what constitutes the "business of
banking"?" The case law in this regard is not conclusive. An unduly restrictive
view is difficult to square with the acceptance of many activities, such as safe
deposit facilities, that are generally accepted as within the scope of the "business
of banking," although not expressly mentioned.
The scope of incidental powers of national banks is a sensitive area, since
any enlargement of the authority of national ':Janks affects the competitive
relationship between national banks and state banks whose powers are based
upon state law. The courts have taken into account the interest in competitive
parity between the two banking systems." Defining the scope of the incidental
powers remains the subject of much legal controversy and uncertainty.7s When a
bank is part of a bank holding company structure, some of the difficulties
presented as a result of the uncertain content of these "incidental powers" may
be sidestepped by conducting the activity through a nonbank affiliate of the
holding company. (Bank holding companies are discussed in Chapter 5.)
One disputed area has been the provision of travel services by national
banks. Although the comptroller sought to authorize such activities by a regula-
tion that would have permitted national banks to operate full-scale travel agen-
cies, a federal court of appeals held that the regulation was not authorized by
law." The court said:

76 This interpretive problem is addressed and the relevant Supreme Court cases are

reviewed in Syrr.ons, "The 'Business of Banking' in Historical Perspective," 51 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 676 -726 (1983). Professor Symons suggests an intermediate view based on
the histOrIcal role of banks, a view that would define the "business of banking" as deposit
taking, credit granting, and credit exchange.
n See First Nat" Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 US 2Sc (1966).
"See National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat') Rank. 41) F. Supp. (D. Ariz. 1976),
affd in part and dismissed in part, 604 F2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979) (barring a national bank
from marketIng a retail information service). .
,. Arr.old Tours, Inc. v. Camp. 397 US J 15 (1970), on remand, 428 F2d 359 () sl Cir
1970), rev'd, 400 US 45 (1970), on remand, 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass. 1972), all'd. 472
F2<i 427 (I SI Cir. ;972).
11 4.03[2J(al OVERVIEW 4-16

And when one looks at past decisions it becomes apparent that the activities
of national banks which have been held to be permissible under the "inci-
dental powers" provision have been those which are directly related to one
or another of a national bank's expressed powers.... [A] national bank's
activity is authorized as an incidental power, "necessary to carry on the
business of banking," ... if it is convenient or useful in connection with the
performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its
express powers under the National Bank Act. If this connection between an
incidental activity and an express power does not exist, the activity is not
authorized as an incidental power. 80
Yet the reasoning supporting the court's decision appears to accept the notion
"that there is a normal and traditional range of activities that is permissible to
banks and is encompassed within the incidental powers phrase, not as incidental
powers, but as powers within the business of banking."·'
A number of important banking functions rests upon the "incidental pow-
ers" grant of authority. Some of these are discussed in the following text.

[a] Borrowing Money. One area of incidental power is the power of national
banks to borrow money." As is often the case, the existence of the power may
involve an interplay of some specific statutory authority or limitations with the
general grant of authority in the incidental powers provisions. As a result of
provisions in the Federal Reserve Act, national banks are authorized to engage
in transactions involving the discounting of commercial paper and to obtain
advances from Federal Reserve banks." In the case of the authority to borrow,
for example. there is specific statutory authority for national banks to pledge
assets to secure public deposits of various kinds,·o but there is no authority to
pledge assets for private deposits.· s

[bl Insurance Activities. Engaging in activities as an insurance agency has been

an area ofcontroversy that ultimately led to legislatiw clarification. At one time,
the banking laws specifically authorized national banks to act as insurance
agen~s when the banks were located in towns with a population of under 5,000

·°472 F2d at 431-432.

81 Symons. supra note 76, at 714 (1983).

"2 S. Whitley, W. Schlichting, T. Rice & J. Cooper. Banking Law § 26.03 (1982),
citing First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'j Exch. Bank. 92 US 122 (1876); Western Nat'] Bank v.
Armstrong, 152 US 346 (1894); Aldrich v. Chemical :"a\'1 Bank. 176 US 618 (1900);
Wyman v. Wallace, 201 US 230 (1906).
8J 12 USC §§ 342-348 (1982). See discussion of the powers of the Federal Reserve
System in Chapler 3.
• 4 12 USC § 90 (1982); 12 CFR § 7.7410 (1987) See the discussion at ,. 3.04[ 1lib].

85 12 CFR § 7.7410 (1987). See the discussion in 2 S. "'hitley, W. SChlichting. T. Rice

& J. Cooper, supra note 82, at § 27.03.
4-17 NATIONAL BANKS 1l4.03[2J[c)

persons." Courts construed this provision to deny authority to national banks

under their "incidental powers" to conduct an insurance business in larger-sized
towns.·' Congress again addressed the issue and imposed limitations on the
conduct of insurance activities in the Bank Holding Company Act." See Chapter
.5 for a discussion of authori ty to engage in insurance related activities.

Ie) Computer Services. Another area of current interest involves providing

computer services and hardware. According to the comptroller, "data process-
ing is a technology rather than a service distinct or different from the underlying
services or functions to which the technology is applied." Accordingly, the
comptroller's regulations authorize a national bank to "use data processing
equipment and technology to perform for itself and others all services expressly
or incidentally authorized under the statutes applicable to national banks.....

"See the former version of 12 USC § 92 (1946). The provisions of Section 92, which
were added as a new paragraph ofRS § 5202 by Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461. 39 Stat. 753,
were omilled in the amendment ofRS § 5202 by Act of Apr. 5, 19/8, ch. 45, 40 SIal. 512,
and therefore the authors of the U.S. Code did not include it. It has bccn refcrred to by
courts as having continued in effect, however. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins.
Agents, Inc., 399 F2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Saxon v. GeorgIa Ass'n of/ndep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
See also Alabama Ass'n onns. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F2d 224(5th Cir. 1976),
vacated in pan, SS8 F2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 US 904 (1978). Banks were
permitted to arrange credit lifc insurance for bank borrowers. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Smith, 436 F. Supp, 824 (SO Tex. 1977), alT'd in part and vacated in part, 610 F2d 1258
(5th Cir. 1980). The issue of engaging in insurance acti"it:es is now covered by the Bank
Holdir.g Company Act in 12 USC § \ 843(c)(8) (\982) See the discussion of insurance
activities in Chapter 5.
8812 USC § I843(c)(8) (1982). The Federal Reserve Board refused to approve a
Citicorp application to establish a bank to engage in national insurance activities, because
the Board believed approval would constitute an evasion of direct limitations on these
activities by the Bank Holding Company Act. ApplicatlOn of CitlCOrp, 71 Fed. Reserve
Bull. 789 (1985).
8' 12 CFR § 7.3500 (1987). The comptroller also has approved the sale of computer
hardware as part of a package of correspondent banking scrvices to other banks, because
these services are "incidental 10 banking." Comptroller of the Currency, Letter No. 345
(J uly 9, 1985), reported in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (eCH) r 85,515 (1985) The comptroller
also has approved a bank's providing, through a wholly owned subsidiary that is a general
par.ner in a services partnership, an electronic network to supply information and trans-
action scrvices relating to commodity transactions The services were approved because
the comptroller saw them as an integrated peoouet offering in cases where "the transae·
tional capability is intimately connected with the information services and financial
seltlement serviccs and is useful and cO'lvenient for the provision of these services.
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretation Leiter No 346 (July J I, 1985), reported in
Fed. Ranking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,516 (\985).
11 4.03[2J[d] OVERVIEW 4-18

[dj Guaranty Agreements. As a general rule, national banks do not have the
authority to guarantee the debts of others. When the guarantee is incidental to
engaging in banking business, however, national banks may do so.'o The Comp-
troller of the Currency has issued rules defining the circumstances under which a
national bank may lawfully guarantee the debt of another. Under the comptrol-
ler's interpretation, a bank may guarantee notes or obligations it sells for its own
account and may guarantee liabilities of its Edge Act subsidiaries and foreign
instrumentalities. A national bank also may act as a surety or guarantor in
transactions where it has "a substantial interest in the performance of the
transaction involved or has a segregated deposit sufficient in amount to cover
the bank's total potentialliabillty...., For example, a bank's interest in disposing
of collateral may justify such an undertaking."
In 1982, the Comptroller of the Currency had occasion to consider whether
a transaction was one in which a national bank had a substantial interest. The
question presented to the comptroller was whether a national bank could guar-
antee a loan made by a Federal Reserve bank to a correspondent of the national
bank, The comptroller ruled that the correspondent relationship by itself is not a
"substantial interest that justifies an irrevocable guarantee."" However, a
national bank could enter into an agreement to guarantee the debt of its corre-
spondent to the Reserve bank i: the agreement was restructured in a manner
acceptable to the comptroller."
The comptroller's rules allow a bank to enter into check guarantee plans that
represent to the public that the bank will honor checks up to a certain amount
drawn by a depositor displaying the guarantee card, This arrangement is one tha\
in essence is an agreer:1ent by the bank to give its customer credi:, ifnecessary, to
honor the customer's check. As such. it is withIn the authority ofa national bank
because it is nothing more than the ordinary bank commitment to lend to a
customer."
A potential source of problems in determining whether the prohibition
against guaranteemg the debts of others has been violated involves the issuance
ofletters of credit. Issuing letters of credit is, of course. a common bank transac-
tion, The comptroUer's rules recognize that a national bank may issue for its

.0 Sec 2 S, Whitley, W, Schlichting, T. Rice & j, Cooper. supra note 82, at § 26,09
(1982), citing Farmers & Miners Back', Bluefield Nat'l Bank. II F2d 83 (4th Cir.), cer.,
denied, 27; CS 669 (1926): Pinckney', Wyleie. 86 F2d 5.l1 (5th Cir. 1936),
s, 12 CFR § 7.70;0(a) (1987),
"Sec 2 S, Whitley. W. Schlichting. T, Rice & J, Cooper, s"pra note 82.
"Comptroller of the C"rrency. Banking Circular No. J 68 (Apr. 9, 1982), reported in
[ja~,-juneJ Wash. Fin, Rep, (BNA) No, 17, at A-4 (Apr. 26, 1982),

" Jd.
os 12 CFR § 7,7015 (1981). FDIC regulations permit :nsurcc' nonmember banks to
iss"e check guarantee cards and to "sue cred,t cards where the bank guarantees the credit
of its customers, 12 CFR §§ 332,3, 337,5 (1987).
 4·19 NATIONAL BANKS 11 4.03[2J1f)

customers letters of credit that conform to the Uniform Commercial Code or to

the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits. Expansion of the
use oflellers ofcredit as a financing device, however, has led to the usc of these
instruments in ways that are perilously close to traditional guarantees. These
probiems are discussed in Chapter 17.
A case involving a question of state law considered what constitutes u a
substantial interest in the performance of the transaction involved." Under
Georgia law, state banks were empowered to guarantee the debts of others when
the bank had such a substantial interest. A customer of the state bank who was
indebted to the state bank and had given the state bank a security interest in
certain oil and gas leases needed additional funds to finance the oil and gas
operation. The state bank was not willing to make the loan itself, but encouraged
another bank to do so and expressed its willingness to guarantee the customer's
obligation to the other bank because the extension of the additional loan also
would improve the securtty of the state bank. Under these circumstances, the
court held that the contract of guarantee given by the state bank to the bank that
extended the additional loan was authorized."

leI Other Powers. There are a number of other activities that national banks
have been authorized to perform under the authority, at least in part, of the
"incidental powers" clause, including the following items:

1. Establishment of bank customer electron:2 communication devices for

instructing banks on funds t~ansfers."
2. Leases 0: personal property that are entered into as a secured lending
transaction.•,

If] Ultra Vires Acts. When a bank enters into a transaction that it does not have
authoTlly to conduct, the bank's lack of authority may be asserted as a defense in
a suit to compel performance of the transaction. Therc is a general body of
corporate law dealing with the circumstances under which this defense of ultra
vires conduct can be raised·' Generally, courts disfavor allowing a person to
avoid obilgations voluntarily entered into on the ground the contract was ultra

"First Nnt'! Bank v. Citizens & S Bank. 651 F2d 696 (10th Cir. 1981).
97 Oklahoma v. Bank of Okla .. 409 F. Supp. 71 (1':D Okla. 1975).
"M & M Leasing ('orp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank. ;upra note 7 ~. In 1987. Congress
ga \'C' nat ICH\G.! banks expres.s authori:y to engage in leasing of personal property a~ pan of a
iir.ancing transaclion. This authority is discussed in t 4.03[ I J.
"Sec 7", R. Eickhot'( &.1. Schneider. Fletcher C,c!opedia of Corporations ch. 40
(19n)
11 4.03[2][f] OVERVIEW 4-20

vires.'oo Similar principles have been applied to national banks, and courts have
refused to permit banks to raise the ultra vires defense to avoid performance of
their own contracts.'o, However, because ofthc public interest in protecting the
solvency of banks, there is a body of case law that allows banks to raise the
defense of ultra vires, although most of these cases are from the 1930s or
earlier. 102
When the bank's action is being challenged by one who claims the bank had
no authority to act, the challenger's ability to question the lack of authority may
be doubtful. The party must have "standing" to challenge the bank's action, and
the bank's lack of authority may be a defect that only the proper regulatory
authority or party with a particular interest can raise. '03 It is not possible to state
an absolute rule in this area, because circumstances may exist where the bank's
lack of authority to engage in the transaction is the result of a deliberate legisla-
tive policy 10 benefit or protect the persons with whom the bank has con-
tracted. 104 This is often the case with consumer-oriented legislation.

100 ld. at § 3407. Total Automation, Inc. v. Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 40 Ill. App.
3d 266, 351 NE2d 879 (1976) ("[T)he defense of ultra vires is not favored by the courts
where it is raised by a private party seeking to avoid payment for a benefit received and
where there is no matter of public policy involved.") See also Krantz v. City of Hutchin-
son, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P2d 227 (1948).
'0' See Citizcns Union Nat'l Bank v. Phelps. 95 F2d 763 (6th Cir. 1938); McCarthy v.
Brockton Nat'l Bank, 314 Mass. 318, 50 NE2d 196 (1943).
102 Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank, 295 US 209 (1935)', First Nat'! Bank v. Con-
verse. 200 US 425 (1906); Birdscll Mfg. Co. v. Anderson. 104 F2d 340 (6th Cir. 1939).
103 See e.g., FDIC v. Freudcnfeld, 492 F. Supp. 763 (ED Wis. 1980), where the court
hcld, alternati vely, that even if a bank violated the prohibition against guaranteeing a debt
by issuing a standby letter of credit. only the United States had standing to chalienge the
bank for its ultra vires action. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Weise, 333 Ill. App. J, 76 NE2d
538 (1947) (Involving a realty trust); Noel Estate. Inc. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 232 F2d
483 (5th Cir. 1956)
,04 See Borkus v. Michigan Nat'! Bank, 117 Mich. App. 662, 324 NW2d 123 (1982),
where a state court held that a real estate loan made by a bank in 1971, a loan that at that
time violated a federal statute requiring real estate loans to be secured by first liens, was an
illegal loan. and the debtor could defend a mortgagc foreclosure action by the bank on the
gcound that :he loan was made in violation of the statute even though the foreclosure
action was brough: after 1974 when the federal proh:bition on second-mortgage real
estate lending was removed.
 5
Bank Holding Companies
',\ 5.01 The Evolution of Bank Holding Company Regulation. . . . . . . . . 5-2
Il J Definition of "Bank Holding Company" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5·2
TABLE 5-1 Number and Deposits of Registered Bank Holding
Companies-Selected Years, 1957-1983 5-4
[2J The History of Bank Holding Company Regulation. . . . . . . . 5-5
P J Nonbank Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5- 7
[4] Nonbank Banks Under the Competitive Equality Banking
Amendments of 1987 ,.......... 5-11
raj Exceptions to the Definition of "Bank" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
[b] Immediate Divestiture for "New Bank" Acquisitions
Between March 5,1987 and Date of Enactment . . . . . . .. 5-14
[c] Grandfather Rights for Pre-March 5, 1987 Acquisitions 5-14
[d] CO:Jditions for Retaining Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
[e] Exception for Activities of Certain Savings Banks. .. . .. 5-17
If] Thrift Institutions' Bank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
[g] Restrictions on Member Banks' Transactions With
Affiliates 5-17
! 5.02 Regulation of Bank Holding Company Activities 5-18
[1 J Exemptions to Prohibition of Nonbank .-'.ctivities . . . . . . . . . 5-18
[2J ActiVities Closely Related to Banking " 5-21
[a) Activities Allowed Under Board Regulation Y . . . . . . . . . 5-21
[b] Deciding When an Activity Is Closely Related to Banking 5-26
[c] Approval of Nonbank Activities-Hearings and Judicial
Review 5-29
[3J Other Authority for and Restrictions on the Activities of
Bank Holding Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-31
raj 1987 Moratorium on Certain Nonbanking Activities . . . . 5-3l
[i] Certain activities of foreign hanks ... . . . . . . . . . . . S-3l
[ii] Securities transactions of banks and bank holding
companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-32
[iii) Insurance activities of banks and bank holding.
companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-32
[ivl Powers!O engage in real estate \r::>nsactions 5·33
fb] Secu~ilies Activities of Bank Holding Companies. . . . . . . 5-33

5-1
l' 5.01 OVERVIEW 5-2

[c] Insurance Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .......... 5-33

[d] Bank Service Companies 5-35
[el Bankers' Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 5-35
[f] Thrift Institutions' Bank. . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 5-36
[g] Other Bank Holding Company Activities. . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-36
(4] Export Trading Companies 5-36
~ 5.03 Savings and Loan Holding Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-40
[I] Regulation of Savings and Loan Holding Companies in
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-40
[2] Effect of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on
Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-42
[a] Regulation of Business Activities of Savings and Loan
Holding Companies and Their Noninsured Institution
Subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-42
[b] Regulation of Relationships Between Insured Institution
Subsidiaries and Affiliate Companies 5-45
[c] Extension of Tying Prohibitions to State-Chartered
Insured Institutions ....................... 5-46
[d] Interstate Activities 5-46
[e] Affiliations With Secunties Firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-46
[fJ Treatment of FDIC-Insured State Savings Banks as
Insured Institutions for Regulation as Subsidiaries of a
Savings and Loan Holding Company. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-47

115,01 THE EVOLUTION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANY

REGULATION
This chapter considers the regulation of bank holding companies. In the
sections that follow, the text discusses the definition ofa bank holding company,
the history of how the complex web oflaws regulating bank holding companies
developed, and the limitations these laws place on the activities that bank
holdmg companies may undertake.

(II Definition of "Bank Holding Company"

The 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956' define a
"bank holding company" as "any company which has control over any bank or
over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this
chapter." Thus, the two major elements of the definition of a bank holding
company are (I) that a company have "control" and (2) that such control be over
a "bank" or a "bank holding company." The def!nition of "bank" is considered

1 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.

1760 (cod,fied at 12 USC§§ 1841,1843. 1849ancat31 USC§§5111,5112(1982».

 5-3 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 115.01[1]

in later sections of this chapter; the present section considers what constitutes
"contro!."
Preliminarily. it should be noted that a holding company need not have any
particular form of organization, and may include corporations, partnerships,
business trusts, and other associations! A bank itself may be a holding company.
In one case, an employee stock ownership plan was viewed by the court as
sufficiently similar in organization and function to be treated as a business trust
that needed the approval ofthe Board of Governors before acquiring control ofa
bank.'
Moreover, a number of companies are exempt from bank holding company
status, which companies otherwise fall within the definition. Some of these
exemptions reflect "grandfather rights" of companies in existence prior to the
time that the various bank holding company restrictions were adopted. Many
such companies were created as a result of the Competitive EqualitY Banking
Amendments of 1987, discussed later in this chapter.
In defining "bank holding company," a company has "control" over a bank
if it:

1. Directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote at least 25

percent of any class of voting stock of the bank;
2. Controls the election of a majority of the directors; or
3. Exercises either directly or indirectly a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the bank, as determined by the Federal
Reserve Board after notice and opportunity for a hearing. 4

In making a finding under the third statutory standard of "directly or

indirectly exercising controlling influence," the Board is aided by a presump-
tion. If a company owns or controls less than 5 percent of the voting shares of a
bank, it is presumed that the company does not control the bank. 5 For the first
two standards or control, the company may not be held to have coP-trol unless it

, Sec i 1 esc § 1841 (b) (1982); 12 CFR § 225.2 (198 7 ). See generlilly Eisen, "Banking
Acqllisilio~ Procedures by Holding Companies," 101 Banking LJ 68 \-6~ \ (19&4);
Golden, "Directors' Dolties When Forming a Bank Holding Company," 99 Banking LJ
146-156 (1982); F:schel, Rosenfield & Stillman, "The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies." 73 Va. L. Rev. 3()1-338 (1987).
, First Nat'l Bank of Blue Island Err.ployec Stock Owncrsbip Plan v. Board of Gover-
nors. 802 F2d 291 (7th Ci~. 1986). See generally Helfer &: Brucmmer, "Imcrslate Nonvot-
ing EqUity Agreemcms and Controll;l1uer the Bank Hclding Company Act: The Impaci
of the Fcderal Reserve Board's 1982 Policy Slalement.·· ,9 Bus. law. 383..415 (1984);
Kadish, "Bank Ho!ding Company Investmcnts in Non'coung Sloek," 1 no Banking LJ
58G-606 (1983)
'12 esc § 1841(8)(1)(1982).
'12l!SC§ 1841(a)~.1)(1982).
~ 5.01[1] OVERVIEW 5-4

directly or indirectly controls at least 5 percent of a class of voting stock of the

bank.· For all three standards set forth in the act, there are certain transactions
through which the securities of a bank may be obtained, transactions that are not
treated as transactions giving rise to control. Examples include ownership of
securities in certain fiduciary relationships, securities acquired pursuant to
underwriting activities, and securities obtained as a result of collecting a debt. 7
At the end of 1986, there were 6,456 bank holding companies controlling
9,409 commercial banks, holding approximately 92 percent of the bank assets of
all the insured banks in the United States.· Comparing these figures with those of
fifteen years earlier, a great increase is apparent. In 1971, bank holding compa-
nies controlled 2,420 banks, with 13,252 offices holding 55 percent of all bank
deposits.'
Table 5-1 shows the growth of bank holding companies and the extent to
which this form of organization is a characteristic of the domestic commercial
banking industry.'·

TABLE 5-1 Number and Deposits of Registered Bank Holding Companies-

Selected Years, 1957-1983

Domes/ic Deposirs ofSubsidiary Banks

End Number of Percentage of
oj Holding Amounr All Deposits
Year Companies 'Billions of Dollan; of u.s. Banks
1957 50* 15.1 7.5
1960 47* 18.3 7.9
1965 53* 27.6 8.3
1970 12 J* 78. J 16.2
1971 1,567 297.0 55.3
1975 1,821 527.5 67.1
1980 3,056 840.7 71.0
1981 3,702 937.8 74.1
1982 4,559 \,107.7 79.4
1983 5,409 1,279.4 83.8

*Incl:Jdes only banK holding companies that conlrol two or more banks.

612 USC § 184l(a)(4) (1982).

1 12 USC § 1841(a)(5) (1982).
• 73 Board of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys. Ann. Rep. 188 (1987).
, M. Jessee & S. Seeiig, Bank Hnlding Companies and the Public Interest 38 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Jessee). .
•• Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. Purposes & Functions 9S (1984).
5-5 BANK HOLDING CO\1PANIES ~ 5.01[21

(2) The History of Bank Holding Company Regulation

The concepts of holding company organization were developed in the early
18005, but it was not until the latter part of the century that corporate bank
holding companies became popular. The growth of bank holding companies
occurred primarily as a means by which investors could circumvent restrictive
state branching laws." By the 1920s, bank holding companies had evolved into
corporate giants with substantial financial power. Expansion continued into the
latter part of the decade, as bankers acted defensively to protect their correspon-
dent banking relationships and other sources of business from loss to existing
holding companies. Anticipation of a relaxing of the branch banking laws also
stimulated interest in the development of bank holding company systems, as
investors sought to acquire banks that could ultimately be operated as integrated
branches. 12
The rapid growth ofbank holding companies concerned independent bank-
ers' groups as well as federal banking officials, who lacked the authority to
regulate such entities. As a result of the stock market crash of 1929, much of the
attention directed toward bank holding company regulation was divened to a
general restructuring of the banking industry. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
contained few provisions concerning holding company regulation. It did, how-
ever, require holding companies to agree to divest any interest acquired in
companies "engaged principally" in the securi,ies business before they could
vote in the selection of directors of affiliated banks." This did little to restrict
holding company movement into nonbanking activities other than the securities
business," and, in any event, holding companies could easily evade the require-
ment by refraining from voting the stock of the bank affiliates."
For the next fifteen years, bank holding company growth was minimal.
Even so, at least one bill designed in some way to restrict bank holding compa-
nies was introduced at every session of Congress between 1933 and 1955."
Anticipation of the eventual passage of regulatory legislation stimulated further
bank holding company expansion." Then, in ; 956, prompted by a Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit decision against the Federal Reserve Board,
which had charged the Transamerica Corporation with violation of the
antimonopoly provisions of the Clayton Act because of commercial bank acqui-

11 G. Fischer. Rank Holdir.g Companies J 38 (19611

" Jessee, supra note 9, at 6.
13 Banking ACl of 1933. ch. 89, § I 9(e). 48 Stal. : 88. Sec also Boa rd of Governors v.
Investment Co. lnst., 450 US 46 (1981,.
".Jessee, supra nole 9, at 8; Fischer, supra note I I. at 59-62.
., See Board of Governors v. I n vestment Co. J nst.. 450 US 46, 70 (1981 ).
'6 Jessee, supra note 9, at 8,

"Jd. at 9.
r 5.01[2) OVERVIEW 5-6

sitions,18 Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. This legisla-
tion empowered the Federal Reserve Board to grant or deny applications ofbank
holding companies for the acquisition of more than 5 percent of the voting
shares of any bank."
The 1956 act defined a bank holding company as a company controlling "25
per centum or more ofthe voting shares ofeach oftwo or more banks,"2O thereby
leaving one-bank holding companies exempt from any regulation. Although the
1956 act controlled further formation of multiple bank networks through hold-
ing company organizations, it failed to curb the affiliation of banks with com-
mercial companies through holding company conglomerates. As a result, some
large banks began utilizing the one-bank holding company as a vehicle for
obtaining new investment outlets. By 1970, one-bank holding companies con-
trolled 38 percent ofall commercial bank deposits and had acquired nonbanking
firms engaged in mortgage banking, factoring, management consulting, and
credit cards." Diverse nonbanking firms, such as Montgomery Ward, Baldwin
Piano, and S&H Green Stamps, also began forming one-bank holding compa-
nies!' The fear that banks, in c9mbination with commerce and industry, might
eventually bring about the formation of a few powerful financial centers domi-
nating the U.S. economy led to the enactment of the 1970 amendments to the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.>'
The 1970 amendments restricted the previously unregulated ability of one-
bank holding companies to engage in nonbank actiylties. They also explicitly
offered bank holding companies the opportunity to expand into nonbanking
activities closely related to banking, under the supervision of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System!' Following this lead, holding compa-
nies expanded aggreSSIvely into nonbanking areas. Between 1970 and 1973, the
number of bank holdmg companies owning nonbank subsidiaries increased
frorr. 531 to 721. and the number of nonbank subsidiaries increased from 3,632
to 4,812."
During the 1980s, the regulatory scheme for bank holding companies came
under new strains. These stresses developed because of the manner in which the

18 Transamerica Corp. \'. Board of Governors, 206 Fed 163 (3rd Cir. 1953), cen.
denied. 346 CS 9()1 (1953).
"Bank Hold:ng Company Act of 1956, ch. 240. § 1842, 70 Stat. 133 (12 USC
§§ 1841-1850 & 26 USC §§ 1101-1103 (1982)).
20 12 U.s.c. § 1841 (1964) (amended 1970).

,. L Goldberg & L. White. The Deregulation of the Banking and Securities Industries
222 (1979).
"Id.
2J Ba~k Holding Company Act Amendments 0: 1970. Pub. L No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
176U(coc/ified at 12 USC§§ 1841,1843. 1849and at31 L'SC§§ 5111,5112 (1982».
24 Jessee. supra note 9. at 38. .
2S (d.
5-7 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES '1 5.0113]

Bank Holding Company Act defined a "bank." In the competition to provide

financial services in the 1980s, companies were finding it advantageous to
acquire depository institutions that performed specialized financial activities,
but that escaped the Bank Holding Company Act restrictions on acquisitions of
banks because these institutions did not fall into the act's definition of a bank.
After an unsuccessful attempt by the Board of Governors to deal with this
problem through a regulatory change in the definition of a bank, Congress
adopted significant new amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act in the
Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987. These developments are
described in the following text.'·

[3[ Nonbank Banks

According to the Bank Holding Company Act, a company becomes a bank
holding company when it acquires control over any bank." A definition of
"bank" is given for the purposes of the act'" The original definition, as enacted
in 1956, included all national banks. state banks, and savings banks. In 1966,
Congress amended this definition so that it was narrower in scope. It substituted
the language "any institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal
nght to withdraw on demand" for the original reference to specific types of
institutions. In 1970, Congress further narrowed this definition by adding the
requirement that banks also must be engaged in making commercial loans.
Following this change, the basic definition ofa "bank," for purposes of the Bank
Holding Company Act, was an institution that

(I) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans!'

"The "nonbank bank" phenomenon is discussed lOfra ~ 5.01[3J. The legislative

changes that Congress made to deal with this problem are discussed infra ~ 5.01 [4).
"See discussion supra ~ 5.0 I[1 J for the definition of "bank holding company" :n the
Bank Holding Company Acl.
12 USC § 1841 ~c) (i 982). See generally Felsenfeld. "Nonbank Banks-An Issue in
2B
Need ofa Polic)." 41 Bus. Law. 99-123 (1985): Malloy. ":-;onbanks and Nondefinitions:
New Challenges in Bank Regulatory Policy," 10 Seton Hall LegiS. J. 1-66 (1986): "The
Demise of the Bank :'>Jon-Bank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating the Activities
of Bank Holding Companies," 98 Harv. L. Rev. 650-668 (1985): "Nonbank Banks:
Congressionai OptiDns," 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1735-1775 (1986); "Nonbank Banks: A Legiti-
mate Financial Intermediary Emerges from the Bank Holding Company Act Loophole,"
14 Pcppcrdine L. Rev. 107-135 (1986); "Have Nonbank Banks Become a, Nonissue'" 38
Hastings LJ 377-411 (1987).
"12 USC§ 1841(c)(I982).
'iI 5.01[31 OVERVIEW 5-8

This definition remained until the Competitive Equality Banking Amendments

of 1987, which enlarged the definition ofa bank.$OUntil the 1987 changes, it was
possible for a company to have control over a financial institution that per-
formed many of the functions that banks performed and that was chartered as a
bank by state or federal chartering authorities, but was not within the restric-
tions on acquisitions of banks and activities of bank holding companies in the
Bank Holding Company Act, because the institution did not constitute a bank
under the definition in the act. These financial institutions became known as
nonbank banks.
Recognition of nonbank banks had at least three legal consequences. Firstly,
control ofa nonbank bank did not make the controlling company a bank holding
company, and, if it was not otherwise a bank holding company, it would not be
subject to the restrictions in the Bank Holding Company Act on nonbanking
activities. Thus, it became possible for commercial companies and securities
firms to affiliate with nonbank banks. Secondly, the interstate banking restric-
tions of the Douglas amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (discussed
in Chapter 6) could be avoided because these restrictions applied only to banks.
Thus, even regulated bank holding companies might find it advantageous to
establish an interstate network of nonbank banks for various purposes. Thirdly,
a bank holding company would not have to establish that acquisition of the
nonbank bank met the various standards in the act for Board approval ofa bank,
but the company could use the nonbank bank to perform many banking func-
tions such as consumer lending and credit card operations. To the extent that
state-chartered nonbank banks might have authority under state law to engage in
activities forbtdden to national banks, such as offering insurance products or
engaging in securities underwriting, the possibility existed for nonbank banks to
enlarge the activities of a bank holding company beyond those contemplated in
the Bank Holding Company Act.
The nonbank bank phenomer.on underwent a series oflegal challenges. The
Board of Governors prevailed in some of the early tests. In Wi/shire Oil Co. v.
Board of Governors," the coun held tha, the Board was entitled to prevent
evasions 0: the act by penetrating the form of the transaction ane looking to its
substance. In this case, an oil company had acquired control of a trust company
that clearly was a bank under the definition. To bypass the Bank Holding
Company Act, the oil company had the trust company send notices to its
depositors that the trust company reserved the right to require fourteen days'
notice ;mor to withdrawal of its transactional accounts, although the notice also
said that the trust company had no intention of exercising thi, right. The oil
company took the position that this action meant the trust company did not

"The Competitiv~ Equality Bankmg Amendrr.enls of 1987 arc disCussed m:ra

~15.0J[4].

"668 F2d 732 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 457 US 1132 (1982).
5-9 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES '1 5.0113)

offer deposits that its customers had "a legal right to withdraw on demand" and
so was not a bank. The court rejected this argument, relying on Section 5(b) of
the act," which gave the Board authority to act to "prevent evasions" of the
act. OJ A similar result was reached by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in a case where U.S. Trust sought permission to expand the activities of a
Florida subsidiary to engage in taking deposits, including demand deposits and
checking accounts, but not to make commercial loans." Although the Board
reluctantly approved the application, with conditions, believing that the literal
language of the act must be followed,35 the court ruled otherwise, stating that
"literalism in statutory interpretation, when it is contrary to an express purpose
of the act, cannot be a talisman." The court beiieved that Congress did not
intend to allow the creation of interstate deposit-taking networks when it modi-
fied the definition of "bank." However, in FirST Bancorporation v. Board of
Governors," the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed an order of the
Board. The case involved the acquisition of an industrial loan company that
offered negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts. The court held that
these accounts were not demand deposits, because a Utah regulation required
the loan company to reserve the right to require thiI1y days' notice before
allowing a withdrawal.
The actions of the regulatory agencies in approving the formation and
control of nonbank banks set offa storm ofcontrov'ersy. Efforts were made over
a four-year period to persuade Congress to adopt legislation to stop the practice.
In response to steps taken by Congress to consider legislation, the Comptroller of
the Currency established a moratorium on the consideration of new applications
for nonbank banks. He subsequently extended :he moratorium several times,
but, when Congress adjourned without addressing the issue, he ended it. With
the end ofthe moratorium, the Independent Bankers Association brought suit to
prevent further chartcring of nonbank banks. This litigation ultimately resu:ted
in an injunction against the granting of further approvals. The couI1 reasoned

32 12 USC § I844(b) (1982).

3:l Compare Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Board, 766 F2d J 446 (10th
Cir. 1985), where lhe Board ruled that a trust company offering deposits that were
restricted by pnvate contract to time deposits was not a bank. The private cDntracts were
enforceable. and so the deposits were not demand deposits
"FIDrida Dep't of Banking & Fin. v. Board Df Go\ernors, 760 F2d 1135 (II th Cir.
1985), vacated, U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of Governors, 106 S. Cl. 875 (1986). Oh
remand, 800 F2d 1534 (II th Cir. 1986), cen. denied sub nom. Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. Board of Governors, 107 S. Cl. 1887 (1987), the court concluded the
application must be approved in light of the Supreme Cou,-{ deeis:on in Board of Govcr-
oors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 US 361 (1986).
"The Board's conditions are described in its deCision. 70 Fcd. Reserve Bull. 371
(1984). See also Application of Bankers Trust New York Corp .• Fed. 'Banking L Rep.
(CCH) ~ 86,095 (1984).
"728 F2d 434 (10th Cir 1984).
11 5.0113] OVERVIEW 5-10

that an institution "is not engaged in the business of banking as contemplated by

the National Bank Act" if it cannot both accept demand deposits and make
commercial loans. These two functions. in the court's view, are central to the
banking business, and the comptroller lacked authority to control institutions
that did not engage in them. 37
The Board of Governors had sought to stem the nonbank bank explosion by
revising its regulations to enlarge the definition a: a bank. Under the new
regulations, a "demand deposit" included NOW accounts and other accounts
with checking privileges. Commercial lending included the purchase ofcommer-
cial paper and retail installment loans. This effort was immediately challenged,
and the Board lost in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and again in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's decision in the case, Board a/Governors v. Dimension
Financial Corp.,'· upheld the validity of nonbank banks." The Supreme Court
ruled that the Board had exceeded its authority when It defined the terms used in
the statutes, "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" in an expansive fashion.
The Court held that the statutory language of the Bank Holding Company Act
was not ambiguous. The phrase that a bank must be an institution that "accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand" did not
include deposits that "as a matter of practice" are payable on demand. Similarly,
the Court rejected the Board's definition ofcommercial loan as going beyond the
commonly accepted definition of commercial loans as well as the Board's own
long-standing interpretation.
Within days after the Supreme Court decision in Dimension Financial
Corp., the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in the U.S. Trust case. 4 • The circuit court then concluded that
although the creation of the Florida nonbank subsidiary "clearly frustrates the
congressional purpose expressed in the Douglas Amendment" against interstate
bank networks, thc definition ofa bank in 12 USC § t 841 (cl, which the Supreme
Cou~t construed in Dimension Financial Corp., must be the same in the part of
the act known as the Douglas amendment, 12 USC § I 842(dl( 11. Hence, because
the subsidtary would not make commercial loans, i: was not a bank.

3!See Independenl Bankers Ass'n 0: America v. Concver, 53 USLW 2430 (MD Fla.
Feb. 15, 1985). The aClion subsequen:ly was dismissed.
"474 US 361 (1986), affg 744 F2d 1402 (10th Cir. ;984).
" Before the Supreme Court decision, there was eonsiderabJejockeying to deter!TIine
whe,her the Comptroller of the Currency or :he Board was entitled to pass upon the
application to create a network of nonbank banks. Independent flankers Ass'n of America
v. Conover, 603 F. Supp. 948 (DOC 1985). The court declmed to enjoin the comptro:ler,
because it believed that such a:l order would in:erfere with the jurisdIction exclusively
vested in the federal COUrlS of appeal to review matters in\'olving the Boan! of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Syster:l.
'·U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board ofGavernors, 106 S. Ct 875 (1986).
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.0114)
5-11

With the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dimension Financial Corp.,
attention shifted back to Congress. In August of 1987, Congress enacted the
Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987. Title I of this act addresses
the nonbank bank issue. The provisions of this act are explained in the following
text.

[4) Nonbank Banks Under the Competith'e Equality Banking

Amendments of 1987
Titie I of the Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987 addresses
the nonbank bank issue. As discussed in the previous section, the 1970 defi-
nition of "bank" in the former version of the Bank Holding Company Act
required that the institution both make commercial loans and accept demand
deposits. As a result, it became possible for institutions chartered as banks by
state and federal banking authorities to avoid classification as banks, for pur-
poses of the act, by refraining from making commercialloans or by declining to
accept demand deposi ts.
Titie I deals with this problem by expanding the act's definition of bank to
include most of the nonbank bank institutions that escaped the old definition.
Because these institutions are now classified as banks, the act makes it illegal for
a holding company to acquire them without the approval of the Federal Reserve
Board. If a holding company makes a nonapproved acquisition, it will be
required to divest." Further, since the acquisition or control of such nonbank
banks makes the company a bank holding company, its activities are subject to
the constraints of the Bank Holding Company Act on nonbanking acti vities and
interstate banking.
Beyond the enlarged definition of "bank," the ti tie contains layers and
sublayers of exceptions and qualifications to t:::tese exceptions, which the act
creates in an effort to recognize acquisitions accomplished before enactment of
the 1987 Amendments, without permitting previously established rights to
become the source of unreasonable competitive advantage.
According to tbe new definition of "bank" in the Bank Holding Company
Act, an institution is a bank if it is an "insured bank" under tbe Federal Deposit
Insurance Act or it is an institution organized under the laws of the United
States, which institution both:

(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw
oy check or similar means for payment to tblrd parties or others; ar.d
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercialloans. 42

"Competitive Equality Banking Act of 19R7, tit. I, § 10I(b). 100 Stat. 554, 55 7
(amendtng 12 USC § 1843(a)(2)( 1982» (hereinaf!cr (,EBA).
"CEBA tit. I, § 10:(a)(I), 100 Slat. 554 (amendi:>g 12 USC § 1841(c) (1982»).
U5.01 [4][a] OVERVIEW 5-12

Under the first part ofthis definition, an institution is a bank ifit is insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 43 Thus, if the comptroller char-
ters a national bank, it will be a bank for purposes of the Bank Holding Company
Act even if it limits its activities so that it does not accept demand deposits or
make commercial loans. If the institution is a thrift institution that the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation has insured, this part of the definition
will not apply, but the provisions of the law on savings and loan holding
companies may apply. This is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Under the second part ofthis definition, an institution qualifies as a "bank"
even if it does not offer what are strictly regarded as demand deposits against
which checks can be drawn. As long as it offers a "check-like" deposit account,
this prong of the definition will be satisfied. This legislative definition reverses
the results reached under the former version of the Bank Holding Company Act,
where the Supreme Court interpreted the reference to "demand deposits" in the
act to exclude other transaction accounts such as NOW accounts, which offer
check-writing services but are not demand accounts." The definition encom-
passes more than checking arrangements; it is also intended to cover transfer by
computer or wire instructions, and automatic sweep arrangements.'s The second
part of the definition requires that the institution both offer accounts from
which check-like payments can be made and offer commercial loans. The new
definition does not enlarge the activities that may be regarded as commercial
lending under the interpretation in Dimension Financial Corp.

[al Exceptions to the Definition of "Bank." Although the act adopts a broad
general definition of "bank," there are numerous exceptions. The institutions
that qualify for these exceptions are not banks for pl:rposes of the Bank Holding
Company Act, as per the following guidelines:

1. Foreign banks with U.S. branches are not banks for purposes of the act if
the definition would apply to them "solely because such [foreign] bank has an
insured or uninsured branch in the United States."" Under this language. it
would seem that as long as the branch does not engage in the activittes that would
qualify it as a bank under the act, regardless of whether the branch is FDIC-
insured or not, the foreign bank does not come within the act.

'3Id.: 12 USC § 1813(h) (1982). Banks insured by :he FDIC includc all national
banks. all member banks of the Federal Reserve System, state banks that elect to apply foc
FDIC inSurance. and othcrs. See 11 I 1.0 I [i ] for a list a I' banks eligiblc for FDIC insurance .
.. See :he discussion of thc DimenSIon case supra 11 srJ 1[3].
"Can:' Rep.. No. ;00-261, Oil H.I<. 27, reprinted as Special Report, F"d. Banking L
Rep. (CCH) No. I 192 at 122-123 (A ug. 7. 1987) (hereinafter ConI'. Rep. No. 100-261).
"CEBA tit. I. § :OI(a)(I), 100 Stat. 554 (amending 12 USC § 1841(c) (1982)).
 llANK HOLDING COMPANIES \I 5.01{4](a]
5-13

2. "Insured institutions" are not banks under the act." Such institutions
are those insured by the FSLlC. They include all federal savings and loan
associations and other FSLlC-insured institutions, including FSLIC-insured
federal savings banks, building and loan associations, savings and loan associa-
tions, homestead associations, cooperative banks, and FDIC-insured federal
savings banks."
3. An organization such as an Edge corporation, whose business in the
United States is only "incidental" to its activities outside the United States, is
not a bank within the act. 4 •
4. A trust company or fiduciary that "acts solely in a trust or fiduciary
capacity ..." is not a bank. 50 There are four requirements that the trust company
must satisfy in order to qualify: (I) substantially all of its deposits must be in
trust or a fiduciary capacity; (2) no FDIC-insured deposits may be marketed
through an affiliate; (3) the institution may not offer checking services; and
(4) the institution may not make use of the Federal Reserve payment services or
discount or borrowing facilities.
5. Credit unions are not banks under the act. 51
6. Credit card banks are exempt if they satisfy the following criteria con-
tained in the act for limiting their activities:·' They must (I) engage only in credit
card operations; (2) not accept demand deposits or similar transaction accounts;
(3) not accept savings deposits below $ 100,000; (4) not make commercial loans;
and (5) maintain only one office for acceptIng deposits. They may, however,
have multiple offices for their credit card "back-room activities."53 The banks'
lending powers are limited as explained in the conference repon:

A credit card bank may make loans only through credIt cards.
Loans made to individuals through credi'. cards are no: commercial
Ioans. The prohibition against commercial loans does not limit a credit

"rd.
"Id; 12 USC § I730a(a)(I)(A) (1982)
"CEllA ti:. I. § 101(a)(I). IOJ Stat. 554 (amending 121)5(' § 1841(c)(1982)).
·'Id. at 554-555. Sec generally Silver & "'orman. "The Trust Company: A Means of
Emering the Financial ServIces Market or Positioning for Interstate Bankir.g." \0\ Bank
LJ 216-231 (1984).
•' CEDA til. I. § 101 (a)( I). J0 ~ Stal. 554, 555 (a";ending 12 USC § 1841 (e) (; 982))
The detinilion or"credit union-- is lhal comained in lhe Federal Reserve Act. It includes
any federally ins~red eredi: unIOn and any credit union eligible to become a federally
insured credit union. 12 USC § 461(b)(I)(A)(iv) (1982)
"CEBA til. I, 101(a)(I), 100 Stat. 554. 555tamending 12 USC § 1841(c) (\982))
"ConI'. Rep. NO.1 00-26J. supra notc 45. at 121.
'il 5.01[4Ilbl OVERVIEW 5-14

card bank from purchasing credit card receivables directly from estab-
lishments where such credit cards are accepted. 54
7. Organizations operating under Federal Reserve Act § 25 or § 25a are
exempt. ..
8. Certain industrial loan companies, industrial banks and similar organi-
zations are exempt, notwithstanding that they are insured by the FDIC, as long
as they qualify under the limitations on their activities imposed by the act. 56
9. Exemptions are provided for certain other named institutions, as long as
the qualifications on their activities are met. s,

[bl Immediate Divestiture for "New Bank" Acquisitions Between March 5,

1987 and Date of Enactment. A company must obtain approval to acquire an
institution that is within the amended defmition of a bank, when that acquisi-
tion is otherwise within the terms of the Bank Holding Company Act. For any
company that was not a bank holding company under the former provisions of
the act, but that became a bank holding company as a result of the new definition
in the Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987, that company is
required to divest itself immediately of any institution it acquired between
March 5, 1987 and the date of enactment of the act (August 10, 1987) if that
institution became a bank as a result of these amendments. s'

[cl Grandfather Rights for Pre-March 5,1987 Acquisitions. Companies that

priorto March 5, 1987, had acquired institutions that at the time were not banks
under the Bank Holding Company Act, but that became banks as a result of the
new amendments, have a general exemption as long as they were not previously
within the definition of a bank holding company. Such companies are not
treated as bank holding companies under the new amendments, and so enjoy
"grandfather rights" to their former status as nonbank holding companies. 59

These grandfathered companies, however, are subject to special regulation,

and will lose their exemption if(l) they acquired control ofa bank or an insured
institution (other than certain emergency acquisitions) after March 5, 1987;
(2) they obtain control of more than 5 percent of the assets or shares ofa bank or
insured institution, except as specifically allowed: or (3) any of their bank

"Id.
ES CEBA tit. I, § 1Ol(a)(I), 100 Stat. 554, 555 (amending 12 USC § i 841 (c) (1982»); 12
USC §§ 60 >605, 611-632 (1982).
55 CEBA tit. I, § 10 J (a)( I J, 100 Stat. 554, 555 (amending 12 USC § 1,84/ (c)(l982))

"re. at 555-556.
"CEBA tit. I, § 10t(b), 100 Stat. 554, 557 (amending 12 USC § 1843(a)(2) (1982)).
59CEBA tit. I, § IOI(e). 100 Stat. 554, 557-561 (amending 12 USC § 1843 (1982».
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 11 5.01[4J[c)
5-15

subsidiaries do not restrict their actlvltles as further provided in the

amendments,
.,
The grandfathered companies are subject to limitations on the activities of
their bank subsidiaries to restrict the possibilities for conflicts of interest and
unfair competitive advantages over companies subject to the full restrictions of
the Bank Holding Company Act as amended,
The bank subsidiaries cannot engage in activities different from those in
which they were engaged on March 5, 1987. They are also restricted on joir.t
marketing of products and services with the other affiliate companies, and may
not market products or services of affiliate companies that would not be allowed
for bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) of the act, limiting holding
companies to activities closely related to banking. Further, the bank subsidiaries
may not market their products or services through affiliate companies that
provide products or services not permissible under Section 4(c)(8) of the act.
However, if a previous marketing arrangement had allowed the banks' products
or services to be offered through such an affiliate as of March 5, 1987, such an
arrangement may continue as long as it is not expanded. Such services or
products must be marketed "only in the same manner in which they were being
offered or marketed as of [March 5, 1987} ..•,,, The conference report of
Congress on the 1987 amendments notes that there are two categories of restric-
tions on ;oint marketing and gives the following examples of how the amend-
ments work:
In category (I), the restrictions on an affiliate's products and services are
such that, for example, a company cou;d not market life insurance or
3Ulorr:otive supplies through its bank subsidlary, since those products arc
not permissible for bank holding companies generally under section 4(c)(8)
of the act. Likewise, in category (2), the grandfathered nonbank may not
permit its products or services to be offered or marketed through an affiliate
that engages in nonbankmg activities that are prohibited for bank holding
companies generally under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act.
Thus the life insurance affiliate or the aUlOmobile parts retailer could not
market the bank's insured deposits or trust accounts.·'

The subsidiaries are not allowed access to t'Je overdraft facilities of the
Federal Reserve System on behalf of any affiliate. This is to prevent an affiliate
company from arranging for the bank subsidiary to c1irect the Federal Reserve

O. rd. at 558.
"Jd. a: 559.
"Conf. Rep. No, 100-261, supra no!e 45, at 126. The conference repon continues
and explain, "On tne other hand, the grandfathcred nonbank bank could offer its
eus-tamers Joar.s frum an affiIJalcd Tnongagc banking or consumer finance company. and
such an affiilate could offcr its customers the products 0: services of the bank, because
these actJ\'ilies are permillcd under seClion 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act"
Ie.
'1 5.01(4J[c] OVERVIEW 5-16

System to make payments for the benefit of the affiliate that exceed the
creditworthiness of the bank and the affiliate. The following example illustrates
this purpose:
For example, a troubled affiliate of a nonbank bank could direct the
nonbank bank to make final, irrevocable funds transfers to pay its creditors
far in excess of the balance in the affiliate's account at the nonbank bank or
even the nonbank bank's account at the Federal Reserve. Those transfers
could precipitate the failure of the nonbank bank, causing loss to the deposi-
tors, creditors, and the FDIC. G3

Finally, the bank subsidiaries cannot increase their assets at any faster a rate
than 7 percent per year. G' The congressional conferees indicated that it would be
permissible for a bank to sell assets tomeet the target growth rate."s As indicated
previously, any violation of these limitations on the activities of the bank
subsidiaries results in a loss of the company's exemption from being classified as
a bank holding company and subjects the company to a requirement of divesti-
ture "of each bank it controls" within 180 days after loss of the exemption.""
The grandfathered company can become free of these restrictions on its
activities by obtaining approval to be a bank holding company and complying
with all of the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act. But this approach
cannot be used to authorize a holding company that has an interstate network of
banks in violation of the Bank Holding Company Act's restrictions on interstate
banking."
The grandfathered companies must supply information to the Board of
Governors, and the Board has authority to examine such companies and to
require repons "solely for purposes of assuring compliance" with these restric-
tions. The Board can exercise its general enforcement authority."
All companies that qualify for grandfather rights from treatment as bank
holding cOI:1panies nevertheless are subject to the antitying restnctions of the
Bank Holdmg Company Act and to the provisions of the act that deal with
transactions with affiliates and insiders."S The anti,ying provisions also apply to
cenain institutions that arc exempt from classification as banks. 70

"ld at 127.
"CEB.... tit. I. § 101(c). 100 Stal. 554, 559 (amend'ng 12 USC § 1843 (1982)).
"Conf. Rep. No. 100-261, supra note 45. at 125.
"CEBA tit. 1, § IOI(c), lOa Stat. 554, 559 (amendlng 12 USC § 1843 (1982)) .
•, Cd. at 559-560. The interstate banking limitations are discussed in Chapter 6.
"ld. at 560. See also 12 USC § 1818 (1982).
"CEBA :i1.I,§ :O;(c), IOOStaL 554, 560 (amending 12 USC§ 1843'(1982)). These
limita:ions are discussed in ~~ 9.02[3J-9.02.[5J. See also r 5.03[2J.
,. ld. at 56!.
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES '1 5.0l[4][g)
5-17

[d] Conditions for Retaining Control. According to a general provision in the

1987 amendments, companies are permitted to keep contro~ over the nonbank
banks they acquired before the amendments became effective, as long as they
limit the activities of the nonbank banks. This grandfather provision applies to
companies that acquired control of an institution that became a bank as a result
of the Competitive Banking Equality Amendments of 1987. Such a company
may retain control of the nonbank bank by adhering to two conditions. T1 Firstly,
the nonbank bank may not engage in any activity that would have caused the
institution to be classified as a bank under the former definition of a bank in the
Bank Holding Company Act. This means that the institution is not allowed both
to accept demand deposits and make commercial loans. Secondly, after
March 5, 1987, the bank may not increase the number oflocations from which it
does business. These restrictions end if the nonbank bank is one that meets
approval from the Board of Governors for the holding company to acquire."

leI Exception for Activities of Certain Savings Banks. Savings banks that are
chartered under state law and that are subsidiaries of a bank holding company
are not subject to the limitations on their activities that other nonbank banks are
subject to under the amendments. The savings bank may engage, "directly or
through a subsidiary, in any activity in which such savings bank may engage ...
pursuant to express, incidental, or implied powers under any statute or regula-
lion, or under any judicial interpretation ..." of the law of the state where it is
10cated. 7J There are, however, restrictions for savings banks on insurance activi-
ties. Savings banks generally are limited to the same insurance nctivilie, 1j~')'.ved
for k.i~ l: Lc,iuidi?, <':O'.I1';';'il;"5, uu\ specIal dispensation is given to savings banks in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York to sell life insurance if special
conditIOns are meL"

[I] Thrift Institutions' Bank. Thrift institutions and savings banks may own a
"bank" without becoming a bank holding company." The bank must restrict its
deposit taking to deposits from the thrift institution or to those arising out of the
business of the thrift institution, or to public dep:)sits.

[g] Restrictions on Member Banks' Transactions With Affiliates. Member

banks of the Federal Reserve System and their sl.bsidiaries are subject to new

71 [d.
11 [d.
Il CERA tit. I, § 101 (d), 100 St3l. 554, 56 i -562 (2mencling 12 USC § 1842 (1982».

'·'Id. at 562.
"CEB.·" tit 1, § 101 (e). 100 Stat. 554, 562-563 (amending 12 USC § 1841 (a)( 5 )(E)
(1982))
11 5.02 OVERVIEW 5-18

limitations on their transactions with affiliates. For those transactions covered

by the amendments, they must be on terms "substantially the same, or at least as
favorable" to the bank or its subsidiary "as those prevailing at the time for
comparable transactions" with nonaffiliated companies." The transactions that
are subject to this requirement include sales of securities or other assets to an
affiliate, payment of money or furnishing of services to an affiliate under con·
tract, lease or otherwise, transactions where the affIliate is a broker or agent or
"receives a fee for its services," transactions with third parties where the affiliate
has a financial interest, and other transactions covered under existing law."
Member banks and their subsidiaries also are prohibited from using any
authority they have as a fiduciary to acquire securities or other assets from an
affiliate." Such acquisitions can be made if there is legal authority from a court
order or under the controlling trust agreement or other fiduciary instrument.
Further, the bank or subsidiary cannot acquire a security if"a principal under-
writer of that security is an affiliate of such bank.""
Member banks cannot advertise that they are responsible for the obligations
of affiliates or enter into an agreement to that effect"o

'i! 5.02 REGULATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANY

ACTIVITIES
Bank holding companies are restricted in the activities in which they and
their affiliate companies may engage. They are prohibited from engaging in
nonbank activities, subject to certain exceptions; these exceptions are discussed
in the following text. Further, the Board of Governors may permit bank holding
companies to engage in activities that are closely related to banking; these are
discussed later in this chapter."

II] Exemptions to Prohibition of Nonbank Activities

Section 4(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act, as amended, sets forth a
general rule that a bank holding company cannot acquire (and after two years
from the date on which it became a bank holding company, cannot retain)
"direct or indirect ownership or contr01 of any voting shares of any company

"CEBA til. t. § 102(a). 100 Stat. 554. 564 (amcnding 12 USC § 371c (1982».
n 12 USC § 371 c(b)(7) «( 982). See also I: 8.0 [(8J on securities.
"CEBA tit. t, § 102(a), 100 Stal. 554. 565 lamending 12 USC § 371c (\982».
"Yd. at 565.
" Id.
Ol For a discussion of activities closely relatcd to banking. see j;)fra ~ 5.02[2].
5-19 BANK HOLDlNG COMPANIES ~ 5.02(1J

which is not a bank. "82 Congress had two reasons for prohibiting nonbank
investments. Firstly, a holding company might use its banks to allocate available
credit to customers of Its other subsidiaries rather than creditworthy borrowers
who are not customers; secondly, the soundness of the holding company's
subsidiary bank might be impaired by investment of its funds in nonbanking
affiliates, thereby risking the depositors' funds. 83
The act provides numerous exceptions to the general rule. Section 4(a)(2) of
the act establishes grandfather rights for holding companies that, at the rime of
the 1970 amendments, had continuously engaged in nonbanking activities since
June 30, 1968. Such holding companies are allowed to continue these activities
indefinitely.84 However, the Board of Governors had the power to terminate
these grandfathered nonbank activities if it determined that these activities
would lead to an "undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair compe-
tition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices."8s If termination was
required, the holding company had ren years to divest its interests. 8'
Section 4(d) authorized the Board to grant exemptions to one-bank holding
companies in existence since July I, 1968, if civesture would cause undue
hardship, such as disrupting existIng business relationships and thereby
advcrsely affecting the bank or community, or forcing the sale of small locally
owned banks to purchasers not reprcsentative of community interests. 81 The act
also allowed the Board to approve retention of a bank when it was so small in
relation to bOlh the holding company's interests and the relevant banking mar-
ket that the likelihood of its granting or denyi:<g credit in furtherance of the
holding company's other interests was minimal."
Section 4(c) specifically exempts labor, agricultural. or horticultural organi-
zations and family-owned bank holding companies, as well as thirteen other
activities closely related to banking. Of these thirteen exemptions, Section
4(c)(8) is the only one authorizing nonbank businesses." The nonbank activities
covered by Section 4(c)(8) are discussed in the following section of this chapter.
The remainIng exemptions permil a bank holding company to acquire the shares

" 12 USC § 1843(a) (1982).

"H.R. Rep. No. 609. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
"12 USC § I 843(a)(2) (1982). Any holding company not so engaged had until
Decembcr 31. 1980 to d,vcsl. 44 Fed. Reg. 74.920 (1979) See generally Annot . "Con.
SlruClion and ApplicatIOn of 'Grandfather ProvISo' of § 4(a)(2) of Bank Holdmg Com-
pany A(( (12 U.S.c. § I843(a)(2»)," 35 ALR Fed. 942 (1977).
os 12 USC § 1843(a)(2) (1982). The act required the Board to aCI within two vears in
the case of companies wilh bank assets over $60 million. '
e. 1d.
81 12 USC § I 843(d)( 1982)
"Id. Sce also P. Heller, Handbook ofTederal Bank Holding Company Law 183 n.76
(1976) (hereinafter Heller).
8.12 USC § 1843(c)(8) (/982).
~ 5.0211] OVERVIEW 5-20

of companies engaged in the exempted activities or to engage in certain of these

activities directly. Thus, the prohibition in Section 4(c) against engaging in
nonbank activities does not apply to:
1. Shares of service companies for the holding company and its banking
subsidiaries; companies engaged in holding or operating properties
"used wholly or substantially" in the operations of the banking subsidi-
ary; companies in the safe deposit business; companies engaged in
liquidating assets of the holding company.
2. Shares acquired "in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted" if they
are disposed of in a timely fashion.
3. Shares that the holding company is required by federal or state law to
dispose of, provided the disposal occurs in a timely fashion.
4. Shares held in a fiduciary capacity permitted under the act.
5. Shares that qualify as being eligible for investment by national banks.
6. Shares ofa company that "do not include more than 5 per centum of the
outstanding voting shares of such company ..."
7. Shares of an investment company "which is not a bank holding com-
pany and which is not engaged in any business other than investing in
securities" as long as the securities "do not include more than 5 per
centum of the outstanding voting shares of any company ..."
8. Shares of companies engaged in activities approved by the Board. (See
discussion in next subsection.)
9. Shares of foreign corporations whose main business is outside the
Unitec States, if approved by the Board.
.10. Shares acquired prior to May 9, 1956 by a bank that is a bank holding
company or by its SUbsidiaries.
11. Shares owned by a company covered by the act in 1970, but "which
does not engage in any activities other than those" allowed under
SecLan 4(c) of the act.
12. Shares of a company that became a bank holding company as a result of
the 1970 amendments, if the company ceases to become a bank holding
company. divests control, or follows conditions established by the
Board.
13. Shares of a company "which does no business in :he United States
except as an incident to llS international or foreign busi:Jess ..." as the
Board approves.
14. Shares ofa company that qualifies as an export tradin'g company."

90 12 USC § 1843(c) (1982).

 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
5·21

[21 Activities Closely Related to Banking

Section 4(c)(8) of the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
reflects a compromise between the House and Senate after nearly two years of
debate." Prominent in the debate were the criteria to be used for determining
permissible nonbank activities. The House bill took a somewhat restrictive
approach, including a "laundry list" of prohibited nonbank activities and a
public benefits test; the Senate bill took a more liberal approach, rejecting the
laundry list and instead leaving the determination of whether activities were
"functionally related to banking" up to the Federal Reserve Board. 92 Both House
and Senate, however, were in total agreement on the requirement that a bank
holding company's entry into a nonbanking activity must result in net public
benefits when weighted against any adverse effects, and that the holding com·
pany bear the burden of proof. 93
Under Section 4(c)(8), then, in order for a bank holding company to engage
in nonbank activities, the Federal Reserve Boarel, after due notice and opportu-
nity for hearing, must determine that the activity is "so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto" and
that its subsequent performance as a subsidiary "can reasonably be expected to
produce benefits to the public ... that outweigh possible adverse effects.""

(aj Activities Allowed Under Board Regulation Y. The Federal Reserve Boarel
implements Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act with Regulation
Y, which contains a list of activities the Board of Governors deems to be "closely
related" to banking.·' With respect to these listed activities, a bank holding
company does not have to show that the activity satisfies the "doselv rclalt'o"
test, but need only show that the public benefi;s from engagi:1g ir. that activity
will outweigh any adverse effects. The activities listed in Regulation Ya,e:

1. Making, acquiring. or servicing loans or other extensions of cedlt

(Including issuing letters of credit and accepting drafts) for the account
of the bank holding company or for the account of others. Loans made
by consumer finance companies, credit card companies, mortgage com-
panies, commercial finance companies. and factoring companies are
examples of transactions the bank holding company can handle.

91 Jessee. supra note 9. at 48.

n ILR. 6778. 9151 Cong.. 151 Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 33125 (1969)', S. 6178, 9 hI Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 Congo Rec. 32124 (1970). See Board of Governors Y. Investment Co. Inst.,
450 US 46 (1981).
9) Jessee, supra note 9, at .lO.

94 12 USC § 1843(c)(8) (1982). See generally Wilson. "Separation. Between HankinI',

and Commerce Under the flank Holding Company ,"CI--A Statutory O'~jeet'vc Under
AlIack," 33 Calh. UL Rev. 163-185 (1983).
•, 12 CFH § 225.25 (J 9P).
~ 5.0212][a] OVERVIEW 5-22

2. Operating an industrial bank, Morris Plan bank, or industrial loan

company, as authorized under state law, so long as the institution does
not become a bank by accepting demand deposits and making commer-
cialloans.
3. Performing the functions ofa trust company as authorized by federal or
state law. These functions may include activities ofa fiduciary, agency,
or custodial nature. The institution may not be a bank and may not
make loans or investments or accept deposits other than as authorized
by Regulation Y. The institution may not accept deposits that are used
by customers as general purpose checking accounts or interest-bearing
accounts.
4. Acting as an investment or financial advisor in providing advice to a
mortgage or real estate investment trust or to an investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 96 These activi-
ties include furnishing general economic information and advice, pro-
viding financial advice to governmental units, and providing "portfolio
investment advice" to other persons.
5. Leasing personal property (including automobiles) or real property, or
acting as agent, broker, or adviser in leasing transactions where the
leases are the functional equivalent of an extension of credit. 97
6. Making equity and debt investments in community welfare projects or
corporations engaged in such projects.
7. Providing data-processing and data transmission services, facilities
(including data processing and data transmission hardware, software,
documentation or operating personnel), data bases or access to such
services, facilities, or data bases by any technological means if (I) the
data to be processed or furnished are financial, banking, or economic,
and the services are limited by written agreement; (2) the facilities are
designed, marketed, and operated for the processing and transmission
of financial, banking, or economic data; and (3) the hardware provided
is offered only with the software designed for use in handling the
quaEfied types of data. (The general purpose hardware may not consti-
tute more than 30 percent of the cost of any packaged offering.)"

"See Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Ins: .. 450 US 46 (1981).

"The Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987 expanded tfle power of
national banks to engage in credit leasing transactions. See f 4.03[I][d] .
.. So:ne of these services may be provided for the imernal use of the bank holding
company syscem under the servicing exemption in Section 4(c)( 1)(C) of the Bank Holding
Company Act WIthout prior Board approval. In addition to the activities previously
mentioned, the Board has issued an interpretation that additional activities will be
permilled as incidental to carrying on these data processing 3ctivlties. On this basis,
subject to certain limitations, a bank holding compan) may provide excess capacity
without limiting it to lhe processing or :ransmission of banking, financial, or economic
5-23 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 'i\ 5.01jllla}

8. Acting as an insurance agent, broker, or underwriter, except as prohib-

ited by the act, for insurance that is credit insurance or insurance
directly related to the provision of other financial services. Also, the
bank holding company may sell insurance without these limitations in a
community where the bank holding company has an office if the popu-
lation of the community does not exceed 5,000. gg
9. [Reserved]
10. Providing courier services for checks, commercial paper, and similar
documents and business records that arc exchanged among banks and
financial institutions.
11. Providing bank management consulting advice to nonaffiliated bank
and nonbank depository institutions,
12. Selling U.S. savings bonds, traveler's checks, money orders, and similar
consumer-tYpe payment instruments. (Money orders and similar
instruments cannot have a face value exceeding $1 ,ODD.)""
13. Performing appraisals of real estate and personal property, inclUding
securities.
14. Engaging in commercial real estate equity financing as an intermediary
for investors by arranging the financing of certain commercial or indus-
trial income-producing real estate projects.
15. Providing securities brokerage services, crec.it activities related to these
securities services, and incidental activities, such as custodial services,
individual retirement accounts, and cash management services. These
securities brokerage services are restricted ac:ivities where the holding
company is buying and selling solely as agent for the account of a

data. 12 CFR § 25 5.123(e) (1987). See generally Association of Data Processing Serv, Org.
\' Board of Governors, 745 F2d 677 (DC Cir 1984); note. "National Banks, Bank
Holdil:g. Companies and Dala Processing Services," 14 Ga. L. Rev. 576 (1980),
gg The insurance p~ovisions of the Bank Hold:ng Company Act are discussed later in
this .section. The scope of the Bank Holding Company Act as il relates 10 insurance
activitIes "as litigated in Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v, Board of Governors, 533 F2d
224 (5th Cir. ! 976), vacated in parI, 558 F2d 729 (51h Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 435 US904
(; 978)
100 The Boaed approved an application of Cilicorp to issue and sell payment instru-
ments (including money orders and official checks) with a maximum face value 0:
$10.000. because il thought entry by Citicorp into tr.is business would increase competi-
tion and encourage dceoncenuation in the industry. The Board expressed concem Ihal Ihe
issu,mce of these Instrumems might have an adverse erfec! on the ~eserve base, so it
required the bank to report weekly on its activity. Application of Citico~p, 71 Fed.
Reserve Bull. 58 (19R5). The Board had previously decided thai Ihe issuance and sale of
payment InstrUIT:elllS wilh a (ace value of up to $ i 0.000 was Closely related to banking. 70
Fed. Reserve Bull. 364 (1984).
11 5.02[2j[a) OVERVIEW 5-24

customer and is not involved in underwricing, dealing, or providing

investment advice or research services.'·'
16. Underwriting and dealing in obligations of the United States and other
governmental bodies, and in obligations permitted by statute, including
banker's acceptances and certificates of deposit.
17. Providing general information and statistical forecasting about foreign
exchange markets and providing advisory and transactional services for
customers engaged in foreign exchange transactions. These services
include arranging for "swaps" among customers and executing foreign
exchange transactions, as long as they occur through a separate subsidi-
ary that complies with Board conditions.
18. Acting as a futures commission merchant for nonaffiliated persons in
the execution and clearance on major commodity exchanges of future
contracts and options on futures contracts for bullion, foreign
exchange, government securities, certificates of deposit, and other
money market instruments that a bank may buy or sell in the cash
market for its own account. The activity must be conducted through a
separately incorporated subsidiary.
19. Providing investment advice on financial futures and options on
futures as a futures commission merchant or a commodity trading
adviser as authorized under the act and by Board regulations.
20. Providing consumer financial counseli:lg, including educational
courses and instructional materials, on financial management matters
such as debt consolidation, applying for a mortgage or bankruptcy,
budget management, tax planning, retirement and estate planning,
insurance and general investment management subject to Board
conditions.'"
21. Providing tax advice and tax preparation services.
22. Providing check guaranty services for merchants.
23. Operat ing a collection agency for collecting overdue retail or commer-
cial accounts.
24. Operating a credit bureau.
The Board is authorized in Section 4(c)(8) to differentiate between activities
commenced de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition of a going

,,, The securities activities permitted to banks and bank holding companies are
discussed in Chapter 8.
'0' The Board also has permitted a bank holding company (0 provjde consulting
~elvices in designing and administering employee bcnelit plans. Application of Bank
Vermont Corp .. Board of Governors. Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,532 (Mar. 6.
1986)
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.02[2][a]
5-25

concern. 103 As seen in Regulation Y, the Board favors de novo entry by a bank
holding company because it may benefit the public by increasing competition. A
bank holding company can engage de novo in any of the listed activities, either
directly or through a subsidiary, thirty days after giving its Reserve bank notice
of its intentions, unless the Federal Reserve bank acts to delay the proposal. 1O•
Upon application for the acquisition of shares ofa company already engaged in
one ofthe listed activities, the applying holding company must await the Board's
determination of whether or not benefits to the public will outweigh any adverse
effects.'os
The Board also reviews applications concerning activities not among those
specifically listed in Regulation Y. If a holding company feels that under the
surrounding circumstances of the case, an activity is closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks, it may file an application for Board approval.'D6
Activities ruled on favorably by the Board in this manner include the
purchase, sale, and arbitrating ofgold and silver coins, '07 engaging in the activity
of a guaranty savings bank, operating a pool reserve plan for the pooling ofloss
reserves of banks with respect to their loans to sma~l businesses, and land escrow
services. 108
Nonbank activities not approved by the Board include:
1. Insurance premium funding (combining the sale of mutual funds and
insurance)"o,
2. Underwriting life insurance not sold in connection with a credit transac-
tion of a bank holding company or its subsidiary"O
3. Real estate brokerage'"
4. Land development'"

10> 12 USC § 1843(c)(8) (1982).

04
' 12 CFR § 225.23(a)( I) (1987). A de novo activity is "presumed to result in benefits
to the public through increased competition." 12 CFR § 225.24 (1987).
105
12 CFR § 225.23(a)(2) (1987).
'06 12 CFR § 225.23(a)(3)( 1987). The Board has ninet\-one days to act on a proposal.
Failure of the Board to aet results in the application bemg deemed approved. 12 eFR
§ 225.23(h) (\987). See BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 596 F2d 1368 (9th
Cir. 1979). See generally Anno\., "Construction and Application of Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Provision That Application for Approval to Acquire Control of Bank Shall Be
Deemed Granted If Federal Reserve Board Does Not Act on Application Within 9J Days
(12 U.S.C.S. § I 842(b))," 38 ALR Fed. 919 (1978).
107 See 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) li~ 43,086, 97, I 77 (1983).
'0' Heller. supra note 88. at 257.
IO'See 12 CFR § 225.126 (1987).
'10 Id.

111 Id.

'" Id.
11 5.02121lbj OVERVIEW 5-26

5. Real estate syndication '"

6. Management consulting '14
7. Property management'15
8. Operation of savings and loan associations".

Although Regulation Y lists the previous activities as those that are not closely
related to banking, there have been substantial changes in the law and enlarge-
ment of the activities recognized as permissible for bank holding companies
since the date of the Board's interpretation. The actions of the Board in approv-
ing activities related to those shown previously should be consulted. 117

(bl Deciding When an Activity Is Closely Related to Banking. In order for the
Board to approve an application for a nonbank activity, it must determine that
the proposed activity is "closely related" to banking and that any adverse effects
are outweighed by benefits to the public. In the case of activities listed in
Regulation Y, the "closely related" question is already affirmatively answered.
For those activities that are not on the list, the Board must determine whether
the proposed activity is "closely related." If the Board's determination is nega-
tive, it does not reach the further question of the potential for public benefits.
The congressional intent behind the "closely related" test of the 1970
amendments is by no means clear, as the House and Senate Conferences
expressed differing views regarding the expansiveness of the clause."· The court
in National Courier Ass'n v. Board o/Governors'" has interpreted the phrase as
being a "substantial relaxation" of the Board's restrictive approach prior to the
1970 amendments. 120 The Courier court articulated three connections that
would bring an activity within the "closely related" requirement:

I.. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services;

l1J Ie.
", Id.
"'[d.
". This is thc policy as contained in the regulation. See Id. The regulation notes that :t
is under consideration. See 1972 Fed. Reserve Bull. 717 (1972). It also has been modi!ied
by Congress in that acquisition of savings and loan associations is permitted in certain
emergency situations. See the discussion at • 6.06.
',IT A good SDurce of the Board's actions is the three-volume Board of Governors,

Federal Reserve Regulatory Servicc.

118 Jessee, supr. note 9, at 30.

m 516 F2d 1229 (DC Cir. 1975).

12' For the Supreme Court's interpretation, see Securities Indus. AS;'n v. Boord of
Governors, 468 US 207 (1984), discussed in this section. CQmpare Board of Governors v.
Investment Co. Ins!., 450 US 46 (1981).
5-27 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES '1 5.02(2I1b]

2. Banks generally provide services that are operati.onally or functi.onally so

similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to
provide the proposed services; and
3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the
proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized form. '21
The Board successfully argued that the courier services in question, used for
transporting banking and financially related data processing materials, met all
three of the aforementioned criteria. The court went on to hold, however, that
non-financially related courier services are impermissible, The following year
the Board applied the Courier test in determining that the operation of a travel
agency was not an activity closely related to banking. 122
In Securities Industry Association v. Board a/Governors, '23 the U.S. Supreme
Court reaffirmed the Board's broad discretion to decide what activities are
"closely related" to banking. Saying that "the Board's determination of what
activities are 'closely related' to banking. , . 'is entitled to the greatest defer-
ence,' "'24 the Court upheld the Board's approval of BankAmerica Corp.'s acqui-
sition of Charles Schwab & Co., a discount broker. The Securities Industry
Association challenged the Board's decision on the basis that an activity cannot
be "closely related" to banking unless it will facilitate other banking operations.
Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
rejected this argument. The Bank Holding Company Act authorized the Board
to consider "a variety of factors" in making its determination.
The Court also rejected as "without merit" the securities association's
argument that the Board could not use a "functional" analysis to decide that the
activities were closely related to banking. In the Court's view, the 1970 amend-
ments to the Bank Holding Company Act expanded the Board's discretion and
gave no indlcation of a congressional intent to forbid the Board from consider-
ing the functional relationship of nonbanking activities to bankmg.:25 In uphold-

", National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors. 516 F2d 1229, 1237 (DC Cir.
1975). See generally "Construction and Application of § 4(c)(8) of Bank Holding Corr.-
rany Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C.S. § 1843(c)(8)), Permitt:ng Bank Holding Companie, to
Acquire Shares In Companies Whose Activities Arc Closely Related to Banking," 3 I ALR
Fed. 520 (1977); De Santo, "Product Expansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and
Revision of Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act," 53 Fcrdham L. Rev.
1127-1157 (1985).
In 62 Fed. Reserve Bull. 148 (1976).

12J 468 US 207 (1984)

"'!c. at 212.
mid. at n.12. Comparc thc Supreme Coun', re;eClion of the Board's "functional"
analysis in Secllrities bdus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors. 468 US 137 (1984), rev'g A.G.
Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F2d 1.J6 (DC CJr. I 9R2) where the legal issue
involved the interpretation of the term "secuLties" in the Glass-Steagall Ac:. This case is
discussed funhe' in Chapter 8.
11 5.02l2][b] OVERVIEW 5-28

ing the Board's findings, the Court noted that banks perform in their trust
depanments functions that are not significantly different from the discount
brokerage activities engaged in by Schwab. Schwab was not engaged in under-
writing or in giving investment advice, but only in executing sale and purchase
transactions and certain related activities for its customers. Banks have offered
similar services for their own customers for years under the authority of section
I Ii pf the Glass-Steagall Act, which expressly allows banks to buy and sell
securities for the account of their customers."·
In Association o/Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board 0/
Governors, '" the coun approved related reasoning by the Board to uphold the
provision of data processing services. The court said it was proper for the Board
to adopt a data test that would not limit the type of technology that might be
used. The affiliate of the bank holding company cou:d provide data-processing
services, regardless of the type of technology employed. as long as the data being
processed or furnished were "financial, banking or eccnomic" and that the other
requirements of the Board were satisfied. The court specifically upheld the
decision to allow bank holding companies to provide general economic informa-
tion and advice and to engage in economic statistical forecasting and industry
studies. In addition, the court approved the sale of data-processing hardware,
although it noted limitations on the extent of this aspect of the bank holding
company's activities.
After finding an activity to be closely related to banking, the Board must
determine whether the activity is a "proper incident to banking," that is,
whether the performance of the nonbanking affiliate "can reasonably be
expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse
effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices."'" Resolution of the
public benefits test must be determined on a casc-by-case basis, with reference to
the panicular facts surrounding the proposed activity.l19 The adverse and bene-
ficial effects set out in section 4(c)(8) are not intended to be exclusive, but oniy to
serve as examples to be weighed. In the absence of any adverse factors, the Board

126 The scope of banks' and bank hold:ng companies' authority to engage in securities

transactions is discussed in Chapter 8.

m 745 F2d 677 (DC Cir. 1984).
'" 12 USC § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
'" See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors. ~68 US 207 (1984); Indepen-
dent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F2d 1206. : 2! 6 (DC Cir. : 9,75). See also
Oklahoma BankersAss'n v, Board of Governors, 766 F2d 1~~6 (10th Cir. 1985); Indepen-
dent Ins. Agents of America v. Board of Governors, i36 F2d 468 (Bth Cir. J 984);
Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Bo"rd of Governo's. 658 F2d 571 (8th Ci,. 1981).
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 'J 5.02{2\[el
5·29

may approve a proposed acquisition even though no public benefits are

expected. '30

Icl Approval of Nonbank Activities-Hearings and ,Judicial Review, Section

4(c)(8) provides that the act's prohibitions against nonbank expansion by bank
holding companies shall not apply to "shares of any company the activities of
which the Board after due no/ice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by
order or regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks as to be a proper incident thereto. "13'
The 1970 amendments added the term "by order or regulation," so that the
Board could proceed "either by order in specific cases or by regulation in a
general classification or category of cases in order to provide maximum flexibil-
ity as a procedural matter in administering this section. "131 The Board has
promulgated Regulation Y to designate activities it deems to be "closely related"
to banking.'33
The 1970 amendments replaced the "due notice and hearing" language of
the [956 act with "due notice and opportunity for hearing," so that "the Board
would not be required to hold hearings in all cases ... , but should hold hearings
in all cases where a contest is raised. "'34 When the Board has previously deter-
mined by regulation that an activity is not "closely related" to banking, or when
the facts in issue are concerned with general pollcy matters, no hearing is
required.'" However, when there is a factual dispute as to the "public benefits"
of an acquisition, it must be resolved in a trial-type hearing because the resolu-

13'Heller, supra note 88, at 263. For a study of Board orders between 1971 and 1976
that evaluated the significance of such factors. see Jessee. supra note 9, at 75.
'3' 12 USC § I 843(c)(8) (1982) (emphasls added)
'" Conf. Rep. No. ; 747, 9l st Cong" 2d Sess. 15 (l970) (hereinafter ConL Rell. No.
1747). Before 1970, the Board had 10 hold a full adjudicatory hearing. See also Indepcr.-
dent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors, supra no:e 129. at 1213.
133 The Regulation Y activities are discussed 10 ~, 5.0:[21[ a1. Amendments that clarify
or interpret these regulations may be promulgated without prior notice or an opportunity
for hearing. See American Bancorp. v. Board of Governors. 509 F2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974\,
where the court foune the Board's amendments regarding the extent to which a bank
holding company's subsidiary ean prcvlde financial services to state and local govern-
ments came within :he exemptions to tr.e r.mice and he.ring requirements in the act.
'''Conf. Rep. No. 1747. supra note 132. at 15-16.
'''In BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 491 F2d 985 (9th CiT. (974), the
coun affirmed the Board's denial of BankAmerica's request for a hearing on its applica-
tio:1to engage in the "non.. f.ull payout" leasing of computer equipment. The court found
that BankAme~iea had participated fully in the Board's extensive publIC hearings prior to
the adoptIon ~,f. Regulation Y, in which they had urged the Board to lfieludo non-full
payout leaSing in its list of "closely related" activities.
~ 5.02[211c) OVERVIEW 5-30

tion depends on the particular "adjudicative facts" peculiar to each

application. '3'
A court can review the Board's regulations, even when those regulations
were not challenged at the time of promulgation, and can set them aside if they
are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
oflaw." 137
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Independent Bankers
Association v. Board ofGovernors, '" confronted the issue of whether or not the
1970 amendments affected the right of interested parties to obtain a full adjudi-
cative hearing in which to challenge an application's approval or denial. The
court concluded: "As a rule a party in interest may not be deprived of his right to
have the facts aired and tested in adversary proceedings-unless it is shown that
none of the facts material to the ultimate decision are in dispute."'" The agency
carries a heavy burden ofjustifieation to show that the parties could gain nothing
by a full adjudicatory hearing.
The act provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Board under
this chapter may obtain a review of such order in the United States Court of
Appeals within any circuit wherein such party has its principal place of business,
or in the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia .... ",.0 It further provides
that "a party who would become a competitor of the applicant or subsidiary
thereof by virtue of the applicant's or its subsidiary's acquisition ... shall have
the right to be a party in interest in the p~oceeding and, in the event of an adverse
order of the Board, shall have the right as an aggrieved party to obtain judicial
review thereof as provided in Section 1848 .... ",., The purpose of this provision
is to guarantee a "properly liberal attitude concerning the right of competitors
... to have standing" so that "the broadest possible forum [is] allowed for
adversary proceedings to take place in order that all issues may be aired com·
pletely."'" To be "aggrieved," a party IT.ust first pursue its administrative

13' Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F2d 224, 235 (5th CiT.
1976), vacated in part, 558 F2d 729 (5th CiT. 1977), cen. denied, 435 US 904 (1978). See
also Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors. 766 F2d 1446 (10th Cir. :985),
where the challengers failed to establish that there were material disputed facts, which
required a :ull evidentiary hearing. See generarIy Helfer & Morse, "Hearings Under
Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act," 101 Banking LJ 50-70 (l984).
137 Alabama Ass '11. of 1115. A/?ell!s l. Board 0(Gol'emor5, 533 F2d at 240.

m 516 :02d 1206 (DC CiT. 1975).

", rd. at i 222.
'" 12 USC § 1848 (1982). See generally Annot., "Jcrisdiction of United States Cour.s
of Appeals to Review Agency Action Under § 9 of Bank Holding Company Act (12 USC
§ 1848)." 40 ALR Fed. 593 (1978): Annot., "Who Is 'Party Aggrieved' under § 9 of Bank
Holding Company Act (12 USCS § 1848), Which Allows ..\ ny Parly Aggrieved by Federal
Reserve Board Order Under Act to Obta:n Judicial Re\ iew," 36 ALR Fed. 349 (1978).
'" 12 USC § 1850 (1982).
"'Cont". Rep. No. 1747, supra note 132, at 29-10.
5-31 fiANK HOLDING COMPANIES fr 5.02[3I1a]

remedies before the Board. Only after a party has exhausted its remedies can it
request judicial review. '43

(3) Other Authority for and Restrictions on the Activities of Bank

Holding Companies
The amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act over the years have
also created another layer offederal statutory law that determines which activi-
ties by bank holding companies and their affiliates are proper. The major such
areas are discussed in the following text. Congress is in the process ofconducting
a comprehensive examination of the structure of the financial services industry,
an examination that could lead to a reevaluation of the activities Congress
approves as appropriate for bank holding companies. The Competitive Equality
Banking Amendments of 1987 state that Congress intends to review the "need
for financial restructuring legislation in the light of today's changing financial
environment both domestic and international ... ."w Pending the completion
of this review, Congress established a moratorium on certain areas ofactivity by
bank holding companies and other financial institutions. The morato~ium
affected financial institutions broadly, and was not limited to bank holding
companies and their amliates. The first part of this section explains the terms of
this moratorium.

[al 1987 Moratorium on Certain :\'onbanking Activities. Title II of the Com-

petitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987 established a moratorium on
certain nonbanking activities. As described, this moratorium was broad in scope
and applied to other financial institutions in addition to bank holding compa-
nies and their affiliates. The moratorium expired on March I, 1988, and Con-
gress stated Its intent that the moratorium shallnO\ be extended."" The activities
subject to the moratOTlum included nonbanking aCllvities of foreign banks,
sccuri:ies transactions, insurance activities, and real estate dealings. They arc
listed in the following text.
iii Certain activities offoreign banks. Foreign banks wnh grandfather rights
under the International Banking Act of 1978 a,e prohibited frOl-:J expanding
i'.ctivities "under any provision of law which is not applicable to domestIc bank
holding companies" by acquiring an interest in another firF.I.'45 Under the law
governing foreIgn banks, some foreign banks enjoyed grandfather rights that
allowed them to engage in transactions and activities that domestic banks could

,., First Na!'! Bank of St. Charles v. Board of Go\'crnors, 509 F2d 1004 (8th Cil
1975) .
c
'" CELlA til. II. § 203(a). 100 Slat. 554. 584 (198 )
""CEllA tit. II. §§ 201(a). 203(b). 100 Stal. 554. 5·~1. 584 (198'7).
""CEllA tit. II. § 20!(J). 100 Slat. 55<1. 582 (1(l8-i
II 5.02[31lal OVERVIEW 5-32

not participate in. This amendment limits foreign banks' abilities to expand the
activities allowed under the grandfather provisions of the International Banking
Act of 1978.
[iiI Securities transactions of banks and bank holding companies. There is a
general moratorium for bank holding companies, affiliates, foreign banks, and
insured banks on certain securities transactions.'" These institutions may not
engage in the United States in any of the following:
(A) in the flotation, underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution
of securities if that approval would require the agency to determine that the
entity which would conduct such activities would not be engaged princi-
pally in such activities,
(B) in any securities activity not legally authorized in writing prior to
March 5, 1987, or
(C) in the operation of a nondealer marketplace in options. 14•

The prohibition on securities activities discussed in item (B) does not apply to
transactions in which the bank is only an agent, and to activities that "had been
lawfully engaged in prior to March 5, 1987 ..."'"
[iii] Insurance activities of banks and bank holding companies. There are
extensive provisions dealing with insurance activities. In general, the amend-
ments prohibit the federal banking agencies from approving any insurance
powers beyond the activities specifically allowed in Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act. 150 In addition, the Board of Governors may not approve
the acquisition of a company under the Bank Holding Company Act, including a
state-chartered bank, unless there is an agreement to limit the insurance activi-
ties of the company to those permitted under Section 4(c)(8). As a result,
although the holding company may acquire a bank that is authorized under the
laws of the state where it was chartered to engage in insurance activities, the
Board will condition the acquisition on an agreement to restrict the insurance
activities to those allowed under the Bank Holding Company Act. 151 Finally,
national banks and foreign banks cannot expand their insurance activities "into
places where it was not conducting such activities as of March 5, 1987."152 A
separate section of the amendments makes clear that thc amendments are not

147 Ie. § 201 (b)(2).

148Id.
14'ld.
150 Ie. § 20J(b)(3). Sec generally "Paving thc Way in the Financial Services Industry:
South Dakota Opcns the Insurance Industry to Banks," 29 SDL Rev. 172-180 (1983);
"The Merger of Banking and Insurance: Will Congress Close the South Dakota Loop-
hole?"'. 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 762-778 (1985); Hem:ner, "Insurance Underwriting
Activities of BH Cs," 100 Banking LJ 700-717 (1983). .
151 CERA tit. If, § 20 I (b)(4), 100 Stat. 554, 582 (j 987)

152ld. § 20 db)(5).
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 11 5.02[3Ilc)
5-33

intended either to "increase or reduce the insurance authority" of bank holding

companies and national banks under the "current law."'53
Ill') Powers to engage in real estate transactions. The amendments limit the
ability of federal banking regulators to approve new real estate powers for
certain regulated financial institutions. The banking agencies may not take
action that would increase the real estate powers of any bank, bank holding
company, foreign bank, or subsidiary.'"
Although there was a moratorium on the previously described activities, the
federal banking agencies were allowed to continue to consider applications or to
adopt rules allowing banks to engage in the suspended activities as long as the
effective date of such action was deferred until the moratorium expired.'"

[bl Securities Activities of Bank Holding Companies. As one of the areas

under comprehensive review by Congress, the securities activities of banks and
bank holding companies were subject to the constraints of the moratorium
imposed by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. 156 Under the existing
provisions of federal law, as discussed in Chapter 8, the Board could approve
bank holding company affiliation with affiliates engaged in securities business,
under some conditions, as long as the company was not "principally engaged" in
such activities. One of the purposes of the (987 moratorium was to prevent
further affiliations with securities firms on this basis.

[cl Insurance Activities. The issue of insurance activities of bank holding

companies has been a controversial one for years. A federal court of appeals
decision in the mid-1970s determined that the sale of insurance to the holding
company and its nonbank subsidiaries and the sale of "convenience" insurance
were invalid. '" This led to a series of Board rulings and regulations'" and to
eventual action by Congress.
The Gam-5t Germain Depository Institutions Act of 19821<9 amended the
Bank Holding Company Act to provide that acting as an insurance principal,

'''CEBA tit. 1I, § 201(d), 100 Stat. 554, 583 (1987).

"'CEBA tit. Il, § 201 (b)(6), 100 Stat. 554, 583 (1987).
'''CEBA tit. II, § 202,100 Stat. 554, 584 (1987).
'''The moratorium imposed by the Competili\'e Equality Banking Act of 198 7 is
discussed supra ~ 5.02[3)[aJ.
'57 AlalJama Ass'n oflns. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated in pan 558 F2d 729 (1977), cer\. denied, 435 US 904 (1978).
156Th e B oar d d eClston
.. . the Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents case is at 44
on remand In
Fed. Reg. 65,051 (1979). Sec also the current Board version of RegulatIon Y cn i nsurancc
activitics. 12 CFR § 225.25(8) (I 9M7).
159 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections oftitlcs 12,
15, and 18 USC).
11 5.02[3J(c] OVERVIEW 5-34

agent, or broker is not an activity closely related to banking in which bank

holding companies can engage. 160 There are six exceptions to this prohibition:
1. Insurance provided to assure repayment of loans in the event of death,
disability, or involuntary unemployment of the borrower.
2. Casualty insurance on property used as collateral for loans extended by
finance companies that are subsidiaries of bank holding companies. (The
dollar value of loans that qualify is limited to $10,000 or, in case of
manufactured homes, $25,000, subject to an adjustment for inflation.)
3. Insurance agent activity in places that have a population not exceeding
5,000 persons, or where the bank holding company can demonstrate that
inadequate insurance agency facilities exist.
4. Insurance agency activity that the bank holding company or its subsidi-
ary (ngaged in on May 1, 1982, or that the Board of Governors had
approved by May 1, 1982. (If a bank holding company or subsidiary
qualifies under this exception, the company or subsidiary also may
engage in sales of insurance at new locations so long as the new locations
are in the state where the principal place of business of the bank holding
company is located, are in a state immediately adjacent to the state where
the principal place of business is located, or are in a state where the
holding company or subsidiary had engaged in insurance activities on
May 1, 1982. Qualifying companies also may offer new insurance cover-
age that becomes available after May 1, 1982. so long as the new coverage
insures against the same types of risks as those the company was insuring
against on May 1, 1982.)'61
5. Certain insurance activities related to property used in the operation of a
bank holding company and insurance protecting employees of the
company.
6. Any insurance agency activity engaged in bv a bank holding company or
subsidiary when the bank holding company has total assets of $50 mil·
I ion or less.

160 [d. § 6C I, amending 12 USC § 1843(c)(8). See Application of Citicorp, 71 Fed.

Reserve Bull. 789 (1985), where the Federal Reserve Board ~efused to approve an applica-
tion of Citicorp to establish a bank to engage in national insurance activities because the
Board believed approval would const:tute an evasion ~f direct limitations on these
activities by the Bank Holding Company Act.
16' In commenting on the grar.dfather rights afforded by the act, the conference
committee stated: "The conferees stress that nothing in this Title is intended to prevent
the trar.sfercing of grandfathered :nsurance activities of a bank holding company to the
parent company or any cf its subsidiaries if the transferral" brought about for manage-
ment or efficiency purposes. Such a reorganiza:ion shall have no effect on the application
or the restrictions or exemptions contained in thiS Title." ConC Rep. on Gam-St Germain
Depository Instit'Jtions Act of 1982, H.R. Conf. Rep. N~. 899, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1982).
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 11 5.02[3][e)
5-35

Special grandfather rights are recognized for bank holding companies regis-
tere with the Board of Governors before
d .January, 1, 1971."2'
The Competitive
,
E uality Banking Act of 1987 established a moratonum on certam msurance
q .,
activIties, as d'Iscussed prevIous
. I'y, 183

[d] Bank Service Companies, The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions

Act of 1982"4 allows insured banks to establish bank service corporations."s
Bank service corporations are defined as corporations "organized to perform
services authorized by this Act, all ofthe capital stock of which is owned by one
or more insured banks."'66 An insured bank may not invest more than 10
percent of its capital surplus in any bank service corporation and cannot invest
more than 5 percent of its total assets in bank service corporations. 167
Bank service corporations may provide services related to the collection of
checks and undertake accounting functions related to depository activities, 16.
Bank service corporations cannot take deposits, and they are limited in the
geographical areas they can serve without prior approval from the Federal
Reserve Board.'" The conference committee on the act stated in its conference
report that the provisions relating to bank service corporations "do not author-
ize a bank service corporation to perform any activity that is not authorized for
any bank that is a shareholder of the bank service corporation or that is not
authorized for bank holding companies" under existing law. Moreover, the
conferees said that "the amendments do not authorize any securities activity"
that is prohibited under existing federallegislation,1TO

lei Bankers' Banks. The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of

1982 'II provides for the establishment of bankers' banks, which are organized to
provide services for other banks and depository institutions. The Comptroller of
the Currency has authority to charter as a national banking association banks

162
12 CFR § 225.2 5(8)(vii) (1987).
163 The moratoriur.1 imposed on certain insurance activities by the Competitive
EqualilY Banking Act of 1987 is discussed supra ~ 5.02[3]lal.
'64 Pub. L. ~o. 97-320, 96 5tat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections oftillcs 12,
I S, and: 8 esC).
165 12 l :SC q 186 I (1982).

1&6 12 l;SC § 1861 (b)(2) (1982),

'67 12 I;SC § 1862 (1982).

'65 12 I;SC § j 863 (1982).

"0 12 USC § 1864 (1982).

170 ConI'. Rep. on Gam-5t Germain Depository InstJlutions Act of 1982, !-l,R. Conf,
Rep, No. 899, 97th Cong., 2e1 SCSI. 92 (1982). .
'7> Pub. L No. 97·320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of tilles 12, 15,
and 18 USC).
'1 5.02/3][1] OVERVIEW 5-36

that will be owned exclusively by other depository institutions and are "organ-
ized to engage exclusively in providing services for other depository institutions
and their officers, directors, and employees."172 Alternatively, the bankers' bank
may be a bank that is insured by the FDIC. The 1982 act authorizes national
banks to invest in a bank insured by the FDIC if the bank is owned exclusively by
depository institutions and if the bank and all its subsidiaries are engaged
exclusively in providing services to other depository institutions. 113 A bankers'
bank is within the definition of "bank" in the Bank Holding Company Act. 174
Therefore, the prohibition against nonbank activities in the act does not apply to
it.

[f] Thrift Institutions' Bank. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, thrift institu-
tions and savings banks may own a "bank" without becoming a bank holding
company.'"

[g] Other Bank Holding Company Activities. There are other important activ-
ities and aspects of bank holding companies that are discussed in other chapters
of this text. The major ones are listed as follows:
1. Securities activities, discussed in Chapter 8:
2. Edge Act and Agreement banks, discussed in Chapter 2;
3. Interstate activities and acquisitions of bank holding companies, dis-
cussed in Chapter 6;
4. Antitrust and competitive considerations in the formation and expan-
sion of holding companies, discussed in Chapters 13;
5. Acquisition of thrift institutIOns, including emergency acquisitions, dis-
cussed in Chapters 6 and 10; and
6. The formation of holding companies for sayings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks, and other thrift institutions, discussed in
Chapter 6.

[4] Export Trading Companies

The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETCA) further enlarged the
scope of permissible bank holding company investment activities. In general,

'72 12 USC § 27(b)(I) (1982)

In: 2 USC § 24 Seventh (1982).
'''See 12 USC § 1841(c) (1982).
175CEBA tit. I, § 101(e), 100 Stat. 554, 562-563 (amending 12 USC ~ 1841(a)(5)([)
(1982)). For a discussion of ,esl,ictlons on the banks' deposit-taking act!vities. see supra
.: 5.01[4][f],
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.02[4]
5-37

the ETCA allows bank holding companies to invest limited amounts ofcapi tal in
export trading companies (ETCs) and provides antitrust immunity to ETCs that
comply with certain certification procedures.
The purpose of the ETCA is to provide for meaningful and effective panici-
pation by bank holding companies, bankers' banks, and Edge Act corporations
in the financing and development of ETCs in the United States. 176 To accom-
plish the stated purpose, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
is to proviae regulations allowing for the establishment of ETCs that win be
competitive with similar foreign-owned trading companies in the United States
and abroad. This legislation is designed specifically to aid small and medium-
sized firms in the export of their goods and services.'" The drafters felt that bank
holding companies in general could provide communication, financing, market-
ing, technological, and management capabilities, which would otherwise be
unavailable to smaller and medium-sized firms."" With such resources, the
drafters projected that ETCs would contribute to the elimination of the increas-
ing trade deficits the United States has faced in the recent past. 179
The ETCA defines an ETC as a company that is "organized and operated
principally for purposes of (Al exporting goods or services produced in the
United States; or (B) facilitating the exportation ofgoods or services produced in
the United States by unaffiliated persons by providmg ... export trade ser-
vices. ""0 The definition is narrower for purposes of investment in ETCs by bank
holding companies. The ETC must be "exclusively engaged in activities relating
to international trade."'·' ETCs may provide a variety of services including
consulting, international marketing research. advertising, marketing product

m Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 91-290, 96 Stal. 1233 (15 USC
§§ 4001-4003 (1982). See 15 USC § 400 ! (b) (1982). See generally Rcinsch, "The Export
Trading Company Act of 1981," 14 JL & Pol'y In;'; Bus. 47-127 (\982); f';or!on, "The
Efficacy of Expor Trading Companies and Related Legislat:on and Regulations," 50 J.
Air L. & Com. 865-905 (1985); Ferchil!, "Banks anc Export Trading Company," (,
Fordham In!'1 LJ 265-287 (1982-83); Golden & Kolb. "The Export Trading Company
Act of 1982: an American Response to Foreign Competition," 58 :"Ictre Dame L. Rev.
743-792 (1983); Seberger, "The Ranking ProviSIOns of the Expoct Trading Co:npany Act
~f 1982," 39 Bus. Law. 475-494 (1984).
"'15 USC§ 400 I(a)(4) (1982).
178 S. Rep. No. 27. 97th Cong., ]st Sess 4 (198 \.1
n', Export Trading Company Act of 1981: Hearin, on S. 144 Ilcfore the Subcomm. on
International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Ranking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong.. 1st Sess. 58-59 (19811 (statement of John Heinz. Senator
from Pennsylvania)
180
15 USC § 4002(a)(4) (1982). There is a narrower c1efinition in the act for purposes
of i~\'estmenl by b"nk holding companies and their subsidiaries in ETCs, 12 USC
§§ I 843:c)(14)IF)(I), 1841(c)(14)(C), IR43(c)(14)(D) (1982)
''':2 USC § IR43(c)(141(F):i) (1982)
~ 5.02(4) OVERVIEW 5-38

research, common l~gal assistance, and more.'" The definition of an ETC limits
the provision of services to "facilitating" the export of domestically produced
goods and services that persons not affiliated with ETCs have produced. ,.3
The ETCA amends the Bank Holding Company Act to allow bank holding
companies to invest up to a maximum of 5 percent of the bank holding com-
pany's consolidated capital and surplus in the shares of an export trading com-
pany."4 Such investments are, however, subject to the disapproval of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Before investing in an ETC, bank holding
companies must give the Board sixty days' prior written notice of the proposed
investment.' B5
The Board may disapprove ofa bank holding company's investment in an
export trading company only upon three findings. Firstly, disapproval may be
based upon a Board determination that the disapproval is necessary to prevent
"unsafe or 'Jnsound banking practices, undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition, or conflicts of interest."'" Secondly, the Board
may disapprove when it finds that i:lVestment in an export trading company
wouid affect the financial or managerial resources of the bank holding company
to the extent that it adversely affects the "safety and soundness" of a subsidiary
bank,'" Thirdly, investment may be disapproved upon the failure of the bank
holding company to provide information required by regulation. ".
Under the terms of the ETCA, both banks and bank holding companies are
permicted to extend credit to ETCs. The extension of credit by bank holding
companies, i::Jcluding extensions of credit by their subsidiaries, is limited to 10
percent of the bank holding company's consolidated capital and surplus.... Such
amount does not include any amount invested by a bank holding company in the
shares of the ETC itself. '". Extensions ofcredit are further limited by the terms of
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act as amended in 1966. 191 Thus, extensions

"2 12 USC § 1843(c)( 14 )(F)(ii) (1982).

,BJ Although ETCs may "engage in or hold shares" of a company engagec in the.
'Jusiness of selling. distributing, or underwriting securit;es in the United States. they may
only do so to the same extent that bank holding companies are allowed to do so under state
ane federal laws. In adeition, ETCs are forbidden to engage in any agricultural or
manufac:uring jJroductio:1 precesses. They mal', howe\'cr. perform packaging and
pcocessing transactions that ar~ incidental to the exportation of goods. 12 USC
§ :843(c)(141':CI (1982),
''':2 l;SC § 1843(c)(14) (1982).
m 12 USC ~ I 843:c)( 14)(A)(i) (1982).
'8(, 12 USC § I 843(c)(14)IA)(iv)(I) (1982).
'" .2 USC § 1843(c)( 14)(A)(iv)(I1) (1982).
m 12 USC § 1843((')( 14)(A)(iv)(IC) (1982).
m 12 USC § I 843(c)(14)(fJ)(i) (1982).
"·Id.
,,, 12 USC § 1843(c)(14)(F)(iv) (1982).
 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.02[41
5-39

of credit include any purchase of securities, assets, or other obligations under a

repurchase agreement and the discounting of promissory notes, bills, and so
forth.'92
In addition, bank holding companies are forbidden to extend credit to ETCs
on terms more favorable than those available to other similar borrowers under
similar circumstances.'·' One exception to this rule, however, is that collateral
requirements otherwise applicable to bank holding companies do not apply to
extension of credit to ETCs in which the bank holding company has an
interest. ,••
The Board may require a bank holding company to terminate its investment
in an ETC at any time.'·' Alternatively, the Board may impose limitations or
conditions on the continued investment in an ETC. ,., Termination, limitation
of activities, or the imposition of conditions e:l the continued investment in
ETCs is dependent on a Board determination that the ETC "has taken positions
in commodities or commodity contracts, in securities, or in foreign exchange,
other than as may be necessary in the course of export trading company's
business or operations."'·'
In addition to bank holding companies, other institutions are allowed to
participate in the overall exporting activities of ETCs. Under the ETCA, Edge
corporations, which are subsidiaries of a bank holding company, or agreement
corporations, which are also subsidiaries of a bank holding company, may
invest, directly o~ indirectly, up to 5 percent of their consolidated capital and
surplus. ,•• When a corporation is not engaged in banking activities, it may invest
up to 25 percent of its consolidated capital ane. surplus in the voting stock or
other evidences of ownership in one or more ETCs.'··
In addition to Edge Act corporation participation mentioned above, the
Export-Import Bank of the United States is authorized by the act to provide loan
guarantees on loans extended by financial institutions, public creditors, or
private creditors to ETCs. >00 These loans must be secured by export account
receivables on inventories of exportable goods. 201 The Export-Import Bank may
guarantee loans only when its board of directors believes the private credit

'" 12 USC § 371 c (1982).

'" 12 USC § : 843(c)(14)(B)(iii) (1982).
", 12 USC §§ 1843(c)(14)(B)(;), 1843(c)(14)(B)(i,) (1982).
'" 12 USC § !843(c)(14)(D) (1982)
'" Id
'57Id.
". 12 USC § 1843(c)(14)(E) (1982).
'" (d.
200
12 USC § 635a-4 (1982). See generally, "The Bank Export Services Act: Dercgula-
1,0n Floundering in Compromise." 34 Emory LJ 455-505 (1985); Wilson. "The Bank
Export Services Act of 1982 How Can It Be Fixed')". : 02 Banking U 569-593 (1985).
201 12 USC § 635a-4 (1982)
1: 5.03(1) OVERVIEW 5-40

market is not providing adequate financing to creditworthy export trading

companies and where guarantees would facilitate expansion of exports that
would not occur without such guarantees.'o, Under this provision, the board of
directors is required to ensure that a major share of any loan guarantee is for the
ultimate benefit ofsmall, medium-sized, and minority businesses or agricultural
concerns. 'OJ
A major purpose of the act was to provide antitrust immunity to ETCs.
Under Section 303(a) of the ETCA, the Secretary of Commerce is required to
issue a certificate of review to an ETC applicant that can establish that its export
trade activities meet four criteria. The ETC must demonstrate that its activities
(I) will not result in a substantial lessening of competition or a restraint of trade
in the United States; (2) will not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress
prices within the United States of the goods or services exported; (3) will not
constitute an unfair method of competition against competitors engaged in the
export of similar goods and services; and (4) will not reasonably be expected to
result in the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods
exported by the applicant. 204 Upon issuance ofa certificate of review, there are
substantial limitations on the ability of any person to bring an action against the
ETC under the antitrust laws. 205

'1 5.03 SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES

III Regulation of Savings and Loan Holding Companies in General
Savings and loan holding companies, like bank holding companies, are
subject to regulation. They must register with the FSLlC and must provide such
information as the FSLIC deems necessary.'o, They must file reports with the
FSLlC, maintain such records as it may prescribe, and submit to examinations
as the FSLlC deems appropriate.'o,
A savings and loan holding company is defined simply to be "any company
which directly or indirectly controls an insured institution or controls any other
company which is a savings and loan holding con:pany .... "208 The law has

'02Id.
2031d.
'0' 15 USC § 40 13(a) (1982). For a discussion of some of the antitrust problems
arising under the Export Trading Company Act, including a discussion of the extent the
act affords ber-efits to banks establishing such affiliates. see 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (B"IA) at
733 (Apr. 4, 1983).
2°'15 USC § 4016 (1982).
'°'12 USC § 1730a(b)(I) (1982).
'0' 12 USC § : 730a(b) (1982).
08
' 12 USC § 1730a(a)( I)(D) (1982). Ac, "insured institution" is defined to mean a
"Federal savings and loan association. a Federal savings bank, a b'Jilding and loan,
5·41 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 11 5.03[il

distinguished between "multiple savings and loan holding companies, " which
are holding companies that control at least two insured institutions, and unitary
savings and loan holding companies, which control no more than one insured
institution.'o9 The distinction is relevant to the activities allowed for the holding
company. Until the enactment ofamendments in 1987, as a general rule, the law
restricted the activities of multiple savings and loan holding companies but not
unitary holding companies!" Similarly, the prohibition on interstate location of
insured institution subsidiaries has applied only to multiple savings and loan
holding companies. 211 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of interstate activities.
Savings and loan holding companies cannot acquire control of or merge
with other insured or uninsured institutions without obtaining prior approval
from the FSLIC. 212 Similarly, any other company cannot acquire control of one
or more insured institutions without the approval of the FSLIC.213 The statute
directs the FSLlC to consider, in deciding whether to give approval, "the finan-
cial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company and institu-
tion involved, and the convenience and needs of the community to be
served .... "214 It forbids the FSLIC from approving an acquisition that would
result in a monopoly or have other serious anticompetitive effects that are not
outweighed by other public interest considerations.'15
The insured institutions that are subsidiaries of a savings and loan holding
company are also subject to special prohibitions'" They may not invest in the
securities or obligations of an affiliate company except for certain allowed
service companies. They may not engage in transactions with affiliates that
involve making a loan or extending credit to an affiliate, except for limited
circumstances permitted by the statute and as authorized by the FSLIC. There
are limitations on the purchase of securities of an affiliate, use of securities ofthc

savings and loan or homestead association or a cooperative bank. the accounts of which
are insured by Ihe Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and shall include a
Federal savings bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ...." ld. at § 1730a(a)(l)(A}. Alternatiye!y, the term "uninsured instilu-
ti ons, " by defir:ll ion, refers to in~titut ions thatare "i nsu red ins! 1tutions," except that they
are not ins\,;red by the FSUe and are not a federal savings bank insured by the FDIC. Id.
al § I BOa(a}O )(8).
'0912 USC § 1730a(a)(1)(E) (1982).
21
°12 USC § I730a(c)(2) (1982).
211 12 USC § I730a(e)(3) (1982).

212 12 USC § I730a(e)( I) (1982).

213 12 USC § I 730a(c)(I}(B) (1982)

,,. 12 USC § J 7JOa(e)(2) (J 982).

"', Id.
m 12 USC § : 7JOa(d) (1982).
 ~ 5.03(2) OVERVIEW 5-42

affiliate as collateral, and guarantees of the affiliate's debt!" Some of these

limitations have been affected by the 1987 amendments, as discussed later.
The FSLIC has general regulatory authority over savings and loan holding
companies. It may promulgate rules and regulations.'" It may conduct investi-
gations, take testimony under oath, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance
of witnesses in order to carry out its investigatory responsibilities!'·

[21 Effect of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on

Regulation
The 1987 amendments contained in the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987 change the scheme for regulating the activities of savings and loan
holding companies in important ways. As in the former law, there is a general
prohibition against the holding company engaging in an activity or providing a
service for an insured institution subsidiary for the purpose or with the effect of
evading the laws that apply to the insured thrift sUbsidiary!'O There are changes,
however, in the types of activities permitted to holding companies.

[al Regulation of Business Activities of Savings and Loan Holding Compa-

nies and Their Noninsured Institution Subsidiaries. The Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act amendments allow savings and loan holding companies and
their noninsured thrift institution subsidiaries to engage in the following activi-
ties, termed "exempt activities" by the statute. These activities are as follows:'"
1. Furnishing or performing management services for an insured institu-
tion subsidiary;
2. Conducting an insurance agency or escrow business;
3. Holding, managing, or liquidating assets owned or acquired from an
insured institution subsidiary;
4. Holding or managing properties used or occupied by an insured institu-
tion subsidiary;
5. Acting as trustee under a deed of trust;
6. Activities allowed by the regulations of the FSLJC for multiple savings
and loan holding companies to engage in directly as of March 5, 1987;'"
and

'" ld.
'" I 2 USC § 1730a(h)( I) (1982).
,,, 12 USC § I 730a(h)(2) (1982).
nOCEBA § ~04, 101 Stal. 552, 567-568 (to oe codified at 12 USC § I730a(e)(l)(A)).
'" Id. (to be codified at J 2 lise § I 730a(e)(2))
'" Under the law before the 1987 amendments. the exempt aetivilies listed in the
stalute included the :ir't five categories shown in the text. as well as other services
 5-43 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES \I 5.03[2I[aJ

7. Other activities that the Board of Governors of the Federal ReserVe

System has approved by regulation for bank holding companies, subject
to any limitation imposed on them by the FSLIC by regulation.

The activities on the Federal Reserve Board's list for bank holding companies
are allowed for savings and loan holding companies and their ncininsured insti-
tution subsidiaries, but only when the FSLIC has given prior approval.'" Thus,
the amendments allow savings and loan holding companies to engage in activi-
ties that the Board of Governors allows bank holding companies to engage ih,
unless the FSLIC determines that the activity should be prohibited or limited for
savings and loan holding companies. In deciding whether to grant approval to
the savings and loan holding company to engage in the bank holding company
approved activities, the FSLIC must apply a test that weighs the costs against the
benefits of providing the service. It must consider the following factors:

(i) [WJhether the performance of the activity described in such applica-

tion by the company cr the subsidiary can reasonably be expected to pro-
duce benefits to the public (such as greater convenience, increased
competition, or gains in efficiency) that outweigh possible adverse effects of
such activity (such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unlidr
competition, conflicts of interest or unsound financial practices);
(ii) the managerial resources of the companies involved; and
(iii) the adequacy of the financial resources, including capital, of the
companies involved'»'

The FSLlC is expressly authorized to distinguish hetween activities a holding

company enters de novo and those it begins by acquiring another firm.'25
Before the 1987 amendments, the prohibitions on activities of savings and
loan holding companies and their subsidiaries applied only to multiple savings
and loan holding companies. Following the 1987 changes, the prohibitio:1s apply
to all savings and loan holding companies, subject to some major exception-s
discussed later. Before turning to the scope of these exceptions, the general
prohibitions need to be set forth. Firstly, as indicated previously, there is a
genera! prohibition against using a savings and loan holding company to evade
the law pertaining to insured institutions_ Secondly, a savings ane Joan holding
company IS not allowed to "commence" any acti"ity other than those perr.1itled
as "exempt" activilles, which are described prn-iously, after the date of the

a;Jproved hy the FSLlC as a proper incident to the o;Jcr"tiolls dinsured IIlstitut,ons. Tile
FSLIC, :J'y' regUlation, provided lhat the holding company and it<; nonlnsufcd institution
_,ubsldiaries could engage in those activities allowed for service corporations. 12 CFR
§§ 545.74, 584.2(cl (1987).
"'CLBA § 104 (10 h" codIfied at 12 USC § I 730a(cj(4».
n'CLBA § 104 (to be codilicd al 12 USC § I 730a(cJ(4J(B)).
"'CEBA § 1~14 (to bc codlficd at 12 l;SC § 1'I30alc)(4)(C»).
~ S.03[2J[aj OVERVIEW 5-44

enactment of the 1987 act, namely, August 10, 1987.'25 Thirdly, the holding
company cannot "continue" any activity, other than those qualifying as
"exempt," for more than a two-year grace period from the date of enactment of
the 1987 act. 227
These prohibitions are subject to certain qualifications. The 1987 amend-
ments introduce a concept of a qualified thrift lender (QTL). This is an insured
thrift institution whose investments in specified housing and related assets equal
at least 60 percent of the total tangible assets of the institution. 228 When the
a
savings and loan holding company is unitary holding company whose thrift
institution is a QTL, the prohibitions on commencing or continuing activities,
other than those that are "exempt," do not apply.228 Similarly, when the savings
and loan holding company has more than one insured thrift institution subsidi-
ary, but all (or all but one) of those insured institution subsidiaries were acquired
pursuant to the emergency acquisition procedures authorized by the statute, the
prohibitions on commencing or continuing activities other than the "exempt"
activities do not apply as long as all uf the insured institution subsidiaries meet
the QTL test."· Thus, a unitary savings and :oan holding company remains free
from the restrictions on its business activities as long as its insured thrift subsidi-
ary meets the QTL test, and it can have even more than one insured thrift
subsidiary as long as they are acquired under the emergency procedures and they
all satisfy the QTL test.'''
Additio:lally, there are significant grandfather rights recognized by the 1987
amendments. As mentioned previously, the general rule is that activities other
than those qualifying as "exempt" may be continued for a two-year grace period.
This grace period does not apply in the case of a company that received approval
to control an insured institution between March 5, 1987, and the date 0: enact-
ment of the 1987 amendments. 232 However, for companies that did acquire
control o:insured institutions approved before March 5.1987, those companies
may continue to engage in any activity in which :he company was lawfully
engaged on March 5,1987.''' This grandfather privilege, however, can he lost if
(I) the company acquires control of a bank or an addnional insured institution

"'CEBA § 104 (to be codified at 12 USC § I 730a(c)(! lIB».

CEBA § ; 04 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730a(c)( II:C)). Alternatively. iflater in
227
:ime than the two-year grace period. the activity cannot be continued beyond the date
when tk company was approved as a savings and loan holding company. [d.
§ \ 04 (to be codified at \ 2 USC § \ 7 30a(0)( I ';"
m CEl:IA
2"CEBA § 104 (to be codified at 12 USC § I 730a(c)(311,-\).
'30 CEBA § 104110 be codified at 12 USC § J 730(a)(cJi.;;(B»
131 See H.R, Conf. Rep. No. 261, 1DOth Coeg.. 151 5ess. j 35, repnntcd in 1987 U.S.
Code Congo & Ad, Ncws 604 (hcrcin,ner H.R. Conf. Rep, '-:0. 261)
m CEDA § 104 (to be codif'Ied ~t 12 USC § 1730,,(eI(6'!,A»,
"'CEBA § 104 (to be eodified at 12 USC § 1730a(cj(6jIB».
5-45 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.03[2][bl

(otherthan through the emergency acquisition procedures); (2) any of its insured
institution subsidiaries fail to qualify as a domestic building and loan associa-
tion under the Internal Revenue Code; (3) the company engages in activities not
permitted as "exempt," other than those in which it was engaged on March 5,
1987; (4) any of its insured institution subsidiaries increase the locations from
which they conduct business after March 5, 1987 (other than increases under the
emergency acquisition procedures); or (5) any insured institution subsidiary
allows an overdraft in its Federal Reserve account on behalf of an affiliate!34
Additionally, the FSLlC has a general authority to order the termination of an
activity to prevent "conflicts of interest or unsound practices" or to protect the
public interest. m

[bl Regulation of Relationships Between Insured Institution Subsidiaries and

Affiliate Companies. The 1987 amendments to the Bank Holding Company
Act revise the regulatory scheme governing the relationship between insured
thrift subsidiaries of savings and loan holding companies and affiliate compa-
nies. As long as the subsidiary of the holding company engages only in those
"exempt" activities that are permissible for bank holding companies, the restric-
tions on transactions between insured institution subsidiaries and affiliates,
with respect to loans, credit transactions, investment in securities, and so forth,
which restrictions were discussed previously. will not apply, and the applicable
rules will be those governing transactions between bank subsidiaries of a bank
holding company and affiliate companies. n ' The purpose of this measure is to
create a parity between bank holding companies ar.d savings and loan holding
companies as to activities between their insured institution subsidiaries and
affiiiate companies. 237
The 1987 amendments also establish cross-marketing restrictions, similar
t:J those imposed on bank holding companies, to foreclose use of an insured
institution to market products or services of an affiliate that is engaged in
b'c1siness activIties other than those allowed uncer the act. Likewise, the insured
i:1s:itut:on cannot market its services through the affiliate if the lat:er is engaged
in business activities other than those allowed under the act. As with the bank
holding conpany p:ovision, there is an excer;:ion for savings ane loan holding
companies that allows then to continue marketing arrangements that were in
effect on March 5, 1987, as long as such arrangements arc continued in the same
manner as they were conducted on that date.'" The cross-marketing restrictions

'" CEBr\ $ 104 (to be codified at J 2 USC § JC 300(c)(6)«(,)).

m CEBA § ,'.\ (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730a(c)(6)(D).
136 CEBA § It, (to be codified a1 12 USC § 17 30a(p)( I J).
,,, H.R. Cont'. J.:.cp. No. 261. supra note 231. at 138.
m CEllA § J 04 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730a(p)(2)).
1] 5.03[2][c] OVERVIEW 5-46

apply to the insured institution subsidiaries of a "diversified savings and loan

holding company. "239

[c] Extension of Tying Prohibitions to State-Chartered Insured Institutions.

The 1987 amendments extend the prohibitions on tying arrangements to state-
chartered insured institutions that are subsidiaries of savings and loan holding
companies. 240 Formerly, these restrictions applied only to federal thrift institu-
tions. The restrictions on "tying" extend only "with respect to products and
services offered by the thrift subsidiary. "241

Id] Interstate Activities. The 1987 changes also affect the provisions dealing
with interstate activities of savings and loan holding companies. The amend-
ments conform these restrictions more closely to those applicable to bank hold-
ing companies. The FSLIC may not approve an acquisition by a savings and loan
holding company if it will result in "a multiple savings and Joan holding com-
pany controlling insured institutions in more than one State ... "242 There are
three exceptions to these restrictions; there may be interstate combinations
when (1) the acquisition is pursuant to the emergency acquisition powers of the
Act; (2) the holding company controls an insured institution subsidiary that has
its home office or a branch office in the state as of March 5, 1987; or (3) the laws
of the state governing state-chartered institutions "specifically authorize such an
acquisition (for state institutions) by language to that effect and not merely by
implication."'43 Thus, the laws on interstate activities of savings and loan hold-
ing companies are similar to the restrictions on bank holding companies under
the Douglas amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act. The interstate
banking limitations are discussed in Chapter 6.

Ie] Affiliations With Securities Firms. Further, the 1987 amendments affect
the regulation of affiliations between securities firms and insured institutions.
They extend the prohibitions in Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act
against affiliations between member banks and firms "engaged principally" in
securities actl vities and against certain interlocking management arrangements
so that they now also prohibit such relationships between insured institutions

Id. A divcrsified savings and loan hoiding company is one whose insured institu-
239
tio~,and related activities comprise less than SO percent of its consolidatcd net wOl1h and
its consoildated nel earnings. 12 USC § 1730a(1 )(F) (1982).
240 CERA § 104 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730a( I».

'41H.R. Conr. Rcp. No. 261, supra note 231, at 139. The lying provisions are
discussed al ~ 9.02.
"'CEBA § 104 (to be eodificd at 12 USC § 1730a(e)(3».
'" Id.
5-47 BANK HOLDING COMPANIES ~ 5.0312Hfj

and securities firms!" As with the provisions for bank holding companies, this
measure was set to expire on March I, [988. Special exemptions exist for
activities involving insured institutions in certain specified real estate related
securities or partnerships and insurance activities!"

[fl Treatment of FDIC-Insured State Savings Banks as Insured Institutions

for Regulation as Subsidiaries of a Savings and Loan Holding Company. State
savings banks and cooperative banks are entitled to be treated as insured institu-
tions under the savings and loan holding company provisions, whether they are
uninsured or insured by the FDIC!'· They must apply to the FSLIC for this
recognition. To qualify, institutions must meet the standards established for
QTLs. By qualifying for this treatment, the savings and loan holding company
rules will apply to these institutions when they are part of a holding company
structure, rather than the bank holding company rules. 247

"'CEBA § 106 (to be codi:ied at 12 USC § I 730a(r»).

'<SId. The moratorium is discussed at ~~ 5.02[3][aJ, 5.02[3][b].
'4SCEBA§ 104 (amending 12 VSC§ 1730a(n)).
247 See H.R. Conl: Rep. No. 261, supra note 231. Of course. for treatment as a savings
and loan holding company, the holding company must not otherwise fall within the bank
holding company rules by controlling a bank as defined in the Bank Holding Company
Act.
 6
Regulation of Bank
Expansion Through
Branching and Interstate
Banking
11 6.01 Branch Banking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . 6-2
[1] Definition of "Branch" ...... ... .. . ... . 6-2
[21 Establishing New Branches-The McFadden Act .. .. . .... 6-6
[3J State Regulation of Bank Branching . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... 6-9
11 6.02 Interstate Bank Expansion by Bank Holding Companies . . . . . .. 6- i 0
[1] The Douglas Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-1 ()
[2] Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidianes-The Douglas
Amendment, the Commerce Ciause, anJ Other
Constitutional Considerations '.",... 6-14
[a] Lewis v. B.T. Investmem MallaKers, file. 6-14
[b] Northeast Bancorp, Inc. f'. Board o/Corernors ., , . . . . . . 6-16
[c] Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Brown '., ' .. " . .. 6-19
[3] Interstate Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidiaries .. , .. ,. 6-20
[41 Effects of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on
Nonbank Bank Interstate Expansion .. ' . . . . . . .. ..,.... 6-22
~ 6.03 ATM Networks and the Restrictions on Interstate Banking , .. " 6-24
~ 6.04 Reg'Jlation of Branching by Savings and Loan Associations. . . .. 6-26
'i 6.0.5 Emergency Acquisitions of Financially Weak Banks " , .. , .. ,. 6-27
[I] Emergency Acquisition Authority. , .. , ..... ' .. ' .. , .. ,. 6-27
[2J Effects of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on
Emergency Acquisition Powers ..... , ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
[a] Enlarged Emergency Acquisition Powers of the FDlC' .'. 6-31
I\)J Acquisition ofa Bank in Danger of Closing . , .. ' . . . . .. 6-32
~ 6.06 Bank Holding Company AcqUisition of Thrift Institullons, " , . . . 6-35

6-1
 OVERVIEW 6-2

116.01 BRANCH BANKING

Although a complex set oflegal restrictions has inhibited the ability of banks
to expand their operations territorially by establishing multiple offices in differ-
ent locations, the barriers have proven ineffective. Large networks of banks
operate across state boundaries, through affiliates and subsidiaries, as a result of
gaps and exceptions in the laws. Additionally, the advent of electronic technol-
ogy has allowed banking to occur through banking communication terminals,
enabling customers to conduct banking transactions at locations far removed
from customers' home bank offices. This chapter discusses the body of federal
law that regulates the territorial expansion of banking activities. Because this
legal framework has become out of step with the realities of the marketplace,
there have been numerous calls for reform.' Substantial changes in the law can
be expected in the future.
"Branch banking" is defined as a single bank's conducting its business at a
number of different offices located in the same or different cities, states, or
nations. "Branch banking" generally refers to arrangements for the creation of
different offices of a bank that is one legal entity. It does not usually refer to
arrangements by which separate bank organizations are affiliated through stock
ownership or other control devices. Such arrangements create bank holding
companies.' Under federal law, the basic constraints on bank expansion are
those limiting the establishment of bank branches, both intrastate and interstate,
and restrictions on bank holding company acquisitions across state lines. 3 These
topics are addressed in the following text.

(1) Definition of "Branch"

Federal law defines a bank "branch" to include "any branch bank, branch
office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located

1 In 1981. a report prepared by the Carter administration concluded, "Whateverlhei~

benefits in an earlier era, the administration regards existing geographic limitations (on
banking] as anachronistic in the competitive marketplace of the 1980s." "Geographic
Restriction On Commercial Banking in the United States: The Report of the President"
(Jan. 1981). Sec generally Conover, "Interstate Banking: Bring Down the Walls," 4 Ann.
Rev. Banking 115-121 (1985).
'The ability 0: bank holding companies to operate multistate affiliates is discussed
infra Ii 6.02.
3S ee generally Collins, "Interstate Banking: Where the Law Stands Now." 4 Ann.
Rev. Banking L. 95-102 (1985): Fried!i, "Changing Times in Interstate Banking Law,"
! 986 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 97-113 (1986); Ginsburg, "The Future of Interstate Banking,"
1984-1985 Corp. Prac. Commer.tator 469-486; Glidden. "Legal Constraints on Bank
Expar.,ion: Can They Be Removed Without DestroyIng the Dual Banking.System?", J 980
U. Ill. LF 369; Gray, "Thc Interstate Banking Diversion:-'.re More Ser:ous Issues Being
Ignored'!", 4 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 123-133 (1985); Note. "Banking Law; Developments
in Interstate Branching," 1985 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 113-136 (1985).
6-3 BANK EXPANSIOK ~ 6.01/11

in any state or territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at

which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.'" If a bank office is
designated a "branch," the extent to which natio:1al banks and Federal Reserve
member banks may establish such an office is restricted by federal law. ' If the
office escapes classification as a "branch," the locational limitations and
approval requirements for bank "branchcs" do not apply.
Thc U.S. Supreme Court has hcld that the primary pur,JOse of the branch
banking law is to promote competitive equality between state banks and
national banks.' In recognition of this purpose, the courts have liberally con-
strued the definition of "branch." For example. notwithstanding the explicit
statutory language classifying a branch according to its deposit-lending or check-
paying activities, it has been held that an off-premises trust operation involving
neither of these activities is a branch and as such is forbidden to national banks
unless authorized by state law. 7
[n another case, the Supreme Court held that an armored car picking up
customers' deposits was a branch. 8 Drive-in faci:ities also have provoked con-

, 12 USC § 36(1) (1982) (emphasis added). This detinition applies to national banks.
Under 12 USC § 321 (1982), state banks that arc members of:he Federal Reserve System
are subject to the same branching controls as nat:ona\ banks. A similar defmition of
"branch" ex:sts for the purposes of regulating state nonmember banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 12 USC § 1813(0) (1982).
'The restrictions by federal law on the extent to which national banks and member
banks may branch are discussed infra ~ 6.01 [2J.
G First NaI'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 US 122 (1969i: First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank

& Trust Co., 385 US 252 (1966).

1 S1. Louis Coun:y I'.'at'l Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co., 548 F2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976),
eert. denied. 433 US 909 (j 977) The comptrolier has indicatcd disapproval of the SI.
Loui.\ COUIltV ,val'{ Bank case. Sec Clarke v. Secun ties Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. C:. 750 (I98 7)
Loan offices have been problems. See State ex reI. Leonard v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co .. No. CIV-78-0304-E, slip op. (WD Okla., lul\ 28. 1978) (an ollicc that took loan
applications but did not lend funds was held to corwitute " branch). A comptroller
inccrpretation states that a loan production office ma:- not both originate and approve
loans at ItS o:ficc wi:hout being a "hranch.'· Further. the office cannot escape classifica-
tio~ as a branch by forwarding loans to the bank's malll offIce for per:unctory approval
and disbursement of funds after the lendir.g decision has already been made by the loan
produC\ion office. Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 199 (May 23. 1985)
(clarifying Ruling 7.7380,12 eFR § 7,7380), rcprintec::c I Feel. Banking L. Rep (CClI)
1; 3168/\ (1985). However, a loan production office :s not to be classified as a bank
"branch" when the following four factors are present: ( I Icustomers have no direct contact
with the loan production office, but ohtain information. flie loan applications, and receive
loan funds from the regular offices of the bank; (2) 10E" disbursement occurs from the
bank's reguJar branch and malll offices; (3) leans arc originated and solicited by the
regular offices of the bank; and (4) thc loan productio" c:Ticc exist., mainly to improve the
cfficiency of bank lean operations and not to compete for customers. Cbmptroller of the
Currency. Inter;Jrelive Leller No. 343 (May 24. 1985). " Quarterly.l. No.4 at 47 (1985).
8 First Nat'l Hank v. Dickinson, 396 US 122 (1969) See generally Annotation, "What
I, a 'Branch' U~de, 12 U.S.C.S. § 36(1) Which a Na'iOnal Banking AssociatIon May
116.01[11 OVERVIEW 6-4

siderable litigation. 9 Another area of controversy has been the customer bank
communications terminals (CBCTs) located offbank premises. At one point, the
Comptroller of the Currency ruled that a terminal established in accordance
with his regulations did not constitute a branch." This ruling provoked a
number oflawsuits and led to a court decision that national banks must comply
with the branch banking laws in establishing computer-linked terminals that
allow bank customers to withdraw cash from their accounts, transfer funds, and
make credit purchases."
The Supreme Court revisited the question of what constitutes a "branch" in
Clarke v. Securities Industry Association.'2 The Comptroller of the Currency
authorized Union Planters National Bank and Security Pacific National Bank to
open offices to conduct discount brokerage services. These offices were not to be
limited to the main offices and branch offices of the banks, but, rather, would be
located at places both inside and outside of the home states of the two banks. The
comptroller took a narrow view of the definition of "branch." He ruled that the
discount brokerage offices were not in violation of the federal branch banking
prohibitions, because they would not be engaging in anyone of the three func-
tions specifically enumerated in 12 USC § 36(f). The Securities Industry Associ-
ation challenged the comptroller's action, contending that federal legislation
requires natio:J.al banks to engage in their discour.t brokerage activities only at
their main offices or at authorized branches, because legislation stipulates that
"the general business of each national banking association shall be transacted in
the place specified in its organization certificate and in the branch or branches, if

Establish. or Operate," 52 ALR Fed. 649 (1981); Annot.. "What Is a 'Branch Bank'
Withl~ Statutes Regulating the Establishment of Branch Banks." 23 ALR3d 683 (1969).
9 See Virgima ex reI. State Corp. Comm'n v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 515
F2d 154 (4th CiL) ecrt. denied, 423 US 869 (\ 975) (dri\'e-in facility, physically separated
from brar.ch bank. not a "branch"); Dakota Nat'\ Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'! Bank &
Trust Co .. 554 F2d 345 (8th Cir.), cen. denied, 434l'S 877 (1977) (f:,eestanding auto
bank. located two blocks from main bank, is a "branch").
lOSee 40 Fed. Reg. 21,700, 21,704 (1975) (amend:ng 12 CFR § 7.7491).
"Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith. 534 F2d 921 (DC Cir.) afrg 402 F.
Supp. 207 (DOC 1975); cert. denied, 429 US 862 (19761. See also Illinois ex reI. Lignoul v.
Continer.tal Ill. Bank & Trust Co .. 409 F. Supp. 1167 I:-lD III. 1975). afrd in pan and
rev'd in part. 536 F2d 176 (7th Cir.). cen. denied, 429 US 871 (I 976); Missouri ex reI.
Kostman v. FlfSt Na:'1 Bank, 405 F. Supp. 733 (ED Mo. 1975). afrd per curiam, 538 F2d
219 (8th Cir.) cen. denied, 429 liS 94\ (1976). Other decisions holding that an o~T­
p:'emises ATM constitutes a branch are Colorado ex reI. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 540 F2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 CS 1091 (1977): but see Oklahoma
ex reI. State Banking Eld. v. Bank of Okla.• 409 F. S~pp. 71 (ND Okla. 1975). For an
extensive discussion of:hc issue, sec N. Penney & D. Baker. The law oj'E1eclronic Fund
Transfer Systems < 22.0 I (1980 & Supp. 1987). See the discussion of ATM activities in
~ 6.03 of this chapter.
2
1 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
6-5 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.01(11

any, established" in accordance with federal bank brar.ching law." The court of
appeals agreed.
The Supreme Court held that the brokerage offices were not branches of the
banks. Relying on the legislative history of the McFadden Act (discussed in the
following text) the Court unanimously concluded (Justice Scalia not participat-
ing) that the phrase "general business of each national banking association" did
not "encompass all the business in which the bank engages, but ... can plausibly
be read to cover only those activities that arc part of the bank's core banking
funct;ons." Although federal legislation specifically authorizes national banks to
engage in securities activities, subject to restrictions, the Court declined to
interpret the "general business" of the national banks as necessarily including all
the activities specifically authorized to national banks when the issue at hand
was the locationa1 constraints imposed on such activities by the McFadden
Act:·'
The Court then turned to its prior decision in First Nationa! Bank I'.
Dickinson,15 in which it had interpreted the McFadden Act as establishing a
policy of competitive equality between state and national banks, and so found
that its decision freeing discount brokerage operations from the constraints of
the branching limitations did not offend the "competitive equality principle."
As the Court said:
The Comptroller reasonably interprets the statute as requiring 'competitive
equality' only in core banking functions, and not in aJ1 incidentai services in
which national banks are authorized to er.gage. We are not faced today with
the need to decide whether there are core banking functIOns beyond those
explicitly enumerated in § 36(f)-, it suffices. to decide this case, to hold that
the operation of a discount brokerage service is not a core banking
function."
Thus, the definition of "core banking function" is left for <lOothcr day. 0leither
the specifIC authorization of an activity 1Il the statute nor the absence of its
enumeration w:1l be conclusive as to whether that activity is a core banking
function. The Court was lllvited by the comptroller to definc "branch" as an
office in which one of the statutory activities of receiving deposits, paying
cneeks. or lending money look place. but the Court studiously avoided any
oppor:unity 10 embrace or reject the comptroller's interpretation."
--_._-
"12 USC§8t (1982}.
" : 07 S. ('I. at 760.
15 396 US 122 (1969).
•• 107 S. ('I. at 762 (['oolnotes omitted).
H Vi~Jlat\on of the prohibition in the National Bank Act against conduct:ng the
lJ~I<';1llCSS 0:' a national bank .[It places outside the bar.k·~ 3u~hori7c<1 locations will not
necessarily make such transactions VOid. Sec RaInier ~al'J Bank v. Schnurr, 11981-1(82)
Fee Banking L Rep. (CCHj V 199,015 (W"sll. Super CI.. ,\pc. '1.1981). holtLng Ih"l
 1i 6.01/2) OVERVIEW 6-6

(2] Establishing New Branches-The McFadden Act

To promote competitive equality between federal and state banks, federal
law generally permits a bank to establish a branch only when it would be
expressly permitted for state banks by state law.,8 The comptroller regulates the
establishment ofbranches by national banks.'· The Board of Governors controls
. the establishment of branches by state member banks. 20 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation approves the creation of branch offices by state non-
member insured banks. 21 If a branch is created by merger or consolidation ofone
bank with another, the law on who is the approving authority and when approval
may be given is more complex. In general, the philosophy of the federal law is to
defer to the state law in order to maintain competitive equality in the banking
system.
The basic federal law restricting the establishment of branches of national
banks dates back to the McFadden Act of 1927." Under this law, special
provisions exist to govern the continuation of branch offices after banks have
been converted or consolidated into a national bank. Grandfather rights exist for
certain branches in existence in 1927 when the McFadden Act was enacted. Also
provided for in the law are certain other special circumstances, such as the
establishment of seasonal banking agencies and other situations. The basic
provision of the Y1cFadden Act is as follows:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller
of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (I) Within the limits of
the City, town or village in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State
banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any pOlnt within the
State in which said association is situated, ifsuch establishment and opera-
tion are at the time authorized to State banks by the Statate law of the State
in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively
and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions
as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks."

persons who were obligated to a national bank under promissory notes and secunty
documents prepared and executed at an unauthorized location did not have a private
right of action to rescind the transaction.
'812 USC §§ 36(c), 321. 1828(d)(I) (1982).
·9Id.
20 Id. It also has authority over the creation of brar.ches in foreign co;.mtries. See
generally ~ 3.03.
21 12 USC § I828(d)( I) (1982).

"Act of Feb. 25, 1927, 44 Stat. 1224. See generally Regan, "Circumventing the
McFacder. Act: The Comptroller of the Currency's Effons to Broaden the Branching
Capabilities of National Banks," 72 Ky. LJ. 707-726 (1983-1984); ~ote, "Interstate
Banking Restrictwns Under the McFadden Act," 72 Va. L. Rev. 1119-1153 (1986).
" 12 USC § 36(c) (1982).
6-7 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.0112]

Thus, the statute produces an interplay of federal and state law. Federal law
determines when an office of a bank constitt:tes a branch, as discussed previ-
ously. However, once federal law recognizes the existence of a branch, state
policies on branching control.
The provisions of the McFadden Act contain two parts. Firstly, the act
permits branching within ;he limits of the city in which the national bank is
"situated," if the law ofthc State "expressly authorizes" state banks to establish
and operatc" such branches!' Secondly, a national bank is permitted to branch
throughout the state in which it is situated when "such establishment and
operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statutc law of the State
in question by language specifically granti:1g such authority affirmatively and
not merely by implication or recognition ...." This second situation requires
determinations that (I) state banks have such authority and (2) the state statute
law specifically grants the authority.26 For the purposes of the act, the term "state
bank" encompasses "trust companies, savings banks, or other such corporations
or institutions carrying on the banking busir.ess under the authority of State
laws."" Given tr.is federal definition, the question as to which depository insti-
tutions within a state are to be regarded as "banks" cannot be decided by state
law. National banks are entitled to branch to the extent that the state expressly
allows its state banks to branch, regardless of the name the state uses to identify
its banks. Under this provision offederallaw, the Fifth Circuit upheld a decision
by the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks in Mississippi to
operate branches statewide, because the state law permitted state savings

,. This law also has been applied to the acquisition 0: an existIng branch of another
bank through an exchange of branches (WaShington ex reI. Edwards v. Heiman, 633 F2d
886 (9th Or. 1980) ) and to the relocation of an old branch \0 a new location (\1utschler v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank. 607 F2d 274 (9th Cif. 1979» See also Marion Nat'l Bank v. Van
Buren Bank, 418 F2d 121 (7th Cir. 1969); cf. Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F2d 333 (3<1
e,L), cert. denied. 400 US 828 (1970).
'5 See American F'delity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann. 683 Fld 999 (6th Cir. 1982),
where the comptroller authorized the establishment ofa branch in the Cil)' where the bank
was situated. although the area of the city where the bra~ch would be placed was in a
dlfferem county than the county where the main bank was iocated. The court declined to
follow a state admimstrative opinion interpreting the state branching law, because it did
not represent a consisoently applied admir.istrative opinion. For the recognition given to
state adminIstrative :nterpretation, also see Washington ex reI. Edwards v. Heimann, 633
F2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980), where the court made clear that Interpretations of the state law by
the state banking agency or adr.oinistrator did not bind the comptroller; F"Sl Nat'] Bank
0: Fairbanks v. Camp, 465 F2d 586 (DC Cir. 1972), ecrt. demed. 6091JS 1124 (1973)
"This requl,es the federal court as a matter of federal law to decide ,,'hcn the state
statute is 5uffJcientiy cxphcit. See a~5o the ca~es on the rok of stale administrative
i:1terprelations cilcd supra note 25.
" 12 USC § 36(h) (1982).
~ 6.01(2) OVERVIEW 6-8

associations to branch to this extent although it denied such branching powers to

state banks'"
Also, under the act, national banks that establish branches must satisfy
capital requirements. Except for certain seasonal banking agencies, a national
bank that establishes a branch outside of its home city must have a "combined
capital stock and surplus equal to the combined amount of capital stock and
surplus" required by the law of the state in which the national bank is situated
for branches of state banks, or a minimum capital stock equal to that required
for the establishment of branches by state banks if the state law requires a
minimum amount. 29
The federal act does not permit national banks to establish branches outside
of the state in which the national bank is located, 3D However, the bank may be
able to operate In common control with an affiliate institution under a holding
company structure. 31
State banks that become members ofthe Federal Reserve System are subject
to similar constraints as those imposed by the McFadden Act. The federal
statutes applicable to state member banks provide that no state bank may hold
stock in a Federal Reserve bank (as required for membership) "except upon
relinquishment of any branch or branches established after February 25, 1927,
beyond the limits of the city, town, or village in which the parent bank is
situated .... "52 However, as the statute continues, this shall not prevent "any
State member bank from establishing and operating branches ... on the same
terms and conditions and subject to the same limitations and restrictions as are
applicable to the establishment of branches by national banks ... ," except that
the Board of Governors rather than the comptroller must give approval." When
a state nonmember bank that is insured by the FDIC is involved, the FDIC by
statute must approve the relocation of branches or the establishment of new
branches. 34 In doing so, the FDIC is required to consider the same factors that it
must weigh in approving the applications of state banks for federal deposit
insurance,35 but the statute that applies to the FDIC's approval does not contain
the IDeational constraints of the federal laws on national banks and state mem-

"Department of Banking and Consumer Fin. v. Clarke, 809 F2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 US 3240 (1987). The types of state laws regulating branching and interstate
banking are discussed at ~ 6.01[3).
" 12 USC § 36(c) (1982).
'012 USC § 36 (1982).
" Interstate expansion by bank holding companies is discussed infra ~ 6.02.
"12 USC § 321 (1982).
"Id.lt also provides that the Board ofGovernors must give approval to the establish-
ment of any new :Jranch within the limits of the city. town, or village. where the parent
bank is situated. ld.
34 12 USC § 1828(d) (1982).

"12 USC §§ 1816, 1828(d) (1982).

6-9 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.01131

ber banks. In the case of state nonmember FDIC-insured banks, however, the
state chartering authority controls the extent to which the bank may establish
new branches, so there is no concern, as there is with national banks, of a
competitive advantage being obtained by national banks engaging in branching
to a greater extent than state law allows their state bank counterparts.
Because branch banking is regarded as the creation of multiple offices by a
single legal entity, it is not generally viewed as "chain banking." The comptroller
has defined "chain banking" as "the form of banking structure in which two or
more independently chartered banks are controlled either directly or indirectly
by the same individual, family or group of individuals closely associated in their
business dealings." Bank holding companies too are not usually thought of as
being part ofa chain banking structure, unless they are "linked to other banking
organizations through common contra!."" Just as the branching restrictions of
the McFadden Act do not necessarily reach chaw banking arrangements, nei.ther
do the similar restrictions of the Douglas amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act apply to chain banking structures that do not qualify as holding
companies. However, the comptroller has ir.dicated that he will monitor chain
banking arrangements involving a national bank, because such arrangements
have the "potential for unsafe and unsound banking practices to impact more
than one institution in the chain grO\:p.""

[3) State Regulation of Bank Branching

A great variety of regulatory schemes exist for branch banking among the
states. While some states pernit statewide branch banking," others permit
branching only within designated areas. Still others prohibit branching
entirel)'." Many states have special legislation addressi:lg automated teller

3; Corr.;:>troller of the Currency, Examinir.g Circular No. 233 (July 22, 1985;.
reprinted in 1 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 13197 (i986).
"ld. 11 has been reported that few state laws limit the use of chain bankIng arrange-
ments. I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1; 3103 (198~ I
"The various stale laws are thoroughly sun'c\'ed in N. Penney & D. Baker, The L~w
of Electronic Fund Transfer S,stems I', 22.01[2] (1980 & D. Baker & R. Brandel Supp.
1987). See ger.er~ily Hawke, Je., "Can Interstate Banking Be Left to the Stales~)", 4 Ann.
Re\. Banking L. 103-113 (1985)
"()~e author'll' reports the rollowing breakdown among the statcs in these three
calegories. II !:sts twenty-four slates that permit stalewide branching; Alaska, Ariz~na,
Califor~,ia, Conncclicut. Delaware, DiStrict of Columbia, Florida. Hawaii, Idaho, tv~"ine,
Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina. South Dakota, Utah. Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. It Ilsts
seventeen states that allow branching within limi~cd areas; Arkansas, Georgia, IndiDna.
Iowa. Kentucky, Lou"iana, Massarhusetls. Miehigac. ,,1,nnesota. :\ebraska. New Harnp-
s~lfe, New Mexlco, Ohic, Ok\ahoma, Pcnnsyh:anla. Tennessee, and Wisconslo. It \~s's
eight Slates Ihal prchibil branching; Colorado. 1:llnois, Kansas, M,ssouri, Montana,
11 6.02 OVERVIEW 6-10

machines and other electronic fund transfer facilities. This legislation mayor
may not treat such facilities as branches. Often the state law governing the
placement of electronic terminals by banks and other depository institutions
authorizes their location over a broader geographic area than allowed within the
same state for traditional bank branches. A number of states specifically author-
ize banks in their states to establish interstate terminals, and some authorize
banks outside oftheir states to locate terminals within the states.'o Thus, the laws
of the states on this subject are varied and complex. In determining the law ofa
particular state, careful attention must be paid to the specific provisions of that
state's law. In addition, administrative interpretations as well as judicial opin-
ions must be reviewed.
State law has become even more complex as states have enacted special
legislation in antIcipation ofiarge-scale interstate banking. With the approval by
the U.S. Supreme Court of state laws allowing interstate banking on a regional
basis, a number of states have adopted laws allowing limited interstate banking
in designated regions. Additionally, some of these statutes provide expiration or
"trigger" dates for the regional limitations, after which time the state will be
open to interstate banking on a national scale. Moreover, states vary as to
whether de novo entry by out-of-state banking enterprises is allowed or only the
acquisition of existing depository institutions. Some states have laws allowing
greater than normal authority for out-of-state bar;king companies to acquire
failing or weak financial institutions within the state."

~ 6.02 INTERSTATE BANK EXPANSION BY BANK HOLDING

COMPANIES
[I] The Douglas Amendment
Under the McFadden Act, discussed in the pre\'ious section, national banks
and Federal Reserve member banks may establish branches only to the extent
that state banks are permitted to branch, and they may not establish branches
beyond the boundaries of the state in which they are located." The Douglas
amendment to t:1e Bank Holding Company Act was enacted by Congress to
p,event evasion of the McFadden Act by national and Federal Reserve member
banks, who might seek to escape the provisions of the act by organizing in the
form of a bank :lOlding company with affiliates ir. different states. Under the

Nor.h Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia. N. Penney & D. Baker, supra n. 38 at ': 22.0 I [2J
(D. Baker & R. Brandel Supp. 1987).
,oThe authoritative treatment of this subject is N. Pe~ney & D. Baker, supra note 38.
"See generally Victor L. Saulsbury, "Interstate Banking-An Update," Regulatory
Rev. (Jt:ly 1986), summarized in : Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) l' 3106 (J 986).
"12 USC § 36 (1982).
6-11 BANK EXPANSION f 6.02(1)

Douglas amendment, 43 a bank holding company is constrained from acquiring a

bank in a state beyond the holding company's home state unless state law (of the
state in which the bank to be acquired is located) permits it. Under this law, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may not approve a bank
holding company application for the acquisition of control of

any additional bank located outside of the State in which the operations of
such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries were principally con-
ducted on July 1, 1966, or the date on which such company became a bank
holding company, whichever is later, unless the acquisition of such shares or
assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is specifi-
cally authorized by the statute laws of the State il: which s~ch bank is
locatcd, by language to that effect and not merely by implication. For the
purposes of this section, the State in which the operations of a bank holding
company's subsidiaries are principally conducted is that State in which total
deposits of all such banking subsidiaries are largest."

As with the McFadden Act, the Douglas amendment requires that the state Jaw
in question specifically authorize interstate expansion by "language to that
effect and not merely by implication. ,." The Douglas amendment applies to any
application of a bank holding company or subsidiary "to acquire, directly or
indirectly, any voting shares of, interest ir., or all or substantially all o:the assets
of any additional bank .. , ,"'6 It docs not apply to the acquisition of nonvoting
shares of other \lank holding companies or banks, although the Federal Reserve
Board has issued a po:ic)' statement cautioning against some types of arrange-
ments, which, in the Board's view, would violate the Bank Holding Company
Act."

" \2 USC: § 1842(d) {l982),

.. 12 USC § 1842(d) (1982).
45 See Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F2d 838 (3d Or. 1984), where the
coUr! concluded thallhe slatutory language was 100 "a",biguous" to find specific authori-
zatIOn therein. 748 F2d at 844. See also Application of Firs: Bank 5\5 .. Inc, 70 Fed,
Reserve Bull. 771 (1984), where the Federal Reserve Board decided t~is requirement was
no: met. A holding co:npany whose principal operations were in Minnesota proposed to
acquire a Utah hank through the formation of an intermediary hold:ng company called
,"Iontana First. Cnder L lah law, the Utah bank commissioner could app,o\e acquisi tlOns
:nvolving bank holdi ng companies wit hin a region cO:Jsisting ofeleven \\ estern states. The
~linnesOla holding company was not within the region. butlhe MOlllana Firs\ corr,pan~
would i:ave been, The Board ruled thaI the language of the Utah statute did r.ot speeifi-
cally authorize the acquisitio:J.
45 12 USC § j 842(d) (1982), In Independcnt Community Hankcrs·\,,'n \'. Boaed of

Governors, 820 F2d 428 (DC Cir. 1987), the court rejected an argument that a hank
hclcing company had no authority undcr this pre\ Ision to acquire an out-of-slate
IUl110nal bank.
"12 CFR § 225.143 (1987).
 ~ 6.02U1 OVERVIEW 6-12

The Douglas amendment, as worded, places a limitation on the Board of

Governors' authority to approve applications to acquire banks under the provi-
sions of Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act." This is significant
substantively as well as procedurally, because it leads to the conclusion that
transactions not requiring Board approval under Section 3 of the act are not
within the prohibitions contained in the Douglas amendment against interstate
banking activity. For example, acquisition of less than 5 percent of the voting
shares ofa bank does not require Board approval." Similarly, because Section 3
of the act does not expressly require Board approval when a bank subsidiary ofa
holding company merges with another bank by acquiring the assets of the other
bank, it has been said that the Douglas amendment principles will not apply."o
Neither does the Douglas amendment state whether the relocation of the
main office of a bank holding company subsidiary bank to another state is
subject to its restrictions, However, the Federal Reserve Board has interpreted
the statute to apply in such circumstances. 51 Reasoning that since its approval is
required for a bank holding company to acquire a subsidiary bank located in a
state outside of the holding company's home state (a requirement established by
Congress to make national banks adhere to state policies on interstate banking),
.the Board takes the position that it would be contrary to the purpose of the
Douglas amendment to allow a bank holding company to evade the statute's

.. 12 USC § I 842(d) (1982) states "no applIcation ... shall be approved under this
section...."
" 12 USC § I842(a) (1982). See generally the discuss,on of bank holding company
reguiation in Chapter 5.
50
12 USC § 1842(a)(4) (1982) says Board approval is needed "for any bank holding
company or subsidiary thereof, olher lhall a bank, to acquire all or substantlaliy all oftl:e
assets ofa bank ... ." (emphasis added.) When a bank subsidiary makes an acquiSition of
the assets of another bank, the section does not apply, although other provisions of law
regulating mergers may require approval .~y the other appropriate banking regulatory
agency. The Board concluded in 1958 that this undermined the purposes of the Douglas
amendment, but the Board's recommended amendment to delete the words "other than a
bank" from the statute was not implemented by Congress. 44 Fed. Reserve Bull. 776,
787-789 (1958).ln Girard Bank v. Board of Governors. 748 F2d 838 (3d Cir. ;984), the
court acknowledged the existence of a "bank merger" nception in Section 1842(a\(4).
Because the court he:d that the Board had ~urisdiction over the merger under Sectior.
1842(a)(3), the case did not have to address the possible nonappiicabtlilY of the Douglas
Amendment Section 1842(d).
5' 12 CFR § 225.144 (1987). The regulation states:

The retenllon by a bank holding company of control of a bank after its relocation
outside of the holdi~g company's home state, whi:c simultaneously controlling a
bank in liS home state, creates a multi-state bank holding company. and, in the
Board's view, is inconsistent with, and cor,slltutes an evasion of, the t~rms and intent
of the BHC Act that a bank holding company not expand its banking operations
outside its home state without the express approval of the othcr state.
Id. § 225.l44(a).
6-13 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.02[11

limitations so easily by acquiring a bank in the holding company's home state

and then moving its main office to a new location in another state without Board
approval.
In Girard Bank v. Board a/Governors," the court was called upon to con-
sider where a bank holding company was located. Mellon owned Girard, a
Pennsylvania bank. The comptroller approved the merger of Girard with Heri-
tage Bank oi'New Jersey. Heritage had ninety branches in New Jersey and one in
Pennsylvania, but was exempt from the restrictions of the McFadden Act
because of grandfather rights. The merger plan called for Mellori to end up with
control of Heritage Bank. The Board blocked the consolidation, ruling that
Heritage was located outside of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding its one branch in
Pennsylvania, and therefore the limitations of the Douglas amendment applied.
The court upheld the Board's ruling, reasoning that in light of Heritage's sub-
stantial activities in New Jersey, it clearly was iocated in New Jersey. Further-
more, even if Heritage might be viewed as being located in both New Jersey and
Pennsylvania because of its single branch in Pennsylvania, tbe Board was correct
in interpreting the Douglas amendment to mean that the bank was "located
outside" of Pennsylvania, and therefore the Douglas amendment required that
the state laws of New Jersey had to specifically authorize the transaction. The
result left a curious juxtaposiiion of the McFadden Act and the Douglas amend-
ment. The comptroller had given approval to the merger under the McFadden
Act but tl:e Board found a violation of the Douglas amendment. The coun
concluded that even if the two provisions were to be construed in harmony, it
would still be persuaded by the Board's interpretation. 53
According to a 1986 Federal Reserve Board decision, application of the
Douglas amendment to mergers may depend on which of the merger panners IS
the surviving corporation. In the case at hand. the Board approved a merger of
two bank holding companies located in Missouri. General Bane Shares was a
holding company with two Missouri banks, nine Illinois banks, and one Tennes-
sce bank. General was authorized to retain t'~e Illi:lOis and Tennessee bank>
because of grandfather rights under the Dougias amendment and specific legisla-
tion in Illinois and Tennessee. The other holdll1g company, Boatmen's Bane
Shares, was the larger organization but had banks located only in MlSSouri. The
Douglas amendment forbade Boatmen's fron, acquiring General, because lhal
would result in Boatmen's acquisition of subsidIary banks in Illinois and Ten-
nessee. To avo:d this, the merger was structured as an acquisition by General of
Boatmen's. The Board approvcd this arrangement, notwithstanding its prior
declsion that substance rather than the form of the transaction would contro'
when a violation of the Douglas amendment occurred. Illinois and Tennessee
regulatory officials had advisee the Board that :he proposed acquisition did not

", 748 F2cl 838 Dc Cir. 1984).

53 :d. at 84.1.
Ii 6.02[2] OVERVIEW 6-14

conflict with their state laws, which permitted out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies to retain banks in their states and to expand through the acquisition of
additional banks.· 4

[2] Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidiaries-The Douglas

Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and Other Constitutional
Considerations
Under the13ank Holding Company Act, the states' authority to regulate
with respect to banks and bank holding companies is specifically preserved. The
act states, "The enactment by the Congress of this chapter shall not be construed
as preventing, any state from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it
now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies,
and subsidiaries thereof."•• The act also states that a bank holding company may
not control a bank outside of the state of its principal operations unless the
acquisition of such control is "specifically authorized by the statute laws of the
state in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication. ".,
When a state legislates with respect to businesses that operate in interstate
commerce, the federal constitution forbids the state from legislating in a manner
that discriminates against interstate commerce. The interplay between the fcc-
eral constitutional prohibition against discrimination and the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act that deal with state authority over interstate bank-
ing became the subject of Supreme Court attention in a 1980 case.

[a) Lewis I'. B.T. lnvestment Managers, Inc. The case was Lewis 1'. B. T. Inl'eSl-
men! }v!anagers, Inc.,67 and it involved Bankers Trust, a New York bank holding
company, which sought to provide investment ad\'isory services in the state of
Florida through a subsidiary, Bankers Trust Investment Managers (BTIM).
When Bankers Trust sought the approval of the Board of Governors for this
operation, opposition developed, and Florida enacted a statute prohibiting OUl-
ofs/are barlk holding con:panies from owning or controlling subsidiaries in
Florida that perforn:ed investment advisory services. The board regarded the
Bankers Trust applicat:on as promoting compctiticn in Florida, but it den:ed
the proposal because of the Florida statl.;te. The board read the Bank Holding

"Appilcat:on of General Banc Shares Cor;:>.. 72 Fed. Reserve Bull. 268 (1986). The
Board said: "As far as either state is concerned, there continues to be only a single
Missour: bank holding company that is authorized to o;:Jerate in these states and that
Missouri bank holding company has no greater rights a:ter the merger than before the
merger. "
5512 USC § 1846 (1982).
56
12 USC § 1842(d)(1) (\982).
5' 447 US 27 (1980).
 6- J 5 BANK EXPANSION r 6.02121[aJ

Company Act as requiring it to defer to state law. Under the board's view of the
act, states enjoyed considerable scope in regulating bank holding companies and
their activities.
The Supreme Court rejected the board's interpretation. Although it
acknowledged that "banking and related financial activities are of profound
local concern..." and that "sound financial institutions and honest financial
practices are essential to the health of any State's economy and to the well-being
of its people ... ,,,sa traditional constitutional principles led to the conclusion
that the Florida statute constituted a discrimination against banks and bank
holding companies whose principal operatIOns were outside of Florida, in viola-
tiO:l of the commerce clause of the lJ .S. Constitution. Recognizing the state's
legitimate interest in preventing fraud and undue economic concentration in
companies supplying financial services, the Court concluded that such interests
did not justify "the heavily disproportionate burden" the statute placed on bank
holding companies that operated principally O'Jt of state. 5 •
The Supreme Court then tur:led to the argument that the Bank Helding
Company Act expressly conferred on the states the power to engage in regulation
of bank holding companies. Congress may, if it desires, regulate interstate
commerce by giving the states "ar. ability to restrict the flow of interstate
commerce that they [the states] would not otherwise enjoy.""" Two pa:1s of the
Bank Holding Company Act were in issue. Firstly, the Florida opponents
claimed that the Douglas amendment (Section 3(d) of the act), by prohibiting a
holding company from obtaining control of a bank outside its home state unless
the state law permits it, gave states the authority to regulate the activities of bank
holding corr:panies. The Court fi~rr.ly rejected this argument, stating that this
part of :he act simply did not apply to the nonbank activities of bank ho:ding
companies. As the court said, "The structure of the Act reveals that § 3(d) applies
only to holding company acquisitions of banks. Non-banking activities are
regulated separately in § 4."" Secondly, the Florida interests clairr:ed that the
part of the Bank Holding Company Act that preserved general state power to
regulate bank holding compan,es (Section 7) gave Florida the authority to
legislate as it d:d. The Court rejected this argument as well, on the ground that
the saId section of the act merely preserved to the states the authority that they
had prtor to enactment of the act: namely, the power to legislate, constrained b\
the limi;s of the commerce clause. 62 This part of the act contained "nothing in its

sa Ie. 3; .~.3.
19\o.a\SO.
6Oldal51
5> Id. at 53.

62 rd. at 55. "Far from crealing a new sta:~ power to discriminate between foreign and
local bank holding companies, Ihc legislative history evinces an intent to forestall such a
hrued in:crpretation. We therefore conclude Ihal § '7 applies o:1ly to stale leglsialion that
opcrales w!thm the boundafle$ marked h> the Commerce Clause" Id.
11 6.02[2][b] OVERVIEW 6··16

language or legislative history to support the contention that it also was intended
to extend to the states new powers to regulate banking that they would not have
possessed absent the Federallegislation."53
The result of the Lewis decision is, thus, twofold. Firstly, notwithstanding
legitimate local interests in regulating finance, discriminatory treatment
designed to favor local interests will be invalid under the commerce clause.
Secondly, neither the Douglas amendment nor the general provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act can be read as a broad grant ofpower to the states to
regulate bank holding company activities. 5'

[b] Northeast Bancorp, Inc. Y. Board ofGoYernors. In Northeast Bancorp, Inc.

v. Board of Governors, the Supreme Court was called upon to give further
consideration to the commerce clause issue in litigation challenging the validity
of state regivnal banking schemes.55 The case involved a challenge to the New
England regional banking scheme. The Board approved applications for two
bank holding companies located in the New England region to acquire banks in
other New England states. This was permissible under the Douglas amendment,
because the states involved had enacted legislation allowing out-of-state holding
companies located in the New England region to acquire banks in their state so
long as reciprocity was extended by the other state. As the Court noted, a
"predictable effect of the regionally restrictive statutes will apparently be to
allow the growth of regional multistate bank holding corr:panies which can
compete witl'. the established banking giants in New York, California, Illinois,
and Texas."5' The petitioners who opposed the acquisitions in the Supreme
Court included Citicorp, a national bank holding company that was located
outside the New England region, and that could not qualify under the state laws
in question for acquiring banks within those states. and another bank holding
company, Northeast, that was located within the region, and that sougl'.t to

5'ld. at 55.
5. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
briefly extended the prohibitions of Section 3(d) on interstate acquisit;ons to certain trust
companies. but this provision expired automatically on October 1, 1981. Pub. L. No. 96-
221, Til. VII. § 712(c), 94 Stat. 132, 189-190 (1980).
55472 liS 159 (1985). See gencrally Gray, "Regional Reciprocal Banking :"aws:
Constitu:ionaI. But What Next'!", 14 Fla. S:. UL Rev. 267-300 (1986): Miller, "Interstate
Branching and the ConstitutiDn," 41 Bus. Law. 337-346 (1986); Note. "The Constitu-
tionality of the New England Interstate Banking Experiment," 4 Ann. Rev. Banking 1..
213-235 (1985); Note, "Regional Banking Statutes and the Equal P,otection Clause," 84
Colum. :... Rev. 2025-2044 (1984); Note, "Regional Banking-A Viable Alternative" An
Empirical Study," 9 J. Co,p. 1.. 815-899 (1984); Note. "Regional Banking Laws: An
Analysis Df Constitutionality under the Commerce Clause," 60 Notre Dame 1.. Rev.
548-565 (1985).
55472 CS at 165.
6-17 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.02(2)[b J

affiliate with a bank holding company outside the region.· J They raised both
statutory and constitutional challenges.
The challengers first contended that the Douglas amendment did not per-
mit a state to approve bank acquisitions that were restricted to a particular
region. Describing the Board as an "authoritative voice on the meaning of a
federal banking statute," the Court agreed with the Board that the Douglas
amendment allowed the state regional banking laws. Reasoning that Congress
intended the Douglas amendment to be a parallel, for bank holding companies,
to the McFadden Act's treatment of banks, the Court said that "Congress
contemplated that some States might partially lift the ban on interstate banking
without opening themselves up to interstate banking from everywhere in the
Nation."" Having determined that Congress, when it passed the Douglas
amendment, specifically intended for the states to have the freedom to impose
partial restraints on interstate commerce such as the regional legislation
involved, it was an easy step for the Court to conclude no violation of the
commerce clause existed. Although such legislation would indeed have been
invalid absent the action by Congress in the Douglas amendment, here Congress
had acted,·' As stated by the Court:
Here the commerce power of Congress is not dormant, but has been exer-
cised by that body when it enacted the Bank Holding Company Act and the
Douglas Amendment to the Act. Congress has authorized by the latter
Amendment the Massachusetls and Connecticut statutes which petitioners
challenge as violat;ve of the Commerce Clatlse. When Congress so chooses,
state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutio:\al
attack under the Commerce Clause. 7•
The Court made clear that other federal banking legislation, such as the provi-
sion allowing the FDIC to arrange for the acquisition of failing banks by out-of-
state bank holdmg companies, would preempt state law if a conflict arose."
The Court further held that no problem existed under the compact clause of
the Constitut:on, because, given the Douglas amendment, the state laws could

67 The legality of the regional arrangements was also litigated in a case 10 which
Northeast Bancorp sought to merge with the Bank of ):ew York. Th,s merger could not
occur without violating the Connecticut regional banking law, because it involved a
bankir.g institution f~om outside the New England reglOn recognized under Connecticl;t
law. Under the Connectict:t statute, if a bank o:Jts:de the region acquired the parent New
England banking institution, the banking organization would have to divest its Connect:-
cut banks. Thc court held that Northeast Bancorp lacked standing to challenge the
Connec:icut legislation, Northeast Bancorp v. Woolf,S 76 F. SuPp. 1225 (D. Conn, 1983),
afrd mem., 742 F2c 1439 (2d Cir, 1984).
68
472 USat :72.
"leI. at 174.
70! d.

"rd. at 176.
~ 6.02[2I1b] OVERVIEW 6-18

not be viewed as an infringement offederal sovereignty; further, it was doubtful

that the regional arrangement amounted to a compact. As stated by the court:

[SJeveral of the classic indicia of a compact are missing. No joint organiza-

tion or body has been established to regulate regional banking or for any
other purpose. 01either statute is conditioned on action by the other State,
and each State is free to modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most impor-
tantly, neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional limitation. 72

Finally, the Court rejected arguments that the state laws denied equal protection
because they discriminated against banking institutions outside the region. In an
earlier case," the Court had held that a state violated the equal protection rights
of out-of-state insurance corporations, notwithstanding the state's interests in
encouraging the formation of instate insurance firms and in promoting invest-
ment in local assets. However, in the instant case, the Court said that although
the state obviously was favoring regional banking institutions over those outside
the region, in matters involving banking "we do not write on a clean slate. "74 The
Court had previously concluded that "banking and related financial activities
are of profound local concern."75 This statement, the Court said, "is a recogni-
tion of the historical fact that our country traditionally has favored widely
dispersed control of banking."" The Court explained the interests at stake in
maintaining a decentralized banking system:

While many other western nations are now dominated by a handful of

centralized banks, we have some 15,000 commercial banks attached to a
greater or lesser degree to the communities in which they are located. The
Connecticut legislative commission that recommended adoption of the
Connecticut statute in question considered interstate banking on a regional
basis to combine the beneficial effect of increasing the number of banking
competitors with the need to preserve a close relationship between those in
the community who need credit and those who provide credit. ... The
debates in the Connecticut legislature preceding the enactment of the Con-
necticut law evince concern that immediate acquisition of Connecticut
banks by holding companies headquartered outside the New England
region would threaten the independence of local banking institutions. n

These interests satisfied the traditional rational basis test of equal protection for
the validity of state economic legislation.

"Id. at 175.
"Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 US 869 (1985).
"Id. at 177.
75 Id .. quoting from Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc.. 447 US 27,38 (1980).
"472 US at 177.
n Northeast, 472 US at 177-178.
 6-19 BANK EXPANSION ,r 6.02I2l1cl

Ie] Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Brown. A result favorable to state interests was
reached in a case before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a case
involving financial activities of the Sears financial network. 78 In tb, case, a
Connecticut statute limited bank holding companies from establishing offices in
the state to engage in banking. The holding companies could only establish
banking offices if they were grandfathered under the act or if the subsidiaries
opening the offices were organized under Connecticut banking laws. Sears
wished to operate places of business containing its Sears Financial Network
Centers, at which affiliate fmancial, insurance, and brokerage organizations
provided services. These services included the processing ofloans from the Sears
Savings Bank (a California thrift institution) and the brokering of certificates of
deposit from the Sears Savings Bank and others. The Connecticut commissioner
determined that the banking services provided at the centers were within the
statute, and involved receiving deposits and permitting withdrawals. Since Sears
came within the definition of a holding company under Connecticut law, but did
not qualify for grandfather rights or as an entity organized under Connecticut
laws, Sears was allowed to establish only two offices per year to conduct banking
activities, as long as those offices did not engage in taking deposits or allowing
withdrawals.
Scars challenged the statute as unconstitutionally discriminatory against
interstate commerce, and III violation of the supremacy clause because of con-
gressional preemption of the field by the federal Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act. The court concluded that the Connecticut regulation was in
response to a "substantiallcgitimate local concern in the regulatIon of banking
scrvices within the state" and did not violate the commerce clause. Although
Scars claimed that tl:e legIslative history reflected a protect:onist intent, the
court disagreed, viewing the statute as an answer to the problem of "how tbe
state could effectively deal with the regulation of banking ... during a volatile
period of nationwide transition in the banking industry."'· Legislators were
responcing to :he problems posed by the entrance of nonregulated banking
entities into the banking arena. The Douglas amendment gave the state the
power to adopt regional banking legislation. As :here was no protectionist intent.
the issue became the extent to which the Connectlcut laws had a c1:scrirr.inatory
effect on interstate commerce. Although the Connecticut act discnminated
between CO:'1llect:c'ut banks ane thr:fts and out-of-state banks and thrifts, this
distinction was not challenged, and could be supported t;nder the McFadden Act
and the Douglas amendment as interpreted in Sortheast BancOIj!, Inc. There was
no c1iscr:minat:on, in the court's view, WIth respect to holding companies, as the
statute applied to a1l holding companics without regard to geography. aD The

... _----
"Sears. RoebUCK & Co. v Br~)w~. 806 F2d 399 I:2d Cir. 1986).
;q lei. al 407·-408.

'0 lei 31 408.

~ 6.02{3] OVERVIEW 6-20

court finally concluded that "any burden upon interstate commerce cannot be
characterized as excessive in relation to the local concern found herein.""

(3] Interstate Expansion Through Nonbank Subsidiaries

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in LeH'is v. B. T. Investment Mana-
gers, Inc. 82 and other cases that have interpreted the Douglas amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act as allowing bank holding companies to locate
nonbank subsidiaries on an interstate basis, bank holding companies have cre-
ated a vast national network of financial services. including trust operations,
investment advisory services, loan processing centers, and credit card opera-
tions." A 1981 report showed that Citicorp, for example, had 229 consumer
finance offices and mortgage outlets in fifty-five cities, and when loan produc-
tion offices and Edge Act subsidiaries were added, the offices totalled about 400
in thirty-eight states."
Also significant is the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in a case involving the United States Trust Corporation and the Florida Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance." In this case, the United States Trust Corpora-
tion asked the Federal Reserve Board to approve the expansion of the activities
of its Florida subsidiary to allow the subsidiary to engage in accepting time and
demand deposits, establishing checking accounts, and making consumer loans.
The Comptroller of the Currency had previously approved conversion of the

., Id. at 409.
82447 US 27 (1980). See also the decision of the Supreme Coun in Clarke v. Securities
Indus. Ass·n. 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987), discussed in ~ 6.0;(ll. holding Ihe McFadden Act
definition of "brar.ch" did not cover discount brokerage o:Tices, because the activity was
not a "core banking function."
., See generally "Survey of Inlernationa I Banking," The Economist, Mar. 14, 1981, at
24', ABA Banking J. 102 (June 1981). See generally Malloy, "Nonbank and Nondefini-
tions: New Challenges in Bank Regulatory Policy," I0 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1-66 (1986);
Motlin & Rigsby. "Loan Production Officcs: The Beginning of the End for the McFadden
Act"" 1DStetson L. Rev. 427 (1981); Siher & Norman, "The Trust Company: A Means of
Entering the Financial Services Market or Positioning for In:erstate Banking," 101 Bank-
ing LJ 216-231 (l984); Note. "The Nonbank-Bank ConucCrum." 4 Ann. Rev. Banking L
187-212 (1985).
"The Economist. Mar. 14. I981. at 24~ The same report showed Bank of America
with 350 offices 'n :orty-onc states and Manufacturers Hanover with 190 offices in
eighteen states. ld.
A:though the prohibitions on interstate activities of the Act do not apply to these
nonbank activities, the Bank Holding Company Act contains othcr standards a bank
holding company must satisfy In order to engage in nonbanking activities. The Board of
Governors must determmc that thc activitics are "c!osc!, relatcd \0 \Hlnki.ng," for exam-
ple. These mat:ers are discussed in Chapter 5.
as Florida Dep't of Bankir.g v. Board of Governors. 760 F2d 1135 (II te Cir. 1985),
vacated. 474 liS 1098 (1986), on remanc. 800 F2d 1534111th Cic. 1986)
6-21 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.02[3J

subsidiary from its former status as a state-chartered trust company to that of r

national bank, on the condition that it refrain from commercial \ending. Because
the subsidiary did not plan to engage in commercial lending, it did not fall within
the definition of a bank under the Bank Holding Company Act and the Board's
Regulation Y, and thus the Board approved the application with conditions.
When the case reached the federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the court ruled against the Board. In the circuit court's view, the Douglas
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act prohibited banks from
expanding interstate, in the absence of specific statutory approval by the state
concerned. Although the Florida suhsidiary would not be engaging in commer-
cial lending, the court believed it was a bank within the contemplation of
Congress when it passed the Bank Holding Company Act. It did not feel that the
act's restrictions on interstate expansion ofbanking should be evaded so easily."
The Supreme Court did not agree with the circuit court's reasoning. The
Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded it back to the circuit court for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Board ojGovernors v.
Dimension Financial Corp."' In Dimension, the Supreme Court held that the
Board could not enlarge the definition of "bank" contained in 12 USC § 1841,
which required that the institution both accept depOslts that the depositor had a
!egal right to withdraw on demand and make commercial loans. Although the
United States Trust application involved the Doughs amendment, J 2 USC
§ I 842(d)(1 ), which was a different pan of the Bank Holding Company Act than
was at issue in the Dimension case, the Eleventh Circllit concluded after the
remand from the Supreme Court that the definition of "bank" must be the same
III both parts of the act. Because the Florida subsidiary would not make commer-
cialloans, it was not a bank under the act.·' As the court stated, "If, as Dimension
holds, Ihe Federal Reserve Board is without regulatory jurisdict;on to regulate
nonbank banks as 'banks' under the Act, then it is without regulatory jurisdic-
tion to prevent the interstate proliferation of nonbank banks under the Douglas
Amendment. " "
thder the Florida Deparlment ofBankll1g & Finance decision, the Douglas
amend:nent restraints on interstate banking do not apply to so-called nonbank
banks. Bank holding companies may expand interstate. free of the restriction> of
tr.e Douglas Amendment, by establishing financial institutions that are
chartered as banks but that escape regulation as such because they neither acccpl
demand deposits nor engage in commerciallending.'o

lJG rd.
" ,174 US 36 J (1986). The Dimensio/l Fill. Corp. ease is discussed al '1 5.0 I [3].
"Flcrida Dep't of Banking v. Board of Governors, 8(1) F2d 1534 (11:h Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Cl : 887 (1987).
"Id.ol 15}6-·ISJ7.
90 For a discussion of nonbank banks geoerally. sec ~ 5.C 113].
11 6.02(4) OVERVIEW 6-22

The nonbank bank rubric has also provided an opportunity for bank hold-
ing companies to establish multistate subsidiaries of other types of financial
institutions. The Federal Reserve Board has approved applications for acquisi-
tions of a savings and loan institution,91 an industrial bank,92 and a bank for
credit card opcrations. 93
In 1987, in response to the explosion of nonbank banks, Congress was
prompted to enact the Competitive Equality Banking Act. This act, discussed in
Chapter 5, restricts bank holding company use of the nonbank bank to avoid the
prohibition on interstate banking. This is discussed in the following section.

[4] Effects of the Competitive Equalit)· Banking Act of 1987 on

Nonbank Bank Interstate Expansion
The 1987 Competitive Equality Banking Act provisions on nonbank banks
affect the ability of bank holding companies to establish interstate banking
networks through establishment of nonbank banks. With the new, expanded
definition of what qualifies as a "bank" under the Bank Holding Company Act,
the Douglas amendment rules on interstate acquisitions become applicable to
many institutions that formerly were not subject to those rules.
The act contains key exemptions from its deiinition of a bank. 94 These
exemptions have particular significance in the interstate banking context.
Erst; y, there is an exemption for bona fide trust companies. 95 Such companies
are not within the definition of a bank if they ~imit their activities. Conse-
quently, under the principles of the Lewis case," bank holding companies may
establ;sh and operate them free from interstate banking restrictions, Secondly,

"Application of United States Trust Corp., 70 Fed, Reserve Bull. 371 (1984),
reprinted in 42 Wash. Fin. Rep, (BNA) 554 (1984),
52 Application of Citieorp, 70 Fed, Reserve Bull. 23, (1984) [1983-1984 Trar.sfer
Binder) Fed, Banking L. Rep, (CCH) ~ 99.853 (Feb. 17, 1984),
53 Application of CItizens Fidelity Corp.. 69 Fed. Reserve Buli. 556 (1983); see also.
41 Wash, Fi:1. Rep, (BNA) 813 (1983), In Independent Community Bankers Ass'n v,
Board of Governors, 820 F2d 428 (DC Cir. 1987) petition for eert, filed, 56 USLW 3185
(US Sept. 22, 1987) (No, 87-397), the court upheld First City Bancorp's plan to acqu:re a
national bank in South Dakota to conduct First City's credit card operations, The oppo-
nents of:hc acquisition contended that the transaction violated the Douglas amendment,
and argued that the amendment did not allow :hc acquisition ofa nQ/ionalbank by an out-
of~state holding company, but the appeliate court disagreed. Although South Dakota law
also restricted the activitIes the national bank could conduct, the court concluded tr.ese
restrictions did not conflict with federal banking legislation.
94 The exemptions to the definition of "bank" in the Bank Holding Company Act are
discussed at ~ 5,0114],
"Competitive Equali:y Banking Act ~f 1987, Pub,:", i"o, 100-86, nOI, 101 Stat.
552. 554-555 (hereinafter CEBA),
96 L~I'i/5 I'. fl, T Inresllnelll Managers. Inc, is discussed supra ~ 6.02[2][a],
6-23 BANK EXPANSION 11 6.02(4}

the 1987 amendments allow operation ofa credit card bank, as long as it (I) does
not make commercial loans or accept demand deposits; (2) limits its general
deposit-:aking activities; and (3) maintains only one office where deposits are
accepted. 97 Thus, the practice of establishing a bank in a state with favorable
laws on interest rates and controls to serve as the basis for national credit card
operations may continue. Thirdly, the act exempts industrial loan companies
from the definition ofa bank." This is in keeping with the previous approach, in
whIch such institutions, although eligible for FDIC deposit insurance," are not
regarded as banks under the Bank Holding Company Act. leO
The grandfather rights established under the 1987 amendments have partic-
ular reference to interstate banking activities. The grandfathered company can
free itself of the restrictions imposed on its activities by the act by o':Jtaining
approval to be a bank holding company and by complying with all 0; the
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act as amended. However, this
approach cannot be used to authorize a holding company that has an interstate
network of banks in violation of the Bank Holding Company Act's restrictions
on interstate banking. '0'
Companies that acquired control ofa nonbank bank institution that became
a bank as a result of the Competitive Equality Banking Amendments of 1987
may retain control of the nonbank bank by satisfying two conditio:1s. lO ' Firstly,
the :1onbank bank may not engage in any activity that would have caused it to be
classified as a bank under the former definition of a bank in the Bank Holding
Company Act This means that the institutior. is not allowed both to accept
demand deposits and to make commercialloa:1s. Secondly, the nonbank bank
may not increase the number of locations from which it does business after
March 5,1987. These restrictions end if the nonbank bank meets approval from
the Board of Governors as a bank that it would allow the holding company to
acquire."3 Thus, ire order for the subs:diary nonbank bank to increase its loca-
tions, the Douglas amendment would have to allOW it,'o,

57 Id.
" Id.
99 Id.

HIO .".Ithough the Board once contended that an ir.dustrialloan company that olTered
negotiable order ofwnhdrawal (NOW) accounts and made commereiall()ans was a bank,
the Boaed's view was overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. First
Uancorp \. Board of Governors, 728 F2d 434 (10th Cif. 1984). Sec I1awke, "Can Inter-
Slale Banking Be LeI': To the State SO" 4 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 103, III (1985).
",' CEBA § : 0: (amendIng 12 USC § 1843(1}(5)). The interstate banking limitations
are discussed in ~ 5.D I r4][ d].
'"' CERA § 101 lamending ; 2 USC § 1843(g) ).
10J Id.

",,' See H.I<. Conf. Rep. No. 261. IOOth Cong., 151 Sess t29, reprInted in 1987 C.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 598-599.
 ~ 6.03 OVERVIEW 6-24

~ 6.03 ATM NETWORKS AND THE RESTRICTIONS ON

INTERSTATE BANKING
Rapid growth has occurred in both interstate and intrastate ATM net-
works, '05 with a substantial percentage of the machines belonging to networks
through which ATM use is available to customers of multiple banks. The great
majority of states have laws that deal specifically with ATM operations.'06 Some
of these laws define an ATM as a branch ofa bank; others specify that it is not.,07
As noted previously, whether and under what circumstances an ATM may
be a "branch" under the federal definition in the McFadden Act has been the
subject of considerable litigation. Since the decisior. in Independent Bankers
Association v. Smith, '06 it has been clear that ATMs can meet the test in 12 USC
. § 36(f) of what constitutes a bank branch. However, in accordance with the
McFadden Act, a national bank may establish and operate ATM branches
within a particular state if the state Jaw specifically allows it. As indicated in
Independent Bankers Association v. Smith, a national bank may be allowed to
establish ATMs consistent with the act-even in a state that, as a general rule,
prohibits bank branching-if that state does not treat.-\TMs as branches subject
to the general state law prohibition against bank branching.'o,
The ability of banks and bank holding companies to use ATM systems was
. significantly advanced in a 1985 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Independent Bankers Association \.. Marine Mid/and Bank,
N.A." O Although prior decisions, such as Independent Bankers Association \'.
Smith, had established that CBCTs that accepted deposits and c.ispensed funds
were "branches" within the meaning of the McFadden Act, the comptro;ler
excluded from the definition of "branch" those terminals that were not owned or
rented by a national ban;{. The case involved a terminal owned by Wegman's, a

'05 These deveiopments are thoroughly reviewed in N. Penney & D. Baker, The La\\'
a/Electronic Fund Transfer Systems " 6.02[5] (1980 & Supp. 1987).
106 There a,e forty-one states with legislation specially authorizing "one or more types

of state-chartered depository institutions to deploy electronic termina~s." ld. at ~ 22.01[2]

0.41.
107 ld. at ~ 22.01 [2] ns. 41-44.
106
534 F2d 921 (DC Cir. 1976). aff'g 402 F. Supp. 207 iDDe 1975), cert. denied, 429
US 862 (1976). See cases eted supra'i 6.01[1].
109
534 F2d at 948-949. See N. Penney & D. Baker, supra note 105, at ~ 22.01[21. See
generally Felsenfeid. "Electronic Banking and Its Effect on Interstate Branching Restric-
tions-An Analytic Appmach," 54 Fordham L Rev. 1019-1062 (1986): Langevoort,
"Interpreting the McFaddcr. Act: the Politics and Economies of Shared ATMs and
Discount Brokerage Houses," 41 Bus. Law. 1265-128C (1986).
110
757 F2 d 453 (2d Cif. 1985), rev'g 583 r. Supp. 104c IWDc<Y 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. C1. 2926 (1986)
6-25 BANK EXPANSION 116.03

supermarket, which terminal was linked to an interbank network through a

contract with Marine Midland Bank, a national bank. Wegman's placed the
terminal in its store to enable customers to access their bank accounts for
deposits, withdrawals, cash advances, and account information. While Weg-
man's loaded the terminal with cash, it was not responsible for emptying the
deposit container or reconciling the deposits; this Marine Midland did. Further,
customer transactions through the terminal required electronic approval by
Marine Midland before cash was dispensed.
A federal district court in New York held that the ATM constitutec a
"branch." The fact that Wegman's owned the terminal, rather than the bank,
was irrelevant, because Marine Midland customers could use the terminal to
deposit or withdraw money to or from their Marine Midland accounts, as well as
to engage in other transactions, "with the same force and effect as if they
appeared personally at a Marine Midland 'brick and mortar' branch and made
the same transactions."'"
Following the St.:preme Court's lead in the Plant City'" case, that "form"
should not control "substar.ce," the cour: held that :he terminal was a branch of
Marine Midland, one that gave Marine Midland a competitive advantage "by
allowing the bank to provide the service to customers of deposit'ng money at a
place away from the bank's main office.''''' Furthermore, the court held the
ATM co:1Stituted a "branch" prohibited by federal Jaw, even though the state
law of New York mlght permit a state bank to utllize the same terminal. The
court rejected a contention that Wegman's violated state law by engaging in
banking without a charter.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It upheld
the comptroller's view that an ATM that is neither owned nor rented by a bank
docs not constitute a branch under the McFadden .-\ct. The court relied on the
language used in the Smith case (on which the comptroller's iTHerpretation was
based). After corr.menting on the difficulty of categorizing the various ways that
l'1odern banking transactions are condt:cted, the circuit court cor.cluded that the
comptrcller had a reasonable basis for distinguishir.g in hIS regulations between
transactions conducted at facilities owned or rented and other types oftransac-
lions. In so holding, the court rejected the argument that Marine Midland rented
the ATM becat:se it charged the user a transaction fee. The coun considered this
charge as a per unit cost, like the charge at a pay telephone for making a
teiephone call.'"

111583 F. Supp. at 1047.

'''FlrSI Nat'l flank Y. Dickinson. 396 US 122 (196 0 )
", 583 F. Supp. at I ()4 7
,,, Id. The cOLIn also held thai the "HIe couns should determine whether Wcgn,an's
violated Slate banking :i1W by open:lI II1g an ATM.
116.04 OVERVIEW 6-26

'16.04 REGULATION OF BRANCHING BY SAVINGS AND

LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
Savings and loan associations are not subject to the same rules on branch
banking and interstate banking that govern banks. The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board in the past has administratively followed rules for federal savings
and loan association branching that were similar to the McFadden Act provi-
sions for national banks. The FHLBB regulations now provide: "As a general
policy, the Board permits a Federal association to branch within the state in
which its home office is located."'" FHLBB policy on interstate branching
allows federal associations to establish branches outside of their home state ( I)
when this is allowed by the state law in which the association's home office is
located and (2) if the state in which the branch is to be located "would permit"
the establishment of such a branch for a state-chartered institution.'" An excep-
tion to this policy allows branching to occur as a result of the acquisition of
failing institutions, under transactions arranged as an alternative to payment of
FSLIC insurance benefits, or to prevent faEure of the insured institutions. 117
The rules for interstate activities of savings and loan holding companies
have differed from those for bank holding companies. Until the 1980s, federal
statutes prohibited multistate savings and loan holding companies.'" In 1982,
this prohibition was relaxed to allow emergency acquisitions of failing institu-
tions.'" In 1987, further changes were introduced by the Competitive Equality
Banking Act.
The general policy of the federal statute dealing with savings and loan
holding companies is that the FSUC may not approve an acquisition by a
savings and loan holding company if it will result in "a multiple savings and loan
holding company controlling insured institutions in more chan one State .... "120
There are three exceptions to this rule; interstate combinations may occur when
(I) the acquisition is pursuant to the emergency acquisition powers of the act; (2)
the holding company controls an insured institution subsidiary that enjoys
grandfather rights, because the combination predates the cutoff date in the act of
March 5, 1987; or (3) the laws of the state governing state-chartered institutions
"specifically authorize such an acquisition [for state institutions] by language to
that effect and not merely by implication." 121 With these exceptions, t'le laws on

n5 12 CFR § 556.5(a)(2) (1987).

n'12 CFR § 556.5(a)(3) (1987).
117 : 2 CFR § 556.5(3)(ii)(a) (1987)

n'See Hawke. "Can Interstate Banking Be Len to the Slates'" 4 Ann. Rev. of
BankingL.I03-1J3(J985); 12USC§ 1730a(e)(3) (1982).
119 Provisions regarding emergency acquisitions of :inaneially weak insLtutions are
discussed infra < 6.05.
120
12 USC § 1730a(e)(3) (1982) .
." 12 USCA § 1730a(e)(3)(c) (West SU;:Jp. 1988).
 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.05[1)
6-27

interstate activities ofsavings and loan holding companies become similar to the
restrictions on bank holding companies under the Douglas amendment to the
Bank Holding Company Act.

'16.05 EMERGENCY ACQUISITIONS OF FINANCIALLY WEAK

BANKS
[l) Emergency Acquisition Authority
The Gam-5t Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982'22 gave the FDIC
and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation special authority to
arrange mergers or acquisitions of certain banks and savings institutions that
had failed or were in precarious financial condition. This authority includes the
power to bypass the usual restrictions against interstate banking. It also includes
the power to approve acquisitions across traditional industry lines, so that
banks, for example, might acquire failed thrift institutions, 12'
Under the 1982 act, the FDIC may give financial assistance to facilitate
mergers or asset acquisitions ofinsured banks that are m financial jeopardy. The
assistance may take the form ofloans, contributions, guarantees, or assumptions
ofliabilities, and may be given directly to the acquiring entity.'24 This assistancll
is authorized only when the insured bank lDvolved is either closed, "in the
judgment of the Board of Directors [of the FDIC]. is in danger of closing," or is
in need of assistance to prevent risk to the FDIC as a result of circumstances in
which "severe financial conditions exist which threaten the stability ofa signifi·
cant number of insured banks or of insured banks possessing significant finan-
cial resources .... "'25 The 1982 act gave similar authority to the FSUC to assist
the mergers of financially threatened insured thrift institutwns. 126 Both the
FDIC and FSUC are limited in the amount of financial aid they can provide to
no more than what would have been "reasonably necessary to save the cost of
:iquidaling" the institution, except in cases where the continued operation of the
institution is "essential" to provide adequate financial services to the
community.'"
The 1982 act also r,ave the FDIC and FSLIC authority to approve
"extraordinary acquisitions" by out-of-state financial institutions in certain

"'Puc.
L. No. 97-320. 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scallered sections of titles 12, 15.
and 18 USC) (hereinafter Garn-St Germain Act).
"'12 USC § 1823(c), (I) (FDle); 12 USC §§ 1729(::'1. 1730a(m) (FSLlC) (1982),
." 12 USC § 1823(c)(2) (1982),
'" 12 USC § 1821(c)(2)~B) (1982). The dClcrminatlo~ of the need for assistance is to
be at the "sole discretIon" of the FDIC. Id.
125 12 USC § 1729(1) (1982),

121 12 USC §§ : 729(1)(4), 1823(c)(4) (1982).

~ 6.0511J OVERVIEW 6-28

circumstances. '2' The FDIC could exercise this autr.ority when there was an
insured bank with total assets of $500 million or more that was closed. 12> The
power of the FSLIC was broader in scope. 130 The act also gave both agencies
authority to approve acquisitions by certain acquiring institutions that are of a
different type than the failing institution, under stated circumstances.'" Thus,
since 1982, the two banking agencies may approve not only interstate acquisi-
tions but also some interindustry combinations as a Ir.eans of rescuing founder-
ing depository institutions.
The emergency acquisition powers of the FDIC cannot be exercised in
disregard of the impact on competition. The law prohibits acquisitions "which
would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combina-
tion or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of
banking in any part of the United States. "'32 It also prohibits the approval of
acquisitions whose effect may be to substantially iessen competition, unless
there is a finding that the "anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions
are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transac-
tion in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served."133
These provisions on the preservation of competition apply only to acquisitions
and sales of insured banks approved by the FDIC. There is no comparable
provision relating to thrift institutions regulated by the FSLIC. 1J4 The law also
authorizes mergers of financially weak federal credit unions with other federally
insured depository institutions when a merger with ar.other insured credit union
is not possible.' 3 '
In a case involving the acquisition of First Federal Savings and Loan
Association by a subsidiary of Citicorp, the merger provision of the Gam-St
Germain Act came under consideration. The plaint:ffs in the case launched a
broad challenge against the FSLICs decision about which of the competing
offers for restructuring the association to accept. In response, the court first held

." 12 USC § 1823(1) (FDIC); : 2 USC § I 730a(m) (FSLIC).

'29 12 USC § 1823(1)(2) (1982) Similar au:hority e\!Sted when :he bank was "in
danger of closing" if it was an insured bank organized in mUlual form with S500 million or
more :n total assets. IC .. § 1823(1)(3).
'J> 12 USC § 1730a(m) (I )(A)(i) (1982). In the case of the FSLlC the insured institu-
tion must be eltgible for merger assistance under 12 USC ~ ; 729(1). discussed previously,
and the FSLlC :nust determine "that severe financial conc:tions exist which threaten the
stability of a Significant number of insured ic.stitutior.s. or c( insured ir.sti:utions possess-
ing significant finanCIal resources ... " and that exerCls:ng authority to approve the
emergency acquisition would "lessen the risk" to the FSUC. Ie.
131 12 USC § 1823(1) (FDIC): 12 GSC § 1730a(m) (FSLIC).
", 12 esc § 1821(f)(7)(A) (1982).
'3312 USC § 1823(1)(7)(B) (1982).
'34 Com;Jare 12 USC § 1823(1)(7) (1982). referring to FDIC and banking concerns,
with 12 USC § : 730a(rn) (1982). referring to FSLlC and t",ift :nstitutions.
135 12 USC § 1785(b) (1982).
 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.05[11
6-29

that while judicial review of the agency decision was proper under the act, the
decision itself as to which bid or emergency arrangements to accept was a matter
for the discretion of the agency that the court could review only for abuse by the
FSLIC in exercising its discretion. A rejected bidder argued that the court should
require the FSLlC to augment the record before the court so that the court could
examine the manner in which the agency evaluated the various alternatives, but
the court refused, stating that, in the court's opinion, the FSLIC should be able to
deal with the emergency presented by a financial institution failure without
having to subject its complicated calculations for evaluating alternative arrange-
ments to a protracted dispute on review. In addition, as the FSLIC needed to
deal with financial institutions in a confidential manner in order to encourage
and evaluate proposals, the preservation of the confidentiality of the informa-
tion submitted to it, on which it based its judgment, also justified denying the
request to force the agency to spread its information on the record.'"
In another Citicorp acquisition, an opportunity was provided for judicial
review of the acquisition provisions. In Getty v. FSLIC,'37 the FSLIC solicited
bids from both Citicorp and Getty for National Permanent Bank (NPB), a
federally chartered mutual savings bank, under the emergency thrift acquisition
provisio:ls of the act. After a series of rebidding, the FSLIC accepted Citicorp's
bid. Getty then launched a challenge to the FSLIC action. After initially losing
its request for a stay, and after procedural disputes to obtain access to inter-
agency memoranda involved in the FSLIC decision process, Getty's appeal was
heard. The court ruled for Getty on two issues. Firstly, 12 USC § I 730a(m)(3)(B)
enumerates priorities for the FSLIC to consider in making its decision, based
upon geographical considerations and the nature of the institutions. The FSLIC
erred by not providing an explanation of how it considered these statutory
priorities.'" Secondly. when the FSLIC decides to request a rebid, the law
permits other bidders who were within a defined range of the "initial lowest
acceptable offer" to submit a new offer as well.·" The FSLIC had refused to
allow Getty to st.:bmit a further modified bid after the last Citicorp bid. The
court held that Getty was entitled to rebid because it was within the prescribed
range of "the offer FSLIC would acccpt but for the rebidding requirement of
subsection (3)(A)."140
Having ruled for Getty, the court then faced the issue of determining
appropriate relief in view of the consummation of the acquisition by Citicorp.
The cour, said that it would be inappropriate for the FSLlC to go through a

Hartigan v. FHLBB, 746 F2d 1300 (7th Cir. ! 984)

136

", Geny v. FSLlC, 805 F2d I 05~ (DC Or 1986). The (icily litigation (No. 86-1387,
DC Cir) was ever.tually settled out of court, according to 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1080
(June 22, 1987).
138 805 F2d at 1055. These priorities are discussed infra V 6.05[21.'
1J9 12 USC § : 730a(m)(3)(a) (1982).
140 805 F2l! at 1060.
11 6.05(2) OVERVIEW 6-30

process of rebidding only to reject a better offer from Getty because it favored
the management abilities of Citicorp. In the court's opinion, the FSLIC could
not reopen the issue ofthe qualifications ofthe bidders, after having determined
those qualifications to have been adequate at the outset, when it solicited the
bids. The court also ruled that fairness required allowing Citicorp, as well as
Getty, to submit a new bid.'"
In 1987, Congress made the emergency acquisition authority permanent
and substantially expanded it. The 1987 legislation also modified some of the
emergency powers and procedures contained in the 1982 act, which have been
discussed in this section. The changes are explained in the following section.

(2] Effects of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 on

Emergency Acquisition Powers
The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 expands the authority of the
FDIC to approve interstate acquisitions of financially weak institutions. It
repeals the 1986 expiration ofand permanently extends the authority contained
in the Gam-5t Germain Act of 1982 on extraordinary acquisitions.'" It also
enlarges that authority in significant respects.
Initially, it should be noted that the substantive amendments to the emer-
gency acquisition authority primarily affect the FDIC. The 1987 act does not
make as substantial a change in the emergency acquisition authority of the
FSLIC, perhaps because this is already reasonably broad. The act extends the
1982 emergency acquisition powers of the FSLIC,.a and also adds a requirement
that the qualified thrift lender (QTL) rules be satisfied.'" The conference report

'4' Id. at
1062.
'''The extraordinary acquIsItion authority expired in 1986 after having been
extended previously. Pub. L. No. 99-120, 1985 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News(99 Stat.)
504. CEBA § 509(a), 101 Stat. 552, 635, amended the Gam-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 by repealing Part D of Title I. This part of the act contained the
provisions calling for the sunset of the emergency acquisitions authority. Title n of the act
was extended for only five years until October 13, 1991, however. CEBA § 509(b). This
contains the authority to issue net worth certificates, discussed in Chapter 10.
14aCEBA Title V, 101 Stat. 552. Other provisions of the 1987 act, as discussed at
~~ 5.03[2J1d), 6.04, give savings and loan holding companies authority to operate inter-
state savings and loans subject to policies similar to the Douglas amendment. These
provisions recogmze the FSLIC's authority to make emergency acquisitions and provide
that such authority is free from the other restraints of the savings and loan holding
company laws on interstate activities. Id., § I04(g)" (amending 12 USC § 1730(e)(3»; see
12 USC § 17 30(a)(m)( I)(A)(i) (1982), saying that no other provisions of federal or state
law except the specific provisions mentioned limit the FSLIC authority. See also H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 26 I, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 139-140, reprinted in 1987 U.S'. Code Congo &
Admin. News 608-609.
'44CEBA § I04(h), 101 Stat. 552,575, amending \2 USC § 1730a(m)(I)(A)(i) by
making the emergency acquisition authonty also subject to Section 408(c) of the National
6-31 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.05[2][al

makes clear that the preemption provISIons in the emergency acquisition

authority reach broadly. The FSLlC's authority to approve emergency acquisi-
tions includes the power to authorize "any company to acquire control" of the
insured institution, not just acquiring firms that also are insured institutions or
banks. '48 The conference report explains:
[I]f a life insurance company invested in or acquired a thrift institution
under section 408(m), that section would preempt any State law that would
prevent the company from continuing to engage in the life insurance busi-
ness because of that investment or acquisition. That section would not,
however, preempt State restrictions on the percentage of an insurance
company's assets that may be invested in anyone subsidiary, or similar type
safeguards. "6
As under the 1982 law, any acquisition of a thrift by a bank holding company
requires the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. In cases involving a merger
party other than another insured savings and loan association, if the law gener-
ally requires approval from the federal regulator of that party (such as the
Federal Reserve Board), approval must be obtained.'" The 1987 amendment
also maintains the requirement that if a bank holding company or bank is
involved in a merger with a savings and loan, the savings and loan may keep
existing branches, but otherwise must conform to the branching rules that apply
to national banks. '48

la] Enlarged Emergency Acquisition Powers of the FDIC. With respect to the
FDIC, the 1987 act amends the previous provisions regarding the FDIC's
authority to exercise its emergency interstate acquisition powers. Under the new
provisions, these powers are limited to circumstances in which the FDIC uses its
general merger assistance powers to help an out-of-state bank or bank holding
company make an acquisition.'"
Although the Senate version of the bill that became the 1987 act contained a
provision upholding the FDIC's authority under state law to arrange interstate
mergers and acquisitions, there is no such statement in the final legislation. The
conference report makes clear, however, that the conferees regarded such a
statement as unnecessary, saying: "The emergency acquisition provisions are

Housing Act, whIch, as amended by the 1987 amendrr.ents, contains the qualified thrift
lender rules. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 140, reprinted in 1987
U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 608-609.
'" 12 liSe § 1730a(m)( 1)(A)(i) (1982).
'" H .R. Conf. Rep. No. 26 J, I OOth Cong., 1st Sess. 140-141, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 609-6 J O.
." 12 USC § J 830a(m)( 1)(A)(iii) (1982).
'" 12 USC § 1830a(m)(S) (1982).
149
12 USC § 1823(1)(3)(1) (1982).
11 6.05[211b) OVERVIEW 6-32

intended to provide the FDIC with greater flexibility in handling closed or

failing banks. The conferees recognize that alternatively the FDIC may use
applicable state laws for an interstate acquisition, where it determines such laws
are more advantageous toward resolving an existing problem.""o
Under the former provisions of the law, the emergency procedures could be
used to acquire stock institutions only if they were closed. The 1987 act permits
acquisition of such institutions when they are "in danger of closing. '''5' The act
also enlarges the scope of the acquisition. Under the new provision, the acquisi-
tion may be made by one or more out-of-state banks or by one or more out-of-
state bank holding companies. They may acquire "an insured bank in danger of
closing which has total assets of$500,000,000 or more" or two or more "affili-
ated banks in danger of closing which have aggregate total assets of
$500,000,000 or more," but, in this latter situation, the total assets of the banks
must be "equal to or greater than 33 percent of the aggregate total assets of all
affiliated insured banks. "'52 When one or more insured banks that are part of a
holding company system of affiliated institutions are acquired, the acquiring
out-of-state bank or banks or holding companies may acquire the entire holding
company, or they may acquire other insured banks affiliated with the banks in
danger ofclosing. The acquiring companies may have the opportunity to acquire
the larger holding system if the banks in danger of closing have "aggregate total
assets ... equal to or greater than 33 percent of the aggregate total assets of all
affiliated insured banks .... "'53

[b) Acquisition of a Bank in Danger of Closing. A bank that is in danger of

closing is defined by the act according to two standards. Both standards require
certification by the state or federal chartering author;ty. One standard requires
an evaluation of the bank's ability to continue to meet obligations of depositors
and creditors in the normal course of business. The other standard Involves an
evaluation of the capital position of the institution. Thus, to find a bank in
danger ofclosing, the chartering authority must certify that either (I) the bank is
not likely to be able to meet the demands ofdepositors or to pay its obligations in
the normal course of business, and "there is no reasonable prospect" of the
bank's meeting depositors' demands or paying obligations without federal
assistance; or (2) the bank "has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will
deplete all or substantially all of the capital of the bank," and there is no
reasonable prospect for replenishment of the capital without federal assist-

150 H.R. Conr. Rep. No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 170. reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code

Congo & Admin. News 638-639.

'" CEBA § 502, 101 Stat. 552, 623-629 (amending 12 USC § 1823(1)(3».
'5'ld.
"'Id.
6-33 BANK EXPANSION ~ 6.0512J(b)

ance."4 Before an acquisition can be made under this authority, the board of
directors of the insured bank in danger ofclosing must request in writing that the
FDIC assist the acquisition.'55 In addition, the state bank supervisor of the state
in which the bank is located must approve it.'56
Once the FDIC provides assistance to such a bank under its general assist-
ance powers in 12 USC § I823(f)(c) to a bank that is eligible for an interstate
acquisition under the act, the bank remains eligible for such an acquisition for as
long as the FDIC's assistance to the bank remains outstanding. 157 This permits
the FDIC to strengthen a failing bank financially, so that it becomes more
attractive as a merger partner.
Once an out-of-state bank or bank holding company acquires a bank under
the emergency interstate acquisition rules, that bank or bank holding company is
allowed to expand in the state in which the acquired bank is located. Subject to
conditions in the act that may limit the timing of the acquisition, it may "acquire
any other insured bank and establish branches in such State to the same extent as
a bank holding company whose insured bank subsidiaries operations are princi-
pally conducted in such State may acquire any other insured bank or establish
branches.""8 Thus, so far as branching and acquisition of additional insured
bank subsidiaries is concerned, the acquiring bank holding company may
expand to the same extent that bank holding companies operating primarily
wi thin the state of the acquired failing bank may expand.
The act also specifies that state laws on regional banking that limit th~
territory in which bank holding companies may operate are not effective against
acquisitions under this emergency authority. Such state laws cannot require
divestiture of any other insured bank or prevent the acquisition of any other
bank or holding company. "8
The 1987 act establishes a procedure by which the FDIC may solicit offers
from prospective purchasers or merger pal1ners in approving interstate emer-
gency acquisitions. 'so The FDIC is given "sole discretion" to determine the

154 CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § I823(I)(8XD) ).

155 CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § 1823(1)(3)(0».
,,, CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § I 823(I)(3)(E) ). Note that there is no provision
for override of the Slate chartering authonty's disapproval. This is unlike the FDIC
authority under 12 USC § 1823(f)(2), with respect to closed bar.ks, where, by unanimous
vote, the FDIC can override the state objections. The emergency acqllJsition powers of the
FSLIC also specify notice to the state official having jurisdiction oflhe acquircd institu-
tion with the power to override the objection of the state official by a unanimous vote. Ie.
(amcnding 12 USC § l830a(m)(l )(B) ).
,,7 CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § 1823(1).
158 ld.

"'ld.
160 CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § I823(f)(6) ). There is a comparable procedure for
thc FSUC. 12 USC § 1730a(m)(2) (1982).
11 6.051211bl OVERVIEW 6-34

buyers it deems "qualified and capable. "'6' Further, in deciding which offers to
accept, the FDIC must consider a list ofstatutory priorities. These priorities ~~e
based on the types of depository institutions involved in the proposed acquIsI-
tion or merger and Ihe states in which they are located. The statute assigns
priority to mergers between depository institutions as follows:

1. Depository institutions of the same type within the same state.

2. Depository institutions of the same type in different states that "by
statute specifically authorize such acquisitions" or, in cases where there
is no such statutory authorization, in contiguous states;
3. Depository institutions of the same type in states other than those in the
second priority;
4. Depository institutions of different types in the same state;
5. Depository institutions of different types in different states that "by
statute specifically authorize such acquisitions" or, in cases where there
is no such statutory authorization, in contiguous states; and
6. Depository institutions of different types in different states other than
the states described in the fifth priority. m

In the case of a minority-controlled bank, the highest priority is to continue the

minority-controlled status. In this situation, the FDIC must seek offers from
other minority-controlled banks before following the priorities listed
previously. 163
The emergency assistance provisions may not be used by the FDIC to
provide assistance to a bank holding company subsidiary that is not an insured
bank, unless the subsidiary is designed as a conduit for channeling help to an
insured bank.'·' Further, the Board of Governors has authority to expedite the
approval process of the acquisition ofbanks in danger of closing.'" The approval
process may be streamlined by dispensing with certain notice and hearing
requirements. The Board also may obtain expedited antitrust review of an
emergency acquisition.'·' Additionally, the 1987 act provides for the use of
"bridge banks" in the acquisition of closed banks.'" Detailed provisions are
contained within the act relating to the establishment of such banks.

'., CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § 1823(f)(5) ).

162 CEBA § 502(c)(2) (amending 12 USC § 1823(1)(6)(B) ). The priorities provided for
the FSLlC are slightly different. 12 USC § 1730a(m)(3)(Bl (1982).
63
' CEBA § 502(c)(2) (amending 12 USC § 1823(f)(6)(C».
'6' CEBA § 502 (amending 12 USC § I 823(f)(9) ).
165 CEBA § 502(h).
'661d.
167 CEBA § 503. See ~ 10.04 on the use of bridge banks.
6-35 BANK EXPANSION 11 6.06

116.06 BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACQUISITION OF THRIFT

INSTITUTIONS
Apart from the emergency acquisition procedures discussed in the previous
section, bank holding companies have had limited ability to acquire savings and
loan associations. The Federal Reserve Board has applied the Bank Holding
Company Act in a manner that denies approval of healthy thrift acquisitions. In
a 1982 case in which the Board did approve a bank holding company acquisition
of a failing thrift institution,1G' it also applied conditions to its approval,limiting
transactions between the thrift and the holding company. These conditions
included restrictions on activities that otherwise would enable the bank holding
company to avoid restrictions on its interstate activities.
The Board's general policy on acquisition of healthy thrift institutions was
set in 1977 in its opinion in D.H. Baldwin.'·' In this case, the Board concluded
that the operation of a savings and Joan association was an activity "closely
related to banking," as required by the Bank Holding Company Act, but it was
not to be regarded as a proper incident to banking, because the benefits of such
an affiliation did not outweigh the adverse effects. Ho The Board later said it
based its determination on three factors;

(I) the perception of a competing and confEcting regulatory framework

governing banks and S&Ls; (2) the possibility that cross-industry acquisi-
tions would undermine the perceived rivalry between the banking and thrift
industries; and (3) the possibility that such acquisitions could undermine
the interstate banking restrictions of the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act ...."

In September 1987, the Board soliCIted public comment as to whether it

should modify its policy on acquisition of healthy thrift institutions. Citing a
changed economic and regulatory environment. in which thrifts engage in
expanded activities and have increasingly formed interstate afTiliations, the

16' Application of lnterslate Financial Corp., 68 Fed. Reserve Bull. 316 (1982);
Application of Citicorp, 68 Fed. Reserve Bull. 656 (19SC).
169
63 Fed. Reserve Bull. 280 (1977).
110 For a discussion of the provisio:1s of the Bank Holding Company Act, see Chapter
5. See also the statement of the Board's general counsel at 35 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 771
(1982). Although federal legislation had so substantial!) ~xpanded the powers of savings
and loan associations that they arguably could be included within the definition of bank in
the Bank Holding Company ACl, the Board would "Ike its policy direction from the
guidelines for acquisitioOl of th~ifts in the emergency procedures of the Garn-5t Germain
Act. Id.
111 Board of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., SoJicit8lion of F~blic Commenr, "Board

PolIcy Regarding the Acquisition and Operation ofThnCtlnstilUtions by Bank Holding

Companies." 52 Fed. Reg. 36,041 (1987).
11 6.06 OVERVIEW 6-36

Board specifically requested commentators to address the implications of a

modified policy on the interstate banking rules of the Douglas amendment. 172

172 Id.
 7
Bank Examination and
Supervision and Restrictions
on Loans and Investments
~ 7.01 Examination and Supervision Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-\
(I] Federal Bank Examination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
[2] Portfolio Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
raj Loans and Extensions ofCredil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
[b] Exceptions to the Limitations on Loans to a Single
Borrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
[iJ Bank acceptances 7-11
[ii] Real estate loans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
[iii] Other investments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
[c] State Banks and Savings and Loan Associations. . . . . . . . 7-13
~ 7.02 Securities Activities. .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . 7-15
[1] Scope of Federal Securities Laws Generally, as Applied to
Banks '" , '" 7-16
[2] Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws 7-19
[3] Defmition of "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21
[aJ Transactions in Stocks, Bonds, and Similar Securities ... 7-22
[b] Certificates of Deposit and Other flank Deposits. . . . . . . 7-23
[c) Promissory Notes and Commercial Loan Agreements ... 7-25
[d] Investment Contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27

Ii 7.01 EXAMINATION AND SUPERVISION GENERALLY

Congress has given the primary federal banking regulators the power to
conduct examinations and require reports of the depository in'stitutions under
each regulator's jurisdiction. This section discusses the general authority of
these regulators', subsequent sections examine particular aspects of regulation by
these agencies.

7-1
U7.0J(ll OVERVIEW 7·2

(11 Federal Bank Examination

The three principal federal bank regulatory agencies-the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
'Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-conduct the examination of banks
under their jurisdiction. The Comptroller ofthe Currency has primary responsi·
bility for national banks.' The Federal Reserve System exercises supervisory
responsibility over state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.'
The FDIC has authority to examine all insured banks, but concentrates espe·
cially on state nonmember insured banks. 3 The Federal Horne Loan Bank Board
has supervisory authority and conducts examinations of insured savings and
loan associations.' The National Credit Union Administration exercises respon-
sibility with respect to insured credit unions.'
In 1978, the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act established a Financial Institutions Examination Council to prescribe uni-
form standards for the examination ofdepository'institutions that are subject to
federal examination.· The council consists of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the chairman of the board of directors of the FDIC, a governor of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System as designated by the chairman, the
chairman of the FHLBB, and the chairman of the National Credit Union
Administration Board. 7 The chairmanship of the council rotates among the
members every two years.'
The council is responsible for establishing uniform principles and standards
and report forms for the examination of financial institutions, to be applied by
the federal financial institutions regulatory agencies.' The council also makes
recommendations with respect to other supervisory matters. The council devel-
ops uniform reportmg systems for federally supervised financial institutions and
their holding companies and nonfinancial subsidiaries, and also is directed by
Congress to conduct schools for examiners.'· To carry out its duties, the council

1 See ~~ 2.03 and 4.02. See also 12 USC §§ 161, 481 (1982).

'See ~~ 2.03 and 3.0:. See also 12 USC: §§ 325, 326 (1982).
3Sed~ 2.03 and 11.0114J. See also 12 USC§ 1815(a) (1982).
• See ~~ 2.03 and I: .02. See also 12 USC § 1440 (1982).
5 See ~~ 2.03 and I ~ .03. See also 12 USC § 1756 (1982).
• 12 USC § 3301 (1982). Congress has considered legislation to improve the training
of federal bank examiners and to establish a system for accepting state examinations of
federally insured institu:ions when minimum standarc.s are satisfied, but the legislation
has not passed. II.R. 4917, 99th Cong.• 2d Sess., 132 Congo Rec. H3297 (daily ed. June 3,
1986); H.R. Rep. No. 809, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986): S. 288, IOOth Cong.. 1st Sess .. \ 33
Congo Rec. S627-·5633 (Jan. 12, 1987).
, 12 USC § 3303(a) (1982).
, 12 USC §§ 3303(b). 3303(c) (1982).
• 12 USC § 3305(a) (\ 982).
'·12 USC §§ 3305(b), 3305(c), 3305(d) (1982).
7-3 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.0111)

has legal access to all reports and records of the five regulatory agencies that are
members of the council, including reports the agencies have made in examining
financial institutions under their jurisdiction."
Although a lederal banking agency may be negligent in conducting an
examination of an institution under its jurisdiction, stockholders and others
with interests in the financial institution concerned have not been successful in
efforts to hold the examining authorities liable for failing to discover improprie-
ties that subsequently proved injurious to their institutions.'2 Further, state
banking regulators do not have the power to examine national banks absent
federal legislation granting them this authority." The Garn-5t Germain Deposi-
tory Institutions Act of 1982 14 gives state regulatory authorities limited power to
examine national banks. The act specifies that state examiners may review a
national bank's records to determine compliance with state unclaimed property
or escheat laws, when the authorities have "reasonable cause to believe that the
bank has failed to comply with such laws.""
With the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983,'6 federal banking
regulatory agencies were given enlarged supervisory and examination powers.
The act authorizes the banking agencies to require banks to set up special
reserves, when appropriate, to guard against poor·quality loans to borrowers in
foreign countries. 17 It also establishes reporting and information requirements
for banks engaged in foreign lending,'6 as well as provisions on fees charged for
restructuring foreign loans that require the amortization of such bank fees over
the life of the loan if the fee exceeds the administrative cost of the loan," a
requirement for special evaluation of the fmancingof certain foreign mining and
mineral-processing projects,'O and additional authority in other areas for the
banking agencies.

1112 USC § 3308 (1982).

12Gary Sheet & Tin Employees Fed. Credit Union Y. United States, 605 F. SUPP. 916
(ND Ind. 1985) (National Credit Union Board did nOI owe a duty to owners of credit
union under Federal Tort Claims Act). See also In re Franklin Nat'} Bank Sec. Litig., 445
F. Supp. 723 (EDNY 1978); Social Sec. Admin. Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. UnIted
States, 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1956).
"For a discussion of the limited grant of authority to the states in this area underthe
federal banking laws, see 11 4.02[2J.
14 Pub. L. No. 97·320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18
USC).
15 12 USC § 484(b) (1982).

"Pub. L. No. 98-181,97 Stat. 1278 (codified at ;2 USC §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. IV

1986) ).
" 12 USC § 3904 (Supp. IV 1986).
16 12 USC § 3906 (Supp. IV 1986).

19 12 USC § 3905 (Supp. IV 1986).

20
12 USC § 3908 (Supp. IV 1986).
1l7.01{lJ OVERVIEW 7-4

The International Lending Supervision Act also grants important powers to

the federal banking regulatory agencies in order to establish capital adequacy
requirements for all banks under their jurisdiction. This authority is not limited
to transactions with foreign parties."' The act directs the federal banking agen-
cies to "cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by
establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions and by
using such other methods as the appropriate Federal banking agency deems
appropriate. "22 It gives the banking agencies discretionary authority to set mini.
mum capital levels for institutions as the agency "deems necessary or appropri.
ate in light ofthe particular circumstances ofthe banking institution."" Failure
of the banking institution to maintain a capital level, as required, can be treated
by the banking agency as an unsafe and unsound banking practice. 24 The federal
banking agency also may require a bank that does not meet the minimum capital
standards to adopt a plan acceptable to the agency to bring itse!finto compliance
with the standards, and then may consider the bank's progress in following that
plan, in passing on a proposal from the bank that "would divert earnings,
diminish capital, or otherwise impede such banking institution's progress in
achieving its minimum capital level.""
The authority of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to
deal with the adequacy of the capital of savings and loan institutions was
enlarged by Congress in 1987. 26
The Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board have
adopted regulations on the adequacy of the capital of the financial institutions
they supervise." Additionally, the federal banking regulatory agencies have
engaged in international discussions leading to a proposal for a uniform set of
guidelines on capital adequacy for banks"· This proposal uses a system for

2' As explained by M. Cobb & H. Birmingham. Federal Regulation of Depository

Institutions, Enforcement Powers and Procedures' 2.04[21IclIii) (Supp. 1986), this mea·
sure was added to the act during its consideration by Congress in order to reverse the
decisIon of the coun in First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697
F2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983), which took an unsympathetic position on the comptroller's
dforts to enforce minimum capital adequacy standards.
22 12 USC § 3907 (a)( I) (Supp. IV (986).
23 12 USC § 3907 (a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).

"12 USC § 3907 (b)(I) (Supp. IV 1986).

25 12 USC § 3907(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).

26 The expandcd authority of the FSLlC to deal with the capital adequacy of saving
and loan Institutions is discussed at ~ 11.02[3].
27 /2 CFR §§ 3.1-3.21 (! 987) (comptroller); 12 CFR PI. 225, App. A (I 987) (Board of
Governors).
"The proposal is contained in a joint news release issued by the 'Federal Reserve
Board, Comptroller of the Currency. and FDIC. The text is contained in Comptroller of
the Currency, Banking Bull. 87-30, "Risk-Based Capital" (Dec. 10. \ 987). In addition to
defining "capital," the proposal suggests a method of weighting based upon risk in
7-5 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 1) 7.01[11

determining adequate capital levels, a system that weighs the capital needs of a
bank according to the degree of risk reflected in the bank's lending and other
operations.
In conducting examinations of banks, the comptroller, the FDIC, and the
Board of Governors follow a uniform rating system}· Under this system, the
agencies rate the financial condition and operating soundness of a bank, based
on evaluation offive aspects of the bank's operations: (l) capital adequacy; (2)
asset quality; (3) management/administration; (4) earnings; and (5) liquidity.
The agency assigns the bank a composite rating on a scale ofone to five, with one
representing the highest rating and five the lowest rating. The statement of the
banking agencies on the rating system defines these five composite rating catego-
ries as follows:
Composite 1. Banks in this group are sound institutions in almost every
respect; any critical findings are basically of a minor nature and can be
handled in a routine manner. Such banks are resistant to external economic
and financial disturbances and capable of withstanding the vagaries of
business conditions more ably than banks with lower composite ratings.
Composite 2. Banks in this group are also fundamentally sound institu-
tions but may reflect modest weaknesses correctable in the normal course of
business. Such banks are stable and also able to withstand business fluctua-
tions quite well; however, areas of weakness could develop into conditions
of greater concern. If the minor adjustments are handled in the normal
course of business, the supervisor response is limited.
Composite 3. Banks in this group exhibit a combination of weaknesses
ranging from moderately severe to unsatisfactory. Such banks are only
nominally resistant to the onset of adverse business conditions and could
easily deteriorate if concerted action is not effective in correcting the areas
of weakness. Consequently, such banks are vulnerable and require more
than normal supervision. Overall strength and financial capacity, however,
are still such as to make failure only a remote possibility.
Composite 4. Banks in this group have an immoderate volume of asset
weaknesses, or a combination of other conditions that are less than satisfac-
tory. Unless prompt action is taken to correct these conditions, they could

deterr.lining the proper capital level for a bank. Risk-Based Capital Requirements fo~
Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Over-
sight and Investigations, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 30. \ 987). For prior views on capital
adequacy expressed by the Federal Reserve Board, see Application of National City
Corp., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 86,068 (Aug. 10,
t 984); Application of Chase Manhattan Corp., 70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 529 (1984); Bank of
Mid-America, Inc., 70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 460 (1984); Manufacturers IJanover Corp., 70
Fed. Reserve Bull. 452 (1984); NeNB Corp., 69 Fed. Reserve Bull. 49 (1983); proposed
rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 3976 (1986).
29 Uniform Interagency Bank Rating System, I Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo ~ 3-1575
( 1978).
 'Il 7.01(1) OVERVIEW 7-6

reason~bly dev:elop .into a situation that could impair future viability. A

pote~lt1al for fadure I.S present but is not pronounced. Banks in this category
reqUIre close supervIsor attention and financial surveiJlance.
Composite 5. This category is reserved for banks whose conditions are
worse than defined under number 4. The volume and character of weak.
nesses are such as to require urgent aid from the shareholders or other
sources. Such banks require immediate corrective action and constant
supervisory attention. The probability of failure is high for these banks. 30
The banking agencies have issued many circulars and policy statements on bank
examination issues. The following publications are some of those issued by the
Federal Reserve Board that may be of special interest with regard to
examination

• "Uniform Agreement on the Classification of Assets and Appraisal of

Securities Held by Banks";31
• "Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State
Member Banks";3~
• "Country Risk-Uniform Interagency Examination Procedures";33
• "Examinations and Inspections of State Member Banks and Bank Hold-
ing Companies";34

30Id.
"Joint Statement by the Board of Governors, Office of the Comptroller, FDIC, and
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo 'Il 3-1501 (1979).
Under this statement, the agencies use the following classification system when it is
necessary to classify assets: substandard, doubtful, and loss. They define these terms as
follows:
A substandard asset is inadequately protected by the current sound worth and paying
capacity of the obligor or of the collateral pledged. if any. Assets so classified must
have a welj-defined weakness or weaknesses that Jeopardize the liquidation of the
debt. They are characterized by the distinct possibili;y that the bank will sustain some
loss if the deficiencies are not corrected. An asset classified doubtful has all the
weaknesses inherent in one classified substandard, with the added characteristic that
the weaknesses make collection or liquidation in full, on the basis of currently
existing facts, conditions, and values, highly questionable and improbable. Assets
classified loss are considered uncollectible and of such little value that their continu-
ance as bankable assets is not warranted. This classiflcation does not mean that the
asset has absoluteiy no recovery or salvage value, but rather it is nol practical or
desirable to defer wrilmg off this basically worthless asset even though partial recov-
ery may be effected in the future.
Id.
"1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo 'Il 3-1506 (1986) (Board of Governors).
33] Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo 'Il 3-1510 (1979).
34 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo 11 3-1 53l (1985). This statement of policy covers the
frequency and scope of examinations of state member banks and bank holding
companies.
7-7 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 117.01(2J(a)

• "Communicating Problems to Management and Boards of Directors";'"

and
• "Trust Rating System." 36

(2) Portfolio Regulation

Traditionally, the statutes governing depository institutions and the actions
of the banking regulators have imposed rigid limitations on the types and
amounts of investments that banks and other depository institutions may
make. 31 Among others, these limitations have included restrictions on the maxi-
mum amount that banks could loan to a single borrower, restrictions on the
amount that could be lent against particular collateral, qualifications for collat-
eral, and restrictions on amounts that could be lent to particular individuals
such as officers and directors of the bank. This handbook cannot examine aU
such regulations in detail. They are too numerous, too varied, and too complex.
Some of the more important of these restrictions are discussed in this chapter.
Other such restrictions have already been referred to in the chapters discussing
the powers of different types of financial institutions (Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5).
It is important to note that since the beginning of the I980s, there has been a
liberalization of the rules limiting depository institutions' activities. On the
federal level, passage of the Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982 marked a distinct loosening of the bonds that circumscribed the actions of
national banks as well as of thrift institutions.

[a) Loans and Extensions aCCredit. Under the Gam-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982,3' the amount a national bank may lend to a single
borrower is determined by a percentage formula. 39 A national bank may loan up
to fifteen percent of its unimpaired capital and surplus to a single borrower; the
bank may loan an additional ten percent when :he additional loans are fully
secured. These two limits are cumulative. To implement these limitations, the

'51 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo ~ 3-1532 (1985).

" 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo ~ 3-1576 (1981). There also are statements on the rating
systems to be used for Edge corporations, id. at' 3-1576.1 (1986); transfer agents, id. at
~ 3-1577 (1986); and data-processing centers, id. at 'I~ 3-1515 (1978), 3-1)16 (1979).
"For a thorough review of the lending limits of national banks after passage of the
Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and the regulations of the comp-
troller pursuant to this legislation, see Norton, "Lending Limits and National Banks
Under the 1982 Banking Act," 101 Banking U 122-1 S4 (1984); Rojc, "National Bank
Lending Limits-A New Framework," 40 Bus. Law. 903-931 (1985)..
"Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18
USC).
'912 USC § 84(a) (1982).
'1 7.01/211al OVERVIEW 7-8

act provides a broad statutory definition of what constitutes a loan or extension

of credit subject to the limitations and defines to whom the limits apply.'o The
Comptroller of the Currency enjoys broad authority under the federal statute to
adopt rules, regulations, and definitions as well as "to establish limits or require-
ments other than those specified in [the statute J ... for particular classes or
categories of loans or extensions of credit."" The comptroller also may decide
when a loan that putatively has been made to one person shall be attributed to
another person for the purposes of applying the loan limitations of the federal
law.' 2
Determining what constitutes a loan or extension of credit is not always a
simple task. Under the comptroller's regulations, an extension ofcredit includes
a "contractual commitment to advance funds,"" Examples of commitments
that fall within this definition are obligations on the part ofthe bank to guarantee
or serve as surety for the benefit of a third party. A standby letter of credit for
which the bank undertakes an obligation to the beneficiary either to repay
money borrowed by its customer, to make payment on account of indebtedness
undertaken by its customer, or to make payment in the event of a default by its
customer in performing an obligation should be treated as an extension ofcredit
subject to the loan limits of the federal law.•• A bank does not extend credit, on
the other hand, by issuing a commercial letter of credit that does not involve a
guarantee by the bank to pay a money obligation and does not provide for the
bank to pay in the event of a default by the customer. 4S
Occasionally, loans that a bank ostensibly makes to separate parties may be
treated as loans to a single person for the purpose of applying the bank's lending
limitation. In de! Junco v. Conover"& the court found that three loans made
separately to a company and two of its officers, respectively, should be aggre-
gated. Moreover, the directors of the bank had personal liability because they
had knowledge of the violation.' 7 The facts were clear that the company used the

40 12 USC §84(b)( 1982).

41 12 USC § 84(d)( I) (1982). See also Glidden, "National Bank Lending Limits and
the Comptroller's Regs: A Clarification," 101 Banking :.J 430-468 (\984).
42
12 USC § 84(d)(2) (1982).
•, 12 CFR § 32.2 (1987).
4. 12 CFR § 32.2(d), (e) (1987). The comptroller has stated that a direct-pay letter of
credit will also he subject to a bank's lending limitations and should be treated the same as
a standby letter of credit. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretative Letter
No. 361 (June 1986), reported in 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BN "-) No.2, at 57 (July \4, \ 986).
"12 CFR § 32.2(d) (1987).
46 682 F2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 l'S 1146 (1983).

47 The enforcement proceeding was brought under 1~ USC § 1818(b)( 1) (1982) rather
than under 12 USC § 93 (1982), which expressly i:nposes liability only for knOWIng
violations. The Cour: said It was not required to decide whether Section 1818(b)( I) also
required the violation to be a knowing one, because the directors in fact had knOwledge.
[d. at 1342.
7-9 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 117.01[2][b)

proceeds ofthe loan, and the bank had known that to be the purpose ofthe loan.
Although the bank directors against whom the comptroller imposed liability
claimed to have acted without knowledge ofthe violation, the court held that the
violation was a knowing one, because the directors "had knowledge of the
identity ofthe borrowers, knowledge that all the loan proceeds were to be used by
one company, and knowledge of the loan amounts and the bank's loan limits.""
The law was violated even though the directors did not know that the three
separate loans must be aggregated, as a matter of law. Moreover, the court
upheld the comptroller's remedial action against the directors. The directors
would remain liable for the total amount of the loans until they were fully
satisfied, and not just until the loans were brought within the bank's legal lending
limit."
The comptroller's regulation also includes detailed rules as to when loans
should be combined to be attributed to a single person. Under these regulations,
a loan to one person should be attributed to another person when the proceeds of
the loan are to be used "for the direct benefit of the other person» or when "a
common enterprise is deemed to exist between the persons. »50 The regulations
define what constitutes a common enterprise.51

[bl Exceptions to the Limitations on Loans to a Single Borrower. There are

ten exceptions to the limitation on loans by a national bank to a single borrower.
These exceptions are stated as follows:

(I) Loans or extensions ofcredit arising from the discount ofcommercial

or business paper evidencing an obligation to the person negotiating it with
recourse shall not be subject to any limitation based on capital and surplus.
(2) The purchase of bankers' acceptances of the kind described in section
372 of this title and issued by other banks shall not be subject to any
limitation based on capitai and surplus.
(3) Loans and extensions of credit secured by bills of lading, warehouse
receipts, or similar documents transferring or securing title to readily mar-
ketable staples shaH be subject to a limitation of 35 per centum of capital
and surplus in addition to the general limitations if the market value of the
staples securing each additional loan or extension of credit at all times
equals or exceeds 115 per cer;,tum of the outstanding amount of such loan or
extension of credit. The staples shall be fully covered by insurance whenever
it is customary to insure such staples.

"Id.
49 For further diSCUSSIOn of the liability of bank officers and' directors, including

liability for breach of lending limits, see the diSCUSSIOn at n 9.01[3], 9.01[4], 9.02.
50 12 CFR § 32.5/a)(l) (1987).
"12 CFR § 32.5(a)(2) (1987).
1\ 7.011211b) OVERVIEW 7-10

. (4) Loans or extensions of credit secured by bonds, notes, certificates of

I~debtedness,or Treasury bi11~ o~the Uni~ed States or by other such obliga-
tIOns fUlly guaranteed as to pnnclpal and tnterest by the United States shall
not be subject to any limitation based on capital and surplus.
(5) ~oans or extensions of credit to or secured by unconditional takeout
comm~t11?ents or guar~ntees of any department, agency, bureau, board,
commission, o~ estabhs~m~nt of the United States or any corporation
wholly owned directly or mdtrectly by the United States shall not be subject
to any limitation based on capital and surplus. .
. (6) Loan,S or extensions of credit secured by a segregated deposit accoullt
m the lendmg bank shall not be subject to any limi tation based on capital
and surplus.
(7) Loans or extensions of credit to any financial institution or to any
receiver, conservator, superintendent of banks, or other agent in charge of
the business and property of such financial institution, when such loans or
extensions ofcredit are approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, shall
not be subject to any limitation based on capital and surplus.
(8){A) Loans and extensions ofcredit arising from the discount ofnegoti-
able or nonnegotiable installment consumer paper which carries a full
recourse endorsement or unconditional guarantee by the person transfer-
ring the paper shall be subject under this section to a maximum limitation
equal to 25 per centum of such capital and surplus, notwithstanding the
collateral requirements set forth in subsection (a)(2) of this section.
(B) If the bank's files or the knowledge of its officers of the financial
condition of each maker of such consumer paper is reasonably adequate,
and an officer of the bank designated for that purpose by the board of
directors of the bank certifies in writing that the bank is relying primarily
upon the responsibility of each maker for payment of such loans or
extensions of credit and not upon any full or partial recourse endorse-
ment or guarantee by the transferor, the limitations of this section as to
the loans or extensions of credit of each such maker shall be the sole
applicable loan limitations.
(9)(A) Loans and extensions of credit secured by shipping documents or
instruments transferring or securing title cowring livestock or givi:lg a
lien on livestock when the market value of the livestock securing the
obligation is not at any time less than 115 per centum of the face amount
of the note covered, shall be subject under this section, notwithstanding
the collateral requirements set forth in subsection (a)(2) of this section, to
a maximum limitation equal to 25 per centum of such capital and surplus.
(Bl Loans and extensions of credit which arise from the discount by
dealers in dairy cattle of paper given in payment for dairy cattle, which
paper carnes a full recourse endorsement or unconditional guarantee of
the seller, and which are secured by Ihe cattle being sold, shall be subject
under this section, notwithstanding the collateral requirements set forth
in subsection (a)(2) of this section, to a limitation of25 per centum ofsuch
capital and surplus.
7-11 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.01 [2I1b)

(10) Loans or extensions ofcredit to the Student Loan Marketing Associ-

ation shall not be subject to any limitation based on capital and surplus. 52
[iJ Bank acceptances. Exception (2) in the previous list, for bank accept-
ances, applies to the purchase of bank acceptances created by other banks where
the other bank is the acceptor. This exception should not be confused with the
limitation on the extent to which a national bank may engage in accepting drafts.
As the comptroller's regulations point out, the limits that apply to a national
bank's acceptance ofeligible drafts are contained in other statutes. Moreover, if
the bank acceptances are not drafts eligible under the standards referred to in the
exception, the national bank may acquire such "ineligible" drafts only within
the limitations of the federal law on loans to a single borrower. 53
The Export Trading Company Act of 1982,54 expanded the ability of banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System to invest in bankers' accept-
ances. 5' Under this statute, a member bank can invest up to ISO percent of
its paid-up and unimpaired capital stock and surplus by accepting
"drafts ... drawn upon it having not more than six months' sight to run,
exclusive ofdays ofgrace," that relate to three types of transactions: (J) "transac-
tions involving the importation or exportation of goods;" (2) "transactions
involving the domestic shipment ofgoods;" or (3) transactions where the bank is
"secured at the time of acceptance by a warehouse receipt or other such docu-
ment conveying or securing title covering readily marketable staples. "5' By
permission ofthe Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, an institu-
tion may increase the amount ofits acceptances to an aggregate amount of up to
200 percent of its capital stock and surplus as previously defined. 57
The statute also distinguishes between acceptances arising in domestic
transactions and those arising in international transactions. The bank may not
accept an aggregate amount of acceptances arising in domestic transactions in
excess of 50 percent of the total amount of acceptances authorized under the
statute." No bank can accept paper or be obligated to anyone person for an
aggregate amount of more than 10 percent of its capital and surplus for transac-
tions involving bank acceptances unless the bank is secured "either by attached
documents or by some other actual security growing out of the same transaction

52
12 USC § 84(c) (1982).
53
12 CFR § 32.6(b) (1987).
"Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233. Title n of this act is known as the Bank Export
Services Act. See ~ 5.02[4).
55 12lJSC § 372 (1982). There is an excellent description of bankers' acceptances and
how they are used in Jensen & Parkmson, "Recent Developments in the Bankers' Accep-
tance Markel," 72 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1-12 (1986).
56 12 USC § 372(a) (1982).

57 12 USC § 3 72(c) (1982).

59 12 USC § 372(d) (1982).
f 7.01[211b) OVERVIEW 7-12

as the acceptance. "e9 Further, banks may participate in acceptances that have
been made by another primary accepting bank. 00

[i1] Real estate loans. At one time, the authority of a national bank to make
real estate loans was subject to detailed requirements on the nature of the
security for the loan and on other criteria. Since the 1982 amendments made by
the Gam-St Germain Act, the Comptroller of the Currency may issue rules or
orders prescribing the terms and conditions under which national banks may
make loans secured by interests in real estate."

(iii) Other investments. Other provisions of the National Bank Act specify
additional activities in which a national bank may engage, and impose Iimita-
tiDns on them. One part ofthe act deals with a national bank's ability to invest in
securities. 62 Although a national bank may both purchase securities from a single
borrower and make loans to the same entity, the comptroller will not treat the
securities as within the loan limitations of 12 USC § 84 (1982) as long as the
investments meet the limits and eligibility requirements of I 2 USC § 24 (1982).63
The comptroller also has considered when purchase of securities or other
paper under a repurchase agreement should be treated as a loan or an extension
of credit. 6 ' Under the comptroller's interpretation, a repurchase agreement
involving certain eligible securities is not to be treated as a loan or an extension
of credit, but a repurchase agreement ofother securities will be treated as a loan
and not as "an obligation of the underlying obligo~ of the security."" When a
bank purchases third-party paper under a repurchase agreement, the transaction
is one that falls within the limitations on loans to a single borrower. The
obligation of the seller of the paper to repurchase :t from the bank should be
regarded as an extension of credit to be measured "by the total amount of paper

59 12 USC § 372(e) (1982). The former version of the statute contained a detailed
enumeration of the type of collateral that would be acceptable security.
60 l.elter from J. Charles Partee, Chairman, Federal Financial Institutions Examina-
tion Council. reprinted in 4 Fed. Banking 1.. Rep. (CCH) ~ 43.690 (1983).
61
12 USC § 371(a) (982). See Borkus v. Michigan Nat', Bank, 117 Mich. App. 662,
324 NW2d 123 (1982), where the court held that a real estate loan made by a bank in 1971,
which viol"ted a statute requiring that it be secured by a first lien, was an iliegalloan. The
coun ruled that :he debtor could defend a mortgage foreclosure action brought by the
bank, on the grounds that the bank violated the statute, even though the foreclosure action
was brough\ "fler j 974. when the federal prohibition on second mortgage real estate
lending had been removed.
6' A national bank's abIlity 10 invest and deal in securities is discussed at ~ 8.01.
61 I 2 CFR § 32.111 (1987).
" 12 ('FR §§ 32.102, 32.103. 32.104 (1987).
65 12 ('FR § 32.103 (1987).
7-13 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.01(2)[e)

the seller may ultimately be obligated to repurchase. "66 Also, under the regula-
tions, the sale of a participation in a loan does not necessarily remove that loan
from the selling bank's own loan limitation. The participation must be sold on a
nonrecourse basis, and "must result in a prorata sharing of credit risk propor-
tionate to the respective interests of the originating and participating lenders,"
in order to be removed from the bank's lending limit. 6' An overdraft other than
an "intra-day" or "daylight" overdraft is an extension of credit. 6. While the sale
of federal funds for one business day is not an extension of credit, a sale with a
maturity of more than one business day is subject to the lending limit. 6•
Although a guarantor will be liable on the obligation of guarantee to the
bank, the obligation need not be included in the loan limitations applicable to
that person if the guarantor "does not receive any of the proceeds, or the benefit
of the proceeds, of the loan or extension of credit," and the rules on attributing
loans to other persons do not apply!O

Ie) State Banks and Savings and Loan Associations. With regard to loans and
investments, state-chartered banks operate under restrictions similar to those on
national banks. It would be too complex to review here the various details of
each state law and regulation. The differences between states in this area are
considerable, and some states have enacted banking laws that grant significant
freedom to state-chartered institutions to engage in activities that traditionally
had been severely curtailed or prohibited. Real estate transactions, insurance
activities, and securities dealings are areas in which such changes have been
especially notable.
The ability ofsavings and loan associations to engage in broader investment
and lending activities has been especially dramatic. Title III of the Garn-St
Germain Act of 1982 71 expanded the powers offederal savings and loan associa-
tions and federal savings banks in a number ofimportant ways, as detailed in the
following paragraphs.
Accounts. The act increases the investment opportunities for federal sav-
ings and loan institutions and federal savings banks. The types of accounts these
institutions may offer to raise capital, include not only savings accounts for
"fixed, minimum or indefinite periods of time," but also demand accounts when
the person or organization has a business loan relationship with the institution

6'12 CFR § 32.104 (1987).

67 12 CFR § 32.107 (1987).
6·12 CFR § 32.105 (1987).
"12 CFR § 32.102 (1987).
70 12 CFR § 32.101 (1987).
71 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18
USC).
 U7.01(2J(cl OVERVIEW 7-14

or the account will assist the thrift institution to collect payments from a non-
business customer!' The act makes clear that accounts established by the insti-
tution may be subject to check or transfer under a negotiable order of
withdrawal, according to regulations established by the FHLBB.
Remote service units. The act authorizes the FHLBB to establish regula-
tions allowing institutions to utilize remote service units for the purpose of
crediting or debiting accounts of the institution. 73
Stock, security, and borrowing powers. The FHLBB is empowered to
authorize federal savings institutions to borrow money, give security, act as
sureties, and issue securities, including capital stock."
Conversion to federal charters. The act authorizes institutions to convert to
federal institutions and to change from a mutual to a stock form of
organization.'5
Investments. The act enlarges the power of federal savings and loan associa-
tions to make real estate loans on nonresidential property, to invest in govern-
ment securities, and to make commercial and other loans. 18
Elimination of interest rate differentials. The act orders the abolition of
interest rate differentials between federally insured banks and federally insured
savings institutions. It required the Depository Institutions Deregulation Com-
mittee to end all differentials by January I, 1984."
Money market account. The act directs the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation CommIttee to establish a new deposit account, within sixty days from the
enactment of this legislation, that will be competitive with money market
mutual funds offered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." No maxi-
mum interest rate limitation may be established for these accounts." This new
account will not be subject to reserve requirements of the Board ofGovernors of
the Federal Reserve System, so long as it is not a transaction account and does
not permit more than three authorized or automatic transfers and three other
transfers to third parties monthly.ao

72 12 IJSC § I464(b)( I)(A) (1982).

" 12 USC § 1464(b)( 1)(1') (1982).
74 12 USC § I 464(b)(2) (1982).

75 12 USC § \ 464(i} (\ 982).

75 12 USC § 1464(c)( I)(A), (n), (G), (H), (R) (1982).

77 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. m,
§ 326, 96 Stat. 1500 (codified at 12 USC § 3503).
r6 12 USC § 3503(c)( I) (I 9B2).

" 12 USC § 3503(c)(2) (1982).

80
12 USC § 3503(c)(3) (1982).
7-15 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION

Antitying provisions. The act prohibits federal institutions from tying the
extension ofcredit or other services to requirements that customers obtain other
services or conduct other business with that institution." These measures are
similar to the antitying provisions applicable to banks.·'
Service corporations. Although the act gives thrift institutions expanded
authority, the conference report on the legislation stresses that the legislation
does not authorize the FHLBB to permit service corporations to engage in any
new activities not previously authorized.· 3

117.02 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES

Banks engage in many transactions that bring them within the ambit of
federal securities laws. These laws and the regulations implementing them are
complex. The complexity becomes even greater in the case of banks, because
banks receive special treatment under these laws. This handbook cannot survey
the extensive body of federal securities laws. Instead, the present section
sketches only some ofthe salient features ofthe general body offederal securities
law, as it relates to banks, with primary emphasis on the provisions ofthe federal
banking statutes that control the extent to which banks and other depository
institutions may engage in securities activities. These latter federal controls are
often popularly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. (See Chapter 8.)
The federal securities laws are relevant to banks in at least three ways.
Firstly, there is extensive regulation of securities issuers and others by thc
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which, among other requirements,
imposes duties of disclosure of information and registration related to transac-
tions within the purview ofthe statutes. Although banks enjoy an exclusion from
many of these requirements, to the extent that they are not excluded, or to the
extent that they engage in activities subject to such regulation, there are serious
consequences. Secondly, the securities laws contain provisions establishing lia-
bility when parties who are covered by the acts engage in certain securities
transactions in a fraudulent manner. Banks generally are subject to the antifraud.
provisions of the securities laws. They also are able to assert rights based on the
securities laws against other parties. Thirdly, since the legislation passed by
Congress in the aftermath of the Great Depression. federal law has attempted to
restrict the extent to which banks may engage in securities activities by requiring
a separation between commercial banks, which engage in deposit taking

81 12 USC § 1464(<;) (1982).

"See ~ 9.02[5].
"Conf Rep. on Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, H.R. Rep.
No. 899, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1982).
l' 7.02[1) OVERVIEW 7-16

and commercial tending, and investment banks and securities brokers and
dealers, who engage in issuing, undetwriting, and dealing in securities. The line
that marks the distinction between commercial banks and investment banking
has blurred if not entirely dissolved in the face of market developments in the
mid-1980s accentuating deficiencies in the federal regulatory scheme. In 1988,
Congress was considering significant changes in the powers that banks may
exercise in this area and concommittant adjustments in the manner in which the
federal government would regulate such new activities. Given the extreme
complexity, technicality, and fast-developing nature of federal securities law,
timely consultation with legal counsel is indispensable.

[I) Scope of Federal Securities Laws Generally, as Applied to Banks

The major federal securities statutes·' are the Securities Act of 1933,·· the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,·· the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,·' the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940·· the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,·· the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Act of 1970.0 (not discussed here), and the Government
Securities Act of 1986.·' The Securities Act of 1933 imposes registration and
information disclosure requirements on issuers of securities. It also contains
provisions prohibiting misrepresentations and fraudulent practices. Securities
issued by a bank are exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act"2 Exemptions also exist for certain trust funds held by the bank as a

.. Good general references are II. Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook

(1987-1988); V. Dilorenzo, W. Schlichting, J. Cooper, 5 Banking law (1987); L. loss,
Fundamentals ofSec\;rities Regulation (1983); L. Soderquist, Understanding the Securi·
tics laws (1987). Sec also Fischer, Gram. Kaufman & Mote, "The Securities Activities of
Commercial Banks: Life Beyond lending," 14 Sec. Reg. (J 315-342 (1987); Note,
"Regulation of Bank Securities Activities," 41 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1187-1213 (1984).
" : 5 USC §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
B' 15 USC §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

" i5 USC §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982).

BB : 5 USC §§ 80a·I-80a-64 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

B9 15 USC §§ 80b·I-80b·21 (1982 & Supp. IV (986).

•015 USC §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982).

91 Pub. L. No. 99·571, 100 Stat. 3208 (codified at 12 USC § 780·5 ar.d 31 USC § 9110,

and amending 12 USC §§ 78c, 780, 780-3, 78q, 78w, 78y, 80a·9, 80b-3 and 31 USC
§ 3121).
"The exemption is stated as follows:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not
apply \0 any of the following classes of securities ... or any security issued or
guaranteed by any bank; or any security issued by or representing an interest in or a
7-17 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.02[1]

fiduciary or under a qualified pension plan arrangement." These exemption

provisions apply to both national and state banks.,. Certain other exemptions in
the act, which are not specifically directed at banks, may apply in particular
transactions, such as the exemption for "private offerings.,,'s
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the disclosure ofinformation,
through registration and periodic reports, by companies that issue securities
listed on the national exchanges or by companies that are ofa certain size. It also
regulates proxy solicitation, deals with disclosure of insider information, autho-
rizes regulation of margin requirements,'· and establishes liability for false
statements and fraudulent practices. As amended in 1964, the act applies to
companies that have 500 or more stockholders or that have assets in excess of$l
million. '7 Generally, the SEC is responsible for administering the act; but, in the
case of banks, the federal banking regulatory agencies have authority. National
banks make their reports to the comptroller; state member banks, to the Federal
Reserve Board; and state-insured nonmember banks, to the FDIC. These federal
banking agencies have regulations that deal with the application of these laws to
the banks under their jurisdictions." .
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 applies to debt securities, such as bonds,
and contains various exemptions, including an exemption similar to that of the
1933 Securities Act for securities issued by banks." The Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 regulate persons who
serve as investment advisers and the activities of companies that engage in
trading or investing in securities. The definitions in the Investment Advisers Act

direct obligation of a Federal Reserve bank; or any Interest or pamclpation many

common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective
investment and reinvestment of assets contributed thereto by such bank in its capacity as
trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian:
15 USC § 77c(a)(2) (1982).
93 Id.
9' "For purposes of this paragraph, ... the term "bank" means any national bank, or
banking institution organized under the laws of any State, territory or the District of
Columbia. the business of which is substantia!ly confined to bankmg and is supervised by
the State or territoriai banking commission or similar official." Id.
" 15 USC § 77d(2) (\ 982).
96 The margin regulations are discussed at ~ 3.04[6][aJ. See also 15 USC § 78g (1982 &

Supp. I V 1986).
97
15 USC§ 781(g)(I) (1982).
98
12 USC§ 78'1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The regulations are at 12 CFR §§ 11.101.
11.20 I, 11.30 I (1987) (national banks); 12 CFR § 206.4 r 1987) (state member banks); and
12 CFR §§ 335.0 I. 335.301, 335.310 (1987) (nonmember FDIC insured banks).
99 15 USC § 77ddd (1982).
 \l 7.0211) OVERVIEW 7-18

do not encompass banks. 100 Under the Investment Company Act, banks'o, are
excluded from the definition of "investment company," as are thrifts'02 and
certain bank trust funds. '03 It is possible for a bank to be subject to the act,
however, if it acts as an "investment adviser" to an investment company.'o,
The United States Government Securities Act of 1986'0' was passed after
the dramatic failure of a number of firms that specialized in dealing in U.S.
securities. The act directs the Secretary of the Treasllry to adopt regulations to
implement its provisions. \0.
The exemption for banks in the securities laws was tested on July I, 1985,
when the SEC adopted a rule requiring banks engaged in securities brokerage
activities for profit to submit to regulation by the SEC as a broker-dealer. The
rule was prompted by actions on the part of the comptroller and the courts
allowing national banks to engage in discount brokerage operations. Achallenge
to the rule by the Bankers' Association produced a decision invalidating the
rule. '07 The SEC argued in favor of a functional division of regulatory responsi-
bility between the banking supervisory agencies and the SEC. The court rejected
this approach, holding that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exempts
national banks from regulation by the SEC.'" In addition, the court read the

10°15 USC §§ 80b-2(a)(3), 80b-2(a)(7), 80b-2(a)(I I), 80b-2(a)( 12) (1982). A bank is
defined for purposes of the act as
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member
bank of the Federal Reserve system, (C) any other banking mstitution or trust
company, whether incorporated or not, doing business under the laws of any State or
of the United States, a substantial portion of the business of which consists of
receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers similar to Ihose permItted to
national banks under the authority of the Comptroller ofthe Currency, and which is
st:pervised and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over
banks. and which is not operated for the purpose of e"ading the provisions of this
subchapter, and (D) a receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institu-
tion or firm ;ncluded in clauses (A), (R), or (C) of this paragraph.
15 USC § 80b-2(a)(2) (J 982).
'0115 USC § 80a-3(c)(3) (1982). A bank is defined the same as in the Investment
Advisers Act. 15 USC § 80a-2(a)(5) (1982). See also Annot., "What is an 'Investment
Company' Under § 3 of Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.s.C.S. § 80a(3) )," 64
ALR Fed. 337 (1983).
'°'15 USC § 80a-3(c)(3) (1982).
10J 15 USC § 80a-3(c)(3), (II) (1982).

'0' 15 USC § 80a-2(a)(20) (1982).

'05 Pub. L. No. 99-57 \, \ 00 Stat. 3208 (codifoed at 15 esc § 780-5 (Supp. IV 1986) )
This act is discussed at ~ 8.02.
'0' 15 USC § 780-5(b)( I) (Supp. IV 1986). The Treasury regulations are reported at 52
Fed. Reg. 27,910,27,926-27,959 (1987) (to be codifted at 17 CFR Ch. ly).
101 American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F2d 739 (DC Cif. 1986).

10' Id. at 743. Section 3 of the 1934 Act defines both "broker" and "dealer" as a
person engaged to certain securities actIvities "but does not include a bank." \ 5 USC
7-19 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 1) 7.02(2)

legislative history of the 1975 amendment to the 1934 Act as indicating that
Congress was specifically aware of the controversy over the scope of the SEC's
regulation of banks' securities activities and that Congress not only declined to
revise the definitions that kept banks from being classified as broker-dealers but
also directed the SEC to provide Congress with recommendations for legislative
change, if that was thought to be appropriate. The court held that the plain
meaning of the statute, regarding the exemption of banks, "reflects a basic
decision by Congress on how to allocate responsibility among different federal
agencies for regulating financial institutions and markets."'o,

[2] Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws

There are a number of provisions in the federal securities laws that establish
liability for misrepresentations, fraudulent practices, and other violations of the
acts. The 1933 Act creates liability for misstatements in registration state-
ments,"0 for securities sold in violation of the registration requirements of the
act, '" and for misstatements by a person who offers or sells securities in inter-
state commerce.'" Under the 1934 Act, there is liability to a person who
purchases or sells in reliance on misstatements in a report filed under the act. '"
The provision most often at issue is Section IO(b) of the 1934 Act. This
provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange- ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive de\'ice or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 114

§§ 78c(a)(4). 78c(a)(5) (1982). The definition of "bank" in the act, 15 USC § 78(c)(a)(6)
(1982), also reveals nO intent to carve an exception 10 :he exemption from regulation
afforded bar,ks.
109 American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F2d at 755.
110
15 USC § TlK (1982). See Escott v. 13arChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(SDNY 1968).
111 IS USC § 771 (1982). See also Annol., "Necessity of Privity Between Purchaser
ane Issuer of Security in Action Against Issuer Under § 12 of Securities Act of 1933 (15
U.S.C.S. § 77ll," 56 ALR Fed. 659 (1982).
112
15 USC§ 771 (1982).
113 ! 5 USC § 78r (1982).

"' 15 USC § 78j(b) (1982). See also Annol., "Purchase or Sale Requirement as 10
Defendant or Victi", in Criminal Prosecution for Violation of § IO(b) of Securities
11 7.02(2] OVERVIEW 7-20

The SEC has implemented Section IO(b) with a regulation known as Rule IOb-5.
ThIS rule has been the basis fo'r broad liability, and reads as follows:

It shall ~e unlawful f~r any person, directly or indirectly, by the use ofany
me~~s or lnstrum~ntahtyof ~nterstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
faclhty of any natIOnal securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
mate:ial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the CIrcumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 115

Although the statute does not expressly give a person who has been injured
by violation of Section 10(b) the right to bring a private action for damages, the
Supreme Court has ruled that such actions may be maintained."6 In order for a
violation of Section IO(b) and Rule IOb·5 to exist, the violator must have acted
with a certain degree of intent or "scienter."117

Exchange Act," 66 ALR Fed. 848 (1984); Annot., "Who is 'Forced Seller' for Purposes of
Maintenance of Civil Action Under § IO(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (i 5
U.S.C.S. § 78(b) and SEC Rule JOb-5," 59 ALR Fed. 10 (1982).
115 17 CFR § 240.1 Ob·5 (1987). The rule is similar to the antifraud provisions of
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 USC § 77q(a) (1982). This section states:
Jt shall bc t:nlawful for any person in thc offer or sale of any sccurities by the tcse of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirecti\-
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property hy means of any untruc statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make thc
statements made, in the light of the circumstances undcr which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transactIOn, practice, or course of business which operates or
would opcrate as a thud or deceit upon the purchaser.
See also Thompson, "The Measure of Recovery Under Rule IOb-5: A Restitution Alterna-
tjve to Tort Damages," 37 Vand. L. Rev. 349-398 (1984).
116 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 US 723 (1975). Not all of the provisions of the se~urities laws may be privately
enforced. Courts have held, for examplc, that indivicua1s who borrow from lenders in
order to purchase securities do not have a private right of action against the investment
Icnders under Regulation U. Bassler 'I. Central Nat'l Bank, 715 F2d 308 (7th Cir. 1983).
Sec generally Annot., "What Constitutes Violat:on of ~Iargin Requirements for Banks
Under § 7 of Securities Excbange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.S. § 78(g») and Regulatlon U
Promulgated Thereunder (12 CFR § 221.1 et seq.)," 14 ALR Fed. 332 (1977).
117 Aaron v. SEC, 446 US 680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Grcen, 430 US 462 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochleider, supra note \ 16. Sec also Note. "Prying Open Swiss Vaults:
7-21 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.02[3)

Rule IOb-5 reaches a variety of practices and conduct. Among the most
significant is its impact on insider trading. The liability under the rule for use of
insider information has developed in a series of Supreme Court decisions. It is
now well established that this liability is much broader than the simple situation
in which an officer of a company with special information about that company
buys or sells company stock."" As bankers may have ready access to much
insider information from serving on boards ofdirectors ofcompanies and in the
course of dealing with credit files, loan applications, and other transactions
involving their customers, the possibility ofliability as a result ofaccess to inside
information must be carefully considered. With banks increasingly engaged in
securities tradings, not only in their trust departments but also in other areas,
this is a problem that needs to be carefully reviewed by experienced legal counsel
for the bank.

[3] Definition of "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The issue of determining what constitutes a security is an important one for
banks, since, as discussed earlier in this chapter,"' the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws do apply to banks when they are involved in a transaction
involving a security, and may be the source of both rights and liabilities. '20 The

The SEC's Investigation of Insider Trading in the Santa Fe Case," 1 Am. UJ Int'I L. &
Pol'y 259-289 (1986).
The scienter requirement is not the same for all of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 US 375 (1983), which
discusses the differences between Section IO(b) and Section II of the 1933 Act. The
precise requirements of the scienter element are matters that have occupied considerable
scholarly and judicial attention. For a thorough discussion see Milich, "Securities Fraud
Under Section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith
Defense," II J. Corp. L. 179 (1986).
I" See Chiareila v. U.S., 445 US 222 (1980); SEC \'. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US 976 (1969). See also Goelzer, et aI., "Symposium
on Insider Trading," 13 HofstraL. Rev. 1-146(1984).
"'The scope of federal securities laws as they apply to banks is discussed supra at
117.02[11·
120 For an excellent brief discl:ssion, see D. Ratner, Securities Regulation (2d ed.
1982). For a more extended treatment. see V. DiLorenzo, W. SchliChting, J. Copper,S
Banking Law Ch 96-105 (1987). See also Annot., "Commodity Futures Contract or
Account as Included ir. Meaning of'Security' as Defined in § 3(aXI0) of the Securities
Exchange Act 0: 1934 (15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(a)(IO»," 58 ALR Fed. 616 (1982); Annot.,
"Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as Securities Within Meaniog of Federal Securi-
ties Act of J933 (15 USC.S. § 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C.S. § 78a ct seq.)," 58 ALR Fed. 408 (1982); Annot., "What Interests in Real Estate
Are 'Securitles' Within the Meaning of § 3(a)( 10) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (IS
U.s.C.S. § 78c(a)(JO»," 52 ALR Fed. 146 (1981).
'Il 7.0213][a) OVERVIEW 7-22

starting point for determining what constitutes a security is with the federal
securities statutes themselves. Preliminarily, it is important to note that each of
the various federal securities laws affecting banks usually contains its own
definition of "security." Care must be taken to be alert to differences between
these laws. It has not been decided, for example, that a security for purposes of
the 1933 and 1934 securities acts is also a security for purposes of the Glass-
Steagall ACt. '2' There are other important differences as well.
Under the Securities Act of 1933, a security includes:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 122

The 1934 Act has a similar definition. '23 There is a vast body of law on what
constitutes a security. In light ofthis, the present section briefly reviews some of
the leading cases that discuss what may constitute a "security" under this and
similar definitions, and also describes some of the circumstances in which
transactions with securities may fall within the antifraud measures of the securi-
ties laws.

la) Transactions in Stocks, Bonds, and Similar Securities. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that shares of stock in a specially regulated cooperative
housing corporation were not "securities" for the purpose of the federal securi-
ties laws,12' in most cases stock will be issued with an investment or profit
motivation and thus will not fit within the limited circumstances present in the
housing case. Therefore, as a leading commentator has said, "A share of stock
will almost always be deemed to be a 'security.' "125

'21 The definition Df "security" with regard to the Glass-Steagall Act is discussed at
~ 8.01 [3].
122 15 USC § 77b( I) (1982).
123 15 USC § 78c{a){ 10) (\ 982). This definition of "security" adds the following to the
definition set out in the 1933 Act (15 USC § 77b(l) (1982)); "but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited." .
'24 United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 US 837 (1975).
125 D. Ratner, Securities Regulation 23 (2d ed. 1982).
7-23 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION II 7.02(3J[b]

When a bank takes stocks and bonds as collateral, there may be a transac-
tion within the securities laws. In Rubin v. United States,126 the Supreme Court
held that a pledge ofsecurities constituted an "offer or sale" within the Securities
Act of 1933, because it was the disposition of an interest in a security for value.
As a result, the Court upheld a bank customer's conviction for violating the
antifraud provisions of the act by, among other things, submitting a false finan-
cial report to the bank and representing that worthless stock used as collateral
was valuable. Similarly, there is a transaction within the federal securities laws
where the antifraud provisions also will apply when the sale of a closely con-
trolled business is accomplished through a transfer of stock.'2'

(b] Certificates of Deposit and Other Bank Deposits. Often there is a dispute
over how to characterize various types of bank instruments or interests. The
Supreme Court has held that certain shares issued by savings and loan associa-
tions are securities for die purposes of the 1934 Ac!.'2. However, in a 1982 case
involving a certificate ofdeposit, Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Court ruled that a
certificate of deposit was not a security under the 1934 Ac!.'2' This case is
important for its suggestion that the protections afforded bank customers
through the provisions of the federal banking laws may serve as the basis for
distinguishing some bank instruments from those that otherwise might be secur-
ities under the federal securities laws.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver, Marine Bank had issued a certificate of deposit,
insured by the FDIC, to the Weavers, who had then pledged the certificate to the
bank to guarantee a loan by the bank to another party. The primary debtor under
this transaction had entered into an agreement with the Weavers that gave them
a percentage of the debtor's net profits and that limited the debtor's ability to
make further borrowings. The primary debtor then became bankrupt, and the
Weavers sued the bank for violations of Section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange

"·449 US 424 (1981).

", Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth. 471 US 681 (1985); Gould v. Ruefenachl. 471
US 701 (1985). Landreth raised the issue ofwhelher the sale of 100 percent ofa company's
stock would be subject 10 the federal securities laws. Gould presented the issue ofwhelher
the sale of 50 percenl of a company's stock 10 purchasers who subsequently were 10
participate in management of the company would be subject 10 the federal securities laws.
The Supreme Court held that both transactions were co\ ered. See also St. Philip Towing
& Transp. Co. v. Pavers, Inc:, 768 F2d 1233 (11th CiL 1985).
'''Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 US 332 (1967). See also SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 359 US 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 US 202 (1967), which
treated variable ar.nuilies as securities.
129 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 US 551 (1982). See also Annot.~ "Certificate of
Deposit as 'Security' Under Federal Securities Laws." 82 ALR Fed. 553 (1987); Klein,
"Certificates of Deposit as Securities: State Law Considerations." 5 Ann. Rev. Banking L.
55-89 (j 986).
'1 7,02{3J(bl OVERVIEW 7-24

Act of 1934.'30 They claimed that the bank's officers violated the securities law
by failing to disclose the financial plight of the debtor. They argued that the
securities laws applied to the transaction because the certificate of deposit and
the agreement between the Weavers and the primary debtor constituted
securities.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Securities Act did not apply,
because neither the certificate of deposit nor the agreement constituted a secur-
ity. Noting that Congress did not intend by enacting the securities laws to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud, the Court said that there were
important differences between a certificate of deposit purchased from a feder-
ally regulated bank and other long-term debt obligations that do constitute
securities. Unlike the holder of an ordinary long-term debt obligation, who
assumes the risk of borrower insolvency, the purchaser of a certificate ofdeposit
"is virtually guaranteed payment in full" because of the existence of federal
deposit insurance. In the view of the Court, "it is unnecessary to subject users of
bank certificates of deposit to liability under the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are
abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.'31
The Court then considered whether the agreement between the Weavers
and the primary debtor constituted a security. The Court held that this agree-
ment was not an instrument ofthe type "ordinarily and commonly considered to
be securities in the commercial world" because it was a "unique agreement,
negotiated one-on-one," which was not offered to other potential investors and
which was not designed to be traded publicly. Moreo\'er, the provision giving the
Weavers control over future borrowings of the debtor was a characteristic not
common to ordinary securities. 132

''0 15 USC § 78j(b) (1982).

131 Marine Bank, 455 US at 559. Sec also Note, "Certificates of Deposit and the
Securities Laws: The Limited Precedent of Marine Bank r. weaver," 4 Ann. Rev. Banking
L. 453-482 (1985).
102 Although a hank certificate of deposit may not be a security when issued by a bank.
the certificate may be marketed in an investment program in a manner that makes the
certificate a security under the federal securities laws. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit distinguished Marine Bank 1'. Weaver when it considered whether a
certificate o:ceposit in an investment program operated by a brokerage firm constituted a
security, under the federal Securi".ies Acts (Sections S(a) and 17 of the 193:> Act, and
Section IO(b) of the 1934 Act). The brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, sold its customers
special certificates issued by banks, certificates that were not otherwise available to the
public. In the court's opinion, Merrill Lynch engaged in an activity beyond that of acting
simply as a broker or sales agent; it used its economIc power to negotiate with banks to
issue certificates of deposit on f,!Vorable terms, it provided a secondary market to i:s
customers for the cenificates, its customers relied upon the firm's skill and financial
stability, ancl i; provided markcting efforts and monitored lhe issuing banks for its
customer>. In view of these factors, the cour: concluded: "Here investors are buying
something more than an individual cerlificate of deposit. They are buyi ng nn opportunity
7-25 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 1f 7.02(3J[c)

Another federal court followed Marine Bank v. Weaver, in a case in which a

Mexican bank issued a certificate of deposit whose payment was determined in
accordance with a floating currency exchange rate. The court reasoned that the
certificates of deposit should not be treated as securities, because they were
issued by a bank that was extensively regulated by Mexico to prevent insolvency,
a regulation that the court thought was the equivalent to the protection relied
upon in Weaver. Because this regulation meant that there was "virtually no risk
that insolvency will prevent [the bank] from repaying" the holder of the certifi-
cates, the court ruled that the certificates should not be treated as securities. 133

Ic) Promissory Notes and Commercial Loan Agreements. In other eases, an

area offrequent litigation has involved lending transactions in which the use of
promissory notes has been claimed to bring the transactions within the ambit of
the federal securities laws. In some cases, the courts have reasoned that such
notes should not be treated as securities when a bank takes them as a lender in a
commercial transaction rather than as an investor.'" In one other case, a federal
court held a lender liable for making negligent misrepresentations to a customer

to participate in the CD program and its secondary market." Unlike the purchaser in
Marine Bank, who relied on the solvency of the issuing bank, a risk protected by federal
deposit insurance, the purchaser from Merrill Lynch relied not only on the solvency of the
issuing banks. but "also on the future solvency of Merrill Lynch to enjoy the unique
benefits of ttis investment opportunity." Thus, federal deposit insurance did not elimi-
nate the risk with res;Ject to Merrill Lynch. Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).
In Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (D.
Mass. 1983), the court held that a certificate of deposit did not constitute a security for
purposes 0: the antifraud provisions.
133 Although this case was based on the Securities Act of 1933 rather than on the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which was involved in Weaver, the court held that the
two acts should be treated similarly. Wolfv. Banco Nacional de Mex. (Banamex), 739 F2d
1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dcnied, 469 US 1108 (1985). See also Note, "Foreign Certifi-
cates of Deposa: Securities or Banking Transactions after Wolf v. Banco Nac/onal de
MeXICO," 7 Hastings Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 435-457 (1984).
134 American Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 702 F2d 93 (6th Cir. 1983). The court held
that a bank was not entitled to sue under the 1933 and 193.; Acts for fraudulent misstate-
ments made by the borrower in connection with a thiny-day promissory note. See also
Great W. Ban:, & Trust Co. v. Katz, 532 F2c 1252 (9t!1 Cir. i 976), on which the court
relied. A similar result was reached in Chemical Bank v. Anhur Andersen & Co., 726 F2d
930 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 469 US 884 (1984), where the court held that the federal
securities laws could not provide the basis for an action in a transaction in which a loan
was secured by a pledge of promissory notes and notes were issued to replace prior
Indebtedness because the transaction was a commercial loan. In Kansas State Bank v.
Citizens Bank, 737 F2d 1490 (8th Cir. (984), the court held that a loan participation
purchased by one bank from another was not a security within the 1934 Act. See also
Vargo, "Equity Participation by the Institutional Lender: The Security Status Issue," 26
S. Tex. LJ 225-241 (1985).
1) 7.02[3)[cj OVERVIEW 7-26

~eJating to the soundness of an investment for which the lender was encouraging
Its customer to borrow money. The court held that a violation could be found if
the lender's acts were "both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales
transaction. "'30

For an extensive analysis of the factors involved in deciding whether a note pur.
chased by a bank is a security subject to the antifraud provisions of the Federal Securitles
Act, see the opinion of Judge Friendly in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544
F2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). The court took the position that if the note is wi:hin the plain
terms of the securities law, it ought to be viewed as a security unless the party asserting to
the contrary meets the burden of showing that the context requires otherwise. Examples
given by the court of cases where the context would require regarding the note as other
than a security included:
the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a home,
the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, the note
evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an
assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-
account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case
of a customer of a broker, it is collateralized). When a note docs nO! bear a strong
faml1y resemblance to these examples and has a maturity exceeding nine months,
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act should generally be held to apply.
544 F2d at 1138. This analysis, however, has not won general acceptance. Certain circuit
courts follow an "investment-commercial" test, where the court reviews the transaction
to determine ifit "more closely resembles typical investment situations ortypical mercan·
tile or commercial transactions." Other circuit courts apply a "risk capital" analysis that
tries to determine "whether the transaction more closely resembles a 'loan' or has the risk
factors associated with 'risk capita!.' "Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F2d 33, 4C
(lst Cir.) cert. denied, 474 US 850 (1985). Accord Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank,
737 F2d 1490, 1494-1495 (8th Cif. 1984). See also Annol., "'Risk Capital' Test for
Determination of Whether Transaction Involves Securit,. Within Meaning of Federal
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
LJS.C.S. §§ 78a et se<;.)," 68 ALR Fed. 89 (1984).
Ir. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 655 F. Supp. 1225
(SDNY : 987), long-term promissory notes were not treated as securities under the 1934
Act, because they strongly resembled commercial loans. See also Glidden, "When are
Loans Security Transactions? A Proposed Test," 13 Sec. Leg. U 212-238 (1985).
135 Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F2d 1057 (6:h eir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 US
1005 (l985). When a bank was heavily involved in financing a company that it alleged'y
knew to have engaged in secunties law violations and to be in financial dif:iculty, a claim
against the bank, charging the bank as an aider and abettor to the securities law violations,
could not be dismissed. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F2d 621 (8th eir. 1985), cen. denied, 474
US 1057 (1986). The appeals court applied a three·pronged test in ruling on the aiding and
abelling liability. The elements of the test were (I) existence ofa securities law violation
'~y the primary party; (2) knowledge by the aider and abettor of the violation; and (3)
substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the pr:marv viola·
:ion. 762 F2d at 624. In the case at hand, the bank's involvement "amounted to i~action
rather than positive deeds of manipulation or deception." but the appeals court said
liability could stiil be established ifthe defendant owed the plaintifr"an independent duty
to act or to disclose," or if the "aider·abeltor COnsCiOllSlv intended to assist in the
perpetration of the wrongful act." 762 F2d at 624-625 (emphasis in original)
7-27 EXAMINATION & SUPERVISION 11 7.0213][d]

[d] Investment Contracts. Given that the definition of security includes an

"investment contract" as well as a "certificate of interest" or "participation in"
something that qualifies as a security, this part of the definition is frequently
litigated because it is so broad in its potential application. A transaction may be
one that gives rise to such an interest, although there is no formal instrument
resembling a traditional security. The leading case on this subject is a 1946
Supreme Court decision entitled SEC v. w.J. Howey Co."· The transaction
invol ved the sale of orange trees that were to be harvested and sold under a
service contract with the seller. The Court ruled that there was an investment
contract, which should be classified as a "security" under the federal securities
laws, when a "person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to

Simpiy put, in the absence of a duty to act or disclose, an aider-abettor case

predicated on inaction of the secondary party must meet a high standard of intent. As
applIed here, Woodward [Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975)J and
}'Jonsen [Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 US 930 (1979)) require that the aider-abettor's inaction be accompanied
by actual knowledge of the underlying fraud and intent to aid and abet a wrongful act.
The requisite intent and knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
762 F2d at 625. In ruling that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on
the aiding and abetting issue, the appeals court noted there was "an unusually favorable
banking relationship between the two parties at a time when BTC [the bank] knew oflEI's
precarious financial position." There was evidence of the bank's knowleu%e of the exis-
tence and importance of the securities program that gave rise to the violation, and,
although the bank made no profit on its loans. it had acted to "lever itself into a more
favorable position" than the holders of the securities. 762 F2d at 630.
The second aspect of the case concerned the bank's liability as a "controlling person"
under 15 USC § 770. which makes a person who controls someone who violates the
securities laws liable jointly and severally with the controlled person "unless the control-
ling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to beiieve in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." The
ap;:>eals court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the bank. [n
approving the district court's analysis. the appeals coun said that the standard to be
apphed was a two-part test. To prevail against the bank. the plaintiff must show, firstly.
that the lender had "actually participated in (I.e., exercised control over) the operations of
the corporation in general; [secondly,] he must prove that the defendant possessed the
power to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation is
predicated. but he need not prove that this later power was exercised." 762 F2d at 631
(emphasis in original). The more restrictive test used in other circuits, requiring actual
participation by the lender in the alleged violat:on. was rejected. The appeals court then
concluded that the facts showed no "actual control." At most, there was the "potential for
influence over some of lEI's business decisions," but this was not enough to show thaI the
bank "actually exercised control over the operation of the corporation in general." 762
F2d at 632. See also Annot., "What is 'Control' Purpose Which Requires Acquiring Entity
to File With Securities and Exchange Commission Statement ofIntent of Such Purpose
Pursuant to § 13(d) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.s.C.S. § 78m(d»," 57 ALR
Fed. 806 (1982).
136 328 I~S 293 (1946).
11 7.02[311d} OVERVIEW 7-28

expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."137 Each of
the elements of this test has been the subj ect of considerable elaboration by the
courts in numerous decisions.

137 Id. at 299.

 8
The Restrictions Against
Banks Engaging in Certain
Securities Activities
11 8.01 The Prohibition Against Dealing in Securities-The Glass-
Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
[I] Basic Provisions of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3
[2] Scope of the Glass-Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5
raj Application of the Act to National Banks, Member
Banks, Insured Banks, and Savings and Loan Associations 8-5
[bJ Application of the Act to Bank Holding Companies and
Their Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-7
[3J Interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
raj The Subtle Hazards Analysis of the Camp Decision. . . . . 8-9
[bJ Defining a Security for Purposes of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
[4J The Bankers Trust Case: Placement of Commercial Paper
and the Ban on Underwriting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
[5J Discount Brokerage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
[a] National Banks 8-16
[bJ Bank Holding Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
[6] Collective Investment Funds 8-19
[a] The Comptroller's Citibank Decision 8-20
[b] Judicial Reaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
[7J Affiliations Between Banks and Securities Firms-
Determining When a Firm is "Engaged Principally" in
Securities Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-24
[8J Restrictions on Securities Activities Imposed by the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-27
raj Bank Holding Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
[bJ Savings and Loan Holding Companies 8-29
[c] Moratorium On Certain Nonbanking Activities. . . . . . . . 8-30
11 8.02 The Government Securities Act of 1986 :. . . . . 8-31
[I] U.S. Government Securities Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-31

8-1
11 8.01 OVERVIEW 8-2

[2] Congressional Response-The Government Securities Act of

1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-34

~ 8.oI THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DEALING IN

SECURITIES-THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
Following the widespread bank closings of the Great Depression, Congress
concluded that at least in pan, responsibility for these failures could be traced to
the involvement of banks in securities transactions that were unduly speculative
or dangerous to the financial reliability of the banks. Through affiliations with
securities firms and in other ways, banks became embroiled in underwriting
stock issues and participating in other securities transactions. To deal with these
perceived abuses, Congress enacted a series of statutes designed to regulate
transactions in securities. Among them was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,'
which was intended to remove banks from the securities business.
The so-called Glass-Steagall wall' is a major characteristic ofD.S. banking.
It attempts to create a permanent separation between the businesses of invest-
ment and commercial banking. This attempted separation has come under
attack in recent years as banks have sought to expand their securities-related
activities to attract new business and to respond :0 competition from other
financial institutions. As a result, litigation has been frequent, and there are
numerous court decisions and regulatory rulings interpreting the scope of the
Glass-Steagall prohibitions. These interpretations have opened some large
cracks in the Glass-Steagall wall. Congress has considered making changes to the
Glass-Steagall framework, and the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
addressed some of the issues in its provisions on nonbank banks and in those
establishing a moratorium on certain banking activities. These are discussed in a
subsequent section. At the outset, however, it is necessary to examine the basic
Glass-Steagall provisions.

1 For excellent treatment of this area, see V. DiLorenzo, W. Schlichting, J. Cooper,

5 Banking Law (1987); Norton, "Op Against 'the Wall': Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma
of a Deregulated ('Reregulated') Banking Environment," 42 Bus. Law. 327-368 (1987).
See also Will in. "Commercial Banks and the Glass-Steagall Act: A Survey of New Prod-
ucts and Activities," 104 Banking U 5-35 (1987); Notes, "Banks and Bank Holding
Companies: Going For Brokerage Under Glass-Steagall." 4 Ann. Rev. Banking L.
315-336 (1985); "Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: Will Congress Allow
Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?", 12 J. Contemp. L. 99-135 (1986); "Security Under the
Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court's Framework for Determining Permissi-
ble Bank Activity," 70 Cornell LR 1194- J 212 (1985): "Securities Activities Under the
Glass-Steagall Act," 35 Emory LJ 463-505 (1986); "Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank
Holding Acts: An Option for Bank Product Expansion." 59 Ind. U 89-1 J 1 (1983-1984).
2 The Glass-Steagall Act is the name givcn to Sections 16, 20, 2 I, and 32 of the
Banking Act of I 933. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (distributed throughout Chs. 2, 3, and 6 of 12
USC).
8-3 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.01[1]

(l] Basic Provisions ofthe Act

There are four provisions that customarily are regarded as the Glass-Stea-
gall prohibitions. These are Sections 21, 16,20 and 32 of the act.' Section 21
prohibits, under criminal sanction, "any person" or firm in the securities busi-
ness (which includes the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distribut-
ing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks. bonds,
debentures. notes, or other securities) from engaging "at the same time to any
extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to
repayment under presentation of a passbook certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor.'"
Section 16 of the act limits national banks and state member banks "to
purchasing and selling ... securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order, and for the account of, customers, and i:1 no case for its own account,"
except "under such limitations and restrictions" as the comptroller may pre-
scribe. s The comptroller may adopt regulations allowing national banks to invest

'12 USC §§ 24,78,377,378 (1982). See id. § 335, which extends Section 24 to state
member banks.
'12 USC § 378(a)(l) (1982). The section reads in full as follows:
For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization, engaged in the business of issuing. underwriting, selling, or distribut-
ing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, deben-
tures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in
the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation
of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national
banks or State banks or trust companies (whether or not members of the Federal
Reserve System) or other financial institutions or private bankers from dealing in,
. underwriting, purChasing, and selling investment securities, or issuing securities, to
the extent permitted to national banking associations by the provisions of section 24
of :his title: Provided further, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as
affecting in any way such right as any bank, banki'lg association, savings bank, trust
company. or other banking institution, may otherwise possess to sell, without
recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing loans on real estate.
s 12 USC §§ 24 Seventh, 335 (1982) states:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order. and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; Provided, That the
association may purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Co:nptroller of the Currency may by regulation
prescribe. In no event shall the total amount of the investment securities of anyone
obligor or maker, held by the association for its OW'l account, ex<:eed at any time 10
per centum of its capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired and 10 per centum of
its unimpaired surplus fund, except that this limllation shall not require any associa-
tion to dispose of any securities lawfully held by it on August 23, 1935. As used in this
section the term "investment securities" shall mean marketable obligations, evidenc-
11 8.01[11 OVERVIEW 8-4

for their own accounts in securities." These must be "investment securities,"

which the act defines as "marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of
any person ... in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures ... " as further
defined by the comptroller. However, the restrictions against underwriting or
purchasing for the bank's own account do not apply to certain U.S. government
agency securities (Which are enumerated in the statute), and to the "general
obligations" of a state or its political subdivisions. Except for these government
securities, the bank cannot hold for its own account investment securities ofany
one obligor or maker that exceed at any time ten percent of the bank's capital
and surplus. 7 Therefore, under Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, national
banks and state member banks may (1) purchase securities for the accounts of
their customers; (2) purchase investment securities for their own account as
authorized by regulation of the comptroller; and (3) deal in the governmental
securities specified in the statute.
Section 20 ofthe act, which applies to member banks ofthe Federal Reserve
System, is discussed in the next section ofthis chapter. Sections 20 and 32 ofthe
act restrict affiliations between securities firms and certain banks through stock-
holding arrangements or interlocking personnel structures. Section 20 prohibits
a member bank from atfiliating with any organization "engaged ;>rincipally in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or
retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities .... '" Section 32 of the act forbids officers and other employees
of firms "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, ofstocks,
bonds, or other similar securities ... " from serving at the same time as an
officer, director, or employee of a member bank.'

ing indebtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation in the

for~ of bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly known as investment securities
under such further definition of the term "investment securities" as may by regula.
tion be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Except as hereinafter pro-
vided or otherwIse permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the
purchase by the association for its own account of any shares of stock of any corpora-
tion. The limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting
and purchasing for its own account, investment securities shall not apply to obliga-
tions of the United States, or general obligations of any Sta'e or of any political
subdivision thereof.
• The limitations of 12 USC § 24 Seventh (1982). including the provision relating to
investment securities. also apply to state member banks by virtue of 12 USC § 335.
T i 2 USC § 24 Seventh (1982).

, 12 USC § 377 (1982). Tbere is an exception for organizations in the process of

liquidation. Id.
, 12 USC § 78 (: 982). The Federal Reserve Board is allowed to make exceptions by
general regulation when it believes that there would not 'Je an undue influence on the
investment policies of the bank or the advice it gives customers. Id.
8-5 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.01 [2I1a]

Additionally, a national bank is authorized to engage in activities for its

customers as a trustee or other fid1.!ciary when state law permits this for state
banks or trust organizations.· o This authority allows banks as trustees to invest
in securities for its trust customers. 11
Even the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act are not absolute. Banks
cannot avoid all dealings with securities. Commercial banks traditionally have
taken securities as collateral for loans and sometimes are called upon to sell them
as part of the process of foreclosing on the collateral when default occurs. In
addition, banks have long provided trust services for their customers, including
managing investment accounts involving the purchase and sale of securities for
their customers. Banks also have invested in government securities for their own
accounts. Glass-Steagall recognizes these activities, and the Supreme Court has
held that they are not prohibited.'2 On the other hand, the Glass-Steagall provi-
sions contemplate that banks' securities activities should not be unlimited.
Defining where the act draws the line between what activities are permissible
and what ones are not is a difficult problem that, if anything, has become even
more complex as the types of securities and their importance in personal and
corporate finance have grown.

[21 Scope of the Glass-Steagall Act

[a) Application ofthe Act to National Banks, :\Iember Banks, Insured Banks,
and Savings and Loan Associations. There are significant differences between
the four sections that make up the Glass-SteagalJ prohibitions not only in the
substance of the Iinitations but also in the scope of their application. Section 16
of the act applies to national banks; it is part of the description of the powers of
national banking associations and does not mentior! what powers subsidiaries or
atTIliates of national banks may have." The terms of Section 16 also apply to
state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System (state member
banks)'" Section 20 of the act applies to banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System, 15 and it forbids their affiliation with "any corporation, associa-
tion, business tn.Jst, or other similar organizatlOn engaged principally ... " in

" I 2 USC § 92a(a) (1982).

12 CFR § 9.11 (l987}.
11

'2 Board of Governors Y. Investment Co. Inst., 450 US 46, 63 n.32 (1981.)

" 12 USC § 24 Seventh (1982).

,. 12 USC § 335 (1982). "State member banks shali be subject to the same limitations
and conditions wi'.h respect 10 the purchasing, scllir.g, underwritillg, and holding of
investment securities and stock as are applicable in the case of naljonal banks under
paragraph "Seventh" of section 24 of this title." Id.
's 12 USC § 377 09821. It reads "no member bank shall be affiliated ..... Id.
 ~ 8.01(2)(a) OVERVIEW 8-6

certain securities activities. It prohibits an affiliation "in any manner" described

in the definitional sections of the National Bank Act.1&
Section 21 of the act applies to "any person, firm, corporation, association,
business trust or other similar organization ... ," and forbids such persons when
they are engaged in the specified securities activities from also taking deposits. 17
They may not "engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
receiving deposits ... "11 Section 32 of the act applies to officers, directors, and
other agents of "any corporation or unincorporated association," a "partner or
employee of a partnership," and any "individual" who is "primarily engaged" in
certain securities activities. '9 They are prohibited from serving as an officer of
"any member bank" unless permitted by the Federal Reserve Board. In view of
these differences as to the persons to whom the prohibitions apply, careful
analysis is necessary in interpreting them.
Based on these differences, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has
established a policy permitting nonmember FDIC-insured banks to establish an
affiliate relationship with, or a subsidiary corporation to engage in underwriting,
selling or participating in, syndications involving securities. This policy was
upheld in a 1987 decision!O Allhough Section 21 prohibits banks that are
engaged in taking deposits from dealing in securities, the court reasoned that this
section applies only to the direct activities of banks and not to their subsidiaries
and affiliates. The Section 20 prohibition against affiliation with securities firms
applies only to member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Section 32 also
applies only to member banks, and Section 16 applies only to national banks (or
slate member banks). Thus, the FDIC was free to permit the activities. 2\
Similar issues arise when a savings and loan institution engages in securities
activities. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has approved savings and loan
associations to engage in brokerage and investment advisory services through <-
subsidiary.22

"The tenr. affiliate is defined in the act to include "direct or indirect contro'"
through stock ownership or control of voting for directors. 12 USC § 221 a (1982).
17 12 USC § 378(a)( I) (I982).

"·Id.
19 I 2 USC § 78 (1982).

20 Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F2d 1540 (DC Cir. 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct.
143 (1987). The FDIC regulations were published at 49 Fed. Reg. 46,709 (1984), codified
at 12 CFR § 337.4 (1987). See generally Saba, "Regulation of State Non·Member Insured
Banks' Securities Activities: A Model for the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?", 23 Harv. J.
Legis. 211-265 (1986).
21 The coun said that the FDIC's authority to curb unsafe and unsound practices was
a basis for regulation of the securities activities but was not of itself a bar.to r,onmember
banks engaging in them. Investment Co. Inst., 815 F2d at 1549-1550.
22 39 Wash. fin. Rep. (BNA) A·20 (1982). See also 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 451
(1983). A federal coun has upheld the authority of the FHLBB to approve such applica·
 8-7 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 118.01{2J(b]

[bl Application of the Act to Bank Holding Companies and Their Affiliates.
When bank holding companies are involved in securities activities, the activities
must meet the tests of the Bank Holding Company Act and be closely related to
banking. 2' The Supreme Court has upheld the Board's use of a "functional"
analysis to decide when proposed securities activities are closely related to
banking. In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors," the Court
declined to adopt a narrow reading of "closely related," which would limit its
activities to those that would facilitate other banking operations. In exercising
its discretion, the Board is entitled to consider a variety of factors, and it was
proper in the instant case to recognize that the discount brokerage activities at
issue were not significantly different from activities routinely performed by
bank trust departments.
Some of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibitions may apply to bank holding
company affiliates. However, the impact may be limited. As Section 16 applies
only to national banks and state member banks, but not to subsidiaries or
affiliates, its restrictions would not affect nonbank holding company affiliates.
Both Sections 20 and 32 apply only to member banks. "In the view ofSection 21
given previously, as applying only to activities of the bank itself, there is no
prohibition on the activities of a nonbank holding company subsidiary as a
result of Section 21 either. Such a view would leave the principal limitations on
securities activities of bank holding companies to the "closely related to bank-
ing" test under the Bank Holding Company Act and, in cases where the holding
company includes a member bank, to the Section 20 prohibition against affilia-
tion with companies "engaged principally" in securities activities and the Sec-
tion 32 prohibition against interlocking personnel arrangements.
In Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Institute,25 the Supreme Court
provided some guidance as to how far the policies against engaging in securities
activities extend to bank holding companies. The Court of Appeals had con-
cluded that the policies of the Glass-Steagall Act should be read into the Bank
Holding Company Act to enforce a rigid separation between the securities

tions. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. FHLBB, 588 F. Supp. 749 (DDC 1984), Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 91,471 (Mar. 9,1984).
The investment powers of savings and loan associations are outlined in 12 USC
§ 1464(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Subsection S specifically provides authority to thrifts
for investments in mongage-related securities. 12 USC § 1464(c)(2)(S) (Supp. IV 1986).
The FHLBB regulations regarding securities include;2 CFR §§ 523-524, 541, 545, 555,
561, 563, and 570 (1987). For a thorough discussion of investment powers of thrift
institutIons, see Zaitzeff v. Metter, "Investment Powers of Federal Savings & Loan
Associations after Gam-St Germain," 36 C. I-la. L. Rev. 591-673 (1984).
23 The requirements relating to bank holding company involvement in securities
activities are discussed at ~ 5.02[2].
24 468 US 207 (1984).

2545Q US 46 (1981).
Vi 8.01\2!1bj OVERVIEW 8-8

business and commercial banking. The Supreme Court took a contrary view,
indicating that the activity in question, the provision of investment advisory
services to a closed-end investment company, would not constitute a violation of
the Glass-Steagall Act, even if it were engaged in by a bank. The Supreme Court
also made important comments about the scope of the Bank Holding Company
Act. In the view of the Court, even if a bank would be in violation of Glass-
Steagall by engaging in these services, it would not necessarily follow that a bank
holding company would also be in violation. 26
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company
Act and concluded that Congress did not intend that Section 4(c)(8) of the act
should be read "[a]s totally prohibiting Bank Holding Companies from being
'engaged' in any securities-related activities; ... "27 The Court then conduded
that the Board had the discretion to determine, in light of its expertise, what
securities-related activities are closely related to banking and, thus, are permit-
ted under Section 4(c)(8V"
Additionally, to the extent that state banks may enjoy powers under their
state chal1ers to engage in securities transactions that are not permitted to
national banks or member banks, such a bank may not be subject to the "closely
related to banking" test of the Bank Holding Compar.y Act, although the bank is
part of a holding company structure, because the closely related test applies to
nonbank subsidiaries.2~

26 According to the Court:

Even if we were to assume that a bank would violate the Glass-Steagall Act by
engaging in certain investment adVISory services, it would nat follow that a bank
holding company could never perform sucb services. In both the Glass·Steagall Act
itself and in the Bank Holding Company Act, Congress indicated that a bank affiliate
may engage in activities that would be impermissible for the bank itself. Thus, § 21 of
Glass-Steagall enurely prohibits the same firm from engaging in banking and in the
underwriting business, whereas § 20 does not prohibit bank affiliation with a securi-
ties firm unless that firm is "engaged principally" in actiVities such as underwriting.
Funher, § 4(c)( 7) of the Bank Holding Company .-\ct, which authorizes holding
companies to purchase and own shares ofinvestme:ll companies, permits investment
activity by a holdlOg company that ,s impermissIble for a bank itself. Finally, inas-
much as the Bank Holding Company Act requires divestment only of the bank's non-
banking interests, the § 4(c)(8) exception would be unnecessary if it applied only to
services that a bank could legally perform. Thus, even if the Glass-Steagall Act did
prohibit banks from acting as investment advisors, that prohibition would not neces-
sanly preclude the Board from determining that such advisory services would be
permissible t:nder § 4(c)(8). Id. at 63-64.
"ld.a171.
"See DeSanto, "Product Expansion In the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revi-
sion of Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Compan) Act," 53 Fordham L. Rev.
1127-1157 (1985)
"For a discussion of activilles closely related to hanklng, see ~ 5.02\2J.
8-9 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES ~ 8.01l311a}

The Federal Reserve Board has identified activities related to securities that
it will treat as "closely related to banking.,,30 The Board has approved applica-
tions to establish subsidiaries to offer investment advice and to buy and sell
government securities, certificates of deposits, and bankers' acceptances."' Fur-
ther, it has approved an application by a foreign bank to participate in a joint
venture with a U.S. securities firm through a subsidiary of the bank to provide
investment advice and portfolio management services for foreign customers
interested in U.S. investments."2 It also approved an application to acquire a
subsidiary mortgage banking firm that would engage in arranging equity financ-
ing for commercial and industrial income producing property."3 Finally, it has
authorized financial futures contracts activities. 3' There is a high degree of
uncertainty over the legality ofmany ofthe securities-related activities sought by
bank holding companies, because each new step will likely face extended
litigation.

[31 Interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act

[aJ The Subtle Hazards Analysis of the Camp Decision. One of the leading
cases interpreting the Glass-Steagall provisions is Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp."" In this case, the Supreme Court held that national banks could not
operate an open-end collective investment fund or mutual fund. In the Court's
view, the bank's operation ofand sale of units of participation in the investment
fund amounted to the underwriting and sale of securities within the meaning of
Sections 16 and 21 of the act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distin-
guished the commingling of assets received for "a true fiduciary purpose rather
than for investment."36 Moreover, it noted that historically, banks had both
pooled trust assets and served as a managing agent for individual customers!'
But the combination of functions in the mutual fund form, in the words of the

30See Regulation Y, 12 CFR § 225.25 (1987), and the discussion at ~ 5.02(2)[ii].

31 Application of ~anufacturersHanove~ Corp., 70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 661 (1984).

32 Application of Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, 70 Fed. Reserve Bull. 835 (1984).

33 Application ofBancOhio Corp., 69 Fed. Reserve Bull. 34 (1983). See also 41 Wash.
Fin. Rep. (BNA) 669 (1983); id. at 606; 12 CFR § 225.25(14) (1987).
34 Application ofJ.P. Morgan & Co., Inc" 68 Fed. Reserve Bull. 514 (1982). See also

41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 668 (t 983); 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 395 (1983). The Board
announced in 1982 its willingness to consider applications to engage In futures commis-
sion merchant activities. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,872 (1982). The Board has since amended
Regulation Y to include such activities. 12 CFR § 225.25 (18) (1987).
"'401 US 617 (1971).
3S 40 I US at 638.
37
401 US at 624-625.
1: 8.01 [3J1a] OVERVIEW 8-10

Court, "gives birth to an investment fund whose activities are of a different

character.""
In concluding that the act forbade operation of the open-end mutual fund
the Court reviewed the purpose of the Glass-Steagall legislation. In now famou;
language, it pointed to the "subtle hazards" that Congress tried to prevent by
separating commercial banking and investment banking. The Court spoke in
these words:

The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to the obvious
danger that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise
imprudent stock or security investments. For often securities affiliates had
operated without direct access to the assets of the bank. This was because
securities affiliates had frequently been established with capital paid in by
the bank's stockholders, or by the public, or through the allocation of a legal
dividend on bank stock for this purpose. The legislative history of the Glass-
Steagall Act shows that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused
on the more subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond
the business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the invest-
ment banking business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold
and sell particular investments. This course places new promotional and
other pressures on the bank which in turn create new temptations. For
example, pressures are created because the bank and the affiliate are closely
associated in the public mind, and should the affiliate fare badly, public
confldence in the bank might be impaired. And since public confidence is
essential to the solvency of a bank, there might exist a natural temptation to
shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other aid. Moreover, the
pressure to sell a particular investment and to make the affiliate successful
might create a flsk that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely
available to those companies in whose stock or securities the affiliate has
invested or become otherwise involved. Congress feared that banks might
even go so far as to make unsound loans to such companies. In any event, it
was thought that the bank's salesman's interest might impair its ability to
function as an impartial source of credit.
Congress was also concerned that bank deposltors might suffer losses on
inveslments that they purchased in reliance on the relationship between the
bank and its affiliate. This loss of customer good will might "become an
important handicap to a bank during a major peflod of security market
deflation." More broadly, Congress feared that the promotional needs of
investment banking might lead commercial banks to lend their reputation
for prudence and restraint to the enterprise of selling particular stocks and
securities, and that ~his could not be done wilhout that reputation being
undercut by the risks necessarily inciden: to the investment banking busi-
ness. There was also perceived the danger that when commercial banks were
subject to the promotional demands of investment banking, they might be
tempted to make loans to customers with the expectatioll that the loan

" Id.
8-11 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES n8.01[3I1b)

would facilitate the purchase of stocks and securities. There was evidence
before Congress that loans for investment written by commercial banks had
done much to feed the speculative fever of the late 1920's. Senator Glass
made it plain that it was "the fixed purpose of Congress" not to see the
facilities ofcommercial banking diverted into speculative operations by the
aggressive and promotional character of the investment banking business.
Another potential hazard that very much concerned Congress arose from
the plain conflict between the promotional interest of the investment
banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested
investment advice.... Congress had before it evidence that security affili-
ates might be driven to unload excessive holdings through the trust depart-
ment of the sponsor bank....
In sum, Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment
banking business largely because it believed that the promotional incentives
of investment banking and the investment banker's pecuniary stake in the
success of particular investment opportunities was destructive of prudent
and disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in the
commercial banking system. 3'
The significance of these hazards in interpreting the act is not clear. Subse-
quent decisions have not indicated whether activities that otherwise might faJ[
within the scope of the prohibitions would be permissible if these hazards were
minimal or nonexistent.
Subsequent to the Camp decision, the Coun held that a bank holding
company could control an affiliate that served as an investment advisor to a
closed-end investment company. In Board ofGo\'ernors v. Investment Co. Insti-
tute,40 the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board prohibited the holding
company from issuing, underwriting, selling, or purchasing any securities. It
could only provide advice. The Coun reasoned that these arrangements did not
violate the act and did not present the "subtle hazards" that existed in the Camp
situation. The Coun also suggested that bank holding companies have greater
freedom to engage in securities-related activities than do banks. 41

[h] Defining a Security for Purposes of the Act. The distinction between
commercial banking and securities transactions received further attention in
Securities Induslries Association v. Board of Go\'ernors." The Court held that
short-term commercial notes constituted securities within the Glass-Steagall Act
so that banks could not engage in activities that would amount to "underwrit-
ing" that paper. [n reaching this result, the Court interpreted the legislative
history of the act as intending to apply the ordinary meaning to the term

J9 40 I US at 630-634.
40
450 US 46 (1981).
'4\ Id. at 63-64. See id. at 64, n.34

42 468 US 137 (1984).

11 8.011311b] OVERV1EW 8-12

"securities," which would encompass "notes," in the absence ofany compelling

t~Y..~l''"'l ··'''''.'·''''n to'f~"":-,f. n r;1fi'OWcr d:;finition.
The Supreme Court's conclusion contrasted sharply with the approach
taken by both the Federal Reserve Board and the appellate court below," both of
which ruled that the short-term commercial notes should not be treated as
securities. When a "functional analysis" based on examination ofthe commer-
cial paper market was applied, the bank's activities were more like a traditional
commercial banking operation than an investment transaction. The Supreme
Court rejected this approach and found the legislative intent conclusive."
Although the Court did not directly address the question of whether the use of
the term "securities" in the various federal securities laws was intended to have
the same meaning in all contexts, it squarely rejected the analysis of the Board
and the court bclow which proceeded on the assumption that a "security" under
Glass-Steagall was different than the definition in the federal securities laws.
There have been a number of problem areas involving bank products and
services where the question arises whether the service is a "security" within the
Glass-Steagall Act. Sweep accounts, where a bank transfers access deposits on a
regular basis, often daily, from deposit accounts into a mutual fund (and in
reverse from the mutual fund into the account to cover deficits) met a stumbling
block when the general counsel of the Federal Reserve Board indicated that such
sweep arrangements, depending on the circumstances, might involve the distri-
bution and underwriting of securities in violation of the act. os
Another area in dispute is the technique of issuing cet1ificates representing
interests in a pool of more traditional interests such as mortgages. The Comp-
troHer of the Currency has issued a legal opinion that a national bank may issue
cet1ificates representing interests in a pool of construction and commercial
mortgage loans." The Federal Reserve Board has similarly authorized subsidi-
aries to deal in securities backed by consumer receivables, reasoning that these
activities were closely related to banking because they involved credit evalua-
tion and loan management functions similar to those involved in handling the

43 A.G. Becker. Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 468
US 137 (1984).
.. The Coun remanded the case for determination of whether :he methods used in
placing the commercial paper amounted to selling and underwriting. 468 US at 160.
Similar diffieuhies in determining whether a "secl1rn\"" exists are presented in recent
Iitiga;ion over whether banks may deal in mortgage-backed pass through certificates.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, No. 87 eiv. 450 (SONY June 25. 1987). The Comptrol-
ler has taken the position that the transaction is equivalent to the sale of loan participa-
tions and so should not be regarded as either a secur:t~ or underwriting or dealing in
securities. Leiter of the Comptroller of '.he Currency. 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1120
( 1987).
45l.elter to the Security Indus. Ass'n, 43 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 743 (1984).
"Comptroller of the Currenc)' Opinion Leiter No. 2S I, 39 Wash. Fin. Rep. (RNA)
804 (1982).
8-13 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.01 [4)

mortgage related government securities permitted by Section 16 of the Glass-

Steagall Act.·7

[41 The Bankers Trust Case: Placement of Commercial Paper and the
Ban on Underwriting
The scope of Section 16 was explored further in the Bankers Trust commer-
cial paper case after it came back to the Federal Reserve Board.'· The Board
determined that Bankers Trust's proposal to engage in the private placement of
commercial paper for commercial customers did not violate the Section 16
prohibitions against selling and underwriting securities. A federal district court
disagreed. On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the decision of the
Board of Governors was upheld." The court first concluded that if the activities
of Bankers Trust were permissible under Section 16, 12 USC § 24 Seventh, they
would not violate Section 21, 12 USC § 378(a){l). Accordingly, its opinion
focused on the interpretation of Section 16 that states that the "business of
dealing in securities and stock by [a commercial bank] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon
the order, and for the account of customers, and in no case for its own account,
and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock. "so
The Securities Industries Association contended that the bank's placement
of commercial paper violated these provisions in a number of ways. It claimed
that
1. Bankers Trust was not engaged in the "business of dealing in securities
and stock" as permitted in Section 16 because such "business" is limited
to dealing in the "secondary" securities market and does not include
participation in the init:al issue of securities;"
2. The restriction in Section 16 to securities activities "upon the order, and
for the account of customers ... " meant the bank could offer securities
services only to accommodate its existing bank customers;S2

"Application ofCiticorp., 49 Banking Rep. (BNAl 88 (1987). The Board stayed the
effective date of its approval pending resolution of a court case dealing with related issues.
4. Securi:ies Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F2d 1052 (DC Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) (hereInafter Bankers Trust).
"Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors. 807 F2d 1052 (DCCir. 1986), eert.
denied 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987). See generally Glidden. "Bank Sales of Commercial Paper
under the Glass-Steagall Act: The Hazards of the Bankers Trust Decisions," 42 Bus. L.
1-28 (1986); Jennings, "Corporate Commercial Paper Issued Through Banks: The Banks'
Hidden Liability," 103 Banking LJ 563-576 (1986).
50 12 USC § 24 Seventh (1982).

51 807 F2d at j 058-1 059.

"The court held that the bank could serve customers other than its regular banking
customers. Securities Indus. Ass'" v. Board of Goverr.ors, 807 F2d at 1059.
118.01(4) OVERVIEW 8-14

3. Because Bankers Trust actively solicited the business, it was not acting
"solely upon the order" of its customers;53
4. The solicitativn of buyers for the commercial paper violated Section 16's
limitation on the "purchasing of securities" to purchases made "solely
upon the order" of the bank's customers·· ,4
5. The.activities undertaken by Bankers Trust constituted "underwriting"
III vIolation of the express prohibition of Section 16;55 and
6. Permitting commercial banks to engage in the activities Bankers Tl1.lst
proposed would expose commercial banks to the "subtle hazards" the
Congress intended the Glass-Steagall Act to eliminate. 5'
The District of Columbia Circuit rejected all of these arguments. In address-
ing what constituted "underwriting," the court acknowledged the uncertainty as
to the nature of this definition but said the Securities Act of 1933 indicated that
it was reasonable for the Board to conclude the private placement of securities
did not constitute underwriting. 5T In addition, the purpose of the Glass-Steagall
prohibition against underwriting was not offended by the private placement
activities proposed by Bankers Trust. The court read the history of the enact-
ment of the Glass-Steagall Act as indicating congressional concern with the form
of economic organization created by the commercial banks that engaged in
investment banking operations. In the court's opinion, these commercial banks
had created an elaborate structure to sell and distribute securities, whiCh placed
heavy fixed costs on the banks. The burden of maintaining this costly distribu-
tion network, in turn, was responsible for creating the "subtle hazards" to which
the act was addressed. The court quoted from the congressional debates on the
act to make its point:
In order to be efficient a securities department had to be developed; it had to
have salesmen; and it had to have correspondent connections with smaller
banks throughout the territory tributary to the great bank. Organizations
were developed with great enthusiasm and efficiency. The distribution of
the great security issues needed for the development of the country was
faCIlitated, and the country developec. But the sales departments were

53 807 F2d at 1061-1062.

54 Id.
55ld. at 1062-1066.
"ld. at 1066-1070.
5' The court rejected Bankers Trust's contention that if the bank confined its activi-
ties to those of an agent, without aequinng an interest of liS own in the transaction, the
activities would not constitute underwriting prohibited by Section 16. Although noting
that some had argued "best efforts underwriting, perfor:11ed solely on an agency oasis,"
should not constitute underwriting, the court specificaily declined to adopt the argument,
saying that it made "little sense" in view of the common understanding in the securities
industry and the approach of the Securities Act of 1933. 807 F2u at 1062, n.3.
8-15 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES ~ 8.01(4)

subject to fixed expenses which could not be reduced without the danger of
so disrupting the organization as to put the institution at a disadvantage in
competition with rival institutions. These expenses would turn the opera-
tion very quickly from a profit to a loss if there was not sufficient origina-
tions and underwritings to keep the sales department busy.
It was necessary in some cases to seek for customers to become makers of
issues of securities when the needs of those customers for long-term money
were not very pressing. Can any banker, imbued with consciousness that his
bond-sales department is, because oflack ofsecurities for sale, losing money
and at the same time losing its morale, be a fair and impartialjudge as to the
necessity and soundness for a new security issue which he knows he can
readily distribute through channels which have been expensive to develop
but which presently stand ready to absorb the proposed security issue and
yield a handsome profit on the transaction?
It is easy to see why the security business was overdeveloped and why the
bankers' clients and country bank correspondents were overloaded with a
mass of investments many of which have p~oved most unfortunate.
From this history, the court concluded it was "highly plausible" that in
Section 16 of the act, Congress :ntended to distinguish between public and
private offerings of securities on the theory :hat private offerings involved
"relatively minor expenses," which were acceptable, as compared to "the much
heavier fixed burden of having a far-flung retail network to distribute securities
to the public." so Although recognizing that such a distinction did not eliminate
all of the subtle hazards, the court agreed that the Board had reasonably assessed
the risks in determining that a distinction between public and private offerings
would minimize the problems that Section 16 was intended to eliminate. The
court then approved the Board's conclusion that the activities proposed 'oy
Bankers Trust would involve private placement. 59 The court then addressed the
specific "subtle hazards" identified by the Supreme Court. Although expressing

sa 807 F2d at 1066.

.. The coun described the Board's analysis ofthc private nature of the activities in the
following terms:
(1) the bank "places commercial paper by separately contracting large financial anc
non-financial institutions." (2) the bank "does not place commercial paper with any
individuals." (3) "t:1e :naximum namber of offerees and purchasers of commercial
paper placed by the bank in any given case is relatively limited," (4) the bank "make~
no general solicita:ion or advertisement to the public" with respect to the placement
of particular paper (though it does advertise its activities in business publications to
publicize its availability as an agent to issuers), and (5) "the commercIal paper placed
with the Dank's assistance is issued in very large average minimum denominations,
which are not a I:kely investmer:t of the general public." ... Such considerations
properly determine what disltnguishes a priyate from a public offering of
secucties. ...
807 F2d at 1064-1065 (citat:ons omitted;.
 11 8.01[5][a) OVERVIEW 8-16

doubt as to whether it should find an activity impermissible because it impli-

cated a bank in the "subtle hazards" condemned by the Supreme Court when the
"language and history of the specific provisions support the reasonableness of
the Board's construction of those provisions," the court concluded that the
Board acted reasonably in assessing the risks posed.

[5} Discount Brokerage

[al National Banks. In an application from Security National Bank in Califor-
nia, the Comptroller of the Currency approved the bank's proposal to establish a
SUbsidiary that would engage in securities brokerage services to the bank's
customers.·o The subsidiary would buy and sell all types ofsecurities as agent for
its customers, and it would provide margin loans to its customers and pay
interest on credit balances in customers' accounts. The services were to be
offered to the public throughout California and eventually other states at both
branch and non-branch bank locations. The subsidiary would register as a
broker-dealer under the Securities Eltchange Act of 1934.
The comptroller, in granting the application, held that the Glass.Steagall
Act did not prohibit the bank from establishing a subsidiary to perform these
functions. "On its face, the Glass-Steagall Act permits those securities purchases
and sales for customers in which the bank acts in the capacity of agent (i.e.,
brokerage transactions), while generally prohibiting purchases and sales by the
banks acting as principal. This constitutes clear authorization for banks and,
hence, their operating subsidiaries (See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7376) to engage in the
activities contemplated for Discount Brokerage.""
The Securities Industry Association challenged the action of the comptrol-
ler. It argued that Section 16, of the Glass-Steagall Act (12 USC § 24 Seventh)
permits the bank to perform brokerage services only for customers whose rela-
tionship with the bank exists independently of the securities transaction. The
court rejected this argument. Section 16, in the court's view, limited bank
securities transactions to those made "for the account of customers," thus
preventing the bank from acting as a principal in securities transactions, but was
not intended to limit the transactions to preexisting customers of the bank.
The court also rejected the argument that the application violated Sectie;]
21 of the act, which prohibits any organization "engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing at wholesale or retail . . .
securities ... " from engaging at the same lime in banking. In the court's view,
"the prohibllion of Section 21 is clearly aimed at the investment banking

60 Comptroller of the Currency. Application of Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, Aug. 26, J 982,
rev·d. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (DDC
1983), afrd, 758 F2d 739 (DC Cir. 1985), rev'd 107 S. C1. 750 (1987).'
"Id. Fo' a description of the Comptroller's decision. see 39 Wash. Fin. Rep. (DNA)
378(1982)
8-17 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 1f 8.01[5I1bl

business by which large blocks of securities newly issued by corporations are

bought by investment banks for resale to the public." The court also rejected the
argument that engaging in such transactions amounted to dealing in securities
"with recourse," in violation of Section 16.62 That prohibition is not violated by
the possibility that a securities transaction might fall through because a cus-
tomer failed to pay for securities and thereby created liability for the bank.
Although approving the comptroller's treatment of the Glass-Steagall issues, the
court was of the view that the McFadden Act prohibition against interstate
banking by national banks would be violated. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
reversed the McFadden Act ruling." (This aspect of the case is discussed in
Chapter 6).
The comptroller's approval of the acquisition ofdiscount brokerage subsid-
iaries did not involve approval of giving investment advice. However, on Sep-
tember 6, 1983, the comptroller approved an application from the American
National Bank ofAustin, Texas to set up a separate investment advisory subsidi-
ary. The comptroller ruled such approval could be given without violating the
Glass-Steagall Act.,. The FDIC also has issued a legal opinion that state non-
member banks may offer discount brokerage services to their customers through
an unrelated broker and share commissions without violating the Glass-Steagall
Act. 65

[bl Bank Holding Companies. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the appli-
cation ofthe Bank Holding Company Act to discount brokerage in 1984 when it
upheld the Federal Reserve Board's approval of BankAmerica Corp.'s acquisi-
tion of a retail discount brokerage firm, Charles Schwab & Company." The
Court held that the handling of purchase and sale transactions for third parties,

'2577 F. Supp. at 256-257.

63 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (DOC
1983),afTd, 758 F2d 739 (DCCir. 1985),rev'd 107S.Ct. 750(1 987). The Supreme Court
denied the Securities Industry Association's petition for review of the part of the court's
order allowing national banks to engage in discount brokerage operations. Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 474 US 1054 (1986).
64 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 355 (1983). The legality of combining discount broker-
age services and investment advice was tested in the :-latWest case. The Federal Reserve
Board's approval for a bank holding company to offer both discount brokerage services
and investment advice through a single subsidiary was upheld by Judge Bork in Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 821 F2d 810 (DC Cir. 1987) cert. denied 56 USLW
3459 (US Jan. II, 1988) (No. 87-562). The subsidiary would act only as agent for
customers and would not act as an ur.derwriter or a principal. The court upheld the
Board's determination that such activities did not constitute a "public sale" of securities
forbidden by Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. The court stated that substantial
deference should be given to the Board's interpretatIOn of the statuie. See ~ 8.01 [5][bJ.
"FDIC, General Counsel's Opinion No.6, 48 Fed. Reg. 22989 (1983).
'6 Secu:ities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors. 468 US 207 (1984).
II 8.01/SJlb) OVERVIEW 8- 18

without providing investment advice, was "closely related" to banking within

the meaning ofSection 4(c)(8) ofthe Bank Holding Company Act, because banks
performed the same functions in their trust departments. Also, the Court con-
cluded the acquisition did not violate Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Section 20 prohibits member banks from affiliating with organizations that
are "engaged principally" in the "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or
distribution" of securities. Schwab's activities did not involve underwritin~ or
issuing securities. Although the securities industry argued that Schwab's dis-
count brokerage activities constituted a "public sale," the Court held "the term
'public sale' in § 20 should be read to refer to the underwriting activity described
by the terms that surround it, and to exclude the type ofretail brokerage business
in which Schwab principally is engaged." The Court read the legislative history
of the act as revealing a congressional concern directed to banks engaging in
underwriting activities because underwriting could put bank funds at risk in
speculative investments and might create other "subtle hazards" as a result of
promotional pressures from affiliates engaged in buymg and selling securities for
their own accounts.
In approving the Schwab affiliation, the Court pointed out that Section 16
of the Glass-Steagall Act allowed banks to buy and sell securities directly for
their customers. Congressional willingness to allow banks to perform these
activities for their customers indicated a disinclination to regard the types of
brokerage activities performed by Schwab as presenting untoward hazards to
commercial banks. Although Section 16 permits banks to engage in securities
transactions for the account of the bank's "customers," the Coun held an
affiliate organization that was not a bank, such as Schwab, could provide the
approved services to the public generally and not just to bank customers. Section
16 applied only to banks; Section 20 applied to affiliates and subsidiaries, and
Section 20 contained no limiting reference to "customers." The court reserved
the issue whether a bank could directly buy and sell securities for persons who
were not otherwise customers of the bank. 67
The ability of bank holding companies to provide investment services to
customers received a large boost in the 1987 NatWest decision. In this case,
entitled Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors,"' the court
reviewed a decision by the Federal Reserve Board approving an application by
National Westminster Bank PLC and its subsidiary. NatWest, under the Bank
Holding Company Act to operate a subsidiary named CSC that would provide
both investment advice and securities brokerage services to institutional cus-
tomers. The Securities Industry Association attacked the Board's action on the

61 468 US at 219 n.20. This question was answered by a lower court in the Bankers
Trust case, which ruled that a bank should not be limned to its eXisting customers. 807
F2d at 1059. Sec ~ 8.01[4J.
"821 f2d 810 (DC Clr. 1987), eert. denied, 56 USLW 3459 (US ./an. I J, 1988) (No.
87-562). The Board's aelion is reponed at 72 Fed. Reserve Bull. 584 (1986).
8-19 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES n8.01[61

ground that when the subsidiary coupled investment advice with brokerage
services it would be engaged in the "public sale" of securities. This would create
a violation of the prohibition against a member bank affiliating with a company
"engaged principally in the ... public sale" of securities in Section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act.
The court rejected the argument of the Securities Industry Association,
relying on the Supreme Court decisions in the Schwab case 69 and Board of
Governors v. Investment Co. Institute,'O The court reasoned that the provision of
brokerage services, as discussed in Investment Co. Institute, did not constitute a
public sale, because, in the context of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, that
term referred to activities of underwriting and distribution. These are functions
"distinctly different from that of a securities broker" because an underwriter
normally acts as a principal while a broker executes orders as an agent for
others." Acting as an agent in providing brokerage services for the account of
others does not violate Section 20. As in Schwab, the NatWest subsidiary would
have no relationship with the issuer of securities other than that needed to
execute customer orders. Although the firm would provide investment advice, it
would not be an underwriter under the Schwab test because it would not pur-
chase securities from the issuer or act as the agent of the issuer. 72 The Court then
went on to conclude that the proposed activities did not pose any problem under
the subtle hazards analysis of the Camp case. 73

[6) Collective Investment Funds

A series of cases have examined the application of the Glass-Steagall Act to
collective investment funds utilized to invest assets of individual retirement
accounts. 74 Although the federal district couns that initially ruled on the cases
took varying positions, the federal Circuit Coun of Appeals upheld the banks'
offering such accounts.

"Schll'ab is Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 US 207 (1984).

7°450 US 46 (1981).
71 821 F2d at 81 J.

72 let at 814.

73 [d. at816-818.

74 See generally Lybecker, "Bank Collective Investment Management Activities," IS

Inst. On Sec. Reg. 347-376 (1984); Notes, "Bank Sponsorship ofa Money Market Mutual
Fund: Can It Survive Glass-Steagall?," J Ann. Rev. Banking L. 194-224 (1984); "Units of
Participation in IRA Common Trust Funds Offered by Commercial Banks: A Violation of
the Glass-Steagall Act?," 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 745-761 (1985); "Glass-Steagall and
Collective Investment Trus1s for Individual Retirement Accounts: Fiduciary Purpose or
Investment'.''', 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 961-999 (1985).
~ 8.01(6)[aJ OVERVIEW 8-20

laJ The Comptroller's Citihank Decision. On October 21, ! 982, the Comp-
troller ofthe Currency approved an application by Citibank to invest assets from
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) collectively in a common trust fund
maintained by the bank. 75 The comptroller considered the application under
regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency, the provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Glass-Steagall Act, and
the federal securities laws.
The comptroller's regulations permit national banks to invest funds collec-
tively in a common trust fund when the bank acts as a trustee or fiduciary, and
also permits such investment when the fund consists solely of assets of retire-
ment or similar trusts exempt from federal income taxation.'· Because the
national bank would be receiving the assets in a trust capacity and because the
retirement account funds are from retirement plans exempt from federal income
tax, the comptroller concluded that both alternatives of the regulation were
satisfied. This was consistent with what the comptroller determined was the
"overwhelming conclusion" to be drawn from the legislative history of ERISA,
"that Congress believed it to be within the power of banks to serve as trustees for
IRA trusts and to collectively invest the assets of these trusts in common trust
funds or in collective investment funds for retirement plan assets.""
Relying upon Investment Co. Institute v. Camp," the comptroller concluded
the IRA trust account proposed in the application did not constitute the type of
investment fund prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act. There were similarities
between the fund proposed in the Citibank application and the fund struck down
in Camp, but there was a decisive difference-Citibank proposed "the receipt
by the bank of assets in trust" rather than receipt "in a managing agent
capacity.""
The comptroller believed that Camp did not disturb long-standing banking
practice of serving as a managing agent for investments while acting as a fiduci-
ary in a traditional bank trust department service. The comptroller noted that
the mean:ng oflhe term "securities" under the Glass-Steagall Act is not necessa-
rily the same as its defmition for purposes offederal securities laws. "In particu-
lar, when, in the present case, the 'securities' merely represent the formal
manifestation of a traditional banking service, it is the Office's opinion that the
prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act are not applicable."'· The COI:1ptroller
went on to consider the possible hazards and potential abuses identified in the

75 39 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 816 (1982). The sllhsequent litigation overthe comptrol·
ler's action is described later in this section.
76
12 CFR §§ 9.18(a)(I), 9.18(2)(1987).
7' 39 Wash. fin. Rep. (ONA) 816-817..(1982).

"401 US 617 (1971).

19 39 Wash. fin. Rep. (BNA) 816-817 (1982).

BO Id.
8-21 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.01 [6][b)

Camp decision and their possible presence in the Citibank proposal. Finding
that the abuses referred to were no more present in the collective investment of
IRA trust assets proposed by Citibank than in the ordinary fiduciary function
banks engage in, the comptroller concluded it would be inappropriate to treat
the participation in the IRA funds offered by the bank as securities even though
those interests would be registered pursuant to securities laws.
The comptroller also expressed reservations as to whether it was necessary
for the bank to register under the Investment Company Act and the federal
securities laws. In his view, the exemption for common trust funds maintained
by banks and the exemption for collective investment funds for certain tax-
exempt pension plans should apply.

[b] Judicial Reaction. Three circuit courts have addressed the question of
whether a pooled investment fund for assets held in trust in individual retire-
ment accounts violates the Glass-Steagall Act. Although the district courts have
taken contrary positions, the three circuit courts have upheld the comptroller's
position.
In the first case, a federal district court in California held that a national
bank could not establish funds for the investment of assets in IRAs, because the
funds were being established and promoted for investment purposes rather than
for fiduciary purposes as a trustee." The district court noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Camp allowed the commingling of trust assets in a common
pool, as long as the assets were "received for a true fiduciary purpose rather than
for investment." The comptroller had classified the bank's purpose as fiduciary
because the provisions of ERISA limit the funds an investor can place in an IRA
each year and impose a penalty on early distributions from the accounts. He also
noted that the accounts cannot be transferred to other individuals, cannot serve
as security for loans, and that the banks have strict fiduciary obligations imposed
as amatter of law to manage the accounts.
But the district court rejected the comptroller's reasoning. Under Camp,
"the validity of an investment fund under the Glass-Steagall Act does not hinge
on its trust form vel non."" After analyzing the hazards that the Glass-Steagall
Act was directed to curb and the manner in which the funds were promoted, the
court concluded the funds were investment funds and that the adoption 0:
ERISA, although it conferred permission to commingle assets in certain types of
common funds, was not intended to give banks authority beyond the powers
associated with their traditional fiduciary roles.
Although the U.S. District Court in California was the first to rule on the
question, the Ninth Circuit did not dccide the appeal in that case until after

81 Investment Co. lnst. v. Conover, 59] F. Supp. 846 (ND Cal. 1984), rev'd 793 F2d

220 (9th Cir. 1986), cen. denied 107 S. Ct. 422 (1987).
"59] F. Supp. at 854.
 'I8.01/611b) OVERVIEW 8-22

decisions in two similar cases by the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Second Circuit. '3 The District of Columbia Circuit case became the lead case on
the issue. (The Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit cases are discussed in note 83.)
In an opinion that closely tracked the analysis used by the comptroller, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court ruled in the Citibank case that the Supreme
Court's Camp decision did not prohibit the commingled trust fund proposed by
Citibank. '4 The District of Columbia Circuit declined to read Camp broadly,
stating: "In our view, however, Camp cannot fairly be read to prohibit any
financial service that some actors in the marketplace view as functionally similar
to a mutual fund. Camp nowhere states that all such services are prohibited.....
The court agreed with the comptroller's distinction. Citibank was offering a
fiduciary service, not the sale of a security. In serving as a "trustee of its IRA

., The California district coun was reversed by a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit, 793 F2d 220 (9th err. [986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 422 (1987). One judge
thought the Comptroller's approval was consistent with Camp and the Glass-Steagall Act;
another thought it was in error; the author of the opinion sided with the Comptroller, but
saw the question as "a close one, and cenainly not free from doubt ...." He expressed his
dOUbts as follows:
The Comptroller's analysis appears to be superficial, and in some respects 10 come
perilously close to disregarding the spirit of Camp while purporting to adhere 10 its
letter. II also comes perilously close to rejecting the division between commercial
banking and investment banking that Congress sought to mandate in Glass-Steagall.
Nevenheless, in the end, the Comptroller did apply, however inadequately, the Camp
test.
ld. at 221.
Similar legai issues were presented by the application of Connecticut Bank and Trust
Company 10 market a collective investment fund consisting of individual retirement
accounts. A federal district coun in Connecticut foliov;ed the lead of the District of
Columbia, and upheld the bank's proposal. Investment Co, Inst. v. Clarke, 630 F. Supp.
593 (D. Conn, 1986), affd mem., 789 F2d \ 75 (2d Cir.) eert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422
(1986). Reading the Supreme Court decision in Camp as intending to distinguish between
"activittes mottvated soldy by an investment purpose and activIties motivated, in signifi-
cant pan, by a purpose other than merely to secure income or profit," the district coun
found that Connecticut Bank's fund constituted a sale of fiduciary services rather than a
sale of investments and therefore was permissible. Both the Comptroller and the coun
placed some importance on the manner in which Connecticut Bank adver:ised the fund:
The fiduciary nature of the Fund is also evidenced hy CBT's intent to "offer the Trust
to IRA customers as part ofa total IRA program" and tc "advenise the Tmst as being
merely one of several IRA alternatives, ... CBT's representations to the Comptroller
that the Fund will not be marketed as a separate investment service independent of
the other IRA options being offered," ... fur:her indicate that CaT is offering a
package of "fiduciary services" rather than a mere in\ estment vehicle,
Id., 630 F. Supp at 596.
"Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover. 790 F2d 925 (DC Cir. 1985), cen: denied 107 S.
Ct. 421 (1986),
" 790 F2d at 930.
8-23 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.0116Jlbl

funds rather than as managing agent," the bank was acting in a capacity quite
different than that condemned in Camp. Moreover, because of the limitations
on IRA investments, which restrict the size of the investment, the transferability
of units, and the use of the units as collateral, and impose penalties on early
withdrawal, the court believed the risks associated with the Citibank arrange-
ment were substantially less than those in Camp."
The Investment Institute had argued that the investment units ofCitibank's
trust should be viewed as securities for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. The
institute position was that any "undivided and redeemable interest in the assets
of a common trust fund" constituted a security. The court rejected this theory.
Under the institute's argument, "all commingling of trust funds by national
banks would be effectively prohibited.... but such commingling, as we have
seen, has historically been permitted and is clearly sanctioned by Camp.""
When the court examined the legislative intent of Congress, it concluded that
congressional intent did not precisely cover units in a commingled trust fund.
The court said:

... as we see it, the statutory language is of limited help in defining

congressional intent in this case. The term "security" clearly encompasses
instruments like stock, bonds, notes, and mutual fund shares, which have
traditionally been unwritten and marketed by members of the securities
industry. As Camp teaches, moreover, the term may include other financial
interests that are functionally equivalent to these traditional kinds ofsecuri-
ties. But, as we have also seen, the term canT.ot be interpreted to include all
financial interests in assets or in a business venture, lest traditional common
trust funds be rendered invalid. Although interests in Citibank's trust share
some of the features of traditional mutual fund shares-for example, they
permit diversifIcation of risk and can be widely marketed-they are, as we
have seen, quite different from traditional mutual fund shares in several
important respects. Obviously, interests in IRA trust funds did not exist in
. 1933 when Congress passed Glass-Steagall: the term Congress employed to
identify the financial interests it had in mind, moreover, is not sufficiently
precise as to clearly encompass such interests."

Since the court was not able to find a clear direction from the legislative history,
it examined the comptroller's analysis and concluded that deference to that
decision was required.
The institute argued that thc form of Citibank's promotion of the fund
indicated that the bank was sel;ing an investment similar to a mutual fund. The
court agreed that the marketplace might regard the Citibank fund as "function-

"Id. at 930-931.
"ld.at93L
"Id. at 934.
11 8.01/71 OVERVIEW 8-24

ally similar to a mutual fund" and that the bank's own marketing and advertis-
ing departments seemed to view the fund in this manner as well. But for the
reasons stated in the quoted material, the court concluded "on close analysis"
that the Citibank fund was "quite distinct from the fund at issue in Camp."
Although Citibank's aggressive marketing strategy "might provide one indica-
tion that its Trust falls on the wrong side of the line between investments and
bona fide fiduciary services," this was not dispositive in view of the comptrol-
ler's evaluation that such promotional measures were not "sufficiently strong to
warrant concern. 8 • The court then stated that Citibank's characterization of the
trust as an "investment opportunity" should not be dispositive of whether the
trust should be regarded as a "fiduciary service," because customers of a bank's
trust department expect not only safekeeping services but also to earn a return
on the funds held in trust. In the court's view, the proper inquiry was "whether
the bank is offering a genuine fiduciary service in addition to an opportunity to
earn a return."sc

[7] Affiliations Between Banks and Securities Firms-Determining

When a Firm is "Engaged Principally" in Securities Activities
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits a member bank from being
affiliated with a company that is "engaged principally" in securities underwrit-
ing and brokerage activities. Additionally Section 32 forbids interlocking per-
sonnel relationships between a member bank and fmns "primarily engaged" in
securities dealing.· ' What amounts to being "engaged principally" and "primar-
ily engaged" has been the critical interpretive issue in a number of important
transactions. 92
When the Bankers Trust commercial paper case came back to the Board
after it was determined the private placement activities would not constitute
"underwriting", the Board considered if there would be a violation of Section 20
because the activities would be conducted through a subsidiary. The Board
concluded that the activity did not necessarily have to amount to more than fifty
percent of the company's business in order to be an activity in which the affiliate
was "engaged principally," The Board said that "the term 'engaged principally'
in section 20 denotes an activity of the affiliate that is substantial, even if the
activity does not represent more than 50 percent of the affiliate's total business
activity or its single largest or most important activity." The Board ther.

"ld. at 937
"°790 F2d at 937,
" See Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 US 441 (1947).
"See generally Note, "Banking Law-Defining 'Security' Under Glass-Steagall; and
Securit:es Affiliate Relationships," 1984 Ann, Surv, Am. L. 987-1005 (1985).
8-25 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES '18.01171

declined to set a fixed percentage for what would amount to being "engaged
principally" and approved the application on the facts ·presented."
Soon after the Board's decision in the Bankers Trust commercial paper case,
the Board decided a series of applications for approval of certain securities
activities to be conducted through affiliates of the applicant bank holding com-
panies. These applications became the occasion for the Board to develop the
views it expressed in Bankers Trust and to give specific guidelines for the
interpretation of when a holding company affiliate should be regarded as being
"engaged primarily" in securities activities for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. The applicant companies sought approval
to use wholly-owned subsidiaries that were or would be engaged in underwriting
and dealing in U.S. government and agency securities and state and municipal
government securities to also engage in activities in certain other types of
securities." The other types of securities for which the applicants sought
approval were municipal revenue bonds, mortgage related securities, securities
backed by consumer receivables, and commercial paper.
In a decision that has great significance for the future development of the
banking industry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
orders of the Federal Reserve Board granting the applications to engage in the
proposed securities activities subject to certain restrictions, and the Supreme
Court declined to review the case further. 95 The two main issues in the case both
concerned the interpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
The first issue concerned the interpretation of "securities" in Section 20.
Because Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly allows Federal Reserve
member banks to underwrite and deal in U.S. government and agency securities
and certain general obligations of state and local governments, without utilizing
affiliate firms,96 there is a distinction for the purposes of Section 16 between
"bank eligible" securities, which the banks may deal in and underwrite, and all
other "bank ineligible" securities, which Section 16 prohibits the banks from
dealing in or underwriting. The express wording of Section 20 does not contain a
similar distinction between bank eligible and bank ineligible securities, how-
ever. The first issue for the court was whether this distinction should be read into

., 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. 138. 141 (1987).

"The applicants and the Board's orders in the matters were Ci:icorp, J.P. Morgan &
Co., Inc., Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. 473 (1987); Chase
Manhattan Corp., Chemical New York Corp., Manufacturers Hanover Corp., Security
Pac. Corp., 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. 607 (1987); id. at 616; id. at 620; id. at 622.
95 Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 839
F2d 47 (2d C:r.), cert. denied, 108 S.C!. 2830 (1988). The Board did !lot pass on the
applications relating lO securities backed by consumer receivables because of the state of
the record. 839 F2d at 50.
96 See the discussion at ~ 8.01 [I] of Section 16 and the secucities actlVities permitted
by that provision.
11 8.01[7) OVERVIEW 8-26

Section 20. Section 20 prohibits Federal Reserve member banks from having an
affiliate that is "engaged principally" in underwriting or dealing in securities. If
"securities" in this section means all types of securities, then Section 20 prohib-
its affiliation regardless of the type of securities the affiliate underwrites and
deals in, so that even affiliation with firms engaged in activities involving only
bank eligible securities is barred. On the other hand, if "securities" means only
the types of bank ineligible securities described in Section 16, the prohibition
will apply only when the affiliate's activities involve bank ineligible securities.
The court concluded, as had the Board, that the bar against affiliation in Section
20 applied only when the affiliate was engaged primarily in activities in "bank
ineligible" securities. The court reasoned that if Congress saw no harm in
allowing banks to deal directly in "bank eligible" securities, there could be no
harm in permitting these same activities to bank affiliates. 91 As a result, if the
affiliate engaged in underwriting and dealing in the United States, state, and
local government obligations permitted by Section 16, then Section 20 would
not prohibit a member bank from affiliation with such firm in a oank holding
company as long as the securities firm did not engage in activities in "ineligible"
securities to the extent that these activities made the firm "engaged principally"
in such "ineligible" securities business.
The second main issue was the standard to apply in deciding when an
affiliate is "engaged princIpally" in the prohibited activities for purposes of
Section 20. The Board took the view that any substantial activity in ineligible
securities was enough to raise the bar against affiliation, and then the Board
defined what it meant by substantial using two quantitative measures. One
measure was a gross revenues test. In the Board's view. the affiliate's prohibited
activities could not exceed a range of 5 to I 0 percent of the affiliate's total gross
revenues. The other measure was a market share test, which limited the affiliate
to no more than from 5 to I 0 percent of the market for the particular security
involved. The Board look a conservative view, adopted limits of 5 percent for
both measures, ar.d provided for subsequent review and possible adjustment··
Deferring to tr.e Board, the court found that the Board's interpretation of
"cngaged principally" as meaning" any substantial activity" was reasonable.
The court agreed that the concerns that prompted Congress to limit bank affilia-
tion with securities firms are not eliminated simply by keeping the affiliate's
secu~jties aCllvities below 50 percent of ,he firm's total actiVIties." The court
ther. '-Iphe!d the quantitative gross revenue measure used by the Board, but ruled
the market share test was not within the scope of the act.'oo

91839 F2d at 62.

"ld. at 63.
"rd. at 64, 66.
"old. at 67-68. The CDun and the Board expressed disapproval of tombining the
gross incomes of two (); more affiliates to delermine whether the affili~lles were engaged
pcincipally in ineligible activity. The court explained: "The reason is plain. The pravi·
8-27 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 1l8.0118][a]

[81 Restrictions on Securities Activities Imposed by the Competitive

Equality Banking Act of 1987
A number of changes were made by the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987 to the laws governing the ability ofdepository institutions to participate
in securities activities. Some of these changes are permanent; others were
temporary.

lal Bank Holding Companies. As discussed in Chapter 5 on bank holding

companies, the 1987 act gives grandfather rights to companies that were not
previously bank holding companies and which controlled nonbank banks as of
March 5, 1987. ' °' In order to retain these rights, such companies must abide by
restrictions against marketing products or services of affiliates through the
nonbank bank when the products are ones which would not have been permissi-
ble for bank holding companies as "closely related to banking.',,02
A similar prohibition exists against marketing the products or services of
the nonbank bank through an affiliate who is not engaged "only in activities
permissible for bank holding companies" under the closely related to banking
provisions. '03 This precludes offering securities products (if they are not autho-
rized as "closely related to banking") ofan affiliate through the nonbank bank. 10.
It also prevents bank services from being marketed through a securities affiliate
that did not qualify as one that meets the test of engaging only in activities
permitted as "closely related to banking." Permission is given to continue
activities in which the nonbank bank was engaged on March 5, 1987, if done "in

sions of § 20 apply to each indi vidual company affiliated with a member bank." 839 F2d
at 63. This approach contrasts with that of the Comptroller of the Currency in an
application by the Dreyfus National Bank and Trust Company to establish a nonbank
bank. The Comptroiler concluded that the proposed bank would not be affiliated with
firms that were "engaged primarily" in securities underwriting and distribution because
the affiliate securities firms of Dreyfus should be regarded as a "single-entity." Decision
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Application of Dreyfus Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 40
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 308,313 (J 983). For a matter raising similar issues under Section
32 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibiting interlocking management relationships between a
bank and a firm "primarily engaged" in securities acti"cties see Decision ofthe Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, Application of J .W. Seligman Trust Co., N.A., 40 Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) 262-265 (1983). The Comptroller's action in the Dreyfus and Seligman cases
prompted the Federal Reserve Board to warn the applicants of the Board's contrary views
of the iegality of the proposals under SectIons 20 and 32. Current Developments, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,531 (Apr. 22, 1983); 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 758 (1983).
101 For a discussion of grandfather rights to companies that became bank holding
companIes as a result of the act, see supra at ~ 5.0\[4)[c].
102 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § j 0 I (c), lO I Stat.
552, 559 (1987) (to be codified at 12 USC § I 843(t)(3)(B) (hereinafter CEBA).
leJ fd.

104 See H. R. Conf. Rep. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code
Congo & Ad. News 489,595-596.
'I8.0118J[a) OVERVIEW 8-28

the same manner in which they were being offered or marketed as of that
date."'" The restrictions on companies with grandfather rights also include
prohibitions on overdrafts on the nonbank bank's account at a Federal Reserve
bank, except as allowed by the act. '06
The 1987 amendments prohibit certain transactions involving securities
between banks and their affiliates. These amendments apply to transactiOIis in
which a member bank engages involving the sale of securities to an affiliate,
transactions where the affiliate acts as an agent or broker for a fee, and other
transactions with the affiliate or with third parties where the affiliate partici-
pates. In these transactions, the member bank and its subsidiaries must do
business "on terms ... including credit standards, that are substantially the
same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at
the time for comparable transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated
companies ... "'07 Alternatively, when there are no comparable standards to use
for the pUrPose ofdetermining if the terms are as favorable as those used in such
transactions, the amendments require the transactions to be "on terms and
under circumstances, including credit standards, that in good faith would be
offered to, or would apply to, nonaffLliated companies."lOa The drafters
explained this means, for example, "underwriting standards may not be relaxed
in comparision to underwriting standards for transactions with nonaffiliated
companies. ",Og
There are further restrictions on a memberbank's purchasing (or a subsidi-
ary of the bank purchasing) as a fiduciary securities ofan affiliate. It is permitted
only when the instrument creating the trust or other fiduciary relationship
allows the pu~chase; when the purchase is permitted by court order; or when the
applicable lawaI' the jurisdiction would allow the purchase."° There is an
absolute prohibition on member banks and their subsidiaries against knowingly
acquiring a security, as a fiduciary or otherwise. during the period of an under-
writing or selling syndicate where the principal underwriter of the security is an
affillate of·.he bank. This ban can be lifted by obtaining, before the securities are
initlally offered for sale to the public, approval in adyance by a majority of the
outside dIrectors of the bank who are not officers or employees of the bank or the
affiliate.'" These restrictions on transactions between member banks and affili-

105 CEllA § IOl(c) (:0 be codified at 12 USC § I 843(f!( 3)).

'06 Id.
07 CEllA. § ~ 02(a). (to be codified at 12 USC § 37 \ c·1 ).
"a Id.
109 H.R. Conr. Rep. 261, supra note 104, at 133.

'" CESA § 102(a) (to be codified at j 2 USC § 37Ic-l)

", Id. The legislators said:
This requircrr.crlt could be satisfied erther by prior approval of~hc specific acquisi-
tion or by the establishment i~ advance of specific standards by the outside directors
8-29 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES If 8.01 [811b)

ates also apply to FDIC-insured nonmember banks and to Fcdcnl Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation-insured thrift institutions.'"
Additionally, the amendments apply the provisions of the Glass-Steagall
Act in Sections 20 and 32 to nonmember insured banks for a period of time from
March 6, 1987, until March I, 1988.'13 (Glass-Steagall Section 20 deals with
affiliations between member banks and securities firms; Section 32 deals with
interlocking management relationships between member banks and securities
firms."4 A similar amendment extends these provisions to FSLIC-insured insti-
tutions also until March 1, 1988.'15 In the case of FSLIC-insured institutions,
however, there are statutory exemptions from the Glass-Steagall prohibitions
for affiliations by FSLlC-insured institutions with [urns that do business in
certain real estate related securities or insurance products. ""
The temporary ban on affiliations between FDIC-insured nonmember
banks and securities firms is on new affiliations. Moreover, as explained by
Congress, it is not intended to prohibit firms that already have an affiliation
from continuing to provide new products or organize new investment vehicles in
the ordinary course of their business. 111

[bl Savings and Loan Holding Companies. Savings and loan holding compa-
nies will be regulated in a manner similar to bank holding companies under the
1987 amendments. Unless the holding company qualifies for special treatment,
as discussed below, the activities in which the holding company and its nonin-
sured subsidiaries may engage are limited.'18 The amendments list the activities
permitted to savings and loan ho:ding companies and to their subsidiaries which
are not insured institutions. This list includes activities which are now permitted
to multiple savings and loan holding companies. Also, the holding company may
engage in a business activity which the Federal Reserve Board has determined is

for such acquisitior.s. If the outside directors establish such standards, they must
reguiarly review acquisitions to assure that the standards have been followed, and
they must periodically review the standards to assure that they continue to be
appropriate in light of market and other conditions.
H.R. ConI'. Rep. 26 I, supra note 104, at 133.
"'CEBA § I02(b) (amending 12 USC § : 828(j)(I)). FSLlC insured :nslltutions are
covered by § 104(d)( I) (amending 12 USC § 1730a(p) ).
113 CEBA § 103(a) (amending 12 USC § j 818(;)). The ccstrictions In the Glass-
Steagall provisions do not apply 10 trust companies Qr credit card banks because of
exceptions created on the amendments. lei.
n. For a discussion of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, ~ee supra at ',8.0 I.
115CEHA§ I06(a) (to be codified at 12 USC§ I 73:Ja(r)).
""ld. (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730a(r)(4)).
IITH.R. ConI'. Rep. 261, supra note 104, at 134.
m CEBA § 104(b) (amending 12 USC § 1730a(c)( I) ).
1) 8.01[8I[cl OVERVIEW 8-30

permissible for bank holding companies subject to possible additional limita-

tion or regulation by the FSLIC. ll9 But the holding company must obtain the
prior approval of the FSLIC in order to begin engaging in an activity approved
for bank holding companies. 12. These restrictions do not apply, however, to a
unitary savings and loan holding company whose thrift institution meets a test
established in the amendments known as the "qualified thrift lender" test. 12t
There also are additional exemptions permitting a savings and loan holding
company to continue activities previously approved (before March 5, 1987) so
long as the holding company does not engage in certain specified activities. The
FSLIC can end this exemption by determining that the activity poses conflicts of
interest or unsound practices or should be prevented to protect the public
interest. m

[e] Moratorium on Certain Nonbanking Activities. Final\y, Title II of \he

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 imposes a moratorium on some
non banking activities. This moratorium lasted from March 6, 1987, until March
1, 1988. It covers some securities activities. An insured bank, a bank holding
company, their subsidiaries and affiliates cannot engage in the following
activities:

(A) in the flotation, unqerwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of

securities if that approval would require the agency to determine that the
entity which would conduct such activities would not be engaged princi-
pally in such activities,
(B) in any securities activity not legally authorized in writing prior to March
S, 1987, or
(C) in the operation of a nondealer marketplace in options, '"

The prohibition in item (A) curbs the developments under Section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, discussed previously, where at1ihations between member
banks and securities firms have been permitted because the securities firm has
not been "engaged principally" in securities activities.
There are exceptions to the moratorium. The prohibition in item (B) does
not apply when the bank is acting as an agent or where the bank was lawfully
engaged in those activities before March 5, 198", or the transaction closed
before June 30, 1987, Further, the moratorium does not prevent one of the
federal banking agencies from issuing orders or regulations expanding securities

". Id. (amending 12 USC § 1730a(e)(2)(F»,

120 Id. (amending 12 USC § I 730a(e)(4) ).

. '" ld. (amending 12 USC § 1730a(e)(3) ). Sec !-l.R. Conr. Rep., supra note 104, al 135,
'" Id. (amending 12 USC § I 730a(e)(6)(D) ).
'" CEBA, § 20 I,
8-31 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.02[1)

powers of banks as long as the effective date of the regulatory action is delayed
until the end of the moratorium.'"

11 8.02 THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES ACT OF 1986

II] U.S. Government Securities Market
With the enactment of the Government Securities Act of I 986,'25 Congress
put in place a system for regulation of persons who act as brokers and dealers in
U.S. government securities. Prior to this act, the provisions of the existing
federal securities laws generally did not reach the activities of brokers and
dealers in U.S. government securities because the securities laws treated U.S.
government securities as exempted securities.'26 As a result, brokers and dealers
in government securities were largely free from regulation, except to the extent
that those persons might come under the supervision of a federal regulatory
agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or one of the
banking agencies.
The U.S. government securities market has been described as "the world's
largest, most efficient and liquid securities market."'" Tens of billions ofdollars
of securities are traded daily. In 1985, the U.S. Treasury raised almost $ 1.2
trillion from this market to finance the budget deficit and to refinance debt. m
The Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve banks, paflicularly the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, playa critical role in the operation of this
market. It is a highly specialized and sophisticated market with transactions in
large dollar amounts that must be executed rapidly. The market operates in a
way that involves a complex web of interrelationships between the U.S. Trea-
sury, the Federal Reserve System, commercial banks, government securities
dealers, and others. The Senate report on the Government Securities Act gives a
description of how ttis market operates that is helpful in understanding the role
of the banking regt:latory agencies in these activities:'"
The government securities market is the cornerstone of the U.S. capital
market system. It serves as a means through which the Department of the
Treasury [Treasury] finances the national debt and provides the ability for

1241d.
m Pub. L. No. 99-571, title 1, § 101, 100 Stal. 3208 (codified at IS USC § 780-5 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
126
15 USC § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. IV 1986). See also 15 USC § 78c(a)(42) (Supp. IV
1986).
'17 S. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprin:ed in 1986 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 5395, 5399.
'28 Id .

." S. Rep. No. 426, supra note 127, at 2-4.

'18.02(1) OVERVIEW 8-32

the Government to meet seasonal shortfalls between its receipts and

cxpcndi~urc~.
The market in government securities consists of several broad categories
of participants including the U.S. Government as the issuer of the securities
through its fiscal agents, the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. In addition to the
Treasury, issuer participants also include Government-sponsored corpora-
bons and Government agency issuers of securities guaranteed by those
entities."o
To sell marketable Treasury debt, the Treasury, through the 12 Federal
Reserve district banks and their branches, sells securities to the public
through a competitive auction process. In addition, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee, uses the day-to-day purchases and sales ofgovernment securities as the
primary instrument for the conduct of monetary policy.
Private participants in the government securities market include the so-
called primary dealers in Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve Bank of
New York has recognized a group of securities dealers and commercial
banks as primary dealers. These are dealers with whom the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York has a business relationship. They are required to demon-
strate market-making capacity, creditworthiness and other factors that indi-
cate fitness for this business relationship.
Ten years ago there were 25 primary dealers. This number has grown to
the present level of 35. Fourteen of the primary dealers are banks or bank
subsidiaries, 12 are broker-dealers subject to Commission regulation and 9
are otherwise "unregulated" at the Federal level. The primary dealers are
the core group of underwriters for Treasury securities in that they partici-
pate directly and actively in auctions of new Government debt. They are
also active in making markets in the over-the-counter secondary markets
for Treasury and Federal agency securities. As market makers, primary
dealers stand ready to buy and sell securities, at the quoted bid and offered
prices. They serve as the essential bridge between the Treasury and the vast
domestlc and international network of institutions and individuals who are
the ultimate holders of Government debt. 131
In addition to the primary dealers, there are a large number of non-
pnmary or secondary dealers in government securities. The secondary

130 In addition [0 Treasury securities. the term 'go\'ernment securities' generally

includes securitles issued or guaranteed by government agencies, such as the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association [GNMA]. or go\'ernment-sponsored corpora-
,ions, such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora'cion [FHLMC], the Federal
National Mortgage Association [FNMA], and the Stt:dem Loan Marketing Associa-
tion [SLMA). ld. at 2, n.2.
13' As demonstrated by the figures below, the ownership or U.S. Treasury securities
has been changing over the last J 5 years. The primary change in the ownership of
federal debt has been a shift or approximately 29 pereen1age points from federal
gover:1menl and individual accounts to f::lfeign, stale, local government and miscella-
neou, accounts wh:ch include savings and loans, credit unions and corporate pension
trust funds. ld. at 3, r.. 3.
8-33 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 11 8.02[1)

dealers market new issues of government securities and act as market

makers in government securities. There is considerable variation in the
regulatory status of secondary dealers. Some are commercial banks, some
are institutions regulated by the Commission, and some are specialized
firms or separate subsidiaries of regulated firms that operate outside of the
federal regulatory structure.
Secondary dealers are not subject to Federal Reserve Bank of New York
oversight. They are not required to submit trading or financial data to the
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York (as primary dealers do daily) and are not
subject to Federal Reserve Bank of New York dealer surveillance visits.
However, in early 1984, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York requested
that non-primary dealers voluntarily submit position, transaction, and
financing data on a monthly basis- in order to improve monitoring of the
market. By June 1, 1984, only 26, dealers were reporting monthly and 7
daily.'32
While the exact number of secondary dealers is not known, in part
because there is no consensus definition of a dealer and in part because a
number of these dealers are not registered with a Federal agency, published
and other sources would suggest that there may be as many as 400 to 500
firms.'33 The Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York estimates that the majority
of these secondary dealers are "regulated" in the sense that their govern-
ment securities dealers operations probably take place within an otherwise
regulated banking organization or within a Commission-registered broker
or dealer. However, even with some of these regulated firms, the govern-
ment securities activities may, in fact, take place in an affiliate or subsidiary
which is not subject to Federal regulation. In addition, perhaps 100 or more
government securities dealers are wholly unregulated at the Federal level.
The Treasury Securities market performs four essential functions for the
Federal Government. First, the market is the means through which the
government finances current deficits. The Treasury sells securities to make
up for any shortfall between revenues and outlays that occur as a result of
.actions taken by Congress and the administration. Second, the market
enables the Government to refinance maturing debt. Third, the market is
the principal means through which the Federal Reserve System carries out

132 "Report on U.S. Treasury Securities-The Markets' Structure, Risks and Regula-
tions," a briefing report prepared by the General .-\ccounting Office for the Subcom-
mittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congo 2d sess., Aug. 1986, p. 27
(GAO report). Id. at 4, n.4-
'33 "Statement of E. Gerald Corrigan before the Subcommittee on Securities, May 9,
1985. See also, "Survey on the Federal Reserve System's Supervision of the Treasury
Securities Market: A Discussion Paper" prepared by the General Accounting Office
for the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congo 1st sess.
(GAO Survey), May 1985, pp. 12-13 (estimated 300 secondary dealers) and SEC
Release No. 34-21959 (Apr. 23, 1985), 50 Federal Register 15905 (SEC Release)
(estimating 200 secondary dealers)." Id. at 4, n.5.
~ 8.02(2) OVERVIEW 8-34

monetary policy. With the buying and selling of Treasury securities, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board)
is able to influence the growth of the money supply and/or change in the
market interest rates and thus to influence the direction ofeconomic activ-
ity. Fourth, the Federal Government uses the market to raise short-term
funds (cash management bills) so that it can carry out its day-to-day cash
management activities.

The much-publicized failures of a number of unregistered government

securities dealers in the period from 1975 to 1985 led to substantial losses by
some banks, thrifts, and municipal investors, as well as to one case of a deposi-
tors' run on certain thrift institutions. 134 This prompted Congress to take legisla-
tive action. The Senate report on the legislation describes the problems that led
to these failures in the following way:
In a number of failures, the firm in question had issued apparently false and
misleading financial statements. In others, problems in one company were
masked by relationships, and at times complex transactions, with affiliated
companies. Indeed, in some instances it would appear that investors may
not have fully understood which entity was the counterparty to transac-
tions. In yet other instances, it appears that the dealers in question used
working capital generated by matched-book operations to engage in trading
for their own account and in the process incurred losses because the custom-
ers failed both to know their counterparty and to secure control of the
securities underlying a repurchase transaction with the problem dealer. The
failure to know the financial status and management of the counterparty,
and the failure to secure control of underlying securities not only ultimately
resulted in the loss to the customer, but also had the effect of providing
funds to the problem dealer, thereby permitting the dealer to continue
operations in a way that may have disguised its true financial condition. 135

[2) Congressional Response-The Government Securities Act of 1986

The Government Securities Act of 1986 addresses the congressional con-
cerns In the following ways. The act does not change the status of U.S. govern-
ment securities as exempted securities under the federal securities laws, but it
establishes a special system of registration. Persons who are not already regis-
tered as brokers and dealers under the federal securities laws but who act as
government securities brokers or dealers now must register with the SEC as a
government securities broker or a government securities dealer. '36 Financial

These problems are reported in S. Rep. No. 426, supra note 127, at 7-8.
'34
13' Id. at 6-7
'" 15 USC § 780-5(a)( I)(A) (Su;>p. IV 1986). There are definitions for both "govern ..
ment securities broker" and "government securities dealer". 15 USC § 78c(43), (44)
(Supp. IV 1986). The "broker" definition refers to a person "regularly engaged in the
8-35 SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 1f 8.02[21

institutions (which include banks and insured institutions)137 and registered

brokers and dealers must give written notice to their appropriate regulatory
agency that they are acting as a government securities broker or a government
securities dealer. '33 Thus, under this scheme, a bank that qualified as either a
government securities broker or a government securities dealer under the act
and the Secretary's regulations would give notice to its customary federal bank-
ing regulatory agency of its activities.
The act gives the Secretary of the Treasury broad rulemaking authority to
provide "safeguards with respect to the financial responsibility and related
practices" of government securities brokers and dealers which may include
"capital adequacy ,tandards," rules with respect to "custody and use of custom-
ers' securities," and measures to deal with "the transfer and control of govern-
ment securities subject to repurchase agreements and in similar transactions. "'39
Except when an emergency exists, the Secretary is required to consult with the
Federal Reserve Board and the SEC. "0 The SEC exercises enforcement author-
ity over those government securities brokers and dealers who register with it,
and the banking regulatory agencies have authority under the law to exercise the
enforcement responsibility with respect to the government securities brokers
and dealers under their respective jurisdictions.'" This gives the power to the
comptroller, the Board of Governors, the FDIC, the FHLBB and the FSLIC to
enforce the act against the institutions for which they have supervisory responsi-
bility."2 The Senate Committee said:
This regulatory structure is intended to preserve the existing enforcement,
inspection and supervisory authority of the bank regulatory agencies over
the banking and nonbanking operations for which they are responsible

business of effecting transac:ions in government securities for the account of others ... "
with exclusions. The "dealer" definition refers to a person "engaged in the business of
buying and sel1:ng government securities for his own account, through a broker or other-
wise, ... " subject to exclusions. The term "government securities" is defined at 15 USC
§ 78c(42) (Supp. IV 1986) and includes "securities which are direct obligations of, or
obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States" as well as cenain
other categories of securities i:l which the United States has an interest or which are
specified by statute. See also Bloomer-tal, "SEC Regulation of Banks as Broker-Dealers,"
7 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rev. 81-88 (1985); Kulka & Keating, "Regulation of Banks as
Brokers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." I0 Seton Hall Legis. J. 67-92
(1986).
137 See definiticns at 15 USC § 78c(46) (Supp. IV 1986).
'" 15 USC § 780-5(a)( 1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
139
15 USC § 78o-5(b)(l )(A)(Supp. IV 1986). See S. Rep. No. 426, supra note 127, at
15-16.
"015 USC § 78o-5(b)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
141
15 USC § 78o-5(c)(2}(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
'42 See definition of appropriate regulatory agency 1n 15 USC § 78c(a)(34) (1982 &
Supp. lV 1986).
1: 8.02[21 OVERVIEW 8-36

under current law. For example, the Federal Reserve Board would have its
current jurisdiction over bank holding company nonbank subsidiaries that
act as government securities brokers or dealers, and the Comptroller of the
Currency would have its jurisdiction over national bank operating subsidi-
aries that act as government securities brokers or dealers. The Commission
retains its current enforcement authority over financial institution-govern-
ment securities brokers and dealers with regard to provisions of the
Exchange Act other than section 15C [the Government Securities Act
amendments].'43
The act also gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority to adopt regula-
tions for depository institutions that are not government securities brokers or
dealers to set safeguards for U.S. government securities that the institution holds
"as fiduciary, custodian, or otherwise for the account of a customer and not for
its own account ... "'44 The regulations are to "provide for the adequate
segregation of ... [the securities held by the institution], including obligations
which are purchased or sold subject to resale or repurchase. ",4S This section is
directed at problems that had been reported to Congress of institutions failing to
follow proper procedures in the custody of government securities of their cus-
tomers. 14. There is a procedure that allows the Secretary of the Treasury to defer
to the rules of the banking regulatory agency when the Secretary finds those rules
are adequate.'"

143S. Rep. No. 426, supra nole 127, al 18.

144pub. L. No. 99-571, title II, § 201, 100 Sial. 3222 (1986) (amending 31 USC
§§ 3121(h)(I), 9110).
14sld.
14. S. Rep. No. 426, supra note 127, at 22.
'47 3 I USC § 3121 (h)( 4) (Supp. IV 1986). Sec S. Rep. :'<0. 426, supra nOle 127, al 22.
 9
Enforcement Powers of the
Banking Regulatory Agencies
Under Federal Banking Laws
1) 9.01 Regulating Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices. . . . . . . . . . . ()-]
[I] Cease and Desist Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
[2] Suspension and Removal of Officers and Directors . . . . . . . . ()-4
[a] Authority of the Federal Supervisory Agencies. . . . . . . . . 9-4
[bJ P:'ocedure for Removal or Suspension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
[3] Civil Money Penalties ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
[4] Special Liabilities of Officers and Directors " ()-] 0
[5] Judicial Review of Agency Actions :. ... ... ... ... 9-11
~ 9.02 Transactions With Insiders and Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ()-12
[I] Loans to or by Executive Oificers of Member Banks ..... " 9-12
[2] Loans to Officers of Banks Where Correspondent Accounts
Are Maintained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
[3] Transactions With Affiliates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9-15
[4] Restrictions on TransactIOns With Affiliates Under the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 " ()-16
[5] Tying Arrangements " 9-17
[6] Interlocking Management Arrangements " 9-20

'19.01 REGULATING UNSAFE AND U;-;SOl.'ND BANKIl\'G

PRACTICES
[1\ Cease and Desist Orders
The power to issue cease and desist orders was granted to the federal
supervisory agencies' by the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of i 966

•These regulatory bodies include the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

9-1
 OVERVIEW 9-2
~ 9.01[1)

(FISA), and that power was expanded by the Fin~ncial Instituti~ns Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FlRA). The appropnate regulatory
agency may issue a cease and desist order against an institution, or against an
ofiicer or director thereof, when, in the opinion of the appropriate federal
banking agency, the institution or the officer or director has engaged in, is
engaging in, or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice." Unsafe and
unsound banking practices are practices that are generally viewed as contrary to
accepted standards of banking operations, which practices might result inabnor-
mal risk Dr loss to the financial institution. 4 The discretionary authority of the
federal regulations agency to define and eliminate unsafe and unsound conduct
is liberally construed. 5 The couns, in interpreting the banking acts, have held
that Congress intended to commit the definition of these practices to the exper-
tise of the appropriate regulatory agencies. 5
Unsafe or unsound banking practices include renewing loans without col-
lecting the interest already due,7 securing loans inadequately,· extending
unsecured credit without first obtaining adequate financial information,· hav-
ing unwritten, if any, repayment and amortization schedules'· or failing to
establish and enforce programs for repayment of loans," failing to maintain
adequate capital reserves, '2 and failing to make adequate provisions for liquid-

the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, and the National Credit Union Association (NCUA).
2 For a more in-depth history of federal enforcement regulations, see S. Huber, Bank
Officer's Handbook of Government Regulation, ch. 22 (Supp. 1988).
312 USC §§ 1464(d)(2)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(e)(I) (FSLIC), 1786(e)(l) (NCVA),
1818(b)( 1) (Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC») (1982).
• See First Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F2d 674, 685 (Sth CiT.
1983).
'Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F2d 1164 (DC Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 449 US 823 (1980).
'See First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 610 F2d 1258 (5th CiT. 1980); Groos Nat'! Bank v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F2d 889 (5th CiT. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Depanment
of Treasury, 568 F2d 610 (8th CiT. 1978).
'Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, 766 F2d 175 (5th Cir. 1985).
• Id.; First State Bank v. FDIC, 770 F2d 81 (6th Cir. 1985).
• First State Bank v. FDIC, supra note 8.
,. Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, supra note 7.
11 First State Bank v. FDIC, supra note 8.

12 See Internatior:al Lending Supervision Act of 1983, at 12 VSC §§ 3901 -39 12 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). ThIS act reversed a U.S. Coun of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision
First NaCI Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 4, which held that th~
comptroller's finding that the bank had inadequate capital reserves, contrary to safe and
sound banking practices, could not suppOli a cease and desist order requiring that the
bank maintain its equity capital at a level of not less than 7 percent of its total assets. The
act authorizes the Comptroller, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board to establish and
9-3 ENFORCEMENT POWERS " 9.01[11

ity.13 The agency may also issue a cease and desist order for a violation of any
banking laws, rules, or regulat;ons, or for any written agreement between the
agency and the institution or an officer or director.'·
Although a subsequent amendment to a statute may correct a violation, the
amendment does not annul the violation that has occurred, and the agency may
still issue a cease and desist order if necessary." Similarly, a regulatory agency
may issue a cease and desist order even when the institution voluntarily stops
engaging in the unsound practices that the order was directed against, because it
is generally possible for the institution to resume those practices. ,.
Once the agency determines that there is cause for a cease and desist order,
it must serve notice on the institution or the officer or director containing a
statement of the facts and providing for a hearing within thirty to sixty days of
the date of the notice." Ifthe financial institution consents or if the administra-
tive law jUdge finds that a violation or an unsafe and unsound condition exists,
the agency may issue a cease and desist order." A cease and desist order gener-
ally requires the institution or the officer or director to terminate a policy or
practice, but it may also require that the institution take affirmative action to
correct the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice.'9
A supervisory agency may issue a temporary cease and desist order, which
takes effect immediately, if it determines that the charges making up the cease
and desist order are likely to cause insolvency, to weaken seriously the condition
of the institution, or otherwise to prejudice seriously the interests of its deposi-
tors prior to completion of the normal proceedings. 20 Temporary cease and

enforce mandatory capital adequacy standards. See ~ 7.0 I [1 J for a discussion of capital
reserves.
"Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, supra note 7.
"12 USC §§ 1464(d)(2)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(e)(l) (FSLIC), 1786(e)(I) (NCUA),
1818(b) (FRB and aCC) (1982). Cease and desist authority may be expressly incorpo-
rated into other banking laws and regulations. For example, the ~oney Laundering
Comrol Act of 1986, 99 Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1359, 100 Stat. 3207-3227 (1986) (amend-
ing 12 USC §§ 1464(d), 1730, 1786, 1811(i)(2)(i). 1818(s)), specifically provides that
regulatory agencies should use their authority to issue cease and desist orders to enforce
the monetary transaction reporting requirements (See ~ 12.01).
15 First Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 4.

,. First State Bank v. FDIC, supra note 8; FSLlC v. Glen Ellyn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 606
F. Supp. 91 (ND III. 1984).
17 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(2)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(e)(I) (FSLIC), I 786(e)(1 ) (NCUA),
1818(b)(I) (FRB and aCC) (1982).
" Id.
"rd. The order generally becomes effective thirty cays after service of the order upon
the bank or officer or director. l[the order is by consent, it becomes effective on the date
outlined in the order. rd. at §§ 1464(d)(2)(B), 1730(e)(2), 1786(e)(2), '1818(b)(2) (1982).
20 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(3)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(:)(1) (FSLIC), 1786(1)(1) (NCUA),
1818(c)(I) (FRB and aCC) (1982).
 OVERVIEW 9-4
" 9.01 (21lal

desist orders remain effective pending completion of the administrative pro-

ceedings and until the agency dismisses the charges, or until the temporary order
is replaced with a permanent order. 21
Within ten days after service with a temporary cease and desist order, the
bank or officer or director may apply to the U.S. District Court for an injunction
setting aside, limiting, or suspending the order pending the completion of the
administrative proceedings. 22 Similarly, the district court may enforce a tempo-
rary cease and desist order against the named party who is violating or threaten.
ing to violate its terms. 23

[2] Suspension and Removal of Officers and Directors

la) Authority of the Federal Supervisory Agencies. The federal supervisory
agencies have the power to remove or suspend officers or directors of financial
institutions they supervise. Three substantive findings must be made before an
officer or director may be removed:
1. The first finding is that in the agency's opinion, the officer or director
has:
a. Committed a violation of law, rule, or regulation or of a cease and desist
order;
b. Engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound practice in connection
with the institution; or
c. Committed or engaged in any act, omission, or practice that constitutes a
breach of the officer's fiduciary duty. 2.
2. The agency must then determine that:
a. ,The bank has suffered or will probably suffer substantial financial loss or
other damage;
b. The interests of its depositors could be seriously prejudiced by reason of
such violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty; or
c. The director or officer has received financial gain by his or her violation
or practice or breach of fiduciary duty.2S

"12 USC §§ 1464(d)(3)(B) (FHLBB), 1730(f)(2) (FSLlC), 1786(f)(2) (NeUA),

1818(c)(2) (FRB and aCe) (1982).
., Id.
" (d.
24
12 USC §§ 1464(dX4)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(g)(1) (FSLIC), 1786(g)(l) (NeUA),
1818(e)(J) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
,. Id.
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS ~ 9.01[2)[a)
9-5

3. The third finding is that the violation or practice or breach of fiduciary

duty is one that involves personal dishonesty or is one that de~o~str~tes2:
willful or continuing disregard for the safety or soundness of the mstltutlon.
The authority of the supervisory agencies to prohibit an officer from
involvement in the affairs of the depository institution is not limited to the
institution at which the improper conduct took place. The supervisory agencies
may prohibit an officer or director from participating in the affairs ofan institu-
tion ifit finds that the officer or director has, with respect to another institution,
by conduct or practice, evidenced either the officer's personal dishonesty or a
willful or continuing disregard for that institution's safety and soundness, with
resulting substantial financial loss or other damage. 27
The authority of the federal agencies to remove or suspend officers or
directors has generally been upheld!1 While this authority is broad, it is not
unlimited. In a case involving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Anonymous v. FDIC,>9 the U.S. district court of the District of Columbia found
that the FDIC had exceeded its statutory authority when it issued an order that
removed an individual from his office and also prohibited him from participat-
ing in the conduct of any federally insured bank. (At the time, he had held
positions in several small banks.) Following an examination, the FDIC found
that the individual was associated to various degrees with several problem loans.
The FDIC later amended its order to prohibit the individual from further
participating in the examined bank and to require him to secure prior written
approval before servmg or acting as a director, officer, or employee of any
federally insured bank or voting for a director of any such bank.'·
The court found that the statute granted authority to the FDIC to remove a
bank officer for misconduct or mismanagement as an official for a particular
bank under 12 USC § 1818(e)(l), butthat the FDIC could not remove an officer
under this section for misconduct at another bank." The court found that
Section 1818(e)(2) would allow the FDIC to remove an officer as a result of
misconduct with respect to another insured bank, but that this power could be

" Id.
2'12 USC §§ 1464(d)(4)(B) (FHLBB), 1730{g)(2) (FSLIC), 1786(g)(2) (NCUA),
1818(e)(2) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
29 See Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1984) (removal of two ofEcers and
directors for breach of their fiduciary duties upheld where the FDIC had told the individ-
uals that a cashier and fellow director had been making loans above the legal lending limit,
and, although they confronted the cashier and told him to stop, they took no funher steps
and failed to inform the banking regulatory agencies); Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783
F2d 1580 (11 th Cir. 1986) (removal of three officers upheld because board's finding was
supponed by substantial evidence, and remedies were not arbitrary or capricious).
29 619 F. Supp. 866 (DDC 1985). .
30Id. at 867.
3' Id. at 869.
11 9.01[211b] OVERVIEW 9-6

exercised only if the other requirements for removal under Section 1818 (e)(2)
were met. 3' These requirements include a finding by the FDIC of personal
dishonesty or a willful or continuing disregard for a bank's safety and
soundness. 33

(b] Procedure for Removal or Suspension. The procedure to remove or sus-

pend an officer or director is very similar to that for cease and desist orders. A
notice ofintent to remove must be served on the officer or director, which notice
contains a statement ofthe facts constituting the grounds for removal and fixes a
date for a hearing within thirty to sixty days after the date ofservice. 3' An earlier
or a later date may be set by the agency upon request ofthe officeror director, or
other person, for good cause shown, orby request of the Attorney General of the
United States. 3S If the facts in the notice are established at the hearing, the
agency may issue an order of suspension or removal on the officer or director.
Temporary suspension or prohibition orders are available to the supervi-
sory agencies when they deem it necessary for the protection of the institution or
for the interests of depositors. These orders are effective upon service, and
remain in effect until the administrative suspension or removal proceeding is
completed, the charges are dismissed, or the order is stayed by a federal district
court. 3. The financial institution must also be served with a copy of the tempo-
rary order. 37 Within ten days after any director or officer has been suspended.
from office andlor prohibited from participating in the conduct of the affairs of a
financial institution, such person may apply to the U.S. District Coun for a stay
of the suspension or prohibition, pending completion of the administrative
proceedings. 3• A removal from office during the pendency of administrative
proceedings is significant as a practical matter, since such hearings commonly
last a year or longer."
Federal supervisory agencies may also suspend or remove any official
charged with a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust if the agency
determines that the official's continued service or participation in the conduct of

"Id. at 869-870.
3J Id. Sec supra r.ote 27.

3. 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(4)(E) (FHLDB), 1730(g)(5) (FSLIC), 1786(e)(5) (NClIA).

1818(e)(5) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
3sld.
35
12 USC §§ 1464(d)(4)(D) (FHLBB), 1730(g)(4) (FSLIC), 1786(g){4) (NCllA),
1818(e)(4) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
371d.
35 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(4)(F) (FHLDB), 1730(g)(6) (FSLlC), 1786(g)(6) (NCllA),
1818(f) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
39 S. Huber, Bank Officer's Handbook of Government Regulation, § 22.04{2]{bl
(Supp. 1988) (citing Anonymous v. FDIC. 619 F. Supp. 866, 873 n.27 (DOC 1985)}.
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS 11 9.01[2Ilb}
9-7

the financial institution threatens the interests of the institution's depositors or

may threaten to impai.r public confidence in the institution.'· The agency may
suspend or prohibit the official from further participation in the affairs of the
institution by written notice, a copy of which must also be served on the
financial institution. 41 The suspension or prohibition remains in effect until the
charge is finally disposed of, or until the agency terminates the order!2 Convic-
tion is sufficient grounds for permanent removal, but an acquittal or other
disposition of the charge does not necessarily reinstate the individual or pre-
clude the agency from removing or suspending the officer under the general
removal powers outlined previously.'"
Within thirty days after the officer is served with notice of suspension or
removal, the person concerned may request in writing an opportunity to appear
before the agency to show that his or her continued service to or participation in
the conduct of the affairs of the institution does not, or is not likely to, pose a
threat to the interests of the bank's depositors or threaten to impair public
confidence in the institution." The agency must provide for a hearing within
thirty days, at which the individual charged may appear, with counsel, to present
written materials and oral argument supporting his or her position. 45 Within
sixty days after the hearing, the agency must notify the official as to whether the
suspension or prohibition will be continued, terminated, or otherwise
modified."
After the final order suspending or removing an officer or director itself
becomes final, violation of the order by participation in the conduct of the
affairs of the bank or by exercising any voting rights in such bank is a criminal
offense, which upon conviction may result in a fine of$5,OOO or imprisonment
for up to one year, or both. 47 The original provisions regarding suspension for
felonies in FISA did not provide for a hearing. This subsection was amended by
FlRA after the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
removal of an officer charged with a felony without a hearing either prior
to or promptly after the removal deprived an individual of due process."
The amended procedures give a suspended bank officer a right to a post-

'012 USC §§ 1464(d)(5)(A) (FHLBB), 1730(h)(I) (FSLIC), ; 786(i)(l) (NCUA),

1818(g)(1) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
<lId.
<lId.
43Id.
"Id.
45Id.
'6Id.
47 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(12)(A) (FHLBB), I 730(p)( 1) (FSLIC), 1786(1) (NCUA), 1818(j)
(FRB and OCC) (1982) .
.. Feinberg Y. FDIC, 420 F. Supp. 109 (DDC 1976).
 OVERVIEW 9-8
11 9.01[211bj

suspension hearing to demonstrate that the continuation of the officer's en: ploy-
ment would not pose a threat to the bank or impair public confidence III the
bank. At the request of the officer, a hearing must be held within ninety days of
the suspension. These amen~ed procedures were upheld in a 1988 Supreme
Court decision." .
In Mallen v. FDIC, 50 a banker who served as president and direc~or of
Farmers State Bank was indicted on two felony counts of making false state-
ments to both ~he bank and the FDIC. The FDIC suspended him by written
notice according to 12 USC § 1818(g) after making findings that continued
service by the bank officer would impair public confidence in the bank. The
officer brought suit in federal court to challenge the suspension without complet-
ing the process for a hearing and review before an administrative law judge. The
federal district court concluded that the suspension violated the officer's due
process rights because the procedures did not give the officer the opportunity for
a prompt hearing on the validity ofthe suspension, and the hearing provided for
would not be one where the officer could present oral evidence. 51
The Supreme Court reversed this decision and upheld the constitutionality
of the suspension procedures on both grounds. 52 Although the statutory proce-
dures contemplated that a hearing might not be held until as long as ninety days
after the suspension, the court believed that this period was not necessarily a
denial of due process, in light of both the public interest in allowing the agency
sufficient time to prepare for a hearing and to reach a correct decision on the
suspension, and the likelihood that a basis for the suspension existed because of
the action of the grand jury in deciding that there was probable cause to issue an
indictment. 53 The court also concluded that the form of the hearing did not
violate the bank officer's right to due process. Even ifthere were cases where due
process required consideration of oral testimony, the FDIC procedures allowed
the hearing officer to permit such evidence to be introduced. In this case, the
bank officer had made no request to present such testimony. Consequently, the
Dank officer could not complain that he had been deprived of the opportunity to
present it. S4 In reaching these conclusions, the court expressly noted that all
parties, including the court, agreed that due process did not require the FDIC to
conduct a hearing before the suspension, in light of the important public interest
in swift action by the FDIC to preserve the integrity of banking institutions."

49 Mallen v. FDIC, ,08 S. Cl. 1780 (1988).

" Id.
" 667 F. SuPp. 652 (ND Iowa 1987).
"Ylallcn v. FDIC, 108 S.C!. 1780 (1988).
"55 USLW at 4468.
" 56 USLW at 4469.
55 56 USLW al 4467-4468.
9-9 ENFORCEMENT POWERS 11 9.01[3)

[3] Civil Money Penalties

Supervisory agencies may assess civil money penalties against institutions
and their officers, directors, employees, and agents who violate specified federal
banking laws or regulations promulgated" or the terms of any final cease and
desist order.57 Civil money penalties may be assessed for violations of limita-
tions of loans by insured banks to executive officers and directors or to affili-
ates,S' for failure to meet reserve requirements," or for violations of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (as amended)6o and the Change of Bank Control
Act of 1978. 61
Penalties for most violations are not to exceed $1,000 per day for each day
during which such violation continues. 52 Civil money penalties are not manda-
tory; they are subject to the discretion of the federal supervisory agency.63 To
determine the amount of the penalty, the agency must take into account the size
offinancial resources and the good faith ofthe institution or person charged, the
gravity of the violation, the history of previous violations, and such other
matters as justice may require. 64
After determining that a penalty is appropriate and is within the statutory
maximums, the agency must issue a notice of assessment to the person or
institution charged. 65 The institution or person assessed has ten days in which to
make a request for an administrative hearing. If no hearing is requested, the
assessment becomes a final and unappealable order." If the allegations are
established at the hearing, the agency issues an order of assessment. The institu-
tion or person assessed may then make an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals

.. 12 USC § 93(b) (1982). For a more detailed analysis of civil money penalties and
director liability, see L. Nicholas, "FIRA: Emerging Patterns of Director Liability," 103
Banking U 151 (1986).
57 12 USC §§ I 464(d)(8)(B)(i) (FHLBB), 1730(k)(3)(A) (FSLIC), 1786(k)(2)(A)
(NCVA), 1818(i)(2)(i) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
58 See 12 USC §§ 375(b) and 371c (1982). See Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 765 F2d 569 (6th
Clr. 1985) (civil penalty of$I,OOO against a director was proper for his breach onegal and
fiduciary duties in approving insider loans over lending limits and with insufficient
security). See also 11 9.02.
59 12 USC § 461 (1982). See 1111 3.04[2], 7.0 I.
60
12 USC §§ 1841-1850 (1982). See 115.02.
61]2 USC§ 18 I 7(j)(Supp.IV 1986). See1l13.03(4].
52 12 USC §§ 93{b); I 464(d)(8)(B)(i) (FHLBB), I 730(k)(3)(A) (FSLIC), 1786(k)(2)(A)
(NCVA), 1818(i)(2)(i) (FRB and OCC) (1982).
63 Id.
64 12 USC §§ 1464(d){8)(B) (FHLBB), 1730(k)(3) (FSLlC), 1786(k)(2) (NeUA),
1818(i)(2) (FRB and acC) (1982).
65 Id. The rules implementing civil money penalty procedures are codified at 12 CFR
§§ 19.22-19.25, 263.30-263.33, 308.64-308.72 and 747.401-747.408 (1987).
66 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(8)(B) (FHLBB), 1730(k)(3) (FSLIC), 1786(k)(2) (NCUA),
18 I8(i)(2) (FRB and acC) (1982).
 9-10
v9.0114) OVERVIEW

within twenty days of service of the final assessment order. &7 If an institution or
person fails to pay an assessment after it has become a final and unappealable
order, or after the appeals court has entered final judgment in favor of the
agency, the agency must then refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney Genera~, w~o
is authorized to sue on behalf ofthe agency to recover the penalty In U.S. Dlstrlct
Court'"

14] Special Liabilities of Orficers and Directors

Officers and directors may be personally liable under several statutory
provisions.'" Section 93(a) of the National Bank Act holds directors personally
liable upon a showing (in a district court) that they knowingly violated any of the
provisions of the chapter!" Civil money penalties are also available against
officers and directors, making them personally liable for violations of banking
laws or of cease and desist orders." A third method of holding officers and
directors personally liable; subject to more controversy than the first two meth-
ods, involves the broad authority ofthe supervisory agencies to issue cease and
desist orders.
Regulators have issued cease and desist orders requiring that officers or
directors personally indemnify the bank for loans made that exceed legal lending
limitations. Because cease and desist authority allows supervisory agencic~ to
order affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from violations, at
least one court has upheld such personal liability. 72 In De/ Junco v. Conover,'3 a
bank made a series of loans to insiders. During a routine examination, the
examiner decided that the loans should be aggrega·ted. When they were aggre-
gated, the loans exceeded the bank's lending limits. The court confirmed the
Comptroller of the Currency's authority to order indemnification by the direc-

., Id.
.. Id. In this collection proceeding, the validity and appropriateness of the final order
imposing the penalty is not suhject to review. Id.
··See generally Banks & Hoskins, "Liability and Responsibility of Bank Directors:
Being Alert to Troubled Times," 72 Ky. U 639-670 (1983-1984); Hawke, "The Limited
Role of Directors in Assuring the Soundness of Banks." 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 285-290
(1987); Searle, "Director Liability and the Relationship Belween Bankers and Regula-
tors," 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 291-297 (1987); Vartanian & Schley, "Bank Officer and
Director Liability-Regulatory Actions," 39 Bus. Law. 1021-1031 (1983-1984); Notes,
"Imposition of Personal Liability on Bank Directors for Violation of Lending Limits
Under Section i 818(b)(l) Enforcement Proceedings: Triso Del Junco v. Conover," 3
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 355-367 (1984)', "Banking RegUlations/Excessive Loans/Director's
Liability," 75 III. BJ 514-517 (1987).
10 12 USC § 93(a).( 1982).

" For a discussion of civil money penalties, see supra ~ 9.01 [3J.
"See Del Junco v. Conover, 682 F2d 1338 (9th eir. 1982), cert. tlenied, 459 U.S.
1146 (1983).
7J 682 F2d at 1338.
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS ~ 9.01[5J
9-11

tors.74 The circuit court did not, however, reach the question of what standard is
required for liability under cease and desist authority. The court noted that "on
its face Section 1818(b)(I) requires no knowledge on the part of the wrong-
doer. "7S The bank directors argued that Section 1818(b) imports the scienter
requirement of Section 93, requiring a knowing violation. However, the court
avoided the issue because it found that even if a "knowing" standard was
required, it was met in this case.'6
In Larimore v. Clarke,77 however, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, en bane, reversed an earlier panel decision and found that the comptrol-
ler's power to issue cease and desist orders to prevent unsafe and unsound
banking practices does not include the authority to impose personal monetary
liability on directors for knowingly approving bank loans that violate the loan
limitations of the National Bank Act. 78 Although the powers granted to the
comptroller include the power to require affirmative action to correct the condi-
tions that result from unsafe and unsound practices, the affirmative action
contemplated by these provisions does not include the power to require direc-
tors to reimburse the bank for loans made in excess of the bank's lending
limitations. To establish personal liability ofdirectors, the specific provisions of
Section 93 of the National Bank Act, which provisions provide for director
liability for knowing violations of the act, must be followed. Under Section 93, a
federal district court must determine the liability of the director. In concluding
that the comptroller lacked authority to impose monetary liability on the direc-
tors, the court distinguished the situation in which a director had been person-
ally enriched as a result ofthe improper banking practices. Personal enrichment,
the court said, might be a basis for requiring reimbursement."

[5) Judicial Review of Agency Actions

The U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction over temporary cease and desist
order.s and removal or suspension orders. For permanent orders, the officer,
director, or financial institution must appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the home office of the institution is located. 80 An appeal from a

741d.
7S Id. at 1342.
761d. The court die not discuss the fact that under Section 93, it is a district court that
deterr.1ines that the director knowingly violated a federal banking law, not the regulatorv
agency, as is the case with cease and desist orders. .
77 789 F2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

"Id.
79 See First Nat'l Bank v. Department of the Treasury, supra note 6 (upholding
Comptroller's order requiring bank officers to reimburse the bank for bonuses improperly
paid to the officers). .
80 12 USC §§ 1464(d)(7)(B) (FHLBB), 1730 U)(2) (FSLIC), (7860)(2) (NCUA),

18! 8(h)(2) (FRB and OCC) (1982).

~ 9,02 OVERVIEW 9-12

permanent order must be filed within thirty days after service of the order, but
the filing of an appeal does not stay the order unless the reviewing court orders
otherwise. 81
The appeals court uses a "substantial evidence" standard of review for
administrative decisions. The court must give deference to the findings and
conclusions of the agency, and may not reverse its action unless the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or unless the
remedies formulated constitute an abuse ofdiscretion or are otherwise arbitrary
and capricious.·2
Several attempts have been made to thwart a supervisory agency's enforce-
ment powers by seeking injunctive relief from a district courLe> By statute, a
district court has no jurisdiction to review agency actions,84 so the party chal-
lenging the agency action usually contends that it is not seeking review of the
order, but rather is seeking reliefbecause the agency acted outside the scope oHts
authority and the order should not have been issued at all. These attempts have
been consistently unsuccessful,85 but the courts generally acknowledge that such
an exception to the jurisdictional bar may exist in extreme situations in which it
is apparent from the face of the record that the agency has grossly exceeded its
authority in issuing the order.·'

119,02 TRANSACTIONS WITH INSIDERS AND AFFILIATES

III Loans to or by Executive Officers of Member Banks

Under 12 USC § 375a, there are limitations on the circumstances under
which a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System may make loans or

8lld.
82 See Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, supra note 28; Bank of Dixie v. FDIC, supra note
7; Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, supra note 58; First Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency,
supra note 4.
n First Nat'/ Bank of Grayson v. Conover, 715 F2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983); Groos Nat'l
Bank v. ComptroUer of the Currency, supra note 6; Abercrombie v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 641 F. Supp. 598 (SO Ind. 1986); Somerfield v. FDIC, 609 F. Supp. 128 (DC
Tenn. (985).
&'12 USC § /818(i)(I) (1982), which provides in part that "except as otherwise
provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or other.
wise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review
modify. suspend, terminate, Or set aside any such notice or order." See also 12 USC
§§ /464(8)(A), 1730(k)(2), 1786(j)(2) (1982).
as Grayson, 715 F2d at 234; Groos, 572 F2d at 889; Abercrombie, 641 F. SuPp. at 598;
Somerfield. 609 F. Supp. at 128. .
88 Grayson, 715 F2d at 236; Groos, 573 F2d at 894-895; Abercrombie, 641 F. Supp. at
602.
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS '1 9.02(11
9-13

otherwise extend credit to its executive officers. Correspondingly, there are

limitations on the member bank's executive officers extending credit to the
bank.•' The action extending credit must be "promptly reported" to the bank's.
board of directors. The statute requires that (1) the loan be one that the bank
would be authorized to make to borrowers other than its officers; (2) the terms of
the loan be "not more favorable than those afforded other borrowers"; (3) the
officer supply a "detailed current financial statement"; and (4) the loan be due
and payable on demand if the officer becomes indebted to other banks in excess
of the limits permitted for loans to the officer.··
The statute specifically approves the following: (1) loans for the officer's
personal residence when secured by a first mortgage lien;·' (2) loans for educa-
tional expenses of the officer's children;"" and (3) other loans as prescribed by
regulation by the appropriate federal banking regulator." The bank must report
any loans made to its executive officers or loans made by its officers, as part ofits
reports to the banking regulatory agencyY An executive officer may incur
indebtedness by indorsing or guaranteeing loans or other assets that the bank has
previously acquired when the officer performs those actions "for the purpose of
protecting the bank against loss" or for the purpose of "giving financial assist-
ance to" the bank.'3 Violations of these rules subject the bank to liability under
the provisions dealing with unsafe and unsound practices and to termination of
insured status."
Additional limitations affect the ability of member banks to make loans to
their executive officers, to persons who are in a position to control 10 percent of
the banks' voting stock, to companies controlled by the banks' executive officers,
or to political campaign committees controlled by such persons or under circum-

87 12 USC § 375a (1982). See generally Mattingly, "Insider Lending Restrictions and
Reporting Requirements Under the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978 As Amended," 3 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 21-87 (1984).
8·12 USC § 375a(l) (1982). When this occurs, the officer must report to the board of
directors the circumstances regarding the loans. Id. at § 375a(6).
•• Id. at § 375a(2).
,oId. at § 375a(3).
"Id. at § 375a(4). The bank may not make loans to a partnership where its executive
officers have a majority interest in the partnership, except to the extent the loan would be
permllted under this general category. In these cases, "the full amount of any credit so
extended [to the partnership] shall be considered to have been extended to each officer of
the bank who is a member of the partnership." Id. at § 375a(5). The regulations imple-
menting Section 375(a)(4) are found at 12 CFR § 31 (1987) for national banks and at 12
CFR § 215 (1987) for state member banks.
92 12 USC § 375a(9) (1982).

9J 12 USC § 375a(7) (1982).

94 12 USC § 375a(8) (1982), which makes a violation of Section 375a a violation of 12

USC § 1818.
 OVERVIEW 9·14
~ 9.02111

stances in which the funds will benefit the executive officer. 95 In such cases, the
loans may not aggregate an amount greater than that which the bank is permitted
to loan to a single borrower."
Additionally, the bank may not make such loans in excess of the limits that
may be set by regulation by the banking agencies, except through advance
approval of the bank's board of directors, with the interested officer abstaining
from any direct or indirect participation in the vote. 91 Further, any loans must be
made "on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral, as
those prevailing at the time for comparahle transactions with other persons
and ... [must not) involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present
other unfavorable features."98 The bank also may not pay an overdraft of the
officer at the bank.·· However, the payment will not be viewed as an overdraft
payment if it is a preauthorized transfer of funds from another account of the
officer at th(' bank, or if there is a written preauthorized arrangement to extend
credit that bears interest to pay the overdraft. 100 The provisions on loans to
executive officers and to companies and political campaign committees con-
trolled by executive officers also apply to FDIC-insured nonmember banks.'01
Purchases and sales of securities and other property between a member
bank and a member of the hank's board of directors are allowed under the
federal banking laws as long as the purchase or sale is "in the regular course of
business upon terms not less favorable to the bank than those offered to others,"
or has been approved by a majority of the board of directors who have no
interest in the transaction. ,.2
Officers have personal liability for knowingly viOlating or permitting an
agent or officer of a member bank to violate the previously stated provisions. '03
Moreover, officers and directors who participate in or assent to such violations
are liable in their personal and individual capacities to the bank, to its sharehold-
ers, and to other persons for all damages they might have sustained because of
the violations.'" There also are civil penalties, which may amount up to $1,000
per day while the violation continues. The penalty may be assessed against an

"12 USC§ 375h(1982).

96 The single borrower limits are contained in 12 USC § 84 (1982).
91
12 USC § 375b(2)(1982).
91
12 USC § 375b(3) (1982).
9912 USC §3 75b(4} (1982).
"012 USC § 375b(6}(F} (1982).
101 12 USC § 1828U}(2) (1982) makes the provisions of 12 USC § 375b applicable to
FDIC-insured banks.
'" 12 USC§ 375 (1982).
103 12 USC § 503 (1982). This imposes liability for violations of 12 USC §§ 375, 37 5a,
37Sb, and 376, and the regulations implementing these sections. .
'0' 12 USC § 503 (1982). A court has held that an omeer may be liahle for a civil
penalty regardless of whether proven damages result. Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, supra note 58.
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS 11 9.0213]
9·15

officer, director, employee, agent, "or other person participating in the conduct
of the affairs of such member bank ... " who violates the federal laws discussed
previously.'os In one case, a bank president was held liable for violation of the
provisions against insider loans, although the president subsequently reported
the loan to the banking regulatory agency. The court said that the president's
good faith efforts were relevant to the determination ofthe penalty but not to the
existence of the violation. 106

[2] Loans to Officers of Banks Where Correspondent Accounts Are

Maintained
Federal law limits the ability of a bank to make loans to executive officers of
banks with whom the bank has a correspondent relationship.'07 These restric-
tions apply to all banks, as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act.'oa If a
bank holds a correspondent account of another bank, neither bank may loan
funds or extend credit to executive officers, directors, or other persons with a
control interest of their correspondent bank, except as permitted by the statute.
The loan must be "on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and
collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other
persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment or present
other unfavorable features. '09 There are civil penalties of up to $1,000 per day
for violations.

[3] Transactions With Affiliates

Extensive regulations exist to deal with the transactions between a member
bank, including its subsidiaries, and affiliates of the bank. 110 Member banks and
their subsidiaries are prohibited from engaging in certain transactions with their
affiliates. Firstly, they may not have "covered" transactions with anyone affili·
atl; that exceed 10 percent ofthe capital stock and surplus of the member bank,
and they may not have such transactions with all affiliates that exceed 20 percent
of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank.'" Secondly, unless special
conditions are met, they may not purchase "Iow-quality" assets, as defined by

05
' 12 USC § 504(a) (1982). It applies to violations of 12 USC §§ 371c, 375, 375a,
375b, 376, and 503, and the regulations thereunder.
'06 Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, supra note 58.
107
12 USC § 1972 (1982).
108 12 USC § 1971 (1982).

109 12 USC § 1972(2)(A), 1972(2)(B), 1972(2)(C), 1972(2)(0) (1982).

"0 12 USC § 371 c (1982). These provisions also apply to nonmember FDIC-insured
banks. 12 USC § 1828(j) (1982). See generally Rose & Talley, "Bank Transactions With
Affiliates: The New Section 23A," 100 Banking U 423-438 (1983).
11112 USC § 371c(a)(l) (1982).
 OVERVIEW 9-16
~ 9.()2(41

law, from an affiliate.'" Thirdly, loans and other credit made by the member
bank to an affiliate, as well as guarantees or letters ofcredit issued on behalfofan
affiliate Inust be secured by collateral having a market value of at least 100
percent 'of the amount of the credit, depending on the nature of the collateral
security. "3
There are five categories of covered transactions. These are (I) loans or
extensions of credit to the affiliate; (2) purchases or investments in securities
issued by the affiliate; (3) purchases of assets from the affiliate except certain
property exempted by order of the Federal Reserve Board; (4) acceptance, as
coJIateral for a Joan from any person, of securities issued by an affiliate; and (5)
issuance of guar,antees, acceptances, or letters of credit, "including an endorse-
ment or standby letter of credit," on behalf of an affiliate.'"
The statute exempts certain transactions from coverage. These exemptions
include (1) transactions with a bank where there is an 80 percent or more voting
control; (2) deposits in the ordinary course of business in a correspondent
relationship; (3) credit given for "uncollected items received in the ordinary
course of business"; (4) certain loans or credit that is fully secured by U.S.
government securities or by a separate "earmarked deposit account"; (5) pur-
chase of stock in companies engaged in certain kinds ofoperational activities for
the bank; (6) purchase of assets with a "readily identifiable and publicly availa-
ble market quotation" at the public price and purchasing loans on a nonrecourse
basis; and (7) repurchase from an affiliate a loan sold to the affiliate subject to a
repurchase agreement or with recourse by the member bank.'"

14J Restrictions on Transactions With Affiliates Under the Competitive

Equality Banking Act of 1987
The amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act contained in the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 expand the restrictions on dealings
between'a member bank and its subsidiaries."" These amendments, which also
apply to FDIC-insured nonmember banks,111 impose the following standards for
transactions between a member bank (including its subsidiaries) and its affili-
ates. The trarisactions must be
(A) on terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that are
substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its

"212 USC § 371c(a)(3) (1982).

"312 USC § 371c(c)(l) (1982).
14
' 12 USC§ 371c(7) (1982).
"' 12lJSC§ 37Ic(d}(1982).
'''Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 102(a), 101 SIal.
552,564 (1987) (to be codIfied at 12 USC § 37Ic-l) (hereinafter CEBA).
117 CEBA § I02(b) (amending 12 USC § I 828(j)).
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS ~ 9.02{5]
9-17

subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions

with or involving other nonaffiliated companies, or
(B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and under circum-
stances, including credit standards, that in good faith would be offered
to, or would apply to nonaffiliated companies.'"
These standards apply to (1) any covered transaction with an affiliate;"· (2) the
sale of securities or other assets to an affiliate; (3) the payment of money or the
furnishing of services to an affiliate under a contract or otherwise; (4) a transac-
tion in which the affiliate is an agent and receives a fee for services to the bank or
another person; and (5) transactions with third persons in which the affiliate has
a financial interest in the third party or participates in the transaction. Prohibi-
tions exist against certain securities transactions with affiliates. These are dis-
cussed in Chapter 8. There is also a prohibition that runs against the bank, its
subsidiarie3, and any of its affiliates from advertising or entering into an agree-
ment that states or suggests that the bank shall "in any way be responsible for the
obligations of its affiliates."12D
As discussed in Chapter 5, the 1987 amendments also impose certain
restrictions on the joint marketing of products between institutions that for-
merly were known as nonbank banks and their affiliates, when they are con-
trolled by companies that were not previously recognized as bank holding
companies. 12 '

[5] Tying Arrangements

Federal banking laws prohibit both state and national banks from tying the
extension of credit or the provision of any other banking service to customer
compliance with certain prohibited conditions.'" Therefore, it is illegal for a
bank to insist that its customers agree to any of the following conditions as a
prerequisite for obtaining a loan from the bank or any other service:

11ICEBA § 102(a), (to be codified at 12 USC § 371c-l(a)(I»).

119 For a discussion of covered transactions with affiliates, see supra ~ 9.02[3]. For a
discussion of certain restrictions on securities transactions, see ~ 8.01 [8].
12DCEBA § 102(a), (to be codified at 12 USC § J7Ic-l(c)).
121 CEBA § 101 (c) (amending 12 USC § I843(f)(3». See also the restrictions applica-
ble to savings and loan holding compan'es. Id. at §§ 104(b), 104(d) (amending 12 USC
§§ 1730a(c), 1730a(d)(p». See also r~ 5.01 [4],5.03[2].
122 12 USC § 1972 (1982). The antltying provisions of the Bank Holding Company
Act apply to conditions attached by a bank to its forbearance from demanding payment of
a loan, because forbearing from demancing payment is the extension of credit. Nordic
Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542 (SDNY 1985). See generally Annot.,
"What Constitutes Violation of Provisions of Bank Holding Company Act Prohibiting
Tying Arrangements (12 u.s.es. § 1972(1»," 74 ALR Fed. 578 (1985).
 OVERVIEW 9-18
~ 9.02151

1. Obtaining additional credit, property, or service from the bank (other

than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service);
2. Obtaining additional credit, property, or service from a bank holding
company or subsidiary of a bank holding company of the bank;
3. Providing additional credit, property, or service to the bank other than
those "related to and usually provided in connection with a loan, dis-
count, deposit or trust service";
4. Providing additional credit, property, or service to a bank holding com-
pany or subsidiary of a bank holding company of the bank;
5. Prohibiting the customer from obtaining other credit, property, or ser-
vice from a competitor of the bank, or from a holding company or
subsidiary of a bank holding company of the competitor, other than
requirements reasonably imposed in a credit transaction to assure the
soundness of the credit. 123
The antitying provisions of 12 USC § 1972 were litigated in B,C. Recrea-
tional Industries 1'. First Na!'l Bank.'" A firm to whom the bank had loaned
money contended that the bank forced it to hire a business adviser, who required
the firm to follow policies beneficial to the bank but detrimental to the finn. The
tirm claimed that this constituted a violation of the antitying statute, The court
held that there was no cause of action stated by the debtor finn. The court
interpreted the tying prohibitions as not interfering with the conduct of "appro-
priate traditional banking practices."'" The bank's action in installing an
adviser who would help protect the bank's investment was a legitimate bank
practice that did not implicate the antitying statute. 12• The court also found no
violation of the antitying provisions of the Sherman Act.
The same conclusion was reached in Tose v. First Pennsylvania Bank,127 In
that case, the bank imposed as a condition to refinancing a loan that fmancial

123
12 USC § 1972(1) (A)-(E) (1982).
12' 639 F2d 828 (J st Cir. 1981).
mId. at 832. Accord McCoy v. Franklin Sav. Ass'n & Mortgage Management Co"
636 F2d 172 (7th Cir, 1980); Clark v. United Bank, 480 F2d 235 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
414U51004(1973).
"6 For other decisions interpreting 12 USC § 1972, see Duryea v. Third Northwest
Nat'l Bank. 606 F2d 823 (8th Cir. 1979); SwerdlofTv. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F2d 54 (5th
(,ir. 1978); Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978); Sterling Coal Co.
v. United Am. Bank, 470 F. Supp, 964 (ED Tenn. 1979).
In McGee v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 761 F2d 647 r II th Cir.), ccrt. denicd, 474
us 905 (! 985), the court hcld that a savings and loan association did not violatc the tying
statutc by rcfemng loan customers to a wholly owncd subsidiary to obtain the appraisals
required for real estatc loans.
See generally "Section 1972: Augmenting the Available Remedies for Plaintiffs
Injured by Anti-Competitive Bank Conduct," 60 Notre Dame L. Rev, 706-723 (1985).
121 648 F2d 879 (3d Cit.), ccrt. denied, 454 US 893 (1981).
 ENFORCEMENT POWERS 11 9.0215}
9-19

control over the debtor firm be exercised by another person. The court held that
the imposition of financial controls over the firm was" directly related to main-
taining the security" of the bank's substantial investment, and the bank's
demand for these controls could not "be considered unusual in the fact of
substantial evidence that it had good reasons to be concerned about the loan."m
In Parson's Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,'" the court followed the
general rules stated above. It held that "a bank's requirement that financial
control of an enterprise be placed in new hands when necessary to protect its
investment before extending further credit, does not constitute a violation" of
the antitying statute.'3D Further, in Rae v. Union Bank,'31 the court held that the
antitying provisions of 12 USC § 1972 could not be the basis for a claim against a
natural person.
In Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., '32 the debtor claimed
that the bank had violated the antitying provisions of 12 USC § 1972(1)(C) ofthe
Bank Holding Company Act, because the bank had required additional security
from its customer as a condition for extending further credit. The court held that
there were no violations ofthe act. Relying on the legislative history, the court
said that "appropriate and traditional transactions engaged in by a bank to
protect its investments" are not violations of the act. Even ifthe bank's conduct
involves "uncommon or unusual banking practices," no violation need exist
where the actions are taken by a lender to protect its investment. Further, the
court went on to say that "even if uncommon practices are not directly related to
a bank's investment, they are violative of the Act only if they are anticompeti-
tive."'33 Thus, there were three defenses to the charge of violation: namely, that
(I) the bank's practices represented traditional banking practices; (2) the prac-
tices involved were directly related to the protection of the bank's investment;
and (3) the practices were not anticompetitive.
In finding that the bank had acted appropriately to protect its investment,
the court said:
This case is representative of bailout situations in which debtors in serious
financial straits, working with their creditors, enter into numerous types of
transactions that protect the creditors' investments while permitting the
debtor's businesses to continue. The complexity of the transactions and
special needs ofthe parties involved determine the type ofarrangement that
will be made to secure the joint aims ofthe debtor and the creditor. Due to

mid. at 897.
679 F2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982).
129

'3D Id. at 244.

13'725 F2d 478 (9th Or. 1984).
'" Continental Bank v, Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 93 NJ lii3, 459 A2d 1163,
cen, denied, 464 US 994 (1983).
133 459 A2d at I 170.
 OVERVIEW 9-20
'iT 9.02(61

. the complicated circumstances of many bailout. cases, sp.ecific b~nking

transactions utilized may appear uncommon, yet, III the mlheu ofbal!outs;
they constitute appropriate banking practices. As such, they do not vlolate
the Aet. '34

16} Interlocking Management Arrangements

A number of separate federal statutes prohibit officers, directors, and
employees of banks from concurrently assuming similar responsibilities at other
financial institutions. Under the Clayton Antitrust Act, no director, officer, or
employee of any member bank of the Federal Reserve System can jointly hold a
position as a director, officer, or employee of any other bank, savings bank, or
trust company organized under federal or state law.•35 The prohibition against
holding simultaneous positions does not apply to a bank owned by the United
States, a bank in liquidation, a corporation principally engaged in foreign bank-
ing under agreement with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, a bank under common control, a bank in a separate and noncontiguous
area, and a bank engaged in a different class of business from that of member
banks."'" The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may, by
regulation, permit an officer, director, or employee to serve in such capacity
simultaneously at one other institution. 137
Section 8 of the Clayton Act also prohibits serving as a director of two or
more competing corporations, when one of the corporations exceeds a certain
size, "other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common
carriers ... "... The Supreme Court has clarified that this part ofthe act does not
apply to interlocks between a bank and nonbank competitors. In a case involving
interlocks between an insurance company and a bank, as well as between an
insurance company and a bank holding company, the Supreme Court concluded
that th.ere were no violations. Relying on the interpretation given this provision
in the enforcement practices ofthe Department ofJustice and the Federal Tra.de

34
' 459 A2d at 1170-1171.
135
15 USC § 19 (1982).
136ld.
137Id. See Reg. L, 12 CFR § 212.4 (1987).
". Section 8, paragraph 4, of the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 19, provides as follows:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any
one of which r3S capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $ I
million, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking associa-
tions, trust companies, and common carriers SUbject to subtitle IV of title 49. if such
corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition byagree-
ment between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of the
antitrust laws.
9-21 ENFORCEMENT POWERS 11 9.0216]

Commission for many years, who declined to recognize such interlocks as

violations, the court held that the prohibitions ofSection 8 applied only when all
the interlocked corporations were corporations other than banks."·
Other federal statutes deal directly with management interlocks between
banks and commercial firms. Under the Banking Act of 1933 (commonly
referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act), officers, directors, or employees of mem-
ber banks of the Federal Reserve System are prohibited from serving concur-
rently as officers, directors, or employees of companies or partnerships engaged
in securities underwriting or distribution, except as permitted by the Board of
Governors.,••
Further, under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, no regis-
tered holding company may have as an officer or director any executive officer,
director, or representative of any bank except as the Securities and Exchange
Commission may permit by regulation.''' Under the Federal Power Act, inter-
locking arrangements between public utility companies and banks authorized to
underwrite public utility securities are prohibited, except as authorized by the
Federal Power Commission. "2
The Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act of 1978 '43 prohib-
its interlocking relationships between depository institutions. The act applies to
commercial banks, savings banks, trust companies, savings and loan associa-
tions, industrial banks, and credit unions. It also applies to bank holding compa-
nies and savings and loan holding companies.'" The act prohibits any
management official of a depository institution or holding company from serv-
ing simultaneously as a management official of any other depository institution
or holding company that is unaffiliated, if the two institutions have offices
within the same metropolitan area (as defined in the statute) or have offices in
the same city or in contiguous cities. "5 Although this provision would permit
some interlocking relationships, no management official of a depository institu-
ti?n with assets over $1 billion may serve as a management official ofany other

131 BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 US 122 (1983), rev'g United States
v. Crocker Nat'( Corp., 656 F2d 428 (9th Cir. J 981). See generally Note, "Manage-
ment Interlocks Between Banks and Other Financial Institutions: United States .....
Crocker National Corporation," 2 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 355-372 (1983); Note,
"Legitimizing Bank-Nonbank Interlocks (BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 103
S. Ct. 2266 (1983»," 33 Emory U 1103-1150 (1984).
"·12 USC § 78 (1982). See Reg. R, 12 CFR § 218.1 ([987). See also ~ 8.01.
,.115 USC § 79q(c) (1982). See 17 CFR § 250.70 (1987).
,., 16 USC § 825d(b)(c) (1982).
143 12 USC §§ 1464, 1730, 1818, 3201-3207 (1982).

'" 12 USC § 320 I (1982).

"0 12 USC § 3202 (1982). The rules are more lenient when the assets of the bank
are less than $20 million.
~ 9.02{61 OVERVIEW 9-22

nonaffiliated depository institution with assets in excess of $500 million. '46

Administration of the act is enforced by the appropriate federal regulatory
agency.'"

'.6 12 USC § 3203 (1982). There are grandfather provisions for officers whose
service began before November 10, 1978. 12 USC § 3205 (1982).
147 12 USC § 3206 (1982).
 10
Liquidation,
Reorganization, and
Supervision of
Failing Banks and Thrift
Institutions
1110.01 Tennination of Deposit Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
1110.02 Receiverships .. .... ...................... 10-4
[1] Events That Justify. the Appointment ofa Receiver. . . . . . . . 10-4
[2] Discretion of the Agency and Scope of Judicial Review. . . . . 10-6
[3] General Powers and Duties of the Receiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
[a] National Banks 10-8
[i] Liquidation and distribution of assets. . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8
Iii] Purchase and assumption agreements. . . . . . . . . . .. 10-10
[b] Savings and Loan Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-11
[4] Requirement of a Ratable Distribution '. . . . . . . . . . .. 10-12
[a] Preferences 10-13
[b] Application to Purchase and Assumption Agreements 10-15
:l [5] Enforcing Obligations; Defenses the FDIC May Avoid. . . . .. 10-15
[a] Holder in Due Course Status 10-16
[b] The Shield Statute 10-17
[c] Section 29(c) of the Securities Exchange Act 10-21
[6] Resolving Disputed Claims; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 10-22
(al Banks to-22
[b] Savings and Loan Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-23
r 10.03 Financial Assistance to Weak Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-24
[1] Direct Financial Aid :....... 10-24

The principal author for this chapter is Catherine R. Hardwick, J.D. 1988, Arizona State
University College of Law.

10-1
~ 10,0} OVERVIEW 10-2

[2] Merger Assistance .... , .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10-25

[a] Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, . . . . . . .. 10-25
[b] Judicial Review of Agency Decisions to Give Merger
Assistance , , " 10-27
[3] Net Worth Certificates , , , . . . .. 10-28
~ 10.04 New Banks and Bridge Banks , . , .. , , . , , . , .. 10-30
[1] Depositlnsurance National Banks .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 10-30
[2] Bridge Bank.~ , . , .. , .. 10-30
~ 10.05 Other Regulatory Powers ' , ,. IO-3l

II 10.01 TERMINATION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE

The federal banking regulatory agencies have special powers and responsi-
bilities when the financial institutions under their supervision become insolvent
or are in danger offailing; the general procedures ofthe federal Bankruptcy Code
do not apply. Because they are specifically exempted from the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code, financial institutions may not file petitions for protection, liquida-
tion, or reorganization in bankruptcy.' Liquidation and reorganization of
financial institutions are regulated by specific statutes governing those institu-
tions. The present chapter describes the various powers possessed by the federal
banking agencies to deal with weak and failing depository institutions.
Because the termination of deposit insurance is such a powerful sanction,
which, as a practical matter, may force a failing institution to dissolve or merge
with another institution, it is considered as part of this chapter on supervision of
failing banks and thrifts. Both the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation have the power to termi-
nate the deposit insurance they provide. 2 Each agency may institute proceedings
to termjnate insurance when its board of directors has determined that the
institution:
1. Has engaged, or is engaging, in unsafe or unsound practices in con-
ducting the business of the bank;
2. Is in an unsafe or unsound condition to continue operations as an
insured bank; or
3. Has violated an applicable law, rule, regulation or order, or any condi-
tion imposed in writing by the corporation in connection with the grant-

1 11 USC §§ l09(b), 109(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Financial institutions are defined

in the Bankruptcy Code to include banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, savings and
loan associations, building and loan associations, homestead associations, credit unions,
industrial banks, and any other similar institution that is an insured institution under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
'12 USC§ 1818(a) (I 982)(FDIC); 12 USC§ 1730(bXI) (I 982)(FSLIC).
 10-3 FAILl::-lG BANKS & THRIFTS 1I10.oI

ing of any application or other request by the bank, or any written

agreement entered into with the corporation.'
Upon the determination by the insuring agency of grounds for termination
ofinsurance, the agency is required to give notice to the primary regulator ofthe
institution before taking action to terminate insurance" This notice must
include a statement of the practices or violations on which the termination
proceeding will be based, and gives the primary regulator an opportunity to
correct any problems. 5
Once the FDIC or the FSLIC determines that appropriate corrective action
has not occurred within the time period allowed, and decides to pursue termina-
tion ofinsurance, the agency gives notice to that effect, schedules an administra-
tive hearing," and issues a final order as to the status of the insurance: If the
institution fails to appear at the hearing, it is deemed to have consented to the
termination ofthe insurance, and a termination order may follow immediately.·
The U.S. Court ofAppeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review termination
orders. 8 Appeals must be filed within thirty days after the date of service of the
order.'· The institution whose insurance has been terminated is required to give
notice ofthe insurance termination to each ofits depositors, account holders, or
members." Insured deposits in the institution on the effective date oftermina-
tion of insurance continue to be insured for two years after the effective date of
termination." Any deposits made after the effective date of termination of
insurance, whether they are new deposits or additions to existing deposits, are

, 12 USC § 1818(a) (1982). Similar reasons justify termination of insurance by the

FSLIC. 12 USC § 1730(b)(I) (1982). An additional reason givenfor the FSLIC to enable it
to terminate insurance is when the insured institution "has violated its duty as such." Id.
• 12 USC § 1818(a) (I 982)(FDIC); 12 USC § 1730(bXI)(1982)(FSLIC). This notice
goes to the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national or district bank, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the case of an insured federal savings bank, to the
authority having supervision of the bank in the case of a stale bank, and to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the case of a state member bank. 12 USC
§ 18 I8(a)(1 982). A copy ofthe notice must also be sent to the state supervisory authority
in the case of a savings and loan institution. 12 USC § 173O(b)(I) (I 982).
• 12 USC § 1818(a)( I 982)(FDIC); 12 USC § I 730(b)(1 ) (I 982)(FSLIC).
• The rules of practice and procedure that govern the termination of insurance are
found at 12 CFR § 308 (1987) (FDIC) and 12 CFR § 509 (1987) (FSLlC).
'12 USCg 1818(a)(1982)(FDIC); 12 USCg I 730(b)(1)(1982)(FSLIC).
• Id.
'12 USC § 1818(h)(2) (1982) (FDIC); 12 USC § I 730(j)(2) (1982) (FSLIC).
l·ld.
11 The FDIC requires written notice to each of its depositors at the last address of
record on the bank's books. In addition, the FDIC may publish notice of the termination
in a local newspaper. 12 USC § 1818(a) (1982). For institutions insured by the FSLIC, the
statute requires "prompt and reasonable" notice 10 all its insured members. 12 USC
§ I730(d) (1982).
12\2 USC § 1818(a) (1982) (FDIC); 12 USC § I730(d) (1982) (FSLIC).
1110.02[1] OVERVIEW 10-4

not insured. 13 Withdrawals from insured,accounts after the termination ofinsur-

ance reduce the insurance coverage by the amount of the withdrawals," The
mstitutions must pay premiums for the continued insurance coverage. 1. During
the two-year period in which FDIC insurance continues, the bank remains
subject to thelaws that control the rights and duties offederally insured banks.'1

1110.02 RECEIVERSHIPS
(lJ Events That Jnstify the Appointment of a Receiver
When a financial institution is failing or has become insolvent, or is in
danger ofbecoming insolvent shortly, the agency that chartered it has the power
to appoint a receiver to wind up the institution's affairs. In the case of national
banks, the chartering agency is the Comptroller of the Currency.
The Comptroller of the Currency may appoint a receiver and close a
national bank when, after due examination of its affairs, the comptroller
becomes satisfied that the bank is insolvent. i7 The comptroller may also appoint
a receiver when the bank is dissolved,1I or when any creditor of a national bank
obtains a judgment against the bank and makes application to the comptroller
that the judgment has remained unpaid for thirty days,"
The comptroller can find the bank insolvent when either or both of two
events occur: (1) The institution's assets, taken at fair market value, are less than
its liabilities 20 or (2) the bank is unable to meet is obligations as they become
due. 21

\3Id.
"Id.
,. Banks continue to pay assessments just as an insured bank would. 12 USC
§ 1818(1I) (1982). Savings and loan associations. however, must pay a final insurance
premium within thirty days after the effective date of insurance termination equal to
twice the last annual insurance premium payable. 12 USC § I 730(d) (1982).
'I 12 USC § 1818(a) (1982). The statute expressly gives the FSLIC only the more
limited power of examination during this period. 12 USC § I 730(d) (1982).
17 12 USC § 191 (1982).
'. A bank may be dissolved if the directors knowingiy violate, or knowingly permit
any of the officers, agents, or servants of the bank to violate any of the regulations in Title
12 of the U.S. Code. The comptroller must file suit for this purpose, and the violation
must be determined by a U.S. district court before the bank is declared dissolved. 12 USC
§ 93 (1982).
1t 12 USC§ 191 (1982).
20 United States Sav. Bank v. Morgenthau, 85 F2d 811 (DC Cir.), cert. denied, 299
US 605 (l936);InreFranklinNat'IBank,381 F.Supp.1390(EDNY 1974). This is called
the balance sheet test.
21 In re Conservatorship ofWellsvllle Nat'l Bank, 407 F2d 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 US 832 (I 969);'Smith v. Witherow, 102 F2d 638 (3d Cir. 1939); In re Franklin Nat'.
Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1390 (EDNY 1974). .
10-5 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1110.0211)

By federal statute, the receiver appointed by the comptroller must be the

FDIC.22 The FDIC may also be appointed receiver of an insured state bank by
the state authority having supervision over the bank, if that appointment is
provided for by state 1aw. 23 The FDIC then possesses all the rights, powers, and
privileges granted by state law to a receiver· of a state bank}4
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the chartering agency for federal
savings and loan associations, has the power to appoint receivers for those
institutions. The grounds for the appointment of a receiver are one or more of
the following: (1) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its
obligations to its creditors and others; (2) substantial dissipation of assets or
earnings owing to any violation or violations oflaw, rules, or regulations, or to
any unsafe or unsound practice or practices; (3) an unsafe or unsound condition
to transact business; (4) willful violation of a cease and desist order that has
become final; or (5) concealment of books, papers, records or assets of the
association or refusal to submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the associa-
tion for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent of the FHLBB.25 In
addition, the FHLBB may appoint a receiver for an association ifthe association
consents to an appointment, if it is removed from membership in any Federal
Home Ldan bank, or ifits status as an FSLIC-insured institution is terminated."
If the receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidating the association,
the FSLIC is the statutorily required receiver. 27 The FHLBB may appoint the
FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered insured institutions if it finds one of the
grounds above, and ifit has written approval ofthe state official havingjurisdic-
tion over the institution. 2• The FHLBB may also "federalize" the receivership of
a state-chartered association by appointing the FSLIC receiver (and thus ending
state control oftne receivership) if the following three statutory conditions are
met: (1) Either a state receivership has been in place for at least 15 days or an
insured institution has been closed under state law; (2) at least one ground
specified in 12 USC § I 464(d)(6)(A) exists with respect to such institution; and
.
(3) a depositor has
.
been unable to make a withdrawal of his or her account. 2t In

2212 USC§ 1821(c)(1982).

23 12 USC § 1821 (e) 1982).
24 rd.
2S 12 USC § 1464(d)(6)(A)(Supp. III 1985).

2. 12 USC§ I464(d)(6}(B)(1982). See Annotation, 65 ALR Fed 302 (FHLBB appoint-

ment ofreceivers or conservators).
27
12 USC §§ 1464(d)(6)(D), 1729(b) (1982).
28
12 USC § I729(c}(1 )(B)(ii)(I)(1982 & Supp. III 1985). Subsections (c)(I)-(c)(3) and
(d) were to expire in 1986. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, however,
repealed the subsections providing for the expiration date. As a result, these provisions
are now permanent. See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86,
§ 509(a), 101 Stat. 551, 635.
2'12 USC§ I 729(c)(2)(1982 &Supp. III 1985). See also Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 689 F2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 US 914 (1983). In Fidelity,
there also was a controversy over the appointment of the FSLlC as a receiver. The
11 10.02[2) OVERVIEW 10-6

these cases, the FSLIC has the same powers and duties as when it is the receiver
for federally chartered associations. 30

(2) Discretion of the Agency and Scope of Judicial Review

The finding by the comptroller that a national bank is insolvent, and the
subsequent appointment of the FDIC as the receiver of the bank as required by
statute, has been held by one court to be a discretionary act that is not subject to
judicial review.31 Similarly, another court held that it would not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the comptroller, unless it appeared by convincing
proof that the comptroller's action was plainly arbitrary, and made in bad
faith. 32 When a state supervisory authority appoints the FDIC as receiver under
a state statute, the discretion of the authority and the extent ofjudicial review
also is determined by the state regulatory provisions. Some state statutes provide
for a period of time in which the insolvent bank may.contest the appointment of
a receiver. 33 If such appointment is not contested during this period, the bank
waives its objection to the liquidation of its assets.:M .
In contrast to national banks, savings and loan associations have ~ore
latitude in contesting the appointment ofa receiver. Within thirty days after the
appointment of a receiver by the FHLBB, a savings and loan association may
bring an action in a federal district court for an order requiring the FHLBB to
remove the receiver. 3S Courts agree that the only question on a challenge to the
appointment of a receiver is whether one of the statutory grounds for appoint-

California commissionerseized the association to liquidate it and appointed the FSLIC as

receiver. Within minutes, the FHLBB independently appointed the FSLIC as receiver,
thus making the receivership federal and removing any state control. In approximately
thiny minutes, the receiver transferred the assets of the association to a newly created
association. Fidelity sued, claiming the appointment was invalid under the statute set out
above. Although there was no significant interruption in Fidelity's business, the coun held
that the' association had been closed under state law and an account holder had been
unable to withdraw from an account as required by the statute. In reaching this result, the
coun emphasized the imponance of swift and coordinated action between state and
federal officials.
30
12 USC § I 729(c)(I)(B)(i)(II) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3' In re Franklin National Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1390 (EDNY (974).
32 United States Sav. Bank v. Morgenthau, 85 F2d 811, 814 (DC Cir.), cen. denied,
299 US 605 (1936).
33 For example, California statutes provide that when the state Superintendent of
Banks has taken possession of the propeI1y and business of a bank, or a receiver has been
appointed, the bank has ten days to apply to the superior coun to enjoin funher proceed-
ings. After a hearing, the coun will either dismiss the bank's claim, or order the surrender
of the propeny and business back to the bank. Cal. Fin. Code § 3101 and 3180 (West
1968). This ten-day period was held to be reasonable in State Sav. & Commercial Bank v.
Anderson, 165 Cal. 437,132 P 755 (1913), afl'd memo 238 US 611 (1914).
,. First State Bank v. Bank of America, 618 F2d 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying
California law).
.. 12 USC § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
10-7 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1110.0213/

ment existed at the time the appointment was made.:Ie Courts are split, however,
on the standard ofjudicial review to be applied to this determination. The scope
ofjudicial review is not clear from the statute, which provides that the court shall
determine "upon the merits" whether to dismiss the association's action or to
direct the FHLBB to remove the receiver.·7
One court recently granted a full trial on the factual issue of whether
statutory grounds existed for the appointment of a receiver,:Ie while another
court determined that the appointment of a receiver should be affirmed unless,
looking solely at the administrative record kept by the FHLBB, the court deter-
mines that the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously.31 More moderate views
would allow an association to submit evidence, but would give the administra-
tive record some deference. 4O

[3) General Powers and Duties of the Receiver

Once a receiver is appointed, all tlte assets of the institution immediately
pass into the control of the receiver.·1 Further, the officers and directors of the
institution, as well as the stockholders of a bank, are precluded from dealing in
any way with the institution's assets while the receivership continues.· 2

'"Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 720 F2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1983),
cen. denied, 467 US 1215 (1984), Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 689 F2d 803, 809
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 US 914 (1983); Colliev. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147 (NO
Ill. 1986). In Biscayne, the association and its majoritY stockholder sued to remove the
FSLIC as receiver. Although the district court found a "pattern of outrageous conduct on
the part ofthe Board's staff" relating to the receivership, the Court of Appeals held that
the conduct ofthe staffwas not a proper subject of inquiry in considering the legality ofthe
receiver's appointment. The court said, "the sole question properly before ... this Court is
whether a statutory ground authorizing the appointment of the FSLIC exists." 720 F2d at
1503:
'112 USC § 1464(d)(6)(A) (Supp.1II 1985).
'"TelegraphSav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862 (NO 11I.1981), affd, 703
F2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 US 992 (1983).
'tGuaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986).
• 0 Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan v. FHLBB, 790 F2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986); Washington Fed.
Say. & Loan v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343 (NO Ohio 1981). Another view assures the
association of an opportunity to be heard. See Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1152
(NO Ill. 1986) (" '[Ujpon the merits' means ... that the court should be satisfied that the
association has had a meaningful opportunity to make a case in opposition to the appoint-
ment of a receiver at some point during the process leading to the appointment. If it has
not, then the court should provide that opportunity. Ifil has, however, the court need not
offer another").
41 Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 US 449 (1900); Anderson v. Cronkleton, 32 F2d 170
(8th Cir. 1929); Hardesty v. Fairmont Supply Co., 123 W.Va. 161,14 SE2d 436, cert.
denied, 314 US 679 (1941).
"Wittnebel v. Loughman, 9 F. supp. 465 (DeNY) atrd, 80 F2d 222 (2dCir. (935),
cert, denied, 297 US 716 (1936),
1l10.02(3J[a) OVERVIEW 10-8

raJ National Banks. The FDIC, as receiver, generally employs one of two
approaches in taking over a failed bank: (l) liquidation, in which the FDIC
liquidates the assets ofthe failed bank and pays its creditors, supplementing with
insurance funds or (2) purchase and assumption, in which the deposits of the
failed bank are taken over by a healthy institution. When the FDIC decides
whether to liquidate an insolvent bank or to execute a purchase and assumption
agreement for the assets ofthe bank, the agency is exercising discretion entrusted
to it by law, and the Federal Tort Claim Act protects the FDIC from liability for
such decisions."
Ii} Liquidation and distribution of assets. The general duties of the receiver
in liquidating an insolvent bank are (I) to realize upon the assets of the closed .
bank, having due regard for the conditions of credit in the locality;" (2) to
enforce the individual liability of the stockholders and directors ofthe bank; and
(3) to wind up the affairs of the closed bank. 4lI The FDIC also has the duty to
notify all persons having claims against tho bank-that the bank is·closed. 4tl
The FDIC must make payment of the insured deposits in the bank as soon
as possible." Payment must be made either by cash or by making available to
each depositor a transferred deposit in a new bank in the same community, or in
another insured bank." Insured depositors must submit proofs of claim, but
payment is not made to a depositor until the FDIC has been subrogated to the
rights ofthe depositor." Ifthe FDIC is not satisfied with respect to the validity of
a claim for an insured deposit, it may require the final determination ofa court
of competent jurisdiction before paying the claim. 5lI Payment of an insured
deposit to any person by the FDIC will discharge the FDIC.·'
Depositors having claims in excess ofinsurance, as well as other creditors of
the bank, are permitted to file claims with the FDIC. When sufficient funds have
been realized from liquidating the assets to justify a dividend to creditors, the

"FDIC v. Jennings, 615 F. Supp. 465 (WD Okla. 1985).

•• Amendments specifically require the FDIC to "fully consider the adverse economic
impact on local communities, including businesses and farms, of actions to be taken by it
during the administration and liquidation ofloans ofa closed bank." Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, § 507, 101 Stat. 551,634 (1987)(to be codified at
12 USC § 1821(i».
's 12 USC § 182t(d) (1982).
•• The notice is to be made by advertisement in newspapers, for three consecutive
months, to notify all depositors and creditors to present their claims. 12 USC §§ 193,
1821 (d)( 1982).
•712 USC § 1821(f) (1982).
4tlW. .
.. 12 USC § 1821{f) and (g) (1982). This right of subrogation may be recognized by
express provision ofstate law, by allowance ofclaims by the authority ha'!ing supervision
of the bank. by assignment of claims by depositors, or by any other effective means.
10
12 USC § 182J{f) (1982).
.. 12 USC § I 822(b) (1982).
10-9 FAILING BANKS & THRIFfS 1110.0213)(al

board of directors of the FDIC orders payment of a ratable dividend. 52 If all

creditors are paid in full and expenses have been recovered, any sums remaining
after the distribution go to the shareholders of the bank. 53
In summary then, the general procedure and priority of claims in liquidat-
ing an insolvent bank is as follows:
1. The FDIC is appointed receiver, the bank is closed, and the FDIC takes
control of all assets, books, and records of the bank.
2. The FDIC sets off any claims it has against depositors' accounts, and
otherwise determines the amount of insured deposits. 54
3. The FDIC pays claims of insured depositors to the extent of their
insurance. 55
4. The FDIC liquidates the assets, defends claims against those assets, and
deducts valid set-offs against the bank.
S. The expenses of the receiver in administering the liquidation are
deducted from the receivership funds."
6. The receivership reimburses the United States for any advances made in
redeeming the circulating notes ofthe bank presented to the Treasury for
payment.s' .
7. Ifsufficient funds have been realized, the FDIC makes a ratable distribu-
tion to the creditors of the bank. Creditors include depositors (for sums
over the insured amount oftheir deposits), unsecured creditors, secured
creditors, sa and the FDIC. 51

.212 USC § 194 (1982). See Note, "Creditors' Remedies Against the FDIC as
Receiver of a Failed National Bank," 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1429-1462 (1986).
53Id.
54 See 12 USC § 1822(d)( 1982).
5. 12 CFR § 3301 (1987) provides guidelines on how to determine the amount of an
account that is insured. See generally Chapter lion deposit insurance.
.. See 12 USC §§ 196, 1822(a) (1982).
57
12 USC § 194 (1982); see also Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 US 275 (1896).
&I Asecured creditor may make a claim against the insolvent bank for the full amount
it is owed, and may receive dividends on that claim in any ratable distribution. The
secured creditor does not lose its security interest in the collateral, however, because liens
arising by express agreement or operation oflaw are nOI invalidated by the insolvency of
the bank. As the receiver liquidates the assets, the secured creditor is entitled to the
proceeds due the secured creditor from the sale. The secured creditor is eligible for
dividends from ratable distributions only until his or her claim has been paid in full.
whether from the dividends, the proceeds ofthe sale ofone secured creditor's collateral, or
a combination of the two. See Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 US 406, 411-412
(1938); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 US 499,510 (1892).
SlThe FDIC becomes a creditor of the bank because of its payments to insured
depositors. It is subrogated to the depositors' claims against the bank. See 12 USC
§ 1821(g) (1982).
1110.02[3][a) OVERVIEW 10-10

8. Stockholders divide up the residual, if any, in proportion to their stock

holdings. 1O

An alternative method ofpayout, called the modified payout, has been used
more frequently in the last few years in the case ofliquidations. Here, the FDIC
pays creditors in advance of the final liquidation of the bank's assets. The cash
payment equals the creditors' proportionate share ofwhat the FDIC estimates it
will recover from the liquidation. If actual collections exceed the estimate,
creditors receive additional payments.
[ii) Purchase and assumption agreements. A Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit opinion includes a good description ofthe purposes and procedures
of purchase and assumption agreements:·'

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a federal agency which

insures bank deposits; As insuror one ofthe primary duties ofthe FDIC is to
pay the depositors of a failed bank. The FDIC has two methods of accom-
plishing this duty. The simplest method is to liquidate the assets ofthe bank
and then pay the depositors their insured amounts, covering any shortfall
with insurance funds. This option, however, has two major disadvantages.
foirstly, the sight ofa closed bank, even an insured one, does not promote the
utmost confidence in the banking system. Accounts are frozen, checks are
returned unpaid, and a significant disruption of the intricate financial
machinery results. Secondly, depositors may wait months to recover even
the insured portion of their funds, and uninsured funds may be irrevocably
lost.
To avoid the significant problems with liquidation, the FDIC whenever
feasible employs a "purchase and assumption" transaction in which the
Corporation attempts to arrange for another bank to "purchase" the failed
bank and reopen it without interrupting banking operations and with no
loss to the depositors. A purchase and assumption involves three entities:
the receiver of the failed bank, the purchasing bank, and the FDIC as
insuror. In most cases, the FDIC is appointed receiver by the appropriate
banking authority and thus acts in two separate capacities: as receiver and
as corporate insuror.
As soon as the receiver is appointed, the FDIC solicits bids from other
banks for the purchase of the failed bank and assumption of its liabilities.
The bids represent the "going concern" value of the failed bank. After
receiving the bids, the FDIC Board of Directors determines whether the

10 12 USC § 194 (1982). The creditors, including the FDIC, receive interest on their
claims from the date of insolvency to the date of full pa)ment of their claims before any
funds are distributed to the shareholders. Nat'l Bank of Commonwealth v. Mechanics
Nat'l Bank, 94 US 437 (1877); FDIC v. Citizens State Bank, 130 F2d IG2 (8th Cir. 1942).
61 Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F2d 862 (Illh Cir.), cen. denied, 459 US 826 (1982). See
Burger, "Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act," 14 Forum 1146-1160 (1979).
10-11 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1l10.02(3J[bl

purchase and assumption is feasible according to the stat\ltory require-

ments of 12 USC § 1823( C).·2 If a bid is accepted, the purchasing bank agrees
with the receiver to buy the assets and assume the liabilities of the failed
bank.
While the purchase ofa failed bank is an attractive way for other banks to
expand their operations, a purchase and assumption must be consummated
with great speed, usually overnight, in order to preserve the going concern
value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking services.
Because the time constraints often prohibit a purchasing bank from fully
evaluating its risks, as well as to make a purchase- and- assumption an
attractive business deal, the purchase and assumption agreement provides
that the purchasing bank need purchase only those assets which are of the
highest banking quality. Those assets not ofthe highest quality are returned
to the receiver, resulting in the assumed liabilities exceeding the purchased
assets. To equalize the difference, the FDIC as insuror purchases the
returned assets from the receiver which in tum transfers the FDIC pay-
ments to the purchasing bank. The FDIC then attempts to collect on the
returned assets to minimize the loss to the insurance fund. In an appropriate
case, therefore, the purchase and assumption benefits all parties. The FDIC
minimizes its loss, the purchasing bank receives a new investment and
expansion opportunity at low risk, and the depositors of the failed bank are
protected from the vagaries of the closing and liquidation procedure."

The FDIC also uses a "whole-bank purchase" technique for handling failed
institutions. Under this approach the acquiring bank takes over all or substan-
tially all of the failed bank's assets at a discount. The FDIC may keep some
problem assets, such as insider loans, even under this approach. The purpose of
the technique is to reduce the FDIC involvement and cash exposure in managing
assets offailed banks. 64

(bl Savings and Loan Associations. The FSLIC, as receiver for savings and
loan associations, is authorized to:

1. Take over the assets of and operate the association;

2. Take such action as may be necessary to put it in a sound solvent
condition;
3. Merge it with another insured institution;

62 The FDIC is prohibited from entering into a purchase and assumption agreement if
the cost of that transaction exceeds the estimated cost of liquidating the bank (including
paying the insured deposits). 12 USC § 1821(c) (1982). This restriction does not apply
where the FDIC determines that the continued operation ofthe insured bank is essential
to provide adequate banking services in the community. Id.
63 Gunter, 674 F2d at 865-866 [notes and citations omitted].
··49 Banking L. Rep. (BNA) 216 (August 10, 1987)_
1110.02[41 OVERVIEW 10-12

4. Organize a new federal association to take over its assets;

S. Proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or
6. Make such other disposition of the matter as it deems appropriate.1S
The FSLIC has discretion as to what actions it takes, as long as such action is
in the best interest of the association, its savers, and the corporation itself.1ll In
addition, the receiver has the duty to pay all valid credit obligations of the
association. 81
If the appointment of a receiver is made for the purpose of liquidating the
association, the FHLBB is statutorily required to appoint the FSLIC as
receiver." Payment of insured deposits under the FSUC is very similar to
procedures under the FDIC. Payment is made either by cash or by making
available a transferred account in another insured institution, and it must be
made as soon as possible. 69 As with the FDIC, the FSUC may require a proofof
claim to be filed before paying the insured accounts, and, if it is not satisfied as to
the validity of the claim, it may require court determination prior to payment,7°

[4] Requirement of a Ratable Distribution

The requirement that any distribution to creditors be ratable" comes up in a
variety ofcontexts. Transactions are frequently challenged as being preferential,
in violation ofthe ratable distribution rule. A claim against the FDIC as receiver,
to participate in the ratable distribution for creditors, is generally provable if
(I) the claim exists before the bank's insolvency and does not depend on any new
contractual obligations arising later; (2) liability on the claim is absolute, and
certain in amount when suit is filed against the receiver; and (3) the claim is
made in a timely manner, well before any distribution of the assets of the
receivership other than a distribution through a purchase and assumption
agreelTlent. 12

65 12 USC § I729(b)(I)(A) (I 982}.

!SId.
17
12 USC § I729(b)(I)(B) (1982).
"12 USC §§ 1464(a)(6)(D}, I729(b} (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
69
12 USC § J 728(b)(1982}.
701d.
11 12 USC § 194 (1982). The National Bank Act simply states that "the comptroller
shall make a ratable dividend ofthe money so paid over to him by such receiver on all such
claims as may have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court ofcompetent
jurisdiction. and. as the proceeds of the assets ... are paid over to him shall make further
dividends on all claims previously proved or adjudicated; ... " Id.
" First Empire Bank v. FDIC, S72 F2d 1361, 1367-1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
US 919 (1978).
10-13 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS \110.02(4)(a}

In FDIC v. United States National Bank,73 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered several important issues relating to the rights of a
creditor of an insolvent bank to a ratable distribution of the bank's assets.
Franklin National Bank loaned $5 million to the United States National Bank
(USNB) in exchange for capital notes ofUSNB, which stipulated that the notes
were expressly subordinated to the payment of senior obligations of USNB.
USNB became insolvent, and the FDIC took over as receiver. The FDIC then
arranged for Crocker National Bank to purchase the assets and assume the
liabilities ofUSNB. The corporate FDIC loaned money to the FDIC as receiver
of USNB, taking a lien on the remaining assets of USNB, to facilitate the
purchase and assumption agreement. Subsequently, Franklin National sued
USNB, claiming that fraud in the loan transaction entitled it to rescind the
subordinated capital note agreement and recover the full amount of the loan as a
general creditor ofUSNB. About one year later, when Franklin Nationa! became
insolvent, the FDIC became its receiver and, thus, was in the posture of suing
itself.
The court first held that, assuming Franklin National was induced by fraud
to enter into the capital note agreement, it could rescind that transaction and
thereby elevate its position to a level of equality with other creditors. As a
general creditor of USNB, Franklin National became entitled to share in the
ratable distribution of the assets as a result of the purchase and assumption
agreement with Crocker. Although Franklin National's claim was not "on the
books" of USNB at the date USNB failed, it was entitled to participate in the
ratable distribution ofthe assets because (1) the claim derived from a transaction
prior to the insolvency; (2) it was not dependent on any new contractual obliga-
tions arising later; and (3) it was otherwise timely made. Because the ratable
distribution was in the form of a purchase and assumption by Crocker National
Bank of the assets and liabilities of USNB, the court held that ratable distribu-
tionwould assure Franklin National Bank of total repayment ofits claim. Thus,
the FDIC as receiver of Franklin National was allowed to recover from the
FDIC as receiver ofUSNB and to participate in the ratable distribution ofassets
arranged by the FDIC as receiver of USNB.

(a] Preferences. Section 91 of the National Bank Act declares any transaction
or deposit or payment of money null and void if it is made after the insolvency of
the bank or in contemplation of its insolvency, or if it is made to prefer one
creditor over another or to avoid the rules of priority of payment in insolvency
proceedings.,.
A frequently litigated situation under the preference statute arises when
deposit accounts are set off against debts owed to the now insolvent bank. For

73
685 F2d 270 (9th Cir. 1982).
"12 USC § 91 (1982).
1110.02[4I1al OVERVIEW 10:.14

example, assume creditor A has $1,000,000 on deposit with the bank in excess of
federal deposit insurance coverage, but creditor A also owes the bank $1 million
for a loan. Because the ratable distribution to creditors of the bank is likely to
pay only a small percentage ofeach creditor's claim, .under ratable distribution,
creditor A would have to pay the $1 million loan but would collect only a portion
of its $1 million deposit claim. By allowing the loan debt to be set offagainst the
deposit claim, creditor A avoids having to bear part of the loss in the ratable
distribution. Other creditors may claim that this result makes the setoffoperate
as a preference to creditor A because it decreases the amount of assets available
to the other creditors. The general rule, however, is that a valid setoff is not a
preference in violation of the National Bank Act. 7. Only the balance, ifany, after
the setoff is deducted is considered an asset of the receivership.'· Thus, a bank
holding a checking account for a correspondent bank that had become insolvent
was entitled to set off the funds in the checking account against obligations the
correspondent bank owed under certificates of participation.n
Courts have looked to both general equitable principals and state law to
determine whether a setoff should be allowed in the particular circumstances.7!
One example of a valid setoff was when the balance of a depositor's account was
deducted from a note due the insolvent bank, even though the bank had sold an
80 percent participation interest in that note to a thirdparty.71 In another case, a
bank that was the beneficiary under a letter ofcredit issued by an insolvent bank
was permitted to deduct the amount owed to it on the letter of credit from a
correspondent account ofthe insolvent bank it held, even though the beneficiary
bank had not made a demand for payment under the letter of credit until after
the issuing bank's insolvency." Setoff was not allowed, however, in a case in
which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the agreement
providing for setoff was unenforceable because it violated the public policy of

75 Scott v. Armstrong, 146 US 499 (l892}, Interfirst Bank-Abilene v. FDIC, 777 F2d
1092 (5th Cir. 1985).
71 Scott v. Armstrong, 146 US 499 (1892), Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F2d
1403, 1407 (I Dth Cir. 1984).
77 Interfirst Bank-Abilene v. FDIC, 777 F2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985).
71 FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986). See also
American Sur. Co. v. Bethleham Nat'l Bank, 314 US 314, 31 6 (I 941}("Consress hasseen
fit not to anticipate by specific rules solution ofproblems that inevitably arise in national
bank liquidations. Instead, it chose achievement ofa 'just and equal distribution' of an
insolvent bank's assets through the operation of familiar equitable doctrines evolved by
the courts.")
,. FDIC v. Mademoiselle, 379 F2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967). Accord Hibernia Nat'l Bank
v. FDIC, 733 F2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984). In Mademoiselle, the assignee orthe 80 percent
participation intere5t was not allowed a preference over general creditors of 80 percent of
the value of the setoff.
.0 FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust, 806 F2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986). The court also
held, however, that the beneficiary bank's claim against the receiver as a confirming bank
on another letter of credit was contingent and could not be set otT.
10-15 FAILING BANKS & THRlFfS 1f 10.02[51

protecting depositors and creditors and maintaining public confidence in the

stability of the banking system."
Similarly, the FDIC is authorized to set off amounts due to depositors as
insurance payments from any amounts owed by the depositor to the insolvent
bank. 12 When the FDIC withholds such amounts, however, it does not have the
same strategic effect as a creditor's setoff, and is more of an efficiency measure.
It will protect the FDIC to some extent, however, in those cases in which an
outstanding loan by the insolvent bank may be uncollectable.

fbI Application to Purchase and Assumption Agreements. Purchase and

assumption agreements may violate the National Bank Act provision requiring a
ratable distribution when the agreement provides full recovery for some credi-
tors but little chance of recovery for others. The FDIC has no authority to
determine which creditors mayor may not be able to recover from the insolvent
bank, and it must make equitable, if not .equal, provision for all creditors.
In First Empire Bank v. FDIC,13 the Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the FDIC should have either (1) included First Empire's claim as the
beneficiary of standby letters of credit in the purchase and assumption agree-
ment it arranged or (2) left sufficient assets in the receivership to allow distribu-
tion to unassumed creditors equal to that undertaken by the acquiring bank to
the creditors it had accepted. The court found that by excluding First Empire's
claims from the purchase and assumption agreement, it had preferred the other
creditors and had violated the provisions of the National Bank Act requiring a
ratable distribution among all creditors. I. The circuit court arrived at the same
result in a case in which the FDIC was acting as the receiver ofa state-chartered
bank, pursuant to California law."

[51 Enforcing Obligations; Defenses the FDIC May Avoid

When the FDIC becomes the receiver of a failed bank, it may pursue legal
claims against individuals and firms whose misconduct has contributed to the

"FDIC v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 701 F2d 831 (9th Cir.), cen.
denied, 464 US 935 (1983). In this case, a setoff involved a $5 million subordinated
capital note, which Bank of America purchased. The coun held that the capital note had
characteristics both of stock and debt. It was like stock because the holder ofthe note was
subordinated to the rights ofgeneral creditors ofthe bank. The effect ofthe setoffby Bank
of America frustrated this purpose and put Bank of America ahead of all of the other
depositors and creditors of the Puerto Rican bank by the amount of the setoff.
12 12 USC § I 822(d) (1982).
13 572 F2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 919 (1978).
"Id. at 1371.
"Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank oflrvine. 815 F2d 538 (9tn Cir. 1987). California law,
like federal law, prohibited preferences to any depositor or creditor.
'i 10.02(5)[a] OVERVIEW 10·16

bank's failure.88 In some cases, the agency may pursue claims against officers and
directors ofthe bank for their breach offiduciary obligations or other dereliction
of duty." Similarly, when the FDIC acquires the assets of an insolvent bank, it
may find itselfin the position of having to enforce notes and other obligations it
has acquired. A number of cases have arisen in which the obligors on these
instruments have asserted defenses when the FDIC attempted to obtain
payment. The FDIC may be able to avoid these defenses under certain
circumstances.

la) Holder in Due Course Status. Ifthe FDIC has acquired a note as a holder in
due course,8' it may be able to avoid certain defenses. When the FDIC acquires a
note under a purchase and assumption agreement as part of the takeover of a
failed bank, the Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the FDIC has
a status equivalent to that of a holder in due course of the note."
In FDICv. Wood,lOthe FDIC, as a holder in due course, was able to enforce
the note free from the defense that the note provided for interest at a rate that
violated state usury laws.1t The court found that as a matter offederal common
law, the FDIC should be viewed as having holder in due course status, which it
requires to carry out its statutory functions. Although state law might not view
the FDIC as a holder in due course, the court believed that there ought to be a
unifonn national rule allowing the FDIC to engage successfully in purchase and
assumption transactions. The court held that "when the FDIC in its corporate
capacity, as part of a purchase and assumption transaction, acquires a note in
good faith, for value, and without actual knowledge of any defense against the
note, it takes the note free ofall defenses that would not prevail against a holder

8812 USC § 1821(d)(1982).

"'See FDIC v. Jennings, 615 F. Supp. 465 (WD Okla. 1985). In this action, the FDIC
filed suit against six former officers and directors of the insolvent Penn Square Bank,
claiming that they failed to set bank policies or to control daily bank operations. made
illegal insider loans, and violated loan lending limits. The FDIC also sued the accounting
firm that audited the bank. The FDIC claimed that the firm's negligence in auditing the
bank caused losses of more than $65.7 million to the bank and its creditors, and sought
recovery of these losses plus punitive damages. The complaint charged the firm with
failing to follow generally accepted auditing standards and its own internal audit guide-
lines, and for being unable to provide an independent opinion because ofloans from the
banks to partners of the accounting firm. See also Galbraith & Seidel, "FDIC vs. Impru-
dent Banking Officials: The Enforcement Apparatus," 104 Banking U 92-126 (1987);
Searle, "Director's Liability and the Relationship Between Bankers and Regulators," 6
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 291-297 (1987).
"See §§ 16.01,16.02 for a discussion of holder in due course status.
uFDIC v. Wood, 758 F2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 474 US 944(1985). See also
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 826 (1982).
10 758 F2d 156 (6thCir.), cert. denied, 474 US 944(1985).

•• Id.
10-17 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1I10.02(Sllb]

in due course."92 Moreover, the FDIC's status as a holder in due course cannot
be affected by the mere existence of information revealing a defense in the mes
ofa bank that the FDIC takes over. According to the court, the FDIC must have
actual knowledge of the defense and must have it as of the date of the purchase
and assumption agreement. 93 Following this approach, the court treated the
FDIC as a holder in due course, although it had acquired the note in question
nearly twenty months after it was due.
The court extended the Wood doctrine in FDIC Y. Leach." In Leach, the
court held that the FDIC was not subject to the defense of failure of considera-
tion;" The FDIC had acquired the note in a purchase and assumption transac-
tion and was without actual knowledge ofthe failure ofconsideration defense at
the time of the purchase and assumption agreement.

(h] The Shield Statute. A federal statute protects the FDIC from unknown
collateral agreements when it acquires obligations in the course of its statutory
duties. This statute, called the "shield" statute, provides:"

No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or interest

of the corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section, either as
security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the corporation
unless such agreement (I) shall be in writing, (2) shall have been executed by
the bank and the person or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder,
including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset
by the bank, (3) shall have been approved by the board of directors of the
bank or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes
of said board or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously from the
time of its execution, an official record of the bank. 97

92 Id. at 161.
13 Id. at 162.
14
772 F2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985).
IOId.
M The shield statute has its origin in the D'Oench doctrine, which protected the FDIC
from agreements that did not appear on the books of the bank. This doctrine was first
articulated in D ·Oench. Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 US 447 (1942), in which the Supreme
Court refused to entertain defenses to agreements that would deceive creditors or the
FDIC, or would have that effect. Actual intent to defraud was not required; if the debtor
signed an agreement that would have the effect of deceiving creditors or the FDIC, he
would be estopped from asserting any defenses. In D 'Oench, the debtor was estopped from
asserting a defense of failure of consideration, and was liable on the notes he signed,
despite the fact he had been promised by the bank's president that the noles would never
he called for payment. See generally Norcross, "The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Super
Powers, The D'Oench Doctrine and Federal Common Law," 103 Banking U 316-356
(1986).
91 12 USC § 1823(e) (1982).
~ 10.02[Sllb] OVERVIEW 11)..18

FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.·1 is a typical case applying the shield statute.
The Lattimore Land Corporation was the obligor on a promissory note that
ultimately was assigned to the Hamilton National Bank and was acquired by tbe
FDIC when Hamilton failed. In the FDIC's suit to obtain payment of the notej
the Lattimore Land Corporation raised the defense that there was an alleged oral
agreement by a predecessor of Hamilton National Bank to give Lattimore
additional loan funds. This alleged agreement had been violated, and therefore
constituted a defense to payment of the note. The court held that the statute
made any unwritten side agreements, such as that alleged by Lattimore, irrele-
vant to the claim of the FDIC. It made nodifferellce in the application of the
statutory shield that the obligors on tbe note were free ofwrongdoirig and were
not customers of the bank that was insured by the FDIC."
The shield statute will also apply when the collateral agreement is in writing
but is not made a part ofthe official records ofthe bank. 100 The FDIC is similarly
protected by the shield statute from claims ofan oral accord and satisfaction on a
note.'o, The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a 1987 case, held that
.the fact that an individual signed a guaranty with the amount blank did not
preclude the FDIC from enforcing the obligation against him.'" In FDIC v.
Venture Contractors, Inc.,'03 Davis and several other individuals were guaran-
tors on a bank loan to Venture Contractors. When the FDIC pursued payment
against the guarantors, Davis alleged that there had been an oral agreement that
he would guarantee only a certain risk, known as the Oketo development project,
for which the loans had been repaid. The court held that Davis's alleged side
agreement met none of the requirements of the shield statute, and Davis, rather

IS 656 F2d 139 (5th Cir. 198 J).

"Accord. Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 US 972 (1982) (coun applied the shield statute even though the FDIC
acquired only a partial interest in a note).
100 FDIC v. De Jesus Velez, 678 F2d 371 (1st Cir. 1982). Capital debentures issued by
the bank became due but were not redeemed. The bank arranged loans with the holders of
the debentures taking back notes and entering into a letter agreement that the bank would
not collect the notes until it first redeemed the debentures. These agreements were kept in
the bank president's personal safe and not made a part of the official records of the bank.
The bank failed. the FDIC acquired the assets, and sued to collect the notes. The holders
of the debentures argued that the letter agreement was a defense, as well as the basis for a
right to set ofT the amount represented by the debentures against the debt represented by
the notes. The court held that the shield statute prohibited recognition of the agreement
because it had not been approved by the bank's board of directors and was not included in
the official records of the bank.
101 FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enterprises. 642 F2d 785 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord Black v.
FDIC, 640 F2d 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 US 838 (1981).
'·'FDIC v. Venture Contractors, Inc., 825 F2d 143 (7th Cir. 1987).
1031d.
10-19 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS If lO.02[S}lb}

than the FDIC or other creditors, should be responsible for signing the guaranty
in blank. 104
The shield statute, however, does not apply when the note, on its face,
indicates bilateral obligations, and the other obligations are not met. In Howell v.
Continental Credit Corp., '05 Mrs. Howell and Continental Credit entered into an
agreement in which Continental agreed to purchase broadcasting equipment
and lease it to Mrs. Howell. To obtain the necessary financing, roughly
$900,000, Continental discounted the leases with Drovers National Bank and
assigned all of its rights under the leases to the bank. Mrs. Howell, to secure her
performance under the leases, deposited $1 million worth of common stock in
an escrow account at the bank. Instead of using all of the money to purchase
equipment for Mrs. Howell, Continental apparently used most of it for other
purposes. When Drovers National Bank became insolvent, the FDIC was
appointed receiver, and acquired the leases in a purchase and assumption
agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Mrs. Howell's defense
that Continental failed to provide adequate consideration. The court ruled that
the shield statute was inapplicable "where the document the FDIC seeks to
enforce is one ... which facially manifests bilateral obligations and serves as the
basis of the lessee's defense."'a. Mrs. Howell's defense "arises directly and
explicitly from the provisions of the leases which were in the bank's files and
which the FDIC now seeks to enforce."'o' The Supreme Court considered the
scope ofthe shield statute in Langley v. FDIC.'" Petitioners owed money to the
Planters Trust & Savings Bank on a note entered into as part of a real estate
transaction. When petitioners failed to pay an installment on the note, Planters
bank sued for payment. Petitioners defended on the ground that the bank had
obtained the note from petitioners by making various misrepresentations as to
the amount of the property.involved and the extent of its mineral nature. The
loan.documentation and the bank's records did not show any reference to these
representations. After the litigation over the note had commenced, the FDIC
became aware of the petitioners' defenses when it conducted an examination of
the bank. Soon thereafter, the state authorities closed the bank and appointed as
receiver the FDIC, which obtained the note as part of a purchase and assump-
tion arrangement. The FDIC then sought to enforce the note and successfully
raised the federal shield statute as a bar to the defenses raised by the petitioners.
The Langley decision resolved the meaning of the term "agreement" in the
statute. Although petitioners argued that the term included only express

104 Id.
'°'655 F2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981).
10. Idat 746.
'·'Id at 747.
'0' 108 S. Ct. 396 (1987).
, lO.02(Sllb) OVERVIEW 10-20

promises and not representations that amounted to conditions to the petition-

ers' performance of their contractto pay the note, the Supreme Court refused to
accept this distinction. In the Court's view, the shield statute was enacted to
enable the FDIC to rely on the records of the bank in evaluating the bank's
worth, to determine its soundness, and to decide how to deal with the bank when
it is failing. This purpose would be defeated by permitting a note that is unquali-
fied on its face to be subject to undisclosed conditions. Because the shield statute
also requires that any agreement must become an official bank record "contem-
poraneously" with the execution of the note in order to be enforceable against
the FDIC, the statute serves the additional purposes of assuring that the bank
itself will exercise "mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior
bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion of new terms, with the collusion
ofbank employees, when a bank appears headed for failure. "'~. Neither of these
purposes would be served by permitting the enforcement of undisclosed
"conditions."l1o
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the FDIC would be
subject to a defense offraud. Petitioners argued that iffraud made the obligation
entirely void, there would then be no interest of the FDIC in the note that was
diminished or defeated by giving effect to the defense. The FDIC conceded that
fraud in the factum, where a party signs an instrument not knowing its true
nature or contents, would not be barred by the shield statute because such fraud
makes the obligation void. But since the petitioners had at most shown only
fraud in the inducement, which would make the obligation voidable but not
void, the petitioners could not raise that defense. ", Finally, the Court ruled that
any knowledge of the misrepresentations by the FDIC prior to its acquiring the
note was irrelevant to the operation of the statute. Congress intended to make
the requirements of the statute apply with certainty. "An agreement that meets
them prevails even if the FDIC did not know of it; and an agreement that does
not meet them fails even if the FDIC knew."112

1°'ld. at 401.
''0 The Langley decision, thus, rejects the reasoning ofthe Eleventh Circuit in Gunter
v. Hutcheson, 674 F2d 862 (lllh Cir.), ten. denied, 459 US 826 (1982), where the court
held the shield statute did not protect the FDIC from defenses based upon the misrepre-
sentations of an insolvent bank's' fonner officers because these misrepresentations made
the transaction invalid from the beginning and were not a separate side "agreement."
Langley, 108 S. Ct. at 399. In Gunter, the coun went on to hold that the FDIC was
protected because of its holder in due course rights under federal common law and its
immunity under Section 29{c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The approach of
Langley is consistent with the view expressed in FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F2d 34, 37 (6th
Cir. 1985), that the shield statute bars an obligor from raising a fraud in the inducement
defense based on bank misrepresentations as to how a blank note would be filled in.
,,, 108 S. Ct. at 402.
112Id. at 403.
10-21 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 11 10.02(5)[c]

Icl Section 29(c) ofthe Securitie~ Exchange Act. Section 29(c) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,113 which provides that violations of the act do not
constitute a defense to the collection ofobligations by persons who acquired the
obligation "in good faith for value and without actual knowledge of the viola-
tion,"'" may protect the FDIC from such defenses when trying to enforce notes
and obligations of an insolvent bank. In Gilman v. FDIC,115 Section 29(c)
permitted the FDIC to enforce a note notwithstanding the violation of Regula-
tion U. On February 16, 1976, the Comptroller ofthe Currency declared Hamil-
ton National Bank insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. The FDIC
then arranged for the sale of the bank's assets to First Tennessee by means of a
purchase and assumption agreement entered into the same day. This agreement
gave First Tennessee the right to return any undesirable loans to the receiver.
Simultaneously, the corporate FDIC completed an agreement with the receiver
obligating the FDIC to purchase loans that FirstTennessee might return. Fol-
lowing this arrangement, First Tennessee acquired the Gilman note. Gilman
claimed that under the securities laws and margin regulations it was not obli-
gated to pay the note, and sent letters in March 1976 to the FDIC, First Tennes-
see, and Hamilton National Bank asserting these defenses. First Tennessee
decided to return the Gilman note to the FDIC as receiver, which in tum, sold
the note to the FDIC as insurer. Gilman then sued Hamilton National and the
FDIC, seeking rescission of the note.
The court assumed for the purposes ofthe appeal that Gilman had a right to
rescind a loan made in violation of Regulation U. The court found, however,
that Section 29(c) permitted the FDIC to enforce the note notwithstanding the
potential securities violations. Gilman argued that the FDIC had actual knowl-
edge at the time the insurance corporation acquired the note because of the
letters sent by Gilman. The court held, firstly, that the FDIC is under no duty to
exaI1,line the assets of a failed bank before it undertakes steps to effect a liquida-
tion or reorganization, because the FDIC must act quickly to protect the insol-
vent bank's status as a going concern. The court then held that for purposes of
Section 29(c), both the receiver and the corporate FDIC should be viewed as
having acquired the Gilman note on February 16, 1976, when an irrevocable
commitment was made to repurchase any assets First Tennessee might decide to
return. To hold otherwise would interfere with the ability of the FDIC to
accomplish a restructuring of insolvent banks through purchase and assumption
arrangements.

113
15 USC § 78cc(c) (1982).
114Id.
115
660 F2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F2d 862 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 826 (1982) (holding that Section 29(c) protected the FDIC
from claims of fraudulent misrepresentation in violation of the federal securities laws).
1II0.0216][a) OVERVIEW 10-22

[6) Resolving Disputed Claims; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

[al Banks. A federal statute provides that claims involving the FDIC are cases
that arise under the laws of the United States, and thus federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, without regard to the amount in
controversy.UI However, ifthe FDIC is acting in its capacity as receiver ofa state
bank, and the action involves only the rights or obligations of depositors, credi-
tors, stockholders, and such state bank under state law, the federal courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, and the proper forum is in
state court.' 11 The Federal Tort Claims Act"I may further limit jurisdiction, for
where it applies, it is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs. 119
In a suit filed by the FDIC in its corporate capacity against the bank offlcers
and directors for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, the defendants could
not assert any claim against the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of the closed
bank, because it was not a party to the suit, and the court had no jurisdiction over
it.':10 Yet in another case, the FDIC was sued in both its capacities-as a receiver
appointed under state law and as an insuring corporation.'" The FDIC as.
insurer had been sued, admittedly, only to ensure recovery ofany judgment that
might be awarded, because the receivership had no assets remaining at the time
of suit. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Section 1819
conferred federal jurisdiction on the court, because the suit sought to impose
liability on the corporation, and thus involved obligations of the corporation.
The dissent argued, however, that the court should look at the claim itself, rather
than at the parties named in the action. In this case, plaintiff was trying to
recover for actions by the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of the insolvent bank,
and the dissent urged that the matter should have been remanded to state court
without reaching the merits. 122
Transactions between the FDIC as receiver and the FDIC in its corporate
capacity have been upheld against claims that they were sham transactions
desigiled to confer jurisdiction on the federal courtS.'23 One court found that it

11112 USC § 1819 Fourth (1982).

117 ld.

111 See 25 USC §§ 2674-2680 (1982).

'19 See FOICv. Air All., Inc., 389 Mass. 950,452 NE2d I J 43 (1983). See also Gregory
v. Mitchell, 634 F2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); Safeway Ponland E.F.C.U. v. FDIC, 506 F2d
1213 (9th Cir. 1974).
120 FDIC v. Butcher, 660 F. Supp. 1274, 1283 (ED Tenn. 1987).
'" Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank oflrvine, 815 F2d 538 (9th Cir. 1987).
122 ld. at 544-546 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).

123 FDIC v. Braemoor ASSOC., 686 F2d 550 (71h Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 461 US 927
(I983); FDIC v. De Jesus Velez, 678 F2d 371 (1st Cir. 1982).
10-23 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1I10.02(6][b]

was necessary under the statutory scheme that the FDIC be permitted to operate
in a dual capacity simultaneously, as a receiver and an insurer. 12'

(b] Savings and Loan Associations. An issue of statutory interpretation has

developed in determining when and whether a party may file suit against the
FSLIC to resolve disputed claims before seeking review through the administra-
tive procedures within the FSLIC and FHLBB. Three federal statutes are at
issue:
I. Section 1730(k)(1) provides that any suit in which the FSLIC is a party is
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the federal courts have
original jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy.'25 It further
provides that for any action in which the FSLIC is a party in its capacity as
receiver, and which involves only the rights or obligations ofinvestors, creditors,
stockholders and an institution chartered under state law, federal courts do not
have original jurisdiction. These actions must be brought in state court.'25
2. Section 1464(d)(6)(C) provides that no court may restrain or affect the
exercise of powers or functions of a receiver, except at the request of the
FHLBB.'27
3. Section I729(d) provides that the FSLIC has the power to settle, compro-
mise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and to do
all other things that may be necessary in connection therewith, subject only to
the regulation of the FHLBB. ' 2'
Several courts have held, after reviewing these statutory provisions, that the
plaintiff's sole remedy was a petition to the FHLBB, with judicial review then
available under the Administrative Procedure Act.'2. The Court of Appeals for

m De Jesus Velez, 678 F2d at 371.

' 25 12 USC § I 730(k)(I) (1982).
'21 Id.
' 27 12 USC § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
'2'12 USC § I 729(d) (1982).
'21 North Mississippi Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 US 1054 (1986) (Counterclaim for specific perfonnance or damages for
breach of contract by a fonner officer dismissed after FSLIC was appointed receiver;
court found it had no subject matter jurisdiction because the FSLIC's suspension of
payments under the contract was a discretionary act in its capacity as a receiver, and thus
subject to review solely by the FHLBB); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1986) (Plaintiff's suit against the FSLlC, as receiver of an insolvent association, seeking to
foreclose its materialman's liens against real estate the receiver had acquired while
liquidating the assets, was dismissed. The court, relying on Hudspeth, held that Chupik
was required to exhaust administrative procedure remedies before pursuing adjudication
in the court system); York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (MD Pa. 1987)
(District court dismissed plaintiff's suit against the FSLIC, contesting the FSLIC's deter-
mination that certain certificates of deposit it owned, with a face value exceeding SI
1110.03 OVERVIEW 10-24

the Ninth Circuit, however, held in 1987 that the FSLIC has no power to
adjudicate creditor claims and is not immune to suit against it as receiver, but -
that the doctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies may be applicable in
certain cases. l30 After a review of the statutory provisions, the regulations
promulgated by the FHLBB, and the legislative intent of Congress, and after a
comparison between the powers of the FDIC and the FSLIC, the court found
that Hudspeth in effect expanded the FSLIC's receivership authority, which the
Ninth Circuit declined to dO. 131 Until this issue is resolved, it appears that a
plaintiffs ability to sue the FSLIC may depend on the jurisdiction in which the
case is heard.

1110.03 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO WEAK BANKS

The Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 significantly
expanded the powers ofthe federal regulatory agencies to provide assistance to
financial institutions in precarious financial condition. The Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act of 1987 further enlarges these powers. The amendments extend
deadlines that had expired for authority conferred by the Gam-5t Germain Act
and provide additional methods of assistance for failing institutions. Generally,
assistance to failing institutions under these statutes takes three different forms:
(I) direct financial aid through loans, deposits, or purchase of assets; (2) arrang-
ing mergers or acquisitions by other financial institutions; and (3) capital infu-
sion through new net worth certificates purchased by the FDIC or FSLlC.

(1) Direct Financial Aid

The FDIC and the FSLIC may provide financial assistance in a variety of
forms to ailing institutions in order to prevent closure and to restore them to
normal operations. The boards of directors of these regulatory agencies may
pursue various courses of action with regard to any institution insured by them
when the action is taken either to prevent the closing of the institution or to
restore a closed institution to normal operations. These actions include the
following: (I) making loans; (2) making deposits; (3) purchasing the assets or
securities; (4) assuming the liabilities; or (5) making contributions. 132

million, were only insured to the extent of$1 00,000, holding that any claim arising from
the exercise of the FSLlC's power as receiver had to be channeled through the administra-
tive process).
'30 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. eHG Int'I,lnc.• 811 F2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
'3' The circuit coun also said that the FSLlC's interpretation of the statutes presented
serious constitutional problems under a Northern Pipeline [Nonhem Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (I 982)J analysis, but it did not have to reach that
issue under its resolution of the case. 811 F2d at 1221-1222.
132 12 USC § 1823(c)(l) (1982) (FDIC); 12 USC § 1729(1)(1) (1982) (FSLIC).
10-25 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 1f 10.03[2/[al

(21 Merger Assistance

Aid may be given to facilitate mergers or asset acquisitions ofinstitutions in
financial jeopardy. This assistance may take the form of loans, contributions,
guarantees, or assumptions ofliabilities, and may be given directly to the acquir- .
ing entity. '33 Unless the federal agency finds that the continued operation of the
insured institution is "essential to provide adequate banking services in its
community," the assistance provided by the federal agency cannot be in an
amount exceeding what the agency determines as "reasonably necessary to save
the cost of liquidating" the institution. '34

(a1 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act. The Gam-St Germain Act
gives the FDIC and the FSLIC authority to approve "extraordinary acquisi-
tions" of failing institutions by out-of-state financial institutions.'35 The failing
institution need not be closed, but it must be "in danger of closing. "'31 More-
over, the regulatory agencies may approve acquisitions by acquiring depository
institutions that are different from the failing institution. Thus, the act permits
not only interstate acquisitions, but also interindustry combinations as a means
ofrescuing foundering institutions. Out-of-state banks and bank holding compa-
nies, for example, may now acquire ailing savings institutions when the condi-
tions of the act are met. 1l7
The act establishes a procedure for approving these combinations, which
procedure requires the consent of both the appropriate federal supervisory
agency and the state regulatory authority, but the objection ofthe state authority
can be overridden by a unanimous vote ofthe federal agency.'31 Ifthe bank is not
closed however, but only found to be "in danger of closing," the FDIC may not

'~312 USC § I823(c)(1982)(FDIC); and 12 usq 1729(f) (I 982)(FSLIC).

1:>112 USC § I823(c){4)(A} (I 982)(FDIC); a similar provision for thrift institutions is
found at 12 USC § I 729(f)(4)(A)( 1982).
135 12 USC § 1823(1) (1982) (FDIC); 12 USC § 1730(m) (1982) (FSLIC).
131 Competitive Equality Banking Act ofl987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 502(b), 101 Stat.
55 I, 623-625 (to be codified at 12 USC § I 823(f)(3) ). A bank "in danger of closing" is
defined as an insured bank with respect to which the chartering authority certifies in
writing that:
(I) The bank is not likely to be able to meet the demands of such bank's
depositors or pay the obligations of the bank in the normal course of business, and
there is no reasonable prospect that the bank will be able to meet such demands or
pay such obligations without federal assistance; or
(2) The bank has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or
substantially all of the capital of the bank, and there is no reasonable prospect for
the replenishment of the bank's capital without federal assistance:
Id. § S02(d), at 627 (to be codified at 12 USC § I823(f)(8) ).
37
' 12 USC § I 823(f) (1982).
131 12 USC § 1823 (1982) (banks); I730a(m) (1982) (savings and loans).
1I10.03[2I[a) OVERVIEW 10-26

assist in a merger unless the board of directors or trustees of the bank being
acquired has requested in writing that the FDIC assist in an acquisition or
merger, and the state bank supervisor ofthe state in which th~ bank in danger of
closing is located approves the acquisition."9
The act establishes priorities for the federal agencies to consider before
authorizing acquisitions under this authority. These priorities are as follows:

1. Between depository institutions of the same type within the same state;
2. Between depository institutions of the same type:
a. In different states that by statute specifically authorize such
acquisitions;
b. In the absence ofsuch statutes, in different states that are contiguous;
3. Between depository institutions ofthe same type in different states other
than the states described in item (2);
4. Between depository institutions of different types in the same state;
S. Between depository institutions of different types:
a. In different states, that by statute specifically authorize such acquisi-
tions; or
b. In the absence ofsuch statutes, in different states that are contiguous;
6. Between depository institutions of different types in different states
other than the states described in item (5)."0

The provisions allowing mergers across state lines were originally passed as
temporary measures, but they have been extended pennanently. I.,
Amendments made by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 now
grant an acquiring out-of-state bank holding company expansion rights in the
state of acquisition through the bank holding company structure.'42 Similarly,
the amendments now prevent regional compact restrictions from applying to a
holding company that makes an acquisition under the emergency authority.143
These changes were made to prevent the application of state legislation that
prohibited certain branching activities by acquiring banks, thus discouraging
these banks from entering into such emergency acquisition agreements.

13·Competitive Equality BankingAct of) 987, Pub. L No. 100-86, § 502(b), IOJ Stat.
551, 624 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1823(1)(3».
'COld. § 502(c)(2). a1625-626 (amending 12 USC § 1823(1)(6». In addition, in the
case of a minority-controlled bank, the FDIC must seek an offer from other minority-
controlled banks before proceeding with the bidding priorities. Id.
'" Id. § 509. at 635.
1.2Id. § 509(c), at 625 (to be codified at 12 USC § I 823(IX4)(D) ).
"3Id. (to be codified at J2 USC § I823(1)(4)(E) ).
10-27 FAILING BANKS & THRIFI'S 1I10.03(2)1b)

The Garn-St Germain Act prohibits acquisitions "which would result in a

monopoly, or· which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy
to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business ofbanking in any part of
the United States, ",.. It also prohibits the approval of acquisitions whose effect
may be to substantially lessen competition unless there is a finding that the
"anti-competitive effects of the proposed transactions are clearly outweighed in
the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the
convenience and needs of the community to be served."'" These provisions on
the preservation of competition apply only to acquisitions and sales of insured
banks approved by the FDIC. There is no comparable provision relating to thrift
institutions regulated by the FSLIC. The act also authorized mergers of finan-
cially weak federal credit unions with other federally insured depository institu-
tions when a merger with another insured credit union is not possible.'41

[b) Judicial Review of Agency Decisions to Give Merger Assistance. A court

considered the merger provision ofthe Gam-St Germain Act in a case involving
the acquisition of First Federal Savings and Loan Association by a subsidiary of
Citicorp.141 The plaintiffs in the case launched a broad challenge against the
decision of the FSLIC about which of the competing offers for restructuring the
association to accept. The court held that judicial review of the agency decision
was proper under the act, but that the decision of which bid or emergency
arrangement to accept was a matter for the discretion ofthe agency that the court
could review only for abuse in exercising its discretion.
A rejected bidder argued that the court should require the FSLIC to aug-
ment the record, in court, so that the court could examine the manner in which
the agency evaluated the various alternatives, but the court refused to follow this
direction. The FSLIC, in the court's opinion, should be able to deal with the
emergency presented by a financial institution failure without having to subject
its cOJ;nplicated calculations for evaluating alternative arrangements to a pro-
tracted dispute on review. In addition, as the FSLIC needed to deal with finan-
cial institutions in a confidential manner to encourage and evaluate proposals,
the preservation of the confidentiality of the information submitted to the
FSLIC on which it based its judgment also justified denying the request to force
the agency to spread its information on the record.'"
Another Citicorp acquisition provided an opportunity for judicial review of
the acquisition provisions. In Getty v. FSLIC,14I the FSLIC solicited bids from

"'12 USC § 1823(f)(7)(A) (1982).

". 12 USC § 1823(1)(7)(B) (1982).
". 12 USC § 1785(b) (1982). See also 11 6.05 on emergency acquisitions.
147 Hartigan v. FHLBB, 746 F2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
,•• Id.
'41 805 F2d 1050 (DC Cir. 1986).
1) 10.03(3) OVERVIEW 10-28

both Citicorp and Getty for National Pennanent Bank, a federally chartered
mutual savings bank, under the emergency thrift acquisition provisions of the
Gam-St Germain Act. After a series ofrebidding, the FSLIC accepted Citicorp's
bid. Getty challenged the FSLIC's action. After initially 10~ing its request for a
stay, and after procedural disputes to obtain access to interagency memoranda
involved in the FSLIC decision process, Getty's appeal was heard. The court
ruled for Getty on two issues. Firstly, 12 USC § 1730a(m)(3)(B) enumerates
priorities for the FSLIC to consider based on geographical considerations and
the nature ofthe institutions. The FSLIC erred by not providing an explanation
of how it considered these statutory priorities. Secondly, when the FSLIC
decides to request a rebid, the act permits other bidders who were within a
defined range of the "initial lowest acceptable offer" to submit a new offer as
well.'50 The FSLIC had refused to allow Getty to submit a further modified bid
after the last Citicorp bid. .
The court held that Getty was entitled to rebid because it was within the
prescribed range of"the offer FSLIC woUld accept but for the rebidding require-
ment ofsubsection (3)(A)."'" Having ruled for Getty, the court faced the issue of
what reliefwould be appropriate in view ofthe consummation ofthe acquisition
by Citicorp. The court said that it would be inappropriate for the FSLlC to go
through a process of rebidding only to reject a better offer from Getty because it
favored the management abilities ofCiticorp. In the court's opinion, the FSLIC
could not reopen the issue of the qualifications of the bidders after having
determined those qualifications to have been adequate at the outset, when it
solicited the bids. The court also ruled that fairness required allowing Citicorp,
as well as Getty, to submit a new bid. 1St

(3] Net Worth Certificates

The Gam.St Germain Act permits the FDIC and the FSLIC to provide
capital assistance to ailing institutions they insure through the purchase of new
net worth certificates. '53 The expiration date of these provisions has been
extended several times, with the most recent amendment setting the expiration
date at October 16, 1991. '54 Using the FSLIC as the example, the net worth
certificate program works as described in the following text.
Qualified institutions may issue net worth certificates, which the FSLIC will
purchase with promissory notes of the financial institution for regulatory pur-

'50 12 USC § I 730(m)(3)(a)( 1982).

'5' Getty, 805 F2d at 1060.
'5' Id at 1062. After this decision, the parties were reported to have settled the case.
12 USC § I 823(i) (Supp. III 1985) (FDIC); 12 USC § 1729(1) (1982) (FSLIC).
153
'54 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-186, § S09(b), 101
Stat. 55l, 635.
10-29 FAILING BANKS & THRIFTS 11 10.03131

poses. The amount of certificates the FSLlC may purchase is tied to the percent-
age of net worth of the issuing institution and the amount of operating losses it
has sustained. For example, the FSUC may purchase certificates in an amount
up to 70 percent of the institution's operating losses when the institution has a
net worth less than or equal to one percent. '55 Losses occasioned by mismanage-
ment or speculation in futures or forward contracts may not be included in this
calCUlation.,...
Qualified institutions are those insured by the FSLlC that have a net worth
of 3 percent of assets or less, have incurred losses during the two previous
quarters, have not incurred losses as a result of speculative transactions or
excessive operating expenses, will have a net worth of not less than 0.5 percent of
assets after the FSLlC purchases the certificates, and have agreed to comply with
terms and conditions set by the FSLIC.m In addition, the institution must have
at least 20 percent of its loans invested in residential mortgages or in securities
backed by residential mortgages. ,..
When a state insuring agency agrees to indemnify the FSLlC, the FSUC
may acquire net worth certificates of institutions insured under state law. 1St
Although the FSUC may establish conditions for the institution to satisfy as part
of its agreement to purchase net worth certificates, including conditions relating
to plans of operation, restrictions on operations, supervisory action, and agree-
ments to merge or reorganize, the FSLIC may not force the institution to consent
to a merger or acquisition or to agree to make specified management personnel
changes ifthe institution will have a positive net worth for a minimum period of
time after the purchase of the certificates.'ea
The certificates held by the FSLIC have priority over claims based upon an
equity interest in the institution, but the certificates are subject to the prior
payments of accounts, certificates of deposit, and certain other debt obligations
of the institution. 16' The FDIC has comparable authority to buy net worth
certificates of qualified insured banks. 16.

155
12 USC §§ 1729(f)(5)(E), 1823(i)(5){1982).
'''12 USC §§ 1729(f)(5)(B)(iii), I 823(i)(2)(C)( 1982).
15'12 USC§ 1729(f)(5)(B)(1982).
'51 Id.

'59 12 USC § 1729(f)(5)(L) (1982).

50
' 12 USC § I729(f)(5)(C)(ii){ 1982).
151 12 USC § I729(f)(5)(A)(iv) (1982). A 1986 report ofthe General Accounting Office
presented a dismal picture of the net worth certificate program. Of the 118 thrift institu-
tions receiving net worth assistance from the FHLBB, none has repaid anyofthe principal
amounts and only eight have made interest payments on the certificates. The income
capital certificate program also had few repayments. The report is descJjbed in 47 Bank-
ing L. Rep. (BNA) 5 (July 7, 1986).
112 See generally 12 USC § I823(i) (1982 & SuPp. III 1985).
'IlI0.04 OVERVIEW 10-30

1110.04 NEW BANKS AND BRIDGE BANKS

(1] Deposit Insurance National Banks
As soon as possible after the closing of an insured bank, the FDIC has the
authority to organize a new bank to assume the insured deposits of the closed
bank, ifit finds it advisable and in the interest of the depositors or the public. 113
A new bank is a temporary device, organized in an attempt to create another
bank to replace the closed bank. The new bank must be located in the; same
community as the closed bank.,.. The new bank is organized as a national bank,
but is managed by an officer appointed by the FDIC board of directors, 111
The FDIC must transfer the amount of insurance due each depositor (from
his or her insured deposit in the closed bank) to the new bank.,•• The new bank
may accept demand deposits, but accounts by an individual depositor may not
exceed $100,000. '81 The FDIC bears the expenses in operating the new bank. '11
When it is desirable to do so, in tile juqgment of the bOl'\r~ ofdirectors, the
FDIC will offer capital stock of the new bank for sale. ' ·' When a sufficient
amount ofstock has been subscribed and paid for, the comptroller will make the
necessary changes to the organizational papers and will issue a certificate of
authority to commence business. At that point the bank is no longer a new bank,
but a full-fledged national bank. 1fO
If capital stock is not offered for sale, or an inadequate amount of capital is
raised, the FDIC may offer to transfer the business of the new bank to another
insured bank in the same community,171 Unless capital stock is sold, or the assets
and liabilities ofthe new bank assumed, the FDIC must wind up the affairs ofthe
new bank. 112 In that case, the FDIC owns the assets of the new bank and is liable
for its obligations. 173

(2) Bridge Banks

Congress recently empowered the FDIC to set up "bridge banks," a new

'13 12 USC § 1821(h) (1982).

16<lld.
lIsld. at § 1821 (i).
1661d. at § 1821U).

167 Id. at § 1821(i). An exception exists where the new bank is the only bank in the
community. In that case, deposits may exceed the $100,000 insured limit.
16sld. at § 1821(j). .
'·'Id. at § 1821 (k). The stockholders of the closed insured bank must be given first
opportunity to purchase any shares of common stock offered.
17°ld.
"'Id. at § 1821(1).
172ld.
'''Id.
10-31 FAILING BANKS & THRIFfS 1110.05

vehicle for dealing with failed ·institutions.'" A bridge bank is a temporary

device that gives ~e FDIC more time to set up a satisfactory merger, purchase
and assumption, or other transaction that cannot be accomplished at the time of
failure. 175 A bridge bank is a new national bank established by the FDIC to take
over the assets and liabilities of a failed bank and to carry on its business for a
limited time. The FDIC may establish a bridge bank only ifone ofthe following
conditions exist: (1) The net cost of reorganizing and operating the bridge bank
will not exceed the cost of liquidating the failed bank (including the cost of
paying the insured deposits); (2) the continued operation of the failed bank is
essential to provide adequate banking services in its community; or (3) the
continued operation ofthe failed bank is in the best interest ofthe depositors of
the closed bank and the public. '18
The FDIC may assist the sale or merger ofa bridge bank in the same way as
any other bank. 171 In addition, when a bridge has taken over a bank that was
eligible for an interstate acquisition, the bridge bank remains eligible for an
interstate acquisition under the same circumstances. m A bridge 'Dank termi-
nates when one of the following occurs: (1) The bridge bank merges or consoli-
dates with another bank that is not a bridge bank; (2) the bridge bank sells all or
substantially all of the stock of the bridge bank other than to the FDIC or to
another bridge bank; (3) a holding company or another bank that is not a bridge
bank assumes all, or substantially all, of the deposits or other liabilities of the
bridge bank; or (4) a period of two years following the date the bridge bank was
organized expires without any other disposition ofthe assets and liabilities ofthe
bank having occurred. 11I

';l10.05 OTHER REGULATORY POWERS

The Bank Conservation Act of 1933'80 enables the Comptroller of the
Currency to appoint a conservator, rather than a receiver, in any case in which
the comptroller deems it necessary to conserve the assets of the bank for the

"'Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 503, 101 Stat.
551,629-632 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1821(i»).
m H.R. Cont: Rep. No. 261, looth Cong., 1st Sess. 174-175 (1987).
111 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 503, 101 Stat.
5S I, 629-632 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1821 (i) ).
mId.
n1ld.
111 Id., § 509(a)( I0), at 631-632. The board of directors of the FDK may extend the
time for winding up the affairs of the bridge bank for up to one year if it is in the best
interest of the depositors of the closed bank and the public. Id.
'10 12 USC §§ 201-213 (1982).
1110.05 OVERVIEW 10-32

benefit of its depositors and other creditors.,11 A national bank conservator is

granted all the rights, powers, and privileges of, and is subject to the duties and
obligations of, receivers of insolvent national banks."2 With the protection of
deposit insurance, the many regulatory measures national banks are subject to,
and the variety of mechanisms by which- the federal agencies may deal with
failing banks, the appointment of a conservator will be rare.
Similar powers were granted to the FHLBB in the Home Owners Loan Act
of 1933.'13 The findings required to appoint a conservator are the same as those
required for appointing as receiver. If the appointment is not made for the
purpose of liquidation, the FHLBB is not required to appoint the FSLIC as
conservator. The appointed conservator has authority to operate the association
and conserve its assets as authorized by the FHLBB.,•• The appointment of a
conservator may be challenged in the same manner as the appointment of a
receiver.
Because cease and desist orders are available· to stop 01"' prevent practices
"which might result in abnormal risk of loss to a banking institution or share-
holders,"'1S they are available and useful in preventing insolvency that may be
caused by violations of regulations. A more complete discussion of cease and
desist orders is given in Chapter 9. Similarly, the federal banking agencies have
authority to remove and discipline officers and directors of the depository
institutions they regulate. These powers are also discussed in Chapter 9.

,., Id. at § 203.

112 Id.
'13 12 USC § J 464(d)(6)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
,.. 12 USC § J 464(d)(6)(D) (1982).
""First Nat'l Bank v. Department of the Treasury, 568 F2d 610, 611 n.2 (8th Cir.
1978).
 11
Deposits and Deposit
Insurance
11 11.01 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
[I) Insured Deposits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
[a) DefInition of "Deposit" ... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. . .. . .. 11-3
TABLE I I-I Regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance
CorPoration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
TABLE 11-2 Maximum Limits on Insured Deposits. . . . . 11-6
[b} Mistaken Payment in Elt.cess of Insurance . . .. . . . . . . . . 11-8
[2) Computing the Amount of Insurance: Rules for Multiple
Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1-9
£3} The Deposit Insurance System ; " 11-10
[4} General Regulatory Authority ofthe FDIC . . . . . . . . . . . . .. II-II
'II 11.02 Thrift Institution Deposit Insurance " 11-13
[I} Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 11-13
(2) Financial Rescue of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
System By the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 . " 11-14
[3} Measures to Improve FHLBB and FSLIC Regulation of
Financially Weak Institutions " 11-18
[a) Accounting Principles .....•................... " 11-18
[b) Capital Forbearance Programs 11-19
[c) General Supervisory Powers " 11-20
[d) Holding ,£orporation for Troubled Assets 11-21
'I 11.03 Credit Union Share Insurance " 11-21
11 I 1.04 Deposit Insurance Backed by the Full Faith and Credit of the
United States 11-24
'111.05 Withholding Tax on Interest Paid " II-25

11-1
1111.01 OVERVIEW 11-2

~ 11.01 THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

Despite the many safeguards provided by the Federal Reserve System,
many bankS failed in the Great Depression of the 1930s. To strengthen the
banking system and to create public confidence in the banks, Congress passed
the Banking Act of 1933, which established a system of federal guarantees of
deposits in national banks. The vehicle for this protection is the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. The original act created a corporation with $150 million
of stock subscribed by the U.S. Treasury and further stock purchased by the
Federal Reserve banks.' This was later amended to replace the stock, which was
repaid, with a reserve fund of $1 billion and with power to borrow from the
Treasury lip to $3 billion, at clirrent interest rates, when the director oftbe FDIC
felt it was needed. 2 Today, most commercial banks are insured by the FDIC.3
The FDIC is managed by a three-member Board of Directors, consisting of
the Comptroller of the Currency and· two· other directors appointed by the
president of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
appointed directors serve six-year terms, and one of the appointees serves as
chairman.' The directors cannot hold office in or own the stock of any bank
insured by the FDIC. The board has rule.making.poweuo carry outthe pUfPOses
of the law. 6
Federal statutes authorize the FDIC to "sue and be sued. u, This provision
gives courts jurisdiction to award money damages against the FDIC only for
claims that would otherwise be permitted under the Federal Torts Claims Act. 7
For a claim to be pursuable against the FDIC under the Federal Torts Claims
Act, the claim must first have been presented to the federal agency, and it must
have been denied by the agency in writing or a period of six months must have
elapsed after the claim was filed with the agency.' Failure to follow this proce-
dure has resulted in the dismissal ofclaims alleging violations ofdue process and
equal Ilrotection under the federal civil rights laws when the FDIC assumed
control over the assets of a bank in which plaintiffs bad an interest.'
The FDIC has the following responsibilities:

'Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168-169.

212 USC§ 1824 (1982).
3 See 11 2.0 I.

412 USC § 1812 (1982).

6 12 USC § 1819 Tenth (1982).
612 USC § 1819 Fourth (1982).
7 Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord, Safeway Portland
Employees' Federal Credit Union v. FDIC, 506 F2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1974). See 28 USC
§ 2679(a) (1982).
'28 USC § 2675 (1982).
• Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981).
11-3 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 11 ll.01[ll1a)

1. It insures deposits;
2. It supervises the liquidation of insolvent banks that it has insured;
3. It seeks to rehabilitate weak banks and to arrange measures that Will
forestall bank failures and depositor losses; and
4. It exercises general supervisory authority over the staie· bankS that it
insures but that are not members ofthe Federal Reserve System. In this
last capacity, it has the power to conduct bank examinations, to pass on
mergers and consolidations, to regulate the establishment ofbranches, as
well as the power to exercise other regulatory control.
The breadth of the FDIC's powers is evident from the scope of its regula-
tions. Table 11-1 lists the current FDIC regulations.'o

(I) Insured Deposits

The FDIC insures deposits in national banks, state banks, and savings
banks. All banks, state and national, that are members of the Federal Reserve
System are required to be insured." State nonmember banks may apply for
insurance With the FDIC, as may the branches of foreign banks. 12 In 1982,
Congress made industrial banks and similar financial institutions eligible for
federal deposit insurance.'3 Most commercial banks have FDIC insurance.
Under current statutes, each account in a bank insured by the FDIC is insured to
a maximum of $100,000." The amount of insurance has not always been this
high. Table 11-2 shows past maximum limits on insured deposits.
The deposits insured include checking, savings, time, or thrift accounts,
certificates of deposit, letters of credit, and traveler's checks.'5 The insurance
also covers other paper issued by the insured bank for cash, items in the process
of collection, and other accounts due customers."

lal Definition of '~Deposit." The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines the
term "deposit" as follows:

(I) the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a

bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given oris obligated
to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial,

'OFDIC regulations are found at 12 CFR pt. 300 (1988).

"12 USC§ 1814(b)(1982).
'212 USC § 1815 (1982).
'3 12 USC §§ 1813(a), 1815(a)(1982).
,. 12 USC § 1821(a)(1 982).
'512 USC § 1813(1) (1982).
" Id.
'J 11.01[I](a] OVERVIEW 11·4

TABLE 11·1 Regulations ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

/2
CFR
PI. Regulation
SUBCHAPTER A-PROCEDURE AND RULES OF PRACTICE
300-302 [Reserved]
303 Applications, requests, submittals, delegations of authority, and
notices of acquisition of control
304 Forms, instructions, and reports
305-306 [Reserved]
307 Notification of changes of insured status
308 Rules of practice and procedures
309 Disclosure of information
310 Privacy Act regulations
311 Rules governing public observation of meetings of the Corporation's
Board of Directors
SUBCHAPTER B-REGULATIONS
AND STATEMENTS OF GENERAL POLICY
324 Agricultural loan loss amortization
325 Capital maintenance
326 Minimum se<;lolrity devices and procedures for insured nonmember
banks
327 Assessments
328 Advertisement of membership
329 Interest on deposits
330 Clarification and definition of deposit insurance coverage
331 Insurance of trust funds
332 Powers inconsistent with purposes of Federal deposit insurance law
333 Extension of corporate powers
334 [Reserved]
335 Securities of nonmember insured banks
336 Employee responsibilities and conduct
337 Unsafe and unsound banking practices
338 Fair housing
339 Loans in areas having special flood hazards
340 [Reserved]
341 Registration of securities transfer agents
342 Applications for a stay qr review of aClions of bank clearing agencies
343 Insured State nonmember banks which are municipal securities
dealers
344 Recordkeeping and confirmation requirements for securities
transactions
345 Community reinvestment
11-5 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE ~ 11.01[I)[a)

12
CFR
Pt. Regulation
346 Foreign banks
347 Foreign activities of insured State nonmember banks
348 Management official interlocks
349 Reports and public disclosure of indebtedness of executive officers
and principal shareholders to a State nonmember bank and its
correspondent banks
350 Disclosure of financial and other infonnation by FDIC-insured State
non-member banks
351 International operations
352 Nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap
353 Reports of apparent crimes affecting insured nonmember banks

Source: 12 CFR pl. 300 (1988).

checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its

certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of
indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a
deposit account and certified by the bank, or a letter ofcredit or a traveler's
check on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, That, without limit-
ing the generality of the term "money or its equivalent," any such account
or instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent
of money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a
promissory note upon which the person obtaining any such credit or instru-
ment is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a charge against a deposit
account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments forwarded
to such banks for collection.
(2) trust funds as defined in this chapter received or held by such bank,
whether held in the trust department or held or deposited in any other
department of such bank.
(3) money received or held by a bank, or the credit given for money or its
equivalent received or held by a bank, in the usual course of business for a
special or specific purpose, regardless of the legal relationship thereby
established, including without being limited to, escrow funds, funds held as
security for an obligation due to the bank or others (including funds held as
dealers reserves) or for securities loaned by the bank, funds deposited by a
debtor to meet maturing obligations, funds deposited as advance payment
on subscriptions to United States Government securities, funds held for
distribution or purchase or securities, funds held to meet i\s acceptances or
letters of credit, and withheld taxes: Provided, That there shall not be
included funds which are received by the bank for immediate application to
~ 11.01[ll[a) OVERVIEW 11-6

TABLE 11·2 Maximum Limits on Insured Deposits

1934 $ 2,500
1934 S 5,000
1950 S 10,000
1966 S 15,000
1969 S 20,000
1974 $ 40,000
1980 $100,000

the reduction ofan indebtedness to the receiving bank, or under condition that
the receipt thereof immediately reduces or extinguishes such as indebtedness.
(4) outstanding draft (including advice or authorization to charge bank's
balance in another bank), cashier's check;·money order, or other officer's
check issued in the usual course of business for any purpose, including
without being limited to those issued in payment for services, dividends, or
purchases, and
(5) such other obligations of a bank as the .Board of Directors, after
consultation with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board ofGover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, shall find and prescribe by regulation to
be deposit liabilities by general usages except that the following shall not be
a deposit for any ofthe purposes of this chapter or be included as part of the
total deposits or of an insured deposit:
(A) any obligation of a bank which is payable only at an office of such
bank located outside of the States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, and the Virgin Islands; and
(B) any international banking facility deposit, including an interna-
tional banking facility time deposit, as such term is from time to time
defined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in
regulation D or any successor regulation issued by the Board of Gover-
nors or the Federal Reserve System."
The Supreme Court considered the scope and policy of this definition in
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation I'. Philadelphia Gear Corp. ,. The Court
held that a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does
not constitute a deposit for purposes offederal deposit insurance. The case arose
as a result oftbe insolvency ofthe Penn Square Bank. Penn Square Bank issued a
standby letter of credit to Philadelpbia Gear at the request of the bank's cus-
tomer, Orion. The letter of credit permitted Philadelphia Gear to draw against it
when Philadelphia Gear certified in writing that Orion had not paid Philadel-

1712 USC § 1813(e) (1982).

"479 US 426 (1986).
11-7 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 11 11.01[I)[a]

phia Gear for goods sold. Penn Square Bank required a promissory note from
Orion when it issued the letter of credit. Although this note was unconditional
on its face, Orion and Penn Square agreed that Orion would be liable on the note
only if Penn Square was required to make payment to Philadelphia Gear under
the standby letter of credit. Penn Square subsequently became insolvent, and
Philadelphia Gear made a demand upon the FDIC, as the insurer ofthe deposits
of Penn Square, for payment under the letter of credit to the extent of the
$100,000 offederal deposit insurance. Philadelphia Gear claimed that the letter
of credit was a deposit.
Philadelphia Gear's argument rested upon the proviso to the statutory
definition of deposit. The proviso states that the receipt of a "promissory note
upon which the person obtaining any such credit or instrument is primarily or
secondarily liable" is the equivalent of money." Using this proviso, Philadel-
phia Gear argued that Penn Square Bank had issued a letter ofcredit in exchange
for "money or its equivalent," and therefore the letter of credit was a "deposit"
under tile statute. Both the District Court and the Court ofAppeals for the Tenth
Circuit had accepted Philadelphia Gear's reading of the statute.
The Supreme Court took the view that the federal deposit insurance scheme
was intended to "safeguard the hard earnings" of individuals against the possi-
bility of bank failure. Congress wanted to insure that someone who put tangible
assets into a bank could always get those assets back. '0 In this case, neither Orion
nor Philadelphia Gear gave any assets unconditionally to the bank. Orion's
obligation on the promissory note was contingent, The Court then found that the
FDIC had interpreted the term "deposit" to exclude letters of credit backed by
contingent obligations, and Congress had enacted legislation containing the
definition of "deposit" without indicating any desire to alter the agency's inter-
pretation. In taking this position, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the
FDIC had conceded that deposit insurance would cover a letter of credit that
was backed by an "uncontingent promissory note." In short, ifthis had been a
standard commercial letter oCcredit arrangement, in which the bank's customer
gave the bank funds to use in paying the letter ofcredit, or permitted the bank to
charge the customer's account for the letter of credit, it would meet the defini-
tion of "deposit" for the purposes of the federal deposit insurance. 21

"12 USC§ 1813 (e) (1982).

20
479 US 426 (1986).
21 In FDIC v. European Am. Bank & Trust Co., 576 F. Supp. 950 (SDNY 1983), the
court considered what definition should be applied to determine the base of a bank's
deposits for the purpose of calculating insurance premium assessments by the FDIC. The
problem arose because of the manner in which transactions through the Clearing House
Interpayment System (CHIPS) of tne New York Clearing House Association were han-
dled. Under CHIPS, funds were transferred electronically within the'system from one
bank to another. The court upheld the FDIC determination that the definition of
"deposit" in the act was satisfied because the balances in question represented "the
unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the usual course of
11 11.Ol[l)[bl OVERVIEW 11-8

[b] Mistaken Payment in Excess ofInsurance. The question ofwhat happens

when a depositor ofan insolvent insured bank is mistakenly paid more than the
fedefal insurance limits justify was considered in a 1985 federal court ofappeals
case. The court was asked to consider if the FDIC could recover payments made
by mistake in excess of the insurance limits. 22 In this case, persons who held
cashier's checks from Penn Square Bank were required to return payments ofthe
checks made after Penn Square became insolvent to the extent the amounts
received exceeded federal deposit insurance limits. The defendants in this case
had redeemed certificates of deposit from Penn Square and received cashier's
checks in payment. A number of defendants were involved, and the cashier's
checks in question varied in amounts from nearly $1.5 million, in the case of one
defendant, to a series ofchecks aggregating over $450,000, in the case ofanother
defendant. The defendants redeemed the certificates without any knowledge of
the impending failure ofPenn Square and deposited the cashier's checks in their
banks for collection.
Before the checks were presented for payment, the comptroller declared
Penn Square insolvent, appointed the FDIC as receiver, and established the
Deposit Insurance National Bank (DINB) to administer the payments of funds
of Penn Square that were federally insured. As a means of enforcing the deposit
insurance limitations, the FDIC established a computer program to reject items
drawn against Penn Square accounts in excess of S100,000, but the program
failed to catch the cashier's checks. By the time the mistake in the computer
program was discovered, DINB had paid the cashier's checks issued to the
defendants, The FDIC then brought suit to recover the amounts in excess ofthe
$100,000 insured limit. (The defendants were entitled to $100,000 for each of
their accounts because a cashier's check is insured as a "deposit" under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.) The FDIC claimed it was entitled to restitution
of the amount paid by mistake under normal principles of unjust enrichment,
The court concluded that the defendants had been unjustly enriched
because they were entitled only to payment of the insured amounts. Although
the defendants argued that VCC § 3-418, which makes payments final in favor of
a holder in due course, applied to their situation, the court firmly rejected the
defendants' argument. Firstly, the court said that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act definition converted the cashier's checks to "deposits" as a matter oflaw, so
the rules of the VCC applicable to negotiable instruments were "irrelevant."23
Secondly, the court reasoned that the defendants, as holders of uncollected
cashier's checks, were creditors of the insolvent Penn Square Bank. When Penn

business and for which it has given or is obligated to give credit, . , ," The court further
stated that the balances also qualified as "credit given for money or its equivalent received
by a bank, in the usual course of business for a special or specific purppse . , .."
2' FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F2d 658 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. All Souls
Episcopal Church v. FDIC, 475 US 1010 (1986).
2) 769 F2d at 661.
11-9 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 11 11.01[21

Square became insolvent, the National Bank Act provisions on the liquidation
of insolvent national banks took precedence over the UCc. Although the
defendants acted in good faith, they, as creditors ofPenn Square, must be treated
accordingly. The critical point in the defendants' relationship to Penn Square
was the time at which the bank closed. When this event occurred, it "cast in
stone" the relationship ofdefendants to the bank. They were simply creditors of
the bank, with no right to preference over other creditors. A holder ofa cashier's
check is not entitled to preference over general creditors of the bank, although
the holder may be entitled to payment to the extent of the insured amount.·'

(2) Computing the Amount of Insurance: Rules for Multiple Accounts

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines the term "insured deposit""
firstly as the "net amount due" after deducting any offsets that may be appropri-
ately deducted from the deposit, and excluding any part of the deposit in excess
of the irisured limit, which currently is $100,000. Further, the definition pro-
vides the following:
Such net amount shall be determined according to such regulations as the
Board of Directors may prescribe, and in determining the amount due to
any depositor, there shall be added together all deposits in the bank main-
tained in the same capacity and the same right for his benefit either in his
own name or in the names of others except trust funds which shall be
insured as provided in subsection (i) of § 1817 of this title. H
When a bank holds trust funds in a fiduciary capacity, the funds are insured
up to the $100,000 limit "for each trust estate," and this insurance is "separate
from and additional to that covering other deposits of the owners of such trust
funds or the beneficiaries of such trust estates. ".7 Additionally, there are special
proviSions that deal with the deposit of public money by public officers and
certain pension plans and retirement accounts.'"
The FDIC has adopted regulations to clarify the application ofthese rules."
These regulations address (I) how accounts held in more than one name are to be
treated for determining the insurance limits; (2) under which circumstances
accounts owned by an individual must be added together to determine the
maximum amount insurable; and (3) how joint accounts are to be treated. There
are record-keeping requirements and rules that make how the account signature

•• Id. at 662.
25
12 USC§ 1813(m)(1}{1982).
:!lId.
•712 USC § 1817(i)( 1982).
•112 USC§§ 1821(a)(2), 1821(a)(3)(1982).
20
12 CFR §§ 330.0-330.10 I (1987).
1111.0113] OVERVIEW 11-10

card is completed and how the interest of parties to the account is disclosed
important in determining deposit coverage.
In the mid-I 980s, the federal banking regulators expressed concerns over
the growing practice, particularly among thrift institutions, of obtaining large
deposits through the services of money brokers. At one point, the Comptroller of
the Currency reported that the thrift industry held approximately $34 billion in
brokered funds, and he estimated that this amount could grow to $260 billion by
the end of 1985. 3• Several concerns were expressed about the use of brokered
deposits. Among these were (l) the cost to the institutions of obtaining such
deposits; (2) the possibility of favored treatment in extending loans to those
serving as money brokers in placing the deposits; and (3) the destabilizing
influence that large amounts of deposits on these terms might have on weak
financial institutions, which might turn to brokered funds to shore up shaky
fmancial conditions. Further, the federal regulators believed that the practice of
money brokers placing deposits in this manner could be deleterious to the
deposit insurance system. If federal deposit insurance covered funds so depos-
ited, the individual investors would be protected from risk, although such funds
might have been placed in otherwise financially weak institutions, under terms
that may have contributed to the institutions' weak.ness.
As a result of such concerns, the FDIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board adopted a joint regulation that limited FDIC and Federal Sa"ings and
Loan Insurance Corporation insurance coverage of deposits made by a money
broker to 5100,000 per broker, rather than $100,000 for each client of the
broker.·' This rule was challenged immediately. In FAIC Securities. Inc. v.
United States, 32 a federal court of appeals ruled the regulation invalid. The court
held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, and the corresponding
statutes applicable to federal savings and loan deposit insurance, plainly con-
templated the insurance offunds placed for depositors by brokers. The efforts of
the two deposit-insuring agencies to restrict the insurance of broker-placed
deposits constituted action in excess of the statutory authority given them by
Congress.

(3] The Deposit Insurance System

To provide security for the insured accounts, the FDIC is required to assess
each insured bank an annual amount equal to one-twelfth of one percent of the
bank's deposit liability. 33 This assessment is collected semiannually and is calcu-

30 Comptroller of the Currency, Speech to National Council of Savings Institutions

Seminar, reprinted in 42 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 265 (1984).
31
49 Fed. Reg. 13,003 (1984).
3'FAIC Securities. Inc. v. United Slates, 768 F2d 352 (DC Cif. 1985).
3312 USC § 1817(b) (1982).
li-ll DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 11 11.01141

lated according to a statutory fonnula that applies the percentage rate to the
institution's "assessment base."34 Although the basic annual rate is one-twelfth
of one percent of adjusted deposits, insured banks are entitled to a credit for a
portion of the FDIC's assessment income after expenses and losses during the
preceding year have been accounted for. 35 This results in a substantially lower
effective assessment rate. Insured banks must me four reports a year on the
condition of the bank, including, among other matters, its deposit liabilities.'·
The funds accumulated by the FDIC for insuring deposits constitute a
pennanent insurance fund. 37 These assets are the reserves that guarantee the
FDIC's ability to fulfill its insurance obligations. At the close of 1986, the extent
of this fund was S18.253 billion. 38 The Board of Directors of the FDIC may
invest this money in U.S. bonds or in other obligations guaranteed by the United
States, but such investments may not be made in amounts over $100,000 at any
one time without the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury.,1 Current funds
not so invested may be kept in a checking account with the Secretary of the
Treasury or in a Federal Reserve bank that the secretary designates.'" Smaller
accounts to be used in liquidating banks may be kept at the discretion of the
Board." When needed for insurance purposes, the FDIC is authorized to borrow
from the Treasury up to $3 billion." The FDIC has not needed to exercise this
authority.

(41 General Regulatory Authority of the FDIC

In addition to insuring deposits and serving as the responsible authority
when bank solvency is threatened, the FDIC engages in the regulation ofinsured
banks not subject to regulation by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System or the Comptroller of the Currency. The powers of the FDIC to
deal with failing and insolvent banks are covered in Chapter 1O. Special assist-
ance to facilitate interstate and interindustry mergers offailing depository insti-
tutions is explained in Chapters 6 and 10. Chapters 7 and 9 describe the powers
that the federal banking regulators have to examine, supervise, and control the
activities of depository institutions. The text that immediately follows briefly
identifies some of these other major regulatory activities of the FDIC.

3' Id.
35 12 uSC § 181 7(d)( J 982).
,. 12 USC § 1817(a) (1982).
31 12 USC § J 821 (a) (1982).

38 FDIC, Annual Report (1986).

3. 12 USC § 1823(a)( 1982).
•• 12 USC § I823(b) (1982).
" Id.
"12 USC § 1824 (1982).
" 11.01[41 OVERVIEW 11-12

1. Examination a/banks. The FDIC has authority to conduct examinations

of any insured state nonmember bank." In addition, it may conduct special
examinations of any insured bank. state or national. whenever "in the judgment
ofthe Board ofDirectors such special examination is necessary to determine the
condition of any such bank for insurance purposes..... The power to conduct
examinations includes the power to take testimony under oath and to examine
the affairs of bank affiliates. 4 '
2. Approval ofmergers and consolidations. When an insured bank merges or
consolidates with another insured bank. anyone ofthree federal authorities may
be involved-the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. or the FDIC. Selection of the appropriate regulatory
agency depends on the status of the bank that will survive the consolidation. If
the surviving bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System but is an
insured bank. the FDIC has the authority to approve or disapprove the merger."
3. Branch banks. No state-insured bank thai is neit a member ofthe Federal
Reserve may operate a new branch without the prior consent of the FDICY
Simiiarly. no state nonmember insured bank may move its main office or branch
from one location to another or operate a foreign branch without the prior
consent oftbe FDIC."
4. Regulation a/the pa}'ment ofinterest and dMdends on deposits. At one
time the FDIC regulated the amount of interest and dividends paid by state
nonmember insured banks on deposits." The Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Control Act of 1980, however, eliminated regulation of interest on
deposits. 1O
S. Regulation to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices. The FDIC
has broad authority to regulate all insured banks because of its statutory author-
ity to terminate the insurance of any insured bank that engages in "unsafe or
unsound practices," or that is in an "unsafe or unsound condition..... As men-
tioned previously and explained in Chapter 2, the FDIC must cooperate with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and with the ComPtroller of

.212 USC § I 820(b) (I 982}.

"Id.
•• 12 USC § 1820(c) (1982).
"12 USC § 1828(c)(1982).
" 12 USC § I 828(d) (1982).
"Id.
•• 12 USC § 1828(g)( I) (1982).
10 Depository Institution Deregulation and MonetaJ:' Control Act of 1980. Pub. L.
No. 96-221, §§ 203, 207(b)(2)-207(b)(3), 94 Stat. 144 (1980) (codified at 12 USCA
§§ 3502. 3506 (1982». See 13.04[61 for a discussion of the Deregulation Committee.
"12 USC § 18J8(a) (1982). See ~ 9.01.
11-13 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 11 11.02(1)

the Currency when the insured bank is regulated by either of these agencies. 52 In
addition, the FDIC has the authority to issue cease and desist orders when any
state nonmember insured bank engages in "unsafe or unsound practices."s, For
a discussion of regulatory authority to deal with "unsafe or unsound" banking
practices, see Chapter 9.

11 11.02 THRIFf INSTITUTION DEPOSIT INSURANCE

Separate federal deposit insurance systems exist for savings and loan
associations and credit unions. These are explained in the sections immediately
following.

[1] Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

The FSLIC is an instrumentality of the United States and has its principal
office in the District of Columbia. Its purpose is to insure the accounts ofeligible
savings institutions. The FHLBB has the statutory authority to direct and oper-
ate the FSLIC.!<I
The FSLIC insures the accounts of all federal associations and federal
mutual savings banks. It also may insure the accounts of state associations,
building and loan societies, and cooperative banks that meet the eligibility
requirements. so The FSLIC may refuse to accept an application for insurance if
it finds that the management of the applicant or its financing policies are
"inconsistent with economical home financing" or with the purposes of the
federal savings and loan insurance legislation. It must reject any application if it
finds that "the capital ofthe applicant is impaired or that its financial policies of
management are unsafe.nSf The FSLIC also has the power to make adjustments
to the-financial statements of applicants as it finds necessary. When an applica-
tion is accepted, the applicant agrees to allow the FSLIC to conduct examina-
tions as it deems necessary, to pay the expense of those examinations, and to
make available information as the FSLIC may require.57 The power to examine

"See ~ 2.03.
., 12 USC § 1818(b)(I)( 1982). See First Nat'l Banb. Smith, 610 F2d 1258 (5th Cir.
1980); Independent Bankers' Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 613 F2d 1164 (DC Cir.
1979); cert. denied 449 US 823 (1980): Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller ofthe Currency,
573 F2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank ofEden v. Department of the Treasury, 568
F2d 610 (8th Cir. 1978).
!<I 12 USC § 1725(a) (1982).
5512 USC § I726(a) (1982).
51 12 USC § I726(c) (1982).
57 12 USC § I726(b) (1982).
1111.02[2) OVERVIEW 11-14

insured institutions extends to afilliates ofthose institutions. sa In making exami-

nations, the FSLIC can take testimony under oath and can issue subpoenas.·'
Accounts that may be insured by the FSLIC include share, certificate, or
deposit accounts as approved by the FSLIC." The amount of insurance availa-
ble has increased over time; as of 1988, accounts may be insured up to an
aggregate amount of $100,000 for anyone member of investor." Individuals,
partnerships, associations, incorporations, and governmental bodies are all eli-
gible for the insurance.12
The FSLIC has the authority to establish reserves for its insuring activi·
ties." Each institution that is insured by the FSLIC is assessed a premium for
insurance that initially is equal to one twelfih of one percent ofthe total amount
of all the insured accounts of the institution. This premium is then subject to
adjustment by a statutory formula." The FSLIC may make further assessment
against the insured institutions when such assessment is necessary to pay losses
and expenses of up to one eighth of one percent, of the total accounts of the
insured members.·· The 'board may also require that the insured institutions
place deposits with the FSLIC."
The FHLBB has regulatory responsibility over the insured institutions. The
power to conduct examinations has already been mentioned. In addition, an
insured institution must agree to limit its lending to an area of 100 miles from its
principal office, except as otherwise provided by the regulation of the FSLIC.·'
The FSLIC regulates securities issued by the insured institution,·' as well as the
sales, plans and practices, and advertising, if any, of the insured institutions."
The FSLIC may require the maintenance of such reserves as it deems necessary
before any dividends may be paid by the institution!O

[2J The Financial Rescue of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
System by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
D)Jring the second half of the I 980s, large numbers of savings and loan
associations encountered serious financial difficulty or failure. Faced with an

51
12 USC § 1730(m)(1) (1982).
51 12 USC § I 730(m)(2) (1982).
10
12 USC § I 724(c) (1982).
II 12 USC § I 728(a) (1982).

50 12 USC §§ 1728(a), I 728(d) (1982),

.312 USC § 1727 (1982).
•• 12 USC § I 727(b) (1982).
"12 USC § 1727(c) (1982).
•, 12 USC § 1727(h) (1982).
•, 12 USC § I 726(b) (1982).
GIld.
·'Id.
'Old.
11-15 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE If Il.02[2J

insurance fund that was not adequate to handle the costs of these failures,
Congress devised a new financing scheme to provide the FSLIC with emergency
funds. Title III of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 71 establishes a
complex financing structure for infusing new funds into the FSLIC. Funds for
the insurance system are to be raised through a new Financing Corporation,
which is authorized to issue long-term bonds to the public. The proceeds from
the Financing Corporation's borrowings are to be channeled to the FSLIC.
Repayment ofthe bonds is supported by the power ofthe Financing Corporation
to assess FSLIC-insured institutions.72
The Financing Corporation is a mixed ownership government corpora-
tion," managed by a three-member directorate comprising the Director of the
Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan banks and two presidents of the
Federal Home Loan banks selected by the FHLBB. 74 The chairman of the
FHLBB selects the chair of the directorate from among these three members. 75
The members ofthe directorate serve without compensation, and the Financing
Corporation is prohibited from paying employees. The Financing Corporation
may calion personnel ofthe Federal Home Loan banks to act for the corporation
and may charge their administrative expenses to the Federal Home Loan
banks. 78 The FHLBB has regulatory authority over the directorate. 7T
The powers of the Financing Corporation are limited to issuing nonvoting
capital stock to the Federal Home Loan banks, investing in securities issued by
the FSLIC as authorized by the act, issuing debt obligations, assessing insured
institutions as authorized by the act, and engaging in certain general corporate
powers.'· The corporation has authority to "exercise such incidental powers not
inconsistent with [the enumerated powers] ... as are necessary or appropriate to
carry out ..." the act. 7.
The Financing Corporation is capitalized through the purchase of nonvot-
ing capital stock by the Federal Home Loan banks. This stock is transferable
only among the Home Loan banks. The total amount that the banks may invest
in the Financing Corporation is $3 billion, with a maximum amount for each

"Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86,101 Stat. 552
(1987) (hereinafter CEBA).
72 For a general description of the financing scheme. see 49 Banking Rep. (BNA)
331-333 (1987).
73 CEBA §§ 302, 303 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441; amending 31 USC § 910 I(2».

14 CEBA § 302 (10 be codified al 12 USC § 144 1(b». The act requires the selection of
the bank presidents to be rotated among the various presidents ofthe Federal Home Loan
banks.ld.
"CEBA § 302 (to be codified al12 USC § 1441(b)(S»).
"CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(b)(6), 1441(bX7), 1441(b)(9».
77 CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(bX8)).

7·CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(c».

" [d.
11 11.02[2} OVERVIEW 11-16

Federal Home Loan bank set by a formula based on each bank's reserves and
undivided profns. 'o The FHLBB determines when and how much capital stock
may be issued, although the apportionment of the stock among the Federal
Home Loan banks is provided for by formula in the act."
The Financing Corporation's authority to borrow money through the issu-
ance of debt securities is limited to no more than $3.75 billion per year, with an
overall total of $10.825 billion.II The cap on borrowings of the corporation is
also tied to the amount of nonvoting capital stock issued, and to the amount of
certain securities acquired by the corporation to secure repayment of the debt.
The Financing Corporation must purchase an amount of certain qualified zero
coupon bonds that is equal to the principal amount ofits obligations, and it must
hold these securities in a segregated account to secure the repayment of the
obligations. 1J Thus, the formula for determining the maximum amount that the
Financing Corporation may borrow is the lesser of (I ) five times its outstanding
nonvoting capital stock; (2).the.total.face .amount ofthe.securities held in the
segregated account; or (3) $10.825 billion."
The debt obligations of the Financing Corporation are lawful investments
for fiduciaries, trusts, and public funds under the control ofthe United States. 15
Although these obligations are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States but are the sole obligation of the Financing Corporation, they are
exempt from state tax to the same extent that the obligations of the Federal
Home Loan banks are exempt." They are taxable by the United States."
The Financing Corporation assesses FSLIC-insured institutions for the
interest and financing expenses it has incurred." With the approval of the
FHLBB, the Financing Corporation may impose a regular assessment on
insured institutions at an annual rate ofone twelfth ofone percent ofthe amount
ofthe accounts ofeach insured institution; by unanimous vote ofthe directorate,

I. CEBA § 302 (to be codifted at 12 USC § 144t(d)(2). (3».

11 CEBA § 302 (to be codifted atl2 USC § 144l(d)(4). (5».
12 CEBA ~ 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441 (e)( 1)1.
13 CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(g)). These securities must be
obligations of the United States. the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association, certain obligations sold by the Federal Home Loan
MOl1gage Corporation, or other securities authorized for purchase by fiduciaries and trust
funds under state law. rd. The maximum amount of such non-jnterest-bearing securities
that the Financing Corporation may acquire is limited to 52.2 billion based on purchase
price.ld.
14CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441{e».
.. CEBA § 302 (to be codified al t2 USC § 1441 (e)(5».
"CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441 (e)('). (S)).
"See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. t56, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
Code and Congo Ad. News 552, 625 (hereinafter H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 261).
"CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(1)).
11-17 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 'I[ 11.02(2)

with Board approval, a supplemental assessment may be imposed at an annual

rate of up to one eighth of one percent. 19 Payments by insured institutions of
assessments under these provisions reduce the FSLIC's authority to impose
insurance under its normal powers to charge premiums for the FSLIC insurance
funds." Thus, as written in the conference report, "no institution can be
required to pay on an annual basis more than a premium of one-twelfth of one
percent, plus an additional premium of one-eighth of one percent, whether the
premiums are paid to the FSLIC, the Financing Corporation, or a combination
ofboth."91 The Financing Corporation may relieve an institution from paying
an assessment when a reduction "is necessary to assist in the sale or other
disposition" ofthe institution because it is in a weak financial condition. 92 The
corporation also may impose an exit fee on institutions that leave the FSLIC-
insured system. 93 However, the act imposes a one-year moratorium on institu-
tions leaving the system. M
The Financing Corporation may use the funds raised by the issuance of its
obligations only for purchase ofcapital stock or capital certificates ofthe FSLIC
or to refund previously issued obligations. 95 The capital certificates are nonre-
deemable; the capital stock is redeemable and nonvoting, and is not eligible for
dividends. 9s The FSLIC is required to establish an equity return account, in
which earnings ofthe FSLIC, calculated in accordance with a statutory formula,
are accumulated for payoff of the capital stock. 91
Among the miscellaneous provisions of the act is a provision conferring a
super priority on security interests of the Federal Home Loan banks. The
conference report explains that this provision is in recognition of the status of
these banks as lenders of last resort, and it is intended to give these banks a
"priority lien position, unless another creditor has obtained a perfected security
interest in the property."" The section applies to security interests granted to a

Blld.
"CEBA § 305 (to be codified at 12 USC § 17270)).
9' H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 261, supra note 87, at 162.
92CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(1)(4)(Q).
».
93CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(1)(4)(.... There are special "equaliza-
tion" provisions for institutions that previously paid exit fees, and there are other special
exceptions in the act.
M CEBA § 306(g) (amending 12 USC § 1727(h)( 1i).
95CEBA § 302 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1441(e)(3».
MId; CEBA § 304 (amending 12 USC § I 725(b)(I)(A).
·'CEBA § 304 (amending 12 USC § 1725(b)(2».
·'H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 261, supra note 87, at 163. The new provisions state:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any security interest granted to a
Federal Home Loan Bank by any member of any Federal Home I:oan Bank or any
affiliate of any such member shall be entitled to priority over the claims and rights of
any party (including any receiver, conservator, trustee, or similar party having rights
1111.02[31 OVERVIEW 11-18

Federal Homo Loan bank by any other Federal Home Loan bank or any affiliate
of such a bank

(3) Measures to Improve FHLBB and FSLIC Regulation of FinanciaJly

Weak Institutions
Title IV of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 contains impor-
tant provisions that deal with the authority of the FHLBB and the FSLIC to
supervise financially weak thrift institutions. Its provisions range from account-
ing requirements to requirements for programs of capital forbearance. In gen-
eral, the act gives authority in these areas to the FHLBB in the case offederally
chartered thrift institutions and to the FSLIC in the case of state-ehartered,
FSLIC-insured thrift institutions.

la] Accounting Principles. The 'Competitive Equality Banklng Act sets rules
for the accounting principles to be followed by the federal thrift regulators. In
general, except as may be otherwise provided, the requirement is that
the Board shall prescribe, by regulation, uniformly applicable accounting
standards to be used by all associations for the purpose of determining
compliance with any rule or regulation issued by the Board or the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to the same degree that generally
accepted accounting principles are used to determine compliance with rules
and regulations of the Federal banking agencies. It
The FHLBB also is required to establish additional regulations, consistent with
those used by the federal commercial bank regulators, for classifying assets,
appraising assets. and reappraising assets acquired by foreclosure. It authorizes
use of certain specific financial accounting standards by institutions engaged in
troubled debt restructuring. Under the FHLBB's power to classify assets of
federally chartered associations, the supervisory agent has discretion to require
an association to establish larger loan loss reserves and to require the association
to classify non performing assets.· oo Amounts held in an association's loss
reserves may be treated as capital for regulatory purposes. '0'

of a lien creditor) otherthan claims and rights that-( I) would be entitled to priority
under otherwise applicable law; and (2) are held by actual bona fide purchasers for
value or by actual secured parties that are secured by actual perfected security
interests.
CEBA § 306 (amending 12 USC § 1430(e».
iiCEBA § 402 (to be codified at 12 USC § 1467(b)(I». The paranel rule for sLate-
insured Lhrifts is at § 402(b) (La be codified at 12 USC § I 730h(b)(1 )). .
'00 CEBA § 402 (to be codified at J 2 USC § 1467(a». The parallel authority for state-
insured thrifts is at § 402(b) (to be codified at 12 USC § 1730h(a)).
'0' ld.
11-19 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 1I11.02[3J(bl

[hI Capital Forbearance Programs. The Competitive Equality Banking Act

sets forth principles for capital forbearance programs. The FHLBB and FSLIC
are directed to adopt "capital recovery regulations for regulating and supervis-
ing troubled but well-managed and viable associations .... "'02 The act requires
the FHLBB to adopt regulations that allow weakened associations to continue to
operate and to participate in a capital recovery program ifcertain conditions are
met. In the case of institutions with a net worth of 0.5 percent or more, the
conditions are as follows:

1. The weak capital condition is the result of losses on loans in which

"economic conditions in a designated economically depressed region"
have adversely affected the value of the collateral for the loans or where
the loans were made by a minority association at least 50 percent of
whose loans are to minorities, for one- to four-family residences;
2. The weak capital condition "is not the result of imprudent operating
practices" as determined by the board;
3. The association obtains board approval for a plan to increase the institu-
tion's capital; and
4. The association complies with the plan and reports properly on its
progress. '03

At the board's discretion, associations with a net worth ofless than 0.5 percent
may participate in a capital recovery program. However, in addition to meeting
the conditions mentioned above, the FHLBB must detennine that the institu-
tion possesses "reasonable and demonstrable prospects ofreturning to a satisfac-
tory capital level. "'0<
The FHLBB and the FSLlC obtain authority under the act to set minimum
capital requirements. This may be done on a case-by-case basis, as the regulators
detennine it necessary for a particular institution. Thrift regulators may require
that an association submit for approval by the regulators a plan to increase
capital to an acceptable level, and they may enforce compliance with the plan.
Further, the regulators may treat a failure to maintain capital at the established
level as an "unsafe or unsound practice." 'os The act further deals with capital
forbearance by extending for five additional years forbearance measures that

'02CEBA § 404(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 1467a(a», 404(b) (to be codified at 12

USC § 1730;(a).
,03CEBA § 404(a)(to be codified at 12 USC § 1467a(b», 404(b)(to be codified at 12
USC § 1730i(b».
'O<CEBA § 404(a)(to be codified at 12 USC § 1467a(c», 404(b)(to be codified al12
USC § 1730i(c».
1°'CEBA §§ 406(a) (10 be codified at 12 USC § 1464(5», 406(b) (to be codified al 12
USC § 1730(t).
11 11.02(Jllc) OVERVIEW 11-20

may have been agreed to in certain cases involving acquisitions of insured

institutions.'1lt
When either the'FHLBB or the FSUC has approved a plan for increasing
capital, as outlined previously, the FSLIC has authority, notwithstanding any
other provision of federal law, "to purchase capital instruments" ofthe associa-
tions. These instruments must pay dividends at a reasonable rate as determined
by the FSUC. In the event the association liquidates or reorganizes, these
instruments also have priority over the claims of holders of equity interests in
the association. The FSLIC negotiates with the association for warrants for the
purchase of stock in the association as a condition for the FSLIC's purchase of
the association's capital instruments. 'D'

Ie) General Supervisory Powers. Further provisions in the Competitive Equal-

ity Banking act deal with the supervisoI:Y.powers,of the FHLBB. The act directs
the board to "issue guidelines which provide greater flexibility for supervisory
agents, examiners, and other employees and agents of the Board ... in applying
regulations, standards, and other requirements of the Board ... with regard to
particular situations or particular thrift institutions.",. Although this direction
is vague as to its scope, another paragraph of the act particularizes the mandate
by indicating that the guidelines must contain provisions relating to renegoti.
ated loans, recognizing additional financial capability ofborrowers, establishing
an appraisal review procedure, and other matters. lOt
Among the supervisory provisions is a requirement that the board establish
an informal review procedure that would allow insured institutions to obtain
review by an independent arbiter ofsupervisory decisions on the appraisal value
of loans held by the institution or collateral for loans, on the classification of
loans held by the association, or on requirements to establish reserves for
losses. nD Decisions made by this informal review process may not be challenged
in court proceedings, as they are not subject to judicial review as such, but any
formal administrative or judicial remedy otherwise available for testing the
original decision that was the subject of the informal review procedures is not
lost and may be pursued. The "findings, recommendations, or conclusions"
reached under the informal review process are not admissible in evidence in any
administrative or judicial proceeding challenging the original decision. 111

,Ilt CEBA § 414 (10 be codified al 12 USC § I 730a(m)( I}(A)(iv}).

'D' CEBA § 405 (10 be codified al 12 USC § 1729(1)(6)).
'''CEBA § 407(a).
'·'Id. at § 407(b).
"·CEBA § 407{d) (10 be codified at 12 USC § 1442a),
"'Id.
11-21 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 1111.03

[d] Holding Corporation for Troubled Assets. Additionally, the Competitive

Equality Banking Act calls for the FHLBB to conduct a feasibility study of
establishing a corporation to hold troubled real estate assets acquired by thrift
institutions."' It directs a modification in procedures followed by the board in
approving and disapproving various types ofapplications.'" Further, it calls for
expanded use ofminority thrift institutions as depositaries or financial agents of
the United States. ". Finally, it calls for persons who are employed by a conserva·
tor or by the FSUC to assist in the management or liquidation of an insured
institution as independent contractors, consultants, or counsel to disclose to the
persons with whom they deal any limitation on their authority to make "legally
binding representations on behalf of" the conservator or FSUC." 1

1111.03 CREDIT UNION SHARE INSURANCE

The National Credit Union Administration Board must insure the accounts
ofall member federal credit unions. 111 It may also insure the member accounts of
credit unions organized under state law when such credit unions meet the
eligibility requirements." 7 Before approving applications of credit unions for
insurance, the board must consider the financial condition and management
policies of the applicant, as well as the character and fitness of the applicant's
management. "' Upon approval ofthe application, each applicant agrees to pay
the reasonable cost of such examinations as the board may deem necessary to
determine eligibility and to protect the insurance fund. The applicant must also
agree to provide the board with all information it desires in order to fulfill its
regulatory responsibilities. Insured credit unions must maintain reserves as
required by the act and must further agree to pay the premium charges for
insurance.'" The credit union also agrees to comply with the other regulations
issued by the board under its statutory authority over insured credit unions.'" In
addition, all insured credit unions are required to make reports to the board of
their condition. 121

"'CEBA § 409.
mid. at § 410.
". Id. al § 412.
"'CEBA§ 413 (to be eodified at 12 USC § l730(b)(4».
". 12 USC § 1781 (a)( I982).
", Id.
". 12 USC § 1781 (e) (1982).
til I2 USC § 1781(b) (1982).
l2Old.
'2\ 12 USC § I 782(a) (1982).
1111.03 OVERVIEW 11-22

Share insurance is financed by a national credit union share insurance fund,

which is held in the Treasury of the United States.'l2 The Secretary of the
Treasury manages the investment of the fund, ... and the fund itself is financed
by insurance premiums assessed against the insured credit unions. These premi.
ums are calculated according to a fonnula requiring insured institutions to pay
an amount equal to one-twelfth of one percent of the total amount of member
accounts in the credit union, subject to various adjustments.'24 In addition, the
fund may be increased by loans from the United States.'u
The board has the power to conduct examinations of insured credit
unions.'· Further, it may tCinninate the insurance of any credit union for engag-
ing in unsafe or unsound practices or for violating board regulations. 127 Like the
other bank regulatory agencies, it has authority to issue cease and desist orders to
prevent violations or unsafe or unsound practices,'28 to remove directors or
officers for violations or breach of fiduciary duty, t2I and to remove officers or
directors who have been charged.with committing serious. crimes. !'O ,It also has
the authority to regulate mergers, consolidations, asset transfers, and conver·
sions of credit unions,'3l and it serves as the agent for liquidating federal credit
unions that are insolvent. ' 3? A court or other authority having jurisdiction may
appoint the board as the agent to manage the liquidation of credit unions
organized under state law.''' The board may also act to prevent liquidation by
making loans, acquiring assets, establishing accounts, and encouraging mergers
or sales of assets of insured credit unions. '14
Member accounts in insured credit unions are insured to a maximum of
S I 00,000 for each member.'35 Insured credit unions are qualified as depositories
for the public money of the United States, and, as such, credit unions may be
employed as the fiscal agent of the United States.'31 All insured credit unions are
authorized to maintain share draft accounts that allow the owners of the

'22 12 USC § 1783(a) (1982).

121 12 USC § 1783(c) (1982).
'2' 12 USC § 1782(c)(2) (1982).
'25 12 USC § I 783(d)( 1982).
'1112 USC§ 1784 (1982).
121
12 USC § 1786(b) (1982).
•n12 USC § 1786(e) (1982).
121 12 USC § 1786(g) (1982).
'30 12 USC § I 786(i)( 1982).
13' 12 USC § 1785(b) (1982).
132 12 USC § 1787(a) (1982).
133
12 USC § I 787(b) (1982).
134 12 USC § 1788 (I 982).
"612 USC § t 787(c)(I) (1982).
"6 12 USC § 17898 (1982).
11-23 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 1111.03

accounts to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable interest to third-

party payees. Thus, credit unions may afford their shareholders privileges that
are equivalent to checking conveniences available at commercial banks. How-
ever, the authority to grant checking privileges is limited to accounts that are
owned either by individuals or by organizations of a nonprofit nature. 137
Insured credit unions also have the benefit of the preemption ofstate usury
limitations. Federal law permits the credit union to charge, "on any loan,"
interest at a rate of not greater than one percent in excess ofthe discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the district
where the credit union is located, or at any higher rate allowed by the laws of the
state in which the credit union is located.' sa
Congress has established a National Credit Union Central Liquidity Facil-
ity to provide credit to member credit unions, enabling them to meet their
various short-term and temporary credit needs.' SI The major function of the
facility is.-w make advances to its members to meet their liquidity needs.'<O The
board will not extend credit to credit unions for purposes ofexpanding their loan
portfolios.•"
The Central Liquidity Facility is part of the National Credit Union Admin-
istration and is managed by the National Credit Union Administration Board.'"
The facility serves only member credit unions, which may be chartered under
state or federal law, and which subscribe to the capital stock ofthe facility. Each
credit union must subscribe in an amount not less than one-halfofone percent of
the credit union's capital and surplus. "3 The facility may draw on loans from the
Secretary ofthe Treasury ifit lacks sufficient funds to meet the liquidity needs of
its member credit unions.,..
In addition to its responsibility to meet these needs, the Central Liquidity
Facility, with authorization ofthe board, may assist in the collection and settle-
ment ofchecks, share drafts, or other instruments of payment drawn on or issued
by member credit unions in the facility. 141 The board has authority to establish
rules and regulations for the collection and settlement of such payment items
and to define the "rights, powers, responsibilities, duties and liabilities, includ-
ing standards relating thereto, of such entities and other parties to any such

137 12 USC § 1785(1) (1982). See generally Annol., "Authority of Credit Union to
Engage in 'Sharedraft' Business," 14 ALR4lh 1355 (1982).
131
12 USC§ 1785(g)(1982).
"'12 USC §§ 1795-1795i (1982).
140 12 USC § 1795e (1982).
14'12 USC § I 795e(a)(l) (1982).
14' 12 USC § 1795b (1982).
14' 12 USC § I 795c(a) (1982).
'''12 USC § 1795e(b)(1982).
'''12 USC § I 795f(b) (1982).
1111.04 OVERVIEW 11-24

items or their collection and settlement.""· The legislation granting this author-
ity to the board allows it to adopt, if it so decides, general banking practices and,
in instances in which they would not otherwise apply, "federal reserve regula-
tions and operating letters, the Uniform Commercial Code and Clearing House
rules. "'41

1111.04 DEPOSIT INSURANCE BACKED BY THE FULL FArm

AND CREDIT OF THE UNITED STATES
In 1982, the financial instability of many savings and loan associations and
the projections oflarge losses among some associations generated speculation as
to whether the assets of the deposit-insuring agencies were adequate to assure
depositors o':the safety oftheir funds. To allay these concerns, Congress passed
resolutions assuring that deposits insured by-the federal government through the
FSLIC or the FOIC were backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.
These resolutions state that Congress "reaffirms that deposits, up to the statuto-
rily prescribed amount, in federally insured depository institutions are backed
by the full faith and credit of the United States,"'"
When Congress enacted Title 9 ofthe Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987, it included a similar resolution. This resolution says:
a. Findings-The Congress finds and declares that-
1. since the 1930's, the American people have relied upon Federal
deposit insurance to ensure the safety and security of their funds in
federally insured depository institutions; and
2. the safety and security of such funds is an essential element of the
American financial system.
b. Sense of Congress.-In view of the findings and declarations con-
tained in subsection (a), it is the sense ofthe Congress that it should reaffirm
that deposits up to the statutorily prescribed amount in federally insured
depository institutions are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States.,••

The financial difficulties offederally insured institutions have led to exami-

nation of the existing system of deposit insurance. A major question under
consideration is whether the current system ofdeposit insurance and regulatory
action, in the event of institutional insolvency, lacks sufficient restraining effect
on institutional investment policies, given that depositors are protected by the

"" 12 USC § I795f{b)(3) (1982).

141 Id.

""H.R. Con. Res. 290. 96 Stat. 2639 (1982).

4I
• CEBA § 901.
11-25 DEPOSITS & DEPOSIT INSURANCE 1111.05

federal deposit insurance regardless ofthe degree ofrisk contained in the institu-
tion's investment practices. Although Congress has received proposals for
reform ofthe federal deposit insurance systems for banks and thrift institutions,
it has not made fundamental changes.'so

1111.05 WITHHOLDING TAX ON INIEREST PAID

For a brief period, Congress considered the idea of requiring banks and
other fmancial institutions to withhold tax on interest and dividends paid to
customers. In 1982, Congress passed legislation requiring the payor of any
interest, dividend, or patronage dividend to withhold ten percent ofthe amount
of the payment as a tax. '11 However, before the legislation became effective,
Congress repealed its provisions by adopting the lnterest and Dividend Tax
Compliance Act of 1983. '52
Although the 1983 measure eliminates compulsory withholding on interest
and dividends, it contains features that affect the reporting and collection of
federal taxes on such income. The act continues the requirement of "backup
withholding," initiated in the 1982 law, for accounts in which the payee fur-
nishes an incorrect taxpayer identification number to the payor or fails in other
ways to satisfy his or her duties under the law. '5' The rate at which this backup
withholding must be made is 20 percent. The law places an obligation on the
payor to withhold taxes when (I) the payee fails to give the payor a taxpayer
identification number; (2) the Secretary of the Treasury notifies the payor that
the payee has furnished an incorrect taxpayer information number; (3) the
Secretary notifies the payor that the payee has not properly reponed interest or
dividends; and (4) the payee fails to give proper certification that the backup
withholding rules do not apply to the payee. '54 Penalties apply when a bank or
other payor ofinterest or dividends fails to file information returns or to provide

150 See, e.g., "'Recommendations for Change in the Federal Deposit Insurance Sys-
tem.· Report ofthe working group on financial institutions reform of the Cabinet Council
on Economic Affairs," Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,181 (Jan. 1985). The FDIC
solicited comments on its policies for taking over failed banks by purchase and assump-
tion arrangements, which protect depositors ofeven uninsured funds. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,088
(1985). See also Goodman & Shaffer, "The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical
Evaluation of Proposed Reform," 2 Yale J. Reg. 145-162 (1984).
'5' The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 91-248.
§§ 301-308, 96 Stat. 324, 516-591 (1982). The act was scheduled to take effect on July I,
1983. but the effective date was extended by action of the Secretary of the Treasury until
July 3 J, 1983. It never became effective, because of repealing legislation as discussed in
the text.
152 Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. 1,97 Stat. 369 (1983).
153
26 USC § 3406 (Supp. III 1985).
'54 (d.
1111.05 OVERVIEW 11-26

the correct taxpayer identification numbers of the payee.'" The act creates a
presumption that a taxpayer who underpays tax due on income shown 011 the
information reports med by the payor is subject to the penalty for negligent
failure to pay taxes.' st

151
26 USC § 6676 (Supp. III 1985).
,sa 26 USC § 6653 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
 12
Financial Transactions
Regulation, Money-
Laundering Controls, and
Crimes Related to Bank
Transactions
11 12.01 Financial Transactions Offenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
[I J Financial Record-Keeping Requirements 12·2
[2J Reporting of Currency Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3
raj Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12·3
[bJ Structured Transactions and Penalties for Reporting
Violations 12-7
13] Money-Laundering Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12·9
[a] Money-Laundering Offenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
[bJ Monetary Transactions Involving Proceeds of Crime . . .. 12-12
[c) RICO and Other Enforcement Measures. . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-12
[4 J Special Enforcement Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-12
raj Authority to Investigate Violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12·12
[bJ Compelling Information About Foreign Bank Records
Protected Under Foreign Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-13
[cJ Forfeiture of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-15
[dJ Immunity for Reports of Violations 12-16
[eJ Change in Bank Control 12-17
~ 12.02 Other Criminal Laws Relating to Bank Transactions. . . . . . . . .. 12-17
[1 J Bank Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-18
[2J Misapplication of Funds 12-23
[3} False Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12-27
[4) Other Federal Criminal Offenses ;...... 12-32

12-1
'il12.01 OVERVIEW 12-2

, 12.01 FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OFFENSES

In response to national concern over the involvement of criminals in laun-
dering proceeds ofcrime through various parts ofthe financial system, and in an
effort to strengthen the hand of federal criminal justice enforcement agencies,
Congress has passed extensive legislation requiring tbe reporting of certain
financial transactions and tbe establishment of certain conduct as federal
crimes. As this legislation affects banks and other depository institutions, its
major features are described here. This discussion cannot review all of the
federal laws that may be the basis for criminal or civil liability in transactions
with financial institutions. That body oflaw is ioo extensive for the abbreviated
treatment appropriate to the scope oftbis text. However, some ofthe significant
aspects ofthis body oflaw are identified here in order to alert bankers and their
counsel to some of the legal concerns that these federal law enforcement meas-
ures create.

[1] Financial Record-Keeping Requirements

The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970' was enacted by Congress for the express
purpose of requiring the maintenance of records and the making of reports by
financial institutions where such papers would "have a high degree ofusefulness
in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings."2 The act autho-
rizes the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate appropriate regulations to
carry out this purpose.'
Generally, the secretary may require federally insured banks to record the
identity of account holders,' to make and maintain reproductions of certain
checks, drafts, and other instruments presented to it for payment or received by
it for deposit, 5 and to require and retain the identity ofall persons who engage in
certain domestic and foreign currency transactions.' Uninsured banks and insti-
tutions"also may be required to maintain these same records and reports.' When

1 Pub. L No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), codified at 12 USC §§ 1730d, 1829b,
1951-1959 (J 982); 31 USC §§ 5311-5323 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (formerly codified at
31 USC §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105,1121-1122).
2 12 USC §§ 1829b(a), 195 I(a) and 31 USC § 5311 (1982).

"12 USC §§ 1829(b), 1953(a) (1982). For regulations, see 31 CFR pI. 103 (1987).
'12 USC § 1829b(c) (1982). See 31 CFR § 103.34 (1987).
512 usq I 829b(d) (1982); 12 usq 1953(1982); 31 eFR ~~ 103.33, 103.34(19&7).
I 12 USC § 1829b(e) (1982); 31 CFR §§ 103.22, 103.23 (1987).
'Businesses that engage in one ofthe functions listed in 12 USC § I953(b)(1 982), i.e.,
any "business which supplies a means for transferring or transmitting funds or credits
domestically or internationally," H.R. Rep. No. 975, 915t Cong., 2d Sess. ~ 9, reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 4403, must also comply with these record-keeping
requirements.
'12 USC § I953(a)(1) (1982).
12-3 TRANSACTIONS REGULATION 1f 12.01[2)(aJ

any of these requirements as set out by the Secretary of the Treasury is willfuUy
violated, the act imposes civil and criminal penalties.'
Under 12 USC § 1955 (1982), the Secretary of the Treasury may impose
civil fines on both the company and its individual officers and employees for
willful violations of the regulations. The fine may not exceed $1,000, and the
secretary may bring suit to enforce the penalty if necessary. There are two
provisions establishing criminal penalties. Penalties of up to $1,000 and one
year in jail for the willful violation ofany ofthe above regulations by any person
are provided for under 12 USC § 1956 (1982). Although some provisions of the
act refer to "uninsured" banks or institutions, as mentioned previously, the
secretary has authority to establish record-keeping requirements for federaUy
insured banks and institutions as well as for uninsured institutions. '0 Moreover,
the scope of the secretary's authority is not limited to financial institutions, but
extends to any person who engages in banking functions such as issuing or
redeeming monetary instruments, transferring funds or credits, operating a
currency exchange, dealing in foreign currency, operating a credit card system,
or "performing such similar, related, or substitute functions for any of the
foregoing or for banking as may be specified by the secretary in regulations."11
The criminal penalties provided in 12 USC §§ 1956 and 1957 apply to "who-
ever" commits a willful violation of the regulations.
Additionally, stiffer penalties are provided in 12 USC § 1957 (1982) for
certain willful violations of any regulation adopted by the Secretary of the
Treasury to carry out the above-mentioned provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Whoever willfully violates these regulations, in furtherance ofthe commission of
a federal felony, is punishable by a fine of$1 0,000 or imprisonment for not more
than five years, or both.'2

(2] Reporting of Currency Transactions

[a] Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Bank Secrec)' Act of 1970 authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations to collect information on

·California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 US 21, 2~1974); 12 USC §§ 1955-1957

(1982).
'0 The regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury defines "bank" broadly to include
all commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other institutions.
31 CFR § 103.11 (1987). The regulations establish additional reporting requirements for
certain persons, such as casinos and brokers and dealers in securities. 3' CFR §§ 103.35,
103.36 (1987). The legislative history ofthe act indicates there was no specific reference to
"insured" banks and institutions because the legislators believed that "the necessary legal
and administrative machinery [was] already in existence." H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note
7, at 19.
11 12 USC § 1953(b) (1982).
"See also 31 CFR § 103.49(a) (1985); H.R. Rep. No. 975, supra note 7, at 20.
'II 12.0112)[_1 OVERVIEW 12-4

foreign and domestic currency transactions. 11 Under the act and regulations, the
Secretary can gather data as described in this section to obtain "reports or
records" that "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings."" These regulations cover the following
transactions.
1. Domesticcurrency transactions. Financial institutions are required to me
reports for every deposit, withdrawal, exchange ofcurrency, or other payment or
transfer "which involves a transaction in currency of more than S10,000.""
2. Export and import ofmonetary instruments. As authorized by the Bank
Secrecy Act, the Secretary ofthe Treasury requires individuals or institutions to
malce reports whenever they physically transport more than $10,000 in currency
or monetary instruments into or out of the United States on anyone occasion. 11
or whenever they receive currency or monetary instruments ofmore than $5,000
from outside the United States on anyone occasion.'f A transfer of funds

13
31 USC § 5313 (1982) (formerly codified as 31 USC § 1081). The requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act for reporting currency transactions are discussed at , 12.01[2J.
"31 USC § 5311 (1982) (formerly codified as 31 USC § 1051).
"31 CFR § 103.22 (1987). See also 31 CFR §§ 103.11, 103.21 (1987). Although 31
USC § 5313 allows the Secretary of the Treasury to require reports of transactions in not
only coins and currency, but also "other monetary instruments" the Secretary prescribes,
the Secretary's regulation is limited to those involving coins and currency. Also, the act
permits the Secretary to set the amount of transactions that should be reported.
11 31 USC § 5316 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 31 CFR § 103.23 (1987).
17 31 USC § 5316 (1982 & Supp.1II 1985); 31 CFR § 103.23 (1987). The definition of
"monetary instruments" is a broad one. It includes instruments such as traveler's checks,
money orders, investment securities in bearer form or indorsed in such a manner as to
pass title by delivery, and bank checks in bearer form or indorsed in blank or with the
name of the payee omitted. The regulation reads as follows:

Monetary instruments. (I) Monetary instruments include:

(i) Currency;
(ii) All negotiable instruments (including personal checks, business checks,
official bank checks, cashier's checks, third-party checks, promissory notes (as
that term is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code), traveler's checks, and
money orders) that are either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made
out to a fictitious payee (for the purposes of§ 103.23) or otherwise in such form
that title thereto passes upon delivery;
(iii) Incomplete instruments (including personal checks, business checks, offi-
cial bank checks, cashier's checks, third-party checks, promissory notes (as that
term is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code), traveler's checks, and money
orders) signed but with the payee's name omitted; and
(iv) Securities or stock in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title
hereto passes upon delivery. .
(2) Monetary instruments do not include warehouse receipts or bills oflading.
31 CFR § 103.! I(K)(1987).
12-5 TRANSAcrIONS REGULAnON 112.01(2I1a)

through normal banking procedures not involving physical transportation of

currency or monetary instruments need not be reported...

Numerous exceptions are provided for banks. For instance, banks need not
report currency or other monetary obligations mailed or shipped through the
postal service or by common carrier. 11 They are also not required to report
overland shipments of such instruments when the shipments are of normal
amounts for the customer's business and involve an established customer main-
taining a deposit relationship with the bank. 21I Other exemptions have been
granted, including an exemption to U.S. banks near the Canadian border that, as
part of their normal business, physically transport currency on a continuing
basis to Canadian banks. 21
Additionally, any money or monetary instruments in the process of being
transported into or out ofthe United States for which a report has not been flied
are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States.22 Case law has held that
the entire amount ofmoney transported in violation ofthis section is subject to
forfeiture, not just the amount in excess ofthe amount required to be reported. 23

3. Transactions with foreign financial agencies. Persons living or con-

ducting business in the United States (including associations and corporations)
who engage in any transaction or maintain any relationship with a foreign
financial agency must keep records and file reports, as the Secretary of the
Treasury prescribes, listing the identities ofthe parties involved and describing
the transaction or relationship.24 The regulations require persons who have "a
financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or
other financial account in a foreign country" to report such interests on their

1131 CFR § 103.23(dr0987).

,. 31 CFR § 103.23(<:)(2)(1987).
20
31 CFR § 103.23(c)(3) (1987).
21 31 CFR pt. 103 app. (1987) (Section 103.23, Exemptions From 364).
22 31 USC § 53 I7(c)(Supp.III 1985)(formerly codified as 31 USC § 1101). The 1984
amendments authorized customs officers to stop and conduct warrantless searches of
vehicles with respect to which "the officer has reasonable cause to believe there is a
monetary instrument being transported in violation" of the export/import requirements.
31 USC § 5317(b) (Supp. III 1985). See also 31 CFR § 103.48 (1987). See generally
Annotation, "Criminal Liability For Failure to Report Export or Import of Monetary
Instrument as Required by Provision of Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act (31 USCS § HOI)," 59 ALR Fed. 438 (1982).
23Uniteli States v. Currency Totalling $48,318.08, 609 F2d 21,0 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. One 1964 MG, 584 F2d 889 (9th Cir. 1978). A forfeiture of nearly $ I.5
million in currency was upheld in United States v. $1.497,081.78, 777 F2d 1451 (11th
Cir. 1985).
24 31 USC § 5314 (1982).
11 12.01[211al OVERVIEW 12-6

yearly tax returns. 21 Such persons are required to keep records of these financial
interests for five years in the event that inspection is later authorized. 21
4. Foreign currency transactions. Financial institutions and other persons
who engage in foreign currency transactions must submit reports covering these
transactions with the Federal Reserve bank in their district. IT Such provisions
were added by amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act in 1973, so that the
Secretary ofthe Treasury could obtain complete and current data on the nature
and sources ofcapital flows, movements ofwhich can have a significant impact
on the proper functioning of the international monetary system. 2• Regulations
adopted by the secretary to implement these statutes require that reports be med
by those persons who engage in any transaction in foreign exchange, in any
transfer of credit between a person within and a person outside the United
States, or in the export of U.S. currency. II Banks and banking institutions are
required to report, at various intervals, their assets, liabilities, and positions in
foreign currency," as well as the assets, 'liabilities, and positions of their foreign
branches and majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.'·

Prior to amendments to the law made by the Money Laundering Control

Act of 1986, there was a division of authority as to whether the reporting
requirements extended to "structured transactions," or "smurfing," in which
cashier's checks and similar monetary instruments that individually were less
than S10,000 in value were acquired, but for which the total amount exceeded

25
31 CFR §§ 103.24, 103.32 (1987). See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 US
21. 37 (1974).
21
31 CFR § 103.32 (1987).
27 31 USC § 531 5 (I 982)(forrnerly codified as 31 USC§§ I 141, 1142); 31 CFR § 128.2
(1987).
1131 USC§ 5315 (1982).
21 31 CFR § 128.2 (1987).
2°31 CFR § 128.31 (1987).
n 31 CFR § 128.33 (1987). The civil and criminal penalties that apply to other
portions of the act do not apply to 31 USC § 5315 (1982) on reporting foreign currency
transactions. Section 5315 (formerly codified as 31 USC § 1142) was added to the act in
1973, and it gives the Secretary of the Treasury authority to "prescribe regulations ...
requiring reports on foreign currency transactions conducted by a United States person or
a foreign person controlled by a United States person." This authority is in addition to
and is broader than the secretary's authority to require reports under other provisions of
the act, such as those relating to the export and import of monetary instruments. At one
time, the sections of the act that set forth the general penalties for violations, 31 USC
§ 5322 (1982) (formerly codified as 31 USC §§ 1058, 1059) (authorizing fine! and
imprisonment) appeared to apply to this foreign currency transaction reporting section.
The revisions now make clear that these penalties do not apply to violations of that
section. 31 USC § 5322 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and Re"ision Notes.
12-7 TRANSACTIONS REGULAnON 11 12.01[2](b]

the $10,000 value that was required to be reported. 32 Additional problems were
created as a result of the secretary's placing the reporting burden only on
fmancial institutions. 33 If a bank was not aware that a person was structuring
transactions to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, the bank could not be
found to have violated the reporting statute because it lacked knowledge of the
need to report; thus the regulations ofthe secretary under the act did not subject
individuals who were not financial institutions to the reporting requirement.:W

[b] Structured Transactions and Penalties for Reporting ViolatioDs. The

Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 amended the provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act to deal with the problems discussed in the preceding section. as It
answers the question whether a series of transactions that separately do not
violate the reporting requirements for certain fmancial transactions can be a
single "structured transaction" in violation of the act. In pertinent part, it
provides as follows:

§ 5324. Structuring transactions to evade reporting requirement prohibited

No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of
section 53 I 3(a) with respect to such transaction-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to
me a report required under section 5313(a);
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to me a
report required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission
or misstatement of fact; or

32 There were numerous cases and a split among the federal coul'ls on tbis issue. See
United States v. Denemark, 779 F2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Giancola,
783 F2d 1549 (11th Cir.), cen. denied, 107 S. Ct. 669 (1986).
33 For cases interpreting who constituted a financial institution that had an obligation
to repon, see United States v. Goldberg, 756 F2d 949 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 472 US 1009
(1985) (partnerships and joint ventures could be regarded as financial institutions
required to repol'l); United States v. Mouzin, 785 F2d 682 (9th Cir.), cen. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 574 (1986) (a single individual could qualify as a nonbank financial institution).
3<United States v. Varbel, 780 F2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F2d 676 (1st CiT. 1985). But see United States v. Cook, 745 F2d l31l (10th
Cir. 1984), cen. denied, 469 US 1220 (1985); United States v. Puel'lO, 730 F2d 627 (11th
Cir.), cel'l. denied, 469 US 847 (1984); United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F2d 1092 (11th
CiT. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 603 F2d 1200 (5th CiT. 1979); United States v.
Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990 (NO Ga. 1984).
U Pub. L. No. 99-570, Tit. r, subtit. H, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986): See also Annot.,
"Liability For Structured Transactions Under The Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act: A Prelude to the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986," 6 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. 325-340 (1987).
1l12.01(2)Ib) OVERVIEW 12-8

(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in

structuring, any transactions with one or more domestic fmancial
institutions." .

The Money Laundering Control Act also amends the monetary transaction
reporting requirements by giving the Secretary of the Treasury authority to
adopt regulations to defme!the term "at one time," which is used in 31 USC
§ 5316(a). The Secretary's definition. may cumulate "closely related events in
order that such events may collectively be considered to occur at one time...."37
This allows the regulations to reach circumstances in which a person has struc-
tured his or her transactions so that they are a series of separate transactions at
different times to avoid the SI0,000 reporting amount for monetary instruments
imported or exported from the United States. The act also modifies the defini-
tion of "attempts" under 31 USC 53 16(a)( I), relating to reports on exporting or
importing monetary instruments, so that it covel'$ any person that "transports, is
about to transport, or has transported" monetary instruments defined in the
act. a
The Money Laundering Control Act increases the penalties for violations of
the currency transaction reporting rules. A structured transaction violation
carries a civil penalty for willful violators of up to the amount of the money
involved." Willful violators ofthe foreign financial. agency transaction reporting
rules may be penalized $25,000 or the amount of the transaction, up to
$100,000.<0
Financial institutions and their omcers and employees who willfully violate
the reporting rules are subject to increased civil penalties, which may range up to
$100,000 for each violation." In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury has
authority to fine financial institutions up to $500 for negligent violations.<2 The
civil penalties are in addition to any criminal penalties that may be imposed on
the offender.<3 The criminal penalties for persons who willfully violate the
reporting provisions "while violating another law" of the United States or as
part of a pattern of iUesal activity involving more than SI00,000 in a twelve-

.. 31 USCA § 5324 (West Supp. 1987). See S. Rep. :-;0. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (to accompany S. 2683), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH), Special Report
I, Money Laundering Crimes Act of 1986, at 47-48 (No. 1145, Sept. 12, 1986)(hereinafter
Special Report).
37 31 USCA § 5316(dj(West Supp. 1987).
31 31 USCA § 5316(a)( I) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
'"31 USCA § 532 1(a)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
<°31 USCA § 532l(aXS)(West Supp. 1987).
•, 31 USCA § S321(a)(I) (West Supp. 1987).
<231 USCA § S321(aX6) (West Supp. 1987).
<331 USCA § 532l(d) (West Supp. 1987).
12-9 TRANSAcrIONS REGULATION , 12.01(3][a)

month period are increased to a fme of not more than $500,000 and imprison-
ment for up to ten years."

. (3) Money-Laundering Controls

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 makes the "laundering of
monetary instruments" a federal crime, makes "engaging in monetary transac-
tions in property dt;rived from specified unlawful activity" a crime, amends the
Right to Financiai Privacy Act and the Bank Secrecy Act, including changes in
the currency reporting rules, and provides for new federal forfeiture powers."

[a) Money-Laundering Offenses. The Money Laundering Control Act makes

it a criminal offense to launder monetary instruments. This crime is committed
whenever a party to a financial transaction knows the property involved repre·
sents the proceeds ofsome form ofunlawful activity and the proceeds are in fact
from certain specified unlawful activities. The offender must have the intent to
violate the law in one of three ways: (I) by promoting the carrying on of certain
specified illegal activities; (2) by conducting the transaction knowing it is
designed to conceal the circumstances ofproceeds obtained from specific unlaw-
ful activities; or (3) by knowing the transaction is designed to avoid federal
transaction reporting rules.
The act also makes it a crime to transport monetary instruments from the
U nited States to other countries or to bring them into the United States when the
person does so with the intent to promote the specified illegal activities or to
conceal proceeds of illegal activities or avoid reporting requirement... This
provision of the act is set forth as follows:
§ 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(8) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds ofspecified unlawful activo
ity; or
(ii) to avoid the transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law,

"31 USCA § 5322(b) (West Supp. 1987).

AS Pub. L. No. 99-570, Tit. I, subtit. H, 100 Stat. 3207-18-3207·39 (1986). Theaet isa
pan of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·570, 100 Stat. 3207.
1112.01 (311a] OVERVIEW 12-10

shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
(2) Whoever transports or attempts to transport a monetary instru-
ment or funds from a place in tbe United States to or through a place
outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or
through a place outside the United States-
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds ofsome form ofunlawful activity
and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds ofspecified unlawful activ-
~;M . . .
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a fine aU 500.000 or twice the value ofthe monetarv
instrument or funds involved in the transportation, whichever is greater,
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. Of
To establish that a crime has taken place under the first part of this provi-
sion, the following must be proven. Firstly, it must be shown that there was
knowledge that the property involved constituted proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity. However, there need not be knowledge of the specific offense
that created the proceeds or knowledge that the proceeds derived from the
specified illegal activities in the act." "He or she need only know that it {the
property) represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity." As stated
in the act, it is enough to know that the property "represented proceeds from
some form. though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State or Federal law, regardless ofwhether or not such activity" is
enumerated within the specified illegal activities in the act.'· This provision
serves to prevent defendants from claiming that they thought the proceeds were
from a crime that was not one ofthe specified illegal activities in the act, and thus
from escaping liability under the act."
Secondly, the person must conduct or attempt to conduct a financial trans-
action that involves the "proceeds ofspecified unlawful activity." There are two
elements under this second aspect-a financial transaction in which certain
unlawful proceeds are used. Thus, the act covers any commercial transaction,

" 18 USC § 1956(a) (Supp. IV 19'a6).

OJ Special Report, supra note 36, at 37.
"18 USC § 1956(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1986).
"Special Report, supra note 36, al 37.
12-11 TRANsAcrroNs REGUIATION '12.01(3](81

not just bank transactions. III However. although proceeds used in the transaction
may be generated by the violation of state or federal law, there is no money
laundering offense under this part of the act unless the crime is one of those
specifically enumerated in the act. 51 Such crimes include most of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) predicate offenses, federal finan-
cial crimes, and foreign drug offenses. In addition, each transaction is a separate
offense. 52
Thirdly, the defendant must have engaged in the transaction either with the
intent to promote a crime specified in the act or with knowledge that the
transaction was designed to conceal a crime. Thus, there is a scienter require-
ment, in addition to the knowledge of the nature ofthe proceeds required in the
first part of the definition of the money laundering offense. Congress deliber-
ately chose to include the "intent" or "knowledge" requirements, and not the
broader standard of"reason to know" or "reckless disregard."u However, Con-
gress stated its belief that the customary treatment of "willful blindness" as
meeting the knowing standard would apply to the act." The following example
was furnished:
Thus, a currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a known
drug dealer involving hundreds ofthousands ofdollars in cash and accepts a
commission far above the market rate, could not escape conviction, from
the first tier of the offense, simply by claiming that he did not know for sure
that the currency involved in the transaction was derived from crime. On
the other hand, an automobile car dealer who sells a car at market rates to a
person whom he merely suspects of involvement with crime, cannot be
convicted ofthis offense in the absence ofa showing that he knew something
more about the transaction or the circumstances surrounding it. 55
Subparagraph 2 of this provision makes it a crime to engage in illegal interna-
tional money-laundering transactions and provides "knowledge" requirements
similar to those discussed above.
A person who violates the money-laundering provisions ofthe act is subject
to a civil penalty to the United States in the amount ofthe greater ofthe value of
the property involved in the transaction or $10,000. 51 The Senate Committee
report stated that this provision was not intended to create a private remedy for
persons other than the government. 57

50 Special Report, supra note 36, at 36.

51lS USC ~ 19S6(c}(7HSupp.IV 19&6}.
52 Special Report, supra note 36, at 38.

53 Special Report, supra note 36, at 34.

5' Special Report, supra note 36, at 36.
&SId.
u 18 USC § 19S6(b}(Supp. IV 1986).
57 Special Report, supra note 36, at 38.
11 12.01(3](b) OVERVIEW 12-12

(b) Monetuy Transactions Involving Proceeds of Crime. The Money Laun-

dering Control Act also makes it a crime to engage in monetary transactions in
property derived from specified unlawful activity." Such offense occurs when
there is a "monetary transaction," that is, a transaction with a fmancial institu-
tion such as the deposit, withdrawal, or transfer of money or a monetary instrn-
ment. The transaction must involve property derived from or proceeds of the
specified criminal offenses in the act. The defendant must have knowingly
engaged in the transaction, although there is no need to prove knowledge that the
property was from a "specified unlawful activity."·'

leI RICO and Other Enforcement Measures. The money-laundering and

monetary transaction offenses have been added to the list of acts that are
predicate offenses and that constitute racketeering under RICO.IO The provi·
sions authorizing wiretaps and similar investigative procedures also have been
extended to the money-laundering and monetary transaction a:imes.·~ In addi-
tion, both money-laundering and monetary transaction offenses may be based
on transactions outside the territorial United States when a U.S. citizen is
involved and certain other conditions are met. 12

(4) Special Enforcement Powers

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 gives additional powers to
federal regulators to investigate violations and enforce the provisions of the act
and the currency reporting requirements.

la] Authority to Investigate Violations. The Money Laundering Control Act

gives the banking regulatory agencies additional authority to examine financial
institutions for compliance with the monetary transaction recordkeeping and
reporting rules. II The act also expands the regulatory authority given to the
Secretary of the Treasury to conduct civil investigations of violations. The

51 18 USC § 1957 (Supp. IV 1986).

51The statute makes it illeaa1 when a person "knowingly enpses or attempts to
ensage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived propeny•..." 18 USC § 1957(a)
(Supp. IV 1986).
10
18 USC §§ 19S2(Supp.IV 19i6}, \961 (19S2 & Supp.IV \9S6).
5' 18 USC § 2516(1) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
52 18 USC §§ 1956(1). 1957(d)(Supp. IV 1986). See Special Report, supra note 36, at
40.
n 12 USC §§ 1818(i)(2)(i), 1818(s) (SuPp. IV 1986); 12 USC §§ 1464(d), 1730, 1786
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
12-13 TRANSACI10NS REGULATION 11 12.01(4)(b)

authority extends to compelling financial institutions and their officers and

employees to produce records and to testify under oath."
The provisions for compelling the production of information raised con-
cern about efforts to obtain information from U.S. branch offices regarding
records held by foreign offices of the banks in nations with secrecy laws. The
Senate Committee dealt with these concerns in its Report:
Under the new section ... this summons authority may be used against any
financial institution, whether foreign or domestic, regulated by the Trea-
sury Department. Concerns have been raised about the application of this
authority to obtain records offoreign fmancial activity through the issuance
of a subpoena to a U.S. branch of a predominantly offshore financial
institution. The primary concern is that compliance with such a subpoena
may force the institution to violate the strict financial privacy laws of other
nations, such as the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands, from which records
may be sought. It is the Committee's intention that efforts should be made,
at least in the frrst instance, to resolve any conflicts that may arise between
U.S.law enforcement interests and foreign secrecy laws through diplomatic
efforts. If diplomatic efforts prove to be unsuccessful, however, the Com-
mittee expects such conflicts to be resolved by a careful balancing of the
competing interests, in accordance with the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Bank of Nova
co'
.,cotla. ... I'

[h) Compellfng Information About ForeIgn Bank Records Protected Under

Foreign Law. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, a 1982 case, tested the
ability of United States law enforcement officials to obtain information from a
bank about records in a foreign branch ofthe bank." The case involved the Bank
ofNova Scotia, a Canadian bank with agencies and branches in many countries,
including the United States and the Bahamas. A federal grand j ury, in the course
ofa tax and narcotics investigation, issued a subpoena to the bank in the United
States calling for the production of records that were maintained in bank offices
in the Bahamas. The bank defended against production of the records on the
ground that compliance with the subpoena would violate the Bahamian bank
secrecy law and, therefore, enforcement of the subpoena against the bank would

.. Special Repon, supra note 36, at 43.

uId.
6. In re Grand 1ury Proceedings, (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F2d
1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 462 US 1119(1983). Fora description ofthe history of
the matter after the U.S. Supreme Coun denied ceniorari, which eventually led to the
bank's compliance, see Olsen, "Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations," 16 NYU
1. Inl'l L. & Pol. 999, 1014 (1984). The Bank ofNova Scalia decision approves the use of
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965). See also the discussion of the Bank ofNova Scalia case in the congressional repon
on the Money Laundering Control Act at 11 12.01(4)[a).
OJ 12.01[4J[b) OVERVIEW 12-14

deny it due process. sr The court said that the Bank of Nova Scotia had DOt made
a good-faith effort to comply with the subpoena, that the Bahamian government
had not taken action to prevent the bank from complying, and that imposing
sanctions against the bank would not result in denial of a constitutionally
required forum for litigating a claim the bank possessed."
In the second Bank o/Nova Scotia case,s, the United States served a grand
jury subpoena on the Miami office ofthe bank to obtain bank records relating to
alleged narcotics offenses. The bank moved to quash the subpoena, claiming it
compelled the bank to violate the bank secrecy laws of the Bahamas and the
Cayman Islands. The court denied the motion and ordered the bank to produce.
When the bank still had not complied after further motions and court orders to
produce, the district court found that the bank had not tried to comply with the
subpoena in good faith and thus held the bank in contempt. Subsequently, the
Bahamas issued an order permitting the bank to produce the documents, but the
bank initially failed to produce all the documents sought by the grand jury. After
further delay, the documents were produced. When the bank appealed the
district court's contempt order and fme, the court of appeals upheld the order.
The court, relying on Section 40 of the Restatement, found that the United
States' interest in enforcement of the narcotics laws outweighed the interest of
the foreign jurisdiction in its secrecy laws. Because the bank voluntarily under-
took to do business in different countries, the court viewed the bank's com-
plaints of being caught between conflicting governmental demands
unsympathetically. The court reviewed the district court's findings, regarding
the bank's lack of good faith in trying to comply with the subpoena, and upheld
the sanctions imposed.
The Bank of Nova Scotia was also involved in United States v. Davis. '0
There the bank sought to comply with a subpoena of bank records relating to a
customer who was involved in a money-laundering scheme, but the customer
applied for a preliminary injunction against the bank in a Cayman Islands court.
The U.S. court ordered the customer to cease the litigation and compelled his

s'The bank relied upon Societe Intemationale Pour Participations Industrieles et

Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 US 197 {I 958), where the failure of the plaintiff to comply
with a court order for production of banking records involving a Swiss bank account was
held not ground for dismissal of the pJaintil1's action.
$I The court relied upon In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532

F2d 404 (5th Cir. 19761, cen. denied, 429 US 940 (1916). where contempt penalties fOT
refusing to testify pursuant to a subpoena were upheld notwithS1anding the witness's
claim that the testimony would subject him to criminal penalty in his country of
residence.
s'ln re Grand Jury Proceedings, (United States v. Bank ofNova Scotia), 740 F2d 817
(11th Cir. 1984). cert. denied, 469 US 1106 (1985).
'0767 F2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
12-15 TRANSACTIONS REGULATION 'I112.0114J(c]

consent to the disclosure ofthe records. 71 The court ofappeals affmned, follow-
ing a Section 40 analysis that weighted the United States interests strongly!"
Federal Internal Revenue and Justice Department officials believe that
foreign laws regulating banks and related commercial transactions have pro-
vided a haven for hiding billions ofdollars of underworld assets in avoidance of
federal taxes.T3 Additional authority to compel banks to produce information
was given to the Secretary ofthe Treasury by the Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986.

Ie) Forfeiture of Property. The Money Laundering Control Act provides

expanded forfeiture provisions and makes subject to forfeiture
(A) Any property, real or personal, which represents the gross receipts a
person obtains, directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of [the
money-laundering or monetary transaction violation sections] ... or which
is traceable to such gross receipts.
(B) Any property within the jurisdiction of the United States, which
represents the proceeds ofany offense against a foreign nation involving the
manufacture, importation, sale or distribution ofa controlled substance ...
within whose jurisdiction such offense or activity would be punishable by
death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and which would be
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if such act or
activity had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States.
(C) Any coin and currency (or other monetary instrument ...) or any
interest in other property, including any deposit in a financial institution,
traceable to such coin or currency involved in a transaction or attempted
transaction in violation ofsection 5313(a) or 5324 oftitle 31 may be seized

11 The constitutiOnality ofcompelling consent to the disclosure was upheld against a

claim ofviolation of the fifth amendment prOhibition aptnst self-incrimination, because
signing the consent form did not amount to testimonial communication. United States v.
Guidoni, 732 F2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 US 932 (1984). But see In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 599 F. Supp. 746 (SD Tex. 1984), where the court held that the
compulsion did involve testimonial communication in violation of the fifth amendment.
12In United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 584 F. Supp. 1080 (SDNY 1984), the
court upheld a subpoena of records from a Hong Kong branch of Chase. See also Garpeg,
Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (SDNY 1984j (Chase ordered to produce bank
records ofcorporation that was not itself under investigation by the IRS). The interests of
the foreign country in nondisclosure were held to prevail in United States v. First Nat'l
Bank., 699 F2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), which involved an effort by the IRS to collect back
taxes. The Section 40 Restatement analysis has been used to uphold discovery orders in
civil litigation where production of foreign records has been sought. Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 FRD 503 (ND Ill. 1984).
13 Hearings, United States Senate, Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, March 15-16, 1983, reported in 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (8NA) 567 (Mar. 21,1983).
(The Subcommittee presented a report on these activities entitled "Crime and Secrecy:
The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies.")
11 12.01(4J(d] OVERVIEW 12·16

and forfeited to the United States Government. No property or interest in

property shall be seized or forfeited if the violation is by a domestic finan-
cial institution examined by a Federal bank supervisory agency or a fman-
cial institution regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a
partner, director, officer, or employee thereof.14
"Gross receipts" refers to the commission or profit earned on the transaction,
and not to the property that may be transferred as part of it. TI The act does not
allow the forfeiture of property owned by persons who have no knowledge of the
activity that is the basis for the forfeiture. ff The act provides procedures for the
seizure by the Attorney General or in some cases by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury." Additionally, when a court convicts a person of the money-laundering or
monetary transaction provisions, the court may order forfeiture of the gross
receipts gained as a result ofthe offense or traceable to it. as part ofthe sentence
for conviction. ff
Finally, the act expands the authority for.warrantless searches ofpenons
crossing the U.S. border by allowing such searches to determine whether the
person crossing the border has complied with the requirements for reporting on
the export and import of monetary instruments in 31 USCA § 5316. Failure to
file the required report or the filing ofan erroneous report under 31 USC § 5316
is ground for forfeiture. This forfeiture includes "a deposit in a financial institu-
tion, traceable" to a monetary instrument for which the report was not filed. fl

[d) Immunity for Reports of Violations. Under the Financial Privacy Act,
financial institutions are authorized to notify the U niled States of information
relating to violations oflaws without adverse consequences under the act. 1D The
Money Laundering Control Act expands this protection. It immunizes the insti-
tution, officer, or employee who reports a violation from liability to the cus-
tomer of the institution for the disclosure, regardless of any state or federal law
to the contrary. This protection, however, extends only to "information which
may be relevant to a possible violation of any statute or regulation," as defined
in the following: "Such information may include only the name or other identi-
fying information concerning any individual or account involved in and the
nature of any suspected illegal activity."" Further, the act authorizes a coun to
order a financial institution to delay giving notice to its customer of the receipt

7. 18 USC § 981(a)(') (Supp. IV 1986).

75 See Special Report, supra note 36, at 49.
11,8 USC § 981 (a)(2)(Supp. IV 1986).
n 18 USC § 981 (b) (Supp. IV 1986).
71 18 USC § 982(a) (Supp. IV (986).
n 31 USCA § 5317(c)(West Supp. 1987),
.. 12 USC § 3403(c) (Supp, IV 1986).
" 12 USC § 3403(c) (Supp. IV 1986). See discussion at ~ 13.01 [2J(c).
12-17 TRANSACTIONS REGUlAnON 1112.02

ofa subpoena or court order relating to a grand jury request for records, notwith-
standing tbe other requirements of tbe privacy act."

leI Change in Bank Control. Procedures for approval ofchanges in the control
of regulated financial institutions by the banking regulatory agencies also are
affected by the Money Laundering Control Act. Agencies are directed to investi-
gate the persons who are acquiring control, to determine independently the
accuracy of certain information submitted regarding these persons, and to pre-
pare a written report of their investigations. In addition, the agencies must
provide a period for public comments on the acquisition, and the notice for
public comment must identify the persons who will acquire control, "unless the
agency determines in writing that such disclosure or solicitation would seriously
threaten the safely or soundness of such bank."1S

11 12.02 OTHER CRIMINAL LAWS RELATING TO BANK

TRANSACTIONS
Criminal law has an important role in the regulation of the conduct of
officers, directors, and employees offinancial institutions. Much ofthe criminal
law that controls the activities of those engaged in banking is state law. Each
state has laws dealing with embezzlement, forgery, fraud, and so fonh. In
addition, there are many laws dealing with financial transactions, such as state
and federal securities laws, antitrust laws, and antiracketeering laws, to name
but a few. As previously noted in the discussion ofthe federal regulatory scheme,
many ofthe requirements in the federal banking laws are backed up by criminal
sanctions if a violation occurs. (See Chapter 9.) Additionally, there are federal
statutes that are specially aimed at crimes committed by banks and bank officers
or that are committed in the course of financial transactions that involve them.
This discussion touches on some ofthese special federal criminal laws," and in
particular, those that have special significance.

12
12 USC§ 3413 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See'll 13.01 [2)[c].
I! 12 USC §§ 1817(j)(2), I730(q)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
•• Congressional concern over misconduct by bank insiders is not misplaced. Out of
the 594 national banks that failed from 1864 to 1920, 228 (more than one-third) of the
failures were attributable to criminal acts. Pratt, Bank Frauds-Their Detection and
Prevention 3-4 (2d ed. 1965), (citing 1 Ann. Rep. ofthe Comptroller ofthe Currency 183
(1920». More recently, a House of Representatives study said that misconduct by bank
officers was a major factor in about one half of all commercial bank failures and one
quaner of all thrift failures from 1980 to 1983. Government Operations Commerce,
Consumer and Monetary AtTairs Subcommittee, "Federal Response to Criminal Miscon-
duct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Financial Institutions," H.R. Rep. No. 1137, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The comptroller stated to Congress in 1987 that "We know that
improper insider transactions are contributing factors in some bank failures; but we also
1112.02(1] OVERVIEW 12-18

It should be noted that beyond the specific prohibitions mentioned in the

sections that follow, bank officers and others may also be convicted of conspir-
ing to commit an offense against the United States, when anyone of the parties
involved in the conspiracy takes any action to "effect the object of the conspir-
acy."11 Further, any person who "aids, abets, counsels, comman4s, induces or
procures" the commission ofany offense against the United States is open to the
same punishment as the principal offender.--

[1] Bank Bribery

Section 21.5 of 18 USC makes it a federal felony to bribe a bank officer or
employee and for a bank officer or employee to accept a bribe.1T As part ofthe
Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress amended this section to increase the
offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, with correspondingly stiffer penalties,
and to enlarge its scope to reach transactions relating to most federally regulated
depository institutions. Because the 1984 amendments reached broadly to
encompass any person who "directly or indirectly" solicits or receives "anything
of value for himself or for any other person or entity" other than the financial
institution the person represents, without regard to the intent of the actors, the
act created widespread concern in the banking industry that numerous innocent
and accepted practices, such as a customer's buying lunch for a bank officer,
might now be federal crimes. Congress responded to these concerns with the

know that the majority oHailures are better explained by different factors, including poor
management and economic problems. The interrelationship between these facton is often
complex, however, and the real impact of each can be difficult to assess accurately. The
experience of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Ocq indicates, however,
that insider abuse is a significant contributing factor in approximately one third of the
national banks that fail, and fraud is a major causative factor in a considerably smaller
percentage of the failures." Statement of Robert L. Clarke. Comptl'Ollerofthe Currency,
before the H. R. Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affain, Comm. on
Government Operations 4 (Nov. 19. 1987). See generally Morse, "Bank Insiders and
Willful Misapplication Statute," 92 Banking U 715 (1975); Buchalter & Allen, "Bank
Insider Abuses-When Does the Axe Fall?" 96 Banking U 804 (1979).
15
18 USC § 371 (I 982).
-- 18 USC § 2 (1982).
IT 18 USC § 212 (1982) makes it a crime for a bank officer to bribe a bank examiner.
Those found guilty may be fined up to $5,000, plus the amount of money given, plus
imprisonment up to one year. 18 USC § 213 (1982) makes it an offense for bank enminen
to accept gratuities or loans. See Annot., "Construction and Application of 18 USCS § 213
Punishing Acceptance of Loan or Gratuity by Bank Examiner," 19 ALR Fed. 340-342
(1974). Also 18 USC § 1909 (1982) prohibits bank examiners from accepting compensa-
tion for performing services for any bank.
12-19 TRANSACTIONS REGULAnON '112.02[1)

Bank Bribery Amendments Act of 1985," Under these amendments, the scope
of the act is narrowed to violations committed with a "corrupt" purpose under-
taken with "intent to influence or reward" a bank officer or accepted by the
officer with a "corrupt" purpose "intending to be influenced or rewarded." The
relevant portion of 18 USC § 215(a) (Supp. IV 1986) provides that the following
actions are federal crimes:
Whoever-
(l) corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything ofvalue to any person, with
intent to influence or reward an officer, director, employee, agent, or attor-
ney ofa financial institution in connection with any business or transaction
of such institution; or
(2) as an officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney ofa financial institu-
tion, corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit ofany person, or corruptly
accepts or agrees to accept anything of value from any person, intending to
be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business or transaction of
such institution; ....n
The penalty provisions include a fine of $5,000 or three times the value of the
bribe, whichever is greater, and/or five years in prison. When the value of the
bribe is not over $100, these penalties are reduced so that the violator may be
fined "not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. "10
As noted previously, 18 USC § 215 makes it a crime both for a person to
offer or give a bribe and for a bank officer to solicit or accept a bribe. The report
of the House Judiciary Committee on the bill explains the relationship between
the two parts of the legislation:
Subsection (aX2) is directed at the persons whose action is sought to be
influenced-an employee, officer, director, agent, or attorney ofa financial
institution. Subsection (aX2) makes it an offense for such officials corruptly
to seek or accept anything ofvalue from any person ifthe giving, offering, or
promising of that thing of value would be a violation of subsection (a)( I).
The use of "corruptly" narrows the current-law offense, which makes any
seeking or acceptance criminal, without regard to the intent or purpose of
the person seeking or accepting the payment. Subsection (a)(2) also requires

"Pub. L. No. 99-370, 100 Stat. 779 (1986) (codified at 18 USC § 215 (Supp. IV
1.986». See also, Dennis & Chafetz, "The New Bank Bribery Act: A Trap for the Unwary,"
I02 Banking U 316-348 (1985).
II "Financial institution" is defined to include banks insured by the FDIC, institu-
tions insured by the FSLIC, credit unions insured by the National Credit Union insurance
fund, Federal Home Loan banks and members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System,
Federal Land banks, Intermediate Credit banks, Banks for Cooperatives, Production
Credit Associations and Federal Land Bank Associations, small business investment
companies, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies. 18 USC
§ 21 5(b)(Supp. IV 1986).
10 18 USC § 21 5(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
1112.02[1) OVERVIEW 12-20

proofthat the giving, offcrina. or promising ofthe thing would have violated
subsection <aX1). The latter requirement means that it must be proved that
the thing of value was corruptly given, offered, or promised. l1

The House Committee also defines "corruptly," drawing upon a treatise on

federal jury practice and jury instructions. The Committee states:

The term "corruptly" means that the act is done "volnntantly [sic] and
intentionally, and with the bad purpose ofaccomplishing either an unlawful
end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.
The motive to act corruptly is ordinarily a hope or expectation of either
financial gain or other benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit or benefit to
another. "12

Bank officers found to have engaged in conduct prohibited by 18 USC § 215 are
subject to civil as weJl as criminal liability, and .the bank, its shareholders, or
other persons who have sustained damages may recover damages, including
punitive damages, from the officer.13
The Comptroller of the Currency has issued guidelines to assist officials of
financial institutions in complying with the bribery laws. N The guidelines
encourage national banks to adopt codes of conduct for their employees. The
comptroller believes "the legislative history ofthe 1985 Allt makes clear that the
guidelines would be relevant to, but not dispositive of any ... decision by the
Department of Justice to initiate prosecution under the Act:'" The guidelines
are intended to permit national banks to identify specific situations in which a
bank officer may appropriately accept something of value, and also to permit
"case-by-ease" review by the bank of other situations through a written disclo-
sure procedure. The comptroller stresses that "bank officials cannot avoid the
prohibitions of the 1985 Act by merely reporting to management the acceptance
of gifts."
The guidelines are as follows:
C. Guidelines for Compliance with the Federal Bank Bribery Law
The OCC encourages all national banks to adopt internal codes of
conduct or written policies or to amend their present codes of conduct to
include the provisions suggested in the guidelines. The guidelines relate

11 H.R. Rep. No. 335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cons. &
Admin. News 1782. 1787.
t2Id.
1'12 USC § 503 (1982); Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank. 477 F.
Supp. 717 (ED Va. 1979).
.. Comptroller of the Currency, Guidelines fOT Compliance with the Federal Bribery
Law, 52 Fed. Res. 46.046-46,048 (1987).
II Id. at 46.046.
12-21 TRANSACTIONS REGULATION 1112.02[11

only to the federal bank bribery law ("1985 Act") and do not address other
areas ofconduct that a national bank may find advisable to cover in its code
ofconduct. A national bank's code ofconduct or policies should be designed
to alert bank officials about the 1985 Act, as well as to establish and enforce
written policies on acceptable business practices. Consistent with the intent
ofthe 1985 Act to proscribe corrupt activities within fmancial institutions,
the bank's code of conduct should prohibit any employees, officers, direc-
tors, agents or attorneys of a national bank from: (1) soliciting for them-
selves or for a third party (other than the bank itself) anything of value from
anyone in return for any business, service or confidential information ofthe
bank and (2) accepting anything ofvalue (other than bona fide salary, wages,
fees or other compensation in the usual course of business referred to in the
1985 Act at 18 USC 215(c» from anyone in connection with the business of
the bank, either before or after the transaction is discussed or
consummated.
In its code ofconduct. a national bank may, however, specify appropri-
ate exceptions to the general prohibition of accepting something ofvalue in
connection with bank business. There are a number of instances where a
bank official, without risk of corruption or breach of trust, may accept
something of value from someone doing or seeking to do business with the
bank. The most common examples are the business luncheon or the holiday
season gift from a customer. In general, there is no threat of a violation of
the statute if the acceptance is based on a family or personal relationship
existing independent of any business of the institution; if the benefit is
available to the general public under the same conditions on which it is
available to the bank official; or ifthe benefit would be paid for by the bank
as a reasonable business expense if not paid for by another party.
Other exceptions to the general prohibition regarding acceptance of
things of value in connection with bank business may include:
(a) acceptance ofgifts, gratuities, amenities or favors based on obvious
family or personal relationships (such as those with the parents, children
or spouse ofa bank official) when the circumstances make it clear that it is
those relationships, rather than the business ofthe bank concerned, which
are the motivating factors;
(b) acceptance of meals, refreshments, travel arrangements or accom- .
modations, or entertainment, all of reasonable value, in the course of a
meeting or other occasion, the purpose of which is to hold bona fide
business discussions or to foster better business relations, provided that
the expense would be paid for by the bank as a reasonable business
expense if not paid for by another party (the bank may establish a specific
dollar limit for such occasions);
(c) acceptance of loans from other banks or financial institutions on
customary terms to finance proper and usual activities of bank officials,
such as home mortgage loans, except where prohibited by law;
(d) acceptance of advertising or promotional material 'of reasonable
value such as pens, pencils, note pads, key chains, calendars and similar
items;
1111.61(1) OVERVIEW 12-22

(e) acceptance of discounts or rebates on merchandise or services that

do not exceed those available to other customers;
(f) acceptance of gifts of reasonable value related to commonly recog-
nized events or occasions, such as a promotion, new job, wedding, retire-
ment, Christmas or bar or bat mitzvah (the bank may establish a specific
dollar limit for such occasions); or
(g) acceptance of civic, charitable, educational, or religious organiza-
tional awards for recognition ofservice and accomplishment (the bank
may establish a specific dollar limit for such occasions).
By adopting a code of conduct with appropriate allowances for such
circumstances, a national bank recognizes that acceptance of certain bene-
fits by its officials does not amount to a corrupting influence on the bank's
transactions. The policy or code may also provide that, on a case-by-case
basis, a national bank may approve of other circumstances, not identified
above, in which a bank official accepts something of value in connection
with bank business; provided that such'approval is made in writing on the
basis of a fuU written disclosure of all relevant facts and is consistent with
the bank bribery statute.
In issuing guidance under the statute in the area of business purpose
entertainment or gifts, the oee is not establishing rules abC!ut what is
reasonable or normal in flXed doUar terms. What is reasonable in one part of
the country may appear lavish in another pan of the country. A national
bank should seek to embody the highest ethical standards in its code of
conduct. In doing this, a national bank may establish in its own code of
conduct a range of dollar values which cover the various benefits that its
officials may receive from those doing or seeking to do business with the
bank.
The code of conduct should provide that, if a bank official is offered, or
receives something ofvalue beyond what is authorized in the bank's code of
conduct or written policy. the official should disclose that fact to an appro-
pri~tely designated official of the bank. The national bank should keep
contemporaneous written reports ofsuch disclosures. An effective reporting
and reviewing mechanism should serve to prevent situations that might
otherwise lead to implications of corrupt intent or breach of trust and
should enable the bank to better protect itselffrom self-dealing. However, a
bank official's full disclosure evidences good failh when such disclosure is
made in the context of properly exercised supervision and control. Manage-
ment should review the disclosures and determine that what has been
accepted is reasonable and does not pose a threat to the integrity of the
national bank. Thus, individuals cannot avoid the prohibitions of the bank
bribery statute by simply reporting to management the acceptance of vari-
ous gifts.
The ace recognizes that a serious threat to the integrity of a national
bank occurs when its officials become involved in outside business interests
or employment that give rise to a conflict of interest. Such conflicts of
interest may evolve into corrupt transactions that are covered under the
1985 Act. Accordingly, national banks are encouraged to prohibit, in their
12-23 TRANSACfIONS REGUIATION 'I[ 12.02[21

codes of conduct or policies, their officials from self-dealing or otherwise

trading on their positions with the bank or accepting from someone doing or
seeking to do business with the bank a business opportunity not available to
other persons or that is made available because ofthe official's position with
the bank. In this regard, a national bank's code ofconduct or policy should
require that its officials disclose all potential conflicts ofinterest, including
those in which they have been inadvertently placed because of business or
personal relationships with customers, suppliers, business associates or
competitors of the bank. II

(2) Misapplication of Funds

Any officer, director, agent, employee, or other person connected in any
capacity with any bank whose funds are insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, which person "embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully
misapplies" any bank. funds (including assets entrusted to the bank's custody),
shall be fined up to $5,000 or imprisoned up to five years or both.t7 The purpose
of this statute is to preserve and protect the assets of any bank having a federal
relationship, that is, any bank that is a member ofthe Federal Reserve System or
whose deposits are federally insured. II To prosecute a violation of 18 USC § 656
(1982) successfully, four essential elements must be proven: (1) that the accused
was an officer, director, agent, or employee of, or otherwise connected with, a
bank; (2) that the bank was federally insured; (3) that the accused willfully
misapplied money or funds of said bank; and (4) that the accused acted with
intent to injure or defraud the bank."

IIId. at 46,048-46,049.
"18 USC § 656 (1982). If the amount embezzled. abstracted, purloined, ormisap-
plied is less than 5100, the penalty cannot exceed SI ,000 or one year in jail or both. Id. See
also Annotation, "Bank Officers' or Employees' Misapplication of Funds as State Crimi-
nal Offense," 34 ALR 4th 547 (1984).
II Garrett v. United States, 396 F2d 489 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 339 US 952 (1968).
"United States v. Mann, 517 F2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 US 1087
(1976); United States v. Landers, 576 F2d 94 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Annot., "Who Is
'Officer, Director, Agent, or Employee' of Bank, or Is 'Connected in Any Capacity' With
Bank and Therefore Subject to Prosecution and Punishment For Misapplication of Bank
Funds Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 656," 57 ALR Fed. 537 (1982); Annotation, "What Consti·
tutes Willful Misapplication of Bank Funds by Bank Officer or Employee in Violation of
18 U.S.C.S. § 656," 51 ALR Fed. 420 {I981}; Note, "Criminal Prosecution of Bank
Personnel Under The Misapplication Statute: The Proper Mens Rea Standard For Estab-
lishing Inlent," 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1397-1419(1984). Although the language ofSection 656
does not specifically include an intent requirement, as did its predecessor (former 12 USC
§ 592), couns have stated that the Revisor's Notes following SeQion 656 clearly indicate
that elimination of such a showing was not intended. S~, e.g., United States v. Beattie,
594 F2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979).
11 12.02(2) OVERVIEW 12-24

The statute docs not require that an accused be actina in an "official

capacity" as an officer or director when funds are misapplied.'oo To fall within
the list of persons so prescribed, it is enough that an accused be connected in
some capacity with a bank, which connection enables that person to gain access
to bank funds. ,., This language reaches beyond those persons who because of
their status as bank officers, directors. agents, or employees fall within the literal
dictates ofthe statute. and includes such nonbank personnel as the proofdepart-
ment manaaer ofa service corporation employed to handle the bookkeeping ofa
federally insured bank'02 and the controlling stockholder ofa national bank who
had been active in bank affairs. ,OJ
Persons not within the statutory language of Section 656 may nevertheless
be charged with aiding and abetting one who is.'" To sustain a conviction, it
must be shown that the alleged aider and abettor encouraged or panicipated in
the principal's commission ofthe crime and that the principal is in fact guilty.'tII
It is not necessary for purposes ofSeetion' 656 that the willful misapplica-
tion of funds results in an actual loss to the bank;'" the offense is complete
immediately upon the act of misapplication with intent to injure or defraud. '07
Indeed, Section 656 may be violated even in instances where the bank involved
actually benefits from the misuse of its funds.'01 Injury to the bank is limited to

lDOUnited States v. Dreitzler, 577 F2d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 1978), cen. denied. 440 US
921 (1979). Contra, Golden v. United States, 318 F2d 357 (bt Cir. 1963).
10' United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F2d at 547.
' 02 United States v. Edick. 432 F2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970).
'Ill Garrett v. United States, 396 F2d 489 (5th Cir.), em. denied, 339 US 952 (1968).

'0' United States v. Tokoph, 514 F2d 597 (10th Cir. 1975).
lOS Id. at 603. In United States v. Anderson, 709 F2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983). the coun
held that the government, in order to establish an aidin& and abetting violation, must
show that (I) a bank employee misapplied bank funds and (2) that the defendant chal'Jed
with aiding and abetting knew of the bank employee's offense and acted with the intent to
further it.
''''' United States v. Tokoph, 514 F2d at 603; United Slates v. Scheper, 520 F2d 1355
(41h Cir. 1975); United States v. Landers, 576 F2d 94 (5th Cir. 1978). A person cannot be
convicted ofviolating 18 USC § 656 on misapplication of bank funds by an officer ofthe
bank when the funds consist of worthless instruments. Thus, the defendant could not be
found in violation for his handling of a check on which the drawer had good defenses and
the bank could not claim status as a holder in due course. United States v. Kellerman. 729
F2d 281 (4th Cir. 1984).
'07 "[Mjisapplication may be found where it is shown that a bank is deprived of its
right to have custody of its funds, that is, its right to make its own decisions as to how the
funds are used." United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F2d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1978), cen. denied,
440 US 921 (1979). See also United States v. Duncan, 598 F2d 839 (4th Cir.), cen. denied,
444 US 871 (1979).
10& United States v. Caldwell, 544 F2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976).
12·25 TRANSACTIONS REGUlATION 1112.02[21

those losses that are pecuniary in nature, and does not include damage to
reputation. ' r.!l
Intent to "injure or defraud" does not require a showing that an accused
affirmatively intended to injure or defraud a bank; proof that the defendant
acted knowingly and that the natural tendency ofsuch actions might cause injury
to the bank is sufficient, regardless of improper motive. "0 There is a split of
authority on whether conduct amounting to reckless disregard of the bank's
interests, as distinguished from mere indiscretion or foolhardiness, is sufficient
to fulfill the intent requirement of Section 656."1
For instances in which the actions ofan accused either are specifically made
illegal by statute (e.g., theft of bank funds) or are made illegal only when
committed with intent to injure or defraud (e.g., an officer making a loan to a
corporation while knowing that the corporation is a sham), approval of such
actions by the bank's board ofdirectors is no defense to the crime ofmisapplica·
tion, as the board has no authority to approve ofa crime offraud on the bank. 111
Similarly, neither is subsequent repayment ofthe funds to the bank a defense. 1II
Examples of conduct held to violate Section 656 are readily found in
circumstances involving the granting ofloans. Included are instances in which a
bank officer secures a loan for himself or herself'" or for a third party l15 by

'01 "While damage to a bank's reputation may eventually result in some deterioration
in the bank's financial condition, such loss would be too indirect and speculative and we
decline to construe the statute as comprehending it." United States v. Arthur, 544 F2d
730, 736 (4th Cir. 1976).
UOUnited States v. Killian, 541 F2d : 156 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schoen·
hut, 576 F2d 1010 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 964 (1978). There is an excellent
analysis ofthe intent requirement in Berger, "Criminal Liability of Bank Directors," 30
Am. J. Compo L. 537 (1982).
,,, Giragosian v. United States, 349 F2d 166 (1st CiT. 1965); United States v. Schoen·
hut, 576 F2d at 1024; United States v. Welliver, 601 F2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979). See United
States v. Adamson, 665 F2d 649 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court, though finding that
reckless disregard was, for purposes of Section 656, the equivalent of "intent to injure or
defraud," did so only with "considerable unease." United States v. Adamson, 665 F2d at
656. In a later proceeding in United States v. Adamson, 700 F2d 953 (5th Cir.), cen.
denied, 464 US 833 (1983), the coun expressly overruled Welliver and held that proof of
knowledge rather than reckless disregard was required under Section 656.
m United States v. Beran, 546 F2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1976), cen. denied, 430 US 916
(1977); Mulloney v. United States, 79 F2d 566 (ISt Cir.), cen. denied, 296 US 658 (1935),
mUnited States v. Beran, 546 F2d at 1321; United Statt'S v. Acree, 466 F2d 1114
(10th Cir. 1972), cen. denied, 410 US 913 (1973). See also Dodgev. United States, 74 F2d
267 (9th Cir. 1934), where the leavingofa promissory note by defendant in the account of
a depositor from which funds were unlawfully withdra....n was held no defense.
, .. United States V. Krepps, 60S F2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979).
". United States v. Kennedy, 564 F2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 435 US 944
(1978). In United States v. Shively, 715 F2d 260 (7th Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 465 US
1007 (1984), the coun said "it has been held to be a misapplication per se for a bank
 1112.02[21 OVERVIEW 12·26

lending money to a nominal borrower who then transfers the funds to the
intended beneficiary, even when the nominal borrower is financially able to
repay the loan and is fully aware ofthe legal responsibility to do so. Also included
are cases in which an officer approves loans in excess ofeither the officer's credit
authority11l or the customers' maximum borrowing limit"7 without the approval
of other bank officers. Officers who grant loans without obtaining sufficient
colJateralll ' or without securing a binding obligation for repayment,l1' and who
subsequently attempt to cover up the transaction, have also been successfully
prosecuted.
Other examples ofconduct held to violate Section 656'10 include the use of
cashier's checks without requiring payment of security, '2' the honoring ofover-
drafts,·1t participation in check-kiting schemes,·n the use of interbank deposits
to secure preferential treatment on personal loans, .u the payment of bribes, .21
and the use of bank funds for payment of personal expenses.· 21

. officer or employee to funnel funds to himselfby making a bank loan to a third party." See
also United States v. Steffen, 641 F2d 591 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 US 943 (1981).
• 11 United States v. Hoclaidae, 573 F2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 821
(1978); United States v. Riebold, 557 F2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US 860
(\977).
111 United State'> v. Schmidt, 471 F2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1972).
11' United States v. Moraite., 456 F2d 435 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US 891 (1972).
111 United States v. Welliver, 601 F2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979).
t20 See Annol., "What Constitutes Willful Misapplication of Bank Funds by Bank
Officer or Employee in Violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 656," supra note 99•
•2t United States v. Reynolds, 573 F2d 242 (5th Cir. 1978).
t2J United States v. Bevans, 496 F2d 494 (8th Cir. 1974); Swingle v. United States,
389 F2d 220 (10th Cir.), cen. denied, 392 US 928 (1968).
•n United States v. Giordano, 489 F2d 327 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Duncan,
598 F2d 839 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 US 871 (1979) (checks held in bookkeeping
department for substantial period. of time and not debited to officer's [account] found to
be misapplication even though officer had sufficient funds at bank to cover undebited
checks). In Williams v. United States, 458 US 279 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a
check kiting scheme did not violate the "false statements" statute, 18 USC § 1014 (1976).
This resolved a conflict between the circuits on the question. Compare United States v.
Williams. 639 F2d 13 II (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 458 US 279 (1982), with United States v.
Sher, 657 F2d 28 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 US 1121 (1982). The petitioner in
Wi/liams also was convicted of misapplication of bank funds under 18 USC § 656 (1976),
but the Supreme Court did not review that conviction. Williams v. United StatC'>, 458 US
at 281 n.2. The Williams decision is discussed in 11 12.0213).
,.. United States v. Brookshire, 514 F2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975); United State& v.
Larson, 581 F2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978).
tlIUnited Stales v. Arthur, 544 F2d 730 (41h Cir. 1976).
"'United Slates v. Gordon, 410 F2d 1121 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 396 US 938
(1969); United States v. Bevans, 496 F2d 494 (81h Cir. 1974).
12-27 TRANSACTIONS REGULAnON 1112.02(3]

Officers, agents, or employees of any savings and loan association, credit

union, or other institution whose accounts are insured either by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, by the administrator of the National
Credit Union Administration, or by any small business investment company127
are also prohibited from embezzling, abstracting, or willfully misapplying the
funds oftheir institution. 1" Violators may be fmed up to $5,000 and imprisoned
for no more than five years. 121

[3] False Entries

18 USC § 1005 was enacted to proscribe criminal conduct outside the reach
of the willful misapplication language of Section 656. 1• Structurally, Section
1005 is divided into three paragraphs, each one stating a separate and distinct
crime. 121 These are (I) the unauthorized issuance or circulation ofbank notes by
an officer, director, agent, or employee of any bank whose deposits are insured
by the FDIC; (2) the unauthorized creation, issuance, or assignment of any bank
obligation (including certificates of deposit, drafts, orders, bills of exchange,
acceptances, notes, debentures, and bonds), mortgage, judgment or decree; and
(3) the making of any false entry in "any book, report or statement" by any
person with intent to injure or defraud such bank, its officers, or examiners.
Punishment may not exceed $5,000 or five years' imprisonment, or both. l22
By their terms, the first two paragraphs ofthe section do not literally require
proof that the accused intended to injure or defraud the bank. However, the
courts that have specifically addressed the issue ofwhether such intent should be
required have split on the question. The Fifth Circuit has ruled that the statute
itself is too plain on its face to require judicial construction. 1u The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, drawing support from the reviser's notes to both
Sections 656 and 1005, has concluded that Congress did not intend to delete the

'27 Officers, agents, and employees of any bank within the Farm Credit System, as
well as those of several Federal allencies, are also included in the statute. 18 USC § 657
(1982).
121
18 USC § 657 (1982).
mId. Ifthe amount involved is less than $100, a fine of up to $1,000 and imprison-
ment for up to one year will be imposed. Id.
'3<1 United States v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335 (DN! 1978) afl'd mem., 605 F2d 1198
(3d Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 444 US 1032 (1980). Sections 656, 334, and 1005 all have
their congressional roots in former 12 USC § 592, which was subdivided into its present
form in 1948 mainly for purposes of clarification. 18 USC § 656 Note (1982).
131 Harrison v. United States, 279 F2d 19, 23 (5th CiT.), cert. denied. 364 US 864
(1960).
132 18 USC § 1005 (1982). For civil liability, see 12 USC § 503 (1982).
132 Harrison, 219 F2d 19,23. In United States Y. Tidwell, 559 F2d 262 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 US 942 (1978), the court specifically declined to overrule the Harrison
decision.
1112.02[3] OVERVIEW 12-28

intent requirement from the flrst and second paragraphs. ,:14 The Supreme Court
has yet to hear the issue.
The m~ority of cases under Section 1005 have dealt with the false entry
paragraph (Paragraph 3). This paragraph is not limited to a defmed class of
persons, as is Paragraph I, but applies to any person who has access to bank
records or who otherwise causes their falsification. 1M The requisite intent to
injure or defraud may be proven by establishing that the natural tendency of the
accused's knowledge and voluntary actions may have been to injure the bank. 1M
Sucl1 intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction
and the nature of the accused's conduct. 1l7 Where a mere clerical mistake is
involved'" or where the accused, without knowledlle, verifies a report contain-
ing a false entry made by another,m no violation has occurred, as the requisite
intent is lacking. Further, it is not necessary that the accused personally write the
false entry, I'or that the accused specifically direct another to insert false infor-
mation; it is enough that the accused set into motion actions that necessarily
result in the making of a faIse entry in the normal course of business. '00 Such
entries may be the result of either an actual misstatement or an omission of
material information. t4t It is not an offense under the statute to make an entry
that correctly reflects a transaction, even where the transaction is part of a
fraudulent or otherwise illegal scheme. 142

':14 United States v. Pollack, 503 F2d 87,90-92 (9th Cir. 1974).
t31Edick v. United States, 432 F2d 350, 352 (4th Cit. 1970).
'M United States v. Southers, 583 F2d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir. 1978). In contrast to
Section 656 (see' 12.02[2]), a mere findina of recklessness would not in itself suffice to
establish the element ofintent required for § 1005. United States v. Adamson, 700 F2d
953, Cerl. denied, 464 US 833 (l983). United States v. McAnally, 666 F2d 1116 (7th Cir.
1981).
137 United States v. Adamson, 700 F2d 953, cen. denied, 464 US 833 {I 983); United
States v. Bevans, 496 F2d 494 (8th Cir. 1974).
131 United States v. Allen, 47 F 696 (D. III. 1880).

131 United States v. Herrig, 204 F 124 (D. Mont. 1913); United States v. Booker, 98 F
291 (DND 1899); contra AIl~II, 47 Fat 699. See Cochran v. United States, 157 US 286
(1895) where willful ignorance or gross negligence by one verifying a repon would serve to
fulfill the intent requirements. See also Annotation, 81 L. Ed. 498 (1937).
140 United States v. Giles, 300 US 41 (1937); United States v. Krepps, 605 F2d 101
(3d Cir. \919). See Morse v. United States, 114 F 539 (2d CiT.), cen. denied, 215 US 605
(1909), where a bank vice-president who supplied false information on slips ofpaper later
copied in routine course of business was found guilty of false entry.
'" United States v. Krepps, 605 F2d 101 (3d Cir. J 979) (bank officer's failure to
reveal himself as the beneficiary of several loans made to other parties wa·s held to violate
§ 1005. even though the named debtors were financially capable of repaying the loans).
'0 United States v. F.rickson, 601 F2d 296 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 444 US 979 (1979).
12-29 TRANSACI10NS REGUlATION 1112.02(3)

The language "any book, report or statement" is not limited to a bank's

formal fmancial accounting records or journals"3 or to those reports that arc
required to be made by law,'" but it is broad enough to cover any document or
record of a bank that would reveal pertinent information for its officers or
directors. l41 Thus, information recorded in loan files, loan applications, I" min-
utcs of board meetings, m and interoffice memos'" falls within the ambit of
Section 1005. As the statute prohibits making false entrics, not false reports,
each false entry constitutes a separate and distinct crime, even though several
may be made in the same statement or report.'·
Examples of conduct held violative of Section 1005 include the making of
false entries in reports to the Comptroller of the Currency,lSO the FDIC,'" and
Federal Reserve banks, '52 and in bank statements and records, for the purpose of
deceiving bank officers and examiners.'13 The withholding ofdeposit slips from
a bank's bookkeeping department, causing false balances to be recorded in
ledgers ofthe bank, was found to constitute a false entry,'14 as was the conduct of
an officer who directed the withholding of checks drawn on insufficient funds,
thereby concealing their status as overdrafts and allowing the officer to omit
reporting them to the bank's board of directors.,n
As Section 656 has its counterpart for institutions insured by the FSLIC, so
does Section 1005. Section 1006, an amalgam ofeleven prior sections scattered
throughout the U.S. Code,'" makes it a criminal violation for any officer, agent,
or employee of any institution insured by the FSLIC or the National Credit
Union Administration, with intent to defraud, to draw any order or bill of

"3United States v. Foster, 566 F2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 US 917
(1978).
'"Harper v. United States, 170 F 385 (8th Cir. 1909).
'45 Foster, 566 F2d at 1052.
'''See United States v. Docherty, 468 F2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1972).
47
' Lewis v. United States, 22 F2d 760 (8th Cir. 1927), aird, 279 US 63 (1929);
United States v. StetTen, 641 F2d 591 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 US 943 (1981).
'''United States v. Kennedy, 564 F2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 US 944
(1978).
'4' Bower v. United States, 296 F 694 (9th Cir.), cen. denied, 266 US 601 (1924).
'SO Phillips v. United States, 201 F 259 (8th Cir. 1912); United States v. Reece, 280 F
913 (D. Idaho 1922).
'"I Crenshaw v. United States, 116 F2d 737 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 US 703
(1941), cen. dismissed per stipulation, 314 US 702 (1941).
'52 Hiatt v. United States, 4 F2d 374 (7th Cir. 1924), cen. denied, 268 US 704 (1925).
'53 United States v. Stokes, 471 F2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mayr, 487
F2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 417 US 914 (1974).
114 United States v. Giles, 300 US 41 (1937).
155 United States v. Bevans, 496 F2d 494 (8th Cir. 1974).
lliSee 18 USC § 1006 Notes.
1l12.02PI OVERVIEW 12-30

exchange or issue any note, debenture, bond, or other obligation without proper
authority. or make any false entry in any book, report. or statement.
This section further contains a conflict of interest provision whereby
officers, agents, and employees are prohibited from receiving, either directly or
indirectly and with intent to defraud, any profit or benefit from any transaction
entered into by the institution. Typical of such conduct would be an officer's
willful failure to disclose a common business interest between the officer and a
loan applicant where the proceeds of such loan are used to further the common
business venture.1I1 Penalties of up to S10,000 and five years' imprisonment are .
provided.'· Section 1014 makes it a federal offense for anyone to make any false
statement or report knowingly, or to willfully overvalue any property, for the
"purposes ofinfluencing in any way" the action ofa federally insured institution
with regard to a loan, application, or other financial transaction.'11 It is not
necessary that the false statement be an application in and of itself'lO or that it
appear in a formal application.· 11 Further, the statute is not limited by its
language to written statements, but covers those made orally as weD. 'II .
In Williams 11. United States,'" the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case described
as a classic check-kiting situation, concluded that 18 USC § 1014 did not apply to
petitioner's scheme of writing checks drawn on insufficient fund!. The majority
ofthe Court, in a split decision, reasoned that passing a check drawn on insuffi-
cient funds did not constitute the making of a false statement under Section
1014 because "a check is not a factual assertion at alI, and therefore cannot be
characterized as 'true' or 'false.""" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a
check is an order to the drawee to pay, which carries the obligation ofthe drawer
to pay the amount of the check on dishonor and notice of dishonor.'" For

157 See, e.g., United Stat~ v. Hykel, 461 F2d 721 (3d Cir. 1972), where asavings and
loan officer concealed his interest in a mortgage loan made to his coventurers; the loan
enabled the coventurers to purchase propeny upon which the success of the venture
depended.
• 51 18 USC § 1006 (1982).
'5' See Annot., "Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1014 and
Similar Predecessor Statutes Making it Federal Offense to Malee False Statement or
Repon, or, 10 Overvalue Property, for Purpose of Influencing Action of Federal or
Federal-Affiliated lending Institutions or Agencies," 16 ALR Fed. 325 (1973).
110 United States v. Zwego, 657 F2d 248 (10th Cir, 1981) cert. denied, 455 US 919
(1982). Signing a promissory note which contains a statement that the purpose of the loan
was "business expense and marketing operation" when the signer knew that statement
was false constitutes the making of a false statement within the meaning of the statute.
United States v. Shively, 715 F2d 260 (7th Cir. 1983), 465 US 1007 (1984).
'"' Zwego, 657 F2d at 250.
mId.; United States v, Sackett, 598 F2d 739 (2d Cir. 1979).
'1$ 458 US 279 (1982).

'I'ld. at 286.
1151d. at 285. See uec §§ 3-104, 3-413.
12-31 TRANSACI10NS REGULAnON 1112.02(3]

similar reasons, the Court concluded that the use of the checks to obtain credit
from the banks in which the checks were deposited did not amount to an
"overvaluing" of property or security, because "the value legally placed upon
them (the checks] was the value of petitioner's obligation," which literally was
equal to the face amount of the checks. '11 Conceding that the basis for its
decision was a technical one, the mlijority supported its view on the grounds that
Congress could not have intended to enact a national bad check law. 181
As the focus of Section 1014 is on the accused's intent (i.e., on whether the
false statement was made for the purpose ofinfluencing the actions ofan insured
bank) and not on the statement's impact, it is of no consequence whether the
false statement actually influenced the bank in any of its decisions. 1M Those
convicted are subject to fmes of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to two
years. 111 Accordingly, it would seem that there is some overlap between Sections
1014 and 1005, as both prohibit the making offalse statements by any person,
regardless of bank affiliation. Case law shows that both officers and nonofficers

111458 US at 285-86.
111 Id. at 287. A person who forges documents in order to obtain paymentfrom a bank
under a letter of credit is guilty ofmaking false statements in violation of 18 USC § 1014.
Unlike the Williams case, forgery of documents to show delivery of goods that, in fact,
were never delivered constituted a misrepresentation. United States v. Tuclcer, 773 F2d
136 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986). Williams also was distinguished
in United States v. Worthington, 822 F2d 315 (2d Cir. 1987), where the coun held thata
check drawn on a fictitious bank account could be a false statement for purposes of 18
USC § 1001. For additional cases interpreting the false statements statute, see United
States v. Price, 763 F2d 640 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Davis, 730 F2d 669 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Shaid, 730 F2d,225 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 469 US 844
(1984).
lHUnited States v. Philips, 606 F2d 884 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 US 1024
(1980); United States v. Johnson, 585 F2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant convicted under
Section 1014 even though the institution, by participating in scheme alons with defend-
ant, knew ofthe statement's falsity and was therefore not influenced by it). See also United
States v. Baity, 489 F2d 256 (5th Cir. 1973), where defendant who submitted a false
financial statement only after the loan was made was found guilty of violating § 1014. As
to whether the statement must be "material," compare Cnited States v. Kernodle, 367 F.
Supp. 844 (MDNC 1973) (no requirement), with United States v. Henderson, 645 F2d
569 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 454 US 850 (1981). "Actual reliance by the savings and loan
on a defendant's false statements is not necessary for a conviction under Section 1014. It is
enough that the statement has the capacity of influencina the savings and loan." United
States v. Glassey, 715 F2d 352, 353 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 464 US 1032 (1983). See
also United States v. Braverman, 522 F2d 218, 223 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 423 US 985
(1975).
169 18 USC § 1014 (1982). For civil liability see 12 USC § 503 (19~2).
Section 1014 has been applied to conspiracies to commit bank fraud by submitting
false credit card slips for collection. United States v. DeBiasi, 712 F2d 785 (2d Cir.), cen.
denied. 464 US 962 (1983).
11 12.02(4l OVERVIEW 12-32

have been prosecuted under each for substantially similar conduct. 170 However,
Section 1014 seems to be directed at officers, directors, and employees only
when they aid and abet others in the falsification ofloan or credit applications,171
or when they apply for loans from other financial institutions on behalf of their
own banlcs. 172
While the prohibitions of Section 1014 are intended to protect federally
insured financial institutions, those of 18 USC §§ 1007 and 1008 are directed at
protecting the insuring institutions themselves. Sections 1007 and 1008 prohibit
the making of any knowingly false statements to the FDIC and PSUC, respec-
tively, for the purpose of "influencing in any way" the actions of the respective
corporation. Violations of either statute are punishable by a fine of not more
than $5,000 and up to two years in jail. 17S
Under Section 493, it is also a violation of federal law for any bank
employee to pass or to attempt to pass what the employee knows to be a false,
forged, counterfeited, or altered note, instrument, or document. 174 The statute
further outlaws the act of forging, counterfeiting, or altering notes, obligations,
or instruments in imitation of those issued by savings and loan associations,
credit unions, and various government agencies and corporations. 17s Violators
are subject to fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or both. 17s

(4) Other Federal Criminal Offenses

Under 12 USC § 92a, the Comptroller of the Currency may grant national
banks the right to exercise the same fiduciary powers allowed state banks under
the laws of the state in which the national bank is located. These powers include
acting as trustees, executors, administrators, assignees, receivers, and guardians
of estates. 177 It is a federal offense for any bank officer, director, or employee to
make or receive a loan utilizing any funds held in trust under one of the above

170 For ex:ample, cf. United States v. Kernodle, 367 F. Supp. 844 (MDNC 1973)
(officers of bank were indicted under Section 10 14 for misrepresenting financial status of
loan applicant on a financial statement), with United States v. Docherty, 468 F2d 989 (an
individual borrower was indicted under Section 1005 for making a false entry on a loan
application).
171 See United States v. GritTen, 579 F2d 1104 (8th Cir.), cen. denied, 439 US 981
(1978); United States v. Kramer, 500 F2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
172 United Slales v. Gleason, 616 F2d 2 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. denied, 444 US 1082,
een. denied, 445 US 931 (1980) (two separate appeals).
173
18 USC §§ 1007, 1008 (1982).
". 18 USC § 493 (1982).
'15 Id.
"Old.
177 12 USC § 92a(a) (1982).
12-33 TRANSAcrIONS REGULATION 11 12.02[4J

powers. l7I Violators are subject to fmes of not more than $5,000, imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both,.,n
Any insured bank that is in default on any assessment due to the FDIC is
prohibited from paying any dividends on its capital stock or interest on its
capital notes or debentures while it remains in default. '10 The officers or direc-
tors who participate in the making ofsuch payments can be fmed up to $1,000 or
imprisoned for up to one year, or both.'" .
Under authority ofthe National Banking Act,"2 national banks were enti-
tled to issue circulating notes upon depositing with the Treasurer of the United
States certain bonds of the United States. 'U These circulating notes constituted
part of the national currency, and they continue to be recognized by law as legal
tender for all debts, taxes, duties, and dues.'M National banks no longer issue
circulating notes, but much of the legislation relating to them remains on the
statute books, including 18 USC § 334, which provides that any officer of a
national bank who countersigns or delivers any circulating note except in strict
accordance with the National Banking Act, as amended, shall be fmed not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'11
In the event that a national emergency is proclaimed by the president of the
United States, the Secretary ofthe Treasury (with the approval ofthe president)
is authorized to regulate, limit, or restrict the transaction of any banking busi·
ness by any member bank of the Federal Reserve.'· Any officer, director, or
employee of any member bank who transacts any business in violation of such
regulations is subject to a fine ofnot more than S10,000 and imprisonment for a
term not exceeding ten years. 'IT
Under 18 USC § 1004 it is unlawful for a bank officer or employee to certify
a check before the amount ofthat check has been regularly deposited in the bank
by the check's drawer. A fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to five

171 12 USC § 92a(h) (1982).

". Yd. ,For criminal statutes dealing with bankruptcy. trustees, etc., see 18 USC
§§ lSI-ISS (1982).
IIll 12 USC § 1828(b)(1982).

"' rd.
112 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified in scattered Sections of 12, 31
USC); 12 USC § 38 (1982).
"'12 USC §§ 101, lOla (1982).
,.. 31 USC § 5103 (1982). At the close of 1960 there were SSS million in national bank
notes still in circulation; however, when unfit for further circulation they are cancelled
and retired upon receipt at the United States Treasury. Mann, Encyclopedia of Banking
and Finance (rev. ed. Garcia 1962).
,". 18 USC § 334 {I 982).
'II 12 USC § 9S(a) (1982).

'"7 !d.
1112.02(41 OVERVIEW 12-34

years may be imposed.'u Although no intent to injure or defraud the bank is

required,'" the officer's certification must be done willfully and with actual
knowledge that the drawer has insufficient funds on deposit at the bank.'·
To avoid any likelihood of public confusion over government sponsorship
or association, 18 USC § 709 prohibits the misleading use by any person or
business entity ofany words or names, or tbeir combination, already in use by a
federal agency. For instance, unless permitted by federal law (e.g., the institution
receives a federal charter), the use of such words as "national," "federal,"
"United States," "reserve," and "Deposit Insurance" as part of a businClls name
is prohibited, as is the use ofthe names ofany ofthe governmental agencies, such
as the FDIC, the National Credit Union, or the Federal Home Loan bank.,., It is
also an offense to falsely advertise or represent that an entity is a member ofthe
Federal Reserve System, or that its deposits are insured by the FDIC, when such
is not in fact the case.'ft Any officer or member of any entity in violation ofthis
statute who participates or knowingly acquiesces in the use of such words or
names may be fined up to $1,000 and imprisoned for up to oneyear.'N
Under 2 USC § 441 b, it is unlawful for any national bank to make, or for any
officer or director ofany national bank to consent to the making of, a "contribu-
tion or expenditure" in connection with any election to any political office.'M
"Contributions or expenditures" have been defined to include any direct or
indirect payment, distribution, advance, deposit, gift of money, service, or loan,
although many loans made in accordance with applicable banking laws and in
the ordinary course of business are not prohibited.'" Upon a determination by

,•• 18 USC § 1004 (1982). Such actions may also subjectthe bank to a forfeiture of its
mem~rship in the Federal Reserve System. 12 USC §§ 331, SOl (1982).
'" United States v. Giordano, 489 F2d 327 (2d Cir. 1973).
,to Id. at 332 n.S.
'" 18 USC § 709 (1982 & Supp. III I985). See United States v. U.S.I.A. Homes, Inc.,
409 F. Supp. 483 (EDNY 1976), where the counenjoined the useofthe initials"U.S.1.A."
upon the government's contention that such use would tend to lead the public to believe
that the private corporation employing such initials was associated with the United States
Information Agency, although the use of such initials was not specifically prohibited by
Section 109.
m 18 USC § 709 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
mId.
'"'2 USC § 441b (1982).
'11$ 2 USC § 441 b(2} (1982). See Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance, 635 F2d I 132
(5th Cir.), cen. denied, 453 US 917 (198 I), where an FEC subpoena against Ben Lance for
production of documents. issued during an invcttiption ofSUSpec1ed violations of Sec-
tion 44 Jb involving extensions of credit by two national banks to the Ben Lance for
Governor Campaign Committee, was enforced by the Fifth Circuit en bane. The national
banks allegedly permitted the campaiiD committee repeatedly to overdraw its accounts to
pay campaign expenses and required no interest on these amounts upon repaymenL See
also 11 9.02, 13.02.
 TRANSACTIONS REGULATION '112.02(4)
12-35

the Federal Election Commission that a contribution or expenditure has been

knowingly and willfully made in violation ofSection 44lb, the commission may
refer the violation to the Department of Justice for criminal proceedings.1. If
the expenditure or contribution in the aggregate exceeds $2,000 during one
calendar year, the violator shall be fmed not more than $25,000 or 300 percent
of any contribution, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.•17
Title 18 Section 1009 punishes any willfully and knowingly made statement
or rumor that is both untrue and derogatory to the financial standing of the
FSLIC by imposing a fme ofnot more than $1 ,000 or imprisonment of not more
than one year, or both.••
The federal wire fraud statute (18 USC § 1343) has been applied to transac-
tions involving bank cards.1" This statute makes it an offense punishable by a
fine of not more than $1,000 or up to five years imprisonment, or both, to
transmit fraudulently "by means ofwire, radio or television communications in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of" carrying out a fraudulent scheme. This statute applies to
anyone who engages in such fraudulent activities, not just to bank officers and
employees, and obviously has a broad application to electronic funds transfers
and similar banking transactions involving computer links.
In a case involving a merchant who violated the statute in a bank card
scheme, the Second Circuit held that the offense stated by the statute only
required that the interstate communication be "reasonably foreseeable" by the
actor. The merchant did not have to personally initiate the interstate communi-
cation, nor even have actual knowledge ofit. In the court's view, it was reasona-
bly foreseeable that "when a defendant requests authorization with respect to a
card not issued by a local bank, an interstate computer check is likely to
follow."200
In BeJl v. United States,"'1 the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret
18 USC§ 2113(b) ofthe Bank Robbery Act, which makesita federal crime when
one "~akes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association." Petitioner managed to steal money from the bank
through false pretenses by altering an indorsement on a check that was not his

'"2 USC § 437g(aX5XC) (1982).

197 2 USC § 437g(d)(IXA) (1982).
'1118 USC § 1009 (1982).
'"18 USC § 1343 (1982). United States v. DeBiasi, 712 F2d 785 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 US 962 (1983). The case also involved conviction for fraudulent use ofcredit
cards under 15 USC § 1644(a), and conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 USC
§ 1014.
200 United States v. Muni, 668 F2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1981).
"'1462 US 356 (1983).
1I12.02[4) OVERVIEW 12·36

own, depositing the check into his account at the bank, and then Closing the
account to withdraw the amount ofthe account. The Court held that the statllte
was not limited to common law larceny; it also coven the crime of obtaining
money 'under false pretenses. In rejecting the argument that Congress intended
to limit the scope ofthe act to the common law definition oflarceny, the Court
said, "We cannot believe that Congress wished to limit the scope ofthe amended
Act's coverage, and thus limit its remedial purpose, on the basis ofan arcane and
artificial distinction more suited to the social conditions of 18th century
England than the needs of 20th century America. "ICII

ICII Id. at 362.

 13
Bank Customer Privacy and
Other Bank Activities
Subject to Special Regulation
~ 13.0I Privacy for Financial Records of Bank Customers. . . ......... 13-1
[I) Rights to Privacy Under the U.S. Constitution. . ......... 13-2
[2] Right to Financial Privacy Act . . . • . . . . . . . . . . ......... 13-4
[a) Conditions of Disclosure 13-4
[b) Special Circumstances and Procedures 13-5
[c] Scope and Operation of Act .... 13·6
[d] Privacy Act of 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 13·8
[3] Privacy Rights Under Other Laws 13·9
'l! 13.02 Regulation of Political Activities " 13-11
11 13.03 Anticompetitive Conduct. " 13-12
[I] Antitrust Regulation '............... 13-12
[2] Unfair Trade Practices " 13-15
[3] Consolidations and Mergers " 13-16
[4) Change in Control " 13-19
'I 13.04 Local Credit Needs: The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 13-20

'l! 13.0] PRIVACY FOR FINANCIAL RECORDS OF BANK

CUSTOMERS
Banks must exercise caution in divulging records of the financial transac-
tions of their customers. The circumstances under which information may be
given to federal agencies is affected by federal statutes. Additionally, there are
state laws that affect the disclosure of information.' Furthermore, rights of

, See Nichols v, Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P2d 280 (Okla.. 1980); People v.
Muchmore, 92 Cal. App. 3d 32, 154 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1979) (upholding a state statute that
allowed police to obtain bank records without notifying the customer in advance). See

13·1
lIl3.GI[I) OVERVIEW 13-2

privacy may exist under state law doctrines or may flow from express or implied
contractual relationships.2

(I) Rights to Privacy Under the U.S. Constitution

The Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution establish a privacy right for banks and their
customers in California Bankers Association v. Shultz' and United States v.
Miller!
Shultz upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act. The act,
described in Chapter 12, requires banks to keep records of certain financial
transactions. The Court first held that no due process right of the bank was
violated by the requirement that the banks maintain records of transactions
involving their customers.' The Court further found that nothing in the record-
keeping requirements violated' any Fourth Amendment privacy right of the
banks, since the record-keeping provisions did not require that any information
be disclosed to the government.' The bank had no privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, because that privilege does not protect a corporation. The
depositor-customers of the bank could not claim a violation of their privilege
against self-incrimination as a result of the record-keeping requirements,
because the records involved were created by a third party-the bank-and not
by the customer.'
The constitutionality of the reporting requirements of the act was also
challenged in Shultz. The Court first upheld the constitutionality of the foreign
reporting requirements. Because of the special concern of Congress that foreign
currency transactions and financial institutions were being used to circumvent
the enforcement of the laws of the United States, the Court found the act to be
reasonable and consistent with the Fourth Amendment.' The Court also consid-
ered the domestic reporting requirements, concluding that there was no viola-
tion of any Fourth Amendment rights of the bank. Much of the information
required by the act to be kept was infonnation the bank already possessed or

generally Note, "Banking Disclosures, Financial Privacy and the Public Interest." 6 Ann.
Rev. Banking L. 391-411 (1987); Nicewander, "Financial Record Privacy-What Are
and What Should Be the Rights of the Customer of a Depositary Institution," 16 St.
Mary's U 601-637 (1985); Rasor, "Controlling Government Access to Personal Finan-
cial Records," 25 Washburn U 417-436 (1986).
2 See Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller. 44 Md. App. 335.408 A2d 758 (1979).
'416 US 21 (1974).
• 425 US 435 (1976).
$416 US at SO.
• Id. at 52.
7 Id. at 55.

• Id. at 63.
13·3 SPECIAL REGUATION 1f 13.01[11

would acquire in its own interests.' The Court did not find it appropriate to
decide whether the domestic reporting requirements violated any Fourth or
Fifth Amendment rights ofthe customer. 10 The Court also found it premature to
resolve whether any Fifth Amendment rights ofthe customers could be violated
by the foreign reporting requirements. 11
The constitutionality of disclosure of records pertaining to customer trans-
actions was faced by the Supreme Court in United States 11. Miller. 1I In Miller,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not give a bank customer a right
of privacy in records held by his bank. The United States had served subpoenas
upon Miller's bank ordering the production of records involving transactions
Miller had made. Without informing Miller, the bank produced the records.
Subsequently, Miller was indicted, and copies of checks obtained with the
subpoenas were used during the trial. Miller claimed that the procedures fol-
lowed by the government to obtain his records to establish a criminal charge
against him violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Miller further argued, and the lower court agreed, that the
subpoenas used to obtain the records were invalid. The Supreme Court held that
regardless of whether the subpoenas were validly issued, Miller had no privacy
right to the records held by the bank. As the Court said, "All of the documents
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only infor-
mation voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course ofbusiness... The Court also said, "The depositor takes the risk,
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government.utl Even though the information is given to the bank
on a promise ofconfidentiality, there is no privacy right protected by the Fourth
Amendment."

'Id. at 67.
,0Id. at 69, 75.
1t Id. at 72.
12
425 US 435 (1976).
"Id. at 442-443.
"Id. In a footnote, the Court suggested that a different case might be presented ifthe
bank had turned over the records in response to only an informal oral request rather than
the legal compulsion of a subpoena. Id. at 445 n. 7.
The Supreme Court held in 1984 that the target of an investigation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) was not entitled to notification when the SEC issued
subpoenas to third parties pursuant to an investigation of matters that could implicate the
target. In the course ofthat opinion, the Court said that the Financial Privacy Act granted
customers of banks and similar financial institutions certain rights to be notified that
would not otherwise exist as a matter of due process, or as a matter of general congres-
sional intent from the legislation dealing with the SEC. The Court noted that the Financial
Privacy Act carefully limits the circumstances under which persons are entitled to protec-
tion. The Court also concluded that there was no basis for an entitlement to notice as a
maller of general standards in conducting an administrative investigation using a sub-
'i 13.01(2)fa] OVERVIEW 13-4

.[2] Right to Financial Privacy Act

[a) Conditions of Disclosure. After the Miller decision, Congress moved to
limit the circumstances under which federal agencies may obtain financial
records. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978'1 limits federal agency
access to the financial records of customers of financial institutions. The act
applies to all financial institutions-banks, savings and loan associations, credit
card issuers, credit unions, consumer fmance agencies, and trust companies. The
financial institution may disclose information about its customers to the federal
agency only when one of the five following conditions has been satisfied:

1. The customer has authorized disclosure;

2. The records are disclosed in response to an administrative summons or
subpoena;
3. The records are disclosed in 1'C1lponse to a search warrant;
4. The records are disclosed in response to a judicial subpoena; or
5. The records are disclosed in response to a written request that follows the
procedure set forth in the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 1I
The act establishes specific procedures that the requesting agency must follow in
order to obtain information under any of the previously listed methods."
Advance notice must be given to the customer unless a delay of notice order is
granted upon application of the government authority or unless an emergency
exists. ,. The act also establishes a procedure by which the customer may chal-
lenge the request for the information."
The Right to Financial Privacy Act does not apply to the disclosure of
information under the following eleven circumstances: 2o

poena, because there would be administrative difficulties in administering such a notifi·

cation requirement, as there would be the danger that legitimate investigations would be
impeded by giving notice to persons who might have a motivation to thwart the investiga.
tion. SEC v. O'Brien, 467 US 735 (1984). See generally, McTaggert v. United States, 570
F. Supp. 547 (ED Mich. 1983).
15
12 USC §§ 3401-3422 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 12 USC § 3402 (1982).

17 12 USC §§ 3404-3408 (1982). A court has found that a customer is entitled to a

copy of the administrative subpoena issued for his records. Although proper notice is
given ofa subpoena, the customer is entitled to further notice of additional orat requests
for additional information. Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580 (ND Tex. 1981).
18 12 USC § 3409 (1982).
,. 12 USC § 3410 (1982). For cases raising issues of the legitimacy of the demand for
the information, see Donovan v. U.A. Local 38 Plumbers & Pipe Trades Pension Funds,
569 F. Supp. 1488 (NO Cal. 1983); Pennington v. Oono\'an, 574 F. Supp. 708 (SO Tex.
1983); United Slates v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1417 (SDNY 1983); Grafstrom v. SEC, 532
F. Supp. 1023 (SONY 1982); Hancock v. Marshall, 86 FRO 209 (DOC 1980).
20See 12 USC § 3413 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
13-5 SPECIAL REGUATION 1f 13.01[211b)

1. When the records disclosed are not identified as belonging to or derived

from the records of a particular customer;
2. When the disclosure is pursuant to examination or supervision by the
appropriate regulatory agency;
3. When the disclosure is authorized by the Internal Revenue Code;~l
4. When a federal statute otherwise requires the disclosure;
S. When the government agency has authority under the Federal Rules of
Civil or Criminal Procedure or comparable rules of other couns in
connection with litigation to which the government agency and the
customer are parties;22
6. When the disclosure is pursuant to the order of an administrative law
judge in a proceeding in which both the agency and the customer are
parties;
7. When the government agency is requesting for law enforcement pur-
poses only the name, address, account number, and type of account of
any customer or group ofcustomers associated with a financial transac-
tion or class of transactions or with a foreign country;
8. When the financial records are sought in connection with an investiga-
tion of the financial institution itself;
9. When the agency seeks the information in administering a government
loan or loan insurance program;
10. When the disclosure is in response to a subpoena or court order that is
part of a grand jury proceeding, and in such cases a court may order the
institution not to notify its customer ofthe subpoena or order in accord-
ance with procedures set in the act;~3
11. When the disclosure is of the customer's name and address to the
Treasury, the Social Security Administration, or the Railroad Retire-
ment Board for the purpose of administering the Social Security Act
and Railroad Retirement Act...
Disclosures made under the last four circumstances, items 8, 9, 10, and 11,
are subject to additional restrictions limiting the use of the information. 2s

[bl Special Circumstances and Procedures. There are special safeguards for
financial information about a customer obtained by a grand jury under a sub-

2' See United States v. MacKay, 608 F2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
2~ See Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Clement. 87 FRO 569 (D. Md. J980).
~3 J2 USC § 3413(i} (Supp. IV 1986).
~. 12 USC § 3413(k) (Supp. IV 1986). The financial institution is baJ;fed from redis-
closing the request and the information contained in it. Id.
~s 12 USC § 3413(h) (1982).
If 13.01[2J(c) OVERVIEW 13-6

poena to the institution.a The information may be used only for the specified
purposes of"considering whether to issue an indictment or presentment by that
grand jury, or ofprosecuting a crime for which that indictment or presentment is
issued, or for a purpose authorized by rule 6(e) ofthe Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; .... "27 If not so used, the records must be returned or destroyed. 'The
custody of the records must be controlled by the government. Further, the
records "shall be returned and actually presented to the grand jury." This clause
has sparked judicial consideration of to whom the institution may give the
records. 21
Additionally. there are special procedures for financial records obtained by
the Federal Bureau of Investiption (FBI) for counterintelligence purposeS. 21
The director ofthe FBI must certify in writing to the financial institution that the
records are sought for such a purpose and "that there are specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are
sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" as defined in the
Foreign IntelligenceSurvelllance-Act of 1978,1' ·The Attorney General ,of the
United States must establish guidelines for the use of such information, and the
Attorney General must report periodically to designated congressional bodies."
The financial institution may not disclose that the FBI either sought or obtained
the information. 32

Ie) Scope and Operadon of Act. The Right to Financial Privacy Act extends
only to records of those who qualify as "customers." Under the definitions, a
customer can only be an individual or a partnership offive or fewer individuals
and their authorized representatives. 33 The act also specifies that the financial
institution must be acting for such a person or providing a service or acting as a
fiduciary "in relation to an account maintained in the person's name .... "3' A

21
12 USC § 3420 (1982).
27 l;i USC § 3420(2) (1982). In United States v. Theron, 116 FRO 58 (D. Kan. 1987),
the coun authorized the bankruptcy trustee of a bankrupt corporation to obtain access to
financial records obtained by a grand jury of a bankrupt corporation and the individual
defendants who once controlled the corporation, so that the trustee in bankruptcy could
trace allegedly fraudulent transfer<> of the corporation. However, corporations are not
persons protected under the financial privacy acl.
2Iln In re Castiglione, 587 F. Supp. 1210 (ED Cal. 1984), the court said it was
improper to live the records to the agents who served the subpoena on the institution. But
a different view ofthe statute was expressed in United Stales v. Kington, 80 J F2d 733 (5th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. I g88 (1987); United Stales v. Residence Located at218
3d Street, 622 F. Supp. 908 (WD Wis. 1985).
21
12usq 3414{a)(5){Supp. IV 1986).
30 12 USC § 3414(a)(5)(A)(Supp. IV 1986).
3'12 USC §§ 3414(a)(5)(8), 3414(a)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
32 12 USC § 3414{a){5)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
3312 USC §§ 3401(4), 3401(5) (Supp. IV 1986).
34
12 USC § 3401(5)(Supp. IV 1986).
13-7 SPECIAL REGUATION 1I13.0112)[cl

corporation is not a customer protected by the act."

Amendments to the act in 1986 offer a limited immunity to information
that a financial institution reports regarding violations oflaw. But this immunity
is limited in its scope. It applies only to information that consists of"the name or
other identifying information concerning any individual or account involved in
and the nature ofany suspected illegal activity.,,'" The statute says, "Nothing in
this chapter shall preclude any financial institution, or any officer, ... or agent of
a financial institution, from notifying a Government authority that such institu-
tion, or officer, .•. or agent has information which may be relevant to a possible
violation of any statute or regulation. "07 As the statute uses the words "may be
relevant," there should be room for recognizing the need for reasonable discre-
tion by the institution in supplying information to authorities, although it is not
certain that a violation in fact has occurred. When the bank supplies the infor-
mation protected by the statute, it is immunized from liability under any state
statute, constitution, or other law or regulation.· 1
When records are obtained by a government agency under the act or as
"otherwise provided by law," the agency must pay the financial institution
assembling the records. 31 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem has the authority to establish the rates and conditions for payment.·o Fur·
ther, any agency or financial institution that violates the Right to Financial
Privacy Act is subject to a civil penalty of $100 plus any actual damages,
punitive damages when the violation is willful or intentional, and the reasonable
attorney fees of any successful complainant."
The Right to Financial Privacy Act only limits access to information by
federal agencies. 42 A court has held that the act preempts state regulation of
disclosure of bank records. 43

35 Spa Flying Serv., Inc. v. United States, 724 F2d 95 (8th Cir. 1984). See Donovan v.
U.A. Local 38 Plumbers & Pipe Trades Pension Funds, supra note 19; Donovan v. Nat'l
Bank, 696 F2d 678 (9th Cir. 1983).
36
12 USC § 3403(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
"Id.
.. Id. See Nikrasch v. State, 698 SW2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), which found that a
bank did not violate the act by giving police information about a customer who leased a
safe deposit box.
3. 12 USC § 3415 (1982). The act does not entitle the bank to reimbursement when it
is the target of the investigation. [n re Grand Jury Proceedings, 636 F2d 81 (5th Cir.
1981). The institution is not entitled to reimbursement for producing records ofthose not
protected as customers under the act. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 771 F2d 73
(3d Cir. 1985).
40 J 2 USC § 3415 (1982).

., 12 USC § 3417(a) (1982).

"See Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P2d 280 (Okla. 1980); Doe v.
Board of Professional Responsibility, 717 F2d 1424 (DC CiT. 1983).
43 McGloshen v. USDA, 480 F. Supp. 247 (WD Ky. 1979) (a state statute requiring
1I13.01(2](d) OVERVIEW 13-8

(d) Privacy Act of 1974. All federal agencies must comply with the Privacy Act
of 1974.... Thus, this act imposes an additional layer of requirements for the
federal regulatory agencies but not for most depository institutions, u they
would not be federal agencies.·5
Under the 1974 Privacy Act, all federal agencies are limited in the extent to
which they can disclose any record ofan individual maintained by that agency."
Unless the individual consents in writing, a court order is required, or the
disclosure must fall within one of the limited exceptions provided in the stat-
ute'" The agencies must maintain an accurate accounting of each disclosure
made.'· Upon request, an individual may gain access to the records of any
agency that pertain to that individual.'· A procedure is provided by which the
individual may request a revision of records that he or she believes are not
"accurate, relevant, timely, or complete."eo
Each agency that maintains records on individuals may maintain in its
records only such information as is ~·relev.ant and necessary'~ to accomplish a
purpose ofthe agency as required by statute or executive order ofthe president. 51
The agency must publish annually in the Federal Register a notice describing its
system of record keeping." Further, it has a duty to "make reasonable efforts to
assure that such records are accurate, complete, timely, and relevant for agency
purposes" whenever it gives out information about an individual to another
person."' The agency must attempt to notify an individual whose records are
obtained under compulsory legal process." The agency also must adopt rules
that establish methods by which an individual may obtain access to the record,

ten days' advance notice to the customer held displaced by federal law). See also SEC v.
First Tennessee Bank N.A.• 445 F. Supp. 1341 (WD Tenn. 1978) (state privacy statute
does not apply to federal agencies); In re East Nat'l Bank. 517 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Colo.
\98\ )(d'!cre is no cause ofaction against bank under state privacy laws ifthe procedures of
the act are followed in giving appropriate notice to customer).
.. 5 USC § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also Annot., "What Are Repons
Prepared or Used by 'Agency Responsible for the Regulation or Supervision of Financial
Institutions,' Within Freedom ofInformation Act (5 uses § 522(6)(8))," 48 ALR Fed.
814 (1980).
.. 5 USC § 552(1) (SuPp. IV 1986).
.. 5 USC § 552a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
•75 USC § 552a(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'·5 USC § 552a(c) (1982}.
'·5 USC § 552a(d) (1982).
so 5 USC ~ 552a(d)(2)(B) (1982).
5\ 5 USC § 552a(e) (1982).

5, 5 USC § 552a(e)(4) (1982).

53 5 USC § 552a(e)(6) (1982).

54 5 USC § 552a(e)(8) (1982).

13-9 SPECIAL REGUATION f 13.01(3)

request an amendment to it, and appeal adverse determinations on any request

for amendment."

[3) Privacy Rights Under Other Laws

State judicial decisions sometimes regard bank customers as having rights
ofconfidentiality in their financial transactions with banks because the banker is
viewed as having a special relationship with the customer, similar to that of a
trustee or fiduciary. Other decisions have suggested occasions when it may be
appropriate to recognize an implied contract right to confidentiality as part of
the banker-eustomer relationship.
An Oklahoma court held that a bank could be held liable to its customer
when the bank's loan officer disclosed confidential financial investment infor-
mation to the spouses oftop company officers who then used the information to
acquire the investment property. H The case involved a real estate transaction. A
customer of the bank disclosed information about the property, including its
attractive price, in seeking a loan from the bank to finance the investment. The
loan officer turned down the loan, but informed the officers' spouses of the
property at a cocktail party. They then purchased the real estate. Referring to the
bank's own practices of cultivating public confidence and trust, the court held
that the "bank's relationship to a loan applicant implicitly imposes the duty to
keep the contents ofloan applications confidential." Although the court said
that the loan application was an arm's-length transaction and not a fiduciary
relationship, it also said that the bank should pursue a policy offair dealing and
evenhandedness, which would prevent it from using its advantageous position
to acquire knowledge ofconfidential financial infonnation from its customers to
the customers' detriment. Moreover, the bank could not be excused on the
ground that the loan officer's disclosure was outside the scope of his employ-
ment, because the officer had a specific duty to exercise care in safeguarding the
information given to him.
In Barnett Bank ofW. Fla. v. Hooper," the Rorida Supreme Court ruled
that a bank's duty to disclose information to a customer with whom the bank has
a fiduciary relationship outweighed a duty of confidentiality toward another
customer. In this case, the bank knew that the second customer had been check
kiting, and decided to dishonor checks drawn by that customer against insuffi-
cient funds. However, the bank also approved a loan to the first customer, a loan
that was used for an investment with the second customer, deposited in the

555 USC § 552a(1) (1982).

55 Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P2d 616 (Okla. a. App. 1982).
See also Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P2d 284 (1961).
57
498 So2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
11 13.01[3J OVERVIEW 13·10

second customer's account, and then applied by the bank to eliminate overdrafts
in that customer's account. The court said:

Accordingly, we find that where a bank becomes involved in a transaction

with a customer with whom it has established a relationship of trust and
confidence, and it is a transaction from which the bank is likely to benefit at
the customer's expense, the bank may be found to have assumed a duty to
disclose facts m.8terial .to the transaction, peculiarly within its knowledge,
and not otherwlSe available to the customer. Where the bank defends its
breach ofduty on the ground that it owes a conflicting duty of confidential.
ity to a second customer, the jury is entitled to weigh the one duty against
the other. 611

The dissent argued that no duty of trust and confidence had been established
with the first customer.
State constitutions may be the basis for privacy rights that are more exten-
sive than' those found in the U.S. Constitution.' Thus,' an appellate court in
Illinois has held that there is a constitutional right under the Illinois Constitu-
tion to privacy in one's bank records. 5' The defendant in this case sought to have
suppressed in a criminal case evidence obtained from her bank records pursuant
to a subpoena issued to the bank ofwhich she did not have notice. The court held
that the IlIinois Constitution had a provision that went beyond the U.S. Consti-
tution, which provision protected against "invasions of privacy." tn the court's
view, this justified finding a right ofprivacy in bank records notwithstanding the
contrary decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.
We believe that it is reasonable for our citizens to expect that their bank
records will be protected from disclosure because in the course of bank
dealings, a depositor reveals many aspects of h~r personal affairs, opinion,
habit and association which provide a current biography of her activity,
Such a biography should not be subject to an unreasonable seizure by the
state government. Furthermore, we reject the idea set out in Miller that a
citizen waives any legitimate expectation in her financial records when she
resorts to the banking system. Since it is virtually impossible to participate
in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining an
account at the bank, opening a bank account is not entirely volitional and
should not be seen as conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation
of privacy.

The court then held that the right of privacy was not invaded because the
issuance of the subpoena was reasonable. 00 Other states have also found privacy
rights in their constitutions."'

SlId. al 925.
o'People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 430. 452 NE2d 85 (1983).
oold. at 434, 452 NE2d at 89.
0' See People v. Chapman, 36 Cal. 3d 98, 679 P2d 62, 201 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1984);
13-11 SPECIAL REGUAnON 1l13.02

In In re The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co. ,I' the court found that a district
court did not abuse its discretion when it entered a protective order to prevent
the public disclosure of personal and financial infonnation ofabank's custom-
ers, infonnation that was revealed in exhibits in a lawsuit between the bank and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Concluding that there was a privacy
interest in bank records, based on the policies contained in the Bank Privacy
Act, on the provisions ofother federal laws and regulations, such as the Freedom
ofInfonnation Act (which contains an exemption for financial records held by
officials who supervise financial institutions), and on confidentiality rules ofthe
financial regulatory agencies, the court said, "Viewed together, these statutory
and regulatory provisions clearly indicate Congress' intention that the banking
records ofindividuals be kept in strict confidence. The privacy interests embod-
ied in those provisions identify a compelling government interest in preserving
the secrecy of personal financial records. "13

~ 13.02 REGULATION OF POLITICAL ACTMTIES

Federal law limits the extent to which banks and other financial institutions
may participate in political activities and make political contributions. Feder-
ally chartered financial institutions, such as national banks and federal savings
and loan associations, generally are prohibited from making any contribution or
expenditure with respect to election to a political office.'4 The definition of
"contribution or expenditure" is broad. It includes any "direct or indirect"
payment, loan, service, or other thing of value to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party in connection with an election. IS It does not include
loans made "in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and
in the ordinary course of business" by a national or state bank. 16

Chames v. DiGiacomo. 486 Pa. 32, 403 A2d [283 (1979). cefl. denied. 444 US 1032
([980); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238,529 P2d 590.18 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
See also Annot., "Rights and Remedies of Financial Institution Customer in Relation to
Subpoena Duces Tecum Exception to General Prohibitions of State Right to Financial
Privacy Statute," 43 ALR4th 1157 (1986); Note. "A Right to Privacy in Bank Records:
The Colorado Supreme Court Rejects United States v. Miller," 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 529
([981 ).
I' 723 F2d 470 (6th Cir. 1983). But cf. Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755
F2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 US 1137 (1985) (financial data submitted by
borrower to government lending agency was not confidential under the Freedom of
Information Act).
•• In re The Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F2d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 1983).
64
2 USC § 44 I b(a) (1982).
•s 2 USC § 441 b(b)(2) (1982).
"Id.
'il13.03(1] OVERVIEW 13-12

The Federal Election Commission advises that the prohibitions of the act
extend to political advertising, the purchase of political dinner tickets, the
purchase ofadvertisements in political literature, and similar contributions. The
Federal Election Commission has exclusivejurisdiction with respect to the civil
enforcement of these provisions of the federal law .Sf The commission' may issue
advisory opinions. Further, any opinions given by the bank regulatory agencies
would not be binding upon the commission.
Corporations organized under state law also are subject to some of the
provisions of this federal law, but only as applied to federal elections.·' Thus,
state chartered depository institutions are subject to the law to a limited extent
while federal institutions are subject to broader limitations. The Federal Elec-
tion Commission has issued an advisory opinion that a subsidiary corporation,
such as a service corporation, of a federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tion would not be subject to the prohibitions of the act that apply to federally
chartered institutions if the subsidiary were a state-organized corporation. The
subsidiary corporation would have to be a distinct legal entity with a legitimate
business function separate from the parent institution that would not be acting
as an agent of the parent.· o Such a state corporation, of course, still would be
subject to the prohibitions of the act with respect to federal elections.

1113.03 ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT

11] Antitrust Regulation

The antitrust laws are an important part ofbanking regulation. The scope of
the antitrust laws is broad, and the application of the antitrust laws to banking is
extensive. It is not possible to summarize the impact of this body oflaw in this
brief section except in a very general way. The relevant antitrust laws for banks
include the Sherman Act: o the Clayton Act," the Bank Merger Act,'2 the Bank
Holding Company Act,'3 the Federal Trade Commission Act," and other stat-

67 2 USC § 437c1b)(l) (1982).

61 2 USC § 441 b(a)( 1982).
G. 1 Fed. Election Compo Fin. Guide (eCH) Advisory Opinion, ~ 5, 464 (Mar. 13,
198D).
'015 USC ~~ 1-7 (1982).
" 15 USC §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
72 12 USC § 1828(c)( 1982).
73 12 USC §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also Annot., "Denial by Board

of Governors of Federal Reserve System of Application for Bank Merger or Acquisition

on Monopolization or Anticompetitive Grounds Under § 3(c) of Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956," 71 ALR Fed. 438 (1985).
"15 USC §§ 41-58 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
13-13 SPECIAL REGUATION 'l13.03{11

utes. An extensive body of judicial decisions exists to interpret this legislation.

In brief, the Sherman Act penalizes both accomplished and attempted
monopolization and its concomitant activities ofprice-flXing, boycott, division
ofsales territories, and others. Bankers must take great care to avoid cooperative
agreements with competitors (whether in clearinghouse agreements or other-
wise) that might give even the appearance of violating the price-flXing con-
straints ofthe Sherman Act. Under the act, such violations can be prosecuted as
criminal offenses.'s
The Clayton Act is directed against incipient monopoly and unfair trade
practices such as tie-in sales and price discrimination directed to that end. It has
been noted that routine and traditional bank practices take on a rather different
character when viewed in light of the antitrust laws, and that practices such as
compensating balances" and prime rates" become questionable under antitrust
scrutiny.
The application of the Clayton Act to bank mergers and holding company
acquisitions was established in the celebrated Philadelphia National Bank7•
decision in 1963. The Supreme Court held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act
applied to bank mergers and that neither the federal scheme of regulation of
banking nor the enactment of the Bank Merger Act immunized banks from the
application of the antitrust laws. In holding that Section 7 applied, the Court
rejected a broad definition 7 • ofthe relevant market that would be affected by the
reduction of competition between the merging banks. In decisions since that
time, the Court rermed its analysis of the competitive effects of bank mergers.1lI
Antitrust concerns are also evident in both the Bank Merger and Bank
Holding Company Acts, which forbid acquisitions resulting in a monopoly (a
Sherman Act violation) or which "substantially ... lessen competition ... unless
... the anticompetitive effects ... are clearly outweighed in the public interest by

75 United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1170,263. It
has been held that, banks may cooperate to oppose a new charter without incurring
antitrust liability. Central Bank v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (ED Mo. 1976), aff'd,
553 F2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 443 US 910 (1977).
76 See Austin & Solomon, "The Antitrust Implications of Compensating Balances,"
89 Banking L.I 675 (1972).
77 See Nadler, "Compensating Balances and the Prime at Twilight," Harv. Bus. Rev.
(Jan.-Feb. 1972).
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 US 321 (1963).
19 rd. at 360-361.

60 See United States v. Third National Bank, 390 US 171 (1968); United States v.
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 US 350 (1970). In United States v. Marine Bancorporalion,
418 US 602 (1974), the Court referred to the local nature of banking activities in analyzing
the relevant geographic market. In a recent decision, a federal court 'upheld a wider
geographic area as the relevant market because of the rural nature of the area involved.
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Board of Govemors, 729 F2d 687 (10th Cir. 1984).
1113.03(1) OVERVIEW 13-14

the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of
the community to be served...."
At one time, the banking regulatory agencies did not regard thrift institu-
tions as significant competitors of banks and thus did not include them in their
analysis of the extent to which mergers of banks might reduce competition for
banking services. In 1982, the Board of Governors took the position that "even
though thrift institutions hold a substantial amount of the market's savings
deposits and make a large number of the market's consumer loans, these institu-
tions are insignificant competitors in the provisions ofdemand deposit services
and commercial loans. "12
On March 31, 1983, the BoardofGovemors of the Federal Reserve System
announced a change in position. In its view, as a result of the Gam-St Germain
Act, "thrift institutions have become, or at least have the potential to become,
major competitors of commercial banks not only in the provision of consumer
banking services but also in the provision of commercial lending ·services."
Subsequently, in approving a merger between First Tennessee National Corpo-
ration with Mountain Financial Company, another bank holding company, the
Board of Governors said it would take into account potential competition from
thrift institutions in determining the competitive effects of the merger. The
Bo~rd stated that in this case, thrift institutions provided "an alternative for
consumer banking services" in the relevant banking market and that "the pres-
ence ofthrift institutions and the competitive influence they exert in this market
should be given considerable weight even though the thrift institutions are not
presently exercising their recently expanded commercial lending powers to any
significant extent. un

I' 12 USC §§ 1828(c)(5), 1842(c) (1982).

USee [Jan.-June] Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-18 (Mar. 29,1982).
IS 69 Fed. Reserve Bull. 298 (1983). The Comptroller of the Currency recognized the
relevance of competition from thrifts in 1982 when he approved a merger between the
Hartford National Bank and the Connecticut National Bank. The comptroller's opinion is
described in [Jan.-June) 15 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A·9 (Apr. 5,1982). The
comptroller gave weight to competition from thrift institutions in approving a merger of
First & Merchants Nat') Bank into the Virginia Nan Bank. 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No.
21, at 814 (Nov. 28,1983). .
For a general discussion of the extent to which competition from thrift institutions
should be considered in appraising the competitive-effeCls of mergers between- banks, see
Note, "The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank ~ergers: A Product-Oriented
Redefinition," 96 Harv. L. Rev. 907 (1983). See also Alca)y & Nelson, "Will Including
Thrifts in the Banking Market Affect Mergers?", 97 Banking U 346 (1980); Friedlander &
Slayton, "Determination of the Relevant Product Market in Bank Mergers: A Time for
Reassessment?" 36 Bus. Law. 1537 (1981); Via, "Commercial Banlcing as the 'Line of
Commerce' in Bank Amalgamations: A Reexamination." 99 Banking U 326 (1982).
Additional merger cases where the Federal Reserve Board gave weight to competition
from thrift institutions involve the formation of a bank holding company, Texas East
13-15 SPECIAL REGUATION 1113.03(2)

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has said that commercial banking pro-
vides a cluster ofproduets and services that in combination constitute a market
unique to commercial banks, and although the Court has rejected a wider
product market definition that would include thrift institutions, the Court's
actions were taken before the dramatic restructuring of the financial services
industry by the Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and other
federallegislation. 14 The Court left open the possibility that the structure of the
banking industry might change so that the Court might reasonably include other
institutions in the definition of the relevant market. u Lower court decisions
have indicated that it is appropriate to give some weight to competition from
thrift institutions in evaluating bank mergers. U

[2J Unfair Trade Practices

Banks are affected by the Federal Trade Commission Act," which bans
unfair and deceptive trade practices and gives the FTC power to adopt rules to
prevent such practices. The FTC cannot exercise enforcement authority over
banks and savings and loan institutions that are under the regulatory jurisdic-
tion of the federal banking agencies.II However, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board have the
authority to adopt regulations for banks and savings and loan associations to
control "unfair or deceptive practices."n Moreover, when the FTC adopts a rule
of this nature, the Board of Governors and the FHLBB must promulgate "sub-
stantially similar regulations" unless these bodies find the practices are not
"unfair or deceptive" or, as to banks, the Board of Governors finds that adop-
tion of the regulation would "seriously conflict with essential monetary and
payment systems policies" of the Board.!IQ
Under the statute, the FTC adopted regulations requiring certain sellers and
creditors to place on consumer paper a legend that preserves the defenses of the

BanCorp., Inc., 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 203 (Aug. 8, 1983); the acquisition by
General Bank Shares Corp. of an Illinois bank, 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 357
(Sept. 12, 1983): the acquisition of Easton Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., by Merchants
Bancorp., Inc., 4l Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 668 (Oct. 31,1983).
.. See United StalCli v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 US 321 (1963); United States v.
Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 US 656 (1974). See also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l
Bank, 399 US 350 {I 970).
USee United States v. Connecticut Nafl Bank, 418 US 656 (1974).
18 United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation. 499 F. Supp. 793 (ONJ 1980);
United States v. Zions Utah Bancorporation, No. C·79-Q769·A (0. Utah Aug. 21, 1980).
"15 USC §§ 41·58 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18 15 USC § 45(a)(2) (1982).
"15 USC § 57a(1)(I) (1982).
tOld.
t 13.0313) OVERVIEW 13-16

consumer. This legend prevents any holder of me paper, including a bank, from
having the special rights of a holder-in-due-course." The fie Act also is the
basis for a rule governing credit practices, which the banking regulatory agencies
enforce. This rule deals with matters such as confessions ofjudgment, waivers of
exemption, assignments of wages, security interest in household goods, and
obligations to cosigners. J2
Specific statutes apply to banks to deal with other aspects of competitive
practices, such as management interlocks, tying arrangements, holding compa-
nies, regulatory approval of consolidations and mergers, and securities
transactions..,

[3J Consolidations and Merlers

Consolidations and mergers of banks are subject to the regulatory authority
of the federal banking agencies when a national bank, a member bank of the
Federal Reserve System, or an institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation is involved. In general, the federal banking agency with regula-
tory authority is that agency that normally has authority over the successor
institution. When there is a consolidation or merger involving a national bank,
which consolidation or merger results in a national bank, the prior approval of
the Comptroller ofthe Currency must be obtained. '4 When the merger or consol-
idation results in a state member bank, the Board of Governors must approve
the transaction. tIS When the surviving bank is to be a nonmember insured bank,
approval of the FDIC is necessary.tII When any insured bank merges with a
noninsured bank or institution, the FDIC must grant prior approval." A consoli·
dation that occurs through the creation of a bank holding company or through
the acquisition ofa bank by a bank holding company must have approval of the
Federal Reserve Board, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Before the federal regulatory agency concerned may approve a consolida-
tion or merger, it must consider the financial resources of the institutions
concerned, as well as "the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."" In addition, the agency is directed not to approve any consolidation or
merger that would have a monopoly effect or that would substantially lessen

" See ~ 16.06[I]. For a discussion ofthe regulations regarding this le,end, see , 16.06.
92 12 CFR §§ 227.11-227.J6 (1987). For a discussion of the credit practices rule, see
~ 26.05.
93 The statutes that deal with the practices listed are discussed at ~, 5.02, 8.m, 9.02,
13.03.
'412 USC §§ 215, 215a (1982).
15 12 USC § 1828(c}(2)(B) (1982).
ll< 12 USC § I828(c)(2)(C) (1982).
Of J 2 USC § t828(c)(1)(A) (I 982}.

1112 USC § 1828(c}(5)(1982}.

13-17 SPECIAL REGUATION '1113.03(3)

competition." Unless an emergency exists, the federal banking agency must give
notice ofthe proposed transaction'oo prior to granting approval and must request
a report from the Attorney General on the competitive factors involved in the
transaction. '0' The federal statutes contain provisions designed to protect the
rights of dissenting shareholders.
The congressional entrusting of responsibility to the comptroller for
approving mergers between national banks has been held to preclude a federal
court from passing on the validity of the merger under the National Bank Act
before the comptroller had an opportunity to evaluate the merger.'02
A series of cases in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts has estab-
lished a framework for deciding when a bank has standing to challenge a merger
or acquisition that it believes will adversely affect it competitively. This frame-
work consists of a two-pronged test. Firstly, the complaining bank must show
that the challenged action "has caused ... injury in fact, economic or otherwise."
Secondly, the test requires that "the interest said to be protected by the com-
plainant is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question,"'03
These standing rules were important in a case in which the Comptroller of
the Currency approved the acquisition ofa weak bank as an emergency measure.

It Id. Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board a similar mandate when the Board
considers mellers, acquisitions, and consolidations under the Bank Holding Company
Act. 12 USC § I 842(c) (1982). In Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board ofGovemors, 638 F2d
1255 (5th Cir. 1981), the coun held the statutory direction to consider community
convenience and needs was not a license to the Board to consider "undefmed anti-
competitive factors." 638 F2d at 1262. See also Washington Mut. Sav. v. FDIC, 482 F2d
459 (9th Cir. 1973); Republic ofTex. Corp. v. Board ofGovernors, 649 F2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1981).
'00 12 USC § I 828(c)(3) (1982).
10' 12 USC § 1828(c)(6) (1982). The Bank Merger Act gives the Attorney General
thiny days to prepare a repon on the competitive factors involved in the merger unless an
emergency exists that requires earlier action. Absent the declaration ofan emergency, the
merger may not be consummated until the thiny days have elapsed. Id. The act also
provides that any action based upon the antitrust laws against such a merger must be
brought within the same time periods and that the "commencement of such an action
shall stay the effectiveness of the agency's approval unless the coun shall otherwise
specifically order." 12 USC § I 828(c)(7) (1982). The automatic stay does not apply to
actions filed by private panies. It applies only to actions brought by the Attorney General
of the United States. Vial v. First Commerce Crop., 564 F. Supp. 650 (ED La. 1983),
appeal dismissed without opinion, 725 F2d 674 (5th Cir. 1984).
102 Nehring v. First DeKalb Bancshares, Inc., 692 F2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1982) (dissent-
ing minority stockholder not entitled to challenge the plan for distributing shares of the
merged company to prior stockholders until the merger is evaluated by the Comptroller of
the Currency).
'03 Association of Data Processing Serv. Oras. Inc. \'. Camp, 397 US I SO, 152-153
(1970); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 US 45 (1970); Investment Co.lnst. v. Camp, 401 US
617(1971).
1113.03(3) OVERVIEW 13-18

The plaintiff, who was a competing bank, complained that the acquisition had
produced for it a new and larger competitor because the acquired bank would
now be operated as a branch office ofa larger banking system. The court agreed
that the new affiliation represented "a change in the competitive configuration"
ofthe banking community and so caused economic injury in fact to the plaintiff.
There was more than the continuation ofexisting competition. lIN But in consid.
ering the second prong of the standing test, the court refused to let the plaintiff
challenge the comptroller's determination of an emergency, because the proce-
dures established for making such a finding were not designed to protect the
interests of competitor banks.'os Similarly, the court found that there was no
standing to challenge compliance with the state emergency branch banking law,
because, unlike ordinary branch banking restrictions, the emergency statutes did
not create an interest enforceable by competitor banks.
When a bank holding company acquires a bank, approval of the Federal
Reserve Board must be obtained. On the other hand, the Comptroller of the
Currency has jurisdiction to approve the acquisition of a bank by a national
bank. In Marshall & llsley Corp. v. Heimann,"" a national bank that was con-
trolled by a bank holding company acquired another bank. It was argued that the
acquisition was unlawful because it had to be approved by the Board of Gover-
nors ofthe Federal Reserve System under the Bank Holding Company Act, and
the approval ofthe Board had not been obtained. Plaintift's.argued that the court
should pierce the corporate veil and treat the acquisition as in effect an acquisi-
tion by a bank holding company, requiring approval ofthe Board ofGovemors.
The court held that the comptroller did not have authority to decide whether the
Bank Holding Company Act has been violated. Therefore, the need for Board
approval could not be decided in the case before the court. Plaintiffs had to take
it to the Board. 107
The Gam-5t Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 and its subse-
quent amendments substantially expand the authority of the FDIC to arrange
mergers. The act gives the FDIC authority to approve "extraordinary acquisi-
tions" of failing institutions by out-or-state financial institutions and also gives
the agency authority to approve acquiring institutions that are different from the
failing institutions.'M
Bank mergers and consolidations are also subject to the antitrust laws and

104 Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F2d 685. 692 (7th Cir. 1981 J. cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982).
l05Id. at 694.
' 041 652 F2d 685 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 C;S 981 (1982).
l07Id. at 699-700.
'M The interstate and interindustry consolidations are discussed at; 6.05. The acqui-
sition of thrift institutions by bank holding companies is discussed at 1 6.06. See
, 1O.03{2].
13-19 SPECIAL REGUATlON '1113.03(4]

rules governing interference with competition. 1M Even though a merger has been
approved by the banking regulatory authorities, such approval win not immu-
nize the institutions involved from prosecution for violation of these laws.
Banks also may become afftliated with other banks and other financial institu-
tions through the activities of bank holding companies, as discussed in Chapter
S. The applicability of federal legal restrictions against interstate banking is
reviewed in Chapter 6.

[4] Change in Control

The Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC
have authority under the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978 to approve the
acquisition ofcontrol ofthe banks within their supervisory jurisdiction. Written
notice must be given to the relevant regulatory agency in advance of the pro-
posed acquisition, and a period of time is allowed for the agency to review the
proposal."° If the agency does not disapprove the proposed acquisition within
the time provided or does not extend the period as provided by law, the acquisi-
tion may be completed.
The federal banking agency may disapprove the proposed acquisition on
ground ofadverse competitive effects, jeopardy to the financial condition ofthe
bank, or inability to provide appropriate management for the bank. 111 Addition-
ally, amendments made in 1986 by the Money Laundering Control Act direct
the banking agencies to investigate the backgrounds of persons who apply to
acquire control, and establish a procedure for public review and comment. 112
Regulations of the FDIC require notice to be given whenever any person
acquires more than a 10 percent ownership interest in a bank subject to the

109 See also Sayers, "Bank Expansion and Probable Future Competition,'· 102 Bank-
ing U 100-141 (1985); Staff, Davidson, & McDonald, "Increased Bank Merger Activity:
Cause~ and Effects," 24 Am. Bankr. U 67-86 (I 986). See 12 USC§ I 828(c)(7)(1 982), and
discussion at " 13.03[ I]. 13.03[2].
110 12 USC § 181 7{j)( I) (Supp. IV 1986). The Change in Bank Control Act, 12 USC
§ 1817 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), expressly requires the Comptroller of the Currency to
issue its nondisapproval of the acquisition of a national bank prior to the acquirer's
obtaining control. In a case where the new controlling pany failed to obtain prior nondis-
approval from the comptroller, but did obtain such a leller from the comptroller after
acquiring control, the court held that any private claim that might arise under Section
18170> of the act became moot. The court also held that a federal district court has no
jurisdiction to review an alleged violation ofthe Bank Holding Company Act, because the
Federal Reserve Board has exclusive jurisdiction. Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720
F2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983).
'" 12 USC § 1817(j}(7) (1982).
112
12 USC § 1817(j}(2) (Supp. IV 1986); 12 USC § 1730(q)(2) (1982). See also
, 12.01(4][e).
'1113.04 OVERVIEW 13-20

supervision ofthe FDIC. In a case where a group ofpersons acquired more than
10 percent ofthe stock ofa bank and together constituted its largest stockholder,
the notice requirement applied, although individually no one owned more than
10 percent. The FDIC was entitled to an injunction barring the group from
assuming control of tlte bank when they failed to give the notice required by the
regulation, because the FDIC was entitled to believe that the collective shares
would be voted as a block. 113

~ 13.04 LOCAL CREDIT NEEDS: mE COMMUNITY

REINVESTMENf ACf OF 1977
In the mid-1970s, Congress was persuaded of the need for legislation to
ensure that financial institutions provide adequate service to their local commu-
nities. The problem perceived by Congress was that some financial institutions
took deposits from their local neighborhoods and communities but did not make
credit available to those same areas. It was charged that some financial institu-
tions refused to make loans in "redlined" areas, and that often these areas
presented no greater investment risks, but rather were simply older areas of the
community or were areas in which racial minorities resided. There was particu-
lar concern expressed as to the failure ofdepository institutions to make residen-
tial mortgage loans available in such areas.
To deal with these problems, Congress first adopted the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975.'" Under this act, every depository institution (Le.,
commercial bank, savings bank, savings and loan association, or credit union)
that makes federally related mortgage loans is subject to record-keeping require-
ments if it has an office located within a standard metropolitan statistical area.
Such depository institutions must compile and maintain data showing the mort-
gage lending activity of the institution according to census tract to reveal the
areas of.its mortgage lending activity.'" The institutions must make the infor-
mation available to the public in accordance with the regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board. '16
Two years later, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977. 117 This act expressly states that
(I) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the commu-
nities in which they are chartered to do business;

103 FDIC Y.D·Annunzio. 524 F. Supp. 694 (ND W. Va. J981).

'14'12 USC §§ 2801-2811 (1982 & Supp.1V t986).
". 12 USC § 2803 (1982 & Supp. IV J986).
'''Id.
'" 12 USC §§ 2901-2905 (1982).
13-21 SPECIAL REGUAnON 11 13.04

(2) tbe convenience and needs of the communities include the need for
credit services as well as deposit services; and
(3) regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obli-
gations to help meet the credit needs ofthe local communities in which they
are chartered....
The purpose ofthe act is "to require each appropriate Federal financial supervi-
sory agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, to
encourage suCh institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communi-
ties in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of
such institutions."'"
To carry out the act, whenever a federal financial supervisory agency exam-
ines a financial institution, tbe agency must assess the institution's record in
meeting the credit needs of its community, including its low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods. This assessment must be taken into account by the
supervisory agency in evaluating any application for a deposit facility by the
institution.'" The act applies to all federal financial supervisory agencies includ-
ing the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the FDIC, and the FHLBB. The regulated financial institutions
whose activities must be evaluated include all banks that are insured by the
FDIC and all savings institutions that are insured by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation.
The evaluations of the efforts made by a depository institution in meeting
the credit needs ofits community are relevant whenever that institution applies
to one of the federal regulatory agencies for approval of one of the following: a
charter, deposit insurance, a branch office or similar facility to accept deposits,
the relocation ofan office, a merger or consolidation with another institution, or
the acquisition of shares or assets of another financial institution.,.,

111 12 USC § 290 I (a)( 1982).

"·'12 USC § 2901(b) (1982).
20
' 12 USC § 2903 (1982).
'" 12 USC § 2902 (1982). See generally Bettauer, "Federal and State Anti-Redlining
Laws: Must National Banks Comply With Bath?", 97 Banking U 329-345 (1980);
Jennings, "Preemption and State Anti-Redlining Regulation: The Need for Clarifica-
tion," II Fordham Urb. U 225-261 (1982-1983); Notes, "Community Bank Regula-
tions: Another Attempt to Control Red-Lining," 28 Cath. UL Rev. 635-661 (1979);
"Red-Lining, Disinvestment and the Role of Mutual Savings Banks: A Survey of Solu-
tions," 9 Fordham Urb. U 89 (1980).
 II
Bank Payments and
Negotiable Instruments
 14
Sources of Commercial
Banking Law and Ba~ic
Principles Governing
Commercial Paper
~ 14.0 I Sources of Commercial Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . 14-2
[11 Federal Power Over Commercial Laws . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • • 14-3
(2) State Commercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code. . . 14-5
TABLE 14-1 State Enactments of UCC and Amendments. . . . . . . 14-7
[31 The Role of the Federal Government as the Source of
Commercial Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . 14-9
TABLE 14·2 Legal Treatises on the Uniform Commercial Code
and Related Subjects . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-10
[a) Federal Administrative Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-11
[b) Preemption of Federal Over State Rules .......•..... 14-12
TABLE 14-3 Hierarchy of Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-13
[e) Authority of Federal Reserve System To Regulate Cenain
Payment Methods 14-15
(4) Conflict of Laws Doctrines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-17
'/ 14.02 Money •..•......•................................ 14-20
[I) Defining Money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 14-20
[2) Gold and Foreign Exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-24
'/14.03 Commercial Paper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-26
[I) Negotiable Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 14-26
(2) Letters of Credit ..•.....................•......•. 14-28
(3) Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-28
(4) Documents of Title .....................•......... 14-29
[5) Security Agreements 14-29
1114.04 Requirements for Instruments to Be Negotiable '. .. 14-30
[I) Advantages of Negotiability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-30

14-1
, 14.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-2

[2] Requirements for Negotiability. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . .. 14-31

[a) Promise or Order ................•............ , 14-31
[b) Unconditional .•..••.•..•.......•........•... , 14-33
[e) In Writina and Signed 14-37
[dJ Certainty as to Sum ..•.•...•..............•..• , 14-38
{e} Payable in Money. . . . • • . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 14-3B
If) Payable on Demand . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . • . . •• 14-39
[g] Payable at a Defmite Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •• 14-42
[h) Payable to Order or Bearer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-42
[i} Designation of Payee . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .• 14-43
[j] Drawee Must Be Cenain. .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . .. . ... 14-44
[k] Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer .. . . . . .. 1444
[1] Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction ...•.••.. 14-45
'IJ 14.05 Docnnent& of Title and Securities. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-45
[I J Documents of Title ....•............•.......•..... 14-46
[a] Negotiability of Documents ofTitie 14-47
[b) liability of Bailee for Loss or Damage to or Failure to
Deliver Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-49
[c) Carrier's or Warehouseman's Lien. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14-52
[2] Investment Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .. 14-53
[a] Investment Securities Under the Pre-1977 UCC 14-54
[b) Investment Securities Under the UCC-1977
Amendments and Uncertificated Securities . . . . . . . . . .. 14-54

1114.01 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW

The United States is a federation ofstates, and under the Constitution each
state is a separate legal entity with authority to enact and enforce laws and with a
separate system of courts and administrative tribunals. Thus, the commercial
banking lawyer must be concerned with the laws ofeach ofthe filty states as well
as the law ofthe United States. Each ofthese fifty-one jurisdictions has delegated
much law- or rule-making power to its administrative agencies. Each state has
administrative agencies with regulatory, rule-making, and adjudicatory respon-
sibilities over banks and other depository institutions. Additionally, separate
agencies supervise other types of financial institutions, regulate the issuance of
securities, oversee insurance firms, and regulate a myriad of other activities
from barbering to mining.
The proliferation of jurisdictions and regulatory bodies can create confu-
sion, especially where modern business transactions that use electronic technol-
ogy constantly cross physical jurisdictional boundaries with a rapidity
undreamed ofat the time most banking and commercial laws were enacted. One
ofa lawyer's chieffunctions is to untangle this maze oflaws in order to make the
rules that govern panicular transactions clearer to business people. The doc-
14-3 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 114.01(1)

trines that control the solution to these problems are part of the subjects oflaw
known as the conflict oflaws and constitutional law. The development ofthe law
in individual cases lies within the special ken of the lepl profession; but bank
officers are entitled to know some of the basic rules that will guide them in
consulting with their lawyers.

[I) Federal Power Over COlDDlerclal Laws

The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land1 and provides stan-
dards for both state and federailaw, The Constitution gives certain powers
expressly to the federal government-Congress, the president, and the U.S.
courts. The federal government has enumerated powers and must draw its
authority to legislate from a grant of power contained in the Constitution. When
state legislative authority is at issue, the U.S. Constitution limits such authority
in two ways. Firstly, the Constitution contains specific provisions limiting the
power of the states to act, as in the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights against
governmental action in violation ofthose provisions. Secondly, the supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution makes the laws of Congress superior to state law
when a conflict exists between federal and state law or when the Congress has
acted to regulate the subject matter to the exclusion of state legislation. Absent
either of these two types oflimitations, state governments have general authority
to legislate in order to promote the health, safety, and welfare ofpersons within
their jurisdiction in what is referred to as a general "police power,"· As a result,
state legislative bodies have broad, general sovereign authority. subject to the
additional limitations of their own state constitutions and laws, to adopt laws
dealing with contracts, property, legal remedies, and other matters. Thus, in
many areas, particularly in matters involving commerce, the states may act so
long as' they do not conflict with the U.S. Constitution or laws adopted by
Congress, and the Congress has not indicated an intention to preempt the matter
from state regulation. For example, the general body oflaw dealing with family
relationships is largely based on state statutes and decisions ofcourts about state
laws. However, federal law affects the power of states to act even in this area of
traditional state concern. States may not enact laws pertaining to family prop-
erty that discriminate in violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses. 3 Moreover, Congress can pass laws under its constitutionally enumer-
ated authority that affect such relationships and are binding on the states. The
federal law, for example, can prohibit credit discrimination. Although the Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to operate in a cenain area, some cases may

, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

• See aenerally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Youna, Constitutional Law§§ 3.1-3.5 (3d
ed. 1986).
3U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
1114.01(1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-4

present no clear indication whether Congress has intended to exercise exclusive

control over that subject. Where Congress has not retained exclusive control,
state law may operate concurrently with federal law in the same area. Considera-
ble uncertainty arises, however, where Congress has not specifically excluded
the states from engaging in regulation in a particular area. As seen in Part I, this
is precisely the case with many laws governing the organization and regulation of
banks.
Commercial law, an intricate web offederal and state laws, governs the legal
nature of the contracts and other documents involved in transactions that
constitute the business ofbanking. The Constitution gives the Congress power to
make laws governing "Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes...• It was originaUy believed that"commerce"
power extended only to commerce that crossed state lines, and not to purely
intrastate transactions. 5 However, as business has expanded, it has been held
that the federal power extends to any transaction that affects interstate com·
merce! In the present state of commercial operations, commerce includes
almost any business transaction.
Although the commerce clause gives Congress power over an enormous
range ofbusiness transactions, this power has only been exercised in some areas.
Among these are consumer rights and fair trade practices. The trend ofincreased
congressional intervention in the commercial field will probably be accelerated
in the future.
In banking, Congress has broad powers. Among the constitutional powers
that Congress possesses are powers "to coin money, regulate the value thereof,
and of foreign coin.'" From early decisions to the present, the U.S. Supreme
Court has expansively interpreted these powers to give Congress broad authority
to regulate banking.' Although Congress has left much regulation of banking

·U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, d. 3.

·See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat.) 1,65 (1824); cf. Paul v. Virginia, 75 US (8
Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
'See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 US 294 (1964); Moore v. Mead's Bread, 348 US
liS (I954); Wichard v. Filburn, 317 US III (1942). For the meanintof"commerce
among" the states, see I Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, Chs. I et seq. (1953); J.
Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, Ch. 4 (3d ed. 1986).
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, e1. 5.

'See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 US 180 (1921) (upholding the
Federal Farm Loan Act); First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows, 244 US 416 (I917) (upholding
Federal Reserve System); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 US 664 (1899)
(upholding the power to limit taxing national banks); ugal Tender Cases, 79 US (12
Wall.) 457 (1870) (upholding laws making U.S. Treasury notes legal tender for all debts);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 US (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (upholding federal tax on state bank
notes); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (state tax on national bank
notes invalid). For a discussion of the powers conferred upon Congress by the clauses in
the U.S. Constitution permitling Congress to borrow money, to coin money and regulate
14-5 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.01(2)

corporations and individual commercial transactions to statCl law, federal laws,

such as the federal statutes on electronic fund transfers and credit disclosures,
deal with special subjects. Further, Congress has created regulatory agencies to
oversee banks' activities. These agencies have had an ever growing role in .
shaping the law applicable to the transactions in which banks may engage. As
discussed later, the Board ofGovcmors ofthe Federal Reserve System has been
given a very special role of oversight and lawmaking with respect to the nation's
payments system.

(2} State Commercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code

Even before the foundhlg of the American colonies, the law governing
commercial transactions in Europe was a separate body oflaw. During medieval
and Renaissance times this law was known as the Law Merchant. In both
England and Europe it was administered by a separate system ofcourts from that
governing land and family matters. In Europe it is still a separate system oflaw
governed by statutes known as commercial codes, which are USUally adminis-
tered by special commercial tribunals.
In England and the United States the commercial law became largely statu·
tory. Although the statutes varied from state to state, they were administered by
common-law courts so that the commercial law of the United States as a whole
was in great confusion. At the end of the nineteenth century, the American Bar
Association, through the Commission on Uniform Laws, drafted and pushed for
adoption in the various state legislatures many uniform statutes that at one time
covered most of the field ofcommercial law. These uniform laws touched upon
most of the everyday banking transactions but became incomplete and obsolete
as modern commercial practices evolved; the Uniform Commercial Code has
replaced most of these laws.
The requirements of commercial paper and the procedures for banks to
collect it are governed almost wholly by statute and agency regulation. Before the
adoption of the uee, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, known offi-
cially as the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), codified the law on negotiable
paper payable in money. The NIL was adopted in all the states and territories.
Three different uniform statutes dealt with goods and documents oftitle relating
to goods: the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the

its value seeJ. Nowak. R. Rotunda &J. Young. COl15titutionalLaw§ 5.7 (3d ed. 1986). See
id. at § 3.2 for discussion of Justice Marshall's historic McCulloch v. Maryland decision
where the Supreme Court gave a broad reading to the "necessary and proper" clause
which gives Congress "the power ... to make all lows which shall be neceSsary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and aU other powers vested by Ihis
Constitution in Ihe government of the United States or in any department or officer
thereof," U.S. Const. article I, § 8. d. 18.
, 14.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-6

Uirlform Bills of Lading Act.' Other uniform acts dealt with other types of
commercial practices, and there were many non-uniform local state laws.
The UCC supersedes most ofthe previous uniform laws dealing with com-
mercial transactions and incorporates in a single code subject matter previously
scattered among many separate statutes.
Its broad scope is seen from the following listing of the articles it contains:
Article I General Provisions
Article 2 Sales
Article 2A Leases
Article 3 Commercial Paper
Article 4 Bank Deposits and Collections
Article 5 Letters of Credit
Article 6 Bulk Transfers
Article T Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, and Other Documents
of Title
Article 8 Investment Securities
Article 9 Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
Article 10 Effective Date and Repealer
Article II Effective Date and Transition Provisions
The UCC has been adopted in all states (Louisiana has not adopted all ofthe
UCC betause of the state's civil law orientation). Since the UCC is the major
source of law for modern commercial transactions, the discussion that follows
states the rules laid down by it. In some cases it is useful to consider the prior
uniform statutes as an aid to understanding the UCC. Where relevant, this pre-
UCC law is discussed.
The UCC was extensively amended by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute in 1972 and again in 1977. These
revisions principally dealt with Article 9 (secured transactions) and Article 8
(investment securities). Article 2A (leases) became part of the UCC in 1987.
Although a substantial number of states have adopted the 1972 amend-
ments and many states have adopted the 1977 amendments, there are states that
have not enacted these changes. Because the amendments make significant
changes in the UCC, it is essential to determine which version of the UCC is in
effect in any given state. 'O Of course, the failure of some states to adopt the
amendments has created a lack of uniformity among the states in their basic
commercial law. Table 14-1 lists the states that have adopted the UCC, shows

• These statutes have b.:en repealed by the vee. See vee § 10-102;
lOThe states in fact have individually made many changes to various pans of the
vec that depan from the uniform text. This book generally discusses the provisions of
the official uniform text without identifying state variations.
14-7 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL lAW 'II 14.01(2J

TABLE 14-1 State Enactments or vee ad Amendments"

EFFEC'l1VE DATES OF STATE ADOPrlONS

1972 1977
State UCC A~ndmtlnU Amtlndmtl1lU
Alabama 1-1-67 2-1-82
Alaska 1-1·63 7-1·83
Arizona 1-1-68 1-1-76
Arkansas 1-1-62 1-1-74 6-28-85
California 1-1-65 1·1-76 1-1-75
Colorado 7-1-66 1-1-78 7-1-82
Connecticut 10.1-61 10.1·76 10-1·79
Delaware 7·1-67 1-1-84 1-1·84
D.C. 1-1-65 3·16-82
Florida 1·1-67 1-1-80 10.1-87
Georgia 1-1-64 . 7-1-78
Hawaii 1-1-67 7-1-79 7·1-86
Idaho 1-1-68 7-1-79 7·1-85
Illinois 7·2-62 7-1·73 1-14-88
Indiana 7·1-64 1-1-86 9·1-88
Iowa 7-4-66 1-1-75
Kansas 1-1-66 1-1-76 7-1-86
Kentucky 7·1-60 7-1-87 7-1-87
Louisiana** 1-1-75**
Maine 12-31-64 1-1-78
Maryland 2-1-64 1-1-81 7-1-86
Massachusetts 10-1-58 1-1-80 3-1-84
Michigan 1-(-64 1-1-79 4-24-87
Minnesota 7-1-66 1-1-77 1-1-79
Mississippi 3-31-68 4-1-78
Missouri 7-1-65
Montana 1-2-65 10.1-83 10.1-83
Nebraska 9-2-65 7-19-80
Nevada 3-1-67 7-1-75 7·1-85
New
Hampshire 7-1-61 8-21-79 7-24-87
New Jersey 1-1-63 12-1-81
New Mexico 1-1-62 1-1-86 6-19-87
New York 9-27-64 7-2-78 9-1-82
North Carolina 7-1-67 7-1-76
Nonh Dakota 7-1-66 1-1-74 7-1·85
Ohio 7-1-62 1-1-79 9-20-84

(conti1lutld)
, 14.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14·8

TABLE 14-1 (cont'd)

1972 1977
Statt UCC Amtndmtnts Amtndmtnts

Oklahoma 1·1·63 10-19·81 11-1·84

Oregon 9-1-63 1·1-74 9-20-85
Pennsylvania 7·1-54 5·25-83
Rhode Island 1-1·62 1-1-80 1-1-88
South Carolina 1-1-68
South Dakota 7-1-67 7-[-83 •••
Tennessee 7·1·64 1-1·86 7-1-86
Texas 7-1-66 1-[·74 9-[·83
Utah 1-1-66 7-1-77
Vermont 1-1-67
Virgin Islands 7-1-65
Virginia 1-1·66 7-[-74 l-l·8S
Washington 7-1-67 6-30-82 6·11-86
West Virginia 7-1·64 7-1-75 5·23-79
Wisconsin 7·1·65 7-[-74 4-24-86
Wyoming 1-2·62 7-[-83 5-27-83

*Table \4·\ was revised on June \~, \988, based on materials then available to the author.
··Louisiana has not adopted Articles 2, 6, and 9. The adoption of Articles 7 and 8 first became
effective 1-1-79.
•••Adopted in 1986, effective date not available.

the effective dates of adoption, indicates which states have adopted the 1972
and 1977 amendments, and further shows the effective dates ofthose adoptions.
The process of updating the UCC is ongoing. A permanent editorial board
considers the need for revision. In 1987, the two sponsoring organizations, the
American Law Institute and the Commissioner on Uniform State Laws,
approved a new Article 2A on leases ofpersonal property. Work is also underway
on revisions to other articles, including Article 6 on bulk transfers.
For a number of years, the sponsoring organizations ofthe UCC have given
serious attention to revisions of Articles 3 and 4 so that those articles would
accommodate chal18es in the banking and commercial practices by which funds
are transferred and payments made, such as check truncation, wire transfers,
and other forms of electronic banking. A drafting committee p~epared several
drafts of a "Uniform New Payments Code" in the early 1980's. This project
attempted to develop a unified code that would apply to all payment systems,
paper checks, and transfers that are electronic in form, but this concept was
abandoned when it appeared impossible to reconcile the many conflicting view-
14-9 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1114.01(3)

points that would be affected by a dramatically new statutory scheme. In its

place, drafting efforts were bepn to revise existing Articles 3 and 4, on commer·
cial paper and bank deposits and collections, to correct some widely recognized
problems, and to develop a new Article 4A that would deal with the large dollar
wire transfer transaction generally conducted by large corporate enterprises. 11
Although the uee covers a wide area of commercial law, it could not and
docs not attempt to state all the law applicable to commercial transactions. The
general provisions of the uee expressly state that the uee is to be supple-
mented by general principles of law:
Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable
Unless displaced by the particular provisions ofthis act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions.11
The supplemental principles of law that the above provision incorporates
into the uee represent a vast body oflegal doctrine. This law cannot be covered
in any detail in a book such as this. There are standard legal treatises on each of
these subjects. Additionally, the various Restatements of the Law, published by
the American Law Institute, are helpful and authoritative sources of informa-
tion about the law on these various topics. 1!
Although there is a permanent editorial board of the uee that works to
preserve its uniformity, the states in fact have individually made many changes
to various parts of the uee that depart from the uniform text. This book
generany discusses the provisions ofthe official uniform text without identifying
state variations.
Many standard treatises cover the uee or particular subjects treated in the
uee. Some of the major works are listed in the following table.

(3] The Role of the Federal Government as the Source of Commercial

Law
The uee is state law and does not directly apply to the U.S. government.
Where the U.S. government is a party to a transaction. the pertinent law derives

.. As ofthis writing, drafts ofsome ofthese amendments have been prepared and are
in the process of review by various study groups and the sponsor orpnizations of the
vee.
lIVCC § J-I03. All references to the UCC in Ihis handbook are to the 1978 official
text. When reference is made to an earlier version of the vec, this is specifically nOled.
's Particularly helpfUl to the commercial lawyer are Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts (1979); Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957); Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1977); Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1957); Restatement of Security (1941).
1114.0113) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-10

TABLE 14-2 Legal Treatises on the Uniferm Commercial Code and Related.
Subjects

H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks (6th ed. 1987).

H. Bailey, Secured Transactions (2d ed. 1981).
B. aark, The Law ofBank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards (1981).
B. aark, The Law ofSecured Transactions (1980).
D. Dobbs, Remedies (1973).
J. Dolan, The Law ofLetters ofCredit: Commercial and Standby Credits (1984).
D. Epstein, Debtor-Creditor Law (3d ed. 1985).
G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965).
R. Goode, Commercial Law (1982).
F. Hart & W. Willier, Commercial Paper Under the Uniform Commercial Code
(1972).
W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series (1982).
R. Henson, Secured Transactions (2d ed. 1979).
F. Miller & A. Harrell, The Law ofModern Payment Systems and Notes (1985).
R. Nordstrom, Sales (1987).
N. Penney & D. Balcer, The Law ofElectronic Fund Transfer Systems (1980).
B. Stone, Uniform Commercial Code (2d ed. 1984).
J. Vergari & V. Shue, Checks, Payments, and Electronic Banking (1986).
G. Wallach, The Law ofSales Under the Uniform Commercial Code (1981).
C. Weber & R. Speidel, Commercial Paper (3d ed. 1982).
J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d ed. 1980).

from the Constitution, federal statutes, regulations of the particular department

or a8ency involved, decisions of the federal courts and, in some cases, the
decisions of the U.S. regulatory agencies. Federal government checks, for exam-
ple, have long been held subject to federal law, and not to the UCC," which is
state law. The federal law applied by the courts, however, is often patterned after
the UCC.'5 Also, Congress can choose explicitly to defer to state law. As dis-
cussed later, the federal role in determining the law applicable to the collection
of checks and electronic payments has become of major importance since the
enactment of the Expedited Funds Availability Act and the Federal Reserve
Board's adoption of Regulation CC, entitled "Availability of Funds and Collec-
tion of Checks."
Many federal acts apply to special businesses such as national banks, where
the regulation ofgovernment agencies may be the ruling law, or establish federal

"Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 US 363, 366 (1942}.

'"Bank of America v. United States, 552 F2d 302, 304-305 (9th Cir. I977}.
14-11 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.01[3)[a]

rules for specific types oftransaetions and practices, as in the aras of cons~er
'credit and unfair business practices. Also, federal and not state law applies to
business transactions on federal reservations, within the territories, and in other
areas governed directly by the U.S. government. In many cases that arise in this
situation, however, diligent search may not reveal any federal statute, agency
ruling, or decision that applies to the case in hand. When this happens, a court
may look to the general law on the subject, such as the UCc, to decide what the
fcderallaw ought to be.11 Thus, as a practical matter, in many modern oommer-
cial transactions, there is a combination of both federal and state law.

[aJ Federal Admi.lstratlTe Agencies. Banks, both stale and national, are con-
trolled in many of their activities by the Federal statutes, such as, among others,
those creating the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
other banking agencies discussed in Part I. These bodies are authorized to issue
regulations governi.n& the activities offederal and state banks within the areas of
their jurisdiction. When these agencies issue regulations within tbeir authority,
the regulations are superior to and prevail over any conflicting state law unless it
is an area where Congress has permitted the states to exercise such legislative
power."
General federal law governs the procedures federal agencies must follow in
their rule-making, adjudicatory, and other regulatory functions. The Adminis-
trative Procedures Act applies generally to federal agencies and contains provi·
sions on these matters. II Specific procedural rules applicable to each particular
agency often are found in the statutes establishing the agency and authorizing its
activities as discussed in Part I of this book. Other federal acts of general
application, such as the Freedom of Information Act," may have important
ramifications for the conduct of federal agency business.
Federal agency regulations are published in the Federal Register, with
proposed regulations published in advance for comment by interested parties.
Subsequently, the regulations become codified in the Code of Federal Regula·
tions. 20 Additionally, the agencies issue circulars, interpretations, and other

11 E.g.,
United Stales v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966).
"See Fidelity Fed. Sav. &. Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 US 141 (1982), holding
that FHLBB regulations for federally chartered savings and loan alSOCialions preempted
state laws restricting exercise of due-on-sale clauses in monpge lending agreements.
11 Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 324,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended
at 5 USC §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305,3105,3344,4301,5335,5372,7521(1982 &. Supp.
IV 1986). See K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1978).
11 Freedom oflnfonnation Act, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended al 5 USC
§ 552 (1982 & Supp.IV 1986».
20Federai statutes require the publication of federal rules. 5 USC §§ 551-559,
I SOI-1511 (1982).
, 14.01(3][b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-12

important information in various publications of each agency. The Board of

Governors publishes important information on legal actions it has taken as well
as Various economic data in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The Comptroller of
the Currency distributes rulings and interpretations it makes. The regulations
imd rulings of the Federal Reserve Board have been compiled by the Board in a
three-volume Federal Reserve Regulatory Service. Current developments that
involve banking regulatory matters are covered in the Bureau of National
Affairs publication Banking Report. Other treatises and looseleaf services on
federal banlcing law are available from commercial publishers.

fbJ Preemption of Federal Over State Rules. The interaction of the laws and
rules governing banking is not only complicated but, in some cases, may be flatly
contradictory. Quite often both state and federal statutes and regulations con-
tain provisions that indicate which laws and rules take precedence. The follow-
ing table shows the order of precedence of various state and federal rules.
Determining when a conflict exists between federal and state law is often
not a simple matter. There are two types ofcircumstances where conflict may be
found. The first situation involves direct conflict, as when the federal law directs
an individual to do one thing and the state law directs the individual to do
something else. When it is impossible to follow both state and federal com-
mands, the federal law prevails. The second situation is more difficult to deter-
mine. Congress may legislate in a particular area with the intent of precluding
state legislation on the same subject matter because such state legislation would
be inconsistent with the objectives ofthe federal law. Deciding when a conflict of
this nature exists involves a review of the particular provisions of state and
federal law and their effect on the objectives expressed in the congressional
legislation.·' With such a test, the outcome ofany particular controversy rests in
great measure upon a detailed analysis of the particular facts and circumstances,
and itls difficult to express any but the most general guidelines. The following
statement by the U.S. Supreme Court may be helpful in understanding the
Court's approach:

Absent explicit preemption language, Congress's intent to supersede state

law altogether may be found from a scheme of federal regulations so perva-
sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to
supplement it, because the act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject, or because the
object sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose .... Even where Congress has

.. For a general discussion of the doctrine of federal preemption, see J. Nowak, R.

Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 9.1-9.4 (3d ed. 1986).
14-13 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.01(3)lb}

TABLE 14-3 HieruCby of Laws

• Constitution of United States

• Laws passed by Conaress
• Rules offederal asendes authorized by Conaress
• State constitutions
• State statutes
• Resulations ofstate ascndcI

not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is pre-
empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a
conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility, ..• or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution. of the· full· purposes and objectives of
Congress. 21
The preemption doctrine is particularly difficult to apply in many areas of
commercial banking law because the federal government has established a regu-
latory framework for controlling banks and commercial bankins transactions
that is both pervasive and fragmentary. The framework is pervasive in view of
the wide variety of depository institutions and commercial banking practices
that are touched by the federal controls and what often appears to be a broad
delegation of authority to administrative agencies, but it is fragmentary in that
the scheme has developed in patchwork fashion over the years; although the
constitutional power to override state commerciallawis clear, it often is difficult
to decide to what extent Congress intended to supplant tbe basic commercial law
tbat otherwise would be operative. The application of state laws to transactions
engaged in by national banks is ilIustrative. No doubt exists that national banks
are instruments of federal policy, and state laws that interfere with a national
bank's performing the functions assigned to it by federal law are invalid. But
national banks engage in many transactions where state law determines the
rights and duties of the parties. "In particular, the contracts of national banks
have always been governed and construed by state laws, at least insofar as those
laws have been ofgeneral application and have not been in conflict with federal
law.""

21 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 US 190, 20),04 (1983).
•• Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 303 Or. 557, 564. 739 P2d 554, 561 (1987). B~st
held that the state law obligations ofgood faith in the performance ofCQIltracts applied to
fees a national bank charged ils customers for not sufficient funds (NSF) checks. Althouah
the comptroller could regulate national banks in a manner which indicated an intent 10
preempt the application ofstate contract law to bank service charges, such as NSF fees, the
, 14.01[3][bJ NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-14

Even when it is determined that federal law should control, Congress may
not have supplied the specific substance ofthe law to govern the transaction. In
cases where a court must fashion the substantive rule ofdecision, the court may
look to the principles ofstate law for guidance in formulating the rule. When the
state law is generally accepted among the states, such as the UCC, its adoption as
the basis for the federal rules is even more compelling, because it promotes
uniformity, certainty, and simplicity in defining the rights and duties of the
parties to commercial transactions.
The federal preemption doctrine applies not only when Congress passes a
law, but also when a federal agency enacts regulations within its authority to
regulate. 24 Thus, actions by the federal banking regulatory agencies also may
have the effect of preempting state law.
In Security Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de fa Cuesta, the U.S.
Supreme Court used sweeping language to describe the authority of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board to regulate federal savings and loan associations. 25 At
issue was the power ofthe board to adopt a regulation preempting state law that
limited enforcement of "due-on-saIe" clauses in mortgage lending documents.
In upholding the power of the board to override the state restrictions, the Court
said that Section 5(a) ofthe Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 21 gave the board
"plenary authority" to regulate federal associations. The Court said:
The broad language of§ 5(a) expresses no limits on the Board's authority to
regulate the lending practices offederal savings and loans. As one court put
it, "[i]t would have been difficult for Congress to give the Bank Board a
broader mandate. "27
Although the Court noted that it was not called upon to decide whether the
federal act or the board's regulations occupied the "entire field offederal savings
and loan regulations," it did find that "Congress invested the Board with broad
authority to regulate federal savings and loans so as to affect the statute's
purposes, and plainly indicated that the Board need not feel bound by existing
state law. "II

comptroller had not done so in the court's opinion. See also Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New
York, 347 US 373 (1954), which held a state Jaw prohibiting use of the word "savings" in
advertising by national banks was preempted because it interfered with the power to
receive deposits.
14 See Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 US 141 (1982).
15Id.
21 12 USC § I 464(a) (1982).
27
458 US at 161.
21 Id. at 162 n.16. On the scope of the Board's power, compare the majority opinion
with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion which emphasized that the Board's power to
preempt state law "is not limitless," id. at 171, and with the dissenting opinion ofJustice
Rehnquist which stressed that the Board's regulatory powers were to be exercised to
14-15 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.01[3](e)

[e) Authority ofFederal Resene System to Replate Certain Payment Meth-

ods. The Federal Reserve System has played a special role in the development of
the U.s. banking system, particularly in the arrangements and facilities for
collecting checks, providing bank credit, and supervising depository institu-
tions. In its capacity as the central banker for the United States, with its hol.dings
of reserves of member banks and others engaged in transactions subject to its
jurisdiction, the Federal Reserve System has developed facilities for the process-
ing of check collection, the transmission of funds by electronic means, and the
handling oftransactions in U.S. government securities. These systems, by them-
selves, give the Board ofGovernors and the Federal Reserve banks great powers
over the manner in which banking transactions are conducted. In addition,
Congress has conferred on the Board of Governors special statutory powers to
regulate key aspects of modern commercial banking practice. Among the most
important are electronic fund transfers and various aspects of consumer credit
practices. It
Under the previously discussed constitutional principles that give
supremacy to the duly enacted regulations of federal agencies over inconsistent
state laws, the regulations of the Board of Governors take priority over the
provisions ofthe UCC. In its Regulation J the board has adopted rules governing
the collection of checks and other items and transfers offunds.:ID UCC § 4-103
also recognizes the importance ofFederal Reserve Board relulations and operat-
ing rules by making these rules superior to those contained in the UCC and
binding on all parties involved in the transaction.
When Congress enacted the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA),)' it gave the Board of Governors sweeping new powers to become the
central regulator ofthe nation's payment system. Congress directed the Board to
exercise these powers to bring about substantial changes in the manner in which
the nation's check clearing and payments systems operate in order to accomplish
goals of greater speed and efficiency in making funds available for use by
depositors. Congress adopted this legislation in Title VI of CEBA, which is
entitled "The Expedited Funds Availability Act...•2 This legislation requires

assure the "soundness" of the federal savings and loan system, id. at 172. For an example
ofa case (although not a preemption case) where the court found regulatory authority was
laclcing, because the agency exceeded the powers Congress gave it, see Board ofGovemors
v. Dimension Fin. Corp.• 474 US 361 (1986).
HSedf 18.02. 18.03,26.03-26.06.
30
12 CFR § 210 (1987). For further discussion of Federal Reserve Board regulations
and operating rules. see ~ 3.03.
"Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(1987) [hereinafter CEBA].
•2CEBA, Pub. L. No. 100-86. Title VI 101 Stat. 552 (1987). Tille VI is the Expedited
Funds Availability Act. The Board has adopted rules to implement the act in a new
Regulation CC. "Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks," which is effective
September I, 1988. Regulation CC will be codified at 12 CFR pt.229. The earlier pro.
, 14.01(3](c) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-16

depository institutions to make funds available for withdrawal in accordance

with a statutorily prescribed schedule of availability.
Although the immediate focus ofTitle VI is on the creation ofa scheme for
making funds more quickly available to customers, there arc other far-reaching
consequences. As discussed in the following paragraphs, CEBA directs the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to initiate changes to improve the
manner in which checks and other payments are collected and gives the Federal
Reserve Board rule making powers to bring about these changes.
1. Federal R~rve Board authority to regulate check collection. The act
gives the Federal Reserve Board sweeping authority over the nation's payment
system. It provides that the Board "shall have the responsibility to regulate-(A)
any aspect ofthe payment system, including the receipt, payment, collection, or
clearing of checks; and (B) any related function of the payment system with
regard to checks."" Additionally, the Board is given specific authorization "to
impose on or allocate among depository institutions the risks ofloss and liability
in connection with any aspect of the payment system, including the receipt,
payment, collection, or clearing of checks, and any related function of the
payment system with respect to checks."'"
Acting under the authority granted in the Expedited Funds Availability Act,
as this book was going to press, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated a new
Regulation CC. "Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks," effective on
September I, 1988, which broadly regulates the bank collection and return of
checks and other payment items. This regulation covers many aspects of the
collection and return process that previously were regulated by the UCC.
Because Regulation CC preempts state law, as discussed later, its provisions
must be considered when dealing with check collection and return questions,
funds availability problems. and other payments issues. Future supplements will
examiile the impact of Regulation CC.
2. Preemption and Priority a/State Law. When the Federal Reserve Board
acts under the authority granted by CEBA, the Board's regulations will preempt
state law, including the provisions ofthe UCC that may be in effect in any state. 3S
The only exception to this preemption ofstate law occurs when the state law or
regulation provides a shorter period oftime for a depository institution to make

posed regulation was published at S2 Fed. Reg. 47,112-47,179 (Dec. II. 1987), amending
12 CPR pts. 210, 229.
"CEBA § 609(c)(I) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4008(c)(I».
34CEBA § 611(0 (to be codified at 12 USC § 4010(0). The statute provides that
liability under this provision "shall not exceed the amount of the check giving rise to the
loss or liability, and where there is bad faith, other damages, if any, suffered as a proxi-
mate consequence of any act or omission giving rise to the loss or liability." Id.
3SCEBA § 608(b) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4007(b».
14-17 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 1114.01(4)

deposited funds available for withdrawal by its customers than the federal
schedules of availability. When a stale law or regulation provides for a shorter
availability period, this state law will supenede the provisions of CEBA and
also, as a result of specific language in CEBA, will be binding on all federally
insured depository institutions in such state.·
3. Improving the Collection of Checks and Electronic Payments. The
Board's broad general authority parallels a wide ranging charge by Congress to
the Board to consider various techniques for the improvement ofcheck process-
ing and payment collections. Congress directed the Board to consider adopting
regulations to require a number of substantial changes in the manner in which
the payments system currently operates. These include check truncation, incen-
tives to institutions to return items promptly to the institution of flI'St deposit,
automation ofthe process of returning unpaid checks, standardized procedures
for check: indonement and automation ofthe reading of indorsements, prompt
notification of nonpayment of checks, procedures for ,,,,tum of all checks
through the Federal Reserve System, development of an electronic clearing
house that would eliminate the transmission ofpaper instruments, and allowing
the return of unpaid checks directly to the depository institution. 37 Part of the
Board's responsibilities under CEBA include the preparation of reports on the
progress made in specific implementation ofthe funds availability provisions of
CEBA as well as a broader study of the feasibility of modernizing the check:
payment system through tbe development of an electronic clearinghouse
process.-

[4J Conflict of Laws Doctrines

A major objective behind the enactment ofthe UCC was tbe elimination of
differences in tbe laws on commercial subjects among the states, so that com-
mercial transactions could be planned on a national basis without the need for
complex investigation ofthe particular laws ofeach state, and the elimination of
disputes arising as a result of differences between the laws of the states when
transactions involved more than one state." The UCC's goal of having a uni-
form national law applicable to commercial transactions, although achieved in
many important respects, could not be completely realized. Differences in inter-
pretations of the UCC, nonuniform modifications by the states, as well as
differences in the laws of the states in areas not covered by UCC ~ate the
possibility for conflicts when a commercial transaction toucbes more than one
state. In such instances, the conflict between the laws of the states that are

• CEDA § 608(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4007(8»).

37 CEDA § 609(b)(to be codified at 12 USC § 4008(b».
H CEDA § 609(d) (to be codified at 12 USC § 408(d».
IIUCC § 102(2)(c).
, 14.01[4) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-18

affected are resolved in accordance with the body of law known as conflict of
laws. 40
The uee, anticipating these difficulties, contains provisions dealing with
such conflicts. It adopts as a general policy the principle that the parties should
be able to agree on the state law that applies to their transaction as long as the
transaction bears "a reasonable relation" to the state law selected.·1 The general
policy of the uee on this matter is stated as follows:
Except as provided hereinafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state,,2
The comment explains what the drafters intended by the "appropriate
relation" test. Prior court decisions in ajurisdiction on conflict oflaws questions
where the court has refused to apply a statute of the jurisdiction should not
necessarily be foUowed in situations that involve the uee:
Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state which has
enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the question what relation
is "appropriate" is left to judicial decision. In deciding that question, the
court is not strictly bound by precedents established in other contexts. Thus
a conflict-of-Iaws decision refusing to apply a purely local statute or rule of
law to a particular multi-state transaction may not be valid precedent for
refusal to apply the Code in an analogous situation. Application ofthe Code
in such circumstances may be justified by its comprehensiveness, by the
policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a reformulation
and restatement of the law merchant and of the understanding ofa business
community which transcends state and even national boundaries.... In
particular, where a transaction is governed in large part by the Code,
application of another law to some detail of performance because of an
accident of geography may violate the commercial understanding of the
parties.~

Specific conflict-of-Iaws provisions govern transactions in specific subject

matters. Article 9 on secured transactions contains a detailed provision on the
perfection of security interests in multiple state transactions.'· There also is a
reference to conflict-of-Iaws provisions in the article on investment securities.·~

... For a statement ofthe general rules in this area ofthe law. see Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws (1971).
•1UCC § 1-105(1).
'2 Id.
quce § \-105 comment 3.
"uee § 9-103.
·'See uee § 8-106. See generally Leflar. "Conflict of Laws Under the U.C.C.... 35
Ark. L Rev. 87 (l98 I).
14-19 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW

A special provision on the liability of a bank covers action or nonaction in

handling checks or other items. This provision, uee
§ 4-102. set forth in the
following text, governs as to the matters covered by it rather than the general role
in Section I-lOS set out previously.... The role reads as follows:
The liability of a bank for action or non-action with respect to any item
handled by it for purposes of presentment, payment or collection is gov-
erned by the law of the place where the bank is located. In the case ofaction
or non-aetion by or at a branch or separate office of a bank, its liability is
governed by the law of the place where the branch or separate office is
located. 47 .

This rule is intended to reach broadly so that banks engaged in handling checks
and other items for coUection may determine with certainty what actions should
be taken by the banks themselves and what they may expect banks in other
jurisdictions to do. The comment to this provision states its purposes:

Subsection (2) is designed to state a workable rule for the solution of

otherwise vexatious problems of the conflicts of laws:
a. The routine and mechanical nature ofbank collections makes it imper-
ative that one law govern the activities ofone office of a bank.. The l'tlquire.
ment found in some cases that to hold an indorser notice must be given in
accordance with the law of the place of indorsement. since that method of
notice became an implied term of the indorser's contract, is more theoreti·
cal than practical.
b. Adoption of what.is in essence a tort theory of the conflict oflaws is
consistent with the general theory of this Article that the basic duty of a
collecting bank is one of good faith and the exercise of ordinary care.
Justification lies in the fact that, in using an ambulatory in!>trument, the
drawer, payee, and indorsers must know that action will be taken with
respect to it in other jUrisdictions. This is especially pertinent with respect
to the law of the place of payment.
c. The phrase "action or non-action with respect to any item handled by it
for purposes of presentment, payment or collection" is intended to make
the conflicts rule ofsubsection (2) apply from the inception ofthe collection
process of an item through all phases of deposit, forwarding, presentment,
payment and remittance or credit of proceeds."

... uee § t - t 05(2) provides that when §4-1 02 is applicable, it "governs and a contrary
agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict oflaw
roles) so specified [in § 4-102J ...." See uee § 1-105 comment S. But, there is also a
specific provision in Article 4 which permits the parties to vary the effects ofthat article by
agreement so long as there is no disclaimer of the responsibilities to act in good faith and
to exercise ordinary care. uee § 4-103(1). Thus. there may be agreements that vary the
choice of law rules set forth in uec § 4-102. uee § 4-102 comment 2ed).
47 uee § 4-102(2).

"uee § 4-102 comment 2.

1114.02 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-20

The fmal part of this Chapter begins the consideration ofthe various types
ofcommercial paper that the UCC covers. Before examining this paper and its
characteristics, however, the next section discusses how money is defmed. It is
necessary to distinguish money from the"instruments that are commercial paper
under the UCC.

'1114.02 MONEY
Before considering the types ofcommercial paper banks handle, a brieflook
at what is money and some of the basic law defining it is useful. Money needs to
be distinguished from other types of negotiable instruments, because the UCC
"provisions on negotiable instruments do not apply to money.·f Similarly, money
does not fall within the definition of"goods" in Article 2 of the UCC on sales. sa
Therefore, the rules in the UCC on the rights of purchasers of goods and
negotiable instruments do not apply to money.

[1] Defining Money

Money has many definitions. Economists define money in terms of its use
as a medium of exchange. 51 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, in carrying out its responsibilities to monitor tile money supply of the
nation, uses a set of definitions that includes demand deposits and sometimes
other deposits and assets. 52 The legal definition of money is different still. In the

"UCC § 3·103(1).
ooUCC § 2.105(1).
51 See J. Cochran, Money, Banking, and the Economy 5 (4th ed. 1979).
52-rpe Board has changed the definitions it uses from time to time. It uses five
categories to measure money, liquid assets, and debt: M·I, M·2, M-3, L, and Debt. See,
e.g., 74 Fed. Reserve Bull., Table A3 (Jan. 1988). These categories are:
4. Composition of the money stock measures and debt is as follows:
MI: (I) currency outside the Treasury, Federal Reserve banks, and the vaults of
commercial banks; (2) travelers checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits at all
commercial banks other than those due to domestic banks, the V.S. government, and
foreign banks and official institutions less cash items in the process of collection and
Federal Reserve float; and (4) other checkable deposits (OCD) consisting of negotia-
ble order of withdrawal (NOW) and automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts at
depository institutions, credit union share draft accounts, and demand deposits at
thrift institutions. The currency and demand deposit components exclude the esti-
mated amount of vault cash and demand deposits respectively held by thrift institu-
tions to service their OCD liabilities.
M2: M I plus overnight (and continuing contract) repurchase agreements (RPs)
issued by all commercial banks and overnight Eurodollars issued to V.S. residents by
foreign branches of V.S. banks worldwide, Money Market Deposit Accounts
(MMDAs), savings and small-denomination time deposits (time depos-
14-21 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.01(1}

uee, money is defmed as "a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a

.domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency. 'til The legal tender of
the United States is defmed more narrowly, including coins and currencies of
the United States,54 Federal Reserve notes, circulating notes of the Federal
Reserve banks, and circulating notes of national banking associations." Legal
tender must be accepted "for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.""
The coins ofthe United States include the nickel, copper penny, subsidiary
silver coins in denominations often, twenty-five, and fifty cents, silver dollars,

ita-inCluding retail RPs-in amounts ofless than $100,000), and balances in both
taxable and tax-exempt general purpose and broker/dealer money mamt mutual
fundIJ. Excludes individual retirement accounts (IRA) and Keop. balances at deposi·
tory institutions and money market funds. Also excludes all balances held by U.S.
commercial banks, money market funds (Ieneral purpose and broker/dealer), foreign
governments and oommercial banks, and the U.S. government. Also subtracted is a
oonsolidation adjustment that represents the estimated amount of demand deposita
and vault ush held by thrift institutions to servi(C their time and savings deposits.
M3: M2 plus larae-denomination time deposits and term RP liabilities (in amounts
of $100,000 or more) issued by oommercial banks and thrift institutions, term
Eurodollars held by U.S. residents at foreign branches ofU.5. banks worldwide and at
all banking offices in the United Kingdom and Canada, and balanc:ea in both taxable
and tax-exempt, inatitution-only money market mutual funds. Excludes amounts
held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, money market funds, and
foreign banks and official institutions. Also subtracted is a consolidation adjustment
that represents the estimated amount of overnight RPs and Eurodollars held by
institution-only money market mutual funds.
L' M3 plus the nonbank public holdings of U.S. savings bonds, short-term Trea-
sury sC(urities, commercial paper and bankers aC(Cptan(Cs, net of money market
mutual fund holdings of these assets.
Debt: Debt of domestic nonfinancial sectors consim of outstandina credit market
debt. of the U.S. governmont, state and local governments, and private nonfinancial
sectors. Private debt oonsists ofcorporate bonds, mortgages, consumer credit (includ-
ing bank loans), other bank loans, commercial paper, bankers acc:cptances, and other
debt instruments. TIle source of data on domestic nonfinancial debt is the Federal
Reserve Board's flow of funds Bcoounts. Debt data are based on monthly averages.
Growth rates for debt reflect adjustments for discontinuities overtime in the levels of
debt presented in other tables.
ld.
53 UCC § 1·201(24). See UCC § 3- I 07 & comment l. The UCC definition includes
foreign coin and currency.
54 31 USC § 5103 (1982).

5'See 12 USC §§ 101-153 (1982) for a description of the authority given national
banks to issue circulating notes.
u 31 USC § 5103 (1982). Before 19JJ, !here were special provisions faT each type of
money that determined its status as legal tender and oontrolIed its circulation: Act of May
12. 1933, Ch. 25, § 43(b)(I), 48 Stat. 52 (1933); Act of June 5, 1933, Cb. 48, § 2, 48 Stat.
113 (1933). Some of the special statutes have not been repealed. TMrc arc special
provisions for gold certificates. 31 USC §§ 5117 (1982).
1114.02[1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-22

and clad coins in denominations often, twenty-five, fifty cents, and one doUar. 17
.There are special-issue coins such as the Eisenhower dollar" and coins issued to
commemorate the bicentennial of the American Revolution. 1I There also is a
Susan B. Anthony dollar.eo The gold coins of the United States were discontin-
ued and withdrawn from circulation on January 30, 1934.11
The currency of the United States includes United States notes, treasury
notes of 1890, gold certificates, silver certificates, Federal Reserve notes, and
circulating notes of Federal Reserve banks and national bankjng associations. I!
At one time the currency ofthe United States was backed by reserves ofgold and
silver. Gold certificates were issued against gold reserves equivalent to 100
percent of the value of the certificates; silver certificates were backed by a 100
'percent silver reserve; the treasury notes of 1890 were secured by both silver and
gold; Federal Reserve notes were secured by gold reserves equal to at least 25
percent oftbe issue and other collateral. A
. The U.S. Court of Claims has held that the United States is under no
obligation to tender payment in gold to a person who holds a bond that the
United States originally promised to pay in gold coins. In Gold Bond Holders
Protective Council Inc. v. United States," the plaintiff owned a $50 gold liberty
bond issued on October 24, 1918. The bond promised that when it was presented

17 Authority to mint clad coins, which are an alloy ofcopper and nickel, is given by 31
USC §§ 5111,5112 (1982). Minting of the minor coins, the penny and the nickel, is also
covered by 31 USC § SIll, 5112 (1982).
$131 USC § 5112(e)(1) (1982).
51
31 USC § 324d (1976) (now repealed).
10
31 USC § 51 I2(d)(I)(1 982).
1131 USC § 5 118(b)(1 982).
12 See 31 USC pI19(b)(I), 5119(b)(2) (1982). U.S. currency notes are those issued
pursuant to federallaw. 31 USC§§ 511 5, 5119(b)(1982). Treasury notes of 1890 are notes
issued under the Act of July 14, 1890 ch. 708,26 Stat. 289. 31 USC § 5119(b)(I)(1982).
At one time national banks issued notes that circulated as money. These "circulating
notes" were secured by bonds of the United States. The National Bank Act authorized
national banks to issue the notes as part ofits plan to strengthen the currency ofthe United
States. By 1870 these notes amounted to more than one-third of the total currency in
circulation. National banks can no longer issue circulating notes. Although many of the
provisions of the National Bank Act relating to circulating notes remain on the statute
books (see 12 USC §§ 101-138, /68-178 (1982», in 1935 the United States retired al1 of
the bonds that carried the privilege of serving as security for issuance of the circulating
notes. 12 USC§§ 10I,10Ia(l982).
13 The issuance of silver certificates was authorized by Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 674,
§ 5, 48 Stat, 1178 (I 934)(original1y codified at 31 U.S.c. §§ 405, 821; repealed by Act of
June 4, 1963. Pub. L. No. 88-36, Tit. I, § 1,77 Stat. 54 (1963)). Issuance ofgold certificates
iuuthorized by 31 U.S.c. § 5117 (1982). The Act ofJune 12, 1945, ch. 186, 59 Stat. 237
(1945) established the gold reserve requirement for Federal Reserve notes at 25 percent.
Before this act, the reserve requirement was 40 percent.
84
676 F2d 643 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 459 US 968 (1982).
14-23 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.02(1)

to the Treasurer of the United States on or after october IS, 1938, the United
States would pay the principal and interest in gold coins oftha CllITCDt standard
ofvalue at that time. In 1981, the plaintiffpresented the bond for payment and
demanded payment in gold coins, orthe equivalent value in currency. This value
amounted to the sum of $1,253, because gold was selling for about $500 an
ounce on the date the bond was presented for payment. The Court of aaims
held that the plaintiff could not recover. In 1935 Congress enacted legislation
that withdrew consent to sue the United States on the gold clause contained in
the plaintiff's bond.II Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the suit
brought by the plaintiff. 1I
The United States has not been on the gold standard since 1934. Since that
year, federal legislation has prohibited redemption of currency in gold. '7 Gold
continued to serve as reserves for U.S. notes, treasury notes, Federal Reserve
notes, and Federal Reserve deposits until Congress removed the requirement of
a gold reserve for Federal Reserve deposits in 1965 and ended the gold reserve
requirements for U.S. notes, treasury notes, and Federal Reserve DOtes in
1968." Congress passed similar legislation dealing with silver reserves. Since
] une 24, 1968, silver certificates cannot be redeemed in silver bullion.II Legisla-
tion enacted in 1967 eliminated the requirement that the Secretary of the
Treasury maintain 100 percent silver reserves for silver certificates. 1lI
Nearly all ofthe currency in circulation today consists of Federal Reserve
notes, issued by the Federal Reserve banks. 71 These are obligations ofthe United

II 31 USC § 51I8(c) (1982).

II Gold Bond Holders Protective Council Inc. v. United States, 676 F2d 643, 646 (Ct.
CI.), cen. denied, 459 US 968 (1982). In Gold Bond Holders Protective Council Inc. v.
Atchinson, Topeka &. Santa Fe Ry., 649 P2d 947, 950·95 I (Alaska 1982), the owners of
bonds that were issued in 1895 with a term providing for payment in acid tried to obtain
payment in gold. In 1933, federal legislation eliminated the gold payment requirement,
but a 1977 amendment to the statute authorized gold payments on obligations issued after
October 28, 1977. 31 USC § 463 (1977) (31 USC 5118(d) (1982». The Alaska Supreme
Court held that this amendment did not restore the bond holders' right to payment in
gold.
I? 31 USC § 5119 (1982). The United States officially adopted the gold standard in
1900 with the Gold Standard Act ofMareh 14, 1900. There is an exceUent description of
the monetary history of the United States in J. Cochran, supra note 51, at 34-49.
II Act of Mareh 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-269, 82 Stat. SO. Congress eliminated the
requirement that Federal Reserve deposits be backed by a reserve of gold certificates in
1965. Act of March 3, 1965. Pub. L. No. 89·3, 79 Stat. 5 (1965). The reserve requirement
originally was set at 40 percent. but was reduced to 25 percent in 1945.
"31 USC § 5119(bXI) (1982).
70 Act of June 24.1967. Pub. L. 90-29. § 1.81 Stat. 77 (1967) (amending 31 USC
§ 405a-I, now at 31 USC 51 I6(b)(2)(1 982».
" Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve System, Purposes & Functions 105 (7th
ed. 1984).
114.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-24

States as well as of the issuing Federal Reserve banks. 12 They are backed by
collateral that equals 100 percent of the value of the notes and that consists of
U.S. government securities and certain types of commercial paper/I
A federal law makes it a crime to print or photograph U.S. currency, but
provides an exception for the publication ofillustrations for "philatelic, numis-
matic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes" in certain publications
when the illustrations are in black and white and are significantly different in
size from the original. In Regan v. Time, Inc.,74 a fragmented Supreme Court
held that this prohibition applied to a photographic illustration ofmoney on the
cover of Sports Illustrated magazine. All but one member of the Court regarded
the statutory publications exception that was limited to certain stated purposes
as a violation ofthe First Amendment, but the Court divided over the validity of
the size and color conditions to the exception.

[2) Gold and Foreign Exchange

Although federal law has eliminated the redemption of currency in gold
since 1934 in domestic transactions, gold continues to play an important role
because of gold reserve requirements, which lasted until 1968, and because of
international monetary arrangements that pledged the United States to redeem
the dollar with gold in international settlements. For a considerable period of
time, federal law required the value of the dollar to be set at a fixed amount per
ounce ofgold. The price was set at S3S per ounce in 1934, and this became the
rate established for foreign exchange in 1944, when the United States became a
member of the International Monetary Fund.n
International economic considerations eventually made it impossible for
the United States to maintain its international commitment to redeem dollars in
gold at theS3S per ounce price." In March 1968, the members of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund agreed to maintain a two-tiered price system that sepa-
rated the official price of gold, which was the basis for international exchange.
from the private market price of gold, which was considerably higher. The two-
tiered price system proved ineffective against stemming the foreign demand for

n 12 USC § 411 (1982).

71 12 USC § 412 (1982).
7< 468 US 641 (1984). The statute is 18 USC §§ 474,504 (1982).
7S Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 43(b)(2), 48 Stat. 5 I (1933); 1934 Proclamation No.
2072, 48 Stat. 1730 (1933). The price previously had been set at $20.67 per ounce. The
authority granted by the 1933 act to fix the value of the dollar expired in 1945. The
Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1944, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512, ratified the international
agreement which set the foreign exchange rate at $35.00. Sec generally H. Rep. No. 1095.
90th Con&., 2d Sen., reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1760, 1761.
7ISecS. Rep. No. 94-1148, 94th Cong., 2dSess. (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S. Code
Cong. &. Admin. News 5936-5945.
14-25 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.02[2]

U.S. COld. On Aupst 15, 1971, PresidentNixon suspendedthe convenion of the

dollar into gold in international settlements. Pour months later, the United
States entered into the Smithsonian Agreement, which realigned exchange rates
between currencies and resulted in an 8.5 percent devaluation ofthe dollar as the
price of gold rose to $38.00 an ounce. In Pebruary 1973, the United States
unilaterally devalued the dollar another 10 percent by rai.ing the price ofgold to
$42.22. By the end of 1973, this structure collapsed. In November 1973, the
governors of the central banks of Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States terminated their 1968
agreement, which had established the two-tier system for pricing gold. The
central banks became free to deal in gold in the private market. As a result, gold
fmally was removed as the basis for tbe international monetary system.
ExchlUlle rates between currencies no longer were tied to a fIXed value in gold,
but could float in response to economic conditions.'" Congress adopted legisla-
tion in 1976 to implement these changes. 1I
As the United States moved away from the gold standard,l'ClItrictions on the
private ownership of gold were eliminated. 71 Also, legislation in 1977 removed
the gold clause prohibition for transactions on or after OCtober 28, 1977. This
prohibition had made contract clauses stipulating for payment of an obligation
in gold or an amount of money measured in gold unenforceable. H Today, gold is
not legal tender, but a highly speculative commodity subject to widely fluctuat-
ing prices. Banks should use caution in engaging in any gold transactions."
The American Arts Gold Medallion Act of 1978 authorized the U.S. Mint to
issue gold medallions. The Mint sells these medallions to the public through a
purchase and distribution contract with a broker. The medallions are distributed

17 Id. J. Cochran, supra note 5 I, at 32, 46.

71 Bretton Woods Agreements Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660
(1976).
71 Act ofSeptember 21,1973, Pub. L. 93-110, § 3, 87 Stat. 352, as amended by Act of
August 14,1975, Pub. L No. 93·373, § 2,88 Stat. 445; Exec. Order No. 11,825, 40 Fed.
Reg. 1003 (1914) reprinted in 12 USC § 9Sa note Section 9 (1982). The Gold ReaerveAct
ofJan. 30.1934, ch. 6, §§ 3-4, 48 Stat. 337-340, vested title logold in the United States and
gave the federal government power to regulate and license private acquisition and use of
gold. The acts of 1973 and 1974 repealed these provisions. They provided that no law,
regulation, or order in effect on the effective date ofthe acts "may be construed to prohibit
any person from purchasing. holding, selling, or otherwise dealin. with lold in the United
States or abroad." Pub. L. 93-110, § 3(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-313, supra § 2.
~Act of Oct. 28,1977, Pub. L No. 95-147, § 54(c), 91 Stat. 1229. The gold clause
prohibition was enacted in 1933. Act of June 5, 1933. ch. 48, § I, 48 Stat. 113.
II See FDIC Policy Statement on Gold, 39 Fed. Reg. 43.765 (1974). Federal Reserve

Board Letter to All State Member Banks (Dec. 9, 1974); Comptroller of the Currency
Banking Circular No. 58 (Dec. 9. 1974).
1114.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-26

and sold to a network of dealers, including banks, brokerage houses, and coin
shops.12

1114.03 COMMERCIAL PAPER

Banks routinely deal in various types ofcommercial paper. One ofthe most
important categories ofpaper handled by banks is paper that qualifies as negoti.
able under Article 3 of the vee. This paper includes checks. drafts, notes,
certificates ofdeposit, cashier's checks, and similar instruments. Banks also may
handle other types of paper. Documents oftitle, such as bills oflading issued by
carriers for the transportation of goods, warehouse receipts, and similar docu·
ments are routinely used in commercial transactions. Investment securities such
as stocks and bonds are another important category. Additionally, ordinary
contracts may be encountered when parties having rights to payment or other
valuable interests under contracts ofvarious types may seek to use these rights as
collateral for loans from banks. Special forms of contracts that create security
interests in collateral such as Article 9 security agreements, real estate mortgages
and deeds of trust, and other financing documents are common. This chapter
briefly describes some of these different types of commercial paper. Chapters
15-21 explain in greater detail the rights and duties of parties to the type of
commercial paper known as negotiable instruments. Special attention also is
given to security agreements that create security interests in goods and other
personal property under Article 9 of the vee.

[1] Negotiable Instruments

The law ofnegotiable instruments has been codified as Article 3 ofthe vee.
The Dee recognizes four general classes of negotiable instruments: drafts,
checks, notes, and certificates of deposit.,) All types must be payable in money,
must be signed by the maker or drawer of the instrument, must be payable on
demand or at a definite time, must be payable to order or to bearer, and must
contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money.""
The vee does not foreclose the possibility that other forms of negotiable
instruments may develop in the future. The vee provisions apply only to
writings that are negotiable instruments "within this article."" Additionally,

use § Sill note (1982).

12 31
uvce § 3-104.
"vce § 3-104(1). For further discussion of the requirements for n'egotiability, see
~ 14.04.
"vee § 3·104 & comment I.
14-27 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.0311)

specialized subcategories of negotiable instruments include cashier's checks,

bank drafts, traveler's checks, share drafts. neaotiable orders of withdrawal, and
personal money orders. These specialized instruments are generally regarded as
falling within the categories established by the UCc, although the UCC itself
does not dc£mc them. Commentators have noted some difficulty in applyin,a the
standard UCC categories to personal money orders and traveler's checks.
The draft, of which the check is an example, is the most common form of
commercial paper that appears in a bank. It is a contract that normally includes
three parties: the drawer, the drawee, and the payee. It is an order by the drawer
that instructs the drawee to pay a certain sum ofmoney to a third party." Drafts
may also be two-party paper, in that the drawer and payee, drawer and drawee,
or drawee and payee may be the same person. When a draft is "drawn on a bank
and payable on demand" it is a check.I '
Some drafts commonly used by insurance concerns have four parties. The
agent of the insurance company draws.the draft on the company payable to a
beneficiary of a policy and payable at a certain bank or designating it as payable
through a certain bank.II
The note, which is normally two-party paper, is simply a promise by the
maker to pay a sum ofmoney to the named payee. Notes can be drawn payable to
the maker and then indorsed and transferred. When the drawer and the drawee
on a draft are the same person, the draft is "effective as a note..... Where a doubt
exists as to whether an instrument is a note or a draft, the holder may treat it as
either one. IO
The money order is a variation of a draft. Money orders may be sold by
banks, by the post office, and by other entities. A drawer orders a drawee to make
payment of a sum of money to the order of a specified person or to bearer.
Usually, the institution that sells the money order is in the position ofa drawee
and the party that purchases and signs the instrument is in the position of a
drawer. Because the drawee has not signed the instrument, it has no liability in
contract on tbe instrument. However, it is customary for sellers of money orders
to obtain payment for them in advance so that tbe money orders have little risk
of being dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Money orders are not
always negotiable. II
The draft is called a cashier's check when it is a draft the bank has drawn on

"UCC §§ 3-104(2)(a). 3-104(2)(b).

"ucc § 3·104(2Xb).
.. For funher discussion of these instruments. see ~ 21.04.
"UCC § 3·1 18(a).
IOUCC § 3·104(2)(b).
91 For further description ofmoney orders. see 4 W. Hawkland. Uniform Commercial
Code Series § 3-104:20 (1986 and Supp.). For fun her discussion of money order liability,
sec 'I 15.05.
t 14.03[2J NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-28

itself. When it is a draft the bank has drawn upon a different bank. the instru-
ment is referred to as a teller's chet:k or bank draft. It is common for thrift
institutions to use teller's checks.
In other spet:ialized forms of drafts used in sales transactions, payment for
goods sold is to be made against the presentation of documents or by drawing
drafts against a letter of credit. Documentary drafts are drafts used in letter of
credit transactions. Another form of draft, known as tbe trade acceptance, is a
time draft drawn by a seller as drawer on a buyer as drawee for the payment of
goods sold. The draft is presented for acceptance to the buyer, usually through
banlcing channels, and, on the buyer's acceptance, may be used as collateral for a
loan or discounted and transferred to a bank or other party who is willing to
purchase the draft.
A banker's acceptance operates in a fashion similar to the trade acceptance,
with tbe exception that a bank is the acceptor on the instrument. The banker's
acceptance also is used in a sales transaction. The seller draws a time draft on a
bank as drawee. The seller expects the bank to accept the draft because of prior
arrangements, usually under an agreement which has established a letter of
credit, which have created a commitment by the bank to accept drafts drawn on
it. After the bank accepts the draft, it may be discounted and sold to otber parties
who are willing to deal in such instruments. Because the banker's acceptance
carries the legal obligation of a bank as an acceptor of the instrument, the
instrument is marketable, and there is a recognized market in which certain
banks and dealers buy and sell these instruments.
The certificate of deposit, which is functionally similar to a note, is an
"acknowledgment by a bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay
it. "12 It may be either negotiable or not negotiable.

(2) Letters of Credit

A letter ofcredit is a promise by a bank or another person that the issuerwiIl
pay when a draft or other specified demand for payment is made to the issuer in
compliance with the conditions set forth in the letter of credit.n Article 5 of the
UCC applies to letters of credit and defines their scope. M International customs
and agreements also may apply. The letter of credit is not a promise to pay
money, as in the case ofa draft or note, but is a promise ofthe issuer to pay when
drafts or similar written demands, as specified in the letter of credit, are made.

[31 Securities
Investment securities are a specialized form of contract rights. Article 8 of

12 vee § 3-104(2)(c).
··vee § S-I03(1){a).
•• vee § 5- 102. For further discussion of the letter of credit, see 1'1 17.02-17.04.
14-29 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.03(5)

the uee applies to invcstment securitiCll. Such securities may be in the form ofa
written instrument, in which case the uee refers to them as a "certificated
security."They also may be in a form such that they arc not represented by an
instrument but merely consiat ofan interest or obligation carried on the books of
the issuer. In the latter situation, the security is termed an "uncertificated
security..... Investment securities are riihts that represent "a share, participa-
tion, or other interest in property ofor an enterprise ofthe issuer or an obligation
of the issuer ....... and that meet additional requirements with respect to their
treatment as a form of investment. Thus, investment securities under Article 8
may include obligations such as a note, debenture, or bond. They also include
interests in a business or enterprise such as shares of stocle and certificates of
interests in busincss trusts, partnerships, or other ventufCll.

(4) Documents of Title

The most common types ofdocuments oftitle arc the warehouse receipt and
the bill oflading. The former is an agreement by a warehouseman to store goods
and deliver them to a named person. The latter is a similar contract by a carrier
to ship goods and deliver them to a named person. Paper of this kind may be
either two- or three-party paper. The person delivering the goods may contract
to have them returned to him, or to his order, or to a third person or to his order.
The rights and obligations created by this paper are covered by Article 7 of the
Vee.f1 Some documents of title, such as bills of lading issued by interstate
carriers, arc also covered by federal law.

(5) Security Agreements

Paper carrying title to real estate or to goods is often used as security for
loans. The most common contracts ofthis form in real estate transactions arc the
mortgage and the deed of trust. Paper that provides for a security interest in
personal property is classified by the vee as a security agreement. II Security
agreements include what under earlier law was termed a chattel mortgage,
conditional sales agreement, or trust receipt." Sometimes the old terminology is
still used, but this is ofno legal consequence. Ifthe vee requirements are met, a
valid security interest is created whatever the name used.'110 These transactions
are discussed in Chapters 22-24.

tSuee § 8.102.
Muee § 8·102(1)(a).
0' For funher discussion of the rights and Obligations created by documents of title,
see ~ 14.05[1].
"vee § 9·105(1).
.. These tenns were created under statutes repealed by the vee.
""See vec §§ 9·102. 1·201 (37).
1114.04 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-30

114.04 REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTRUMENTS TO BE

NEGOTIABLE
The holder ofa negotiable instroment may obtain special rights and advan-
tages as compared with persons who have claims based upon ordinary contract
rights. For an instroment to be a "negotiable instrument," it must meet the
requirements set forth in the UCC, as follows:
§ 3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft..; "Check"; "Certificate
of Deposit"; "Note"
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the
maker or drawer except as authorized by this article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.'01

Before considering these requirements, it is worth noting that Section 3-104

applies to negotiable instruments "within this article." The comment to the
section explains that the drafters used this language deliberately because it
"leaves open the possibility that some writings may be made negotiable by other
statutes or by judicial decision. The same is true as to any new type of paper
which commercial practice may develop in the future. "'02
An obligation cannot be made a negotiable instrument by contract between
the parties or by their conduct or by action labeling the obligation as negotiable.
The law ofestoppel may be applicable in a particular case to give rights to a bona
fide purchaser or other person that are similar to the rights held by a holder in
due course ofa negotiable instrument, but this result depends upon principles of
law outside the vee and does not make the writing a negotiable instrument as
such.,03

[IJ Advantages of Negotiability

The holder of a negotiable instrument has advantages over the transferee of
ordinary contract rights. Firstly, the holder of a negotiable instrument may
qualify as a holder in due course. Being a holder in due course will enable the
holder to be free from many defenses of parties to the instrument that might
otherwise be asserted in defense to a demand for payment and will enable the

'01 vee § 3-104.

102 vee § 3-104 comment 1.
103ld., comment 2.
14-31 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.o4(2)(a1

holder to claim the instrument free from any claims of ownership by other
parties. '04 Secondly, the holder of a negotiable instrument has a cause of action
on the instrument against the parties who are liable on the instrument such as the
drawer or maker atld indoners. 'M Having a cause of action on the instrument
may give the holder a simpler claim than would be the case if the holder had to
litigate a claim for payment based upon performance ofa contract. Thirdly, the
holder of a negotiable instrument is given the advantage of various presump-
tions, procedural rules, and substantive rights. When an instrument is given as

I.
payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation, no consideration is
necessary for the instrument. Signatures on the instrument are presumed to be
genuine or authorlzed. 'OT Further, once the signatures on an instrument are
established, the holder is entitled to recover on the instrument by producing it
unless a defense has been established.'.
At one time there was an additional advantage in holding negotiable com-
mercial paper, because the Federal Reserve Board required that the paper be
negotiable in order for it to be eJiaible for rediscountina within the Federal
Reserve System. The Board eliminated the need for commercial paper to be
negotiable in 1970, and this change removed an important reason from a bank's
standpoint for wanting commercial paper it took to be negotiable. I"
[2] Requirements for Negotiability
Except in cases where special statutes and regulations protect consumers,
the provisions ofthe vee govern the nature and effect of most types ofnegotia-
ble paper. " o The requirements for negotiability are described in the subsections
that follow. The basic statute that establishes these requirements is set out at the
beginning of this section.

(a) Proinise or Order. No set words are necessary to meet the requirement that
an instrument contain a promise or order. Any words that show the intent ofthe
person drawing the instrument to make an order or promise are sufficient. 111 The

104 vec § 3-305.

'05vec §§ 3.413, 3-414. 3-41 S.
101 vec § 3.408.
'01 vee § 3-307(1).
104 vee § 3-307(2).
lot See 3S Fed. Reg. 6116 (1970), where the Federal Reserve Board eliminated its
regulation prohibiting the discounting of commercial, agricultural. or industrial paper
that was not negotiable in 12 eFR § 201.3(a) (1970); 9 Fed. Reserve Bull. 559 (1923).
Although the Board's regulations prior to J 970 had required negotiability, the Federal
Reserve Act did not impose such a requirement. See 12 vse § 343 (1982).
'''The special consumer rules are discussed in , 16.06.
,,, vee § 3·104 & comment 5.
'II 14.04[2J1al NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-32

form of order that commonly appean in checks or drafts is simply "pay to the
order of," but alternative language will be sufficient if it is "clearly the equiva-
lent" ofthe language used in the UCC. When it is doubtful that the language used
is the clear equivalent, the comment counsels the instrument should be viewed
as not negotiable. m
"lor we promise to pay" is the usual printed form of the promissory note,
but such words as "I undertake" will be a sufficient promise. l1S On the other
hand, IOUs and due bills containing such statements as "due to X $100" are not
promises, but mere acknowledgments of debt, while "borrowed $100" or
"received $100" and the like are mere receipts, not promises. If the words are
ambiguous, it is the policy of the UCC to treat such paper as nonnegotiable
within Article 3.'"
A negotiable instrument must not only contain an unconditional promise or
order but alro must be free from any other promises or obligations. The uec
provides that a negotiable instrument must "contain an unconditional promise
or order to pay a sum certain in money and no otherpromise, order, obligation. or
power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this article; ... ""1
Thus, a contract cannot be converted into a negotiable instrument by including
phrases that otherwise would establish negotiability under uee § 3-104. How-
ever, the vee recognizes certain additional promises or obligations as appropri-
ate. These include certain requirements with respect to coIlateral that are
common in notes and other statements. The specific sections ofthe vce dealing
with the various requirements for negotiability contain details on which terms
are permissible. In addition, there is a general provision that allows use of
certain terms in a negotiable instrument without destroying its negotiability.
That section provides as follows:
§ 3-112. Terms and Omissions Not Affecting Negotiability
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected by
(a) the omission of a statement of any consideration or of the place
where the instrument is drawn or payable; or
(b) a statement that coIlateral has been given to secure obligations
either on the instrument or otherwise of an obligor on the instrument or
that in case of default on those obligations the holder may realize on or
disposal of the collateral; or
(c) a promise or power to maintain or protect coIlateral or to give
additional collateral; or
(d) a term authorizing a confession ofjudgment on the instrument ifit
is not paid when due; or

112uee ~ 3-104 comment 5.

IlSYd.
'''See vee §§ 3-102 comment 2. 3-104 comment 5.
11Suee § 3-104(1)(b) (emphasis added).
14-33 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.0412]lb]

(e) a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law intended for the
advantage or protection of any obligor; or
(f) a term in a draft providing that the payee by indoning or cashing it
acknowledges full satisfaction of an obligation of the drawer; or
(g) a statement in a draft drawn in a set of parts (Section 3-801) to the
effect that the order is effective only if no other part has been honored.
(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any tenn which is otherwise
illeaal.

[hI Unconditional. The "promise or order" in a negotiable instrument must be

unconditional, as set forth in the following guidelines:
§ 3-105. When Promise or Order Unconditional
(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made condi-
tional by the fact that the instrument
(a) is subject to implied or constructive conditions; or
(b) states its consideration, whether performed or promised, or the
transaction which gave rise to the instrument, or that the promise or order
is made or the instrument matures in accordance with or "as per" such
transaction; or
(cl refers to or states that it arises out ofa separate agreement or refers
to a separate agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration; or
(d) states that it is drawn under a letter of credit; or
(e) states that it is secured, whether by mortgage, reservation oftitle or
otherwise; or
(I) indicates a particular account to be debited or any other fund ot
source from which reimbursement is expected; or
(g) is limited to payment out of a particular fund or the proceeds of a
,particular source, if the instrument is issued by a government or govern-
mental agency or unit; or
(h) is limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership,
unincorporated association, trust or estate by or on behalf of which the
instrument is issued.
(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument
(a) states that it is subject to or governed by any other agreement; or
(bl states that it is to be paid only out of a particular fund or source
except as provided in this section.

To be unconditional, the promise or order must stand on its own without

relying upon an outside document or event except as specifically permitted by
the Vec.,,1 A provision in a note that it "is payable when ':t1y contract is

lIIUCC §§ 3·\05. 3-( \2.

OJ 14.04(2]1b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-34

accepted" will make the instrument conditional and therefore nonnegotiable." 7

However, when such expressions are mere statements of the transaction
from which the instrument arises, such as statements of accounts fonnd in
voucher checks ("this check is in payment of the following account,"), they are
not conditions and do not render the instrument nonnegotiable. 11I IfreQuests are
contained in the instrument for an act required in the course of business for
payment of the instrument, such as requests often found on certificates of
deposit, "payable on retum of this certificate properly endorsed," or the words
on a check, "payable when properly countersigned by the payee," they do not
constitute conditions and therefore do not affect negotiability of the paper.
These are not sufficient in themselves, however, to make the paper negotiable, or
payable to order, and the instrument must qualify as a negotiable instrument
apart from this language.'11
Statements ofthe source ofreimbursement ofthe account to be charged do
not affect negotiability ofinstruments containing them. A promise to payout of
a particular fund, however, renders the instrument nonnegotiable. 12O For exam-
ple, "pay to the order of X and charge my account" or "on account of contract"
should not destroy negotiability,121 but "payout ofmy cotton retums"12:1 or "out

117 UCC § 3-105(2). A note that contained a restriction to the effect that it could not be
transferred, pledged, or assigned without the written consent of the maker was not a
negotiable instrument because the promise to pay was not unconditional. First State Bank
at Gallupv. Clark, 91 NM 117, 119,570 P2d 1144, 1146(1977).
The makers ofa promissory note incorporated a condition in the body ofthe note that
gave the makers the right to apply payments made under the note to a bank thaI held a first
mortgage on real property. (The makers had purchased the land subject 10 that mortgage,
but their sellers were obligated to pay the debt the mortgage secured.) The court held that
Ihis condition prevented the note from being a negotiable instrument. lllinois State Bank
v. Yates, 678 SW2d 819, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Because the note was nonnegotiable,
the bank could not be a holder in due course and took the instrument subject to the
defense that there was a partial failure of consideration.
See generally Annot., "What Constitutes Unconditional Promise to Pay Under UCC
§ 3-104(1)(b)," 88 ALR3d 1100 (1978).
1•• UCC § 3.105.

..·UCC § 3·110(2) & comment 5.

2CI
• UCC § 3·105(1)(1), (g). When more than one interpretation ofa provision in an
instrument is possible, a court may prefer to adopt a construction that upholds the
negotiability of the note. The Texas Court of Appeals took this approach in Grant Rd.
Pub. Util. Dist. v. Coulson, 638 SW2d 616, 618-619 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), where it
construed a provision in a note that payment was to be made from the proceeds ofsales of
bonds as being a promise to pay from that source iffunds were available but otherwise to
pay from other sources and refused to construe the provision as meaning that payment
could only come from the source stated because that would destroy the negotiability of the
instrument.
• 2. uec § 3-105(1)(1). This was the result before the V.C.c. L'tah Lake Irrigation Co.
v. Allen, 64 Utah 51 I, 231 P 818 (1924); Slaughter v. Bank of Bisbee, 17 Ariz. 484,154 P
1040 (1916); Hanna v. McCrory, 19 NM 183, 141 P 996 (1914); First Nat'l Bank v.
Lightner, 74 Kan. 736,88 P 59 (1906); Shepard v. Abbott, 17 Mass. 300,60 NE 782
(J 901).
,..vcc § 3-I05(2)(b). See the following pre-VCCcase. Tomlin v. Neale, 76 Cal. App.
14-35 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.04(2][b]

of my account",Q are conditions if they are interpreted as making payment

depend upon the existence of a balance in the specified accoun~, and therefore,
if so intended, they render the instrument nonnegotiable. Notes issued by IlOV-
ernmental bodies are often payable out of "paving funds," "school taxes," and
other particular funds. The UCC specifically exempts this paper from the partic-
ular fund rule and makes it negotiable. 'M Although all checks drawn upon bank
accouBts are expected to be paid from the balance of the appropriate account,
the checks themselves contain no reference to such expectation and a careful
examination will show that they are unconditional orders. When a bank pays on
a check, even if tho payment constitutes an overdraft, it is not a violation of the
contract contained on the face ofthe check, and the bank may claim the amount
from the depositor.m
Promissory notes of partners and unincorporated companies sometimes
raise difficulties on the question bfconditional promises. The general rule oflaw
is that an instrument payable out of a particular fund is not negotiable. '9 If a
partner in a business were to draw a note payable out of only his share of the
business, it would be from a particular fund and therefore nonnegotiable. 1I7 But
a note that limits payments only to the assets of the partnership, exempting
personal property ofthe partners, is negotiable. '21 A similar rule applies to trusts.
It is a common practice to include in instruments descriptions of the trans-
action from which they originate. If such statements are merely descriptive of
the transaction that gives rise to the instrument, they do not constitute condi-
tions and are viewed as only informational. For example, "the transaction which
gives rise to this instrument is the purchase ofgoods from the drawer" does not
affect the negotiability of the draft on which it appears. "Value received in rent
for the month of August" in a rent note, "this note is in payment of the first
installment of a contract," and the like in notes do not destroy their negotiabil-
ity, and abbreviated forms of such statements, "value received as per contract,"
are all construed as mere statements ofthe transactions and do not prevent the
instrument containing them from being negotiable.'111 On the other hand, such
provisions as "this is subject to and part ofsaid contract," "payment to be made
only as provided in contract," and their abbreviation, "subject to contract, It

726, 245 P 800 (1926). In Rogers v. Willard. 453 So2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
however, the court concluded that a note made payable out of "restanrant earnings" did
not destroy the negotiability of the instrument because that language was not a condition
that payment would be made from only that source.
123 vee § 3-1 05(2)(b). See the following pre-Vee cases. Glendora Bank v. Davis, 204
Cal. 220, 267 P 311 (1928); Rector v. Strauss, 134 Ark. 374, 203 SW 1024 (1918);
Woodward v. Smith, 104 Wis. 365, 80 NW 440 (1899).
'''vee § 3-I05(1){g).
' 25 vee § 4-401(1).
'21 vee § 3-105(2){b).
12' [d.
'21 vee § 3-105(I){h) & comment 7.
""vee § 3-105(1)(b).
114.04(2]1b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-36

make the instruments dependent upon the terms of the contract and therefore
. conditional and nonnegotiable.'36
A Florida case held that a mere reference in a note that it is being secured by
a mortgage does not render the note conditional. However, when the terms ofthe
mortgage "are by this reference made a part hereof' of the note, the note is
conditional. IS'
. The negotiability ofan instrument is to be determined from an examination
ofthe face ofthe instrument. The vee provides that "a separate agreement does
not affect the negotiability of an instrument:' 112 It is possible for a separate
writing to modify or affect a note or other negotiable instrument as between the
immediate parties. '33 But the comment explains that the existence ofa separate
writing or oral agreement should not destroy the negotiability of a note. The
comment states:
Subsection (2) rejects decisions which have carried the rule that contempo-
. raneous writings must be read together to the length ofholding that a clause
in a mortgage affecting a note destroyed the negotiability of the note. The
negotiability of an instrument is always to be determined by what appears
on the face of the instrument alone, and if it is negotiable in itself a
purchaser without notice of a separate writing is in no way affected by it. ,:w

The uee is not clear as to the extent to which parol evidence may be used to
vary the terms of a negotiable instrument. There is a provision, uee § 3-118,

UOUCC § 3-105(2}(a). A check was not made conditional by a notation in its lower
lelthand comer stating, "Payee must prove clear title to material'" Furthermore, the
statement did not give notice to the holder ofthe check to investigate and determine ifthe
drawer had a defense to payment of the instrument. The court found the phrase ineffec-
tive to destroy negotiability or to give notice because it was located on the check where a
drawer normally writes memoranda. It was "nothing more than a self-serving declara-
tion" for the drawer's own record-keepin& and informational purposes. Western Bank v.
RaOec Conslr. Co., 382 NW2d 406, 409-410 (SO 1986). See also ~ 21.03[1].
13' Holly Hills Acres, Ltd. v. Charter Bank of Gainesville, 314 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla.
Oist. Cl. App. 1974). When a mortgage bond states that it incorporates all ofthe covenants
and conditions contained in a separate mortgage agreement, the bond is not a negotiable
instrument because it states that it is subject to another agreement. VCC § 3-105(2Xa).
"The fact that the incorporated mortgage may not actually contain any provisions that
would impede the unconditional promise to pay is of no significance." In re Levine, 24
Bankr. 804, 811 (Bankr. SONY 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 32 Bankr. 742 (Bankr.
SONY 1983), alrd, 732 F2d 141 (2d Cir. 1984).
The incorporation of liens into the terms of a note does not make the note a non-
negotiable instrument. Tbe court said that "the deeds of trust and security agreement
given to secure the debt or promises to pay could not have rendered defendant's promise
to pay uncertain or conditional." Thus, the incorporation oftbe liens in the note did not
affect the negotiability of the instrument. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v.
Matthews, 71 NC App. 209, 321 SE2d 545, 547 (1984).
132UCC § 3-119.
133 UCC §3-119( I). Sed 16.05.
'''UCC § 3·119, comment 5.
14-37 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.04l2)lcl

that gives rules of construction to apply in certain enumerated circumstances

where the terms of an instrument are ambiguous. The comment to this section
states that its purpose "is to protect holders and to encourage the free circulation
of negotiable paper by stating rules of law which will preclude a resort to parol
evidence for any purpose except reformation of the instrument. Except as to
such reformation, these rules cannot be varied by any proof that any party
intended the contrary."·· In tbe next section, DeC § 3·119, which deals with
when a separate writing may affect a negotiable instrument, the comment states
that the vee "does not attempt to state general rules as to when an instrument
may be varied or affected by parol evidence, except to the extent indicatedby the
comment to the preceding section."•• Cases have held that parol evidence may
not be admitted to contravene the terms of a written instrument appearing
complete and unconditional on its face. ,~

leI In Writing and Signed. The requirement of writing simply means that no
agreement that is oral can be negotiable. The term "writing" in the law includes
longhand, typewriting, or any form ofprinting.·11 The signature, as has already
been indicated, may be made by writing the name any place on the paper,'" by
mark, rubber stamp, printing, or lithography, if it can be identified sufficiently
and is intended to serve as a signature.'· Parol evidence is admissible to identify
the signer. W
The requirement tbat a negotiable instrument be a "writing" excludes
transfers of funds made by electronic communication methods from the defini·
tion of negotiable instrument. Thus, the law in the vee relating to negotiable
instruments does not specifically deal with electronic fund transfers and check
collection and payment systems that involve processing by electronic means
rather than transmission oftbe paper instruments, such as "wire transfers" and
"check truncation... This is discussed in Chapter 18.

,"UCC § 3·118, comment I.

'"UCC § 3·119, comment I.
m Trustees of Tufts College v. Parlane SportsWear Co., 4 Mass. App. 783, 342 NE2d
727 (1976); Texas Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 SW2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
For a discussion ofthe UCC rules on when a separate agreement may modify the terms of
a negotiable note so as to provide the basis for a defense to payment of the note, including
a discussion ofthe relevance of parol evidence to establish such a sepamte agreement, see
~ 16.05.
,.eUCC § 1-201(46).
13IUCC § 1-201(39). See Estate of Donohoe, 271 Pa. 554, 115 A 878 (1922).
,.°vec §§ 3-401(2), 1.201(39). In Sequoyah Stale Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 274
Ark. I, 621 SW2d 683, 684 (1981), the court held that the printed name of a bank on a
money order constituted a signature.
141 vee § 3-401 comment 2. For further discussion of signalures made by agents and
other representAtives, see" 15.04, 18.04, 20.08.
114.04(2)[d] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-38

(d) Certainty as to Sum. Under the uee, to be negotiable, an instrument must

. be payable in money.iU The amount ofthe instrument will be sufficiently certain
to meet the requirements of negotiability if the amount is stated on the instru-
ment or can be calculated by a simple process ofarithmetic and reference to the
calendar at maturity. Thus, instruments payable with interest until maturity at a
certain rate are negotiable. '43 Instruments payable with interest at a certain
percentage until maturity (providing that the whole amount will bear a different
rate in case of default) are equally negotiable, because the amounts can be
calculated both before and after default.'.... In some cases, an instrument may be
negotiable when it contains promises to pay in addition to its face value certain
specific business charges even though the exact amount of these charges is
unknown. For example, the promise to pay exchange,'44 cost of collection, or
attorney fees does not destroy negotiability.,.1
The policy behind the sum certain rule is that "at any time of payment the
holder is able to determine the amount then payable from the instrument itself
with any necessary computation. "'47 The comments state that "the computation
must be one which can be made from the instrument itself without reference to
any outSide source, and this section does not make negotiable a note payable
with interest 'at the current rate'.",.1 Because of these requirements, a note with
a variable interest rate dependent upon an external index is not payable in a sum
certain.'"

(el Payable in Money. A negotiable instrument must be payable in money.'so

An instrument may be made payable in a foreign currency. When this is done,
unless the instrument specifies otherwise, payment of the obligation may be
satisfied by paying "that number ofdollars which the stated foreign currency will
purchase at the buying sight rate for that currency on the day on which the
instrument is payable or, if payable on demand, on the day ofdemand."'" The
instrument may specifically require as the medium of payment that the instru-
ment be payable in a foreign currency. IS> It is unclear from the language ofUee
§ 3·107 and comments ifit would be acceptable for an instrument to be for a sum
certain in a foreign currency but payable in U.S. dollars at a stated exchange rate

"'vee § 3-104( I)(b).

'''vee§ 3·[06.
'''vce § 3-[06(1).
"·vee § 3·106(1)(d).
'''vee § 3-106(1Xe).
,., vce § 3-106 comment I.
'44Id.
'''See Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n Y. Arena, [45 VI. 20, 481 A2d 1064 (1984);
Northern Trust Co. v. E.T. Clancy Export Corp., 612 F. Supp. 712 (ND 111. 1985).
150vec §§ 3-104(lXb), 3-107(1).
151 VCC § 3-107(2).
'SOld.
14-39 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.04[2JlQ

other than "the buying sight rate for that currency on the day on which the
instrument is payable."1u

(f] Payable on Demand. Instruments are payable on demand when they so

state, or say they are payable at sight, or on presentation.1M If no time for
payment is expressed, the instrument is presumed to be payable on demand and
negotiability is not affected by the omission ofa defmite date. 111 An instrument
with blanks not tilled in is not negotiable. A note that states on its face, "On
demand but no later than 180 days after date," creates ambiguity as to whether it
is payable on demand. 'II
When an instrument is payable on demand. the time when a cause ofaction
will accrue against a party liable on the instrument will depend upon whether the
party has primary liability as a maker or acceptor or secondary liability as a
drawer or indorser. In the case ofa maker or acceptor. the cause ofaction accrues
on a demand instrument "upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of
issue. "'&7 A cause of action against a drawer of a draft or an indorser of any type
of instrument, on the other hand, "accrues upon demand following dishonor of
the instrument."'" Giving notice of dishonor is sufficient to constitute a
demand for payment. '5'
When the instrument is a certificate of deposit, a different rule applies.
Because a certificate of deposit is the type of instrument that may be held for a
considerable length of time, a period that may exceed the applicable statute of
limitations, the uee provides that the cause of action against an obligor on
either a demand or time certificate of deposit will accrue upon demand.'10
When the issue is the time at which interest may begin to run on an
instrument that has not been paid, "unless an instrument provides otherwise,
interest runs at the rate provided by law for a judgment" and when the instru-
ment is payable on demand, the interest begins to run "from the date of
demand" in the case of a maker, acceptor, or other primary obligor.'" In other
cases, interest runs from the date of accrual of the cause of action unless the
instrument provides otherwise. lI2

,sauce § 3.I07{2).
's<uce § 3·108.
155ld. In Harris & Harris v. Tabler, 232 Va. 15. 77, 348 SE2d 241, 243 (1986), the
court ruled that a note without a due date is payable on demand and that a five-year
stalute of limitations begins to run on the date of issue. See' 21.10(2).
l!;5 Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Schriber, 282 Or. 625, 580 P2d 1012, 1013 (1918).
157uee § 3-122(l)(b).
'55uee § 3-122(3).
'''Id.
'"uee § 3-122(2) & comment I. In the case of a time certificate of deposit, the
demand may not be made, of course, until on or after the date of matllrity.
,., vec § 3-122(4).
'·"Id.
~ 14.04(2J(f] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-40

A negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) draft is a draft where the account

.to be debited is usually a savings account at a bank or thrift institution. Federal
law authorizes depository institutions to offer NOW accounts. Because the
NOW draft is not drawn on an account on which the drawer has a legal right of
withdrawal on demand as is the case with a checking account, a question
remains as to its legal classification. Although the institutions that offer NOW
accounts routinely pay NOW drafts on demand, the statutes authorizing such
accounts provide that the institutions may require the persons who present the
drafts for payment to give notification to the institution in advance of with-
drawal for a short period oftime, such as thirty days.'13 Thus, although the NOW
draft functions similarly to ordinary checks, the NOW draft does not fall within
the definition ofa "check" ifit is regarded as not payable on demand. 11.. It is not
clear that the reserved right of the drawee institution to require advance notice
before making payment would necessarily prevent the instrument from being
payable on demand. The precise terms on the face of the instrument should be
important to the resolution of this question.
Under some circumstances, the drawee institution's reserved right of prior
notice may preclude the drawer-customer from asserting a claim against the
drawee for wrongful dishonor ofthe instrument because invocation of the prior
notice provision is not wrongful by the drawee. However, the holder ofthe NOW
draft may have a cause ofaction against the drawer for dishonor when the terms
ofthe instrument do not condition the holder's right to payment. Other interpre-
tations, relying on the existence of the drawee's waiver ofthe notice requirement
or analogizing to postdated checks, have been offered. '11 Sometimes the NOW
draft is a "payable through" draft where it is to be presented for payment at a
bank other than the thrift institution that holds the account. Although this is
another difference between the NOW draft and a check, it does not affect
whether the instrument should be regarded as payable on demand.
A note on its face stating that the draft is payable on demand should not be
construed as an installment obligation payable at a definite time simply because
the lender and borrower have agreed to a separate payment schedule. The
payment schedule merely clarifies how the debt should be paid, assuming no
demand for payment in full is made by the holder of the note. Rogers v. Security
Bank o/Manchester adopted this interpretation for a demand note that con-
tained a separate payment schedule in the note itself. III
In Kersten v. Continental Bank, the court held that a promissory note stating
it was payable "on demand, ifno demand in 90 days" should not be viewed as a

113 See discussion at ~ 19.02[2J. In Board of Govemors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
US 361, 368 (1986), the Supreme Court discussed NOW accounts and observed that they
were not demand deposits because ofthe institution's legal right to require notification in
advance of withdrawal.
'64 See Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n. v. Secretary of Banking, 481 Pa, 332, 392 A2d
1319 (1978). See generally H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, , 1.22 (6th ed. 1987).
115 See H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 1 1.22 (6th ed. 1987).
111658 F2d 638, 639 (8th Cir. /981).
14-41 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.04[2][fl

demand instroment that was a matured debt. 1t7 In the court's view, the instru-
ment required the holder to make a demand for payment ifthe obligation was to
mature prior to the ninety days stated.1u In another case, the promissory note
stated that it was payable "on demand and ifno demand be made, then principal
and interest is payable in monthly installments of ...." The court concluded,
after referring to other documents executed as'part ofthe same transaction, that
the note should be construed to be an installment note, not a note that was
payable on demand. 111
The status ofatime certificate of deposit was considered in Yahn &: McDon-
nell, Inc. v. Farmers Bank of Delaware. 11O A party trying to collect on the
certificate of dePosit from the issuing bank: had acquired it after its stated date.
The bank defended against the claim on the ground that the holder of the
certificate could not be a holder in due course because he had acquired the
certificate after it was overdue. The trial court agreed with this contention,
ruling that either the certificate had matured on its stated date or that the
certificate became a demand instrument after the stated date and acquisition
more than a reasonable length of time after its issue is notice to the acquirer that
it is overdue. The court of appeals required the district court to further explore
the facts surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate. The appel-
late court believed that the pre-UCClaw and uce § 3-122, wbich provides that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run ......ith respect to a certificate of
deposit until a demand for payment has been made, might require treating the
certificate of deposit differently than other negotiable instruments payable on

llf 129 Ariz. 44, 49-50, 628 P2d 592,597-598 (et. App. 1981).
mId. See VCC § 3-109(1) comment 4. A note dated July 30,1976, stating that it was
payable "on demand or if no demand be made January 31, 1977," was nota demand note
as to which the statute oflimitations began to run on the date ofits making, but was a note
due on January 31, 1977. Loomisv. Republic Nat'l Bank ofDallas, 653 SW2d 75, 77 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983).
The cause of action on a certificate of deposit accrues upon demand for payment.
This occurs when the instrument is presented, and there is a refusal to pay. Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Yahn & McDonnell,
Inc. v. Fanners Bank of Del., 708 F2d 104 (3d Cir. 1983).
'II Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co. ofCreve Coeur, 664 SW2d 530, 531, 536-537
(Mo. a. App. 1983). In Seatlle First Nat'l Bank v. Schreiber, 282 Or. 625-626, 580 P2d
1012-1013 (1978), a promissory note provided that it was payable "on demand but not
later than 180 days." Ifthe instrument was a note payable on demand, the cause ofaction
accrued on the date of its issue, and the action was barred by the statute oflimitations. If
the note was payable at a definite time, the cause of action accrued on the maturity date,
and the statute oflimitations had not yet run. The coun concluded that the language made
the note ambiguous, and it was improper for the trial coun to rule as a matter oflaw that it
was a demand note. The court did not resolve the issue of the use of parol evidence to
eliminate the ambiguity. See generally Hillis, "Negotiable Promissory Notes Containing
Time and Demand Provisions: The Need for Consistent Interpretation," 19 Ga. L. Rev.
717(1985).
170Yahn & McDonnell, Inc. v. Farmers Bank of Del.• 708 F2d 104, 107-109 (3d Cir.
1983).
, 14.04121ll1 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-42

demand. Referring to the official comments, the court pointed out that banking
·custom is that such certificates are held for a considerable period of time and
often are held for a period beyond the statute of limitations.

III Payable at a Deftnlte Time. Instruments are payable at a definite time

when they are payable on or before a specific date. 17t An instrument also is
payable at a definite time ifit is payable "at a fixed period after a stated date" or
"at a fIXed period after sight."·72
An instrument may be payable at a definite time "subject to any accelera-
tion."·7S The comments explain that a note with such an acceleration clause is
"no less certain than a note payable on demand."114 Although an acceleration
clause may be abused, this is not a problem that should destroy negotiability.
Curbing abuse is addressed by the general provisions of the UCC on options to
accelerate at will which require that such a power be exercised in good faith when
there is a belief "that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired."175
Although the exercise of an acceleration clause may not be known to a subse-
quent purchaser or holder of the instrument, the provisions on notice to pur-
chasers and holders in due course provide that lack of notice of the acceleration
will not impair the holder's status as a holder in due course.· 71 Further, lack of
notice would operate as an excuse for delay in presenting the instrument. 177
Acceleration clauses are further discussed in Chapter 24.

Ihl Payable to Order or Bearer. One of the most important requirements of a

negotiable instrument is that it be payable to order or to bearerY' Most non-
negotiable instruments are quickly identified because of the absence of both of
these clauses. '.
The common printed forms are "pay to the order of," "pay to X or order,"
"pay to bearer," "pay to X or bearer," and sometimes "pay to the order of X or
bearer.'.' The first two are order instruments;·>1 all the others are bearer instru-
ments...• Use of the words, "pay to cash," or the words, "pay to the order of
cash," make the instrument payable to bearer.'" The UCC is stricter than the

17> vee § 3-109(1)(a).

m vee § 3-109(1)(a), 3-109(1)(b).
• 73 vee § 3.109.
174 vee § 3-109, comment 4.
175 vee § 1-208. See vee § 3-109, comment 4. Acceleration clauses are discussed in
ehapter 24.
m vee §§ 3-302,3-304,3-109 comment 4.
m vee § 3·511( I).
171 vee § 3-104(I)(d).
171 vee § 3.110(1).
"·vee § 3·111.
•., vee § 3-III(c).
14-43 SOVRCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.04(2)[1)

pre-UCC law about this element of negotiability. For example, the expression
commonly found in certificates of deposit, "on return of this certificate properly
endorsed," was usuaUy construed as maldng the instrument payable. to order.'·
The UCC provides for the opposite result.- Under the Uce. the terms of the
instrument must say it is payable to order or use the other lansuase specified by
the UCC to make the instrument payable "to order" or "to bearer:' Therefore,
use oflanguage "pay to X or his assianees" and "pay to X's assignees only" does
not meet the requirements of negotiability under the UCC.'M
Under the UCC, it has been held that checks made payable to the order oCa
"depository account," followed by a number, are order instruments and not
bearer instruments. The court stated that such a designation of the payee does
not fall within any of the catClOries mentioned in the UCC for bearer instru·
ments. 18I A note not payable to order or to bearer is not a negotiable instrument,
but such a note is not outside the scope ofArticle 3 ofthe UCC.lfits terms do not
preclude transfer and it is otherwise negotiable, the note is within Article 3.'11

(I) Designation of Payee. The payee of an instrument must be specified with

"reasonable certainty."'" The payee may be the drawer or maker,,. any person
who is not the drawer or maker, two or more payeesjointly, one or two ofseveral
payees, or the holder of an office for the time being.•• For example, "pay to
Jones and Smith" or "Jones or Smith" is sufficient designation. So also, instru-
ments bearing "treasurer of the town of Framingham,"'" "trustees of Crozier
Memorial Funds," "executor of Brown's estate," can be cashed or indorsed by
the person holding the indicated office at the time of the act, and are therefore
sufficient designation of the payee. III
Instruments drawn or payable to the cashier or fiscal officer of a bank or
corporation are deemed payable to the corporation and may be negotiated by the
indorsement of that officer or of the corporation itself. 1I2
"Pay to the order of ........•....•." is an incomplete designation. Until it

112 See Forrest v. Safety Bankins & Trust Co., 174 F 345 (3d Cir. 1909).
'''vee § 3-110(2). comment 5.
'''vee § 3-110(1).
••1 Frosl Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas & Barrera, 500 SW2d 906, 910-911 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
"·Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop., Inc., 99 Idaho 143, 144-145,578 P2d 1074.
1075-1076 (1978). See vee § 3-805.
Ie' vec § 3-11O( I).
"'vee §§ 3-110(1)(a), 3-1 10(1 Xc).
,It vee § 3-IIO(IXd), 3-110(1)(1).
'BOvee § 3-IIO(l)(e).
'I' Id. See also vee § 3-111, comment 2, which makes clear that sucn instruments are
not payable to bearer-they are order instruments, althOUgh only the office is designated.
'12 vee § 3-110(1).
114.04[2]0] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-44

is filled in, the instrument remains nonnegotiable.'1S Blank instruments are

discussed at , 20.09[2].
In cases where names are misspelled or where instruments are made payable
to persons operating under a trade name, such instruments may be negotiated by
the btdorsement of the persons intended, either by using the name on the
instrument or by using the true names.'t4 The payor or transferee for value may
require signature both in the form on the instrument and in the correct form to
assure the authenticity of the signer and remove doubt as to the identity of the
signer by subsequent holders.'15 Instruments payable to a partnership or an
unincorporated body of persons, are payable to order and can be negotiated by
anyone with authority to represent the partnership or body.,11

Ul Drawee Must Be Certain. In the case ofchecks and drafts, the drawee ofthe
instrument must be sufficiently designated so that he or she can be identified
and located. 1I7 Thus, an instrument may be negotiable ifdrawn on a single firm,
whether incorporated or not,,11 or on joint drawees.'" The drawee must be a
"person," but under the UCC definitions a person may be an individual or an
organization and an organization is also broadly defined to include, as well as
the customary associations, any "legal or commercial entity."-

[k] Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer. In order for an instrument

to be negotiable the instrument must by its terms be payable "to order" or "to
bearer." The rules contained in the UCC that establish negotiability will apply in
some cases, however, even though the specific language that is necessary for an
instrument to be payable to order or to bearer does not appear. UCC § 3·805
provides that "this article applies to any instrument whose terms do not pre-
clude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this article but which is
not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can be no holder in due course
of such an instrument." This provision is not intended to make ordinary con-
tracts into instruments under Article 3 of the UCc. But the provision does
permit the application ofthe general rules for negotiable instruments to writings

1Q vee§ 3-115. The rules onjointand multiple payees are discussed at ~ 15.01 [3][dl.
See also the discussion ofjoint accounts at ~ 19.03[2]. Blank instruments are discussed at
~ 20.09[2].
". vee § 3·203.
1Mld.
"" vee § 3.11O( I Xg).
117vee § 3.I02(I)(b).
'"vee § 3-] 02(l)(b). See definition of "person" and "organizati9n." vee §§ I_
201(28), 1·201(30).
'"vee § 3.102(1)(b).
-vee §§ 3-102(I)(b), 1-20](28), 1-201(30).
14-45 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.04(2](1]

that are similar in form and that in practice are treated as if they were
instrumcnts.101

(I] AmblllJOus Terms and Rules ofConstnction. The VCC contains a number
ofrules to encoUrage free circulation ofnegotiable instruments without resort to
parol evidence. These rules are set out as follows:
§ 3-118. Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction.
The following rules apply to every instrument:
(a) Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or a note the
holder may treat it as either. A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a
note.
(b) Handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms, and
typewritten control printed.
(c) Words control figures except that if the words are ambiguous
figures control.
(d) Unloss otherwise specified a provision for interest means interest
at the judgment rate at the place of payment from the date of the instru-
ment, or if it is undated from the date of issue.
(e) Unless the instrument otherwise specifies two or more persons who
sign as maker, acceptor or drawer or indorser and as a part of the same
transaction are jointly and severally liable even though the instrument
contains such words as "I promise to pay."
(I) Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single
extension for not longer than the original period. A consent to extension,
expressed in the instrument, is binding on secondary parties and accom-
modation makers. A holder may not exercise his option to extend an
instrument over the objection of a maker or acceptor or other party who
in accordance with Section 3-604 tenders full payment when the instru-
ment is due.
Carelessly drawn instruments sometimes contain differences between the
amount stated by the words of the instrument and the amount stated in the
figures. In one case, a note was filled in so that the amount was stated as
"nineteen hundred eight hundred ninety six and 011100" in one place and
"$19,896.01" in another. The court found the note was for the latter amount.:tIlZ
Although the rule in UCC § 9-318(c) provides that words control figures unless
the words are ambiguous, the court was able to determine reasonably from the
circumstances that the amount was as stated in the figures.

201 vee § 3-805. comment.

2D2 Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, 533 SW2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
'1114.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENI'S 14-46

1114.05 DOCUMENTS OF TI1LE AND SECURITIES

The chief types of negotiable paper other than negotiable instruments that
are payable in money fall into two broad classifications: documents oftitle and
investment securities. If they are documents of title, such as bills of lading and
warehouse receipts, they are covered by Article 7 of the UCC. If they are
securities that are traded on exchanges or in the "over the counter" market, they
are covered by Article 8 of the UCc. 203 Corporate bonds also will usually fall
within the UCC's coverage ofsecurities. 204
Although commodity paper may take almost any form, it usually appears in
two standard types: the warehouse receipt issued by warehouses; and the bill of
lading issued by carriers such as trucks, railroads, and ships. The negotiability of
bills oflading is also affected by a federal statute,- which covers all shipments in
interstate commerce, from any state or territory, or shipments from any state or
territory to a foreign country.2Of This act is similar to Article 7 ofthe UCC, which
would apply to purely intrastate transactions.

[1] Documents of Title

Documents oftitle, or commodity paper, as they are sometimes called, fall
into two definite classes: negotiable and nonnegotiable. The nonnegotiable bill
oflading or ocean freight bill is known as a straight bill,207 whereas the negotiable
one is called an order bill. 2GB Warehouse receipts also are either negotiable or
nonnegotiable, but are not referred to as "straight" or "order" receipts. 2at
The nonnegotiable document of title is simply a specialized form of receipt
for the goods given by the carrier or warehouse. 21o The definition of "document
of title" specifically includes a bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, ware·
house receipt, or order for the delivery ofgoods. 211 The definition also includes:
Any other document which in the regular course of business or fmancing is
treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is
entitled to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the goods it
covers. To be a document of title a document must purport to be issued by

203uee§ 8·102(1)(a), comment 2.

-uee § 8·102.
205 49 USC app. §§ 81·124 (1982), known as the Pomerene Bills of Lading Act.
206 49 USC app. § 81 (1982).
207 49 USC app. § 82 (1982); uee § 7·104.
201
49 USC app. § 83 (1982); uee § 7·104.
-uee § 7·104.
21
°49 USC app. § 109 (1982); uee §§ 7·102, 7·104. A nonnegotiable document of
title such as a bill of lading can pass rights to the goods it covers by transfer. When a
straight bill is transferred, the transferee has the right to notify the carrier to hold the
goods for him in accordance with the duties of the contract owed to the transferor at the
time of notification. See uee § 7·504.
211uee§ 1.201(15).
14-47 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.0511J1a)

or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession

which are either identified or are fllngible portions ofan identified mass. 2tt

When a document of title is in a form to be negotiable, transfer of the

document carries with it the transfer of important rights in the goods repre-
sented by the document. As a result, negotiable bills and warehouse receipts not
only embody shipping or storage contracts, but also serve important functions in
security transactions because the paper itself carries title to the goods
identified.2"

[a) NegotfabiUty of Documents oflltle. When a negotiable document of title

is duly negotiated to a bona fide purchaser, such a purchaser gets title to the
document in much the same manner as does the holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. 214 Title to the document also carries title to the goods,211
with the exception that the true owner (or one having a legal interest from whom
the goods were stolen or who lost them and had nothing to do with issuing the
document) does not lose his or her original title or interest. ltl
The term "duly negotiated" is a term ofart under the UCC.217 In order for a
document of title to be duly negotiated or for there to be a due negotiation, the
document first must be transferred with proper indorsements. A negotiation
occurs when the document of title runs to the order of a named person and is
negotiated by that person's indorsement and delivery. When the document of
title is one that by its terms runs to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery alone. An
order document of title can be indorsed in blank, thereby making it run to
"bearer" and capable offurther negotiation by delivery alone. Alternatively, an
order document oftitle may be indorsed to a particular person, and when this is
done the document runs to the order ofthat person and can be further negotiated
only by that person's indorsement and delivery.21I These rules on how a docu-
ment of title is negotiated parallel those for negotiable instruments that are
discussed in Chapter 15.
As described previously, in order for a document of title to be duly negoti·
ated, a proper negotiation must occur, in addition to the satisfaction of the
following requirements. The document must be negotiated "to a holder who
purchases it in good faith without notice of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person and for value, unless it is established that the negotiation

212 rd.
49 usc § III (1982); vee §§ 7·501,7'502,7-503.7-504.
212

214uee § 7·502(l){a).
2,5uee § 7.502(l)(b).
m uee § 7-503. There are also cenain other exceptions to the rule that title to the
document carries title to the goods.
"'uee § 7-501(4).
l1Iuee § 7·501(1).7.501(2),7-501(3).
1I14.05[lUa] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-48

is not in the regular course of buSiness or fmancing or involves receiving the

document in settlement or payment of a money obligation."2"
. As a result of the due negotiation requirement, a holder of a document of
title by due negotiation is analogous to the holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument. The holder by due negotiation must meet a test not required of the
holder in due course, however. A holder by due negotiation must take the
instrument "in the regular course of business or financing." The comments to
UCC § 7-501 explain the reasons for this additional requirement. It imposes the
duty of the transferee of a document of title of asking first if the transferor is "a
person with whom it is reasonable to deal as having full powers. "220 The com-
ment explains that "in regard to documents of title the only holder whose
possession appears, commercially, to be in order is almost invariably a person in
the trade. No commercial purpose is served by allowing a tramp ora professor to
'duly negotiate' an order bill of lading for hides or cotton not his own, and since
such a transfer is obviously not in the regular course of business, it is excluded
from the scope of the protection of subsection (4). "Ill' A second question also
must be answered satisfactorily for a due negotiation to occur. The question is
whether the transaction is "one which is normally proper to pass full rights
without inquiry, even though the transferor himself may not have such rights to
pass, and even though he may be acting in breach of duty." The purpose of this
aspect of the requirement is to limit the "effective wrongful disposition to
transactions whose protection will really further trade. nlll2
Once a document oftitle has been transferred by due negotiation, the holder
acquires good title to the document, title to the goods, all rights based on agency
or estoppel to obtain the goods, and the direct obligation of the issuer of the
document to hold the goods or deliver them according to the terms of the
document free of any defense or claim by the issuer except those expressly
permitted by the UCC. 223 As a result of the provisions, a person who acquires a
document by due negotiation may obtain a good title to the goods represented by
the document although the transfer of the document was in breach of duty or
occurred as the result of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, loss, theft, conver-
sion, or other wrongful conduct. 22< The holder by due negotiation gets good title
to the goods even though the goods may have previously been sold or transferred
to some other third person. 22•
In some circumstances, a holder by due negotiation will not obtain good
title to the goods represented by the document. This situation occurs when the
original owner ofthe goods cannot be held responsible for having introduced the

"'ucc § 7·501(4).
, 20 UCC § 7·501, comment I.
'2' Id.
222Id.
2Uucc § 7.502.
2,. UCC § 7-502(2).
22·Id.
14-49 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11 14.0S(1I1a)

goods into the stream of commerce so tbat a document of title could issue
covering them. The uee provides that a document oftitle will confer no rights
in goods apinst a person who owns the goods or had a perfected security interest
in the goods (in both cases before the document of title issued covering the
goods) and who did not do any of the followina: (I) deliver the goods or entrust
the goods to a person who was given "actual or apparent authority" to ship,
store, or sell the goods or had a special power under the vee
to dispose of the
goods; (2) entrust any document of title covering the goods to a person who is
either the bailor of the goods or the nominee ofthe bailor and who had actual or
apparent authority with respect to the goods as above; (3) acquiesced in the
procurement by the bailor or his nominee of any document of title.m
As a result of these provisions, in the case where goods are stolen from an
owner, the thief obtains a document of title covering the goods and then duly
negotiates the document to a purchaser, the purchaser who takes by due nesotia-
tion will not obtain title to the goods. There could be no showing that the owner
had delivered or entrusted the goods or any document oftide covering the goods
to the thief, nor could it be shown that the owner had acquiesced in the thiers
procuring the document oftitle on the goods. However, where an owner ofgoods
entrusts possession of the goods to a person who is in the position of having
apparent authority to ship or store or sell the goods, if that person acts beyond
the scope of his authority and obtains a document of title and duly negotiates it
to a purchaser, such a purchaser will obtain a good title to the goods.m
When a document oftitle is transferred under circumstances where there is
no due negotiation, the transferee of the document acquires only the title and
rights that his transferor had or had actual authority to convey.22. As a result, if
the transferee obtained the document oftitle from a thiefor one who transferred
it fraudulently, the transferee will not obtain good title to the goods. 2ft
The formal requisites of negotiable and nonnegotiable documents are not
complex. V nder the U ee, a document of title is negotiable ifthe goods are to be
delivered "to bearer" or "to the order of a named person."230 All other docu-
ments ~f title are not negotiable.

22luee § 7.503(1).
22r When a thiefsteals a negotiable document oftitle which is in bearer form and duly
negotiates it to a purchaser, the purchaser should obtain 8 good title to the document and
to the goods. This is an obvious purpose ofUCe § 7·502(2) ("even though any person has
been deprived of possession of the document by ... theft .. ,"). II is possible to read uee
§ 7·503( I) as leading to a contrary conclusion because it is difficult to find that Ihe owner
has delivered or entrusted or acquiesced as required by that section. Nevertheless, it is
believed that the intent of Section 7·502(2) and the analogy to negotiation of bearer
negotiable instruments under similar circumstances should prevail and entitle the holder
by due negotiation to protection.
2.. uce § 7-504( I).
22. J d.

230UCC § 7-104. See also 49 USC app, § 83 (1982).

1I14.05[1)[b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-50

[b) Uability of Bailee for Loss or Damage to or Failure to Deliver Goods. A

carrier or warehouseman who issues a negotiable document of title is under the
usual liability of the shipper or bailee of goods. In addition, by making the
.document negotiable, that individual undertakes to deliver the goods to the
holder ofthe document at the completion ofthe shipment or the storage."1 Bills
of lading are sometimes issued in sets providing that in case the first is not
presented, the second will carry the rights. The second contains similar provi-
sions in case of nonpresentment of the first. In these situations, the carrier is
required to perform the contract on behalfofthe person first presenting anyone
ofthe set ofbills. This practice originated in transactions that involved overseas
transportation with great risk ofloss or delay ofthe documents. U2 The bills were
usually sent by different routes in order to make sure that the consignee received
at least one copy. Railroads are prohibited from issuing bills in sets for inland
shipments. 21:1
The carrier or warehouse is liable to deliver the goods to the holder of the
document of title, and discharges his liability ifhe does so in good faith. 2:M Ifthe
bailee can show that the bailee delivered the goods to a person who had a right to
the goods that was better than tbe holder ofthe document oftitle, sucb a delivery
will excuse the bailee from failing to deliver to the holder. 2SI When tbe holder bas
acquired tbe document oftitle by due negotiation, as seen earlier, in few circum-
stances will anotber person have a better title to the goods than the holder.

231
49 USC app. § 89 (1982); UCC § 1-403. Where a warehouse releases goods under
the purported authorization ofthe holder ofthe original receipt without production ofthis
original and it turns out that the authorization was forged, the warehouse remains liable.
Turner v. Scobey Moving & Storage Co., 5I 5 SW2d 253, 255-256 (Tex. 1974).
232 See UCC § 1-304(1) and comment.
133 See 49 USC app. § 84 (1982); UCC § 7·304.
I:MUCC §§ 7.403, 7-404. "Under New York law, a warehouse that fails to provide an
explanation for its failure to return stored property is liable for conversion." Under UCC
§ 7.204, a warehouse may limit its liability by agreement in some cases, but it cannot limit
its liability for its own conversion. Colgate Palmolive Co. v. SIS Dart Canada, 724 F2d
313,317 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 US 963 (1984).
A bailee is prima facie liable to the bailor under the law of Tennessee for negligence
when the property was delivered to the bailee in good condition, the property was not
returned in accordance with the contract or returned in a damaged condition, and the loss
or damage was not due to the inherent nature ofthe property. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v.
Dunbar Transfer & Storage Co., 732 F2d 511, SIS (6th Cir. 1984).
Under Seclion 22 of the Pomerene Bill of Lading Act (codified at 49 USC app. § 84
(1982», a carrier is liable to the holder ofan order bill of[ading for damages caused by the
failure to deliver the goods described in the bill oflading.ln Industria Nacional Del Papel,
Ca. v. MIY "Albert F.," 730 F2d 622, 624-625 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 US 1037
(1984), the ship delivered worthless wastepaper instead ofthe soft wood pulp described in
the bill. The court held the carrier liable for nondelivery and further. held that the
statement in the bill of lading, "particulars furnished by shipper," did not relieve the
carrier of liability.
235 UCC §§ 7.403(1 )(a), 7-403(3),
14-51 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW , 14.05(1)(II(

When a nonnegotiable document oftitle is involved, the bailee must make

delivery of the goods to the person entitled to delivery under the terms of the
document oftitle or in accordance with written delivery instructions given to the
bailee by the person entitled to the goods under the non.negotiable document.2M
Failure to deliver the goods to the person entitled to the goods will make the
bailee liable to the person entitled to delivery.
Under certain circumstances, carriers may avoid liability for loss caused as
a result ofthe misdescription ofgoods in the bill oflading or failure ofthe goods
to be received for shipment when the carrier makes a proper notation on the bill
oflading and the notation is a truthful one.m Similarly, a warehouse may avoid
liability for nonreceipt or misdescription of the goods by appropriate notation
on the warehouse receipt when the notation is truthful.-
The VCC permits a bailee to avoid liability for failing to deliver to the
holder or other person entitled under the document when there is a "lawful
excuse. "231 One COurt has beld that a warehouse has a lawful excuse for not
delivering goods to the person entitled to them under UCC § 7-403 when the
warehouse files an interpleader action that brings all of the claimants to the
goods under the jurisdiction of the court.z•
Tyrone Pacific International. Inc. v. M. V. Eurychill'241 involved an action
against the issuer ofa bill oflading for wrongful refusal to issue a bill oflading for
goods shipped by ocean vessel. The carrier refused to issue the bill of lading
because the shipper failed to pay disputed freight charges. The shipper eventu·
ally paid the charges to obtain the bill of lading and then brought suit for
conversion. The court held that no action for conversion had been established
because the shipper had not demonstrated either that the bill of lading had
declined in value during the period of its detention by the carrier or that the
shipper had lost an opportunity to sell it.
In a case decided before the VCC became effective, the court held a ware-
house liable for failure to deliver goods because the bailee did not prove that it
was not 'responsible for the inability to return the goods. In this case, the goods
were stored at the bailee's warehouse from 1953 until 1973, when the plaintiff
demanded their return. The warehouse responded that the property was
destroyed along with the warehouse in a fire and also introduced evidence that
the warehouse was in an area subject to repeated fires and robberies. The court
held that there was a presumption of negligence when the bailee failed to

2:11UCC ~ 1.403(4).
m VCC § 7.301.
"'vee § 7·203.
m vec § 7.403(I)(s).
240 Corriian Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, 696 F2d 3S9, 362 (5th Cir. 1983).
241 658 F2d 664, 666-667 (9th Cir. 1981).
, 14.05(1](c] NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-52

redeliver the bailed property. Because the bailee had not established the actual.
facts of the fire or how the goods were destroyed, it was responsible to the
plaintiff. The court also refused to give effect to a term limiting the warehouse's
liability contained in the warehouse receipt, because the plaintiffhad not signed
the receipt and the warehouse had failed to prove the plaintiff had "actual
knowledge of the limitation of liability provision." The court imposed the
standard of actual knowledge because of the social policy against enforcing
contract provisions exculpating professionals from liability for negligence in
dealing with nonprofessionals. 242
In Preston v. United States,243 the court considered the rights ofpersons who
had stored grain that was commingled in a warehouse. The United States, which
held warehouse receipts for some ofthe grain in the warehouse, withdrew the full
amount it was entitled to under its receipts although it knew the warehouse had
less than the amount ofgrain that should have been on hand. The court held the
government liable in conversion under the Federal Torts Oaim Act to other
holders of warehouse receipts because the government knowingly took more
than its pro rata share of the grain. The existence of the conversion depended
upon the application of Article 7 of the UCC. Under UCC § 7-207(2) fungible
goods commingled in a warehouse are owned in common and the depositors of
the goods are treated as tenants in common. The UCC does not set out rights of
tenants in common, so the court looked to the common law which imposes a
duty ofgood faith in transactions between joint tenants. Under the common law,
one j oint tenant could claim only its pro rata share when a shortage exists. 2" Any
clause in a warehouse agreement purporting to exculpate the warehouseman
from a duty of reasonable care is ineffective and contrary to the UCc. 2<5

Ie] Carrier's or Warehouseman's Lien. A carrier or warehouseman has a lien

on the goods to cover freight and other charges. This lien gives the right to hold
the goods as security for the payment. In cases where the goods are covered by
documents of title, the warehouse or carrier may enforce the lien for storage or
freight on the goods covered. As is the case with certain purchases for value of
negotiable bills and holders by due negotiation of warehouse receipts, the bailee
can assert a lien for other charges only when the charges appear on the face ofthe

242 Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A2d 799, 805
(1982).
42
' 696 F2d 528, 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'gdenied, 709 F2d 488 (I 983)(the court
clarified the fonnula for calculating the damages recoverable in its decision on rehearing).
'"See United States v. Luther, 225 F2d 499 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 US
947 (1956).
,.s UCC §§ 7-202(3), 7-204( I); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Lake Warehouse Div. of Lake
Erie Rolling Mill, Inc., 47 App. Div. 2d 492, 375 NYS2d 918, 921-922 (1975).
14-53 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW f 14.05(21

document.-In addition to the right to hold the goods until the charges are paid,
the warehouse has the power to foreclose the lien by selling the goods at a special
sale after fust giving proper notice to the parties involved. :147 In cases ofperiaha.
ble goods or hazardous goods, the uee gives a warehouse special powers to sell
the goods quickly without having to follow all of the normal procedures, but
even in these cases there must be notice to persons who claim an interest in the
goods. 24& The lienor must be engaged in the warehouse business in order to assert
alien under Section 7·209 of the uee.'"

[2J Investment Securities

The laws governing the transfer of rights represented by investment securi-
ties such as corporate stock and bonds have been codified partially in the ueC's
Article 8 on investment securities. Although the uee, in states where it has been
adopted, supposedly repeals the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,21G it should be
noted that the uee may not apply to all stocks, bonds, and corporate securities,
but only to those "commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or marlc.ets or
commonly recoanized ... as a medium for investment,"n, or "of a type" so
traded although the particular security issue may not be. m Althou&b this cate-
gory covers most investment paper that comes to banks, other state laws deal
with interests in corporations and their property. The uee Article 8 applies
only to certain limited aspects ofrights in investment securities related to their

241
49 USC app. ~ 105 (1982); UCC M 7-209, 7·307.
"'veCM 7-210.7·308.
2..uee § 7·206(3). There is no comparable emersency provision in the UCC for
carriers. See VCC § 7·308.
2" In a Florida case, the plaintiff asked the defendant to pick up the contents of his
house and s~ore them pending notification ofan address to which they would be shipped.
No such notification was given, and after more than two months, the defendant mailed a
notice to the address the plaintiff had given, but the letter was returned. The defendant
sold the goods to satisfy its lien for their storage but did not advertise the sale as required
by Section 677.210 of the Florida statute. To the plaintiff's action for conversion of the
goods, the defendant pleaded that it was nota warehouse, buta carrier. The court beld that
a carrier may also be a warehouse. Suddath Moving & Storage Co. v. Roure. 276 So. 2d
549-550 (Fla. Disl. Ct. App. 1973).
2IOuce § 10-102.
251 UCC § g.102(t)(a)(ii). See generally Annot., "What Is A Security Under U.C.C.
Art. g," II ALR4lh 1036 (1982).
25' VCC § g-1 02( I)(a)(ii). This obviously includes securities that would not actually
be on sale in regular markets, but they may be like those that are. Thus, forged V.S.
Treasury bills are investment securities as defined by Section 8-102 ofthe VCC. Brannon
v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 137 Ga. App. 275,277,223 SE2d 473, 475 (1976). Sec also
Morsan Guar. Trust Co. v. Third Nan Bank, 529 F2d 1141 (1st Cir. 1976); Colin v. Penn
Cent. Nat'l Bank, 404 F. Supp. 638 (ED Pa. 1975), aff'd without opinion 554 F2d 512 (3d
Cir. J 976).
11 14.05[2](a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 14-54

transfer. A substantial body of other state and federal law remains relevant to
other aspects of rights relating to investment securities transactions. 213

[a) InvestmentSecarities Under the Pre-1977 uee. Article 8 ofthe pre-I 977
uee covers not only stocks and bonds, but also interim certificates, equipment
trust certificates, warrants for either money or property, and any other sort of
paper commonly dealt with in security markets2M that is one ofa class or series of
instruments evidencing participation or other interest in property or in an
enterprise or that is an evidence of an obligation of the issuer. 2S1
Under the pre-1977 uee, securities are divided into two classes, "regis-
tered form" and "bearer form,"2H and all securities are considered negotiable
instruments. 217 The registered form is a security that specifies a person entitled
to it and the transfer of which may be registered. HI It may include stocks, bonds,
and other instruments when in the proper form. A security is in the "bearer
form" when its original terms run to bearer,211 and such a security is negotiable
by delivery.2IO An indorsement on a security in bearer form may give notice ofan
adverse claim, but an indorsement is a concept that normally applies only to
registered securities. 2ll Similarly, an indorsement in blank on the back of a
security in "registered form" does not change its nature but makes the certificate
itself negotiable by delivery until it is again specially indorsed. 212 The issuer of
the registered security is entitled to regard the person who is registered on the
books ofthe issuer as the owner. 2IS The transfer ofa security in "registered form"
without a necessary indorsement gives the transferee only the rights of an
assignee until he or she enforces his or her right to indorsement. 214

213uee § 8·101 comment. Article 8 was extensively amended in 1977. When this
book discusses the pre-I 977 official version of Article 8, citation is to the uee (1972
Original Text). When the current version, adopted in 1977. is discussed, the citation is
simply to the vee without specifying the 1977 Official Text.
2.. vee § 8·102 & comment (1972 Official Text). See also vee § 8·102, comment 2.

21' vee § 8·102 & comment (1972 Official Text).

256uee§§ 8-102(1)(c), 8-102(1)(d) (1972 Official Text).

2S7uee § 8-105(1)(1972 Official Text).
251 vee §§ 8·101 comment, 8-102(I)(c) (1972 Official Text).
2.. vee § 8-102(1Xd) (1972 Official Text). Thus, a security is not in "bearer form"
when it is originally in registered form and then indorsed to bearer. Id.
210 vee §§ 8·102(1)(d), 8-302 (1972 Official Text).

281 vee § 8.310 and comment (1972 Official Text).

262uee §§ 8·302,8-308(2) (1972 Official Text).

""uee §§ 8·102(l)(c), 8-207 (1972 Official Text).
"'4 vee § 8-307 (1972 Official Text).
14-55 SOURCES OF COMMERCIAL LAW ,. 14.05[2J(bJ

[bJ Investment Secaridetl Under the UCC-I977 AmendJllents and Uncer-

tiftcated Securitietl. Article 8 of tbe UCC was amended in 1977 to broaden its
scope to cover securities that are not represented by a tangible, paper certificate
or document, but consist only of llD interest registered on the boob of the
company.·1 The rules govcm:iDg negotiable securities represented by a certifi-
cate remain basically unchanged. These securities, which are negotiable, are
called "certificated securities" llDd include both registered and bearer forms as
provided in the original Article 8." Interests in a business or obligations of the
issuer that are not represented by an instrument may be classified as "uncertifi·
cated securities" when they meet the Article 8 deftnition ofsuch interests. This
requires, amOng other characteristics, that the security be "ofa type commonly
dealt in on securities exchanges or markets," be registered on the books of the
issuer or an agent of the issuer, and be part ofa class or series ofsucb interests.·'
U ncertificated securities are not negotiable, because they are not represented by
the instrument. and statements or notices ·sent by an issuer of uncertificated
securities are not negotiable instruments either and are not certificated securi-
ties. :III It is possible to be a bona fide purchaser ofbotb certificated and unccrtifi-
cated securities.·1
The transfer and pled&e ofboth certificated and uncertificated securities are
discussed in Chapter 22.

"'ucc App. I, § 8-101. Reasons for 1977 Change (1972 Official Text). Some state.
have not adopted these amendments yet. See Table 14-1. f 14.0I[2]. for a list of the
jurisdictions that have enacted the 1977 Article 8 amendments.
• Iuee §§ 8·102, 8·IOS.
·'uee § 8.102(i)(b) and comment.
2IIuee § 8-IOS.
muee § 8-302(1).
 15
Rights and Liabilities of
Parties to Commercial Paper
1115.01 Transfer and Negotiation of Commercial Paper 15·2
[1] Transfer of Property Generally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15·2
[2} Transfer of Negotiable Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1505
[3] Indorsements. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15·7
[a} Types oflndorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . lS·S
[i] Blank indorsement ........•............... 15·8
[ii} Special indorsement 15·9
[iii} Indorsement without recourse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 15·10
[iv] Restrictive indorsements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15·10
{v} Conditional indorsements ............ IS-II
[b] Rights and Duties of Restrictive Indorsees. . . . . . . . . . . 15·12
[c] Bank's Power to Supply Missing Indorsement. . . . . . . . 15·13
[d] Transferees ofInstruments With Missing Indorsement. . 15-14
tel Limitation oflndorsees' Rights by Separate Contract. . . 15·18
11 15.02 Liability of Parties on Negotiable Instruments. . . ........... 15-19
n}Primary and Secondary Liability. . . . . . . . . . ........... I 5-20
[2} Liability of Maker and Acceptors . . . . . . . . . ........... 15·20
[3} Acceptance 15·22
[4) Indorser's Liability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 15-24
[5] Drawer's Liability .......... .. .... ....... 15-25
11 15.03 Liability in Warranty for Transfer and Presentment of
Negotiable Instruments ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-26
[I] Presentment Versus Transfer Warranties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-27
[2] Warranties of Customers and Collecting Banks . . . . . . . . . . 15-30
11 15.04 Liability of Agents and Representatives •.......... . . . . ... 15-31
[I] Rules Regarding Liability. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 15-31
[2] Case Examples '. . 15-33
[a) Principal's Name Missing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 15-33
[b] Agent Fails to Sign in a Manner That Shows Agency
Status 15-34

15-1
'15.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·2

, 15.05 Bank's Liability on Negotiable Instruments Generally. . . . . . • . 15·39

[I)
Certificates of Deposit '" ..•..•. ..•..... 15-39
Cashier's Checks ......•....................•....
(2) 15-39
Money Orders. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . .
(3) 15-41
Traveler's Checks ..........•.••.....•......•. ,...
(4) 15-42
Accepted Drafts and Certified Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(5) 15-44
[a) Obligations of Acceptance or Certification. . . . . . . . . . . 15-44
lb) Certifying or Accepting Forged or Altered Paper 15-46
[c] Mistaken Certification. . .• . . . . . .. •. ... . . .... 15-47
1115.06 Sureties and Accommodation Parties. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . • . . 15·47
[I] The Rights of an Accommodation Party Allainst the
Principal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15-49
[2] The Obligation of an Accommodation Party to Pay. . . . . . . 15-52
(3) Defenses to Payment of an Accommodation Party. . . . . . . . IS-55
(4) Accommodation Parties in Consumer Transactions. . . . .. • IS-58
, 15.07 Discharge of Liability ............•.......•......•... 15·58
., 15.08 Handling ofInstruments Involving a Fiduciary. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-61
[I] UCC Provisions Relating to Fiduciaries ....... 15-62
[2] Uniform Fiduciaries Act Provisions ......... 15-66
(3) Problems in Detennining When There Is Knowledge ofa
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-69

1115.01 TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION OF COMMERCIAL

PAPER
Commercial paper is a specialized fonn of property that through commer-
cial custom and the development of the law has come to be recognized as
property that must be readily transferable to fulfill its commercial purposes. The
ease with which commercial paper may be transferred and the willingness of
commercial parties to accept the transfer of such paper depends in part on the
rights and liabilities that attach to parties to the paper and pass to transferees. To
evaluate these rights and liabilities, a brief look at the rules that apply to the
transfer of property generally is helpful.

(1) Transfer of Property Generall:r

An essential attribute of the ownership of property ofall types is the ability
to transfer ownership to another person. Whether the property is goods, contract
rights, real property, or claims based upon legal rights against other parties. the
ability to transfer or "alienate" rights in such property is im·portant. How
property is transferred or conveyed depends upon the type of property involved.
Every state has statutes that deal with the transfer of land or interests in real
15-3 RIGHTS & LIABIUTIES , IS.01(1)

property which require the completion ofVarious formalities in order to accom-

plish a valid transfer. To convey real property, ihe grantor typically must use a
deed that satisfies certain formal requirements of the law of the state in which
the land is located. Other specialized types of property may have rules peculiar
to that property. For example, procedures for the transfer ofinterests in invest-
ment securities, such as shares of stock or corporate bonds, are set forth in the
laws pertaining to such property. Some property may be regulated under legal
regimes for which there are procedures for recording or filing notice of owner-
ship interests in the property, as is the case with federal copyrights and patents.
Further, there are legal systems for recognizing security interests in personal
property that have centralized filing systems, as well as procedures for noting
ownership and security interests on certificates of title or for registering those
interests with federal authorities.'
Ordinarily, the transfer oftitle to goods is an uncomplicated affair that may
be accomplished by simple delivery ofthe goods with the intention to pass title.
Even these simple transactions may become complex when the transferor
attempts to retain control by reserving title for security purposes, to make the
passage of title conditional for other purposes, or to make the transfer of title
effective on death. 2 When a bailee has possession of goods with title in another
person, there are additional complications in determining to whom the bailee
may deliver the goods, who has the right to compel the bailee to perform, and
how interests in the goods held by the bailee may be transferred. While this
discussion does not attempt to restate the law on the transfer oftitle to property
generally, the focus of this chapter is on the transfer of interests in commercial
paper.
Generally, a person to whom an interest in property has been transferred,
the transferee, acquires no better rights than the rights the transferor had the
authority to transfer. In a corollary rule, a transferor generally has or had the
authority to transfer whatever rights in the property the transferor has. This
latter rule must be limited to the extent the law will recognize as valid restraints
that prior owners of property create on the ability of.subsequent .. owners to
transfer interests in the property. As might be expected of a commercially-
oriented statute, the Uniform Commercial Code takes a general posture favor-
ing the transferability of property. In Article 9, the UCC provides that a
"debtor's right in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred .. ,
notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer
or making the transfer constitute a default.'" The uec also recognizes a policy
of free transferability with respect to negotiable instruments in providing that

I For funher discussion of perfection of security interests, see Chapter 22.

2 For a good discussion of the general rules applicable to the transfer of ownership
interests in personal propeny, see R. Brown. Personal Propeny (W. Rauschenbush ed. 3d
ed. 1975).
'vcc § 9-311.
1115.01(1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-4

the transfer of a negotiable instrument generally vests in the transferee "such

rights as the transferor has therein" with certain exceptions to prevent fraud.'
In certain circumstances, the law recognizes greater rights in the transferee
than in the transferor ofthe property possessed. Buyers in the ordinary course of
business ofgoods, for example, who meet the standards set forth in uee § 2-403,
obtain a good title to the goods although their seller's title may have been
deficient. 5
When a contract right is transferred or assigned, the general rule is that the
rights of the assignee remain subject to the terms of the contract between the
obligor and the assignor of the contract and any defense or claim arising from
that contract. The uee contains a provision on the assignments of "accounts."
In the uee terminology, the obligor is referred to as an "account debtor." 1 The
uee provision with respect to assignments adopts the general rule stated previ-
ously, but permits an account debtor by agreement with the assignor in the
contract to give an assignee rights greater than those held by the assignor! The
relevant provision states as follows:
(I) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to
assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206
the rights of an assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the
assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives notification of
the assignment.
(2) So far as the right to payment or a pan thereof under an assigned
contract has not been fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding

'uec § 3·201(1). See generally Annot., Beane. "Rights of Drawers, Banks and
Holders in Bank Checks and Other Cash Equivalents," 19 Tulsa U 612 (1984).
s uec § 2-403(2). For a good description of the rules applicable to good faith
purchase of goods, see R. Nordstrom, The Law of Sales 511-525 (2d ed. 1970); G.
Wallach, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code §§ 7.04(1), 7.04(2)
(Supp. 1987); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 140-146,776-777 (2d
ed. 1980).
S An account debtor is a person who is "obligated on an account, chattel paper or
general intangible;" vec § 9-1 05( I)(a). An account is broadly defined to mean "any right
to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered that is not evidenced by an
instrument or a chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance." General
intangibles is a term that refers to "any personal propen,. (including things in action)
other than goods. accounts, challel paper, documents, instruments, and money." UCC
§ 9-106. Chatlel paper is defined as a writing that evidences both "a monetary obligation
and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods... ," vec § 9-IOS(·I)(b). Thus, an
account debtor is obligated on a broad range of difTerentt>'pcs of obligations.
7 VCC § 9-3 J 8( 1). For a statement of the general rule as applied tD all contracts
generally. see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 336 (1979).
15-5 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 11 15.01(2)

notification of the assignment, any modification of or substitution for the

~ntract made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards is effective against an assignee unless the account debtor has
otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under the
modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that such
modification or substitution is a breach by the assignor.
(3) The account debtor is authorized to pay the assignor until the account
debtor receives notification that the amount due or to become due has been
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. A notification
which does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is ineffective. If
requested by the account debtor, the assignee must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof that the assignment has been made and unless he does so
the account debtor may pay the assignor.
(4) A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is
ineffective ifit prohibits assignment ofan account or prohibits creation ofa
security interest in a general intangible for money due or to become due or
requires the account debtor's consent to such assignment or security
interest.•

With respect to commercial paper, persons who qualify as holders in due

course obtain greater rights to the instrument than those possessed by their
transferors. Chapter 16 of this handbook discusses the holder in due course
doctrine and the various limitations that have been ingrafted upon it. As previ·
ously discussed in Chapter 14, holders by due negotiation of documents of title
may acquire rights superior to those of their transferors. Similar rules exist to
protect bona fide purchasers of investment securities.·

(2) Transfer of Negotiable Instruments

In discussing the transfer of negotiable instruments, a distinction must be
drawn between transfer and negotiation. When the transfer meets the formali-
ties required for "negotiation," the transferee of the instrument becomes a
"holder" and acquires the special rights attaching to that status under Articles 3
and 4. ,. A negotiation occurs only when the instrument is transferred in the
proper manner. It requires delivery, plus any necessary indorsement of the
instrument. 11 For delivery ofthe instrument to occur, there must be a "voluntary
transfer of possession" of the physical instrument. 12 Where an indorsement is

"vec § 9·318.
·vec§ 8·307.
'·vee § 3·202(1). See also vee § 1·201(20).
" vee § 3·202(1).
"vce § \·201(14).
1115.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-6

necessary, it must be made by a holder ofthe instromeot, or one acting 00 behalf

of the holder, by a signature on the instrument."
An instrument,like other property, can be transferred without being negoti-
ated. Rights will pass to the transferee although the transfer is not by negotiation.
The UCC statell: "Transferofan instrument vests in the transferee such rights as
the transferor has therein When an instrument has been transferred for
value, if it is not payable to bearer, the transferee has the right to require the
indorsement of the transferor so as to make the transferee a holder by negotia-
tion. 15 However, until the proper indorsements are obtained. there wilt be no
negotiation and "there is no presumption that the transferee is the owner."'e
A transferee who does not take by negotiation cannot be a "holder" and so
cannot qualify as a holder in due course. However, because a transferor can
transfer all the rights that the transferor has, if the transferor is a holder in due
course in his or her own right, the transferee will acquire those rights. This is
discussed in Chapter 16.
Whether an indorsement is necessary in order to transfer a negotiable
instrument by negotiation depends upon the character of the negotiable instru-
ment. If the instrument is payable to "bearer," it may be negotiated by delivery
alone. Subsequently, ifthe instrument is specially indorsed to be payable to a
particular person, the instrument in that form may be further negotiated only by
both delivery and indorsement." When the instrument is issued in a form such
that it is payable to "order," it can only be negotiated by delivery plus whatever
indorsements are necessary. 11 If the instrument is indorsed in "blank," the
instrument becomes payable \0 bearer and may be further negotiated by delivery
alone until it subsequently becomes specially indorsed to be payable to order. n
Thus, the form of indorsement, whether a special indorsement or an indorse-
ment in blank. will determine whether the instrument will be regarded as
"order" paper or "bearer" paper for purposes of further negotiation.
Unless the holder ofan instrument is a holder in due course, the holder will
take the instrument subject to defenses of nondelivery or delivery for a special
purpose. 2O Delivery is generally defined in the uee as any "voluntary transfer of
possession," and an instrument is "issued" when it is first delivered. 21 Thus, in a

'3 VCC§ 3-202(2).

,. l:Ce § 3·201 (l). There are exceptions so that a transferee who has been a party to
fraud or illegality cannot obtain beller rights by laundering the instrument through a
subsequent holder in due course. Id.
ISvce § 3.201(3).
" Id.
"vee § 3-204(1).
'Ivec § 3.202( I).
19vee § 3-204(2}.
20vec § 3.306(c).
•,vec §§ !·201(14}, 3·I02(1}(a).
 15-7 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 11 15.01(3)

1985 Wisconsin case in which the decedent had made a promissory note to the
. payee but had retained it among his personal papers, there was no delivery ofthe
note. The payee could not enforce the obligation although the decedent had sent
the payee a letter informing the payee of the existence of the note payable to
him. 22

(3J Indorsements
Negotiable instruments are commonly transferred by delivery and indorse-
ment written on the instrument. To be effective under the UCC, the indorse-
ment must be on the instrument itself or on a paper finnly attached to it. 23
To be valid, the indorsement must transfer the entire instrument." If part of
the instrument has been paid, the indorsement must transfer the entire remain-
ing unpaid amount. 25 When an indorsement attempts to split up the instrument
and transfer a part to person A and another part to person B, the indorsement
will not be effective to negotiate the instrument. Such action may operate as an
assignment of parts of the instrument to the persons designated and may be
enforceable as an assignment by them. s Because no negotiation would occur,
the assignees could not qualify as holders in due course. A partial assignment
differs from a security interest in an instrument. An instrument can be negoti-
ated to a party who holds the entire instrument as security for a debt. The
secured party must take care to be sure the formalities of delivery and indorse-
ment necessary for negotiation are met; otherwise, the secured party will have
only the rights of a transferee.27
An indorsement may be made by an agent or representative. 2I According to
the comments to the UCC, the power to sign for another person "may be implied
in law or in fact, or it may rest merely upon apparent authority."21 Proving that
the signature is authorized and therefore binding upon the principal is merely a

22 Vesely v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 128 Wis. 2d 246, 381 NW2d 593 (Ct. App.
1985).
23VCC § 3·202(2); Lamson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 187 Colo. 382, 531 P2d 966
(1975); Estrada v. River Oaks Bank & Trust Co., 550 SW2d 719 (Tell. Civ. App. 1977).
2. VCC § 3-202(3).
25Id.
2& Id. & comment 4.
27 See VCC § 3-201(2).
2IVCC § 3-403(1).
.. UCC § 3-403. comment 1. When a lawyer exceeded the authority granted by his
clients and indorsed checks for deposit into his personal account, rather than into the
client's account, the indorsement was not effective because it was not authorized. The
lawyer's conduct amounted to conversion of the client's property. The depositary bank
was also liable for conversion because it paid the proceeds ofthe check to the lawyer. Levy
v. First Pa. Bank, 338 Pa. Super. 73, 487 A2d 857 (J 985).
, 15.0113)[a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-8

matter ofestablishing the authority oftbe aaent "as in other cases ofrepresenta-
tion." The drafters ofthe UCC indicate that parol evidence should be admissible
to prove or deny tho existence of the representative relationship. III
In a case before the New York Court of Appeals, the general and manqing
partner of a partnership indorsed a note to the bank. The partner exceeded his
actual authority and negotiated the note for his own benefit, rather than for that
of the partnership. The court held that although the bank might have behaved
more prudently by investigating the notes offered to it, it had no obligation to
investigate. The partner had apparent authority to transfer the note; therefore,
the bank acted in good faith because the test ofgood faith is not whether the bank
ought to have known or should have inquired, but whether the bank actually
knew of some fact which should have prevented the bank from taking the note.
Having acted in good faith, the bank qualified as a holder in due course that
could enforce the notes notwithstanding the unauthorized transfer of them by
the general partner.n An agent who indorses commercial paper should be careful
to indorse it in a representative capacity so that the agent will not be personally
liable for payment of the paper.:12

(a] Types of Indorsements. The most common forms of indorsements that

appear on negotiable instruments are the blank and the special indorsement.
Indorsements may also be restrictive, qualified, or conditional. ss
(i) Blank indorsement, The blank indorsement is a transfer of the instru-
ment by simply signing the name of the payee or the indorsee without further
words." Paper with such an indorsement is thereafter transferable by delivery
and payable to bearer. Any holder desiring to make an instrument with a blank
indorsement one that is payable to order may do so by writing above the

30 UCC § 3.403, comment I.

31 Chemical Bank ofRoches1er v. Haskell, 5 I NY2d 85. 411 NE2d 1339.432 NYS2d
478 (1980). Apparent authority cannot be created by the conduct of the person whose
authority is in Question. Confederated Welding & Safety Supply, Inc. v. Bank orthe Mid·
South. 458 So2d 1370 (La. Ct. App. 1984), cen. denied, 462 So2d 1264 (1985). The court
held it was unreasonable to rely on the appearance of authority created by the president of
the company himself. "It is well·es1ablished that the mere fact that an employee has
managerial status and is in charge of the company's office does not entitle third persons to
assume that he had the authority to execute or indone negotiable paper belonging to his
employer."ln Grosberg v. Michigan Nat'J Bank of Oakland, 420 Mich. 707, 362 NW2d
715 (1984), the court interpreted Section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act as conferring
authority on one partner, as a matter of law, to indorse checks of the partnership that are
payable to other partners. According to the court, the act gave a panner implied authority
to indorse all incoming checks to the partnership.
32 See UCC §§ 3·403(2), 3-403(3); see generally 11 15.04. ,
33 uce §§ 3-204, 3-414, 8.308(2). Under the uce the term "restrictive indorsement"
includes a conditional indorsement. vec § 3-205.
,. uce §§ 3-204(2).
15-9 RIGHTS & LIABILmES 11 15.01(3)[aJ

signature ofthe blank indorsee the holder's own name or the name ofthe person
desired together with additional words, such as "pay to the order of" or "pay
to," which indicate that the check is payable to the person designated. H Alterna-
tively, the holder may specially indorse the instrument, which will allow the
instrument to be further negotiated only with the indorsement of the special
indorser. After the instrument has been specially indorsed, it no longer is bearer
paper, and subsequently can be negotiated only with the indorsement of the
person named.
[ifJ Special indonement. A special indorsement indicates the person to
whom or to whose orderthe instrument is to be paid. After being so indorsed, the
instrument can be further negotiated only by the indorsement of the special
indorsee. 31 The special indorsement controls even when the instrument origi-
nally was issued as bearer paper; indorsement by the special indorsee is neces-
sary to further negotiate the instrument. Sf Where an instrument originally
payable to order has been indorsed in blank, making it a bearer instrument, a
subsequent special indorsement controls and thereafter the indorsement of the
special indorsee is necessary to further negotiation. 31
The most common forms of special indorsement are "pay to X.. or "pay to
the order of x." Such expressions as "r hereby transfer my rights to X"" and "r
hereby assign to X" have caused some conflict among the pre-Code cases. '0 The
UCC makes clear that the addition ofthe words of assignment does not change
the character of the indorsement." Under the UCC, words of assignment,
guaranty, or limitation ofliability do not keep signatures from being effective as
indorsements.
Generally where doubt exists as to the capacity in which a person signs an
instrument, that person will be regarded as an indorser, unless he or she clearly
indicates his intention to be bound in some other capacity.'2 Such an intention

25 VCC §§ 3.204(3), 8-308(2).

21VCC § 3.204(1).
21 ld. The rule is different for bearer sl'curities. Special indorsements ofbearer securi·
ties do not prevent further negotiation; they merely serve to give notice ofpossible adverse
claims to the securities so indorsed. VCC §§ 1·201(5),8-304,8·310, comment 1. Cf. VCC
8-308(2). The pre·lJCC negotiable instruments law treated bearer instruments as remain·
ing bearer paper notwithstanding any special indorsement. See F. Beutel, Beutel's Bran-
non Negotiable Instruments Law at 628 (7th ed. 1948).
21 VCC § 3.204(1).
21 Copeland v. Burke, 59 Olda. 219,158 P 1162(1916). Contra, Gale v. Mayhew, \6\
Mich. 95, 125 NW 781 (1910).
'0 See Annot.• "Indorsement in Form of Assignment Held Qualified Indorsement,"
81 Banking U 447 (1964); Note, "Negotiable Instruments-Assignments as Indorsements
Without Recourse," 10 NCL Rev. 306 (1932); "Effect ofAssignment Indorsed on Back of
Commercial Paper," 44 ALR 1353 (1926).
.. VCC §§ 3·202(4), 8-308(1).
•~ vce § 3-402 & comment.
11 15.01(3I(a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-1Q

may be expressed in appropriate words or indicated by the position on the

.instrument of the name of the indorsing party. The indorsement of an instru-
ment to "cashier" or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation is a special
indorsement to the bank or corporation, and the instrument can be nesotiated
further either by the indorsement ofthe cashier or fiscal officer or by the bank or
corporation itself."
(liil Indorsement without recourse. A qualified indorsement is a transfer of
title to the instrument by which the indorser indicates his or her desire to limit
his liability. Such an indorsement is commonly made by adding over the signa-
ture such words as "without recourse...•• Such a qualification may be added to
any type ofindorsement. Its effect upon the liability ofthe indorser is discussed
in the section that follows.
(hI Restrictive Indorsements. Restrictive indorsements are of four types.
The first tYl=e, which purports to prohibit further negotiation ofthe instrument,
can be made by adding to the signature of the indorser such an expression as
"pay X only..... The second type vests title in trust for a third person and is
created by such expressions as "pay to X in trust for Y,"" or "pay First Metropol-
itan Bank for account of Y."" The third type ofrestrictive indorsement, one that
is very common in banking, is an indorsement that signifies a purpose ofdeposit
or collection, and which may be made by adding to the indorsement the expres-
sion "for collection..•• or "pay any bank...•• Restrictive indorsements also
include a fourth classification called "conditional" indorsements.
The UCC establishes certain general rules for all types ofrestrictive indorse-
ments. No restrictive indorsement, regardless of its character, "prevents further
transfer or negotiation ofthe instrument." However, the restrictive indorsement
may give notice to certain panies and may impose requirements on subsequent
parties that must be satisfied. In general, however, banks in the collecting
process, including the payor bank, will not be affected by any restrictive indorse-
ment on an instrument as long as the bank is not the depository bank." Because
banks must process checks rapidly and in bulk. it is reasonable to relieve all
banks, except the flISt bank in which the item is deposited, from having to
examine the chain of indorsements.
When the restrictive indorsement indicates that the instrument has been
indorsed for purposes ofdeposit or collection, the transferee must "payor apply

'3 uee § 3.117 comment.

"uee § 3·414.
.. uee § 3-205(b).
•• UCC § 3·205(d).
" ld.
.. uee § 3·205(c).
"ld.
5. uee § 3.206(2).
15-11 RIGHTS &: LIABILITIES ,. 15.01(3l{.1

any value given by him for on the security ofthe instrument consistently with the
indorsement...."11 By making payment consistent with the indorsement, the
transferee becomes a holder for value and may qualify as a holder in due course
by satisfying the other holder in due course criteria. Thus, a depository institu-
tion that ignores a "for deposit" indorsement cannot be a holder for value; and
m
therefore will not be a holder due course and will be liable to the owner of the
instrument for having paid it In a manner not consistent with the terms of the
restrictive indors.ement. 52 A similar rule applies when the indorsement is a
"conditional" indorsement. 52 When the indorsement is in trust or otherwise for
the benefit of another person, the first taIcer under such an indorsement "must
payor apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument
consistently with the indorsement.... "54 To the extent that the payment is
consistent with the indorSement, the taker becomes a holder for value and
possibly in due course. A subsequent holder for value is not on notice or
otherwise affected by a conditional indorsement "unless he has knowledge that a
fiduciary or other person has negotiated the instrument in any transaction for his
own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.... "51
[vI ConditioaaI indorsements. Any kind ofindorsement may be made con-
ditional by adding words indicating that the instrument is to be transferred or
paid only on some condition contained therein!' For example, "on arrival ofthe
ship Swallow, "17 or "This indorsement is made subject to all conditions of a
separate contract"l1 are types ofconditions. A conditional indorsement does not
destroy negotiability of the instrument. to Payor banks that are not depositary
banks are not given notice or otherwise affected by a conditional indorsement.to
Intermediary banks likewise are under no duty as a result of a conditional
indorsement." A payor bank may properly pay the holder of an instrument
bearing a restrictive indorsement so long as the payor bank is not the depositary
bank. 12 Restrictive indorsements should be distinguished from mere directions

51 vee § 3.206(3).
52[d.
531d.
.. vee § 3·206(4).
551d.
56 The VCC classifies such indorsements as restrictive. VCC § 3-205(a).
51 D. Smout, Chalmers on Bills of Exchange 116 (13th ed. 1964).
5" Randles v. Gully, 128 Okla. 220, 262 P 201 (1927).
...vcc § 3·206 (I).
6. VCC § 3-206(2).

61 UCC § 3-206(3).

62 VCC §§ 3·206(2), 3·603( I )(b). See also the discussion of notice to a bank from
memoranda on a check at , 21.03.
1I1S.01[3)Ib) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-12

or notations written on checks, which indicate the disposition ofthe proceeds or

the source of the account.

Ibl Rights and Duties of Restrictlye Indorsees. Restrictive indorsements do

not prevent further negotiation ofthe paper, even where the indorsementspecif·
ically tries to prohibit further negotiation." A bank is not bound by restrictive
indorsements unless the bank is the first bank to whom the item is given for
collection or is the transferee of the person who restrictively indorsed."
In the case ofrestrictive indorsements that are indorsements in trost, arefor
collection or deposit, or are conditional, the first indorsee under the restrictive
indorsement and the party required to pay (when the payor is not a bank) must
conform to the terms of the indorsement or be liable to the person for whose
benefit the indorsement was made. IS Insofar as the indorsee does conform, that
indorsee may become a holder in due course of the restrictively indorsed paper,
cutting offdefenses of previous parties." When the indorsement is in trust or for
the benefit of the indorser or another person, a person who is a holder for value
after the first taker under the indorsement is "neither given notice nor otherwise
affected" by the restrictive endorsement "unless he has knowledge that a flduci·
ary or other person has negotiated in any transaction for his own benefit or
otherwise in breach of duties......., Thus. actual notice of breach of fiduciary
duties by subsequent holders will remain significant. In the case ofindorsements
that are classified either as conditional indorsements or as indorsements for
collection or deposit, any transferee other than a bank is bound to payor apply
any value given consistently with the terms of the indorsement. II The first bank
that receives the instrument for deposit will be on notice from the terms of the
indorsement and under the obligation to pay value consistently with the terms of
the indorsement. Subsequent intermediary banks and the payor bank (when the
payor is not the same bank as the depositary bank) are free from any effects as a
result of the terms ofthe restrictive indorsement.n
To illustrate these rules, consider a check that the payee (P) indorses "Cor
deposit" and deposits at Bank A where P has an account. Bank A forwards the

"uee § 3-206(1).
•• vee § 3-206(2) provides: "An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the
depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a restrictive indorse·
ment of any person ..."; vee § 4.205(2) states: "An intermediary bank, or payor bank
which is not a depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a
restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor." See also
uee §§ 3·206(3), 3·206(4). 3·603.
., vee §§ 3·206(4). 3-603( I)(b).
63 uee §§ 3.206(3). 3-206(4) & comment 4.
• 7 vee § 3.206(4).

"uee § 3.206(3).
6t uee §§ 3.206(2). 3·206(3)
 15·13 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 1f IS.Ol[3Jld]

check for collection to Bank B which, in tum, sends the check to Bank C for
payment. Bank A is obligated to P to honor the restrictive indorsement and
credit the funds to P's account. Banks Band C do not have any responsibility to
see that P's account is properly credited. Ifa thief(1) should steal the check from
BankA and then take it to Bank C for payment or for deposit to some account of
T at Bank C, in this situation Bank C is on notice of the restrictive indorsement
because the check got outside the bank collection process when it was stolen and
Bank C is now the first bank in the collection process when T attempts to obtain
payment. If Bank C pays the check to T, Bank C will be liable to P for making a
payment that is inconsistent with the restrictive indorsement. For additional
discussion of problems involving miscredited proceeds and restrictive indorse-
ments, see Chapter 20.

Ie) Bank's Power to Supply Missing Indorsement. Under uec § 4-205(1),

banks may supply missing indorsements oftheir customers, which are needed to
establish title to an item, unless there is an express statement on the item that
requires the customer's indorsement, such as "payee's indorsement required. "'0
The bank must note on the instrument that the customer's account was credited.
However, the authority given under VCC § 4-205(1) to a depository bank to
supply the missing indorsement ofits customer does not extend to supplying the
missing indorsement of a non-customer joint payee on the check. The bank's
authority extends only to parties who are customers of the bank!'
In a New York case, the court held that a party could be a customer of the
bank for the purpose ofallowing the bank to supply the party's missing indorse-
ment although the party had no account at the bank. 72 The person became the
bank's customer when the bank agreed to collect the check for him!' Although
the argument was made that the bank should be viewed as the purchaser of the
check for its own account and not as an agent for collection, the court reasoned
that the VCC expressed a policy in Section 4-20 I to avoid deciding cases on the
basis of agency or owner status. 7 •

[d) Transferees of Instruments With Missing Indorsement. The effect of

.transferring an instrument without indorsement is similar in all types ofnegotia·
ble paper. If the instrument is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, such a
transfer, which is made by mere delivery ofthe paper, constitutes a negotiation,

7. UCC § 4.205. See generally Annal.; Kreig, "The Missing Signature as an Unautho·
rized Signature of the Customer: The Debate Continu~," 103 Banking U 542 (1986).
H Krump Conslr., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 98 Nev. 590. 655 P2d 524 (1982).

72 Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Price, Miller. Evans and Flowers, 57 NY2d 220. 441
NE2d 1083.455 NYS2d 565 (1982).
"See UCC § 4· I04{e).
"For further discussion of this case, see ~ 20.07.
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·14

and a person taking the instrument under these circumstances is a "bolder" arid
may be a holder in due course by satisfying the additional criteria. for tbat
status."
If the instrument Is payable to the order of a particular person, indorsed
specially, or contains some type of restrictive or conditional indorsement, the
manual delivery without indorsement confers upon the transferee such title as
the transferor had in the instrument. If the transfer is for value, it gives the
transferee the right to have the indorsement ofthe transferor. TI This right is to an
unqualified indorsement and may be enforced in court,11 but until such an
indorsement is actually placed on the instrument, the transferee is a mere
assignee oftitle to the paper and cannot sue as a holder in due course,"
A person to whom a negotiable instrument has been transferred without a
necessary indorsement is classified as a "transferee" by the UCC." Although.
such a person is not a holder ofthe instrument and therefore can never become a
holder in due course as long as the indorsement is missing, such a person has
rights as a transferee. Most importantly, the transferee acquires all ofthe rights
that his or her transferor had in the instrument.II The transferee may bring suit

"uce § 3·202. See' 15.01[3)[a)[i].

"uee § 3·201(3).
"Id.
"uee § 3·20 I. For a case in which the court found that the transfer of a check
without an indorsement was an assignment so that the obligor, who had constructive
notice of the assignment, lost any control or power to revoke payment of the funds, see
Security State Bank v. Morlock, 355 NW2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), The general
differences between ordinary transfers of property and negotiation are discussed at
~ 15.01.
11 uee § 3.20 I. A person who does not have possession ofa check cannot be a holder
and, thu~ lacks standing to enforce payment ofthe check under uee § 3·30 I even though
he may be the beneficial owner of the instrument. If the person can establish status as a
transferee of the check, he may enforce the instrument under uee § 3·201 which gives a
transferee the rights of his transferor, but an assignment of rights to the check without
physical transfer of possession is not sufficient to constitute a "delivery" or "transfer"
under this section. Locks v, North Towne Nat'l Bank, 115111. App. 2d 729, 45 I NE2d 19
(1983). There may be some circumstances where physical possession ofthe instrument by
an agent would constitute constructive possession by the beneficial owner. 45 I NE2d at
19.
•• uee § 3·201. The transferee cannot obtain greater rights than his transferor had. If
the transferor lacked title to the check, his transferee would not have good title either. For
an e~ample of a case where the court held that alI subsequent transfers could not become
holders of the instrument due to the missing necessary indorsement, see O'Mara Enters.,
Inc. v. Mellon Bank, 601 F. Supp. 565 (WD Pa. 1985). In O'Mara Enterprises. the court
said that no transferee could become a holder out of the chain of title, even though there
was an indorsement by the missing indon;ee, after the check had becln restrictively
indon;ed for deposit. See Brown \'. Bell. 291 Ark. 116.722 SW2d 592(1987). The owner of
a note payable to order can transfer his ownership interest by making a gift of the note
even though he fails to indorse it.
 15-15 RIGHTS & UABIUTIES 11 15.01[3)[d]

to obtain payment of the instrument, although the transferee does not have the
. benefit of the special presumptions established by the Dee for holders. 8 '
Because the relationship between the bank and its customer is contractual
and requires the bank to obey the orders ofits customer on checks drawn against
the customer's account, a check made payable jointly to named payees is not
properly payable unless both of the named payees indorse the check.n If the
bank fails to obtain both signatures, the customer may require the bank to
recredit the account. It is not necessary, according to one court, for the customer
to prove actual damages before being entitled to have the account recredited. 83

11 VCC § 3-20 I. Pay Center Inc. v. Milton, 632 P2d 642 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). In Fore
v. Bles, 149 Ariz. 603, 721 P2d 151 (Ct. App. 1986), the court recognized the rights ofa
party who was not a holder. When Fore and Bles divorced, the court determined that Fore
had an interest of $52,500.00 in a nOle for $133,431.44 under Arizona community
property laws because it was obtained for a loan of community funds. The maker of the
note was a firm named ISSI, and Bles was the payee. The divorce decree awarded Fore a
share of "the loan repayments due the community from ISSI" without specifically refer-
ring to the note. The note was payable to Bles, on demand, and had neither been indorsed
nor physically transferred to Fore. Fore sued ISSI, naming Bleus an involuntary plaintiff,
to collect on her interest in the note, ISSI defended on the grounds that Fore lacked
standing to sue for payment ofthe note because she was neither a holder nor a transferee of
the note. According to ISSI, only the holder could enforce the note. The court ruled for
Fore. (It should be noted that the judgment provided for Bles to present the note to ISSI
for panial cancellation.) According to the coun, Fore was not a holder but had obtained
the rights ofa holder as a transferee under VCC § 3-20 I. Thus, she could sue on the note in
her own name because she became a transferee through the Arizona community propeny
laws. Having been awarded a beneficial interest in the note on dissolution of the marital
community, she gained the right to exercise exclusive control over her separate propeny
under the community propeny laws. Recognizing an exclusive right in Bles to enforce the
note would violate this principle. Also, it would encourage collusion between the maker
and the payee to deny enforcement rights to Fore. See Vance v. Vance, 124 Ariz. 1,601
P2d 605 (1979) (an uncooperative payee could not prevent a co-payee from suing on a
note).
82 VCC § 3-116 provides that when an instrument is payable to the order of two or
more persons. all of them must act in order to negotiate, discharge, or enforce the
instrument. See also American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Joseph Valley Bank, 180 Ind.
App. 546. 389 NE2d 379 (1979). See generally Note. "Drawers: Check for Missing
Endorsement on Joint Payee Checks," 32 Mercer L. Rev. 407 (1980).
83 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. First Nat'! Bank ofAkron, 63 Ohio St. 2d 220, 407 NE2d 519,
17 Ohio Op. 3d 136 (1980). See C.H. Sanders Constr. Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 123 AD2d
25 1,506 NYS 2d 58 (1986). A check named two payees using the word "and" plus a mark
that might be interpreted as a virgule between the two payees' names. The court held that
the check was ambiguous as to whether both payees needed to indorse. T9 protect the
interest of both payees, who were not responsible for writing the check, the coun ruled
that the check should be deemed to be payable jointly. However, as the action was brought
by the drawer, if the drawee bank could establish that the drawer received value for the
check, the drawee bank would have a defense of unjust enrichment.
, 1S.Ol[311d] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·16

In Puckett v. South East Plaza Bank,·' the court upheld the right ofone joint
payee to recover from a bank that cashed a draft in which she and another were
named as joint payees without requiring her signature. The plaintiff's signature
was forged. The court further held that the plaintiff could maintain the action
without making the otherjoint payee a party to the lawsuit because he was not an
indispensable party to the action.
Instruments payable to more than one person must be examined to deter·
mine whether they are payable in the alternative or payable to all ofthem. II
When the instrument is payable in the alternative, it is payable to "anyone of
them" and anyone ofthe persons to whom it is payable who has possession of
the instrument may negotiate, discharge, or enforce it." On the other hand, ifthe
instrument is not payable in the alternative, then it must be regarded as payable
to all of them and the instrument "may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced
only by all of them...•r An instrument payable to "A or B" is payable in the
alternative to either A or B. An instrument payable to "A and B" is payable to
both of the parties.·· As the comment to the UCC recognizes, although an
instrument is payable to more than one person and requires all of those persons
to take action to negotiate or enforce the instrument, "one may of course be
authorized to sign for the other...." or to give consent to actions by the other.··
A signature may be made by an agent, and the UCC incorporates the traditioll,al
rules of agency where authority may be established not only in cases of an
express grant ofauthority to the agent but also in cases where authority "may be
implied in law or in fact, or it may rest merely upon apparent authority."ta
Sometimes an instrument is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to two or
more persons in the alternative or is payable to all of them jointly. In a common
situation, a slant or virgule is inserted between two names as in an instrument
payable "to A/B." It has been held that a check made payable to two persons with
a slant between the two names may be paid on the indorsement of either one of
the paYees. The slant, or virgule, is the equivalent of "or" rather than ..and.....

14
620 P2d 461 (Okla. Cl. App. 1980). See also Quintana v. Allstate Ins. Co., 378
NW2d 40 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), holdini that an insurance draft was converted when the
insurance company paid the draft over the forged endorsement of one ofthe two joint
payees on the instrument.
15VCC § 3.116.
··VCC § 3·116(a).
07 VCC § 3.116(b).

.. vcc § 3·116 & comment.

01 [d.
•• VCC § 3·403 & comment I; see also VCC § 3·404 & comment I. For further
discussion of rules ofagency, see l' 18.04, 19.04, 20.08.
•, See Dynalectron Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co.• 704 F2d 737 (4th Cir: 1983); Ryland
Group Inc. Y. Gwinnelte Co. Bank, 151 Ga. App. 14g, 259 SE2d 152 (1979); Miron
Rapid.Mix Concrete Corp. y. Bank Hapoalim, 105 Misc. 2d 630, 432 NYS2d 776 (Sup.
15-17 RIGHTS & UABILITIES 1I1S.01[3](dl

The obligor on a promissory note that is payable to two or more payees

.jointly (and not alternatively) must make payment to aU of the joint payees.
Payment made to only one of them will leave the obligor liable to the remaining
payees... Ofcourse, one joint payee may be authorized by the otherjoint payees
to act on behalf of all of them. Also, a joint payee may indorse the instrument
and transfer his or her interest to another person, including one who was also a
joint payee, and that person will have the status of a holder if all necessary
indorsements are obtained.
In another case, one joint payee, Cook, sued the depositary bank and the
drawee bank for conversion of a check on which he was a joint payee with
American General. The plaintiffclaimed that the banks paid the check notwith-
standing that his indorsement had been forged. Cook knew his indorsement had
been forged but delayed for ten months in giving notice. The banks argued that
Cook's delay in notifying them amounted to either a ratification of the forged
indorsement or an estoppel from challenging the authenticity of the indorse-
ment. The court held that ratification ofa forged signature is usually a question
offact. The court then stated, "We find that ten months is a substantial delay
raising an inference of ratification sufficient to warrant that this issue be submit-
ted to the trier of fact. However, although urged to do so by the banks, we are
unwilling to find as a matter of law that this delay by itselfconstitutes a ratifica-
tion which entitles the banks to judgment in their favor."" The court further
held that whether Cook was estopped from claiming the indorsement was unau-
thorized was a question offact. Moreover, if the banks failed to exercise due care
in paying the check, they could not assert estoppel as a defense.
Finally, although a check must be delivered in order for a payee to have a
conversion claim against a bank for payment of the check on a forged indorse-
ment, delivery of this check did occur. The drawer delivered the check to the
other payee. Delivery to one joint payee may constitute constructive delivery as
to all payees. Although Cook knew that the check had been delivered to the payee
who committed the forgery, Cook's ratification of the delivery of the check to
such payee did not constitute a ratification of the forgery.
The depositary bank's failure to authenticate Cook's signature as a joint
payee did not, as a matter of law, constitute failure to act in a commercially

Ct. 1980). A comment to VCC § 3-116 states that an instrument payable to "A and/or B,"
is to be regarded as "payable in the alternative to A, or to B. or to A and B together...."
.. Concepcion v. Tojeiro, 457 So2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Although a
certificate of deposit payable in the alternative to multiple parties required an indorse-
ment prior to payment according to its terms, the bank was not liable in conversion for
paying the proceeds to one of the named payees without an indorsement because a
properly payable party received the proceeds. Gray v. Bertrand, 723 SW2d 957 (Tex.
1987). See generally H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, ~ 7.13 (6th ed. 1987 and Cum.
Supp.).
"Cook v. Great W. Bank, 141 Ariz. 80, 85, 685 P2d 145, 150(Ct. App. 1984).
11 15.01(3)(e} NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IS-18

reasonable manner. In this case, the indorsements appeared proper on their face;
the joint payee, who was a customer ofthe bank, deposited the check to his own
account, and the indonement of the depositing payee was authentic. Whether
the bank acted in a commercially reasonable manner was a Question offact to be
resolved in an evidentiary hearing."

lei Umitatlon of Indorsees' Rlahts by Separate Contract. Although a holder

in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the instrument free from any
conditions imposed by a separate written agreement of which the holder is not
aware,85 the parties among themselves may make any indorsement or transfer
subject to contract arrangements. Under this rule every indorsement or other
contract on a negotiable instrument may be shown to have been conditional or
for a special purpose only and not for the purpose of transferring property in the
instrument... For example, an indonement or even the oriainal instrument may
have been delivered or made as part of a laraer contract that shows the transfer
was a pledge as collateral security for a loan. '7 But oral agreements that contra·
dict the nature ofthe indorsement are of doubtful enforceability, although the
UCC itself"does not attempt to state general rules as to when an instrument may
be varied or affected by parol evidence....""

11 15.02 LIABILITY OF PARTIES ON NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS
When a person deals in commercial paper, three types of liabilities may
arise. Firstly, a person may become liable on the contract that is evidenced by the
paper itself, which usually is called liability on the instrument. Secondly, a
person may become subject to liability arising from the circumstances surround-
ing the transfer of the paper. Under the uee, a person who transfers a negotiable
instrument or who presents it for payment or acceptance automatically makes
certain warranties which, ifbroken, create warranty liability. Thirdly, the person

" Id.
"uee § 3·119(1 J.
"uee § 3·119. This section permits a separate wrilll.'n agr/!/!m/!nl to modify the
terms of a negotiable instrument as between the obligor and his "immediate obligee" and
transferees who are not holders in due course.
97 Pre· vee law was similar. The authorities are collected in F. Beutel, Beutel's
Brannon Negotiable Instruments Law at 366 (7th ed. 1948).
.. vee § 3·119, comment I. See also vee § 3·118, comment I, which expresses a
policy that except for "reformation ofthe instrument," there should not ~ reson to parol
evidence to show the panies to an instrument intended terms contrary to those stated in
the instrument. The general SUbject of when a writing or other agreement may modify or
affect the terms of a negotiable instrument is discussed in .. ~ 14.04[211b), 16.05.
15-19 RIGHTS & UAB[LITIES '115.02(11

who becomes a party to a negotiable instrument may lu\ve obligations that

derive from a larger contract, of which the transfer of the commercial paper is
only part of the· performance. One common example is the transfer of a check
given in payment of a debt.
The Dee treats liability on the instrument as liability in contract." The
contract may be evidenced by the written terms of the agreement the party has
signed, or by additional words added to the indorsement. In other cases, as when
one signs a blank negotiable instrument, the liability may be furnished by rules
of law giving consequence to the signature and its position on the paper. It is,
however, a clear rule oflaw that no one is liable on negotiable paper unless his or
her signature appears thereon. 100
The fundamental rule of liability in negotiable instruments law is that no
person is liable on a negotiable instrument unless that person has signed it.'o' Of
course, one can become bound by the signature of another when the person
signing is an agent with express, implied, or apparent authority to bind the
person whose name is signed. A person also may be estopped or otherwise
precluded from denying that the signature on an instrument is his or her autho-
rized signature.,02 In SommervjJle Technical Sen-ices v. United States,'03 the
court reaffirmed that a party is not liable on an instrument unless his or her
signature appears. In this case, the court held that the United States could not be
liable on a promissory note that it had neither signed nor ratified.
Signing a negotiable instrument carries imponant legal consequences. The
signature is the basis for liability on the instrument.'04 Unless the instrument
clearly shows the capacity in which it is made, the signer will have liability as an
indorser. ,,.

(I) Primary and Secondary Liability

The two types ofliabilities on negotiable instruments are known as primary
and secondary liability. The person primarily liable is the one who, according to
the tenns ofthe contract, has a direct obligation to pay without the holder having
to first present the instrument to another party. Most other panies are second·

.. See uee §§ 3-413, 3·414, 3·415.

,oa uee § 3.40 I. See National Bank of Bossier City". Fornea, 272 So2d 411, cert.
denied, 273 Sold 297 (La. Ct. App. 1973). arising under the Louisiana Negotiable
Instruments Law.
'0' UCC § 3.401(1).
102 See uee §§ 3·404, 3·405, 3-406.
'°3 640 F2d 1276 (Ct. CI. 1981).
""uec § 3·401. See UCC §§ 3-413, 3·414, 3·415.
105 uee § 3-4G2.
1115.0212) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-20

arily liable. 101 The maker ofa note or of a certificate ofdeposit and the acceptor
ofa draft are all primarily liable. The drawer of a check or draft and any indorser
are usually considered secondarily liable.1I7

[2] Liability of Maker and Acceptors

The UCC uses the term "maker" in a technical way to refer only to the
obligor on an instrument that contains a promise to pay, such as a "note."'01
When the instrument is a draft or a check, the person who draws the draft or who
issues the check is a "drawer," not a "maker." This distinction is important
because a maker has primary legal liability, whereas a drawer has secondary
liability .'at Therefore, to hold a drawer liable when the instrument is dishonored,
the holder must show that the instrument has been properly presented and
notice of dishonor given. 110 The UCC requires presentment and notice of dis-
honor for charging secondary parties, such as drawers and indorsers.'" The
maker of or the person promising to pay a note or a certificate of deposit is
required to perform according to the terms of the promise. No presentation of
the paper at maturity is necessary to hold the maker ofa note. 112 When the maker
has signed a demand instrument, althOUgh no presentment is necessary to hold
the maker liable and the cause of action against the maker accrues as of the date
of the instrument or, when no date is stated, on the date of issue, it may be
advisable to make a demand for payment nevertheless. Under the uce, unless
the note provides otherwise, interest on the unpaid obligation will run at the rate

vee
\Ill § 3-J02! IXd). Sometimes the capacity in which a person sillns a negotiable
instrument is ambiguous. The VCC supplies special rules to resolve this ambiguity. Under
VCC § 3·402, a signature is an indorsement "unless the instrument clearly indicates" that
it is made in some other capacity. Custom and usage may supply the needed explanation
as when the position of the signature indicates the individual has signed as a maker or
drawer. vec § 3-402 comment; Huron CounW Banking eo. v. Knallay, 22 Ohio App. 3d
110.489 NE2d 1049 (1984). The position ofpany's signature on the lower right-hand
comer ofa note indicates an intent to sign as a maker, not an indorser. There also are rules
for when a si,lnature should be trealed in a representath'e capacity. vee § J-'U>J. dis-
cussed in ~ 15.04. Similar ambiguities sometimes arise over signatures that are claimed to
be for accommodation. See ~ 15.06.
'07 uee § 3.J02(d).

vee
'01 §§ 3-104(1 Xa), 3-413( I), 3-413(2).
'01 uce § 3-413.
"oThe rules on presentment and notice of dishonor are discussed in Chapter 21.
'" vce § 3-501. There are certain situations where presentment and notice of
dishonor are excused. See the discussion in ~1 21.10. 21.1 I. .
'" vee vee
§ 3-413( I), 3-50 I. See also § 3-122 on the time when a cause of action
accrues.
15-21 RIGHTS & LIABIUTIES , 15.02(2)

provided for judgments from the time that a demand is made on the maker,
acceptor, or other primary obligor. m .
The same rules apply to the liability ofan acceptor. An acceptor is a person,
on whom a draft or a check is drawn, who has agreed to be liable for paying the
instrument by signing it."< Accepting a check is called certification, and the
liability certification creates is similar in all respects to accepting a draft."s The
drawee ofa check or a draft is not liable on the instrument unless and until he or
she accepts it... 6 Thus, the term "acceptor" is also a term ofart used by the uee
to refer to a drawee who has become liable by signing the draft or check.
Under the UCC, to be liable as an acceptor, the drawee must write the
acceptance on the draft.'17 Liability may be created by other acts, but such
liability will be based on theories ofcontract or tort and will not be based on any
contract obligation of the drawee on the instrument. 11I
The vee expressly provides that a draft is not an assignment. 111 Because of
this rule, a drawee such as a payor bank on a check may not become liable to pay
a draft upon notification that the drawer has issued an order to pay a specified
person. If the drawee were viewed as a bailee holding property belonging to its
customer, the drawer, the drawee would become liable to parties to whom the
drawer had transferred that property when the drawee received notice of the
transfer. The same consequences would attach ifthe drawer were to be treated as
having made an assignment of rights the drawer had for payment from the
drawee. In modern banking operations, a payor bank must rapidly process
payment of numerous checks each day, and the recognition of bank liability
whenever the bank had notice ofits customer's check would require the bank to
make difficult judgments before deciding what checks should be paid from the
customer's account, and would erode the efficiency of the system. The vee
avoids these problems by making clear that a draft "does not ofitselfoperate as

"'vee §§ 3·122(1),3-122(4).
'14 vee §§ 3·410. 3-413(1).
115 vee § 3-411.

116 vee §§ 3·409,3-411(2).

117 vee § 3-410( I) comment. In W.B. Farms v. Fremont Nafl Bank & Trust Co., 756
F2d 663 (8th eir. 1985), the court enforced a drawee's oral promise to pay a check. The
payee's bank had called the payor bank and obtained an oral agreement that the payor
bank would pay the check when the drawer had sufficient funds in his account. Although
the account subsequently received enough funds to pay the check. the payor bank did not
pay it. Reasoning that the vee permits parties to enter into private contracts to govern
their relationships, the court permitted the issues of the existence and terms of the
agreement to be submitted to a jury for decision.
118 See vee § 3-409(2) & comment 3; vee § 3-410, comment 3, which states:
"nothing in this section is intended to eliminate any liability of the drawee in contract,
tort, or otherwise arising from the separate writing or any other obligation or representa·
tion, as provided in § 3·409."
111 vee § 3-409(1).
1115.01(3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-22

an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its pay-
ment ..." and there is no liability on the part of the drawee until the drawee
accepts the instrument, which, as noted previously, requires the drawee's own
signature. 1M Although a draft does not operate as an assignment "ofitseIf," it is
possible for the drawer to have made an assignment. The provision does not
prohibit assignments of funds held by drawees. The assignment may "appear
from other facts, and particularly from other agreements, expressed or implied;
and when the intent to assign is clear the check may be the means by which the
assignment is effected. "':11 Moreover, the Dec does not prohibit a drawee from
becoming liable to the holder for breach ofan agreement that drawee has made
to accept the instrument, and the drawee "may be liable in tort or upon any other
basis because of his representation that he has accepted, or that he intends to
accept. "1'2

(3) Acceptance
The common form ofacceptance is to write across the face ofthe instrument
such words as "accepted" or "certified" followed by the signature ofthe drawee.
However, any words are sufficient to hold the drawee as an acceptor, if they do
not express a negative answer to the order to pay. For example, "good," together
with a signature is sufficient; "kiss my foot" is not. 12) In fact, the signature alone
of the drawee is a sufficient acceptance.'"
When the holder is entitled to an acceptance, the holder is entitled to have it
made on the face of the draft or check, and failure to give it constitutes a
dishonor, which then establishes a right to recourse against prior indorsers and
the drawer. 125
An incomplete, dishonored, or overdue bill may be accepted under the Dee
by a signed writing on the instrument. "II Because the writing must be on the
instrument, it is impossible under the uee to accept nonexistent paper or drafts
before they are drawn. Such promises are binding in favor of later purchasers
under the uee, only if they meet the requirements of letters of credit under
Article 5"7 or are enforceable under general tort or contract theories because of
the representation made to accept the instrument, as discussed earlier.

2Q
' Id.
•21 uee §3-409, comment I.
122 uee § 3·409(2), comment 3.
123uec§ 3·410, comment 4.
' uec§ 3·401(1).
24

':I$uec §§ 3-S01(I)(a}, 3-507(1)(a). A bank is not obligated 10 certify a check. uce

§ 3·411(2). See also'~ 15.05[5], 21.10[8J. .
121 uec § 3-410(2).
127uecM 5-103(1)(a), 5·102(2). 5·102(3).
15·23 RIGHTS & LIABIUTIES 1115.02(3)

With one exception, any expression in an acceptance that varies the terms of
the draft gives the holder of the· draft the rights to refuse the acceptance and to
treat the draft as dishonored. ,:II The only exception is that an acceptance may be
conditioned upon payment "at any particular bank or place in the United
States" unless the acceptance goes further and states that the draft "is to be paid
only at SUCD bank or place."'21 However, when an acceptance is conditioned
upon making payment at a bank in the United States, the draft must be pre-
sented at the bank so designated. no Acceptances that vary the terms of the draft
include acceptances that are conditional, are for part of the amount, are for
payment at a different time than that provided in the draft, and "any other
engagement changing the essential terms of the draft."'" When the holder ofthe
draft refuses an acceptance that has varied the terms ofthe draft, the drawee "is
entitled to have his acceptance cancelled. "'32 Alternatively, the holder may agree
to the acceptance. If the holder agrees, any indorser and drawer who do not
"affirmatively assent" to the variance are discharged from liability on the
instrument. 133
Following are some examples in which acceptance is "qualified" so that the
terms oCthe draft are vaned. A partial acceptance of the amount of the draft is
qualified. Thus, accepting a $500 draft for an amount not over $200 would be a
qualified acceptance.... It is common to indicate a place of payment on a draft,
but this docs not qualify the acceptance. Ifthe acceptance is to pay at a particular
place only, it is Qualified. For example, "pay at First National Bank of Browns-
ville" is unqualified, but "pay at the Second National Bank only" is qualified. 135
Any limitation or change in the time of payment is also a qualified acceptance.
For example, "accepted to be paid as soon as proceeds of hardware are availa-
ble" is qualified. In addition, an acceptance of a sight draft to be paid in sixty
days would be Qualified.'"

'21vee § 3-412(1).
'''vee § 3-412(2).
130 vee §§ 3-412, comment 3. 3-504(4) & comment 4.
131 vee § 3-412, comment I.
mvee § 3-412(1).
". vee § 3-412(3). A lessee forwarded a cenified check to the lessor for rent due. The
check contained the following language on the reverse: "Acceptance and Indorsement of
this check constitutes a full and final settlement between lessor and lessee with regard to
any obligation by lessee to lessor under lease... ." The lessor had the check cenified but
did not indorse it. The coun held that the lessor's having the check certified constituted an
acceptance under the terms specified in the check even though the lessor failed to sign or
indorse the check. The lessor received payment and the lessee was relc:ased. Kersh v.
Manis Wholesale Co., 135 Ga. App. 943,219 SE2d 604 (19751.
134 vec § 3-412.
"'vce § 3-412(2).
"'vee § 3-412.
1115.02(41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-24

A general acceptance of a draft thalis not a check does not change the
liability of the drawer and prior indorsers, but the certification of a check may
af'ect the liability ofprior parties. fIT When the holder of a check obtains certifi-
cation ofthe check, the certification discharges the drawer and prior indorsers in
the same manner as ifthe check had been paid fully.•11 But, when the 'drawer ofa
check is the person who presents it for certification, the drawer is not discharged
from liability.'31

(4] Indorser's Liability

lndorsers are secondarily liable. An indorser is liable to all subsequent
holders to pay the face amount ofan instrument, if it is dishonored by the person
primarily Iiable."o In the case of drafts, the indorser who, before acceptance,
indorses a draft that is entitled to be presented for acceptance also undertakes
that the draft will be accepted and paid. If the drawee fails either to accept or pay,
the indorser must pay the instrument.'" The liability is conditioned upon proper
presentment of the paper at maturity and notice of dishonor,••2 the formal
requirements for which are discussed in Chapter 21. If these formalities are not
met, or if they are not timely, the indorser's liability is discharged.'" In absence
of liability on the instrument based on dishonor, the indorser is under no
obligation other than liability for breach of warranty and any liability based on
the underlying obligation for which the instrument was given. The indorser's
liability based on warranty arises at the time ofdelivery ofthe paper and attaches
without any notice ofdishonor. Liability on the underlying obligation, ofcourse,
depends on the terms of the agreement or obligation. Warranty liability is
discussed later in this chapter, as is the relationship between liability on a
negotiable instrument and liability on the underlying obligation.
In absence of agreement to the contrary, the indorsers are liable to each
other in the order in which their signatures appear on the paper.,•• Thus, jf a
check has been made payable to A, indorsed by A to E, indorsed by B to C.
indorsed by C and presented for payment but dishonored by the drawee bank. C
may recover against any ofthe prior indorsers, either.4. or B, and also has a right
to recover directly from the drawer of the check. If C chooses to recover from

", Lee § 3-411.

"Bld.
'31 Dec § 3-411 (2). See also' 15.05[51 on accepted drafts and cenified check!.
,.°uec § 3.414(1).
,., uee ~§ 3-414( I), 3·50 I( I), 3·507.
142 uec § 3-4 J 4( I ).
,uuec ~ 3-501(I)(bl, 3-502.
'''Wilson v. Turner, 29 NC App. 101,223 SE2d 539, cert. denied, 290 NC 311,225
SE2d 832 (1976).
15·25 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 'Ii 15.02{5]

indorser B, B in tum may recover either from A or from the drawer. Once the
drawer has been called upon to pay, there can be no recourse against any of the
indorsers, A, B, or C, because the liability of tile indorsers is discharged by the
payment of the drawer.'" The procedures for giving notice of dishonor and
establishing liability in these cases are discussed in Chapter 21.
The indorser's conditiona1liability does not apply to indorsers who indorse
"without recourse." ,..

[5] Drawer's Liability

The liability of a drawer on a draft is similar to that of an indorser, except
that the drawer does not have further recourse on lhe instrument against any-
one. ,.7 The drawer undertakes that upon presentation the instrument will be
accepted, or paid, or both, and that given proper notice ofdishonor the drawer
will pay the amount of the instrument to any holder or subsequent indorser who
may be compelled to pay it.'"
Although tile drawer's liability depends on proper presentment and notice
ofdishonor, the drawer usually cannot avoid liability even ifthe presentment or
notice is delayed beyond the time when it was due. '" The drawer is discharged
only to the extent that the delay caused lhe drawer loss offunds to cover the draft
because the bank on which the draft was drawn became insolvent.'$l1 To avoid
liability in this limited situation, the drawer must assign his or her rights against
the insolvent bank for payment of the check to the holder. In limited situations
in which protest is necessary, however, any delay in making it results in a
complete discharge of the drawer.'" (These problems are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 21.) Otherwise, the drawer is required to pay drafts on default
of the drawee.,52
A drawer is also precluded from denying to subsequent parties or to the
indorsee the existence of the payee and the payee's capacity to indorse. '53 For
example, if the drawer made a check payable to an unlicensed corporation
without power to contract, and the proper corporate officer subsequently
indorsed it, the drawer would not be able to deny the power ofthe corporation to

"·vec § 3-601 (3).

'''vee § 3-414(1).
,.7 Compare vce § 3-413(2) with VCC § 3-414( I).
'''uce § 3·413(2).
14tUCC § 3.502.
50
' 1d.
••, ld.
152 UCC §§ 3-413(2), 3·50 I, 3·502. See Beutel, "The Liability of Secendary Parties
Under the Vniform Commercial Code, Drawers and Indorsers," I Rut.-Cam. L. Rev. 15
(1969).
153 VCC § 3.413(3).
1115.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-26

transfer the instrument. However, the drawer does not guarantee the genuine-
ness of the payee's indonement and can set up forgery where it exists, so long as
there is no basis for finding that the drawer is estopped or precluded. 1M
Under uee Section 3·307, signatures on negotiable instruments are pre·
sumed to be "genuine or authorized." After signatures on tbe instrument are
established as genuine or authorized, the holder of the instrument is entitled to
recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense. Thus, when the holder
produces a check and sues to recover against the drawer, the holder is entitled to
recover unless the drawer establishes a defense. The holder may obtain summary
judgment against the drawer if the defendant drawer does not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a defense to the suit on the instrument.'51 A drawer may
disclaim the contract liability of a drawer by expressly drawing "without
recourse."'ss

, 15.03 LIABILITY IN WARRANTY FOR TRANSFER AND

PRESENTMENT OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
There are warranties that attach when a person transfers a negotiable instru-
ment or presents it for payment or acceptance. The vec
contains separate
warranty rules, depending on whether the instrument is One that is being trans-
ferred or presented by a customer or collecting bank, in which case the rules in
Article 4 control, '$7 or whether the instrument is being transferred or presented
by any other person, in which case Article 3 rules apply.'" The rules, however,
are essentially the same in either case. The following explanation will focus on
the general rule in uee § 3·417. Significant differences in uec § 4·207 with
respect to the warranties made by customers and collecting banks will be noted.

(1) Presentment Versus Transfer Warranties

There are two different categories of warranties. Firstly, some warranties
are made by a person who obtains payment or acceptance of an instrument.

15' vee §§ 3-413(3),3-404,3·405,3-406. See generall~' WI 20.01. 20,08.

'SS Sawgrass Builders. Inc. v. Realty eooOp. Inc., 172 Ga. App. 324, 323 SE2d 243
(J 984). Where a note was signed by one asserting to be the attorney in fact for the
defendants, the presumption of genuineness of the signatures as those of defendants
applies (Vee § 9-307( I n, and defendants have to produce some evidence to challenge the
authority ofthe signature. Until this was done, vee § 3-403( I), which requires plaintifTto
prove the authority of the agent, did not apply. Bowers v. Winilzki, 83 Or. App, 169,730
P2d 1253 (1986).
166 vee § 3-413(2). For a discussion oflhe relationship of the drawer's liability on the
instrument to thaI on the underlying obligation for which it was given, see t 15.07,
IS7 vec § 4-2()7.

"'vec § 3-417,
15-27 RIGHTS & UABILITIES 1115.0311)

Secondly, a different group of warranties is made by a person who transfers an

instrument and receives consideration. A distinction is thus drawn between
presenting an instrument for payment or acceptance and transferring an instru-
ment. The two groups ofwarranties are dissimilar. This distinction is intentional
in order to implement, among other policies, that policy expressed in the historic
case of Price v. Neal. l • 1
The full text of the various warraniies is set forth as fonows:
Warranties on Presentment and Transfer
(I) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is
unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due
course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether
or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor ofa draft ifthe holder in due course took the draft
after the acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that
the drawer's signature was unauthorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this
warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also the
drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor ofa draft with respect to an alteration made prior
to the acceptance if the holder in due course took the draft after the
acceptance, even though tbe acceptance provided "payable as origi-
nally drawn" or equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor ofa draft with respect to an alteration made after
the acceptance.
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration
warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any
subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the
transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and

vee
15' See generally § 3-417 & comments; vee § 3-418 & comments; vee § 4-207
& comments. For a discussion of the rule of Price v. Neal, see ~ 20.08.
1I15.03(1} NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-28

(c) the instrument has not been materially altered; and

(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge ofany insolvency proceeding instituted with
respect to 'the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted
instrument.
(3) By transferring "without recourse" the transferor limits the obliga-
tion in subsection (2) (d) to a warranty that he has no knowledge ofsuch a
defense.'so

The presentment warranties, which are made by the person who obtains
payment or acceptance and also by any prior transferor ofthe instrument, run to
the party who pays or accepts the instrument.'81 Thus, such a payor or acceptor,
who acts in good faith, may charge the presenting party or any prior transferor of
the instrument with liability for breach ofwarranty in an appropriate case. The
three basic warranties are (l) a warranty of good title to the instrument; (2) a
warranty of no knowledge that the signature ofthe maker or drawer is unautho-
rized; and (3) a warranty that the instrument has not been materially altered. As
previouslY indicated, these warranties are the ueC's basic scheme for allocating
liability in cases where an instrument has been altered or bears a forged signa-
ture. When the warranty has been breached, the payor or acceptor may recover
against earlier parties who transferred or presented the instrument such that the
liability may come to rest on the party who took the instrument from the person
who made the alteration or unauthorized signature. In certain situations, the
payor or acceptor may not recover for breach of warranty because of special
exceptions carved out from the basic warranties. For example, the warrantY that
the instrument has not been materially altered is not given by a holder in due
course acting in good faith to the acceptor ofa draft as to an alteration made after
the acceptance because the acceptor should have known of the state of the
instrument at the time the acceptance was made. m Similarly, the warranty is not
made to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration made before the
draft was accepted, if the holder of the instrument took the draft after the
acceptance, and this exception applies even though the acceptance may state it is
"payable as originally drawn." The reason for this exception is to avoid uncer·
tainty as to the state of the instrument in the hands of the innocent holder.'53
The warranty of good title is intended to be more limited than the warran·
ties contained in the group of warranties made by transferors of an instrument.
This was done deliberately to preserve the rule in Price v. Neal that a drawee who
pays an instrument with a forged drawer's signature is deemed to know the

,•• vee § )-417.

'., vee § )-417( 1).
,•• vee § 3-417 & comment 5.
'53 vee § 3-417, comment 5.
15-29 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES , 15.03[2}

signature of the drawer and cannot recover against an innocent holder.'"

The transfer warranties are broader in scope than are the presentment
warranties. Any person who transfers an instrument and obtains consideration
for it makes warranties to his or her immediate transferee. Moreover, if the
transfer ofthe instrument is by indorsement, the transferor makes the warranties
to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith. tIS There are
five basic transfer warranties: (1) the warranty ofgood title to the instrument; (2)
the warranty that all signatures are genuine or authorized; (3) the warranty that
the instrument has not been materially altered; (4) the warranty that no defense
of any party is good against the transferor; and (5) the warranty that the trans-
feror "has no knowledge ofany insolvency proceeding instituted with respect to
the maleer or acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted instrument." Thus, if a
holder of an instrument is required to take up an instrument because it has an
unauthorized signature or was altered or for some other reason amounting to a
breach of warranty, the holder will have recourse against the holder's immediate
transferor and prior indorsers for breach of warranty. This shifts the liability
back to the party who dealt with the person who committed the alterations or
unauthorized signature. It then becomes the risk ofthat party to collect from the
wrongdoer.
When an indorser transfers an instrument with an indorsement expressly
made "without recourse," the indorser disclaims the indorser's contract liability
on the instrument, as discussed earlier, but may not eliminate liability for breach
of the transfer warranties. A "without recourse" indorsement limits only one
transfer warranty (so that there is no defense of any party that is good against the
transferor). It converts that warranty to the more limited warranty that the
transferor "has no knowledge ofsuch a defense. "'H The section on customer and
collecting bank has no comparable provision; thus, the "without recourse"
indorsement does not limit the warranty made to a collecting bank. 117

[2} Warranties of Customers and Collecting Banks

The warranty rules that customers and collecting banks make differ some-
what from the general Article 3 warranties made by presenters and transferors.

". VCC §§ 3-417 & comment 4, 4-2CJ7 & comments, 3-418 & comments. See the
discussion at ~ 20.08.
tIS VCC §§ 3-417(2), 4·207(2). The warranties run 10 subsequent transferees. Thus,
the warranties made by a collecting bank under uee §§ 3-4t7(2)(b) and 4-207 (2Xb)
include the warranty thai the signatures on the check are authorized but this warranty
does not run to the payee ofthe instrument. Matco Tools Corp. v. Pontiac Siale Bank, 614
F. Supp. 1059 (ED Mich. 1985).
"'vee § 3-417(3).
107 vec § 4.207(2).
1115.03121 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IS-3D

As in the case of the general warranty rules, a division exists between the
warranties that a customer or collecting bank makes to a payor bank or "other
payor who in good faith pays or accepts ..." and warranties made by a customer
and collecting bank in transferring the item for a "settlement or other considera-
tion" to a transferee or any subsequent collecting bank.'1& In the case of the
Article 4 warranties. warranties are made regardless of any lack of indorsement
or words ofguarantee or warranty.'· An additional transfer warranty provides:
"Each customer and collecting bank so transferring an item and receiving a
settlement or other consideration engages that upon dishonor and any necessary
notice of dishonor and protest he will take up the item." This warranty is
comparable in form to the contract ofan indorser. Because the warranty will be
made regardless of whether the instrument has been indorsed, each customer
and collecting bank will have the liability ofan indorser although they have not
specifically indorsed the instrument.' 70 As this language refers to customers and
collecting banks that "so transfer" an item, the warranty should be similar to the
transfer warranties generally in running only to the "transferee and to any
subsequent collecting bank .. ,"111
The provisions in the Article 4 warranties also limit the liability of the
customer or collecting bank for breach of warranty to the "consideration
received ... plus finance charges and expenses related to the item, ifany. "172 The
provisions also require that a claim for breach of warranty be made within a
reasonable time after the person claiming "learns of the breach." Failure to
make a timely claim results in the discharge of the person liable for breach of
warranty to the extent of any loss caused by delay in making the claim.,,,

'''Compare vec § 4·207(1) with UCC § 4-207(2).

•.. UCC § 4-207(3).
110 Chilson v. Capital Bank of Miami, 10 Kan. App. .2d 111, 692 P2d 406 (1984), alrd,
237 Kan. 442, 701 P2d 903 (1985), held that the three-year statute of limitations, which
applies to suits for breach of implied warranties, governed a suit for breach of warranties
against a collecting bank that had stamped on the check "prior indorsements guaranteed."
The court declined to apply the five-year statute of limitations that is applicable to the
breach of wrinen contracts.
171 vec § 4-207(2).

172 uec § 4.207(3). The damages referred to include "expenses related to the item."
The comment indicates this should be read broadly so that they may include "ordinary
collecting expenses and in appropriate cases could also incfudesuch expenses as attorney's
fees." vee § 4-207, comment S.
"'vee § 4-207(4}. It has been held that the payor bank may not recover from a
collecting bank, for breach of warranty of presentment, when payment has been obtained
on a check with a forged indorsement if the proceeds of the forged check reached the
intended payee. The court held that it would be inequitable to allow the payor bank to
recover because the payor bank had suffered no damage from the forgery. Banker's Trust
of S.C. v. South Carolina Nat'! Bank of Charleston, 284 SC 238,325 SEld 81 tel. App.
1985).
15-31 RIGHTS &. LlABlUTIES , 15.04(1)

The parties between themselves may limit the liability in warranty by a

special contract."o Such a contract should be in writing and should state clearly
the warranties that are intended to be released; otherwise all warranties men·
tioned earlier apply automatically upon the transfer ofthe paper without further
agreement. Banks only warrant their good faith and authority when collecting
documentary drafts.'71

11 15.04 LIABILIlY OF AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES

(II Rules Regarding liability
When a person signs as an agent or representative ofanother party, such as
an officer for a corporation or a trustee on behalfof a beneficiary, two questions
arise. The first question is whether the agent's signature will bind the principal
on whose behalf the agent signed. The second question is whether the agent will
have any personal liability on the instrument as a result of the signature. The
vee deals with both of these issues.
The general rule of liability on negotiable instruments is that no person is
liable unless the person signs the instrument. 111 A signature of a person may be
made by an agent, and the general rules of agency and establishing such agency
will apply. 111 The principal may be bound because the agent will be deemed to
have express authority, authority implied as a matter oflaw, or apparent author-
ity. ", Although the text of the vee is not clear on the point, the comments
indicate that a principal will not be liable on a negotiable instrument signed by
an agent, even when the agent has authority to sign, unless the principal is named
on the instrument. '7 •
The second question, as to the liability of the agent, also is addressed by the
vee..This is a more complex legal issue and depends on the circumstances
presented. The vee provision is as follows:
Signature by Authorized Representative

174vce § 3.417 &. comment I; vee § 4·207.

175 vee § 7.508.

"'vee § 3·401.
177 vee § 3-403( I). See also vee § 3-404 &. comment I.
171 "The power to sign for another may be an express authority, or it may be implied
in law or in facl, or it may rest merely upon apparent authority. II may be established as in
other cases of representation, and when relevant parol evidence is admissible to prove or
to deny it." vee § 3·403, comment I.
m vee § 3.403, comment 2; the principal is not liable "unless the instrument names
him and clearly shows that the signature is made on his behalf."
, 15.04[1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-32

(1) A signaturemay be made by an agent or other representative. and his

authority to make it may be established as in other cases of representation.
No particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person
represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative
capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties. is
personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but
does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity,
or if the instrument does not name the person represented but does show
that the representative signed in a representative capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established the name ofan orpnization preceded
or followed by the name and office ofan authorized individual is a signature
made in a representative capacity...• .. . ..

The UCC thus sets forth three circumstances in which the agent will be person-
ally obligated on the instrument, even where the agent is acting as an authorized
representative: (1) when the instrument does not name the person represented
and also does not show the agent signed in a representative capacity; (2) when
the name of the person represented appears on the instrument but the signature
of the agent does not show that the agent signed in a representative capacity; and
(3) when the instrument does not show the name ofthe person represented but it
does show that the agent's signature was in a representative capacity. In situa-
tions (2) and (3), as between the immediate parties, the agent is permitted to
establish that the agent signed the instrument in a representative capacity. The
agent has no such opportunity to explain the ambiguity in the instrument as
against any other party. When the agent signs the instrument showing that the
signature is as the representative ofanother person. the agent will not be liable so
long as the signature is authorized.'"
An authorized agent would not be liable on the following signatures: "Jones
& Co., by Smith.. agent" or "Jones & Co., by Smith, president," "Jones & Co.,
per Smith, agent" or similar designation, and "Smith, agent for Jones & Co." In
these situations, the agent, if properly authorized, would not be liable on the
instrument. The signature not only indicates that it is made by a representative.

110 UCC § 3-403 .

..,uee § 3-404( I). An unauthorized signature operates as the signature of the
unauthorized signer. Jd. Because the principal is not liable on the instrument unless the
instrument names him or her (see supra note I 79) and the agent who signs'as a representa-
tive may not be personally liable under situation (3) in the text, there may be the bizarre
result that no one is liable on the instrument under the literal application of these rules.
 IS-33 RIGHTS & UABILITIES 11 15.04(2)[al

but it also shows the person who is represented as required by the UCC."2. When
. the agent signs a negotiable instrument without authorization from the princi·
pal, the agent is personally liable on the obligation regardless of the form in
which the agent signs.'u
The greatest difficulty has come in cases falling under the second circum-
stance, in which the instrument names the person represented but fails to show
that the signature on the instrument was made in a representative capacity. The
problem frequently arises in the use of checks where there is a preprinted
corporate name but the check is sisned by an officer without indication that the
signature was made in a representative capacity. A legal issue also may arise as to
whether a negotiable instrument has been made payable to a party personally or
is payable to the person the party represents. The UCC has provisions dealing
with this issue.'"

(II Case Examples

A rich body of case law deals with the problem of signatures by agents and
other representatives. This section presents cases that illustrate the rules dis-
cussed earlier.

(a) Principal's Name Missing. When a principal's name does not appear on an
instrument signed by an agent whose signature did not disclose that he or she
signed as agent but only signed individually, the principal is not liable on that
instrument, even when the payee knew when the instrument was issued that it
was intended to be the obligation of one who did not sign. liS
When an agent signs a negotiable instrument with his own name, without
indicating that he is signing as an agent or as a representative and does not name
the person who is the principal, the agent will be personally liable on the

lI2UCC § 3-403. See generally Holland, "Corporate Officers Beware-Your Signa.

ture on a Negotiable Instrument May Be Hazardous to Your Economic Health," 13 Ind.
L. Rev. 893 (1980); Annot., "Construction and Application ofUCC § 3.403(2) Dealing
with Personal Liability of Authorized Representative Who Sians Negotiable Instrument
in His Own Name," 97 ALR3d 798 (1980); Annot., "Admissibility of Parol Evidence to
Show Whether Guaranty of Corporation's Obligations Was Signed in Officer's Represen.
tative or Individual Capacity," 70 ALR3d 1276 (1976). See also Annot., "Personal
Liability of Officers or Directors of Corporation on Corporate Checks Issued Against
Insufficient Funds," 47 ALR3d 1250 (1973).
'13 UCC § 3-404(1); see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 324 (1958).
,.. VCC § 3·117. These provisions are discussed at V 14.04(2){/].
1IsNess v. Greater Ariz. Realty, Inc., 21 Ariz. App. 231, 517 P2d 1278.(1974), which
quoted part of VCC § 3-40 I, comment I. The case involved a note, but the rule applies
with regard to a check signed by an individual that does not disclose the name of a
purported principal for whom the alleged agent is signing.
 115.04[2)(b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-34

instrument.'" Although the agent in fact may be acting as an agent, he may not
. introduce parol evidence to prove the agency status. '"1 This rule was followed in
Gainok v. Featherson.,'11 where a person who signed a promissory note with her
own name was prevented from attempting to show by parol evidence that she
had signed in a representative capacity. The court followed this rule, even
though the person seeking to recover on the note was the original payee with
whom the defendant had dealt.'"'

Ibl Agent Fails to Sign In a Manner That Shows Agency Status. When an
agent acting with authority signs an instrument without indicating that the
signature is as a representative, but the instrument contains a printed corporate
or other business name, courts have come to the conclusion in some cases that
the instrument should be treated as if the printing on the instrument showed that
the signature of the agent had been made as a representative of the organization.
The result oftaking this view is that, as long as the signature is within the scope of
the agent's authority, the agent does not have personal liability and the organiza-
tion named has the sole liability on the instrument. The cases are in conflict on
this point, but there appears to be a greater willingness to recognize the signature
as made in a representative capacity when the instrument is a printed corporate
check than when the instrument is a promissory note. Some of the cases dealing
with this situation are described later.
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that a person who signed a check in the
lower right-hand corner with his personal name, without indicating that the

,.. uee § 3·402(2j{a).

"' vee § 3·403, comment 3 ("parol evidence is inadmissible under subsection (2){a)
to disestablish his obligation"). When a corporate officer signs a note using only his name,
and the name of the corporation does not appear on the note, parol evidence is not
admissible to prove that the parties intended the signature to be in a representative
capacity. If the name of the corporation appears on the instrument, then the signature is
ambiguous and vec § 3·403(2j{b) permits the presentation of extrinsic evidence to
clarify the panics' intent ifthe dispute is between the immediate panies. However, when
the corporate name does not appear, and there is no indication of a signature in a
representative capacity, there is no ambiguity, and extrinsic evidence cannot be admitted
to show that it was signed in a representative capacity. Mid·America Real Estate & Inv.
Corp. v. Lund, 353 NW2d 286 (NO 1984).
In some cases, there can be a threshold issue of whether the checlc contains a
statement of the name of the principal represented. (As previously indicated, the checlc
must contain both the name of the principal and that of the representative in order for
there to be an ambiguity under uee § 3.403(b){2) that would permit the introduction of
parol evidence to establish that the check had been signed in a representative capacity.) In
one case, the coun held that a check imprinted with the legend "Thrifty Liquors" was not
effective to name the corporation, "Thrifty Liquors, Inc." In re Turner, 49 Bankr. 231
(Bankr. O. Mass. 1985).
101
131 Ariz. 421, 641 P2d 909 (Ct. App. 1982).
"'The same result was reached in Bradley v. Romeo, 716 P2d 227 (Nev. 1986).
15·35 RIGHTS & UABIUTIES 11 15.04[2J(b)

signature was made as a representative of the corporation for which the person
was an officer, should be treated as a personal signature for which the person
signing was personally liable. The check contained the printed name of the
corporation in the upper left-hand comer, but the court said that this was not
enough to raise an issue of fact as to the representative nature of the signature.
Thus, although the UCC in § 3-403(2) allows the immediate parties to a transac-
tion to show that a check was signed in a representative rather than a personal
capacity, the failure ofthe drawer ofthe check to introduce further evidence that
it was intended as a corporate check required the court to direct summary
judgment for the payee. The check was given to the payee in payment for some
325,000 hot dog buns that the drawer ordered for concession stands in Iowa in
anticipation ofthe visit ofthe Pope. When only 300 buns were sold, the drawer
stopped payment on the check and this prompted the suit by the payee.,90
Arizona has followed the rule that the representative nature of a signature
on a check can be shown by the use of a preprinted check with a corporate name
printed on it. J.M. Cook signed the check without indicating that she was the
treasurer of the corporation, Arizona Auto Auction. The check contained the
name and address of the corporation printed at the top and the name, Arizona
Auto Auction, printed immediately above the signature line on the lower right-
hand comer. In a suit asserting personal liability ofCook on the check, the court
held that the instrument should be regarded as a corporate obligation. If a
promissory note had been involved, the result might have been different. Unlike
the practice ofrequiring a personal obligation on a corporate promissory note, it
would be "most unusual," the court found, to demand the individual obligation
of an officer on corporate checks. Consequently, the court thought it not likely
that any confusion existed as to who was liable on the check. Moreover, testi·
mony indicated that the bank treated the check as a corporate obligation and
acted consistently with this expectation by first obtaining a judgment against the
corporation. '91
In another case, certain checks were signed with the name of a corporation
followed by the names of two individuals, with each individual signature pre-
ceded by the word "by" and foIlowed by the words "authorized signature." The
court held that only the corporation was liable on the checks and that one of the
signing individuals who was sued on the checks was not personaIly Iiable. m

'90Co]onial Baking Co. of Des Moines v. Dowie, 330 NW2d 279 (Jowa 1983).
191 Valley Nat'l Bank, Sunnymead v. Cook, 136 Ariz. 232, 665 P2d 576 (Ct. App.
1983). The Arizona coun followed the rule stated in Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa.
Super. 87, 236 A2d 542 (1967). See also Kovash v. McCloskey, 386 NW2d 32 (NO 1986).
19'5outheastern Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp. 649 (Ala. (975), rev'd on other
grounds, 542 F2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976), where the coun indicated that the cpecks basically
fell within the rule of§ 3-404(3) of the UCC and that any person seeing such checks would
regard them as only the obligation of the corporation and not of any individual signer,
who clearly signed as an agent. The coun also indicated that the individual signer should
, 1S.04(2](bI NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-36

However, in a situation where a note neither named the person represented nor
showed that the signature was given in a representative capacity, the word "by"
preceding the signature on the face of the note did not alone show that he had
signed in a representative capacity.'"
Where a check was issued bearing the name of an incorporated travel
agency, signed by the president of that oraanization who indicated neither title
nor representative status on the check, the court held that the payee (described as
an "immediate party"), who knew when the check was taken that the president
had signed as an officer of the corporate drawer, could not enforce payment of
the check against the president individually when the check was dishonored
because of insufficient funds in the corporate account. 114
When a check was issued by a company whose name appeared as signatory,
followed by the signature of two individuals without any title or other indication
that they signed in a representative capacity, the court held in a suit against one
ofthe two individuals (whose signature was-af11xed by a check-writing machine)
that such individual was not liable. The court said that it was clear from the
evidence adduced that the individual intended to sign only in a representative
capacity, and that the payee (who was suing on the check) knew ofthis intention,
evidence to that effect not being disputed by the payee. III Note that the action
was between immediate parties. In a case involving a check bearing on the left-
hand side the printed name ofan organization, where the check was signed by an
individual who did not add a title or other indication of representative capacity,
it was held that the jUry should decide whether the individual signer was person-
ally liable, and with thejury having held for liability there was said to be nothing
in the evidence to justify a conclusion as a matter oflaw that the individual had
signed in a representative capacity. 'M
Where a check bore the printed name "Cessna Ranch" together with an
address and telephone number in the lower left-hand corner, but was signed by
an individual who failed to include any title or other indication of representative
capacity along with his signature, the court found that the bank, which had taken

not be liable under an Alabama "bad check" law conferring civil liability on one who
issued a worthless check.
• 93 Giacalone v. Bernstein. 348 S02d 679 (Aa. Dist. CI. App.), ccrt. denied, 354 S02d
980 (1977); see UCC § 3-403(2).
19'Viajeslberia, SA v. Dougheny, 87 SO 591, 212 NW2d 656 (1973).
195 Speer v. Friedland, 276 S02d 84 (Aa. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
\\6 Carleton Ford. Inc. v. aste, I Mass. App. 8 J9,295 NE2d 402 (1973). See Griffin v.
Ellinger, 530 SW2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), atrd, 538 SW2d 97 (1976), held that an
in~ividual signer ofthe ~heck, who did not indicale his litle. had the burden ofshowing by
eVidence an understandmg Ihal he was nOI to be held personally liable by the payee, The
mere facts Ihat the identity of the corporate principal was printed on the' upper left-hand
pan of the cheeks involved and that there had been previous instances where the payee
had taken checks signed by other officers of the corporation were not considered enough
to negate personal liability.
15-37 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES , 15.04'2J[bJ

the check on deposit from the payee and had permitted a partial withdrawal of
the proceeds, was entitled to the extent of the withdrawal to hold the signer
penonally liable. Since the bank was not an "immediate party," the Court said'
that the signer could not introduce evidence ofany agreement between the payee
and the signer as to the capacity in which the check was signed.ttl
A company president who signed a corporate check without adding his title
or indicating his representative capacity was held penonally liable when the
check failed to clear.,11 This may occur when the check is not imprinted with the
fum name.'ts Absence of "by" or "for" renden an individual signer of a corpo-
rate obligation liable therefor. 2OO Where a corporate president signed a note of
the firm receiving proceeds, absence of the corporation's signature on the note
precluded its liability thereon under Section 3-401 of the DeC. which provide..
that no one is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon."'
A corporation owed money for delivery of merchandise on open account.
The creditor demanded a "penona! note" from the president and secretary of
the debtor "as a condition to continued business." A note was executed bearing
the typed name ofthe corporation, followed by the signatures ofthe two officen.
without any indication that they had signed in a representative capacity. It was
held that the evidence in the case sustained a holding that the two individuals
had signed in a penonal capacity and were therefore penonally liable. The DeC
permits it to be established between the "immediate parties" that the signatures
were made in a representative capacity, where the principal is named. As the
signatures did not show "representative capacity." the court held that the bur-
den ofproofwas on the individuals to show affirmatively an undentanding with
the payee that they were not personally liable. Such a burden was not met in this
instance. 202
In Berryfast, Inc. v. Zein/eld. the court held the individual signatures on a
promissory note were made in a representative capacity although the signatures
did not make clear that the parties were signing as representatives. 2D3 The note

'.7 American Exch. Bank v. Cessna, 386 F. Supp. 494 (NO Okla. 1974).
" I Griffen v. Ellin8er, 19 VCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 587 (Tex. 1976).
111 A.J. Jackson Chevrolet v. Oxley, 564 P2d 633 (Okla. 1977).
200 Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Coppes, 25 VCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 765 (NY 1978).

2o'Weublce v. ~ichardson & Sons, Inc., 265 NW2d 571 (Wis. 1978).
2D2Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co.• 245 Ark. 825, 434 SW2d 822 (1968). The action was
by the payee of the note against one of the individuals who had signed without inclUding
his title. The court observed that the note would have had little value ifit had been merely
the note of the corporation alone. and further observed that the individual was the most
literate ofall the persons involved in the transaction. For other cases where parol evidence
was admitted to show representative capacity between "immediate parties," see Sullivan
County Wholesalers, Inc. v. Sullivan County Dorms, 59 AD2d 628, 398 NYS2d 180
(1977); Medley Hardwoods. Inc. v. Novy, 346 So2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
203 714 F2d 826 (8th Cir. 1983). Foran exampleofa case where a note contained both
a corporate signature and the signature ofan officer without an indication that the officer
115.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-38

simply had the name ofthe corporation with lines for signatures of two individu-
als below. In a suit brought by the payee against the makers ofthe note, the court
held that the trial court was entitled to find the makers were not personally liable
in view of the previous dealinp of the parties where notes were sisned that
clearly indicated the siBners were liable personally as well as in their capacity as
representatives ofthe company. The court did not discuss UCC § 3-403, but said
that any doubts concerning the signatures could be resolved against the payee
who drafted the note.
In dicta. a court indicated that the maker of a note may be able to establish
against someone other than a holder in due course that his signature on the note
was intended to be in a representative capacity. By doing so, the maker of the
note avoids personal liability by proving that the note was incomplete and
should have been completed to show that the signature was in a representative
capacity. In this case, the defense failed because there was no evidence to
establish that the signature was in a representative capacity.2G4

~ 15.05 BANK'S LIABILITY ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

GENERALLY
Banks use various types ofcommercial paper in making remittances and for
other transactions. The liability of the bank on such instruments is the same as
that ofother parties. It will not be liable unless it has signed the instrument; the
nature of the liability depends on the capacity in which the bank signs the
instrument. The bank may be a drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser of a
negotiable instrument; its liability will be the same as other parties who sign
instruments in these capacities.
The holders of paper on which the bank is obligated, whether they are
holders 'in due course or not, are simply general creditors of the bank. In the
absence of special circumstances, holders in due course have no greater claim

had signed in a representative capacity and the court concluded that the officer would be
liable personally, see United FaSleners.lnc. v. First State Bank of Crossett, 286 Ark. 202,
691 SW2d 126 (1985). In Kordick v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trost Co., 496 NE2d 119
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986), defendant, who was president of the corporation, signed a continu-
ing guaranty with bank for the corporation's obligations. He signed the document using
the title, "President." When the bank moved to enforce the guaranty against the defend-
ant personally, he could not esca?e liabilit)' for having signed in a representative capacity
under VCC § 3.403(3). Although the document identified the organization and the
signer's office, vee § 3·403(3) does not apply to "guaranty" agreements, but only to
Article 3 paper, thus, the court affirmed a finding by the court below of personal liability.
See also Cleveland Chemical Co. of Ark. v. Keller. 19 Ark. App. 7, 716 SW2d 204 (1986)
(person who signed a guarantee for obligations of the Keller Chemical Co. in the form.
"KELLER CHEM. CO., By: lsi M.G. Keller." was personally liable.
2<)4 Hill v. Consumer Nat'l Bank, 482 So2d 1124 (Miss. 1986).
 15-39 RIGHTS & LlABILmES 'llS.OS{l}

against the bank because they hold a cashier's check or certificate ofdeposit than
. any other creditors, and they do not take precedence in insolvency over general
creditors.205 The scope offederal deposit insurance on such items is discussed in
Chapter 11. The uee contains a provision that gives a preference in insolvency
to certain bank customers who have not received a final settlement from a
coUecting bank, 201 but this provision does not prevail over the federal law
applicable to both bankruptcy and the regulation of national banks. 207

[1) Certificates of Deposit

A certificate ofdeposit may be either negotiable or nonnegotiable. A negoti-
able certificate of deposit is simply defined by the uec as a writing that
complies with the other requirements of the uec for negotiability and that
constitutes "an acknowledgement by a bank or receipt ofmoney with an engage-
ment to repay it.,,:tQt The certificate must state that it is payable to order or to
bearer and meet the other requirements ofnegotiability.2OlI

(2) Cashier's Checks

The uee does not specifically define "cashier's check." General banking
usage defines a cashier's check as a draft drawn by the bank upon itself. The bank
is both drawer and drawee. Because the bank has signed the instrument as a
drawer, it has a liability on the check as a drawer. The effect ofdrawing the draft
on itself, however, is to make the bank primarily liable for paying it. Therefore,
under the uec, the holder of this instrument may treat it as the equivalent ofa
note made by the bank and may hold the bank liable as a maker without need for
presentment.·" Problems involving attempts to stop payment on cashiers'
checks are discussed in ehapter 20.
A bank that issues a cashier's check normally must honor the check because
the issuance by the bank constitutes a contractual obligation to pay. The bank is
liable because it has signed the instrument. Sometimes a court will say the bank's
obligation is that of an acceptor; when the bank issued the cashier's check, the
bank had accepted the check in advance. A more straight forward analysis holds
the bank liable for signing the check as a drawer.'" There is little legal signifi-
cance in whether the bank's obligation is as an acceptor or a drawer. In either

.05 See Chapter 10.

•Dlvce § 4-214(4).
• a7 See Jennings v. Vnited Stales Fidelity & GuaT. Co., 294 VS 216 (1935).
•a·VCe § 3·( 04(2)(c).
20. See Thomas v. Estate of Eubanks. 358 So2d 709 (Miss. 1978).
210VCC § 3-118(a).
'''vee § 3·417.
, 15.05[3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-40

event, when the check is procured from the bank through fraud, the bank has a
. valid defense entitling it to refuse payment. Participation in a check kiting
scheme constitutes fraud. 212
One court held that a bank had to pay cashier's checks that had been stolen
from the bank while blank and unsigned. The court reasoned that the bank could
be viewed as having been negligent in allowing the checks to get out of its
possession. Because cashier's checks are regarded as the equivalent of cash and
the banks that issue them encourage this attitude, the court concluded that it
would not be unfair to impose a duty on the bank to protect innocent third
parties by securing the blank cashier's checks and, thus, minimizing the risk of
forgery.2"
A payor bank that issues a cashier's check payable to joint payees may
recover against a collecting bank when one of the joint payee~s indorsements is
forged. Undl'r uee § 4·207(1), the collecting bank automatically warrants to the
payor that the indorsements are good and that the bank is collecting the check for
the rightful owner of the instrument. Both of these warranties are broken when
one ofthe joint payee's signatures is forged. Prior payment to the payor bank for
the cashier's check from the remitter does not constitute a previous payment to
the bank that precludes it from recovering against the collecting bank for breach
of these warranties. Recovery by the bank does not amount to a windfall because
the bank remains liable to pay the cashier's check when it is properly indorsed,
and the bank also may be liable to the true owner of the check for conversion by
paying one other than the tNe owner over a forged indorsement. 21 '

[3] Money Orders

Many of the instruments that are called money orders are simply drafts
drawn by the bank either on itselfor on a correspondent. When the money order
is drawn on the bank itself, it has the same legal status as the cashier's check. 2'$ If
the money order is drawn on another bank, it has the same legal effect as a draft.
In either case, to be negotiable, it must meet the essential requirements of
negotiability under the vee. On these so-called bank money orders, the bank
signs the instrument as the drawer. It will, therefore, be liable to the holder of the
instrument as a drawer or, in the case ofthe money order drawn on itself, in the
same fashion as when it draws a cashier's check.

2'2 Bancodi Roma v. Merchants Bank, 92 AD2d 42. 459 NYS2d 592 (1983).
213 Savemart, Inc. v. Bowery Say. Bank, 117 Misc. 2d 947, 461 NYS2d 144 (1982).
2" Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Zions First Nan Bank, 656 P2d 425 (Utah 1982).
21$ See Rose Check Cashing Servo v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 40 Misc. 2d 99~,
244 NYS2d 474(1 963), afl'd, 43 Misc. 2d 679, 252 NYS2d 100 (1964). Sec also H. Bailey,
"Bank Personal Money Orders as Bank Obligations," 81 Banking U 669 (1964J; Note,
"Bank Money Order is Obligation of Bank," 82 Banking U 73 (1965).
15-41 RIGHTS & UABIUTIES 1115.05(3)

In some cases, banks allow customers themselves to draw money orders

against the bank. The customer pays the bank: in advance for the face amount of
the money order and is issued an instrument that has blanks for the customer to
sian, for the insertion ofthe name ofthe payee, and for the date. When the blanks
arc filled in, the instrument becomes a negotiable instrument if it is payable to
order or to bearer and has the other essential requirements for negotiability. The
"personal money order" should have the same effect as an ordinary check drawn
on the bank. The bank has not signed the money order and, therefore, under the
uee would not be liable on it. However, the case law is not consistent on this
point. A number ofcourts have taken the view that the personal money order is
like a personal check, and is not a bank obligation. 211 Other states have taken the
view that the money order resembles a bank obligation. m Some courts have
confused the issue by finding a signature by the bank when probably none was
intended. 211 The cases often reflect the view that the holder ofa money order is
different from the holder of a personal check and should be able to rely on
payment by the issuer. Because the uee does not recognize money orders as
such, the rights of the parties are not clear.
In a case involving an American Express money order, the court held that
the money order was analogous to a personal check. 21I Under the court's analy-
sis, American Express, the issuer of the money order, was the drawee. The

211See Garden Check Cashing Service v. First Nat'l City Bank, 25 AD2d 137,267
NYS2d 698 (1966), afi'd per curiam 18 NY2d 941, 223 NE2d 566, 271 NYS2d 141
(1966); Thompson v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 47 Ohio App. 2d 249, 353 NE2d 895
(1975); Krom v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 38 AD2d 871,329 NYS2d 91 (1972).
217Thompson Poultry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 199 Neb. 8, 255 NW2d 856 (1977);
Bank ofEI Paso v. Powell, 550 SW2d 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977). See generally H. Bailey,
Brady on Bank Checks § 1.21 (6th ed. 1987) (hereinafter Brady on Bank Checks); Bank of
Niles v. American State Bank, 14 m. App. 3d 729, 303 NE2d 186 (I 973)(the court did not
discuss the form of the instrument involved or whether it had been signed by the issuing
bank).
211 See Sequoyah State Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 274 Ark. 1,621 SW2d 683 (1981),
where the court held that the printed name of the bank on a money order constituted a
signature, thereby making the bank liable. Another court reasoned that, although a bank
did not sign a given money order, the bank was liable on the money order by reason of an
implied representation that it would accept the money order when properly presented to
the bank. Graybar Elec. Co., 39 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) at 1721 (Mun. Ct. Mass. App.
Ct. 1984). Thus, the bank's liability is not on the instrument itself but on the failure to
honor the duly presented items in accordance with the bank's implied representation.
Furthennore, when a customer pays for a money order, those funds are not on general
deposit with the bank such that there is a relationship of debtor and creditor between the
bank and its depositor. The court held that cash paid for the issuance ofa money order is
not placed on general deposit. Rather, it is deposited only in payment for the instrument.
The depositor retains no right to the funds paid, and so the bank does not hlive the right to
set ofT against such deposits other obligations the purchaser may have to the bank.
211 Sony Corp. of Am. v. American Express Co., 115 Misc. 2d 1060, 455 NYS2d 227
(Civ. Ct. 1982).
 11 15.05{4) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·42

purchaser of the money order was the drawer. The money order contained a
. printed statement that the instrument was not a traveler's check and should not
be cashed fat strangers, that the issuer reserved the right to refuse payment ifthe
instrument was raised, altered, or stolen, or signatures were forged. A thief stoic
the instrument while it was in the mail, forged the payee's indorsement, and
obtained payment. The court held that the payee had an action for conversion
against the drawee, American Express, under UCC § 3-419( IXc). The court also
held that the payee should be viewed as the assignee ofthe drawer and therefore
as a successor to the drawer's riabt to recover from the drawee, American
Express, for paying an instrument that was not properly payable because of the
forged indorsement. In this case, the money order was payable through a bank,
for the court held that the bank was not liable because it was not the payor.
A federal district court has held that a personal money order should be
treated like a personal check because it does not become an obligation of the
bank until the bank signs it. Following this analogy to the personal check, the
court held that a customer who purchases the money order has the same right to
stop payment as does the drawer of a personal check under UCC § 4-403. The
court said that personal money orders are "bills of exchange drawn on a bank
payable on demand from funds deposited by the purchaser thereof. "220

141 Traveler's Checks

Traveler's checks are instruments that are purchased from a bank or other
organization, such as the American Express Company; it is contemplated that
the purchaser will sign at the time of purchase and then will countersign at the
time the instrument is cashed. Use of this procedure permits the party who
cashes the traveler's check to compare the signatures, thereby giving protection
against taking a stolen instrument. The exact nature of a traveler's check as a
negotiable instrument is subject to some question. The UCC does not recognize
the traveler's check as a separate form of negotiable instrument. But the trav.
eler's check may be classified as a draft drawn by the issuing company or bank
upon itself. The issuing company can be viewed as having signed the instrument
since its name usually will appear on the instrument, and it will be tbe issuing
party. Under this approach, the issuing company would be liable on the trav·
eler's check when it comes in the hands ofsomeone who can claim to be a holder,
which could occur when blank traveler's checks are stolen, signed by the thief,
countersigned, and transferred to someone who takes them in good faith and for
value. It could also occur when the original purchaser countersigns the traveler's
checks, and they are then stolen and transferred to a good faith purchaser for
value. However, if the original purchaser has signed the traveler's check but not

... United Apparel Distrib.• Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 548 F. Supp. 612 (SONY
1982).
15-43 RIGHTS & LIABIUTIES Y15.05(4)

countersigned it and ifthe instrument is subsequently stolen and the countersig-

nature forged, the forgery could be viewed as analogous to a forged indorsement.
.Under this approach, the purchaser would not acquire title to the instrument
and could not enforce the liability of the issuer. 22t
In a case that involved international fraud where over 150 $1,000 traveler's
checks were involved, the plaintiff sued Thomas Cook, Inc., the company that
originally sold the traveler's checks, demanding payment. The plaintiffclaimed
to be a holder in due course, having obtained the traveler's checks from the
individual who acquired the checks from Thomas Cook. When the traveler's
checks were purchased, the customer signed them and left the place for the
counter signature blank, as is proper procedure. Subsequently, the customer
reported the checks as stolen and was reimbursed by Thomas Cook. Later, in
Greece, an individual with the traveler's checks obtained payment from the
plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that before making payment, he checked with
local banks to determine if there were any problems with Thomas Cook trav-
eler's checks bearing serial numbers of the checks in question. Upon receiving
information that these offices had no knowledge of any problems, he purchased
the checks. When the traveler's checks were eventually presented for payment,
Thomas Cook refused to pay them,and the plaintiffbrought suit, claiming to be
a holder in due course. The court held that the traveler's checks were negotiable
instruments but negotiation required a counter signature on the checks. Since
the counter signature was a forgery, there was no negotiation and, thus, the
plaintiffcould not be a holder in due course. Had the counter signature been an
authorized signature, a negotiation would have occurred and the traveler's
checks would have been negotiable instruments, payable to bearer. Although
Thomas Cook guarantees the payment ofits traveler's checks when the acceptor
of the checks has the individual presenting them countersign the checks in the
presence ofthe acceptor, the court denied recovery on Thomas Cook's guarantee
because the court did not believe they were signed in the presence of the
plaintiff. 22'
In another case against Thomas Cook, the plaintiff sought to recover for
traveler's checks sold by Thomas Cook that the plaintiff claimed to own. The
plaintiffargued a right to recover as the owner under UCC § 3-804, which gives
the owner of a lost or stolen instrument the right to payment. In this case, two
groups of checks were involved. The first group constituted checks sold directly
by Thomas Cook to the plaintiffwho had signed these checks at the time ofissue.
As to these checks, Thomas Cook indemnified the plaintiff for the loss. The
second group of checks, however, had been purchased by the plaintiff from a
street broker in Iran. These traveler's checks had not been completed by any

221 See generally Brady on Bank Checks, supra note 217. at r 26.4. See generally
Anno!., "Rights of One Who Acquires Los! or Stolen Traveler's Checks," 42 ALR3d 846
(1972).
222 Xanthopoulos v. Thomas Cook, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 164 (SDNY 1985).
 115.05[5](al NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-44

identifying signature. The court held that, without this signature, the traveler's
. checks were not instruments nor negotiable instruments under the UCC, and
therefore no action could be brought under uce § 3-804.:IU

[5] Accepted Drafts and Certified Checks

la) Obliaations of Acceptance or Certiftcation. Under the uec, acceptance of
a draft is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft. The acceptance
must be written on the draft and may consist ofthe drawee's signature alone.224 A
draft may still be accepted, however, even though it has not been signed by the
drawer, is incomplete, is overdue, or has been dishonored.- When a bank
certifies a check, it constitutes an acceptance. nl A bank has no obligation to
certify a check. 2fT
In Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Co. v. East End State Bank, the court fol-
lowed the rule that a bank does not become liable upon a check until it accepts it
in writing.22' The seller of small recreational boats had sold boats to the buyer
over a period of time under an arrangement in which the seller would call the
buyer's bank to determine if funds were available to pay checks given by the
buyer in payment for the boats. Under this procedure, the bank then would call
the buyer to determine that the buyer had ordered the boat and, after confirma.
tion, would inform the seller that the check would be honored upon delivery of
the boat. They followed this practice for over a year until the bank refused to pay
one check because the buyer had stopped payment. In a suit by the seller against
the bank, the seller argued that the bank should be bound by its oral promise to
pay the check under the procedures the parties had established. The court
rejected this argument, holding that under uee §§ 3·409 and 3·410 the drawee
bank does not become liable upon a check until the bank accepts the check in
writing.
After a bank that has issued a letter ofcredit accepts drafa drawn under the
letter ofcredit. the bank's customer on the letter ofcredit cannot enjoin payment
of the drafts. Under uec § 4·303( I)(a), once the drafts have been accepted, the
legal process can no longer be used to suspend the bank's duty to pay. In the view
of one court, this provision overrides § 5·114(2)(b), which carves out limited
circumstances as to when the customer may enjoin the issuing bank from paying
under a letter of credit, because of fraud in the underlying transaction. 2"

2>3Thomas C. Cook. Inc. v. Rowhanian. 700 SW2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
n4 VCC § 3-410.
,,. vce § 3-410(2).
,,·ucc § 3-411.
m vce § 3-41 1(2).
m 641 SW2d 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
n. First Commercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc.• 64 NY2d 287, 475 NE2d 1255,
486 NYS2d 715 (1985).
 15-45 RIGHTS & UABILITIES 1l1S.0S(5)lbl

When a bank accepts a draft, the draft becomes the primary liability of the
bank-all other parties continue to be secondarily liable. But when a holder
. obtains the certification ofa check, the parties prior to such holder, including the
drawer, are entirely discharged by the certification.230 When, however, the
drawer has the check certified, the drawer is not discharged, but remains second-
arily liable. Under the UCC, discharge ofprior parties occurs only when a /wider
procures certification.23' A bank that has certified a check becomes primarily
liable upon it in a manner similar to its liability upon its own cashier's check.
A drawer loses the right to stop payment after a check has been certified.232
The drawer may prevent the bank from paying the check either by supplying
adequate indemnity or by enjoining payment in a legal action.2.13·Also, the
certifying bank may be able to elect to refuse payment so that its customer, who
is claiming a right to the check, may assert that claim in any litigation brought by
the holder of the check against the bank. But if the bank is sued on the certifica-
tion, the bank cannot defend the suit on the theory that the customer has the
better claim to it (except in cases of theft or where there is a restrictive indorse-
ment) even against one who is not a holder in due course. 2:14 The customer must
enter the litigation and assert the claim directly. In any event, ifthe check is in
the hands of a holder in due course, that holder will have a title to the check,
which is superior to the claim of the customer. 235 If the adverse claimant to the
check neither puts up satisfactory indemnity nor obtains an injunction against
the bank, the bank is free to pay the check without fear of double liability-as
long as the bank does not make a bad faith payment to a holder who acquired the
check by theft or through a thief, and as long as payment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a restrictive indorsement. 2M

[bl Certi(;tlng or Accepting Forged or Altered Paper. A bank's acceptance of

an instrument is an engagement to pay that instrument according to its terms at
the time of the acceptance. 237 Thus, on the one hand, ifan alteration raises the
amount of the check or draft before acceptance or certification, the bank has
engaged to pay the check or draft in the raised amount. On the other hand, if the
instrument is altered after the bank accepts it, the normal rules on alteration
apply. The bank will be discharged from its liability if it is a material alteration,
unless the instrument is in the hands ofa holder in due course. A holder in due

230VCC § 3·41 I. See Windsor. "The Certified Check." 81 Banking U 480 (1964).
231 vec § 3.411(1).

232 vec §§ 4-403(1), 4·303(1 Xa).

233VCC § 3-603. See discussion at ~ 20.05[2], 20.0513].

230 vec § 3-306(d).
235 vec § 3-305( I).
231 vee § 3-603.

23' VCC § 3-413(1).

 'i 15.0SIS)lb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-46

course will be able to enfon:e the instrumellt according to its original tenor at the
. time the bank accepted the instrument.:t»
A bank that certifies a check OD which the drawer's signature is forged is
liable on its certification. The certification or acceptance is final in favor of a
holder in due course or other person who has relied on it in good faith.- The
only exception to the finality of the acceptance under the preceding rule is for
breach of warranty when the instrument is presented to the bank for acceptance
or payment. There is no breach ofwarranty when a check with a forged drawer's
signature is presented as the only warranty made in this situation is that the
holder has a good title. There is no warranty that the drawer's signature is
genuine. 240 A warranty is made that the presenter has "no knowledge" the
signature is unauthorized. U1 The bank will not be liable on its certification to
one who has taken the instrument after the forgery of an indorsement that is
necessary to title, because persons who present an instrument to the bank for
acceptance or payment warrant to the bank that they have good title. Z42 A bank
that makes a good faith payment of an altered check is entitled to charge the
account of its customer according to the original terms of the instrument. Z43
Whenever the drawee accepts a draft with conditions or qualifications, the
holder is entitled to refuse the acceptance and to treat the draft as dishonored.z"
If this happens, the drawee is entitled to have the acceptance cancelled. Z&S The
uee states that this result obtains whenever the proffered acceptance "in any
manner varies the draft as presented. "Z4I The drafters of the uec intended this
rule to cover all situations involving "conditional acceptances, acceptances for
part of the amount, acceptances to pay at a different time" and to any other
engagement that changes the essential terms of the draft. ur Under this view,
language placed on certified checks stating that the check is "certified as origi-
nally issued" may be viewed as a qualified acceptance that the holder is entitled
to treat as a dishonor of the instrument.

2R vce §§ 3·40i(2), 3-40i(3).

mvec § 3-418.
2&.vce §§ 3-417(1),4-207(1). See Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Vnderwriters Trust Co.,
73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 NYS2d 75 (Civ. et. j 973)(holding thatlhe certifying bank could not
recover from the collection bank for breach of warranty when the check had a forged
drawer's signature).
••• uee §§ 3.417( I )(bj, 4-207( 1)(b). There are certain exceptions to even this war-
ranty which are not relevant in this example.
.&. vee § 3-417(1 lea).
.., lJCC § 4-40 I(2)(a).
"·vee § 3·412(1).
,.sld.
U&ld.
.., vee § 3-412, comment I.
15-47 RIGHTS & UABILITIES 1115.06

[e) Mistaken Certification. When a bank has certified a check by mistake,

.either because of the state of the holder's account or for other reasons, the
mistake is no defense against subsequent holders in due course or others who
have changed their positions on account of the certification. 2 "

1115.06 SURETIES AND ACCOMMODATION PARlIES

It is common in lending transactions for a creditor to require that the debtor
supply security or other assurances for the debtor's performance of the obliga-
tion. When the security for the obligation takes the form of an interest in
personal property or fIXtures, the arrangement creates a security interest under
Article 9 ofthe UCC. 24t Thesetransactionsare diseussedin Chapters 22-24. The
parties also may structure the transaction to give the creditor the promise of a
third party or parties that the debtor will perform. Such an assurance may be part
of a transaction in which the debtor also gives the creditor a security interest in
collateral to secure the obligation, or it may be part ofa transaction that involves
no security interest in personal property or fIXtures.
The relationship that is created when a third party promises a creditor that
an obligation owed by another will be satisfied has been specially recognized in
the law. The relationship created is one of suretyship. It always involves three
parties: (I) the principal who is the person who has the principal obligation to the
creditor;250 (2) a creditor who is the person to whom the principal owes the
obligation and also is the person to whom the surety has a duty;251 and (3) the
surety who is the person who has an obligation to the creditor but who should be
freed from that obligation by the principal's performance of the principal's
obligation to the creditor. 252 In the simple example in which Dora borrows
money from the bank in a loan transaction and Sally guarantees the repayment
ofthe loan by Dora in order to induce the bank to make the loan, the bank is the
creditor, Dora is the principal, and SaUy is the surety. The Restatement defines
the suretyship relationship as one "which exists where one person has under·

201 VCC § 3-418. See Rockland Trust Co. v. Southshore Nat'l Bank, 366 Mass. 74,314
NE2d 438 (1974).
mVCC§ 1.201(37).
250 The Restatement of Security § 82, comment c (194.1) defines the principal as "the
person who, in the solution ofthe rights and duties ofthe panies, should bear the ultimate
burden unless excused for some reason personal to himself."
251 "The creditor is the person to whom the surety is bound and to whom the principal
is under an obligation or other duty," It can include a person who is entitled to satisfaction
for a tort as well as a person who is the obligee of a contract. Restatement of Security § 82,
comment d ( 1941). .
252 "The surety is the person who is bound on an obligation from which another, by
the discharge of a duty, should relieve him." Restatement of Security § 82, comment b
(1941).
, 15.06 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-48

taken an obligation and another person is also under an oblilllltion or other duty
10 the obligee. who is entitled to but one performance. and as between the two
who are bound. one rather than the other should perform. "113 Thus. a surety is
not a co-obligor. As between the surety and the principal, the principal is the
party who should perform the obligation. 2114
Although efforts are sometimes made to distinguish between "suretyship"
and "guaranty," the search for a distinction is elusive and usage is not always
uniform. The Restatement of Security uses the terms "guaranty" and "surety-
ship" interchangeably; it also uses the term "guarantor" as a synonym for
"surety."m Although the Restatement uses the terms interchangeably, state or
federal statutes may assign different meanings to the particular terms; therefore,
care should be employed when the application of a statute is involved. In the
vee, the drafters used the term "accommodation party" and avoided use in the
statutory language of the traditional terms "surety" or "guarantor." The com-
ments make clear, however, that "an accommodation party is always a surety
(which includes a guarantor).... "251 An accommodation party is a special type of
surety because an accommodation party has always signed a negotiable instru-
ment. The vee defines an accommodation party as "one who signs the instru-
ment in any capacity for the purpose oflending his name to another party to it. m
The vee negotiable instruments provisions apply to suretyship relations
only when an accommodation party exists. If a person is a surety but is not a
party to a negotiable instrument by having signed the instrument. the vee
will
2S1
not apply; instead. the general law ofsuretyship will govern. This handbook is
primarily concerned wi.th transacti.ons involving accommodation parties. It is
not possible to escape some consideration of the general law ofsuretyship in this
context because the vee provisions are limited and do not spell out all the

m Restatement ofSecurily § 82 (1941).

2" AlthoUi/! suretyship arrangements are commonly used in credit transactions to
give the creditor assurance the debtor will repay the obligation. the transaction is not a
security arrangement within Article 9 of the VCc. As indicated above, a security interest
is an interest in "personal property or fixtures." vce § 1-201(27). The Restatement of
Security (1941), however, includes suretyship among the subjects it treats.
255 Restatement of Security § 82, comment g (1941).
251 VCC § 3-415, comment I.

257 VCC § 3.415( I). Notwithstanding their rule, an accommodation party who signed
two promissory notes as an accommodation was held liable on tWO notes he had not signed
which were executed as replacements in substitution of the original notes. The court held
the renewal did not extinguish or change the original debt. Estate of Williams. 109 Ill.
App. 3d 828, 832·833, 441 NE2d 412,416-417 (1982). See the discussion ofrenewal notes
in Chapter 24.
m See VCC §§ 3-415, 3-416, 3-606. See generally Brennan & Burdick, "Does the
Guarantor Guarantee? Lender, Beware!" 11 Seton Hall L Rev. 353 (1981); Annot.,
"Conflict of Laws: What Governs Validity and Construction of Written Guaranty," 72
ALR3d 1180 (1976).
15-49 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 'il15.06[11

details ofthe legal relationships an accommodation party has to others who are
parties or have rights in the instrument. In such cases,· it may be ne<:essary to
resort to general principles oflaw to supplement the uee. 211 In so doing, some
caution is in order. The general body of suretyship law is old and some of its
distinctions are being reconsidered.a.. On some points, there is considerable
diversity of views among the states. Furthermore, although the Restatement of
Security, published in 1941, is a respected source ofauthority, it is not a current
statement of the law.

(11 The Rights of an Accommodation Party Against the Principal

Under the uec, an accommodation party is a type ofsurety.aSl Such a party
must be a person who signs a negotiable instrument and who does so "for the
purpose oflending his name to another party to it."2U As a result, an accommo-
dation party has two legal capacities. Firstly, the accommodation party is a party
to the negotiable instrument who undertakes liability on the instrument. The
uee is clear that this liability may be in "any capacity" and so the accommoda-
tion party may be one who has signed as a maker, indorser, acceptor, or other
party. The capacity in which the accommodation party has signed will deter-
mine the liability the accommodation party has to those who have an interest in
the instrument,al) Secondly, the accommodation party is someone who has
signed in order to benefit another party to the instrument by the signature.
Because of this relationship, the accommodation party has the right to recover
on the instrument against the principal if the accommodation party is called
upon to pay.2" Further, regardless ofthe capacity on the instrument in which the
accommodation party signed, the accommodation party is not liable to the
person the accommodation 'party accommodated. HI
As a result of these rules, one may be an accommodation party although the
relationship indicated on the face of the instrument may not indicate such fact.
Using the example of the loan to Dora presented earlier, if a promissory note
were used in the loan transaction. one way to structure the transaction would be
for both Dora and Sally to sign the note as comakers with the bank as payee. If
this is done, although Sally has signed in the capacity of a maker, her signature
was to accommodate Dora; thus. Sally is an accommodation party and Dora is

211 vee § 1-103.

as. See generally J. White and R. Summer, Uniform Commerda\ Code §§ 5\6-5\9
(2d ed. 1980).
2S1 vee § 3-41 S, comment I.
mvee § 3-415(1).
H'uec § 3-415(2) & comment I. These obligations are discussed in 1115.0612] infra.
214 uce § 3-415(5).
215 Id. The party accommodated is the principal.
'1115.06(1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IS-50

the accommodated party in the uec parlance. Assuming such a relationship is

established, ifSally is required to pay the bank, Sally will have a right ofrecourse
for reimbursement from Dora. Moreover, if Dora pays the note to the bank,
Dora has no recourse against Sally. Although the general rule is that co-obligors
on a contract, such as comakers ofa note, ordinarily have a right ofcontribution
from each other for their proportionate liability on the obligation/" because
Sally is an accommodation party she does not have the legal rights and duties ofa
co-obligor so far as concerns her relationship to Dora. As an accommodation
party, Sally has no liability to Dora. 211
The transaction could be structured in other ways as well without changing
the relationship between Sally and Dora. Dora could be the maker of the note,
with Sally as the payee and indorser, and the bank could be the indorsee. In such
a case, the relationship between Sally and Dora remains the same. If Sally is
required to pay, Sally has a right of recourse on the instrument against Dora.
Dora has no recourse against Sally either as a result oftheir suretyship relation or
from the capacity in which they have signed the instrument since a maker does
not have recourse against an indorser. Another alternative might be to have Sally
sign as maker of the note, with Dora as the payee and indorser, and bank as
indorsee from Dora. The relationship between Dora and Sally still does not
change. Sally has a right of recourse against Dora ifSally pays the note. Dora has
no right of recourse against Sally because, notwithstanding the usual rule that
allows an indorser to recover from the maker of the note, Sally signed to
accommodate Dora. Finally, another manner of structuring the transaction
might be to have Dora sign as maker with the note payable to bank but prior to
delivering the note to the bank Sally signs as an indorser. The relationship
between Sally and Dora is the same as indicated earlier. In this case, Sally's
signature as indorser is irregular because it is out of the chain of indorsements.
Normally, the bank as payee would indorse the instrument before other parties.
Because the indorsement ofSally is not in the chain oftide, the indorsement "is
notice of its accommodation character.....• Although this does not affect the
relationship between Dora and Sally, the notice to subsequent parties may be
important in determining whether Sally may raise certain defenses against
them..••
Under general suretyship law, a surety has three types of rights against the
principal. Firstly, after the surety has paid the debt, the surety may go against the

2•• The vee contains no provision incorporating this principle but. presumably. it
would apply as a result of vee § 1-\ 03.
"'vee § 3-415(5).
2•• vee § 3-415(4).

2•• This is discussed in ~ 15.06[3]. It is important to note that the discussion above
concerns the rights and duties between Dora and Sally. The capacity in which Sally signs is
important so far as her liability is concerned to subsequent parties. This is discussed in
~ 15.06[2].
15-51 RIGHTS It UABIUTIES , 15.0611)

principal debtor and require the principal to repay the surety. This right is
known as reimbursement. Secondly, the surety has a right of subrogation. After
paying the debt, the surety succeeds to the rights the creditor had against the
principal debtor as well as any rights the creditor had in collateral securing the
obligation. The surety need not rely on this right ofsubrogation, but may use any
other remedy to achieve reimbursement.27o Thirdly, the surety has a right known
as exoneration. Exoneration entitles the surety to require that the debtor pay the
creditor to prevent the creditor from suing the surety.271
The vee does not spell out the rights ofan accommodation party in detail.
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the vee
gives an accommodation
party a right of recourse "on the instrument" against the party accommo-
dated. 272 The comments suggest that this is intended to inCOrPorate the general
rights ofsubrogation to the rights of the holder of the instrument who is paid. 213
Sometimes the face of an instrument does not indicate that a party has
signed for aCcommodation. It is not necessary that any magic language be used to
be an accommodation party. The vee does not address what must be shown in
order to establish that one is an accommodation party, but it does indicate that
as between the asserted accommodation party and another person who does not
qualify as a holder in due course who took the instrument without notice ofthe
accommodation, the nature of the signature as being for accommodation "may
be shown by oral proof. "274 It is not necessary to show that the accommodation

270Anna Nat'l Bank v. Wingate, 63111. App. 3d 676, 678, 381 NE2d 19,21 (1978).
27' For a general description of these principles see Restatement of Security §§ 103,
104,112,141 (1941).
muee § 3-415(5).
2nuee § 3-415, comment 5. See also uee § 3·603(2) which would make an accom-
modation party who pays an instrument and obtains possession of it a transferee of the
party who was paid. See generally Lindsey v. Zeller, 10 Kan. App. 2d 4, 690 P2d 394
(984), which recognizes an accommodation maker has a right of subrogation against
other makers under Section 3.415(5).
274 vec § 3-415(3). See generally Annot., "Who Is Accommodation Party Under
UCC § 3-415," 90 ALR3d 342 (1979); Noble, "The 'Surety' and Article 3: A New Identity
for an Old Friend?" 19 Duq. L. Rev. 245 (I 981); WIadis, "VCC Article 3 Suretyship and
the Holder in Due Course: Requiem for the Good Samaritan," 70 Geo. U 975 (1982).
See Capital Bank v. Bernstein, I vec Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1597 (DDC 1986).
Suit was brought in federal district court of District of Columbia against Eve Bernstein,
the wife of one of several men who borrowed funds from plaintiff. Eve signed the note
along with her husband. She moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction since she
lived in Maryland, had no personal or telephone contact with plaintiff, and had executed
the note in Maryland. The court held for defendant, as due process would prohibit
asserting personal jurisdiclion in D.C. given the lack of contacts. The court then trans-
ferred the case to Maryland. .
In EI-Ce Storms Trust v. Svetahor, 724 P2d 704,707-708 (Mont. 1986), a wife was
treated as an accommodation party when she signed a note for the purpose ofenabling her
husband to obtain a loan for his business and did not receive any direct personal benefit
11 15.06{2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IS-52

party did not receive any consideration, although this may be a factor to show
'that the signature was for the benefit ofsomeone else. 271 In some cases, an issue
of who has been accommodated may arise. Because the UCC rules alter the
rights of recourse between the accommodation party and the party accommo-
dated, it is important to know not only whether a person is acting as a surety but
also who is the principal for whom the surety is making the accommodation. 271

[2) The Obligation of an Accommodation Party to Pay

An accommodation party may sign a negotiable instrument for accommo-
dation in different capacities-as maker, indorser, acceptor, or otherwise.
When the transaction is one in which the instrument has been taken for value,
the accommodation party will be liable to those who have rights on the instru-
ment according to the capacity inwhich the accommodation party has signed. 277
Thus; if the accommodation party has signed as an indon.er. he or line will be
liable as an indorser; likewise, ifthe signature is as the maker ofa note, there will
be liability as the maker of a note. Whether the holder who is enforcing the
instrument must first make a prior presentment and demand for payment upon
the pany who has been accommodated simply depends on the capacity in which
the accommodation party signed the instrument. The normal rules ofliability of
parties to negotiable instruments apply. When it is necessary for a presentment,
notice ofdishonor, and so fonh to occur in order to hold an indorser, the same
procedures must be followed to hold an accommodation party who has signed as
an indorser. When the accommodation pany has signed as a maker, however, no
prior reson to the principal is required. 271 These rules apply even though the
person who has taken the instrument knows that the pany has signed for
accommodation. 271
An accommodation party may add language to a signature indicating "pay-
ment guaranteed" or "collection guaranteed" or the like. This language may
affect the undertaking of the accommodation pany. "Payment guaranteed"
indicates that if the instrument is not paid when it is due, the signer "will pay it

although her signature was without limitation. Her status as an accommodation party
could be implied from the circumstances.
"'vcc § 3-415. comment 2.
... ~ Fithian v. Jamar, 286 Md. 161,4\0 A2d 569 (1919), for an illustration ofa
situation where some parties were sureties for some of the other parties to an instrument
but not to all of them. For an interesting case where the possibility of circular liability
existed as a result of application of the rules on liability of accommodation parties, see
Belmont County Nat'l Bank v. Onyx Coal Co., 350 SE2d 552 (W. Va. 1986).
271 VCC § 3.415(2).
271 See VCC § 3·415, comment l.
no vec § 3.415(2).
IS-53 RIGHTS & UABIUTIES '15.06[21

according to its tenor without resort of the holder to any other party.'-. When
the language used is "collection guaranteed," the signer agrees to pay "only after
the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor to judgment and
execution has been returned unsatisfied" or the primary obligor is insolvent or
otherwise obviously unable to pay."' When language of guaranty is used that
does not specify whether it is a guaranty ofpayment or collection, it is construed
as a guaranty of payment. 212 When such language appears with the name of a
person who has signed in a capacity as primary obligor, such as maker or
acceptor, the language gives rise to a presumption that the signature is for
accommodation so long as there are others primarily liable on the instrument. 213
By using words ofguaranty, the signer waives the necessity ofany "presentment,
notice of dishonor and protest."tu Such words, accompanying an indorsement,
do not limit the character of the signature as an indorsement. 2'5 Although the
language ofguarantee may not be in sufficient detail to satisfY a general statute of
frauds requirement that guarantees for the debts of another must be in writing, a
special statute of frauds rule allows a guaranty written on an instrument to be
enforceable notwithstanding. 2M A specific guaranty does not accompany the
debt when the obligation is transferred, since it runs in favor of a named creditor
only; conversely, a general guaranty runs with the obligation. Under the UCC,
words of guaranty without specific limitation give rise to an obligation to pay
that runs to the holder.2I1
One court applied the rules on a guarantor's obligation to modify the
liability the parties would have had based on the capacity in which they signed a
note. Three individuals guaranteed promissory notes executed by the county
Democratic committee by indorsing the notes to the bank. The notes, which
were dated May 3, 1967, were payable on demand. In 1977, the committee
ceased making payments, and, in January of 1980, the bank demanded payment
from the individuals. When the individuals refused, the bank brought suit
against them in July 1981. The individual guarantors asserted that the suit was
barred by the statute of limitations because the action had not been commenced
within six years from the date of the note, May 3, 1967. If the guarantors were
treated as indorsers, the cause ofaction would not accrue until after the holder of

2.0 VCC § 3-416( I). See generally Annot., "Construction and Effects ofUCC § 3-416,
Governing Guaranty Contracts," 10 ALR4th 897 (1981).
211 VCC § 3-416(2).
mUCC § 3-416(3).
2I·VCC § 3-416(4).
2··UCC § 3-416(5).
2I5VCC § 3-202(4).
2··UCC § 3.416(6).
211 FinanceAmerica Private Brands, Inc. v. Harvey E. Hall,lnc., 380 A2d 1377. 1380
(Del. Super. Cl. 1977). See generally, Hawkland, "Liability of Accommodation Parties
Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 25 Prac. Law. 35 (979).
'115.06(3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-54

the note had made a demand for payment and given notice of dishonor. If this
were the case, the suit would have been timely.- The court held tbat the status
ofthe guarantors was analogous to that ofthe maker ofthe note, not an indorser,
because uee § 3-416(1) provides that a guarantor waives presentment, notice of
dishonor, and protest. Because the individual guarantor's liability was that ofa
comaker, the cause ofaction accrued on the date ofthe instrument, May 3, 1967,
and the statute of limitations had expired. 2I'
Persons who sign as an accommodation party sometimes attempt to defend
an action on the instrument against them on the grounds that there was no
consideration for their signature. The uee rejects this as a defense in cases
where there is sufficient consideration to support the transaction in which the
instrument was given. Under this view, consideration for the transaction
between the party who was accommodated and the person who took the instru-
ment is enough. The comments to the uee support this view by indicating that
"the obligation of the accommodation party is supported by any consideration
for which the instrument is taken before it is due."210
The principle that an accommodation party is liable on the instrument even
when the party does not personally receive any consideration was followed in a
West Virginia case. Two individuals served as accommodation makers ofa note
signed by a corporation. Although the individuals did not personally receive any
consideration, the court said that their liability "is supported by the considera-
tion which flows from the creditor to the principal debtor and the fact that no
consideration flowed directly to the accommodation indorser [guarantor] is
irrelevant... 211

(3) Defenses to Payment of an Accommodation Party

Under general suretyship law, when a surety is called upon by the creditor to
pay, there are two types ofdefenses that might be interposed ifthe circumstances

2"See uec § 3.122(3).

2atBank of N.Y. v. Bersani, 90 AD2d 302, 305, 457 NYS2d 142. 145 (1982).
290 vec § 3·415(2), comment 3. The language of the section refers to an instrument
that has been taken for "value" before it is due, but the comment refers to the existence of
consideration for the transaction involving the pany accommodated. There may be some
cases where an instrument is taken for value, as in the case where it is taten as security for
an antecedent debt, vce § 3·303, but there would be no consideration in a traditional
sense. It is the intention of the uee, as reflected in the comments, to make consideration
unnecessary when an instrument is taken as security for an antecedent obligation. vce
§ 3·408. It is not intended that an accommodation pany could claim the lackofcons'dera-
tion in such a case as a defense to the accommodation pany's obligation. See VCC § 3-41 S,
comment 3, stating thaI the language used in Section 3-415 (2) is intenQed to make the
obligation of the accommodation pany consistent with the policies as to antecedent
obligations as consideration in Section 3·408.
2U Pitrolo v. Community Bank & Trust, 298 SE2d 853, 856-857 (W. Va. 1982).
 l5-55 RIGHTS & UABILITIES , 15.06(3)

warrant it. The first type ofdefense is that relating to tbe principal debtor's duty
to perform the obligation to the creditor. For example, when the creditor com-
. mits breach ofcontract such that the principal debtor does not have a duty under
the contract to pay the obligation, the failure of consideration should be a
defense available to the surety, as well. 212 Not all circumstances in which the
principal may avoid payment should excuse the surety, however. For example,
the lack ofcapacity ofthe principal to enter into the contract is not a defense that
is generally available to the surety against the creditor.- The second type of
defense is that relating to the surety's status as a surety. Four classic situations
frequently present themselves in various contexts. The first situation arises
when the creditor takes action to release the principal from liability. The second
is the situation where the creditor modifies the contract with the principal. The
third is where the creditor enters into a binding agreement with the principal to
extend the time for payment by the principal. The fourth is where the creditor
takes an action that injures or reduces the value ofsecurity held by the creditor
for the principal's obligation. In all four of these cases, the circumstances may
warrant discharge of the surety from liability.2tO In the first three situations
mentioned, discharge of the surety may be avoided if the creditor obtains the
consent ofthe surety or makes an express reservation of rights against the surety.
The uee provides for certain suretyship-type defenses in uee § 3-606.
Although this section by its terms is not limited to accommodation parties, it
primarily applies to cases in which accommodation parties claim that a dis-
charge has occurred as a result of actions taken by the holder of the instrument.
This section provides that there may be a discharge ofan accommodation party
when the holder (I) "releases or agrees not to sue any person against whom the
party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse ...;" (2) "agrees to
suspend the right to enforce against such person [a person against whom the
party has a right ofrecourse as indicated above] the instrument or collateral ...;"
(3) "otherWise discharges such person [the party against whom there was a right

m See Restatement of Security § 126 (1941). This section gives the surety a defense
when there is a "material failure of performance by the creditor" which was not justified
by conduct of the principal.
"'See Restatement of Security § 12S (1941). See generally J. White & R. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code 531-535 (2d ed. (980).
... See Restatement ofSecurity §§ 122.128, 129, 132 (1941). The exact circumstances
under which a discharge may occur may vary, and it is important to note that the
restatement view is not followed by all courts, particularly with respect to modifications
of the contract between the creditor and principal which are not injurious to the surety.
One court has held that vee § 3.606( IJ, which gives guarantors to a negotiable instru.
ment a discharge when certain events occur, does not apply to a guaranty agr~ement that is
separate from the note itself. The separate writing is not part of a negotiable instrument
and is governed by common law rules rather than the UCe. Gregoire v. Lowndes Bank,
342 SE2d 264, 267 (W. Va. 1986).
1115.06[31 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-56

of recourse as above) ... ;""5 or (4) "unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the
instrument given by or on behalf of the party [who is claiming the dillcharge] or
any person against whom he [the party claiming a discharge] has a right of
recourse.""' In all ofthese cases, the holder can avoid the discharge by obtaining
the express consen~ of the accommodation party. The holder also can avoid a
discharge in the first three ofthe situations by making an "express reservation of
rights" against the accommodation party.ItT
The express reservation of rights provided in the section is intended to state
the generally accepted role in suretyship situations. When the holder of the
instrument (the creditor) makes an express reservation of rights as part of any
arrangement with the principal debtor that modifies the debtor's obligation or
suspends enforcement of the instrument, the holder preserves all the rights the
holder had aga\nst the accommodation party as ofthe time when the instrument
originally was due. It also results in preserving the rights ofthe accommodation
party to pay the instrument as ofthat time and the rights ofthe accommodation
party to recourse against others. 21' The express reservation need not be commu-
nicated to the accommodation party under the generally accepted view as to
reservation of rlihts. 211 Additionally, the comments support the view that an
accommodation party may give consent to such actions by the holder of the
instrument in advance, and the consent may be incorporated in the instrument
itself. Thus, a term in the note may indicate that the parties signing for accom-
modation have waived an objection to the types ofactions referred to earlier by
the holder of the instrument.*
The availability to an accommodation party of discharges based upon the
party's status as an accommodation party, such as the discharges based upon
release of the principal, extending time, or impairing collateral, may depend on
notice to the holder ofthe instrument that the party signed for accommodation.
Such defenses are not available against a holder in due course who has no notice
that the party signed for accommodation. Oral proofcannot be admitted to show
the signature was for accommodation. Thus, the holder in due course will be able

2M UCC § 3·606(1 lea).

2M UCC § 3·606( I)fbI. See generally Annot., "Who Is a Party Discharsed on Negotia-
ble Instrument to Extent of Holder's Unjustifiable Impairment of Collateral, Under
U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b)," 93 ALR3d 1283 (1979).
"' uee § 3·606( I lea).
2M UCC § 3.606(2).

2M See e.g. Restatement of Security §§ 122, 129 (1941).

300 UCC § 3-606, comment 2 states that: "Consent may be given in advance, and is
commonly incorporated in the instrument; or it may be given afterward. It requires no
consideration, and operates as a waiver of the consenting party's right to claim his own
discharge." For a case upholding the waiver by guarantors on a promissOry note of their
rights againsl a secured pany in the event of failure to secure collateral, see Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc., 701 P2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1985).
IS-57 RIGHTS & L1ABIUTIES " 15.06(41

to enforce the instrument against the signer based on the capacity in which the
instrument was signed, as maker, indorser, acceptor, or whatever capacity, as
long as the holder in due course took without notice of the accommodation. 301
A conflict in the case law exists on whether the maker of a note will be
discharged from liability on the note when a holder impairs collateral given by
the maker to secure the note. Although vee § 3-606 provides for discharge of
the liability of a party when the holder impairs any collateral "given by or on
behalf ofthe party or any person against whom he has a right ofrecourse," some
courts have held this defense is available only to someone who is in a position of
a surety on the instrument. Because a maker ofa note is primarily liable on that
obligation and has no recourse against other parties (except comakers) the maker
is not like a surety whose risks are increased whenever the surety's (accommoda-
tion party's) recourse against the collateral or other persons is imparred.:102
Following this rule, a court held that a comaker ofa note was not able to raise as a
defense that a secured party impaired collateral given by another comaker to
secure the note. In the view of the court, comakers have only a right ofcontribu-
tion among themselves and are not subrogated to the rights that the payee may
have against other comakers. Although one of the comakers may have been
released, that release does not result in the release of the other comakers. ~03 In a
case in which a comaker of a note signed as an accommodation party, a coun
granted a discharge from liability on the instrument where the holder had been
found to have unjustifiably impaired the collateral securing the instrument. The
court reasoned that vee § 3-606 was an intentional expansion of the defense
based on impairment of collateral to include parties who were comakers in an
accommodation capacity. Distinguishing the situation from one in which the
signer was an ordinary comaker of the note, the coun stated that the ordinary,
not for accommodation comaker, would not be able to assert the defense....

(4) Accommodation Parties in Consumer Transactions

V se ofaccommodation parties and guarantors also may raise other implica-
tions under special rules regulating consumer credit practices. Among the regu-

301 uee § 3-415(3}. As discussed previously, when the accommodation pany has
signed as an indorser outside the regular chain ofindorsernents, this will be notice that the
signature is one for accommodation. uee § 3-415(4).
3O'United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F2d 885, 890 15th Cir. 1983}. Although a
maker may not be entitled to a discharge ofliability, the maker may have ri&hts against the
secured pany based on the VCC rules which place duties on a secured pany who is in
possession of collateral.
... In re LA. Durbin, Inc., 49 Bankr. 528, 531-532 (Bankr. SO Fla. 1985}, alrd, 62
Banlcr. 139 (Bankr. SO Fla. 1986). See also EI-Ce Storms Trust \". Svetahor, 724 P2d 704,
706-707 (Mont. 1986) following the rule that an ordinary maker cannot raise the defense
of impairment of collateral as constituting grounds for discharge.
304 FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Clr., Inc. 766 F2d 744, 749-750 (3d Cir. 1985).
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-58

lations that need to be taken into account are the Federal Trade Commission's
.credit practice rules.* The credit practice rules make it a deceptive act or
practice to misrepresent the nature or extent ofcosigner liability to any person in
a consumer credit transaction. They also make it an unfair act or practice for a
lender or an installment seller to obligate a cosigner without providing cenain
disclosures and information to the cosigner of the nature of the liability being
assumed. A disclosure document, containing a statement describing the nature
of the legal liability the cosigner will assume, must be given to the cosisner. The
rule defines a cosigner as "a natural person who renders himself or herselfliable
for the obligation of another person without compensation.,,301

~ 15.07 DISCHARGE OF LIABILITY

Panies who are liable on a negotiable instrument are released or discharged
from that liability under a number of circumstances, usually by payment of the
instrument. Any person who is liable on a check, note or other negotiable
instrument may end that liability by paying the holder. m
When the drawer ofa check or the maker ofa note pays the instrument, the
liability of all the indorsers on the instrument is discharged because when a
person having no recourse on the instrument against other panies pays the
instrument, the liability of all panies to the instrument is discharged. 30' The
vee rule is broader than simply discharge by payment and the same result
follows regardless ofthe reason for the discharge. The liability of other panics to
the instrument is discharged whenever a pany who has "no right of action or
recourse on the instrument" "reacquires the instrument in his own right; or is
discharged under any provision ..." ofAnicle 9, except as specifically limited in
the section on impairment of recourse or collateral. 30 '

,os 16 CFR § 444.3 (1988).

06
' 16 CFR § 444.I(k) (l987}. There are cenain exclUSions, as for spouses whose
signatures may be needed to perfect a security interest under state law.
301 UCC § 3-603(1).
308 UCC § 3-601(3).

,.old. See Yahn & McDonnell. Inc. v. Farmers Bank. 708 F2d 104 (3d Cir. 1983). A
bank paid the proceeds ofa cenificate of deposit to a person other than the holder of the
certificate of deposit or the payee named on the certificate. The court held this did not
constitute payment to the holder, and the bank could not rely upon its action as a defense
when the holder sued to obtain payment. However, the court indicated that if the claimant
was not a holder in due course, then the bank might have defenses against the holder.
Because the holder of the CD had a series of transactions with the pany whom the bank
had paid. the court left several issues open for further exploration. Assuming the bank had
a claim for reimbursement from the pany the bank paid, could this claim be asserted as an
offset or defense to the action by the holder? Did a defense of unjust enrichment exist
15·59 RIGHTS &. UABILITIES 1115.07

In circumstances that involve an accommodation party, the accommoda-

~on party has recourse on the instrument against the party who has been
accommodated. The party accommodated· has no recourse on the instrument
against the accommodation party because as between these two persons the
party accommodated is the principal debtor and should pay.•,0 Thus, a payment
by the party accommodated will discharge all parties when the accommodated
party has recourse against no one. Discharge of the accommodation party,
however, will not result in a discharge ofall parties to the instrument because the
accommodation party always has recourse on the instrument.'"
Discharge may occur through actions other than payment. One method is
through the intentional cancellation of an instrument. This may occur by mark-
ing the face of the instrument in a manner that indicates that the holder has
canceled it. The holder's mutilation or destruction of the instrument or the
party's signature will be effective when done with the intent to cancel. The
holder also may discharge a party by renunciation of rights in a signed writing
delivered to, or by surrender ofthe instrument to, the party to be discharged.·,2
No consideration is needed to make the discharge valid-it may be a gift.
Problems sometimes arise when a note is canceled and a new renewal note is
executed. These and related issues are discussed in Chapter 24. A holder may
discharge a party by striking through a signature, such as an indorsement.
Other provisions that may give rise to a discharge of liability include the
following:
• Discharge by tender ofpayment;3'3
• Impairment of right of recourse of collateral;l14
• Reacquisition of the instrument by a prior party;3..
• Fraudulent and material alteration;3tS

because the holder, through the various transactions, in effect received the benefit of the
bank's payment?
310 See vee § 3-601(3), comment 4.
311 Id.

312 vee § 3-605.

3.3 vee § 3-604. When full payment is tendered to a holder, the party is discharged to
the extent of subsequent liability for interest, costs. and attorney fees. A refusal of the
tender by the holder results in a discharge of any party who has a right of recourse against
the party making the tender. In the case of a maker or acceptor on an instrument that is
otherthan an instrument payable on demand, a formal offerlo pay is not necessary. Being
able and ready 10 pay at every place of payment specified in the instrument is equivalent
to a tender. Id.
3" vee § 3-606. This is discussed in ~ J 5.06.
m vee § 3-208. This may produce a discharge of intervening parties.
311 vec § 3-407. This is discussed in ~ 20.09.
11 15.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-60

• Certification of a check;J17
• Acceptance varying a draft;311 and
• Delay in presentment or notice of dishonor or protest.·..
These circumstances are not exclusive. A party may be discharged from liability
"by any other act or agreement" with the party which would "discharge his
simple contract for the payment ofmoney.":I2a
A relationship exists between a party's liability on an instrument and the
party's liability on the underlying obligation for which the instrument was given.
When a person is discharged from liability on the instrument for whatever
reason, that person's liability on the underlying obligation is automatically
discharged. 321 For example, where D gives P Ii check that P indorses to X to pay
for goods, any action that discharges P as an indorser will also discharge P from
the obligation to pay X for the goods for which the check was given. As discussed
in Chapter 21, delay in presentment of the check for payment or in giving notice
ofthe dishonor of the check are circumstances that may cause a discharge of P's
liability as an indorser.
Although a party may be discharged from liability on the instrument, the
discharge is treated like any other defense so far as the rights ofa holder in due
course are concerned. If the instrument remains in circulation and is in the
possession of a holder in due course who did not have notice of the discharge
when the holder in due course took the instrument, the discharge is not effective
as against the holder in due course. 322 Because of this rule, it is essential that one
who pays an instrument insist that the instrument be produced, so that the fact
of payment may be noted upon the instrument when the payment is a partial
payment, and so that the instrument will be surrendered to the payor and
notation of payment made on it when payment is made in full. 313 Otherwise, the
continued circulation of the instrument may lead to its purchase by a holder in
due course, who will be entitled to payment notwithstanding the prior payment
by the pany who claimed to have been discharged.
Although a holder may take an instrument with notice that one of the parties
to the instrument has been discharged, the holder will not be prevented from
being a holder in due course and from enforcing the instrument against other

vee
317 § 3.411. This may result in the discharge of the drawer and prior indorsers
when a holder obtams the certification.
vec
318 § 3.412.
m vec § 3·502. This is discussed in Chapter 21.
vee
320 § 3.60 I (2).
m vee § 3·802(1). For furl her discussion of the relationship between a party's
liability on an instrument and on the underlying Obligation for which the instrument was
given. see ~ 21.03[2).
m vee § 3.602.
323 vee § 3.505( IXd).
15-61 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 115.0S[I)

parties so long "as there is no notice that the others have been discharged.soc Of
course, notice that the maker ofa note has been discharged would be notice that
all indorsers also were discharged because the maker has no recourse on the
instrument against any other party to it, as discussed earlier. But notice to the
holder "that one of several indorsers has been discharged normally would not be
notice that any other indorser or maker had been discharged, because the
indorser does have recourse on the instrument against prior indorsers and the
maker, and so the discharge of the indorser does not cause a discharge of the
other panies.

1f 15.08 HANDLING OF INSTRUMENTS INVOLVING A

FIDUCIARY
In many situations, a bank will handle a check or other negotiable instru-
ment in which a fiduciary is involved. Although the vee has special rules to
deal with such circumstances, the uee does not define "fiduciary." A bank may
be involved with a fiduciary when the bank purchases, collects or pays a negotia-
ble instrument. A fiduciary relationship exists, under general legal principles,
whenever an agent acts on behalf of a principal, an officer acts on behalf of an
organization, or a trustee acts on behalf ofa beneficiary. The Uniform Fiducia-
ries Act defines a fiduciary to include "a trustee under any trust, expressed,
implied, resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conserva-
tor, curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit ofcreditors,
partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public officer, or any
other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust, or estate. "325 A
person may include an organization as well as an individual. Given this defini-
tion, on many occasions a fiduciary will be the drawer of the check, a payee or
indorsee Of an instrument, or will be acting on behalfofa principal to whom the
instrument is payable.

[lJ VCC Provisions Relating to Fiduciaries

The uec treatment of transactions that involve fiduciaries is not elaborate.
An extensive body of common law and statutory law was developed prior to the
Vec. m Some of the prior law will be relevant under the vee because of the

32< UCC §§ 3-60 I, 3-602 & comment.

325 Uniform Fiduciaries Act § I(I}, 7A ULA 395-396 (I 985}.
""See G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law Of Trusts And Trustees §§ 901-912 (2d ed.
rev. 1982); Restatement (Second) ofTrusls §§ 321, 324 (1959): Uniform Fiduciaries Act,
7A ULA 395-426 (1985). See generally Brady on Bank Checks Ch. 13 (2d ed. 1987).
, 15.08(1] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-62

incorporation of general principles of law where the specific provisions of the

.uee have not displaced such law.327
A number of provisions in the uee are relevant in considering problems
related to fiduciaries. Among the most important of these rules is that a pur·
chaser of an instrument will have notice of a claim against the instrument and,
therefore, cannot be a holder in due course when the purchaser "has knowledge
that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment ofor as security for his
own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of
duty."32a This provision requires that the purchaser have both knowledge that
the person concerned is a fiduciary and knowledge that the circumstances
amount to a breach of duty by or personal benefit to the fiduciary. Merely
knowing that a person who negotiated the instrument "is or was a fiduciary" is
not enough to give the purchaser notice ofa defense or claim."' According to the
comments to the section, the purchaser is entitled to assume that a fiduciary is
acting properly, and as long as there is no notice ofa breach, the comment states
that "the purchaser may pay cash into the hands ofthe fiduciary without notice
of any breach of the obligation. "S30
The uee distinction between knowledge of a breach of duty and only
knowing that a person is a fiduciary is critical. When the purcbaserofa check or
a note does not have notice ofa defense or claim and qualifies as a holder in due
course, the purchaser takes free from the claims of any person, including a
beneficiary who was injured by a fiduciary's breach of obligation. On the other
hand, when the purchaser has notice of the breach of obligation and, thus,
cannot qualify as a holder in due course, the purchaser takes the instrument
subject to the claims of other parties, such as the wronged beneficiary. SSt
Additionally, the uee rules on payment of an instrument pennit one to
make payment to the holder, although a third party asserts claims to the instru-
ment, so long as the provisions on restrictive indorsements are not violated and
it is not a bad faith payment to one who acquired the instrument through a
thief. m
When an instrument is restrictively indorsed to a person, the uee provi-
sions on restrictive indorsements require payment to be made consistently with
that indorsement. Although an agent or other fiduciary may transfer the instru·
ment to the bank, where the instrument is indorsed restrictively for deposit to
the account of the principal, the depositary bank will be required to act consis-

"'UCC§ (·103.
321 uee § 3.304(2).

32. uee § 3.304(4)(e).

330 uee § 3·304, comment 5.

33\ uee §§ 3·305, 3·306. See discussion at " 16.02[ I J, 16.03.

332 See discussion of these rules at ~ 20.05[2).
 15-63 RIGHTS & LIABILITIES 1115.08(1)

tently with the directions in the indorsement. W Similarly, if the indorsement

provides iliat the instrument has been transferred for the benefit or use of the
indorser or of another person, the fIrst transferee under the indorsement also is
required to pay any value given consistently with the indorsement. 3S4 Addition-
ally, the uee provisions dealing with forged and unauthorized signatures apply
in cases in which tbe agent or fIduciary lacks authority to issue, transfer, or
obtain payment of the instruments in question. These rules may give rise to
actions by the principal based upon conversion, and to the application of the
uee preclusion policies in circumstances in which the principal should be
bound by the conduct of the agent because of the principal's own negligent
conduct or other basis for an estoppePU
The problems discussed in this chapter involve circumstances in which a
fIduciary otherwise has authority to transfer or to issue or obtain payment ofan
instrument on behalf of his or her benefIciary, but has engaged in a transaction
that breaChes the duty owed to the principal. Thus, one common thread in these
circumstances is the question of when a person handling an instrument should
be charged with notice that a fIduciary, who was involved with the instrument,
has acted in breach ofthe fIduciary's duties. Two general principles of trust law
are relevant. Firstly, so long as a person acts in good faith to payor transfer to a
fIduciary money or other property that the fIduciary has authority to receive, the
person will not be viewed as responsible for a subsequent misapplication of the
funds or property by the fIduciary.J3e This principle applies only when the
fIduciary has authority to receive the money. Secondly·, a person will be liable
when the person participates with a trustee in a breach oftrust. As explained in a
leading treatise, this wrong occurs when the person engages in conduct that
assists the trustee in the breach of trust and the person has knowledge or may
legally be charged with the knowledge that the transaction amounted to a breach
of trust. m When will a purchaser or payor of an instrument to a fIduciary be
viewed as participating in a breach oftrust by the fiduciary? Although the body
oflaw is extensive, the answers to this critical question remain unclear. A bank
dealing with a fiduciary should exercise caution.

333 VCC § 3-206(3).

334 VCC §§ 3-205(d), 3-206(4). There is a provision like the holder in due course
notice provision that states that when there is an instrument that has been indorsed for the
benefit of a person, "a later holder for value is neither given notice nor otherwise affected
by such restrictive indorsement unless he has knowledge that a fiduciary or other person
has negotiated the instrument in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in
breach of duty (subsection (2) of§ 3-304)." VCC § 3-206(4).
335 See discussion at ~ 20.08.
mVniform Fiduciaries Act § 2, 7A VLA 401 (1985).
33' G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 901 at 257-259 (2d ed.
rev. 1982).
1115.08(1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-64

The law relating to fiduciaries' handling of negotiable instruments is

affected in some states not only by the UCC, but also by the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act. A number of jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act of
1922. 31' All of these state enactments predate the UCC by a considerable period
oftime, but the UCC did not repeal the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Thus, in those
jurisdictions where the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is in effect, courts need to
harmonize the more detailed rules of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act with the
policies of the UCC and to decide what effect the subsequent adoption of the
UCC had on the oontinuing force ofthe policies in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
The UCC provisions apply smoothly in many of the situations that involve
fiduciaries. For example, suppose D issues a check drawn on Bank B that is
payable to ..F as trustee for B," F indones it to X, X in turn transfers it to BankA,
and Bank A presents it to Bank B for payment. Although Bank A may have notice
from the manner in which the check designates the payee that a person who was a
fiduciary, F, negotiated the check, there is DO notice from the circumstances that
F negotiated the instrument for personal benefit or in breach ofduty. Bank A can
qualify as a holder in due coune. Any claim to the instrument of B based upon
breach offiduciary duty by F will not be effective against Bank A, which has the
rights of a holder in due ooune."' The negotiation of the instrument by F is
effective, although F breached his or her duty to B by negotiating it in this
particular transaction.- Likewise, when Bank B pays the check, the payment
will be to a holder, the payment will not violate the rules on restrictive indorse-
ments, and so Bank B may properly pay the check to Bank A notwithstanding
notice of the claim of B unless B takes the legal action required to enjoin
payment. 3" If a does sue, and litigation ensues between B, BankA, and Bank B
over who has the superior right to the proceeds of the check, Bank A will prevail
because it took the check free from all claims to it by anyone, when it took the
check as a holder in due course. The same reasoning and result should follow for
a check that is issued by F as trustee for B, on an account of D's in Bank a, and
which is payable to X, then transferred, and paid as previously. Thus, in most
cases, the vee permits persons, including banks, who purchase or pay instru-
ments to do so although a fiduciary may have been involved in the issue or
transfer, so long as the person who purchases or pays has no knowledge ofbreach
of duty by the fiduciary. This furthers the policy of permitting checks to be

33. Twenty.fivejurisdictions have adopted the act. They are Alabama, Arizona, Colo·
rado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio. Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 7A ULA 391 (1985).
330These rules follow from the provisions on notice and indorsement, UCC §§ 3·
206(4), 3-304(4).
... uee § 3·207( I )(d)•
... UCC § 3·603.
15-65 RIGHTS & UABILmES 1115.08[2)

handled rapidly without inquiry into extrinsic circumstances to determine the

validity of the instrument.
The more difficult situations are those in Which the purchaser or payor has
dealt directly with the fiduciary. In the two previous examples, X dealt directly
with F and knew that F was a fiduciary. If that is all X knew, then, under the
UCC, X may qualifY as a holder in due course, but X cannot have that status ifX
knew that the transaction involved a breach of Fs duties as a fiduciary. There
are a number ofpossible situations. In the first situation, the check is payable to
the fiduciary as such, either because the instrument names"F as fiduciary for B"
as the payee or it was indorsed to "F as fiduciary for B. n F then transfers the
check to BankA, which applies the check to settle a personal obligation ofFwith
the bank, or which credits the check to a personal account ofFwith the bank, or
which credits the check to an account at BankA in the name of"Fas fiduciary for
B ." The second set of situations involves checks or other instruments issued by
F as a fiduciary for B drawing against funds in a fiduciary account or an account
beneficially owned by B. The check may be payable to "F" personally or to "F as
fiduciary for B." The check may be payable directly to a third party. such as a
check payable to Bank A. The third set of circumstances arises when fiduciary
funds are deposited into an account maintained by the fiduciary in the deposi-
tory bank and F subsequently withdraws the funds for personal benefit in breach
oftrust. In this scenario, F may deposit the fund to a personal account of"F" or
to an account maintained in the name of "F as a fiduciary for B. n
The UCC does not address these circumstances separately, but rather leaves
the solution to an application of the general principles on notice to a holder in
due course and when payment is proper. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act contains
a set ofelaborate separate rules that distinguish between various ofthese types of
transactions on the theory that the forms of some of them may constitute notice
of breach of duty. These provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act may con-
tinue to have some effect, notwithstanding the enactment ofthe UCC, because a
comment to. the UCC indicates that the policies ofthe Uniform Fiduciaries Act,
at least in part, are followed by the UCC.3<'

[2] Uniform Fiduciaries Act Provisions

Section 4 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act deals with transfer of negotiable
instruments by a fiduciary.'"' It provides that an indorsee who takes an instru-
ment from a fiduciary that was payable or indorsed to the fidUciary as such is not
bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his or her
obligations, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a

,.,See uee § 3·304, comment 5, indicating that the provisions in Section 3-304(2)
follow Section 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
"'See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 4, 7A UIA 405 (1985).
1115.08(2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·66

breach of the fiduciary's obligations unless the purchaser takes the instrument
"with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith." The same rule applies
when an instrument payable to or indorsed to the principal is indorsed by a
fiduciary for the principal. (This applies only when the fiduciary has authority to
indorse the instrument for the principal). An example of a check falling under
this rule ofSection 4 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is one drawn by D, payable
to P, which P then indorses specially "to F as fiduciary for S" and which F tben
indorses to X or to Banlc A. Another example is a check drawn as above, but
specially indorsed by P to "B" and which Fthen indorses" F, as agent for 8" to X
or to Bank A. When the transferee (X or Bank A in the previous examples) has
actual knowledge that the fiduciary is transferring the instrument in payment or
security of a personal debt of the fiduciary or for other personal benefit, the
transferee is liable to the principal if there is in fact a breach of the obligation
owed to the principal by the fiduciary in transferring tbe instrument. Under this
view, the form ofthe instrument that makes clear it is payable to Fin a fiduciary
capacity is regarded as sufficient to give notice ofa breach of duty by F in using
the instrument to gain a personal benefit, although the transferee does not have
actual knowledge that the transaction in fact constitutes a breach.
Section 5 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act deals with checks drawn by a
fiduciary in that capacity and payable to third persons.3" An example would be a
check payable toXas payee and written by "Fas trustee for B," drawn on a trust
account with Bank B where F is the trustee and B is the beneficiary of the
account. Once again, the payee is not under any obligation to inquire, and is not
placed on notice of any breach by the fiduciary of obligations owed to the
principal, unless the payee takes the instrument wilh actual knowledge or knowl-
edge offacts amounting to bad faith. However, when the payee of the instrument
is a personal creditor of the fiduciary, and the instrument is delivered to the
creditor to pay for a debt that the creditor knows is a personal debt of the
fiduciary or knows is otherwise known to be for the personal benefit of the
fiduciary, the payee is liable to the principal where the fiduciary has in fact
breached an obligation owed to the principal.
Section 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act deals with checks drawn by a
fiduciary as such, and payable to a fiduciary personally.3<5 These would include a
check drawn by "F as fiduciary for B" on a fiduciary account where the payee is
"F." In such cases, the transferee "is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary
is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instru-
ment, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach
of his obligation as fiduciary" unless the transferee has actual knowledge ofthe

See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 5, 7AULA 406-407 (1985).

344

3" It also includes checks

drawn by .. F as fiduciary for B" which are payable 10 P and
subsequently Iransferred by P. See Uniform Fiduciaries Acl § 6. 7A ULA 410 (1985).
15-67 RIGHTS'" LIABILITIES , 1!t08[2'

breach or such knowledge as amounts to bad faith. A comment to the UCC

indicates that the UCC incorporates the notice concept of this section.~
The drafters ofthe Uniform Fiduciaries Act stated that the rules in Sections
4-6 were intended to permit one to take an instrument without any duty of
inquiry, and assuming any fiduciary has acted properly as long as the instrument
is not taken "in a transaction known by the taker to be for the personal benefit of
the fiduciary.",.7 The Uniform Fiduciaries Act takes the position that this
presumption that the transaction is proper should be rebuttable only by proof
that the person who took the instrument either had actual knowledge that the
transaction was improper or acted in bad faith under a subjective definition of
bad faith. J.. When the person taking the instrument knows that the fiduciary is
using it to obtain a personal benefit, the drafters distinguish between the types of
cases in Section 4. in which the taker knows that Fis using an instrument payable
to "F as fiduciary for B" for personal gain. and the types in Section S, in which
the taker is a payee who knows "F as fiduciary for on has drawn a check to obtain
a personal benefit, from the cases in Section 6, where" F as fiduciary for au has
drawn a check payable to "P' and then transferred it for personal benefit. The
Uniform Fiduciaries Act finds a "strong presumption that the fiduciary is acting
improperly" in the Sections 4-S cases, but no such presumption in Section 6
cases because the fiduciary may have been entitled to be paid from the funds of
the principaP41 The UCC, in a comment to the notice provisions in Section 3-
304, states that it "follows the policy of Section 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act, and specifies the same elements as notice of improper conduct of a fiduci-
ary."350 The UCC comments are silent as to whether the UCC also incorporates
the policies in Uniform Fiduciaries Act §§ 4, S & 7.
Section 1 ofthe Uniform Fiduciaries Act covers deposits made in the name
of the fiduciary in the capacity as a fiduciary.351 These situations would include
deposits of cash or instruments by "F as fiduciary for B." In these cases, when
the fiduciary draws a check on the account, using the same name as fiduciary
with which the deposit was made, the bank has authority to pay the check and
has no liability to the principal for breach of the fiduciary's authority in drawing
the check, unless the bank has actual knowledge ofa breach ofobligation or such
facts as amount to bad faith. When the fiduciary draws such a check payable to
the drawee bank itself in payment for a personal debt of the fiduciary, the bank
is liable to the principal if the transaction constitutes a breach of the fiduciary's
obligation.

... uee § 3·304(2), comment 5.

34? Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 6, comment I, 7AULA 410-411 (1985).
"·'d.
"·Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 6, comment 2, 7A ULA 411 (1985).
..0 uee § 3·304, comment 5.

35' See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 7, 7A ULA 413 (1985).

 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-68

Section 8 ofthe Unifonn Fiduciaries Act deals with accounts in the name of
the principal.m When a fiduciary with authority to draw checks on the account
does so, Section 8 applies. This section follows the same rules as contained in
Section 7 for deposits in the name of the fiduciary as such. The bank may pay
unless it has actual knowledge of a breach by F, except that when F makes the
check payable to the drawee bank itselffor a personal debt of Fto the bank, the
bank will be liable to the principal if there is a breach of duty in fact.
Section 9 ofthe Uniform Fiduciaries Act covers deposits in the fiduciary's
personal account at the bank. 313 When the fiduciary makes a deposit to a per-
sonal account of checks that indicate that they were drawn by the fiduciary as a
fiduciary or were payable to the fiduciary in the capacity as a fiduciary or were
checks in the name ofthe principal, or the deposit otherwise consists offiduciary
funds, "the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire wllether the
fiduciary is committing ... [by the deposit) a breach ofhis obligation as fiduciary
.. ," as long as the bank does not have actual knowledge that F has breached his
duty and has not acted in bad faith. Further, the bank may payout the deposit on
the personal check of the fiduciary without liability to the principal, so long as
the bank does not pay the check having either actual knowledge the fiduciary had
breached a duty owed the principal or knowledge of such facts that the payment
of the check amounted to bad faith. 354

3i2See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 8, 7A ULA 415 (1985).

"'See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 9, 7A ULA 417 (1985).
354 The provision of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act that allows a bank to make payment
to a tiduciary who deposits the funds in a personal account as long as the bank does not
know the fiduciary is breaching his duty was held not to apply in Arvada Hardwood Floor
Co. v. James, 638 P2d 828, 830 (Colo. Ct, App, 1981), The coun said the provision could
not apply because the depositor was not a fiduciary and did nOI have authority to indorse
the checks,
In BoulTos v. Riags Nat'l Bank, 655 F2d 1257, 1259 (DC Cir. 1981), a bank claimed
the protection of Section 2 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act which provides that "a person
who in good faith pays or transfers to a fiduciary money. , , which the fiduciary as such is
authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper application thereof by the fiduci·
ary ," The bank permitted a person it claimed was its customer's agent to make withdraw-
als from the customer's account. The coun held that this provision of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act excusing good faith payment to a fiduciary applies only when the payor
deals with someone it knows is a fiduciary. In this case, th~re were disputed issues offact
as to whether the person who 'made the withdrawals in fact was authorized to make them
and as to whether at the time of the withdrawals the bank knew he was authorized to act
for its customer.
The provision of lhe Uniform Fiduciaries Act that relieves banks of any duty to
inquire whether a fiduciary is acting contrary 10 his obligations as a fiduciary was
examined in Levy v. First Pa. Bank, 338 Pa. Super, 73, 487 A~d 857 (19851. The coun said
that cases under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act that held that a bank was' relieved of any
duty of inquiry into whether a fiduciary's indorsement was within lhe scope of the
fiduciary's authority did not apply to a case where the bank did not know it was dealing
with a fiduciary. In the latter case, Ihe bank is liable in conversion ror paying over an
15-69 RIGHTS & liABILITIES 1I1S.08(3]

[3] Problems in Determining When There Is Knowledge of a Breach of

Fiduciary Duty
Although the Uniform Fiduciaries Act draws distinctions based on the
different types of transactions, commentators have questioned the significance
ofthe distinctions. One leading authority notes the distinction in the act between
checks on a fiduciary account payable to a bank that are delivered to the bank in
payment of a personal debt of the fiduciary and cases where persons other than
banks are the indorsees, transferees, and payees. The authority disagrees that in
the former circumstances the form of the transaction alone is enough to give
notice that the bank is participating in a breach of the fiduciary's duty, while in
the second set ofcases the form ofthe transaction does not show a breach. 36' This
same authority suggests that whether the bank takes a check drawn by "F as
fiduciary for B" which is either payable to the bank, or payable to "F' personally
and indorsed by F to the bank, or where the bank receives cash known to be
proceeds ofa check drawn by the fiduciary as such to the fiduciary personally, or
the bank accepts a check payable to F as a fiduciary, which the fiduciary has
indorsed to the bank, strong evidence suggests that the trustee has personally
benefited from the transaction and this should be enough to give actual knowl-
edge to the bank of a breach of Fs obligation or is at least knowledge of facts
sufficient to amount to bad faith. 36I But the views stated by this authority do not
square in all cases with the policies in the uee, which indicate that the existence
ofnotice ofbreach ofthe obligation ofa fiduciary is not to be based on knowing a
fiduciary was involved in the transaction unless there is knowledge ofadditional
circumstances showing personal benefit to the fiduciary or breach of obligation
to the principal.
In the case where there is a check drawn by D on Bank B payable to "F as
fiduciary for B," then indorsed by F to Bank A to pay Fs personal debt at the
bank, this should be a circumstance in which the bank could be viewed as having
actual knowledge that fiduciary funds were used to pay a personal debt of the
fiduciary. The bank would then be prevented from being a holder in due course,
and the principal's claim to the proceeds based upon the bank's participation in
the breach of trust would not be cut off.
Although a similar result would appear to be appropriate when the fiduciary
deposited the same check (one payable to "F as fiduciary for B") to the fiduci-

unauthorized indorsement ofa check. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act does not apply, in the
coun's view, because that Act is designed to shield banks from negligence only when they
know that the party before them is acting for another. The objective of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act was to make transactions "between banks and known fiduciaries easier
and faster" and not to make risk-free transactions with persons not known to be
fiduciaries.
mG. Bogen & G. Bogen, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 904 at 286'(2d ed. rev.
1982).
,.6Id.
,-r 15.08(3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15·70

ary's persona! account at BankA, there is authority to the contrary. In one case, a
father was the guardian ofan account established for his son. The father received
a $14,000 check made payable to him as guardian for the son. The father took
the check, deposited it to his personal account at the bank, and retained $4,800
in cash, which the father subsequently spent on an automobile. The father used
the remaining amount in the account for personal expenditures in violation of
the fiduciary responsibility owed to the son. The court held that the bank had no
liability for tbe father's conduct. It did not have to inquire of tbe father whether
negotiation of the check was within the father's authority as a fiduciary. The
court said:
In general, a bank may assume that a person acting as a fiduciary will apply
entrusted funds to the proper purposes and will adhere to the conditions of
the appointment.... A bank is not in the normal course required to conduct
an investigation to protect funds from possible misappropriation by a
fiduciary, unless there are facts-not here present-indicating misappro-
., 357
pnatlon....

On the other hand, another court held that when a bank receives a check for
deposit that has been made payable to a guardian in the person's capacity as a
guardian, the bank must place the check in a guardianship account or be held
accountable for notice that the individual is violating the fiduciary duty owed as
guardian, by depositing the check into a personal account. 35. The Restatement of
Trusts takes the position that although a bank knows a fiduciary has deposited
trust funds into a personal account at the bank, the bank does not have a duty of
inquiry as to whether there has been a breach oftrust in making the deposit, and
the bank is not liable for participation in the breach of trust absent further
circumstances known to the bank indicating that the trustee is committing a
breach of trust. 35' The Restatement would apply the same rule if the fiduciary
has drawn the check as a fiduciary on a fiduciary account and deposited the
check in the fiduciary's personal account.3&O The rule in Ihe uee does not give a
clear answer to the case where funds payable to a fiduciary as such are deposited
to the fiduciary's personal account. The issue is whether the depositary bank

351 Knox
v. Columbia Banking Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 64 NY2d 434, 436-437, 488
NYS2d 146, 148-149,477 NE2d 448, 450-451 (1985).
358 Smithv. Olympic Bank, 103 Wash. 2d 418, 421-422, 693 P2d 92, 95-96 (1985).
See also Canyon Lake Bank v. New Braunfels Utilities, 638 SW2d 944 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982), where the bank was liable when it allowed a trustee to take proceeds from a
maturing cenificate of deposit in the name of the trustee and deposit the proceeds into a
personal account at the same bank. .
359 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 324, comment d ( 1959).

.... 'd.
15-71 RIGHTS & UABILITIES '115.08(3)

knows the fiduciary was engaged in a "transaction for ... [the fiduciary's] own
benefit or otherwise in breach of duty."361
When a fiduciary draws a check as fiduciary on a fiduciary aCcount, if the
check is used to pay a personal debt of the fiduciary or otherwise for personal
benefit, under what circumstances might the bank that takes such a check for a
personal obligation of the fiduciary be viewed as having notice of breach of
obligation? The Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 5, as noted earlier, makes a check
drawn by a fiduciary payable directly to the personal creditor, under circum-
stances where the payee knows it is for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, a
transaction in which the creditor is liable if there was a breach of fiduciary
obligation in fact. However, when the fiduciary deposits such a check to a
personal account of the fiduciary, under Section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act, the bank has no duty to inquire and will not be liable for paying out the
deposit on the personal check of the fiduciary unless the bank has actual knowl-
edge that there is a breach of the fiduciary's obligation in making the deposit or
in drawing the cbeck or there is sufficient knowledge to amount to bad faith.
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act attempts to distinguish between the bank as
depository and the bank as creditor. When the bank is a depository, it is liable
only when it has actual knowledge or acts in bad faith, but when 'the bank
receives payment as a creditor from the fiduciary for a personal debt of the
fiduciary, the act treats the bank in the same manner as the act treats other
creditors whom a fiduciary pays. The bank as creditor will be liable when it deals
with a fiduciary in these circumstances who in fact breaches the fiduciary
obligation owed to the principal. 312 However, in some cases checks drawn by a
corporation payable to a bank were deposited by an officer in a personal account
or the officer obtained cash from the bank for the check, and the bank was liable
for paying the proceeds improperly.H3
Given the varying views of what constitutes notice ofa breach of fiduciary
duty or when funds are being used by a fiduciary in violation of the obligations
owed to the principal, banks should use great care in dealing with fiduciaries.
The notice provisions in UCC § 3·304 are susceptible to different interpretations
because the language ofUCC § 3·304(2) makes knowledge that a fiduciary has
negotiated an instrument as payment for the fiduciary's own debt or in a
transaction for the fiduciary's own benefit, sufficient information to constitute
notice of a claim or defense without indicating clearly whether the transferee
must also know that use of the check for personal gain constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. The section ends with the phrase "or otherwise in breach of
duty," which could be read as assuming the circumstances where the instrument

361 t;CC § 3.304(2),

362 Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 9, comment 6, 7A ULA 418 (1985).

363 See discussion at ~~ 20.07 and 20.08 of miscredited proceeds and checks with
unauthorized signatures. See generally Brady on Bank Checks'~ 13.3-13.4(6th ed. 1987),
'115.08(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 15-72

was used in payment of a personal debt or for penonal benefit also are circum--
stances where there was knowledge that the use in that manner constituted a
breach offid~ciary duty. Given the ambiguity in the uee provisions, courts
may be expected to deal with cases as they are presented and to continue to draw
on the pre-uee law for help in resolving them. As seen in the previous discus-
sion, ifthe pre-Uee law reflected in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is relevant and
continues, in some circumstances knowledge that a fiduciary has gained person-
ally win be sufficient to give notice of breach of duty although there is no
knowledge a breach in fact occurred.
The issues under the uee are somewhat diiTerent when the bank is a payor,
rather than a transferee, because then the relevant section is uec § 3-603, not
the holderin due course provisions. Under the provisions governing payment of
instruments, notice of the claim of another party is not decisive because the
payor bank is free to pay the holder so -long as it docs not violate the rules
concerning restrictive indorsements. With the strong pre-UeC background, in
which payment to a fiduciary with knowledge of the breach of a fiduciary
obligation creates liability for the payor, it may be questioned whether the UCC
payment provision in Section 3-603 will be interpreted to insulate payors from
their traditional liability.
 16
Holders in Due Course
, 16.0 I Holder in Due Course Requirements .•••....•••••.....••• 16-2
[1] The Holder Requirement • . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . 16-3
[2] Taking Without Notice of Defects or Defenses . 16-3
[a] Defmition of "Notice" .•........................ 16-5
[b) What Constitutes Notice of a Chum or Defense . 16-5
[3] Good Faith . . • . . • • • • . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-11
[4] Giving Value •••.•...••.•...•.................... 16-15
[5] Persons Who Cannot Qualify as Holders in Due Course .... 16-19
11 16.02 Rights of a Holder in Due Course •....................... 16-20
[1] Freedom From Conflicting Oaims . 16-21
[2] Freedom From Defenses . 16-21
[a] Defenses of Parties With Whom the Holder Has Dealt . 16-21
[b) Real and Personal Defenses . 16-23
[c) Categories of Real Defenses .•.................... 16-24
[i) Incapacity ...•............................ 16-24
[ii] Duress or illegality . 16-25
[iii] Fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature ofthe
instrument ....•.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16-26
[iv] Discharge in insolvency proceedings ......•...... 16-27
[v] Other discharges when the holder has notice . . . . . . . 16-27
11 16.03 Rights ora Holder Who Is Not a HOlder in Due Course . 16-28
1116.04 The Shelter Principle-Acquiring the Rights of a Holder in Due
Course by Transfer . 16-31
t 16.05 Defenses to the Instrument Based Upon Separate Conditions or
Agreements . 16-33
1 16.06 Preservation of Oaims and Defenses in Consumer Transactions 16-35
[1] Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status by FTC . 16-37
[2] Transactions Covered by FTC Rule . 16-38
[a] Financed Sale and Purchase Money Loan . 16-38
[b) Impact of FTC Rule : .. 16-39
[e] Case Examples ...............•................ '16-40

1"6-1
, 16.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-2

[3] Preservation of Oairns and Defenses Under the Uniform

Consumer Credit Code. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1642
[a] Section 3.307: Usc of Negotiable Instruments 16-43
[b] Section 3.403: Credit Card Transactions. . . • • . . . . . . .. 1643
[c] Section 3.404: Waiver of Defensc Dauses . . . . . . . . . . .. 16-44
[d] Section 3.405: Availability ofOaims and Defenses
Against Lender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 16-44
[4] Other State and Federal Restrictions on Holder in Due
Course Riahts .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 16-4S

Y16.01 HOLDER IN DUE COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Under t'l.e Unifonn Commercial Code, a holder in due course is a person
who has acquired an interest in a negotiable instrument in a way that gives the
person a special status like that of a bona fide purchaser of other property. The
UCC gives a holder in due course many special rights, including an ownership
interest in the instrument that is free from the claims of other parties and the
ability to enforce the liability of parties to the instrument free from many
defenses. To become a holder in due course, a person must meet the fonnal
requirements set forth in the UCC. Articles 3 and 4 contain an elaborate network
of provisions that bear on who can become a holder in due course and what such
a person must do in order to acquire such status. Although these provisions are
in part a codification of prior negotiable instruments law, they go beyond that
law both in scope and detail and they substantively change prior doctrine.
Four requirements must be met in order to obtain the status of a holder in
due course:

1. The person must be a "holder" of a negotiable instrument;

2; The person must take the instrument for value;
3. The person must take the instrument in good faith; and
4. The person must take the instrument without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored or that any person has any defense against or claim
to 1t. 1

Although a holder in due course enjoys special rights and privileges, both
federal and state law have dramatically cut back the availability ofholder in due
course rights in consumer credit transactions. 2

, UCC § 3-302.
2 Seediscussion of the Federal Trade Commission Holder in Due Course Rule and
other measures affectina holder in due course riahts infra ~ 16.06.
16-3 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.01[2}

(I) The Holder Requirement

The UCC requires a holder in due course to be a "holder."2 To become a
holder, the person must take the instrument by negotiation, which means that
the instrument must be properly delivered and transferred with any necessary
indorsement, as discussed in Chapter 15. A person who is a transferee of an
instrument and who meets the other requirements for being a holder in due
course may become a holder by obtaining the missing indorsements on the
instrument.' Such a person does not become a holder, and so cannot qualify as a
holder in due course, until the necessary indorsements are obtained.
A person can be a holder in due course only by being in possession of a
negotiable instrument either directly or through an agent who is acting on behalf
of the holder.' If an instrument fails in any respect to meet the requirements for
being a negotiable instrument, the transferee cannot claim status as a holder in
due course. (The requirements for negotiability are discussed in Chapter 14.) If
the instrument is not "payable to order or to bearer," the UCC is clear that there
can be no holder in due course of such an instrument.' Because of the require-
ment that the instrument be negotiable, a common defense to a claim by a
purported holder in due course is to attack the instrument as not meeting the
formal requirements for negotiability.
The transferee of a negotiable instrument acquires the rights of the trans-
feror through a "shelter" principle that permits the transferor to pass on the
rights the transferor enjoyed! The transferee thus "steps into the shoes" of the
transferor and receives whatever rights the transferor possessed, but the trans-
feree acquires no greater status or rights than the transferor had.

(2) Taking Without Notice of Defects or Defenses

The; uee requires that a holder in due course be an innocent purchaser,
unaware of troubles in the transaction or in the instrument for which it was
given. The key section states that the holder must take the instrument "without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or

3vee § 3-302(1) ("A holderin due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for
value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person"). All vec
citations are to the 1978 official text unless otherwise noted.
'vee § 3-201(3).
'vec § 3-302(1) on the requirements for being a holder in due course refers to being
a "holder who takes the instrument . . . ." Instrument is defined to be a negotiable
instrument. vee § 3-102. The possession requirement flows from the definition of
negotiation as requiring the delivery of an instrument. vee § 3-202(1). In order to have a
delivery, there must be a "voluntary transfer of possession:' vee § 1-201(14).
I vec § 3-805.
'The "shelter" principle is discussed in '116.04.
'16.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-4

claim to it on the part of any person...• Under this provision there are four types
ofproblems ofwhich the holder must have no notice at the time of"taking" the
instrument The holder must have no notice that (I) the Instrument is overdue;
(2) the instrument has been dishonored; (3) someone who is obligated on the
instrument has a defense to the liability on the instrument; and (4) some person
claims an interest in the instrument.'
The first two situations do not present many difficulties. What constitutes
dishonor is discussed in Chapter 21 and ordinarily there will be no great diffi-
culty in ascertaining that an instrument has been dishonored or when the person
receives notice of such facts. Under this requirement, one who takes a check
knowing it has been refused payment for insufficient funds, for example, cannot
be a holder in due course. Likewise, when a time draft has been presented for
acceptance and the drawee has refused acceptance, a subsequent holder with
notice of such refusal would have notice of dishonor and could not qualify as a
holder in due course; to
The uee itselfcontains several rules to help determine when an instrument
is overdue. It provides that a purchaser has notice thfat an instrument is overdue
if the purchaser "has reason to know" any of the following:
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is an
uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been made or
more than a reasonable length oftime after its issue. A reasonable time for a
check drawn and payable within the states and territories of the United
States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days. 11

'uee § 3·302(1)(c). See generally Annot., "What Constitutes Taking Instrument in

Good Faith and Without Notice of Informities or Defenses to Support Holder in Due
Course Status Under UCC § 3-302," 36 ALR 4th 212 (I 985}.
• VCC § 3·302(1 Xc}.
'0 See generally Annotation, "What Constitutes, Under the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law or Commercial Code, a Reasonable Time for Taking a Demand Instru-
ment, so as to Support the Taker's Status as Holder in Due Course," 10 ALR 3d 1199
(1966). The LTC requirement that a holder in due course take the instrument without
knowledge that it is overdue has important consequences for Joan guarantee arrange-
ments. For example, in one case, the United States acquired promissory notes under its
loan guarantee program for HUD home improvement loans. After the maker of the notes
defaulted in payment, the bank that held the notes (the original payee) assigned the
instruments to the United States. In a suit by the United States against the maker of the
notes for payment, the court held the United States could not claim to be a holder in due
course because it took the notes after default had occurred and, therefore, with knOWledge
that the notes were overdue. United States v. Gray, 552 F. Supp. 943. 945 (N.D. IJI. 1982).
"ucc § 3-304(3). The choice of the language "reason to know" is ·significant. The
UCC distin&uishes between actual knowledge and reason to know as discussed later in this
seclion. See uce § 1-201(25).
16-5 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE , 16.01(2)[b)

It is important to note that although an instrument may be overdue, a holder will

not be precluded from becoming a holder in due course if the holder took the
instrument without notice that it was overdue. '2
The UCC policy with respect to checks is significant. If the holder takes a
check more than thirty dayS after its date ofissue, it is presumed that the check is
overdue. Ordinarily, since the check will be dated, there will be notice from the
face ofthe instrument to the holder and the holder will not be able to qualify as a
holder in due course. Antedating or postdating an instrument, by itself, does not
make an instrument overdue. The fact that an instrument is antedated or
postdated does not give notice to the purchaser that a defense or claim to the
instrument exists.'!
Most of the difficulties arise in connection with the requirement that the
holder take without notiCe of a claim or defense. Before considering what will
amount to notice of a claim or defense, attention should be given to the defmi-
tion of notice in the uec, which is carefully and deliberately drawn.

[a] Definition of "Notice." There are different possible qualities ofnotice, and
the legal system is not always consistent in how it uses the tenn. At one extreme,
notice can mean actual knowledge that a fact exists. At another extreme, notice
can mean facts or circumstances that could be discovered by a search by a
diligent party in official records. This latter type of notice is sometimes referred
to as constructive notice. The UCC holder in due course provisions take an
intermediate view. Actual knowledge ofthe existence ofa defense or claim to the
instrument disables a person from being a holder in due course under the UCC."
But the provisions go further, defining notice as including something that exists
when a person has "received a notice or notification of it"" or when a person
"from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in ques-
tion ... has reason to know that it exists."'· Thus, a "reason to know" standard is
appropriate in deciding whether a person has taken an instrument with notice of
a defense or claim. The UCC does not go so far as to say that constructive notice
from official records is sufficient to give notice to a holder in due courseY

[h) What Constitutes Notice of a Claim or Defense. Sometimes the appear-

ance of the instrument itself is so irregular that a taker will be placed on notice

12 vee § 3·304 comment 7.

'1 vee § 3-304(4).

"The term notice includes "actual knowledge." uee § 1-201(25)(11.).

'svee § 1-201(25)(b).
1. vee § \-20 \(25)(c).
17 vee
§ 3-304(5).
1 16,OlI2)[b) NEOOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16·6

that something may be wrong. II Thus, there is notice ofa claim or defensc if"thc
instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence offorgery or alteration,
or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its vaJidity, terms or owner·
ship or to create an ambiauity as to the party to pay ..• ,"1'
In addition, the purchaser will have notice of a claim or defense when the
purchaser has notice "that the obligation ofany party is voidable in whole or in
part, or that all parties have been discharged."· Under this rule, if the taker
knows that one party, such as an indorser, has been discharged, that knowledge
will not preclude the taker from becoming a holder in due course. If the taker
knows that all parties have been discharged, as in the case where the instrument
had previously been paid, the taker cannot be a holder in due course. 21
One situation that has created difficulties involves instruments issued or
negotiated by fiduciaries. The uee draws a distinction between notice that a
fiduciary has negotiated an instrument for personal benefit or otherwise in
breach of duty and notice only.that the person negotiating the instrument is or
was a fiduciary. Knowing that the person is a fiduciary is not notice that the
fidUciary has breached his or her obligations to the beneficiary because the
holder is entitled to assume the fiduciary is acting properIy.22
To assist in determining when there is notice ofa claim or defense, the Dee
specifies that certain circumstances do not by themselves give a purchaser of an
instrument notice of a defense or claim:

(4) Knowledge ofthe following facts does not of itself give the purchaser
notice of a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise
or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice
that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the
purchaser has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
(I) that there has been default in payment ofinterest on the instrument
or in payment of any other instrument, except one of the same series.

I-First Nat') Bank v. Otto Huber & Sons, Inc.• 394 F. Supp. 1284 (OSO 1975) (the
note was open to two interpretations of when it was due, and so gave notice ofa defect in
the instrument).
\I vee § 3.304(1)(a).

20 vee § 3-304(1 }(b).

uee
21 § 3·304. comment 4.
21 vee §§ 3·304(2). 3-304(4)(e) & comment 5. For a detailed discussion of transac-
tions involving fiduciaries who use negotiable inslruments, see' 15.08.
 16-7 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE t 16.01[2Ilb)

(5) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute

notice within the provisions ofthis Article to a person who would otherwise
be a holder in due course. 23
For the notice to be effective to prevent a taker from being a holder in due
course, it "must be received at such time and in such manner as to give a
reasonable opportunity to act on it. "1& When a purchaser acquires an instrument
and meets all the requirements for being a holder in due course at the time the
instrument is acquired, later notice of facts that would constitute notice of a
defense or claim will not prevent the purchaser from being a holder in due
course. There is an ambiguity when a purchaser takes possession of an instru-
ment in good faith and without notice but later has notice of a claim or defense
before giving all the value that was agreed upon for the purchase of the instru-
ment. Is this notice too late because it has come after the purchaser has taken the
instrument? The VCC's policy on value indicates that one becomes a holder in
due course only to the extent that "the agreed consideration has been per-
fanned ...."os This policy suggests that the holder who has notice after taking
the instrument but before all value is given becomes a holder in due course only
to the extent that value is given prior to the notice, but the question is not clearly
answered by the VCC.
Knowledge that the person giving a check has a bad financial record, has
overdrawn the account, or might otherwise generally be considered a bad risk
does not in itselfpreclude the person taking the check from being a holder in due
course. 21 Similarly, no notice ofa claim or defense has been found when a bank
takes for deposit a check from a payee-depositor and permits withdrawal of
credit before the check is collected even though the depositor's account balance
is low or has been previously overdrawn or even when the bank knows that its
depositor is experiencing financial problems and has overdrawn the account. 21
Circumstances that are grounds for suspicion and conjecture only are not
enough, as was held in a case in which a purchaser of traveler's checks acquired
them outside the normal commercial market and at a different price than would
be customary."

., vec §§ 3·304(4)-3·304(5). When there will be notice of a defense from the exis-
tence of a separate writing or other agreement is discussed infra t 16.05.
2' vee § 3.304(6}.
25 vee § 3.303(a),

>e SI. Cloud Naf) Bank & Trust Co. v. Sobania Constr. Co., 302 Minn. 7\, 73, 224
NW2d 746, 748, (1974), which held that the depository bank could recover on the check
from the drawer, who had stopped payment.
27 Commerce Bank v. Edco fin. Serv.• 379 F. Supp. 293. 294 (ED Mo. 1974), alrd per
curiam 503 F2d 1047 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding thaI the depository bank could recover
from the drawer who had stopped payment on the checks thaI had been deposited).
21Sendery v. American Expre5S Co., 16 vec Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 753, 755 (NY
Sup. Ct. 1975) (the court held this was not enough to give notice the checks were stolen).
1I16.01(2)(b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-8

Whether a transferee of a negotiable instrument has notice of a defense to

the instrument before taking it usually will be a question of fact for a jury to
decide. In First National State Bank v. RelianceElectric Co., ill the court upheld a
jury fmding tha~ a bank took an assignment of an equipment lease from its
borrower with notice that the borrower had not delivered the equipment to the
lessee. Because the lease contained a waiver ofdefense clause, the bank claimed
to have had a status equivalent to that of a holder in due course. 3D In upholding
the jury's finding, the court precluded the bank from being in the position of a
holder in due course, because the bank knew, from its past dealings with the
borrower, that the borrower was in financial difficulty and was following a
practice of borrowing against equipment leases for undelivered equipment.
When the bank received the loan lease documents for the transaction at issue in
the case, there was nothing in them to indicate that the equipment covered by the
lease had been delivered. The court said, "[T]he documents in themselves were
sufficient to put a sophisticated lender with knowledge of [the borrower'sJ
marketing practices on notice that delivery of the equipment to the lessee was to
be made sometime in the future."" The veeexpressly states that knowledge
that a promise in a contract has not been performed is not, by itself, notice ofa
defense under the contract. There must be reason to know a breach exists. II The

See also Gutekunst v. Continental Ins. Co., 486 F2d 194. 196 (2d Cir. 1973); Mid-
Continent Nafl Bank v. Bank ofIndepcndence, 523 SW2d 569, 573-74 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975).
19
668 F2d 725 (3d Cir. 1981).
10 See VCC § 9-206. See also ~ 15.0 I[I] for a discussion of assill1ments of accounts
and contractual waivers of defenses.
11 668 F2d at 730. A bank in Israel claimed to be a holder in due course of notes made
by a buyer of diamonds in California who save the notes to a diamond dealer, who in tum
indorsed the notes to the bank. The court held that the involvement of the banlc in the
underlying transaction for the export ofthe diamonds raised the issue ofwhetherthe bank
had "dealt with" the buyer in such fashion that the .bank could not be a holder in due
course. This was a question offact that could not be resolved on summary judsment. The
court said there also was an issue of whether the bank was aware of a custom in the
diamond trade in Israel that allowed a buyer to return the diamonds and be discharged
from any obligation to pay. This too constituted an issue offact. The bank would have had
notice of a defense if it had known that the underlying obligation for which the note was
given was "voidable in whole or part." See VCC §§ 3-302( I), 3-304( I )(b). Additionally,
the buyer daimed that the diamonds had been returned to the seller by sending the
diamonds to the bank. If 50, the bank might have had notice that the obligation of the
buyer to pay had been discharged because ofthe Israeli custom. Finally, there was an issue
ofwhether the bank had notice that an executory contract had not been duly performed. It
was alleged that under Israeli Jaw, only a bank can export diamonds. The bank, knowing
the contract was executory, may have known that the diamonds were never delivered and
that the buyer had a defense of failure of consideration. Barclays Discount Bank, ltd. v.
Levy, 743 F2d 722, 726-727 (9th Cir. 1984).
3. vee § 3-304(4).
 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE If 16.01(2J[bJ

UCC rule makes it difficult to find notice when the holder has taken the instru-
ment before the breach of contract actually occurs.
It has been held that receipt ofa postdated cashier's check does not consti-
tute notice to the payee ofa defense to the check. The bank that issued the check
argued that the postdating should have indicated to the payee that the remitter,
who obtained the check from the bank, did not have the funds to pay for it and,
therefore, that the payee had notice ofthe bank's defense oflack ofconsideration
for the check. Although the payee was sufficiently concerned about the postdat-
ing to call the bank and inquire about its validity, the court held that these
circumstances did not constitute notice of a defense. Under the New York
standard for notice, contrary to the uniform defmition of notice in UCC § 1-
201(25), there must be actual subjective knowledge that a defense exists,»
When the payee on checks in which the plaintiffbank had a security interest
transferred those checks to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for payment of
tax obligations, the IRS became a holder in due course. Therefore, the bank
could not enforce its security interest against the IRS, and the IRS's action in
taking the checks did not con.stitute conversion. Payment by means of third-
party checks was not such a suspicious circumstance that the IRS was prevented
from being a holder in due course. 3'
Notice to one joint payee of a defect in the instrument is not automatically
imputed to the other payees because of their relationship as joint payees.U

:1:1 Indyk v. Habib Bank, Ltd., 694 F2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1982). A 1985 case considered
what constituted a notice of a defense. In Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmetal, Inc., 624 F.
Supp. 8 I I (SONY 1985), the court pointed out that under uee § 3-304( l)(b), there is
nOlice of a defense ifthere is notice that the obligation is "voidable in whole or in part,"
which, as noted in uee comment 3 to that section, was intended "to restrict the provision
to notice of a defense which will permit any party to avoid his original obligation on the
instrument, as distinguished from a set-offor counterclaim." FoJlowing this analysis, the
court also pointed out that uee § 3-302(1)(c), defining a holder in due course, refers to
one who has taken the instrument without notice of any defense apinat or claim to "it,"
meaning the instrument in question as contrasted to some other agreement. The court
thus concluded that notice of a defense relating to the underlying transaction, although
possibly sufficient as the basis for a counterclaim, would not be notice of a defense against
the instrument that would deprive the holder of status as a holder in due course. (The
court did not consider further the extent to which a defense on the underlying transaction
might give rise to a defense against the instrument based on failure of consideration or
other breach of contract under uee § 3·306.)
I' Valley Nat'l Bank v. Porter, 705 F2d 1027, 1030 (8th eir. 1983). In Taves v.
Griebel, 363 NW2d 73, 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), the court held that knowledge ofa stop
payment order does not constitute notice ofa defense. The court said, "Failure to inquire
why payment is stopped may be negligence and lack of diligence, but it is not notice of
what he might discover."
JI United States v. Mark Twain Bank, 771 F2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1985).
1\ 16.o1(2]lb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-10

In Stewart Y. Thornton,sa the Arizona Supreme Court upheld a determina-

tion that a purchaser ofa note given as part ofa real estate transaction was not a
holder in due course because oftbe deep discount on tbe note and the effect of
the Federal Interstate Land Sales Fun Disclosure Act, which Jives the obligor
forty...eight hours to rescind the transaction. The court said:

[n the instant case, the note was not purchased for full value. It was dis-
counted one-third. That fact alone is sufficient to alert a prospective pur-
chaser to a possible defense. Moreover, it was sold in the 48·hour period
during which the purchaser of the property CQuld have voided the purchase
agreement. By examining the written sales agreement in possession of the
seller of the note, Stewart could have ascertained that Mrs. Thornton had
not inspected the lot or received a property report.... We think under these
circumstances bad faith could have reasonably been inferred by the trial
judge, and he could have concluded that Stewart was not a holder in due
course within the meaning and intent of the DeC. To hold otherwise would
open to rampant abuse the fraud which Congress's Act, Section 1703(b)
seeks to prohibit."

When an organization such as a bank or a corporation acquires the instru-

ment, notice to the organization will occur as a result ofinformation coming to
the attention of the agents of the organization. If notice is given to the proper
person in the organization, the organization is charged with that notice even
when another person acting for the organization has no actual knowledge ofsuch
facts. sa The law puts the burden on the organization to maintain "reasonable
routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting
the transaction...."" The person conducting the transaction for the organiza-
tion does not have to have actual knowledge oftbe matter. Under the uec, the
relevant individual will be deemed to have notice from the time when it should
have been brought to the person's attention if proper diligence by the organiza-

:101l6Ariz. 107,568 P2d 414 (1977).

17 Id. at 110, 568 P2d at 417,

3tUCC § 1-201(21).
3. Id. That section states:

Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is effec-

tive for a panicular transaction from the time when it is brousllt to the attention of
the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time when it
would have been brought \0 his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence. An organization exercises due diligence ifit maint.ins reasonable routines
for communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction
and there is reasonable compliance with the routines. Due diligence does not require
an individual acting for the organizalion to communicate information unless such
communication is pan of his reaular duties or unless he has reason to know of the
transaction and that the transaction would be materially affected by the information.
 16-11 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 1116.01(3]

tion had been used. 40 Similarly, notice is considered given when the person
giving the notice takes the steps "as may be reasonably required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know of
it."''''
There is an important qualification in the UCC's notice provisions. This is
that "[t]he time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may
cease to be effective are not determined by this Act."·2 Because ofthis qualifica-
tion; there can be situations in which an individual has received notice but, due
to the passage oftime or other justification, the person subsequently is relieved
from its effect. 43

(3] Good Faith

A holder in due course must take the instrument in "good faith." Courts
have long debated what constitutes good faith for purposes of being a holder in

4ll Id. An organization is defined broadly to include "a corporation, government or

governmental subdivision or agency, business trust. estate, trust, partnership or associa-
tion, twO or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or
commercial entity." UCC § 1-201(28)•
•• UCC § 1·201(26). As a result, a person receives notice when the matter comes to his
attention or when the notice "is duly delivered at the place ofbusiness through which the
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such
communications." See generally, Blum, "Notice to Holders in Due Course and Other
Bona Fide Purchasers Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 22 BCL Rev. 203 (1981).
In Bryen v. Krassner, 208 NI Super. 639, 506 A2d 803, cert. denied, 105 NI583, 523 A2d
210 (1986), a trustee's knowledge prec1uded beneficiaries from status as holders in due
course. Krassner made a promissory note payable to Kennedy Investors (KI). KI trans-
ferred the note to plaintiff, who was trustee for fifteen creditors of KI who had agreed to
talce the note in exchange for cancellation ofthe debts KI owed them. When plaintiffsued
for payment of the note, Krassner defended by contending that he had been defrauded.
Plaintiff countered this defense by asserting he had the rights of a holder in due course.
The trial court combined the status ofplaintifftrustee with the fifteen beneficiaries to find
they collectively had status as a holder in due course. The appellate court reversed. The
plaintiff trustee did not qualify as a holder in due course because he was in bad faith, had
knowledge of defenses, and gave no value. The beneficiaries, although they had given
value in good faith, were not holders. The court commented that any other ruling
would thwart justice under the circumstances, if established, that the trustee knew
that the beneficiaries were releasing credits of value against an entity in which he had
a financial interest in exchange for a note subject to defenses of which they were
unaware. It would conflict with the principal of trust law that a trustee is obligated to
make full disclosure of all facts known to him respecting the trust which are material
for the protection of the beneficiary's interests ....
506 A2d 804·805.
"vce § 1·201(25). See First Nat'( Bank v. Fazzari, 10 NY2d 394, 223 NYS2d 483,
179 NE2d 493 (1961).
COld. See vee § 1-201, comment 25.
1116.01(3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-12

due course. Can one be a purchaser in good faith when the instrument is
. acquired under suspicious circumstances? What degree of care. if any, need be
exercised by a purchaser before acquiring an instrument? The debate involving
the resolution ofquestions such as these continues even though the UCC draft·
ers deliberately chose to adopt a narrow definition ofgood faith for purposes of
the holder in due course rules in Article 3. Good faith is defined simply as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.""
This definition contrasts sharply with the definition of good faith that the
UCC imposes upOn a merchant in Article 2 on the sales ofgoods. Good faith for
a merchant requires not only honesty in fact but also "the observance ofreason·
able commercial standards offair dealing in the trade."u In Article 3 on negotia.
ble instruments, the absence of an objective standard like the merchant test was
not accidental. At one time, the UCC contained a good faith standard for a
holder in due course similar to the reasonable commercial standard required ofa
merchant in Article 2. The sponsors of the UCC deliberately eliminated this
added test to restrict the standard to the present one of "honesty in fact...••
Although the test for good faith, thus, does not require the purchaser to
conduct an investigation to determine whether a negotiable instrument is sub-
ject to outstanding claims or defenses, the purchaser cannot deliberately ignore
facts that indicate problems in order to avoid obtaining knowledge ofdefenses or
claims. As is apparent in the discussion of the cases that follows, couna struggle
on where to draw the line between circumstances in which there is no duty to
inquire and circumstances in which a calculated avoidance ofbecoming knowl-
edgeable exists.
The fact that a bank teller took and cashed two checks of a corporation
drawn on another bank, in violation of an internal rule of the cashing bank
requiring the approval of the manager before cashing such checks, was held to
make no difference in testing the good faith oftbe bank. All that was necessary
was that the bank take tbe checks in simple good faith, for value, and without
notice of any dishonor or of any defense or claim. When the bank met the
"simple honesty" test, it could be a holder in due course and enforce payment of
the checks against the drawer corporation, which had stopped payment."'

"uec § 1-201(19).
,suee § 2.103(I)(b).
"The history is explained in E. Farnsworth and J. Honnold, Cases on Commercial
Law 56-57 (4th ed. 1985). See vce § 3-302( I)(b) (1952 ed.); 1956 recommendations of
the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial CO(!e- which gave as reason for the
change that it was intended "to make clear that the doctrine of an objective standard of
good faith exemplified by the case ofGill v. Cubiti, 3 B & C. 446 (1824), is not inlended to
be incorporated ..... See generally Gillelle. "Limitations on the Obligation of Good
Faith," 1981 Duke U 619.
"Industrial NaC! Bank v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc. 291 NE2d 603. 606 (1973),
where the court declared that the subjective test. or that of "honesty in fact" was all that
was required. in order to establish the good faith of the bank.
16-13 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.01(3)

When a bank took a check from the payee, who was not a regular customer
of the bank, and issued its own cashier's check to the payee in exchange for the
check, the bank having first telephoned the payor bank to verify the account and
the sufficiency of funds, it was held as a matter of law that the bank taking the
check had acted in good faith and was a holder in due course. As a holder in due
course, the bank was held entitled to enforce payment of the check against the
drawer, who had stopped payment. The court noted that the act of stopping
payment occurred after the frrst bank had telephoned the payor bank to verify
the account and the sufficiency of funds. 4I
Under the "simple honesty" test of good faith, a stockbrokerage frrm was
not denied holder-in-due-course status merely because it took a check drawn by
a corporation to the order ofthe brokerage firm as payee in satisfaction ofa debt
owed to the firm by an individual customer (who was the remitter ofthe check)
for stock purchased by that individual customer for his own benefit.•• However,
when a bank has had an unusually close relationship with the assignor ofa note,
and there are other circumstances from which knowledge ofthe shaky nature of
the assignor can be imputed to the bank, there is justification according to an
Ohio court in finding that the bank has not taken the note in good faith. Thus,
the bank is not entitled to the protection afforded a holder in due course. 50
In cases in which unconscionable or unfair contracts have been practiced by
payee-sellers, courts sometimes scrutinize the relationship between the sellers
who have taken the paper and the finance companies or banks to whom the
paper is transferred. When tbe purchaser of the paper bas a close business
connection with a fraudulent payee, some courts hold that the purchaser lacks
the good faith necessary to be a holder in due course."

"Manufacturers& TradenTrustCo. v. Murphy,369 F. Supp. 1l-l3(WDPa.l974),

which cited VCC § 3-302(1) and the definition of "good faith" as "honesty in fact" in
VCC § 1:20l(19).
•• Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296
Minn. 130, 133-l34, 136.207 NW2d.282, 285-286, 288 (1973). The court commented
that there were no facts known by the broker that might attract the application of what is
sometimes called the "red light" test, where in connection with the taking of an instru-
ment, there are "danger signals" from which may be inferred the existence of a claim to
the instrument on the part ofanother person. It appeared that the individual customer, an
attorney-secretary ofthe corporation and an attorney for the president ofthe corporation,
had improperly obtained and used the corporate check for his own purpose, but the
brokerage firm had no knowledge of this.
"Security Cent. Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 52 Ohio App. 2d 175, 177, 368 NE2d 1264,
1266 (1976). A formeremp!oyee ofthe bank was a sales representative ofthe assignor. The
bank. took a substantial number of notes from the assignor. The officer of the bank who
had handled the notes resigned under pressure because of deals that presumably included
this one. The court determined that the type ofbusiness the assignor conduc;ted seemed to
be almost inherently suspect.
"The Nevada Supreme Court applied the close business connection doctrine to a
nonconsumer transaction in St. James v. Diversified Commercial Fin. Corp., 714 P2d
1116.01131 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS .16-14

Failure to make inquiries that a reasonable man would make is not bad faith
and docs not constitute notice of adcfcnse. The Louisiana Court of Appeals
explained:
The "reasonable man test" is not the standard to be applied in determining
notice of a defense or good faith. Both determinations require a more
subjective test, with the determination of good faith being totally subjec-
tive. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales, 452 F. Supp.
1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The "reason to know" portion ofthe notice require-
ment guards against an intentional or willful ignorance.a
The court held that a holder who took an antedated promissory note did not
have notice of a possible defense of lack of corporate authority. In the court's
view, mere negligence or failure to make inquiries that a reasonable man would
make do not amount to bad faith as long as the holder does not refuse to inquire
in order to deliberately remain ignorant offacts that might disclose a defect in
the transaction. 53
A court upheld a jury determination that the purchaser of a $10,000 trea-
sury bill in bearer form was not a holder in due course because she did not act in
good faith. The purchaser, a tavern owner, had never purchased a treasury bill.
She bought this bill from her accountant. a longtime friend, at a discount of$500
and after receiving advice from her banker that treasury bills were risky invest-
ments because anyone in possession could cash the security. The court held that
the question ofthe purchaser's good faith was a matter for the jury to determine
on the basis of its assessment of her credibility."

179, 181 (Nev. 1986). The buyer entered into a transaction structured as a direct loan
from the finance company. evidenced by a promissory note payable directly to the
financer. Although a nonconsumer sale, tbe court followed the same reasoning as that
used in·Unicov. Owen, SONJ 101, 113, 232A2d40S, 417 (1967), discussed infra 1) 16.06,
where the coun ruled in a consumer financing deal that the financer's close connection to
the deal should make the financer a participant in that transaction and therefore not
someone entitled to be a holder in due course. The coun also remarked that it saw no
r1~ason to limit the Federal Trade Commission holder in due course regulations to con-
sumer transactions. Whether a close connection exists would be an issue of fact to be
determined in each case. For earlier judicial development of the close connection doc-
trine. see Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073,137 SW2d 260, 262 (1940);
Mutual Fin. Co. v. Manin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). There is an additional
discussion of this doctrine at , 16.06.
•~ Republic of Tex. Say. Ass'n v. First Republic Life Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 125 I, 1255
(La. a. App.), een. denied, 422 So. 2d 161 (La. 1982).
53
417 So. 2d at 12S6.
"McCarthy v. Kasperak, 3 Ohio App. 3d 206, 444 NE2d 472, 47S (1981). When a
check that had been completed without authority was taken by a perwn under circum-
stances not in the ordinary course ofbusiness, and where the person was facing a $400,000
loss if payment was not obtained from the person delivering the check, a coun concluded
that the person was not a holder in due course. The person "either knew of the circum-
16-15 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.01(4)

{41 Giving Value

A holder in due course must take the instrument "for value."u There is a
special definition of value in the UCC. It is not the same as what constitutes
"consideration" in the law ofcontraets. It is different from the general definition
of value that the UCC follows and that may be applicable to other types orOOna
fide purchasers. 51

stanc", or closed its eyes and in bad faith simply did not seek the truth in order to let its
money." E. Bierhaus & Sons, Inc. v. Bowling, 486 NE2d 598, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
In Banker's Trust Co. v. Crawford, 781 F2d 39, 41-43. (3d Cir. 1986), where
Pennsylvania law was applied, the court concluded there was no duty to mue an inquiry
into the nature ofthe transaction when circumstances suggested the possibility ofa defect
or defense in the underlying transaction. The court stated the following:
rrlhere is no affirmative duty of inquiry on the part of one taking a negoti&ble
instrument, and there is no constructive notice from the circumstances ofthe transac-
tion, unless the circumstances are so strong that if ignored they will be deemed to
establish. bad faith on the part of the transferee.
781 F.2d at 45. The case involved a cashier's check that Crawford had sent to Chalfont
Industries. Chalfont negotiated the check to Cutner Buick. Crawford became concerned
about the check, obtained an order directing the issuing bank not to pay the check, and
went personally to Chalfont'S office to intercept the check, but a Chalfont employee falsely
told him the check had not arrived after it had been indorsed over to Cutner Buick. A close
relationship existed between Chalfont and Cutner Buiclc as the respective companies were
owned by a father and son team, with the father supplying working capital, loans, and
other financial assistance to the son's business. However, tbe district court found there
was no evidence showing lack of good faith on the part of Cutner Buick in accepting the
check and no knowledge on the part of Cutner Buick of the fraudulent activities of
Chalfont employees. Cutner's failure to inquire into the circumstances of the check did
nOl slem from an attempt to avoid knowledge oftbe underlying circumstances. The court
also held lhat Pennsylvania did not recognize the "close connection" doctrine tllat would
have identified Cutner Buick with the payee, Chalfont, who bad been a party to the fraUd.
Knowledge of a cuslomer's financial difficulties did not prevent a banle from being a
holder in due course in Com Exchange Bank v. Tri-State Livestock Auclion Co., 368
NW2d S96,600 <SD 1985). Elkton, the bank's cuslomer, had an arrangement to buy cattle
for Tri-State to sell at auction and had authority to write checks to pay for the cattle on the
Tri-State account at a different bank. When Elkton had written checks in excess of $1
million, Tri-State laid its bank not to pay the checks, and thaI bank notified Elkton's bank.
Elkton's bank claimed to have advanced funds against these checks and brought suit for
payment. Altbough the bank was aware of Elkton's financial difficulties, it did net
intentionally remain ignorant of circumstances that would have disclosed defects in lhe
transaction and had no reason to inquire more closely under lhe VCC standard for good
faith of "honest;! in fact."
5! VCC § 3-302(1 Ita). See generally Annot., "Who is HolderofInstrument for 'Value'
Vnder UCC § 3·303," 97 ALR 3d 1114 (1980).
51 UCC § 1.201 (44); compare UCC § 2-403(1) on Good Faith Purchasers ofGoods for
Value wilh vec §§ 3-302-3-303. Vndertbe general definition in Section 1-201 (44), value
includes "any consideration sufficient 10 support a simple contract." This is not enough
under tl1.e special definition for value for Article 3, wl1.ich requires tl1.at tl1.e consideration
be pelfarmed or olher faclors be present, as explained in this Section. Section 3-303(a}.
1116.01(4) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-16

Generally, there are three circumstances in which a holder gives value:

1. To the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that
[the holder] acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument
otherwise than by legal process;11
2. When the holder takes the instrument "in payment of or as security for
an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is
due;"51 or
J. When the holder takes the instrument by giving another "negotiable
instrument for it or makes an irrevocable commitment to a third
person,""
The value defmition is significantly different from what constitutes ordi-
nary consideration for a contract because value is given only to the extent that
the consideration has been performed at the time the holder claims to be a holder
for value. The vee explains that "the underlying reason of policy is that when
the purchaser learns of a defense against the instrument or ofa defect in the title
he is not required to enforce the instrument, but is free to rescind the transaction
for a breach of the transferor's warranty ....There is thus not the same necessity
for giving [the purchaser] the status ofa holder in due course, cuttina off claims
and defenses, as where he has actually paid value,"fO
Article 3 specifically provides that giving a negotiable instrument or an
irrevocable commitment to a third party is value, as is payment ofa prior debt. I '
Giving a negotiable instrument is value because there is always the potential for
its being negotiated to a holder in due course. Although a holder takes the
instrument for value "when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an
irrevocable commitment to a third person, "12 this principle has been held to
apply only when the commitment to the third person is made at the time the
holder takes the instrument. If the commitment is made after the holder takes
the instrument. no value is given and the holder cannot become a holder in due
course,n

51 vee § 3.303(a).
51 uee § 3.303(b).
"vee § 3·303(c).
60 vee § 3-303, comment 3. The comment then gives as a common illustration "bank
credit not drawn upon, which can be and is revoked when a claim or defense appears." See
lext discussion, later in this section, of bank credits as value. See generaUy Kor:zenik v.
Supreme Radio, Inc., 341 Mass. 309, 191 NE2d 102 (964); Salta v. Mann Theaters, 94
Nev. 137, S7S P2d 133S (1978).
.. vee § 3·303(c), comment (5); Texaco State Bank v. Hullinger, 75 Ill. App. 2d 212,
214,220 NE2d 248, 250 (1966).
"vee § 3·303(c).
.. Bennett v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 19l':C App. 66, 68, 198 SE2d 33. 35,
cer!. denied 284 Ne 121, 199 SE2d 659 (1973).
16-17 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 'J 16.01(4)

The fact that an instrument is acquired at a discount or less than face value
does not, of itself, establish lack of value for putposes of determining whether a
holder is a holder in due course.••
The concept of giving value in order to be a holder in due course must be
distinguished from the requirement of consideration to support a contract.
Although a holder may not have given value and therefore cannot be a holder in
due course, it is still possible for the instrument to have been acquired in
exchange for consideration, which creates enforceable contract rights. Failure of
consideration can be a defense of a party to a negotiable instrument against
someone who does not have the rights of a holder in due course. With a negotia.
ble instrument, however, no additional consideration need be given when the
instrument or an obligation as a party to an instrument is "given in payment of
or as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind.'..•
Taking an instrument "in payment of or as security for" a prior debt is
value. It has been held that a widow took certain cashier's checks for value and
was a holder in due course when she took the checks in partial payment for loans
she had made to a corporation of which she and her late husband had been the
sole stockholders." When a bank takes a check on another bank in exchange fOT
its own cashier's check, it is a holder for value ofthe check it has taken. The act of
issuing the cashier's check comprises both the giving of a negotiable instrument
and the making of an "irrevocable commitment."••
In a Connecticut case, the court held that provisional credit made by a bank
against one ofits customers' overdrawn accounts constituted value althOUgh the
credit entered was subject to a later withdrawal or reversal of credit by the
plaintiff. The bank took the instrument in payment for an antecedent obligation
and received a security interest in the item and its proceeds."
A person who acquires a security interest in a note gives value to the extent
of the security interest and can qualify as a holder in due course if the other
requirements for holder-in-due-course status are satisfied." However, attaching
creditors and other parties who acquire a lien on the instrument by compulsory
legal process do not give value and cannot become holders in due course.'o

"Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Woodard, 159 Ind. App. 50, 304 NE2d 859
(1973). But purchaser of an instrument at a "deep discount"' may raise notice and good
faith issues as discussed in 1!V 16.01[2], 16.01[3].
'"ucc § 3-408.
II Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 22 III. App. 3d 4 10, 417, 318 NE2d 52, 59 (1974).
11 Manufacturers & Trader Trust Co. v. Murphy, 369 F. Supp. II, 13 (WD Pa. 1974),
which cited UCC § 3-303(c) in support of its holding. See Note, "Taking a Bank Money
Order for Value Under uec Section 3-303," 63 Minn. L. Rev. 983 (1979).
··Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nafl Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 644, 365 A2d
1222, 1225 (1976).
It UCC § 3.303(a). Holleman v. Murray, 666 P2d 1107. 1109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
'0 uce § 3.303(a) & comment 4.
1116.01[4] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16·18

A bank eogaged in the collection ofitems may give value by giving credit to
its customer for the item when special rules of the UCC are met. A bank gives
value when it obtains a security interest in an item." A bank obtains a security
interest in an item that has been deposited in an account at the bank when the
bank has given credit for the item and such credit "has been withdrawn or
applied."n Thus, when the bank gives a provisional credit for a check that the
customer has deposited but retains a right to revoke the credit and charge back,
the bank does not have a security interest until the customer has withdrawn
funds against such credit or the bank has taken action to "apply" the credit in
some fashion. However, when the bank gives credit "available for withdrawal as
of right," the bank has a security interest in the item to the extent of the credit
whether or not the credit is drawn on or the bank has a right to charge back to the
account ofits customer. U It is senerally believed that this latter provision would
not apply to the ordinary case where a provisional credit is given to a deposited
check pending the bank's collection of payment because this would not be a
circumstance where the customer had a "withdrawal as of right.'tf4 The bank
also has a security interest when it makes an advance to its customer "on or
against the item. ,,'s
When a customer deposits a group of checks to the customer's account and
the bank allows the customer to make a panial withdrawal against the provi.
sional credit given for the deposit, the bank has obtained a security interest as a
result ofthe credit withdrawn. This security interest exists in "all ofthe items" as
well as in "any accompanying documents or the proceeds of either." This
security interest continues in the item and the accompanying documents and
proceeds as long as the bank is engaged in collection of the item and until the
bank receives a final settlement for the item. When the bank receives a final
settlement, the security interest in the item is realized. 7I The UCC follows an
accounting method of credits first given are first withdrawn for purposes of
deciding against what items the withdrawals are made'"

"vce § 4·209. See generally Note, "Bank Credit a~ Value in Article 4 ofthe Vniform
Commercial Code," 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 395.
n VCC § 4·208(1 )(a). The bank's security interest extends not only to the item but
also tl> any documents which are taken that accompany the items (as when a documentary
draft is being collected) as well as to the proceeds of the item and any documents. Id.
11 VCC § 4.208(1 )(b).
"See]. White &. R. Summer, Vniform Commercial Code § 14-15 (2d ed. 1980). It is
interesting to note that the customer obtains additional rights to withdrawal, not contem-
plated by the VCC, in the Expedited Funds Availability Act of I 987. See' 20.II[IJ(b). For
a discussion of when funds are available for withdrawal as of right under the uee, see
~ 20.11(1 Jla).
71UCC § 4-208(I)(c).
"vee § 4·208(3).
11 uce § 4-208(2).
16-19 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 1116.01[S]

Recognition of a depository bank or collecting bank as giving value all a

result ofgiving bank credits for deposited items has broad implications. As long
as the bank makes sure that there is a proper chain of indorsements and other-
wise takes without notice of a defense or claim and in good faith, the bank is a
holder in due course. This permits the bank to enforce the liability of prior
parties such as indorsers and the drawer or maker free from defenses or claims if
the check subsequently is not paid!1
The rules on bank credit as value have been applied in various cases. The
following are illustrative. In Lynnwood Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Bank ofEverett. 7.
the court held that a depository bank gave value when it applied the provisional
credit, given for a check deposited by its customer, to reduce an existing over-
draft in the customer's account. When the check was presented for payment to
the payor bank (Bank of Everett), it refused to pay the check because of a stop
payment order. The check was then returned to the depository bank, which
subsequently presented it a second time. This time the Bank of Everett paid the
check notwithstanding the stop payment order. When the drawer of the check
sued the Bank ofEverett for making a wrongful payment in violation ofthe stop
payment order, the court held that the Bank of Everett was subrogated to the
depository bank, which was a holder in due course. In Friendly National Bank v.
Farmers Insurance Group,lIJ the court held that a bank had given value for an
insurance claims draft when it allowed its customer to draw checks against the
amount the bank had provisionally credited to the customer's account.
In European Asian Bank, A.G. v. G. Crohn & Co.," a bank gave credit to its
customer for a bill ofexchange that had been accepted by Crohn. After giving the
credit, the bank applied it to satisfy an antecedent debt of the customer. The
credit given was conditional on payment of the bill of exchange by Crohn, but
the court held that such credit constituted value for the purpose ofqualifying as a
holder in due course. The bank could reverse the credit only if Crohn failed to
pay the bill. This was different from giving a provisional credit, because the bank
had "agreed to expose itself to the credit risk of the party obligated on the
instrument taken in payment of the antecedent debts."

(5) Persons Who Cannot Qualify as Holders in Due Course

There are three categories of purchasers ofinstruments who cannot become
holders in due course. A person who purchases an instrument at ajudicial sale or
gets it through legal process such as attachment or the like cannot be a holder in

7' The bank has an added advantage in that it may supply the indorsement of its
customer as discussed previously. UCC § 4·205. See 1i \5.01 [3J[c].
71 29 Wash. App. 686, 630 P2d 489 (198\).
10 630 P2d 318, 320 (Okla. 198\).

" 769 F2d 93. 97 (2d Cir. 1985).

, 16.02 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-20

due course."' A person who obtains a negotiable instrument by acquiring it "in

taking over an estate" is not a holder in due course." Finally, when an instru-
ment is purchased "as part ofa bulk transaction not in regular course ofbusiness
of the transferor," the purchaser is not a holder in due course." The policy
underlying these exclusions is that such persons are merely successors in interest
to the prior holder and should acquire no better rights than the prior holder.
Under the shelter principle, discussed later in this chapter, the person acquiring
an instrument in such manner succeeds to the rights of the predecessor trans-
feror of the instrument. If the transferor was a holder in due course, the pur-
chaser may succeed to that status. If
A bulk purchase, the comments suggest, would include situations where a
new pannership purchases !Ill the assets of a fonner pannership or where a
corporation is reorganized and takes over in bulk the assets of a predecessor
company." The comments also state that the bulk purchase rule "has panicular
application to the purchase by one bank ofa substantial pan ofthe paper held by
another bank which is threatened with insolvency and seeking to liquidate its
assets,"" The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation may acquire holder-in-
due-course status as a matter offederallaw when it purchases assets in bulk ofan
insolvent bank notwithstanding the nonapplicability of the holder in due course
rights granted by the uee."

~ 16.02 RIGHTS OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

A holder in due course under the uee has a number of special rights and
pri"'i!eges that are not available to a person who does not qualify as a holder in
due course. Perhaps the most significant rights of a holder in due course are to be
free from the claims of other parties and to be free from certain defenses to the
instrument of parties with whom the holder has not dealt." Additionaliy, a
holder in due course has special rights under numerous other provisions in the
uee. For example, payment to a holder in due course is final. lO No discharge of

n uee § 3-302(a).
13 uee § 3-302(3)(b).

.. uee § 3-302(3)(c).
II vee § 3.302, comment 3. The shelter principle IS discussed in ~ 16.04.

II vec § 3.302, comment 3.

"[d.
liThe FDIC's holder-in-due-course status is discussed at 1 10.02{Sj.
II vee § 3.305.

10 vee § 3-418.
16-21 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE ~ 16.02[211al

the liability of any party to a negotiable instrument is effective against a holder

in due course who does not have notice of the discharge. Ii

[1) Freedom From Conflicting Claims

A holder in due course not only takes a negotiable instrument free from
many defenses, the holder in due course also acquires ownership of the instru-
ment free from "all claims to it on the part ofany person."lZThis gives the holder
in due course rights in the instrument that arc free not only from others' claims
oflega! title to the instrument "but also from all liens, equities or claims of any
other kind. "'3 The holder in due course cuts off all conflicting claims including
those based upon "rescission ofa prior negotiation."" In Bricks Unlimited Inc. v.
Agee," this rule was applied to give a bank an ownership interest in a note free
from the competing claim ofa gamishingjudgement creditor. Bricks Unlimited
was a judgment creditor of the person who was the payee of the note. Bricks
Unlimited garnished the debt represented by the note. After the garnishment,
the payee transferred the note to the bank. The bank was not aware of the
garnishment when it acquired the note. Because the bank had no notice of a
claim or defense, it was a holder in due course and acquired the instrument free
from the conflicting claim of the garnishing judgment creditor.

(2) Freedom From Defenses

The right of a holder in due course to be free from defenses as provided by
the uee is a bit more complex than the right to be free from claims of other
persons. There are two reasons for this. Firstly. the holder in due course takes
free from the defenses of certain persons only. The holder in due course takes
free from "all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has
not dealt. ..."" Secondly, the holder in due course does not take free ofcertain
defenses. The defenses that remain good against a holder in due course are often
referred to as "real" defenses, whereas the defenses that a holder in due course
may avoid are referred to as "personal" defenses.

la) Defenses of Parties With Whom the Holder Has Dealt. Although the
uec allows a payee of an instrument to be a holder in due course,l7 it also
"vee § 3-601.
92 vec § 3-305(1). One who is not a holder in due course "takes the instrument
subject to ... all valid claims to it on the part of any person ... "vec § 3-306(a).
"3uce § 3-305, comment 2.
"ld.
95
672 F2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982).
-vce § 3-305(2).
17 vee § 3-302(2).
, 16.02[2](81 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-22

provides that a holder in due course does not take the instrument free from
defenses of parties with whom the holder has dealt. OI This requirement signifi-
Cantly limits the benefits ofholder-in-due-course status for payees. In the typical
case in which'the payee deals directly with the drawer or maker, the payee takes
the instrument subject to all defenses the drawer may have to it. Thus, one
consequence of this rule is that the immediate parties to a transaction may
choose to make payment using a negotiable instrument without altering their
underlying rights and duties with respect to the transaction. In other cases, such
as where the payee acquires a cashier's check from a remitter in a transaction
where the payee's dealings have been with the remitter only, the payee may
qualitY as a holder in due course and take the instrument free from any defense
the bank which drew the instrument might assert." In this situation the payee
has dealt with the remitter, but not with the bank that issued the cashier's check.
These principles were followed in Standard Finance Co. v. Ellis,101 to find that
the payee of a promissory note who had loaned money to the maker of the note,
which payee had been personally present when it was executed and had
explained the terms and conditions of the note to the maker, took the note
subject to any defenses available to the maker because the payee had "dealt"
with the maker. '01
Although a holder of a note may not be able to cui off the defenses of
someone with whom the holder has dealt, there may be other principles oflaw
relevant to whether a defense may be shown. When the defense is based on a

" UCC § 3·305(2). A Louisiana court first held that although a payeeofa note may be .
a holder in due course. it does not take the note free from the defenses of parties with
whom the payee has deaIt directly. In a confused opinion on rehearing, the court went on
to say that the payee would not be a holder in due course if the payee had deaIt directly
with the maker ofthe note and the maker had a valid defense Bpinst the payee. But failure
of consideration would not be a defense apinst a holder in due course even if the holder
had dealt directly with the pany asserting the defense. American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Sunbelt Envtl. Sys., Inc., 45 I So. 2d 1111, 1119 (La. Cl. App. 1984).
"vcc § 3-302, comment 2.
100 3 Haw. App. 614, 617, 657 P2d 1056, 1059 (1983).

101 Compare A.C. Davenport & Son Co. v. United States, 703 F2d 266, 269 (7th Cir.
1983), where the court held qualified as a holder in due course, a subcontractor to whom
the Government Services Administration (GSA) had sent a check. The check was a
duplicate ofchecks previously issued to the contractor. who had failed to pay the subcon-
tractor. The GSA then tried to back out ofpaying the check to the sub because it had failed
to stop payment on the checks to the general contractor, who had become bankrupt. The
court did not discuss whether GSA and the sub had "dealt" with each other. Nor did the
court consider whether the subcontractor could be a "holder" of a check made payable to
the general contractor. (The check was payable to the general contractor in care of the
subcontractor for deposit in a special account from which only the .subcontractor could
withdraw.) For dubious dicta to the effect that the payee of a note would not be subject to
the defense of failure of consideration even though a holder in due course, see American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Sunbelt Envtl. Sys., Inc., 45 I So.2d 1111, 1119 (La. Ct. App. 19114).
16-23 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.02(2J(b)

separate agreement, the parol evidence rule may apply. The parol evidence rule
limits the circumstances under which parol evidence may be admitted to vary
the· terms of a writing intended as a froal and complete statement of an agree-
ment. If the parol evidence rule applies, the evidence offered will not be
admissible. '02
In Kovash v; McCloskey,'~ the defendant was the plaintiff's attorney in a
debt collection matter. The check was issued payable to the plaintiff and the
defendant jointly; the defendant indorsed it to his client, the plaintiff, but the
check was dishonored for insufficient funds when presented. In a suit on the
check on the defendant's indorsement, the defendant raised the defense oflack
of consideration because he had merely indorsed the check to transfer it to his
client. The plaintifftried to avoid the defense by claiming that he was a holder in
due course and had not dealt with the defendant because he was not involved in
the original transaction that gave rise to the issuance of the check. The court
rejected this reasoning, holding that the plaintiff's taking the check from the
defendant amounted to dealing with the person as contemplated in UCC § 3-
305(2).

(bJ Real and Personal Defenses. The UCC permits a holder in due course to
take free of all defenses ofany party to the instrument with whom the holder has
not dealt except certain listed defenses. They are:

(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and

(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of
its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.'04
The foregoing enumerated defenses, which are valid even against a holder in due
course, are often referred to as "real defenses." Other types of defenses, which
are not effective against a holder in due course, are termed "personal defenses."
The rights of a holder in due course should be compared to the rights ofone
who is not a holder in due course. A person who is not a holder in due course
takes the instrument subject to "all defenses of any party which would be

102 See infra ~ 16.05 for a discussion on the relationship between the parol evidence
rule and negotiable instruments.
03
' 386 NW2d 32 (NO 1986).
'04 vee § 3-305(2).
lIUi.02[2J(c) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-24

available in an action on a simple contract These include defensca based

upon failure ofconsideration, nonperformance of conditions precedent, nonde-
livery ofthe instrument or delivery for a special purpose, the instrument's being
held as a result of theft, and the payment's being inconsistent with a restrictive
indorsement. * The only defense that cannot be raised against a holder of an
instrument who is not a holder in due course is a defense based upon "the claim
ofany third person to the instnlment 17 Thus, when the drawer ofa check is
sued by one who is not a holder in due course for payment of the check, the
drawer cannot raise in defense that the payment properly should be made to a
third party who is the real owner of the instrument. The third party must be a
party to the litigation and raise the defense for himself or herself. '01

Ie) Categories of Real Defenses. The five categories of real defenses that are
good against even a holder in due course are as follows.

[I) Incapaclt)'. Two types of incapacity which can be a defense against a

holder in due course are infancy, when it is a defense to a simple contract, and
other incapacity, when it makes an Obligation "a nullity. "'01 The uce
does not
define when infancy is available as a defense, but leaves it as a matter to be
determined by the general law of the jurisdiction on when an infant can avoid
contracts. llD
The incapacity of an individual, such as an incapacity based upon being a
minor, does not prevent an instrument from being 1ransferred. The infant or
other person with the incapacity may be able in an appropriate case to rescind
the transaction or to have another equitable remedy imposed (such as imposing
a constructive trust on proceeds) to prevent the proceeds of the transaction from
being misapplied contrary to the local law, but such remedies cannot be exer-
cised against a "subsequent holder in due course."'" Otherwise, negotiation "is
effective to transfer the instrument" even though it is made by an infant or other
person who Jacks capacity. 112 Although the holder in due course who acquires the
instrument cannot sue an infant and hold such person to an obligation on the
instrument when the defense ofinfancy is a real defense, the holder in due course
does have rights on the instrument against other parties such as indorsers who

to. vee § 3.306(b).

tOt vee § 3.306.
'07 vee § 3.306(d).

'01 vee § 3·306 & comment 5. See vee § 3·603. The claims of third parties to the
instrument an: discussed in 11 16.03, 20.05[2].
'01 vee § 3·305(2Xa), (b).
1'0 vee § 3.305, comment 4.

111 vee § 3·207. It is not clear what is meant by a subs~quent holder in due course.
'''vee § 3·207( I).
16-25 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.02[211c:)

are not incapacitated. An infant or other party under incapacity may have a right
to rescind the transaction and recover the instrument except to the extent that
the vee protects a holder in due course. Because the holder in due course takes
an instrument free from the claims of any person, the claim of the incapacitated
party to the instrument based on his or her right to rescind will not be good
against the holder in due course. "Against him [the holder in due coursel there
can be no rescission or other remedy, even though the prior negotiation may
have been fraudulent or illegal in its essence and entirely void.""5
The vee provision stating that any other incapacity that makes the obliga-
tion on the instrument a nullity is a real defense is a rule intended to cover
situations such as "mental incompetence, guardianship, ultra vires acts or lack.
of corporate capacity to do business, any remaining incapacity of married
women, or any other incapacity apart from infancy. "114 In this type of incapac:-
ity, it is expected the disability will be based upon local statutes. The vee
intends to draw a distinction between local laws that render the obligation
"entirely null and void," in which case the defense is good against a holder in due
course, and laws whose effect "is merely to render the obligation voidable at the
election of the obligor," in which case a holder in due course will take free ofthe
defense.'" This may involve tricky problems of interpreting the legislative
intent.
[ill Duress or illegality. Duress or illegality in the transaction can be a
defense against a holder in due course when the local law provides that under
such circumstances the obligation is a nullity. The same distinction is drawn
between obligations that are a nullity and obligations that are merely voidable as
just discussed. Examples given by the drafters include statutes making gambling
or usurious contracts illegal. Whether such transactions make the obligation null
and void or only voidable is up to the particular jurisdiction to determine.
Likewise, duress in entering into an Obligation may create a defense that is good
against Ii holder in due course. The drafters give the example of an instrument
that a person has signed at the point of a gun. But all duress may not have the
same consequences. Other threatened action, although wrongful and giving rise
to legal remedies against the person who made the threats, may not be deemed so
oppressive that the transaction is a ..nullity......
Illegality is often recognized when the transaction involves a gambling debt.
In First State Bank v. Spencer, the defendant gave the bank a note for a loan to

'''vee § 3-207 comment 5.

"'vee § 3-305 comment 5.
'15 rd.
'''vee § 3·305. comment 6. See also Williamsen v. Jernberg, 99 III.· App. 2d 371,
373-374,240 NE2d 158, 160-161 (1968); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 Ill.
App. 3d 729, 734, 303 NE2d 186, 191 (1973). See generally Note, "vee § 3-305(2)(b):
What Degrees of Duress?" 21 S. Tex. U 37 (1980).
1116.02(1)(cl NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-26

pay a gambling debt. 117 Ordinarily, a bank can recover on such a loan, notwith-
standing that the proceeds are used to pay a prior gambling debt. This general
rule. does not apply, however, when the lender is a participant in the illegal
transaction. In Spencer, the court held that the bank should be treated as if it
were involved in the illegal transaction because the defendant owed the gam-
bling debt to the chairman of the board of the bank, the purpose of the loan was
to permit the bank officer to recover the debt, and the bank officers handling the
transaction were aware that the proceeds of the loan were to be used for payment
of this debt.'"
Another frequently encountered problem involves the defense of usury. The
laws that control the amount of interest that may be charged for various credit
transactions are complex, vary enormously from state to state, and are affected
by federal legislation when consumers and financial institutions are concerned.
The effect of these laws when a person charges interest in violation of them
varies greatly. The uee does not determine when an obligor such as the maker
on a promissory note that is usurious may raise the violation of the interest
controls as a defense against a holder in due course seeking payment of the note.
As in the other cases of illegality, the uee treats usury as "primarily a matter of
local concern and local policy" that is best left to locallaw." 1 The uee recos-
nizes the defense as one that is good against a holder in due course ifthe local law
regards the illegality as enough "to make the obligation entirely null and void,"
but cuts off the defense when the consequence of the illegality is that the
obligation is only voidable or otherwise something less than "null and void:'
However, even when the defense is one that a holder in due course can avoid, if
the instrument gives notice of the existence of the illegality on its face, as may
occur when the rate of interest is excessive, the holder takes the instrument with
notice of the illegality and therefore does not qualify as a holder in due course.'2O

(iii] Fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature or the Instrument. There is a

special form of misrepresentation that provides the signerofa negotiable instru-
a
ment with defense against even a holder in due course. If the misrepresentation
is what is sometimes referred to as "fraud in the essence or fraud in the factum,"
it is a defense that the obligor can raise against a holder in due course. The
misrepresentation must be such that it "has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowl-

1117 Kan. App. 2d 147, ISO-lSI, 638 P2d 379, 382·383 (1981).
118 See generally Annot., "Fraud in the Inducement and Fraud in the Factum as
Defenses Under UCC § 3·305 Against Holder in Due Course," 78 AlR3d 1020 (1977).
The parol evidence rule does not bar oral testimony by the maker of a promissory note
that he was fraudulently induced to sign the note. Pinken v. Frank, 104 F2d /0/9. 1022
(8th Cir. 1983).
"" UCC § 3·305. comment 6.
lnS ee uec § 3-304(1)(b).
16-27 HOLDERS IN DUE eOURSE 11 16.02(2](c)

edge of its character or its essential terms...."t2t The example given in the
comments is misrepresentation that tricks the signer into signing a negotiable
instrument by making the signer believe the document is an innocuous paper of
some other type. lEI Under this rule, it is not enough for the signer to establish
misrepresentation that deceived the signer as to the nature of the instrument.
The signer also must show that it occurred under circumstances where the signer
had no "reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge" of what the transaction
was about. The comment indicates that the determination ofwhether a reason-
able opportunity existed requires an exploration of all the facts and circum-
stances, such as the person's "intelligence, education and business experience;
his ability to read or to understand English, the representations made to him and
his reason to rely on them or to have confidence in the person making them; the
presence or absence of any third person who might read or explain the instru-
ment to him, or any other possibility ofobtaining independent information; and
the apparent necessity, or lack of it, for acting without delay."tlS

(i1') Discharge In insolvency proceedings. When a person who has liability

on a negotiable instrument has been discharged in insolvency proceedings ofany
kind, the person has no liability on the obligation discharged by those proceed-
ings, and the discharge may be raised even as against a holder in due course.12<

(v) Other discbaraes when the holder has notice. A number of circum-
stances may create a discharge of the liability of a person on a negotiable
instrument. 125 Although a holder may have notice that one or more parties to a
negotiable instrument have been discharged, notice of such discharge does not
prevent the holder from being a holder in due course. t28 The holder may still
have recourse against parties on the instrument who are not discharged or of
whom the holder does not have notice of the discharge. If the holder has notice
that the obligations of all the parties to the instrument have been discharged,

12t vee § 3-305(2)(c).

1%1 vee § 3-305, comment 7.
123 vee § 3-305, comment 7. See, e.B., FDIC v. Culver, 640 F. Supp. 725,730 (D.
Kan. 1986), where the court concluded the defendant could not raise the defense of fraud
against a holder in due course where he had signed a blank note and claimed not to have
known what he had signed because the terms were left blank. The court quoted approv-
ingly from an 1884 case that one who has the ability to read and understand that the
document is a note but who signs it on the assurance that it is a different instrument is
negligent as a matter oflaw. The 1884 case cited was Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan. 478, 2 Pac.
580 (1884).
12< vee § 3-305(2)(d).

us See vee § 3-60 I, which lists nine different provisions in Article 3 as well as a
general principle of discharge whenever the law would recognize the act or agreement as
sufficient to discharge a "simple contract for the payment of money." See also 'If 15.07.
u'vee §§ 3-305, comment 9, 3-304{I)(b).
11 16.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-28

however, the VCC provides that the holder cannot be a holder in due course.,21
Clearly, a distination is being drawn between certain defenses which may result
in a discharge of a party from liability on the instrument and other types of
defenses. This is because a holder takes an instrument with notice ofa claim or
defense when he or she takes it with notice "that the obligation of any party is
voidable in whole or ·in part" but, as indicated earlier, is not precluded from
being a holder in due course as a result ofnotice ofdischarge ofa party unless he
or she takes it with notice that all parties have been discharged. til
A holder in due course may have rights based on other principles oflaw as
well. The holder in duo course, ofcourse, bas all rights that a holder would have
to enforce the obligations of parties to the instrument. The holder in due course
also may have rights based upon general principles of contract, tort, agency or
other law. '2• One case said a holder in due course could bring an action based
upon negligence against the issuing bank on a certificate of deposit when the
bank attempted to pay the certificate without requiring its production and
surrender. The court reasoned:
Moreover, since an action in negligence is separate and distinct from any
claim based on the instrument or the underlying contract, we do not believe
that the allocation of rights created by the holder in due course doctrine
presents such a comprehensive remedial scheme as to supplant a negligence
action.... Accordingly, we find that the Code does not bar a claim based on
a theory of negligence. t3.

Failure of consideration is not a defense to payment ofa note, even against

one who is not a holder in due course, when the note was given to secure a prior
debt (referred to as an antecedent obligation in the UCq.13'

1116.03 RIGHTS OF A HOLDER WHO IS ~OT A HOLDER IN

DUE COURSE
A holder may have valuable rights to enforce a negotiable instrument even
though the holder does not qualify as a holder in due course. As previously
discussed, the obligor on a negotiable instrument has an obligation to pay that

mUCC § 3-304(l)(b).
'21 Id. The reference to obligations that are "voidable" is a deliberate choice of
language. according to Comment 3, and is intended to dislinguish notice of a defense
which does preclude holder-in-duc..:ourse status from notice of a setoff or counterclaim.
vec § 3·304 comment 3.
12·See VCC § 1·103
". Yahn & McDonnell, Inc. v. Farmers Bank, 708 F2d 104, 113 (3d Cir. 1983).
131 vee § 3·408. See also Bradley v. Romeo. 716 P.2d 227, 288 (Nev. 1986).
16·29 HOLDERS IN DUE eOURSE , 16.03

runs to the holder. 1I2 The holder is entitled to demand payment of the instru-,
ment, and the person obligatedto pay may safely pay the holder notwithstanding
that other third parties may have given notice of or asserted claims to the
instrunient.'3.l The only exceptions to the ability to make payment to the holder
are when the adverse claimant to the instrument takes action either by supplying
an indemnity adequate to the payor or by obtaining an itijunction from a court of
competent jurisdiction over both the adverse claimant and the parties. '34 Other·
wise, the payor may ignore the claims ofother persons and pay the holder unless
the circumstanccs are such that it (1) would be a payment in,bad faith to a person
who acquired the instrument by theft or through a thief or (2) is a payment by
one other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank that is not a depository
bank to a holder for a restrictively indorsed instrument and the payment is not
consistent with the terms of the restrictive indorsement.'M Further, if a holder
brings suit to enforce a party's obligation on an instrument. apart from the two
exccptions just given, relating to theft and restrictive indorsement, the party
obligated on the instrument is permitted to raise only his or her own defenses.
"The claim of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a
defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person himselfdefends the
action for such party.",.
A holder also has the benefits of the presumptions and rules on burden of
proofestablished for enforcing an obligation on a negotiable instrument. Firstly, '
signatures on a negotiable instrument are deemed to be admitted unless specifi-
cally denied in the pleadings.'27 When the validity or authority ofa signature is
placed in issue, the holder who is claiming under the signature has "the burden
of establishing it . . . ." The holder is assisted in meeting this burden by a
statutory presumption that a signature on a negotiable instrument is "genuine or
authorized" unless the lawsuit is one which involves enforcement of the obliga-
tion ofa purported signer who is dead or incompetent. 121 Burden ofestablishing
under the uee means "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the
existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. "'If Secondly, once
the signatures on an instrument are established or are admitted as a result of the
failure to deny the validity of the signature, the holder is entitled to recover on
the obligation represented by the signature on the instrument by simply produc-

122 uee §§ 3·413-3.414. 3-603. See discussion at 11 15.02.

13.l uee § 3.603.
124 uee § 3.603(1).

125 rd.
121 uee § 3.306(d).
127uee § 3-307(1}.
121 Id.

12'uee § 1-201(8).
1116.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-30

ing the instrument unless the party being charged establishes a defense. '40 The
comments make clear that this role is deliberately designed to permit a holder
"to recover in the absence of any further evidence...m The comments also
indicate that the intent is to place the burden on the defendant not only to
establish the existence of a defense but to prove it by a "preponderance of the
total evideoce. ' 4! These presumptions and the benefit of the allocation of the
burden of proofare rights that run only to a holder. A person who is not a holder
but who has possession of an instrument is required to prove all aspects of the
person's right to recover on the instrument. '43 Thirdly, ifit is then shown by the
defendant that a defense exists to the claim made by the holder, the holder has
the burden ofestablishing that the holder or some person under whom the bolder
claims is in all respects a holder in due course. 144
The person who is not a holder in due course takes the instrument subject to
defenses ofthe person the holder seeks to charge with liability. These include an
all-encompassing list of defenses:
I. All valid claims to the instrument;
2. All defenses available in a simple contract action;
3. Defenses based on failure of consideration;
4. Nonperformance of conditions precedent;
5. Nondelivery or delivery for a special purpose; and
6. Defenses related to acquisition of an instrument through theft or pay-
ment in a manner inconsistent with a restrictive indorsement. ' "
The reference to "all valid claims" is intended to be read broadly to include not
only legal claims of ownership to the instrument but "all liens, equities, or other
claims of right against the instrument or its proceeds. "I" Of course, the availa-
bility ofdefenses to an action on a negotiable instrument may be affected by the
general rules in the uee respecting the obligations of parties to negotiable
instruments. For example, the uee has special rules on when failure of consid-
eration is a defense. Although it generally is a defense against any person who is
not a holder in due course, it is not necessary for consideration to be given when

uee § 3-307(2}.
'40
"'uee § 3-307, comment 2.
142 Id.
'" rd.
'''uee § 3-307(3).
1'5 uee § 3.306.
,.. uee § 3-306, comment 2. Thus, equitable claims that might give rise to a right to
rescind a transaction and recover the instrument or its proceeds would be viewed as a
claim under this section. rd.
16-31 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE ~ 16.04

the instrument is taken in payment ofor as security for an antecedent obligation,

'. .
l.e., . dbt'47
a pnor e .
A person who does not have the status of a holder in due course takes the
instnlment subject to "an defenses of any party which would be available in an
action on a simple contract. "'41 The defenses available against one not a holder
in due course may include setoff. In one case, the maker of a note had a claim
against her husband under an indemnity agreement entered into with him
during a divorce. The note was payable to the husband's company, which the
court treated as being an alter ego ofthe husband for purposes of the rights and
liabilities with respect to the instrument. The company negotiated the note after
maturity to the holder. Because the maker could have set off her unrelated
claims based on the indemnity agreement against her obligation on the note if
payment had been demanded by her husband or the company (the payee), she
was entitled to setoffagainst the holder not in due course as long as those claims
arose prior to either notice ofthe transfer ofthe note or its actual negotiation to
the holder. '41

1116.04 THE SHELTER PRINCIPLE-ACQUIRING TIlE

RIGHTS OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE BY
TRANSFER
When a check, note, or other negotiable instrument is transferred, the
transferee acquires all the rights that the transferor had in the instrument.'so The
transferee obtains these rights even when the transfer does not qualify as a
negotiation. '5' Therefore, when a check that is payable to the order of a named
person is transferred by the payee to another party without indorsement, the
party who acquires the check also acquires all the rights ofthe payee to enforce it
even though the transfer does not constitute a negotiation.
When the transferor of the instrument is a holder in due course, the trans-
feror's rights as a holder in due course are transferred. This is known as the
shelter principle.'"2 The UCC adopts this approach to assure the holder in due
course a market for the paper that the person acquires.'u There is a limitation to
this principle, however. A transferee who has been a party to any fraud or

'47 vee § 3.408.

,.. VCC § 3.306(b).
'4' Barrett v. Odom, Mays, & DeBuys, 453 So. 2d 729, 732-734 (Ala. 1984). A holder
also took subject to setoff rights in Contrail Leasing Panners, Ltd. v. Executive Serv.
Corp., 100 Nev. 545, 688 P2d 765, 768 (1984).
'sovcc § 3·201.
10' See vee § 3.201(3).
102 rd.
103 rd.
, 16.04 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-32

illegality or who was a previous holder with notice of a defense or claim cannot
use the shelter rule to acquire the rights of a holder in due course. These rules
were applied in Rozen v. North Carolina National Bank, '14 to fmd that a trans-
feree was not entitled to claim the rights tbat a previous holder ofthe instrument
could have asserted. In this case Rozen. the transferee, sought to enforce a
negotiable certificate ofdeposit. The bank that issued the certificate dishonored
it because of a claimed right to set off a debt owed by the original holder of the
certificate. Rozen could not be a holder in due course in his own right because he
know the certificate had been dishonored when he bought it; therefore, he argued
that he succeeded to the holder in due course rights of his transferor, Manufac-
turers Hanover.'" Rozen received the certificate ofdeposit from Manufacturers
Hanover, who had acquired the certificate as part collateral for a loan. The coun
rested its conclusion on alternative arounds. Firstly, it said that Manufacturers
Hanoverw8.'" not Rozen's assignor, because Manufacturers Hanover was not the
owner of the certificate-it only was a pledgee without the right to transfer the
collateral. Secondly, the court held that the debt owed to Manufacturers Hano-
ver for which the certificate was pledged had been paid and therefore any
interest Manufacturers had in the certificate was terminated.
The shelter principle, which gives a transferee the rights of the transferor, is
a rule that allows the transferee to "step into the shoes of' the transferor. It does
not make the transferee a "holder" in the transferee's own right. If it did, the
rules on negotiation would be undermined. Consider a check drawn payable to
the order ofP, which is issued to P. P then is a holder because P is in possession of
an instrument issued to P.'SI When P transfers the instrument to T without
indorsing it, there has been a transfer but not a negotiation. 1ST Consequently,
when T transfers the check to X, whether or not T indorses the check, X cannot
be a holder as long as the indorsement of P is missing. Absent agreement to the
contrary, as long as the transfer from Pto Tis for value, Thas the right to obtain
the indorsement of P, and when the indorsement is obtained, T becomes the
holder of the instrument. Similarly, when Ttransfers the check to X, X may have
the right to obtain the indorsement of T. Because X also succeeds to all of r's
rights in the instrument, X may also acquire the right that T has to obtain the
indorsement of P. When X gets the indorsements of both P and T, Xbecomes a
holder with all the rights of a holder. ' " Until T or X becomes a holder, even

154
588 F2d 83 (4th Cir. 1978).
155 Rozen also was closely connected to one ofthe original panies in the transaction.
Allen Stein. Stein succeeded to ownership of the corporation that originally held the
cenificate and that was indebted to the issuing bank. Stein could not qualify as a holder in
due course because ofhis role in these transactions. Stein engineered the assignment ofthe
certificate to Rozen, who also happened to be Stein's brother-in-law.
'" VCC § 3-202. See vce § 1-201(20).
"7 UCC § 3·202. see discussion of negotiation in Chapter I~ .
..IVCC § 3-201(3).
16-33 HOLDERS IN DUE eOURSE 1116.05

though each may have taken the instrument in good faith, without notice of a
claim or defense or that the instrument is overdue, and for value, neither can
qualify as a holder in due course in his own right. This is true even though P may
have been a holder. Although vee § 3-201 gives T and X the rights ofPwho is a
holder, it does not make either T or X a holder. lSI

1116.05 DEFENSES TO THE INSTRUMENT BASED UPON

SEPARATE CONDmONS OR AGREEMENTS
An area of great confusion is the extent to which a party may impose
conditions upon the obligation the party undertakes as a signer of a negotiable
instrument based upon a separate agreement with the person to whom the
instrument is given. A number of interrelated vee provisions must be
considered.
A holderin due course is not bound by any separate agreement ofwhich the
holder does not have notice. ,.. Although a holder in due course has notice that an
instrument was taken as part ofa separate agreement or under circumstances in
which a promise was made which is still executory or unperformed, the holder in
due course is not regarded as having notice that a defense or claim exists as a
result of those circumstances alone.'" In order to have notice that disqualifies
the holder from being a holder in due course, the holder must have notice ofthe
actual existence of a defense or claim, such as a default in any promise or
agreement relating to the instrument."~It is possible for a holder in due course to
obtain notice of such a defense by examining the terms of a separate written
agreement, as in the case in which the separate writing states that the instrument
"is a sham and cannot be enforced...."'13 Regardless ofthe existence ofnotice, a
separate written agreement does not destroy the negotiability of an instrument
that otherwise meets the requirements for negotiability.'"
One ·who is not a holder in due course may be affected by a separate
agreement. Two separate uee provisions support this result. Firstly, vee § 3-
119(1) permits an instrument's terms to be "modified or affected" by a separate
"written agreement executed as a part of the same transaction" determining the
rights between "the obligor and his immediate obligee or any transferee.... "'15

tSi To the extent there is any contrary implication in Bowling Green, Inc. v. State
Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F2d 81 (I st Cir. 1970), it is submitted such suggestion does
vee
not reflect the policies of the on transfer and necotiation.
'IOvec §§ 3-119(1), 3-305(2).
uec
,11 § 3-304(4)(b).
vee
'12 § 3-304, comment 9.
'13 vce § 3·119, comment 4.
,..vce § 3-119(2).
lSI VCC § 3-119(1}.
'1116.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-34

Secondly, uec § 3-306(c) on the rights ofone who is not a holder in due coune
makes clear that a person who lacks holder-in-due-course rights takes an instru-
ment subject to the defenses of "want or failure of consideration, nonperform-
ance of any condition precedent, nondelivery or delivery for a special
purpose Both ofthese sections establish a general rule that one who is not
a holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument subject to conditions or
other agreements validly entered into that limit or condition the obligation
undertaken by parties to an instrument.
The availability ofa defense based upon a separate agreement or condition
is made more complex by considerations of when it is appropriate to use parol
evidence to prove the existence of such a condition or agreement. vee
§ 3·119
refers only to separate written agreements. vee§ 3-306 is not so limited,
however. The comments to the vce indicate that Article 3 should not be read as
stating general rules "as to when an instrument may be varied or affected by
parol evidence" except for certain specific rules of construction adopted by the
vec to avoid ambiguity as to the terms of an instrument. 1tT Section 3·306,
which makes the defenses of failure of consideration, nondelivery, or delivery
for a special purpose available against one who is not a holder in due coune, is
silent in both its text and the official comments as to the use of parol evidence to
establish such defenses. As between the immediate parties, some courts have
permitted the use of parol evidence to show nonperformance of a condition
precedent, lack of consideration, or other defenses to the instrument. Parol
evidence has been allowed to show that the negotiable instrument is only part of
an entire oral contract between the parties and does not represent the parties'
complete agreement. ,.. Courts also have enforced between the immediate par-
ties conditions imposed on when a check could be presented for payment.,11 On
the other hand numerous cases express reluctance to allow parties to contradict
their obligations as parties to negotiable instruments that on their face are
absolute and unconditiona1. 17O When the terms of the instrument are ambiguous,

," VCC § 3·306(c).

"'vcc § 3-119. comment I. § 3·118 & comment I.
III Scafidi v. Johnson, 420 So. 2d 1] 13, 1115 (La. 1982). See also Gulf States Fin.
Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591, 593, 181 So. 2d 36, 38 (1965). In Participat-
ing Palts Assocs., Inc...... Pylant, 460 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (Ala. Ct. App. 1984), the COUlt
enfol'Ced an agreement between the panies that the delivery of a check was conditional.
"'Engelcke v. Stoehsler, 273 Or. 937,940,544 P2d 582, 585 (I 975)(cbeck condi·
tioned on obtaining evidence of an insurance payment). See generally the discussion in H.
Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks 11 5.6 (6th ed. 1987). which reviews the case law on
conditional delivery.
". For a aood general discussion ofthe application of parol evidence to commercial
paper, see C. Weber and R. Speidel. Commel'Cial Paper 88-98 (3d cd. '1982). In Brooks v.
McCorkle, 174 Ga. App. 132-133, 329 SE2d 214-215, (1985), the coun refused to pennit
the introduction of parol evidence to show that the lenns of a promissory note were
modified by oral conditions lhat were part of a larger transaction.
16-35 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.06

use of parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity serves a more traditional

f1l,nction. tTl

1116.06 PRESERVATION OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES IN

CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS

Significant limitations exist to preclude application ofholder in due course

rules in consumer credit transactions as the result ofaction by the Federal Trade

When an individual indorsed a check, she became liable as an indorser and could not
claim that her indorsement was intended to be merely an assignment of her rights to the
instrument, according to the ruling in another case. She claimed it was an assignment of
her rights in the instrument to her husband because the assignment was provided for in a
separation agreement that she had entered into with her husband. The court held that
since she had not indorsed the check in a manner that indicated the recourse against her
was limited, her liability was as an indorser and there was a negotiation ofthe instrument,
not merely an assignment. The coun recognized that UCC § 3-119(1) pennits the terms of
an instrument to be affected by other written agreements executed by the obligor and her
immediate obligee, but the coun declined to apply this section for reasons that were
unclear. When the makers ofthe note refused to pay it. and dishonored the instrument, the
husband sued his former wife on her indorsement and recovery was allowed. Alves v.
Baldaia, 14 Ohio App. 3d 187, 190-191,470 NE2d 459,462-463 (1984).
In another case, Nelson executed a guaranty contract for a debt that was owed by a
corporation in which he had an interest. He claimed that he was not liable under the
guaranty because the consideration for giving the guaranty was that the corporate obliga-
tion would be restructured by the lender, which had not been done. The coun rejected the
argument. It held that when a guaranty is given that is absolute on its face, it is an
unconditional promise to pay that does not depend upon an)' condition. Moreover, parol
evidence would not be admissible to contradict the language in the agreement that it was
an unconditional promise to pay. Although the court's analysis indicated that the guar-
anty was given as security for an antecedent debt, no consideration is required when an
instrument or obligation is given as security for an antecedent obligation. American
Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F2d 1365 (II th Cir. 1984); UCC § 3-
408. The same conclusion was reached in International Minerals & Chern. Corp. v.
Matthews, 71 NC App. 209, 321 SE2d 545 (1984), review denied, 313 NC 330, 327 SE2d
890 (1985). See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Cooper, SO AD2d 518,375 NYS2d 118
(1975); Trustees of Tufts College v. Parlane Sportswear Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 783, 342
NE2d 727 (1976). The following cases did not permit the use ofpar01 evidence to vary the
terms ofnotes which appeared on their face to be complete and unconditional. Trustees of
Tufts College v. Parlane Sportswear Co., 4 MaS\. App. Ct. 78:>, 342 NE2d 727-72%(1976)',
Texas Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 SW2d 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
", In Banker's Credit Serv., Inc. v. Dorsch, 231 Va. 273-275,343 SE2d 339, 340-341
(1986), the court allowed parol evidence. The defendant signed a note but added "without
recourse per uec § 3-413(2)." The court regarded the language as ambiguous because
UCC § 3-413(2) uses the tenn "without recourse" only in the context of referring to a
draft. The defendant was entitled to introduce correspondence showing that his liability
was not personal but was limited to the land securing the note.
, 16.06 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-36

Commission. Before examining the FTC rule, it is useful to review how the
holder in due course doctrine worts in consumer transactions. When a con·
sumer signs a negotiable note as part of a credit or purchase transaction, the
transfer ofthe note to a person who qualifies as aholder in due course results in
the consumer's being obligated to pay the note notwithstanding any legal claim
the consumer may have had against the party to whom the note was originally
given if the consumer's claim does not rise to the level ofa "real defense," which
is good even against a holder in due course. l12 For example, suppose a consumer
who purchases an automobile from a used car dealer pays for the car in part by
signing a negotiable promissory note. The dealer then discounts this note to a
fmance company. If the car is worthless, the consumer has a claim against the
dealer for breach of warranty. In some cases, the consumer might even have a
right to return the car and demand a refund. If the dealer sues the consumerfor
the purchase price,. the consumer can set off against the dealer's claim the
damages caused by dealer'S breach of warranty. However, none of these rights
can be exercised against the fmance company to which the note was transferred
ifthe finance company Qualifies as a holder in due course. 17S A comparable result
follows when the consumer signs a purchase agreement with the dealer that
contains a clause providing that upon the assignment of the contract the con·
sumer waives any defenses or claims which might be asserted against the original
seller.
Because of the harsh results these rules have produced for consumers who
generally were not in any position to bargain over the loss of these rights, there
are now broad restrictions on the applicability of holder in due course and
waiver of defense provisions in consumer transactions. Even before the enact-
ment of special statutes dealing with this problem, courts were sensitive to
protect consumers from these results. A leading case is Unico \I, Owen,114 in
which the court held that an assignee ofa note and sales agreement did not have
holder-in-due-course status because the assignee was closely connected to the
seller of the goods.• 75 Today, many special consumer credit protection statutes
deny holder-in-due-course status or comparable·rights to creditors in consumer

112 See discussion supra ~ 16.02.

173 VCC § 3-305. See supra 116.02. See llenerally Geva, "Optimality and Preservation
of Consumer Defenses-A Model for Reform," 31 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 51 (1980).
174 50 NJ 101,232 A2d 405 (1967).

115 For a general discussion oflhese problems, see Countryman, "The Holder In Due

Course and Other Anachronisms in Consumer Credit," 52 Tex. 'L Rev. I (1973); Kripke,
"Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-0riented Viewpoint," 68 Colum. L. Rev. 445
(1968); Rohner, "Holderin Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or
Reformation?" 60 Cornell L. Rev. 503 (1975); Rosenthal. "Negotiability-Who Needs
It?" 71 Colum. L. Rev. 375 (1971); Note, "Consumer Protection-The Role of CutofT
Devices in Consumer Financing," 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 50S.
16-37 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 1116.06(1)

transactions. III Without doubt, however, the most far-reaching changes to the
holder in due course doctrine.were accomplished by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. It has promulgated rules that effectively nullify the holder-in-due-course
status of most consumer credit transactions. These rules are discussed in the
following sections of this chapter. 177

(I] Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status by FTC

The FTC rule on preservation of consumers' claims and defenses is simple
in operation. 17I Any person who sells or leases goods or services to consumers
must be sure that any consumer credit contract executed by the consumer in
connection with the transaction contains a notice prescribed by the FTC.171 Any
consumer credit contract taken by the seller must contain the following:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-
JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS
H;EREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
When the seller accepts in payment the proceeds of any purchase money loan,
the consumer credit contract must contain this notice:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-
JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERYHEREUN-
DER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY
THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.

The effect of placing this legend on the instrument is to incorporate this provi·
sion into the terms of the instrument. As a result, if the instrument otherwise
would have been negotiable, the notice destroys negotiability because it makes

171 See, e.g., Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.307. See generally, Lawrence &
Minan, "The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine on the Commer-
cialization ofInnovative Consumer Products," 64 BUL Rev. 325 (1984).
177 The authority ofthe FTC to engage in this regulation is controversial. See I. White
& R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 14-8 (2d ed. I980); Annot., "Validity, in
Contract for Installment Sale of Consumer Goods, or Commercial Paper Given in Con-
nection Therewith, or Provision Waiving, as Against Assignee, Defenses Good Against
Seller," 39 ALR3d 518 (1971).
171 16 CFR § 433 (1988).
171 16 CFR § 433.2 (1988).
~ 16.06(1] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16·38

I.
payment conditional upon the absence of a claim of defense. It also nullifies
any clause contaihed in the agreement that purports to waive the consumer's
defenses and claims against the seller. Thus, without directly ohallengina the
validity of state law, the FTC bas effectively nullified it by requii'ina use of a
notice that, under general contract principles and the UCC, operates to destroy
holder-in-due-course status. 111

(2) Transactions Conred by FTC Rule

For the FTC rule to apply, the transactions must involve a consumer who is
acquirini aoads or services for personal, family, or household use. 182 Any such
transaction in which a "consumer credit contract" is used imposes obligations
upon the seller to make sure that the contract contains the notice. A consumer
credit contract is defined, inclusively, as "any instrument which evidences or
embodies a debt" arising from a purchase money loan transaction or a financed
sale. lIS

[a) Financed Sale and Purchase Money Loan. A financed sale is simply the
extension of credit to a consumer in a way that comes within tbe defmition of a
credit sale under the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z.1M When a seller of
goods or services does business on credit, taking a consumer credit contract as
part ofthe transaction, this constitutes a financed sale.
A purchase money loan, on the other hand, is "a cash advance which is
received by a consumer" in return for a finance charge as defined in the Truth-
in-Lending Act and Regulation Z. It must be used to purchase goods or services
from a seller who refen consumers to the creditor making the advance or who is
affiliated with the credit "by common control, contract, or business arrange-
ment. ".'II Thus. the purchase money loan involves an advance by a third-party
creditor to a consumer who uses the proceeds to make a purchase of goods or
services from the seller. The consumer credit contract-is executed by the con-
sumer and the creditor, but the seller has an obligation to make sure the contract
contains the required notice. This follows from the provision in the regulation
that prohibits the seller from accepting as payment for any consumer sale or

I·UCC §§ 3-l04(1)(b), 3-l05(2).

II, For the reflection of a similar policy to preserve consumer rights in the regulations
applicable to the federally insured student Joan program, see United States v. Griffin, 707
F2d 1477 (DC Cir. 1983).
112 16 CFR § 433.I(b) (1988).
113 16 CFR § 433.l(i) (1988).

•" 16 CFR § 433.I(e) (1988).

"' 16 CFR § 433.I(d) (1988).
16-39 HOlDERS IN DUE COURSE 11 16.06[2J[b1

lease the proceeds ofa purchase money loan unless the consumer credit contract
contains the required notice. ,M
The provisions of the rule, thus. cover arrangements between sellers and
creditors where there is an extensive degree of cooperation in providing fmanc-
ing for the goods or services sold or leased by the seller. Under the terms of the
regulation, the affiliatibn between seller and creditor need only be "by common
control, contract, or business arrangement. "117 The contract can be oral or
written, formal or informal, so long as it contemplates "cooperative or concerted
activity" between the seller and the creditor in providing financing.'11

[b) Impact of FIe Rule. The obligation to comply with the FTC rule by placing
the appropriate notice on the consumer credit contract applies only to sellers. A
seUer is any individual, corporation, or other business organization "who, in the
ordinary course of business, sells or leases goods or services to consumers."'I.
Creditors have no duty to see that the notice appears on the contract.'·
Although the rule's effect on creditors is indirect, it is still substantial. Any
creditor who engages in discounting paper that arises from consumer transac-
tions will be deprived of holder-in-due-course status as a result of the notice on
the paper. Moreover, in most cases, the creditor will know that the paper it is
discounting resulted from a consumer transaction just from the nature of the
business of the assignor of the paper, regardless of whether the seUer in fact
properly put the notice on the paper. In such a case, it is probable that the
creditor would be held to know that the FTC notice was required on the paper,
and so the creditor may be viewed as lacking the good faith needed to be a holder
in due course even when the legend is missing. II'
Ifa creditor takes consumer paper governed by the FTC notice, any defense
the consumer might have against the seller of the goods or services can also be
asserted as a defense to payment to the creditor, assuming that the consumer has

16
' 16 CFR § 433.2(b) (1988).
117
16 CFR § 433.1(d) (1988).
'" 16 CFR § 433.1 (I) (1988).
"" 16 CFR § 433.I(a), (j) (1988).
,.°40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (1975). But the authority of the Federal Trade Commission
does not extend to banks. See 15 USC § 45(a)(2) (1982). At an earlier time, the FTC
proposed extending the rule to creditors t!trough an amendment which would have made
it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller "or a creditor" to take a consumer
credit contract in violation of the rule. After receiving additional information in 1977, 42
Fed. Reg. 52439 (1977), publishing a repen, and requesting funher public comment, 43
Fed. Reg. 54950 (1978), Ihe Commission approved the amendment in substance, 44 Fed.
Reg. 65771 (1979), but it was never put into effeci.
,., UCC § 3·302. See generally, 1. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code,
a11143; Note, "The FTC's Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consumer
Security or Consumer Fraud?" II Val. UL Rev. 263 (1977).
t 16.06[2Jlc) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-40

a valid defense against the seller ariling from breach of warranty or other breach
of contract. It is important to note that the FTC notice also makes the creditor
subject to claims the consumer has against the seller. This provision may require
a creditor to refund amounts to the consumer that the consumer has paid under
the contract. The notice limits the extent ofany claim that the debtor can assert
against the creditor to "amounts paid by the debtor" under the contract.
Although it is not clear from the language, this limitation could include amounts
paid by the consumer under the contract to persons other than the creditor-for
example, payments made to the seUer before the conttllCt was auir,ned and,
perhaps, depending upon the wording of the contract, down payments made to
the seller.

lcl Case Examples. The case law dealing with the FTC rule is not extensive.
Several cases have considered what effect to give the notice when it is contained
in a contract that is not a consumer contract. In InternJJtional Harvester Credit
Corp. v. HiIl,'t2 the court held that the holder ofa commercial contract could be a
holder in due course even though the document contained the FTC notice. In
this case, the notice said it applied only if it was a consumer contract. A Florida
appellate court reached a similar result in First New England Financial Corp. v.
Woffard, m in which the notice said it did not apply if the amount financed
exceeded $25,000 or the transaction was for commercial purposes. In Jefferson
Bank & Trust Co. v. Stamatiou, 1.. on the other hand, the court denied holder-in-
due-eourse status because the FTC notice was in the contract, even though the
purchase was for a commercial use. The court took the straightforward approach
that the parties could govern their relationship by their contract and had done so
by including the FTC notice.
When the Ftc notice should have been used in a transaction, but the
contract does not include it, one court has ruled that the holder may become a
holder in due course. '15 1n the court's view, the FTC might penalize the seller for
violating its rule, but the violation did not affect the holder's status as a holder in
due course. The case did not involve facts in which the bank that held the
contract had been found to be a regular financer of the seller who should have
known the paper needed the FTC notice.
When the consumer credit contract is transferred, the holder takes the
contract as ifit were in the hands of the transferor. subject to all the claims and
defenses that the obligor had against the transferor. The FTC notice does not
create any new claims or defenses, but simply puts the holder of the contract in

1ft 496 F. 5upp. 329. 332-333 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).

113 421 So. 2d 590. 593-594 (Fla. DisL Cl. App. 1982).
,.. 384 So. 2d 388. 391 (La. 1980).
'I$Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey. 393 So. 2d 668-669 (la. 1980).
16-41 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 1116.0612)[cl

the shoes of the seller ofthe goods. lfthe buyer has a defense against the seller, it
will be good against the holder.'"
. An interesting issue was presented in Provident Bank v.· Barnhart,'t7 in
which the buyer purchased a car from the seller usina a consumer credit contract
with the FTC notice. Ten months later. because ofcomplaints over defects in the
car. the buyer and seller settled their dispute over the seller's warranty liability
by letting the buyer trade in the original car on a new vehicle,. obtaining a
cancellation of the old indebtedness and entering into a new fmancing agree-
ment for the new car. The seller failed to pay the plaintiff bank to whom the
original contract had been assigned and became insolvent. When the plaintiff
bank sued on the original consumer credit contract. the trial court gave the bank
summary judgment. The appellate court ruled summary judgment was in error.
There was a material question offact as to whether the acquisition ofthe new car
was a settlement of the buyer's warranty claims or was merely the purchase ofa
new car. lfthe latter. the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. lfthe transaction
were a warranty settlement, the settlement would be a defense against the
plaintiff. The court did not explore whether the settlement between the buyer
and the seller could be conclusive of the existence of a defense against the
plaintiff, nor did the court consider whether the seller could create a defense or
claim for the buyer by conduct after the transfer of the consumer credit contract
that would be effective against the bank because of the FTC notice. '" Ofcourse,
if the buyer does not have a defense against the seller because of an effective
waiver in the original sales agreement, the assignee ofthe contract is also entitled
to the benefit of the waiver of the defense.'"

'" United States v. Griffin, 707 F2d 1477. 1482 (DC Cir. 1983) (student loan;
defenses against school lender good against government to whom loan transferred);
Tinkerv. De Maria PorscheAudi,Inc., 459 So. 2d 487, 492493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
review denied, 471 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1985) (return ofverdict against seller for fraud required
setting aside as inconsistent a verdict for the financer for the balance owed on the
contract); First Homestead Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Boudreaux, 450 So. 2d 995, 996 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (arbitration clause in home improvement contract effective against
financer); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Johnson, 426 So. 2d 691, 695 (La. Ct.
App. 1982), cen. denied, 433 So. 2d 151 (La. 1983) (defense against seller of redhibitory
defects available against seller's financer); Dartmouth Plan, Inc. v. Valle, 117 Misc. 2d
534-535, 458 NYS2d 848-849 (1983) (finance company could not enforce contract
assigned by an unlicensed contractor because state law forbade the contractor from
recovering); State v. Excel Management Servs., Inc., III Wis. 2d 479. 484485, 331
NW2d 312, 316-317 (1983) (seller's violations of consumer credit code prohibitions
IIsains\ bait and switch tactics and misrepresentation constituted a defense that buyer
could assert against the assignee of the contracts).
117 3 Ohio App. 3d 316, 445 NE2d 746 (1982).

'II For a discussion of the general law on modifications by the obligor and assignor of
contracts that have been assigned, see UCC § 9-318(2) and ~ 22.07[ I]. .
'" Xerographic Supplies Corp. v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 386 So. 2d 299.
300 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 1980) (buyer's waiver ofcertain warranties in the sales agreement
1116.06(3J NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16·42

Some cases have presented situations in which the buyer, who was obligated
on the consumer credit contract, was entitled to protection under state law as
wellaa the protection flowing from the FTC notice. The CUC$ have given tile
consumer-buyers the benefit of such protection.- In Cooper v. Repuhlicbank
Garland, the FTC notice and the state law on limitations ofactions combined to
allow tbe buyer to raise the seller's breach of warranties as a defense to an action
by the bank to collect the unpaid balance on the buyer's contract, even though
the statute of limitations barred the buyer from afilrmatively recovering from
the seller. til,

(3] Preservation of Claims and Defenses Under the Uniform Consumer

Credit Code
The pervasiveness of the FTC holder in due course rule makes much state
legislation on this subject moot. The FTC rule, of course, does not purport to
override any loca1law on the subject Thus,locaIlaws may provide additional
rights and duties. Also. they may reach transactions not covered by the FTC rule.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) is a comprehensive attempt to
deal with this subject. Drafted prior to the FTC rule, many ofthe purposes of the
UCCC provisions have now been satisfied by the FTC rule. Nevertheless, tile
UCCC deserves consideration because of its attempt to deal comprehensively
with the holder in due course problem.
The UCCC is the first attempt by a uniform law to eliminate the holder in
due course. The first draft of the UCCC (1968 act) was promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968. The
1968 act was adopted by eight states."02 The current version ofthe act, which was
promulgated in 1974. varies substantially from the 1968 act.
The purpose of the UCCC is to abolish the holder in due course doctrine in
consumer transactions.2OI The 1974 act contains four provisions that pertain to

was enforceable by the assignee ofthe contract). For a discussion of the law relatina to the
assignment of accounts, see UCC § 9·318(2) and 1 22.07[ I].
200 Saporita v. Delco Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 527.530,428 NYS2d 58 1,584 (J 980)(extra
recovery under state law could be obtained) (dicta); De UI Fuente v. Homes Sav. Ass'n,
669 SW2d 137, 142, 146 (Tex. Ct. App. I 984) (failure to give notice under state credit
code: ofsubseque:nt neaotiation of the buyer's note created liability for attorney's fees and
other damaaes), See generally. Sovern, "Paradigm and Paradox in New York Consumer
Credit Law: After Holder in Due Counc," 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L 119 (1981).
201
696 SW2d 629. 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
202 See Hadak & Caner, "The Erosion ofthe Holder in Due Course Doctrine: Histori·
cal Perspective and Development," 9 UCCU 165 (1976). See also Notes, "Regulation Z
and the UCCC: The Bewildering Maze of Credit Disclosure Provisions," 1979 BYUL
Rev. 394; "Consumer Defenses and Financers as Holders in Due Course," 4 Conn. L.
Rev. 83 (J 97 I).
mUCCC § 3.301, comment (1974).
16-43 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE 1f 16.06(3)lb)

negotiability and the consumer: Section 3.307 deals with the holder in due
course; Section 3.403 pertains to credit card transactions; Section 3.404 is
concerned with the waiver of defenses clause; and Section 3.405 treats direct
loans.

(a) Section 3.307: Use of Negotiable Instruments. Section 3.307 prohibits use
of negotiable instruments for credit in consumer transactions:

With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease (except a sale or

lease primarily for an agricultural purpose], the creditor may not take a
negotiable instrument other than a check dated not later than ten days after
its issuance as evidence of the obligation of the consumer. 204

lb) Section 3.403: Credit Card Transactions. Section 3.403 extends the policy
reflected in Section 3.307 against holder in due course rights to credit card
transactions. It has two parts. Firstly, it subjeetil the issuer ofa credit card to all
the defenses and claims the cardholder may have against the original seller or
lessor if the seller or lessor is "licensed, franchised, or permitted by the card
issuer to do business under the trade name or designation ofthe card issuer or
person related to the card issu~r."1OI This makes the card issuer who, like oil
companies or retail stores, permits others to sell products under the card issuer's
name or trademark, subject to all claims and defenses of its cardholders that
arise from the sale or lease of property or services by those authorized to do
business. The liability extends "to the extent of the original amount owing" to
the card issuer for the transaction related to the claim or defense. 2OI Secondly,
whether there is a relationship between the card issuer and the business that sold
the goods, the credit card issuer will be subject to "all claims and defenses of a
cardholder against the seller or lessor arising from the sale or lease ofproperty or
services pursuant to the credit card" ifcertain criteria are met. 207 These criteria
are (l) the original amount owing to the card issuer with respect to the transac-
tion in dispute must exceed fifty dollars, (2) the residence ofthe cardholder must
be within 100 miles ofwbere the transaction occurred or within the same state;2D1
and (3) the cardholder must make a good-faith attempt to obtain satisfaction
from the seller. tot The credit card issuer is liable only for the amount owing at the
time the issuer has notice of the claim or defense. Oral notice to the issuer is

204UCCC § 3.307 (1974). See UCCC§ § 1.301(12), I.30l( 14)(1974)(consumercredit

sale and consumer lease defined).
205UCCC § 3.403(2) (1974).
2OIId.
207 UCCC § 3.403(3) (1974).
:lOI The phrase "in the same state" is optional.

2O'UCCC § 1.11 0(2)( I974)(good faith defined).

11 16.06(3)[cl NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 16-44

effective unless the issuer requests written confl1'1l1ation and the buyer fails to
give such written confl1'1l1ation within the time required. The card issuer must
give-the cardholder at least fourteen days for the written confl1'1l1ation. The
cardholder can give notice of the claim or defense before attempting good faith
settlement with the seller. Any agreement made between the cardholder and the
card issuer to disclaim any ofthe provisions ofSection 3.403 is unenforceable. 2lG

[cl Section 3.4414: WaJver of Defense Clauses. SectioD 3.404 eliminates the
effect of a waiver of defenses clause, making all assignees in consumer credit
sales or consumer leases subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer
arising from the transaction. Section 3.404 also provides that even ifthe assignee
has taken a negotiable instrument in violation of Section 3.307, such person is
still subject to any claims and defenses the consumer as buyer or lessee may have
&pinst the seller or lessor. The assignee is liable only for tbe amount outstanding
at the time the consumer gives notice to the assignee of the defenses or claims
against the original seller or lessor. There are requirements similar to those
discussed for Section 3.403 of good faith efforts at settlement and giving notice
of the claim or defense, as well as a similar prohibition against waiver of the
consumer's rights.

[d] Section 3.405: Availability of Claims and Defenses Against Lender. Sec-
tion 3.40S subjects a lender, other than the issuer of a credit card, to all claims
and defenses ofa consumer against a seller or lessor with respect to the purchase
or lease of property when the lender has made a consumer loan "to enable" the
consumer to enter into the sale or lease transaction. When the criteria of this
section are met, tbe lender will be subject to all the claims and defenses the
consumer has against the particular seller or lessor with respect to the property
or services in question. 2I1 For this liability to arise, a relationship must exist
between the lender and the seller or lessor. The act specifies six ways in which the
required relationship may be shown.

(a) The lender knows that the seller or lessor arranged for the extension
of credit by the lender for a commission, brokerage, or referral fee;
(b) the lender is a person related to the seller or lessor, unless the
relationship is remote or is not a factor in the transaction;
(c) The seller or lessor guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the
risk of loss by the lender upon the loan;
(d) The lender directly supplies the seller or lessor with the contract
document used by the consumer to evidence the loan, and the seller or

a'o Compare the federal rules on credit cards discussed in Chapter 18.
au UCCC § 3.405(1)(1974}.
16-45 HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE , 16.06(4]

lessor has knowledge ofthe credit terms and participates in preparation of

the document;
(e) The loan is conditioned upon the consumer's purchase or lease of
the property or services from the particular seller or lessor, but the
lender's payment ofprocceds ofthe loan to the seUer or lessor docs not in
itself establish that the loan was so conditioned; or
(f) The lender, before he makes the consumer loan, has knowledge or,
from his course ofdealing with a particular seUer or lessor or his records,
notice of substantial complaints by other buyers or lessees of the particu-
lar seller's or lessor's failure or refusal to perform his contracts with them
and of the particular seller's or lessor's failure to remedy his defaults
within a reasonable time after notice to him of the complaints. au
As in the previous provisions, the consumer must make a good faith attempt to
settle and may hold the lender only to the cxtent of the amount owing to the
lender at the time the lender obtains notice of the claim or defense. The proce-
dures for giving notice are similar. The vee prohibits waivers of a consumer's
rights under this section. 2's There also is a procedure for determining what the
amount owing to the lender is when the loan represents the consolidation of two
or more loans or represents an open-end credit account.21<
The ueee provisions abolishing the holder in due course doctrine with
respect to various consumer transactions have been influential in other legisla-
lion. Although the number ofstates that have adopted the uecc is limited, and
the states that have adopted the provisions have often incorporated nonuniform
amendments and variations, the policies reflected in the UCCC on the holder in
due course rules have gained widespread acceptance. The federal rule on claims
and defenses in credit card transactions is patterned in great part after the
UCCC. The federal credit card rule is discussed in Chapter 18.

[4] Otber'State and Federal Restrictions on Holder in Due Course

Rights
There are many specialized consumer protection statutes. They are by no
means uniform and, instead, vary greatly in the degree ofprotection afforded the
consumer. Some states' statutes are limited to specific consumer transactions,
such as home solicitation sales or other special transactions. A few states have
special laws that abolish or sharply restrict the holder in due course doctrine. In
view of the great variety of these statutes, banks should consult local counsel as
to the possible existence of local laws affecting the rights of those who engage in
the business of discounting or rediscounting consumer paper.

212UCCC §§ 3.405(l)(a)-3.405(1)(f) (1974).

213UCCC §§ 3.405(2), 3.405(4) (1974).
21<UCCC § 3.405(3) (1974).
1116.06(4). NEGOTIABLE lNSTRUMENTS 16-46

There also are numerous federal consumer protection laws. Some of these
are discussed in Chapter 26. Consumers have a right under federa11aw to assert
claims and defenses in certain credit card transactions.III Also, an FTC rule tbat
applies to door·to-door sales makes it an unfair trade practice for a seller in a
door-to-door sale transaction to rail to give proper notice to the buyer that the
transaction can be canceled if the buyer acts within three business days. III The
FTC rule makes it an unfair trade practice to transfer any "note or other
evidence of indebtedness to a finance company or other third party" before
midnight of the fifth business day after the buyer signed the contract or pur-
chased the goods and services. lu

Z1I See discussions in Chapters 18 and 26.

·'"16 CFR § 429.1 (1988).
117 16 CFR § 429.I~h) (1988).
 17
Letters of Credit
, 17.01 Rights and Duties of Parties in Letter of Credit Transactions. . . • 17-1
(I] Scope of VCC Letter of Credit Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-4
[2] Form of Letters of Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-5
[3] Letters of Credit Are Not Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-7
[4) International Letters of Credit and the Uniform Customs ... 17-8
1117.02 Obligations of an Issuer of a Letter of Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-9
[1] Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17-9
[2] Issuer's Obligation to Pay the Beneficiary. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-11
{a] Indemnities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .. 17·12
{b] Relationship of Letter of Credit to the Underlying
Contract 17·14
[3] Standby Letters of Credit 17-17
117.03 Documentary Drafts. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17·19
(1] Bank's Duty to Present Draft and to Notify Customer of
Nonpayment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. t 7·21
[2] Bank's Responsibilities for the Documents and the Goods . .. 17-22
1117.04 Letters of Credit and Bankruptcy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17-24

1117.01 RIGHTS AND DUllES OF PARTIES IN LEITER OF

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
The letter of credit first developed in sales transactions, particularly inter-
national sales, in which the seller ofgoods sought assurance of payment from an
independent and reliable financial party before undertaking the expense and
risks of shipping goods to a buyer who was unknown and located at a distant
point. The usefulness of the letter of credit as a technique whereby commercial
parties could shift credit and payment risks to financial institutions that were
better equipped to assess credit risks, arrange for international payment through
reliable channels, and obtain security for credit extended led to the expansion of
the use of the letter ofcredit in other circumstances as well. As a result, the use of
the so-called standby letter ofcredit for all sorts of commercial transactions has
grown enormously. Regardless of the type of transaction, the basic underlying

17-1
 1117.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17·2

law governing the rights and obligations ofparties to a letter ofcredit transaction
. is the same.
A letter ofcredit is a written promise by the issuer ofthe credit to pay drafts
or other demands for payment that comply with the terms of the credit.' No
special form, other than that the credit must be in writing and signed by the
issuer, is necessary to make the letter ofcredit binding upon the issuer. I A letter
ofcredit may be issued by banks, individuals, or fmns and may be conditional or
unconditional, revocable or irrevocable. I The party issuing the letter ofcredit is
liable to the person who is entitled to payment under the terms of the credit.'
The letter of credit thus involves at least three parties: the issuer, who is
obligated to pay when the terms of the credit are satisfied; the customer, who
requested the issuance ofthe credit and who usually is using the credit to satisfy
an obligation to some third person related to a separate transaction; and tbe
beneficiary, who is entitled to payment under the terms of the credit and whose
right to payment is based upon some underlying business relationship with the
customer.·
Other parties may become a part of the letter of credit transaction. Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, the right to draw under a credit can be trans-
ferred or assigned when the credit is expressly designated as transferable or
assignable.' When the credit states that it is nontransferable or nonassignable,
the beneficiary may assign his or her right to the proceeds under the letter of
credit. In such case, the assignee, in effect, obtains a security interest in the letter
of credit.' Such an assignment of "proceeds" only does not transfer the right to
perform under the letter of credit or to obtain payment.'
The obligation of the issuer may be "confirmed" by another party. For
example, a New York bank might issue a letter ofcredit and a bank in California,
where the beneficiary is located, might confirm the credit of the New York bank

1 See uee § 5-1 03{1 )(a). The uce citations are to the West 1978 official text unless
noted othelWise. See also Annot., "What is a Letter of Credit Under uec §§ 5-102-5-
103," 44 ALR4th 172 (1986); Farrar & 1:andau; "Letters of Credit, It ·40 Bus. Law. 1177
(1985): Kozolchyk, "Is Present Letter of Credit Law Up To Its Task?", 8 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 285 (1986); Rosenblith. "ModifYina Letters of Credit: The Rules and the Reality,"
19 UCC U 245 (1987).
IUCC § 5-104.
IVCC §§ 5-103. 5-106.
• UCC § 5-114{ I). For a general discussion ofrights involved, see J. Dolan, 1be Law
of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits (1984); L. Sarna, Letters of Credit:
The Law and Current Practice (2d ed. 1986); J. White & R. Summers. Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 18 (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter White & Summers).
·VCC § 5·103. See also Harfield. "Who Does What to Whom: The Letter of Credit
Mechanism," 17 VCCU 291 (1985).
• VCC § 5.116(1).
'vcc § 5-116.
• See UCC§ 5·116, comment! 1-3.
17·3 LElTERS OF CREDIT OJ 17.01

so as to give the beneficiary the advantages ofbeing able to rely on the obligation
ofa local bank. When a bank confirms a credit, it becomes liable for payment of
the credit. The UCC provides that a confmning bank engages either that it will
itself honor the credit that has been issued or that the credit in fact will be
honored by the issuer.' The confirmation must be in writing and signed by the
confmning bank. '0 Confirmation of a credit is different from merely advising a
party that a credit has been issued. Mere notification of the issuance of a credit
will not make the bank liable to the beneficiary."
The letter of credit obviously is a useful commercial instrument for assuring
payment. It was first used extensively in international transactions in which
great distances separated the sellers and the buyers of goods and both parties
needed the assurance that could be obtained from a reliable bank that payment
would be forthcoming upon proper performance ofthe underlying contract. The
popularity of the letter ofcredit now extends to purely domestic transactions. A
bank may be asked to issue a letter of credit to assure the performance of its
customer under domestic sales contracts or other transactions. Letters of credit
have been used as substitutes for performance bonds, deposits, and guarantees
for the performance of other obligations.'t One such example is the so-called
standby letter ofcredit, which is issued by a bank to be drawn against only in the
event of a default in some underlying contract by the bank's customer.
The letter ofcredit is a direct obligation of the issuing bank to the benefici·
ary.'3 With limited exceptions, the issuer must honor demands for payments or
drafts drawn that comply with the terms of the credit regardless of whether the
underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary is properly per-
formed." This is because the letter of credit is designed to require payment by
the issuer on the basis of the documents presented to the issuer. The standard
definition ofa letter ofcredit in the UCC makes it clear that a credit is a letter of
credit when the issuer is a bank "if the credit requires a documentary draft or a
documentary demand for payment.""
The Vee deliberately makes the definition of what constitutes a letter of
credit within the scope of Article 5 of the uee depend upon the nature of the

·uee § 5·I03( IXi).

,ouee § 5.104.
11 uee § 5.\03(1)(d).

12 See generally White & Summers, supra note 4, at § 18.1.

13 uec §§ 5·103(I)(a), 5-114(1). See generally, Dolan, "Letters of Credit, Article S
Warranties, Fraud, and the Beneficiary's Certificate," 41 Bus. Law. 347 (1986).
"uee § 5·\14(1).
11 uce § 5·102(1)(a). Under the uec, credits conspicuously designated as letters of
credit are also trealed as letters of credit, thus permitting a flexible definition of the
instruments that will be subject to the vee rules. vec § 5·102(1)(c). It also applies when
the issuer is not a bank if lhe "credit requires that the draft or demand for payment be
accompanied by a document of title...." vec § 5.102(1)(b).
, 17.01(11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-4

issuer of the credit. When the issuer is a bank, the policy ofthe vee provision is
to treat an engagement to pay as a letter of credit "whenever the promise to
honor is conditioned on presentation of any piece of paper This follows
from the definitions used for "documentary draft" and "documentary demand
for payment."The vee defmes these as a draft or a demand "honor ofwhich is
conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents." In turn,
"document" is defmed as "any paper including document of title, security,
invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like."" Thus, the use of the term
"document" with respect to letters of credit is different from and much broader
than the definitions ofdocumentoftitle that are used in other articles to refer to
bills of lading, warebouse receipts, and the like, as well as from the use of the
term "document" in Article 9 on secured transactions, in which it is limited to
referring to documents of title. I '

[IJ Scope of VCC Letter of Credit Pro"isions

The VCC applies to some, not all, letter ofcredit transactions. International
transactions may be governed by other rules. II Even more important, New York,
which is the home jurisdiction for a large number of banks that issue letters of
credit, has added a provision to the VCC that states that the parties may by
agreement, course:of dealins, or u~trademake the Jetter ofcredit subject to
the Uniform Customs and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits
adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce rather than to the uee.:IO
Even when the uee applies, the VCC makes it clear tbat it does not purport to
codify all aspects of letters of credit. It takes tbe view tbat the law of letters of
credit is still developing. II In this situation, usage oftrade and the development
of business practices with respect to letters of credit will be important in cover-
ing tbe areas that are not specifically covered by the uec.u
The uec expressly provides as follows:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts oftetters of
credit as such rules or concepts·have developed prior to this act or may

II vee § 5-102. comment I.

ITvec § 5-I03(l)(b).
I'vce § 5-103. comment 2.
I' For further discussion on international transactions, see' 17.01(4].
10 The version of UCC § 5-102 adopted by New York, as well as Alabama, Ari~ona.
and Missouri, reads as follows: "V nless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a
letter ofcredit or a credit ifby its terms or by agreement, course ofdealinsor US8se oftrade
such letter of credit or credit is subject in whole or in part to the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the Thirteenth or any subsequent
Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce."
•• vee § 5-102, comment 2.
n See generally White & Summers, supra note 4, at § 18-3.
17-5 LEITERS OF CREDIT , 17.01(2)

hereafter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself
require, imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to a
situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this Article."

The comment to the section just quoted indicates that the drafters believed that
in some areas where the law was evolving, it would not be useful to attempt to
codify rules that might stultify further development of the letter of credit. The
drafters identified some ofthe important areas not covered by Article 5 as those
that "revolve around the question ofwhen documents in fact and in law do or do
not comply with the terms of the credit. "24 The drafters offer the following
advice in applying the article:

The rules embodied in the Article can be viewed as those expressing the
fundamental theories underlying letters ofcredit. For this reason the second
sentence of subsection (3) makes explicit the court's power to apply a
particular rule by analogy to cases not within its terms, or to refrain from
doing so. Under § 1-1 02( I) such application is to follow the canon ofliberal
interpretation to promote underlying purposes and policies. Since the law of
letters of credit is still developing, conscious use of that canon and attention
to fundamental theory by the court are peculiarly appropriate. 25

[2] Form of Letters of Credit

As indicated earlier in this chapter, a letter of credit must be in writing and
must be signed by the issuer. 2I A telegram is a sufficient writing ifit identifies the
sender by an authorized authentication, which may be by a code. 27 No considera-
tion is necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge it or otherwise modify its
terms. 25
Usually the letter ofcredit is a "documentary" credit that calls for payment
against the presentation of specified documents. When the issuer is a bank, a
letter of credit may call for payment against any type of document.29 The
document may be a bill oflading, which was the principal document called for in
the traditional international letter of credit transaction, but also it can be a

23 uee § 5.102(3).
24 uee § 5-102. comment 2. The comment also refers to minor matters such as "the
absence of expiration dates and the effect of extending shipment but not expiration
dates," which the article leaves to future adjudication. Id.
25 uee § 5-102, comment 2.
2'uee § 5-104(1).
2'uee § 5-104(2).
21 uee § 5.105.
2'uee § 5-102(1)(a). The definition of "document" is discussed in 1 17.01.
1117.01(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-6

warehouse receipt, an inspection certificate, or a certificate of performance. 30

When the issuer is a party other than a bank, the credit will be viewed as a letter
ofcredit when the documents are documents oftitle-bills oflading, warehouse
receipts, and the like. 31
The vee also permits the parties to establish a letter of credit obligation
that does not faU within the guidelines described earlier as long as the obligation
conspicuously designates the credit as a letter of credit.:It This permits the
issuance of a "clean" letter of credit that does not condition payment upon
presentation ofdocuments and gives the parties flexibility in structuring letier of
credit arrangements to meet their commercial needs. n
The letter ofcredit must be distinguished from guarantees, which are agree-
ments to make advances and other arrangements.3< The vee
provides that
Article 5 on letters of credit does not apply to these other forms of transactions
unless the requirements discussed earlier are satisfied. Of Thus, at least in part,
the form of the transaction will determine whether Article 5 governs. If it does,
the legal consequences will be quite different from those that would apply if the
transaction were treated as one of a simple guarantee or a third party beneficiary
contract. 36
A letter of credit may be either a "notation credit" or a "straight" letter of
credit. The notation credit is used when it is expected that a number ofseparate
payments will be made under the credit. Persons who receive drafts drawn
against the credit from the beneficiary or otherwise pay the beneficiary on the
strength of the credit are required to make a notation on the letter ofcredit as to
the amount they have paid or drawnY In this fashion, subsequent persons who
deal with the beneficiary on the strength of the letter of credit will know the
amount ofcredit that remains to be drawn against. Failure of the person to note
the amount paid or drawn on the letter of credit makes the ~rson liable in
damages to the bank issuing the credit if any loss occurs as a result of the failure
to make the notation. 36 An early example of this t~·pe of letter of credit was the

30uce § 5·102(1)(a) & comment I. See New Jersey Bank v. Palladino. 17 NJ 33,
38-39, 389 A2d 454. 459-460 (1978), for a discussion of what writings constitute a
sufficient documentary demand.
3' VCC § 5.102(l)(b).

.. uec § 5·1 02( I )(c). "Credit" is defined by the vee as "an engagement by a bank or
other person made at the request ora customer and [otherwise within AMide 5) ... that the
issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the condi-
tions specified in the credit"· vee § 5·103(1)(a).
•3See uee § 5-102. comment 1.
"Seediscussion at ~ 17.01[3].
"uee § 5·102(2).
31 Sed 17.01 [3).
37 vee §§ S.IOB( I). 5·108(2).

31 vce § 5.' 08(2)(1l}.

17-7 LE1TERS OF CREDIT 1117.01[31

traveler's letter of credit, which was given to a traveling purchaser who had a
number ofpeople from whom he expected to purchase goods.~· When a notation
letter ofcredit is us~, the issuing bank may justifiably refuse to pay any drafts
drawn against-it.until it receives evidence of notation on the letter of credit."
Letters ofcredit may be either revocable or irrevocable, although usually the
parties will want the credit to be in irrevocable form. Ifthe letter is irrevocable,
the issuer cannot revoke the credit or refuse to honor drafts after the credit has
been sent to the customer or the beneficiary, or after authorized written advice
of its issuance has been given to the beneficiary." If the credit is revocable, the
issuer may modify or revoke it without the consent of the customer or the
beneficiary.·2 The letter ofcredit should state whetherit is revocable or irrevoca-
ble. The vee does not provide a rule for interpretation if the credit is silent on
the matter.

(31 Letters of Credit Are Not Guarantees

A letter of credit in legal form is neither a guarantee nor a third party
beneficiary contract. If it were, knowledge of the existence of defenses and
claims in the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary
might be available to the bank as issuer and justify the bank's refusing payment
to the beneficiary. Under the letter of credit, the bank has a direct obligation to
pay regardless ofthe underlying contract between the customer and the benefici-
ary as long as the documents presented satisfy the terms of the credit..~
The expanded role of the letter ofcredit gives rise to legal problems at times.
Some of the transactions in which letters of credit are used closely resemble
guarantee transactions. If the credit is characterized as a guarantee, the issuing
bank could refuse payment because ofdefects in performance of the underlying
contract; such a result destroys the fundamental understanding of the letter of
credit as an obligation undertaken by the issuing bank that is independent of the
underlying commercial contract. Also, it may result in complications for those
depository institutions that are prohibited by banking regulations from guaran-
teeing their customers' obligations." Litigation on the question of whether a

"See vec § 5·108, comment 2.

'0 vee § 5-I08(2)(b).

"vce § 5-106. Language in a leller of credit stating that it sh.all "remain in for<:c"
was sufficient to make the letter of credit irrevocable for the period oftime stated under
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. Conoco, Inc. v. Norwesl
Bank, 767 F2d 470-471 (8th Cir. 1985}.
'2 uce § 5-106.
•, For further discussion of the bank's obligation to pay, see' 17.02[2J.
"See New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 NJ 33, 37, 389 A2d 454, 458 (1978).
, 17.01(41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-8

letter of credit constitutes a guarantee has been extensive. and the specific facts
of each transaction must be carefully examined."
From the bank's standpoint, questions may also arise as to whether letters of
credit should be viewed as extensions ofcredit subject to loan limits. restrictions
on loans to afflliates. and limitations on loans to single borrowers."

[4J International Letters of Credit and the Uniform Customs

Since the UCC is the law ofthe state that enacts it, it does not apply to all aspects
of international letters of credit. Here, the laws of many countries may be
involved because the buyer, the seller of goods, and the financing banks may be
located in different nations; therefore, usages ofthe trade may be the basis ofthe
illtimate rules oflaw. These customs have been authoritatively collected by the
International Chamber of Commerce in a document known as the Uniform

"In FOICv. Freudenfeld, 492 F. Supp. 763, 768 (ED Wis. 1980), the court held that
a standby letter ofcredit issued by a national bank was not a banle guarantee that violated
the provisions of the National Bank Act against national banles' guaranteeing debts. (See
the discussion ofthe powers ofnational banks at '114.03[2][dJ.) The court further held that
even if the bank violated the provision against guaranteeing debts by issuing the standby
leuer ofcredit, only the United States had standing to challenge the bank for its ult,a vi,es
action.
In another case, a federal district court upheld a proaram initiated by Citibank to
provide standby credits to back the payment of municipal bonds. The insurance associa-
tion challenged the program, contending that it amounted to selling insurance, an activity
not permitted national banks, and that the program was an illegal bank guarantee. The
court rejected these contentions, saying the credits were standby letters of credit. Ameri-
can Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404, 408-411 (DOC 1987).
See Bank ofN.C. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F2d 202 (7th Cir. 1978); Wichita Eagle &
Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974); Dubuque
Packing Co. v. Fitzgibbon, 599 P2d 440 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Republic Nat'l Bank v.
Nonhwest Nat'l Bank, 566 SW2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds 578
SW2d 109 (Tex. 1978). See generally KMW Int'! v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F2d 10
(2d Cir, 1979); Barclays Bank v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. dismissed 414 US 1!39 (1974); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, 469 F. Supp.
473 (SONY 1979); American Bell Int'! v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420
(SONY 1979). Examples of standby letters of credit may be found in National Surety
Corp. v. Midland Bank & Trust Co., 408 F. Supp. 684 (DNJ !976), rev'd 55 I F2d 21 (3d
Cir. 1977); Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133 (NO III. 1976);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marquette Nat'! Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976).
41 Standby lellers of credit are subject to the lending limitations of the National Bank
Act for national banks. 12 USC § 84(c)(2) (1982); 12 CFR §§ 32.2(e), 32.3 (1988). See the
discussion in ~ 7.01(2). See also International Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Bank ofWadley, 407 F.
Supp. 1270, 1271 (MD Ala. 1976). See generally Arnold &. Bran·silver. "The Standby
Letter of Credit," 10 UCCU 272 (1978); Verkuil, "Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters
of Credit," 25 Stan. L. Rev. 716 (1973).
17-9 LEITERS OF CREDIT , 17.02(1)

Customs and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits," mentioned

earlier in this chapter. Most standard forms used for letters of credit in interna-
tional trade have a clause in the terms ofthe letter that refers to and incorporates
the Uniform Customs. Although letters of credit under the Uniform Customs
function similarly to those under the UCC, some differences exist. The Uniform
Customs also may be evidence oftrade usage, which can supplement the rules set
out in the UCC."
Although the Uniform Customs may apply, the UCC letter ofcredit provi-
sions are not necessarily irrelevant. In areas in which the Uniform Customs do
not supply an answer or where interpretation is required, a court may look to the
UCC for a statement ofpolicies and applicable law. Because the UCC represents
the continuation ofthe development ofrules oflaw pertaining to letters ofcredit
that began many years prior to the UCC, this law should continue to be relevant
in instances in which there is no conflict with the provisions of the Uniform
Customs in the same way that the case law prior to the UCC was relevant to
transactions under the Uniform Customs."

1117.02 OBUGATIONS OF AN ISSUER OF A LEITER OF

CREDIT
The issuer of a letter of credit has an obligation to its customer to make
payment in accordance with the terms ofthe letter of credit. The issuer also has
an obligation to the beneficiary of the letter of credit to make payment to the
beneficiary when the beneficiary complies with the terms.

(1] Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer

A letter of credit will ordinarily be used to further a commercial contract
between the issuing bank's customer and the beneficiary. The issuing bank has
no responsibility for any performance of the underlying contract between the

07 See International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for

Documentary Credits (rev. ed. 1983). See also Byrne, "The 1983 Revision ofthe Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits," 102 Banking U lSI (1985).
.. See Gewolb, "The Law Applicable to International Letters of Credit," II Viii. L.
Rev. 742 (1966). See also generally, Armstrong, "Letters of Credit in East-West Trade:
Soviet Reception of Capitalist Custom," 17 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 329 (1984); Flax-
Davidson, "The ALADI Treaty and Letter of Credit Transactions in Latin America," 19
Int'! Law. 1303 (1985); Leacock, "Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining
Payment of Letters of Credit in International Transactions," 17 Vand. J. Transnat'i L.
885 (1984); Saunders, "leiters of Credit in International Transactions," 102 Banking U
361 (1985).
•• See White & Summers, supra note 4, at § 18-3; United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 NY2d 254, 258-260, 392 NYS2d 265. 269-211, 360 NE2d
943,947-949 (1976).
117.0211) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17·10

customer and the beneficiary,lO but it does have responsibility for examjnjng the
documents presented to ensure that they comply with the terms ofthe letter of
credit. As spinst its customer. the i.ssuina bank must act in good faith. observe
general banking practices. and follow the terms of the letter of credit agree-
ment. 51 The bank does not have to engage in any investigation of the perform-
ance of the underlying contract or inspect the goods that are represented by the
documents. but it must carefully examine the documents to ascertain that "on
their face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit".1It Subject to a
contrary agreement, the bank assumes no responsibility for the genuineness or
falseness ofdocuments that appear to the bank to be regular on their face, as long
as the bank has no notice of irregularity."
When drafts or other documents are sent for collection, the bank will not be
responsible for the acts ofother parties. Ifdocuments are lost in transit, the bank
is not liable.so
The issuing bank may be liable to its customer for wrongfully dishonoring
drafts drawn against the credit. 1S However, when a documentary draft or
demand for payment under a letter ofcredit is made, the bank has until the third
banlcingday after receipt ofthe documents to pay. II The delay will not constitute
dishonor. If the person who presents the documents "expressly or impliedly"
consents, the bank may delay payment further.
When the bank properly pays a draft under a letter ofcredit, it has a right to
immediate reimbursement from its customer. 11 When the bank accepts a draft

IOUCC § 5·109(1). For a statement of this view in the law prior to the VCC. see
Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 NY 386, 389, 146 NE 636, 639 (1925).
11 uce § 5.109(1).
52 uee § 5·109(2). A bank that paid drafts drawn on an expired letter ofcredit was not
entitled to recover from its customer for unjust enrichment. City Nat'l Bank v. Westland
Towers Apartments, 152 Mich. App. 136, 139-140, 393 NW2d 554, 557-558 (1986),
appeal denied, 428 Mich. 885 (1987).
53vce § 5·109(2). See UCC § 5.)14(2).
"vce § 5·I09(I)(b).
55uce § 4-402. The issuer of a letter of credit may become liable for anticipatory
breach, as well as for wrongfUl dishonor ofdrafts drawn under the letter ofcredit, when the
issuer repudiates its obligation to pay and refuses to pay subsequently submitted drafts.
Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 599 F. Supp. 592, 599-600 (ND Ill. 1984), aII'd in
pan memo & rev'd in pan mem., 785 F2d 312 (7th Cir. 1986).
"uce § 5-112.
57UCC § 5-1 14(3). In Northern Trust Co. v. Oxford Speaker Co., 109111. App. 3d 433,
436-438,440 NE2d 968, 971-973 (1982), the coun held that the seller of goods who was
to be paid in a documentary transaction arranged by the seller's bank could raise equitable
defenses, such as waiver and estoppel, when the tran,action broke down and the bank
sou&ht to recover from the seller. The bank sued its customer, the seller, as drawer of the
draft and under the bank's right to charge back uncollected instruments to its customer.
The coun held that advice and assurances from the bank to the seller, which encouraged
the seller, who was unfamiliar with documentary transactions, to enter the deal, raised
17-11 LEITERS OF CREDIT 11 17.0212]

under the credit, it is entitled to be given funds for payment "not later than the
day before maturity" of the acceptance. 51

[2] Issuer's Obligation to Pay the Beneficiary

The issuing bank must honor drafts drawn against a letter ofcredit or other
demands for payment when they comply with the terms of the credit." As
previously indicated, the bank's duty to pay arises when the terms of the docu-
ments presented on their face comply with the terms of the credit,lO Apart from
the exceptions discussed in the next subsection, the bank has no right to refuse
payment to one otherwise entitled to payment on the grounds that the underly-
ing contract for sale, or other contract, between the customer and the beneficiary
has not been properly performed.I.
Although these rules are easily stated, troublesome legal questions can arise
as to whether there has been compliance with the terms ofthe credit. Some courts
have applied a strict test,I2 Questions of waiver, estoppel, and cure can arise."

issues as to whether the bank should be estopped from claiming its right to repayment. By
advising the seller that the seller's documentation complied with the terms of the letter of
credit, an issue also arose of waiver of the bank's right to reco"er for losses caused by
defects in the documentary arrangements.
s·ucc § 5-114(3).
s'ucc § 5-114(1).
IOUCC §§ 5-109, 5-114(2).
., UCC § 5-114(1).
12 See Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. Banco del Pais, S.A., 261 F. Supp. 884, 889
(SDNY 1966). See generally White & Summers, supra note 4, at § 18-6.
The strict approach was followed in Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. \". North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 528 F2d 802, 806 (4th Cir. 1975), where the court held that the bank should not have
paid a letter of credit that provided that drafts presented for payment had to be accompa-
nied by ail invoice describing the goods as "100% acrylic yarn" when the invoice submitted
only stated that the goods were "imported acrylic yam" even though it could be determined
from packing lists stapled to the invoice that the yam was I00 percent acrylic. On the other
hand, in Transamerica Delaval, Inc. v, Citibank, 545 F. Supp. 200, 204 (SDNY 1982),
involving a dispute between the customer and the issuing bank over whether the bank's
payment was wrongful, the court held that a standard of "substantial compliance" should
prevail, In this case, the bank could proceed reasonably to detennine what constituted
compliance with the letter of credit because the bank's customer had failed to provide
precise specifications,
The demand for payment by the beneficiary under a letter of credit must comply with
the dates specified in the letter ofcredit. Where a letter provided that it expired on April 7,
1980, but the draft and accompanying documents drawn against the letter did not arrive
until April II, 1980, four days late, the issuing bank was justified in refusing to pay even
though the draft had been sent prior to the expiration date and had been delayed in the mail.
The court rejected the argument that the normal grounds for excusing delay in presenting
negotiable instruments for payments should apply to letter ofcredit transactions. The court
reasoned that the value of the letter of credit depended upon the ability of the issuer to
U 7.0212](al NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-12

(a) Indemnities. Parties seeking payment under a letter of credit commonly

offer indemnities when a question arises as to minor variations between the
documents presented for payment and the terms ofthe letter ofcredit. The uee
recognizes the use of indemnities as an appropriate practioe. For example, the
sales provisions allow a seller to tender less than a full set of bills of lading in
overseas shipment transactions without breaching the underlying sales contract
by furnishing an indemnity. I. Although such practice determines the rights
between the buyer and the seller on their contract, it does not bind the bank that

precisely assess its risk on the letter ofcredit by eValuatina the letter's tenns and specifying
the conditions for payment. The coun thus rejected the argument that UCC § 5-102 should
be viewed as incorporating UCC § 3-511(1) in the general law govemingletters of credit.
Moreover, the coun found thai the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits applied and that those rules expressed a policy of placing the risk of delays due to
aets of God and other causes on the beneficiary, not the issuer, of the letter of credit.
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Bank ofYa., 544 F. Supp. 386, 4()()-402 (D. Md. 1982),
aff'd, 704 F2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
In Beckman Cotton Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaahan) 966, 969
(NO Ga. 1982), on the other hand, the coun held that a bank issuina a letter of credit with
an expiration date ofSunday, October 30, wrongfully dishonored drafts that were presented
on Monday, October 31, when the beneficiary had called the bank in advance rep.rding
presentment of the draft and a bank officer had consented to presentment on October3!.
When the tenns ofa letter ofcredit call for "full set clean on board biUs of lading," the
mode of shipment must be ocean shipment and transportation ofthe goods by air does not
comply with the letter. "The issuer ofa letter ofcredit should not be placed in the position of
having to determine whether an unauthorized method of shipment is material." Board of
Trade v. Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F2d 1241, I243(9th Cir. 1984).
An issuina bank wrongfully refused to pay a draft drawn under a letter of credit when
the letter of credit required the draft to state "drawn under ... LetteT of Credit Number
105 ... " and the draft stated "letter of Credit No. 105 ... "(Changing "L" to "I" and
"Numbet" to "No."). Tosco Corp. v. FDIC, 123 F2d 1242, 1247-1248 (6th Cit. 1983).
In Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus.lnt'l, Inc., 767 F2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1985). the
court determined that it was inappropriate to resolve on summary judement whether the
conditions required for payment of a standby letter of credit had been performed.
See also generally, Dolan. "Strict Compliance With Letters of Credit: Striking a Fair
Balance," 102 Banking U 18 (1985); Notes, "Letters of Credit: The Role ofIssuer Discre-
tion in Detennining Documentary Compliance," 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1519 (1985); "let-
ters of Credit: A Return to the Historical Documentary Compliance Standard," 46 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 457 (1985).
II For a case where the court held that the beneficiary was entitled to go to trial on the
issue of whether a confinning bank under a letter of credit had waived strict compliance
with the tenns of the leiter of credit, see Yoest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 707 F2d 680, 685-686 (2d. Cir. 1983). The court noted that care must be taken in
finding waiver because such a finding could jeopardize the bank's ability to obtain
reimbursement from its customer.
.. ucc § 2-323(2).
17·13 LETTERS OF CREDIT 11 17.02(2)[a]

is obligated as the issuer of the letter of credit.II. A bank: is permitted to offer

indemnities both for itself and for the benefit of another person in order to
encourage the honor of a letter of credit, negotiation of drafts under a letter of
credit, or reimbursement." When such an indemnity agreement is made, unless
it otherwise expressly provides, the agreement to indemnify is limited to
"defects in the documents but not in the goods" and the agreement "expires at
the end often business days following receipt of the documents by the ultimate
customer" unless notice is sent before the expiration date. '7 This provision does
not require any issuer to accept an offer ofindemnity. The comments make clear
that "[tJhe question whether a particular banking usage may require honor of
documentary drafts accompanied by indemnities for particular defects goes to
the meaning ofthe terms of the credit and is beyond the scope of this section.""
There are three limited exceptions to the issuing bank's duty to pay when
presented with documents that appear on their face to conform to the credit.
These exceptions are (1) when the documents presented are not genuine or are
invalid or there is no right to transfer them; (2) when the documents are forged or
fraudulent; and (3) when there is "fraud in the transaction.... "'1 Even in these
situations, the issuer must honor the drafts presented when they are presented by
persons who are in the position of a holder in due course. 1O Moreover, the bank
does not have to become embroiled in controversies with its customers over
whether it should pay. If the bank acts in good faith, it is free to honor drafts
drawn notwithstanding notification from the customer of fraud, forgery, or
other defects until the customer enjoins payment in an appropriate court!!

81 VCC § 2.323, comment 2.

..vcc § 5-113(1).
11 VCC § 5-113(2).
.. VCC § 5-113, comment 4. The comment cites Dixon, [rmaos & Cia, Ltda. v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 144 F2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 VS 850 (1945), where the
court found a banking usage to accept indemnities under certain circumstances. The
comment states that a determination that applicable usage makes a demand for payment
with an offer of indemnity one which complies with the terms of the credit is a decision
that "rest!s] on the implications of the usage rather than on breach of the issuer's duty"
under the VCC § 5-113, comment 4.
I. VCC § 5-114(2).
70 [d.
71 VCC § 5-114(2)(b). Although the customer gives the issuing bank notice offraud in
the underlying transaction, the bank may pay drafts drawn on the letters ofcredit ifit acts
in good faith unless the customer obtains a court order enjoining payment under VCC § 5-
114(2). W.O.A., Inc. v. City Nat'l Bank, 640 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (WDArk. 1986). See also
Annot., "What Constitutes Fraud or Forgery Justifying Refusal to Honor, or Injunction
Against Honoring Letter of Credit Vnder VCC § 5.114(1)(2)," 25 ALR4th 239 (1983);
Rosenblith, "What Happens When Operations Go Wrong: Enjoining the ~tler of Credit
Transaction and Other Legal Strategems," 17 VCCU 307 (1985); Thorup, "Injunctions
Against Payment ofStandby Letters ofCredit: How Can Banks Best Protect Themselves,"
101 BankingU 6(1984).
, 17.0212}[b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-14

Needless to say, what constitutes "fraud in the transaction" is not always clear;12
nor is it always clear what circumstances will bring the other exceptions into
play. In these cases, ifthe bank acts in good faith, it may pay unless the customer
obtains a court order enjoining the payment.
If the issuer ofa letter ofcredit can refuse to pay the beneficiary ofthe letter
on the ground that a breach of the underlying contract between the beneficiary
and the customer has occurred, the usefulness of the letter of credit will be
impaired. Beneficiaries will not be able to rely upon issuance of the letter as
assurance of payment upon compliance with the terms of the letter.

[b) Relationship ofI.etter ofCredit to the Underlying Contract, Although the

issuance of a letter of credit does not, by itself, eliminate the rights that the
parties to the underlying transaction may have based upon their contract, it does
shift some ofthe risks and burdens. When a letter ofcredit is used as the method
for payment under a contract for the sale of goods, the seller is assured that the
risk of litigation over the adequacy of the seller's performance will be thrust
upon the buyer, because the seller will get paid under the letter ofcredit and the
buyer will be forced to pursue the seller to enforce the buyer's rights under the
contract.1S When problems arise, buyers and other customers who have procured

72 See Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722,31 NYS2d 631,
634 (Sup. Ct. 1941), which found fraud in a case where documents called for the shipment
of bristles but the material shipped was rubbish. See also Note, "UCC-Letters ofCredit
and 'Fraud' in the Transaction," 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1088 (1986).
1S Recovery from one who has fraudulently obtained payment ofa letter of credit can
be significant. When a person drew funds under a standby letter of credit without having a
basis for believing that any amounts under the letter of credit were owed, the person was
found liable for both fraud in falsely certifying that payment was owed and fraud in the
transaction. This person was held liable for the payments received, 8$ well as for substan-
tial pu~itive damages. Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank,
757 F2d 399, 404-405, 408 (lst Cir. 1985). See also }:ote, "Lelten of Credit Litiga-
tion-Bank Liability For Punitive Damages," 54 Fordham L. Rev. 905 (1986).
The plaintiff-customer arranged for a letter of credit to be issued in favor ofa bank in
Saudi Arabia as part of a contract with a Saudi refinery. When a dispute arose, the bank
demanded payment under the letter of credit. The plaintiff sued to enjoin payment,
claiming the demand was fraudulent. The court held that a preliminary injunction against
payment was improper because there is no "irreparable injury where only money is at
stake and where there is a satisfactory remedy at law...." The parties had contracted for
their disputes to be resolved under Saudi law, using Saudi arbitration. Moreover, suit
could be brought in federal court to recover for any harm caused by the fraudulent
demand for payment ofthe letter ofcredit. Underthe contract, irreparable harm could not
be posited on the buyer to obtain an unfair advantage using payment of the letter of credit;
that advantage was already contemplated by the arrangements in the contract. The
plaintiff also could not claim irreparable injury to its credit and business reputation from
the payment ofthe letter of credit on the theory that obtaining lettel'$ ofcredit in the future
would become more ellpensive. Failure to obtain an injunction should not reflect
adversely on the plainlitrs reputation, because obtaining such an injunction is an
17-15 LETIERS OF CREDIT , 17.02(211b1

the issuance ofa letter of credit sometimes seek to avoid this result by enjoining
payment. UCC § 5-114(2) gives the customer a right to enjoin payment only in
very limited circumstances. Nevertheless, an extensive case law dictates when it
is proper to enjoin payment and how strict the standard for granting an injunc-
tion should be.r·

extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted. Foxboro Co. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 805 F2d
34, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1986).
r. A court may enjoin payment under a letter of credit when there is fraud in the
documentation required to be presented. In Griffin Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 374 NW2d
768, 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), the court held that fraudulent certification by the
beneficiary ofthe letter, statinll that funds drawn under the letter were due the beneficiary,
would entitle the customer to enjoin payment to a person who was not a holder in due
course. Furthermore, the court could enter a preliminary injunction to preserve the status
quo pendinll determination of the circumstances.
Fraud in the transaction entitling a court to enjoin payment ofa letter ofcredit under
UCC § 5-114(2)(b) exists when the beneficiary has "no plausible or colorable basis under
the contract to call for payment" ofthe letters. Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F2d 19,
25 (1st Cir. 1984). In Itek the Court held that the circumstances justified enjoining
payment ofa letter ofcredit to a bank in Iran. The letters ofcredit were given to reimburse
the Iranian bank if it was called upon to make good on guarantees it had made on a
contract. The court said that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy to sue to
recover the money because that claim would have to be pursued in an Iranian court. The
court then found fraud in the transaction. See also Verner, .. 'Fraud in the Transaction':
Intraworld Comes of Age in Itek," 14 Memphis St. UL Rev. 153 (1984).
In Wyle v. Bank Melli, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 1163-1166 (NO Cal. 1983), the court
enjoined payment on a letter of credit that provided that payment would be made on a
simple demand for payment by the beneficiary without requiring any proofofentitlement
to payment. In this case the beneficiary was an Iranian bank. The court concluded that
there was no basis that would justify paying under the letter of credit, so the demand for
payment was fraudulent. However, this fraud involved the customer of the Iranian bank,
not the bank itself. The court held that the Iranian bank should have known that the claim
of its customer against it for payment was fraudulent, and that it therefore did not have
the status ofa holder in due course with respect to the claim it was presenting against the
issuing bank for payment on the letter ofcredit. For another case where the court enjoined
payment of a letter of credit because of fraud in the transaction, see Rockwell Int'l Sys.,
Inc. v. Citibank, 719 F2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983).
An intermediate appellate court in Louisiana concluded that the phrase "fraud in the
transaction" contained in UCC § 5-114(2) refers to fraud in the letter ofcredit transaction
between the issuing bank and the beneficiary of the letter of credit and not to the
underlying transaction between the parties to the deal for which the letter was issued.
Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 450So2d I, 9 (La. Ct. App. 1984), afrd in part &
rev'd in part, 464 So2d 721 (La. 1985).
In Originala Petroleum Corp. v. Beta Fin. & Invs. Corp., 39 Bankr. 1003, 1015
(Bankr. ND Tex 1984), the court refused to enjoin payment under a letter of credit. The
court believed the purpose of the letter of credit would be destroyed ifany controversy
regarding the validity ofthe underlying transaction could serve as grounds for the issuance
of an injunction. 39 Bankr. at 1008. .
In a case involving a standby letter of credit, the court held that the bank issuing the
letter of credit breached its undertaking to pay by refusing to pay the beneficiary on
11 J7.02(1Jlb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-16

The court granted an injunction in Harris Corp. 1'. National Iranian Radio &
Television. 711 The case involved radio transmitters the seller had sold to a buyer
in Iran. The seller had been paid in advance but had given the buyer a standby
letter ofcredit to guarantee performance ofthe contract. The seller was not able
to perform the contract because of the Iranian revolution. The underlying
contract between the buyer and the seller recognized this event as cause for
termination ofthe seller's obligation, but the government ofIran demanded that
the letter of credit be paid because of the non-performance of the seller. The
court held that the buyer's action suggested a fraudulent effort to obtain an
undeserved benefit from the seller because the buyer must have known that the
failure to perform did not constitute a breach ofcontract. Having found fraud in
the transaction, the court granted a preliminary injunction against payment. In
California, on the other hand, a customer cannot enjoin payment of a letter of
credit even on the ground offraud.18

ground of fraud. The opinion of the court contains a good discussion of the distinctions
among fraud in the transaction (meanina the underlying commercial transaction between
the customer and the beneficiary); fraud in the inducement (fraud that leads the bank to
issue the letter of credit because of false represeotations made by the beneficiary); and
fraud in the documents presented to the issuer of the credit in order to obtain payment.
Tem-Tex Prods., Inc. v. Capital Bank & Trust Co" 623 F. Supp. 816, 821-822 (MD La.
1985), afl'd, 788 F2d 1563 (5th Cir. 1986). .
Customers sued banks that issued letters of credit and the beneficiaries ofthe letters
to enjoin payment of the credits for fraud in the underlying transaction. Because the
plaintiffs and the issuina banks were adverse parties in this suit, there could be no
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship unless there was complete diversity between
the plaintiffs and the defendant banks. W.O.A., Inc. \'. City Nat'l Bank, 640 F. Supp.
1157, 1159 (WD Ark. 1986).
See generally, Note, "Enjoining the Suicide Letter of Credit," 17 Willamette 1. Rev.
253 (1980).
71
691 F2d 1344, 1356-1358 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Kimball & Sanders, "Prevent-
ina Wrongful Payment of Guarantee Letters of Credit-Lessons From Iran," 39 Bus.
Law. 417 (1984).
71 Agnew v. FDIC. 548 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (ND Cal. 1982). The California version of
UCC § 5-114 deletes the provision that "1\ court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin
such honor" of a lelter of credit for fraud, forgery, and the like. However, a California
court has held that this section refers to the duty of the issuer ofthe letter ofcredit to honor
payment demands. Under California law, it is possible to enjoin the beneficiary from
attempting to draw under the credit. To do so, however, the complainant must show
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Te~as Commerce
Bank, 159 Cal. App. 3d lOS 1,206 Cal. Rptr. 21 8,222-223 (1984). In Wyle v. Bank Melli,
577 F. Supp. 1148, 1161 (ND Cal. 1983), the court followed a similar interpretation and
suggested that an unusual case was presented when both the beneficiary was subject to
jurisdiction before the court and the courts in Iran were closed to the American interests
involved. ,
An Illinois court declined to draw a distinction between enjoining the issuerofa letter
of credit from paying under the letter of credit and enjoining the beneficiary ofthe credit
from drawing under the letter of credit. Jupiter Orrington Corp. v. Zweifel, 127 III. App.
17-17 LETTERS OF CREDIT , 17.02[3]

A bank may become liable on a letter ofcredit by confmning a credit issued

by another bank, under UCC § 5-107(2). In a case involving a letter of credit
irsued by a bank in Venezuela for a Venezuelan customer to pay for tires
purchased from a seller in Louisiana, the liability of a confirming bank was at
issue. A bank in Louisiana confirmed the letter of credit. In a suit against the
confmning bank, the buyer claimed that the bank had failed to perform its duty
of examining the documents required for payment under the credit. The court
held that the confrrming bank did not owe a duty ofcare to the buyer because the
bank's duty ran to its customer, the issuing bank in Venezuela. The buyer's
remedy, the court held, was against the issuing bank for its failure to exercise the
proper standard of care. '1T
The customer's power to enjoin payment ofa letter ofcredit for fraud in the
underlying transaction ends once the issuing bank has accepted drafts drawn
against the letter of credit, according to the New York Court of Appeals. UCC
§ 4-303 provides that the legal process cannot be used to affect the bank's duty to
pay if the process comes after the bank has accepted the item. In the view of the
court, this provision was entitled to prevail over Section 5-114(2)(b), which gave
the customer a method of stopping payment when the customer could show
fraud in the transaction. 1I

[3] Standby Letters of Credit

The preceding discussion does not expressly distinguish between the obliga-
tion to pay under the traditional letter of credit used in a sales transaction and
the obligation to pay under the standby letter ofcredit. The issuer's obligation to
pay when the demand meets the terms of the letter of credit is in form the. same
and is based upon the same legal authority in the UCC. 7' The function of the
standby letter of credit, however, differs sharply from the traditional letter of
credit. In the traditional letter of credit transaction, the buyer of the goods has
arranged for the issuance of the credit. The issuer of the credit anticipates that
the seller will draw on the credit. The issuer usually obtains a security interest in
the goods as a result of having made an advance and of being in possession of

3d 559, 562, 469 NE2d 590, 593 (1984). The court reasoned that permitting issuance ofan
injunction againslthe beneficiary to prevent the presentation of drafts against the credit
"would be tantamount to allowing a party to accomplish indirectly that which he is
forbidden to do directly."
77 Auto Servicio San Ignacio, S.R.L v. Compania Anonima Yenezolana de Navega.
cion, 765 F2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir. 1985).
"First Commercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc., 64 NY2d 287, 292, 475 NE2d
1255,1260,486 NYS2d 715, 720(1985).
.. ucc § 5·114(1). See generally, Notes, "The Standby Letter ofCredi\: What It Is
and How To Use It," 45 Mont. L. Rev. 71 (1984); "The Independence Rule in Standby
Letters of Credit," 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 218 (1985); "Standby Letters of Credit: Are They
Insured Deposits?" 32 Wayne L. Rev. 1165 (1986).
'Il17.02(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17·18

documenu of title that are turned over to the issuer when the seller presents the
draft. The issuing bank will be reimbuned by the buyer in the normal course of
business. As the buyer will have the goods for resale or other purposes, the buyer
anticipates generating revenues as a result ofthe transaction that ultimately may
be the source of reimbursement for the issuing bank.
The standby letter of credit transaction works differently from the tradi-
tional transaction. In the standby letter of credit transaction, the letter of credit
is a backup that is available to one ofthe parties in the event that something goes
wrong with the transaction. The standby letter of credit is an assurance of
performance from the bank that issues the letter ofcredit when the contemplated
performance of the underlying contract, whatever that might be, between the
beneficiary ofthe credit and the beneficiary's counter party, who normally is the
customer for whom the bank issued the letter of credit, fails. For example, in
Harris Corp.,lo the buyer paid the seller in advance. To ensure the seller's
performance, the seller gave a standby letter ofcredit to the buyer. The buyer was
entitled to draw on the credit if the seller failed to perform. Using a letter of
credit in this way contemplates that the beneficiary will never draw against the
letter of credit if the underlying contract is properly performed.
The problems in the Harris Corp. case also illustrate two ofthe risks with the
standby letter of credit. The first is the risk ofa demand for payment under the
letter ofcredit that is fraudulent or that is made even though the beneficiary may
not have a right under the underlying contract to make such a demand. Because
the bank that issued the letter of credit will not be interested in determining
whether the underlying contract has been performed as a condition to deciding
when to pay under the letter of credit, the terms of the letter of credit will
authorize payment when proper documents or certification are presented to the
bank. In some cases, this documentation may be a simple demand for payment.
In other cases, the terms of the letter of credit may require documents that
include certification by third parties, such as an architect, ofcompleted perform-
ance. The terms for payment that the parties stipulate in the letter ofcredit, thus,
are critical. They may have an important bearing on the extent to which the
customer who arranges the letter ofcredit will have to bear risks associated with
the beneficiary making an improper demand or a demand that may be a matter
of dispute between the parties because ofdisagreements that arise subsequently
as to the performance of the underlying contract.
Second, when the beneficiary makes a demand under a standby letter of
credit and the issuer pays, the risks ofcontracting for the underlying transaction
are dramatically altered. The customer now must bring suit against the benefici·
ary if the customer believes that the beneficiary is liable for breach of the
underlying contract or other obligations. Having given the standby letter of

10 Harris Corp. \'. National Iranian Radio & Tele\·jsion. 69 J F2d 1344, 1346-1349
(II th Cir. 1982). For further discussion of this case, see' 17.02[2).
17-19 LETI'ERS OF CREDIT 1117.03

credit, the customer is no longer in the position ofdealing with contract disputes
by withholding performance of the underlying contract. Moreover, since the
bank that pays on the standby letter of credit will look to its customer for
reimbursement, the customer may be in the position of having expended sub-
stantial funds in the course ofperforming the underlying contract and having to
also pay the bank to reimburse the issuer for payment to the beneficiary.
Because of risks such as these associated with the standby letter of credit, a
substantial body of litigation addresses when a customer may eXl.ioin payment
under a letter of credit.·1 As indicated in the preceding subsection, a common
contention is that making a demand for payment under a standby letter ofcredit
when the beneficiary knows that the underlying contract does not entitle the
beneficiary to obtain payment is a fraudulent demand that should be enjoinable
under UCC § 5-114(2). This argument must be treated cautiously, however,
because it involves the court in making a determination as to the performance of
the underlying contract in the course of deciding whether to enjoin payment of
the letter ofcredit. The purpose ofthe letter ofcredit, in its traditional role, is to
assure payment without inquiry into issues relating to performance ofthe under-
lying contract unless there are circumstances so egregious as to amount to "fraud
in the transaction."

1117.03 DOCUMENTARY DRAFTS

A documentary draft under the UCC is any draft accompanied by docu-
ments that are to be delivered to the person designated in the draft upon
compliance with the terms of the instrument.12 The accompanying documents
may be documents of title, securities, or "other papers." P The draft may be
negotiable or nonnegotiable." Frequently, the document that accompanies the
draft will be a bill onading, a warehouse receipt, or some otherdocument oftitle.
Typically, the drawer of the draft wants to delay transfer of the goods, repre-
sented by the bill of lading or the warehouse receipt, until the drawee pays or
accepts the draft. To accomplish this, the drawer gives the draft and the accom-
panying document of title to a bank for collection. The bank will forward the
documents through customary banking channels to another bank, which then
will present the documents to the drawee for payment or acceptance according
to the terms ofthe draft. When the drawee complies with the terms ofthe draft,
by paying or by accepting it, the bank releases the bill onading to the drawee and
remits the payment or the accepted draft to the person entitled to it. This

11 A number of cases that consider when a customer may enjoin payment under a
letter of credit are discussed in ~ 17.02[2].
12 uee § 4-104(1 )(1).
"Id.
"rd.
1117.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-20

procedure gives the drawer the security ofretaining control ofthe goods until the
drawee pays or accepts, and it gives the drawee assurance ofreceiving control of
the goods on payment. By using a documentary transaction, the parties have
contracted to shift the normal allocation of risks in a contract for tbe sale of
goods, because in agreeing to pay against documents, the buyergives up tbe right
to inspect the goods before payment.II This forces the buyer to pay first and bear
the affmnative burden of litigating if the buyer objects to the seUer's
performance.II
When banks handle documentary drafts for collection, their rights and
responsibilities are substantially the same as those involved in collecting checks
and other instruments, as explained in the preceding paragraphs. A documen-
tary draft is an instrument for the payment of money and so falls within the
definition of an "item," collection of which is governed by the rules of the
UCC.17
When a draft is drawn and secured by a bill of lading or other paper, it
usually is only part of a large:r contract covering the sale or transfer of the
merchandise represented by the documents. The underlying contract has been
made directly between the seller and the buyer ofthe merchandise." The coUect-

vee
as §§ 2-310,2-513. See also generally, Hawk.land, "Documentary Transactions:
New Solutions to Old Problems," 18 vecu 291 (1986).
II In the usual documentary draft sales transaction, the buyer must pay the draft in
order to get tne documents necessary for obtaining delivery of the goods from the carrier
or other bailee as explained earlier. Since the buyer has paid, when, after inspecting the
goods, the buyer learns ofdefects in the SOOds or other grounds for objection to the seller's
performance, the buyer will have to brina suit against the seller in a place where jurisdic.
tion over the seller can be obtained to recover damages. In Vickers v. Mach. Warehouse &
Sales Co., II J Wash. 576, 191 P 869 (1920), a person in the position of such a buyer tried
to attach the proceeds of a documentary draft that the buyer had paid while the proceeds
were in the hands of the collecting banks. The buyer initiated suit for breach of contract
against the seller in a local coun, and brought the attachment proceedings to seize the
payment and, presumably, to establish jurisdiction over the seller. The elTons were
unsuccessful in this case because the coun viewed the banks as having an ownership
interest in the proceeds as a result of having made advances on the draft. A similar result
would obtain under the vee, which gives a collecting bank a security interest in an item
"and any accompanying documents or the proceeds ofeither" when the bank gives credit
tnat has been drawn against. gives a credit where withdrawal is available as of right, or
makes an advance against the item. VCC §§ 4-208(1)(a), 4.208(l)(c). See discussion at
11 16.01[4). To permita buyer to use such an attachment procedure to obtain jurisdiction
to litigate contract claims aaainst the seller related to a documentary sales tl'allsaction
would result in the rever'lal of the risks allocated by the contract, which called for the
buyer to pay in advance against documents.
"uec § 4.104(1)(g).
II The parties must specifically contract for terms that require paYJIlent by the buyer
on the presentment of documents. Absent a contrary agreement, the buyer ofgoods has a
right to inspect the goods before making payment. vec §~ 2-31 O(b), 2·503(5}, 2-5 13{l), 2-
513(3){b).
17-21 LETTERS OF CREDIT 1117.03(1]

ing bank ordinarily has no notice of the terms ofthe deal between the buyer and
the seller. In these circumstances, then, it is extremely important for the bank
transferring or collecting such paper to follow carefully the instructions of tbe
drawer of the draft and to properly transmit the papers to correspondent banks.
The bank's failure to follow such instructions may result in breach of the
underlying sales contract and liability for damages for failure to exercise the
proper degree of care in handling the documentary draft.II
The way documents of title such as bills oflading and warehouse receipts
operate to control the delivery and ownership ofgoods held by the bailee (such as
the carrier or warehouse) is explained in Chapter 14.

[1) Bank's Duty to Present Draft and to Notify Customer of

Nonpayment
When a bank takes a documentary draft for collection, it must either present
the draft to the drawee for payment or acceptance or it must send the draft
through collection channels so that it may be properly presented. 1O The bank
must act promptly and use ordinary care in presenting the draft." When the
draft, or other set of instructions by the bank's customer, directs the bank to
present the draft "on arrival" or "when goods arrive" (or when the documents
use similar language), the bank may wait to present the draft until it believes that
the goods have arrived."
When the bank has presented a documentary draft and the draft has not
been paid or accepted in due course, the bank has a duty to promptly notify its
customer.·3 This duty is placed on the bank even when it has purchased the draft

"UCC §§ 4·201,4-202,4-203. See UCC § 4-103 on the measure ofliability.

IOL"CC § 4.501.
•• UCC § 4-202. When a collecting bank delivered documents of title to the drawee
without requiring the acceptance ofthe drawee as the collection instructions required, the
collecting bank was liable to its customer for failure to do so. The individual signatures of
the officers ofthe drawee did not constitute compliance with the instructions. The bank's
liability was for failure to exercise ordinary care, UCC § 4-103(5), which includes "the
amount ofthe item reduced by the amount which could not have been realized by the use
of ordinary care" except that consequential damages can be recovered in cases of bad
faith. The case presented a special damages issue, since the customer based the damages
on its inability to recover on an insurance policy, and not on its inability to collect from
the drawees. The court remanded the case to determine whether the customer's inability
to collect on the insurance policy should be viewed as a direclloss that could be recovered
because ofthe bank's lack ofordinary care or whether it should be treated as a consequent-
ial loss for which the customer must show that the bank acted in bad faith. Bar-Ram
Irrigation Prods. v. Phenix-Girard Bank, 779 F2d 1501, 1503-1505 (11th Cir. 1986).
•2UCC § 4-502.
•2 VCC § 4-50 I. By acting as agent in collecting the draft, the bank will have a
fiduciary relationship to the owner of the draft under the view taken in Aimor Elec.
Works, Ltd. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 727 F2d 688, 691-692 (8th Cir. 1984). See ~ 17.03(2).
11 17.03(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-22

from the customer and is no longer acting as an agent for collection; this is so the
customer can find out whether the underlying commercial transaction, for
which the draft was given, is going throuah as planned. M When the draft calls for
payment "on arrival," the drawee does not have any duty to payor accept until
the goods have actually arrived. The drawee's refusal to payor accept will not
constitute dishonor, but the bank must notify its customer of the refusal."
Having given this notification, the bank has no duty to present the draft a second
time until it receives instructions to do so until it learns that the goods have
arrived."

[2] Bank's Responsibilities for the Documents and the Goods

The documents that accompany a documentary draft are usually a form of
security for payment of the draft. In a typical transaction, the drawer will not
want the bill oflading or other paper transferred to the drawee until the drawee
has made payment or accepted the draft. It is the bank's duty to preserve the
security when dealing with the paper. The bank should follow strictly the instruc-
tions of its customer as to release of the documents." Unless otherwise
instructed, when the terms of the draft require payment in three or fewer days
after it is presented to the drawee, the bank should not release the documents to
the drawee until after the draft is paid. III When the draft is payable more than
three days after presentment, the bank must deliver the documents to the drawee
on acceptance ofthe draft'" Releasing the underlying documents to the drawee
without receiving payment or acceptance of the draft may result in a loss ofthe
customer's security for the draft, and the bank will be liable for ils lack of care in
handling the documents.'110 In some cases, the drawee or purchaser ofthe under-
lying goods may have the right to inspect the goods before making payment. '0'
Unless the bank is instructed otherwise, however, it must follow the rules stated
here and not release the documents until there is proper payment or acceptance.

"vee § 4·501 & comment.

•svee § 4-502.
"Id.
11 vee § 4-503.

•• vee ~ 4·503(a). See vee § 2-514. A bank was liable for releasing documents when
the buyer paid with an uncertified personal check in a pre·Vee case. Bunge v. First Nat'l
Bank, 118 F2d 427, 429·430 (3d eir. 1941). The vee should provide the same result
under Section 4.21I(lXd). Since the draft is drawn on a person, not on a bank, the
collecting bank is authorized to take in settlement of the draft only "a cashier's check,
certified check or other bank check or Obligation." Section 4·211 (I )(d).
•• vee § 4·503(a).
'''vee § 4·202.
• G' ~e vee §§ 2·512, 2·513, 2-514.
17-23 LE'ITERS OF CREDIT , 17.03[2J

The draft may designate a referee, with whom the bank may consult for
instructions, in the event that the draft is dishonored by refusal either to payor
to accept.'02 The bank is not required to consult with the named referee, but ifit
does not, it must use diligence and good faith to discover the reason for the
draft's dishonor; it then must notify its customer of the dishonor and of the
results of its inquiry and must request further instructions. '03
The presenting bank has no obligation with respect to the goods represented
by the documents. The bank's only obligation is to follow "reasonable instruc-
tions seasonably received." In following such instructions, the bank has a right
to be reimbursed for any expenses it may incur, as well as a right to prepayment
or indemnity for its expenses.'M When a bank has given timely notice of dis-
honor to its customer and has requested instructions, and the customer does not
give the bank instructions within a reasonable time, the bank may "store, sell, or
otherwise deal with the goods in any reasonable manner."'· The bank will have
a lien upon the goods, or upon their proceeds, for its expenses in storing or
otherwise dealing with the goods.'M
A transferor of a bill of lading or other document of title normally makes
warranties to the transferee that the document is genuine and that the transferor
does not know of any fact detracting from the document's validity or value. '07
When a collecting bank transfers a bill oflading or a document oftitle as part ofa
documentary transaction, however, the bank does not make these warranties,
but warrants only that it is acting in good faith and that it has the necessary
authority to transfer the documents.'01 In determining the scope of the bank's
warranties, it makes no difference that the bank may have purchased the docu-
mentary draft or made advances against it.'01
Documentary drafts are frequently drawn against letters of credit. When
this occurs, additional responsibilities exist that are based on the obligations on
the letter of credit. no
In Aimor Electric Works. Ltd. v. Omaha National Bank,'" the court dis-
cussed the duties ofa bank engaged in collecting documentary drafts. The bank
acted as collecting bank for a Japanese seller, presenting drafts to the seller's
American customer for ninety days' acceptance. The bank also loaned funds to

'02 vee § 4-503(bl.

'03 rd.
'04 vee § 4-503.
'05 vee § 4-504(1 l.
'01 vee § 4-504(2).
107 vee § 7-507.
'01 vee § 7-508.
101 Id.
no These additional responsibilities are discussed in~" 17.01-17.02.
,., 727 F2d 688 (8th Cir. 1984).
1117.04 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 17-24

the American customer to enable the customer to pay for some ofthe shipments.
The loans were secured by the customer's accounts receivable, which the bank
required to be specially deposited. When the bank's actions in applying the
special deposit to reduce the outstanding loans caused the customer to lack funds
to payoff outstanding drafts to the Japanese seller, the seller sued the bank. The
seller claimed that the bank breached its fiduciary duty to disclose to the seller
that it had a conflict ofinterest because of its secured interest in the proceeds of
the buyer's accounts arising from the sale of the goods shipped. Allbough the
court conceded that the bank's status as collecting agent created a fiduciary
relationship to the seller, it held that the jury was adequately instructed on the
point, and there was no error in its verdict for the bank.

11 17.04 LETTERS OF CREDIT AND BANKRUPTCY

When the issuer of a letter of credit becomes insolvent, the rights of the
beneficiary to obtain payment may be challenged by creditors of the bank who
oppose payment of the letter of credit on terms other than those similar to the
rights of general creditors to share in the distribution of the assets of the bank.
The UCC contains an insolvency provision that seeks to treat letter of credit
transactions as "wash" transactions for purposes of insolvency on the theOry
that the bank is simply transmitting funds ofits customer when payment is made
to the beneficiary of the credit. 112 The UCC provision seeks to protect "any
funds or collateral" that is given either after or before the insolvency occurs and
that is given to pay drafts or demands under the credit or to serve as indemnity
for such payment.'1' To the extent that the insolvent bank is holding any such
funds or collateral, the persons entitled to draw under the letter of credit are
given the right to be paid in preference to "depositors or other general creditors
of the issuer or bank."no The UCC applies the same rule when no funds or
collateral is given to the bank if a specific agreement has been made for the
purpose of indemnifying the bank for payment of the credit that authorizes the
bank to "charge a general or current account" with the bank. 111 These insolvency
provisions expressly apply only in the cases of letters of credit where either a
bank is the issuer and the credit requires a documentary draft or documentary
demand or any person is the issuer and the credit requires the draft or demand
for payment to be accompanied by a document of title such as a bill oflading. 11I

11. uee § 5-117 & comment.

muce § 5-117(I)(a). If any pan of the credit is unused, the person supplying the
funds or collateral is entitled to its return. vec § 5·117( I)(b).
"'uee § 5-1 17(I)(a).
111 vee § 5- 117(1 )(c).
lIIVCC§§ 5·117, 5·102,
17·25 LETIERS OF CREDIT , 17.04

As state law, the UCC cannot dictate what occurs in bankruptcy because
that is a matter offederal law. The application of the federal bankruptcy law to
letter of credit obligations is discussed in Chapter 25.
 18
Alternative Payment
Systems: Bank Cards, Credit
Cards, and Electronic Fund
Transfers

, 18.01 Alternative Payment Systems Generally. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 18-3

II] Types of Transactions 18-3
Ia] Check Truncation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18·3
[b] Automated Oearinghouse Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-4
Ic] Book Entry Securities and Safekeeping Services. . . . • . . 18-5
[d] Wire Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-5
[eJ Automated Teller Machines ................. 18-6
{f] Point of Sale Terminals 18·6
[g] Home Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18·6
[h] Credit Cards 18·7
(2] Sources of Law ..............................•.. 18-7
, 18.02 Electronic Fund Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-8
[1] Soope of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 18-9
[2] Error Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-12
[3] Failure to Execute a Transfer or Stop Transfer Order
Properly 18-13
[4] Preauthorized Transfers and Stop Payment Rights 18-14
15J Suspension of Obligations to Third Parties. . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-15
[6J Disclosure and Notice Obligations " . . . .. 18-15
[al Initial Disclosure and Notice of Changes . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-16
(b] Documentation of Transfers Made·Through an
Electronic Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18.16
(c] Preauthorized Transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-17
[d] Periodic Statement of Account : .. 18-18
Ie) Notice of Error Resolution Procedures........ 18-19
(f] Documentation as Proof of Transfer .. .... .... ...•. 18·19

18·1
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-2

[7] MisceUaneous Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-19

[81 Issuing Access Cards .. 18-19
[9) Relation to State Law . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-21
[10] Enforcement Powers and Private Remedies. . . . . . . . . . • .. 18-22
[a] Administrative Enforcement. . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . .. 18-22
[b] Criminal Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-22
[c] Liability ofInstitutions , 18-23
\118.03 Bank Credit Cards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-24
[I] Truth-in-Lending Act Provisions ,. . . . . . . . • . . . .• 18-27
[2] Issuing Credit Cards. . . . • • . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. 18-28
[3] Preservation of Cardholder Oaims and Defenses. . . . . . . .• 18-28
[4] Prohibition Against Setoff of Obligations 18-31
[5] Wrongful Refusal to Extend Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-31
[6] Terms of Credit Card Plans Affecting Merchants and Others
Who Honor the Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-32
[7] Duty of Sellers to Notify Issuers of Returned Goods and
Other Credits " 18-32
[8] Credit Card Fraud " 18-33
f 18.04 Unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers and Credit Card
Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-33
[1} Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards " 18-34
[a] Statutory Rules and Regulation Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-34
[b] Defmition of "Unauthorized Use" ...........•.... 18-35
[iJ Loaning of the credit card " 18-37
[iiI Estranged spouses and other family members " 18-38
[iii] Lost and stolen cards 18-41
[iv] Employer-employee 18-41
[2] Unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers " 18-42
raj StalUtory Rules and Regulation E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. J8-42
[b) Definition of "Unauthorized Transfer" " 18-45
\I 18.05 Fund Transfers Not Regulated by the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, or the UCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18-47
[I] Regulation of Wire Transfers by the Federal Reserve System 18-50
[a] Basic Definitions " 18-50
[b] Authority of the Reserve Bank to Process Transfer " 18-52
[c] Procedures Governing Reserve Bank Transfers 18-53
[d] Liability of the Reserve Bank 18-54
Il) Bank Liability for Erroneous or Wrongful Fund Transfers " 18-56
[3] Proposed Revision of UCC to Cover Modem Payment
Systems " 18-60
[4] Check Truncation and Other Electronic Processing Methods
of Check Collection .•...................... : . . . .. 18-61
[5] Regulation of ACH Transactions 18-64
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 11 18.01(l)[a)
18·3

{6} Regulation of Direct Deposit Payments and Boole Entry

Securities Transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . • . . .. 18-66

1118.01 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS GENERALLY

11] Types of Transaction!
With the availability of sophisticated electronic technology, fmancial insti-
tutions have been developing new techniques that aid their customers in trans-
ferring funds, paying third parties, and drawing upon lines of credit. These
techniques offer the ability to move large sums of money rapidly and reliably to
distant points and multiple transferees. In addition, they have created opportu-
nities for cost savings by the depository institutions and payers who engage in
mass processing of fund transfers, while at the same time they have made
possible sophisticated programs of money management and control by the
customers of institutions having this capability. Consumen may enjoy quick
and convenient access to cash from savings and checking accounts and lines of
credit. Merchants and suppliers ofservices to consumers may receive faster and
more reliable payment with less costly processing ofthe payment instruments.
These alternative payment systems eliminate the physical transfer of paper
checks and rely instead upon electronic transmission and data-processing equip-
ment. The development ofthese systems is an ongoing process, but it is apparent
that these developments have brought, and will continue to stimulate, substan-
tial changes, not only in the way that depository institutions do business, but also
in the regulatory framework affecting these transactions.
This handbook does not attempt to provide a detailed discussion of elec-
tronic fund transfer systems.' However, a number of systems are in operation,
and these systems deserve brief mention.

[al Che'ck Truncation. Some banks have experimented with check truncation
systems in which checks are retained at various points in the bank collection
process, rather than being physically transferred to the payor bank and returned
to the customer after payment. Check truncation is discussed further, later in
this chapter. 2

1 There are several good general sources on the various forms ofelectronic payment
systems. The leading authority is N. Penney &. D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund
Transfer Systems (1980) (hereinafter Penney & Baker) and D. Baker &. R. Brandel, The
Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (1987 Cum. Supp.) (hereinafler Baker &
Brandel). See also M. Benfield & P. Alees, Commercial Paper and Alternative Payments
Systems (1987); F. Miller & A. Harrell, The Law of Modem Payment Systems and Notes
(1985); J. Vergari & V. Shue, Checks, Payments, and Electronic Banking.(1986).
2 See infra' 18.05. See generally Penney & Baker, supra note I, 1 2.01; Baker &
Brandel, supra note I, , 2.0 I.
, l~Ol(ll[b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-4

(b] Automated Clearinghouse Transactions. There are numerous automated

clearinghouses (ACHs). These clearinghouses engage in clearing functions simi-
lar to those involved in payment by paper checks, except that the information is
transferred electronically-usually on magnetic tape exchanged between mem-
ber banks of the clearinghouse-but also by direct electronic communication.
Although observers note that ACH transactions have not become as large in
volume as was initially predicted, transfers through the ACH system are sub-
stantial. The Federal Reserve System too provides ACH services.
Authorities estimate that the ACH network handled between 600 million
and 700 million transactions in 1985.3 The federal government probably
accounts for slightly more than half of the number of ACH transactions.' The
value ofACH transactions in 1983 amounted to about $1.4 trillion for private
transactions and $127.5 billion for government transactions.' Over 11,000
banks and over 4,000 thrifts are reported to be members in ACH associations.'
ACH transactions may include both credit and debit transactions. Credit
transactions involve direct payments to the bank accounts of the persons enti-
tled to payment. For example, a large employer may use ACH services to make
payroll payments to employees through direct credits to the accounts of the
employees at banks that are members of the ACH. Debit transactions also may
take place through the ACH system. A person with a bank account in a bank that
is a member of an ACH may authorize the bank in advance to transfer funds
from the account to pay various recurring obligations, such as mortgage pay-
ments, insurance payments, and utility bills.
The ACH Associations have developed rules for their clearing operations. A
national automated clearinghouse association (NACHA), formed in 1974, has
developed rules for interregional electronic fund transfer. 7 These rules are
enforceable as contracts between the members of the associations but cannot
override the regulations of the Board of Governors under the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act' or the general authority of the Board over payments systems. 9
The federal government has a direct deposit program, in which Social
Security and other benefit payments are credited directly to the accounts of
payees through use of automated clearinghouses.'o The federal government also
makes payments through ACH networks for interest on government securities,

3Baker & Brandel, supra note I, ~ 3.03[4) at S3-19.

tId. at S 3-16.
, Id.
, Id: at S 3-18.
T See Penney & Baker, supra note 1, ~ 3.03(3).

'The Electronic Fund Transfer Acl is discussed infra ff /8.02. .

9 See ~ I4.0 J [3)[c) for a discussion of the authority of the Board of Governors over
electronic payment systems.
10 See infra ~ J 8.05(6).
18·5 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.01[I)(dl

income tax refunds, payments to persons who do business with the ~ederal
government, payments to government employees, and many other. CIrcum-
stances." The U.S. Treasury has adopted regulations governing the direct
deposit program. 11 These federal regulations describe the procedures for making
payments through the ACH method, the obligations of the participants in the
transactions, and the liabilities oUmandal institutions to the U.S. government
when payments are made to persons not entitled to receive the payments, as may
occur when the recipients ofpayments are deceased or incompetent or when the
beneficiaries of federal benefit payments are deceased.
The Board of Governors regulates transfers through ACH services offered
by the Federal Reserve Banks, in its Regulation J and various operating cir-
culars."

[cl Book Entry Secorldes and Safekeeping Services. The Federal Reserve
provides book entry securities services for the U.S. Treasury and for certain
federal agencies. The Federal Reserve System also provides safekeeping services
for depository institutions. A depository institution may arrange for its Federal
Reserve bank to maintain custody of various U.S. agency securities, which may
be held by the Federal Reserve bank for custodial purposes or for the purpose of
collateralizing borrowings from the Federal Reserve or for deposits of public
funds held by theinstitution. The Federal Reset vel System will process transfers
of securities and related payments. The Federal Reserve System may make
securities transfers through electronic communications, through the Federal
Reserve's wire transfer system. Many of these transactions may be initiated
through on-line computer connections between the Federal Reserve bank and
the participating depository institution." Additionally, .the ACH network is
employed to credit interest and other payments related to these securities trans-
actions directly to the bank accounts of the securities owners.

[dl Wire Transrers. Large dollar amount transfers also are made electronically.
These transfers, for the most part, are made by large corporate parties and often
are referred to as wire transfers, or wholesale wire transfers. Typically, they are
transactions in which large amounts are involved and for which speed is impor-
tant. Many of these transfers relate to transactions in U.S. government securi-

See generally Baker & Brandel, supra note I, ~ 5.02.

11

"31 CFR pt. 210 (1988).

•3 12 CFR pt. 210, subpt. B (1987).

"See generally Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve
System-Purposes and Functions 110-111 (1984); Board of Governors of tbe Fed.
Reserve Sys., Annual Report 211-212 (1986). The U.S. Treasury has regulations gov-
erning the processing of transactions involving book entry securities. J 1 CFR pt. 357
(1987).
1I18.01(1)(e) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-6

ties. The Federal Reserve System provides such fund transfer services through
its FedWire network. These operations are discussed in Chapter 3. Another
network through which large dollar wire transfers may be made is known as
CHIPS, which stands for Clearinghouse Interbank Payment System. CHIPS is
operated by the New York Clearinghouse Association. ,$ An international net-
work for making electronic funds transfers of a similar nature is known as
SWIFr, the Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommuni-
cation.'·

[e] Automated Teller Machines. Customers may make transfers of funds

through noncheck transactions by use of an automated teller machine (ATM),
which is linked to the customer's bank. The ATM may be part of a network
established by the customer's own bank or it may be a part of an ATM system
shared by a group of banks over which different banks' transactions may be
processed. The operation ofATM networlc:s raises various regulatory questions,
including the application oflaws restricting branch and interstate banking; these
regulatory issues are discussed in Part 1 of this book. 17 Through the use of an
ATM, a customer may be able to instruct its bank to make payments of obliga-
tions to the bank such as mortgage payments, to transfer funds between different
accounts, to make deposits, to withdraw cash, and sometimes to m.ake payments
to third parties.

[I] Point of Sale Terminals. Payments to third-party vendors also may occur
through point ofsale (POS) terminals. In these systems, a terminal is located at a
merchant's place ofbusiness, which enables the customer to obtain direct access
electronically to his or her account at the bank in order to transfer funds from the
customer's account to an account of the merchant."

[gJ Home Banking. Home banking systems are systems that permit customers
to engage in banking transactions from their homes. Some such systems involve
giving instructions to the bank through the customer's telephone. Other systems
involve a more sophisticated array of services available through a computer
terminal located in the customer's home.

15 See generally Penney & Baker, supra note 1,19.04; Baker & Brandel, supra note 1,
11 9.04. .
1. See generally Penney & Baker, supra note I, ~ 9.05; Baker & Brandel, supra note I,
'119.05.
17 See generally Penney & Baker, supra note 1, ~ 6.01-6.04; Baker IL Brandel, supra
note I, ~ 6.01-6.04.
" See generally Penney & Baker, supra note 1 1 7.01; Baker & Brandel, supra note I,
11 7.01.
18-7 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.01(1)

[hI Credit Cards. Payments through credit cards mayor may not involve
electronic processing and transfers of funds. Credit card transactions are dis-
cussed in this chapter because the law relating to credit card transactions fre-
quently is important in consumer banking services that involve electronic fund
transfers. A bank card may permit tbe cardholder to engage in a number of
banking transactions that include both access to a credit line as well as access to a
checking or other account that may be directly debited. Additionally, payment
by credit card is in itself a significant method of consumer payment for goods
and services.
Although the discussion in this section has treated the various types of
alternative payment systems as if there were a clear separation between the
processing of paper checks and the electronic transfer of funds, the distinction
may become blurred as technological developments lead to the processing of
check collection by electronic communication methods. As discussed previously
in Chapter 14, the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System is under a
mandate from Congress to develop a more efficient system for check collection,
which utilizes electronic technology. In view of this mandate, it is reasonable to
expect that substantial changes will occur in the traditional forms of handling
check collections and payments. Some of the legal questions associated with
these changes are discussed in this chapter. 11

(2) Sources of Law

While there is no comprehensive regulation of electronic fund transfer
systems comparable to that provided by Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for negotiable instruments and bank collections, efforts are under-
way to amend the UCC to provide for these new payment systems." The UCC
itself, in Articles 3 and 4, generally applies to "negotiable instruments" and
"items," neither of which contemplates an electronically transmitted payment
order. 2 ' Nevertheless, since the UCC provides the general framework ofJegal
regulation for bank collection and payment, it will doubtless serve as a source of
law, at least by analogy, for resolving problems associated with electronic fund
transfers. 22

11 See also the discussion of check truncation in 1 20.12[2].

20See discussion of effons to amend the UCC at 1I14.01[2}.
2' See Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank, 790 F2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986). In Evra
Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 459 US 1017 (1982),
the court said, "Maybe the language of Article 4 could be stretched to include electronic
fund transfers, see section 4·102(2), but they were not in the contempl,ation of the
draftsmen." See also Delbl1leck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
. 22 Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank, 790 F2d 407, 409(Sth Cir. 1986), followed
thIS approach.
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-8

In 1978, Congress enacted the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. Although this
act is not a comprehensive treatment ofelectronic fund transfers, it does provide
guidelines for dealing with certain important problems. The federal act primar-
ily applies to consumers, that is, natural persons, thus leaving a broad area of
commercial transfers uncovered by the act. n The act establishes disclosllre
requirements and rules for documenting transactions. It also contains provi-
sions for dealing with preauthorized transfers, resolving errors made by the
fmancial institution, determining liability for unauthorized transfers and failure
to make transfers as instructed, and distributing liability for malfunctioning
systems that affect underlying customer obligations. These subjects are dis-
cussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System bas implemented
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act with its Regulation E.2' 118lso has promulgated
an extensive Official Staff Commentary on the regulations, which gives specific
answers to questions ofinterpretation ofthe act and its regulations. 25 In addition
to Regulation E, the Board has adopted rules in its Regulation J to deal with
other aspects of wire transfers. 2I Further Board regulation may be expected. as
the Board adopts rules to carry out the mandates ofCongress under the Compet-
itive Equality Banking Act of 1987 to improve the efficiency of the nation's
payment systems. 27 The Board also has issued other rules and policy statements
relating to electronic transfers of various kinds.' Some of the more significant
statements include policies designed to reduce the risk of payment failure to the
payments system and policies designed to eliminate float in payment
transactions.
Additional federal statutes cover other aspects of electronic fund transfer
transactions. When credit transactions are involved, federal consumer statutes,
such as the Truth-in-Lending Act, may be relevant. States, too, may regulate
electronic fund transfers, as long as the regulation is not inconsistent with the
federal Act. 21 State law may afford consumers greater protection than the federal
act. a

1118.02 ELECIRONIC FUND TRANSFERS

The term "electronic fund transfer" often is used in a general sense to refer
to any transaction with a financial institution in which debits or credits are made

23 15 USC §§ 1693. 1693a(5) (1982).

,. 12 CFR pt. 205 (1988).
,. Id. at Supp. II.
,. 12 CFR pI. 210. subpt. B (1988).
21 See discussion at f 14.01[3J(c).

26 15 USC § 1693q (1982).

"Id.
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.02[1)
18·9

to the accounts ofcustomers and where data is communicated ai least in part by

some form of electronic media, without the processing of a paper instrument
such as a check ordeposit slip. In this general sense, the term may be used to refer
to transactions at ATMs and POS terminals, ACH transfers, systems of check
truncation, telephone payment arrangements, and large dollar wire transfers
between corporate customers over FedWire, CHIPS, SWIFr, or other networks.
This popular usage must be distinguished from the legal classifications created
by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. This act, discussed later, is limited in scope
to only some of the types of transactions identified here.

(1] Scope ofthe Electronic Fund Tr8llsler Act

For the purposes of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, an electronic fund
transfer is defined as a "transfer offunds, other than a transaction originated by
check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an elec-
tronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer, or magnetic tape so as to
order, instruct, or authorize a fmancial institution to debit or credit an
account.":10 The definition thus does not reach the typical checking transaction
that would be covered by the UCC. It also does not cover check truncation
arrangements because these transactions are at least "originated by check."
The federal act further provides that the term "electronic fund transfer" is
to be understood to include, but not be limited to, point of sale transfers,
automated tcller machine transactions, direct deposit or withdrawal of funds,
aud transfers initiated by telephone.s, Under the definitions adopted by the aet,
the act covers the use of cash-dispensing machines, POS terminals, and ATMs,
because all of these expressly qualify as electronic terminals. s2
In 1984, the Board amended its Regulation E to add to the definition "all
transfers resulting from debit card transactions, including those that do not
involve an electronic terminal at the time of the transaction."ss The act does not
cover the following:
1. Check guarantee or authorization systems that do not directly debit or
credit consumer's accounts;s<
2. Fund transfers between depository institutions or Federal Reserve
banks, other than ACH transfers offunds held at Federal Reserve banks

30
15 USC § 1693a(6) (1982). The Board ofGovemors of the Federal Reserve System
has issued regulations under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, as well as interpretations
of those regulations. 12 CFR pt. 205 (1988) (Regulation E); 12 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II
(1988) (Official Staff Interpretations).
Sl 15 USC § 1693a(6) (1982).
Sf 15 USC § 1693a(7) (1982).
0.'1 12 CFR § 205.2(&) (1988).
s. 15 USC § 1693a(6XA) (198'2); 12 CFR § 205.3 (1988).
, 18.02[11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-10

or other depository institutions and which are not "designed primarily to

transfer funds on behalf of a consumer";u this exempts transfers over
FedWire and similar networks used "primarily for transfers between
financial institutions or between businesses."·
3. Transactions where the "primary purpose" is to buy or sell securities
through registered or regulated broker-dealers;"
4. Automatic transfers between savings accounts and checking accounts
under an agreement with a consumer in which the institution covers
overdrafts or maintains a minimum balance in the consumer's demand
deposit account;"
S. Transfers, initiated by a telephone conversation between a consumer
and a financial institution, that are not undertaken pursuant to a pre-
arranged plan in which periodic or recurring transfers are
contemplated;--
6. Any trust account held by a financial institution under a bona fide trust
agreement;40
7. Certain preauthorized transfers to small financial institutions}'
Regarding the exclusion for telephonic transfers offunds that are not made
as part of a prearranged plan or agreement, the federal Court ofAppeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that this exclusion from coverage means that a consumer
account holder cannot sue a financial institution under the act for wrongfully
charging the customer's account in response to a telephone instruction from a
person other than the customer. Although the customer might have an action
under state law for conversion or breach of contract based on the customer's
deposit agreement with the institution, the customer was held to have no remedy
under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act}2
The act applies to all financial institutions, state or federal, including banks,
savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, or other
institutions that hold consumer accounts. c, It also includes anyone "who issues

35
15 USC § 1693a(6}(B) (1982).
31
12 CFR § 20S.3(b) (1988).
)7 15 USC §§ 1693a(b), 1693a(c) (1982).

.. Id at (6XD).
3' Id at (6XE).
... 12 CFR § 205.3(1) (1988).
c, 12 CFR § 205.3(g} (l988).
C2 Kashanchi v. Te~as Commerce Medical Bank, 703 F2d 936, 942 (5th Cir. 1983).
See also Abyaneh v. Merchants Bank, 670 F. Supp. 1298, 1300{MD Pa. 1987), where the
court held that a telephone call from a swindler, which initiated a wire transfer. was an
exempt transaction so the true owner of the account had no remedy under the act.
43 15 USC § 1693a(8)( 1982).
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.02[1]
18-11

an access device and agrees with a consumer to provide electronic fund ~nsfer
services."~ As previously indicated, the act applies to consumer transactions. A
Consumer is defined as a "natural person," and thus, does not include corpora-
tions, trusts, or other artificial entities. U . ,
Although debit cards and other cards used to obtain access to a customer s
account are covered by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Board's
regulation," the Truth-in-Lending Act covers transactions involving credit
cards.'7 When the same card provides access to a consumer's deposit account for
the purposes of making debits or credits, and also allows the consumer to draw
on a line of credit or other credit feature, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and
Regulation E will cover aspects of transactions that fall within the deftnition of
an electronic fund transfer while the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z will
cover those aspects relating to the credit feature.'·
Even so, occasions will arise when it is unclear which body oflaw applies.
The Board's staff has taken the position that when a combination credit
card/access device is used to obtain unauthorized cash advances from a line of
credit at an automated teller machine, the consumer liability provisions of
Regulation Z under the Truth-in-Lending Act will apply, because the advances
"do not involve a consumer asset account" so that there would not be an
electronic fund transfer. o, On the other hand, if the unauthorized transfers
accomplished through the use of a combination card were from a checking
account, which resulted in a cash advance from an overdraft line of credit, the
Board's view is that Regulation E applies because the transfer was an electronic
fund transfer. As the Board explains, "there was an extension of credit only as a
consequence of the overdraft protection feature on the checking account. "110
However, if the same card is used to make unauthorized withdrawals from the
checking account and the line of credit, separately, both Regulation E and
Regulation Z will apply. 51

.012 CFR § 205.2{i) (1988).

45
15 USC § I693a(5)( 1982).
"IS USC § I 693a(6){A) (1982); 12 CFR § 205.2(g) (1988). See generally Brandel &
Olliff, "The EFT Act: A Primer," 30 Ohio St. U 531 (1979); Connors, "The Implementa-
tion ofthe Electronic Fund Transfer Act: An Update of Regulation E," 17 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 329 (1981); Vergari, "Anicles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code in an
Electronic Fund Transfer Environment," 17 San Diego L. Rev. 287 (1980); Notes, "EFT
Act," 58 Or. L. Rev, 363 (1979); "Electronic Fund Transfers: Regulation E and the Riflht
to Financial Privacy," 16 Gonzaga L. Rev, 313 (1981); Symposium, "Electronic Fund
Transfers," '37 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 613 (1976).
0'12 CFR § 205.5(c) (l988).
"Id.
0'12 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.611 6-9 (1988).
SOld.
"Id.
'l18.02(2} NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-12

[2} Error Resolution

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act establishes procedures to assist a con-
sumer in obtaining an investigation, a review, and a resolution, by the account-
holding £mancial institution, when the consumer believes that there has been an
error in the statement of the consumer's account as a result of an electronic fund
transfer transaction.·2 After the consumer notifies the institution of an alleged
error, the institution has a duty to investigate to determine whether an error has
occurred, and to report its fmdings to the customer within ten business days.5:l
The institution may require that the customer give written confirmation of the
alleged error ifit notifies the customer ofthis requirement when the oral notice is
given to the bank.·' When the institution determines that an error occurred, it
must correct the error within one business day after it comes to that determina-
tion, and such correction must include the crediting of interest when
applicable. 55
The fmancial institution may avoid the ten-day deadline by giving the
consumer provisional credit for the amount claimed to be in error while it
completes its investigation.· Under this approach, the investigation must be
concluded within forty-five days, but the customer must have full use of the
funds provisionally credited under this procedure. 51 When the financial institu-
tion concludes that there was no error, it must deliver a written explanation ofits
finding to the consumer within three business days after it has concluded its
investigation. 57

52
15 USC § 1693f(1982).
53 IS usq 1693(1)(a)( 1982).
5'Id.
5! 15 USC § I 693nb) (1982).
·'\.5 USC § I 693nc) (1982).
57 15 USC § 1693nd) (1982). Bank's customer notified bank that she believed an error
had been made in transfers from her account to pay monthly premiums on a life insurance
policy under a preauthorized transfer plan. On two occasions the bank transferred funds.
although the transfer created overdrafts in the customer's account. A bank officer checked
the complaint, determined that no error had been made (because although the bank made
two transfers in October, one of those was for the previous month's payment), and
telephoned the customer with an explanation of the matter. The customer treated the
matter as unresolved and brought suit against the bank under the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act. The court held that although no error occurred with respect to the cus-
tomer's checking account, the bank violated Section 908(d) of the act, which requires that
the financial institution investigate and "deliver or mail to consumer an explanation ofits
findings" at the end of its investigation, and inform the customer of her right to obtain
copies of the documents on which the bank relied. Oral notification is not sufficient.
There was no indication of bad faith on the part of any party so the treble damage
provisions did not apply. Although the act requires finding civil liability; the court noted
that the customer may well have benefited from the bank's action as the bank paid the
premium althOUgh it had no obligation to cover her overdraft. This situation could be one
for the district court to exercise its discretion to award only nominal damages and a
18-13 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 118.02131

The financial institution will be liable to the consumer for treble damages if
a court finds that the financial institution has (1) knowin&lY and willfully con-
cluded that the consumer's account was not in error when it was unreasonable to
draw this conclusion from the evidence available; (2) failed to credit the con-
sumer's account provisionally within the ten-day period mentioned; and (3)
either did not make a good-faith investigation of the error or did not have a
reasonable basis for believing that the account was not in error."
Errors subject to this resolution procedure-include unauthorized electronic
fund transfers, incorrect electronic fund transfers to-or from-the consumer's
account, omissions from the consumer's statement of electronic fund transfers
affecting the account, computational errors, receipt of incorrect amounts of
money from an electronic terminal, consumer requests for information or clari-
fication about an electronic fund transfer, and other errors prescribed by regula-
tions of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.11 Because
unauthorized transfers are errors, the financial institution has a duty to investi-
gate them, as it does in the case ofother errors. Although the act could be clearer
in this matter, it appears that when the financial institution determines that an
unauthorized transfer has been made, the institution does not have to recredit
the account if it can sustain the burden of proving tbat the consumer was liable
for the amount of the unauthorized transfer. 1O
Error resolution procedures are provided under the Truth-in-Lending Act,
as well. When an electronic fund transfer also involves an extension of credit
under an agreement whereby the financial institution extends credit to cover an
overdraft in the consumer's account or to maintain a minimum balance in a
consumer's account, the Board's regulations specify that the error resolution
procedures under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act shall govern, rather than
those under the Truth-in-Lending Act."

{3] Failure to Execute a Transfer or Stop Transfer Order Properly

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act makes a financial institution liable for
failing to transfer funds in some circumstances that are comparable to those in
which a bank wrongfully dishonors a check. 12 The act makes a financial institu-
tion liable "for all damages proximately caused by ... the financial institution's
failure to make an electronic fund transfer, in accordance with the terms and

reasonable attorney's fec to mitiaate the results of strict liability for a "technical and
nondamaging violation." Bishey v. DC Nat'l Bank, 793 F2d 31S, 317-318 (DC Cir.
1986).
51 15 USC § I693fte) (1982).
51 15 USC § I693ft!) (1982).
8. 15 USC § I 693flb) (1982).
&1 12 CFR ~ 205.1 t(i) (1988).
• 2 15 USC § I693h(a){2) (1982).
, 18.02[41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-14

conditions of an aecoullt, in the correct amount or in a timely manner when

properly instructed to do so by the consumer ... '>S3 The institution is not liable,
however, if the consumer's account has insufficient funds, if there is an encum-
brance or effective legal process that restricts transfers from the account, if the
transfer exceeds the credit limit established for the account, if an electronic
terminal lacks sufficient cash to complete the transaction, or otherwise as pro-
vided by the Board's regulations."
The financial institution will be liable under the federal act in other situa-
tions as well, such as when the institution (1) fails to make an electronic fund
transfer, because it has previously failed to credit a deposit of funds to the
consumer's account that would have provided sufficient funds for the transfer"
(this provision is broad enough to cover failure to credit deposits which are made
by means other than electronic fund transfers) or (2) fails to stop payment on a
preauthorized transfer from the consumer's account, which the consumer prop-
erly instructed the institution not to pay."
Unlike the rules for wrongful dishonor in the UCC, the fmancial institution
has an absolute defense to liability, if it can show that its failure resulted from
circumstances beyond its control, and that it exercised reasonable diligence or
that the failure was caused by a technical malfunction known to the consumer at
the time of attempting to initiate the electronic fund transfer"7 When the
institution makes an unintentional good faith error, the act, consistent with the
UCC provisions on wrongful dishonor, limits the liability of the institution to
"actual damages proved."··

[4] Preauthorized Transfers and Stop Payment Rights

It is necessary under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act for preauthorized
transfersjrom a consumer's account to be authorized in writing. A copy of the
authorization must be provided to the consumer when the authorization is
made." When the amounts of the transfers from the consumer's account vary,
the financial institution or the payee, before each transfer, must provide notice
to the consumer of the amount, and must date the transfer that will be
completed. 70

.315 USC § 1693h(a)(l) (1982).

14Id. .
• 5 15 USC § 1693h(a)(2) (1982).
"15 USC § 1693h(a)(3) (1982).
• 7 15 USC § 1963h(b) (1982).

"15 USC § 1693h(c) (1982).

·'15 USC § 1693e(a) (1982).
70
15 USC § 1693e(b) (1982).
18-15 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM '1118.02161

The act gives a consumer the right to stop payment of any preauthorized
transfer. The consumer need only notifY the institution orally or in writing, at
any time up to three business days before the scheduled date of the transfer. 11
The institution is entitled to require written confmnation of any oral notifica-
tion within fourteen days of oral notification, if the consumer is told of this
requirement at the time the consumer gives the ora! notice.'1
The act also has notice roles that apply to certain recurring preauthorized
electronic fund transfers that result in a credit to a consumer's account. U These
notice requirements are discussed later in thill chapter. n

[5) Suspension of Obligations to Third Parties

Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, a person who has agreed to accept
payment by means of an electronic fund transfer may not claim that the con-
sumer is in default of an obligation if a malfunction in the system prevents
making the transfer.n The consumer's obligation is "suspended" until the mal-
function is corrected. '1 The person to whom payment was to be made may revive
the obligation, however, by making a written demand for payment after the
malfunction has occurred.17

l6] Disclosure and Notice Obligations

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act requires various disclosures and notices
to be given to the consumer. These notices may be grouped into the following
categories:
1. An initial disclosure statement at the time the consumer enters into an
agreement with the institution for the electronic fund transfer service;"
Z. Notification of changes in the terms or conditions of the consumer's
account;"
3. Annual notice oferror resolution procedures or periodic notices in lieu of
the annual notice;"D

71 15 USC § I 69k(a) (1982).

121d.

7115 USC § I 693d(b)(1 982).

"See infra ~ 18.02{611c).
75 15 USC § I 693j (1982).
711d. See UCC § 3-802, comment 3.
71 15 USC § I693j (1982).
"15 USC § I 693c(a)( 1982); 12 CFR § 205.7 {I 988).
"IS USC § I693c(b) (1982); 12 CFR § 205.8(a) (1988).
ID 12 CFR § 250.8(b) (1988).
'II 18.02(6][a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-16

4. Documentation of transfers initiated at electronic terminals;"

5. Periodic statement of the consumer account;12
6. Notices with respect to preauthorized transfers to and from a consumer
account. n

(a) Initial Disclosure and Notice of Cbanaes. Under the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, the fmancial institution providing the service must disclose to the
consumer, at the time of contracting for the fund transfer service or before
making the fIrst electronic fund transfer involving the consumer's account, the
following: (I) information bearing on the consumer's liability for unauthorized
transfers; (2) the procedures for giving notice of unauthorized transfers; (3) the
charges that will be made; (4) the consumer's right to stop payment of
preauthorized transfers; (5) the consumer's right to documentation oftransfers;
(6) the institution's liability for failure to fonow the provisions ofthe act; and (7)
the circumstances under which the institution will disclose information, con·
cerning the consumer's account, to third persons."
When there is any change in the terms ofthe consumer's account that affects
these matters, the consumer must be notifIed in writing prior to the change!1
The act and the Board's regulations prescribe deadlines for giving this notice.

(b) Documentation of Transfers Made Through an Electronic Terminal.

When an electronic fund transfer is made from an electronic terminal, the
fInancial institution must provide the customer with written documentation of
the transfer." The fInancial institution must make available to the consumer a
"written receipt," and this receipt must be available "at the time an electronic
fund transfer is initiated ... ".. The receipt must set forth the amount and date,
as well as the type oftransfer, the identity ofthe consumer's account, the identity
ofany third party to whom the funds were transferred, and the identification of
the terminal used.
The definition of what constitutes an electronic terminal broadly includes
any "electronic device, other than a telephone operated by a consumer, through

11 IS USC § 1693d(a)(1982); 12 CFR § 205.9(a), (I) (1988).

12
15 USC §§ 1693d(c)-l693d(e) (1982); 12 CFR §§ 205.9(b)-205.9(d), 205.9(h)
(1988).
13
15 USC § 1693e (1982); 12 CFR § 205.10 (1988).
"IS USC § I 693c(a) (1982). The contents ortbe disclosure are specified in 12 CFR
§ 205.7 (1988).
illS USC § I693c(b)( 1982).
• 1 IS USC § I693d(a) (1982).
17
12 CFR § 205.9(a) (1988). The receipt must be written and cannot consist of a
display on the screen of the terminal. 12 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.9, 1 9-3 (1988).
IS-17 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.01(611cl

which a consumer may initiate an electronic fund transfer...• Thus, the term
includes POS terminals, ATMs, and cash-dispensing machines. I' Transfers
using such devices are subject to the documentation requirements. However,
transfers accomplished by a consumer from a telephone at home do not fall
within this particular documentation rule, although other disclosures with
respect to the consumer's account are applicable. The Board's regulations per-
mit a financial institution to make arrangements for third parties, such as
merchants or other institutions, to make the receipt available, but the account
holding financial institution remains legally responsible for seeing that the
receipt is available.III
Home banking systems permit a consumer to use a computer terminal or
television set located in the home to communicate with the financial institution
for the purpose of making transfers from the consumer's accounts. Although
such home banking terminals fall within the literal scope of the Board's defini-
tion of an electronic terminal, and transactions initiated through them are
electronic fund transfers, the Board's staff takes the position that these home
banking transactions are not subject to the documentation rules requiring the
institution to make available a written receipt to the consumer at the time the
consumer initiated the transfer. The staff reasons that the home banking equip-
ment is "analogous to a telephone in function" and so should have the benefit of
the exemptions for consumer use ofhome telephones, from the electronic termi-
nal definition and the terminal receipt requirement. II

(cl Preauthorlzed Transfers. Preauthorized transfers also are subject to docu-

mentation requirements." When the preauthorized transfer involves a credit to
a consumer account by electronic funds transfer from the same payor on a
recurring basis, the financial institution has an obligation to provide notice to
the consumer of the credit, except where the payor provides positive notice to
the consumer that the transfer has been initiated.n When the institution has the
obligation to give notice to the consumer, there are three options: (l) transmit-
ting by oral or written notice within two business days ofthe transaction that the
transfer has occurred; (2) transmitting· oral or written notice to the consumer
within two business days after the date on which the transfer was scheduled to
occur that the transfer did not occur; or (3) providing to the consumer a readily
available telephone line for his or her use, to ascertain whether or not the transfer

II 12 CFR § 205.2(h) (1988).

"ld.
10
12 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.919-2 (1988).
I' 12 CFR pI. 205, Supp. II, § 205.2 , 2·23 (1988).

12 IS USC §§ 1693d(b), 1693e (1982); 12 CFR § 205.10 (1988).

I> 12 CFR § 205. J O(a) (1988).
11 18.02(6](d) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18·18

occurred, so long as tbe telephone number is disclosed to the consumer on the

initial disclosures and periodic statements to the consumer."
When preauthorized electronic fund transfers are made/rom a consumer's
account, the consumer must flI'St receive a copy of the authorization of the
preauthorized transfers. II In cases where a preauthorized transfer varies in
amount from the previous transfer relating to the same authorization or
preauthorized amount, the institution or the payee involved must give written
notice to the consumer ofthe amount and scheduled date ofthe transfer, at least
ten days before the scheduled transfer date." The consumer may elect to limit
notice of changes to circumstances in which the amount of the transfer fails to
fall within a specified range ofamounts or differs from tbe most recent transfer
by a specific agreed upon amount. IT

(d) Periodic Statement of Account. A financial institution is under an obliga·

tion to deliver a periodic statement ofaccount for "any account to or from which
electronic fund transfers can be made ... ,," The statement must be delivered
monthly or for a shorter cycle in which an electronic fund transfer has occurred;
in the event that no transfer has occurred, a statement must be delivered at least
quarterly."
The statement must include information as to each electronic fund transfer
occurring during the time cycle, the amount ofthe transfer and proper transfer
charges, the date the transfer was credited or debited to the account, the type of
transfer and type of accounts involved in the transfer, the place at which the
consumer used an electronic terminal, information as to the location of the
terminal, the name of third parties to whom or from whom funds were trans·
ferred (this does not apply to checks deposited to the consumer's account at an
electronic terminal), the number of the consumer's accounts for which the
statement is issued, the amount of fees or charges assessed against the account,
beginning and ending balances in the account, a telephone number and address
to be used by the consumer to give notice oferrors, ifthe alternative ofproviding
error disclosure information in the periodic statement is elected, and the tele-
phone number to use to determine whether a preauthorized transfer has
occurred, if the institution elects to use that procedure.'oo
The Board has further regulations that apply to certain passbook accounts.
nonpassbook accounts that are accessed only by preauthorized transfers to the

MId.
1112 CFR § 20S.IO(b) (1988).
H 12 CFR § 20S.IO(d) (1988).
1TId.
H 12 CFR § 20S.9(b) (1988).

"Yd.
'00 Id.
18-19 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM V18.02[8J

account, and certain

, intrainstitutional transfers between accounts of the con-
sumer at the same fmancial institution.'·'

(eJ Notice of Error Resolution Procedures, The initial disclosure statement

must provide the consumer with infonnation about procedures to follow in the
case of errors or of questions the consumer may have about electronic transfers
involving the consumer's account. Such information must include the financial
institution's telephone number and address at which the consumer may contact
the institution to obtain answers to the consumer's question.'02 The financial
institution must make sure that the consumer receives this infonnation periodi-
cally, by mailing to the consumer at least once every calendar year the same
notice for each account from or to which an electronic transfer can be made.'03
Alternatively, the financial institution may elect to follow a different procedure.
In lieu of sending the annual notice, the institution may mail or deliver a similar
notice as part or with each periodic statement required by the regulations.'M

(I] Documentation as Proof of Transfer. The documentation of an electronic

fund transfer as required by the act in the periodic statement, or other documen-
tation of transfer, is admissible as evidence in any legal proceeding that the
transfer was made and, according to the act, "shall constitute prima facie proof
that such transfer was made."'01

(7J Miscellaneous Restrictions

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act forbids any person from conditioning a
grant ofcredit to a consumer on that consumer's agreement to repay by means of
a preauthorized electronic fund transfer.'01 It also prohibits anyone from requir-
ing a consumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic fund transfers
with a particular institution as a condition of employment or of receipt of a
government benefit.'01

(8J Issuing Access Cards

Tlie Electronic Fund Transfer Act limits the circumstances under which a
bank or other institution may send bank cards or other means of access to

'·'12 CFR § 20S.9(e), 20S.9(d), 205.9(h) (1988).

,.212 CFR § 205. 7(a)(1 0) (1988).
I.' 12 CFR § 205.8(b) (1988).
'·"d.
'0$15 USC § I693d(f) (1982).
'01 15 USC § 1693k (1982).
'·'(d.
1118.02(8] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-20

consumers on an unsolicited basis.'01 It is permissible to send a card or other

access device to a consumer in response to a request or application of the
consumer, and to renew or replace already-issued cards that the consumer has
accepted.'01 .
In order to send a card on an unsolicited basis to the consumer, the institu-
tion must distribute cards that are not validated. This means that the card may
not be used to initiate an electronic fund transfer without some further step
taken by the consumer to validate the card."· In addition, the institution must
make disclosure to the consumer of his or her rights and liabilities, as discussed
previously in this chapter. It must provide a clear explanation that the card has
not been validated and of what must be done to dispose of the card if the
consumer so desires. The card must be able to be validated "only in response to a
request or application from the consumer, (and] upon verification of the con·
sumer's identity."'" Accompanying the card, there must be a "complete disclo-
sure" of the matters covered by the initial disclosure statement, to give an
explanation "ofthe consumer's rights and liabilities that will apply if the access
device is validated."'"
Cards sent to renew or to substitute for cards previously issued may be sent
on an unsolicited basis, only when the original card was one that was "accepted"
by the consumer. 111 An accepted card is one that the consumer has "requested
and received or has signed or has used, or authorized another to use. "'\4
As noted previously, when an unsolicited card is sent to a consumer, it
cannot be a validated card. This means that it may not be a card that can be used
to initiate an electronic fund transfer without further action by the consumer.
The consumer must request or apply for validation of the card through a proce-
dure that will verify the consumer's identity.1tS One method of implementing
these provisions· is for the issuing institution to refrain from sending the con-
sumer a personal identification number (PIN) with the card, and to require that
the consumer subsequently acquire such a number to validate the card.
The Truth-in-Lending Act also contains rules dealing with the distribution
of credit cards. These rules may overlap with those in the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act on the issuance of access cards, when the card combines features of
both a credit card and an access card. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act does not

'Of 15 USC § [693i(b)( 1982). See generally 12 CFR § 205.5 (1988).

,.. 15 USC § 1693i(a) (1982).
11·15 USC § [693i(c) (1982).
", 15 USC § 1693i(b)(4) (1982).
112 12 CFR § 205.05(b)(2) (1988).

113 15 USC § 1693i(aX2) (1982).

14
' 15 USC§ 1693a(1)(1982).
I1S 15 USC § 1693i(bX4) (1982).
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.02(91
18-21

contain any provision that clarifies which rules apply when these rules overlap.
The Board however, has adopted regulations on this point.".
An el~tronic fund transfer may involve an extension of credit. When this
occurs, the Truth-in-Lending Act may apply. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
however, makes clear that its provisions are to govern a consumer's liability for
unauthorized electronic fund transfer and an extension ofcredit, pursuant to an
agreement between the consumer and the fmancial institution that credit will be
111
extended when the consumer's account is overdrawn.
A consumer's liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfer may be
limited even more than is provided by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. The
consumer and the fmancial institution are authorized to enter into an agreement
that further limits the consumer's liability. Additionally, under the federal act,
any "other applicable law," including state law, that limits the consumer's
liability must be given effect.'"
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act has been implemented by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Regulation E. In addition, national
ba~ may be concerned with regulations issued by the Comptroller of the
Currency.'" Federal Savings and Loan Associations will be concerned with
regulations adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that deal with
remote service units and transactions involving POS transfers or ATMs.'·

19) Relation to State Law

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides that state laws relating to elec-
tronic fund transfers are invalid only to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the federal act. tal It expressly provides that state law may give consumers greater
protection than the federal act affords. Thus, state law may limit the liability of
consumers for unauthorized electronic fund transfers beyond that granted under
the federal act.
When questions arise as to whether a state law is consistent with the federal
act, a procedure is provided by which the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System may rule on the matter. In cases where the Board determines
that state law is inconsistent with the federal act, financial institutions will be

"6 12 CFR §§ 205.5(c), 205.6(d), 226.12(g) (1988).

'" 15 USC § 1693g(c) (1982).
". 15 USC § 1693g(d) (1982).
". See generally 12 CFR pI. 7 (1988).
!:"Under 12 CFR § 533.1 (1988), Regulation E applies to any memberoflhe Federal
Home Loan Bank system. See also 12 CFR §§ 545.141 (FHLBB, remqte service units),
545.142 (FHLBB, home banking service) (1988).
10' 15 USC § 1693q (1982).
11 18.02[10)[a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18·22

immune from any liability under the state law, even if it is later determined that
the Board's ruling was erroneous.'22

[10) Enforcement Powers and Private Remedies

[aj Administrative Enforcement. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System has the authority to prescribe regulations to implement the
purposes ofthe Electronic Fund Transfer Act.'23 These regulations are contained
in its Regulation E. '2' The Board also has the authority to issue model clauses
that fmancial institutions may use to comply with the disclosure requirements of
the act.,25 Use of these model clauses will constitute a defense to an action
brought against the institution to impose civil liability for violation of the
disclosure requirements.'"
Powerto administer the Electronic Fund Transfer Act is given, in the case of
national banks, to the Comptroller of the Currency and, in the case of member
banks ofthe Federal Reserve System that are not national banks, to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In the case of banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System but which are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, power is given to the Board of Directors ofthe
FDIC. The FHLBB and tbe Administrator of the National Credit Union have
comparable administrative responsibilities for the institutions under their
authority.'"'
The act does not exempt creditors from complying with state consumer
credit laws unless the state law is inconsistent with the federal act. Effective
Aprill, 1982, the act provides that the Board ofGovernors may, upon applica-
tion of a creditor, rule whether a state law is inconsistent with the federal act.
When the Board determines that a state provision is inconsistent, creditors are
required to follow the Board's interpretation, and will not incur liability under
the state law, even though the Board's determination later may be judged to be in
error. ""

[bI Criminal Enforcement. Willful violation ofthe act carries criminal penal-
ties. Violations may result in a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for
not more than one year or both. 12.

'" Id.
103 15 USC § 1693b (1982).
I •• 12 CFR pt. 205 (1988).
'25 Id.
121
15 USC § 1693m(d) (1982).
127 15 USC § 16930 (1982).
""IS USC § 1610(a) (1982).
"" 15 USC § 1611 (1982).
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM II 18.02(10Jlc)
18·23

The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 establishes substantial fedoral penalties
offmes and imprisonment for engaging in intentionally fraudulent transactions
with credit cards and other access devices. The act applies to persons who
produce, use, or traffic in counterfeit devices, to those who use unauthorized
devices, and to the knowing possession with intent to defraud of''fifteea or more
devices which are counterfeit or unauthorized." The act defines "access device"
broadly to include "any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of
account access" that may be used by itself or with another device "to initiate a
transfer of funds. "'10
Use of an unauthorized access device with intent to defraud violates the
federal Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, and may subject the user to criminal
penalties ofa fmc of "the greater of $10,000 or twice tbe value obtained by the
offense or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both," and greater
penalties in the event of multiple convictions.'"' Even stiffer penalties exist for
certain cases in which there is intentional fraud involving one who "produces,
uses, or traffics" in a counterfeit device, or with similar intent "produces,
traffics in, has control or custody of, or possesses device-making equipment. ",:12
The penalties go up to $100,000 and/or twenty years for certain repeat
offenders. '33

(c) liability of Institutions. Except as limited with respect to errors treated

under the error resolution procedures, a financial institution will be liable to
consumers for failure to comply with the Electronic Fund Transfer Act for actual
damages, costs, and attorney fees and, when the action has been brought by an
individual, for an amount not less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.'30 When
the action is brought as a class action, tbe minimum recovery limits are not
applicable to members of the class, and the total recovery of the class for the
same failure to comply with the act may not exceed the lesser of one percent of
the defendant's net worth, or $500,000.1:11 The court is directed to take into
account in fixing the amount of liability the frequency, persistence, nature, and
willfulness of the noncompliance. ' :N1
Good faith is a defense to actions brought to impose liability under the

13. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1601-1603, 98th Cong., 2p Sess. (l984)(amending 18 USC
§ 1029).
'3' Pub. L. 98-413, § 1062(a), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (I 984)(amending 18 USC § 1029).
132 18 USCA § 1029(c)(2) (West Supp. 1988).

133 18 USCA § 1029(c)(3) (West Supp. 1988). For additional discussion of credit card
fraud. see ~ 18.03[8J.
'3' 15 USC § 1693m(a)(2) (1982).
13sld.
" .. 15 USC § 1693m(b) (982).
1118.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-24

act. IS7 Compliance in good faith with regulations of the Board or use of Board
disclosure forms also constitutes a defense.'" The person may avoid liability by
offering to correct any failure to comply with the provisions of the act and by
paying the appropriate amount ofdamages to the injured consumer.'· When an
action is brought under the act in bad faith or to harass, the defendant may
obtain reasonable attorney fees. 1<10
Additionally, the act makes invalid any writing or agreement that attempts
to waive rights on any cause ofaction created by the act.'" Consumer remedies
exist when an institution knowingly and willfully fails to meet its responsibilities
under the error resolution procedures. These are explained in the discussion of
error resolution. ,42

1118.03 BANK CREDIT CARDS

While the previous section of this chapter discussed the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act and its application to bank card transactions involving payments
and other debits and credits to and from a consumer's account that fall within
the definition of an electronic fund transfer, this section considers those credit
transactions that are subject to regulation by the Truth-in-Lending Act and
Regulation Z. The most noteworthy of these transactions involve bank credit
cards.
Generally, credit cards are big business. There are different kinds of credit
cards. Many retail stores have their own credit cards, and large retailers, such as
Sears Roebuck and J .C. Penney, have established extensive networks for credit
card transactions with their customers. Additionally, there are credit cards that
began as travel and entertainment cards, such as those issued by American
Express, Diner's Club, Carte Blanche, and oil companies, but which now have
expanded their scope so that they may be used in a broad range of transactions.
With the entry ofsome large commercial firms into the financial services indus-
try and the expansion ofinsurance companies, securities firms, and other finan-
cial companies into large financial services conglomerates, there are systems
such as the Sears Discover card, which combine credit plans with other funds
transfer features. In addition, bank cards commonly incorporate features that

137 15 USC § I693m(c) (1982). To sustain the good faith defense. the defendant musl
show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error nolwithstanding the maintenance of errors reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error," Id.
31
' 15 USC § I 693m(d) (1982).
139 15 USC § 1693m(e) (1982).
"·15 USC § 1693m<O (1982).
,., 15 USC § 16931 (1982).
,.. Sed 18.02[2).
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM V18.03
18-25

permit direct access to the consumer's accounts for various debit and credit
transactions, as well as access to credit lines in more traditional credit card
.transactions. The number oftransactions handled through bank cards has grown
rapidly, and today the bank card is a major.supplen:ent to the chocking a~unt
as a method of directi.n& payment to third partIes as well as a deVIcc for
.extending credit.
There are two major bank "credit card systems," MasterCard (Master
Charge) and Visa USA. Both systems involve four parties to the transaction. The
first is a card issuing bank. On issuing the card to a customer, the bank estab-
lishes an account with the customer, the second party to the transaction, and
agrees with the customer on the amount of credit to be made available, on the
terms for payment, and on the rate of interest to be charged. The issuing bank
mayor may not be the financial institution where the customer maintains a
checking or other account. Sometimes a link is created between the checking
account and the credit card account to cover overdrafts in the customer's
checking account.,n
Thus the cardholder or customer ofthe bank is entitled to use the card as a
means of payment at an establishment that has agreed to honor the card, who is
the third party to the transaction. Usually the cardholder will be billed on a
monthly basis for charges to his or her account, and will be provided with an
option to pay the accoullt in full, without interest cbarges, or to pay an agreed
upon portion ofthe account, with finance charges being assessed. Thus, the card
combines the features of both a credit arrangement and a method of payment.
The ml\ior bank credit card systems provide the customer with a monthly
statement describing the transactions involving the account, but do not return
the credit card slips executed by the cardholder, when using the card.
Merchants and other establishments who accept the card as payment must
enter into an agreement with a bank that is a member of the system (the fourth
party to the transaction) that they will follow the procedures established for use
of the card. The merchant may be required, for example, to obtain advance
approval for transactions that exceed a certain amount. The merchant agree-
ment with the bank also establishes the terms on which the bank will purchase
the sales slips obtained by the merchant in transactions using the card, and sets
the discount rate. When this relationship is established, the merchant then
regularly deposits with the bank the sales slips generated through use ofthe card,
and receives from the bank the appropriate credit at the agreed upon discounted
price. The bank that purchases the sales slips from the merchant, if it is not the
issuing bank that holds the account ofthe cardholder, thus has the responsibility
ofobtaining collection ofthe slips. Each card system has established procedures
for accomplishing these clearings. They operate in a fashion similar to clearing·

"'See aenerally Penney & Baker, supra note 1,111.01 (3); Baker & Brandel, supra note
1,1 1.01(3).
1118.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-26

houses that handle check collection. In most cases, the clearing is accomplished
electronically without transfer of the paper sales slips.
The precise legal characterization that should be given to these bank credit
transactions is unclear. While some have viewed the credit card as an instrument
similar to the letter ofcredit, it also has been viewed as a process by which drafts
are drawn against the card-issuing bank, which are accepted in advance by the
bank, through the credit card. The exact legal characterization of credit cards
may not always be ofgreat practical importance, because the rights and duties of
the parties involved are controlled by contract: the cardholder enters into an
agreement with the issuing bank, the merchant enters into an agreement with the
bank that receives the charge slips, and the banks that are members ofthe system
are bound by agreements and by the rules and regulations of the bank card
associations.
The uec does not govern credit card transactions. It may, however, apply
to the underlying sales transaction for which the card was used. The card itselfis
not a negotiable instrument, and neither are the charge slips that the customer
executes in using the card, as they normally are not worded to comply with the
UCC's requisites for a negotiable instrument. Bank credit cards are affected by
regulatory legislation. The most important such legislation at the federal level is
the Truth-in-Lending Act. This act contains provisions that apply not only to the
credit aspects of the bank credit card, but also to other aspects that affect bank
card usage.'"
As a result of litigation involving BankAmericard, the major bank card
systems follow a practice of allowing banks to issue cards ofboth systems. Thus,
some banks may issue both MasterCard and Visa USA. The BankAmericard
litigation involved the validity ofa regulation that prohibited banks from issuing
cards of other systems. While the court did not view the regulation as a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, it did "remand it for a trial to determine whether

,.. See generally Brandel & Leonard, "Bank Charge Cards: Need Cash or Need
Credit," 69 Mich. L Rev. 1033 (1971); Cleveland, "Bank Credit Cards: Issuer,
Merchants, and Users," 90 Banking U 719 (1973); GOntz, "Bank Credit Cards Under the
Uniform Commercial Code," 87 Banking U 888 (1970); Dobson, "Credit Cards," J. of
Bus. L 331 (1979); South, "Credit Cards: A Primer," 23 Bus. L. 327 (1968); Weistan,
"Consumer Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls," 70
Mich. L. Rev. 1475 (1972); Notes, "Apponionment of Credit Card Fraud Loss," 4 UC
Davis L. Rev. 377 (1971); "Bank Credit Cards and the Usury Laws," 4 UC Davis L. Rev.
33S (1971); "Bank Credit Cards and Enterprise Liability," 21 UCLA L. Rev. 278 (1973);
"Liability of Credit Card Issuer for Failure to Disclose Terms as Required by Truth-in-
LcndingAct," 26 U. Miami L. Rev. 461 (1972); "Bank Credit Cards and the Consumer:
Prolll'amming Justice Into the Cashless Society," 7 Val. UL Rev. S03 (1973); "Preserving
Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions," 81 Yale U 287 (1971); Comments,
"Applicability of the Law of Lctters of Credit to Modem Bank Card Systems," 18 Kansas
LR 871 (1970); "Credit Cards, Distributing Fraud Loss," 77 Yale.U 1418 (1968);
"Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards and Some Related Questions: What Problems
Remain?" 62 Ky. U 881 (1973).
18-21 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1 J8.03fJJ

the prohibition would be viewed as an unreasonable restraint on com~letion,

after all the facts were considered. The case was then settled, and follOWins the
settlement, banks were allowed to issue freely cards of both major systems.'"

[I) Troth-in-Lending Act Provisions

The Truth-in-Lending Act contains a number of provisions that have
important consequences for credit card transactions. Of course, to theexteDt
that the credit card involves a consumer credit transaction, it may be subject to
the general regulatory provisions of the act. These provisions are discussed in
Chapter 26. The disclosure rules discussed in Chapter 26 are especially impor-
tant for credit card issuers. In addition, there are some provisions of the federal
act that apply specifically to credit card transactions. These will be discussed in
the present chapter, in the sections that follow.
At the outset, it should be noted that the federal legislation exempts from its
application credit transactions that are primarily "for business, commercial,
agricultural, or organizational purposes," to "sovernment bodies or organiza-
tions," for credit over $25,000 not secured by real property or a dwelling, for
credit for public utility services whose rates are regulated, for securities or
commodities accounts, as part ofan installment agreement for the purchase of
home fuels, and for certain federal student loan programs. IO' Even if a card has
been issued for an exempt credit transaction, the card is still subject to the rules
in Regulation Z on the issuance of credit cards and liability for their unautho-
rized use. I07 Thus, telephone calling cards and cards issued for extensions of
credit in excess of $25,000 are subject to the rules on issuance and unauthorized
use.'"
The Truth-in-Lending Act defines a credit card as "any card, plate, coupon
book or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, prop-
erty, labor, or services on credit."'" Regulation Z refers to "any card ... or other
single credit device that may be used from time to time to obtain credit."'" The

,.. Worthen Bank clt Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 US 918 (1974). See the discussion in Penney &: Baker, supra
note I, ~ 1.01,20.02. The transaction fees Visa charges for processina paper and payments
thrOUgh the Visa network do not constitute an anti-competitive agreement in violation of
the federal antitrust laws. National Bancard Corp. v. Visa USA, 596 F. Supp. 1231,1256
(SD Fla. 1984), atT'd, 779 F2d 592 (II th Cir.). cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 329 (1986).
,.. 15 USC § 1603 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The exemptions cover transactions that
are "primarily" for these purposes or entities. The official statT interpretations otTer
further guidelines on how to determine if a particular transaction is primarily for an
exempt purpose. 12 CFR pt. 226. Supp. I, § 226.3 ~ 3(a) (1988).
'" 12 CFR §§ 226.3 note 4, 226. I2(a)-226. I2(b) (1988).
". J2 CFR § 226.3 note 4 (/988).
,.. IS USC § 1602(k) (1982).
150 12 CFR § 226.2(a)(l5) (1988).
1118.03(21 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-28

defInition in Regulation Z does not include a check because there is no repeated

use ofthe instrument. Nor does it cover a debit card or check guarantee card that
has no credit feature. IS' The defInition does include a check guarantee card that
has a tie to a line of credit or to an account that is tied to a line of credit, a
combination debit/credit card, and an identifIcation card that allows deferral of
payments or that indicates advance loan approval when presented to a
merchant. '.2

[2) Issuing Credit Cards

The Truth-in-Lending Act prohibits issuance ofcredit cards unless they are
issued in response to a customer's request or application for a card.'113 When the
customer has previously received a credit card that he or she has accepted by
signing, using, or authorizing another to use it, the issuer may send another
credit card to the customer to renew or to serve as a substitute for the previously
issued card, without the prior request of the customer.,..
The rules on issuance of credit cards apply regardless of the purpose for
which the card was issued.'55 Therefore, the requirements apply even to a card
that may have been issued for a business or other purpose, that otherwise would
be exempt from the act and the Board's regulations.'sa

[3) Preservation of Cardbolder Claims and Defenses

The Truth-in-Lending Act preserves cardholder claims and defenses arising
out of the commercial transaction for which the credit card was used in cenain
circumstances. As discussed in Chapter 16, when a purchaser uses a check for
payment or signs a promissory note, the seller may transfer the instrument to a
holder in due course. When the purchaser signs a contract, the seller may assign
it to one who will have the rights of a holder in due course, if the contract
contains an enforceable waiver of defenses clause. The holder in due course
doctrine is limited in consumer transactions by the FTC rule, as discussed in
Chapter 16.
What rights does a purchaser have to raise claims and defenses when that
purchaser uses a credit card to pay? For example, a cardholder may use a credit
card to buy an appliance from a merchant. If the appliance is defective, the
cardholder has a claim against the merchant for breach of warranty. If the

'51 12 CFR pI. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2 ~ 2(a)( 15) (1988) (Official Staff Interpretations).
152 Id.

'53 15 USC § J 642 (1982).

154 12 CFR § 226.13(a)(2) (1988).
155 12 CFR §§ 226.3 note 4, 226. 12(a) (1988).
156Id.
 18-29 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.03[3)

cardholder simply purchased from the merchant on credit, the cardholder might
. try to resist paying the merchant by setting off the claim againSt the amount
owed. Having used a credit card in payment, has the cardholder lost the right to
stop payment to the merchant? Further, does the·bank that issued the card have
a right to payment from the cardholder, free from any defenses pr payments that
the cardholder might have against the merchant, assuming that the bank has
paid the merchant for the transaction?
The Truth-in-Lending Act provides that the claims and defenses a con-
sumer has, arising out of transactions in which the credit card is used, will be
effective against the bank or other party who issued the credit card as part of an
open end consumer credit plan. 1I7 The card issuer's liability, however, is some-
what limited. Firstly, the cardholder must have made a good faith attempt to
resolve the problem with the merchant who honored the credit card. Secondly,
the cardholder may not assert claims and defenses against the issuer, in transac-
tions that involve small amounts of money. The act gives the cardholder the
right to assert such claims and defenses only when the initial transaction exceeds
fifty dollars. '51 Thirdly, the underlying transaction that gave rise to the claim or
defense must have occurred within the same state as that in which the cardholder
maintains his or her address, or within 100 miles ofthe cardholder. 1M Thus the
issuer's responsibility is limited to transactions occurring within an area in
which it may be possible for the issuer to obtain redress against the merchant,
without undue problems.
The fifty-dollar limitation and the geographic limitation do not apply when
the issuer ofthe credit card is also the seller, or is related to the seller. Thus, the
limitations do not apply to use of an oil company credit card at any of the
company's franchised dealers throughout the country, nor do they apply to use
of a credit card of a national retail chain. The monetary and geographic limita-
tions also are ineffective when the cardholder has obtained the card through a
mail solicitation of the card issuer. 110
Finally, the issuer's liability under the act is limited to the amount of credit
that is outstanding with respect to the underlying transaction. III The act pro-
vides a method by which the amount ofcredit outstanding may be determined,
when finance charges and partial payments are involved. ' ° Under regulations
adopted by the Board of Governors, the cardholder is entitled to withhold
payment to the card issuer up to the amount of credit that is outstanding. 1f3

151 15 USC § I 666i(a) (1982).

151 Id.

'$' Id.
,sa Id.
'0' 15 USC § I666i(b) (1982).
'''Id.
'u 12 eFR § 226.12(c) (1988) (Regulation Z).
1118.03(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-30

The federal provision applies only to transactions in which the credit card
was used as a means of payment or as an extension of credit. ,M Therefore, the
cardholder's right to assert claims and defenses against the issuer does not arise
in transactions involving check guarantee cards, debit cards, or overdraft
plans. liS
The relation is unclear between this provision dealing with the preservation
ofclaims and defenses against the card issuer and those provisions ofthe Truth-
in-Lending Act on resolution of billing errors. If a dispute arises between the
bank and the cardholder, over a charge that the cardholder believes to be
improper because ofa claim or a defense arising out ofthe underlying transac-
tion, it is possible to regard the charge as a matter subject to the billing error
resolution procedures ofthe act. '11 It should be noted, however, that there is no
time limit for asserting claims and defenses against the card issuer under the
preservation of defense provisions, but that there is a deadline for asserting
billing errors under'the act. tl7
The act does not prevent a cardholder from raising claims or defenses
arising from the underlying transaction in situations in which the geographic
and other conditions of the act are not met. Further, the act does not compel the
cardholder to give up any rights that the cardholder might have under the terms
of the agreement with the card issuer or under general legal principles. In this
aspect, the characterization ofthe transaction could be important. If the obliga-
tion ofthe cardholder is to be considered like that ofa customer under a letter of
credit, defects in the underlying transaction will not be a defense to the duty to
reimburse the issuer. On the other hand, if the transaction is viewed as a
standard checking transaction, the cardholder may be viewed as having rights
against the bank, analogous to the stop payment right. Obviously, this is a matter
that should be resolved in the agreement between the cardholder and the card
issuer.
The Truth-in-LendingAct rules that preserve consumer claims and defenses
may give a consumer a basis for avoiding payment to the card issuer for charges
incurred in transactions with a credit card in which the consumer has a defense.

'60 I 5 USC § 1666i(a) (1982).

165See 12 CPR § 225.12(c) note 24 (1988) (Regulation Z).
... See IS USC § 1666 (1982). The Board's staff takes the position that the error
resolution procedures and the preservation of claims and defenses provisions are inde-
pendent, and the cardholder may assert rights under either, if applicable. 12 CPR pt. 226,
Supp. I § 226.12 ~ 12(c)1 (1988). For example, payment of the disputed balance by the
cardholder may prevent use of the claims and defenses procedures, but the billing error
procedures might be available. Id.
161 See Lincoln First Bank, N.A. v. Carlson, 103 Misc. 2d 467, 426 NYS2d 433 (Sup.
Ct. 1980). The court also suggested that the cardholder might be able to.retain defenses,
even though the underlying transaction occurred more than 100 miles from his mailing
address, when the card issuer failed to comply with provisions of the statute dealing with
correcting billing errors.
18-31 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.03151

When the card issuer complies with the consumer's right to refuse payment in
such a case, a question may arise as to whether the card issuer will have recourse
against the merchant that sold the goods, or against prior banks or the bank card
system that participated in processing the merchant's claim for payment.Hthe
consumer had used a check for payment, but had effectively stopped payment on
it, the bank would have charge-back rights against prior parties under the uee
bank collection statutes, and holders of dishonored instruments would have
recourse against prior indorsers on the contract an indorser makes to pay the
instrument if it is dishonored. The Truth-in-Lending Act does not cover the
relationship between the card-issuing bank and prior banks and merchants who
participate in the system. The rights of the bank that holds the customer's
account to recover against these prior parties will depend on the agreements
entered into by the parties to the credit card system.

[4] Prohibition Against Setoff of Obligations

When the cardholder maintains deposit accounts with the issuer of the
credit card, problems may arise over the right of the issuer to set offdebts owed
under the credit card plan against the deposits of the cardholder. The act
generally prohibits such setoffs. Setoffs are allowed only when such deductions
are made in connection with a written authorization by the cardholder, which
allows periodic payments to be deducted automatically from the cardholder's
deposit account. However, this action may not be taken with respect to any
outstanding disputed amount, upon the request of the cardholder. 18' Further,
this provision does not prevent the bank from utilizing any remedy that might be
available to it, by state law, to attach the funds of the cardholder in tbe institu-
tion by following procedures available to crediton generally.'"

15] Wrongful Refusal to Extend Credit

There is no provision in the Truth-in-Lending Act that gives tbe holder ofa
credit card a right comparable to that ofthe drawer ofa check against a bank that
wrongfully refuses to honor checks drawn on the customer's account at the bank;
similarly, although the Electronic Fund Transfer Act makes a bank liable under
some circumstances for failing to carry out an electronic fund transfer,110 the
Truth-in-Lending Act does not contain comparable rules that would make a
bank liable if it refused to honor a transaction that was within the credit limits of
the consumer's account.

... 15 USC § I 666h(a) (1982).

"'15 USC § I 666h(b) (1982).
170 See supra ~ 18.02[31 for the Electronic Fund Transfer Act rules.
lI1S.03[6] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18·32

Moreover, the act expressly provides that to the extent that the card issuer
cail show that a violation of the act. if there was such a violation, was "not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error," the card issuer would
not be liable for the violation. 111 As listed in the act, "Examples of a bona fide
error include, but are not limited to, clerical, calculation, computer malfunction,
and programming, and printing errors, except that an error of legal judgmen
with respect to a person's obligation under this title is not a bona fide error."n
Although a cardholder has the right to invoke the billing error correction proce·
dures ofthe act, when an erroneous charge is made to the cardholder's account,
the creditor may reduce the credit limit granted the cardholder until the dispute
is resolved. 173

[6] Terms of Credit Card Plans Affecting Merchants and Others Who
Honor the Card
The act prohibits a card issuer from requiring that a seller contract for other
services from, or open other accounts with, the bank as a condition for participa-
tion in the credit card plan. '74 In credit card plans where the seller is a person
other than the issuer of the credit card, the card issuer cannot prohibit a seller
from offering discounts to customers who pay for goods and services by methods
other than through use ofthe credit card. 175 When a seller offers such a discount,
it will not constitute a finance charge for the purposes of usury controls under
state law,17I nor will it constitute a finance charge for the purpose ofdisclosure. 117
To avoid classification as a finance charge, the discount must be "offered to all
buyers and its availability ... [be] disclosed clearly and conspicuously.n m

[7] Duty of Sellers to Notify Issuers of Returned Goods and Other

Credits
The act places a duty upon sellers who have accepted a credit card as
payment, to notify the card issuer promptly when the seller accepts the return of

", 15 USC § I640(b) (1982).

'72 Id.
173
15 USC § 1666 (1982).
174 15 USC § 1666& (1982).

175 IS USC § 1666f(a) (1982).

116 IS USC § I666j(c)( 1982).
177
15 USC§ I666f(b) (1982).
171
15 USC § I 666f(b) (1982). At one time the act prohibited sellerS from imposing a
surcharge on cardholders who use credit cards for payment, but this is no longer effective.
Pub. L. No. 94·222, as amended.
18·33 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 11 18.04

the goods or gives the cardholder credit for the transaction. 17I Upon receipt of
the notice, the credit card issuer must credit the account of the cardholder.'le

(8) Credit Card Fraud

The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984 establishes substantial federal penalties
offines and imprisonment for engaging in intentionally fraudulent transactions
with credit cards and other access devices. The act applies to persons who
produce, use, or traffic in counterfeit devices, and who use unauthorized
devices, and to knowing possession with intent to defraud of "fifteen or more
devices which are counterfeit or unauthorized." The aet defines "access device"
broadly, to include "any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of
account access" that can be used by itself or with another device "to initiate a
transfer of funds.""'
The federal law applies both to transactions with a "counterfeit access
device" and to those with an "unauthorized access device."'12 Thus, it reaches
conduct in which the access device is "lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled or
obtained with intent to defraud as well as where it is "counterfeit, fictitious,
altered or forged. "'13

11 18.04 UNAUTHORIZED ELECfRONIC FUND TRANSFERS

AND CREDIT CARD TRANSACI'IONS
With the advent of new consumer payment systems, such as credit cards
and automated teller machines, came the inherent risk of unauthorized use of
the card or access device. Unauthorized use issues arise in various situations.
Some common fact patterns include use of the card without express permission
by an estranged spouse or other family member, use by a friend to whom the card
was loaned for a limited purpose, use by an employee who charges personal
items to' a business account, and theft of credit cards or access devices. Origi-
nally, resolution of these issues would have to occur under the terms of the
agreement between the bank and the consumer and under the general principles
of agency and contract law. Federal legislation now regulates and limits con-
sumer liability in cases ofunauthorized use in transactions that come within the

171 15 USC § 1666e (1982).

n. Id.
"'Pub. 1. 98·473. § 1601-1603. 2d Sess.• 98th Cons. (\984) (amending \8 USC
§ 1029). A government study of wire transfer fraud concluded that the average loss
exposure. per transaction studied, exceeded $800,000. Bureau of Justice Statistics. U.S.
Dep'!. of Justice. Special Report: Electronic Fund Transfer Fraud (Mar. 1985).
112 18 USCA §§ I029(e)(2). I029(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988).

,uld. See discussion supra ~ 18.02[IO][b].

11 18.04(ll1a) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-34

Truth-in-Lending Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, and the related regula-
tions of the Board.
Unauthorized use of credit cards is regulated by the Truth-in-Lending
Act.'" Regulation Z sets out in detail the requirements for limiting consumer
liability.'" For debit cards accessing ATMs, POS terminals, and other electronic
terminals, unauthorized use is regulated by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act'·
and by Regulation E."7 Ifa card serves as both a credit card and an access device,
the law regulating the transaction depends on the nature ofthe transaction. Ifthe
unauthorized use was of the card as a credit card, Regulation Z win apply.
However, if the card is used to withdraw money from a checking account at an
ATM, Regulation E applies.'" The scope of Regulation E and of Regulation Z
was discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. It is important to bear in
mind that although the Truth-in-Lending Act generally does not apply to credit
cards primarily issued for a business purpose, the provisions of the act on
liability for unauthorized use do apply to cards issued for business purposes.

[I) Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards

[a) Statutory Rules and Regulation Z. The issuer must meet certain require-
ments before it can hold a consumer liable for any unauthorized use of his or her
credit card:'"
1. The credit card must be an accepted card; 110
2. The issuer must have supplied the cardholder with adequate notice ofthe
potential liability and a description of a means by which the cardholder
may notify the issuer of loss or theft of the card; 111 and

,.415 USC §§ 1601-1693r (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

11& 12 CFR § 226.12 (1988). Official Staff Interpretations of the statute and regula-
tions provide additional guidance. The interpretations appear in a Supplement to the
regulations.
'11 15 USC §§ 1693-1693r (t 982).

117 12 CFR § 205 (1988).

'1112 CFR § 205.6(d) (1988).

111 15 USC § I643(a)(1982).

110 Generally, an accepted credit card must be requested and received, or signed or
used by the consumer. See 12 CFR § 226. I2(a) note 21 (1988).
'91 Notification by the cardholder to the issuer may be oral, either in person or by
telephone. or written. 12 CFR § 226. I2(bX3) (1988). Notice is deemed given when steps
have been taken as may be reasonably required to provide the card issuer with the
pertinent information about the loss. theft, or possible unauthorized use of the card. Id.
18·35 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 'R 18.04[11(b]

3. The issuer must provide a method whereby the user of the card can be
identified as the person authorized to use it.,n

If the issuer moets the requirements listed above, it may chllJ'le the con-
sumer with liability of not more than $50, for any unauthorized use ofthe card
that occurs before the issuer has been notified that an unauthorized use of the
card has oc:currcd or may occur as the result of loss, thef\., or otherwise.'n
The cardholder's liability is limited only when the use is unauthorizod. The
cardholder is liable without limitation for all authorized use. Authority is
defmed in the traditional way, as discussed later, to include actual, implied, and
apparent authority,
The card issuer has the burden of proving that a particular use was autho-
rized. I" If a usc was not authorized, the issuer has the burden ofshowing that the
preconditions to liability were met.'11 Further, ifstate law provides more protec-
tion for the consumer, it will not be preempted by this federal regulation.'11
Similarly, the cardholder agreement between the bank and the consumer may
provide more protection for the consumer, but the federal limitations are the
ceiling. m

Ib] Definition of "Unauthorized Use." The key issue in limiting consumer

liability for unauthorized use of a credit card is the determination ofwhether the
use in fact was unauthorized. Unauthorized use is defined in Section 1602(0) as
the use of a credit card by a person, other than the cardholder, who docs not have
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use, and from which the card·
holder receives no benefit.'" Whether such authority exists is determined by the
applicable state law.'" Generally, authority is "actual" when the cardholder

,to A signature, a photograph. or a fingerprint on the card, or electronic or mechanical

confirmation, such as a PlN (personal identification number) all may serve this purpose,
See 12 CFR pt. 226, Supp. l, § 226.12 ~ 12(b)(2Xiii) (1988). (Official StaffInterpretations).
For example, a cardholder cannot be held liable for an unauthorized use of his or her
credit card number over the phone (as in mail order), because the issuer has not provided a
means to identify the consumer in those circumstances. 12 CFR pt. 226, Supp.l, § 226.12
12(b)(2Xiii), 3 (1988). If, however, the issuer can prove the use was authorized, the
cardholder is fully liable.
113 IS USC § 1643(a)(I) (1982). The $SO limit applies to a "series of unauthorized
uses"; there would not be a separate $50 limit on liability for each unauthorized transac.
tion. 12 CFR pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.121112(b)(1) (1988) (Official Staff Interpretations).
190 IS USC § 1643(b)(1982).
115 Id.

1"15 USC § I632(c) (1982). See 12 CFR § 226.12(b)(4) (1988).

197 I 5 USC § 1632(c) (1982).
19' J 5 USC § 1602(0) (1982).
,.. 12 CFR pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.1211 12(b)( l) II988)(Official Staff Interpretations).
1I18.04(lJ[b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-36

gIves express permission to use the card. 2OCI Authority is "implied" when the
surrounding circumstances indicate permission from the cardholder.'"
The difficult cases usually involve questions of "apparent authority."
Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, apparent authority results from a
manifestation by the principal to a third person that another is acting as the
principal's agent. 202 It is created by conduct of the principal (the cardholder),
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person (a merchant) to believe
that the principal consents to have the act done on his or her behalf, by the
person purporting to act for the principal (the allegedly unauthorized user).203
Under the Restatement view, apparent authority exists only when the card-
holder does something that the third person (the merchant) may reasonably
interpret as conferring authority to conduct the transaction on the person who is
making the charge to the account. Apparent authority is not created by the
.conduct of the wrongdoer alone, however convincing such conduct might be.
Under the Restatement, the concept of apparent authority also embraces
situations that present elements ofestoppel. For example, when a principal (P) is
aware that another person (A) is falsely representing himself as the agent of P,
under circumstances in which the principal has a duty to the third person (1) to
prevent A from committing a fraud, P may be estopped from denying the
authority of A, if P fails to take appropriate action and T changes position in
reliance on the representations of A. 204
Using an estoppel approach, some commentators have argued that author-
ity can be "apparent" when the cardholder fails to take steps to dispel an
impression a reasonable person would have that the credit card user has the
cardholder's permission. 2DS The typical situation in which this type of apparent
authority argument is made is one where the cardholder loaned or gave the
allegedly unauthorized user the credit card, with express authority for a specific
transaction other than the one for which the card was used. As noted earlier,

..lOSee R. Brandel, J. Terraciano, B. Abbott, Truth in Lending: A Comprehensive

Guide 119-120 (1986 Supp.).
... Id.
202 Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 8 comment a (1958).
203Id. at § 27.
... Restatement (Second) of Agency, §§ 8, 8B (1958). "A person who is not otherwise
liable as a party to a transaction purported to be done on his account, is nevertheless
subject to liability to persons who have changed their positions because oftheir belief that
the transaction was entered into by or for him, if(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused
such belief, or (b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them ofthe facts." Id. at 8B(I)(a) &
8B( I)(b). See also comment d: "When one realizes that another is or may corne under a
misapprehension as to the authority of his agent ... his duty to give information is a duty
of due care ... [T)he action required is that which would be taken by a reasonably prudent
business man, with the normal regard for the interests of others and his own reputation."
205Id.
 18-37 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.04[l]Ib]

these cases fan into several distinct categories, which are examined separately in
tbe text that follows.
. [l] Lowng olthe credit card. .When a consumer lends the consumer's credit
card to a friend or an acquaintance, the consumer generally will be liable for any
and all charaes made on the card, even if tbe "friend" charges more than tbe
.amount for which the cardholder expressly gave permission. Courts find that
once a cardholder gives a user authority to use the card for some purpose, tbe
user's possession of the card gives the user "apparent authority," which may
make the cardholder responsible for any other use of tbe card until the card-
holder terminates that authority by retrieving the card or by taking other action
to dispel the apparent authority. Thus, the apparent authority generally lasts
until the cardholder reports the card stolen, or reportS tbat it is being used
without authorization. For example, in Martin v. American Express,1II4 the card-
holder gave his credit card to his business partner with authorization to charge
$500 for a business-related expense. The partner subsequently charged $5,300.
The Alabama court beld that where a cardholder, who is under no compulsion by
fraud, duress, or otherwise, voluntarily permits the use of his credit card by
another person, the cardholder has authorized the use ofthat card and is thereby
funy responsible for any charges as a result ofthat use. 207 A similar situation also
resulted in fuUllability of the consumer in Stllndard Oil Co. v. Steele. 2OI Here the
court quoted Martin v. American Express and found the cardholder llable for
over $1,500 charged by a "friend" and other unknown parties after the card-
holder had loaned the credit card to allow the user to get a tank of gas for a trip.
The court did, however, hold that notice from the cardholder to the issuer that
the card was lost, stolen, or being used without authorization would terminate
the consumer's liability.20.
A consumer credit card holder recovered damages for pain and suffering
and emotional distress from a bank that billed her for charges made with her
Bankamericard Visa card, after she had notified the bank ofthe theft ofher card.
The case arose under the California Credit Card Act. The consumer loaned her
Visa card to a friend on May 24, 1979, to allow the friend to purchase a plane
ticket to Hawaii. The friend agreed to telephone the cardholder every day and to
return the credit card on his return from Hawaii. The friend disappeared, failed
to telephone, and never returned the card. On May 26, two days later, the
consumer notified her bank to cancel the card because it had been stolen.
Although the bank recovered the card in September, by then $2,200 in charges
had been incurred. The bank not only refused to remove these amounts from her
account, but also informed a credit reporting service that the consumer had

201
361 So2d 597, 599 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
207 Id.
201
22 Ohio Misc. 2d 27, 29, 489 NE2d 842, 844 (1985).
:ZOOId.
1I18.04(1)lb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-38

exceeded her credit limit and had an account that was past due. In a trial before a
jury, the consumer obtained a judgment that her liability on the Visa card was
limited to $50 and that she was entitled to an award of $50,000 in damages,
which, under the California law, were trebled to $150,000. The court of appeal
afTtrmed the award, holding that the credit card was a stolen card within the
meaning of the statute, because the friend took the card under false pretenses
without any intention of returning it. Characterizing the action brought by the
consumer as in the nature ofa tort, and, based on a willful violation ofa statutory
duty, the court held that the cardholder was entitled to compensation for all
damages resulting from the breach ofthe duty, including those from m.ental and
emotional distress. 21 0
Iii) Estranged spouses and other family members. Estranged spouses create
unauthorized use problems when the spouse is an authorized user on the credit
application but is not contractually liable on the account. Under the usual terms
for issuance of a credit caI'd, the consumer who is obligated to pay the account
may designate to the card issuer other persons who have authority to use the card
to make charges. These persons mayor may not receive a card with their name
on it. 211 Often the account holding spouse designates the other spouse as an
authorized user. Subsequently the spouses separate or divorce, and the card-
holder who is responsible for the account no longer wants the other to be
authorized to make charges on the account. The card issuers take the position
that the user continues to be an authorized user until all the credit cards issued
under that account are surrendered to the bank. The cardholder may then open a
new account, a single card is issued, and the problem is resolved. Cardholders
argue, however, that notice to the issuer informing it that a previously autho-
rized user is no longer authorized should cut off liability of the cardholder for
any subsequent purchases charged by that user.
The Federal Trade Commission apparently agrees with the cardholders. 212
Shell Oil Company required the surrender of credit cards to terminate the
authority ofan authorized user. The company held the cardholder liable for any
balance charged until the surrender of the cards, despite notice to the company
by the cardholder that the third person was no longer authorized. The FTC filed
a complaint against the oil company, claiming that it was violating the terms of
the Truth-in-Lending Act. Shell Oil entered into a consent order, which required
them to cease charging cardholders for purchases made by third persons, subse-
quent to notification by the cardholder to the company that the authority of the
third person had been terminated. m

2'0 Young v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 111-116,
190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125-130 (1983).
211 12 CFR pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.12 V 12(a)(I), (6) (1987) (Official StafT
Interpretations).
no In re Shell Oil Co., 95 FTC 357 (1980).
mId.
18-39 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1I18.04{lJ(b)

Courts, however, have taken the position that notification alone is not
enough to terminate the authority of an authorized user. In Oclander Y. First
National Bank,·" a woman opened a credit card account with the bank, and her
husband was an authorized user. Several months later, she notified the bank that
she and her husband were separated. The bank "blocked" the account from
additional charges, and forwarded to her the standard divorce and separation
affirmation form to be completed and returned to the bank to restore her credit.
She completed and returned the forms on August 9, 1982. On the forms she
indicated that she had destroyed one ofthe cards and retained the other. Relying
on her representation, the bank "unblocked" the account, under the impression
that it was for her use only. Apparently the woman had not destroyed the credit
card, because various charges, totaling over $11 ,000, were made on the account
by her husband in Spain, between October 29 and November 30. She refused to
pay the charges, and the bank sued.
The appellate court affIrmed the summary judgment for the bank, holding
that Section 1643 did not apply to limit the wife's liability, since the husband's
use was authorized. The bank had not even required her to surrender both cards,
but only to account for them. Had she followed the bank's requirements. she
could have protected herself.
In Walker Bank & Trust CO. Y. Jones,·" the court discussed the effect of
notification on the issue of authority. Walker involved two cases consolidated
on appeal, with similar facts. Two women opened credit card accounts with
cards issued in their husbands' names as authorized users. Both marriages broke
up, and the women notified the bank that they would no longer honor charges
made by their husbands on the accounts. The bank immediately told them they
had to surrender the credit cards to avoid liability for charges made by their
husbands. Neither woman did so, immediately. One woman surrendered the
cards three months later; the other surrendered the cards four months later, and
only after a bank representative visited her place vf employment to retrieve the
cards from her. Purchases were made by the husbands after the date of notifica-
tion by the wives. but before the cards were surrendered.
The wives argued that their liability was limited to $50 under Section 1643.
because once they gave the bank notice, their husbands were no longer autho-
rized to make charges to the account. The bank argued that while notification
may cut off any further liability for unauthorized use because of the federal
statutes, it does not determine whether the use was authorized or unauthorized.
The court agreed with the bank that notification serves only to eliminate liability
for subsequent unauthorized use."" Notification, ifgiven prior to the unautho-
rized charges. serves to eliminate the $50 liability and not to render a use

.,, 700 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

015
672 P2d 73 (Utah 1983), cert. denied, 466 US 937 (1984).
'" Id. at 75.
'118.04[1][bJ NEGO~LE[NSTRUMENTS 18-40

unauthorized. Unless and until the unauthorized nature of the use has been
established, the notification provisions, as well as the statute itself, are irrelevant
and ineffectual. 211
The court found that the husbands had apparent authority because they had
possession of a credit card with their names imprinted on it and because their
signature would naturally match the one on the card. The card was a representa-
tion to the third party (the merchant) that the agent had authority to use the
credit card account. Because the husbands had apparent authority, the limita-
tion of consumer liability did not apply, so the wives' liability was determined
under their credit card agreements with the bank. 211 The agreement required
return ofthe cards before the cardholder's liability could be terminated. Because
the wives did not immediately return the credit cards, they were liable for the full
balance of the account.
A strong dissent argued that notice to the bank of potential unauthorized
use should revoke any apparent, implied. or actual authority of the husband. 211
The dissent found that once notice is given, the bank is in the best position to
protect everyone; it can list the credit card in the warning bulletins to merchants,
it can terminate the existing account, it can transfer all existing charges to a new
number, and it can issue a new card to the cardholder. The dissent also claimed
that the rule imposed an unreasonable burden on cardholder spouses because of
the obvious difficulty in retrieving a credit card from an uncooperative
estranged spouse. The rule, argued the dissent, arms the spouse with a weapon,
permitting vinually unlimited spending at the expense of the other. 22O
A famil~ relationship, by itself, generally aoes not establish implied or
apparent authority if the family member is not a designated authorized user. 221
The bank generally has to prove facts indicating that use by the family member
was authorized by the cardholder, or that the cardholder received some benefit
from the charges on the account.

211Id.
211 Id. at 76.
219 Id. at 76-77.
22°Id. at 79. Compare Vaughn v. United States Nat'] Bank, 79 Or. App. 172,718 P2d
769 (1986), discussed at ~ 18.04[2][b].
." So far the law has not addressed what effect, if any, community property rules
might have in establishing the authority of one spouse, as manager for the community, to
contract debts. through use of the other spouse's credit card, that bind the marital
community. It is possible, in those community propeny jurisdictions that regard each
spouse as legally entitled to contract debts on behalf of the community, which can be
satisfied out ofcommunity property, each spouse may have actual authority under the law
to act. But even in cases where one spouse may incur debt that binds the community, the
law may not recognize any right to collect the debt from the separate, noncommunity
property of the nonconsenting spouse.
18-41 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM '118.0411)(bJ

In Fifth Third Bank/Visa v. GUbert,- the court found that a cardholder was
not liable for charges made by his minor daughter on his credit card account,
because the bank had not presented any evidence indicating whether she had
possession of the· card. whether the cardholder had accompanied her when she
incurred the charges, or whether the cardholder had consented to the charges.m
The bank could not even collect the $50 limited liability, because it had failed to
make the required disclosures to tbe cardholder. Similarly, the Ohio Court of
Appeals refused to find a cardholder liable for charges made by. his wife, where
no evidence was presented that the wife acted as the cardholder's agent or that
the cardholder ratified her use of the credit card. 224
11Il) Lolt and stolen cards. In cases of lost or stolen credit cards, any
subsequent use will be unauthorized, because the cardholder has done nothing to
manifest any authorization of the actual user. The potential carelessness or
negligence ofa cardholder generally should not be considered, because Congress
intended to eliminate negligence standards in allocating liability and to shift the
risk of loss and fraud to the issuers, who could better reduce those losses and
spread the risk among all cardholders.- Liability thus will be limited to $50, if
charges are incurred before the cardholder notifies the issuer. In cases in which
the credit card has been issued but not accepted by the cardholder, the act
stipulates that the cardholder will have no liability.
Jiv) Employer-employee. When a credit card is issued to an employer in the
business entity's name, and an authorized employee uses it for personal benefit,
the same rules apply as when a cardholder loans the credit card to a friend. When
a cardholder voluntarily and knowingly allows another to use the card, and that
person subsequently misuses it, the cardholder is still liable.m
Regulation Z provides that if ten or more credit cards are issued by one
issuer for use by the employees of an organization, the issuer and the employer

m 17 Ohio Misc. 2d 14, 16,478 NE2d 1324, 1326 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1984).
m The court did, however, find the minor daughter personally liable for the charges
she made on a theory of implied contract.
22. Society Nat'l Bank v. Kienzle, 11 Ohio App. 3d 178, 182-183,463 NE 2d 1261,
1265-1266 (1983).
225See R. Rohner, The Law of Truth in Lending, 1 10.03[1J (1984 & Cum. Supp.
1987); J. Weistart, "Consumer Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative
Controls," 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1475. 1518-1519, 1525-1528 (1972).
2aSee Cities Service Co. v. Pailet, 452 So. 2d 319,321-322 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(employer cardholder liable for balance due as ofdate he notified iuuer that card was \OSI
and chal'Bes were unauthorized. Employee had authorization to use the card for work-
related expenses. No explanation for the charges, but employer made no allegations that it
was stolen, fraudulently used, or lost). See also Mastercard v. Newpon, 133 Wis. 2d 328,
396 NW2d 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (town liable for full balance of credit card account
where iI, as employer, authorized an employee to use the card for fuel. Employee had
misused it, charging hotel and restaurant expenses and gift and clothing purchases for her
personal use. Employee had apparent authority. so limitation did not apply).
, 18.0412][a] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 1&-42

may agree that the employer will be liable for unauthorized use (and thus will not
be subject to the protections of Section 1643); however, the employees are still
subject to the protection given to consumers. 227

[2] Unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers

(Il) Statutory Rules aDd Regulation E. A consumer is subject to three diiTerent
levels of liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers, depending on the
factual circumstances. Unauthorized electronic fund transfers are usually made
at ATMs, generally by acquaintances who exceed their authority, through fraud-
ulent schemes, or through mechanical mistakes made by the ATM. As with
credit cards, a bank must meet three preconditions to hold a consumer at all
liable for unauthorized transfers:
1. The access device must be accepted;'"
2. The issuer has provided a means whereby the user of the access device
may be identified as the person authorized to use it, such as signature,
photograph, fingerprint, or electronic or mechanical confirmation;'"
and
3. The issuer has disclosed to the consumer the potential liability of the
consumer for unauthorized use of the access device, and has made other
required disclosures. 23O
The three tiers of liability are contingent on two factors: (I) the time at
which the consumer receives notice that the access device has been lost or stolen
or that an unauthorized transaction has occurred and (2) the time at which the
consumer notifies the issuer of SUCh. The rules of liability are given as follows:
1. Ifthe consumer notifies the bank within two business days ofdiscovering
the loss ofthe access device,liability is limited to the lesser of$50 or the
amount of unauthorized transactions that occur before notice was given
to the bank.
2. If the consumer fails to notify the bank within two business days after
discovering the loss, the consumer's liability increases to the lesser of:
a. $500, or
b. the sum of

2'112 CFR § 226. 12(b)(S) (l98B).

22' 15 USC § I 693g(a) (1982). "Accepted" generally means that the consumer asked
for and received an access device, such as a debit card and PIN (personal identification
number).
22t 15 USC § 1693g(a)( (982).
'''15 USC § I 693g{b) (1982); 12 CFR § 205.6(a)(3)(1988). The required disclosures
include the name and address of the office to be notified in the event of a lost or stolen
access device. or an unauthorized transfer; and the financial institution's business days.
 18-43 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM Y 18.04(2)(a)

I. $50 or the amount of unauthorized electronic fund transfers that

occur before the close ofthe two business days, whichever is less,
and
iI. the amount of unauthorized electronic fund transfers that the
bank proves would not have occurred but for the failure of the
consumer to notify the institution within two business days after
their discovery, and that occur after the close oftwo business days
and before notice to the bank.
3. If the consumer fails to report within sixty days of transmittal of the
periodic statement any unauthorized transaction that appears on the
statement, the consumer's liability shall not exceed the sum of:
a. the lesser of SSO or the amount of the unauthorized transactions
appearing on the statement or that occur during the sixty day period;
and
b. the amount ofunauthorized electronic fund transfers that occur after
the close of the sixty days and before notice to the bank and that the
bank establishes would not have occurred but for the failure of the
consumer to notify the bank within that time."'
There may be situations in which both item 2 and item 3 apply. In those
cases, item 2 determines the liability for any unauthorized transfers that appear
on the periodic statement and that occur before the close of the sixty day period,
and item 3 detennines the liability for transfers that occur after the close of the
sixty-day period. 232
Examples of calculating liability appear in the Official Staff Interpre-
tations: 233

a. Situation 1: $500 Limit Applies

D(Jt~ . Event
lune 1 C's card is stolen.
lune2 $100 unauthorized transfer.
June 3 C learns of theft.
Iune4 $25 unauthorized transfer.
lune 5 Close of 2 business days after discovery of loss.
June 7-8 $600 in unauthorized transfers that could have been prevented
had notice been given by Iune 5.
June 9 C notifies bank.

231 I S USC § 16938(a)(1982); 12 CPR § 205.6(b)( (988).

on 12 CFR § 205.6(b)(3) (1988).
233 J2 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.6 n 6-5 (1988) (Official Stilff Interpre-
tations). The examples in the text are taken from the interpretations with some
modifications
1f 18.04[2)[a] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-44

Computation of Liability:
Paragraph 2 will apply to determine C's liability for any unauthorized
transfers that occur before notice is given. because the consumer failed
to give notice within 2 business days of discovering the loss.
• Amount of transfers before close of2 business days = $125. The
maximum liability for these 2 days - $50.
• Amount of transfers. after close of 2 business days and before
notice to institution. that would not have occurred but for C's
failure to notify the bank within 2 business days = $600.
• Because the sum ($650) exceeds the maximum liability under this
subsection. the total liability of C = $500.

b. Situation 2: Both $500 and Unlimited Liability Provisions Apply

Date Event
June 1 C's card is stolen.
June 3 C learns of theft.
June 5 Oose of 2 business days after discovery of theft.
June 7 $200 unauthorized transfer that could have been prevented
had notice been given by June 5.
June 10 Periodic statement is transmitted to C (for period from 5/10 to
6/9).
June IS $200 unauthorized transfer that could have been prevented
had notice been given by June 5.
July 10 Periodic statement of C's account is transmitted to C (for
period from 6/10 to 7/9).
August 4 5300 unauthorized transfer that could have been prevented
had notice been Jiven by June 5.
August 9 Close of 60 days after transmittal of statement showing
unauthorized transfer.
August 10 Periodic statement of C's account is transmitted to C (for
period from 7/10 to 8/9).
August 15 $100 unauthorized transfer that could have been prevented
had notice been given by August 9.
August 20 C notifies bank.
Computation ofLiability:
Paragraph 2 will apply to determine C's liability for unauthorized
transfers that appear on the periodic statement and unauthorized
transfers that occur before the close of the 6O-day period.
• Amount of unauthorized transfers before close of 2 business days
=$0.
• Amount of unauthorized transfers. after close of 2·business days
and before close of 6O-day period. that would not have occurred
but for C's failure to notify within 2 business days = $700.
18-45 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 11 18.04[2JlbJ

• Because the $700 in unauthorized transactions exceeds the

maximum, C's liability under this section is $500.
Paragraph 3 will apply to determine C's liability for lq1authorized
transfers occurring after the close of the 6O-day period. There is no
dollar ceiling on liability here•
• Amount of transfers, after close of 60 days and before notice, that
would not have occurred but for C's failure to notifY within 60 days
"'$100. C's total liability is $5OO(underb)+$100 (under c) ... 5600.

c. Situation J: $50lUnlimited Liability Provisions Apply

The facts are tbe same as in situation 2, except tbat C does not learn ofthe
card theft, but Questions the account balance and notifies the bank on
August 20 of possible unauthorized transfers.
Computation of IJabillty:
Only paragraph 3 applies here.
• Amount of transfers appearing on the periodic statement or
occurring during tbe 60-day period'" $700. The maximum
liability for this period is $50.
• Amount of transfers, after close of the 6O-day period and before
notice, that would not have occurred but for C's failure to notify
within 60 days'" $100. .
• C's total liability - $1 SO.
Notice to the bank may be oral or written. If written, notice is effective, for
purposes of these regulations, upon mailing. 234 A bank also may be deemed to
have notice when it becomes aware of circumstances that lead to the reasonable
belief that an unauthorized electronic fund transfer involving the consumer's
account has been or may be made.us

[bl Definition of "Unauthorized Transfer." Regulation E defines an unautho-

rized electronic fund transfer as
an electronic fund transfer from a consumer's account initiated by a person
other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and
from which the consumer receives no benefit. The term does not include
any electronic fund transfer I) initiated by a person who was furnished with
the access device to the consumer's account by the consumer, unless the
consumer has notified the financial institution involved that transfers by
that person are no longer authorized, 2) initiated with fraudulent intent by

m 12 CFR § 20S.6(c) (1988).

235 Id.
f 18.04[2)[b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-46

the consumer or any person acting in concert with the consumer, or 3) that is
initiated by the fmancial institution or iu employee. 13I .

Official staff interpretations further elaborate that a consumer cannot be

said to have "furnished" an access device ifthe consumerwas robbed orinduced
by fraud to give it to another. 217 However, if the consumer furnishes an access
device and grants actual authority to make transfers to another person who then
exceeds that authority, the consumer is liable for the transfers unless the bank:
has been notified that transfers by that person are no longer authorized. 231
An access device is defined as a "card, code, or other means of access to a
consumer's account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the
consumer for the purpose of initiating electronic fund transfers. "211 Examples
include debit cards, telephone bill payment codes, and PINS.24O
The negligence of the consumer is not to be considered in calculating
liability or in determining authorization. For example, writing a PIN on the
debit card, although it may be considered negligence under the state law that
applies to the unauthorized transaction, cannot be considered in determining
who bears liability for an unauthorized transaction. 2"
There are few cases interpreting the definition of unauthorized electronic
fund transfers. Vaughn v. United States National BanJil'z involved unauthorized
transfers by an acquaintance-thief. On two or three occasions, Vaughn had given
his ATM card and the PIN to his brother's.girlfriend to make purchases for his
benefit. Each time she did what was requested, and returned the card to him
along with the teller receipt and the change. Shortly afterward, she moved into
the house that Vaughn and his brother shared. On three occasions thereafter she
stole Vaughn's ATM card from his wallet and used it to obtain money for her
own use from the ATM, each time putting the card back in his wallet so that he
would not suspect anything. Vaughn was unaware of this activity until the bank
notified him that his account was overdrawn.
The court held that these transactions were unauthorized because the girl-
friend took the card from Vaughn's wallet and used it for her own benefit. She
had no more apparent authority in using the card than ira thiefhad stolen it; it
......
Z3I15 USC§ 1693a(II)(1982); 12 CFR §205.2(1)(1 988). Under IS USC § l693b, the
Federal Reserve Board is authorized to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of
the statute.
m 12 CFR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.2 'J 2-27 (1988) (Official Staff Interpretations).
Similarly, if a consumer is forced by a robber to withdraw cash at an ATM, the liability
limitations apply because the robber's actions are tantamount to stealing and using the
access device. Id. at , 2·28.
m12 CPR pt. 20S, Supp. II § 20S.2 11 2-27 (1988) (Official Staff Interpretations).
m 12 CPR § 205.2(a)(1) (1988).
200 12 CPR pt. 205, Supp. II, § 205.2112-1 (1988) (Official Staff Iriterprelations).
211 See 12 CPR pt. 20S, Supp.II, §205.2116-6.5 (I 988)(Official Staff Interpretations).
2"79 Or. App. 172,718 P2d 769 (1986).
18-47 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.05

made no difference that she was an acquaintance, or had formerly been autho-
rized to use the card.au
As with credit card unauthorized use, the bank has the burden of proving
that a transfer was authorized, or if unauthorized, that the bank meets the
conditions necessary to hold the consumer liable.'''' One difficult aspect ofthis
burden is that ofproving when the consumer knew, or discovered, that the access
device was missing or stolen. The burden of proof may, in some situations,
decide the case.24I

11 18.05 FUND TRANSFERS NOT REGULATED BY THE

ELECfRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT. THE TRUTH-IN-
LENDING ACT. OR THE UCC
The first part ofthis chapter discussed the law regulating payments that fall
within the scope of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Truth-in-Lending
Act. These transactions, with some limited exceptions, involve consumer trans-
actions that transfer funds or draw on credit arrangements. For the most part,
fund transfer transactions initiated by customers who are not consumers will not
be subject to regulation under these federallaws. l 4& The transactions not covered
are substantial. Among the fund transfers not covered are those which some-
times are referred to as "wholesale wire transfers," such as are made through
CHIPS or FedWire. 241 Federal Reserve sources report:
In terms of dollar volume, electronic wire transfers are by far the most
important type of payments processed by the Fed. Over 142 trillion dollars
were transferred over the Federal Reserve's electronic transfer system in
1987, more than 12 times the dollar volume transferred by check. Most of
these transactions occurred among large corporations, depositories, and
financial companies. Moreover, electronic transfers mainly involved fed-
eral funds trades and securities purchases and sales, not purchases and sales

2" Id. at 770.

244
15 USC ~ 1693g(b) (1982).
245 Judd v. Citibank, 107 Misc. 2d 526, 527-528,435 NYS2d 210, 211-212 (City Ct.
1980) presented a classic situation in which allocation ofthe burden ofproofwould decide
the matter. Plaintiffclaimed that she had not withdrawn funds from her account by using
her Citibank access card at an automated cash maChine, and the bank claimed that the
computer printout from the machine demonstrated the funds could only had been with.
drawn by use ofthe card and of the correct personal identification code. Relying upon the
recommendations of the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfen, although
not deciding the case under the provisions ofthe Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the court
held that she satisfied her burden of proof as plaintiff.
145 The scope of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Truth·in-Lending Act is
discussed at ~, 18.02[ IJ. IS.03[ I I. 26.03[1 J.
247 See supra 1I18.01[IJ.
'1118.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-48

of fmal goods and services. Individual electronic transfers tended to be

large averaging 2.7 million dollars each. Thus, the number of these small
"wh~lesale" electronic transfers was minuscule in relation to the total check
volume processed by the Federal Reserve.!'"

Additionally, transactions covered by either the Electronic Fund Transfer

Act or by the Truth-in-Lending Act provisions on credits cards are regulated
only in part. The federal law and the Board's regulations focus on the rights and
duties ofthe consumer in such transactions. For the most part, the requirements
placed on fmancial institutions under these regulations are rules that govern the
institution's relationship with a consumer who engages in an electronic fund
transfer or a credit card transaction. To the extent that a fmancial institution in
processing such transactions makes fund transfers to or receives fund transfers
from other institutions or parties, these aspects of the transaction are not cov-
ered by the federal regulations. The rules establishing the legal rights and obliga-
tions of the parties with respect to these unregulated aspects of the transaction
will depend on general law of contracts, torts, and other common-law principles
and the terms ofany private agreements between the parties. There is considera-
ble uncertainty, however, as to how general law principles might apply to such
fund transfer transactions, because the case law is limited in both the number of
decisions and the breadth of the issues addressed. Although the participants in
such transactions seek to allocate the risks through private contracts, the nature
ofsome ofthe fund transactions makes it difficult for private contracting to bind
all who may be affected by a fund transfer transaction or to develop uniform
rules for loss allocation that treat all participants fairly.
The present form of Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC was drafted prior to the
development of payment systems through electronic fund transfers, ATMs.
ACHs, and other forms offund transfers. As a result, the provisions ofArticles 3
and 4 contemplate the processing ofpaper instruments such as checks and other
commercial paper but are ill-suited for application to the varied and different
systems of fund transfer that do not utilize paper instruments.'"
The regulatory gap is filled, in part, by regulations of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System and operating circulars of the Federal
Reserve banks, with respect to transactions conducted through the Federal
Reserve System,"o As a consequence of the passage in 1987 of the Expedited
Funds Availability Act, which was part of the Competitive Equality Banking
Act. Congress gave the Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System broad

.... Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Weelcly Letter, p.1 (Apr. 15, 1988).
••, See discussion supra 1 18.0 I[2].
..0 See 12 CFR pt. 210. subpt. B (1988) (Regulation J). Each Federal Reserve bank
issues operating circulars covering the collection and payment of items and transfer of
funds. There are circulars on check collection, automated clearinghouse items. and other
transactions.
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 'I 18.1)5
18-49

powers to change and to regulate the nation's pa~ments~ltem~!l1Th~ Board has

proposed a new regulation CC on check coUectlon, wbich will. modify ~me ?f
the rules in the UCC on collection and payment of checks. Thtl regulatton will
affect electronic and other fund transfers to some extent. It is likely that the
Board will play an increasingly important role in regulating the conduct offund
transfers as it exercises its powers under the Expedited Funds Availability Act.
..
Further, there are sisnificant regulatory issues associated with the handling
of fund transfers. A major example is the attention that regulators are gIVing to
the risks that large dollar fund transfers create for the payment system. The
Federal Reserve Board has adopted policies to identify and address some of
these risks. One policy calls on banks that participate in such systems to take
various actions to reduce the risks ofpayment failure.2l2 In view ofthe enormous
sums of moneys that are transferred by wire, any given bank at the close of
business on any given day may be oblisated to send funds that greatly exceed its
total capital, since it anticipates receiving settlements by wire from other banks.
The concern is that if one bank in the chain fails to make a settlement, there
could be a chain reaction of disastrous proportions throughout the banking
system.
A glimpse at the types of problems that might arise was provided by Federal
Reserve Board officers, in testimony to Congress in December 1985. They
described a computer failure at the Bank of New York in November 1985, a
failure that prevented the bank from delivering to purchasers some $20 billion
worth of government securities. Because the banlc could not deliver the securi-
ties to the purchasers, the purchasers did not pay for them. As a result, at the
close ofbusiness that day, the Banlc ofNew York had an obligation to the Federal
Reserve banlc for $22.6 billion for the securities. To solve the difficulty, the Bank
of New York obtained an overnight loan of $22.6 billion from the discount
window of the Federal Reserve bank. This loan, which was the largest overnight
loan ever extended by the Federal Reserve bank, amounted to almost double the
asset size of the Bank of New York and exceeded the bank's capital by about
twenty-three times. 253
The remainder of this section briefly considers the hodgepodge of law and
regulations that have emerged to deal with fund transfers not covered by federal

25'See discussion at 1 14.0I(3)[c].

252 Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Interim Policy Statement (1987),
reported at 3 Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Regulatory
Service ~ 7-065 (1987). See also id. t'l7-065.1-7-065.3, 7-066. Foran earlierstatement of
the policy see 50 Fed. Reg. 21,120 (1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 34,493 (1985). Related policies
proposed by the Board include a series of proposals related to book-entry securities
transfers, ACH transactions, daylight overdrafts, and other issues. See 51 Fed. Reg.
45,043, 45,046, 45,050, 45,052, 45,053, 45,054 (Dec. 15, (986).
2UThe Bank of New York problem is described in 45 Wash. Fin. Rep. (DNA) 888
(Dec. 16, 1985).
, 18.05[1] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-50

law on credit cards or consumer electronic fund transfers. A drafting committee

is working to develop a new Article 4A of the UCC, which would apply to such
fund transfers. Although working drafts are in the process of review and com-
ment, the sponsoring organizations ofthe UCC have not yet approved an official
draft for inclusion in the UCC. The work of this group, however, should be
helpful in identifying legal issues and possible solutions to them, although the
work of the drafters is incomplete.

(I] Regulation of Wire Transfers by the Federal Reserve System

The Board ofGovemors ofthe Federal Reserve System has adopted regula-
tions on the wire transfers of funds that are handled through the wire transfer
facilities of the Federal Reserve banks.- The Board bases its authority to adopt
rules regulating these wire transfers on its general authority to provide for the
safekeeping of money and property deposited with Federal Reserve agents, on
its authority to exercise general supervision over Federal Reserve banks, and on
its authority to provide the functions of a clearing house and to regulate the
access of its members to reserve accounts held by the Federal Reserve banks. HI

[a} Basic Definitions. The Board's regulations on wire transfers cover transfers
to or from a Federal Reserve Bank. The regulations contain a set ofdefinitions.
A "transferor" is a member bank, a Reserve Bank, or other institution "that
maintains or uses an account at a Reserve Bank and that is authorized by that
Reserve Bank to send a transfer item or request to it."211 A "transferee" is a
member bank, Reserve Bank, or other institution "that (1) maintains or, if
authorized by the Reserve Bank, uses an account at a Reserve Bank and (2) is
designated in a transfer item or request to receive the amount of the item or
request.',m A "transfer item" is (1) an item sent by the transferor, other than a
Reserve bank, to a Reserve Bank for debit to the transferor's account at the
Reserve bank and for credit to a transferee; (2) an item sent by a Reserve bank to
another Reserve bank, for credit to the latter or to any other transferee; or (3) an
item issued by a Reserve bank, at the request of a transferor, for credit to a
transferee.211 A transfer item is a writing that evidences a request for the pay-

214 12 CFR § 2 I0, subpt. B (1988). Amendments to other parts of Regulation J have
been proposed as part of the Board's implementation ofthe Expedited Funds Availability
Act.
25512 USC §§ 248(i)-248(j), 248(0), 342, 464 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986). As discussed
at 11 14.0I[3][c], the Competitive Equality BankingAcl of 1987 gave the Board additional
authority over the national payments system to regulate payments transactions even when
the transactions do not use Federal Reserve System facilities.
211 12 CFR § 210.26(&) (1988).

211 12 CFR § 21 0.26(f) (1988).

21112 CFR § 210.26(d) (1988).
18-51 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM " 18.0~1][.1

ment ofmoney to be handled under these procedures, and that may be commu-
nicated not only by means ofa letter, memorandum, or similar writing, but also
by means of magnetic tape, a disk, "or other medium designed to contain in
durable form conventional signals used for electronic communication of
messages... m The definition of "item," for purposes of the wire transfer regula-
tions, does not include instruments such as checks and drafts that constitute
items for purposes of the Board's regulations on collection of checks and other
items. 210 The regulations also cover "transfer requests," which are requests made
by telephone to a Reserve Bank, requesting that the bank issue a transfer item. H1
A "beneficiary" is a person other than the transferee, who is designated in a
transfer item or transfer request "to receive the amount of the item or request
from the transferee."
As contemplated by the Board's regulations, Bank A, who is a transferor,
may request that its Federal Reserve bank transfer funds from an account of
Bank A at the Reserve bank to an account maintained by Bank B, who is the
transferee, at the same Reserve bank. Bank A may be acting on behalf of a
customer in sending the transfer item. The customer will be engaging in the
transfer to accomplish payment to a beneficiary, who will be a person or organi-
zation who is a customer of some bank, such as Bank B. Because the transaction
will be accomplished by the Reserve bank, making debits and credits to accounts
with it, the Board refers to this type of transaction as an "intra office
transaction...112
There also are "interoffice transactions.....• In these transactions, two
Reserve banks are involved. The following example illustrates an interoffice
transfer. The transferor, Bank A, has an account with Reserve Bank 1. The
transferee, Bank B, has an account with Reserve Bank 2. To carry out the
transaction, Reserve Bank 1 is obligated to debit BankA's account and to send a
"matching transfer item" to Reserve Bank 2. A matching transfer item is a
transfer item that is identical in amount, transferee, and beneficiary, to the
transfer item Reserve Bank 1 received from Bank A. When Reserve Bank 2
receives the transfer item, it then credits Bank B's account....
Each of the Reserve banks, under the Board's regulations, is authorized to
adopt operating circulars that govern the details of its fund transfer opera-
tions. 21S The Board's regulations and the operating circulars adopted by the
Reserve banks "are binding on transferors, transferees, beneficiaries, and other

21'12 CFR §§ 210.26(c), 210.28(a) (1988).

ttD 12 CFR § 210.26(c) (1988).
211
12 CFR § 210.26(e) (1988).
H212 CFR § 210.32(a) (1988).
mId., § 210.32(b).
tt'ld.
ttS 12 CFR § 210.27(a) (1988).
1l18.0!5[l)lbl NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-52

parties interested in an item."- Thus, although the regulations are drafted in

terms of the rights and liabilities that exist between the Federal Reserve banks
and the banks with accounts at the Federal Reserve banks, which are involved in
the fund transfers, the rules established are binding on all those "interested in an
item."217
Nevertheless, as the Board's regulations primarily concern the relationship
between these banks, the relationship between the transferor bank (BankA in the
previous example) and its customer is largely untouched by the regulation, and
thus is a matter for agreement between A and its customer. Similarly, the
relationship between BankA and the beneficiary, regarding when the beneficiary
shall be deemed to have been paid, is not directly covered by the Board's
regulation although the answer to that question is affected by the Boa,rd's rules
on final payment to the transferee. Likewise, the relationship between the trans-
feree institution (Bank B in the previous example) and the beneficiary of the
transfer (who is a customer of Bank B) is one that falls outside the scope of the
regulation.

[b) Authority of the Reserve Bank to Process Transfer. When a transferor

institution sends a transfer item or makes a transfer request, the action gives
authorization to the Reserve bank to charge the amount to the transferor's
account and to process the transfer.- A transferor is required to have in its
account at the Reserve bank at the end ofthe banking day "a balance of actually
and finally collected funds sufficient to cover the amounts of transfer items
debited to the account during that day."al The Reserve bank may refuse to act
on a transfer item or transfer request or may impose conditions to its acting on
such item or request, ifthe Reserve bank has reason to doubt the adequacy ofthe
balance in the transferor's account. Additionally, the Reserve bank has a secur-
ity interest in the assets of the transferor that are in the possession ofthe Reserve
bank, if the transferor's balance is inadequate, if the transferor suspends pay-
ments, or if the transferor is closed without having a balance to cover the
amounts debited. 210
A transferee bank, under the Board's regulations, authorizes its Reserve
bank to credit the amount of transfer items to its account. 211 When a transferee
bank receives a transfer item, or, when it receives advice from its Reserve bank
that its account has been credited for an executed transfer offunds and the item
or advice designates a beneficiary, the transferee will be held to the following

2M 12 eFR § 210.27(b) (1988).

217 rd.
"'12 CFR § 2IG.29 (1988).
"'12 CFR § 21O.31(a) (1988).
>TO 12 CFR § 210.31 (1988).

271 12 CFR § 21 O.30(a) (1988).

18-53 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.05[1 J(el

qreement: frntly, the bank must "credit promptly the beneficiary's account or
otherwise make the amount available to the beneficiary;" or secondly, the bank
must "notifY promptly its Reserve bank if it is unable to do so because of
circumstances beyond its control...m

[el Procedures Goveminl Reserve Bank Transfers. The operating circulars of

the Reserve bank set forth a schedule showing the hours when the Reserve bank
will handle transfer items and requests.273 The regulations establish a standard
for timely action by the Reserve banks in the processing of transfer items or
requests. "A Reserve Sank acts seasonably if it takes proper action on the day it
receives a transfer item or request. Taking proper action within a reasonably
longer time may be seasonable but the Reserve Sank has the burden of so
establishing. No Reserve Sank shall represent that it will complete a transfer of
funds on the day requested. "274 If a Reserve bank acts diligently, its time for
acting on a transfer may be extended, when circumstances beyond the control of
the bank delay the action.m
After a transferor sends a transfer item or request to its Reserve bank, the
Reserve bank under the Soard's regulations is required to send an advice of
debit to the transferor.·11 The information contained in this advice will be
binding upon the transferor, unless the transferor gives the Reserve bank written
objection within ten calendar days of receiving the advice of debit.m
It is pOssible for a transferor to request that a Reserve bank revolce a
transaction. The regulations permit a Reserve bank to cease acting on a transfer
item or request, if it receives the request for revocation "in time to give the
Reserve bank a reasonable opportunity to comply. ".11 The regulations do not
define what is "a reasonable opportunity to comply." Presumably, this would
include a requirement that the Reserve bank have a reasonable time to act before
final payment has occurred under the Board's regulations. Although the revoca-
tion request may come too late, the regulations authorize a Reserve bank, when
the transferor so requests it, to ask for a return ofthe funds from the transferee.•"
Provisions also exist for situations in which an erroneous transfer OCCUrs. In the
event ofan "erroneous or irregular transfer offunds," a Reserve bank on its own
initiative may ask for the return of the funds from the transferee.-

27. 12 CPR § 210.30 (1988).

27'12 CPR § 210.33(a) (1988).
274
12 CFR § 210.33(b) (1988).
275
12 CPR § 210.37 (1988).
m 12 CFR § 210.34(b) (1988).
mId.
... 12 CFR § 21 0.35(a) (1988).
·"Id.
• Ia 12 CFR § 21 a.35(h) (1988).
, 18.05111ld) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-54

Fund tranSfers through the Federal Reserve System become fmal under the
regulations ofthe Board, when the transferee's Reserve bank "sends the transfer
item or sends or telephones the advice of credit for the item to the transferee,
whichever occurs first. "211 Once fmal payment has occurred, the credit given by
the Reserve bank is available for use by the transferee, subject only to the
Reserve bank's right to apply the funds to an obligation owed to the Reserve
bank by the transferee. 212
Under the Federal Reserve wire transfer system, there is no separate settle-
ment of accounts that must occur at some time subsequent to the transaction.
Settlement occurs automatically, as a result ofthe debits and credits made to the
accounts with the Reserve bank.

[d) LiabiUty of the Reserve Bank. The Board's regulations also specify the
liability of the Reserve banks that participate in wire transfer transactions. The
regulations expressly provide that a Reserve bank is not responsible "to a
transferee, beneficiary, or other party, except its immediate transferor.":ru Fur-
ther, the liability of a Reserve bank for its transferor is limited to the require-
ments established by the Board's regulations, and the Reserve bank is not liable
for "the insolvency, neglect, misconduct, mistake, or default ofanother bank or
person, including a transferor, except as provided in this section."" The basic
standard of liability that a Reserve bank undertakes is a liability for its own or
for another Reserve bank's "lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary
care. "216 The regulations set forth the liability as follows:
(b) Damages. A Reserve Bank is liable to its immediate transferor for a
failure to credit the amount ofa transfer item or request to the transferee's
account caused by a Reserve Bank's failure to exercise ordinary care or act
in good faith. A Reserve Bank's liability for such a failure to credit is limited
to damages that are attributable directly and immediately to the failure to
credit, but does not include damages that are attributable to the conse-
quences of the failure to credit, even if such consequences were foreseeable
at the time of such failure.
(c) Right to Indemnity. The transferee's Reserve Bank shall indemnify
the transferor's Reserve Bank for any loss or expense sustained (including
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation) as a result of the failure of the
transferee's Reserve Bank to exercise ordinary care or to act in good faith in
an interoffice transaction. 2"

211 12 CFR § 21 0.36(a) (1988).

2U 12 CFR § 210.36(b) (1988).
2U 12 CFR § 210.38(a) (1988).
2"Id.
mId.
211 12 CFR § 210.38 (1988).
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.05(1][11)
18-55

There is a two-year statute of limitations for asserting claims against a Reserve

bank for failure to exercise· ordinary care or to act in iOod faith under this
provision. itT
The scheme contemplated by this liability provision is tbat of placina
liability for a transfer not properly executed on the transferor's Reserve bank.
For example, in a transaction invoJviug an interoffice transfer, in which the
transferor's Reserve bank sends a transfer item to a different Reserve bank that
is the transferee's Reserve bank, but where something goes wrong in the transac-
tion and the transfer is not properly credited to the account of the transferee,
liability would be as follows: the transferor's Reserve bank would be responsible
both for its own and for the transferee's Reserve bank's lack of good faith or
failure to exercise ordinary care in executing the transaction;!A the transferor's
Reserve bank would be liable in damages for the failure of the transferee's
Reserve bank to exercise ordinary care or to aet in good faith, although this
liability would be limited to damages directly attributable to the failure to make
the proper credit. 2at .
The liability of the transferor's Reserve bank runs only to the transferor
bank. 210 The Board's regulations do not give any right of action to the customer
of the transferor or to the beneficiary of the transfer. They may have rights,
however, based on their own separate agreements and the terms of the agree-
ment between the customer and the transferor bank. To the extent that the
transferor ReseI'Ve baAk is liab1c...as. a result of a failure of the transferee's
Reserve bank to act in good faith and with ordinary care, the transferor's
Reserve bank has a claim for indemnity from the transferee Reserve bank.It'
Thus, the loss resulting from the improper handling ofthe transaction comes to
rest ultimately on the Reserve bank that failed to exercise ordinary care or to act
in good faith.
The liability of the Reserve bank is cast in terms of failure to exercise
ordinary care or to act in good faith. This differs from the contract liability of a
payor bank under the DCC, for wrongful dishonor or making payment of an
instrument that is not properly payable. As discussed in Chapters 20 and 21, on
check. collection and the bank's duties to its customer, in such cases a payor bank
may be liable, regardless ofthe payor bank's exercise ofdue care and good faith.
There is no comparable duty for wire transfers in the Board's Regulation J. The
closest requirement to such an absolute contractual liability is the regulation
requirement that applies to a Reserve bank handling a transaction in which the

U7 12 CFR § 21 O.38(b)(2) (1988). This two-year statute oflimitations becomes effec-

tive on January I. 1990.
211 12 CFR § 210.38(a) (1988).

211 12 CFR § 21 O.38(b) ( 1988).

010 ld.
0" 12 CFR § 210.38(c)(1988).
1I18.0!5(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-56

transferee has an account at another Reserve bank. In this situation, the regula-
tions place a duty on the transferor's Reserve bank to send "a matching transfer
item" to the transferee's Reserve bank.m The matching transfer item must be
one that matches the transfer item sent by the transferor "as to amount, trans-
feree, and beneficiary, if any...."na If the transferor's Reserve bank fails to send
such a transfer item that is properly "matching," that failure should be the basis
ofliability, although the regulations speak in the language offailure to exercise
ordinary care or to act in good faith.

[2] Bank Liability for Erroneous or Wrongful Fund Transfers

As noted in the discussion at the beginning of this section, a substantial
body of transactions involving fund transfers is not governed by the law con-
tained in Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC on the collection of checks and similar
items, and does not fall within the scope ofthe Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the
Truth-in-Lending Act, or the Board's regulations under these acts. To the extent
that a transaction does not involve action by a Federal Reserve bank or to the
extent that it raises issues not covered by the Board's regulations for such
transfers handled by Reserve banks. there is no comprehensive body oflaw that
dermes the rights and duties of the parties. There are scattered cases involving
situations in which wire transfers have gone awry. The courts in these instances
have looked to general principles oflaw to define the rights of the parties. This
section reviews some of these decisions.
When a bank undertakes to make a transfer of funds for its customer, it
enters into a contractual obligation with the customer to carry out the customer's
instructions. If the funds are being transferred through use of a negotiable
instrument that the bank is acting to collect, the measure of damages that the
bank is exposed to, in the event that it fails to use ordinary care in the transac-
tion, is the amount of the item unless there is bad faith. 2M When the bank acts in
bad faith, it may be liable for additional damages. Do However, if the transfer is
made electronically, it is doubtful that the UCC provision applies."s Also, under
the UCC, a bank is liable to its customer if it charges the account of a customer
for an item that is not properly payable because the amount is altered, because
the signature on the time of its customer is forged or is not an authorized

212
12 CFR § 210.32 (1988).
213 Id.
2.. UCC § 4.103(5).
21$ Id.

-UCC § 4·103 by its terms applies only to "items." See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 673 F2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 US 1017 (I 982). See also Delbrueck & Co.
v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). As the coun said in
Evra Corp., "Maybe the language ofAnicle 4 could be stretched to include electronic fund
transfers, see § 4·102(2), but they were not in the contemplation of the draftsmen."
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1118.0511]
18-57

signature, or beCause the item lacks a necessary indorsement by a party.entitled

to payment of the item. For the samerealODS, UCC rules are not applicable to
. fund transfers made electronically, where there is no "item" comparable to a
checlt that is physically transferred with "indorsements" of the parties entitled
to payment.
A federal district court case, which was later appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, raised the question ofthe standard ofliability to be applied when a bank
negligently fails to honor a wire funds transfer instruction. In this case, Hyman-
Michaels in Chicago was engaged in chartering a ship from a foreign owner.
Payment for the ship's charter was to be made to the owner's account in a
Geneva, Switzerland bank. The contract was a favorable one for Hyman-
Michaels. At a time when a payment was due, Hyman-Michaels instructed iu
Chicago bank to transfer funds to the Swiss bank. The Chicago bank telexed the
transfer to the Swiss bank, but for an unknown reason the Swiss bank did not act
on the message. Possibly, as the court remarked, the receiving telex machine had
run out of paper on which to print the message. In any event, the owner of the
ship notified Hyman-Michaels that the charter was canceUed because timely
payment had not been made.
Hyman-Michaels then initiated steps to determine what went wrong with
the transfer and ultimately succeeded in having the Swiss bank acknowledge
transfer ofthe funds. However, by the time the Swiss bank recognized the funds'
transfer, the payment to the ship owner was five days late, and the ship owner
rejected it. A panel ofarbitrators subsequently upheld the right ofthe shipowner
to cancel the contract. Hyman-Michaels then sued the Swiss bank for failing to
carry out the wire transfer instruction. A federal district court held that the Swiss
bank was liable to Hyman-Michaels for the profits lost as a result ofthe cancella-
tion of the favorable ship charter contract in the amount of $2.1 million. m
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the judgment for Hyman-Michaels was
reversed. The court held that it would decide the case under common-law
principles based on the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale. a.. In the court's view,
the Swiss bank should not be held to have known the consequences ofits failure
to carry out the wire transfer instructions. "Electronic funds transfers are not so .
unusual as to automatically place a bank on notice of extraordinary conse·
Quences if such a transfer goes awry. Swiss bank did not have enough informa-
tion to infer that if it lost a $27,000 payment order it would face a liability in
excess of$2 million." The court recognized that, unlike Hadley v. Baxendale, the
case in question did not involve a contract relationship between the Swiss bank
and Hyman-Michaels.~" It was argued that Hadley v. Baxendale should not

m Evra COJ1). v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820, 829 (ND Ill. 1981).
HI I 56 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).

.,. But compare the VCe's theory that collecting banks can be subagents. VCC § 4-
201(1).
1118.05(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-58

apply because the district court had found the Swiss bank liable because of its
negligence in the transaction. The Court of Appeals reasoned that even.th~ugh
the case was tried on a negligence theory, the Hadley v. Baxendale pnnctples
should apply. Hyman-Michaels exhibited a lack of prudence in transferring
funds at the last moment and, then, in delaying payment for five days after
learning that the transfer had not been made. If Hyman-Michaels had acted
promptly, the owner probably would not have been able to cancel the charter.
Applying the doctrine that a tortfeasor should not be liable for damages that
the injured party could have avoided by acting in a reasonable fashion, the court
concluded that the Swiss bank should not be liable for Hyman-Michaels' lost
profits. Moreover, the court said, the profits lost on the ship charter contract
should not be regarded as a foreseeable consequence of the Swiss bank's negli-
gence. "In short. Swiss bank was not required in the absence of a contractual
undenaking to take precautions or insure against a harm that it could not
measure but that was known with precision to Hyman-Michaels, which could by
the exercise of common prudence have averted it completely."
In Center Coordinates. Inc. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.,- the plaintiff
sued because its instructions to wire funds for the exercise of certain stock
options were not timely executed. Plaintiff notified its bank, Union Chelsea, to
transfer funds to Barclay's Bank for the credit of a customer of that bank in the
Bahamas, who would then use the funds to make payment for the stock. Because
Chelsea had no direct relationship with Barclay's, it wired the funds to the
defendant bank, Morgan Guaranty, under FedWire. Morgan Guaranty had a
correspondent relationship with Barclay's. The defendant received the funds
and credited Barclay's account, but it failed to notify Barclay to credit the funds
for the account of the specific customer. When notice finally arrived, it was too
late to purchase the stock. The coun held that even if electronic fund transfers
were to constitute "items" within UCC § 4-103(5) on negligence, which is not
necessarily the case, the plaintiff could not recover consequential damages,
because Section 4-103(5) limits the bank's liability as long as it exercises ordi-
nary care. Nor could plaintiff recover consequential damages under common-
law contract, ton, or strict liability theories because of the principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale. The coun said there was no evidence that the defendant, Morgan
Guaranty, knew of the purpose of the wire transfer nor of the consequences of
failure to effect the transfer. The plaintiff was in the best position to avoid the
risk by checking to be sure that timely delivery had occurred.
In Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American Bank,301 the court was called on to
determine how to allocate the loss arising from a fraudulent scheme that induced
the Boston Trust Co. to wire $800,000 of its customer's funds to a rare coin

:lOG Center Coordinates, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trusl Co., 40 UCC Rep. Servo (Calla-
ghan) 1340, 1342-1343 (NY Sup. Ct. 1985).
301 Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank, 790 F2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
18-59 ALTERNATlVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.05(2)

dealer in Texas. Parties posing as a customer ofBoston Trust sent a forged letter
directing the tIuat company to liquidate $&00,000 from a mutual fund account
ofanother individual, and to send the funds to an account at a bank in Texas, for
which the account number ofthe rare coin dealer was given. The trust company,
using a correspondent bank, wired the funds to the account at the Texas bank,
bearing the number of the coin dealer, but the transfer stated that it was for the
account of the individual in whose name the funds were held by Boston Trust.
Although Boston Trust had adopted intemal procedures to verify such transfers
(because of previous problems with a similar fraud), the trust company failed to
observe its own procedures. When the trust company discovered the fraud, it
reinstated its customer's account and demanded reimbursement from the bank
in Texas. The trust company argued that the Texas bank should bear the entire
loss, because it was negligent when it failed to deposit the funds for the account
of the individual named in the transfer order. The Texas bank, on the other
hand, argued that the trust company should bear the loss because it dealt with
the imposter and, thus, was in tbe best position to prevent the loss.
Although the district court used Texas law to apply a comparative negli-
gence approach, and so divided the damages between the trust company and the
Texas bank, the court ofappeals rejected this approach. In its view, commercial
disputes do not present compelling reasons for a comparative negligence resolu-
tion. Texas law used comparative negligence in personal injury cases, so that a
plaintiff who had suffered a serious loss might be permitted to recover, even
though that individual might have been minimally negligent. The court did not
believe that commercial disputes required the same consideration.
After rejecting comparative negligence, the court looked to the uee for
guidance. It drew two principles from the uee. Firstly, it found that the UCC's
imposter rules were relevant because they indicated that the person who dealt
with an imposter "had the best opportunity to take precautions that would have
detected the fraud." Secondly, the final payment principle in the UCC also
applied, because this situation was one in which the interests of certainty in
commercial transactions argued for not reopening a transaction that had been
finally concluded at an earlier time. Both of these 'principles, the court said,
required placement of the loss on the trust company.
In a Texas case, an oil company orally instructed its bank to wire $2.25
million to a trading partner but the bank transferred $2.5 million instead. Five
days later, the company gave the bank written confirmation ofthe $2.25 million
transfer order. When the company later received notice that its account had been
debited $2.5 million, it advised the bank ofthe error by telephone. Although this
was not a UCC Article 4 transaction. the bank was liable in that it had a duty to
exercise ordinary care. As the court said, "A depositor may justifiably expect a
bank to implement commercially reasonable internal procedures designed to
process an oral transfer request in accordance with the depositor!s instructions,
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-60
, 18.05(3)

to verify the aceura.cy of, and compliance with, instructions, to detect and
minimize inaccuracy and to act promptly and diligently to remedy errors,"302

(3] Proposed Revision of UCC to Cover Modern Payment Systems

For a number of years, there have been serious efforts to develop amend-
ments to the uee so that it mi&ht comprehensively cover all payment systems,
including transfers of funds made by electronic means and through electronic
terminals. As discussed in Chapter 14,3OlI a drafting group working under the
auspices ofthe permanent editorial board ofthe uee prepared a "Uniform New
Payments Code," which offered a comprehensive realignment and revision of
Articles 3 and 4 to apply to all payment transactions, whether made by a paper
instrument, such as a check, or by means of a bank card or other electronic
media. This effort proved unsuccessful, but work on the revision continued. The
revisers' efforts generally fall in three categories: (1) development of a new
Article 4A to the uec that would cover large, wholesale wire transfers of the
type made by corporate customers over FedWire and similar fund transfer
networks; (2) revision of existing Articles 3 and 4 of the uec to facilitate
modernization ofthe check collection process through use ofnew computer and
electronic technology not contemplated at the time the original articles were
drafted; (3) general updating and improvement of existing Articles 3 and 4 to
eliminate technical problems and to resolve questions of current concern.
Proposed Article 4A would apply to large dollar corporate wire transfers but
would not attempt to cover CQnsumer transactions within the scope of the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act or most credit card or debit card transactions.3OC
The proposal thus focuses on the most significant body of fund transfers that
currently are not subject to comprehensive regulation. The efforts to limit the
scope ofa new VCC Article 4A necessarily involve the need for definitional rules
to identify the transactions subject to its coverage.
The drafters of the new article address the circumstance in which a bank
becomes obligated to execute a fund transfer, and deal with the question of how

J02Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 678, 682 (SD Tex. 1986).
The court relied on the decision in Securities Funds Scrvs., Inc. v. American Nat'! Bank &
Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323 (ND Ill. 1982).
30SSce ~ 14.01/2].
300l The drafts of the proposed revisions are in a form such that they are intended for
discussion only and do not represent any conclusion or official position taken by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the reporters for the
project, or the advisory committee. The discussion of the project in this chapter is based
upon the February I, 1988 discussion draft. Because of the highly tentative nature of the
work at this stage, this discussion docs not attempt to report fully on the provisions
proposed for discussion in the draft but rather intends to usc this effort· at developing a
legislative solution to the legal problems associated with fund transfers to illustrate the
types and scope of legal problems associated with these transactions.
 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM f 18.05[41
18·61

liability should be allocated between bank and the bank's eust~mer for lo~
caused as a result ofunauthorized orders. As a fund transfer may Involve a senes
of consecutive transfers between banks before the transfer reaches the bank of
the intended beneficiary of the payment, the proposed article deals with the
relationships between the banks who participate in the transaction. The legal
issues that are presented include: (i) determining when a bank that receives a
payment order becomes obligated to carry out the order and what the scope of
such obligation is; (2) defming the legal recourse that a recipient of the transfer
order might have against the sender in the event that the order is in error,
unauthorized, or otherwise results in liability to the bank; (3) resolving the
extent, if at all, to whicb a remote bank in this chain of transfers will have
liability to the customer who originated the transaction or to the beneficiary of
the payment, should the transaction fail for any reason; and (4) establishing rules
as to when a transaction may be reversed and when it becomes irrevocable.
As the basic purpose ofthe transaction is to accomplish a payment from tbe
customer who originated the order to some identified beneficiary, the proposed
article deals with questions relevant to defming when such payment occurs, who
is obligated to the beneficiary for the payment, and how the payment affects any
underlying transaction between the customer and beneficiary for which the
payment was made.
In response to the concern that fund transfer transactions may be affected
by a bank that participated in a transfer but then suspended payment before
settlement of the transaction could occur, the drafters consider rules for deter-
mining how to treat tbe transaction when such a bank failure occurs. Additional
matters, such as the ability of the parties to contract out of the rules of the
proposed Article, also are addressed.

[4) Check Truncation and Other Electronic Processing Methods of

Check Collection
The search to improve the speed and efficiency of the check collection
system has led to experiments with reduction of the physical transmission of
paper checks in favor of systems that transmit the information on the checks by
electronic media. Such approaches often are referred to as check "truncation."
The checks may be retained at various stages in the process of collection. One
approach is to have the depository bank retain the instrument and obtain
collection by communicating with the payor bank by electronic means. Other
schemes may involve retention of the instruments by the payor bank without
return of the cancelled checks to the bank's customer." Credit unions have
widely practiced a form of truncation ofthe credit union share draft, and other

:lO1 For a description of the various types of check truncation systems, see Penney &:
Baker, supra note I, ~ 2.01; Baker & Brandel, supra note \,112.01.
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-62
1[ 18.05(4)

banking institutions are initiating plans for truncation arrangements as well.

The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 dir~cts the Boar~ofGove~orsof
the Federal Reserve System to examine the effiClency that rmght be gamed by
such an approach.:lOII , .,
The current version ofUCC Articles 3 and 4 presents some lepllssues Wlth
respect to truncation arrangements. Experts have questioned whether the duties
imposed in UCC § 4-406 on a customer, to examine the customer's periodic
statement and to report unauthorized signatures or alterations, would be effec-
tive if the bank did not return the checks to its customer or hold the checks for
the customer's inspection. 3lI7 Under UCC § 4-406, the customer's duty to report
unauthorized signatures and alterations arises only when the bank (1) sends to
the customer "a statement ofaccount accompanied by items paid" in support of
the entries on the statement; (2) "holds the statement and items pursuant to a
request or instructions of its customer...; or" (3) "otherwise in a reasonable
manner makes the ·statement and items available to the customer..•":101 The
issue is whether the practice of having a bank other than the customer's bank
hold the "items" would qualify as satisfying the bank's obligation to its
customer.
Other provisions of the UCC do not fit well with a system of check trunca-
tion. The rules in Article 3 on presentment contemplate the physical delivery of
the instrument to the payor. The UCC gives the party to whom presentment is
made a right to examine the physical instrument and to have the instrument
cancelled or a receipt for partial payment noted on the instrument. .1 Addition-
ally, one cannot become a "holder" under the UCC, without having possession
of the instrument. 31o To the extent that a bank engaged in the collection process
would need to rely on having the rights of a holder or of a holder in due course,
there would need to be recognition that these rights might exist without physical
possession of the instrument.
A system of truncation would raise additional issues that could best be
resolved by legislation. If presentment of the physical item would no longer be
required such that a demand for payment made by electronic means would be
sufficient, there would be a need for rules allocating loss in the event that the
information electronically communicated did not accurately reflect the terms of
the item for which payment was sought. The UCC scheme of warranties on
transfer and presentment, which deal with title, signatures, and alterations,
obviously was not drafted with electronic transfer orders in mind. Further, since
the payor would not examine the physical item, the payor would not be able to

3DtSee ~1I14.0I[31[c), 18.01(2).

307 Penney & Baker, supra note 1,12.02; Baker & Brandel, supra note I, '112.02.
.... vee § 4-406( I).
• 1 vee vee
§ 3-505. See also § 3-504.
31·See vee §§ 3-202, 1·201(20), 1·201(14).
18-63 ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM , 18.05[4J

detect alterations or forgeries, regardless ofhow obvious such actions might be,
and thus the rights of a payor to recover in such instances against the bank that
examined the physical item would have to be specified. This could involve a
reconsideration ofthe Price v. Neal rule. When the payor bank pays an item in
which there was an obvious forgery of the drawer's signature that the truncating
institution could have detected by reasonable procedures, should the Price v.
Neal rule be preserved to deny the payor recourse against the bank that was in
the best position to detect the forgery7l11
In a truncation system, the duties of the institution that serves as the
custodian of the items need to be identified. How long must the items be held
and wbat liability might attach for inability to retrieve an item? Similarly, the
rights ofthe customer to obtain a copy ofthe original item or a copy of it need to
be established.
The Board of Governors of tbe Federal Reserve System has become
involved in check truncation plans as a result of the enactment ofthe Expedited
Funds Availability Act, as part of tbe Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987. '12 This legislation requires that the Board consider adoption ofregulations
to improve check processing.'1' Among the improvements that Congress
directed the Board to consider is action to establish check clearing through an
electronic clearinghouse process.'1. In response to this direction from Congress,
the Board proposes to put into effect a truncation service. The Board contem-
plates that, ultimately, the Federal Reserve banks will be able to offer a trunca-
tion service to permit the Federal Reserve bank of first deposit to retain the
item. m The Board also proposes to provide a service that would permit elec-
tronic or magnetic tape transmission of data on the magnetic ink character
recognition line on an item, but which would allow subsequent delivery of the
paper check. '11 Under this approach, the Reserve banks could process the critical
data swiftly, using electronic communications technology, and retain the bene-
fits of having the paper instruments available to the payor, by transmitting the
paper' on a slower processing schedule. The Board's proposed Regulation CC
would authorize banks to present checks by electronic means. S17 The authority to

311 For a discussion of the Price v. Neal rule, see' 20.08.

312 The Expedited Funds AvailabililY Act is Title VI of Public Law 100-86, Competi.
tive Equality Banking Act of 1987. The provisions ofthe Expedited Fund Availability Act
are discussed in ~ 20.11
31' 12 USCA § 4008(b) (Wesl Supp. 1988).
314 Id.

m See Proposed Rules, "Availability of funds and colIection of checks (Regulation

CC) and Collection of checks and other items and transfer of funds (Regulation J),"
Docket No. R-0620, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,112, 47,121 (Dec. II, 1987).
'" Id.
317 Proposed Rule No. R·0620, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,1 12, 47,158 (Dec. II, 1987), amend.
ing 12 CFR § 229.36(c).
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-64
'II 18.0S(S)

make presentment in this way would depend on the presenting bank's having an
a
agreement with the payor bank permitting the truncatiQn."

(5) Regulation of ACH Transactions

Transfers of funds through ACHs are governed by the rules adopted by the
respective clearinghouse associations." 1 When a fund transfer occurs through
the ACH system established by the Federal Reserve System, federal regulations
apply.
Each Federal Reserve bank has adopted an operating circular to govern
transactions involving the clearing and settlement of automated clearinghouse
items by the Federal Reserve banks. no The operating circular applies to ACH
"items." Such items are defined to include a writing in an approved medium
evidencing a right to the payment of money that is processed by the Federal
Reserve bank for clearing and settlement under the Federal Reserve bank's ACH
rules. The defmition excludes orders for payment that constitute "items" under
Regulation J applying to the collection of checks, "items" under Subpart B of
Regulation J on wire transfers of funds, U.S. government payment by ACH
method, payment instructions relating to the Treasury book entry security
system, and wire transfers of securities by the Federal Reserve bank. a21 The
Federal Reserve bank prescribes the format for items and the media by which
they may be sent. 322
The originator of ACH items is deemed to enter an agreement with the
Federal Reserve bank that includes an indemnity agreement to hold the Reserve
bank harmless for any loss or expense sustained as a result ofactions taken by the
Reserve bank in accordance with its rules for handling ACH items. 323 The
originator commits that it will have adequate funds on hand to cover the
amounts to be debited to its account at the time when settlement for the ACH
items is to occur. 32.
Under the operating circular, a Res(;rve bank may refuse to permit tbe use of
credit given for an ACH debit item when the Reserve bank has not received
finally collected funds until the Reserve bank's "opening of business on the

311Id.
311 For a general discussion of the operation of ACHs and the rules applicable to
transactions involving ACHs. see Penney & Baker, supra note I, Ch. 3; Baker & Brandel,
supra note I, Ch. 3.
320 See e.g., Circular 4, "Automated Clearing House Items," Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, (Feb. 1988) (hereinafter Circular 4). This discussion is based on Circular 4.
32' Circular 411 3(0).
322 Circular 4 11 5-6.
323 Circular 4 11 9.
324 Circular 4 11 II.
18·65 ALTERNATlVE PAYMENT SYSTEM vJ8.0SlS}

bankins day following the settlement date. . ..... If the bank fails to receive
"actually and finally collected funds in settlement of a debit item, at or before
the opening of business on tbe banking day following the settlement date," the
bank "reverses the debit and credit previously made in settlement ofthe item"
and gives notice ofits actions.lit When a Reserve bank gives a receiver credit for
a credit item, the credit is available for use on the settlement date subject to the
bank's right to apply the funds to an obligation the receiver owes to the bank. 3D
The operating circular covers both credit items and debit items. A credit
item is an "item sent to a Reserve Bank by an originator for debit to the
originator's account and for credit to a receiver's account."· A debit item is "an
item sent to a Reserve Bank by an originator for credit to the originator's and for
debit to a receiver's account."" A receiver is a "depository institution or other

a.
authorized institution...that is designated in an item to receive the item {rom a
Reserve Bank... When a receiver uses the Federal Reserve ACH service, the
receiver enters into. an agreement to follow the applicable ACH l"Ules. This
agreement includes an indemnification of the Reserve bank apinst loss result-
ing from its handling of transactions under the authority given to it by the
receiver. a:1l
The ACH rules govern when there is a right to reversal ofcredits and debits
made, and they also establish a procedure (or the- handling of disputes with
respect to returns.:m:
The operating circular spells out the liability of the Reserve bank. The basic
rule limits liability so that the Reserve bank is responsible "only to an originator,
a receiver or another Reserve Bank, and only for our own failure to exercise
ordinary care or for our own or our employees' willful misconduct.":AI The
circular specifies that the Reserve bank is not acting as agent or subagent of
another, and is not liable for the conduct of any other bank or person and does
not make any warranty with respect to items handled. al4 The measure of dam-
ages for failure to exercise ordinary care or for willful misconduct in the handling
of a credit or debit item specifically excludes liability for consequential dam-
ages. 33S In cenain cases, the Reserve bank under the circular has the right to

m Circular 4 , 23.
32. rd.
m Circular 4 1 24.
321 Circular 4 11 3(h).
32t Circular 4 ~ 3(i).
no Circular 4 1 3(\).
331 Circular 4 1 28(d).

m Circular 4 ~, 33-36.
mOreular " ~ 42.
3)Old.
m Circular 4 11 43.
'1118.05(6) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 18-66

recover from other parties ifit is found liable for actions taken by the Reserve
bank in the handling or settling of an item.us

[6] Regulation of Direct Deposit Payments and Book Entry Securities

Transactions
Numerous government payments are made by the ACH method through
the services provided by Federal Reserve banks and other fmancial institutions
to recipients at these institutions. The U.S. Treasury has regulations defming the
obligations and responsibilities of the participants in these payment transat--
tions. These rules cover various benefit payments including social security, civil
service retirement, Veteran's Administration compensation or pension pay-
ments, and others.:l37 The regulations describe how a recipient becomes entitled
to receive payment through the ACH payment method. They also define the
responsibility of financial institutions who enroll recipients in the ACH pay-
ment program.ssa The regulations place a duty on a financial institution that
receives payment through this method to "credit the amount ofthe payment to
the designated account of the recipient on its books, and it shall make the
amount available for withdrawal or other use by the recipient not later than the
opening of business on the payment date...sn
The regulations also cover the responsibilities ofthe financial institution in
the event of death or legal incapacity of a recipient, or death of a beneficiary. S40
Additionally, there are regulations to cover the processing of transactions
involving book entry government securities under the regulations. Rules gov-
erning the registration ofsuch securities are provided. Additionally, the regula-
tions provide procedures through which payments may be made relating to
transactions in such securities, such as interest payments, by direct deposit
through ACH methods.'"

sse Circular 4 1 46.

317
31 CFR § 210.2(d)(1987).
331 31 CFR § 210. 7(b)( 1987).
3Sl31 CFR § 210. 7(d) (I 987).
,.031 CFR § 210.11 (I 987}.
,., 31 CFR § 357.26 (I 987). The Federal Reserve banks have adopted operating
circulars that govern federal payments made by the automated clearing house method.
See, e.g., Circular II, "Federal Payments by the Automated Clearing House Method,"
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco (Feb. 1988). See also 31 CFR pts. 350, 354 (1987)
(Regulations governing book entry Treasury bills, book entry securities ofthe student loan
marketing association).
 19
Bank Accounts
'19.01 Basic VCC Definitions " • 19-2
'19.02 Nature of Bank Accounts. • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • . . . .. 19-4
[I) Legal Relationship Between Bank and Depositor. . . . . . . . . . 19-4
(a) Bank as Debtor to Its Depositor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-4
[b] Bank as Bailee or Trustee . . . . . • . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . • • . 19-5
[c) Accounts at Branches . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 19·7
(d) Bank Ownership of Deposited Funds ...........•... 19·9
[2) Kinds of Accounts • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 19·9
[a] Checking Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-11
[b) Savings Accounts . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19·11
[cJ Special Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-12
[d) Certificates of Deposit ... . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . •• 19-12
[e) NOW Accounts. . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-13
(I) Automatic Transfer Accounts " ......... 19-14
[I) Share Draft Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-1 S
[h) Money Market Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-1 S
{3} Opening an Account 19.15
[4j V nconscionable Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19.16
[5J Termination of Relationship 19-17
1119.03 Forms of Accounts 19.20
[1) Individual Accounts , 19-20
(2) Joint or Multiple Party Accounts . . . . . . .. 19.20
[a) Common·Law Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .. 19.21
[b] V niform Probate Code , 19-22
[c) Creditors' Rights Allainst Joint Account ..........•.. 19-23
[d) Ownership Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . • • .. 19.25
tel Bank Payment of Joint Account Funds 19.26
[f) Liability for Overdrafts , . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-27
[g) Conflicting Claims , , . . .• 19.28
[3] Partnership Accounts ..•...................... " .. " 19-29
[4] Corporate Accounts , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19.32
n19,04 Signatures,........................................ 19.30

19-1
'1119.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-2

[1] What Constitutes a Signature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-31

[2} Single, Multiple, and Facsimile Signatures 19-32
'1119.05 Nondeposit Liabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-35

11 19.01 BASIC UCC DEFINITIONS

Terminology in commercial banking law often is confusing because there
are many sources aflaw that may apply to commercial banking transactions, as
explained in Chapter 14. Although these sources use common terms, such as
"bank," "check," "customer," and so forth, their defmitions ofthe terms are not
necessarily the same. The proper definition always depends on the specific
circumstances and the specific law or regulation to be interpreted. Bearing this
in mind, it is helpful to understand the uee terminology. Because of the
adoption of the uee by all states, the uee definitions provide a uniform
terminology that is widely understood. The uee definitions also, as a general
rule, will be relevant to many of the commercial transactions discussed in Part
Two.
The uec's definition of "bank" is circular. A bank means "an-y person
engaged in the business of banking,'" but the uee provides no definition of
banking.
The ueC's definition does not have to be limited to institutions chartered
as banks under federal and state banking laws. Since the uec provisions on the
collection and payment of instruments are meant to provide a comprehensive
statutory scheme, a sound approach would include all depository institutions
engaged in the collection and payment of instruments as subject to the uee
provisions. However, there is little law on this question. 2
Similarly, the uee does not define branch bank, although it does provide
that a: branch or a separate office of a bank should be treated as a separate bank
for purposes of computing the deadlines in the uec and determining the place
at which presentment, notice of protest, and similar actions must be taken. 3
Apart from this, the uee is silent. The comments indicate that branches might
be treated as separate banks for some purposes but not for others.' (Branch
banking and its regulation are discussed in Chapter 6.)
Other imponant banking terms and their uee definitions are:

'UCC § 4-105(a) (I978) (subsequent citations to Uniform Commercial Code (VCC)

refer to 1978 officialtexl).
2VCC § 4-I05(b). See generally Anno!., "Construction of VCC § 4-105, Which
Defines Payor Bank, Collecting Bank, and the Like," 84 ALR3d 1073'(1978).
3 VCC § 4-1 05(c).
• VCC § 4-1 05(d).
19-3 BANK ACCOUNTS '119.01

1. D~positary bank. The fmt bank to which an item ill transferred for
collection. A depositary bank may also be a payor bank when the item deposited
is payable by the bank in which it is deposited. I
1.. Payor bank. The bank that pays the item involved. The payor bank of a
draft or checJc is the drawee. Payment must be distinguished from cashing a
check or purchasing it. When a negotiable instrument is paid, the liability of the
drawer, indorsers, and any other party to the instrument is discharged.'
3. lnterm~diary bank. Any bank to which an item has been transferred for
collection, not including the depository or payor bank, howeVer!
4. Collecting bank. Any bank, other than the payor bank, that handles the
item for collection.' A depository bank that is not the payor bank can be a
collecting bank.
5. Presenting hank. The bank that presents the item to the payor bank for
payment. A presenting bank can be a depository bank or any collecting bank.'
6. Remitting bank. Any bank engaged in remitting the proceeds ofan item
to the depository bank. It includes any payor or intermediary bank engaged in
the remittance process."
7. Item. Any instrument for the payment of money but not including
mOlley, such as currency and coins, itself. An item may be either negotiable or
nonnegotiable. 11 The definition of"item" has been held broad enoush to include
a savings account withdrawal slip.'t
8. Instrument. A negotiable instrument within Article 3; may be a draft,
check, note, or certificate of deposit.'3
9. Account. Any account with a bank, including a checking, time, interest,
or savings account."
10. Customer. Any person "having an account with a bank or for whom a
bank. has agreed to collect items."'·

·vee § 4.105(e).
I vee § 4.105(1).

'vee § 4.104(g).
'Boutros v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 655 F2d 1257, 1260 (DC Cir. 1981); Coleman v.
Brotherhood State Bank. 3 Kan. App. 2d 162, 171.592 P2d 103. 112 (1979).
'vee §§ J·I02(I)(e), 3-104(2).
"'vee § 4.104( I Xli).
11 vee § 4-104(1)(e).
12 vee § 4. J 04(1 )(h).

13 vee § 4-1 04(I)(c).

"vee §§ 1-201(4),4-104(4).
"vec § 4-104(1)(d).
, 19.02[I](al NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-4

11. Midnight deadline. A deadline of midnight on the banking day follow-

ing the bankjng day when an item or notice is received or when another time for
takjng action begins to run.'·
12. Banking day. A day on which the bank is open to the public and carries
on substantially all of its banking functions."
13. Bank. "[Ajny person engaged in the business of banking.""
14. Clearinghouse. Any association ofbanIcs or other payors that regularly
clear items."
15. Settle. To pay by cash, by clearing house settlement, by charge or credit,
by remittance, or by other means as instructed. Under the uee, settlements are
either "provisional," meaning they are subject to revocation, or "final." 2O

11 19.02 NATURE OF BANK ACCOUNTS

[1) Legal Relationship Between Bank and Depositor
[aj Bank as Debtor to Its Depositor. When money is deposited in the normal
way, the transaction amounts to an unsecured loan given by the depositor to the
bank. Title to the money or securities offered for deposit passes to the bank and
the depositor has, simply, the claim of an ordinary unsecured creditor against
the bank, together with any rights that may develop out of the contract and the
general nature of the banking business. 2 '
When checks, or other instruments payable by someone other than the
depositary bank, are deposited, the vee regards the depositor as the owner of
the item while it is being collected, and the vce presumes that the bank is acting
as the agent of the depositor for the purpose of collecting the instrument. 22
Likewise, the other banks who participate in the chain of collection and who are
not the payor of the item are sub-agents of the depositor. This means the risks of
ownership remain with the depositor. When the bank receives final payment, it

..vce § 4-104(1 )0).

17 VCC § [-201(4).
" Cf. Congress Indus., Inc. v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 114 Ariz. 361, 364, 560 P2d 1268,
1271 (Ct. App. 1977).
"vcc § 4-106. See Annot., "Construction of vee § 4-106 Defining Separate or
Branch Office of Bank," 5 ALR 4th 938 (1981).
20VCC § 4-106 & comments 1,4, 5. See Annot., "Allachment and Garnishment of
Funds in Branch Bank or Main Office ofBank Having Branches," 12 ALR3d 1088 (1967).
" See J.T. Morse, Jr., 1 Morse on Banks and Banking 665 (H. Voorhees ed. 6th ed.
1928) (hereinafter Morse on Banks).
"uee §§ 4-104(I)(g}. 4-105(d), 4-201(1). The collection process is discussed in
Chapter 2.
19·5 BANK ACCOUNTS '1119.02(1){b)

becomes accountable to its customer for the item and a debtor-ereditor relation-
ship exists. 2S It is possible for the bank to become a purchaser ofthe item. In this
case, the bank is not actina as an agent on behalfoftbe owners for the purpose of
collection, because the bank becomes the owner of the item that it purchased. U
However, the VCC provisions on collection and payment apply whether the
bank is an agent or a purchaser.'1
When a collecting bank accepts an item for deposit and gives its customer
credit for the item, the uee presumes the credit is provisional and, thus, subject
to reversal if tbe bank cannot obtain payment from the payor bank. These VCC
provisions give the bank the specific right to charge back against the customer's
account any loss caused by the dishonor of the paper deposited. I.e The customer
also carries all risk eflosses not caused by the bank's own negligence that occur
in the collection procesS. 17 This will be discussed in Chapters 20-21.

[b) Bank as Bailee or Trustee. Sometimes a question can arise as to whether

the bank has received a deposit establishing a debtor-creditor relationship. For
example, a depository institution was held not accountable for sums ofcash that
were entrusted to one of its officers for deposit when the money was delivered
outside the bank and in a social setting.II Use of night depositories has raised
problems and courts have regarded the bank as a bailee in this situation. It The
provisions of the uce forbidding disclaimers of liability for failure to exercise
reasonable care apply to payment and collection only, not to bailments, but
some courts nevertheless have given effect to the uee principles.- Even if the

2SUCC § 4·213(3) & comment 9.

2. See VCC §§ 4-201, 4-209.
2'vce § 4-20\(1} &: comment I.
21~CC § 4-212.
., vec § 4-20\(1).
2. Sheldon v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 566 F2d 80S, 808 (lst Cir. 1977).

II See Annot., "Liability of Bank in Connection With Niaht Depository Service," 77

ALR3d 597 (1977).
311 The cases are collected in H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks 1112.1 (6th ed. 1987);
Annot., "Liability ofBank in Connection with Night Depository Service," 77 ALR3d 597
(1977). See Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 NJ Super. 122, 114-115,350 A2d
279, 281-282 (1975), cert. denied. 70 NJ 518, 36\ A2d 532 (1976), which collects
decisions both ways on this point-both under pre-Code law and under the VCC. The
court applied Section 4·\03( I) of thevee as not permitting such a disclaimer in connec-
tion with night depository service. See also Gillen v. Maryland Nat" Bank, 274 Md. 96,
100,333 A2d 329, 333 (1975) (applying contract principles). But see Valley Nat'\ Bank v.
Tang, 18 Ariz. App. 40, 43, 499 P2d 991, 994 (1972), which miaht be said to hold that the
operation of a night depository service by a bank is not a part ofthe depOsit and collection
process as such.
'il19.02(I)lb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19·6

UCC does not apply, the law places a duty on bailees to exercise care in the
custody of property entrusted to them."
General bank deposits should be distinauished from instances in which a
customer leaves securities or chattels in safekeeping. In such situations, title to
the goods or chattels remains in the customer and the bank is a bailee with the
duty of taking reasonable care ofthe securities. In case ofloss or destruction that
is not the bank's fault, the risk also remains with the customer.:n
Banks also engage in trust transactions. For example, a trust is created when
the trust department of a bank takes securities to hold and to manage for a
customer. When a trust is established, legal title to the property passes to the
bank, which becomes a trustee with a right to manage the property and deal in
the securities ofthe customer, who remains the beneficial ownerofthe property.
The customer in this situation is usually called a beneficiary.
Although the bank as trustee has legal tide to the property or the trust estate,
the trustee conducts the business for the benefit of the beneficiary and must
account to the beneficiary for all profits and losses, less, ofcoune, a reasonable
fee for acting as trustee.:l3 A trustee is a fiduciary and is held to a high standard of
responsibility and loyalty to the beneficiary.s,
An issue that has been litigated is the cbaracterization of funds paid to a
mortgage lending institution that the institution holds in an impound account to
pay insurance costs and taxes on the mortgaged property. Arguments have been
made that the institution holds such funds as a trustee for its customer. A 1983
case in federal court held that a savings and loan association did not have to pay
interest on the impound funds to its customers. The customers argued that the
amounts paid by them should be viewed either as a "special deposit," in which
case the association's control over the funds was restricted, or as a trust, in which
case the association would have to account for any benefit derived from use ofits
beneficiaries' funds. The court held that there was no special deposit under the
terms of the mortgages:

S1 See R. Brown, Personal Property § 11.1 (W. Rauschenbush ed. 3d ed. 1975). The
standard of care varies depending on the circumstances. The bailee may have the burden
of proof in explaining how the property got lost.
32See R. Brown, Personal Property § 11.1 (W. Rauschenbush ed. 3d cd. 1975) for a
discussion of the duties of bailees. See also Annot., "Liability of Bank or Safe·Deposit
Company For Its Employee's Theft or Misappropriation of Contents of Safe Deposit
Box," 39 ALR4th 543 (1985). Riggs v. Bank of Camas Prairie, 34 Idaho 176, In. 200
P.118,119(1921}.
33 For a brief discussion of the nature of the trustee's liabilities, see G. Bogert, Trusts
§§ I, 140-141, 144 (6th ed.; West 1987); A. Loring, A Trustee's Handbook §§ 17-18,22.
28 (6th ed. 1962); A. Scott, 2 The Law ofTrusts§§ 170.22,172-\73,179.5 (3d ed. 1967).
Some of the problems that arise when a bank deals with trustees are discussed in Chapter
15.
3' See G. Bosen, Trusts § 93 (6th ed.; West 1987); A. Loring, A Trustee's Handbook
§§ 25. 74 (6th ed. 1962); A. Scott, 2 The Law of Trusts § 174 (1967).
19-7 BANK ACCOUNTS ,. 19.02[1](el

Special deposits traditionally remain subject to order of the depositor. Here

the monthly payments are installments on a debt. The bank is a creditor, not
a depositary. Once the plaintiffs pay the defendant, they have no right to
withdraw the money. demand its return. or direct its disposition by the
defendant. Timely payments satisfy the plaintiffs' monthly debts created by
the mortgages. In return. the defendant is bound by the mortgage contract to
pay tax and insurance bills as they come due. as
The court also rejected the characterization ofthe payments as a trust. Although
the mortgage agreements used the words "trust," "trustee," and "in trust," the
relationship between the association and its customers was a traditional debtor-
creditor relationship, not a fiduciary relationship, because the customers could
not prove an express trust was intended. The court observed:
Several factors indicate establishment of a debt rather than creation of a
trust. If the monthly payments here are insufficient to cover first the sums
due for taxes and insurance, and second the monthly loan debt, then the
mortgagors are in defauJt. There are no expressed restrictions on the mort-
gagee's use of the monthly payments until the liability arises to pay insur-
ance and taxes. Additionally, none of the parties ever manifested an
intention to create a trust other than by signing a form document. H
Under some circumstances banks may be held to have the duties of a
fiduciary to their customer. In addition, courts have been holding that banks
owe their customers an expanding duty of good faith. These developments are
discussed in Chapter 24.

(cl Accounts at Branches. When a domestic bank operates a branch bank in a

foreign country. customers who are depositors in the foreign bank are creditors
ofthe bank generally. Ifpolitical instability or other circumstances in the foreign
country prevent the branch from paying its depositors. the bank, as a general
rule, remains obligated to pay tbe debt owed its customers. This rule was
reaffirmed in a case involving the Saigon branch of the Chue Manhattan Bank
in New York City. In April 1975, Chase closed the Saigon branch to escape the
communist takeover of South Vietnam. Subsequently, ten corporate plaintiffs
with demand deposits at the branch and one individual plaintiff with a certifi-
cate ofdeposit from the branch sued Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City.
The Second Circuit reversed a decision for Chase and held that Chase was
obligated to pay the plaintiffs the amount owed. It stated the general rule as
follows:
A bank which accepts deposits at a foreign branch becomes a debtor, not a
bailee, with respect to its depositors. In the event that unsettled local

"Judd v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F2d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1983).
30rd. at 1241.
11 19.02(1J[c} NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-8

conditions require it to cease operations, it should infonn its depositors of

the date when its branch will close and give them the opportunity to with-
draw their deposits or, if conditions prevent such steps, enable them to
obtain payment at an alternative location.... In the rare event that such
measures are either impossible or only partially successful, fairness dictates
that the parent bank be liable for those deposits which it was unable to
return abroad. To hold otherwise would be to undennine the seriousness of
its obligations to its depositors and under some circumstances (not necessa-
rily present here) to gain a windfall. u
Chase argued that the corporate plaintiffs had been nationalized by the
Vietnamese government and therefore could not sue on their own behalf.
According to Chase, the claim that was being asserted belonged to the successor
to the corporations, the Vietnamese government. The court rejected the claim
that the government of Vietnam succeeded to the corporate mantle of the
plaintiffs declaring, "A government which confiscates abandoned assets is no
more the successor in interest to the departed corporation than a bank robber is
to a bank victimized by him."· The Vietnamese government had not assumed
the assets and liabilities of the corporate plaintiffs, nor could it be viewed as
having seized the assets of the plaintiffs that the deposits in the Saigon branch
represented. For one thing, the seizure by the Vietnamese government involved
only the physical assets of the plaintiffs, and for another, given Chase's depar-
ture from Vietnam before the confiscation by the Vietnamese government, the
debt owed by Chase to the plaintiffs was no longer located within Vietnam for
that government to seize." Thus, the act of state doctrine did not bar the
plaintiff's recovery, because that doctrine does not require courts or the United
States to give effect to foreign acts of state as to property outside the acting
country's territorial jurisdiction. 40

"Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 US 976 (1982). The court relied upon Sokoloffv. National City Bank, 239 NY
158,167. 145 NE 917 (1924); Heininger, "Liability of United States Banks for Deposits
Placed in Their Foreign Branches," IlL. & Pol. Int'l Bus. 903. 975 (1979). See also
Sokoloffv. National City Bank, 130 Misc. 66, 224 NYS 102 (Sup. Ct. New York County,
1927), aird, 223 AD 754, 227 NYS 907, aird, 250 NY 69. 164 NE 745 (1928). One issue
in the case was which law applied-the law of Vietnam or the law of the state of New
York? The court did not decide. Even though this was a case in which the law of Vietnam
may have governed. because the parties did not take the position during the trial that the
claims of the plaintiffs had to be proven under Vietnamese law. the law of the state where
the trial was held could be applied. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 660 F2d at
860.
.. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F2d at 861.
., Id. at 862.
4OId. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank. 612 F. Supp. 351, 358 (SDNY 1985), raised
the issue of liability of a U.S. bank for deposits in a branch located in the Philippines that
could not pay deposits because of a Philippine government decree. In a later proceeding,
the court held that the depositor could, under Philippine law, look to the bank's world-
19·9 BANK ACCOUNTS , 19.02(2]

Finally, Chase argued that with respect to the individual plaintiff, it was
relieved of the obligation to perform because tbe seizure made performance
impossible. While recognjzing that the result might have been different jf the
Saigon branch had bC!ln a separate, locally incorporated subsidiary or if the
deposit oontract had included an explicit waiver of tbe depositors' right to
proceed apinst the home office, the court held that the liability of the Saigon
brancb to repa)' tbe debt "'Presented by the deposit account could be enforced
against the bank generally, not just against the branch.

(d) Bank Ownership of Deposited Funds. When the bank irrevocably credits
the depositor's personal account, it is free to deal witb the funds deposited by the
customer as it sees fit. This is because the title passes entirely to the bank in tbese
cases and, from then on, the bank is liable to its customer for the credit given and
tbe whole risk ofbusiness operation belongs to the bank and not to tbe customer.
Under the UCC, tbe point when the bank's liability to its customers arises is the
moment when the bank has made either a "fmal payment" or a "fInal settle·
ment" for the items its customer has deposited." When a bank gives its deposi-
tors provisional credit for checks or other items deposited, the bank may obtain
a security interest in tbe items while they are in the process ofcollection.

(2) Kinds of Accounts

Bank accounts exist in a variety offorms. At one time, the classif'tcation was
simpler than it is now. Banks could offer checking accounts that paid funds as
their customers ordered by check. These accounts were "demand" deposit
accounts because the checks drawn against the accounts were payable on
demand." Banks and other depository institutions also offered savings accounts
and time deposit accounts and issued certificates of deposit. These different
kinds of accounts existed in part because of laws forbidding the payment of
interest on demand deposits and regulating tbe amount ofinterest that could be
paid on time deposit accounts. As explained in Chapter 3, Congress has deregu-
lated the control ofintercst payments on deposit accounts, although theprohibi.
tion against paying interest on demand deposits still exists,U has enlarged the
class of depository institutions entitled to offer checking type "transaction
accounts," and has authorized a variety of types of accounts from which pay-

wide assets for payment oflhe bank's debt incurred atlhe Philippine branch. Wells Fargo
Asia Ltd. v. Citlbank, 660 F. Supp. 946, 950 (SONY 1987).
"uee §§ 4-213(1), 4.213(2), 213(3). Finalilyofpayment is discussed in Chapter 21.
'2 For an ex.planation of "payable on demand," see ~ 14.04(2)[11.
03
12 USC §§ 371a, 1828(g)(I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The regulalion of inIeres1 is
discussed aI113.04[6]. For the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board.on what consti·
tutes a demand deposit subject to the prohibition against interest, see 12 CFR
§§ 204.2(b)( I), 217.2(a) (1987); the similar rules of the FDIC are at 12 CFR § 329 (J 987).
'I19.02(2} NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-10

ments can be made to third parties on the order of the depository institution's
custQmer." These accounts from which payments may be made to third parties
are deemed "transaction accounts."
Federal banking law defines a transaction account as
a l1eposit or account on which the depositor or account holder is permitted
to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment
orders of withdrawal, telephone transfers, or other similar items for the
purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons or others. Such
term includes demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal accounts,
savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft accounts.·5
The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to further define what constitutes a
"transaction account" to reach accounts or deposits that are used "to provide
funds directly or indirectly for the purpose of making payments or transfers to
third persons or others."•• Because the Federal Reserve Board sets different

.. Prior to 1980, there was a general prohibition in federal law against depository
institutions' allowing customers of interest-bearing accounts to make withdrawals by
negotiable instruments. There were, however, exemptions for a few states, beginning with
Massachusetts and New Hampshire and, in 1916, extending to Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Maine, and Vermont. In 1918, New York was added. Then, in 1980, depository
institutions in all states obtained authority to offer NOW accounts with the enactment of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. See 12 USC
§ 1832{a) (\982). Before the barriers to checking against interest-bearing accounts were
dropped, various elTons were made to circumvent the restrictions, resulting in a series of
decisions. In American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 686 F2d 953, 955 (DC Cir.), cen.
denied, 444 US 920 (1919), the coun struck down regulations that allowed automatic
fund transfers from interest-bearing accounts to checking accounts. In a number of cases,
the authority of thrift institutions to offer NOW accounts was litigated. For decisions
upholding the elTons of thrift institutions to offer various checking arrangements, see
Aorida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers Credit Union, 359 S02d 886 (Aa. Dist.
Ct. App. 1918); Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 461, 231 A2d 45
(1968); Consumer Say. Bank v. Comm'T, 361 Mass. 717,232 NE2d 416 (\9'1l); Hudson
County Nat'l Bank v. Provident Inst. for Say. in Jersey City, 44 NJ 282, 208 A2d 409
(l965); Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n Y. Secretary of Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 392 A2d 1319
(1918); Washington Bankers Ass'n v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 453,598
P2d 119 (\979). But see Androscoggin County Say. Bank Y. Campbell, 282 A2d 858 (Me.
1911); New York State Bankers Ass'n Y. Albright, 38 :-''Y2d 430, 343 NE2d 735, 381
NYS2d 17 (1975); Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n Y. Mutual Say. & Loan Ass'n of Wis., 96 Wis.
2d 438, 291 NW2d 869 (l980), appeal after remand, 103 Wis. 2d 184. 307 NW2d 180
(198!) (modifying prior decree in light of the 1980 Monetary Control Act).
In Hondo Nat'\ Bank v. Gill Say. Ass'n, 696 F2d 1095, 1099-1100, 1102 (5th Cir.
1983), the coun held that the federal statute forbidding checking from interest-bearing
accounts did not create an implied cause of action for a commercial bank that was a
competitor of the thrift institution to enforce the prohibition. The enforcement of the
statute was the responsibility of the banking regulators.
•s 12 USC § 461 (b){ 1)(C) (1982).
·'12 USC § 461(b){I)(F) {I 982).
19-11 BANK. ACCOUNTS 11 19.02[2J[b)

reserve requirements for transaction accounts than for "nonpersonal time

deposits," it is still necessary to distinguish between ditTerent types of accounts
for these regulatory purposes. (Reserve requirements are discussed in Chapter
~ .

Some of the common types of accounts are described as follows.

[a) Checking Accounts. The checking account is simply an arrangement in

which the bank: borrows money from the customer and agrees to pay it upon
demand. Demand is evidenced by a check, which is a negotiable instrument.
Negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, which also feature checkina
privileges, do not have to be demand accounts. Federally chartered savings and
loan institutions are generally authorized to otTer savings accounts in the form of
"savings deposits, shares, or other accounts. for fued, minimum, or indefinite
periods of time...".r and may make such accounts subject to check or with-
drawal on negotiable or other orders. 4I As a result of the Gam-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, such institutions may otTer demand
accounts to perSODS or organizations that have a business loan relationship with
the institution. Also, such a rederal thrift institution may accept a demand
account from a commercial pany when the account is for the sole purpose of
effectuating payments to the account by a nonbusiness customer."
For regulatory purposes in determining what accounts constitute deposits
for which the bank must maintain reserves at the rate specified for "demand
deposit," the Federal Reserve Board bas a definition of "demand deposit" that
includes some accounts in which the bank may require the customer to give
notice of intended withdrawal for a minimum period of time." When tbe
current volume refers to instruments payable on demand or accounts that are
"demand" accounts, the term "demand" is used in the sense used in the uce,
I.e., that the instrument is payable when it is presented to the proper pany for
payment.&1

lbl Savings Accounts. A savings account also may be a demand account (when
the institution is one not subject to the prohibition against paying interest in 12
use § 371 a), but banks may reserve the right to pay only upon notice and may
require presentation of a savings account book andloT a nonnegotiable order or

41
12 USC § 1464(b)(I)(A)(1982).
12 USC § 1464(b)(I)(E)(1 982).
41

"12 VSC § 1464(b)(I)(B) (1982); 12 CFR § 545.12 (1987).

50 12 CFR § 204.2(b)(l) (1987). For the comparable rules of the.Fedel'lll Deposit
Insurance Corporation. see 12 CFR § 329. I(b) (1987).
SI VCC §§ J-102(e), 3-108. See discussion of when instruments are payable on
demand in ~ 14.04.
1I19.02(2)[c) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-12

withdrawal slip. 52 Federal law permits banks and thrift institutions to set up
savings accounts against which customers may draw checks. These are often
called NOW accounts. 53

[eJ Special Deposits. Special deposits may take a number offonns. Sometimes
they are a means ofholding funds in litigation. trust funds, and cash securities of
various types, such as deposits to show good faith in the case ofcontracts and the
like. Attorneys maintain such accounts to hold funds of clients for whom they
are fiduciaries. Special deposits are created by special contract between the bank
and the depositor. In most instances ofspecial deposits for the benefit ofa third
person, the bank becomes a trustee of the deposit for the benefit of the named
person. 54 Special deposits are often payable upon demand, sometimes upon
tenns, and occasionally they bear small amounts ofinterest. In many instances,
such accounts are evidenced by certificates of deposit.

(dJ Certificates of Deposit. Certificates of deposit (CDs) are instruments

issued by the bank specifying that a certain sum of money has been deposited.
These certificates may be either negotiable or nonnegotiable. II When nonnegoti-
able, the bank simply contracts to return the amount to the depositor plus any
contracted-for interest. Ifthe certificate is negotiable, the bank agrees to pay the
depositor or any person whom the depositor shall order, or the bearer of the
certificate. When the CD is a negotiable CD, the debt of the bank is to the legal
holder of the certificate and not to the original depositor."

52See Annat., "Liability of Saving.! Banlc for Payment to Person Presenting Lost or
Stolen Passboolc or Savings Account Card," 68 ALR3d 1080 (1976).
53 See "2.02, 3.04{6J[b] for a discussion ofthe federal law which made these changes.
50 See Annot, "Special Banlc Deposits As Subject of Attachment or Garnishment To
Satisfy"Depositor's General Obligations," 8 ALR4th 998 (1981).
55 See Chapter 14 for an explanation ofthe elemenu required for negotiability ofsuch
paper.
'" The prohibition on the payment of interest on demand aocounts in the Federal
Reserve Act, 12 USC § 371 (1982), was crucial to the Federal Reserve Board's actions in
limiting the participation of its member banks in establishing a secondary market for
certificates of deposits or other negotiable time deposits issued by the bank. The Board
concluded that a member bank could facilitate the sale of its nesotiable time deposits by
arranging to find a purchaser for a time deposit that a customer was trying to sell; that is, in
doing this, the member bank would not be violating the principle that a penalty should be
imposed for payment of a time deposit prior to maturity. However, the Board said that a
member bank's purchase ofa negotiable time deposit that it had issued should be viewed
as an early redemption of the time deposit. Thus, here the member bank would be
violating the rule that requires charging a penalty for early redemption ofthe time deposit.
The Board indicated that a member bank could enter into an arrangement with an
unaffiliated third party in which the third party agreed to purchase time deposits held by
the bank's customers, but the Board believed that a reciprocal arrangement of this kind
 19-13 BANK. ACCOUNTS , 19.02{2)[el

[e] NOW AccollDtl. Banks, savings and loan associations, and other deposi-
. tory institutions are authorized to create negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
accounts. Customers of the institutions that have established these lUTlU1&e-
.nents may, thus, make withdrawals with instruments that are similar in form to
checks and are payable to third parties. All depository institutions may offer
NOW accounts. I? NOW accounts can be held only by individuals. units of
government, and nonprofit organizations that operate "primarily for religious,
philanthropic, charitable, educational, political," or similar purposes. SI The
instruments used in NOW accounts are like checks. They fall within the UCC
. defmition of a draft. The customer is the drawer, the savinas institution is the
drawee or payor. On the face of the instrument there is a blank for the name of
the payee, which is inserted after the language "pay to the order of." The
instrument may be "payable through" a named commercial banlc, rather than
through the savings institution that is the drawee." There is a question as to
whether a negotiable order of withdrawal is a "check" as defined in the UCC. to
By definition, a check must be a negotiable instrument that is payable on
demand and drawn on a bank. With the NOW account, although the instrument
may customarily be paid on demand by the institution on which it is drawn, the
drawee institution may have the right to deny payment for a period of time
stipulated in the terms of the NOW account for which advance notice of with-
drawal must be given. Further, a bank is defined as any person who is engaged in
the business of banking. It is not clear whether a savings institution is a bank
under the VCC. The better view would seem to be that the VCC should apply to
negotiable orders of withdrawal since they function like checks.'1

between member banks violated the rule. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Member Bank Participation in the Secondary Market for its Own Time Deposits,
(1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bankins L. Rep. (eCH) f 99,272 (Aug. 27, 1982).
51 12 USC § I 832(a)( I982).

• t The entire beneficial interest ofthe account must be held "by one or more individu-
als or by an organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charita-
ble, educational, political, or other similar purposes and which is not operated for profit
••." 12 USCA § 1832(a)(2)(West SuPp. 4. 1987), asamended by the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987. NOW accounts also are available for the deposit ofcertain public
funds. Those eligible to have NOW accounts have expanded through congressional and
judicial action. See American Banker's Ass'n v. FHLBB, 668 F2d 953 (DC Cir. 1981); 12
CFR§§ 217.151, 329(1987).
St This means that the bank named is nolthe drawee or payor of the instrument, but
rather handles it only forcollcction. See UCC § 3·120. See H. Bailey, supra note 30,11 1.22.
Payable through drafts are discussed in Chapters 14 and 21 of this lext.
&OSee UCC § 3-104.
It See H. Bailey, supra note 30, 11 1.22.
'l19.02(2)[Q NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-14

(f) Automadc Transrer Accounts. Automatic transfer accounts allow with.

drawals to be made automatically from a savings account. The withdrawn funds
are then transferred to a checking account or other demand deposit account, in
accordance with an agreement made in advance between the bank and the
depositor. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System or that are
insured by the FDIC may establish such automatic transfer accounts for their
savings depositors who are individuals subject to regulations established by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 82
Authority to establish automatic transfer accounts was litigated in Otero
Savings d Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board." Otero had set
up a program that permitted its customers to open two accounts: an interest·
paying savings account and a zero balance checking account. When the customer
drew a check on the checking account, the funds necessary to cover the check
were automatically transferred from the savings account to the checking
account. Otero established the program before the effective date of the Deposi.
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Prior to this
act's amendments to the federal banking laws, it was not lawful for a savings and
loan institution to permit withdrawals by negotiable instrument from an
account on which interest was paid. The 1980 act, however, made it permissible
for all depository institutions to give their customers checking privileges from
such NOW accounts. ' • Although 12 USC § I832(a), which authorizes the estab-
lishment of NOW accounts, has applied by its express terms since 1979 to all
financial institutions, 12 USC § 371a had previously provided that banks
that were members of the Federal Reserve System could establish automatic
transfer accounts. Otero argued that given tb.ese two sections, 12 USC § 1832(a)
should be interpreted in a narrow fashion not to cover the establishment of
automatic transfer accounts. The court rejected this conclusion, finding no
inconsistency between the two sections. In its view, banks under 12 USC § 371a
were permitted to establish automatic transfer accounts, but savings and
loan' associations and otber financial institutions did not have this authority
until the amendments of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 became effective. The court held that there was no
constitutional problem in distinguishing in this fashion between banks and other
financial institutions. It stated: "Congress has undisputed authority to legislate
in this area and may make reasonable distinctions between its treatment of
commercial banks and savings and loans. It may also experiment by allowing
particular types of accounts in one region of the country before extending the
rule to others. "&1

"12 USC§§ 371a. 1828(g)(2)(1982).

13 665 F2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).

•• 12 USC § 1832(a) (1976).

15 665 F2d at 283.
19-15 BANK ACCOUNTS , 19.02[3}

[g] Share Draft Accounts. Share draft accounts, or share accounts, are
accounts with a credit union." A person who has a credit union account has an
ownership interest that is represented by a share in the credit union to the extent
ofthe account. Credit unions are also authorized to allow their members to draw
from these accounts by negotiable order of withdrawal."

[h] Money Market Accounts. The Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions

Act of 1982 authorized offering a type ofaccount that has no maximum interest
rate and that is designed to be competitive with money market mutual funds.
This account is insured by the federal deposit insuring agencies. Even though the
legal controls on the payment ofinterest on accounts other than demand depos-
its have expired, the money market account has the additional advantage ofnot
being subject to reserve requirements so long as it is not a transaction account
and the number of transfers from the account by check and by preauthorized
withdrawal is limited."

(3) Opening an Account

Opening an account in a bank involves only a simple contract in which the
depositor lends money to the bank in return for an asreement by the bank to pay
bacl:: the amount either with' or without interest, depending upon the nature of
the contract. The exact relationship is determined by the agreement signed by
the bank and the depositor, and the terms of such an agreement usually are
binding upon the parties, unless they involve an unfair advantage or a violation
of the banking laws. As discussed in Chapters 14 and 21, the regulations of the
Federal Reserve Board and the rules in clearinghouse agreements also establish
legally enforceable rights and duties between the bank and its customer.
Banks customarily place standard contracts on deposit slips and passbooks.
These, contracts sometimes attempt to regulate in detail the nature of the trans·
action and the risks involved in collecting commercial paper. These contracts
are usually drawn so as to give the bank the maximum protection in the circum-
stances, but, if they are unduly harsh and one-sided or if they unfairly surprise
the customers or attempt to disclaim responsibility for acting in sood faith and
with reasonable care, they may not be enforceable against the customer."
Federal law requires banks to give special notice ofsome bank policies. For
example, the Expedited Funds Availability Act requires notice on deposit slips,
at ATM sites, and on signs in the bank of certain bank policies on when a

II See generally \2 use § 1752(5) (1982).

n 12 USC § \785(1)( 1) (1982).
61
2\ USC § 3503(c) (1982).
" See vec §§ 4·\ O~( I), \-203. Cf. uec § 2-302.
V19.02{4] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-16

depositor may use the funds deposited. 70 Other disclosures are required when
the account involves a credit card account within the Truth-in-Lending Act or an
access device within the Electronic Fund Transfer Act as discussed in Chapter
26.

(4] Unconscionable Agreements

Standard printed contracts, which the depositor is asked to sign and which
are made out in advance by the bank's lawyers, are common not only in commer·
cial banking but throughout the business world. A well-known rule of law
incorporated in the UCCTi is that between the parties, rules of law can be
changed by agreement. Thus, courts in the past have enforced contracts signed
by the parties that worked a hardship on one ofthe signersP Taking advantage
of this rule. banks and other businesses sometimes have created standard form
contracts that give them great advantages and require their customers to waive
legal rights. Courts will provide relief to customers from such contracts when
they find them unduly oppressive or unconscionable.13 When such contracts are
not negotiated by parties with equal bargaining powers and understanding/4 and
when they work a hardship on one of the parties, they may be found to be
contracts of adhesion or unconscionable contracts. Under the UCC, courts
refuse to enforce these contracts against the injured party,1s

7G For discussion on the Expedited Funds Availability Act, see 1I20.11[IJ[bj.

71 UCC §§ 4-103, 1·103.
72 See Fon Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 gv.'2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
13 See Balgar, "The Contract of Adhesion," 20 Am. J. Compo L. 53, 58 (1972). See
generally, "Banks Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing," 55 ALR 1026 (1987).
"See Overmyer v. Frick, 405 US 174, 187 (1972), where it was held that there was
equal bargaining power in negotiating a cognovit provision.
7S UCC § 2·302. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67 (l972); Williams v. Walker
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445 (DC Cir. 1965). See also Doslert, "Appellate Restate·
ment of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work," 54 ABAJ 1183 (1968). Section 2-
302 of the UCC, on unconscionable contracts, does not expressly apply to agreements
between banks and their customers. Although it is contained in the UCC article on the sale
of goods, it probably applies by analogy. See UCC §§ 1.103, 1-203. See Comment,
"Unconscionability: Uniform Commercial Code Section 2·302," 36 Alb. L. Rev. 114
(1971-1972); Navin. "Waiver ofDefense Clauses in Consumer Contracts," 48 NCL Rev.
505,531 (1969-1970); Hilman, "Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A
New Framework for UCC § 2·302," 67 Cornell L Rev. I (1981-1982).
The California Supreme Court held that a cause ofaetion for unconscionable conduct
was established by allegations that a California bank's customers were charged $6.00 for
each check drawn on insufficient funds, although the cost to the bank o(processing such
checks was only $.30. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P2d 503. 513, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1985).
19-17 BANK ACCOUNTS , 19.02(5)

Sometimes banks form contracts providing that the customer shall not hold
the bank liable for losses caused by negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the
bank or its employees. Agreements of this sort are made illegal and void by the
express provisions ofthe UCC and are, therefore, unenforceable.71 Such stipula-
tions do little more than create ill will on tbe part of the customer and invite
charges that the bank has acted in bad faith. Further, a bank's contract with its
customer will be interpreted in light of the course of dealings between the bank
and tbe customer." As a result, action by a bank that is inconsistent with an
established manner of dealing between the bank and its customer may not be
proper even though the written contract is ambiguous or lacks a specific clause
on the matter.
The uee also specifically provides tbat tbe contracts between tbe bank and
its depositors shall be performed in good faitb:- The bank's duty ofgood faith to
its customer is discussed in Chapter 24.

[51 Termination of Relationship

The relationship ofbanker and depositor, being created by contract, can be
terminated in the same manner at the will of either the bank or the depositor.
The bank may terminate the relationship by notification and by payment ofthe
balance owed to the depositor, and the depositor may do so by notification and
by checking out the balance of the account. In the absence of notification, the
depositor's account being overdrawn does not terminate the relationship. In
such a situation, tbe overdraft represents a loan by the bank to the depositor. 7t
In the case of the customer's death or incompetence, the uee allows the
bank to continue to pay until it has received notice ofthe death or incompetence.

See Gianni Sport, Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 151 Mich. App. 598,599-600,391 NW2d
760,761-762 (1986). A clause in a contract for the purchase of clothes to sell for the
Christmas holidays allowed the buyer to cancel without notice at any time before delivery.
The court upheld ajury findin, of unconscionability when the buyer canceled just before
the October delivery date and took the loods only when the seller agreed to a 50 percent
price reduction. Although both parties were experienced merchants and the cancellation
clause was standard in the industry, the last-minute cancellation was unconscionable
because it put the seller in the position of havinll to absorb the loss or aaree to a price
reduction. The order represented 20 percent of the seller's annual business. Thus, the
court agreed the clause was unreasonable and was the product of unequal baraaining
power.
"vee § 4-103{1). See vee § 1-103.
77vee §§ \-103, 1-205(3)-(4), 4-103(1). See vee §§ 2-208-2-209. A coune of
performance may be relevant in establishing a waiver or modification ofa contract term.
vee § 2-208(3).
"vee § 1-201( 19), 1·203, 1·208. Cf. Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v. Gustafson, 385 SW2d
196 (Ky. 1964).
"See vee § 4-401(1).
, 19.02(5) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-18

Even in cases in which the bank: knows ofthe death, it may payor certify checks
drawn before death for ten days after that death unless it is ordered to stop by a
person claiming an interest in the account.eo This person may be a creditor or a
relative, the bank has no responsibility to determine the validity ofthe claim.'1
When the relationship is terminated by death, the bank: can settle upon order of
the probate court.
In the case of multiple party accounts, the rights of the survivors in the
account when one of the parties dies depend upon the general property and
probate law of the jurisdiction. The Uniform Probate Code, for example,
presumes that the account goes to the survivors. 12 If the bank: pays innocently,
not knowing of the death, it is protected by the UCC provision just mentioned.
Whereas UCC Section 4-405 has the effect ofauthorizing payment from an
account under some circumstances, notwithstanding death or incompetence, the
provision apparently does not require a bank to honor a check drawn by a
representative of an incompetent person when there has been no judicial
appoint'llent or qualification of the representative. 13
When a debtor delivered to his bank five checks on his account to pay
certain unsecured and unmatured notes, it was held that the bank: might properly
apply the checks to pay the notes after the debtor's sudden death, even when the
bank: was aware ofthe debtor's death." In addition to being notified ofthe fact of
death, the bank must be ordered to stop payment by a person claiming an
interest in the account. I i
As indicated, payment of a check by a bank after the death of the drawer
mayor may not be proper. Similarly, the person receiving the payment mayor
may not have the right to keep it. In one case, a check was drawn by a wife on a
joint account kept with her husband and paid by the bank after the wife's death.
Local law and the facts of the particular case indicated that the surviving joint

'D UCC § 4-405. See Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 47
Misc. 2d 741, 746,263 NYS2d 354 (NY Sup. Ct. 1965), afl'd, 25 AD2d 499, 267 NYS2d
477 (1966). Priono the UCC, it was usually held that ifa bank pays in good faith, without
knowledge ofthe death, such a payment is valid. Glennan \'. RochesterTrust Co., 209 NY
12, 14, 102 NE 537, 539 (1913). Balkam, "Payment of Bill of Exchange or Check by the
Drawee After the Drawer's Death," 14 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (1901); Zane, "Death of the
Drawer ofa Check," 17 Har\'. L. Rev. 104, 117-118 (1903).
11 UCC § 4-405, comment 4.
•, Uniform Probate Code § 6-104.
13 Cf. Beaucar v. Bristol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 6 Conn. Cir. 148, 154-156, 268 A2d
679, 685-687 (1969).
·'In re Estate of Schenck, 63 Misc. 2d 721, 723-724, 313 NYS2d 277, 279-280
(1970). The decision indicated that final payment took place upon delivery ofthe checks
to the payor bank. The debtor was killed in an accident the day after delive,ring the checks
and another creditor of the debtor objected to the application ofthe checks to pay the bank
debt, without success.
asCirar v. Bank of Hanshorne, 567 P2d 96, 98 (Olela. 1977).
19-19 BANK. ACCOUNTS 1119.02(5)

depositor (the husband) could recover the payment from the person who
received it. I'
In another case, it was pointed out that the UCC provision dealing with
payment following the death of a customer merely protects the bank making
payment but does not prevent an executor or administrator of the deceased
depositor's estate from recovering from the person obtaining payment of a
decedent's cbeck when such recovery is authorized under a probate statute. IJ
When an agent or other person signing a representative account dies, the
bank's authority to honor checks is terminated in the same manner as in individ-
ual accounts, and no checks may be drawn against the account until a new
representative is appointed by one who has authority to open the account.
When a federal check or payment is involved, the UCC rules do not apply
because the rights and duties of the parties arc determined by federal law.
Federal rules cover direct deposit payments made by the U.S. Treasury and the
payment ofU.S. Treasury checks, such as those for social security benefits. The
rules determine the liability ofbanlcs for failing to return funds when the death of
the payee revokes the right to receive payment, as in the case where death ofthe
payee terminates the right to social security benefits." The regulations do not
give the bank a right to recover such benefit payments that its customer may
have withdrawn from the account. Although the bank may be liable for the
return of money to the U.S. Treasury, the bank's right to recover from its
customer or to cbarge ita cllstomer's account-depends upon the applicable state
law and the contract between the bank and its customer."
The death of a depositor can cause problems for a bank when there is an
arrangement with other parties, such as insurance companies or pension compa-
nies, to have proceeds paid directly into the customer's account at the bank. The
agreements in such direct deposit arrangements usually provide that the bank
will reimburse the persons making the deposits if funds are paid out after the
customer dies. Counsel for the Comptroller of the Currency has advised that

"Blair v. Davis, 281 So2d 247, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), which actually
involved a question ofthe proper venue ofthe legal action by the survivor to recover the
amount of the check from the payee.
"Blacle v. Han, 301 So2d 787, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1914).
II 31 CFR ~ 210.11, 240.11, 240.12 (1987). See Cornptrollerofthe Currency, Bank-
ing Circular No. 224, "Federal Recurring Payments Through Financial Institutions By
Means Other Than By Check" (Nov. 18, 1987). The Social Security Act establishes
procedures to protect recipients in the case of overpayments, but the cases have generally
treated payments after death as "erroneous" payments that are not within the protections
of the statute. Thomas V. Bowen, 791 F2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1986); Breault v. Heckler,
763 F2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1985); Dockstaderv. Miller, 719 F2d 327,329-331 (10th Cir.
1983), cen. denied, 467 US 1256 (1984); Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F2d 1092,
1096-1097 (9th Cir. 1983). See also First Interstate Bank v. Haynes, 73 Or. App. 714,718,
699 P2d 1168, 1172 (1985).
"31 CFR § 210.11(c) (1987).
, 19.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-20

banks may enter into such arrangements to reimburse without violating the
prohibition in the National Bank Act against guaranteeing debts of third
parties.- . .
. The right of the bank to pay from any account may be suspended by court
action. This may take the form of an attachment of an individual account by a
creditor of the depositor. In this case, the bank may not honor any checks after
attachment occurs and the bank has a reasonable time to act on it." Bankruptcy
or receivership ofthe depositor also automatically suspends the right ofthe bank
to pay at the depositor's order. Accounts so suspended can be reopened only by
order of the court or properly constituted officers.

1119.03 FORMS OF ACCOUNTS

Accounts may be opened in a number of forms. The owner may be an
individual or multiple parties may have an ownership interest. When there are
multiple parties, the rights ofeach party in the account will depend on the legal
form ofthe account selected. The person or persons who have an interest may be
an individual or another legal entity such as a partnership or corporation.

[I) Indhidual Accounts

The individual account, which is the simplest form, is merely an arrange-
ment in which an individual has the right to deposit and withdraw money. No
special formality is necessary for opening such an account unless the individual
is a minor, is under interdiction, or is under legal guardianship. In any of these
cases the bank should receive authorization of the parent or legal guardian
before opening such an account. If the bank fails to take this precaution, the
applicable state law may make the bank liable for conversion of the funds even
though it has paid them on the order ofthe incompetent individual. At one time,
married women had to receive permission from their husbands before opening
bank accounts. Of course, this is no longer true. Married women are now fully
able to enter into contracts on their own. Requiring the consent of the spouse
would, in fact, violate federal law prohibiting credit discrimination. 12 .

[2) Joint or Multiple party Accounts

The Probate Code defines ajoint account as "an account payable on request
to one or more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any

to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Letter No. 177 (1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 'i 85,258 (Jan. 14,1981).
" UCC § 4·303.
12 15 USC § 1691(a)(l) (1982); 12 CFR § 202.7(a) (1987). See infra 'i 26.06.
19-21 BANK. ACCOUNTS 'II 19.03(2I[a)

right ofsurvivorship..... As this definition indicates, there is more than one type
ofjoint account. In some arransements, when one ofthcjoint parties dies, the
interest of the deceased party passes to the surviving parties. Other arrange-
ments have no survivonhip feature and the interest in the account passes to the
estate of the deceased party. Also, during the lifetime of the parties to the joint
account, questions may arise as to the respective interest ofeach ofthe parties in
the account. In some arrangements, all parties must sign in order to make
withdrawals. In others, each party has a right to draw separately against the
account. The extent of the interest of each of the parties in the account, the
power of creditors ofany one of the parties to levy on funds in the account. and
the right of one party (when the account permits checking) to stop the payment
of checks drawn by another are also troublesome issues. The resolution of these
issues will vary, depending on tbe particular circumstances and the contract
entered into by the bank and the parties to the account. Whatever the arrange-
ment, the bank needs clear rules to guide it in making payments so that it can
avoid liability for improper payment of funds in the account.
Clearly, the relationship between the parties to a joint account is not a
simple one. Although the parties usually can accomplish their desired objectives
by clearly defining their respective rights in tbe deposit agreement, this clarity of
intent is often missing. In these cases, problems arise. Was a survivorship feature
intended? Were all parties to have a right of separate withdrawal? What interest
does each party have in the account?

la) Common-Law Rules. The common law evolved rules of property to

describe the relationships between parties who held joint interests in property.
One form of joint ownership was known as tenancy in common. Under this
arrangement, each joint tenant had a specific, although undivided, interest in
the cOrPus of the property (the interest could be 30 percent, SO percent, 7S
percent, and so forth). All tenants had an equal right to the property and there
was no survivorship feature. The common law also recognized a form ofjoint
ownership known as joint tenancy. In this form, all the joint tenants had an equal
interest in the property and the interest of any one joint tenant passed to the
survivors upon the joint tenant's death. The common law presumed tbe creation
of a joint tenancy when the intent of the parties was unclear, but this presump-
tion has been reversed by statute in many states, thus creating a presumption in
favor of tenancy in common. Unfortunately, these common-law rules do not
apply well to bank accounts." Joint bank accounts usually do not meet the

"Unifonn Probate Code § 6-101(4).

t'See Note, "Joint Savings Accounts: Rights of Nondepositors While Original Joint
Tenants Still Alive (First Nalional Bank v. Munns, 602 SW2d 910, Mo. App., ED 1980),"
46 Mo. L. Rev. 666 (1981); Comment, "The Jointand Survivorship Bank Account," 1957
U. III. LF 655 (1957); Note. "Joint Bank Deposits." 15 Cornell LQ 96 (1929-1930); Note,
"Bank Accounts: Transfer of PrDperty at Death," 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 289 (1955-1956);
11 19.03(2)1b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-22

technical requirements needed by common law for creation ofjoint tenancies,

and tenancy in common often does not serve the interests of the parties because
it lacks the survivorship feature.
Although the common-law rules on joint property interests do not, as a
general rule, fit the joint-account situation well, the courts have permitted
parties to establish the arrangements they desire by contract. Fortunately, in
most states, the rights of parties to joint accounts are controlled by statutes that
clarify some of these ambiguities.

(b] Uniform Probate Code. The Uniform Probate Code contains a comprehen-
sive treatment of multiple party accounts.II These provisions create a series of
presumptions that apply to joint accounts unless the parties give "clear and
convincing evidence" ofa different intention. One presumption is that any sums
remaining on deposit at the death of one party to a joint account belong to the
surviving party or parties.· Another presumption is that during the lifetime of
all the parties, the joint account belongs to the parties "in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit."17 Whatever the legal relation-
ships between the parties to the joint account, the bank will be protected if it
follows its deposit contract provisions. II The bank is not required to inquire as to
the source of the funds in the joint account or the purposes for which any sum
withdrawn is to be used. II
One problem with joint accounts concerns the rights of survivors when one
of the joint owners dies. When an elderly or ill person opens the account and
makes all deposits to the account, but the name of another is included on the
account, does the party opening the account intend to make a gift of any of the

Kepner, "The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name," 41
Cal. L. Rev. 596 (1956); See Ilenerally Farnum, "Joint Tenancy and Joint Bank
Accounts-Danller, Handle With Care," 17 Idaho L. Rev. 101 (1980-1981); Note,
"Banlcing Law-Overdrafts-Liability for Overdrafts ofa Joint Bank Account Under the
UCC-Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A2d 442 (NY 1975)," 1976 BYU L. Rev. 499
(1976); Note, "Cambridge Trust v. Carney: Overdraft Liability on Account Co-Signato-
ries," 28 Me. L Rev. 254 (1976); R. Brown Personal Property§ 8.8 (W. Rauschenbush ed.
3d cd. 1975). See generally Annot., "Creation of Joint Savings Account or Savings
Cenificate as Gift to Survivor;' 43 ALR3d 971 (1972).
ISProbate Code §§ 6-101 through 6-113.
"Probate Code § 6-104(a). Although the Probate Code recognizes the survivorship
feature ofjoint accounts, there are rights, which may be assened by the deceased pany's
estate against survivors, for the payment of taxes, debts, and administrative expenses,
when the other assets ofthe estate are insufficient. However, the bank can pay the survivor
before any legal claim to the account has been assened by the representative of the estate
without fear of liability.
t7 Probate Code § 6-103(a).
.. Probate Code §§ 6-102, 6-108.
H Probate Code § 6-108.
19-23 BANK ACCOUNTS 11 19.03(2J1c)

account to the other person named? The second name may have been added
simply as a convenience in making deposits and withdrawals with no gift
intended. lOG Moreover, even when a gift was clearly intended, the person who
opened the account and deposited the funds may have intended the interest to
pass only upon his or her death. The latter kinds of arrangements have been
attacked as not satisfYing the legal formalities for transferring interesu at death,·
The Uniform Probate Code assists in the resolution of these problems. It
creates a presumption that persons who use joint accounts intend the proceeds
ofthe account to go to the survivors. 'G' It makes clear that transfers pursuant to
joint account arrangement do not have to be measured by the requirements the
law establishes for wills. '02 The Uniform Probate Code also recognizes a "pay-
able on death" account (POD), which is payable to only one person during that
person's lifetime but which becomes payable, upon his or her death, to one or
more other POD payees.'os

lc) Creditors' Rights Alainst Joint Account. The creditors ofone party to the
joint account have rights to levy against the account, and these rights have also
been a source of problems. (Banks face similar questions in exercising setoff
rights against a joint account when only one of the parties is indebted to the
bank.) Just because an account is held jointly does not mean that creditors can
treat all ofthe funds in the account as the exclusive property of any one of the
depositors, for purposes of satisfying that depositor's debts. 11M

'00 See
In re Estate of Michaels, 26 Wis. 2d 382, 386, 132 NW2d 557, 561 (1965), A
similar problem can exist with trust accounts. See In re Totten, 179 NY 112, 115.116,71
NE 748 {I 904). See generally Annot., "Liability of Bank to Joint Depositor for Removal
of Name From Account at Request of Other Joint Depositor," 39 ALR4th 1112 (1985).
'G' Probate Code § 6·104.
'G·ld.
'G, Probate Code ~ 6-IOI( 10), 6·104(b). See generally Annot., "Payable-on.Death
Savings Account or Certificate of Deposit as Will," 50 ALR4th 272 (1986).
,~. Hayden v. Gardner, 238 Ark. 351, 352-353, 381 SW2d 752, 753-754 (1964), See
generally Annot., "Bank's Right to Setoff, Based on Debt of One Depositor, Against
Funds in Account Standing in Name of Debtor and Another," 68 ALR3d 192 (1976);
Annot., "Joint Bank Account as Subject to Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution by
Creditor of One of the Joint Depositors," II ALR3d 1465 (1961). In Uttecht v. Norweit
Bank of Norfolk, N.A., 221 Neb. 222, 224-225, 376 NW2d II, 13-14 (1985), noted
Collins, "Bank's Right to Vary Setoff Statute by Meansof Contract," 103 Banking U 380
(1986), the Nebraska Supreme Coun upheld the bank's setoff of a debt of one pany to a
joint account against CDs as to which only one ofthe other joint owners was the beneficial
owner. This result was contrary to Section 6-113 of the Uniform Probate Code, because
the bank's debtor did not have a "present right of withdrawal" in the account and had not
contributed to the account. However, tbe court held that a contract between the bank and
the parties 10 the account was controlling. The contract provisions were obtained in a
bank pamphlet referenced on the face ofthe CDs. See also Annot., "Joint Bank Account as
, 19.03(2J[c] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-24

A creditor of one party to a joint bank account must exercise caution when
taking action against a joint account to obtain satisfaction of the debt. The
creditor has no interest in the portion of the joint account owned by the parties
who are not indebted to-the creditor. In Atkinson v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 111I the oourt limited the ability ofa bank to set off a husband's debt to the
bank against a joint account at the bank held by the husband and his wife.,1II In
Yakima Adjustment Service Inc. v. Durand,'D7 the oourt held that a joint bank
account established by a mother and her son was owned entirely by the son, so
that a creditor of the mother was unable to garnish funds in the account.
Although Washington has a statute creating a presumption of equal ownership
in a joint account, the court held that the statutory presumption was for the
benefit of the bank and did not apply in a case in which the bank was merely a
stakeholder and the creditor was claiming an interest in the account. The court
applied the general rule that a creditor oould attach oniy whatever interest the
debtor had in the account.
In Smith v. Idaho State University Federal Credit Union,'ot the court indio
cated that a state statute designed to protect banks when funds are paid out of
multiple-party accounts would extend to the situation in which one party to a
joint account pledged the deposits in that account as security for a loan made by
the bank to him. The court indicated that the pledge ofthe account by one ofthe
parties should be treated, for purposes ofthe statute, as payment ofthe account
to satisfy the loan.
In Estate ofOney v. Getty,'111 there was a situation similar to one involving
the claim of a creditor to a joint account, but in this case the claimants were
persons who claimed an interest in accounts under a will of the decedent who
had opened the joint accounts. The claimants challenged the validity ofthe joint
tenancy bank accounts that the decedent had opened with a relative. Two
statutes were involved in the case. One statute made the establishment ofajoint
tenancy account, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, conclusive evi·
dence ofintent to vest title in the survivor to the account in any action in which
the bank or the surviving depositor was a party. The court held that since the
lawsuit brought by the claimants under the will was a probate proceeding against
the executor of the estate, it was against neither the bank nor the surviving

Subject to Attachment, Garnishment, or Execution by Creditor of One of the Joint

Depositors," 11 ALR3d 1465 (1967).
ICIS 635 F2d 508, 511-512 (5th Cir. 1981). Ifthe United Stales proceeds againstajoint
account to enforce the tax obligations of one of the parties to the joint account, the state
law rules governing debt collection procedures may not apply. See United States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 US 713 (1985) discussed infra 1 19.03[2)[g].
lClCSee also Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee, 634 F2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1981).
ID728 Wash. App. 180, 184-186,622 P2d 408, 410-411 (1981).
11lI103 Idaho 245, 247-248, 646 P2d 1016, 1018-1019 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
111I31 Wash. App. 325, 327-328,641 P2d 725, 727-728 (1982).
19-25 BANK. ACCOUNTS 11 19.03[2J[d)

depositor, so the presumption did not apply. The other statute created a rebutta-
ble presumption ofintent to create a survivorship tenancy when ajoint account
was created by a savings and loan association. The court held that the trial court
should conduct a hearing to determine whether the decedent intended to create a
right ofsurvivorship or make a gift ofan interest in the account or simply added
the other name to the account as a convenience with no intention of relinquish-
ing ownership of the funds.

[d] Ownership Interests. When one party to ajoint account deposits substan-
tiallyall the funds in the account, serious questions may arise as to the ownership
interests ofthe joint tenants in the account during the lifetime of the parties. In
some situations, it may be possible to regard the party who deposits the funds as
intending to make a gift to the other parties to the account. In other situations, it
may be clear that no such intent was present. These problems were raised in
Anderson v. Baker.'" Sanders opened several accounts in her name and that of
her son Baker. The signature cards provided that the parties to the account
agreed that any funds placed in the account shall be "conclusively intended to be
a gift" at the time ofdeposit ofthe funds to the extent of the account holders' pro
rata interest in the account. It was clear, however, that Sanders' purpose in
creating the account was for convenience, with no intention to make a gift to her
son. Shortly before Sandea:s died, shC$tarted au action against ber son to compel
the return of control of the account and the funds in it. Montana law made the
entering of an agreement between co-depositors conclusive in establishing the
intent ofone joint depositor to make a gift ofan interest in a joint account to the
other depositors, but the court did not follow this rule in Anderson v. Baker.
Sanders asserted her sole rights to the account during her lifetime. The court
reasoned that the agreement on the signature card may not have accurately
expressed Sanders' intentions with respect to the joint account. In its view,
signature cards were similar to contracts ofadhesion in that the joint depositors
had no 'control over the terms of the card. Accordingly, the court held that when
"a depositor during his or her lifetime raises the issue ofownership offunds in a
joint tenancy account, the statements' on the signature card are not conclusive
and additional evidence may be examined to ascertain the true intent of the
parties. "111 The court upheld the use of parol evidence to ascertain the intent of
the parties.
Sly v. Barnl.'t/" 2 also involved the ownership rights of two parties to a joint

110
196 Mont. 494, 641 P2d 1035 (1982). See generally Annot., "Nondrawini
Cosigner's Liability for Joint Checking Account Overdraft." 48 ALR4th 1136 (1986).
111 641 P2d at 1038. See Annot., "Parol Evidence Rule as Applied to Deposit ofFunds
in Name of Depositor and Another," 33 ALR2d 569 (1954); Annot., "Creation of Joint
Savings Account or Savings Certificate as Gift to Survivor," 43 ALR3d 971 (1972).
112
97 Nev. 587. 588-589, 637 P2d 527, 528-529 (1982).
, 19.03[2][el NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-26

tenancy account during the lifetime of the parties. The terms of the signature
card provided that the parties to the account were "joint depositors" who owned
the money "jointly with the right of survivorship." Nevertheless, the funds in
the account were contributed by only one ofthe parties, who maintained control
over the account passbook, checks, withdrawal slips, and deposit book. When
that party withdrew all tbe funds in the account and closed it without the consent
of the other party, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption ofan intent to establish a joint tenancy account and that the other
party to the joint account had no present or survivorship interest in the account.

[e) Bank Payment of Joint Account F1mds. The scope of statutes designed to
protect banks who payout proceeds ofajoint account to one ofthe joint tenants
was limited in a decision by the New York Court ofAppeals. The court held that
the statute did not apply to protect the bank when the bank permitted one ofthe
joint tenants to substitute a new name for the name of the other joint tenant on
the account and then allowed the person whose name was added to withdraw the
funds. The bank argued that the change in name was the equivalent of a with-
drawal offunds from the account and the establishment of a new account. The
court held that the statute protecting the bank when withdrawals were made by a
joint tenant did not apply to name changes. 1l3
The uec permits a depositary bank to supply any indorsement of its
customer that is missing when the indorsement is needed in order to collect the
check for the customer.'" In addition, deposit agreements between banks and
their customers sometimes provide that the bank may credit instruments pay-
able to the customer to the customer's account at the bank when they are sent to
the bank for deposit. When a joint account is concerned, these provisions may
produce problems for one of the joint parties to the account. Susen v, Citizen's
Bank & Trust Co. "5 is an example of one of these problems. Susen had a joint
checking account with her daughter. A $5,000 check payable to Susen and
bearing an indorsement purporting to be Susen's was deposited into the account.
Before Susen received notice of the deposit, the bank paid out two large checks
from the account. These checks had been signed by the daughter, but were
otherwise not filled in. The checks were stolen from the daughter, filled in, and
cashed at another institution before presentation to Susen's bank. The bank
defended its actions in paying the checks on the ground that the daughter's
signing blank instruments constituted negligence that estopped the bank's cus·
tomer from recovering against the bank under uce § 3-406. Susen argued in
response that the bank should not have deposited the $5,000 check without her

113 Brown v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 51 NY2d 441, 443-444, 415 NE2d 906, 908-909,
434 NYS2d 916, 917-918 (1980).
'14 vee § 4.205(1 l.
115
111 III. App. 3d 909, 91 1·912,444 NE2d 701, 703-704 (1982).
19-27 BANK ACCOUNTS 11 19.03[211fJ

indorsement. Without this deposit, the account would have lacked sufficient
funds to pay the two other checks. Relying upon the account agreement card
between the bank and Susen, the court held the bank was entitled to credit the
funds from the $5,000 check into the joint account and acted accordina to
reasonable commercial standard, notwithstanding Susen's claim that ber
indorsement on the check had been forged. The aareement with the bank, the
court concluded, permitted the deposit of Susen's funds into the account with-
out her knowledge and without her indorsement.

[Q Liability for Overdrafts. Liability for overdrafts on a joint account is a

troublesome issue. A new twist on this problem occurred in United States Trust
Co. ofNew York v. McSweeney.11I Edward and Christine, husband and wife, had
a joint checkinsaccount. The bank honored a number of overdrafts, some of
which were written by Christine and others by Edward. The bank sued Christine
for payment ofthe overdrafts, and Christine offered three defenses: (I) that her
husband controlled the account and she simply followed his directions and
received no benefits from the overdrafts; (2) that deposits made to the account
should be allocated in a pro rata manner to the overdrafts written by her; and (3)
that she should not be held liable for overdrafts of her husband. The court ruled
against Christine on the first two contentions. Firstly. as the drawer of checks
that constituted overdrafts, she was liable for payment. Although she might have
a claim for reimbursement a8mst Edward, as between Christine and the bank

"'91 AD2d 7, 8-9, 4S7 NYS2d 276, 277-278 (NY App. Div. 1982).
The Texas Supreme Coun held that a co-signor on a joint checking account should
not be charged for overdrafts created by the other pany to the account without some
showing that the co-signor had either "participated in the transaction which created the
overdraft; was enriched by the overdraft; or in some manner ratified the transaction
creating the overdraft•..." The coun held that a pany to the accountshould not be viewed
as a "customer" of the bank under VCC § 4-40 I(a) on the mere signing of the bank's
signature card. Although the trial coun had determined that such a person could be
treated as the bank's "customer" and, therefore, could be charged for any items properly
payable from the account, the coun reversed this decision. In reaching this result, the
coun noted that the pany the bank was seeking to charge had never signed a check on the
account or made a withdrawal from the account. The coun did not consider whether the
outcome would have been changed had the parties entered into /I written indemnity
agreement as pan of their deposit contract with the bank. The coun did not consider
whether state community propeny rules might establish liability because there was no
showing that such propeny rules applied to this account. Williams v. Cullen Center Bank
& Trust. 685 SW2d 311, 314-315 (Tex. 19&5). This decision was critically reviewed in
"Overdraftl1ability on Joint Checking Accounts," 102 Banking U 491 (1985). In Yoder
v. Cromwell State Bank, 478 NE2d 131, 135-136 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), one party toajoint
checking account deposited checks that were subsequently dishonored and charged back
to the account. The coun held that the bank could charge back and recover the amount
owed from all panies to the account because all were "customers" ofthe banle under uce
§ 4.212( I), which gives a bank the right to charge back against its customers.
1119.03[211&l NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-28

the control over the account by her husband, even if true, did not exculpate her
from liability on her checks. Secondly, the court held that the bank could allocate
deposit! made to the account as it saw fit to the debts of either Edward or
Christine and, therefore, could allocate the deposits entirely to Edward's over-
drafts and sue Christine for the full amount of her overdrafts. Thirdly, the court
recognized that the liability of one joint tenant to a checking account for the
overdrafts of another joint tenant was not a settled matter and held that, in the
absence of any specific term in the account agreement on the matter,
the liability of one co-signatory for the overdrafts of the other depends ...
upon the resolution of such issues as the knowledge of the co-signatory of
the overdrafts, the degree of participation of the co-signor in the day to day
operations of the account, and the benefits allegedly derived by the c0-
signatory from the overdrafts. 117
The court adopted this approach because joint tenants ordinarily are not agents
for each other and become such only upon ratification or acquiescence by the
other tenant.

Ig] Conflicting Claims. In Fortune v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,''' the court
discussed the dilemma a bank faces when presented with a demand by one joint
tenant for funds in the account and a claim by another that the funds belong to
someone else. The other claimant argued that because of a statute on adverse
claimants to bank deposits, the bank could not pay the funds in the account to
the joint tenant until a court order had been obtained. The court held that this
statute was not meant to apply to parties who were cotenants on an account,
because it would mean the bank would have to either sue or be sued every time a
private dispute existed between the cotenants. The court held that the bank had
an absolute duty to honor the demand ofanyone of the tenants to the funds. In
honoring the demand ofthe joint tenant for the funds, the bank "simply acted in
conformity with the contractual obligation the cotenants themselves had agreed
to, and such an act cannot form the basis for a cause of action against Bank."'"
When the United States levies against a joint bank account in order to
collect a tax obligation ofone ofthe parties to the joint account, the result may be
different than if it were a private party making the levy under state debt-
collection procedures. In United States v. National Bank ofCommerce, '20 three
individuals were parties to a joint checking and a joint savings account. Under
the terms of the accounts, each individual had the right to make a complete

117 457 NYS2d at 279.

"'Fortune v. City Nat" Bank & Trust Co., 671 P2d 69 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
"' Id. at 72. .
,.. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 US 713, 724-726 (J 985)(five-
to-four decision).
19-29 BANK ACCOUNTS 'i 19.03(3)

withdrawal of all of the funds in the accounts. One of the parties owed delin-
quent taxes. Acting on the powers granted by 26 USC § 633l(a), the Internal
Revenue Service levied on both the checking account and the savings account.
The bank argued that state law determined the rights ofthe delinquent taxpayer
in the two accounts and that the Service could levy on the accounts only to the
extent that state law gave the delinquent taxpayer a property interest in the
accounts. The Supreme Court agreed that state law determined the property
rights of the parties. However, it stated further that state law did not control the
remedies that were available to the United States as a creditor where it was
reaching the taxpayer's property to satisfy the tax obligation. Because state law
gave the taxpayer an unlimited right of withdrawal in the accounts, the court
concluded that the taxpayer had a "property right" that entitled the Internal
Revenue Service to levy upon the entire amounts in both accounts. The state law
limitations on levies by state creditors did not bind the federal government. The
court concluded that the Servicc's levy on the full amounts in both accounts
would not divest the other owners oftheir property interests in the accounts. The
procedure used by the service was "provisional" and expressly provided a
method for these other parties to assert their ownership claims after the levy was
made. Thus, the ownership questions were deferred and the levy on the accounts
could go forward without a prior adjudication of the rights ofall of the parties to
the joint accounts.
Another problem arises when one joint depositor tries to stop payment on a
check drawn by another joint depositor. In this situation, the bank is caught in a
crossfire. !fit pays the check, it may be subject to claims, by the joint depositor
who attempted to stop payment, against improper payment and even against
wrongful dishonor if subsequent checks are not paid as a result of the improper
payment. If the bank follows the stop payment instruction, it may be liable for
wrongful dishonor to the joint depositor who drew the check. Obviously, the
deposit agreement should resolve this problem. Absent agreement, unfortu·
natel~, the law is not clear. '21

13) Partnership Accounts

Partnership accounts usually are opened to handle the funds of a partner-
ship. Any general partner may act as agent for the partnership and, therefore, can
open an account for such a firm. However, in the case of an unlimited partner·

12' Cf. Valley Bank& Trust Co. v. Weyerman Feathers, 30 Utah 2d 161-163,514 P2d
1282-1284 (1973) (bank liable for wrongful payment for not following stop payment
order issued by wife on check drawn by husband) with Brown v. EaslInan Nat'l Bank. 291
P2d 828 (Okla. 1955) (bank not liable for payment of check drawn by husband over a stop
payment order issued by wife). See generally Annot., "Bank's Liability for Its Payment of
Checks Drawn By One Depositor After Stop Payment Order By a Joint Depositor," 55
ALR2d 975 (1957). Stop payments are discussed at ~ 20.05.
f 19.03[4] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19·30

ship, ii is safer if authorization for opening such ~ ~ccount is &iv~n ~y.all the
members ofthe partnership, and, in the case ofthe limited partnership,It IS safer
if authorization is given by the general partners.

[4] Corporate Accounts

Corporate accounts can be opened in the name of the corporation only by
properly constituted officers ofthe corporation. Although a corporation may be
estopped from denying the authority of an agent it has allowed to carry on a
continuous course of dealing, the bank should require a resolution ofthe board
of directors or a written authorization by a responsible officer under such a
resolution for the opening of the account.
When an employee or other purported agent forges resolutions ofcorporate
authority, the resolutions are not effective to give the employee power to act, by
signing checks, on behalf of the corporation.122 Unless the corporation ratifies
the employee's conduct, or is estopped because ofits own carelessness to chal-
lenge the actions taken, the signature cannot bind the corporation and will not
constitute its signature. 1u Problems arising from the payment of checks with
unauthorized signatures are discussed in Chapter 20.

, 19.04 SIGNATURES
In the case of the ordinary checking or commercial account, the bank is
authorized to pay upon the order of the person whose signature is recorded on
the signature cards kept for that purpose. The signature card constitutes the
bank's contract with its depositor and contains the terms that give the persons
named on the card authority to act on behalfofthe depositor in making deposits
and withdrawals and signing instruments. It has been held that a bank may
properly refuse to pay a check when the account to be charged is not accurately
described and when the name ofthe signer is in a form different from that on the
bank's records of those authorized to sign."c .

122 UCC § 3-404( I).

'23 UCC §§ 3-404-3·406. See Nationwide Homes v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
262 NC 79,81,136 SE2d 202, 204(1964). See also H. Bailey, supra note 30, § 3.6 (6thed.
1987). Contra Flo-Control, Inc. v. Northeast Bank, 150 Ga. App. 880,258 SE2d 695
(1979), which reached a contrary result b£<:ause ofa special statute exculpating the bank.
'''Commonwealth Nat'! Bank v. Kennedy Co., 20 Utah 2d 83, 86, 50S P2d 298,301
(1973); sec UCC § 3-203. Cf. Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 463 SW2d 747, 750 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971).
19-31 BANK ACCOUNTS '119.04(1)

[1) What Constitutes a Signature

Under the UCC, no person can become liable on a check or other nelOtiable
instrument without signing it.12S Very few formalities are necessary for a signa-
ture to be effective. A signature can be made by using a "trade or assumed name"
or by "any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature. "'21 The following
official comment reveals the flexibility recognized by the UCC:
A signature may be handwritten, typed, printed or made in any other
manner. It need not be subscribed, and may appear in the body of the
instrument, as in the case of "I, John Doe, promise to pay-" without any
other signature. It may be made by mark, or even by thumbprint. It may be
made in any name, including any trade name or assumed name, however
false and fictitious, which is adopted for the purPOse. Parol evidence is
admissible to identifY the signer, and when he is identified the signature is
effective. 111

For a signature to be effective, it must either be authorized or ratified by the

person who is bound or be made under circumstances justifying an estoppel or
preclusion against denying its validity. UI An authorized signature is one made
with "actual, implied or apparent authority," as those concepts are understood
in the law ofagency generally.,l. Grounds for preclusion may include negligence
as well as circumstances in which there are express or tacit representations as to
the genuineness of the signature. ,:10 Also, special rules govern the allocation of
responsibility for signatures made by agents and employees in certain circum-
stances, impostors, and others.131 (These rules are discussed in Chapter 20 in the
sections on forged and altered checlcs.)
The UCC negligence rule applies when the negligence ofa person "substan-
tially contributes ... to the making of an unauthorized signature.... "132 Not all
negligence will meet the test of "substantially contributing" to the forgery.

111 vee § 3·40 I(I). Although there is no liability on the instrument without a signa-
ture, liability may arise as a result ofother duties based on the law ofcontract, tort, fraud,
and so fonh. vee § 3-401; comment 1.
'Bvee § 3·401(2).
127 vee § 3-401; comment 2. See also the definition of"signed," which encompasses
"any symbol executed or adopted by a pany with present intention to authenticate a
writing." vee § 1-201(39).
12' vee § 3.404.
1!1 See vee §§ 1-201(43), 3-403, 3·404. An "unauthorized signature" includes a
fOfled signature as well as a signature otherwise lacking authorization.
':10 vee § 3·404, comment 4; see vee § 3-406.

'31 vee § 3.40S( I).

"'uce § 3·406.
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-32
1I1!U4(2]

In Springhill Bank & Trust Co. l'. Gish,'u a depositary bank sued Gish to
recover payment on checks that had been stamped "for deposit only, Gish
General Store." The bank had given credit for the checks but was unable to
obtain payment from the drawee bank because the drawer of the checks had
stopped payment. Gish, however, had not received the credit for the checks
because the account was opened and the checks were indorsed and deposited not
by Gish but by prospective purchasers of Gish's business. Gish had given the
purchasers access to his cash register to familiarize themselves with the business,
but they used this opportunity to unlawfully remove checks received by the
business, indorse them, and deposit them in the account with the bank. Gish had
never authorized these transactions. Accordingly, the court held that the signa-
tures on the checks were not effective as his signature. 1I4 Moreover, permitting
the purchasers to have access to the cash register was not action that "substan-
tially contributed" to the unauthorized indorsements.'SI
A signature may be made by an agent.'· No special formalities are necessary
for one to become an agent. Questions sometimes arise as to whether a signature
on an instrument has been made in a representative or agency capacity or it has
been made to bind the signer personally.137 These matters are discussed in
Chapter 15.
Deceptive practices may make a signature ineffective. A lender obtained the
signatures of its borrower's wife and his mother on a contract guaranteeing the
loan by having a trusted employee of the borrower deliver the documents to the
wife and the mother. The wife and the mother signed the papers, wrongly
believing that the husband had previously reviewed and approved the loan.
(They customarily signed other papers this employee had brought to them.) The
lender misled the women by conduct the court regarded as overreaching; there-
fore, enforcement of the contract was deemed unconscionable.'31 If the decep-
tion is serious enough to prevent the signer from having a reasonable
opportunity to know what is being signed, the fraud in obtaining the signature
may be a defense even against a holder in due course.'31

[2) Single, Multiple, and Facsimile Signatures

Accounts may be drawn upon by use of single, multiple, or facsimile signa-
tures. In the case ofthe single signature, the bank is simply required to pay upon

'33403 So2d 819 (La. Ct. App. 1981}.

,.. 403 So2d at 820. See VCC § 3-404(1}.
135
403 So2d at 821. See VCC § 3-404(1}.
131 VCC § 3.403( I).

'37 See VCC § 3-403. These matters are discussed in , I 5.04.

'31 ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Alex Cooley's Ballroom, Inc., 726 F2d 1559, 156 I (11th
Cir. 1984}.
13·VCC § 3-305(2Xc). See 1116.02(2).
19-33 BANK ACCOUNTS , 19.04(2)

the order of the indicated signature. Multiple signatures may be handled in two
ways. The bank may be authorized to pay either. on anyone signature or only
when all signatures appear on the check. The signature card and the official
corporate or other authorization should identify which signatures are necessary.
In the absence of specifiClition in the bank's contract with its customer, there
may be uncertainty in accounts held. by multiple parties as to who owns the
account and is entitled to withdraw funds. Theile rights may be determined by
local statutes, such as the Probate Code, on ownership rights in mnltiple party
accounts.
The facsimile signature is a mechanical device used by some larae busi-
nesses for signing checks. It may be a robber stamp or a printed signature; both
methods of signina are entirely valid. '40
Before the UCC, the law provided, in absence ofagreement to the contrary,
that the bank was required to pay only when the signature was placed upon the
check by a properly constituted officer. 141 In case such a stamp got into the hands
ofa wrongdoer, orifthe printed signatures were stolen, the loss would fall on the
bank and not on the depositor. \41 This rule onaw has been changed by the UCC,
which provides that the customer is liable ifthe misuse ofthe signature has been
caused by his own negligence or if he has contributed substantially to the
situation upon which the bank relied.,a There still remain cases in which the
unauthorized signature was created in circumstances beyond the control ofthe
depositor. Unless the bank protects itselfby special agreement with its customer,
the bank may be liable for paying checks over facsimile signatures in these
circumstances because the customer cannot be shown \0 be negligent. The bank
should protect itself either by insurance or by a contract under which the
depositor assumes the risk ofloss in cases in which it is impossible for the bank
tellers to distinguish the proper from the improper use of the facsimile signature.
Such contracts have been upheld. ,..

"oUCC §§ 1-201(39), 3-401. See Toon v. Wapinitia Irrigation Co.. 117 Or. 374, 243
P554 (1926); Carroll v. Mitchell-Parks Mfg. Co., 60 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 128 SW 446
(1910); Lexington v. Union Nat'l Bank, 75 Miss. I, 22 So. 291 (1897).
,., F. Beutel, Beutel's Brannon Negotiable Instruments Law § 23 (7th ed. 1948).
1<. Id. at Section 15; Paul Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Nonh Birmingham Am.
Bank. 225 Ala. 507. 508, 144 So. 7. 8 (1932).
143 UCC § 3-406. Comment 7. Section 3.406, describes as the "most obvious case" of
negligence that would preclude a person from challenging the validity of a signature
negligence in the safekeeping ofa signature machine or stamp.
,.. Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F2d 398. 403 (5th Cir. 1977). Wilmington
Trost Co. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 273 A2d 266, 268 (Del. 1971), where the coun held that
the depositor was precluded from assening forgery under Section 3-404 oftbe UCC. Wall
v. Hamilton County Bank, 276So2d 182. 183-184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See Phoenix
Die Casting Co. v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 29 AD2d 467, 469, 289 NYS2d
254.256 (I 968)(dccided underpre·UCC law). In Fred Meyer. Inc. v. Temco Metal Prods.
Co., 267 Or. 230, 232-233, 516 P2d 80, 82-83 (1973), tbe drawer used a protectograpb
, 19.04(2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19·34

Even when the bank and its customer have entered into an agreement to
protect the bank's paying checks with facsimile signatures, courts have inter-
preted the agreements narrowly and imposed liability on the bank in some
situations. In Cumis Insurance Society Inc. Y. Girard Bank,·<11 the bank paid a
series ofchecks that bore a forged facsintile signature ofits customer, the drawer
ofthe checks. The bank claimed that a resolution on me with the bank, signed by
the customer, relieved the bank from liability for making payment against the
facsimile signature of its customer even when the signature was unauthorized
and forged. The language ofthe resolution stated that the bank would pay checks
"bearing or purporting to bear the facsimile signature or any signature or signa·
tures resembling the facsimile specimens . . . with the same effect as if the
signatures were manual signatures." The court held that the bank was liable for
paying the checks. Because the signatures were not authorized by its customer,
the checks were not properly payable. Although the resolution arguably altered
the relationship between the bank and the customer with respect to the bank's
duty to pay, the court construed the resolution narrowly, reading it to mean that
facsimile signatures were to be treated the same as manual signatures. Thus,
unless its customer was negligent, the bank was liable for paying over an unau-
thorized nonauthentic signature. In interpreting the resolution in this fashion,
the court expressed grave doubts as to the validity ofany agreement that tried to
change the rules relating to forged signatures to eliminate the bank's liability.
In Mercantile Stores CO. Y. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,'" an employee of the
drawer, Mercantile Stores, stole bank checks from Mercantile and traced the
facsimile signature of Mercantile on the stolen checks, using carbon paper and a
previous dividend check issued by Mercantile as a model. The drawee bank,
Idaho First National, ultimately paid the checks. The court held that Mercantile
was not negligent under uee § 3·406 or uee § 4-406, so that the bank was liable
for paying the checks over an unauthorized signature. The bank attempted to
rely upon a resolution Mercantile had signed that gave the bank the right to pay
checks bearing Mercantile's facsimile signature "regardless of by whom or by
what manner the facsimile signature thereon may have been affixed thereto if
such facsimile signature resembles the facsimile specimen impressed on this

machine to write the amoun1.s of the checks but a manual signature was needed. The
drawer's carelessness in looking after the machine and blank check forms was not enough
to make the drawer liable when the machine was stolen and checks forged. The coun held
UCC § 3-406 did not apply under the circumstances. It might be said that the checks
resembled paychecks and thus had an "extra" appearance of authenticity, but they were
not signed by the purponed drawer, and the drawer's negligence did not contribute to the
forgery. In First NaCI Bank & Trust Co. v. Canright, 189 Neb. 805. 808, 205 NW2d 542,
545 (1973), the bank was liable for paying on a rubber stamp signature without having the
authorization of its customer. See West Penn Administration, Inc. v. Union Nat'l Bank of
Pittsburgh, 15 UCC Rep. 428 (Pa. CP 1973); H. Bailey, supra note 30.§ 22·8.
"·522 F. Supp. 414, 420-423 (ED Pa. 1981).
"'102 Idaho 820, 822-823, 641 P2d 1007,1009-1010 (Idaho 1982).
19-35 BANK ACCOUNTS 1119.05

resolution." The court held that the act of manually tracing the signature on the
forged checks did not constitute a "facsimile signature" within tbe meaning of
the resolution given the bank.
In Corsica LivestockSales. Inc. v. Sumitomo Bank, '47 the court held the banlc
was bound by its signature card with ita customers to pay checks only when the
checks drawn against the account were signed by persons whose signatures were
on file with the bank. The bank could not defend having paid the check on the
ground that its customers had otherwise authorized a person whose sisnature
was not on record with the bank to sign checks against the account. The court
rejected the bank's argument, which was based upon uee § 1-201(43)'5 defining
"unauthorized signature" as one made "without actual, implied or apparent
authority," because, it reasoned, the bank's duty should be defined on a "con·
tract basis" rather than on an "agency basis."

1119.05 NONDEPOSIT UABILITIES

In recent years, banks have increasingly used short-term transactions to
obtain working funds that historically have been provided by deposits. These
include so-called federal funds and repurchase agreements. The latter, "repo,"
agreements are short-term transactions in which a bank receives funds against a
"sale" ofsecurities.that do not leave its possession because it has agreed concur-
rently to buy them back a day or so later at the "selling price" plus the going
market rate of interest on transactions of this type. Thus, although cast in the
form of a purchase and sale, the "repo" agreement functions like a loan and a
repayment offunds. The purchase offederal funds is also a short-term transac-
tion that, strictly speaking, involves only the transfer of a balance from one
member bank to another on the books of the Federal Reserve. The term, how-
ever, sometimes has been used in a wider sense to apply to any short-term (one-
day) interbank transfer of funds and even to a bank's nondeposit liability to a
nonbank customer.
Sometimes the distinction between the foregoing transactions and deposits
is difficult to establish by an objective index. Nonetheless, the distinction is
crucial. If the obligations are not deposits, they are not subject to reserve
requirements or to Federal Deposit Insurance assessments, since they are unin-
sured. The bank regulatory agencies have warned that caution must be used in
entering into repurchase arrangements, as there use can raise substantial legal
issues, including questions arising under the securities laws.•••
A bank may be on either side of these transactions, that is, the seller
(depositor) of federal funds or the buyer (depository) of them. To the same

147
726 F2d 374, 378-379 (8th Cir. 1983).
'''See generally Hexter, "That Which We Call a Deposit.. .," 26 Bus. Law. 1,69
(1970-1971).
, 19.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 19-36

functional effect, in a repurchase agreement, the bank can be the seller-deposi-

tory or the buyer-depositor. A resale agreement would be the same arrangement,
with the participants reversed.
. Another distinction between deposit and nondeposit sources of working
funds lies in the formalities of the structural and operating arrangements. In
contrast to the provisions for signature cards, deposit agreements, passbooks,
and checks ofthe deposit arrangement, the nondeposit arrangements usually are
characterized by informality and flexibility. They may involve little or no docu-
mentation and are consummated largely by telephone. Remarkably enough, and
despite their frequency and magnitude, nondeposit agreements have produced
little litigation and the amount of applicable law, whether statutory, decisional,
or regulatory, is quite sparse.
The use of repurchase agreements by banks came prominently to the pub-
lic's attention when a major dealer in government securities defaulted upon the
payment ofan estimated $207 million in overdue interest on government securi-
ties that were the subjects of repurchase agreements.••, The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board has issued a series of memoranda and regulations that establish
guidelines for the use of repurchase agreements involving government securities
by federally insured savings and loan associations. \10 The Federal Reserve Board
has also issued guidelines for member banks and has cautioned member banks
about participating in repurchase agreements. It advised that retail repurchase
agreements should state conspicuously that "the obligation is not a deposit and
is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."111 It further
advised banks to make it clear in their advertising and marketing of repurchase
arrangements that these arrangements are not deposits and are not insured by
the FDIC. The guidelines also contained a caution about wholesale repurchase
agreements. The Board pointed to the risks that the bank might bear if the
securities that are the subject of the repurchase agreement could not be returned
to the.bank. '52 The staffofthe Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a
release on the issuance of repurchase agreements by banks and savings·and loan

"'N.Y. Times, May 20, 1982, at D-\.

'10 FHLBB, "Proposed Rule on Transfer and Repurchase ofGovernment Securities."
4 7 Fed. Reg. 8204 (FHLBB Feb. 25, 1982); FHLBB, Memorandum No. R-51 a, 2 FHLBB
Annot. Manual of Statutes and Regulations (5th ed. Sept. 8, 1981); FHLBB, Memoran-
dum No. R-51 2 FHLBB Annot. Manual of Statutes and Regulations (5th ed. May 8,
1981). The FHLBB has adopted regulations concerning retail repurchase agreements to
expand the consumer protection features ofthe existing regulations. FHLBB, Resolution
No. 82-367 (May 20, 1982) cited in FHLBB, Memorandum No. R-51 b, 2 FHLBB Annot.
Manual of Statutes and Regulations (5th ed. Feb. 28, 1983). Memorandum No. R-51 b,
which replaces Memorandums R-5 I and R-51 a, is codified at 12 CFR § 563.8.
's, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Letter to Presidents of all
Federal Reserve Banks (Apr. 13, 1982), reprinted in Fed. BankingL. Rep. (CCH)~ 37,022
(Apr. 30, I 982).
lS2ld.
19·37 BANK ACCOUNTS , 19.05

associations that states that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws apply to transactions involving rePurchase agreements. '13 The Federal
F'mancial Institution Examination Counsel drafted a policy to govem fmancial
institutions dealing in repurchase agreements. The Board adopted these guide-
lines on October 30, 1985.'" The Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the
National Credit Union Administration, and the FHLBB have also adoPted the
guidelines. ,II
A rislc to bank customers who invested in repurchase agreements became a
reality when the Mount Pleasant Bank and Trust Company of Mount Pleasant,
Iowa, failed. The FDIC, as receiver for the failed bank, determined that custom-
ers with claims against the bank as a result of repurchase agreements did not
have priority over the claims ofdepositors or other general creditors ofthe bank.
The steps necessary to perfect a security interest in the underlying federal
securities to protect the purchasers had not been taken in setting up the rePur-
chase transaction. Accordingly, when bankruptcy occurred, the purchasers
could not depend upon the underlying federal securities for payment and were,
instead, in the position of general unsecured creditors of the bank. In making
this determination, the FDIC stated that its conclusion was based upon the
particular repurchase arrangements used by the Mount Pleasant bank and that it
was not intended to be ofgeneral applicability to all repurchase arrangements.,.
It is strongly recommended that counsel be consulted on setting up any
repurchase arrangements "and that when such transactions are undertaken,
appropriate documentation be made.

mSee SEC Release No. 33-6351, dated Sept. 25,1981, "Retail RepurchalC Agree-
ments by Banks and Savings and Loan Associations; Interpretations," 46 Fed. Reg.
§ 48,637 (SEC Oct. 2.1981).
'14 "SupervilOry Policy Statement on Repurchase Agreement Transactions," 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,451 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Nov. 18, 1985).
115 "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; Repurchase Agreements and
ReverSe-Repurchase Agreements," 50 Fed. Reg. 48,372, 49.940 (FHLBB, Dec. 6, 1985); I
Fed. BankingL. Rep. (CCH) 1'1 201 4-2016 (Apr. 18. Oct. 22, Oct. 31, \ 985); Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., BL-43·85 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 186,467
(Nov. 18, 1985).
15' See 39 Wash. Fin. Rep. (DNA) No. 13, at 595 (Oct. 4, 1982); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., Press Release 77-82 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 99,308 (Sept. 29, 1982).
 20
Mutual Duties of the Bank
and the Depositor
'II 20.01 Bank's Right to Charge Customer's Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2D-2
11 20.02 Improper Payment and Bank's Rights of Subrogation . . . . . • . . . 2D-4
1120.03 Liability of Bank for Refusal to Pay . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . 2D-S
'I 20.04 Postdated Checks and Stale Checks .•.............•.....• 2D-I0
120.05 Stopping Payment.. . . .. . . • . . . . . . . . • .. . • . . . . . . . . . .. .. 2D-1l
[1] Basic Rules on Stopping Payment. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-1l
[a] When Is a Stop Payment Order Timely? 2D-12
[b] Subrogation Riahts and Proof of Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-13
[2] Claims of Third Parties to Checks 2D-17
13] Stopping Payment on Cashier's Checks, Bank Drafts, and
Certified Checks .. 2D-18
120.06 Bank's Duty to Pay the Holder. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-21
[1] Order Paper and Identification of Payees and Indorsers . . . .. 2D-22
[2] Bearer Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-23
13] Fictitious or Nonexisting Payees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-23
11 20.07' Miscredited Proceeds and Restrictive Indorsements 2D-28
'120.08 Checks With Forged or Unauthorized Signatures 2D-37
[1] Breach of Warranty by Customer Obtaining Payment of
Check With Forged Indorsement . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 2D-43
[2] Conversion of Check When Bank Pays Over a Forged
Indorsement . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-43
13] Customer Negligence As Defense to Bank's Payment of
Check With Unauthorized Signature or Alteration. . . . . . . .. 2D-4S
[4] Bank's Improper Payment of Check as Cause of Customer
Loss 2D-49
'Il 20.09 Alteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2D-SO
[1] Altered Checks That Were Complete When Signed. . . . . . .. 2D-S2
[2] Instruments Issued With Blanks '. . . .. 2D-S4
11 20.10 Depository Bank's Obligation of Good Faith 2D-SS

20-1
11 20.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-2

'120.11 Bank's Right to Revoke Credits to Customer's Account and to

Charge Customer for Items Not Paid ... . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . .. 20-56
[11 Customer's Riiht to Withdraw Apinst Items Deposited .... 20.60
[a] Customer's Right to Withdraw Against Deposited Items
Under the UCC . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 20.61
[b) The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 . . . . . . . .. 20-63
[i) Defmitions and scope of EFAA .. . . . . • . . . • . • • .. 20.64
[iiI Funds availability requirements ...•..•..•... '. .. 20.64
[iii] Accrual of interest on deposits. . . . . . • . . . . . • • . .. 20.73
[iv] Calculation of business days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20.74
[v] Administrative enforcement and private remedies .. 20.74
[vi] Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC . . . . . . . . . .. 20-75
1 20.12 Customer's Duty to Examine Statements of Account. . . . . . . . .. 20-81
[I] Duty to Examine Statements and to Report Improper
Payments' ..............•.•..•.......•........•. 20-81
[2} Duty to Report Forgeries and Alterations When Bank Retains
Checks 20-86
[3] NeaIigence and the Duty of Due Care Under the UCC 20-87
11 20.13 Liability of Bank on Promises and Representations With Respect
to Its Customer's Account . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .. 20-88

11 20.01 BANK'S RIGHT TO CHARGE CUSTOMER'S ACCOUNT

Under the Unifonn Commercial Code, a bank may charge its customer's
account for "any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account
even though the charge creates an overdraft.'" This rule expressly permits the
bank to pay checks drawn by its customer even though the customer's account
does not contain sufficient funds and the payment creates a deficit in the
account. The UCC's reasoning is that "the draft itself authorizes the payment for
the drawer's account and carries an implied promise to reimburse the drawee"
bank.' A bank is not required to pay a check that would create an overdraft,
however, because such a check is not "properly payable."3

1 UCC § 4-401(1) (1978) (subsequent citations to the Uniform Commercial Code

refer to the 1978 official text). On the relationship between the bank and the customer, see
generally Alces, "Toward a Jurisprudence of Banlc·Customer Relations," 32 Wayne L.
Rev. 1279 (1986); Fox, "Banker-Customer Relationship: Maintaining the Legal Status
Quo," 130 Solie. J. 638 (1986).
• UCC § 4·401, comment I. A bank's payment ofa check was held proper under vec
§ 4-401, even though the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the Check and the
check had been dishonored previously. Lincoln Nat'l Bank &. Trust Co. ·v. Peoples Trust
Bank, J771nd. App. 312, 379 NE2d 527 (1978).
'vcc § 4-401(1).
20-3 MUTUAL DUTIES '20.01

Apart from the overdraft problem, there is little in the UCC to explain when
an item is "properly payable." The most common problems involve checks
subject to stop payment orders, altered checks,' checks with forged necessary
indorsements,' and checks on which the drawer's signature has been forged.- All
of these checkS are not properly payable. The bank's customer has grounds for
objections ifthe drawee bank pays such checks, and the drawee bank may refuse
to honor them without liability to its customer (the drawer) for failing to pay.
Although the bank may properly refuse payment, this does not necessarily mean
the bank will sufTer loss if it pays these types of checks. This depends on the
particular circumstances. For example, negligence by the drawer may permit the
bank: to charge the full amount ofan altered check to the drawer. These problems
are discussed in subsequent sections. The drawee bank also may be justified in
refusing to pay. without liability to its customer, certain other types of checks
although payment by the bank: under proper circumstances would allow the bank
to charge the payment to its customer. Such items include checks presented after
the death of the drawer,7 postdated checks,' and stale checks.'
A bank's liability for paying a check over a forged signature ofits customer
is a primary obligation owing to the customer, not the secondary liability of a
surety. Therefore, the bank cannot defend an action brought by the customer on
the ground that its recourse against a forger was impaired by a settlement
agreement the customer entered into with the forger. 'o
A customer's right to force the bank with whom it has an account to recredit
that account for improper payments must be carefully distinguished from a
situation where a customer seeks recovery from other parties in the collection
chain, such as prior collecting banks and transferees of the check, based on
theories of conversion, negligence, and so forth. There may be circumstances
where the customer has a right to require the drawee bank to recredit its account
because the item was not properly payable, but tbe customer has no cause of
action against other parties who have handled the instrument. 11
Banks frequently charge customers fees for providing various services in
connection with the customer's accounts. Ofcourse, the bank's contract with its
customer or other agreement with the customer when the services are provided

• See infra ~ 20.09.

5 See infra ~ 20.08.
SId. See UCC § 3-510, comment 2.
7 See ~ 19.02[5].

- See infra ~ 20.04.

lId.
"SCCI, Inc. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 78 Or. App. 176, 714 P2d 1113 (1986).
11See Kings Premium Servo Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 115 AD2d
707,496 NYS2d 524 (1985), where the court held the drawer ofa check that had been
completed without authorization could not recover against the depository bank but would
have an action against the· drawee bank to recredit the account.
1120.02 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-4

should authorize the charges. Customers have challenged some of these charges
as unconscionable. One area oflitiaation had been the fees banks have charged
for processing insufficient funds checks. In a California case, the Supreme Court
of California ruled a bank could be held liable for charging its customers exces·
sive fees for handling such checks. 12 Fees charged by banks also may be regulated
by special federal rules when the transaction involves consumer credit or other
matters subject to special disclosure and notification requirements. Some of
these requirements are discussed in Chapter 26.

~ 20.02 IMPROPER PAYMENT AND BANK'S RIGHTS OF

SUBROGATION
When a bank mistakenly pays a check that is not properly payable, it must
recredit the account ofthe customer for any charge made against the account on
the item involved. 13 The bank does have rights of subrogation when it makes a
payment that is otherwise improper." Under the UCC, it is subrogated to rights
that any holder in due course, or any other payee or holder, might have against
the drawer or maker of the instrument." It also is subrogated to any rights ofthe
drawer, or maker against other parties to the check, that might arise out of the
transaction for which the check was given." Under these principles, when a bank
pays an item improperly, but the payment is made to a holder in due course, the
bank has no liability to its customer for wrongful payment. Because the customer
would be obligated to the holder in due course in any event (unless the customer
has a special defense that would be good even against a holder in due course), the
customer cannot complain of the fact of payment by the bank.
One consequence of a bank's improper payment of an item may be that
when a subsequent item on the same account is presented for payment, the bank
will dishonor it because the bank erroneously believes the customer's account
lacks the funds to cover the item. This may make the bank liable for wrongful
dishonor because the check would have been paid if the bank had not made a
mistake in charging the customer's account for the first check (which was not

12 Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1985), appeal dismissed, 475 US 1001 (1986). See also Best v. United States Nat'l Bank,
78 Or. App. 1,714 P2d 1049, alT'd, 303 Or. 557, 739 P2d 554 (1987).
11 UCC § 4.40 I.

"uee § 4·407.
ald. Although the bank wronllfully paid a check without the correct number of
signatures, the bank was subrogated to the rights of the payee who supplied advertising
sel'Vices to the customer. American Communications Telecommunications, Inc. v. Com·
merce N. Bank, 69\ SW2d 44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
,. uec § 4·407(c).
20-5 MU11JAL DUTIES· '20.03

properly payable).1f In these cases, the bank ~y have righ~ based on su~roga­
tion against its customer, ¢e drawer, for the Item the bank Improperly paid, but
it is not clear legally tbat such subrogation rights are enough to justify the bank's
charging the customer's account for the improperly paid check and thereby
excusing the resulting dishonor for insufficient funds of subsequent checks.
The subrogation rights ofa payor bank that pays a check in violation ofits
customer's stop payment order are discussed later in this chapter, in the section
on stopping payment.

~ 20.03 LIABILITY OF BANK FOR REFUSAL TO PAY

The checking account normally involves a relationship between at least
three parties: the banker, the depositor, and the person to whom the depositor,
by its check, orders payment.
The bank is indebted to the depositor but has no obligation to the payee or
other holder until the bank "certifies" or "accepts" the instrument. The bank is

I.
the drawee and bas not signed the check. Until the bank does sign the instru-

I.
ment, either by accepting it or by certifYing it, the bank has no liability as a
party to the check to the holder. The bank's contract is with its depositor to pay
items that are "properly payable"20 and, upon breach of this obligation, its
liability runs to its customer. 21
Absent special circumstances, a check is not an assignment to the payee of
the debt owed by the bank;22 therefore, the bank is under no obligation to the
holder of the check as a result of the drawer's action in transferring the instru-
ment to the holder. The drawee is not liable unless it accepts or certifies the
check. 22 Even if the depositor and the payee of the check arrange by a separate
contract to have the check operate as an assignment, the bank owes no duty to
the holder unless it has been notified of the provisions of this contract. Even
then, as the bank's duties to the third party are derived only from its duties to the
depositor, any claim a third party may have against the bank is subject to the

I.17 uceuec
See
§ 4-402. See infra 11 20.03.
§§ 3·409-3.410.
""No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon," VCC
§ 3-401(1).
20UCC § 4·401. See 1120.01.
21 UCC § 4·402. See generally Dow, "Damages and Proof in Cases of Wrongful
Dishonor: The Unsettled Issues Under uec Section 4-402," 63 Wash. ULQ 237 (198S);
Sabbath, "Drawee Bank's Liability for Wrongful Dishonor: A Proposed Checkholder
Cause of Action," S8 St. lohn's L. Rev. 318 (1984).
22uce § 3-409.
22Id. Certification of a check is acceptance. vec § 3-411 (I). See the discussion of
acceptance at ~ 15.02[3].
,. 20.03 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-6

bank's claim against the depositor. 24 Thus, except in special circumstances, the
bank is not liable to the check's holder for refusing to honor a check."
The bank, however, is under absolute liability to its depositor to pay at the
depositor's order when the signature on the order corresponds with the signature
on me at the bank, when the amount to be paid is within the amount ofmoney on
deposit in the checking account, and when the order is otherwise properly
payable. 2I A bank that fails to honor a check properly drawn upon available
funds is liable not only for breach of contract with its depositor but also for any
resulting damages. Thus, even in the case of a mistaken refusal to honor a check
drawn against sufficient funds, the bank may be liable. Such cases may involve
damages far beyond the amount of the check, or even the total amount in the
account, if the depositor can show actual damage to his or her business and
credit caused by the bank's refusal to pay.1f
There are many situations in which liability for wrongful dishonor may
arise as a result ora mistake. For example, if the bank mistakenly sets offa debt
owed to the bank against the account or in good faith pays a check that is not
properly payable, the bank's action will reduce the funds in the account to pay
subsequent checks. If the bank subsequently dishonors a check that would have
been paid but for the erroneous charge to the account, the dishonor is wrongful,
and the bank is liable for damages to its customer, regardless of its good faith in
charging the account. 2I
Under the uec," the bank is liable for any damages proximately caused by

24 See UCC § 9-318( I) for an illustration ofthe types of defenses and claims an obligor
miJht assert against an assignee.
25Thecourt in A.tlantic Cement Co. v. South Shore Bank, 730 F2d 831 (1st Cir. 1984),
enforced the rule of UCC § 3-409( I) that a check is not an auignment and held that the
payee of a check dishonored by the drawee bank had no cause of action against the bank,
whether or not the dishonor was wrongful as against the drawer or there had been a prior
history of payment of checks ofthe drawer.
Because a check is not an assignment of funds, the holders of checks did not have
standing to contest the forfeiture of the account for violation of federal narcotics laws.
United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F2d 895 (11 th
Cir. J 985), ccrt. denied, 474 US 1056 (1986).
21 uee § 4-401(1). A court has applied the uee principles of wrongful dishonorto
the issuer of a money order who mistakenly refused to pay the money order when it was
presented by the payee. The purchaser of the money order was permitted to sue the issuer
for wrongful dishonor. Lovejoy v. Weese, 689 SW2d 387 (Mo. Cl. App. 1985).
2' vee § 4-402.
"See Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 NM 735, 418 P2d 191 (1966), Coles
Country Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank &. Trust Co., 20 Ill. App. 3d 23, 312 NE2d 643
(1974) (abstract only).
21 uee § 4·402 contains the following provision:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mistake, liability is
 MUTUAL DUTIES 'i 20.03
20-7

the dishonor, even for damages due to arrest or prosecution of the customer.
When the dishonor is due to an honest mistake on the part of the bank, the
liability is limited to the actual damales proved.all The comments by the draft~rs
ofthe UCC say that this provision rejects the pre-UCC law ofsome states, ~~ch
lets business persons recover substantial damages without proofofaetualrnJury
(on the theory that dishonor of the checks is a "per se" defamation of ~e
person's credit reputation)." By negative implication, however, when the dis-
honor is intentional, the UCC does not restrict liability to "actual damages
proved."n
The UCC has been applied to deny damages for mental anguish or emo-
tional disturbance sustained by a customer after wrongful dishonor. However, in
one case, in which wrongful dishonor was found to have occurred under aggra-
vated circumstances, the court permitted recovery of punitive damages as weD
as damages for injury.to the depositor's credit and damages for mental anguish.
In this instance, a check on the account ofa third person payable to the depositor
was cashed at the bank on a forgery of the depositor's indorsement. The drawee
bank returned the check as improperly signed and the check was charged against
the depositor's account. In the meantime, the depositor had written checks on
his account. He notified an officer afbis bank of the forgery ofhis indorsement,
but the bank refused to take any action, and, the court said "the officer called

limited to actual damages proved. Ifso proximately caused and proved damages may
include damages for an arrest or prosecution ofthe customer or other consequential
damages. Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrong-
ful dishonor is a question of fact to be detennined in each case.
HId.
3' uee § 4-402, comment 3. See generally Davenport, "Wrongful Dishonor: uce
§ 4-402 and the Trader Rule," S6 NYU L. Rev. 1117-1147 (1981).
32See J. White &. R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 17-4 (2d ed. 1980)
(hereinafter White & Summers). The bank's customer sued the bank for wrongful dis-
honor when the bank improperly set off debts against special accounts the customer had
with the bank and checks were subsequently dishonored. The accounts were special
accounts where the bank was a trustee and where the bank's relationship with its depositor
was not the normal debtor/creditor relationship. "When money is deposited in a bank for
a specific purpose, it is a special deposit to the extent that title to the money does not pass
to the bank but remains in the depositor." Larstone Corrugated Carton Co. v. Fint Seneca
Bank & Trust Co., 39 uee Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1397, 1405 (Pa. Ct. ep 1984). In this
case, the special accounts were required under the customer's financing contracts with the
Small Business Administration, and the bank had participated in setting up the contracts.
When the bank applied an overdraft on the customer's general account against funds in
the special accounts, the court held that the customer was entitled to recover damages for
wrongful dishonor. These damages included loss of credit and damage to business stand-
ing under uee § 4-402. The court further held that ifthe dishonor was done intentionally
and not "by mistake," the customer might be entitled to recover substantial damages for
injury to his credit and business standing without proving actual damages. Id. at 1404.
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-8
'IJ 20.03

over a uniformod guard." The bank then dishonored the checks on the account,
marking them "paid in error" and "account closed." The court held that the
conduct of the bank was deliberate and in disregard of the depositor's claim of
right, thus justifying the damage award.IS
In another case, the court found a bank to have wrongfully dishonored
certain corporate checks after it reneged on its promise to make a loan to the
corporation. The bank was held liable for compensatory damages to the two
individuals who owned and operated the corporation; these compensatory dam-
ages included damages for emotional distress caused by certain "criminal and
administrative investigations and charges as well as various acts of harassment
and vandalism" that followed the dishonor. M The court said that the owners
"did not merely allege a subjective state of discomfort at having their checks
dishonored; rather they gave proof of objectively verifiable events which fol-
lowed the dishonoring of their checks and which would have induced mental
suffering in any reasonable person."n However, the court declined to award
punitive damages, since it found no malice on the part of the bank personnel,
only a "bona fide disagreement" as to how far the bank was required to go in
helping the owners with tbeir fmancial problems."
The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a verdict of S18,500 for mental
anguish and loss ofcredit and a $45,000 award ofpunitive damages when a bank
wrongfully froze its customer's account for four yetln-. The bank froze the
account when the customer notified the bank that its checkbook had been lost.
The bank had honored two forged checks on the account a few days before the
notice of the lost checkbook was given. Subsequently, the police arrested the
forger and notified the bank that the customer had no connection with the
forgeries. Nevertheless, the bank continued to freeze the account for four years.
The customers lost their credit standing; a check written for a down payment on
a house was dishonored and they were unable to conclude the purchase; and
marital difficulties appeared to result from the financial strain and the reposses-
sion of two vehicles. The court held that UCC § 4-402 "impliedly recognizes

UNonhshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 SW2d 718 (Tex. Clv. App. 1975). Thecoun stated
that the statutory Jiability of a bank for wron,fuJ dishonor is "more in the nature of ton
than contract" and justified the award on the ground that the dishonor was deliberate and
did not occur through mistake.
•• Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958, 123 Cal. Rptr.
g48, 854 (1975). The court also held that the owners, as the-only active Pi iucipals of the
corporation, might sue for wrongful dishonor under the uec.
35Id.
HId. at 958-959, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 854-855. In a wrongful dishonor suit resulting
from miscrediling of a deposit to a savings rather than a checkin, account, it was Doted
that neither the VCC nor pre-UCC Michigan law foreclosed damages fOr mental anguish.
Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 VCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 906, 912 (Mich. Ct. CP
1974).
 MUTUAL DUTIES '120.03
20-9

mental suffering and other intangible injuries" and further stated that "exact-
ness in proof' of damages IS . not reqmr. ed.37
Another issue in interpreting the scope of the UCC provision on wrongful
dishonor is determining who is entitled to recover when wrongful dishonor
occurs. Under UCC § 4-402, the bank's liability for wrongful dishonor runs only
to its "customer," the person or entity that has the account with the bank.-
Because ofthis defmition ofilie term "customer," courts have held iliat individ-
uals who were partners or officers could not recover for injuries to iliemselves for
dishonor of checks drawn on the partnership or corporate accounts. 11
In Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,'lJ ilie court held that because a savings
wiilidrawal slip constitutes an "item" under the UCC, a depositor in a savings
account could sue for wrongful dishonor when the bank refused to honor ilie
wiilidrawal slip. The court went on to hold iliat in a proper case ilie depositor
could recover not only consequential damages for ilie wrongful dishonor but also
punitive damages. 4 •
In Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson:' the bank froze its cus-
tomer's account wiiliout notice and then dishonored checks drawn against the
account even though the account had sufficient funds to pay them. The bank's
conduct was found to constitute such gross indifference to the customer's rights
as to constitute actual malice entitling recovery of damages for mental anguish,
loss of credit, loss of time, loss of money, and loss of the use of ilie funds in the
account.

"Twin City Bank v. Isaacs, 283 Ark. 127,672 SW2d 651 (1984).
"ucc § 4·I04(1)(e).
SI Farmer's Bank v. Sinwellan Corp., 367 A2d 180 (Del. 1976); Loucks v. Albuquer.
que Nat'l Bank. supra note 28. P2d 191 (1966). But see First Nafl Bank v. Hobbs, 248
Ark. 76, 450 SW2d 298 (1970); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d
949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975). See also Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
80 I F2d 719 (4th Cir. 1986). The president and sole stockholder of a corporation that had
a corporate checking account with the bank could be a customer ofthe bank for purposes
ofUCe § 4-402 when the bank's dealings with the corporation treated the individual as
. responsible for the corporate obligations. In addition, the jury could find wrongful dis-
honor, even though the customer had drawn the dishonored checks alainst previously
deposited checks that had not cleared, because the bank failed to notify its customer of its
termination of an agreement to give immediate credit. The customer was entitled to rely,
under the circumstances, on the balances shown on the bank statement. The coun upheld
an award 0($268,000 in damages because the jury could find that the bank's dishonor of
the checks ruined the business ofthe customer (an automobile dealership) and entitled the
customer to a recovery based on the value of assets lost in bankruptcy. The dishonor led
suppliers to deal COD and the manufacturer to terminate the franchise. An award of
$175,000 was allowed for defamation of the officer of the company for injury to business
reputation and for emotional harm where the bank's dishonor was not in load faith.
'lJ640 P2d 953 (Okla. 1981).
4. Id. at 956-957.
42
617 SW2d 918 (Tex. 1981).
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-10
'20.04

~ 10.04 POSTDATED CHECKS AND STALE CHECKS

Postdated checks are not properly payable before their date.U In many
cases, however, there will be no practical liability to the bank if a postdated
check is mistakenly paid, because the bank will be subrogated to the rights ofany
holder of the check against the drawer." If, as is often the case, the holder is a
holder in due course, the drawer will have an obligation to pay that cannot be
avoided by most defenses."
A postdated check is an enforceable obligation and is a negotiable instru-
ment if it otherwise satisfies the requirements for negotiability. Postdating the
instrument does not make the obligation conditional and does not destroy
negotiability." Because a postdated check is an enforceable obligation, it is
consideration for a sale if the seller accepts the check. <1
A check that is more than six months old is considered a stale check. A bank
may refuse to pay such a check." If a bank acts in good faith, it may pay checks
presented more than six months after their stated date. <. There is considerable
uncertainty as to what constitutes "good faith" when the bank knows the check
is stale, particularly if customary banking practice is to refuse payment. Some
take the view that as a general rule, a bank should be liable to its customer for
knowingly paying a stale-cheelc.lII.
The drafters of the UCC take the view that a bank should not be held liable
to its customer for paying a check aPinst which there is an expired stop payment
order after the check has become stale."

"VCC § 3-114(2). See eenerally Annot., "Extent of Bank's Liability for Payina
Postdated Check," 31 ALR4th 329 (1984).
.. VCC § 4407. There may be problems ifpremature payment ofthe postdated check
leads to dishonor for insufficient funds of subsequent checks.
<. See generally Chapter 15; see also White &. Summers, supra note 32; § 17·3. Sec
aenerally Annot., "Application of 'Bad Check' Statute Witb Respect to Postdated
Checks," 52 ALR3d 464 (1973).
"vce § 3-114(1). Esecson v. Bushnell. 663 P2d 258 (Colo. Cl. App. 1983).
., Esecson, at 260. Acceptance ofa postdated check as payment suspends the underly-
ina obligation for which the check was taken until the check has been dishonored. The rule
is the same as that for checks taken in payment that arc not postdated. Grumet v. Bristol,
125 NH 537, 484 A2d 1099 (1984). Sec aeneralTy 121.03[4J.
.. uee § 4-404.
<. rd.
$OSee White &. Summers, supra note 32, § 17-3.
11 See vce § 4·403, comment 7, which sugests that the last sentence of Section 4-
403(2), together with the second clause in Section 4-404, rejects the reasoning ofpre·Code
cases, which held a bank liable for payina a stale check aaainst which there had been an
expired stop payment order.
20-11 MUTUAL DUTIES f 20.05(11

11 20.05 STOPPING PAYMENT

Because the relationship of bank and depositor creates an implied agree-
ment on the part of the bank to pay only on the order of the depositor, the
depositor may revoke this authority at any time before payment. A bank that
pays after receipt of a stop payment notice, either on an individual check ~r on
an entire account, is liable to the drawer for so doing because the check 15 not
"properly payable. "51

[1] Basic Rules on Stopping Payment

To be effective, a stop payment order must be received by the bank "at such
time and in such manner as to afford the bank: a reasonable opportunity to
act . . . "13 This doubtless means the customer must reasonably describe the
check. What is "reasonable" may not be so clear. Some inaccuracy in the
description has been tolerated. S4 For example, when a customer correctly named
the payee and provided the date and number of the check, but supplied the
wrong amount, the court held identification was sufficient to stop payment.1I
With the use of magnetic ink character recognition, and computer processing,
what amounts to a reasonable identification may depend upon the check-search-
ing system used by the bank.II In any event, it is appropriate for the bank and the

12 UCC § 4-403, comment 8. A bank's failure to give proper notice of dishonor made
the bank liable for payment of a check drawn on insufficient funds. However, the bank
was entitled to charge its customer's account for the overdraft caused by the check even
thouah the bank had advised its customer the check had been dishonored and retumed
NSF when the customer gave the bank a stop payment order. Brown v. Lee County Bank,
501 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
AUCC § 4-403(1).
50 Sec H. Bailey, Brady On Bank Checks § 23.7 (6th edt 1987) (hereinafter Brady on
Bank Checks). It has been said that an oral stop payment order must describe the check
with particularity. Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 366 So. 2d 25 I (Ala.
1978). See generally Annat., "Sufficiency ofDescription ofCheck in Stop Payment Order
Under UCC § 4-403," 35 ALR4th 985 (1985); Annot., "Construction and Effect orucc
§ 4-403(2) Regulating Oral or Written Nature of Stop Payment Order," 29 ALR4th 228
(1984).
$5 Elsie Rodriguez Fashions, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 UCC Rep. Servo
(Callaghan) 133 (NY Sup. 1978).
$I The check identification method used by the payor bank's computer system was the
critical factor in Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So. 2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Althoup the customer gave her bank the correct check and account numbers forthe check
she instructed the bank to stop, her error in describing the amount as $150 rather than
$700 was detcnninative. Under the maanetic ink encoding system used by the bank for
computer processing, the amount of the check is encoded by the first bank to handle it,
and this become5 the key method of identifying the instrument as it is processed for
payment. Because the check could not be identified in this system without the amount, the
court held the failure to describe the amount accurately deprived the bank ofa reasonable
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-12
11 20.05(1](al

customer to enter into an agreement as to the information necessary to identify

checks that should be stopped.

ial When Is a Stop Payment Order TImely? A stop payment order will ~ot be
effective unless it is received by the bank before the check has been paid. In
addition the vee states that the stop payment order must be received not only
prior to 'fmal payment or certification, or prior to some act indicative of a
decision by the bank to pay the item, but also in time to enable the bank to aet on
s7
the item prior to performance of one ofthe actions previously specified.
This principle was applied in a case in which the drawer ofa check appeared
at the bank at its opening time on Monday morning to stop payment on a check
dated some six days earlier. The bank employee who received the stop payment
order checked the records to see whether the check had cleared before he gave
the drawer a printed notice confirming his request to stop payment. However,
the check had been cashed on the preceding Saturday morning, when the bank
had been open for certain transactions; but such Saturday transactions had not

opportunity to act on the customer's order. The case arose under the Florida variation of
vee § 4-403 which requires a stop payment order to describe the check "with certainty."
The court held that tills standard was meant to require lUI10re precise description than
what would qualify under the UCC uniform provision. A bank's computer system also
failed to catch a check in StaffServ. Assocs., Inc. v. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 207 NJ Super.
317. 504 A2d 148 (l985), because the customerincorrectly described the number of cents
in the check he directed the bank to stop. The correct amount ofthe check was $4,117.12
but the amount described in the stop payment order was $4,117.72. The customer
correctly described the date, check number. account number, and payee's name. A1thouah
the bank's stop payment order form advised the customer that information on it must be
correct "including the exact amount ofthe check to the penny, or the bank will not be able
to stop payment," the court held that the bank could not avoid liability for paying the
check over the stop payment, because the check was reasonably described. By electins to
use a computer system that was dependent on the amount o{ the check, the bank assumed
the risk of beins unable to stop a check a customer had reasonably described. The court
concluded that the bank "should not be permitted to relieve itself ofthis risk unless it calls
atlention to its computerized system and the necessity (or the exact check amount to meet
computer requirements." The statement on the stop payment order form was ineffective
because it erroneously informed the customer that all the infonnation requested on the
order form needed to be correct when in fact only the amount of the check had to be
accurate. See generally Graziano, "Computerized Stop Payment Orders Under the uce:
Reasonable Care or Customer Beware?" 90 Com. U 550 (1985).
In Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Berry, 123 AD2d 254,506 NYS2d 60(1986), the
customer did not give his bank a reasonable opportunity \0 act on his stop payment order
when he made three errors in identifying the check: he gave the check number as 245
rather than 244, the amount as $6,511.31 rather than $6,518.31, and the payee as "First
National Bank ofMiddlebury, Vermont, R. Hamilton," ratherthan 'OR. Hamilton and the
National Bank of Middlebury, Vermont." There was no discussion of how these errors
may have caused the bank to fail to identify the check.
See generally White & Summers, supra note 32, § 17-5.
57 UCC ~ 4-303( I), 4-403(1).
20-13 MUTUAL DUTIES 'II 20.05I1IIb]

yet been recorded or processed through the bookkeeping system of the bank at
the time on Monday morning when the bank employee receiving the stop
payment order had checked the records. The court held that the bank did not
have a reasonable amount of time to act on the stop payment order and that, in
~~~~~~~~~~bank~_~~in~~
When a check given as earnest money in a real estate transaction was taken
by the payee to the bank on whicb it was drawn and there exchanged for a
cashier's check payable to the same payee in an identical amount, the court
found that the original check was fmally paid at the time the cashier's check was
issued. The court said that the bank was not required to honor a stop payment
order that was received the following day and that came too late, from its own
customer (the drawer of the original earnest-money check). Accordingly, the
bank was not entitled to recover the amount of the cashier's check from the
payee.el
In another case, the drawer of a check went to the bank and ordered that
payment be stopped, taking this action at 9 a.m. The bank certified the check at
10:40 a.m. the same morning, at the request ofthe payee. The court held that the
bank had sufficient time to act on the stop order and that the certification was
improper; also, the drawer did not have the burden ofproving any negligence on
the part of the bank. H A bank that received a stop payment order from a
depositor and then paid the check two days later, by issuing two treasurer's
checks for the same amount, was not allowed to charge the payee's account and
was held responsible for the loss."
Before the UCC was enacted, a single stop payment notice was sufficient
and did not need to be renewed. Under the UCC, stop payment orders have a
limited duration-oral notices are effective for only fourteen days; written
notices are good for only six months. 1Z

[bJ Subrogation Rights and Proof of Loss. Under pre-Code law, a bank was
not entitled to charge tbe account of its customer for a check paid over a stop
payment order, even though payment was made to a holder in due course who
had a good claim against the customer; nor could the bank recover the amount

51 Siniscalchi v. Valley Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 64, 3S9 NYS2d 173 (NY Dist. Ct. 1974),
where the coun cited Section 4-403 in suppon of its ruling.
51 Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Youngblood, 135 Ga. App. 638, 219 SE2d 172 (1975).
HTusso v. Security Nat'l Bank, 76 Misc. 2d 12,349 NYS2d 914 (NY Dist. Ct. 1973).
The coun also held that the bank could recover the amount ofthe check from the payee in
a third-pany action.
.. Anthony Roberts Properties, Inc. v. Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Co., 16 vee
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1088 (1973), aff'd memo 228 Pa. Super. 854, 322 A2d 661 (1974).
The coun indicated, however, that the bank might be subroaated to the drawer's rights, jf
any, against the payee under Section 4-407 of the vce, but did not rule on this point.
12 vce § 4-403(2).
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-14
'I :ZO.05(11[b1

paid from a bona fide holder." Under the UCC, the bank has rights ofsubroga-
tion against both its customer and third party payees and holders. These rights
may insulate the bank from liability in many cases in which payment is made to a
holder in due course, even though the bank has wrongfully failed to honor a stop
payment order."
This subrogation provision was given effect in a case in which a bank paid a
corporate check, signed by a dying president to his wife, over a stop payment
order given by the successor president of the corporation. In this instance, the
bank was deemed to have paid the check because offailure to return it within tbe
prescribed time limits or to give timely notice of dishonor. The court indicated
right of subrogation was possible even though tbe bank had not charged the
account ofthe corporate drawer and, by not appealing an order oftbe trial court
denying its right to charge the account, had lost the right to charge its drawer's
account.'5
When a bank pays a check over a stop payment order and the drawer
demands tbat his or ber account be reimbursed for the ·payment, the bank has,
under this provision ofthe UCC, a right ofsubrogation against the payee for the
loss suffered. When the bank pays over a stop order and the drawer does not
demand reimbursement for the payment, according to one court, the bank has
no subrogation right since it has not suffered any Joss." When a wife placed a
stop payment order on a check drawn by her husband on their joint account and
the bank paid the check over the stop order because of a failure in the bank's
computer system, the bank was held to have no right of recovery from the
husband."
In Lynnwood Sand cl Gravtllnc. v. Bank ofEI'erelt," the court held that a
payor bank acquired the rights of a holder in due course because it was subro-
gated to the rights ofa depository bank. The depository bank was a holder in due
course because it had applied a provisional credit for a check against an existing
overdraft in the depositor's account. Because of the payor bank's subrogation
rights,the bank was entitled to summary judgment in a suit brought against the

II Johnson v. First State Bank; 144 Minn. 363; 175 NW 612 (I 920}; National Bank of
N.J. v. Berrall. 70 NJL 757, 58 A 189 (1904). Contra National Loan & Exch. Bank v.
Lachovitz, 131 SC 432. 128 SE 10 (1925). See Annot., "Bank's Right to Recover Back
Money Paid on Stopped Check," 39 ALR 1239 (1925). Cf. Note. "Bank May Recover
Money Paid on Stopped Check," 81 Banking U 624-628 (1964) & 80 Banking U 1075
(1963); ucq 3-418.
"UCC § 4.407. See supra' 20.02.
01 Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co.• 34 NY2d 404, 314 NE2d 860, 358 NYS2d 113
(1974).
" Aljax Corp. v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 458 Pa. 57,333 A2d 469 (1974).
5' Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Weyerman Feathers, 30 Utah 2d 161,514 P2d 1282
(1973). The bank had sought recovery from the payee of the check, as -well as from the
husband. See also Johnson v. Eudora Bank, 257 Ark. 518. 517 SW2d 957 (1975).
1129 Wash. App. 686, 630 P2d 489 (1981).
 20-15 MUTUAL DUTIES 1 20.05[1)(b)

bank by the customer who had issued a stop payment order on the check.
The UCC provides that the burden ofestablishing the fact and the amount
. ofloss resulting from the payment ofan item contrary to a binding stop payment
order is on the customer.
There is some doubt under the UCC on how the stop payment and subroga-
tion provisions interact and relate to the bank's liability for wrongful dishonor
for nonpayment of subsequent items. Consider the following hypothetical case,
which illustrates these issues. Suppose a customer draws Check 1 for $5,000 but
gives the drawee bank a timely stop payment order. Because of a clerical error,
the bank pays Check 1 and deducts $5,000 from the customer's checking
account. As a consequence, when the customer's Check 2 for $3,000 is pre-
sented, the customer's account does not have sufficient funds to pay it, so the
bank dishonors the check. On a lawsuit by the customer against the bank for the
wrongful dishonor, the bank may make two arguments: First, until the customer
shows there was "loss" as a result of the payment of Check 1, as required under
UCC § 4-403(3), the charge by the bank to the customer's account for Check 1 is
proper and, thus, the dishonor ofCheck 2 for insufficient funds is not wrongful.
Second, the bank has subrogation rights under UCC § 4-407 against its customer
(assuming there is a holder in due course or payee to whom the drawer would be
obligated for nonpayment of the check), and these rights justify the bank's
charge to its customer's account for Check 1, so that the subsequent dishonor of
Check 2 was proper.
The answers to the bank's arguments are not clear. In an earlier version of
the UCC, an official comment explained the customer's duty to prove loss as
follows: "When a bank pays an item over a stop payment order, such payment
automatically involves a charge to the customer's account. Subsection (3)
imposes upon the customer the burden of establishing the fact and amount of
loss resulting from the payment. Consequently until such burden is maintained
either in a court action or to the satisfaction ofthe bank, the bank is not obligated
to recredit the amount of the item to the customer's account and, therefore, is
not liable for the dishonor ofother items due to insufficient funds caused by the
payment contrary to the stop payment order....• When a revised edition of the
UCC was published, although the text of the main section remained the same,
the comment just quoted was eliminated without any explanation.
The customer's burden under UCC § 4-403(3) to establish the "fact and
amount ofloss" should be construed in light ofthe UCC's provisions giving the
bank rights to subrogation in Section 4-407. A comment to Section 4-407 states:
If a bank pays an item over such a stop order it is prima facia liable, but
under Subsection (3) of 4-403 the burden of establishing the fact and

It VCC § 4-403, comment 9 (1952 edition). For an excellent discussibn Oflhis issue,
see E. Allan Farnsworth and J. Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial Law
242-243 (4th ed. 1985).
, lo.oSlll{b1 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENiS 20-16

amount ofloss from such payment is on the customer. A defense frequently

interposed by a bank in an action against it for wrongful payment over a
stop order is that the drawer or maker suffered nO loss because he would
have been liable to a holder in due course in any event. On this argument
some cases have held that payment cannot be stopped against a holder in
due course. Payment can be stopped, but nitis, the drawer or maker isliable
and the sound rule is that the bank is subrogated to the rights ofthe holder in
due course/~
This comment suggests that a customer makes a prima facia case against the
bank by showing payment occurred over a timely stop order. The burden of
establishing the fact and amount oflo" is on the customer. It is unclear whether
this means the customer must always present additional proof." If the bank
chooses not to present any evidence, the comment can be read as support for
holding the bank liable for wrongful payment because the customer has shown
the bank is "prima facia liable" once the customer has shown the bank paid over
a binding stop payment order. The second part ofthe comment suggests that the
bank's right to subrogation is a matter ofdefense on which the bank would have
the burden ofestablishing that 5ubroption rights exist against the customer. On
this view, it would be inappropriate to construe the customer's burden under
Section 4-403(3) as havinllto negate the possibility that the bank is subrogated to
the rights of a holder in due course or other party against the customer under
Section 4-407.
The bank's second argument, that its rights to subrogation give it a right to
maintain the charge to the customer's account for paying the check over the stop
payment order, also is a matter ofuncertainty. In a New York case, a bank gave a
customer credit for a check the customer deposited that was drawn on another
customer of the bank. The bank subsequently deducted the credit from the
customer's account because the drawer of the check stopped payment, but the
bank's action was too late and the debit occurred after the bank had made final
payment. The bank claimed to have subrogation rights against the customer
whose account it had debited. The court said, "When the bank is suing as
subrogee, it may not at the ·same time make a preliminary determination of the
merits of the case by charging back on the depositor's account ... so that in this
case the Bank has no more or less right to take away or freeze Elizabeth's (the
customer's) account than would the Bank's subrogor.... When the bank is acting
as subrogee, it has the burden ofgoing forward."" The New York case is not like
the problem posed above where the bank is using subrogation to justify charging

70uec § 4-407, comment I,

The vec defines "burden ofestablishing" a fact as meaning the person with such a
71
burden has "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is
more probable than its nonexistence." uec § 1-201.(8). . '
7'S unshinev. Bankers Trust Co.• 34 NY2d 404, 314 NE2d 860. 864, 358 NYS2d 113.
J 17 (1974). For a good analysis of this case, see E. Farnswonh and J, Honnold. Cases and
20-17 MUTUAL DUTIES '1120.05(2)

its customer's account. In the New York decision, the bank tried to use the
subrogation doctrine to justify reversing a final payment. In the problem above,
the fmal payment rule is not in issue.
Overdrafts are authorized by the uee. As a result, where a depositor
reduces the balance in his account in lieu of stopping payment, a bank inadver-
tently paying a check is entitled to collect that amount from the defaulter. 1s In
many instances, banks have attempted to relieve themselves ofthe risk ofpaying
stopped checks by special agreement with the depositor. Although some provi-
sions ofthe uee may be varied by agreement and there is some leeway to defme
by agreement the identification needed by the bank to stop payment and to
regulate similar details, the uee takes the position that agreements exculpating
banks from liability for not following stop payment orders are invalid,14

(2) Claims of Third Parties to Checks

Since the payment ofchecks depends upon a contract between the depositor
and the bank, third parties normally are not allowed to stop payment on checks.
However, in a number ofinstances, the holder ofa check may lose the check, be
defrauded, have it stolen from him, or have other claims to the proceeds. In such
a case the right to payment may belong to the injured holder and not to the
person who has possession of the instrument. Under the former Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, the bank could not safely make payment if the injured
holder gave notice in time. 75 To protect itself, the bank would have to pay the
money into court and interplead the parties.
Under the uee, the bank may, even if notified, still make payment to the
person presenting the check as long as the bank makes sure the person is a
"holder" ofthe check, subject to two exceptions discussed later." The bank may
elect not to pay the check in deference to the wishes of the injured holder, as the
uee allows the bank to insist upon "indemnity deemed adequate" to itselfas a
77
condition to refusing payment. If the bank is not willing to voluntarily refuse

Materials on Commercial Law 252·253 (4th ed. 1985), referring to Thomas v. Marine
Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284,381 NYS2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976), Saratoga
Polo Ass'n v. Adirondack Trust Co., 118 Misc. 2d 247, 460 NYS2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1983);
and Siegel v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 386 Mass. 672, 437 NE2d 218 (1982).
7. Continental Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. 98, 559 P2d 218 (Ct. App. 1977).
7. A number of states have varied the VCC provision on stop payment orders. VCC
§ 4-403, comment 8. See Brady on Bank Checks, supra note 54, § 23.20; White &
Summers, supra note 32, § 17-2.
7S F. Beutel, Beutel's Brannon Negotiable Instruments Law, § 88 (7th ed. 1948).
71UCC § 3-603. See generally Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Chemical Bank N.Y.
Trust Co., 47 Misc. 2d 741, 263 NYS2d 354 (1965); afI'd memo 25 App. Div. 2d 499, 267
NYS2d 477 (1966); Spinazzola v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 28 Mich. App. 207, 184
NW2d 265 (1970).
77 Comment 3 to VCC § 3-603 makes clear that the bank is free to clroose not to pay
the instrument, even when the instrument is not indemnified or enjoined. Ifthe bank has
liability on the instrument, the holder may sue to compel payment and the bank will be
 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-18
11 20.0513]

payment, the injured holder has tho burden oftaking action to prevent payme.nt.
The injured holder has two alte~ati~es-t? indemnify the ~ank1l or t? ~nng
suit to enjoin payment in an action In which all three parties (ba~, lDJured
holder, and tbe adverse claimant who possesses the check) are subject to the
jurisdiction of the court.1I .
There are two exceptions to the bank's freedom to pay the holder who
presents the check without liability to other claimants: (I) The bank is liable for
not observing tbe rules in tbe UCC on restrictive indorsement lO and (2) the bank
is liable if, in bad faith, it makes payment to a thief or to someone who has
obtained the instrument through a thief, unless the person seeking payment
qualifies as a holder in due course."

[3) Stopping Payment on Casbier's Checks, Bank Drafts, and Certified

Checks
Problems that involve attempts by third parties to stop payment of checks
often arise in connection with casbier's checks, bank drafts, and certified checks.
For example, a buyer may obtain a cashier's check from a bank, made payable to

limited in its ability to assert the riahts ofthe injured holder ofthe instrument as a defense.
UCC § 3-306(d).
11 The indemnity must be "deemed adequate" by the bank, under Section 3-603( I) of
the UCC, which seems to establish a subjective test, but the bank is under a general
obligation to act in good faith under Section 1-103 of the UCC, and should be wary of
taking action that could be regarded as an unreasonable rejection of indemnity.
A court took a different approach in a case where a stock brokerage firm issued checks
of its own for a customer, and the customer subsequently asked the brokerage firm to stop
payment on the instruments. The customer asked the brokerage firm to issue checks to pay
$85,000 to the seller of a horse. When the customer desired to cancel the purchase of the
horse, he notified the brokerage firm to stop payment on the checks at a time when the
firm could have stopped payment if it had taken timely action to notify the banks on
which the checks were drawn. Instead, the brokeraae firm told its customer that it was too
late to stop payment. The court held that the firm owed a duty to. its customer to
communicate the stop payment request. "Althouah the issuance ofthird pany checks for
its customers mayor may not be part of a defendant's daily routine, once it undenook the
responsibility, it had a duty to use due care in carrying out the transaction, including
effectively communicating any stop payment requests." Weiss v. Advest. Inc., 180 F2d
1014 (3d Cir. 1985) (unpUblished opinion) (opinion reported at 46 Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) 21 (Nov. 29, 1985). The opinion did not discuss the application of UCC § 3-603.
7. When the check has been stolen, the pany in possession will be unknown in most
cases. This creates an obvious problem in satisfying the VCC provision requiringjurisdic-
tion over the advene claimant. The purpose of this section is to protect the bank against
conflicting claims. and it appears possible for a coun to satisfy this objective through
indemnity conditions even though it is not in a position to conclusively adjudicate the
rights of the absent claimant.
"vec § 3-603(1){b).
II VCC § 3·603( 1Xa).
20-19 MUTUAL DUTIES , 20.05[3)

a seller, to use in purchasing goods. After the check is given to the seDer, the
goods are not delivered or some other defense arises as a result of the sale
transaction. Can the buyer direct the bank to stop payment on the cashier's
check? The cases that have been decided in this area are confusing. Some ofthe
decisions may be criticized for not following the UCC.
It is clear under the UCC and the case law that the injured claimant (the
buyer in the preceding example) cannot compel the bank to stop payment ofthe
cashier's check by merely giving notice to the bank. Cashier's checks, bank
drafts, and certified checks are not like ordinary checks because, with these
instruments, the bank is liable as the drawer or the acceptor of the instrument.
The bank's signature appears on the check, and the bank is contractually bound
under the UCC to pay the holder of the check. Because the bank has a legal
obligation to pay, the UCC provisions giving customers the right to stop pay-
ment do not apply.12
Although the injured claimant (buyer) cannot make the bank stop payment
by giving notice, the claimant may be able to use the provisions in the UCC for
supplying indemnity or enjoining payment.U These provisions contemplate the
circumstance, given in the example, that by following the procedures in those
provisions, the claimant (buyer) could force the bank to refuse to pay the holder
even though the bank as a party to the instrument, absent a good defense, would
be liable to the holder, as would be the case with a cashier's check, bank draft, or
certified check."

'0 Section 4-402 of the UCC expresses the policy that the stop payment order is too
late ifthe bank has taken any action with respect to the check that would make it liable for
payment under UCC ~ 4-303. Thus, a customer cannot stop payment on a certified check.
See comment 5. The same principle should apply when a cashier's check or bank draft is
used, but the literal language ofUCC § 4-403(1) does not fit. (The bank has not taken any
action under UCC § 4-303 with respect to these instruments.) Perhaps the reason the
language of § 4-403( I) appears inapt is that the provisions of § 4-403 are not meant to
apply to cashier's checks or bank drafts. Cashier's checks and bank drafts are not items
payable for the account of the customer as required in Section 4-403(1).
uUCC § 3·603. In Ward v. First Interstate Bank of Riverton, 718 P2d 886 (Wyo.
1986), the plaintiff sued to enjoin the issuing bank from paying a cashier's check that he
had purchased. The check, which was for almost $30,000, was delivered to the payee but
never presented for payment. The plaintiffsued to stop payment, claiming that a reason-
able time for presentment had passed and also that the bank was being unjustly enriched
by the use of the money during the time the check was outstanding. The court affirmed a
summary judgment for the bank, finding that the effect of delay in presenting the check
was a matter between the payee and the bank, which would be relevant, if relevant at all,
when the check was presented for payment. The court also rejected the claim of unjust
enrichment on the pan of the bank because the plaintiff had not shown any right to the
funds. The court did not discuss UCC § 3-603, although that section would appear to
provide a basis for denying an injunction against the issuing bank when the party seeking
the injunction had not obtained jurisdiction over the payee of the instrument.
'4 See UCC § 3-603, comment 3. A court has held that it is improper to enjoin a bank
from paying the proceeds of its cashier's check because the cashier's check constitutes the
120.05(31 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-20

Can the bank elect to refuse to pay the holder on the request of the injured
clliimant and raise, as a defense in any subsequent action brought by the person
in possession of the instrument, that the rights of the injured claimant are
superior? Unfortunately. the answer given by the cases is not clear. Numerous
statements wagest tluit the bank may not stop payment,II but the UCC seems to
contemplate that the bank may choose to refuse to pay if it is wi11ing to assume
the risk of subsequent litigation.II
If the person in possession of the instrument sues the bank on the bank's
liability as drawer or acceptor, the UCC limits the right ofthe bank to raise the
rights of the injured claimant as defenses to payment. With the exception of the
defenses that (1) the person seeking payment acquired the instrument through a
thief or (2) that payment would violate a restrictive indorsement, the injured
claimant who is asserting rights superior to the party presenting the check for
payment must intervene in the litigation and personally assert the claims to the
check. IT Ofcourse a person presenting the check for payment who has the rights
ofa holder in due course has a right to payment ofthe instrument that is superior
to any claim to the instrument that may be asserted by adverse parties.II
Although the UCC thus seems to pennit the bank to elect to refuse payment, so
as to allow the competing claimants to litigate their rights to the instrument in a
suit brought against the bank for payment, the cases in this area are not clear and
advice of counsel should be sought. 11

primary oblip.tion of the bank. Key Int'I Mfg., Inc. v. Stillman, 103 AD2d 475, 480
NYS2d 528 (1984), alrd as modified 66 NY2d 924, 489 NE2d 764, 498 NYS2d 795
(1985).
II Sec generally Brady on Bank Checlcs, supra note 54, § 23.11.
II See UCC §§ 3·306, comment 5, 3.603, comment 3. See generally Note, "Uniform
Commercial Code: A Bank's Right to Dishonor a Cashier's Check," 38 Okla. L. Rev. 359
(1985);Annot., "Bank's Right to Stop Payment on Its Own Unoenified Check or Money
Order," 97 ALR3d 714 (1980).
IT UCC § 3.306(d).
.. UCC § 3·305(1).
It See senerally Annot., "Uniform Commercial Code: Bank's Right to Stop Payment
on Its Own Uncenified Check or Money Order," 97 ALR3d 714 (1980); Brady on Bank
Checks, supra note 54, § 23.11; White &. Summers, supra note 32, § 17-5.
In a 1984 case, a bank issued its cashier's check after receivins a personal check from
a third pany. The personal check was dishonored. The bank refused to pay its cashier's
check when it was subsequently presented. The coun held that the bank could not refuse
to pay the cashier's check because the bank's knowledge of the lack of payment of the
personal check came too late to terminate the bank's duty under UCC § 4-303. The coun
was persuaded, as a matter of policy, that a cashier's check ought to be treated as the
equivalent of cash. In dicta, the coun suggested a different result would have been
obtained had the cashier's check been issued to the person who had defrauded the bank by
givins it a forged or stolen personal check. In this situation, the coun said the bank could
use a defense of fraud or lack of consideration. Da Silva Y. Sanders, 600 F. Supp. 1008
(DOC 1984).
20-21 MUTUAL DUTIES 120.06

11 20.06 BANK'S DUTY TO PAY THE HOLDER

The drawee or other payor of an instrument has the obligation to pay the
ho/derMJ of the negotiable instrument when the instrument is due and when any
steps required for proper presentment are met." As long as payment is made to
the holder, the payor may disregard claims to the instrument or its proceeds
asserted by other persons unless adequate indemnity is supplied or payment is
properly enjoined. n This rule does not protect a payor who acts in bad faith to
pay a holder who received title to the instrument through a thief, unless the

A federal court reached a result similar to that in the Sanders case. A bank issued a
cashier's check to the payee, who paid for the cashier's check with two other checks on
which the payee had forged the indorsements. The payee subsequently gave the cashier's
check to the Hotel Riviera in payment of a gambling debt. When the cashier's check was
presented for payment, the bank dishonored the check because it had not been able to
obtain payment on the two other checks with the forged indorsements. The hotel sued the
bank for payment of the cashier's check. Even though the hotel conceded it was not a
holder in due course, the court held that tbe bank could not assert the defense of failure of
consideration. The court came to this conclusion because it believed that a cashier's check
should be a reliable form of payment. Moreover, the hotel had not participated in the
fraud that led to the issuance of the cashier's check. The cause of the loss was the bank's
own actions in dealing with a customer who had committed fraud. Hotel Riviera, Inc. v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 768 F2d 1201 (lOth Cir. 198~).
The purchaser of a cashier's check has ownerahip rights in the check and is entitled
under UCC § 3-419 to bring suit for conversion against someone who misappropriates his
property. Lawrence v. Central Plaza Bank & Trust Co., 469 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
19a5).
Relying on general equitable principles, a Wisconsin court permitted a bank to stop
payment on its cashier's check and assert a defense offailure ofconsideration against the
customer-payee to whom it issued the check. The check had been issued in exchllllJle for
the customer's personal check, but the customer stopped payment on the personal check.
Pulaski Chase ClKlP v. Kellogg-eitizens Nat'. Bank, 130 Wis. 2d 200,386 NW2d 510 (Ct.
App. 1986}.ln Fur Funtastic, Ltd. v. Kearns, 120 Misc. 2d 794,467 NYS2d 499 (Sup. Ct.
1983), the court said a bank may stop payment on its own check as an accommodation to
its customer, but the bank is liable on the instrument. Because the customer who uses the
bank instrument for payment will be discharged from liability on the underlying contract,
the court concluded the bank ought not to be allowed to raise contract defenses of the
customer if the holder sued the bank. "This approach preserves the function of bank
checks as cash equivalent items, inasmuch as banks will presumably be disinclined to stop
payment ifthey are precluded from raising their customers' defenses or warranty claims in
subsequent litigation with the holder."
In University State Bank v. Allied Conroe Bank, 712 SW2d 193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986),
the court ruled that a bank cannot stop payment on its own cashier's check, even when the
check issued was part ofa check-kiting scam. The bank's claim that it was raising a defense
for non-payment allowed by UCC §§ 3-306 and 3-408 rather than stopping payment was
rejected as a distinction without a difference.
10 uec § 3-603( I). See UCC § 3-504( I} (presentment is made "by or on behalfof the
holder").
I ' The presentment requirements are explained in Chapter 21 .
• 2 UCC § 3-603( I). Third party claims are discussed at 1 20.05[2].
'20.0611) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-22

holder is a holder in due course,1I nor does it protect a payor who violates the
vee provisions on restrictive indorsements."
When a drawee bank pays a check to a person who is not the holder, the bank
may have to pay twice. The true owner of the check may have an action for
conversion against the drawee" or an action based on the vee provision on lost
or stolen instruments.- Because the instrument is not properly payable, the
bank's customer may be able to require the bank to remove the charge to the
customer's accoUnt until payment is made to the proper person. rr
How maya bank or other payor determine who is entitled to payment? The
following subsections explain what rules apply.

[1) Order Paper and Identification of Payees and Indorsers

Since the agreement between the bank and the depositor is that the bank
must pay at the order ofthe depositor, the bank is required to identify the payee
or holder of the check. II Payment to the wrong per-son is at the risk ofthe bank.
In cases where a check payable to the order of a named payee carries a
number of indorsements, each one in the chain of title must be genuine and
properly authorized. If not, the bank cannot charge the check: against the
drawer's account." When there is an irregularity in anyone ofthe indorsements,
the bank may have recourse, based on breach of warranty oftide or of right to
payment, against the person who indorsed it to the bank or who received
payment."» In many ;n~tances, banks gurantee among themselves all prior
indorsements. '01 The 1.. _ e imposes the same responsibilities automatically as a
matter oflaw on transfers by collecting banks without need for the words "prior
indorsements guaranteed."102 This gives the bank recourse against prior collect-
ing banks for breach of warranty, but, absent grounds for estopping the drawer
from challenging the signature,'03 the drawee-bank cannot charge the drawer's

II vee § 3-603(1). See supra 11 20.05(2].

Hvee § 3·603(1). Restrictive indorsements are discussed at' 15.01(3](a).
85 VCC § 3-419( I). See discussion of conversion infra ~ 20.08[2].
91 UCC § 3.804. See discussion at II~ 20.08, 21.08.
17 vce § 4-401. See discussion supra ~'l20.01, 20.06[1 J.
to The bank may pay only items that are "properly payable" from its customer's
account. VCC § 4-401. Only items that are properly presented are entitled to payment, see
vce §§ 3-505, 3·507, and only a person who Qualifies as a holder can make a proper
presentment. VCC § 3·504. Payment must be made to the holder in order to discharge
liability on the instrument. UCC § 3-603.
VI See 1115.01 on indorsement. transfer, and negotiation.
11>0 vec § 4·207. See also UCC § 3-417. The warranties are discussed in \I 15.03.

101 These warranties arise automatically under UCC § 4-207.

102 VCC § 4.207. comment 2.
'0) See vec §§ 3-405-3.406.
20-23 MUTUAL DUTIES , 20.06[3)

account if one of the necessary indorsements is, in fact, a forgery or otherwise

unauthorized.'M
A bank may require the person seeking payment to supply identification
and to give evidence ofauthority to obtain payment when the person presenting
the item seeks payment on behalf of someone else.'os
When the bank pays a person who is not entitled to payment, the rightful
owner of the instrument has an action against the payor bank for conversion.'·
The payor bank may be able to recoup its loss by seeking recovery from the
presenting bank, prior collecting banks, or other indorsers. Each ofthese parties
warrants to the payor that it has a good title to the check. '07 In this fashion, the
loss ultimately should come to rest on the party who dealt with the forger. That
party then bears the risk and expense of collecting from the forger.'M

[2) Bearer Paper

When the drawer has ordered tbe bank to pay to "bearer" or to "a named
payee or bearer," the bank is justified in charging the drawer's account when it
has actually paid out the money to any holder in good faith.'01 Checks made
payable to "casb," "current funds," "payroll," or similar names that do not
purport to be any persons are also payable to bearer until the check is specially
indorsed.llB
When a check originally payable to bearer is indorsed to a special person,
the bank must pay to this person or to his order and the check is no longer
payable to bearer.'ll The manner in which other indorsements can change the
duties of the bank to the customer are discussed in Chapter IS.

[3) Fictitious or Nonexisting Payees

The provisions in the UCC that deal with fictitious or nonexisting payees'"
evolved from prior law and can best be understood in light of the decisions

'BO uce § 3-404.

'05 uce § 3-505( I)(b).
'
04
.uce § 3-419.
, 01 UCC §§ 3-417(1),4-207.
'04 The forger is liable on the check by signing it. uec §§ 3-401, 3-404( I).
'01 UCC § 3.603.
1lBUCC §§ 3-11 I (c), 3-204(1).
'" UCC § 3·204.
"2 UCC § 3·405. See generally Annot., "Bills and Notes: Nominal Payee Rule ofUCC
§ 3-405( I )(b)," 92 ALR3d 268 (1979); Annot., "Construction and Application ofUCC § 3-
405( I )(a) Involving Issuance of Negotiable Instrument Induced by Imp~ster," 92 ALR3d
608 (1979); Note, "The Role of Negligence in § 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
69 Ky. U 143 (1980).
, 20.06(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-24

reached in cases decided pre-uee. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments

Law, checks drawn to fictitious or nonexisting payees known as such by the
person drawing the check were treated as bearer paper and charged to the
account of the drawer, no matter to whom payment was made in good faith, 111
and no matter what the chain oftitle was as shown by the indorsement.
Cases of this kind fell into a number of classes and were the source ofmuch
difficulty and litigation. They usually arose from two causes: either the drawer,
for some business reason, desired to keep the real payee of his check secret, or
some type of fraud or embezzlement was involved.
Another difficult situation involving use of a fictitious name is the one in
which a person receiving payment by check impersonates another for the pur·
pose of receiving money due to the otber. Under pre-Uee law, if the drawer of
the check and the impersonator were face to face when the check was delivered,
the courts usually held that the drawer meant to pay the person in front of him
and that the bank was justified in paying to the impersonator or to his order. But
if the transaction between drawer and payee was not face to face, the courts
usually held that the payee was not fictitious and that the bank was justified in
paying only to tbe person intended by the drawer."· In cases of this sort, the
bank's best protection was to insist upon careful identification of persons to
whom checks are paid, as it was impossible for the bank to know the depositor's
or his agent's intention when either of them drew the check.
The uee operates on an entirely different theory. It provides that in cases
in which the payee's name is fictitious or the drawer ofthe check or the employer
is defrauded by imposters, or by employees using fictitious names for paper not
payable to bearer on its face, any person may indorse in the name ofthe fictitious
or defrauding payee and such indorsement passes title or authorizes the bank to
make payment according to the face of the instrument. 115 The difference
between the two rules seems to be that under pre-Uee law, when the payee's
name was intended to be fictitious, the bank could pay without any indorsement,
but under the uee an indorsement in the name of the fictitious or defrauding
payee is necessary and anyone can so indorse. When it pays with due care, the
bank is protected according to the chain oftide appearing on the indorsements
and the loss falls on the depositor.

111 F. Beutel, supra note 75, §§ 9(3), 88.

,.. Mercantile Nafl Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. I, 132 NYS 1017 (1911), alrd,
210NY 567,104 NE 1134 (1914); Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 275 NY 399. IONE2d 457
(1937); City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 NY 64,184 NE 495 (1933);
McHenry v. Old Citizens National bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 NE 395 (1911). First Nat')
Bank v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 170 NY 88, 62 NE 1089 (1902).
U5UCC § 3·405 & comments. See Brady on Bank Checks, supra note 52, at 128.2.
Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 419 Pa. 78,212 A2d 222
(J 965).
20-25 MUTUAL DUTIES 1f 20.06(3}

The uee rule that deals with imposters and unfaithful employees does not
apply to all forgeries, but only to those within the terms of the provision. It
state1:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective if
(a) an imposter by use of the mails or othenvise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of
the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee ofthe maker or drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the
person so indorsing. 111

When a credit union issued its loan check to the order of two payees (a borrower
who represented that the loan was to buy a car and the car dealer) and when the
borrower conected the check on a forgery of the car dealer's indorsement, the
court held that the "impostor" rule ofthe uee did not apply, since the borrower
had impersonated no one. Instead, the borrower had presented a forged pur-
chase order to the credit union as the means of obtaining the loan. The result was
that the car dealer's indorsement was forged and the bank that took the check
with the forged indorsement on deposit was held liable to the drawee or payor
bank that paid and then made good to its depositor (the credit union) the check
in question. 11T
It has been held that the "fictitious payee" rule of the uee applied to a
check with a forgery of both a drawer's signature and an indorsement; the court
took the position that the forger intended the named payee to have no interest in
the check and indorsement in the payee's name was considered legally valid and
not forged. '"
The "fictitious payee" rule of the veewas also applied in a case in which
so-called bill ofsale drafts (considered by the court as ordinary checks), drawn by
a cattle dealer ostensibly for the purchase ofcattle and naming a purported cattle
seller as payee, were, on the drawer-dealer's forgery of indorsements of the
payee, paid by the bank on which they were drawn. The drafts were drawn to
deceive the bank and to obtain funds from an account and a line of credit,

HI UCC § 3-405.
117 East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 50 Ala. App. 476, 281 So. 2d 431
(1973). But see Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank. 553 F2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977).
"' Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 SW2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973). The court took the position that the forger might be considered a person signing "as
or on behalf of a ... drawer" within the "fictitious payee" rule ofSection 3·405( 1}(b) ofthe
Uniform Commercial Code.
1120.06(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-26

extended by the bank to eaable the dealer to purchase cattle. The court held that
the particular drafts were not intended to be payable to the named payee and
that the indorsements were effective. 1II
The fictitious payee rule was not applied in the case of a firm president's
son, who obtained checks payable to the firm and, misrepresenting his identity
but correctly stating his relationship, indorsed the checks in the firm's name with
the suggestion that such indorsement might be valid by reason of actual or
apparent authority.'to
In another case, it was held that the "fictitious payee" rule, thougb applica-
ble, did not absolve a bank from liability when the president ofa company drew
company checks to the order ofa creditor ofthe company but then deposited the
checks in his personal account at the banlc, with indorsements of the creditor's
name made without the creditor's authority. The court held that although the
president had drawn the checks to the order of the creditor but intended the
creditor to have no interest in them, the transactions by which the president
deposited the checks payable to a third person in his own account were so
irregular as to call into question their validity and thus give the bank notice of
irregularity, depriving it of holder-in-due-course status.'I'
The UCC extends the fictitious payee rules to situations in which the name
ofthe payee is supplied to the drawer of the check by an agent or employee who
intended that the payee have no interest in the check. 111 These are the so-called
padded payroll cases. The UCC adopts a policy that makes the drawer of the
check, as part of his risks of doing business, responsible for supervising his
agents and employees.
A New Yorlc case considered under which circumstances an employee
should be deemed to have "supplied" the payee's name to the employer,
intending the payee to have no interest in the check.m In this case a bookkeeper
received invoices for payment from a legitimate finn with which his employer
did business. The employee then diverted the checks, forged the payee's signa-
ture, and obtained the proceeds ofthe checks. When the employer sued the payor

111 Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Bank ofOdessa, 386 F. Supp. 555 (WO Mo. 1974). The
action was by the surety of the bank on which the drafts were drawn, against the bank
taking the drafts on forged payee indorsements. Because of the rule ofSection 3-405( J)(b)
of the VCC, the indorsements were held effective; thus they denied recovery by the
drawee's bank's surety on either a breach of warranty theory or a conversion theory.
11°W.R Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 563 P2d 117 (Okla. 1977).
m McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 SW2d 874 (Tenn. 1973).
112 VCC § 3-40S( Il(c). A Texas appeals coun applied this rule to hold indorsements
effective in a case where a company's bookkeeper forged the indorsements of payees on
checks drawn by the company that employed her in order to divert the checks to her
personal account. Clint(m Weilbacher Builder,lnc. v. Kirby State Bank. 643 SW2d 473
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
113 Danie Fabrics Div. v. Moraan Guaranty Trust Co., 96 Misc. 2d 746,409 NYS2d
565 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
20-27 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.06(3)

bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust, the bank contended that because of the impostor
rule, the forged indorsement on the check was effective and so payment by
Morgan was proper. The employer took the position that since the checks were
prepared as part of "bona fide business transactions" between the named payee
and the employer, the clerk who prepared the checks for signature did not
"supply" the checks to the cmployerwithin the meaning ofthe imposter rule but
simply was guilty ofconversion. The court agreed with the employer's argument,
saying: "the checks involved were based upon bona fide transactions and obliga·
tions ofthe plaintiffwhich arose out ofthe nonnal business relationship with the
payee named on said checks. In such instance, it cannot be claimed that the
employee ... supplied his employer ... with the name of the payee, ... as said
checks were legitimately based upon open invoices due and owing to the
payee .... ",.,
The vee impostor rule was applied in a case in which James F. Beaird, Jr.,
contacted a prospective investor in an oil lease and represented himselfto be an
employee ofa certain company that sold oilleascs. The investor telephoned the
company and was infonned that it had an employee named James Baird. The
investor then obtained a cashier's check from a bank payable to James Baird and
delivered it to Beaird. Beaird then cashed the check at another bank where he
was known, indorsing it twice, in the names ofJames Baird and James F. Beaird,
Jr. The court held that the indorsement of Beaird was effective and that there
was no forgery.'·s
In another case, a bank, in making a cashier's check payable to a purported
seller of a motor vehicle, was not guilty of negligence contributing to forgery or
alteration of the instrument, nor did the matter come within the so-called
impostor rule.,.s
In Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,121 a bank issued a
cashier's check made payable to two named joint payees. One of the payees was
an individual and the other was a company selling an automobile for which the
check was to be used as payment. The bank issued the check on the basis of
phony documents presented by the individual named as payee. The court held
this was not a situation within the vee imposter rule, under which an indorse-
ment in the name shown on the instrument would be effective.'" Rather, the
court held that the case should be treated as within the vee comment that the

'·"d. at 569.
125 Covington v. Penn Square Nat'l Bank, 545 P2d 824 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975). See
Note. "UCC Section 3-405: Oflmposters, Fictitious Payees, and Padded Payrolls," 47
Fordham L. Rev. 1083 (1979); "The Effect of Bank Misconduct on the Operation of the
Padded Payroll Preclusion ofUCC § 3-405," 27 UCLA L. Rev. 147 (1979).
126Guaranty Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 454 F. Supp. 488
(WD Okla. J 977).
,.7656 P2d 425 (Utah 1982).
'''See vce § 3·405.
1r 20.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-28

imposter rule does not apply to a false representation that the party is the
authorized agent of the payee.· 11 The court reasoned that the principle underly-
ing this comment should apply to protect a party who makes a check payable to
the seller of goods.
In still another case, Dykstra Y. National Bank ofSouth Dakota,liG a bank
officer's payment of a check made payable jointly to two partiel after obIerving
one of the joint parties forge the signature of the other joint party was held not
commercially reasonable. The court said the bank could not argue that the
impostor rule ofUCC § 3-405 applied, because that section did not absolve the
bank from conducting its business in a proper manner. It is important to note,
however, that unlike other loss allocation provisions ofthe UCC,'" the impostor
provisions do not expressly require the bank to observe reasonable commercial
standards in paying the check. "2
The fictitious name situation should be distinguished from the situation in
which the drawer has simply misspelled or misdesignated the payee. In either of
illese cases, the bank is justified in paying the person intended, and may charge
the drawer's account, even though the indorsement may vary slightly from the
name of the payee.· 32 For example, a check drawn payable to West Wisconsin
Limestone Company may be properly paid under the indorsement Wisconsin
Limestone Company when the latter is the person who is entitled to payment.
However, a bank or transferee of paper payable to a misspelled name may, if it
gives value for the paper, require the indorsement in both the misspeUcd and the
proper name of tbe holder. ' :14

11 20.07 MISCREDITED PROCEEDS AND RESTRICTIVE

INDORSEMENTS
It follows from the principle that the bank must pay the person properly
entitled to payment under the terms of the check that the bank must properly
credit the proceeds of the check when it is given to the bank for deposit. When
the check is made payable to the bank itself, the bank muSt act carefully. It has
been held that when a bank takes a check from an employee ofthe depositor that
is previously signed by the depositor and that is made payable to the bank, the

IUJd. comment 2.
130
328 NW2d 862 (SO 1983).
131 See UCC §§ 3-406, 4·406.
132uce § 3·405. See City of Phoenix v. Great Western Bank & Trost Co., 148 Ariz.
53, 712 P2d 966 (Ct. App. 1985), which explores this issue and indicates the bank's
negligence does not preclude application of the role.
,,. vce § 3-203.
13·ld.
20-29 MUTUAL DUTIES no.07

bank must apply the check to the credit of the depositor; the bank is liable to its
depositor if it cashes the check or credits it to the employee's account. lH
When a check is restrictively indorsed, the transferees of the instrument
may have special obligations with respect to payment of the proceeds of the
instrument. When the transferee is not a bank, the transferee of an instrument
containing an indorsement that states "for collection," "for deposit," or similar
terms must act consistently with the terms of the indorsement.1. If the trans-
feree is a bank, only the flrst bank after the check has been restrictively indorsed
is placed on notice by the indorsement. lS7 Transferees that take an instrument
with notice that it has been restrictively indorsed in this manner, but that do not
credit or disburse the proceeds ofthe instrument in accordance with the instruc-
tions ofthe indorsement, are not regarded as holders for value. l31 Therefore, they
cannot qualify as holders in due course, and their interest in the instrument is
subject to the lawful claims of other parties. llt
In Rutherford v. Darwin, '00 the court considered the liability of a bank that
credited proceeds of a restrictively indorsed check to the wrong account. The
court upheld summary judgment against the bank in favor of the person who
owned the account that should have been credited. The case raised an additional
question as the bank's defenses in such an action. Darwin deposited the check.
He was the general partner ofRancho Village, the firm that owned the check, and
had full authority to manage the funds ofthis finn. Darwin restrictively indorsed
the check to be paid to Rancho Village, but he instructed the bank to deposit the

1" Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671,148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 582 P2d
920 (1978); Pacific Indem. v. Security First Nat'] Bank, 248 Cal. App. 2d 75, 56 Cal. Rptr.
142 (1967); Bank ofS. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, Inc. 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A2d
388 (1978). 9 as Banks and Banking § 340 (1938). The topic ofmiscredited proceeds is
considered in Note, "A Co-Payee Has a Cause of Action in Conversion Against Both the
Collecting and Payor Banks for Payment of a Check Over His Missing Endorsement,
Despite. the Payee's Lack of a Proprietary Interest in the Procceds,-Trust Co. v. Refrig-
eration Supplies, Inc., 241 Ga. 406, 246 S.E.2d 282 (1978)." 13 Ga. L. Rev. 677 (1979).
See also the discussion of fiduciaries transferring instruments at ~ 15.08.
131 UCC § 3-206(3).
137 UCC §§ 3.206(2)-3-206(3).
31
' UCC § 3-206(3).
,"ucc § 3·306(a). Restrictive indorsements are discussed generally at n 15.01[3),
20.07. See Citibanc ofAlabama/Fultondale v. Tricor Energies, Inc., 493 So. 2d 1344 (Ala.
1986). One of Trioor's officers deposited a $75,000 check payable to Tricor into his
personal account. Tricor then sued the depositary bank, claiming oonversion and pay-
ment contrary to a "for deposit" indorsement. The court held that Tricor had ratified the
bank's action, and that Tricor had acted as though the officer's use of the check were a
personal loan, which he partially repaid. Another oount, alleging failure to dishonor a
check within the bank's midnight deadline, was barred by the statute oflimitations. In this
instance, the oourt applied the limitation period for statutory penalties; not the longer
period for conversion actions.
14 °95 NM 340, 622 P2d 245 (Ct. App. 1980).
'10.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-30

proceeds to the account of a different fum. The court held that Rancho Village
was entitled to recover from the bank because the bank.failed to fonow the tenns
ofthe restrictive indorsement. The bank argued that Rancho Village had waived
the indorsement because its general partner, who had authority to act in the
matter, directed that payment be made to a different account. The court rejected
the argument, reasoning that the utility of restrictive Indorsements would be
impaired by such a defense because the presence of a restrictive indorsement on
a negotiable instrument "creates the legitimate expectation that it was negoti-
ated in accordance with the restrictlons."141 The restrictive indorsement should
have been canceled for the bank to properly pay the proceeds of the check in a
way inconsistent with the indorsement. The court further held that Rancho
Village was not estopped from recovering because of lack of care in structuring
its affairs so that Darwin's embezzlement was not discovered earlier. The court
refused to accept the bank's contention that uee § 4-406, which requires a bank
customer to examine his bank statement, expressed a policy ofcustomer respon-
sibility for managing a bank account that should be extended by analogy to
release the bank from liability.
A bank also was held liable under the principles discussed in this section for
crediting the proceeds of drafts drawn payable to the bank to the personal
account ofthe individual who deposited the drafts rather than to the account of
the drawer. 142 The bank argued it could properly make payment to the person
depositing the check because it could give funds to a fiduciary for deposit in the
fiduciary's own account as long as the bank did not have notice of any breach of
the fiduciary duty. The court held this principle did not apply as the depositor
did not hold the funds as a fiduciary and had no authority to indorse the
checks.1"

,., 11'1. at 249.

"2 Arvada Hardwood Floor Co. v. James, 638 P2d 828 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
"3Id. at 830.
In Bullitt County Bank v; Publishers Printing, 684 SW2d 289 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). the
drawer's office manaaer (Youna) took company checks to the bank that were made
payable to the bank and exchanged the checks for cashier's checks that were made payable
to Citizens Fidelity Bank in another city where Young maintained a private account.
Young did not have authority to cash, write, or indorse checks. The employer maintained
accounts at the depository bank. The depository bank routinely permitled Young to
exchange the checks for cashier's checks without questioning Young about his authority to
do so. The court quoted from Corpus Juris to find that the depository bank had a duty to
the drawer of the check. It quoted the followina statement:
Where a check is drawn to the order ofa bank to which the drawer is not indebted,
the bank is authorized to pay the proceeds only to persons specified by the drawer; it
takes the risk in treating such a check as payable to bearer and is placed on inquiry as
to the authority of the drawer's agent to receive payment.
684 SW2d 289, 292, (quoting from 9 CIS Banks and Banking § 340 (1938». The court
then concluded that the failure ofthe bank to notify its depositor regarding the checks was
20-31 MUTUAL DUTIES '1120.07

Although a depository bank may supply the indorsement of its customer

when it is missing underUCC § 4-104(e), the bank will be liable ifit fails to pay
the proceeds ofthe check consistently with the indorsement. In a case decided by
the New Yark Court ofAppeals, the defendant law fum issued a check naming a
construction company as the payee. An employee of the construction company
took the checks to the Marine Midland Bank and asked the bank to wire the
funds· to an account of the construction company at an Oklahoma bank. The
construction company had not indorsed the checks. Although the construction

a violation of its duty of care. The bank would have had a defense if the employer had
cloaked tbe agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds of the checks, but the
record contained no evidence that the agent had such apparent authority. Id. at 292-293.
In Federal Ins. Co. v. Banco Popular, 750 F2d 1095 (!stCir. 1983), the court applied
the law of Puerto Rico and apportioned liability on a comparative negligence basis
between a negligent bank, which had miscredited the proceeds of a check, and tbe owner
of the check, which had been negligent in its office procedures. The suite was brought by
the insurers ofIntemational Charter Mortgage Corporation (ICMq to recover from two
Puerto Rican banks for losses suffered as a result of the fraud of Pagan. Over a ten-year
period, Pagan, who was an ICMC financial officer with authority to sign cbecks on
corporate accounts, embezzled approximately $400,000. The amount in question in this
suit, slightly more than $100,000, was obtained by drawing company checks made pay-
able to the order of the two Puerto Rican banks. Although ICMC required a second
signature on the checks, Pagan obtained this through misrepresenting the purpose of the
checks. The checks then were sent to the banks with Pagan's personal credit card bins and
the credit card numbers written on the backs of the checks. The banks credited Pagan's
accounts without any inquiry about his authority to use corporate funds for personal
debts. The plaintiff insurers charged the banks with negligence. The trial court found the
banks to be negligent in paying the checks to Pagan's personal accounts without inquiry as
to his authority, but also found that ICMC maintained a grossly negligent system of
intemal control. Because of ICMC's own negligence, the court reduced the recovery by 75
percent. On appeal, the court upheld the determination that the banks were liable for
paying the proceeds to satisfy Pagan's personal obligations, saying that in many jurisdic-
tions "the banks would have been negligent as a matter oflaw merely by crediting a check
made payable to their own order to the debt of a third party without inquiring of the
drawer." 750 F2d at 1099. The court did not feel it necessary to decide whether this
principle would apply in Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction that does not have the UCC, because
suspicious circumstances existed that should have alerted the bank to the improper
diversion offunds, including the facts that the checks were drawn on trust accounts, the
debts on the credit cards were substantial amounts from hotels with gambling casinos, the
banks knew Pagan earned less than $20,000 per year, and two of the checks used were
visibly altered. The court further upheld the determination of negligence on the part of
ICMC for not having adequate internal controls. A major fault was leaving Pagan
unsupervised so that he could both execute checks and reconcile the corporation's bank
statemeJ:lts. Furthermore, the second signature procedure was inadequate, since no
invoice or signed authorization was required. The plaintiffs argued that the negligence of
the employer, ICMC, should not be a basis for apportioning loss because the wrong
committed by the bank constituted conversion, and comparative negligence is not a
defense in an action for conversion. The court held that the law of Puerto Rico controlled
this issue and the statute in question treated conversion as merely one form offault that is
properly subject to the principle of apportionment.
'20.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-32

company had never maintained an account at the Marine Midland Bank, a bank
employee stamped the checks "credit to the account ofthe payee herein named.
Marine Midland Bank" and then transferred the funds to the Oklahoma bank as
requested. Subsequently, the defendant stopped payment on the checlcs, and
they Were returned to Marine Midland Bank, who could not recover from the
constnlction company because the company had become bankrupt. Marine
Midland Bank soUlbt to collect from the defendant law fmn that had issued the
check. Marine Midland claimed it was entitled to recover as a holder in due
course because its supplying of the construction company's indorsement was
effective as an indorsement under UCC § 4-104(e). The court agreed the bank
was entitled to supply this indorsement, because it was acting as an agent for
collection on behalf of the construction company. Although the defendant
argued that the bank had purchased the check for its own account and that it was
not handling the check for coUecdon on behalfofthe construction company, the
court rejected the defendant's interpretation on the grounds that UCC § 4·201
intended the bank's liability for handling checks to be decided without regard to
the bank's status as agent or owner. In any event, the court did not have to decide
this question because Marine Midland Bank was not a holder in due course. The
court said that the indorsement supplied by Marine Midland Bank was a restric-
tive indorsement that required the bank to deposit the proceeds to the construe·
tion company's account. Payment of the funds in a way inconsistent with this
indorsement, such as transferring the funds to tbe Oklahoma bank, did not
constitute tbe payment of value for the instrument under UCC § 3·206(3) on
restrictive indorsements. Without having given value, Marine Midland Bank
could not be a holder in due course.'"
In Spielman v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust CO.,lU a check was given to a
law firm (Pitney, Hardin & Kipp), which was tbe named payee, to be used as
payment in settling a dispute. The check was indorsed:
Pay to Special Account
# 012·043478
lsi Pitney, Hardin & Kipp
For Deposit Only
Special Account 012·043478

,•• Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Price, Miller, Evans & flowers, 57 NY2d 220, 441
NE2d 1083,455 NYS2d 565 (1982).
'.56 NY2d 221, 456 NE2d 1192.469 NYS2d 69 (1983). The appellate court decision
is reported at 90 AD2d 499, 454 NYS2d 743 (1982). The court distinluisbed the decision
in Underpinning & Found. Constructors v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 NY2d 459, 386
NE2d 1319,414 NYS2d 298 (1979), where the court had held that althouah a forged
indorsement may be effective so that no action would lie against the drawee bank for
improper payment, there may be circumstances in some "comparativ~ly rare instances"
where the conduct by the depository bank would be wrongful and entitle the drawer to
recover from the depository bank even though recovery could not be had from the drawee
bank. Failure to follow a restrictive indorsement could be sucb a cale.
20-33 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.07

An attorney with the fum forged the indorsement ofthe payee's name, deposited
the check in his personal account at the Chemical Bank branch that had the
account number 0 12-043478, withdrew the funds and absconded. He was subse-
quently found dead from a bullet wound in the head. The law firm (the payee)
did not have an account at Chemical Bank. The check was paid by the drawee
bank. The drawer then sued both the drawee bank (Manufacturers Hanover
Trust) and the depository bank (Chemical Bank). Since the forgery of the payee's
agent was effective as the indorsement of the payee under UCC § 3-405, the
drawer could not recover against the drawee, because the check had been effec-
tively negotiated and properly paid. The drawer succeeded in recovering against
the depository bank in the appellate court on the grounds that the check: had
been restrictively indorsed by the payee and the bank was obligated to pay the
instrument in accordance with the restrictive indorsement. The deposit to the
attorney's personal account, even though it had the same number, was not
consistent with the restrictive indorsement because "deposit only" meant the
proceeds had to be credited to an account of the payee. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed, stating that if the name of the attorney had been used in the
indorsement, rather than the account number, the actions ofthe depositary bank
clearly would have been correct. The payee would have indorsed the check to the
attorney, and the attorney would have restrictively indorsed the check: for
deposit to his numbered account. Thus, "[i]fthe account number was sufficient
to identify the transferee and as a signature, the depositary honored the direc-
tions given it and it is not liable to plaintiffs."'" The court decided the deposi-
tory had foHowed the instructions in the indorsement. The bank could have
viewed the check as containing two indorsements ....ith the number identifying
the attorney as the indorsee from the payee firm:
If it is contended that the writing must be considered as two indorsements
and that the special indorsement was not proper because the statute requires
transfer to a "person," as indeed it does, then the answer is that there is no
requirement that the person be identified by name nor any prohibition
against identification by bank account number, title or similar means. That
the account number was used rather than the name of the owner of the
account does not alter the designation when the account is in existence and.
identifiable as belonging to a specific person. Furthermore, there is no
specific requirement of the form of the signature necessary for a valid
indorsement. Once the indorsee was identified by number, the indorsement
could be executed consistent with it. 14'
Or, if the indorsement were viewed as a single indorsement, "both special and
restrictive," to deposit the proceeds to the account indicated, the depository

'46 Spielman v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 6 NYS 221, 223, 456 NE2d 1192,
1194,469 NYS2d 69, 71 (1983).
• 41 Spielman, 6 NY2d at 221, 456 NE2d at 1195, 469 NYS2d at 72.
~ 20.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-34

bank's actions still were reasonable. "[T]here are many instances in which a
family member or a business may indorse for deposit funds to the credit of
another and a depositary is not on notice ofchicanery because ofit noris it liable
if it faithfully follows such a direction...14. In short, when the depository bank
took the check, "its examination of the check disclosed either a negotiation of
the check to its customer by special indonement and then a direction to deposit
the proceeds to his account or a single indorsement, both special and restrictive
to similarly deposit the proceeds.."" If the latter was the case, the bank was not
on notice as to any improper conduct by the direction to deposit the funds to the
account of one other than the named payee.
In Brite Lite Lamps Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,''' the
defendant bank aUowed an employee of the plaintiffto deposit to the employee's
personal account at tbe bank checks made payable to the plaintiff as payee and
indorsed "pay to the order ofManufacturers Hanover Trust Company or pay to
the order of any bank, banker or trust company." The court held that by paying
the proceeds of the check into the employee's personal account, the bank obvi-
ously violated the indorsement on the check.
In Menthor, S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp., '1' the court considered who was
entitled to bring a conversion action under uce § 3-419. The plaintiff, Menthor,
was the transferee of various checks drawn against the Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Bank (MHT) that had been indorsed in blank by various payees to
Menthor. Menthor, in turn, indorsed the checks "for deposit only" and for-
warded them to be deposited in Menthor's account at Swiss Bank. The checks
never were deposited as Menthor intended and instead wound up being pre-
sented on MHT by Banco di Napoli. When the checks arrived at MHT, the
indorsement "for deposit only" was blacked out, leaving only the signature of
Menthor's agent and, below that signature, the signature of a party named
Esteban. Menthor sued MHT for conversion for paying the checks. MHT con-
tended that Menthor was not entitled to recovery in convenion because
Menthor no longer was the holder of the checks, having transferred them to
Swiss Bank for collection. The court rejected this argument, saying that Swiss
Bank was merely Menthor's agent. Menthor remained the beneficial owner of
the instruments and could sue in conversion for violation ofits ownership rights.
In the same case, MHT sued the presenting bank, Banco di Napoli, for
breach of warranty of presentment under uee § 4-207 for breach ofthe warran-
ties ofgood title and no material alteration. The court held MHT was entitled to
recover. Blacking out the restrictive indorsement amounted to an alteration.

'" Id.
mId.
". 34 vce Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1221 (NY Sup. Ct. 1982) (the indorsements are
reslriclive because they are in the fonn "pay any bank." UCC § 3·205(c».
'" 549 F. Supp. 1125 (SONY 1982).
20-35 MUTUAL DunES , 20.07

Because the warranty was absolute, without regard for whether Banco di Napoli
acted reasonably, MHT was entitled to recover. The court also rejected the
argument that Banco di Napoli should be relieved from liability for breach of
these warranties because it no longer possessed any proceeds of the checks.
Although this principle limits the liability of representatives (but not payors) in
uee § 3-419(3) on conversion, it does not apply to actions for breach of
warranty under uee § 4-207, such as this action between MHT and Banco di
Napoli.
A bank that treated the imprint from a rubber address stamp that simply
contained the name and address of the payee as an effective indorsement was
held liable to the payee in Pargas, lru:. v. Estate ofTaylor. t52 The district manager
of the payee diverted checks to his personal account at the bank by indorsing
checks payable to the payee with a rubber address stamp containing the name
and address ofthe payee. The bank did not have a corporate resolution authoriz-
ing the employee to indorse checks on behalfofthe payee. In a suit by the payee's
insurer against the bank, the court held that it would take notice of the fact that
checks payable to a corporation are not normally indorsed in blank by use of a
return address stamp and delivered to third parties. By allowing such proce-
dures, the bank failed to act in a commercially reasonable way and also violated
its internal procedures. Although uee § 3-304(4Xe) provides that notice to the
bank that a person negotiating the instrument is a fiduciary does not give the
bank notice ofa claim against the check, the court held that the bank's failure to
act in a commercially reasonable manner prevented use ofSection 3-304(4)(e) as
a defense. '" The court also took the position that the payee had not ratified its
employee's actions because the payee had no knowledge of the employee's
embezzlement and could not readily discover it in light ofthe employee's control
of the books.
In a North Carolina case, the court held that a company that was the payee
of checks that had been wrongfully diverted by the company's employee to a
separate personal account could not recover from the depository bank that paid
the checks over the restrictive indorsement ofthe company ifthe company could
be viewed as having ratified the actions or its employee. The depository bank
was entitled to raise the company's ratification as a defense to the suit without
having to establish that the bank acted in a commercially reasonable fashion. In
the court's view, uee § 3-404 on ratification does not require the bank to show
it acted with commercial reasonableness. 15<

52
' 416 So. 2d 13S8 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
'''Pargas, Inc. v, Estate of Taylor, 416 So. 2d 13S8 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (note that
VCC § 3-304(4)(e) does not impose any standard ofcommercially reasonable action on a
person dealing with the fiduciary).
150 American Travel Corp. v. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co., S7 NC App. 437,
291 SE2d 892, petition denied, 306 NC SSS, 294 SE2d 369 (1982).
11 20.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-36

In a Georgia case, the court allowed the drawer ofchecks to recover from the
depository bank that had deposited the checks to the benefit of the wrong
person, without requiring properindonementl ofthe checks. Although the court
based its result on a breach of warranty under UCC § 4-207 by the depository
bank, it did not discuss how the drawer ofthe checks could take advantage ofthe
warranties. In placing liability on the depository bank, the court refused to offset
from the damage award an amount that subsequently came to benefit the
drawer, because the benefit was "completely fortuitous" so far as the depository
baole was concerned. Finall}', the court indicated that the depository bank had
made a deliberate business decision not to examine incoming checks and should
consequently bear the risk of the loss it incurred as a result of following this
policy.'u
In PWA Farms. Inc. v. North Plattt State Bank,'H the purchaser of a farm,
DRW, drew a check payable to North Platte State Bank, and sent it to the bank
intending it to be used to pay off a mortgage on the farm as part ofthe purchase.
DRW did not give the bank instructions on how to apply the check. although it
had enclosed a copy ofthe mortgage statement showing the amount due, and the
check had a notation "interest reo PWA Farms." One of the sellers, Williams,
who also had a personal obligation owing to the bank, advised the bank that a
check would be coming to be applied to his note. On receipt of the DRW check,
the bank contacted Williams who instructed the bank to apply it to his personal
note. PWA Farms, the seller, sued the bank for misappropriation and conver-
sion. The court ruled for PWA Farms. "By using a bank's name as the payee of
the check, a drawer is intending to place the proceeds in the bank's custody and
under its control, and nothing may be inferred from the language of the
check. "'51 The bank was not free to use the proceeds as it saw fit. The court
noted:
It is a well established rule that when a check is drawn to the order ofa bank
to which the drawer is not indebted, the bank is authorized to pay the
proceeds only to persons specified by the drawer; it takes the risk in treating
such check as payable to bearer and is placed on inquiry as to the authority
of the drawer's agent to receive payment.'M

Thus, the bank took the risk of the consequences of its action by paying Wil-
liams. The court further held that PWA Farms was entitled to recover as the
assignee of the cause of action that DRW had for conversion. The court said:
(T]he bank was clearly exercising a wrongful act of dominion over the
proceeds ofDRW's check. It is elementary that when a check is drawn to the

'55C. & S. Bank v. Pilco Plantation, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 37, 325 SE2d 426 (1984).
154 PWA Farms, Inc. v. North Platte State Bank, 220 Neb. 516. 371 NW2d 102
(1985).
mId. at 519.371 NW2d at 105.
,sa Id. at 519, 371 NW2d at 105.
20-37 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.08

order of a bank and the drawer gives no specific instructions as to the

disposition of the funds, the bank has no right to pay the proceeds of the
check to a stranger to the transaction.'"

1120.08 CHECKS WITII FORGED OR UNAUTHORIZED

SIGNATURES
Since the bank can payout ofits customer's account only on the order ofthe
person whose name appears on the signature card, it follows that the bank
cannot charge the drawer's account when the drawer's signature has been forged
or used without his or her authority.11G The bank, at its own peril, must know and
recognize its depositor's signature. ll1 When the bank pays an innocent holder for
value of a check upon wlrich the drawer's signature has been forged, it cannot
recover the amount, even from the holder to whom it paid. l11 The UCC makes
payment final when it is made to a holder in due course or other person who has
changed position in reliance on the payments. llt
The UCC follows the rule of Price 1'. Neal, which puts the loss on the bank
when it pays a draft with a forged drawer's signature. 1M Showing how this is so
requires some analysis, however. The UCC sections on warranties made on
presentment and transfer, Sections 3-417 and 4-207, distinguish between war-
ranties made to a person who pays an instrument and warranties made on the

18tld.
IG
' The check is not "properly payable." UCC §§ 3·404,4-401. The person who signs
the instrument will be liable as a drawer, indorser. or other party according to the capacity
in which he or she signed. UCC § 3-404(1). See generally Lechner, Jr., "The Drawer's
Negligence: A Powerful But Underutilized Defense in Forged Checlc Cases," 15 UCCU
2g I (I (83); McDonnell, "Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks: The Oash ofthe Utilita·
rian and Paternalistic Creeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 73 Gee. U 13gg
(I (85); Triantis, "Allocation of Losses From Forged Indorsements on Checks and the
Application of§ 3·405 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 39 Olda. L. Rev. 669 (1986);
Note, "Section 3·405 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Time for a Negligence Stand-
ard?" 37 Ala. L. Rev. 199 (1985).
111 An unauthorized signature is "wholly inoperative," absent ratification or estop-
pel. UCC § 3-404(1 l.
1I2UCC §§ 3-417 & comment 4,3-418,4.207. See Pricev. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng.
Rep. 871 (KB 1762). See generally, Brady on Bank Checks supra note 54, at§ 25.12; White
& Summers, supra note 32, § 16·2.
lIS UCC § 3-418. This changes the pre·UCC rule, which had allowed the bank to
recover for mere negligence on the part ofthe holder. UCC § 3-418, comment 4; see Brady
on Bank Checks, supra note 54, at § 25.12. There is further argumentthatthe bank cannot
recover, even when the person receiving payment is not a holder in due course or has not
acted in reliance. Apart from the requirements of § 3-418, UCC § +301 may make
payment final. See White & Summers, supra note 32, § 16-4.
1" 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (KB 1762). UCC §§ 3-417 and comments, 3-418
comment 2, 4-207 and comments.
, 10.08 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-38

transfer ofan instrument to a transferee or subsequent holder. The presentment

warranties are contained in Sections 3-417(1) and 4-207(1). The transfer warran~
ties are contained in Sections 3-417(2) and 4-207(2). These sections are mutually
exclusive.
When a check is transferred, the transferor warrants to the transferee and to
subsequent collecting banks that on the item "all signatures are genuine or
authorized."'H Therefore, if the check contains a forsed drawer's signature or a
forged indorsement, there is a breach of warranty, and the transferee or subse-
quent collecting bank will have recourse for breach of warranty aaainst the
transferor.
The warranties made to a payor such as a drawee ofa draft or a payor bank
on a check are different from the transfer warranties. There is a warranty that the
person presenting the instrument "has no knowledge that the signature of the
maker or drawer is unauthorized" subject to certain exceptions.,.. This warranty
would not be broken if the person presenting the check for payment did not
know of the forgery. The person presenting the instrument also makes a war-
ranty of "good title to the item" or authority to obtain payment on behalf ofone
who has a good title. ItJ This warranty is broken when there is a forged indorse-
ment that is necessary in order to transfer title to the instrument to the trans-
feree. In such a case, the true owner ofthe instrument will not lose any ownership
rights as a result ofthe transfer because the forged indorsement is ineffective and
so there cannot be a holder in due course on the instrument. When the person in
possession of such an instrument presents it for payment or acceptance, the
warranty of good title is breached because the true owner prior to the forged
indorsement has title to the instrument, not the presenter. When the check
contains only a forged drawer's signature, however, there is no breach of the
warranty ofgood title. The check is not "owned" by the person whose signature
was forged. Rather, it is an instrument of the forger. '11 It can be transferred to
subsequent holders who will obtain rights against the forler on the instrument.
There is no breach of the warranty ofgood title even though the signature of the
person purponing to be the drawer is not genuine. Thus, when there is a forged
drawer's signature, there will be a breach of the warranty made on transfer ofan
instrument to a collecting bank,'I. because of the warranty that signatures are
genuine, but there is no breach ofthe warranties made on presentment to a payor
bank,17O because the warranty that signatures are genuine is not made to a payor
bank.'"

111 vee §§ 3-41 7(2)(b). 4.201(2)(b).

'"I vee §§ 3.417(1)(b), 4.201(J)(b).
111 vee §§ 3.417( I )(a), 4·207(1 )(a).
'''vee § 3·404(1).
"·vee § 4·207(2)(b); see also § 3-417(2)(b).
'10 vee § 4-207( I): see also § 3·417(1).
171 Sec vee §§ 3·417 & comment 4, 4-207 & comment 4.
2()'39 MUTUAL DUTIES 1'120.08

When the forged signature is an indorsement (and not the drawer's signa-
ture) that is a "necessary" indorsement because it is a link in the chain oftitle,1n
the bank cannot charge the drawer's account.m But, in contrast to the forged
drawer's signature, because ofthe operation ofthe transfer warranties, the bank
can recover from the person it paid.174 Payment over a forged indorsement also
constitutes conversion and the payor bank will be liable to the rightful owner of
the check for its amount. 17I
The vee provision on conversion, vee § 3-419, distinguishes between
conversion by a drawee or person who is to pay the instrument and conversion
by a representative such as a depository or collecting bank. The relevant para-
graph states:
Subject to the provisions ofthis Act concerning restrictive indorsements
a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good

1nSee, 15.01 on indonements and nqotiation.

t?3 The item is not "properly payable." uec § 4-40 1. See Taylor v. Equitable Trust
Co., 269 MD 149, 304 A2d 838 (1973); Sumiton Bank v. FundingSys. LcasinICorp., 512
F2d 774 (5th Cir. 1975).
174There is a warranty made by the person obtaining payment that he has "good
title." uec ~§ 3-4 17(I)(a), 3-418, 4-207(1 )(a). Prior indoners also make this warranty.
n,VCC § 3-419(l)(c). See generally Annot., "Bank's 'Reasonable Commercial Stan·
dards' Defense Under UCC § 3-419(3)," 49 ALR4th 888 (1986); Annat., "Payee's Right of
Recovery, in Conversion Under UCC § 3-419(l)(c), for Money Paid on Unauthorized
Indorsement," 23 ALR4th 855 (1983).
An action by the payee ofa check against a bank for failin& to deposit the check to his
account because a former bank officer fOl'led the indorsement and diverted the checks to
his own account was governed by the state's six year statute of limitations, which applied
to conversion actions, rather than the two year statute oflimitations, which applied to tort
actions generally. Vest v. First Nat'l Bank, 659 P2d 1233 (Alaska 1983). In Daube v.
Bruno, 493 So. 2d 606 (La. 1986), in an action for eonversion based on VCC § 3·419, the
court applied the one-year limitations period for tort actions, not the period applicable to
suits'to recover on negotiable instruments.
A depository bank was liable in conversion for allowing one ofseveral joint payees on
a draft to obtain credit for the draft without the indorsement ofthe other joint payees. The
coun reached the result under the general common law of conversion because vec § 3-
419(1) refers only to a forged indorsement and not amissing indorsement. Failure to act in
a commercially reasonable manner deprived the bank of the VCC § 3·419(3) defense.
Great Am. Ins. Cos, v, American State Bank, 385 NW2d 460 (NO 1986). A similar result
was reached when one offourjoint payees on a check forged the indorsements ofthe other
payees and obtained the proceeds. In this case, the unauthorized indorsements were made
in the presence of the bank employee, who testified that he took the indorser's word as to
hi' authority to sign for the other payees. Qark v. Griffin, 481 NE2d 170 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985).
In Crockford v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 132 Misc. 2d 959, 50S NYS2d 525 (Sup. Ct.
1986), a thief stole a government check before the payee received it. The payee obtained a
replacement check from the government and then sued to recover interest from the
depository bank that took the stolen check over a forged indorsement.'The coun held that
the plaintiff had a cause of action based on conversion.
1120.08 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-40

faith and in accordance with tho reasonable commercialltandards applica-

ble to the busincss of such J.'Cpresentative dealt with an instrument or ita
proceeds on behalf of one who was not the trUe owner is not liable in
conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any
proceeds remaining in his hands.' 71

Under this provision, then, a bank othcrthan the payor bank may have a defenn
to an action for conversion for paying a check over a forged indorsemellt. This
defense, under the literal terms of the uecprovision, will exist when the
collecting bank can show the following. Firstly, the bank must have acted "in
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards" appli-
cable to the bank's handling afthe item. Secondly, the defense is available only
to the extent that the conversion claim is for an amount "beyond the amount of
any proceeds remaining in his [tbe bank's] bands." Because the section is
expressly subject to the provisions on restrictive indorsements, the defense will
not be available to a depository bank that pays a check in a manner contrary to
the terms ofa restrictive indorsement. The effect of the section, if implemented
fully, would be to preserve a cause of action in conversion against the payor of
the instrument, but to provide a defense to collecting banks, including deposi-
tory banks, who in good faith payout the proceeds of an instrument under
circumstances where a conversion claim might exist.
uee § 3-419 docs not expressly state that a cause of action in conversion
exists against one other than a payor or drawee. But the presence of the defense
in UCC § 3-419(3) strongly implies that the ueeacknowledges the existence of
such a cause ofaction either by implication from U ee
§ 3-419 or as a matter of
general common law rules that have not been disturbed theby uec.
m The
UCC's Section 3·419(3) defense has encountered resistance in the courts. Often,
the depository bank may be the most convenient target for a conversion action
involving checks with forged indorsements because the payor banks may be
located in distant cities and there may be multiple payor banks involved in a
given forgery case, although the bulk ofthe forged instruments may be deposited
or collected through one or a few depository banks. As a result, some decisions
have strained the express language oftbe provision to find that there were funds
remaining in the hands of the depository bank. 11I

mVCC § 3419(3).
177 See VCC § 1-103.
"'See Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 311, 501 P2d 609,101 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1913);
Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 3 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 311 (Pa. Ct. CP 1965).
Contra, Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 91 NJ 1,477 A2d 806 (1984). See also
Hydraflo Corp. v. First Nafl Bank, 217 Neb. 20, 349 NW2d 615 (1984), where the court
held that the good faith and reasonableness of the action of the depository bank were for
the jury to decide when the bank accepted a check. payable to a corporation for deposit to
an individual account.
20-41 MUTUAL DUTIES 120.08

The uee provision makes any "unauthorized" signature, not just forgeries,
invalid.17t The person whose name is signed can ratify the signature or be
estopped from denying it. lID Furthermore, the authority to sign may be implied
or apparent."1 Where, after a dissolution ofa law partnership by the withdrawal
ofone partner the old account was kept open by the continuing partners, and a
check drawn in favor of the withdrawn partner and a continuing partner was
indorsed with a rubber stamp, in accordance with the old practice, for deposit in
the old account, the court held that the bank had acted properly in accepting the
deposit and later permitting its withdrawal by the continuing partners, since the
indorsement could be made by an agent having actual, implied, or apparent
authority and since the withdrawing partner had not put the bank on notice of
any change in the practice.m Ratification will make the signature effective, but a
joint payee, whose indorsement is forged by the copayee, could not be held to
have ratified the indorsements where it was found he had not been aware of the
forgeries. 11S The affirmance required to create a ratification ofan unauthorized
signature may arise from conduct that can be rationally explained only ifthere
were an election to treat a supposedly unauthorized act as, in fact, authorized. 114
The forgery need not be on the instrument itself. When a savings bank
grants withdrawal payments to a person who does not represent himself as the

mUCC § 3-404(1). A signature by an alent that is in excess of his authority has been
held to be an unauthorized signature. Pine BluffNat'1 Bank v. Kesterson, 2S7 Ark. 813,
520 SW2d 253 (1975). See Krieg, "The Missina Signature as an Unauthorized Sianature
of the Customer: The Debate Continues," 103 BaRkinl U S42 (1986). Annot., "Bank's
Liability for Payment or Withdrawal on Less Than Required Number of Signatures," 7
ALR4th 655 (1981).
110 UCC § 3-404(I). See generally Annot., "What Constitutes Ratification of Unau-
thorized Signature Under U.C.C. § 3·404," 93 ALR3d 967 (1979). Although ratification
may oc.cur as a result of conduct that can be explained only as an election to treat the
signature as authorized, "ratification requires intent to ratify plus full knowledge of tbe
material facts." Bank of Hoven v. Rauscb, 382 NW2d 39, 41 (SD 1986). There may be
cases where a party has not ratified a signature. but the party is precluded from claiming
the signature was not authorized because failing to give effect to this sianature would be
inequitable or unconscionable. No ratification was found where the defendant had signed
an original promissory note but that note was cancelled and the defendant's son signed the
defendant's name to a subsequent note at a higher interest rate. The court found that the
second note was not a renewal note and that the defendant did nothing to affirm any prior
act that. absent ratification, would not otherwise have been binding upon him. Id. at
42-43.
111 See UCC §§ 1.201(43), 3-404, comment I; Equipment Distrib. Inc. v. Charter Oak
Bank & Trust Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 606, 379 A2d 682 (977).
lIS Keane v. Pan Am. Bank, 309 So. 2d 579 (Fla. App. 1975). The court cited Section
3·419(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code. holding that the bank had acted with com-
mercial rea50nableness in making the check payable to two firm members on the indorse-
ment of the dissolved firm. .
lU United Bank v. Mesa N.O. Nelson Co., 121 Ariz. 438. S90 P2d 1384 (1979).
"'Fulka v. Florida Comm'l Banks, Inc., 371 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
'20.08 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-42

depositor and who obtains payment upon the strength of an order purported to
be signed by the depositor, the bank may not charge the amount of the check
against the account ofthe person whose name is forged.'1S
When a bank pays a cbeck where both the drawer's signature and the payee's
signature are forged, the uee loss allocation rules are inconsistent. The forged
indorsement creates a breach oftbe presentment warranty of good title, which
allows the bank to recover from the presenter; the forged drawer's signature
creates no breach of any presentment warranty. thus requiring tbe bank to
absorb the loss. The uee fails to say which rule should apply. Some cases regard
the forgery of the drawer's signature as the critical factor in allocating loss, and
place the loss on the payor bank on the grounds that the fmality policy ofSection
3-418 of the uee should apply. liS
What constitutes a forgery is important for the purposes of bond coverage.
A "counterfeit" check has been held equivalent to a "forged" check, within the
meaning of the coverage term of a "discovery blanket bond" that referred to
"forgery or alteration of any instrument." In tbis instance, tbe insured. a credit
union, had arranged with its bank to pay checks impressed with facsimile
signatures made by a check.writing machine in the cn:dit union's possession.
The bank paid a number of checks printed on paper different from that of the
checks of the credit union and imprinted with a check-writing machine that
impressed a facsimile signature "nearly identical" to that used on the credit
union's own checks. The credit union was held as entitled to recover from the
insurance company under the blanket bond. 117

111 Maddox v. Fint Westroads Bank, 199 Neb. 81, 256 NW2d 647 (1977).
,uPerini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Baker, "The
Perini ease: Double Forgery Revisited (Part I)," 10 UCCU 309 (1978). The Perini case
was followed in Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414 (ED Pa. 1981). In a
double forgery case, the drawee bank is viewed as having spent its own money when it
honon a check with a forged drawer's signature. Consequently, the drawee bank cannot be
held liable in conversion for paying on a forged indorsement. Another court followed the
same liability rule, placing the loss on the payor bank in a case in which the instrument
contained both a forged drawer's signature and a missing indorsement of the named
payee. National Credit Union Admin. v. Michigan Na!'1 Bank, 771 F2d 154 (6th Cir.
1985). Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National aty Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,503 NE2d 524
(1986) reb'g en bane on other grounds 31 Ohio St. 3d 150, 509 NE2d 945 (1987), followed
the Perini case in holding that a double-forgery case should be treated as a forged drawer's
signature situation. In this case, the endorsements were effective, since they were made by
an employee who procured checks intending the payees to have no interest.
'''MBTA Employees Credit Union v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 374 F.
Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1974). As to kinds oflosses which are covered by a banker's blanket
bond, sec Annot., "What Are 'Securities, Documents or Other Written Instruments'
Within Terms of Banken' Blanket Bond Insuring Loues From Counterfeitina: or For-
gery," 38 ALR3d 1437 (1971).
20-43 MUTIJAL DUTIES 1120.08(21

[IJ .Breach of Wammty by Customer Obtaining Payment of Check

With Forged Indorsement
A bank that pays a check containing a forged indorsement is entitled to
recover the amount it has paid from the prior collecting banks or customer who
obtained payment ofthe check. The basis for the payor bank's recovery is breach
ofwarranty. Every customer or collecting bank who obtains payment ofa check
makes a warranty to the payor bank ofhaving a good title to the check or ofbeing
authorized to obtain payment on behalf of someone who has good title to the
check. When the collecting bank obtains payment of a check that has a forged
necessary indorsement, the bank cannot claim to have good title. The rightful
owner of the check whose indorsement has been forged has title.,.. Similar
warranties are made by those who are not banks but who obtain payment of a
negotiable instrument. In (See also the discussion earlier in this section explain-
ing the difference between the presentment warranties and the transfer
warranties.)
A bank sued for breach ofwarranty by the payor bank can raise as a defense
that the payor bank unreasonably delayed giving notice of its claim. If the bank
can demonstrate that it suffered loss as a result of the payor bank's delay in
giving notice of the forgery, it will be relieved from liability to the extent of the
loss caused by the delay.'1G In Home Indemnity Co. v. First National Bank, 1., the
court held that a payor bank on an insurance draft unreasonably delayed giving
notice to the depository bank that accepted'the check with the forged indorse-
ment. Because of the payor bank's delay in giving notice, the depository bank
allowed the forger to withdraw the proceeds of the check and disappear.

[2] Conversion of Check When Bank Pays Over a Forged Indorsement

When a bank pays a check over a forged indorsement, the bank will be liable
in conversion to the rightful owner ofthe check.'" This liability for conversion is

,"VCC ~ 4-207(1)(a).
1t. VCC ~ 4-207( I lea) provides that any person who obtains payment (and any prior
transferor ofthe instrument) makes a warranty to the payor ofthe instrument that he has a
good title or is authorized to obtain payment on behalf of someone who has a good title to
the instrument. See also VCC § 3-404(1).
IIGVCC ~ 4-207(4). The South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized an equitable
defense to the payor bank's action for breach of warranty against a collecting bank that
had obtained payment of a check with a forged indorsement. In this case, the proceeds of
the check reached the intended payee. The court held that the payor bank could not
recover for breach of warranty because it could not show that it had suffered damage as a
result of the forgery. Bankers Trust v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 284 SC 238, 325 SE2d
81 (Ct. App. 1985).
111 659 F2d 796 (7th Cir. 198 I).
lI2UCC § 3-4 I9(I)(c). Section 3-419(1)(c) gives aeause ofaetion in conversion to the
"true owner" of the check. One court held that a payee who had never received physical
; 20.08[2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-44

not limited to forgeries, but also includes unauthorized indorsements.111 These

principles were reaffumed in Aetna Casualty & Sur. CO. Y. Hepler State Bank.1M
The payee company relied upon an employee to collect checks owed to the finn.
The employee, without authority, used a signature stamp ofthe rum
to indorse
the checks and obtain payment. The court held that the bank at which the
employee deposited the checks was liable in conversion to the payee company.1N

possession ofthe check and who could not be reprded &I having had constructive delivery
ofthe instrument was not the "true owner" ofthe check for purposes ofsuit under Section
3-419. The payee would not be without a remedy, however. The payee could still enforce
the underlyina obligation for which the checks originally were issued. Lincoln Nat'l Bank
&. Trust Co. v. Bank of Commerc:e, 764 F2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
111 See Aetna Casualty &Sur. Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 6 Kan. App. 2d 543, 630 P2d
721 (1981). Accord D&.G Equip. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 764 F2d 950 (3d Cir. 1985).
1M 6 Kan. App. 2d 543, 630 P2d 721 (1981).

Its Although the court relied on UCC § 3-419(1}(c), this section establishes conver-
sion liability for payors. It is not clear from the facts that the defendant bank was the payor
bank as well as the depository bank. liit was not the payor bank, then it would not be liable
for conversion under Section 3-419(1}(c), but a similar conversion liability could be
implied under Section 3-419(3). Section 3-419(3) offers the non-payor bank defenses
which are not available to payor banks under Section 3·419( I), however. See also Top
Crop Seed &. Supply Co. v. BanlcofSouthwllIt La., 457 So. 2d 273 (La. Ct. App.1984). The
court held that VCC § 3-419 changed prior law and permitted a payee to bring a direct
cause ofaction for conversion against a depository bank. The court also noted that Section
3-419(3) contained a defense for certain representatives who no longer retained funds
attributable to the converted instrument. However, the court declined to rule on the
extent to which such a defense might be available and noted that the defense had been
restricted in other jurisdictions. There is an extensive and arowing case law on the
circumstances under which the depository bank and collecting banks are entitled to take
advantage of the UCC § 3-419(3) defense to an action for conversion. A depository bank
had a defense to conversion under VCC § 3-419(3), where the forger withdrew the funds
and the bank had no knowledge that the signature of the payee was a fof'ICry. The court
extensively canvassed the case law on the liability ofdepository banks for conversion and
concluded the drafters intended to create a defense although the depository bank might
ultimately bear the loss because of the warranties it made to the payor bank. Moore v.
Richmond Hill Sav. Bank. 117 AD2d 27, 502 NYS2d 202 (1986).
The UCC scheme for allocating risk through the transfer and presentment warranties
was circumvented in Great Am. Ins. Cos. v. American State Bank, 385 NW2d 460 (ND
1986), which involved an insurance draft where Great American was both the drawer and
the drawee. Great American paid the draft over a missing indorsement ofone of two joint
payees. IfGreat American had sued for breach ofwarranty, the defendant depositary bank
would have a defense based upon delay in notifying the defendant bank ~f its claim.
Instead ofpursuing a breach ofwarranty theory, Great American took an assignment from
the payee of its rights to the draft and sued in conversion. The court permitted Great
American to maintain the conversion action but allowed the defendant to assert the
defense of unreasonable delay in notification of the breach of warranty under UCC § 4-
207(4). Because the drawer and the drawee were the same company. the court further
ruled that the drawee had an obligation to notice that there was a missing indorsement ofa
joint payee; the time when Great American learned of the missing indorsement for the
2Q-4S MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.08(3)

The bank defended the conversion suit on the grounds that the payee fum
should be precluded from asserting the indorsement was not authorized because
it was negligent in entrusting its checks to the employee. The court held that
there need be no inquiry into the negligence ofthe payee because the bank could
not raise this defense if it failed to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards. In the court's view, permitting an individual
to cash a check made payable to a corporate payee "is an unreasonable commer-
Cial banking practice as a matter of a law. "'II

[3] Customer NegUgence as Defense to Bank's Payment of Check With

Unauthorized Sipature or Alteration
A bank may be able to escape liability for paying a check over a forged or
unauthorized signature if it can establish negligence or other breach of duty to
the bank by the person who claims injury as a result of the bank's action. The

purpose ofdetermining the availability ofthe defense of delay should run from the time it
approved payment of the draft. .
'II 630 P2d at 728. Under UCC § 3-419(3), a collectins bank's liability for conversion
when it pays over a fOl'l!ed indorsement is limited to the proceeds it has on hand as long as
the bank acts in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. In Coulter Elea., Inc.
v. Commercial Bank, 727 F2d 1078 (11th Cir. 1984), an employee ofCoulter Electronics,
Inc. opened an account with the bank in the name of"Coulter Electronics" and deposited
company checks to the account. The company claimed the bank could not raise Section 3·
419(3) as a defense because it was commercially unreasonable as a matter of law for the
bank to deposit checks payable to "Coulter Electronics, Inc." to a sole proprietor account
in the name of"Coulter Electronics." Finding that the variance between the name of the
payee and tbe indorsement wasso small that it did not impose an Db/iption liS a mailer of
law on the bank to make further inquiry, the court held the bank's action was not
commercially unreasonable.
A bank was liable for conversion when it permitted a fonner corporate officer to
deposit ·checks payable to the corporation into the officer's personal account at the bank.
The bank had notice that the officer lacked authority to sill1 checks for the corporation,
since the corporation had given the bank a new signature card and COI'porate resolution
that did not authorize the former officer to act on behalfofthe corporation. The court held
further that the bank could not raise the defense of acting in a commercially reasonable
manner under Section 3-419(1)(c) because "the failure of a bank to inquire when an
individual presents a check made payable to a corporate payee for deposit to his personal
account is deemed an unreasonable commercial banking practice as a matter of law."
D&G Equip. Co., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 764 F2d 950 (3d Cir. 1985). In Lincoln Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank ofCommerce, 764 F2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985), the court also found
that a bank acted unreasonably in permitting a check that had been made payable to a
corporation to be deposited into a personal account.
A bank did not follow reasonable commercial standards when it failed to require
proper identification on opening of a new checking account and, further, allowed the
signature card for the account to be taken from the bank for signature by other parties.
River Parish Servs., Inc. v. Goodhope Refineries, 457 So. 2d 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 462 So. 2d 650 (La. 1985).
, 20.08[3] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-46

UCC gives the bank two possible defenses. The ftrst arises when the customer of
the bank breaches his duty to examine his monthly statement and report forger-
ies and alterations to the bank. (This defense is discussed later in this chapter.)
The second defense is based upon the negligence oftbe claimant. Under UCC
§ 3-406, when the claimant's own negligence "substantially contributes" to the
making of the alteration or unauthorized signature, the claimant is estopped
from asserting a claim based upon the alteration or unauthorized signature
against the bank. This defense is available only to a holder in due course or a
person who has paid the instrument "in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards" of the payor's business. lIT
The UCC docs not define what negligence will be regarded as substantially
contributing to an alteration or an unauthorized signature. That determination

lIT UCC § 3-406. In Confederated Welding & Safety Supply, Inc. v. Bank ofthe Mid-
South, 458 So. 2d 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1984), cel1. denied, 462 So. 2d 1264 (La. 1985), the
court held that a bank had acted unreasonably by not asking to see a corporate reSOlution
identifying those authorized to indorse checks when the president of the corporation
deposited corporate checks to his personal account. In this case, the corporation did not
maintain an account with the bank:. In another case, the court held that althouah the
corporate resolution authorized the president of the company to indorse checlcs for
deposit to corporate accounts, the president had no authority to deposit checks to his
personal account. There could be no implied authority or appearance of authority,
because any appearance ofauthority the president had to conduct the business as he saw
fit was based solely upon appearances created by the president himself. The court said
further, "[I]t is well established that the mere fact that an employee has managerial status
and is in charge of the company's office does not entitle third persons to assume that he
had the authority to execute or indorse negotiable paper belonging to his employer." 458
So. 2d at 1315.
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that Section 9 ofthe Uniform Partnership Act
confers the powers on one partner to indorse checks of the partnership that are payable to
other partners. Grosbergv. Michigan Nat'l Bank:, 420 Mich. 101, 362 NW2d 715 (1984).
Because the UCC has carefully balanced the interests of the parties and allocates loss
depending upon the applicability of the various sections that deal with customer negli.
gence and bank commercial reasonableness, it is not appropriate to apply general princi-
ples of comparative fault to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties. Five
Towns College v. Citibank, 108 AD2d 420, 489 NYS2d 338 (985).
In Fidelity Bank: v. United Nat'l Bank, 630 F. Supp. 16 (DOC 1985), Fidelity drew a
check: on itself that was taken by United with a forged payee's indorsement and then paid
by Fidelity. The court ruled that Fidelity's negligence in handling the transaction barred it
under UCC § 3-406 from asserting against United that the check had been paid over a
forged indorsement. The court assumed Section 3-406 was applicable without discussing
whether United was a "payor" covered by Section 3·406. Ed Slinn Chevrolet, Inc. v.
National City Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221,503 NE2d 524, reh'gen bancon other grounds, 31
Ohio 5t. 3d 150, 590 NE2d 945 (1987), rejected a trial court's use Qf comparative
negligence to allocate liability in a forged check case.
See 11 16.01[3] for a discussion ofgood failh. A related defense, discussed at' 20.06[3],
is that based upon the UCC impostor rule in UCC § 3-405.
20-47 MUTUAL DUTIES '1120.0813)

is left for the court or jury.,. Examples are given in the comments to the uee,
however. They include leaving blank spaces in the instrument so that words or
flgUre5 may easily be inserted, lack: of care in safeguarding signature stamps or
automatic signing devices, negligently mailing a check: to the wrong person
having the same name as the payee, and failing to take steps to prevent addi-
tional forgeries by the same person after having received notice of a prior
forgery. In
A repeatedly litigated issue is the extent ofan employer's responsibility for
supervising an employee who forges the signature of the employer. In Commer-
cial Credit Equipment Corp. v. First A/aba1tUZ Bank, 200 the court held that a
corporation could not recover from a bank that paid checks forged by an
employee when the corporation had failed to make a proper background check.
which would have revealed prior fraudulent acts by the person before the person
was hired, and also had failed to safeguard the corporation's blank checks and
check embossing equipment. An employer also may be found neglijent for
failing to establish business procedures to oversee the activities ofits employees
or by failing to follow its own procedures for controlling the actions of its
employees. 201
When an employee pads the employer's payroll by arranging for the
employer's checks to be issued to payees named by the employee and the
employee intends to divert payment for his own purposes, the uec
prevents the
employer from claiming that the employee's indorsement of the checks was
unauthorized. 202 The VCC's theory is that this loss should fall upon the employer
as a risk ofhis business rather than upon the subsequent party who has taken or
paid the instrument. This result is reached under uec
§ 3-405, the sG-Called
impostor rule, and does not require proof of negligence as such. The drafters of
the vee regarded the employeras in a better position to prevent the forgeries by
exercising "reasonable care in the selection or supervision of his employees" or

I.' See VCC ~ 3-406, comment 3. Five Towns Colle&e v. Citibank, 108 AD2d 420,489
NYS2d 338 (I 985) (issues offaet for thejury to decide were whether a customer's delay in
notifying the bank of forged signatures constituted negli&ence, whetber the bank failed to
exercise reasonable care when it did not attempt to verify signatures on checks, !lnd
whether bank policy regardin& signature verification was commercially reasonable).
'"vce § 3-405, comments 3, 7.
200 636 F2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981).

201 See Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. First Ala. Bank, 636 F2d 1051 (5th Cir.
1981); Ashley-Hall Interiors, Ltd. v. Bank of New Orleans, 389 So. 2d 850 (La. Ct. App.
1980); Thompson Maple Prods., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, j 11 Pa. Super. 42, 234 A2d
32 (1967). A court found that giving the same person responsibility for both possessing the
checkbook and reconciling bank statements, while failing to supervise the employee and
controlling a signature stamp, was negligence as a malter of law. Read .v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank. 286 SC 534, 335 SE2d 359 (SC 1985).
202 VCC § 3-405(1 )(c).
11 20.08[31 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-48

at least "in a better position to cover the loss by fidelity insurance. "lOa This
provision applies only when an employee supplies the employer with the name
of the payee with the intention that the payee will not have any interest in the
check.2G4 The philosophy ofenterprise responsibility that this provision reflects,

ttl uee § 3-405, comment 4.

2G4 vee § 3-405(I)(c). Ordinarily a forged indorsement is not effective as an indorse-
ment and payment by the payor bank over such a forgery is improper. The drawer ofthe
check is entitled to recover apinst the bank. However, when an employee engages in
fraudulent conduct by submitting names of payees to his employer, intending that the
payees would not receive anyinterest from the checks, the uee holds the employer
responsible for the conduct of its employee and reprds the indonement, although a
forgery, effective for purposes of allocating liability. It makes no difference under this
role, vee § 3-405(a)(l), that tbe payees were actual customers. In this case, the suit was
brought by the drawee: bank, who was also the payor bank on a cashier's check that had
been intercepted by the drawee bank's employee and deposited with a collecting bank,
First City Bank. The coun held that there was no cause of action against First City Bank
for breach of warranty in presenting the check for payment because tbe effect of the
faithless employee provisions in vee § 3-405 meant that tbe warranty of title was not
violated. Moreover, the drawee had no action under common law theories ofnegligence or
conversion, because the payment made on the check to First City Bank was final. uee § 3·
418. Although First City Bank indorsed the check in a manner that stated that the prior
indorsements were guaranteed, the COUI t held that this indorsement did not enlarge upon
the principles in the vee reaardlng warranties made between banks. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. First City Bank, 675 SW2d 316 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
One court held that when a bank I\d~ncuthe flctitious payee defense under vee
§ 3-405, the indorsements on the checks must be "exactly the same as the named payees."
Thus, the coun refused to recognize the defense where the indorsement varied from the
name on the check, although the variations were minor in nature. Consolidation Pub.
Water Supply Dist. No. C·l v. Farmer's Bank, 686 SW2d 844 (Mo. App. 1985). A bank
must act in good faith in order to obtain the advantage of the fictitious payee defense. The
standard for the bank's good faith, however, is that of honesty in fact, as provided in VCC
§ 1·201( 19). This is a subjective standard. Therefore, unlike vec § 3·406, which requires
the bank to observe reasonable commercial standards, the fictitious payee defense of
VCC § 3·405 docs not require the bank to observe objective reasonable commercial
standards. Consolidated Pub. Waler Supply Dist. No. C·I v. Farmer's Bank, 686 SW2d
844 (Mo. App. 1985). But see E.F. Hutton &. Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 149 Cal. App. 3d 60,
65, 196 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1983).
When the fictitious payee rule applies, the indorsement ofthe unfaithful employee in
the name of the employer is effective as the employer's indorsement. The drawer of the
check cannot claim that there was no proper negotiation, and the drawer does not have a
cause of action against the collecting bank for negotiating the check. Funhermore, when
the collecting bank sends the check on for payment, there is no breach of the warranty of
genuineness of the indorsements on the part of the collecting bank because the indorse·
menl is good. In a case in which the collectin& bank acted negligently in allowing the
employee to obtain the proceeds ofthe check, the coun held that the collecting bank could
assen the fictitious payee defense of VCC § 3·405 and would not be liable for negligence.
Although the bank has an obligation to act in good faith under vec §·1·203, the coun
concluded this was a standard of"honcsty in fact" and not of commercial reasonableness.
The coun declined to superimpose a negligence standard on the good faith requirement in
20-49 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.08[4]

however, could be relevant in other situations in which the reasonableness ofthe

employer's conduct under UCC § 3-406 is in question.
A signature by one who has authority to act as an agent for the person whose
name is signed does not constitute a forged or unauthorized signature. Accord-
ingly, a depository bank: could not sue its customer for breach ofthe warranty of
title when the customer obtained payment ofa check that was payable to a third
party who had authorized her to obtain payment. 201 Proofofauthority to obtain
payment can be made in accordance with the general laws ofagency and requires
no special showing. 201

[4] Bank's Improper Payment of Check as Cause of Customer Loss

A bank: will have a defense to paying a check over a forged indorsement ifit
can show the proceeds were applied to the intended obligation of the checlc. One
court has ruled, however, that this defense will not be available where the
proceeds of the check were not applied to the obligation for which the check was
issued even though the proceeds may have been received by the payee for
payment on a different account.-
When a check is paid over a forged indorsement, the proceeds may be
recovered even when they come into the hands of one other than the forger.
Although the person receiving the funds may neither have breached any war·

vee §§ 1·201 (19) and 1·203 for the purposes of interpreting the availability of tbe
fictitious payee defense in vec § 3-405. City of Phoenix v. Great W. Bank & Trust, 148
Ariz. 53, 712 P2d 966 (Ct. App. 1985).
For further discussion of VCC § 3-405, see 1 20.06[3].
205 First Nat'l Bank v. Nunn, 628 P2d 1110 (Mont. 1981).

101 Id.
207 Sherrill White Constr., Inc. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 713 F2d 1047 (4th Cir.
1983). In D&G Equip. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 764 F2d 950 (3d Cir. 1985), the court
rejected the bank's defense of mitigation of damages based on an argument that tbe
corporation, whose indorsement was unauthorized, had obtained the benefit ofthe funds.
In the court's view, the mitigation defense required the bank to show that payment was
made to the parties that the corporation would have specifically designated. A customer
had no damages for improper payment of checks when proceeds of forged checks were
deposited back to the customer's bank account. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City
Bank, 28 Ohio St. 3d 221, 503 NE2d 524 (1986). But as the forged checks were a device
used by an employee of the customer's to cover thefts of cash from the customer, these
losses might be recoverable damages. The court remanded the case to determine whether
they could be classed as consequential damages and, if so, the customer could recover
them because of the bank's bad faith as provided in VCC § 4-103(5) or because the
damages were within the contemplation of the parties under Hadley v. Baxendale. On
rehearing, however, the Ohio Supreme Court held that appellees may not recover conse·
quential damages, concluding that as a matteroflaw there was insufficient showing ofbad
faith. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National City Bank, 31 Ohio St. 3d ISO, 509 NE2d 945
(1987).
'20.09 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-S0

ranty with respect to the check, nor have perpetrated a fraud on the owner ofthe
check the rightful owner may be able to recover the proceeds that have been
. conv;rted. In A.~/o.r 1'. First InterstIJte Bank, 201 the court described the rule of
liability as follows:
It needs no citation of authority to support the proposition that when a
person has stolen, embezzled or misappropriated another's property, the
injured party should be restored to the possession of his property or its
equivalent so long as it has not passed into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser without notice.-
In a suit for conversion against a depository or collecting bank under UCC
§ 3-419(c), the banks have a defense ifthey acted in good faith and in accordance
with reasonable commercial standards and no longer have any proceeds remain-
ing in their hands. In a Texas case, a bookkeeper diverted checks that came to her
employer by indorsing the company's name and depositing them to her personal
account. The company sued her bank (the depository bank) for conversion.
Because the bookkeeper had withdrawn the funds from her account, the bank
had a defense ifit could establish its good faith. The company claimed the bank
lacked good faith because it had failed to verify the indorsement of the firm,
which was the payee on the checks, when it accepted the checks for deposit to its
customer's personal account. The court found sufficient evidence of the bank's
good faith and nothing irregular about the checks to require the bank to depart
from its normal practice of not verifying indorsements of payees of checks
submitted for deposit.I'o

~ 20.09 ALTERAnON
When the drawer's signature is genuine but other parts of the check have
been altered, either by filling in blanks or changing material provisions of an
already completed cheek (such as the amount or, in the case of notes, the rate of
interest) the situation is treated, under the UCC, as an alteration. 11t

.... Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P2d 712 (Utah 1983).
201 Angelos, 671 P2d at 778. The coun also held that the doctrine of "avoidable
consequences" or mitigation of damages did not operate to prevent the owner of the
instrument from claiming damages as a result of the forgery when the embezzlement
consisted ofa series of wrongful acts rather than one continuous act because the doctrine
did not require one to take steps in advance to avoid the con~uence of a future
threatened wro~g. Also, t~e doctrine would not apply where the bank was in as good a~ if
not better po5mon to aVOid the damages than the owner of the instrument.
210 Steven-Daniels Corp. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 673 SW2d 651 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
... uce § 3-401. See generally Annot., "What Constitutes 'FraudUlent and Material'
Alteration of Negotiable Instrument Under uec § 3-407(2)(a)," 88 ALR3d 90S (1978).
'-0-51 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.09

Alterations can be authorized by the drawer or maker of the paper or they

can be made without consent. When the drawer authorizes a holder to fill in
blanks or change some term in the paper, there is no problem. The holder may
enforce the instrument according to the authority given to bim.21l The bank on
which such a check is drawn may pay it and may chariC the account of the
drawer. ltl (The rules for unauthorized alterations are discussed in the next two
subsections.) A drawer or m,aker of an instrument may be precluded from
challenging an alteration that is due to negligence on his part, or where there is
subsequent ratification, or where there is any other ground for estoppell ••
An instrument that is incomplete or bears visible signs of alteration so as to
"call into question its validity, terms or ownership" gives notice to anyone who
takes the instrument that there is a defense or claim to it.l ' s This prevents the
person who takes it from qualifying as a holder in due course.

The vee rules have been used to help define the crime offo!'&ery. See State v. Rovin, 21
Am. App. 260, 518 P2d 579 (1974).
212 vee § 3-407(3). Under UCC § 3-407, an alteration would be neither material nor
fraudulent if done with the consent ofthe parties concerned. See American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Straughan, 248 So. 2d 73 (La. Ct. App. 1971); See Brady on Bank Checks, supra
note 54, at § 24.3. In In re Estate ofNorris, 532 P2d 981 (Colo. App. 1974), a man who was
in a hospital and terminally ill signed a check in blank and did not otherwise fill it in
except to insert the figures "3,300" after the word "for" in the lower left-hand comer. He
gave the check to a friend who was visiting him and asked the friend to give it to his (the
signer's) sister. The check was fl1led in for $3,300. The sister then deposited the check, but
it was not paid because the signer had died in the meantime. In a claim by the sister against
the signer's estate, the court held that the presumption that the check had been properly
completed had not been overcome, as there was no evidence regarding the amount to be
filled in except the cryptic "3,300" in the lower left-hand comer of the instrument. The
court cited Section 3-115 of the UCC as supporting its holding. The court also observed
that the payor bank was not liable to the payee where the drawer was deceased and,
furthermore, stated that the drawer's estate had not met the burden of showing lack of
consideration for the check.
When a bank believed that it had authority to change the interest rate on a promissory
note by increasing it, the alteration was not fraudulent and the maker of the note was not
discharged from liability on it. Because the maker of the note consented to the alteration,
the bank could enforce the note for the altered amount. The change made in the note was
final, and the bank could not elect to enforce the original agreement, rather than the note
as changed. As a result, the maker had a defense to payment ofthe note because the altered
note violated state usury laws. Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 368 NW2d 913 (Minn.
1985).
213 UCC § 4-40 I.
m See UCC §§ 3-406,4-406. See generally Annot., "Commercial Paper: Whal
Amounts 10 'Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized Signature' Under
UCC § 3.406," 67 ALR3d 144 (1975). .
l'$UCC § 3-304(I)(a).
, 20.09(1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-52

(1) Altered Cheeks That Were Complete When Signed

Where a check is complete when signed but is subsequently altered, such
alteration by the holder dischlU)es any party whose contract is thereby cbanaed,
imlcss that party assents or is precluded from asserting the defense. til However,
the bank paying such an instrument in good faith may recover from the drawer
the amount originally specified on the check. For example, ifa check originally
calling for $100 has been raised to $1,000 and been paid in good faith, the bank
may charge the drawer's account only $100." 7 In cases in which a bank pays an
altered check, the bank may have recourse upon the persons to whom it paid for
the amount ofthe loss under the uee warranty sections.a.. Both presenters and
transferors warrant that the item has not been materially altered.
An alteration is a material alteration under the uee when it changes the
contract of a party to the instrument. all Material alterations includc a change in
the number of the parties to the instrument, additions or deletions to the
instrument, and unauthorized completion ofblank instruments. In St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance Co. v. State Bank,1tO the court held that an alteration to the
amount ofthe check was not material because the words ofthe check describing
the amount controlled the fisures placed on the check,m and only the figures
were altered.
Alteration ofa check in any material respect by a holder voids thc check so
far as the drawer is concerned, and it releases the drawer from the obligation to
pay unless the item comes into the hands of a holder in due course. A holder in
due course can enforce the check according to its original terms. 222 Under the
uce, the alteration must be fraudulent and material in order for the drawer and
any other party to the check whose contract is changed to be discharged from
liability; otherwise, the bank can enforce the check according to its original
provisions. U3
Notations in the margins of checks, indicating the amount when the hand.
writing is doubtful or noting part payments, are not material alterations within
this rule because they do not change the contract of the parties who have signed
the check and would not be fraudulent changes. They have no effect whatever
upon the instrument. 22'

216 uec § 3-407(2).

m uec § 4.401(2Xa).
"'uec §§ 4-207, 3-417.
2It uec § 3-407(1).
22G 412NE2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
221 uec § 3-118.

"'uec § 3-407(3). Visible alterations may prevent the holder from qualifying as a
holder in due course. uee § 3·304(1 )(a).
l2'uee § 3-407 & comment.
m uee § 3-407(2Xb).
20-53 MlITUAL DUTIES 1120.09111

Negligence in completing a check that makes it easy to alter precludes the

drawer from challenging the alteration. But the bank that pays such a check must
act in "good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards"
of the payor's business.- The UCC provides in § 3-406 that:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration ofthe instrument or to the making ofan unauthorized signature is
precluded from asserting the alteration or lack ofauthority against a bolder
in due course or against a drawee or other payor wbo pays the instrument in
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of
the drawee's or payor's business.
The UCC does not defme what will constitute negligence. The comment to the
section states that this question is "left to the court or the jury upon the circum-
stances of the particular cases."021 The comment further states that circum-
stances in which negligence has usually been found include those in which
"spaces are left in tbe body of the instrument in which words or fIgures may be
inserted. "221 The comment then says, "No unusual precautions are required, and
the section is not intended to change decisions holding that the drawer ofa bill is
under no duty to use sensitized paper, indelible ink or a proteetograph; or that it
is not negligence to leave spaces between the lines or at the end ofthe instrument
in which a provision for interest or the like can be written."121 A connection must
exist between the negligence and the alteration. As the drafters ofthe UCC put it,
"It must afford an opportunity of which advantage is in fact taken."m
The negligence creates an estoppel against the negligent party against subse-
quent holders in due course or persons who pay the instrument in good faith and
who act in a commercially reasonable manner. 13CI

225 VCC § 3-406. An alleged salesman induced his victim to allow him to fill in a check
from the victim's checkbook, for $1.26 to pay for a small purchase. He filled in the amount
both in figures and in long hand but left space to the left of the entries so that the check
could be easily raised. The check was then raised to $6,841.26. The check was later cashed
at the bank on which it was drawn. In an action to recover the difference between the
original and the raised amount of the check, a trial coun judgment permitting recovery
against the bank was reversed on the ground of"failure of the court to instruct the jury on
the provisions of the V niform Commercial Code." In particular, the court referred to
failure to have the jury instructed "as to what reasonable commercial standards are."
Williams v. Montana Nat'l Bank, 167 Mont. 24, 534 P2d 1247 (1975)•
• 21 VCC § 3.406, comment 3.
••1 [d.
••• VCC § 3-406, comment 3.
'21 VCC § 3-406, comment 4.
2:11I VCC § 3-406 & comment 5. The requirement that the party who will have the
benefit of the preclusion be a holder in due course creates a technical problem when the
negligence has made possible a forged indorsement through which the claimant bases
rights to the instrument. Although the policy ofthe preclusion rule applie$, the claimant is
not a holder and so cannot be a holder in due course unless one accepts the circular logic
11 20.0912) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-54

(1} Instruments Issweel With Blanks

Instruments issued with blanks are subject to slightly different rules
. although the UCC also classifies such instruments as "altered" when they are
completed without authority. Where a depositor draws a check and puts it into
circulation with any material part blank. a bank paying in good faith may charge·
the depositor's account for the manner in which the check is actually filled in,
whether it has been completed in accordance with the customer's instructions or
not. For example, if a depositor signs a check and leaves the amount blank,
intendins to make it for $10, and it is wrongfully filled in for $100 and paid by
the bank in good faith, the bank may charge the account for $100. ftl The bank
may pay the check, even when it knows the check was filled in by someone other
than the drawer, as long as the bank acts in good faith and does not have notice
that the completion is improper. at
The case of instruments issued with blanks should not be confused with the
situation in which the depositor has filled in the blanks but left them in such a
condition that they may be easily altered. In this situation, if the instrument is
subsequently altered, the trier of fact could view the loss under the UCC as
attributable to the negligence ofthe drawer in writing the check and so would fall
on the depositor if the check comes into the hands ofa holder in due course or is
paid in good faith. U3
Where a depositor signs an incomplete check that is subsequently stolen and
filled in for an amount, the loss falls on the depositor who signed the check. It
makes no difference whether the depositor lost the check as a result ofcareless-
ness in handling it or the check was stolen from the depositor without any fault
on his or her part. In either case, a holder in due course can enforce the check for

that the preclusion role has made the claimant a bolder in due course. This reasoning is
not logically satisfying, but it appears to be what the drafters intended, as shown by tbe
examples in the comments. uee § 3·406 comment 7 gives as an example mailing a check
negligently "to the wrong person having the same name as the payee." For this example to
fit the section, the transferee after the forged payee indorsement has to be treated as a
holder.
23'vee § 4·401(2){b). See §§ 3·115, 3·407.
vee
m § 4-401 (2)(b). This establishes a less restrictive test for payor banks than for
persons claiming as holders in due course. See VCC § 3·304(1). A drawer insurance
company signed a check but left it blank; it was later completed without authority. The
check contained a printed legend stating, "This check only payable to automobile insur.
ance plan or an insurance company." As completed, the check was payable to an individ-
ual. The insurance company drawer brought suit against the depository bank. The court
held that there was no cause of action against the depository bank, The drawer's claim was
against the drawee bank to force il 10 properly recredit the drawer's account for the
improper charge, In the coun's view, the legend on the check was notice that it had been
completed in an unauthorized manner, since the individual was not an automobile
insurance plan or an insurance company. Kings Premium Servo Corp. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 115 AD2d 707, 496 NYS2d 524 (1985).
233UCC § 3·406, comment 3.
20-55 MUTUAL DUTIES , 20.10

the completed amount against the depositor/drawer and the bank can charge the
depositor's account if it pays in good faith. 2M
A holder in due course always can enforce a completed instrument accord-
ing to its terms as completed. W Thus, even if the bank on which the check is
drawn refuses to pay it (perhaps because of a stop payment order), a holder in
due course can require the drawer to pay the amount oftbe check as completed.
In the case of a fully completed check that has been altered, a holder in due
course may enforce it for its original amount.

~ 20.10 DEPOSITORY BANK'S OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH

In addition to the previously mentioned obligations to its depositors, a bank
is required to exercise due care and good faith in all dealings with its customers.
Thus, it must use due care in notifying a depositor of overdrafts on collecting
paper, ofchargebacks on collecting paper, and ofreceipt ofthe depositor's goods
and funds that may come into its hands. In the absence of such reasonable
notification, the bank may be liable for resulting injuries. 23I A bank is also
required to use due care in dealing with valuables left in safe keeping, collateral
securities, and other properties of the customer that come into its possession.m
These liabilities are attached by law, and courts would usually give no effect to
contracts by which banks attempt to relieve themselves of liability for the
negligence of their employees. 2:11

2:I'uee § 4-401(2)(b). See uee §§ 3-11 S, 3-407, 3-603(2), and comments therein.
2:11 vee § 3-407(3). See Saka v. Sahara-Nev. Corp., 92 Nev. 703, 558 P2d 535 (1976).
A holder was held to have had notice of the fraudulent completion of a check when the
holder, who was facing a $ 400,000 loss if it did not obtain payment from the pany who
delivered the fraudulent check, took it under circumstances that the coun believed
required funher inquiry. Because the holder took the check not in the regular course of
business and under circumstances where the holder "either knew ofthe circumstances, or
closed its eyes and in bad faith simply did not seek the truth in order to get its money," the
holder was not a holder in due course, and the drawer ofthe check had a defense based on
the check's fraudulent completion. E. Bierhaus & Sons. Inc. v. Bowling, 486 NE2d 598
(Ind. Cl. App. 1985).
See Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 231 Va. 283, 343 SE2d 81
(1986). A bank that held an altered note had not suffered a loss within its blanket bond
because it could enforce the note in its altered amount as a holder in due course, even
though the maker's and the indorser's insolvency made the note uncollectible. The note
had been executed in blank and an amount greater than that authorized by the indorser
was filled in later.
231uce §§ \-\03,1-203. For an able discussion of this liability under pre-Code law,
see \ Morse on Banks and Banking § 252 (Voorhees ed.• 6th ed.; 1928) (hereinafter Morse
on Banks).
m See Morse on Banks, supra note 236, Ch. 14.
231uee § 4-103.
1120.11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20·56

Ifthe depositor's own negligence contributes to the loss, the vee rules for
allocating the loss are more complex; specific sections must be consulted. In
some situations the bank: will be obligated to follow reasonable commercial
standards notwithstanding its customer's negligence.Zit In the absence of negli.
gence, the bank and its customer, under the provision of the vee, may make
contracts changing these roles; but neither party can contract away its exercise of
due care and good faith. ROO
There has been a dramatic expansion in bank liability in a series of cases,
most involving situations in which the bank acted as a lender or made a commit-
ment to extend credit, because the bank breached a duty to act in good faith
toward its customer. 2' 1 The implications of the bank's liability for breach of its
duty ofgood faith raised by these cases radiate beyond the specific fact patterns
involved and signal the need for a bank to act with care and in good faith with
respect to all of its actions toward its customers.

11 20.11 BANK'S RIGJIT TO REVOKE CREDITS TO

CUSTOMER'S ACCOUNT AND TO CHARGE
CUSTOMER FOR ITEMS NOT PAID
When a customer deposits a check and that check is not paid, the bank has
the right to charge back any credit given to the customer, as long as the bank acts
properly in handling the check. When the check deposited is drawn upon a bank
other than the depository bank, there is a presumption under the vee that any
credit given to the customer for the check by the depository bank is provi·
sional. t4t This presumption applies even though the credit given by the bank is
subject to "immediate withdrawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn."ZG If,
subsequently, the check is not paid, the depository bank may revoke the credit it
gave and charge back the amount to its customer's account.·.. In order to take
advantage ofthis right to charge back, the depository bank must act promptly in
notifying its customer or in returning the dishonored check. The bank must
return the check or send notice to its customer before midnight of the banking
day after which it learns that the check was not paid. z,. The bank need only

vee
13tSee, e.i., vee
§§ 3-406, 4-407; but see § 3·405.
".vee § 4-103.
W These cases are discussed al 1 24.02(2).
vee
2<2 § 4·201(1).
2431d. Of course, the panies can expressly agree to treat the settlement as "provi.
sional" or "final." Id.
'''vee § 4·212(1).
241 Id. Oral notice by telephone from a bank clearinghouse to the depository bank that
it is returning an item is effective to give notice to the depository colleciing bank. Upon
receipt of the notice, the depository bank must then give notice prior to its midnilht
20-57 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.11

"send" notice within the deadline; actual receipt ofnotice by the customer is not
required. 2..
The bank loses its right to charge back when it gives afinal settlement to its
customer or when it receives afinal settlement for the check. 2'? Of course, the
bank has a duty of due care in handling the check for collection. 2"
When a payor bank pays an item in cash over the counter, the uee views
this as a final payment. 2•• Disputes may arise as to whether a check presented to a
payor bank has been paid in cash or whether the bank has accepted it for deposit,
given a provisional credit, and made a general withdrawal of cash from the
customer's account. Characterization ofthe bank's action may depend upon the
form ofthe bank's deposit slip and how the slip is filled out. 250 The comments to
the uee provision on final payment say that the uee permits a bank to make
clear that credit given to its customer in settlement for an item is "provisional"
and subject to the bank's right to revoke if the bank acts in a timely manner

deadline to the indorsers ofthe check ifit is to hold the indorsers liable on the instrument.
In this case, the bank waited until it received written notice ofdishonor and then promptly
notified the indorsers. The dispute involved a check for $490,000. The coun rejected the
argument that vee § 4-202(a) requires written notice of dishonor. Moreover, there was
an agreement between the clearinghouse bank and the depository bank that oral notice
could be given. Although the depository bank could not recover against the indorser for
liability on the check because of its failure to give timely notice and the depository bank
also lost its right to charge back the amount of the dishonored check to its customer's
account under vee § 4-2 I2, the coun held the chargeback remedy was not exclusive.
Because the indorser was also the customer of the bank, the bank was entitled to recover
on equitable principles of unjust enrichment. Greerv. White Oak State Bank, 673 SW2d
326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
2"VCC §§ 1·201(26), 1-201(38}, 4.212(1}. Section 4·212(I} says "send," but oral
notice may be effecitve. Brady on Bank Checks, supra note 54, at ~ 21.8.
2C1VCC § 4·212(1). In Yoder v. Cromwell State Bank, 478 NE2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985), the coun held that a depository bank could charge back a dishonored check to its
customer's account under Section 4-212( I}, even though the payor bank had become
accountable for the check. The payor bank became liable for payment of the instrument
because its deadline for dishonoring the check had been missed and final payment had
occurred. The coun reasoned that: "Given the volume and speed of check processing, it
would be unrealistic to require the collecting bank to inquire and ascenain the grounds
for, and propriety of, every item which is dishonored. The bank's duty of ordinary care
extends to presenting or sending an item for collection and seasonably notifying the
customer of any dishonor." The depository bank must be able to rely upon the notice of
dishonor it receives so that it may act promptly with respect to its own customer. The
coun also held that once the depository bank has given proper notice of dishonor and
chargeback to its own customer, the bank may wait a longer period oftime before actually
exercising its chargeback right.
'''vec § 4-202. See Chapter 21.
"'vce § 4-213(1}(a}. See vec § 4-213, comment 3, "traditionally and under
various decisions payment in cash of an item by a payor bank has been considered final
payment."
'''See Kirby v. First & Merchants NaCI Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 SE2d 273 (1969).
II 20.11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-58

under the Uec. an applicable clearinghouse agreement, or other special

agreement. 251
vee § 4-212, unlike other sections of the uee, does not state that the
collecting bank becomes accountable for the amount of the item if it fails to
follow the procedures there prescribed for giving notice of dishonor. ul One
court interprets this omission as meaning the customer must establish damages.
Under uee § 4-103, the customer is entitled to recover only the amount of
damages the customer suffered from the bank's lack of care reduced by any
amount that could not have been realized had the bank used ordinary care. Thus,
instead ofstrict liability for the face amount ofthe item, the bank is liable only to
the extent that its actions caused injury. 2U
The ability of a depository bank to charge back an uncollected check to its
customer's account was disputed in one case because the bank erroneously
advised the customer on the time it would take for the check tei be returned ifit
was not paid. The customer deposited a check drawn upon a bank in the Cayman
Islands. The customer claimed a bank employee said the normal time for return
of bad checks was about ten days, although the time involved for the return of a
check drawn upon a Cayman Islands bank was actually longer. Claiming reliance
on the employee statement, the customer drew against the credit the check
represented. The court held the bank did not have a duty to inform the customer
of the delay involved in collecting Cayman Islands checks, but even if the
customer had been misled by the employee statements, the bankwould be liable
under UCC § 4-212(4) for negligence in collection only when the negligence of
the bank was the cause of the dishonor.""

251 VCC § 4-213, comment 4. The comment states that a payor bank may keep
settlements provisional "by general or special agreement with the presenting party or
bank; by simple reservation at the time the settlement is made; or otherwise. Thus a payor
bank (except in the case ofstatutory provisions) has control whether a settlement made by
it is provisional or final, by participating in general agreements or Clearing House rules or
by special agreement or reservation."
251 See VCC §§ 4-213 and 4-302.
m Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Prospect Nat'l Bank, 708 F2d 290 (7th Cir.
1983).
H4Chasev. Morgan Guarantee Trust Co., 59OF. Supp.I137 (SONY 1984). The same
principles were applied in a New York case. When a person deposits a check to her
account, credit given for the check is provisional until the check is finally paid. Although a
bank teller told the depositor that the check had "cleared" and the depositor then
withdrew money from the account, drawing on the credit, the bank did. not lose its right to
charge back to the account for the amount of the check when it was returned to the bank
unpaid. Even if the bank teller acted negligently in giving the erroneous statement to the
depositor, the negligence was not the cause for the nonpayment of the cheek. Vnder VCC
§ 4-103(5), the measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care in handling a
check is the amount of the check reduced by the amount that could not h,ave been realized
by the use of ordinary care. Allen v. Carver Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 123 Misc. 2d 704, 477
NYS2d 537 (NY Sup. Ct. 1984).
20-59 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.11

When the check deposited with a bank is drawn upon that bank, so that the
bank is both the depository and the payor bank, the bank must act promptly in
deciding whether the check should be paid. The bank is required to give at least a
provisional settlement for the item before "midnight of the bankinll day of
receipt" and must decide before midnight of the banlcing day following the day
of receipt whether it will choose to refuse to pay the item, in which case it must
return the check or send written notice ofits action. 251 Ifthe payor bank holds the
item without observing these deadlines, the bank will be accountable for the
amount of the item. 211 After the bank becomes accountable for the item, any
subsequent risk ofnot being able to collect it is upon the bank, not the customer.
The payor bank's right to charge back its customer's account also terminates
when the bank makes fmal payment of the item. 217 Under the UCC, fmal
payment occurs when the bank

1. Pays the item in cash;

2. Settles for the item without reserving a right to revoke or having a right
under statute or agreement to revoke; or
3. Completes the process of posting the item to the account of the person to
be charged for it; or
4. Makes a provisional settlement for the item and fails to revoke it in a
timely fashion as permitted by statute or agreement.

When final payment occurs, the payor bank becomes accountable for the
amount of the item. 211
The provisions of the UCC on the collection of checks are affected by the
Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 (EFAA), which requires banks to
conform to federal standards in making funds available to their customers that
the customers have deposited. This act does not change the concept of when
payment ofan instrument is "final"; it does impose obligations that may require
a bank to make funds available before a check is fmally paid or before the bank
has the opportunity to learn whether the check has been finally paid. These
matters are discussed in the next subsection.
Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board also affect the time within which
a payor bank must give notice to prior banks of the dishonor of a check. Failure

2IIuec § 4-301(1 l.
211 uee § 4-302.
2S7vec § 4-301(1). The jury must determine when a bank has completed the process
ofposting checks to establish that final payment has occurred. Consolidaled Cigar Co. v.
Texas Commerce Bank, 749 F2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1985).
251 vee § 4-213( I). See 11 21.03 on final payment and payor bank's right to cancel
payment.
( 20.11[11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-60

to give timely notice under the federal guidelines may make the payor bank
liable for loss caused by its failure to exercise the proper degree of care.lSI
Given the Federal Reserve Board's general authority to adopt measures to
speed up the collection ofchecks, it is reasonable to expect there will be greater
regulation by the Board of the check collection process that may modify the
provisions in the UCC. The Board's authority in this regard is discussed in
Chapter 14. One area of recent experimentation involves modif1Clltion ofdead-
lines to permit representment of checks for small dollar amounts because the
experience in processing sucb checks indicates that a high proportion of them
are paid on such a representment.- The Board also has adopted a new Regula-
tion CC, which became effective on September 1, 1988. This resolution makes
substantial changes in the traditional rules on check collection, and should be
consulted in determining the rights and duties of the parties involved in the
check collection process. Chapter 21 discusses the aspects ofthe regulation that
deal with check collecting generally. This chapter discusses EFAA and the parts
of Regulation CC that deal with funds availability and disclosure rules.

[I] Customer's Right to Withdraw Against Items Deposited

A customer's right to withdraw funds or to have checks paid against funds
that have been deposited is an issue that has stirred some controversy. A general
provision in the UCC, § 4-213(4), gives the customer certain rights of with-
drawal. As discussed later, in cases in which the customer has deposited a check
in the customer's account tbat is payable on another bank, the customer does not
have a right to withdraw funds represented by that deposit until the depository
bank has received a settlement for that check that has become final "and the
bank has had a reasonable time to learn that the settlement is final. "H' Beca use
of the way the bank collection process works, where the bank treats deposited
checks as cash items that will be paid and receives notification from a payor
bank only when the payor is dishonoring the item or refusing to make payment
for some reason, there is no particular time when the bank learns that a given
check has been paid. lIt! Some depository institutions have adopted policies of

2U 12 CFR § 210.12 (1981) (Regulation I). (See further discussion of Federal Reserve
Board requirements at ~ 21.1 I(2)[d).)
2SO See 52 Fed. Reg. 10,812 (1987). See discussion of Board's proposal at [Current
Developments) Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86,915 (Mar. 30, 1987). For a general
discussion of the Board's authority in this regard, see ~ 21.06.
2t. VCC § 4-213(4)(a).
2U There are a number of excellent law review articles on the subject of funds
availability. These include excellent descriptions of the bank collection process. See
generally Baxter & Patrikis, "The Check-Hold Revolution," 18 UCCU 99 (1985); Jor-
dan, "Ending the Floating Check Game: The Policy Arguments for Delayed Availability
Reform," 36 Hastings U 515 (1985); Note, "Bank Check-Hold Policies: A Proposal to
20-61 MUTUAL DUTIES 'i 10.11l11Ia)

varying flexibility under which they would impose "holds" on deposited checks
drawn against other institutions. These hold policies sparked complaints from
consumer interests and resulted in litigation and state legislation giving custom-
ers a right to withdraw deposited funds according to specified schedules of
availability. At the same time, Congress had been considering adopting national
legislation on this subject for several years. This consideration fmaIly resulted in
a congressional decision to greatly enlarge the involvement of the federal gov·
ernment in the payments system, with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System as the primary federal regulator. This decision is reflected in
Title VI ofthe Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. Title VI is known as
the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987. 211 The Board has adopted exten·
sive regulations in a new Regulation CC to implement the act. These regulations
become effective September 1, 1988. The next two subsections discuss first the
provisions ofthe UCC and state law and then the impact ofthe Expedited Funds
Availability Act of 1987.

fal Customer's Right to Withdraw Against Deposited Items Under the uee.
A customer depositing a check or other instrument with a bank does not have an
immediate right to withdraw the funds represented by the deposit. The bank
does not have to permit the customer to withdraw against the deposit until the
bank determines that the item will be paid. 2M When a customer deposits a check,
in his or her own bank account, that is drawn upon a different bank, the
depository bank ordinarily gives the customer provisional credit, or what the
vec caIls a provisional settlement for the amount deposited. Under the uec,
when a collecting bank gives a credit to its customer, there is a presumption that
it is provisional. HI The bank may revoke any provisional settlement it has given
and may charge back the amount to the account ofits customer.211 The customer
does not have a right to draw against the provisional credit until it becomes fmal
and until the bank has had a reasonable time to learn of its finality.2l7 The
settlement becomes final when the check is paid by the payor bank and the
proceeds have been remitted to the depository bank.-
Under the customary procedures for collecting payment of checks, checks
are treated as "cash" items, and a depository bank will ordinarily not receive

Protect Consumers," 14 J. Legis. 53 (1987); Note, "Delayed Funds Availability: A Bank

Customer's Right 10 Deposited Check Funds," S. Ill. L"U 121 (1986).
213 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, tit. VI, 101 Stat.
552 (1987).
2l4UCC § 4-213(4).
m UCC § 4-201(1).
,,'ucc § 4-212. See' 21.03(4).
mUCC § 4-213(4).
•s·ucc §§ 4·211, 4-213.
'I! 20.11(I)(a) NEGOTUWLEINSTRUMENTS 20-62

notice that a particular check: it has forwarded for payment to a payor bank: has
in fact been paid. The depository bank: receives a settlement for the check: when
it is received for collection under the applicable clearinghouse rules, special
agreement with the correspondent banks, or Federal Reserve operating rules and
regulations. If the check or other item is subsequently dishonored by the payor
bank, notice of dishonor is given and the settlement provisionally given to the
depository bank is reversed. When the payor bank honors the cbeck or other
item by paying it, no notice is given. The provisional settlement previously given
to the depository bank simply becomes a fmal settlement automaticaDy through
the passage oftime. 2M As a result. the depository bank usually receives no notice
when a check is paid but receives notice only when a check is dishonored.
Because the system for returning dishonored checks and giving notice of dis-
honor to the depository bank, in sharp contrast to the system for obtaining
payment of checks, has worked in a notoriously slow manner, a considerable
period of time may elapse before the depository bank learns that a particular
check is not paid. Fraud involving tampering with routing instructions on the
check can extend the delay.
To protect themselves against the possibility that a deposited check might
not be paid, some institutions adopted policies of placing "holds" for varying
lengths of time on deposited items before the institutions would permit their
customers to make withdrawals or to draw checks against those items. These
policies were administered with varying degrees of flexibility, according to the
commentators who have studied the subject, but in some cases the holds
imposed significant delays on a customer's access to funds. Such hold policies
often reached Quite broadly, as the banks generally applied them to broad
categories of checks, with the result that a customer was prevented from using
funds deposited from checks that in fact were paid and were probably paid
relatively Quickly after deposit. In aNew York case, a customer challenged the
hold policies adopted by a bank, but the court ruled that the uee permitted a
bank to enter into agreements with its customers on check hold periods. 210
When the customer deposits a check, in his or her own account, that is
drawn upon the bank where the check is deposited (so that the depository bank is
also the payor bank), the bank must decide before its midnight deadline whether
or not to pay the check. 2f1 If the bank decides to· pay the item, the credit given
becomes available to the customer for withdrawal "at the opening of the bank's
second banking day following receipt of the item. "212 The right of the customer

HI See the description of the bank collection process contained in Brady on Bank
Checks. supra note 52. at Ch. II. See generally the discussion of the bank collection
process contained in the comments to vee§§ 4·201, 4·211, 4·213, 4·301.
210Rapp v. Dime Savings Bank, 4g NY2d 658, 396 NE2d 740, 421 NYS2d 347
(1979), aWg 64 AD2d 964, 408 NYS2d 540 (1978).
m vee § 4-302.
muec § 4-213(4)(b).
20-63 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.1l[I)(b)

to make withdrawals against credits the bank gives for deposit to the account is
subject to any rights the bank might have to set offthe credit against some other
obliption the customer owes the bank. m
Consumer interest groups are paying increased attention to bank policies on
how long depositOry banks hold consumer checks while in the process of clear-
ing. Some states have adopted legislation aimed at curtailing banks' use of
lengthy waiting periods before allowing customers to withdraw against the items
deposited. New York adopted a measure giving the State Banking Regulator
authority to prescribe "a reasonable period oftime" for checks to clear. Califor-
nia also has modified UCC § 4-213(4) to permit state banking regulatory agen-
cies to establish reasonable periods for check clearance.""
As discussed next, the EFAA makes the Federal Reserve Board the regulator
ofthe rules on availability offunds, and customer-bank rights and duties in this
regard now are controlled by federal law.

lb) The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 [EFAA). For several years
Congress has considered legislation that would impose a duty on a depository
institution to make funds deposited by its customer available for withdrawal by
the customer based on a schedule of availability established by law. With the
passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Congress adopted
the legislation in Title VI of the Act,l75 This legislation-known as the
EFAA-requires depository institutions to make funds available for withdrawal
in accordance with a statutorily prescribed schedule of availability.
When the Federal Reserve Board acts under the authority granted by the
act, the Board's regulations will preempt state law, including the provisions of

mUCC § 4-213(4).
17·For a description ofthe New York statute, see 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No.8, at
271 (Aug. 22, 1983). See also Cal. UCC §§ 4-212-4-213, and Article 1.8, Cal. Fin. Code,
Ch. 7, Div. I (1983). The California legislation followed a lawsuit against Crocker
National Bank, which was settled when the bank agreed to adopt a publicly disclDsed
policy reaarding "holds" on the payment of checks and agreed to stipulations regarding
the periods it would hold payment of checks of $1 ,000 or less pending collection. See 41
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 811 (Nov. 28, 1983). At the federal level, a Joint House Subcom-
mittee ofthe House Banking Committee held hearings on the pricing ofcheck clearing and
related problems, such as check "float." 40 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 1304 (June 20, 1983)
(hearings held June 15-16, 1983). For an informative article that analyzes the time needed
for check collection and the risk of nonpayment, see Cooper, "Checks Held Hos-
tage-The Funds Availability Controversy," 102 Banking U 532 (1985).
I15Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, tit. VI, 101 Stat.
552 (1987) (hereinafter CEBA). The Board has adopted rules in a new Regulation CC to
implement the act. Regulation CC (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR pt. 229). The proposed
rules were published at 52 Fed. Reg. 47,112-147, 179 (Dec. II, 1987), amending 12 CFR
parts 210, 229.
If 2O.11[lJ(b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-64

the UCC that may be in effect in any statePI The only exception to this
preemption of state law occun when a state law or regulation that has been in
effect on September 1, 1988 provides a shorter period oftime for a depository
institution to make deposited funds available for withdrawal by its customers
than is provided by the federal schedules of availability. When there is such a
state law or regulation providing for a shorter availability period, it will super·
sede the provisions ofEFAA and will also, as a result of specific language in the
EFAA, be binding on all federally insured depository institutions in such state. 2n
[iJ DefinitioDS and scope ofEFAA. EFAA contains general definitions that
affect the scope of the new legislation. Many of these definitions deal with
tenninology commonly used in describing check collection and payment. Some
ofthe tenns are used in the UCC, but the definitions in EFAA are not necessarily
the same as those in the UCC. Thus, great care must be used in reviewing EFAA
to apply the appropriate definitions. The following terms are among those
specifically defined in EFAA: account, business day, cash, cashier's check, ceni·
fied check, check, check clearing house association, check processing region,
consumer account, depository check, depository institution, local originating
depository institution, noncash item, nonlocal originating depository institu-
tion, proprietary ATM, nonproprietary ATM, originating depository institu-
tion, participant, receiving depository institution, teller's check, wire transfer. 271
The regulations that implement EFAA have their own terminology and defini·
tions, some of which are different than those used in EFAA. 271
[liJ Funds availability requirements. The funds availability provisions of
EFAA generally require a depository institution to make available to its cus-
tomer funds that the customer has deposited with the institution according to a
schedule that varies with the type of instrument deposited. In some situations
EFAA distinguishes between availability of funds for withdrawal in cash and
availability of funds for withdrawal in other ways, such as by a check drawn on
the account by the customer. As discussed later, specific rules determine when
the customer must be permitted to make withdrawals in cash and when funds
"shall be available for withdrawal" generally. The discussion that follows
describes the provisions in EFAA. The Board has established in its Regulation
ce, effective September I, 1988, the specific requirements that depository
institutions must meet. The regulations contain many important details and
clarifications of how EFAA applies.
"Available for withdrawal" is defined in the Board's regulations to mean
that the funds deposited are "available for all uses generally pennitted to the

271CEBA § 608(b) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo7(b».

217 CEBA § 608(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo7(a». The preemption provisions
are complex. See Regulation CC § 229.20 (1988) (to be codified at 12 ~FR § 229.20).
271 Regulation CC§ 229.2 (1988)(to be codified al 12 CFR § 229.2).
m CEBA § 602 (10 be codified at 12 USC § 400 I).
20-65 MUTUAL DUTIES , 2O.11(IJ(b]

customer for actually and f"mally collected funds under the bank's account
agreement or policies, such as for payment of checks drawn on the account,
certification ofchecks drawn on the account, electronic payments, withdrawals
by cash, and transfers between accounts.,,- Thus, the rules on funds availability
affect whether a bank may properly dishonor a check drawn on the account for
insufficient funds. There is civil liability under the act and regulations for failure
to comply with the availability rules, as discussed in the following paragraphs,
but the federal liability rules do not apply when the claim· is for wrongful
dishonor. 21 '
Although EFAA requires banks to make funds available for withdrawal, the
banle retains the rights the bank otherwise has under the UCC or other law to
revoke a settlement given to its customer or to charge back the customer's
account for checks deposited by the customer that have not been paid. 212
1. Availability SChedules. There are four categories of deposits treated in
EFAA. The availability schedules vary depending upon the category. Subject to
the exceptions discussed later, the general availability schedules for these catego-
ries are as follows:
a. Cash deposits and wire transfers. When a deposit is made in cash or
when a depository institution receives funds by a wire transfer for
deposit to an account at the institution, EFAA establishes the general
rule that the funds "shall be available for withdrawal" no later than on
the business day after the business day on which the deposit was
made. This means that if the customer deposited cash on Monday or
the institution received a wire transfer on Monday, the institution
would have to make the funds available for withdrawal on Tuesday. m
EFAA leaves the definition of the term "wire transfer" to regulations
of the Federal Reserve Board.ao
b. Government checks, cashier's checks, and low risk instruments.
When the customer deposits funds in the form ofgovernment checks,
cashier's checks, or similar instruments, the institution must make the
funds available for withdrawal no later than the business day after the
business day on which the funds are deposited. 215 Thus, when the
customer deposits funds on Monday, ifthe deposit consists ofgovern-

210 Regulation CC § 229.2(d) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.2(d».

211 Id. § 229.21(f).
212Id. § 229.19(c)(2)(ii).
2UCEBA § 603(a)(1 )(to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(a)(I).
21°CEBA § 602(25) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4001(2S)}. See Regulation CC
§ 229.2(/1) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.2(/1). The definitionexclud~electronic
fund transfers under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. Id. An "electronic payment" is a
wire transfer or an ACH credit transfer. Id. § 229.2(p).
21ICEBA § 603(a)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(a)(2)}.
11 2o.Il[1)[b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-66

ment checks meetinl the requirements of EFAA, the institution must

make the funds available for withdrawal on the next business day,
which would be Tuesday when the institution opens for business. The
Checks that qualify for this next day availability are those that Con-
gress thought would have a low risk of nonpayment. There are several
subcategories of these checks. There is generaUy next day availability
for checks that are obliaations of a government entity, either the
United States, a state government, or a local government, when the
bank's customer is the person to whom the check was issued and is the
only indorser. EFAA is specific that these must be checks that are
drawn on the U.s. Treasury, drawn by a state, or drawn by a unit of
general local government. State and local government checks must be
deposited in a receiving depository institution located in the same
state as the state in 'which the government unit is located, and the
check must be accompanied by a special deposit slip identifying the
check as one drawn by the state or the local government,2M
The next business day availability rule applies to three other subcat-
egories ofdeposited funds as well. There is next day availability for up
to the first $100 each bank customer deposits by check on any given
business day. aT There is next day availability for a check deposited in
a branch of the same depository institution on which the check was
drawn if both the depository branch and the branch on which the
check was drawn are located in the same state or in the same check
processing region. And there is next day availability for the deposit of
a cashier's check, certified check, teller's check, or depository
check. 21• As with state and local government checks, the bank's cus-
tomer must be the person to whom the check was issued and the only
indorser, and the check must be accompanied by a special deposit slip
when the instrument is deposited. 211

2" CEBA § 603(a)(2XB}. (C) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(a)(2}(B), (C). The
Board's regulations require the check to be deposited to an account of the payee. Regula·
tion CC § 229.10(c) (I 988)(to be codified at 12 CFR § 229~IO(c».
21TThe SI00 applies to that part ofthe checks deposited that are not otherwise subject
to next day availability, and the $100 is for the customer's aggregate deposits to all
accounts. The amount is reduced if the amount of the deposits entitled to this next day
availability is less than $100. Regulation CC § 229.IOCc)(l) (to be codified at 12 CFR
§ 229.IO(c».
m A depository check includes a cashier's check, certified check, teller's check, and
"any other functionally equivalent instrument as determined by the Board." CEBA.
§ 602(11) (to be codified at 12 USC § 400 I(11). The check must be deposited to an
account of the payee. Regulation CC § 229.IO(c) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR
§ 229.10(c».
'''CEBA § 603(a(2»(F) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(a)(2)(F».
20-67 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.11(1)1")

In the case'ofcertain checks that otherwise would qualify for next day
availability but that are not deposited in person to an employee ofthe
depository bank, the Board's regulation provides that the funds shall
be available on the second business day after the banking day on
which the funds are deposited. 2M
Co Local and nonlocal checks. Local checks are checks a customer depos-
its at a depository institution that are drawn on a local originating
depository institution.... Given the definition of local originating
depository institution as the branch that is the drawee on the check
and that is located in the same check processing region, a local check is
one that is both drawn on a branch of a depository institution and
deposited in a branch of a depository institution located within the
same check processing region. The term "check processing region"
refers to the geographical areas served by a Federal Reserve Bank
Check Processing Center. 2ft Nonlocal checks are checks drawn on a
branch ofa depository institution that is located outside of the check
processing region where the check is deposited. Subject to exceptions
discussed later, wben a customer deposits local checks, the institution
must make the funds available for withdrawal according to first a
temporary availability schedule and eventually a permanent schedule.
The permanent schedule goes into effect on September 1, 1990 or such
earlier date as the Board may require.
Under the permanent schedule, with respect to local checks, not more
than one business day can intervene between the business day of
deposit and the day on which the funds are available for with-
drawal. 2Q Under the permanent schedule, if the check deposited is a
nonlocal check, not more than four business days may intervene
between the business day ofdeposit and the day on which the institu-
tion makes the funds available for withdrawal.-
Before the permanent schedule goes into effect, there is a temporary
schedule of availability. The temporary schedule becomes effective
after August 31, 1988.2H Under the temporary schedule for local
checks, no more than two business days may intervene between the
business day of deposit and the day the institution makes the funds

""Regulation CC § 229.10(c)(2) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.IO(c».

2t1 CEBA § 603(b}(l) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo2(b)(l».
211CEBA § 602(9) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4001(9»). The Federal Reserve Board
by regulation may define a larger area as a check processing region. Id.
ZQCEBA § 603(b)(I) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(b)(I».
:l94CEBA § 603(b)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo2(b)(2».
21'CEBA § 603(c)(3) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo2(c)(3».
11 20.11[l]lb) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-68

llvailable for withdraWal..III Under the temporary schedule for nonIo-

cal checks, up to six business days may intervene between the day of
deposit and the.day on which the institution makes the funds availa-
ble.:lt7 To illustrate the operation ofthese rules, if a customer deposits
a nonlocal check on Friday, the depository institution must make the
. fIrSt $1 00 ofthe deposit available on a next-business..da.y basis, but as
to the remainder of the deposit, the bank may then wait until six
business days have elapsed (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thurs-
day, Friday, and Monday) before permitting the customer to with·
draw the funds-on the second Tuesday after the day of deposit.
The rules on when funds are "available for withdrawal" are modified
when withdrawal is in cash. When the deposit consists oflocal checks
or nonIocal checks, the general rule is that funds shall be available for
"cash withdrawal" no later than on the business day after the funds
become available for withdrawal under the permanent schedule of
availability for such local checks and nonlocal checks. 21' However, a
portion ofthe funds must be available for withdrawal in cash by 5 P.M.
of the business day on which the funds are generally available under
the permanent schedule for local checks· and nonlocal checks. The
institution must pennit the customer to withdraw in cash at least
$400 of funds deposited by this 5 P.M. deadline. lIt The $400 cash
withdrawal amount is in addition to the $ I00 that is to be available on
the next business day after the business day ofdeposit under the rules
relating to government checks and other items for which next-day
availability should be provided, but the $400 is the total amount the
institution needs to make available for all of the local and nonlocal
checks deposited on the same business day.
Under the temporary schedule, there are also provisions dealing with
cash withdrawal. As in the case ofthe permanent schedule, the general
rule is that the institution must make the funds available for cash
withdrawal not later than the business day after the business day when
the funds would otherwise be generally available under the rules on
local checks. soa There also is a $400 cash withdrawal allowance that
the institution must make available to the customer by 5 P.M. on the
business day after the funds become available for local checks under

2"CEBA § 603(c)(I)(A) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(c)(I)(A)).

211 CEBA § 603(c)(2) (to bel codified at 12 USC § 4002(c)(2».
211 CEBA § 603(b)(3)(A) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(b)(3)(A».
2ltCEBA § 603(b)(3)(B) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(b)(3)(B».
·CEBA § 603(c)(I)(B) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(c)(I)(B».
20-69 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.11(l][b]

the temporary schedule.:I01 However, under the temporary rules, the

ability of a customer to make cash withdrawals against nonlocal
checks is different. When a customer deposits ilonlocal checks, there
is no provision in the act mandating when the institution must make
.the funds available for cash withdrawal. The only applicable provi-
sion speaks of availability for withdrawal generally,i02 and this is the
rule that allows six intervening business days.
There are no special rules that adjust the time when funds must be
available for cash withdrawal in the case of deposits that qualify as
deposits of government checks, cashier's checks, or similar next-day
availability items. In these cases, the customer is entitled to withdraw
funds by any means, cash or other payment instrument, because
EFAA specifies the institution must make funds "availablefor with-
drawal," without further qualification. This reading of the statute is
consistent with the reading of those special sections on cash with-
drawals that speak of"time period adjustments" on the categories of
checks to which those provisions apply.*
The cash withdrawal rules for nonlocal checks, discussed in this sec-
tion, apply to certain actions by the bank that are not cash withdraw-
als but that involve a similar bank commitment to pay. According to
the Board's commentary, "the cash withdrawal rule also includes
withdrawals by electronic payment, issuance of a cashier's or teller's
check, certification of a check, or other irrevocable commitment to
pay, such as authorization of an on-line point of sale debit. The rule
would also apply to checks presented over-the-counter for payment
on the day of presentment by the depositor or other person."-
d. ATM deposits. The legislation distinguishes between a proprietary
ATM and a nonproprietary ATM. A proprietary ATM is a machine
that is located at or adjacent to a branch of the receiving depository
institution, is located in close proximity to the branch oftbe receiving

:101 CEBA § 603(c)(I)(B)(ii) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(c)(I)(B)(ii». When the

local check is drawn on a bank that participates in the same clearinghouse as the deposi-
tory bank, and in certain other similar cases, under the temporary schedule, the funds
must be available for cash withdrawal on the day when the funds must be available under
the general rule, without the one day extension. Regulation CC § 229.1 I(b)(2) (1988) (to
be codified at 12 CFR § 229.II(b)(2». In the case of withdrawals by automated teller
machine, the institution does not have to permit withdrawals that exceed the maximum
amount otherwise allowable for withdrawal from an ATM. CEBA § 603(c)(I)(B)(ii).
i02 CEBA § 603(c)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC, 4002(c)(2».
-CERA §§ 603(b)(3), 603(c)(I)(B) (to be codified at 12 USC 6Q 4002(b)(3),
4002(c)(I)(B».
304Regulation CC § 229.1 J(b) commentary (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR
§ 229.II(b) appendix).
'2o.tl(1IIbI NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-70

depository institution, or is owned by the receiving depository institu-

tion and operated by or exclusively for it.- A nonproprietary ATM is
simply an automated teller machine other than a proprietary ATM.-
As with checks, there is both a temporary schedule and a permanent
schedule for which the depository institution must make funds availa-
ble for withdrawal. 101 Under the temporary schedUle, all categories of
deposits are treated similarly in the case of nonproprietary ATMs.
This schedule provides that not more than six business days shall
intervene between the business day of deposit and the day when the
depository institution must make the funds available for with-
drawal.* The temporary schedule goes into effect after August 31,
1988, and it expires before thepennanent scbedule goes iota effect on
September 1, 1990 or such earlier date as the Board directs.
Under the permanent schedule, the funds availability schedule for
deposits at nonproprietary ATMs depends upon the category of
deposit. When nonlocal checks are deposited, not more than four
business days may intervene between the day of deposit and the day
the institution makes the funds available for withdrawal." When the
deposit is in cash, government checks or related instruments, or local
checks, the general rule for nonproprietary ATMs is that no more than
one business day may intervene between the business day of deposit
and the business day on which funds are available for withdrawaL'"
In order for the check to be classed as a "local" check, the local
originating depository institution on which the check is drawn must
be located in the same check processing region as the ATM where the
customer makes the deposit. 311 The rules on the availability of funds
deposited at proprietary ATMs generally are the same as those in the
temporary and permanent schedules for other deposits. 312
The Federal Reserve Board has general authority to reduce the time
period as provided in the permanent and temporary schedules for
funds availability to as short a time as possible based upon "the
period oftime achievable under the improved check clearing system
for a receiving depository institution to reasonably expect to learn of

3IlICEBA § 601(16) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4001(16».

'''CEBA § 601(18) (to be codified al12 USC~ 4001(18». An on-premises ATM does
not have to be owned or operated by the bank under this definition. Id.
:Ill1 CEBA § 603(e) (10 be codified at 12 USC 4002(e}).

'''CEBA § 603(e)(1) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(e)(I)).

'D'CEBA § 603(e)(2)(B) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(e)(2)(B».
310 CEBA § 603(e)(2)(A) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(e)(2)(A»).
'" CEBA § 603(e)(2)(C) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(e)(2)(C».
"'CEBA § 603(e)(3) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(e)(3».
20-71 MUTUAL DUTIES 'I 20.11[1]11I]

the nonpayment ofmost items for each category ofchecks. "'1' Under
this authority, the Board can shorten the time period in either the
temporary or the permanent schedule if the adoption of improve-
ments, such as electronic clearing ofpayments, gives depository insti-
tutions faster notice when checks are. being returned for nonpayment.
EFAA allows one additional business day for deposits in depository
institutions located in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands, where the check is drawn on a depository institution not
located in the same state, commonwealth, or territory.'1.
For clarification, EFAA expressly states that it is not to be construed
as requiring the physical return ofcheclcs to a depository institution or
that notice of nonpayment be given within the times set forth for the
funda availability.311
2. The Safeguard Exceptions to the A.,ailability Schedules. The rules on
funds availability are subject to five categories of"safeguard exceptions."'1' The
first category deals with new accounts. During the fJI'St thirty days ofthe opening
of a new account, special rules apply. There is a requirement of next-business-
day availability for cash deposits, wire transfers received, cashier's and similar
checks, and government checks.317 There are no availability schedules that apply
to other types of deposit items. The permanent and temporary schedules for
local and nonlocal checks and ATMs specifically do not apply.3l' Even in the
case of cashier's checks and government checks, the rules on next-business-day
availability apply only with respect to the first $5,000 of the aggregate amount
deposited. 31I As to the excess over $5,000, EFAA allows not more than eight
business days to intervene between the business day of deposit and the business
day on which the funds are available.
The second category of exceptions deals with large deposits in one day,
redeposited checks that previously had been returned unpaid, and accounts that
have had repeated overdrafts. In these cases, the Federal Reserve Board may
adopt regulations to provide for exceptions to the normal schedules ofavailabil-
ity.'20 A large deposit is one that is more than $5,000 in anyone day.

"'CEBA § 603(d)(l) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(d)(I».

314 CEBA § 603(d)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(d)(2».
315CEBA § 603(1) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4002(1).
I1ICEBA § 604 (10 be codified at 12 USC § 4003).
317 CEBA § 604(a)(I) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(a)(l)). Regulation CC
§ 229.I3(a) (1988) defines a new account.
3.. CEBA § 604(a)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(a)(2».

31ICEBA § 604(a)(3) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(a)(3».

320CEBA § 604(b)(to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(b». The Board has done this. See
Regulation CC § 229.13 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.13).
11 2o.Il(1)(b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-72

The third category i' a "reasonable cause exception."'" The availability

rules do not apply when the receiving depository institution has "reasonable
cause to believe that the check i' uncollectible from the originatina depository
institutioo."112 Reasonable cause "requires the existence of facts which would
cause a well grounded belief in the miDd of a reasonable penon...an When a
depository institution invokes the reasonable cause exception, it must Jive
notice of the reasons it believes such cause exists. The institution's determina-
tion that reasonable cause exists must be on an individual basis because it cannot
be based on "any class of checks or persons."1M The depository institution may
not collect fees for the customer's overdraft on the account with respect to such
deposits unless the ~stitution conforms with ·the written notice requirement in
EFAA.
The fourth category of exceptions deals with emergency conditions. The
availability rules in the permanent and temporary schedules and those pertain-
ing to ATMs do not apply when there is an interruption of communication
facilities, suspension of payments by another depository institution, war, or
"any emergency condition beyond the control of tbe receiving depository insti-
tution," but the receiving depository institution in all cases must exercise dili-
gence under the circumstances in responding to the emergency.ft.
The fifth category of exceptions are exceptions that the Federal Reserve
Board may adopt if it determines that institutions are experiencing "an unac-
ceptable level oflosses due to check related fraud. "321 On making such a finding,
the Board has authority to suspend the provisions of EFAA with respect to the
class ofchecks concerned.lfthe Board exercises such authority, it must report to
Congress in detail and the effective period of its order is limited. 321

3. Notice and Disclosure Rules. When a depository institution' uses an

exception other than the new account exception, it must give notice of the day
the funds will be available for withdrawal.- The notice also must state the

m CEBA § 604(c) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(c)).

mCEBA § 604(c)(J) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(c)(J».
323 Id.

32' CEBA § 604(c)(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(c)(2)). The reasonable cause
eltception provoked expressions of concern from bankers about potential liability in
stating reasons for concern why a check might not be paid. The Board commentary states
the Bank may say it is applying the exception based on "confidential infonnation" in an
appropriate case. Regulation CC § 229.13(e) commentary (1988) (to be codified at J2
CFR § 229.I3(e) appendix).
... CEBA § 604(d) (10 be codified at 12 USC § 4003{d)).
:121 CEBA § 604(e)(I) (to be codified al J2 USC § 4003(e)( J)).
321 CEBA §§ 604(e)(2)-604(e)(3) (to be codified at 12 USC §§ 4003(e)(2)-4003(e)(3».
321CEBA § 604(t)(1) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(1)(1).
20-73 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.1111JlbJ

'reason the exception was invoked.- Moreover, the federal law specifies a time
when the notice must be given.- In the case of deposits made in person, the
.institution must "immediately" provide notice in writing; in the case of other
deposits, the institution must mail the notice not later than the close ofthe next
business day. Federal Reserve Board regulations govern tbe time for notice wben
the emergency conditions exception or the prevention of fraud exception
applies. When an institution learns of facts that justify the use of an exception,
althou&h tbe knowledge is gained after the deposit bas been made, the institution
may give notice as soon as practicable as long as it is not later than the first
business day following the day the facts became known. Ia' In addition, EFAA
requires institutions to give advance written notice when a customer opens a
new account. U2 The institution's preprinted deposit slips must contain a sum-
mary notice that deposited items may not be available for immediate
withdrawal.-
EFAA requires a mailing to customers about the institution's funds availa-
bility policy in the fIrSt regular mailing to customers after tbe effective date of
the act.- When the policy cbanges, subsequent written notice must be sent. The
institution also must post notices at manned teller stations where deposits are
accepted and must post a general notice at ATM locations.- In certain cases
where the institution defers accrual of interest on funds deposited, the institu-
tion must include notice ofits policy on accruing interest in the disclosures. sa
The Board has published model disclosure forms and clauses that depository
institutions may adopt. m
[iiil Accrual oflnterest on deposits. The law requires depository institutions
to begin accruing interest on funds deposited in an interest bearing account at
the institution no later than the business day on which the institution receives
provisional credit for the funds. lSI The Board's regulations specify how banks
should comply with this accrual rule. They also clarify that the interest accrued
rule applies only to an "account" that is covered by Regulation ce. This has the

m CEBA § 604(0( I}(A)(ii) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(1)( I)(AXii)).

330CEBA § 604(0(2) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo3(f)(2)).
~1 CEBA § 604(0(3) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4003(1)(3)).
~2CEBA § 60S(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4OO4(a)).
33)CEBA § 605(b) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4OO4(b)).
3uCEBA § 60S(c)(1) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4004(c)(I)).
mCEBA § 60S(d) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4004(d». A notice posted at the
manned teller stations must be specific in describing the time periods applicable to the
availability of funds deposited. The notice posted at ATM locations may be general in
nature.ld.
mCEBA § 605(e) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo4(e».
337 CEBA § 605(0 (to be codified at 12 USC § 4004(f). Regulation CC Appendix C
(1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR part 229).
... CEBA § 606(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4005(a)).
, 2O.11(1)[b) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-74

result ofexcluding interest bearins accounts that are not transaction accounts.'"
There are two exceptions to the general interest accrual rule. The fmt exception
is for credit unions thatfollow aaeneral policy on accrual ofinterest ordividends
with respect to all funds that are deposited into accounts at such institutions.Mo
The seoond exception is for checks that are returned to tbe depository institution
unpaid. SOl
II,) Calculation of business days. The computation of business days is
important in determining the application of the funds avaiJabiJity schedules. A
business day is "any day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday."341
When a deposit is made on a nonbusiness day or after the close of business on a
business day, it is treated as a deposit being made on the next business day.30
Unless EFAA provides otherwise, when a requirement provides that funds be
available for withdrawal on a business day, the funds must be available for
withdrawal at the start of the dl\y."" The Board's Regulation CC defmes when a
day starts for these purposes. It also contains rules to determine when a deposit is
received. 341 The reiulation distinguishes a "business day," which is defined to be
". calendar day other than a Saturday or a Sunday ..... or certain specified
holidays, from a "banking day," which is a business day when "an offiCe of the
bank is open to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking
functions."·
1'1 Admlnlstrati'e enforcement and private relllCdlel. EFAA provides for
enforcement under the general administrative enforcement authority of the
appropriate federal banking agency. NT In addition to the general authority given
to the Federal Reserve Board, EFAA authorizes the Board to order depository
institutions to stop dealing with other depository institutions or persons who fail
to comply with EFAA or the Board's regulations.Me This lives the Board author-
ity to deny access to the payment and collection system to institutions who fail to
comply.

II'Regulation CC § 229.14 commentary (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.14

appendix).
MlCEBA § 606(b) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4005(b». This exception was adopted
because credit unions have followed the practice of allowing only panial dividends on
funds not on deposit for an entire dividend period. H.R. Cont: Rep. No. 261, 1OOth Cong.•
ht Seu. 182, reprinted in 1987 US Code Cona. & Admin. News 489. 651.
a.. CEBA § 606(c) (to be codified at 12 USC ~ 4005(c)).
2
34 CEBA § 602(J){to be codified at 12 USC § 4001(3)).
:l43CEBA § 607(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4oo6(a».
~CEBA § 607(b)(to be codified at 12 USC § 4006(b».
""I ReBulation CC § 229.19 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.19).
MlRegulatlon CC §§ 229.2(b), 229.2(&) (l988) (to be codified at 12 CFR §§ 229.2(b),
229.2(1».
"". CEBA § 610(a) (to be codified al 12 USC § 4009(a».
""CEBA § 610(c) (to be Codified at 12 USC § 4009(c)}.
20-75 MUTUAL DUllES 1 2tul1l1{lll

EFAA also creates a civil remedy for persons who are injured by the failure
of depository institutions to comply with the requirements of EFAA or the
Board's regulations under EFAA.Ht The depository institution is liable to per-
sons who are injured by the institution's noncompliance to the extent of any
actual damage sustained and, in' a nonclass action, an additional amount over
actual damages of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 as the court may
allow.- When an aggrieved party is successful in enforcing liability, the party
may recover costs of entertaining the action including reasonable attorney's
fees.· 1 An institution has a defense when it makes an innocent mistake. It may
not be held liable when it demonstrates the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error and it had maintained procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid making such errors.au
[vi) Federal Reserve Board Repladoo cc. The Federal Reserve Board has
implemented EFAA by promulgating Regulation ee, which became effective
September 1, 1988.31' Subpart B of this regulation, which is discussed in this
chapter, details what banks must do to meet the funds availability and disclosure
duties imposed by EFAA. Subpart e of the regulation contains rules on the
collection and return ofchecks, which are discussed in Chapter 21. Bankers must
carefully review the requirements of Regulation ee because it will be the
controlling source oflaw on many aspects ofa bank's collection, payment, and
return of checks. Because the relationship of the Board's regulation to the DeC
produces an intricate web of federal and state law which is not yet fully devel-
oped, this is an area in which bankers should consult with legal counsel to review
bank practices and procedures.
Future supplements to this book will discuss Regulation ee in greater
detail. This section can only alert the banker to some ofthe significant features of
the regulation.
Regulation ee preempts state law, including the DeC, but there are differ-
ences in the scope of the preemption between Subpart B ofthe regulation dealing
with funds availability and disclosure and Subpart e of the regulation dealing
with check collection and return.:114 The funds availability regulations preserve
state rules in effect on or before September I, 1989, that require funds to be

3O'CEBA § 611(a) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4010(a».

50
' CEBA § 61I(a)(2)(A) (to be codified at 12 USC § 401O(a)(2)(A)). There is a
maximum amount which may be recovered in the case of a class action. It can be no more
than the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the net wonh of the depository institution.
Id. at § 61I(a)(2)(B).
351 CEBA § 61I(a)(3) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4010(a)(3)).
352CEBA § 611(c) (to be codified at 12 USC § 4010(c». See liability rules at Regula-
tion CC § 229.21 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.21).
:IN Regulation CC (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR pan 229).
'"Regulation CC §§ 229.20, 229.41 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR §§ 229.20,
229.41).
11 20.11{l](b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-76

available for Withdrawal in a shorter time at state chartered banks and extend the
scope ofany such state rule so that it also applies to an federally insured banks in
the state.U1 But when there is an inconsistency with state law, either because of
longer state funds availability periods or because ofthe existence ofstate disclo-
sure or notice duties, Regulation ee preempts the state law. m The Board
commentary indicates that when a conflict in availability schedules exists, the
state schedules may be preempted in their entirety, not just to the extent of the
inconsistency.m When state law requires disclosure of funds availability polio
cies, the Board indicates that a general policy of preemption will apply unless
state law applies to deposits, such as certain savings and time deposits, that are
not "accounts" covered by the regulation. '11 In contrast, the preemption provi·
sions with respect to the check collection and return rules of Subpart e of the
regulation are drawn more narrowly. In this instance, the regulation preempts
only "to the extent of the inconsistency." thus preserving to whatever extent
there is no inconsistency the applicability ofthe uee and the other state laws to
the collection and return process.:II1
Regulation ee contains model forms, clauses. and notices that may be used
to meet the disclosure obligations ofEFAA.·o Since a bank is protected from
civil liability when it engages in an act in good faith in conformity with a "rule,
regulation, orinterpretation" of the Board, the availability ofthe model clauses
offers a means for minimizing potential problems.II'
The terminology ofRegulation ee is important because it defines the scope
ofthe regulation. The terminology, which is similar to that used in the uee and,
in some instances, the terms used in EFAA itself, differs in several important
respects. A "check" is defined more comprehensively than under the uee. 3ft It
includes a traveler's check drawn on or payable through or at a bank, for
example. au This makes the funds availability rules apply to such instruments.
The definition of"account" generally limits the scope ofthe regulation to banks
with transaction accounts." Although the regulation uses the term "bank," this
term includes depository institutions generally, and the definition is broader for

"SId. § 229.20(a)..
351Id. §§ 229.20(b), 229.20(c), &. commentary.
357 Id. § 229.20(cl commentary. The Board lakes Ihe view that superceding state Jaw
in its entirety "avoids the necessity offorming very complex hybrids of state and federal
law that could not have been contemplated by the stale or federallegislalures." Id.
351Id.
35IId. § 229.41 &. commentary. The Subpart C preemption rules are discussed in
Chapter 21.
3'" Id. Appendix C.
301 Id. § 229.21(e).

• 2 Regulalion CC § 229.2(k) (1988) (10 be codified at 12 CFR § 229.2(k».

313 Id.
H4 Id. § 229.2(a}.
20-77 MUTUAL DUTIES 11 20.1l11J(bJ

the purposes ofSubpart C than for the funds availability and disclosure rules of
Subpart B.315 There also are specific exclusions from the various parts of the
regulation.
Regulation CC elaborates in much greater detail than EFAA does the spe-
cific availability sChedules that banks must meet and draws some important
distinctions that are not present in EFAA. For eumple, on the schedule applica-
ble to checks when next day funds availability must be afforded, the regulation
extends the availability date by an additional business day in some situations
when the deposit is not made to a deposit facility ofthe depository bank manned
by an employee of the bank. 3M In these situations, the funds must be made
available on the second business day after the banking day when the customer
deposited the checla.H7 Further, some key definitions do not appear in EFAA.
The regulation defmes "wire transfer" and "electronic payment" and clarifies
that a bank does not receive an electronic payment until the bank has received
both "payment in actually and finally collected funds .•. and ... [i]nfonnation
on the account and amount to be credited."311
The regulation computes the funds availability schedules in a manner dif-
ferent from EFAA. Although EFAA describes the time limits in terms of the
number of business days that must intervene between the day when the deposit
is received and the time when the funds must be made available, Regulation CC
calculates the time when the funds must be available in terms of a specified
numQer of business days after the banking day of deposit. Thus, the regulation
uses both the term "business day" and "banking day" to compute time periods
within which banks must take action.:N1
The Federal Reserve Board has summarized the availability rules under
Regulation CC in a useful manner in the following tables. They are set forth
below to illustrate the operation of the various time periods discussed in the
early sections of this chapter on EFAA.

315 Id. § 229.2(e).

-ld. § 229.!O(c)(2).
31' ld.
-ld. § 229.!O(b)(2).
3Illd. §§ 229.2(0, 229.2(g).
11 20.1l{l][b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-78

Temporary Funds Availability Schedules

...,.... .. ... ......... Figure 1

I. The flnt $I 00 ofa day's deposit musl be made available for either c:uh withdrawal or cheek writina
purposes at lhe stan of the next business day § 229.IO(c)(l)(vii).
2. For local checks cleared through a local dearinghouse. the remainder oftbe deposit must be made
available for either cuh withdrawal or check writina purposes by the lhird busine" day followin'lhe
day of deposit § 229.1J(b)(I).
3. For local checks dellrM oUlside a local dearinghOllM. the remainder of the depo,it must be made
available for check wriling purposes by the third business day followinl lhe day of deposit
§ 229.1 I!b)(2).
4. For local checks cleared ourside a local ckaringhouse. $400 of the depo,it mUlt be made available
for cash withdrawal no later than S:OO p.m. on the day specifled in the schedule. This amount is in
addition 10 the $ 100 that must be made available on the business day foUowin. the day of deposit
§ 229.1 I(b)(2).
S. The remainder of the deposit must be available for cash withdrawal at the sIan ofbulinels on the
following day § 229.ll(b)(2).
6. For nonlocal checks. the remainder of the deposit must be made available for either cash with·
drawal or check writinl purposes by the seventh bUliness day followinlthe day ofdeposil § 229.1 I(c).

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supplementary Information Relating to
Regulalion Cc. S3 Fed. Reg. 19.374-19.376 (19g8).
20-79 MUTUAL DUTIES 'I 20.1l(l][b]

Permanent Funds Availability Schedules Figure 2

................ay
MOJlllMY
Io.ret
of ....... .".. •

-II'.,II, WEDI
'Dorll
or _.. , ......,
......... (0.,.•• "",II _..,
....... -,
ChIClb ......... 1M . . . . , . . . . . . , . - . . .........
.........., CU.~')
nn_......
lUra,..,
LOC",-

A ~ 0 .......·
Dc.-w...........
Ie I' SiooJ1l '1400
I
Ih II' SSOOJ1l
~ a..kWridIIr

~ ...... ..... .... _-_ .. .................

~
-.............. -------- ------_ .. - _._a._.. _ --------,---------

a
NOHLOCAL

A
Ie ,
II's,ooJh
I
It S400 J1J II' S500 JJl

I. The fint $100 ofa day's deposit must be made available for either casb witbdrawal or cbeck writilll
purposes at tbe start ofthe lIext busilless day § 229. 1O(cX I Xvii).
2. Local cbecks must be made available for cbeck writillg purposes by tbe second business day
followill' deposit § 229.12(b).
3. Nonlocal cbecks must be made available for check writing purposes by the fifth busilless day
followinl deposit § 229.12(c).
4. $400 ofthe deposit must be made available for cash withdrawal no later than S:OO p.m. on the day
specified in the schedule. This is in addition to the $100 that must be made available on the business
day followin. deposit § 229.12(d).
S. The remainder ofthe deposit mull be made available for cash y,;thdrawal at the stan ofbusiness the
following day § 229. 12(d).

Source: Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System, Supplementary Information Relating to
Regulation CC, S3 Fed. Reg. 19,314-19,316 (1988).
, 20.l1[l](b] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-80

Permanent Funds Availability Schedules J,o'igurc 3

"""',.... WI 01....... 01 ...

0-
DCUhWkh .

~a..IL I. .

I flU tOOl)

I. The first $ 100 ofa day's deposit must be made available for either cash withdrawal or check writinl
purposes at the start of the next businen day § 229.\O(c)(l)(vii).
2. Local checks must be made available for check writinl purposes by the second business day
followlnl deposit § 229.\ 2(b).
3. Nonloca\ checks must be made available for check writinl purposes by the fifth business day
followlnl deposit § 229.I2(c).
4. $400 ofthe deposit must be made available for cash withdrawal no Jater than 5:00 p.m. on the day
specified in the schedule. This applies to the allrepte amount ofdeposit. that must be made available
on a specified day, and is in addition to the $100 that must be made available on the business day
followinl deposit § 229. I 2(d).
S. The remainder ofthe deposit must be made available for cash "ithdnwa\ at the start ofbusiness the
following day § 229. \ 2(d).

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supplementary Information ReJating to
Regulation CC, S3 Fed. ReJ. 19,374-19,376 (1988).

There are separate provisions creating civil liability for failure to comply
witb the Regulation in Subparts Band C. no Under Subpart B oftbe regulation a
bank is liable to any person its failure has harmed, for damages in an amount

>fOld. §§ 229.21, 229.38. Liability under Subpart C, id. § 229.38, is discussed in

Chapter 21.
20-81 MUTUAL DUTlES 1120.12(1)

equal to the "actual damage sustained by that person as a result of the fail-
ure ... " plus "such additional amount as the court may allow.... ":11" As to the
"additional amount," there is both a minimum recovery specified and a limita-
tion on the maximum amount that may be recovered in an action brought by an
individual, and there are constraints on class action awards. m When there is a
successful action enforcing liability for failure to comply with the regulation, the
party may recover costs and a "reasonable attorney's fee ... "m The liability
provisions of Subpart B of the regulation do not apply to matters involving
compliance with Subpart C, which has its own liability rules, and do not apply to
cases involving wrongful dishonor. 314 Because of this exclusion, wrongful dis-
honor claims presumably still will be governed by the UCC rules. The Subpart B
liability rules give a bank a defense in the case of unintentional violations that
represent errors made in good faith. UI They also impose a duty of record
retention on a bank to retain evidence ofcompliance with the funds availability
and disclosure requirements for two years. 3T1

1120.12 CUSTOMER'S DUTY TO EXAMINE STATEMENTS OF

ACCOUNT
(1] Duty to Examine Statements and to Report Improper Payments
It is customary for banks to issue statements of account to its customers at
monthly intervals or at such times as they are requested. Like any other state-
ment of account, this statement is not binding upon the customer or upon the
bank. Normally a bank can rectify mistakes and show the true state of account,
but it is possible for the statement to become a representation that binds the
bank or the depositor ifeither party. by failing to act upon the statement. causes
loss to the other. Although no specific UCC provision produces this result, the
UCC allows general principles of equity and estoppel to apply.m
Since the bank may suffer loss as the result of paying forged and raised
checks, the customer owes the bank a reasonable duty to investigate statements
and to notify it in case such improperly paid checks are contained in the
statement. At common law, it was necessary for the bank to show loss resulting
from absence of notification before it could hold the customer to the statement

371 Id. § 229.21(a).

372 Id. § 229.21 (a). For an individual action, this liability is "not less than $100 nor
greater than S1,000." Id.
mId. § 229.2I(a)(3).
mId. § 229.21(1).
375 Id. § 229.21 (el.

mId. § 229.21 (g).

mUCC § 1-103.
110.11(1] NEG011ABLEINSTRUMENTS 20-82

as issued. In attempting to relieve themselves of this liability, banks often put

notices on the monthly statements that they had to be checked or returned in ten
days or they would be reaardcd as correct. O~, in some instances, the~ ~quired
the depositor to sign an agreement, upon reoetptofthe statement, proVIding that
in the absence ofnotiflcation by the depolitor I the statement would be rcprded
by the bank as correct. The courts generally held that neither the notice nor the
agreement was binding on the customer under such circumstances, unless the
bank showed direct resulting 10ss.l7I Under the UCC, aood faith contracts ofthis
nature that do not try to exculpate the bank from its duty ofreasonable care and
that are willingly made by the customer are probably enforceable. 31I
The UCC provides that when a bank sends a statement, the customer must
use reasonable care and promptness to discover and notify the bank of any
alterations or forgeries of tbe customer's signature. If the customer fails to do
this, the bank is relieved from liability as to the items the customer failed to
report if the bank can show that'the failure to report by the customer caused tbe
bank loss. Further, ifthe forgeries or alterations continue to occur after the time
when tbe customer sbould have given notice, the bank will not be liable for its
good faith payment of forged or altered items by the same wrongdoer as long as
tbe bank observes reasonable commercial standards in paying the items.
The theory underlying tbe UCC is that iftbe customer had given tbe bank
timely notice, it would bave been alerted and could have prevented paying the
subsequent checks passed bytbe-person who altered or forged the first check.-
The duty ofthe customer to report forgeries is different when a forged indorse-
ment is involved. Although the customer should know his or her own signature
and be able to detect any forgery, this is not necessarily true with respect to

"'See Union Tool Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 P 424
(1923); Denbigh v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Wash. 546,174 P 475 (1918); and see Annota-
tion, "Examination of Accounts, Pass BooJcs, or Canceled Checks by Bank Depositors,"
103 ALR J 147 (1936), 67 ALR 1121 (I930); 28 ALR 1435 (1924), 15 ALR 159 (1921),
31tUCC §§ 1-102(3), 1-205,4-103. In New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 41 AD2d 912, 343 NYS2d 538 (1973), the
court gave effect to an agreement requiring the depositor to give written notice within
thiny days ofthe mailing or delivery of any statement or account that the sipature upon
any returned item was forged. The coun held the agreement did not absolve the bank for
negligence, lack of good faith, or ordinary care, but instead provided a condition prete-
dent to liability in the form of an abbreviated period of limitations.
3IOUCC § 4-407. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank. 37 NY2d 252, 333
NE2d 334, 372 NYS2d 18 (1975), where the l:ourt applied the duty to examine bank
statements to a bank that was the issuer ofchecks. A customer's report offorgery to a bank
need not talce a special form. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Scarsdale Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co.• 96 MiSl:. 2d 715, 409 NYS2d 608 (1978),
In Consolidated Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. C-I \'. Farmer's Bank, 686 SW2d 844
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the court held as a matter of law that notification to the bank by a
pany other than the bank's customer satisfied the reQuirement for notice to the bank of
foraeries invec § 4-406.
20-83 MUTUAL DUTIES 1I 20.12(11

forgeries ofindorsements. The customer's failure to detect a forged indorsement

will not preclude the customer from challenging the bank's payment ofthe item,
as long as he or she acts reasonably in eJ:amining the statement and as long as
there was not a prior forgery of the customer's signature by the same forger on
any other check.Ht In any event, if the customer can establish that the bink has
exercised a lack ofordinary care in paying the items that were forged or altered,
the loss will remain on the bank. 1I2
The UCC further establishes an absolute statute oflimitations for reporting
forgeries and altered items. Regardless of due care on the customer's or the
bank's part, the loss will fall on the depositor if he does not report his unautho-
rized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item within one year
or if he fails to report unauthorized indorsements within three years.In

Ht UCC § 4-401(1). UCC § 4-406, which imposes certain duties upon a customer to
review his bank statement and notify the bank of "his unauthorized signature or any
lilteration on an item," does not impose any responsibilities on the customer to notify the
bank that an indorsement of a joint payee is missing. A court held that UCC § 4-406
"imposes no responsibilities on the customer with regard to indorsements of any kind,
except that it fIxes a three-year statute oflimitations on the customer's risht to sue for an
ullauthoriud endorsement." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 40
Conn. Supp. 10, 72, 481 A2d 111, 113 (1984). (It should be noted that UCC § 4-406(2)(b)
extends the customer's liability to any subsequent "unauthorized sianature" by the "same
wrongdoer" after the customer failed in his duty to report "his unauthorized signature"
on an item.) .
H2UCC § 4-401(3). In Nu-Way Serv. Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 530
SW2d 143, 146-148 (Mo. App. 1915), the court found th at the company had not exercised
reasonable care in examining its bank statement and canceled checks for forgeries, where
the bookkeeper merely reconciled the amounts ofthe canceled checks mathematically but
never examined the checks for forgeries or lilterations and did not compare the checks
with the company checkbook. The court held that the bank had exercised reasonable care
in paying the item since the forgeries were well done. In the same case. the bank was liable
for paying altered checks, notwithstanding the customer's failure to exercise reasonable
care in reporting the alterations, because "the lilterations were maladroitly performed and
the changes so egregious as to call for the reproval of the bank clerk" who handled the
payment ofthe checks.ld at 748. See also G. & R. Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523
F2d 1164 (DC Cir. 1915); Parsons Travel Inc. v. Hoag, 18Wash. App. 588, 510 P2d 445
(1911)•
.,3 VCC § 4-406(4). See generally Annot., "Construction and Application ofUCC § 4-
406, Requiring Customer to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature, in Cases
Involving Bank's Payment of Check or Withdrawal on Less Than Required Number of
Signatures," 7 ALR4th 1111 (1981).
In McMickle v. Girard Bank, 356 Pa. Super. 521, 515 A2d 16 (1986), the court held
that a bank had made its statement available to its customer under VCC § 4-406(1) when
it sent the statements and canceled checks to the person its customer had designated.
Thus, the customer was bound by the one-year preclusion when she failed to report to the
bank forgeries by the person who received the statements.
It has been held that this statutory deadline cannot be avoided by suing on common-
law negligence, conversion, or other theories. Brighton, Inc. v. Coloniai First Nat'l Bank,
176 NJ Super. 101,422 A2d 433 (1980), aff'd, 86 NJ 259, 430 A2d 902 (1981).
, 20.12[1) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-84

Section 4-406(4) of the UCC, which provides one year for the customer to
give notice to the bank, is not a statute oflimitations that begins to run when the
customer "knew or should have known" ofthe fOI'l!ery. It is a statutory prerequi-
site of notice and establishes a deadline for giving notice to the bimk.*
In American Htrltage Bank cf Trust Co. v. lsaac,- the court held that it was
not proper for a bank to pay a draft drawn on the firm name of "Cash Cattle
Company, Inc." when the account with the bank was in the name of"Cash Cattle
Company" even though the individual signing the draft was a partner with
authority to draw drafts against "Cash Cattle Company." The court viewed the
bank's action in paying such drafts to be negligence that prevented the bank from
asserting that its customer breached the duty to examine and report unautho-
rized signatures under UCC § 4-406. However, because the partnenhip did not
prove that the partner had diverted these funds for personal use, the court held
that there was no showing of any loss as the proximate result of the bank's
negligence.
It has been held that the payment ofa check by a bank on less than all ofthe
required signatures for the account constitutes a payment on an "unauthorized
signature." Although the bank may well lack ordinary care in payina such an
instrument, if the customer waits more than a year to report to the bank that
payment was made without all of the necessary signatures, the one-year limita-
tion period for reporting unauthorized signatures will apply, and the bank's lack
ofcare will not be relevant. The customer will be absolutely barred from claim-
ing payment was improper.:IM
The duty of a customer to examine his or her bank account and report
forgeries and unauthorized signatures to the bank extends not only to checks
paid from the account but to other withdrawals as well, according to one author-
ity. In Boutros v. Riggs National Bank,SI1 the court held that the UCC imposed
upon a person who maintained a savings account a duty ofexamination to detect
unauthorized withdrawals. The court reasoned that the withdrawal slip consti-
tuted an "item" under the UCC....

·"Jensen v. Essexbank, 396 Mass. 65, 483 NE2d 821 (l985).

385 636 P2d 1926 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 675 P2d 742 (Colo. 1984).

>I, See Annot., "Construction and Application of UCC ~ 4-406, Requiring Customer
to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signatures, in Cases InVolving Bank's Payment of
Check or Withdrawal on Less Than Required Number of Signatures," 7 ALR4th 1111
(1981); Annot., "Bank's Liability for Payment or Withdrawal on Less Than Required
Number of Signatures," 7 ALR4th 655 (1981). See also cases cited note 396 infra.
m 655 F2d 1257 (DC Cir. 1981).
·"Id. at 1260. See Coleman v. Brotherhood State Bank, 3 Kan. App. 2d 162, S92 P2d
103 (1979). The duties imposed upon a customer to examine his bank statement and
report unauthonzod signatures by uec § 4-406 were applied to withdrawals from a
savings account in Tally v. American Sec. Bank, 35 vee Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 215
(DDC 1982). The court trealed the withdrawal slips as "items" under vee § 4-406.
Although the bank retained the withdrawal slips, they were available to the customer for
20-85 MUTUAL DUTIES 1120.12[11

In K&K Manufacturing, Il/C. v. Union Bank., 3It the court held that
"[m]isplaced confidence in an employee will not excuse a depositor from the
duty of notifying the bank of alterations on items paid from the depositor's
account."310 The depositor argued that it had exercised reasonable care and
promptness in examining its monthly statements because the forged checks paid
by the hank were forged by a trusted employee.m The court held that the
employer's duty to examine its statement should be measured against a standard
that charged the depositor "with the knowledge of all facts a reasonable and
prudent examination of his bank statement would have disclosed if made by an
honest employee...:m
A bank cannot take advantage of the defense that its customer failed to use
reasonable care and promptness in examining and reporting unauthorized signa-
tures and authorizations if the bank itself has not acted in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards in paying the check.- In
K&K Manufacturing, Inc. v. Union Bank.," the court held that a bank's proce-
dure of manually checking signatures on checks with the depositor's signatures
on file at the bank was reasonable in view of the fact that most large banks have
completely abandoned making physical comparisons ofthe signatures. In Thore-
son v. Citizens State Bank," the court held that a bank's acceptance of checks
that had neither the indorsements of the payees nor a stamp guaranteeing the

inspection as Section 4-406 requires. The court did not have to decide whether the one-
year statute of limitations should run from the time the customer received the statement
of account from the bank or from the time the withdrawal slips would have been made
available for inspection, pursuant to a reasonably prompt demand for inspection after the
customer received the statement, because the court concluded under either alternative the
time for reporting the unauthorized signatures to the bank had clearly elapsed. Id. at 220-
221. In Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 640 P2d 953 (Okla. 1981), the court held a
savings account withdrawal slip was an "item" under the UCC. A<:cordingly, the deposi-
tor could sue for wrongful dishonor of the withdrawal slip.
311 129 Ariz. 7, 628 P2d 44 (Ct. App. 1981).
31OId. at 48.
391Id. See Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545,403 SW2d 109 (1966),
which excused a church from negligence in a case where checks were forged by a long-time
faithful and trusted employee.
312 K&K, 129 Ariz. at II, 628 P2d at 48. See generally Pine Bluff Nat'l Bank v.
Kesterson, 257 Ark. 813, 520 SW2d 253 (1975); Exchanae Bank & Trust Co. v. Kidwell
Constr. Co., 463 SW2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), writ denied, 472 SW2d 117 (1971);
Faber v. Edgewater Nat'l Bank, 101 NJ Super. 3S4, 244 A2d 339 (1968).
3t3UCC § 4-406(3).
3"129 Ariz. 7,628 P2d 44 (Ct. App. 1981).
315 294 NW2d 397 (ND 1980).
1120.12(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-86

absent indorsements could amount to failure to exercise ordinary care by the

bank.
When a bank pays a check with only one signature that is drawn against a
corporate account for which the bank has a corporate resolution on file requiring
at least two signatures before payment, the bank should be regarded as having
paid the check over an unauthorized signature according to the Texas state
courts. Because payment of the check involved an unauthorized signature, the
corporate customer has a duty under uee § 4·406(d) to examine its bank
statement to see ifthe proper signatures are present and report any unauthorized
payment to the bank. SK
The one-year preclusion in uee § 4-406(4) applies only to forgeries or
alterations on checks drawn on the customer's account, not to items deposited
by the customer drawn on other accounts. Thus, it docs not apply to the altera-
tion of a restrictive indorsement on checks the customer deposited.:m

[2] Duty to Report Forgeries and Alterations When Bank Retains

Checks
As banks shift to electronic means of transferring funds and making pay-
ments, new systems for permitting the collection of checks without physically
transferring the checks have emerged."" These check truncation systems pro-
vide for the retention of the checks at various points in the banking system.
Under one approach, the checks are held by the payor bank. Under another, the
bank of deposit retains the check. Although the customer receives a statement
with information about his account and about the transactions involving it, the
checks he has drawn are not returned to the customer with the statement.
Under the vee, the customer's duty to discover and report unauthorized
signatures or alterations normally arises because the bank sends the customer a
"statement of account accompanied by items paid."s" Under this provision,
sending only a statement is not enough to trigger the customer's duty to report.
The vee also provides that the customer has a duty to report unauthorized
signatures or alterations when the bank either '·'holds the statement and items

""First Nat'l Bank v. La Sara Grain Co., 646 SW2d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. t982). On
appeal, the bank was ultimately held liable because the evidence supported the trial
coun's finding that the bank had actual knowledge that two silnatures were required and
thus did not meet the good faith requirement in uee § 4-406(d). 673 SW2d 558 (Tex.
1984). See also Provident Sav. Bank v. United Jersey Bank, 207 NJ Super. 303, 504 A2d
135 (1985) (reviewing the existing case law). But a contrary decision was reached in In re
Florida Airlines, [nc., 57 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. MD Aa. 1986), without giving reasons for it.
m Patterson Produce Co. v. First Nat') Bank, 475 So. 2d 1368 (Aa. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
m These systems are described in N. Penney & D. Baker, The Law ofEleetronic Fund
Transfer Systems 1 2.01 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
". UCC § 4-406 ( I) (emphasis added).
 20-87 MUnJAL DUTIES 1120.12(3)

pursuant to the request or instruction ofits customer" or reasonably "makes the

. statement and items available" to the customer. 400 These alternatives also are
difficult to implement in a check-truncation system. A major problem exists
when the checks are not to be held by the customer's bank but are retained
elsewhere in the system by the depository banks. Since the customer's bank is
not "holding" the items fur the customer, it is questionable whether the items
are reasonably "available." Probably the only solution is for the bank and the
customer to enter into an agreement in which the customer accepts a duty to
report forgeries and alterations, although the cancelled checks will not be
returned with the statement. <lG1

[3} Negligence and the Duty of Doe Care Under the UCC
The UCC contains an elaborate system for allocating the risk ofloss when a
check contains forged signatures or has been altered. This system begins with the
warranty provisions that permit banks or other parties that have taken an item
as a transferee or that have paid an item to charge back their loss to a prior party
when a breach of warranty can be shown. These basic allocation rules are
modified (1) by certain special provisions that apply when a pany's negligence
contributes to an unauthorized signature or alteration- or a customer fails to
comply with the customer's duty to examine bank statements of the customer's
account4O.J and (2) by rules imposing more general supervisory responsibility
upon enterprises to supervise the activities of their employees who may be
involved in check handling functions. -.M Following the UCC's scheme for alloca-
tion of liability may appear inconvenient at times because it seems to involve a
circuity of action where a customer must first object to the customer's bank that
it improperly paid an item and this bank, the payor bank, must in tum seek
recovery for breach of warranty over against prior banks, and so forth. 4OI In
various situations, persons have attempted to shon circuit the UCC allocation
scheme·· by finding liability based upon rules not expressly set forth in the
UCC.... One of the more celebrated cases in which these efforts were successful
is Sun 'N Sand. Inc. v. United California Bank. <07 Here, the court found that the
presentment warranties made by a collecting bank to a payor bank should also be

400VCC § 4-406( t).

.., For an excellent discussion ofthese problems, see N. Penny & D. Baker, supra note
398.
"'vee § 3-406.
"'vee § 4-407.
-vec § 3-405.
"s See Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust ,Co., 345 Mass.
I, 184 NE2d 358 (1962).
-ld.
..721 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, (1978).
, 20.13 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-88

treated as for the benefit of the drawer. The court also found a negligence
liability ofa coUecting bank to the drawer ofan item that the collecting bank had
handled for collection. The extent to which it might be appropriate under the
vee to resort to common law principles establishing liability, such as negli·
gence, is not clearly specified by the vee. As previously noted, uee § 1·103
permits resorts to general principles oflaw but it is not appropriate to rely upon
such general principles when they are "displaced by the particular provisions" of
the vee.... Given the particularity and specificity of the vee provisions on
loss allocation among parties involved in handling a check for collection and
payment, including treatment of the consequences when a customer is negligent
and when a bank fails to observe reasonable commercial standards, there is a
powerful argument that the vee provisions should not be avoided by resort to
negligence rules that are outside the vee.
Although general common law principals ought not be used to circumvent
the vee's complex Calculus for allocating loss, there are specific provisions in
the vee that impose liability upon a depositor for failing to exercise due care.
These situations include the failure to exercise care with respect to signatures
and alterations.,.. They also include circumstances in which the customer will be
held responsible for having issued checks to persons who were not intended to
have an interest in the instruments under the "fictitious payee provisions.....o

11 20.13 LIABILITY OF BANK ON PROMISES AND

REPRESENTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ITS
CUSTOMER'S ACCOUNT
A bank may become liable to those it deals with for representations it makes
about the status ofaccounts held by its customers at the bank or for undenakings
with respect to those accounts.'" In Harwood &Associates,/nc. v. Texas Bank &
Trust, "2 a bank was held liable for failing to carry out a promise to transfer funds
from one of its customer's accounts to the ,plaintiff. In this case, the funds
transferred were to pay for a computer ordered by the bank's customer and sold

mUCC§ 1·103.
m UCC § 3.406.
"0 UCC § 3·405. See generally Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill.
App. 2d 235, 207 NE2d 158 (1965). For other examples of situations where the carelen.
ness of the depositor resulted in the loss falling upon him, see George Whalley Co. v.
National City Bank, 55 Ohio App. 2d 205, 380 NE2d 742 (1977) (failure to supervise
bookkeeping); Dominion Const., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 154,315 A2d 69 (1974)
(carelessness in naming joint payees).
'" See Herbert, "Truth or Consequences? A Bank's Liabilitv for Erroneous Assur·
ances Concerning a Customer's Account," 6 Ann. Rev. Banking i.. 95 (1987).
412 654 F2d 1073 (5tb Cir. 1981).
20-89 MUTUAL DUTIES 1l2U3

to a third party. The bank agreed to transfer the funds from its customer's
account to the plaintiffin exchange for the plaintiffs taking action to obtain the
release of a stop payment order on a check given by the third party purchaser to
the bank's customer and deposited by the customer at the bank. The court held
that the bank's undertaking was a valid oral contract that did not constitute a
guarantee contract, which must be in writing to satisfy the statute offrauds. The
court further held that the benefit for the bank from the plaintiffs arranging for
the lifting of the stop payment order and the detriment to the plaintifffrom his
giving up the protection that the withholding ofpayment to the bank's customer
would have represented constituted sufficient consideration to malee the bank's
promise to transfer the funds an enforceable contract.
It is also necessary for bank officers to be careful in making representations
to their customers as to the extent to which deposits with the bank will be
regarded as security for debts to the bank. In Zimeri v. Citizens & Southern
International Bank, m the debtors claimed that the bank promised that their
certificates of deposit would not be used as collateral for a particular loan,
although they had signed an agreement that said that the certificates of deposit
were security for that loan. The court held that the bank was not estopped from
setting offthe loan amount against the certificates ofdeposit because the debtors
had not established all the elements of estoppel. In this case, although arguably
there had been a representation by the bank and a justifiable reliance by the
debtors on that representation, the debtors had not established that, as a result of
that reliance on the bank's representation, they had changed their position to
their detriment. The court came to this conclusion because the debtors had an
independent motivation for keeping the certificates of deposit at the bank. In
other circumstances, it may be difficult for a bank to show such an independent
reason.
In LeBovici v. Jamaica Savings Bank"" a bank officer's statement to a
customer that the customer could, by paying an interest penalty, make a with-

on 664 F2d 952 (5th Cir. 1981)•

.,. 81 AD2d 150,439 NYS2d 688 (1981), afi'd, 56 NY2d 522, 434 NE2d 1332, 449
NYS2d 954 (1982).
The Second Circuit dismissed an action to recover from a bank for a negligent
misrepresentation that the bank would make a loan. The court held that New York law
required proof of a special relationship between the bank and the person to whom the
statement was made that would create a "duty" to avoid negligent misrepresentations.
Quoting from another New York case, the court said, "The imposition of a duty to speak
carefully when the damages are limited to economic loss, requires proof of a special
relationship between the parties sufficient to justify actionable reliance." Durante Bros. &
Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F2d 239, 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 473 US 906
(1985). In the court's view, "An ordinary creditor-debtor relationship between bank and
customer does not create such a duty ofcare." Id. Moreover. when the misrepresentation
is promissory rather than factual, "liabilitY has been imposed only where there was shown
a special relationship or a breach of contract." Id. The court summed up its view by saying
 , 20,13 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 20-90

drawal from a savings account before the time stipulated in the account agree-
ment was held not to estop the bank from denying the customer authority to
. withdraw. The bank officer's statement was one of present intention only that
did not bind the bank's future conduct.
A bank's refusal to give its customer information about the customer's
account was the basis for a punitive damage award in a case involvil18 the bank's
management of an investment account for the customer.•'S
In Zion's First National Bank v. United Health Club, Inc.,41s the plaintiff
charged the bank with providing credit information that defamed the plaintiff

that the plaintiff had not found any New York case "ruling that liability may be imposed
on a defendant for a negligent promissory misrepresentation that could not give rise to
liability for either fraud or breach of contract, where there was no special relationship
between plaintiff and defendant." Id. at 253.
A bank has a duty to use reasonable care in processing a home loan customer',
application for a mortgage loan and also may be liable for reckJelSly making false state-
ments about the customer's ability to qualify for the loan. The Equal Credit Opponunity
Act does not preempt all ISpects of the bank-customer credit relationship. HiJh v.
McLean Fin. Corp., 6S9 F. Supp. IS61 (DDe 1987) (following Jacques v. First Nat'l
Bank, 307 Md. 527, SIS A2d 7S6 (1986».
Abank has a duty ofdue care when its banking customers seck advice on investments.
A bank's statement that a particular investment was sound, where the bank had informa-
tion matetialto the risk in the investment, constituted a statement offact, not of opinion.
Under these circumstances, a fraud and negligent misrepresentation action could be
brouJht against the bank. Hill v. Equitable Bank, 6SS F. Supp. 631 (D. Del. 1987).
Abank's failure to give proper notice ofdishonor made the bank liable for payment of
a check drawn on insufficient funds. The bank was entitled to charge its customer's
account for the overdraft caused by the check even though the bank had advised its
customer that the check had been dishonored and returned NSF when the customer gave
the bank a stop payment order. Brown v. Lee County Bank, SO I So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. er.
App, 1987).
"sBank of N.Y. v. BriaJIt, 494 NE2d 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
·"704 F2d 120 (3d Cir. 1983). A suit against a bank for fraud by customers who
guaranteed a debt 10 the bank was nat successful in Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga.
615,331 5E2d S89 (1985) (overruled on other grounds, Emmons v. Burlcett, 256 Ga. 855,
353 SE2d 908 (1987). The customers claimed the bank misrepresented the financial
condition of the debtor whose obligation tbey guaranteed. The court, however, held that
Ihe bank's statements were "merely statements of opinion or expectation, and thus were
not representations regarding an existing fact." The court also found that the reliance of
the customers on the bank's opinion was misplaced, as the customers were in as good a
position as the bank to analyze the debtor's financial condition. The customers' "faiJure to
investigate the matter showed a lack of due diligence."
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F2d 771 (7th Cir.
J985), the court did permit a creditor to obtain damages from a bank because offraudu-
lent statements the bank made about the financial condition ofthe creditor's borrower. In
this case, the borrower was an automobile dealership that General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC) was financing. The bank misrepresented to GMAC the status of
loans to the dealer, the condition of the dealer's accounts, the dealership's compliance
with loan repayments, and the amount ofloans to the dealership. The coun also regarded
20-91 MUTUAL DUTIES 120.13

and with interfering with a future business relationship. The court held that the
bank was not liable under either count. The information the bank provided was
accurate as well as privileged, and the elements required for interference with a
prospective business relationship were not established.

as sianificant the fact that the bank had an adverse relationship with OMAC because the
bank's loans to the dealership were unpaid and the bank's coune ofaction enabled it to get
the proceeds to reduce the dealenhip's debt to the bank. In Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765
F2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985), a bank became liable as an aider and abettor to a fraudulent
underwriting scheme because the bank's loan officer wrote a letter assuring others that the
underwriter engaged in the fraudulent scheme was a penon of trustworthy character. By
writing the letter, the loan officer assumed a special duty toward those to whom he had
written. Moreover, writing the letter under the circumstances of the case was severely
reckless conduct.
In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679
(1985), the California Supreme Court reinstated a $2.1 million jury award against the
bank for fraud and failure to extend crcdit.ln another California case, it has been reported
that damage awards totaling more than $26 mi11ion were recovered against the Bank of
America on the theory that the bank had forced the plaintiffs out ofbusiness by refusing to
extend additional credit. The plaintiffs contended that the bank had made loans to them
and then maneuvered them into a position where they could not repay those loans. The
trial court reduced the original $26.7 million in punitive damages to $6 million, and both
the bank and the plaintiffs have appealed. Kruse v. Bank of Am., 4S Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) 773 (Oct. 18, 1985).
 21
Collection and Payment of
Instruments
, 21.0 I Responsibilities of Banks in Collecting Payment of Checks and
Other Negotiable Instruments ..•..•............••••.... 21-2
[I] Liability of Depositary Bankfor Collecting Payment . . . . . . . 21-3
(2) Bank's Duties in Choosing Other Collecting Banks 21-5
(3) Duties ofIntermediary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 21-5
[4] Effect of Private Agreements on Banks' Duties. . . . . . . . . . . 21-7
, 21.02 Failure to Act Properly in Collecting the Item. . . . . . . .. . . . • . . 21-9
[I] Duty of Holder to Present Instrument Promptly . 21-9
(2) Duty of Collecting Bank to Act Promptly 21.10
(3) Form of Payment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-11
[4] Delay From Misroutings 21-12
'21.03 Payment ofllems by Payor Bank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-15
[I] Accountability of Payor Bank for Payment ofItems 21-15
(2) Legal Consequences and Timing of Payment. . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-1 B
(3) Notice to Payor From Notations on Checks 21-20
[4] Effect of Payment on the Underlying Transaction. . . . . . . .. 21-21
[5 J Payment by Remittance Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-23
[6] Payor Bank's Right to Cancel Payment and Recover Proceeds 21-24
(7) Application of Final Payment Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 21-2B
[B) Method of Return ofllems Not Paid Under UCC and
Federal Reserve Board Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. 21-30
'121.04 Instruments Payable at or Through Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-32
'121.05 Errors in Handling Computer-Encoded Checks. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-34
[I) Errors in Check Amounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-35
(2) Errors in Routing Directions 21-36
1121.06 Collection and Return of Checks Under Federal Reserve Board
Regulation CC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-39
1121.07 Use or Central Data Processing Center for Payment ofCh'ecks by
Bank With MUltiple Branches .........................• 21-42

21-1
1121.01 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-2

'121.08 Payment of Lost or Stolen Checks .........•.......•..... 21-45

'1121.09 Jurisdiction in Lawsuits Involving Check Collection and Other
Transactions ..•.................................. " 21-47
'Il21.10 ·Presentment for Payment Under uee and Federal. Reserve
Board Rules .............•......................... 21-48
[1] Liability of Primary and Secondary Parties " 21-50
[2] When Instruments Mature " 21·50
[3] Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-5 I
[4] Time to Make Presentment for Payment " 21·52
[5] Formalities of Presentment ...............•......... 21-53
[6] When Presentment Is Excused " 21-55
[7] Duty of Payor Bank to Pay " 21-56
raj When Payment May Be Refused Without Dishonor " 21-56
[bJ what Is Dishonor? ...............•........... " 21-56
[8] Presentment for Acceptance " 21-57
'Il21.11 Protest and Notice of Dishonor " 21-58
[1] Protest .......•.............................•.. 21-58
[2] Notice of Dishonor ••..•.••....................... 21-59
[a] When Notice of Dishonor Is Necessary " 21-59
[bJ Giving Notice .......................•........ 21-60
[cJ Who Should Be Notified " 21-60
[d) Deadlines for Notice Under uec and Federal Reserve
Board Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21-61
[e) When Notice of Dishonor Is Received " 21·65
If] When Notice of Dishonor is Excused 21-66
[3} Presentment of Previously Dishonored Checks ., " 21·67
[4J Waiver of Presentment, Notice, and Protest " 21-67
[5} Consequence of Failure to Give Notice of Dishonor to
Drawer " 21-67
, 21.12 Collection of U.S. Government Checks 21-68
[I J Indorsement, Transfer, and Collection of Government
Checks " 21-70
(2] Deadlines for Payment of Government Checks and for
Making Claim to Recover Payments for Checks With Forged
or Unauthorized Indorsements " 21-72

11 21.01 RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANKS IN COLLECTING

PAYMENT OF CHECKS AND OTHER NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
This chapter discusses the process by which banks collect payment on
negotiable instruments for their customers and the rights and duties of those
involved in the collection process. The basic law governing this process is Article
21-3 COLLEcrION & PAYMENT 1121.01(11

4 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, but the VCC is not the only source of law. A
vast number of collections occur through the Federal Reserve System. The
Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System has promulgated regulations
that govern its collection procedures. The UCC provides that Federal Reserve
reaulations are binding upon all parties concerned, whether a specific agreement
exists or not, and that they supercede the provisions ofthe UCC. Until Congress
directed the Federal Reserve Board to regulate the collection process to expedite
the availability of funds to bank customers, the uee was generally consistent
with the regulations of the Board. As discussed in Chapter 14, the role of the
Board in regulating the collection process greatly expanded when eongress
enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act. To implement this act, the Board
adopted a new Regulation CC, "Availability of Funds and eollection of
Checks," which became effective September I, 1988, and preempts those por-
tions of the vee that are inconsistent with Regulation CC.
Banks also collect payments through clearinghouse associations. These
associations adopt their own rules, which also are binding upon the parties and
which supercede the provisions of the uee. The emergence of electronically
transmitted payment instructions and transfers has led to a new body of law.
These transactions are largely outside the coverage of the uee. Instead, the
rights of the parties are established by private agreement and, to some extent, by
special federal and state legislation. The UCC recognizes the effectiveness of
these agreements to the extent that they may vary from its terms. Because the
vce remains the basic body of law offering a comprehensive view of the
collection and payment process, this chapter primarily focuses on the relevant
provisions of the uee. Electronic fund transfers are discussed in Chapter 18.
The impact of Regulation CC on the framework established by the vee
cannot yet be fully determined. Some of the key provisions of the regulation are
noted in Chapter 20 and in this chapter. Further analysis will appear in future
supplements to this book. Given the new complexities created by the interplay
between Regulation ec and the vec, it is important to review both authorities
on any issue involving the collection or return of checks. This is an area where it
is important to obtain the advice of legal counsel.

(I) Liability of Depositary Bank for Collecting Payment

When a depositor places various items in a bank, either as deposits or as
items for collection, the uee allows the parties to make any agreement they
desire to cover their relationship, provided that the agreement does not attempt
to relieve the bank of responsibility for its own negligence or exercise of bad
faith.' Contracts of this nature must be clearly set out,' whereas Federal Reserve

1 VCC § 4·103(1) (1978) (subsequent citations to the Uniform Commercial Code

(Vcq refer to the 1978 official text). See New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 41 AD2d 912, 343 NYS2d 538 (1973) (agree-
1121.01[1] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-4

regulations and operating circulars, clearinghouse rules, and the like are binding
on the parties whether or not they assent to them. 3
In the absence of agreement or regulations, the UCC establishes rules
governing the collection process. Regardless of the indorsement's nature or
fonn, and whether the paper is deposited or simply given to pay the customer's
obligation to the bank, the bank becomes the depositor's or customer's agent for
purposes ofcollection unless clear contrary intent exists. The paper is still owned
by the depositor and the bank handles it at the customer's risk.' The depositary
bank, and all subsequent banks handling the paper, have all the rights ofholders
in due course for any liens they may have on the paper, for any advances they
have made, or for covering any loss they may suffer in the collection process. s
These rules apply even though the bank may have purchased the item and is its
owner"
Since the banks are agents for collection, they have certain duties that
include presenting or sending the items for payment, receiving payment, and
remitting the proceeds. In case ofdishonor, the bank has a duty to give notice of
the dishonor, to return the item with care, and to arrange for any needed
protest. 7 Federal Reserve rules also apply and establish duties when a bank acts

ment enforced requiring the depositor to give notice of foreeries within thirty days of
mailing the statement of account); State ex rel. Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App.
2d 124,346 NE2d 326 (1975) (unilateral notice on bank'~ statement, requiring reporting
of errors within ten days, not enforced); Valley Nat'l Bank v. Tang, 18 Ariz. App. 40, 499
P2d 991 (1972) (VCC provisions against disclaimers do not apply to night depositary
arrangements because they are not part afthe collection and deposit process); Hy·Grade
Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 NJ Super. 112,350 A2d 279 (1975), cen. denied, 70 NJ
518, 361 A2d 532 (1976) (agreement disclaiming liability for negligence in a night
depositary service not effective).
In bank ofWyandolle v. Woodrow, 394 F. Supp. 550 (WD Mo. 1975), a payor failed
to follow a Federal Reserve operating letter requiring the wiring ofadvice of nonpayment
when a debit item of $1,000 or more was involved. The coun indicated in dicta that
failure to observe the Federal Reserve procedure might subject the payor bank to liability
for any loss resulting from its delay in giving notice of nonpayment. Federal Reserve
regulations have been held binding upon Federal Reserve System nonmembers that use
Federal Reserve clearing procedures. Community Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 500 F2d
282 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 US 108 (1974), amended 525 F2d 690 (9th Cir.
1975).
•vee §§ 1·102(3). 1·201(1), 1.201(3).
•vce § 4·103(2).
• VCC § 4·201(1). See Jones v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 2d
143 (1976) (holder status ofdepositary bank is a question of fact to be resolved on a case·
by-case basis).
svec § 4·201(1) & comment 4. See VCC §§ 4·208-4·209.
'vce § 4-201(1).
'vcc § 4·202. For Federal Reserve rules on collecting checks and giving notice of
dishonor. see ~~ 21.03(8). 21.1I(2)[d).
21-5 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.01(3)

in collecting checks and giving notice ofdishonor. The VCC has adopted the so-
called Massacbusetts rule.' According to this rule, when a check is payable in a
distant city, the depositary or collecting bank is required to forward the item for
collection but is not liable for any act of a bank to which the item is sent,
provided the depositary or collecting bank obeys the instructions it received
when taking the item.' When losses occur during the collection process of an
instrument deposited for that purpose, the owner has a claim onJy against the
bank causing the loss. All banks in the process of collection are subagents of the
owner and are directly responsible to the owner.'· Therefore, although the
depositary bank is not liable for any other bank's negligence or insolvency while
handling the item, it is liable to the depositor for its own lack of care. ll

l2} Bank's Duties in Choosing Other CoJlectin. Banks

Each bank in the collection chain has a duty to act with ordinary care in
presenting an item for payment or in sending a check to another bank to make
presentment. This duty means the bank is responsible for giving proper instruc·
tions to the intermediary banks and agents it selects and must use care to choose
properly qualifled intermediaries to collect the item.,2
At common law, when an instrument was drawn or made payable on a bank
in a city that had two or more banks, the paper was required to be sent to one
other than the drawee or payor. If the instrument was sent directly to the drawee
or payor for collection, any loss resulting from failure of the proceeds to be
returned fell to the bank sending the instruments. on the theory that it was
improper to ask a bank to collect from itself." The VCC allows the transmitting
bank to send the item directly to the drawee or to use any other reasonably
prompt method of collection.,.

(3) Duties of Intermediary

A number of banks may be involved in the process of collecting paper. For
example, a buyer from Champaign, Illinois, may give a check drawn on a

• VCC § 4-202, comment 4.

• VCC §§ 4-202(3), 4·203.
'·vce § 4-202(3) & comment 4.
"vcc § 4.202( I).
12 VCC ~ 4·202(1 )(a) & comment 4.
'3 Minneapolis Sash & Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136, 78 NW 980
(1899). See Turner. "Bank Collections-the Direct Routing Practice," 39 Yale U 468
(1930).
,. VCC § 4-204. The VCC also permits, in optional provisions. the direct return of
dishonored items to the depositary bank. VCC §§ 4-202(1 )(b), 4·212(2). Federallegisla.
tion to speed up check collection also authorizes the Fed~ral Reserve Board 10 establish
rules for direct presentment and return. Regulation CC ofthe Board contains provisions
to implement this. See ~ 21.03[8].
1121.01(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-6

Champaign bank to a merchant in Winnetka. The merchant will deposit the

check in his Winnetka bank, the Winnetka bank may then send it through
clearings to its Chicago correspondent bank, the Chicago correspondent wiD
send it to a second Chicago bank that is a CXlrrespondent of the Champaign
drawee bank, and the second Chicago bank will then send the paper to the
Champaign bank. When aU or some of the banks are members of a common
clearinghouse, the number of banks needed to handle the instrument may be
reduced. Under the UCC, each ofthe collecting banks, while it has the check, is
the agent of the depositor. for collection." The Winnetka bank is called the
depositary bank and, in this example, it also is a collecting bank. The two
Chicago banks are intermediary banks or collecting banks and the Champaign
bank is the payor bank."
Although each of the intermediary banks is directly responsible to the
original depositor, each bank is in no way bound to carry out the depositor's
instructions to the depositary bank." Neither are the intermediary banks bound
by any ofthe indorsements appearing on the paper, including restrictive indor-
sements, made by persons other than the bank that directly transfers the item to
the intermediary bank." The only duty of an intermediary bank is to credit the
account ofthe transmitting bank, to follow its special instructions ifany,"and to
see that the item is forwarded to the next bank in the chain of collection in a
timely manner. 20 Under the UCC, a collecting bank acts timely when it takes
action before its midnight deadline, which is midnight of the next business day
after receipt of the item or notice." Collecting banks may obtain a security
interest in an item for the amount of the credit given" and, even if the item is
restrictively indorsed, may be holders in due course of the item.·3
A collecting bank is directly liable to the original depositor for any losses
caused by its negligence or improper handling ofthe item;" but it is not liable for
losses caused by delays beyond its control." A collecting bank also may extend

15 uee § 4-201(1).
11 uee § 4.105. See the description of these definitions in ~ 19.0 I.
17 uee § 4-203.

"uee §§ 3·206(2), 3-419(4). See uee §§ 4·203,4·205(2).

"uee §§ 4·203. 4·205(2).
•• uee § 4.202(2).
" uee § 4.104(l){h). See discussion at ~ 21.02[2].
•, uee § 4·208(1). The security interest arises when the credit given for the item has
been withdrawn or applied or certain other action occurs. Id. See the discussion of this
concept in ~ 16.01 [4]. See also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Fon Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 NJ
Super. 43. 213 A2d 315 (1965).
'3 uce § 4·209. See uee § 3-206(4).
"uec §§ 4.103(1),4-201,4-202(3). On the question of causation; see Marcoux v.
Van Wyk, 572 F2d 651 (8th Cir. 1978), cefl. dismissed 439 US 801 (1978).
"uec § 4.108(2).
 21·7 COLLECTION & PAYMENT t 21.01(4)

any ofthe vee time limits for the collection ofa specific item by one additional
banking day when the extension is a good faith attempt to collect payment ofthe
item."
The rules of the Federal Reserve System may vary from the provisions of
the UCC. For example, such a rule affected the liability of an intermediary
Federal Reserve banle in Childs v. FederalReserve Bank,:t7 where a Reserve bank
successfully avoided plaintiff's claim for negligence in handling a checlc in the
amount of $200,000. A Federal Reserve regulation stated that a Reserve bank
acts only as the senders agent with respect to an item and that only a bank may
qualify as a sender. Moreover, the regulation also stipulated that a Reserve bank
shall not act as ageot or sub-agent of the owner of the item. The court held that
. the regulation changed the rule that otherwise exists under the uee as to
liability of collecting banks to the owner of the item being processed for collec-
tion. In this situation, the bank did not attempt to disclaim liability for good
faith and Qrdinary care; the bank simply did not owe the owner of the items any
.duty of care because it was not the agent of that party.

[4] Effect of Private Agreements on Banks' Duties

The effect ofspecific uee provisions can be changed by agreement between
parties. The vee, as a general policy. permits great freedom to parties to enter
into contracts that vary the rules ofthe vee. This policy is incorporated into tbe
general principles that apply to all of the articles in the uce. o' Article 4 specifi-
cally embraces this policy in the provisions on bank collection of checks. 2t The
policy for recognizing this power to vary the effect of the rules stated in the uee
itself is explained in lerms of the technical nature of banks' work in clearing
checks and other items, the need for flexibility to meet changing conditions, and
the need to respond to improvements in operating methods. A comment to the
key section concludes that "it would be unwise to freeze present methods of
operation by mandatory statutory rules. This section, therefore, permits within
wide limits variation of provisions of the Article by agreement.":10

Oi VCC § 4-108(1). The extension is available only "unless otherwise instructed." Id.
See V 21.02. A collecting bank is not an insurer of collection nor is it responsible for the
mistakes of its customer. Madsen v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 28 Vtah 2d 438, 503 P2d
1213 (1972). See also Der Ghazarian v. Banco da Lavoura de Minas Gerais, S.A. 16 VCC
Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 771 (NY App. Term 1975).
0'719 F2d 812 (5th Cir. 1983).A Federal Reserve bank is the agent or subagent ofthe
owner of the item under the current regulations and is liable to the owner for the Reserve
bank's lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. 12 eFR § 210.6 (1988).
0' VCC § 1.102(3). There also is a general proviso that the absence of language in
provisions of"'unless otherwise agreed' or words of similar import" is not to be taken as
expressing an inference that the provision cannot be varied by agreement. rd. § 1-102(4).
"vcc § 4-103.
3·vee § 4-103, comment I.
, 21.01[41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-8

There are limits to the freedom to contract granted by the uee. There may
be no variation by agreement when the act "otherwise provides. "31 A bank
cannot disclaim "responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinary care ..." and cannot limit the measure of damages, although
an agreement can determine standards to measure responsibility ifthe standards
"are not manifestly unreasonable. "52
Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars, as well as clearing-
house rules and similar rules, are given the force ofagreements. 33 These rules and
regulations "have the effect of agreements • . . whether or not specifically
assented to by all parties interested in items handled. "14 This provision was
included to meet the problem posed by the circumstance that banks handle so
many items each day that they cannot possibly obtain the agreement ofeveryone
who has an interest in an item being handled for collection or retum. u
The comments to the section make clear that agreement, as defined in the
uee, has a broad meaning and includes circumstances in which a person may
become bound by estoppel or ratification. An agreement may be found from
legends on deposit tickets, signature cards, and similar documents. 31 But, as the
comment indicates, private agreements will not bind parties, such as the owner
of a check handled for collection or other parties to the instrument, unless the
parties actually have agreed." The provision dealing with Federal Reserve
regulations and clearinghouse rules is specifically drafted to have a wider effect
and bind persons not parties to the agreement. However, it is not clear how far
the binding force of these Federal Reserve regulations or clearinghouse rules
extend.
The Federal Reserve Board's Regulation ee on the availability offunds and
collection of checks also contains provisions that permit the variation of the
terms of the regulation to some extent by agreement. The part of the regulation
dealing with collection of checks may be varied by agreement subject to limita-
tions, similar to those in the uee forbidding disclaimers of good faith and
ordinary care. 31 The commentary suggests the regulation should be construed to
be consistent with the official comments interpreting the parallel uee provi-
sion. 3' This commentary specifically points out the inability to bind persons who

"uee § 1-102(3). Interestingly, the "except as otherwise provided" language of§ 1-

102(3) does not appear in § 4-103.
32 uee § 4-103(1).
33uee § 4-103(2).
34 Id.
35uee § 4-103. comment 3.
36 uee § 4-.03. comment 2.
37 Id.
31Regulation CC § 229.37 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.37).
3'Id. § 229.37, commentary.
21-9 COLLECTION & PAYMENT , 21.0211]

have not been a pany to the agreement and warns that, in light ofthis principie,
agreements "that delay the return of a check beyond the times required by this
subpart may result in liability ... to entities not pany to the agreement."4O The
regulation also specifically addresses agreements that provide for check tronca-
tion, and specifies that such a truncation agreement cannot extend return times
or make other changes in the duties imposed by the regulation as to "parties
interested in the check that are not party to the asreement. "41
Both the vee and Regulation ee contain safe harbor provisions that
protect banks that follow the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. The
vee makes action by a bank approved by the vee or Federal Reserve regula-
tions and operating circulars sufficient to constitute ordinary care. Action in
accordance with clearinghouse roles "and the like," as long as there are no
specific instruments to the contrary, is prima facie to be regarded as the exercise
of ordinary care.u Regulation ee provides that good faith action in conform-
ance with Board rules or interpretations wiU not be the basis for liability under
the regulation even if the rule or interpretation is later determined to be
invalid.'s
As a result ofthese provisions of the vee and Regulation CC, the rights and
liabilities of panies involved in the collection of checks and other items cannot
be determined by reference only to the rules contained in state legislation, such
as the vee, federal legislation, or agency regulation. It is necessary also to
consult clearinghouse rules and determine ifother private agreements exist that
validly affect the rights and duties that might otherwise be imposed as a matter
oflaw.

~ 21.02 FAILURE TO ACT PROPERLY IN COLLECTING THE

ITEM
(1] Duty of Holder to Present Instrument Promptly
Under the vee, the holder ofa negotiable instrument has a duty to present
the instrument for payment in a timely fashion. An instrument that has a staied
time for payment should be presented for payment'on that· date"" When an
instrument is payable on demand, as is the case with checks, ifindorsers are to be
held liable in the case ofsubsequent dishonor ofthe instrument, presentment for
payment must be made within a reasonable time after the indorsement was

'·'d.
41 [d. § 229.36(c). See also the examples of matters that might be covered by agree-

ment in the commentary 10 id. § 229.37.

"vee § 4-103(3).
OJ Regulation ee § 229.38(h) (J 988) (to be eodified at 12 CFR § 229.38(h)).
•• vee § 3-503( I Xc). .
f 21.02(2) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-10

made." In the case of uncertified checks, the vee sets up rebuttable presump-
tions that presentment within thirty days after the date the check is written is a
reasonable period of time within which to hold the drawer liable, and that
presentment within seven days after indorsement is sufficient time for holding
the indorsers liable. To meet these deadlines, the customer need only begin the
process of bank collection within those periods when a check is involved. In
other words, presentment on the drawee does not actually have to occur in order
to meet the deadlines."
The drawer ofchecks or drafts payable at a bank, together with the maker of
notes or the acceptor of drafts payable at a bank, are, if they assign their rights
against the bank to the holder, discharged from liability to the extent ofany loss
caused by unreasonable delay in presentment. For example, if the drawee bank
should fail during the interval and pay only fifty percent on the claims of
creditors, the drawer ofa check or draft, the maker ofa note, or the acceptor ofa
draft payable at the bank would be discharged from all liability by assigning his
or her rights to this dividend <as against the insolvent bank) to the holder of the
instrument. 47 Indorsers ofchecks, drafts, and notes are entirely discharged. One
major consequence, then, of unreasonable delay in presenting an item for pay-
ment is that if the item is subsequently dishonored, the holder will not have
recourse against prior indorsers."
Delay in presentment may be excused when there is no notice that it is due,
it is unreasonable to make presentment within the time available, payment on
the item has been stopped, or presentment is waived. 4f A holder in due course
that does not know about the delay in presentment is not bound by the prior
discharge in liability. 50

(2) Duty of Collecting Bank to Act Promptly

When a collecting bank handles an item for collection, the bank generally
will be under a duty to act more promptly than the previously mentioned time
periods suggest. The collecting bank has a duty to use ordinary care and to act
promptly in collecting the item or forwarding it for presentment. If the bank acts
before its midnight deadline (midnight on the banking day following the day it
received the item), the vee treats the bank action as timely.&' On the other

45 vee § 3-503(1 lee).

.. vee § 3-503(2).
47 vee § 3.502(l)(b).
.. vee § 3·502(1 lea). The discharge ofliability is only on the obligation as indorser. It
would not affect the liability of an indorser for breach of warranty that the signature~ on
the items were nOI forged.
"uee § 3-511.
50 uee § 3-602.
"uee § 4-202(2). In Wilhelm Foods. Inc. v. Nat'l Bank, 388 F. Supp. 1376 (SONY
21-11 COLLECTION de PAYMENf 1 21.O2l31

band, if the bank delays beyond its midnight deadline, the bank will have the
burden ofproving tbat its delay was reasonable. Failure to establish the reasona-
bleness ofthe delay may, to the extent of any loss caused by its delay, make the
bank liable to its customer for the amount of the item.1l In addition to liability
for delay, banlcs have been held strictly accountable for failing to make proper
presentment. 53 Ofcourse, when the delay does not cause any loss and the item is
subseqUently dishonored, the bank may have rights to charge the item back to its
customer's account. If there has been no discharge of indorsers, as discussed
earlier, the bank: may have rights against the prior indorsers.
In cases in which the item presented for collection is dishonored, it is the
duty ofthe collecting bank to give proper notice ofdishonor when it learns ofthe
dishonor. Failure to give such notice or to return the dishonored item by the
bank's midnight deadline will result in a loss of the right to charge back the
customer's account." Federal Reserve regulations may require the bank to
follow different deadlines.

[3J Form of Payment

At common law, it was the duty ofthe collecting bank to collect cash or legal
tender. Any other medium was taken at the risk of the collector. Forexample, if
the collecting bank accepted credit or a check or draft on another bank, the
parties secondarily liable on the instrument were discharged" and if the draft or
check failed ofcollection, the collecting bank had to make good on the loss." The

1974), the court held that a bank collecting drafts on a nonbank drawee had not failed to
exercise ordinary care when it retained the drafts in an effort to get payment for periods of
founo twenty·five days, given the previous hisloryofthe bank'sdealinas with the drawee.
52 uee §§ 4-202(2), 4.103(5). In order for the holder of a check to recover from a
collecting bank for mishandling the presentment of the check for payment (in this case
delay in presenting the check for payment), the holder must prove not only mishandling,
but also that there would have been "a reasonable chance ofcollection" ofthe instrument
if the collecting bank had acted properly. Determining whether a reasonable.chance for
collection existed is a question offact. Alioto v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 1402 (NO Cal.
1984).
S!VCC § 4-202(I)(a). For funher discussion of a bank's riabt to chllJlle dishonored
items back to a customer's account. ~ee ~ 20.11.
"vce ~ 4·212. Compare vec § 4-202(I)(b), which makes the bank liable for loss
caused by the failure to act with ordinary care in giving notice of dishonor. The UCC
leaves open the possibility that a longer time might be shown to be reasonable. vee §§ 4-
202(2), 4.212(1). See discussion of deadlines for notice at 1 21.11(2][d]. The Federal
Reserve Board has imposed ~ignificant new duties with respect to the return of dishon-
ored checks and other items in its Regulation ce, effective September I, 1988 (to be
codified at 12 CFR pt. 229). These are discussed at ~~ 20.1 1,21.03[81, 21.1 I[2][d].
55 See Annat., "Discharge of Drawer or Indorser of Check by Holder's Acceptance
Therefor of Something Other Than Money," 52 ALR 994 (1928).
"Virtue v. Danbury Stale Bank, 205 Iowa 392, 218 NW 58 (1928); Hommerberg v.
'i 21.02(4) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-12

existence of custom or clearinghouse rules allowing banks to accept drafts or

credit on the books of another bank was not binding on depositors who had not
agreed to such methods. If The uee not only makes such clearinghouse rules or
private agreements effectiveSl but it also specifically authorizes collecting banks
to accept the following:
1. A remitting bank's check drawn on some other bank;
2. A check drawn on a remitting bank that is a member of the same
clearinghouse;
3. A charge, with the collecting bank, on an account ofthe remitting bank;
or
4. Any bank instrument, when collection is being made from a person other
than a bank. s.
Having made the collection, the bank is under the duty to remit at once to
the person who sent the item for collection. Even under the uee rule, which
makes the correspondent bank liable for losses it directly causes to the owner of
the item, it is a proper procedure to remit the proceeds to a solvent correspon-
dent who sent the item."

[41 Delay From Misroutings

A case decided in a federal court in New York examined in detail the
obligations of a collecting bank and the relationship of Federal Reserve guide-
lines to the liability ofthe collecting bank." The problem involved a fraudulent
$800,000 check deposited by Goldstein in an account with the Union Trust
Bank of Maryland (Union Trust). The check bore the name of the First Penn-
sylvania Bank of Philadelphia (First Penn) as the payor bank. The magnetic ink
chara!;ter recognition (MICR) numbers, however, indicated that the check
should be routed to the State Bank of Albany (Albany State) for payment. As a
result of these inconsistencies on the check, it was routed through five banks
over the course of nearly two weeks. Every bank handling the check met its

State Bank, 170 Minn. 15, 212 NW 16 (1927); Annot., "Liability of Collecting Bank
Which Accepts Something Other Than Cash," 61 ALR 739 (1929).
57 Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 US 160 (1924). See cases cited in Beutel's
Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law 1302 (7th cd. 1948).
.. ucc § 1-201(3).
Sf uec § 4-211. See discussion at ~ 21.03[5].
BOld.
•, United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 590 F. SUPl>.
486 (SDNY 1984). Subsequent proceedings in the case are discussed at ~ 21.05[2]. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank efN.Y., 620 F. Supp. 361 (SDNY
1985), afl'd, 786 F2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986).
21·13. COLLECfION & PAYMENT '1121.0214]

midnight deadline, but ten days expired before the depositary bank, Union
Trust, was notified that neither Albany State nor First Penn would honor the
check. Unfortunately, the day before notification, Union Trust (having thought
that the failure to get any notice was an indication the check had been paid),
permitted Goldstein to withdraw $755,000 against the check.
The check was routed through tbe various banks in the following manner. It
was deposited May 6, 1980 at Union Trust, which forwarded the check to
Philadelphia National Bank (PNB). PNB thought Albany State was the payor
bank and so routed the check to the New York Fed on May 7 in anticipation of
the New York Fed's sending it to Albany State. The New York Fed forwarded
the check but Albany State returned it through the New York Fed on May 9
stamped "sent in error." The New York Fed sent the check on May 12 to the
Philadelphia Fed (it was not clear whether this was done so the Philadelphia Fed
would return the check to tbe depositary bank or because it intended the check to
be presented to First Penn for payment). The Philadelphia Fed forwarded the
check to First Penn on May 14. On May 16, First Penn discovered there was no
account on which the check could be drawn and notified PNB by telephone of
the dishonor. PNB promptly notified Union Trust, but the notice came too late.
Union Trust claimed that the New York Fed breached its duty to use
ordinary care in handling the check under uee §§ 4-202(1)(a) and 4-202(1)(b),
contending tbe New York Fed failed to exercise ordinary care, since it (1) did not
notify Union TIDst when Albany State returned the check; (2) sent the check to
the Philadelphia Fed rather than to PNB; (3) did not notify Union Trust oitbe
delay caused by routing it to Albany State; and (4) did not wire advice of the
nonpayment by Albany State.
The court beld that the New York Fed was obligated to use ordinary care
with respect to the routing of the check and the selection of intermediary banks
or other agents. "The phrase 'ordinary care' in Article 4 of the u.e.e. is not
intended to refer to a standard of care unique to the banking world. Instead, it is
'use(l with its normal tort meaning.' "'2 The New York Fed justified its conduct
by citing a Federal Reserve operating circular. The court decided to treat the
matter as one of contract, rather than of tort, after reviewing the terms of the
circular. Under the circular, the bank was required to give advice by wire of the
nonpayment of a check of $2,500 or more under certain circumstances. The
court interpreted the circular to mean that wire notification must be given ifthe
bank was either the payor bank on the item or if the bank itself had received
notice of nonpayment from the paying bank or any other bank. Therefore, since
the New York Fed had not received prior notification and was not the payor
bank, it did not have an obligation to wire notification to tbe depositary bank.
The provisions of the uee in Section 4·202(1 )(e), referring to delays in
collecting a check, were intended to apply only to delays occasioned by mishaps

IZThe court relied upon Dee § 4.103, comment 4.

1121.02[4) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-14

in the mails, the court said, and not to problems caused by misrouting. Relying
on North Park National Bank v. Bankers Trust CO.,n the court concluded,
"'delay in transit' connotes some impediment to physical transportation of the
item in question."
Discussing the duty of the New York Fed to send notice of dishonor of the
check under uee § 4-202(1), the court rejected the argument that the New York
Fed's only duties were to send notice of dishonor or return the unpaid check to
the transferor bank and that sending it to the Philadelphia Fed satisfied that
requirement because the Philadelphia Fed was the equivalent of the transferor.
The court said, "A paying or collecting bank has little choice upon learning of
dishonor than to send notice or return the check. A message of§ 4-202(1)(b) is
that not only is a collecting bank to notify downstream banks ofdishonor but it is
to exercise ordinary care in doing so. This includes the duty to use ordinary care
both in touting the check and in selecting intermediary banks."e.
The court explained the issue as follows:

Regardless of New York Fed's intention in sending the check to Philadel-

phia Fed, if the Philadelphia Fed had then returned the check to PNB the
loss would not have occurred for Union Trust would presumably have
received notice of Albany State's dishonor on May 14, the day before it
released funds to Goldstein. The forwarding to Philadelphia Fed thus was
not in and ofitselfnegligent, nor was it necessarily a cause of Union Trust's·
loss. The only risk which arguably made New York Fed's action negligent
was the risk which materialized: That Philadelphia Fed would not recognize
the fraudulent nature of the check and would forward it to First Penn for
collection. Of course, there is no guarantee that sending the check to PNB
would have avoided this risk. PNB could have sent the check to First Penn
as easily as Philadelphia Fed, and the total handling time would have been
no shorter.
Whether New York Fed's behavior constituted a lapse in ordinary care
thus revolves around three factors: the foreseeability of Philadelphia Fed's
failure to return the check, the foreseeability of loss resulting from that
action, and the feasibility, given modem banking procedures, of New York
Fed's detecting the fraud discerning the risk and taking curative action. 55

Thus, the issue became whether having a check in its hand that had not been paid
and that contained inconsistent directions regarding the payor bank created a
circumstance in which "it was reasonably foreseeable that Philadelphia Fed
would forward such a check to First Penn for collection rather than return it to
PNB, that it would be dishonored by First Penn, and that Union Trust would
release funds against the check before receiving timely notice of dishonor from

53
572 F. Supp. 524 (SONY 1983).
&4United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 590 F. Supp. at 495.
5sId.
21·15 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.03[11

First Penn..... Ifso, then there was a failure ofordinary care in routing the check
without taking precautions.
In discussing what constituted ordinary care, the court noted that the
system ofhandling checks requires swift processing and it would be "wholly
unfair to impose liability on New York Fed if detection of this sophisticated
fraud was wholly inconsistent with participation in the system" used for check
processing. "Ifefforts by all banks to detect this type offraud would bring check
processing to a screeching halt, New York Fed cannot be faulted for making
those efforts."17 Thus, the court indicated that there should be an inquiry as to
whether the type of fraud was such that the New York Fed should have taken
exceptional precautions to detect it. If no special precautions were warranted,
the court asked, should the problem have been detected and the loss of Union
Trust anticipated under standard banking procedures? .

~ 21.03 PAYMENT OF ITEMS BY PAYOR BANK

When items for collection are sent to the payor bank, the bank is under a
dual capacity-to act as agent for the owner to collect from itself and, also, to
pay the item, as it is the drawee or other payor of that item. Whether the
instrument coming to the bank is indorsed for collection or comes indorsed in
blank, the payor-bank's duties are the same.

(1) Accountability of Payor Bull for Payment of Items

The vee contains an elaborate set of rules that set time limits for payor-
banks to act on items and that specify when items are regarded as paId." Under
the vee, the deadlines for a payor-bank to decide whether it will payor
dishonor and return an item may be established by agreement between the
parties, and Federal Reserve regulations and clearinghouse rules have the effect
of such agreements." If no time is provided in the relevant Federal Reserve
regulations, clearinghouse rule, or .agreement, .then the bank, under the vee, .
has until the close of business the next banking day to decide whether to pay!O
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has rules for clearings
thrDugh the Federal Reserve banks." They resemble those set out in the vee
but they impose different notification rules and impose other duties to expedite

.. Id. at 498.
., Id. at 499.
i. vee § 4·213( I)(d). See generally Annat., "What Constitutes Final Payment Under
V.c.e. § 4.213," 23 ALR4th 203 (1983).
60 vce § 4.\03(1), (2). See note 60, infra.
'0 vec §§ 4·213, 4·301.
11 See Regulation J. 12 CFR pan 210( 1987); Regulation CC(to be codified at 12 CFR
1121.03[11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-16

the availability of collected funds to customers and the return of dishonored

items. In the collection provision under the UCC. the bank has until midnight of
the day it receives the item to .settle for it" and until midnight of the next
business day to pay. to return it, or to send notice of dishonor/' (A collecting
bank may grant the payor bank a on,e-day extension without discharging parties
secondarily liable.)" The time may be extended for a longer period in case of
emergency/s As previously indicated, the time may be further extended by
agreement or clearinghouse rules.7I although the matter is not entirely free from
doubt. 77 If the bank fails to act within this time, it is "accountable for the amount

plITt 229). See discussion at 1 21.11 [2][d] on the deadlines for notice. Regulation CC
applies to bank clearings generally, not just those involving Federal Reserve banks.
72UCC §§ 4-103, 4-301.
7'UCC §§ 4-104(h), 4-302. Regulation J makes paying banks accountable for cash
items (which include checks) ifthe bank holds the item beyond the day of receipt without
paying it. 12 CFR § 21O.9(a)(I)( 1988). The bank may recover such a payment, however, if
the bank takes proper action before its midnight deadline or other time allowed under
state law. 12 CFR §21 O. I2(a) (1988). These rules apply to check cleared through a Reserve
bank. Regulation CC imposes requirements on all banks as discussed at ~ 21.03[8J,
21.1 I[2][d].
.. ucc § 4-108(1).
•s UCC § 4-108(2). The effect of a,computerbreakdown upon the bank's duty to make
a prompt return of dishonored checks is not clear. In Port City State Bank v. American
Nat'l Bank, 4\\6 Fld 196 ( \Oth CiT. 1913), the delay was excused. But see Sun River Cattle
Co. v. Miner's Bank, 164 Mont. 237, 521 P2d 679 (1974). supp. op. 164 Mont. 479, 525
P2d 19 (1974).
"See West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'( Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661,155 NW2d 587
(1968). A drawee bank's failure to pay a check by its midnight deadline under UCC § 4-
302 was excused because the owners of the check orally authorized the bank to hold the
check to determine if funds to pay the check would be wired to the bank by the next day.
Although the oral agreement relieved the bank ofliability for holding the check beyond its
midnight deadline, the agreement gave the owners of the check a claim against the bank
for breach of contract when the funds arrived and the bank refused to pay. It was up to a
jury to decide if the bank had agreed to hold the check for payment as contended by the
owners. The court did not discuss the application ofUCC § 3-409( I) which provides that a
drawee is not liable on an instrument until he accepts it (which can only be accomplished
by the bank's signing the instrument, UCC § 3-410), but Section 3-409(2) allows the
creation ofliability based upon a contract separate from the instrument. The court agreed
that consideration for the oral agreement could be found in the release of the bank from
liability for holding the checks beyond its midnight deadline. Corsica Liveslock Sales, Inc.
v. Sumitomo Bank, 726 F2d 3/4 (%th Cir. 19%3).
A payor bank is strictly liable for the amount of a check that it holds beyond its
midnight deadline without paying or returning. The only exception to this rule is when
there is delay for reasons of circumstances beyond Ihe control of the bank. UCC § 4-
108(2). There is a division of opinion on whether principles of equitable restitution may
apply as discussed at ~ 21.03[3].
77UCC § 4-301(1) requires the bank 10 act before its midnight deadline without
21-17 COLLECfION & PAYMENT , 21.0311)

of" the item.'1 Ifthe instrument is properly presented for acceptance, failure to
act within the time allowed for acceptance will make the bank accountable. 71
Under the uee, refusal to payor to return an instrument amounts to a conver-
sion on the part of the bank. The bank is then liable for the amount of the
instrument. aD
In a Michigan case, plaintiff claimed that defendant payor bank became
accountable because it failed to meet the uee deadlines, for dishonoring a
check that plaintiff sought to collect." Plaintiff claimed that the payor bank
failed to meet the uee § 4-302 deadlines for settlement and return of dishon-
ored checks and had made final payment under uec § 4-213 by completing the
process of posting. The court held that plaintiff had the burden of proving that
the payor bank failed to meet the uec deadlines. Plaintiffcould not rely upon a
Federal Reserve bank stamp on the checks that indicated the checks had been
received by the Federal Reserve bank three days after the payor bank received
them, because the' Federal Reserve stamp would have been dated the third day
even as to items received by the reserve bank after a 9:30 A.M. cutofftime on the
second day. Likewise, the plaintifffailed to establish that the payor bank did not
"settle" in a timely fashion, because the plaintiffintroduced no evidence that the
adjustment of balances through the Federal Reserve bank clearinghouse had not
given provisional credit. Finally, although the payor placed a paid stamp on the
back of the checks, the court concluded that the process of posting had not been
completed, because the checks had not been debited to the drawer's accounts
and evidence showed the stamp had been applied erroneously but not that the
bank had made a decision to honor the checks.
In Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Minden Exchange Bank & Trust Co.," the
court held that the defendant payor bank did not become accountable for checks
returned late, because the collecting bank impliedly agreed that the checks
should not be handled as demand items and could be retained by the payor bank
for a reasonable time until funds became available for their payment. The case
involved two checks-one over $19,000 and the other over $10,000, When the

indicating any e~ceptions. See also Section 4.213(4)(b). VCC § 4-103 may be viewed as
modifyinll these limits, however. See West Side Bank Y. Marine Nat'l Exch, Bank, supra
note 76.
11 vee § 4·302; Rock Island Auction Sales v. Empire Packing Co., 32 III. 2d 269, 204
NE2d 721 (1965).
71 VCC § 4.302(b).
ID vee §§ 3-419, 4-302; Note, "Payor Bank Liable for Retaining Check Too long
Under Uniform Commercial Code," 82 Banking U 241 (1965). See generally Annol.,
"Bank's 'Reasonable Commercial Standards' Defense Under uee § 3·419(3)," 49
ALR4th 888 (1986),
II Van Senus Auto Pam, [ne. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 116 Mich. App. 342, 323
NW2d 391 (1982).
82 212 Neb. 820,326 NW2d 176 (1982).
1121.03(2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·18

checks were fIrst presented to the defendant, the defendant dishonored the
checks for insufficient funds and properly returned them to the depositary bank,
which, in turn, notifIed its customer and charged the checks back to the plaintiff
customer's account. The depositary bank then stamped the checks for collection
only and sent them back to the defendant with a letter requesting the defendant
to "please make a separate remittance or credit for this collection as indicated
below" and stating "hold ten days if necessary... Although the letter was sent on
January 12, the depositary bank did not hear from the defendant until late in
April after having sent several tracers on the items. The court held that under
these circumstances, an agreement existed that the checks were to be held for
collection and were not to be treated as demand items by the payor bank. The
court reasoned that vee § 4-103 allowed the time deadlines for the collection of
checks to be varied by agreement in this fashion. u

(2) Legal Consequences and Timing of Payment

Vnder the vee, the liability of any party is discharged to the extent of its
payment or other satisfaction of the obligation, even though such satisfaction is
made with knowledge of another person's claim, so long as the payor neither
pays in bad faith a thiefor thiefs assignee, nor pays in violation ofthe terms ofa
restrictive indorsement. The only remedy of a person who has claims on such
paper is to supply satisfaction indemnity or obtain an injunction against
payment."
The vee provides that payment of an instrument may be made by any
person, if the holder consents, including a person whose name does not appear
on the instrument, and upon the surrender of the instrument the person who
pays acquires the rights of a transferee."' The comment explains that "{ulpon
payment and surrender of the paper, the payor succeeds to the rights of the
holder, subject to the limitation ..." that someone who has been a prior party to
any fraud cannot improve his position." An Illinois case considered the applica-
tion of this section and its relationship to uee § 3-605, which provides that the
holder of an instrument may discharge any person from liability by cancelling
the instrument. Defendants executed a note payable to bank. When the note fell
due, plaintiff, who was related by marriage to the defendants (the defendants

13Id. at 823, 326 NW2d at 179.

.. VCC §§ 3.601(3), 3·603. For a party to be discharged by payment of an instrument,
payment must be made to the holder of the instrument. VCC § 3·603(1). When a party
pays someone other than the holder ofthe instrument, the payor assumes the risk that it
may pay the wrong person. Champion Int'l Corp. v. Vnion Nat'l Bank, 73 NC App. 147,
325 SE2d 656 (1985), rev. denied, 313 NC 597, 332 SE2d 177 (1985), Discharge is
discussed at ~ 15.07.
..vcc § 3·603(2).
at VCC § 3·603, comment 4.
21·19 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.0312)

were relatives of plaintiff's wife), paid the note and got possession ofit from the
bank. The bank officer stamped tbe note paid and delivered it to the plaintiff
witbout indorsement. The defendants continued to pay for a number ofmonths,
but stopped m ak iD8 payments when plaintiff separated from his wife. Plaintiff
sued on the note, and the defendants claimed plaintiff's payment to the bank
constituted a cancellation of the debt under uee § 3-605. The court decided for
plaintiff. The defendants continued to be liable for payment ofthe note because
the plaintiff acquired the rights of a transferee under uee § 3-603(2) when he
paid the bank and, therefore, succeeded to the bank's right to enforce the note."7
In Mercantile Bank d Trust Co. v. Villeins, the court held that when a note is
stamped "paid," there is a presumption of payment, but tbe presumption is not
absolute. The stamp merely shifts the burden ofgoing forward to the payee, wbo
can rebut the presumption by showing the note was stamped "paid" by mistake
or without authority.II
Payor banks are bound when they also are the depositary bank, but, in
situations in which a payor bank is not also the depositary bank, the bank is
bound only by restrictive indorsements, as well as by the instructions of its
immediate transferor." In addition, a payor bank may have protection given by
clearinghouse rules, Federal Reserve directives, or special contracts made with
depositors."
The time when payment occurs is important for a variety of reasons. It
determines when a payor bank loses the right to "charge-back." It also is relevant
in deciding the timeliness of stop orders, setoff, attachment, or other action
against the account. Under the vee, payment becomes final when the first of
the following events happens:

• The item is paid in cash;

• The item is settled for and the right to revoke the settlement waived;
• The process of posting the item to the account of the person to be charged
. therewith is completed; or
• A provisional settlement is made for the item and is not revoked within
the time allowed by agreement; law, or clearinghouserules."'

When the payor bank is also a bank in which an item was deposited and if that
item has not been paid or dishonored before the opening of the second banking

11 McGrew v. Mix, 112 III. App. 3d 14, 445 NE2d 30 (1983).

II Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Vilkins, 675 SW2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), later
appeal, 712 SW2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). See discussion at ~ 15.07 on discharge ofliability
and ~ 24.0113] on cancellation of debts.
•,vce §§ 3·206(2), 3·206(3), 3.206(4), 3-603.
9C vee § 4-103.

.. VCC § 4-213.
1121.03(3) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·20

day following its receipt. the customer has the right to withdraw against the
credit given for the item."

[3) Notice to Payor From Notations on Checks

Although the payor of a check is responsible for making payment to the
proper party in accordance with the order ofthe drawer and the indorsement of
the instrument, a payor bank generally does not have notice from notations and
memoranda that are not part of the contractual terms of the instrument. In a
New York case that illustrates this rule,93 plaintiffwas a shareholder in a mutual
fund for which the defendant bank was the transfer agent. Under the arrange-
ments with the fund, plaintiff was entitled to switch his investment in the stock
fund to a money-market fund on notice to the bank. When plaintiff sought to
exercise this power, a series ofevents occurred that resulted in the liquidation of
his stock fund and led to plaintiff's sending the bank a check for $21,000 to be
invested in the money-market fund. The check contained a notation in the
lefthand corner in the space provided for memoranda that it was "For Acct. 155-
69-985-P RESERVE FUND." The bank applied the check to the purchase of
shares in the stock fund rather than the money-market fund. After the bank and
the stock fund refused to return the amount of the check, plaintiff sued both for
negligence in handling the check. By this time the value of plaintiffs shares in
the stock fund had fallen to $7,260.00. The court rejected the contention that the
writing on the memorandum part ofthe check gave notice to the bank, relying on
the language of an 1888 U.S. Supreme Court case:
No bank is bound to take notice ofmemoranda and figures upon the margin
of a check, which a depositor places there merely for his own convenience,
to preserve information for his own benefit; and in such case, the memo-
randa and figures are not a notice to the Bank that the particular check is to
be.paid only from a particular fund."
The Court also relied on the words of Judge Learned Hand:
A bank's business must be done with dispatch; innumerable items pass
before a teller in the course of a month. He is indeed charged with knowl·
edge of his depositors' signatures and with the genuineness of the endorse-
ments; but to demand of him a scrutiny of any notations upon them and

.. uce § 4-213(4)(b). See Edwards, "Recovery of Final Payments Underthe Uniform

Commercial Code." 6 Ohio NUL Rev. 341 (1979). Funds availability rules are covered in
i 20.11[1]. There are complex federal rules which preempt the UCC Regula.tion ce,
"Availabilily of Funds and Collection ofChecks" (10 be codified at 12 CFR pari 229). See
~ 20.11 [I].
"Woods v. Bank of N.Y.• 806 F2d 368 (2d Cir. 1986).
'4Id. al 371 (citing State Nat'l Bank v. Dodge. 124 L:S 333, 346 (1888».
21-21 COLLECfION &; PAYMENT , 21.0314]

such conclusions as deliberation might require would impose undue restric-

tions upon the fluidity of such business. H
The court then found that no duty existed to "scrutinize directions placed on the
memorandum portion of an incoming check." In light of the volume of checks
that the bank must handle daily and the need for speed in processing them, an
obligation to take notice of memoranda on a check was commercially
unreasonable."

(4) Effect of Payment on the Underlying Transaction

At common law, it was the general rule. in absence of agreement to the
contrary. that payment ofobligations by negotiable instruments was only condi-
tional. When the instrument was not paid. the holder could revert to his or her
rights against the persons liable on the original debt. When the parties agreed
that a negotiable instrument was to be taken as final payment, the underlying
contract or obligation for which the instrument was given was discharged by the
delivery of the instrument. Thereafter, the instrument constituted the only
contract between the parties.
The uee continues the common-law rule that payment by·check is condi-
tiona!." Under the uee. payment of an obligation by a negotiable instrument
simply suspends the operation ofthe contract so paid" and. if the check given in

Uld. at 371 (citing Childs v. Empire Trust Co., 54 F2d 981, 983 (2d Cir.), celt.
denied, 286 US 554 (1932».
"Id. at 372.
•,vec §§ 2-511 (3), 3-802.
.. vec § 3-802(1)(b). See generally Annot., "Discharae of Debtor Who Makes Pay-
ment by Delivering Check Payable to Creditor to Latter's Agent, Where Agent Foraes
Creditor's Signature and Absconds With Proceeds," 49 ALR3d 843 (1973).
In a case involving the refund of excess insurance premiums, a Maryland coun used
the doctrine of conditional payment to avoid hardship. In this case, .the insurance com·
pany refunded to its beneficiary a $12.00 check supposedly representing excess premiums
paid. However, the insurance company made a mistake in calculatinl the refund. The
check was $7.50 greater than it should have been. The insurance company corrected its
mistake by charging the $7.50 to the beneficiary's account and, when the beneficiary
failed to pay the $7.50, canceled the insurance policy. The court held that the insurance
policy could not be canceled, because the beneficiary did not owe any premium to the
insurance company. The court reasoned that the obligation of the insurance company to
refund money to the customer was never discharged. since the check had not been
presented for payment. Ward v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 62 Md. App. 351, 489 A2d 91
(1985).
An important consequence of taking a negotiable instrument for an obligation is that
based on the instrument, the holder acquires rights that give the holder a cause of action if
the instrument is not paid. When a promissory note is given as evidence of a debt, for
example. the holder obtains a cause of action on the promissory note. It will be essential 10
this action that the holder produce the note or evidence thaI the note has been lost or
1121.03(41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-22

payment is dishonored, the debtor may be held on either the underlying contract
or the instrument. But payment by an instrument upon which a bank is drawer,
maker, or acceptor where there is no recourse on the instrument against the
debtor discharges the underlying contract. If the instrument is dishonored, the
only recourse of the holder will be against the bank."
Under the UCC, it is proper for a buyer to tender payment to the seller by
means of a check when that manner of payment is "current in the ordinary
course of business" unless the parties have agreed otherwise.'OG The seller does
not have to accept a check as payment but the seller cannot unfairly surprise the
buyer by a demand for legal tender. If the seller demands legal tender, the seller
must be reasonable in allowing the buyer an extension oftime to make payment
by this means if that is needed. '0'

destroyed. As discussed in the text, the holder ofthe note may have an alternative cause of
action based upon the underlying debt itselfifthe note is not duly paid. Union Sav. Bank
v. Cassing, 691 SW2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
"ucq 3-802(1)(a). See Harris v. Hill, 129 Ga. App. 403, 199 SE2d 847 (1973). The
person paid must accept the check as payment. See Tennant v. Satterfield, 158 W. Va.
917,216 SE2d 229 (1975). See also BalmoralArms v. Rutkin, 104 NJ Super. 354, 250A2d
50 (I 969}; Stream v. C.B.K. Agronomics, lnc., 79 Misc. 2d 607, 361 NYS2d 110 (1974),
modified 48 AD2d 637. 368 NYS2d 20 (1975); Delaware State Bank v. Patton, 5 I3 P2d
868 (Okla. 1973). The underlying debt is discharged by acceptance of a cashier's check in
payment even though the bank fails to pay the check because it is insolvent. Chen v.
Roosevelt & Main St. Realty Corp., 131 Misc. 2d 572, 500 NYS2d 948 (1986).
'GOuec § 2-51 1(2).
10' UCC§ 2-511(2), comment 3. A check is not legal tender and a creditor has the right
to refuse to accept payment by check and to demand payment in cash. See also UCC § 2-
511(2}, which provides that a seller may demand payment in legal tender, rather than
payment by check, as long as the seller gives the buyer any extension of time reasonably
necessary to procure legal tender.
Thus, a tenant was not entitled to insist that his landlord redeposit a personal check
that had been dishonored NSF because the landlord had no Obligation to accept the check
as payment under UCC § 2-5 I I (2), even if the tenant had sufficient funds on deposit at the
time. When the check was dishonored, the landlord had a claim against the tenant for the
obligation and could insist upon payment in cash. Armfield v. Poretsky Management,
Inc., 39 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 883 (DC Super. Ct. 1984).
When a customer owes a debt to the bank, the CUSlOmer does not make a proper
tender of payment by making a deposit unless the deposit is an agreed upon form of
payment. Citizens Valley Bank v. Douglas Robins, Inc.. 69 Or. App. 711, 687 P2d 815
(1984).
In one case the question was whether a buyer had made a sufficient tender ofpaymen\
under a real estate contract when he did not have sufficient funds on deposit in the
account on which the check was drawn at the time of the tender. The court held that the
tender was effective, since there was no requirement that there be funds on deposit. In this
case, the recipient of the check refused to accept the check for reasons th'\t were not valid,
and therefore could not later argue that its duty to present the check for payment was
excused. It did not learn of the insufficiency of funds for several years after the check had
21-23 COLLECfION '" PAYMENT , 21.03[5]

Under UCC § 3-802(1), when a party has "taken" an instrument "for an

underlying obligation," the obligation is suspended until the instrument is
presented for payment. In one case, a check was mailed to a party who held the
check without returning it or proceeding to have it presented for payment, and
without objecting to payment by means ofa check. The court concluded that the
retention of the check constituted acceptance of payment. 101

15) Payment by Remittance Instrument

A collecting bank will receive "settlements" for the items it forwards to
other banks. These settlements may be made through credits and debits to
accounts between banks or as prescribed by clearinghouse rules or requirements
of the Federal Reserve System. In cases involving "noncash" items, a collecting
bank may receive payment fur tbe item in the form of some type of remittance
instrument, such as a cashier's check. The UCC allows collecting banks to take
settlements for items sent for collection in a check drawn on a bank other than
the remitting bank, a cashier's check ofthe remitting bank when it is part 'oftho
same clearinghouse as the collecting bank, or authority to charge an account of

been tendered. McLaughlin v. Sports & Recreation Club, Inc" 356 NW2d 398 (Minn.a.
App. 1984).
'.2 Amsterdam Urban Renewal Agency v. McGrallan, 91 AD2d 792, 458 NYS2d 67
(1982), aft"d. 59 NYld 624, 449 NE2d \l13, 463 NYSld 195 (\983). When a penon takes
a postdated check and holds it until the date arrives, the obligation for which the check
was given in payment is suspended, and the holder of the check cannot regard the drawer
ofthe check as being in default on the obligation. Grumet v. Bristol, 125 NH 537, 484A2d
1099 (NH 1984),
Actions that constitute "taking" a negotiable instrument for an oblip.tion are matters
of common law. UCC § 3-802( I) does not explain when an instrument is "taken" for an
obligation. In a case where a promissory note was offered to a party for an obligation, a
federal district court held that the offeree did not ha\'e to respond to the offer, and its
silence did not amount to acceptance of the offer unless the circumstances could justify
construing the conduct of the offeree as acceptance. Kalish & Rice, Inc. v. Regent Air
Corp., 624 F. Supp. 173 (SONY 1985). One would expect the result to be different when
the offer is made to pay by check because of business practices regarding checks as
customary payment instruments. See UCC § 2-511(2).
The principle in UCC § 3-802(1) that an underlying obligation is suspended when a
party has "taken" an instrument for that obligation is consistent with the conclusion that
the underlying obligation remains in effect, so long as the parly to whom the obligation is
owed bas not" taken" an instrument in payment. 1n Lincoln Nat'l Bank &. Trust Co. v.
Bank of Commerce, 764 F2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985), the court held that a payee who never
received physical possession of checks and who could not be regarded as having had
constructive delivery of checks did nO.t qualify as a pany who had rights to the checks or as
a party entitled to maintain a suit for conversion under LTC § 3-419. The payee's remedy
was to pursue enforcement of the underlying obligation for which the checks originally
were issued.
, 21.03(6) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-24

the remitting bank held by the collecting bank. IN However, it also gives the
collecting bank receiving payment in such media the right to charge back if the
check or other credit memorandum is not ultimately paid. '04 Thus, the risk of
loss by failure of payment of the check or credit given as remittance is placed
squarely on the owner of the item that the bank was collecting. lOS The owner of
the item has only a claim on the remitting bank or nonbank remitter that gave
the remittance instrument.
The collecting bank still has reason to be careful about the type of instru-
ment it authorizes for use by the remitting bank in settlement. If the collecting
bank authorizes use of a nonbank obligation, a cashier's check of a remitting
bank that is not part of the same clearinghouse, or other nonapproved forms of
remittance, the collecting bank receives a final settlement at the time it takes the
instrument. '01 This makes the collecting bank accountable to its customer for the
item being collected. 1D7 When the collecting bank receives such an instrument
from a remitting bank, but has not authorized the remitting bank to use it, the
collecting bank may accept it in settlement without liability in case it is dishon-
ored, so long as the collecting bank acts promptly to collect the remittance
instrument. If the bank acts to collect or present the remittance instrument
before its midnight deadline, the provisional settlement the collecting bank gave
to its customer for the item will remain provisional until the remittance instru-
ment is finally paid.'01

(6) Payor Bank's Right to Cancel Payment and Recover Proceeds

Under the uee, in certain situations a payor bank may revoke the settle-
ment that it has given for an item presented to it for payment. It may then
recover the amount of the credit or the proceeds that it has paid. However, the
payor bank is not entitled to recover the amount of its payment if it has "paid
cash over the counter" for the item presented to it.'·' This is treated as a "final"
payment.' I.
When the bank gives a "provisional" settlement for the item presented for
payment, which may be by credit or by use ofa check, draft, or other remittance
instrument, the bank may revoke the settlement and may recover any payment it

'''vee § 4-211(1) and comments 1,5.

'04 vee § 4-212.

'05 See comments to vee §§ 4-211-4·212.

'De vee § 4·21 1(3)(b).
,.7 vee § 4.213(3).
101 vee § 4.211 (3 lea). Delay beyond the midnight deadline in collecting or presenting
the remittance instrument will make the collecting bank accountable to its customer.
vee § 4·211(3)(c).
tDlvee § 4-301(1).
110 vee § 4-213(1 Xa).
21-25 COllECTION & PAYMENT ~ 21.03(6)

has made if it acts in a timely fashion.'" The bank must act before it has done
anything that could be regarded as final payment. 112 It also must act before its
midnight deadline (midnight ofthe b~g day following the bank's receipt of
the item) by either returning the item or giving written notice ofdishonor when
it is impossible to return the item. 1I3 Under the uee, the bank's right to revoke
the settlement that it has given appears to be absolutely barred if the bank does
not meet these deadlines. Opinion differs on whether a bank might under some
circumstances have the right to recover a payment made by mistake or under
circumstances giving rise to an equitable claim based on unjust enrichment. In
uee § 3·418 payment is final only when made to a holder in due course or other
person who acted in reliance. Because the provisions ofArticle 4 are controlling
when there is a conflict with Article 3, the difference of opinion centers on
whether the finality policy ofSection 3·418 also applies to bank payments under
Article 4. 114
The uee in Article 4 seems to establish a rule offinal payment for payor
banks that permits the bank to recover payments only when it can demonstrate
breach of warranty11S on the part of prior transferors of the instrument. The
relevant section, uee § 4·302, makes a payor bank accountable for the item if
the bank fails to give timely notice of dishonor. There are no other exceptions
stated in the statute. The payment is final under the terms of the section
regardless of any reliance on the payment by the party receiving payment.
Notwithstanding these uee provisions, some cases have recognized additional
situations in which the bal;lk will be permitted to recover a payment made by
mistake in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The uee gives little guidance in
this area and the case law is divided.'1&

,,, uee § 4.301(1).

m For further discussion of final payment, see 11 21.03[2], 21.03[7].
muec § 4-301(2).
'" uec §§ 3-418, 4-301-4.302. See H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks Ch. 15 (6th ed.
1987); White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 613-618 (2d ed. 1980). See cases
cited infra nOle 116. See generally Annol., "Recoyery. by .Bank of Money Paid Out to
Customer by Mistake," 10 ALR4th 524 (1981); Note, "Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 3 and 4-Bank Required to Disburse Funds After Final Payment," 64
Marq. L. Rev. 408 (1980).
115The final payment rule permits recovery of payment when there is a breach of
warranty made to the payor. UCC §§ 3-418, 4-302. Warranty liability is discussed at
11 J sm. See also 11'1 20.08, 20.09.
'" See generally Annot., "Recovery by Bank of Money Paid Out to Customer by
Mistake," 10 ALR 4th 524 (1981); Annot., "What Constitutes Change of Position by
Payee·Balik so as to Preclude Recovery of Payment Made Under Mistake," 40 ALR2d
1009 (1955}. When a bank mistakenly pays a check drawn on an account with insufficient
funds, can the bank obtain restitution from the party receiving payment if there has been
no detrimental reliance upon the payment? Some commentators have argued and some
courts have accepted that UCC § 4-21 3, which describes when payment becomes final,
expresses a rule that such a mistaken payment cannot be recovered (except for breach of
, 21.03(6) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-26

Collecting banks, which give a provisional settlement to their customers for

items they are handling for cOllection, also have the right to revoke the settle-

one of the warranties made on presenting the check for payment) even when traditional
equitable claims for recovery, such as unjust enrichment, exist. These authorities talce the
position that the midni&\lt deadline rule for payor banks in UCC § 4-302 "displaced
common law equitable principles." State & Sav. Bank v. Meeker, 469 NE2d 55 (Ind. App.
1984). But a federal Court ofAppeals has taken the contrary view and held that the payor
bank could invoice restitutionary principles to recover the payment. The court reasoned
that UCC § 3-41 S, which prevents recovery of payment only when there is payment to a
holder in due course or to a person who made a good faith change in position in reliance on
the payment, should not be read as being limited by Section 4-213 when the payor is a
bank. The court stated: ..§ 4-213 'is oriented toward time of payment, not legal effect of
paymenL' ..• The purpose ofsection 4-213 is 'to determine when settlement for an item or
other action with respect to it constitutes final payment,' ... Section 4-213 determines
when the final payment rule of section 3-417 comes into effect, not what the rule is
supposed to mean," National Sav. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F2d 1303, 1306 (6th
Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 466 US 939 (1984).
The basis for recovering payment made by mistake also was tested in a case involving
two bearer notes ofthe Manville Corporation for $5 million each. The defendant, Ameri-
can Savings and Loan Association, purchased the notes through the Chase Manhattan
Bank who was an agent of the issuer of the notes, Morgan Guarantee Trust Company of
New York. Prior to payment of the notes, the Manville Corporation became bankrupt.
Morgan had established special procedures to handle the payment of items for which
Manville was responsible. When Chase presented the notes for payment through the New
York Clearinghouse, Morgan personnel tried to obtain instructions on how to deal with
the notes. Morgan was one hour late in giving notice of dishonor because it received its
instructions late. Acting on the theory that the notes had been paid, Chase transferred $10
million credit to American. Morgan then sued American claiming entitlement to the
money based upon theories of conversion and unjust enrichment. The court held that
Morgan could not recover its payment. Morgan failed to meet the Clearinghouse deadline
for giving notice of dishonor of the instruments, and American was a payee who qualified
as a holder in due course. Thus, regardless of whether UCC § 4-213 by itself establishes a
rule of final payment, UCC § 3-418 was satisfied, and the payment to American was final.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Over a dissent that the opinion undermined the finality of
such transactions by opening the possibility of allowing a payor to recover a mistaken
payment after months had elapsed, the majority found the case presented a situation
different from the usual UCC § 3-418 circumstances because the maker of the note,
Manville Corporation, was bankrupt. Although the bankruptcy laws do not prohibit
recovery of the payment, the coun believed that the policy of treating creditors similarly
argued for denying a windfall gain to American that would favor American at the expense
of the other creditors. This policy, combined with the fact that American was aware of
Manville's bankruptcy. distinguished the case from the normal UCC § 3-418 circum-
stances. As the coun said:
[I]fboth panies to a transaction know that the payee is not entitled to payment on
an instrument, the rationales behind § 3-418 are inapplicable. The payee who receives
payment aware that he is not entitled to it does not have the same expectation of
finality as an innocent payee and the payor bank in this circumstance does not have
superior knowledge. A pany who accepts payment of an instrument-knowing that the
payor was entitled to dishonor it justifiably receives less favorable treatment bv a
court of equity than a payee ignorant of any problem. .
21-27 COLLECTION &: PAYMENT 1121.03[6]

ment and. ifthey act in a timely fashion, to recover any payments that have been
made. m When the collecting bank receives a negotiable instrument as payment
for the item it has presented, the settlement given by the collecting bank to its
customer does not become final until the instrument given in payment is actu-
ally paid. If that instrument is dishonored when it is presented for payment, the

Morgan Guar. Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F2d 1487 (9th
Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3214 (1987).
In Town & Country State Bank v. First State Bank, 358 NW2d 387 (Minn. 1984), a
check·kiting scheme existed involving a number ofbanks. First State was the central bank
where the person who committed the fraudulent scheme maintained his main accounts.
One of the other banks involved sued Fint State, claiming that Fint State acted in bad
faith because it knew of the existence of the check-kiting scheme but did not inform the
other banks becausc it wanted to shift the losses to the other banks. The coun held that
good faith was an issue for the trier of fact and affirmed a finding of good faith. It was
reasonable for the officers of Fi"t Bank to extend some timc to its customer to cure the
customer's overdraft problems because ofthe bank's past experience with the customer in
correcting problems ofthis nature. The test ofgood faith is a subjective one and the proper
course of action is not always easy to determine.
The other banks also sued First State, claiming that they should be able to recover
payments on checks they had made to First State because the payments were not final. The
coun held that final payment under Anicle 4, Section 4-213, does not require the person
to whom payment is made to be either a holder in due course or one who has changed
position in reliance on the payment. Section 3-418 does not apply to the recovery ofbank
payments under Article 4. The coun admitted that there was a conflict on this question
and that the uec provisions were unclear, but it held in favor ofa finality rule because it
believed finality of payment was an imponant policy in the bank collection process.
In Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v. People's Nat'l Bank, 699 P2d 146 (Okla. 1985),
the coun held that the term "accountable," as used in vec § 4·302, "has been uniformly
construed to mean strict liability for the full amount ofthe draft, with no requirement that
there be proof of actual damage." Thus, when the bank retained a draft beyond its
midnight deadline because it had agreed to wait for funds that never were forthcoming,
the bank became liable for the amount of the draft. Lack of good faith on the part of the
person presenting the instrument for payment is not a defense to the payor bank's failure
to give notice ofdishonor or return the instrument by its midnight deadline unless the lack
of good faith in some way caused the payor bank to'breach its obligation under vec § 4-
301 to return the check. Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 753
F2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985) (dicta).
An equitable defense based upon unjust enrichment was permitted to a payor bank in
Starcraft Co. v. c.J. Heck Co., 748 F2d 982 (5th Cir. 1984). In this case, the bank became
liable to pay a check because it failed to give notice of dishonor before its midnight
deadline. However, as a result of a release that the payee had executed to the drawer ofthe
check, the drawer did not owe an obligation to the payee. The coun noted that if the bank
paid the payee the amount of the check, the payee would be unjustly compensated, since it
would have been paid twice. If the bank charged the payment of the check back to the
drawer. the drawer would be able to recoverthe payment from the payee on the grounds of
the unjust enrichment. Because of this possibility. the COUrt held that the bank ought to be
subrogated to the drawer's claim for restitution against the payee. This gave the bank a
valid defense to the action by the payee for payment of the check.
", vec § 4-212.
1121.03(7] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-28

collecting bank will be able to revoke the settlement it originally gave to its
customer for the item presented for payment.'"

(7) Application of Final Payment Rule

When a payor bank pays a check that contains a forged or unauthorized
indorsement, the final payment rules may apply. If the payor bank has commit-
ted any ofthe acts that constitute final payment, it loses the right to revoke the
settlement it gave and recover the amount paid. Once the payment becomes
fmal, any attempt by the payor bank to charge back and revoke credit given to
prior collecting banks will be ineffective. It has been held that a prior collecting
bank, upon receipt of such an ineffective notice of chargeback has no right to
revoke the settlement it gave to its customer.'" Although a bank has no right to
revoke the settlement given after payment is final, it may have a claim against
the prior collecting banks and the presenting customer for breach ofwarrantY of
title. If the check has an unauthorized or forged necessary indorsement, the
parties presenting the check may have breached the warranty of good title.'2O
These matters are discussed in Chapter 20.
When a check is made payable to two joint payees, and only one of the
payees has agreed to the retention of the check beyond the payor bank's mid-
night deadline, does the other joint payee have a claim against the payor bank?
This question arose in a 1985 Montana case in which a check for over $41,000
was payable jointly to Iverson and the Montana Livestock Production Credit
Association (MLPCA). The payor bank had dishonored it twice and stamped
the check "payment refused twice-present for collection only." MLPCA sent
the check back a third time with a memorandum instructing the payor bank to
hold it for longer than tbe usual period. After one month, the payor bank
returned the check at the request ofMLPCA. The bank officer had violated bank
policy}n waiving the bank's midnight deadline on this instrument because he
lacked authority to grant such a waiver for checks oyer $500. In a suit by Iverson
against the bank, the court held that the bank was not accountable for missing its
midnight deadline under UCC § 4-302 because the memorandum accompany-
ing the check did not demand payment immediately but only when funds were
available; thus, the check was not a "demand item" under the terms ofUCC § 4-
302. The court also ruled that Iverson could not pursue a claim against the bank
for violating the midnight deadline, since Iverson had not presented the check
but had transferred it to MLPCA, and the bank had acted within the allowable
time as to MLPCA, the party presenting the check, because of the accompanying

111 VCC §§ 4-211 (2), 4-212( I).

m First Nat"l Bank v. N unn, 628 P2d 1110 (Monl. 1981). But a contrary result was
reached in Yoder v. Cromwell State Bank, 478 NE2d 131 lind. Ct. App. 1985).
12.First Nat'! Bank v. Nunn, 628 P2d 11](l (Monl. 1981).
21-29 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.0317)

memorandum. Finally, the court found that the memorandum by MLPCA

amounted to an agreement varying the effect of provisions ofUCC § 4-103.12'
The burden ofproving that the final payment deadline had expired, because
the payor bank did not return a check by its midnight deadline, usually will fall
upon the party asserting final payment occurred. This burden had to be met even
in a case in which the returned items were received well after the normal mailing
time for return of the items. '22
A payor bank is not excused from returning a check before its midnight
deadline because the check had pencil marks and an encoding error that made it
impossible to process the check by computer. The court held that these were not
circumstances beyond the control of the bank that justified extending the mid-
night deadline. '21 The bank must be prepared to handle the check even when it
cannot be processed by computer. m
The requirements that a payor bank must satisfy in order to return a
dishonored item differ from those for collecting banks. One important differ-
ence is that a payor bank must return a demand item, such as a check, before its
midnight deadline or give notice of dishonor before its midnight deadline.'ls A
collecting bank, on tbe other hand, must act in collecting the item within a
reasonable time. If it acts before its midnight deadline, the action will be
reasonable. A longer time may be reasonable, but the bank has the burden of
proving that it was reasonable. Uti This difference became important in a case
involving the collection ofdrafts that a seller drew on its customers' accounts for
payment of goods sold. In a transaction similar to those involving document
drafts, but which the parties stipulated did not involve documentary drafts,127
the seller loaded a freight car with merchandise, obtained a bill of lading for the
carriage ofthe goods, drew a sight draft on the customer to whom tbe goods were
shipped, and gave the draft and bill aflading to his bank for collection. The local
bank gave credit to the seller and forwarded the draft to the bank in the cus-
tomer's home town for collection. The draft named both the customer and the
bank in the customer's town as the drawee. The buyer became bankrupt, and the
seller'sued the bank named as drawee for payment on the theory that the bank
became liable on the draft because it held the draft past its midnight deadline.

12' Iverson v. First Bank.. 712 P2d 1285 (Monl. 1985).

mWhalen & Sons Grain Co. v. Missouri Delta Bank, 496 F. Supp. 211 (ED Mo.
1980), afrd mem., 657 F2d 274 (8th Cir. 1981).
"'See vce § 4.108(2).
..4 Bank leumi Trust Co. v. Bank of Mid·Jersey, 499 F. Supp. 1022 (DNJ 1980), afrd
mem., 659 F2d 1065 (3d Cir. 198 [).
12Slt also must settle for the item before midnight of the day of receipt unless it is the
depositary bank. vce § 4-302(a).
121 vec § 4-202(2).

127 The stipulation by the parties was important because the payor bank's midnight
deadline for paying drafts does not include documentary drafts. VCC § 4-302(a).
11 21.03[8) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·30

Although the customer had an account with the drawee bank, the court held that
the bank should not be viewed as a payor bank because the buyer had not given
authority to the bank to pay the draft. The court held that the defendant bank
should be treated as a collecting bank which, under the UCC, could hold the
draft for an extended period of time if the bank could demonstrate that it was
reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, a prior course of dealing
between the bank and the seller supported the determination that holding the
draft for fifty-two days while waiting for payment from the buyer was
reasonable. '2'
When a payor bank makes arrangement with anotherbank to process checks
drawn on the payor bank, there should be a clear understanding as to the status
of the bank that will be processing the checks. Ifnot, a substantial legal question
arises over the time limits the bank will have to return checks, as was illustrated
by Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony Bank & Trust CO.12I The payor bank, Old
Colony of Boston, entered into an agreement with First National Bank to have
First process Old Coiony's checks. When checks drawn on Old Colony came into
the hands of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the Federal Reserve bank
debited the account of First and sent the checks to First. First then sent the
checks to Old Colony. Under the arrangement between Old Colony and First,
First had no authority to make a decision to pay the checks. Thus, the court held
that the time for computing Old Colony's midnight deadline began when Old
Colony physically obtained receipt ofthe checks. It was argued that the arrange-
ment could be viewed as a presentment authorized by Old Colony at a place
other than the bank's premises, namely at First National Bank, but this argu-
ment was not accepted, as First had no authority to decide to pay the checks. '30
The court also suggested that in arrangements of this nature the parties could
vary the terms of the UCC by agreement. 131

lSI Method of Return of Items Not Paid Under uee and Federal
Reserve Board Rules
When items given the payor bank fail offinal settlement, the UCC gives the
payor bank two alternatives. It may reverse the process ofcollection by returning
the items through the channels by which they came, 132 or the bank may return the
items directly to the depositary banks ifsuch return is authorized either by law or
by agreement. When there is a direct return the depositary bank will be required

128 Southern Colton Oil Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 670 F2d 548 (5th Cir. 1982).
129
497 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Mass. 1980).
13. But see Capitol City First Nat'! Bank v. Lewis State Bank, 341 So. 2d 1025 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1978).
", UCC § 4·103.
132 UCC §§ 4-212,4.30 I. An intermediary bank that receives a returned check has the
same alternatives when it returns the item under the UCc. UCC § 4-212.
21-31 eOLLEcrloN &. PAYMENT 'II 21.03(8)

to pay the returning bank for the amount ofthe item. A method for accomplish-
ing this is by having the returning bank draw a draft for the amount of the
returned item on the depositary bank. The depositary bank then pays the draft
and charges its customer.'" Clearinghouse credits previously set up or credits
entered seriatim between the coUecting banks in forwarding the item are not
disturbed. The section of the uee authorizing such direct returns was made
optional, but it has been adopted in most jurisdictions.
Regulation ee changes the rules for check returns. It imposes a duty of
"expeditious return" on paying and returning banks.'3' The regulation antici-
pates that to meet this duty. banks may choose not to return checks by retracing
the chain of banks used in forwarding the item to the payor bank but will use
more rapid methods of return, including direct return to the depositary bank. '35
These provisions displace some ofthe provisions of the uee and Regulation J
that otherwise would determine the method and timeliness for the return of
checks.
Under Regulation ee, the depositary bank is obligated to accept returned
checks and written notices of nonpayment at locations specified by the regula-
tion,'34 and it also must pay the amount of the check to the bank returning the
check before the close of business on the banking day it received the returned
check. lS1 Payment is final and must be by a method that credits an account of or
makes the proceeds of the payment available to the returning or paying bank on
the payment date. m The returning and paying banks make warranties as the
check is transferred from bank to bank in returning it which operate similarly to

'''vee § 4-212(2).
l:14Regulation ec §§ 229.30(a), 229.31(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR
§§ 229.30(a). 229.31(a». See infra 1121.06.
135 Regulation ee § 229.30(a) & commentary (1988) (to be codified in 12 CFR
§ 229.30(a) & appendix). As the commentary nOles, this regulation affects the VCC. It
means that direct returns are authorized in all jurisdictions, not just those with the
optional vec § 4-212(2) provision. 1\ means that a paying bank may send a returned
check directly to lhe depositary bank or a returning bank rather than as limited in vee
§ 4-301 (4). The time limits for relurn may be affected by the "expeditious return" duty.
When a check is returned, the settlement for it will be final ralher tban by a series of
provisional settlements that are revoked on the return of the item.ld.. See Regulation ec
§ 229.31(<:) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.3I(c)) on the duty ofbanks to settle for
the returned check. The settlement is final. Id. Also, the expeditious return rules modify
the veC's midnight deadline rules for return in some instances. For example, a paying
bank may extend the deadline for return in order to use a method that normally would be
faster, such as return by a courier who leaves after midnight. Regulation ee § 229.30(c)
(1988) (10 be coditied al 12 eFR § 229.30(c». The rules also affect how a bank should
route returns. Retracing the process ofcollection is not enough to satisfy the bank's return
duty.
13. Regulation CC § 229.32(a) (1988) (to be codified at J 2 CFR § 229.32(a)).
131 Regulation ce § 229.32(b) (1988) (to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.32(b)).
"'Old. The payment methods are specified: (I) debit to an account of lhe depositary
bank on the books of the returning or paying bank; (2) cash; (3) wire transfer; or (4) any
other form agreed to by the returning or paying bank. Id.
1121.04 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-32

the warranties made in the forward collection process. 13' The regulation imposes
a liability on banks that handle checks for either forward collection or return to
pay any bank subsequently handling the check that fails to obtain payment for
the check. Thus, if the depositary bank fails to pay for. the returned check
because of insolvency or other reason, the returning bank may recover from
prior banks and so forth down the chain of return and collection until the loss
ultimately comes to rest on the bank that took the check in collection from the
depositary bank. 140
The Federal Reserve System is developing new services to assist banks in
complying with the expeditious return duties and notification of nonpayment
requirements.

1121.04 INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE AT OR THROUGH BANKS

It is common business practice to make notes or drafts payable at certain
banks. The vee has changed the pre-DeC rules by specifically providing that a
statement on an instrument using the words "payable through" (a certain bank)
simply designates the named bank as a collecting agent and does not authorize it
to pay the instrument.'" The bank, in such a case, will have the rights and duties

131 Regulation ee § 229.34 (1988) (to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.34). Paying banks
and returning banks make the following warranties when they transfer a returned check
and receive a settlement or some other consideration for it. The warranties run to the
banks' immediate transferee, any subsequent returning bank, the depositary bank, and
the owner of the item: (I) the paying bank returned the check within its deadline; (2) the
bank is authorized to return the check; (3) the check has not been materially altered; and
(4) if a notice of nonpayment is sent in lieu of the check, as permitted underthe regulation,
a warranty that the original check will not be returned. Id. § 229.34(a). A paying bank also
makes warranties with respect to the notice of nonpayment that (I) the bank will return
the check within its deadline; (2) the bank is authorized to send the notice; and (3) the
check has not been materially altered. Id. § 229.34(b). There are no warranties with
respect to state and local government checks, and there are only the first group of
warranties above with respect to U.S. Treasury checks. Id. §§ 229.34(a), 229.34(b).
140Regulation ec § 229.35(b) (1988) (to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.35(b)). The
commentary suggests that circuity of action may be avoided by permitting the returning
bank to recover directly from the first collecting bank although the text of the regulation
does not specifically authorize this. After the collecting bank takes up the check, it would
have rights of recourse under the uee against indorsers and other panies to the check.
'" vee § 3-120. Regulation ee uses the term "paying bank." This term differs from
the uee's "payor bank" in a number of ways. A significant difference is the inclusion of
cenain "payable through" banks in the definition of a paying bank. Regulation ee
§ 229.2(z) (1988) (to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.2(z)). For an article discussing the
differences between the requirements in Regulation J, which seem to give the status of
payor bank to a bank that aClS as a payable through bank and the provis\ons of the uee,
see Kreig & Pressman, "Dishonored Payable-Through Drafts: Deadline for Return," 103
Banking U 357 (1986).
 21-33 COLLEcnON & PAYMENT 1121.04

of a collecting bank.'42 When a draft or note is payable at a bank, the maker-

drawer or acceptor is discharged to the extent ofthe loss caused by the failure to
present on time.,"3 Federal Reserve regulations, however, take a different view
. from the UCC and give payable through banks in certain situations the duties of
paying banks....
Ifa note or acceptance states that it is "payable at" a bank, the UCC allows
states to adopt two possible alternatives. Under the first option, it is equivalent
to a draft drawn on the bank that is payable when due out of any funds of the
drawer or maker available in current account or otherwise available for pay-
ment. In the second option, the statement does not create an order or authoriza-
tion to the bank to pay it but merely designates a place of payment. 145
In Friendly National Bank v. Farmers Insurance Group,'" an insurance
company issued a draft, drawn on itself, that stated that it was "upon acceptance
payable through Commerce Bank of Kansas City." The payee on the draft
deposited the instrument with her bank which, in tu.rn, forwarded it to Com-
merce Bank. Commerce Bank returned the check without payment with the
notation that the insurance company declined payment. The depositary bank,
Friendly National Bank, then sued the insurance company for payment of the
draft. The court b;ld that Friendly National Bank was a holder in due course and
entitled to recover against the insurance company. Friendly gave value by
allowing its customer to draw checks against the amount provisionally credited
to her account. The fact that the draft was payable through another bank did not
constitute notice ofany possible defense to the draft. It "was merely to designate
the Commerce Bank of Kansas City as a collecting bank to make present·
ment,'·,·7 Also, the language of the draft reading "upon acceptance pay .. ," did
not give the defendant insurance company "any greater right to stop payment
than if the words 'upon acceptance' had not been included in the draft,'''''
Because the insurance company had signed the draft as the drawer of the
instrument, it had made a drawer's contract and was bound to honor the draft.
LikeWise. the statement on the draft that it was a "claims draft" did not put the
bank on notice of any possible defense to the instrument.

142 See Wilhelm Foods, Inc. v. National Bank, 382 F. Supp. 605 (SONY 1974). On the
liability of such banks for breach of warranty when an endorsement is forged. see Mont·
gomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 265 Or. 55, 508 P2d 428 (/973); 238 E. 34th SI. Corp. \'.
Continental Ins. Co., 75 Misc. 2d 493, 347 NYS2d 618 1I972).
"3 vce § 3.502( I )(b).
,.. See definition of"paying bank." Regulation ec § ~29.2{z){191111)(to be codified at
12 CFR § 229.2(z).
14! vee § ).121.
," 630 P2d 31 8 (Okla. 1981).
'·'Id. 8t 321.
,.lld.
1121.05 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 2l-34

In Horney v. Covington County Bank, '4' the court considered the status ofa
draft used for payment in the cattle business. The buyerS used a draft that
contained the language, "upon acceptance pay to the order of." The buyer would
sign the draft and fill in the blanks indicating the draft was addressed to "cattle
Company, 610-627.7, Covington County Bank, Collins, Miss." When Coving-
ton County Bank received the draft, it checked with the cattle company before
paying. When the cattle company became unable to pay drafts it had drawn, the
sellers sued the Covington County Bank, claiming the draft was a demand item,
the bank was a payor bank, and the bank was liable on the draft for the face
amount because it held the draft past its midnight deadline. The bank argued it
was not liable because the draft was not a "demand item" that it was obligated to
payor return by its midnight deadline under UCC § 4-302. The bank argued that
the words "upon acceptance" on the draft conditioned the order to pay so that it
could not be regarded as a demand item. The court said:
We hold that the words "upon acceptance" do not affect the order to pay. If
"acceptance" were used in its technical sense under 75·3·410, i.e., "the
drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft," it is nonsensical since it
would mean that the plaintiffwould be paid if the Bank agreed to guarantee
payment, something no one would expect the Bank to do. If it meant the
"acceptance" by Bank's customer, it is superfluous since by signing,
Cervantes (the drawer of the draft and company to which the instrument
was addressed] through his agent accepted the instrument.
We also note that the bank created this instrument. It could easily have
made its status clear simply by using language such as "payable through" or
"payable at" with the effect discussed below.'so

The court concluded that the bank should be regarded as a drawee on the draft
and therefore subject to the liability ofa payor bank for failing to return the item
before its midnight deadline. The bank could have indicated it only acted as a
conduit for payment by using the special words "payable through" or "payable
at" or similar language. As no such words were used, the bank could not bring
itself within uec § 3·121 on instruments that are payable through a bank.

~ 21.05 ERRORS IN HANDLING COMPlJTER·ENCODED

CHECKS
Today, most checks are encoded with magnetic ink to enable electronic

41
' 716 F2d 335 (51h Cir. 1983).
'SOld. a1338. The coun concluded il did not have to decide if the draft was "negotia.
ble" because the bank was liable under vee § 4-302 for failing to act before its midnight
deadline with respect to a non-negotiable as well as a negotiable "demand item." Id. at
337. See generally Krieg & Pressman, "Dishonored Payable-Through Drafts: Deadlines
for Return," 103 Banking U 357 (1986).
21·35 COLLECTION & PAYMENT , 21.05(1)

machinery to read the checks without manual handling and visual decision
making. The encoded numerals identify the bank against which the check is
drawn, the account to be charged, and, usually, the number of the check. When
the checlc is presented for deposit, it is encoded by the depositary bank to
identify the amount of the check. Thereafter, the check can be electronically
handled for collection. Although this method does not protect against forgeries
or matters that might be revealed by a visual inspection ofthe check, banks may
well decide that the savings to be obtained through greater efficiency in process-
ing the checks more than offset the losses that may occur as a result offailing to
make a visual inspection ofindividual checks. However, a bank's reliance upon
the encoding will not relieve it from the liability, established under the vee. for
paying instruments that are forged or altered. Regardless ofthe coding, the check
would not be properly payable.151

[I] Errors in Check Amounts

It is possible for a bank to make an error in encoding the amount of the
check. The encoded amount may be either more or less than the amount of the
check itself. As between the payor bank and its customer, the vee rule seems
clear: the bank may only charge its customer's account to the extent the check is
"properly payable."'J2 If an error was made in encoding the check in a large
amount, the bank would be obligated to credit the account for the excess that was
charged. By the same token, absent special circumstances in which the customer
changes its position in reliance upon the error ofthe bank, the payor bank should
be able to charge its customer when it mistakenly debits the account for an
amount less than the actual amount of the check. The check is a direction to the
bank to pay the amount ofthe check and entitles the bank to charge the customer
for it even when it constitutes an overdraft. 153
The ability ofa payor bank to recover against prior collecting banks when it
suffers a loss as a result of an error in encoding is more problematic. When the
payor bank has paid an excess amount to the collecting bank, it has been
suggested that it might be entitled to recover the excess amount on a theory of
restitution. This approach has its difficulties, however, because the collecting
bank will not have been responsible for the mistake and probably will no longer
be holding the funds. There would be no breach of the warranties of transfer or
presentment in this situation either.,.. Perhaps recovery could be had against the
bank that made the encoding error, on general equitable principles recognized
under the vee as long as those principles are not in conflict with the Vec.'s,

151 vee § 4.401.

'5'ld.
'53 Id.

vec § 4-201.
\S4 See

"'UCC§ 1-103.
\(21.05[2] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-36

In a case in which the payor bank had, because ofan encoding error, cbarged
its customer for less than the true amount of the check, the bank likely will
become liable to prior parties for the full amount ofthe check because the check
will have been finally paid. The bank will not have given notice of dishonor in
time. '58 If the bank is unable· to recover the excess amount from either its
customer or prior collecting banks, can it recover from the bank who made the
encoding error? The UCC does not offer a solution although, again, equitable
principles might suggest placing the loss on the bank that made the error. 157
When a customer deposits a check and his bank makes an error in encoding
it, the customer may have an action against the bank for failure to exercise
ordinary care in handling the item for collection. 'II In any event, if the item is
finally paid, the depositary bank will become accountable to the customer for the
amount of the check. 15I If the depositing customer obtains a greater credit than
he would be entitled to as a result ofthe encoding error, perhaps the depositary
bank will have an action in restitution against the depositing customer. Again,
the UCC offers no solution, but general equitable principles can supplement the
provisions of the UCC.'60

[2} Errors in Routing Directions

In Citizens State Bank v. Martin,''' the Shawnee State Bank issued its
customer, Martin, checks that had an encoding error in the bank routing
number. Although the bank became aware of the error, it did not insist upon
return of the checks. Instead, Shawnee State Bank instructed Martin to destroy
them. Several years later, Martin used one ofthe checks with the encoding error
to deposit $41,000 in an account he had at Citizens Bank. Because of the
erroneous routing number, the check was delayed in reaching Shawnee State
Bank for payment by a number of days. During this interval, Martin withdrew
the $41,000 deposited at Citizens Bank. Shawnee State Bank dishonored the
check and, again, there was a delay in its return to Citizens Bank. Citizens then
filed suit against Shawnee State Bank and others, claiming Shawnee was liable
for its negligent failure to recall the erroneously encoded checks from Martin.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the trial court erred in entering sum·
mary judgment against Citizens Bank on this claim. As a member of the Kansas
City Clearing House Association, Shawnee had a duty to other member banks,

,.6 vee § 4-30 I.

15' See N. Penney & D. Baker, the Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems, § 1.02(2)
(1980 & Supp. 1987).
,.. vee § 4-402.
"·vee§4.213(3).
'". VCC § 1-103. There are excellent discussions of the problems pre.sented by encod-
ing errors in H. Bailey. Brady on Bank Checks, ~~ 19.2-19.9 (6th ed. 1987); N. Penney &
D. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer, f 1.02(2) (1980 & Supp. 1987).
,., 227 Kan. 580. 609 P2d 670 (1980).
21-37 COLLECTION & PAYMENT '121.05(2)

including Citizens, to protect against loss from the use of checks that could not
be processed by machine, because the clearinghouse rules required members to
use their best efforts to reduce the use of non-machine-processed items. In the
court's view, Shawnee had breached its duty to protect the other banks belonging
to tbe clearinghouse from the likelihood that they or some other third person
could be injured by the delay in processing checks it knew could not be machine
processed.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New
York'u was a major case involving the fraudulent manipulation of the magnetic
numerals used for routing the check. Plaintiff was the depositary bank, Union
Trust Company ofMarylancL Goldstein opened an account at Union Trust with
a cash deposit and then deposited a check for over $880,000. The check eventu-
ally came back to Union Trust as uncollectible, but Goldstein had withdrawn a
substantial sum and disappeared before Union Trust learned the check had been
dishonored. Union Trust then sued the collecting and payor banks. The check
was drawn on an account at First Penn by a company called Metropolitan
Investment Corporation. Although the teller at Union Trust was supposed to
notify the branch manager when a check of this size was deposited, the teller
failed to do so. Nonetheless, the manager discovered the deposit in the course of
his normal review of account fluctuations. The manager then sought informa-
tion about Goldstein but learned that there was no record ofhis business nor any
such account at First Penn. Union Trust had this information by May 9, within
four days ofthe deposit. On May 12, Goldstein tried to arrange a wire transfer of
funds from the account under rather unusual circumstances that, among other
things, involved giving a bottle of expensive champagne to a bank officer. The
officer declined to make the transfer because there had not been a sufficient time
period in which to collect the check. Goldstein returned two days later and
accomplished a wire transfer and cash withdrawal. The transfer was to a Mary-
land coin dealer. The officer, who was aware of the information the bank had
received from First Penn, checked for holds on the check before making the
trimsfer, but the computer did not report any. Further, while Goldstein tried to
obtain the coins from the dealer, Union Trust was informed of the return of the
check by First Penn. These various circumstances could be viewed as negligence
by Union Trust in handling the account.
There was an added complication because the MICR number was not
printed in magnetic ink and was the wrong size, which required the check to be
hand processed. As a result, the check was sent to PNB for processing. PNB used
the routing number to forward the check to the processing center in Utica, New

112 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Federal Re~erve Bank of N.Y., 620 F. Supp.
361 (SDNY 1985), atrd. 786 F2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986). For a prior deci~ion at an earlier stage
in this ca~e. see 590 F. Supp. 486 (SDNY 1984). That opinion is discussed at Y. 21.02[4].
See Benerally, Fairfax & Fry, "MICR Fraud: A Systems Approach to Foiling the Felon's
Fun," 40 U. Miami L Rev. 737 (1986); Note. "Assessing Liability for MICR Fraud," 37
Ala. L. Rev. 145 (1985).
121.05[21 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-38

York for forwarding to Albany State Bank. Albany State received the check on
May 9 and returned it to the processing center stamping it "Sent in Error." By
then it was May 12, and on May 13 the Utica processing center sent the check to
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Notwithstanding discrepancies in the
check described as "glaring," that office did not detect the fraud and sent the
check on May 14 to the Federal Reserve Bank ofPhiladelphia, which presented
it for payment to First Penn on May 14. First Penn dishonored the check but did
so later than its midnight deadline, on the morning of May 16. Union Trust
received notice of dishonor later that afternoon but by then Goldstein had
collected the coins and vanished.
The defendant banks moved for summary judgment. The court applied by
analogy the preclusion rule ofUCC § 3-406 that deals with negligence contribut-
ing to an alteration of an instrument. After saying that it was not "particularly
clear that depositary banks are best situated in all, or even most, cases to detect
MICR fraud," the court went on to note that it was appropriate to apply the
spirit of UCC § 3-406 by analogy to the apportionment of loss due to MICR
fraud because:
The depositary bank, like the drawer of the check, is well situated to protect
the system against MICR fraud. The depositary bank has an opportunity to
examine the check free ofthe time pressures which prevent collecting banks
from giving checks more than a cursory glance. Perhaps more important,
the depositary bank is in the unique position of being able to examine both
the depositor and the check. No other bank in the collecting chain can
examine the depositor, a crucial disadvantage given the seemingly difficulty
of detecting this type of fraud. 113
Union Trust's suit against the collecting banks was based on breach ofduty
under UCC § 4-202. Following the reasoning discussed previously, the court
concluded that "if those banks can demonstrate that the negligence of the
depositary bank played a substantial role in the success of the fraud," the
collecting banks were entitled to impose the preclusion rule. The court then gave
summary judgment to the defendant collecting banks. The action against the
payor bank charged failure to return the check before the midnight deadline, but
the court also held for defendant, First Penn. The court observed that the
midnight deadline under UCC § 4-302 "does not shift the burden of loss to a
payor bank which misses its deadline if the payee was already aware when
presenting the check that it would not be accepted or paid except by mistake." As
Union Trust had been advised by First Penn that there was no such account on
which the check had been drawn, Union Trust had no reason to expect the check
to be collected and should not profit from First Penn's mistake in missing the
midnight deadline.

,., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 620 F. Supp. at 372.
21·39 COUECI10N & PAYMENT '21.06

~ 21.06 COLLECTION AND RETURN OF CHECKS UNDER

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD REGULATION CC
Regulation ee, effective September I, 1988, contains important provisions
dealing with banks' responsibilities in handling checks for collection and
return.- These provisions supercede any provision of the vee that is in
conflict with the regulation "but only to the extent ofthe inconsistency.",·1 As a
result, the regulation does not completely displace the vee, and the law gov-
erning check collection and return must be gleaned from the interplay between
these two bodies of law. As has been the case with other Board regulations,
bankers can expect a continuing stream of revisions, additions, and interpreta-
tions as experience with the regulation is obtained. The regulation applies to
bank collections generally and is not limited to collections that involve the
Federal Reserve system.
Regulation ee uses a vocabulary that is different from the uee to some
extent. Its definition of "bank" includes various types ofdepositary institutions
as defined in the Federal Reserve Act.'M Because "account" is defined to mean a
transaction account, certain types of depositary institutions that do not have
transaction accounts will not be subject to the provisions dealing with expedi-
tious return ofchecks, notice ofnonpayment, and other duties.'17 The regulation
uses the term "paying bank" ratherthan the uee term "payor bank." A paying
bank is a broader term and includes banksdesignated on checks as "payable at"
or "payable thrOUgh" banks under certain circumstances. 'I' A "returning bank"
is a bank that handles a returned check or notice in lieu of return, but does not
include a paying bank or depositary bank.'" The definition of check: is more
extensive than the vee, but does not include a "noncash item.""1 The regula-
tion distinguishes between a "banking day," which is when a bank is open to the
public for business, and a "business day," which is a calendar day other than
Saturda}', Sunday, and certain specified holidays.'" Time limits in the regula-
tion -are figured sometimes in banking days and sometimes in business days.

"0 Regulation CC (1988) (to be codified as 12 CFR part 229). The regulation is
divided into 3 subparts. Subpart A contains definitions and other general provisions.
Subpart B on the availability of funds and disclosur~ of funds availability policies is
discussed in Chapter 20. Subpart C is the part that deals with bank collections and returns
and is the only part discussed in this section. The regulation became effective as this book
went to press. Consequently, only a briefoutline ofthe regulation is provided here. Future
supplements will examine the regulation in more detail.
"lId. § 229.41.
II. Regulation CC § 229.2(e) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.2(eJ).
'&rId. § 229.2(a), 229.30(e), and 229.3 He}.
'1I1d. § 229.2(z).
"'Id. § 229.2(cc),
"Old. § 229.2(k}.
111 Id. § 229.2(1)-229.2(g).
11 21.06 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-40

The regulation imposes a duty on paying banks when a check is not paid to
make "expeditious return."172 There are several alternative ways this duty may
be met. A "two-day/four-day test" is established under which the paying bank
will meet its duty ifthe returned check would normally have been received by the
depositary bank under the return method used by the bank within the time
constraints oithe test. 173 liit is a local check, tbe returned check must be received
by the depositary bank not later than the cutoffhour on the second business day
following the banking day on which the check was presented. If it is a nonlocal
check, four business days are allowed. '1.
Alternatively, the bank may use a "forward collection test," which generally
requires handling the return check in the same manner that "a similarly situated
bank would normally handle a check" for forward collection that was drawn on
the depositary bank. 115
When the bank cannot identify the depositary bank, there are procedures
for the bank to simply return the check through the collection path used, and the
expeditious return duty then does not apply. 115 The bank is entitled to rely on the
routing number designating the depositary bank that is encoded on the check. 117
Certain provisions permit the bank to extend the time forreturn or giving notice
of nonpayment under the VCC or Regulation J if the extension permits return
by a more expeditious procedure. 11I With the exceptil>11 of this extension provi-
sion, the paying bank still must comply with the midnight deadline rules ofUCC
§§ 4-301-4-302, and the bank becomes "accountable" if it does not comply with
the deadlines as the VCC provides. 11I
The return rules contemplate return directly to the depositary institution or
to other banks, which mayor may not have been involved in the forward
collection of the check, who agree to make expeditious return.'10 The Federal
Reserve System is expected to offer a return check service that could be used
under tbese provisions.
There also is an expeditious return duty for returning banks. II' Returning
banks have alternatives for meeting this duty that are similar to those for paying
banks. These alternatives may require returning banks to act more quickly than
they would otherwise have to under the UCC. There is a procedure for encourag·

mId. §229.30.
mid. § 229.30(a)(I).
"4 Id.
tl5 Id. § 229.30(a)(2).

". Id. § 229.30(b).

111 Id. § 229.30(g).
17IId. § 229.30(c).
11IId. § 229.30. commentary.
110 See discussion of method of return in 1 21.03[81.

"'Regulation CC § 229.31 (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.31).

21·41 COLLECfION & PAYMENT 11 21.(16

ing returning banks to expedite returns by using magnetic ink encoding technol-
ogy to make.the return check a "qualified return check.,,'n Returning banks may
charge for handling returned checks. '13
Because the return process win not usually retrace the forward collection
chain, Regulation ee makes substantial changes in the vee scheme for collec-
tion based on provisional and final settlements between banks. Settlements
between banks, both in the forward collection process and in the return process,
are final.... However, certain provisions allow a bank engaged in the return
process to charge back to prior banks ifa bank is unable to obtain payment ofthe
item being returned.'" As a result, the vee
provisions dealing with when a bank
becomes accountable or is regarded as having made "flOal payment" still have
some relevance. '" The regulation treats the return process in a manner similar to
the forward collection process, and there are warranties made when a paying
bank or returning bank transfer a check in the course of its return. 1I7
To speed up 'returns, Regulation ee imposes a standard for bank indorse-
ments.'·· It seeks to reduce the need for certain "boilerplate" indorsements by
giving a banka charge-back right against prior banks ill the collection and return
route, regardless of whether the bank has indorsed the check.'·· By stipulating
that after a bank indorses a check only a bank can become a holder of it until it
has been specially indorsed to someone who is not a bank, Regulation ee also
assists bank customers. '10 A bank may be liable for losses caused by delay as a
result of failure to follow the indorsement procedures. '"
The regulation imposes duties on depositary banks. When checks are
returned, the depositary bank has a duty to make payment in a manner that
makes the proceeds of the payment available promptly. '12 There is a duty to
accept returned checks at locations specified in the regulation, "3 as well as a duty
to act promptly when a returned check erroneously has been routed to it....
Regulation ee expands the Board's rules regarding notice of nonpayment

'It Id. § 229.31 (a).

"'Id. § 229.31(d).
,0< Id. §§ 229.31(c). 229.36(d).
1M Id. § 229.35(b).
,It See id.; 229.35. commentary (b).
'17 Id. § 229.34. See discussion' 21.03(8).
mId. § 229.35 & Appendix D.
'HId. § 239.35(b).
'told. § 229.35(c).
'" Id. § 229.38(d).
,.. Id. § 229.32(b). See discussion ~ 21.03[8).
". (d. § 229.32(a).
'MId. § 229.32(c).
121.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-42

of large dollar checks in amounts of $2500 or more."1 It contains rules on the

presentment of checks for payment, including the recognition of truncation
agreements.'M The regulation also provides special rules applicable to collec-
tions and returns when a bank becomes insolvent and when bank mergers
occur. 1I7 The expeditious return rules and notice of nonpayment rules generally
do not apply to U.S. Treasury checks, U.S. Postal Service money orders, and
checks drawn upon state and local governments that are not payable through or
at a bank. 11&
Other parts of this chapter discuss the provisions in Regulation CC on
varying the regulation's effects by agreement, presentment, notice of nonpay-
ment for large checks, and liability. Chapter 20 discusses the provisions related
to funds availability.

'21.07 USE OF CENTRAL DATA PROCESSING CENTER FOR

PAYMENT OF CHECKS BY BANK WITH MULTIPLE
BRANCHES
When a bank uses a central computerized data-processing center for deter-
mining whether to pay checks that have been drawn upon all of its branches,
does the central operation constitute "final payment" to foreclose the bank from
later reversing the entry and charging back the amount of the check to the
presenter? This question was raised in ldah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank.'" In
this case, the plaintiff was the payee ofa check drawn upon the Haley branch of
First Security Bank. The plaintiffdeposited the check in its account in the Twin
Falls Bank, an unrelated bank. Twin Falls, pursuant to an arrangement it had
established with First Security, sent the check for collection to the First Security
office in Boise. First Security's Boise office maintained a data-processing center
for all the First Security branches. The Boise data-processing center utilized a
computer bookkeeping procedure to enter checks in the individual accounts
held by the customers of all of the branches of First Security Bank. This com-
puter center was located in Salt Lake City. Plaintiffs check was duly sent to the
Salt Lake City computer center. The computer center then returned the check to
the Boise office indicating the check was drawn against an account with insuffi-
cient funds. The processing center in Boise prepared a return check notice and
forwarded the check and the return notice to the Haley branch. The Haley
branch checked the signatures on the check, checked with its tellers to determine

1tSId. § 229.33. The~e rules are discu~ed at ~ 21.1 I[2J[d].

1M Id. § 229.36. See discu~ion at ~ 21.1 O.
'.TId. §§ 229.39 (insolvency), 229.40 (mergers).
'·'ld. § 229.42.
'"99 Idaho 517, 584 P2d 1242 (1978).
21-43 COLLECfION & PAYMENT ~ 21.07

if a deposit had been made overnight to cover the check and, rmding none,
stamped the check as not paid. The Haley branch then returned the check to the
Boise office. illtimately, the check was returned to the plaintiffpayee two weeks
after the check had been deposited. The plaintiff claimed that First Security
could not charge back the amount of the check because it delayed too long in
doing so. Plaintiff argued the receipt of the check by the data processing center
con~titutedpresentment on the payor bank which began the time running within
which the bank had to act to revoke the initial settlement given when plaintiff
made its deposit. In addition, plaintiff argued that the actions taken by the data
center constituted completion of the process of posting which would be final
payment. The court held for the defendant, First Security Bank. The court first
noted that the activities of the processing center in Boise were like those of a
collecting bank. The Boise branch indorsed the arriving checks, sorted them
through the processing center according to the banks on which they were drawn,
and encoded them with magnetic ink characters to allow computer processing. It
also prepared the checks for physical delivery to the branches. The court said
that when those actions are "performed for the Boise branch at the data process-
ing center, the Boise branch is truly acting as a collecting bank." The court also
recognized, however, that the use of the central computer meant that the Boise
branch data processing center also was performing one ofthe steps employed by
a payor bank in recording payment of" a check. .
The court concluded that the receipt ofthe check at the Boise branch could
not constitute a presentment upon the payor bank. Firstly, it noted that the Boise
branch was not acting under any express delegation ofauthority from the Haley
branch to act as its agent for the purposes of payment.- Secondly, the court
observed that the Boise branch was not in a position to verifY the authenticity of
the check because the signatures were maintained at the Haley branch. In view of
this comment, it is important to note that the Haley branch did include a
physical check of signatures in its process of determining whether to pay the
check. Finally, the court said that although the process of posting obviously
began with the activities of the data processing center and there were entries
made to the individual account through use of the computer records, there was
no decision made to pay until the check arrived at the Haley branch. Therefore,
the process of posting had not been completed and no final payment occurred.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court found some comfort from Dee § 4-
106. The Idaho legislature had not included the bracketed language in Section 4-
106 that required a branch to maintain its own deposit ledgers in order to have
the benefit of that section.'" The court said that this was done deliberately to
allow branch offices ofa bank to use central record keeping systems. Finally, the

tDO See UCC § 4-204.

..' UCC § 4-106 states: "A branch or separate office ofa bank [maintaining its own
deposit ledgers) is a separate bank for the purpose ofcomputing the time within which and
determining the place at or 10 which action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given
'II 21.07 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-44

court said that its decision would promote efficient handling of checks by
encouraging banks to use modem computer record-keeping systems rather than
the old methods of individual handling of checks. 202
The court reached a result contrary to Idah-Best in Central Bank a/Alabama
v. Peoples NatioMI Bank, 200 rejecting the argument that UCC § 4-104 gave the
branch office of the payor bank status as a separate bank for the purpose of
computing the bank's deadline for charging back. The court took the view that
the central computer processing facility that received the check prior to its
delivery to the office of the branch should be viewed as the place where present-
ment occurred.
In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust CO.,2IM the court
ruled that the failure of the payor bank to return a check before its midnight
deadline after receipt at the bank's data processing center made the bank liable
for the amount of the check. The court concluded the computer center should be
viewed as the payor bank when (I) the center is the designated place of present-
ment for checks drawn upon the bank's branch office; (2) the center performs
services specifically for the branch; (3) the branch docs not customarily perform
the services provided by the center; (4) the services are an integral part of the
branch's processing of checks; and (5) the center does not send the checks to the
branch but only transmits computerized information. 2C5
In Lawrence v. Bank a/America, 201 the holder of two checks presented them
for payment at Branch A of the Bank of America, where the holder had a
personal checking account. The checks were drawn on Branch B of Bank of
America. Branch A cashed the checks after first determining through the bank's
computer that there were sufficient funds in the account on which the checks
were drawn. Four days later, the bank notified the holder that payment had been
stopped after the checks were cashed, that it was debiting the account of the
holder for the amount of the checks, and that it was returning the checks to him.
The court held that under the California version of the UCC, the two branches
were separate banks for the purposes of the time when action may be taken or
notice is received under UCC § 4-106. The court rejected the argument that the
centralized computer system of the bank should make the two branches a single
entity for purposes of determining if the stop payment order had been made
prior to payment of the check.

under this Anicle and under Anicle 3." The bracketed language is optional and had not
been adopted by the state of Idaho.
2C2 The court remanded the case for a determination of when the payor bank had
"settled" for the check. In Idah.Best, Inc. Y. First Sec. Bank, 101 Idaho 402, 614 P2d 425
(1980), the court upheld the determination that a timely final settlement had been made.
2.13 401 So.2d 14 (Ala. 1981).
204
746 F2d 200 (3d Cir. 1984).
200 Id. at 204.

201 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1985).
21-45 COLLECTION & PAYMENT ~ 21.08

Many of the issues discussed in tbis section are addreued. in the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation ce. The regulation contains rules on the present-
ment ofchecks and clarifies when a paying bank will be deemed to have received
a check for the purposes of triggering the bank's duties to return the check
expeditiously or give notice ofnonpayment. The rules specifically permit checks
to be presented on the basis of the route encoded on them, deal with the branch
bank issue, and authorize presentment at places the paying bank requests. The
duties ofa paying bank apply to banks that are designated as "payable through or
payable at" banks in addition to paying banks. These matters are covered in the
section of this chapter dealing with presentment. 201

1121.08 PAYMENT OF LOST OR STOLEN CHECKS

To obtain payment of a check or other negotiable instrument, the instru-
ment itself must be presented to the payor. Any party to ",hom presentment is
made may demand surrender of the instrument when it is paid.- When the
instrument is lost, destroyed, or stolen, there is no instrument for tbe owner to
present. The VCC gives the owner ofsuch an instrument the right to maintain an
action to collect it from any party who may be liable on the instrument after the
owner proves his ownership and the circumstances that prevent physical pro-
duction of tbe inliotrument. 2tlt The owner must also prove the terms of the
instrument, ofcourse. 210 Because the owner is not in possession ofthe paper, the
owner will not be aided by the DCC's presumptions regarding proof of the
validity of signatures on the instrument. 2"
Because a person who pays someone who claims to be the owner of a lost
instrument runs a risk that the instrument will surface later in the hands of a
holder in due course, if the instrument was lost or stolen while indorsed in blank
or otherwise in bearer form, the DCC provides that a court may condition the
owner's claim for recovery upon the supplying ofindemnity to protect the payor
against subsequent claims. 212 A New Jersey case explored some of the problems
involved with this approach. m Plaintiff received a cashier's check of over
SI 5,000 that named him as the payee. He testified that he mailed the check to his
father in Puerto Rico but the check was lost in the mail. The plaintiff made a
demand upon the issuing bank to refund the money or issue another cashier's

201 See ~ 21.10 on presentment for payment under the vee and the Federal Reserve
Board rules.
201 vee § 3·505(Ij(d). See ~ 21.10 on the requirements for presentment.
201 vee § 3.804.
210Id.
211 vee § 3.804 comment.
212 vee § 3.804.
"'Santos v. First Nan State Bank, 186 NJ Super. 52,451 A2d 401 (1982).
,. 21.08 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-46

check but the bank refused. The bank had issued the cashier's check to the
plaintiff in 1978. Two years later, the plaintitTbrought suit to recover his money
from the bank. The bank had offered to reimburse or issue another check if the
plaintiffwould post a bond indemnifying the bank against possible loss, but the
plaintiff did not have enough money to obtain the bond. According to the
plaintiff, he did not indorse the check and so it could not come into the hands of
a party who would qualify as a holder in due course and thereby have a better
claim to the check than the plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff's testimony
on this point should not be relied upon, because the bank should not be put to the
risk that someone might appear claiming that the plaintiff had authorized
someone else to make the indorsement. (And, ofcourse, the bank also is at risk if
the testimony proves to be false.) Because over four years had elapsed from the
time the Check was issued until the case was heard by the court, the court thought
it highly unlikely that a holder in due course ever would appear who could
demand payment. Nevertheless, the court did not want to impose the risk of this
possibility occurring on the bank. The plaintiff could not assert his rights to the
check by enjoining the bank from paying it, because he could not bring an action
in which the bank, the plaintiff, and the holder of the check were under the
jurisdiction of the same court, since the holder of the check, if one existed, was
not known. 214
The court solved the dilemma by requiring the bank to establish a certificate
of deposit that would be available to plaintiff after the six-years' statute of
limitation for actions to enforce payment of the check expired. If no claimant
appeared during this time to present the check, the certificate would be paid to
the plaintiff. In the interim, the bank was to pay interest on the certificate of
deposit quarterly to the plaintiff until either a claimant appeared or the limita-
tion period expired. The court left open for the trial court to determine if it
would be appropriate to award interest to the plaintifffor any period prior to the
entry of the court's judgment. In leaving this question open, the court suggested
that the award might be justified under the theory that at least a portion of this
prior time period could be regarded as a time when payment of the check would
have been unlikely. 215
The holder may use Dee § 3-804, on proof of ownership, to sue on the
instrument when the note has been mistakenly returned to the maker and the
maker refuses to give it back. Recovery may be had even against persons liable
on the instrument, such as indorsers, other than the person to whom the instru-
ment was mistakenly surrendered."·

'14 See uee § 3-802.

215 Santos.186 NJ Super. at 66, 451 A2d at 415.
"" Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 4 Conn. App. 376, 494'A2d 1216, cen.
denied, 197 Conn. 808, 499 A2d 58 (1985). Refusal to payor return an instrument
presented for payment may constitute conversion as well. See UCC § 3-419(1).
21-47 COllECTION & PAYMENT 1121.09

1121.09 JURISDICTION IN LAWSUITS INVOLVING CHECK

COLLECTION AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
Checks and other negotiable instruments are freely transferred across state
lines and are often handled by banks and parties in more than one state. When
the collection ofthe check breaks down and one party seeks to assert legal rights
over another through a lawsuit, the choice of the jurisdiction in which to bring
the lawsuit can raise difficult legal problems. These questioDs ofjurisdiction to
sue are generally beyond the scope of this handbook, lIT although a 1982 case
involving interstate check collection is worth noting here. In this case,l" checks
were drawn on a Chicago bank and made payable to an Iowa corporation whose
principal place ofbusiness was in Iowa. A forger obtained the checks, forged the
payee's indorsements, and cashed the checks at an Iowa bank. The Iowa bank
sent the checks for collection through its clearinghouse to the Chicago bank. The
true payee then sued the Chicago bank in a federal district court in Illinois. The
Chicago bank then sought to bring the clearinghouse into the lawsuit and the
clearinghouse moved to bring the Iowa bank into the lawsuit. The court held that
it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Iowa bank. The Iowa bank could not
reasonably have foreseen that by cashing the checks concerned that it might be
required to respond in an Illinois court for its actions. Because all the activities
relevant to the liability of the Iowa bank took place in Iowa and would be
premised upon Iowa law, the court said, "it is therefore difficult to imagine any
special interest that Illinois could have in the resolution ofthe dispute between
two Iowa banks-the depositary bank and the clearinghouse bank-about facts
and law alien to Illinois." In the view ofthe court, granting personal jurisdiction
over the Iowa bank "would positively hinder the underlying policies of the
several states that favored the free flow of commerce and of interstate banking
transactions in particular."
An Ohio court has interpreted its long-arm statute to hold that there is
jurisdiction in Ohio to sue a New York bank that was engaged in factoring
accounts of a California company that sold goods to a business in Ohio.m Gold
Circle Stores, an Ohio business, bought goods from Bel Sales. Bel Sales, a
California corporation, sold all of its accounts receivable to Chemical Bank, a
New York bank that the parties stipulated does not contract to supply services or
goods in Ohio. The court held that the Bank's entering into the factoring agree-
ment and accepting the benefits under it, including direct payments from the
Ohio firm on the accounts receivables, constituted the transacting ofbusiness in

217 A complete description ofthese problems is contained in the multivolume treatise,

C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1969-1987).
211 Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental III. Bank 8< Trust Co., 695 F2d 289 (7th Cir.
1982). .
111 Gold Circle Stores v. Chemical Bank-Dommerich Div., 4 Ohio App. 3d 10,446
NE2d 194 (1982).
1121010 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-48

Ohio within the state long-arm statute. These activities were enough to support
jurisdiction over the bank without denyihg the bank due process of law. The
court relied upon the circumstance that the factoring agreement gave the bank
title to the merchandise sold by Bel Sales and involved the bank in the sale ofthe
merchandise to a degree "much greater than that of an assignee of an existing
account receivable." The particular case arose when the Ohio firm tried to
collect for merchandise returned to Bel Sales. As to this transaction, the court
stated, "Chemical Bank's contracts are essentially the same as those of Bel
Sales."

1121.10 PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT UNDER vee AND

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD RULES
Prior to September I, 1988, when Regulation CC of the Federal Reserve
Board became effective,220 the major source oflaw governing the presentment,
collection and payment of checks was the uec with some impact from the
Board's Regulation J. Regulation CC, which broadly covers many aspects ofthe
collection and return of checks, now also plays a significant role. Some of the
rules in Regulation CC address issues relating to the presentment ofchecks that
are discussed in this section. Because ofthe importance ofRegulation CC, a brief
overview of the scope of its provisions relating to presentment of checks is set
forth here before examining the traditional law represented by the UCC.
Regulation CC contains rules on how to determine the places where checks
may be presented for payment. Under the regulation, a check will be considered
received by the paying bank when it is received (I) at the location requested by
the paying bank; (2) at the address associated with the routing number on the
check; (3) at any branch of the head office if the check does not give a specific
address for the bank; or (4) at any branch, head office, or other location "consis-
tent with the name and address of the bank on the check ..." if the bank is
identified on the check by name and address. 221 The paying bank must accept
presentment of checks at any of the locations specified in the regulation, and so
this rule varies the provisions ofthe UCC that call for presentment to occur at a
place specified in the instrument or requested by the payor bank. 222 These rules
clarify that presentment can be made based on the routing instructions encoded
on the check. They also clarify that receipt at a processing center the paying bank
has designated amounts to receipt by the paying bank itself.

220 Regulation ee § 229.36 (1988) (to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.36).

221 [d. § 229.36(b).

222 [d. § 229.36 commentary (c). The uee rule making the place specified in the
instrument controlling is Section 3-504(2)(c). vee § 4-204(3) goes further and permits
presentment at a place the payor bank requests.
21-49 COlLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.10

When there is a truncation IIgreement with the paying bank, a bank may
present a check by transmitting the information called for in the agreement
without presentation of the chec\!:. itself.= There are limitations on the extent to
which a tI1Ulcation agreement may vary the return times and other duties placed
on the banks by the regulation. The agreement cannot affect parties who are
interested in the check but who have not been a party to the truncation
agreement. 214
Receipt of the check in accordance with these rules triggers the running of
the time for the paying bank to meet its duties ofexpeditious return and notice of
nonpayment.2'IS These duties will fall on banks identified as banks for which
checks are "payable at or payable through" because these checks are considered
to be drawn on the bank so identified for purposes of the expeditious return and
notice Qf nonpayment duties. 22I
Regulation ee also changes the uec scheme by which collecting banks in
forwarding a check make provisional settlements that subsequently either are
reversed in the event the check is dishonored or become final when the check is
paid. Under the Board's regulation, settlements 4l the forward collection of the
check are "final when made."'u This is consistent with the regulation's
approach of anticipating direct returtl of dishonored checks to the depositary
bank or other bank, which would bypass some of the intermediary banks that
handl~d the check in the forward collection process. 12tI The regulation recognizes
that collecting banks maybe liable to priorbanks and the owner ofthe check for
failure to exercise due care in the forward collection process.2'I1 This preserves
the DeC approach of regarding tbe banks as the qent or sub-agent ofthe owner
of the check for purposes ofliability.2IO The regulation also provides a duty on
banks to settle when a check is returned for nonpayment131 and to make payment
to the extent a bank that subsequently handles a check does not receive payment

mId. § 229.36(c).
224 Regulation CC § 229.36(c) (I 988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.36(c».
201 Regulation CC § 229.36 commentary(b)(1988)(to be codified at 12 CFR § 2·29.36
appendix). See id. §§ 2i9.3O(a), 229.33. The duties of expeditious return and notice of
nonpayments are discussed at 111 21.03[8), 21.11 [2][d}.
221 Regulation CC § 229.36(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.36(a». See also
the definition of"paying bank." Id. § 229.2(z). The regulation does not mean that a check
sent for payment or collection tD a payable through or payable at bank should be treated as
drawn on that bank for purposes ofthe final payment and midnight deadline roles ofUCe
§ 4·30 I according to the Board's commentary. Regulation CC § 229.30, commentary.
2211d. § 229.36(d).
m See the discussion of methods of return at ~ 21.03(8].
22tRegulatjon CC § 229.J6{d) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.36(d».
230 Id. § 229.36 commentary (d).
23' See id. § 229.3 J(c), on the duty ofthe returning bank to seitle, and id. § 229.32(b),
on the duty of the depositary bank to pay.
, 21.10(11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-50

for it. '32 These provisions appear to give paying banks and banks that have
handled the check for collection and return rights that are similar in effect to
those under the UCC scheme based on provisional and fmal settlements.
Although Regulation CC preempts provisions of the UCC to the extent of
any inconsistency,233 the regulation is written against the general backdrop of
negotiable instruments law and bank collection rules established by the UCC.
Thus, it is still important to consider the framework established by the UCC. In
addition, there are instruments that do not involve the application ofthe Regu-
lation CC rules, such as the collection ofpromissory notes and drafts that do not
involve banks. The material in the remainder of this section describes the UCC
treatment of presentment. As it is reviewed, it is important to keep in mind that
Regulation CC should also be consulted for possible applicability in any situa-
tion involving the collection or return of checks.

(l) Liability of Primary and Secondary Parties

Liability on negotiable instruments payable in money can be primary or
secondary. Makers of notes and acceptors of drafts are primarily liable. Indor·
sers, and all other parties, are secondarily liable. Their liability is conditional.
Drawers of checks and drafts, although they are classed in the UCC as "second-
ary parties,"'34 are subject to a sort ofliability that has combined characteristics
of both primary and secondary liability.
No special formality is necessary for charging parties primarily liable. '35
Except for the liability in warranty arising from the transfer of instruments,
parties secondarily liable can usually be held to their conditional liability only if
the holder meets certain formalities at maturity ofthe instrument. These formal-
ities are known as presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor. The require·
ments of the law must be followed strictly in these respects or the right of
recourse against the panies secondarily liable may be lost (unless they have
waived the requirements either before or after maturity).

(2) When Instruments Mature

Demand paper is mature the moment ofissue and the maker is liable to pay
it at any time within the statute of limitations. m When a date of maturity is

"'Id. § 229.35(b).
mId. § 229.4 I.
"'vee § 3·102(1)(d).
us veC§ 3-413(1); cf. vee § 3·502(1). See Farber v. Sackett, 255 Mass. 569, 152 NE
54 (1926); Vnion Bank v. Sullivan, 214 NY 332,108 NE 558 (1915).
''''vee §§ 3-108, 3-122, 3-503. See First Nat'( Bank v. Capps, 208 Ala. 235, 94 So.
112(1922).
21-51 COllECTION & PAYMENT 121.10(3)

stated, the instrument matures on the date indicated.U'f Drafts are sometimes
payable "at sight." In such a case, the paper matures as soon as it is ab.own to the
person required to make payment. Ifthe instrument is payable a certain number
ofdays after date, after sight, or after happening ofa specific event, maturity is
calculated by excluding the day from which the time is to begin to run and by
including the day ofpayment. aI For example, an instrument dated January 5
and payable in thirty days matures on February 4. When an instrument contains
no date of maturity and no time for payment is expressed, it is payable on
demand. 13I However, when an instrument payable a definite number of days
after date is issued with that date blank, it will be considered as an incomplete
instrument; under the UCC, it cannot be enforced until completed. When it is
completed by fiUing in that which normally would be the date of issue, in
accordance with the authority given, the instrument can be enforced.!"
Time paper must be presented for payment on the date stated as payable.
Demand paper must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after the
attachment of drawer's and indorsers' liability.2"
In Yahn & McDonnell. Inc. v. Farmers Bank,2'" the court considered when a
certificate ofdeposit becomes due. Under UCC § 3-122( I >, the cause ofaction on
a certificate of deposit accrues when a demand is made for payment even when
the certificate is one that bears a specific time of maturity. The certificate of
deposit is treated differently from demand notes because such certificates are
often held for a long period of time that may exceed the period of the statute of
limitations. The district court had held that the certificate either matured on its
stated date or that after the stated date it became a demand instrument that the
transferee had acquired after a reasonable lenglh of time. The court remanded
the issue back to the district court for reconsideration in light of the circum-
stances surrounding the issuance and acquisition of the certificate.

(31' Saturdays, Sundays, and Holidays

When the maturity date of an instrument falls on a Sunday or on a holiday,
the instrument is payable on the successive business day. When a time instru-
ment matures on a Saturday, which is not a full business day, it should be

>aT uee§ 3-503(1)(c). Ifthe instrument is not paid when due, there isa cause ofaction
against the maker or acceptor, which accrues on the day after maturity. vee § 3-
122(1 )(a).
231 See vec§ 3-503(I)(a). Although the vee has no provision for the computation of
time, no change from prior law was intended. vee § 3-503 comment J.
231 vee § 3-108. Keister v. Wade, 191 AD 870, 182 NYS 119 (1920).
240uec §§ 3·1 14 & comment 2, 3-115.
... vee n 3-503(1)(c), 3-503(1 )(e).
mYahn & McDonnell, Inc. v. Farmers Bank, 708 F2d 104 (3d Cir. 1983).
1121.10(41 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-52

presented for payment on the successive full business day. 2a Some states have
special legislation governing holiday and Saturday bank transactions.2" When
Regulation CC of the Federal Reserve Board applies, it contains its own set of
deadlines for the collection and return process as discussed previously.245

[4] Time to Make Presentment for Payment

Presentment for payment is not required for holding the parties primarily
liable on negotiable instruments but it is necessary for holding indorsers and, in
some instances indicated below, for holding drawers.
Ifan instrument is not payable on demand, it must be presented on the day
it falls due. 2" Presentment the day before is not sufficient and presentment after
maturity also will be untimely ifthere is no excuse for thedelay ."'7 When there is
an unexcused delay, indorsers are discharged, and other parties may be dis7
charged if loss occurs as a result of bank insolvency because ofthe delay.2"
Demand instruments must be presented a reasonable time after their issue
to hold the drawers and a reasonable time after indorsement to hold the indor-
sers. Reasonable time is determined by the nature of the business and the
particular circumstances involved. 24'
Checks, since they are intended for immediate payment according to the
usual business custom, should be presented the next business day after receipt.
The vee sets deadlines ofseven days and thirty da}'s for initiating the collection
of a check to count on holding indorsers and the drawer liable. 210 Failure to
properly present a check or begin collection within seven days completely dis-
charges indorsers but a drawer is discharged only when presentment is delayed
more than thirty days and the drawer is deprived, by the insolvency of the
drawee bank, of funds to pay the draft and, even then, the drawer is only

mUCC § 3-S03(3}.
m California, for example. has adopted a non-uniform VCC § 3-123. Many states
have special statutes that authorize bank transactions on Saturdays, Sundays, and holi·
days. See H, Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks ~ 14.13 (6th ed. 1987). .
241See I 21.06 and the definition of "banking day" and·"business day" in the
regulation. Regulation ee § 229.2 (I 988)(to be codified at 12 eFR § 229.2).
2" vee § 3-S03(I)(c).
241 See vee § 3-S I I.
241 vee § 3-S02.
2U vee § 3.S03(2).
2501d. What constitutes a reasonable length of time is determined by commercial
practice. The vee sets a presumption that a check must be presented within a week after
indorsement, or collection must be started. to hold an indorser; the presentation or
collection of a check within thirty days after issue is necessary to hold the drawer. The
presumption, of course. may be rebutted by proying contrary current business practices. It
is therefore wise to start both checks and demand drafts in the process ofcollection the day
after they are received.
21-53 COLLECTION'" PAYMENT 11 21.10[5)

discharged ifhe assigns his rights against the bank to the holder.211 For example,
ifa check for $100 is held for an unreasonable length oftime, during which time
the drawee bank fails and pays a dividend on liquidation of only forty percent,
the indorsers are completely dischaIged and the drawer will be discharged upon
assigning, to the holder, his right to a claim ofSIOO.- If the drawee bank was
solvent but the check was dishonored for other reasons, the indorsers still would
be discharged because of the delay but the drawer would remain liable.
Demand notes and certificates of deposit, although matlU'e as issued, are
obviously intended to run for some time. Although they may be presented at
once, the holder will not lose his or her rights against the indorsers if he or she
holds them for some time. The length oftime elapsing between the issue ofsuch
paper and the date on which it must be presented in order to hold the parties
secondarily liable depends upon the custom of the particular locality in which
the paper is circulated. If a note is payable on demand, the cause of action
against the maker accrues on its date, and this will begin the statute oflimita-
tions running. 21'
When overdue paper is still in circulation after maturity, it is held subject to
the same rules as any other demand paper. Iftime paperis held beyond maturity,
without being presented, the indorsers are discharged; but anybody indorsing
thereafter may be held by presentment, within a reasonable time after such
indorsement. The same rule applies to stale checks. For example, if a checkwith
one indorser is held by Jones for sixty days, the indorser is already discharged as
indicated above. IfJones then indorses to abank, which presenu the check to the
drawee on the next day, the prompt presentment gives the bank the right to hold
Jones on his indonement but should not revive the liability of the flrst indorser
unless the bank takes without notice of Jones's delay. Under the UCC, persons
indorsing after maturity are not entitled to presentment and notice of dis-
honor.'S4 No one who takes an instrument with notice that it is overdue can be a
holder in due course. m

[5} Formalities of Presentment

To complete presentment, a number of formalities must be carefully
observed. The instrument must be presented by the holder or by someone acting
on his or her behalf, such as an agent or a collecting bank.'1II Presentment must be

151 vee § 3·502. See Grist v. Osgood, 90 Nev. 165,521 P2d 368 (Nev. 1974).
mvee §§ 3-501-3·502.
IS3 vee § 3·122(1) & comment I. The cause of action on a demand cenificate of
deposit does not accrue until there has been a demand for payment. Id.
IS'vee § 3-501(4).
In vec §§ 3-302( 1)(c), 3-304(3).
III vee § 3-504. See vec §§ 3-505, 4-210.
, 21.10(5] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·54

made to the person who is the payor ofthe instrument, which may be the maker,
acceptor, drawee or other payor. m Presentment to the drawer ofa check is not
proper. The place for presentment is the place specified in the instrument, and if
no place is mentioned, presentment should be made at the place of business or
residence of the party who is to pay.258
At the time of presentment, the instrument must be exhibited to the person

a.
required to make payment and, at the same time, a definite payment demand
must be made upon him. Mere informal talks or requests over the telephone
are not sufficient presentment. Under the UCC, presentment by mail, through.
the clearinghouse, or by any means agreed upon or determined by commercial
custom, is sufficient. The reason the instrument must be exhibited is because the
payor is entitled to proof the person demanding payment is a holder who has a
right to payment and, further, by paying the instrument, to take possession of it
and cancel it, or, in the case ofa partial payment, to have the payment noted on
the instrument. 2tO
Presentment must be made at a reasonable hour on a business day. For
example, ifit is payable at a bank, it must be presented during banking hours or
during the customary time for clearing, ifsuch customary time takes place after
banking hours. 211
An invalid presentment was found when a bank attempted to present a
group of checks in bulk over the counter to the payor bank. Two banks in
Aorida, Citizens and Aorida National, 212 had previously informally exchanged
in bulk checks drawn on each other until Florida National changed to a com-
puter processing system. Although Florida National had stopped the manual
exchange, Citizens appeared with a two-inch stack of checks drawn on Florida
National and demanded paym:-nt. Florida National refused to pay unless each
check was individually indorsed but offered to permit Citizens to deposit the
checks. Florida National quoted a two dollar per item processing fee for present-
ment in bulk for payment over the counter. Citizens then made arrangements
with a correspondent bank for the collection of the checks at a cost of from
$0.040 to $0.055 per item plus the costs of delay. Citizens then sued Florida
National for damages from its refusal to pay over the counter. The court ruled
for Florida National. Although. over the counter presentment was allowed under
vee § 3-504, it was obsolete, and Florida National was fully within its rights
under UCC § 3-505 in requiring Citizens to exhibit each check individually and
to indorse a receipt for payment on the check. Furthermore, Citizens had no

257 vee § 3-504( 1).

258 vec § 3-504(2)(c).
... VCC § 3-505.
-vec § 3-505(l)(d).
... VCC §§ 3-503(4), 3-504(2)(b).
2M Florida Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Bank, 474 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Disl. Ct. App. 1985).
21-55 COLLECTION &. PAYMENT '21.10[6\

right to insist upon receipt ofprovisional payment from Florida National with-
out exhibiting the checks individually to determine whether they were properly
payable. Because Citizens had not properly presented the checks, it was not
entitled to damages.
Collecting banks (but not nonbank parties) are authorized to present items
at any place designated by the payor bank. 21' This allows use of a central
processing center or other arrangement for check truncation. H4
When the instrument has been lost, the owner may recoverfrom those liable
for it upon proofofownership. 211 In such a case, the payor is entitled to a bond to
indemnify him against possible loss through demand by some other holder.

(6) When Presentment Is Excused

There are a number of instances in which delay or failure to make present-
ment may be excused. When delay is caused by circumstances beyond the
control ofthe holder and is not due to his default, misconduct, or negligence, late
presentment may be sufficient if it is made as soon as the cause of the delay
ceases to operate. 2f1 Presentment may be dispensed with entirely when, after the
exercise of reasonable diligence, presentment is impossible."' It may also be
excused if the drawee is a fictitious person 211 or if presentment has been
waived. m
There are also certain cases in which the parties secondarily liable are not
entitled to presentment, even though it can be made. Thus, presentment for
payment is not required for charging the drawer when he or she has no right to

~.. UCC § 4-204(3).

'''See Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, 99 Idaho 517, 584 P2d 1242 (1978); atrd
after remand, 101 Idaho 402, 614 P2d 425 (1980). Regulation ee applies when checks are
being presented. It has rules on where and how checks may be presented to the paying
bank as discussed at ITIT 21.06, 21.1 O.
m uec § 3-804. See Household Finance Corp. v. Jobnson, S6 Obio App. 2d 14, 38 J
NE2d 215 (1978) ("preponderance of evidence" test applied).
H1uce § 3-511(1).
211 uec § 3-511 (2){c).
'··UCC § 3-51 I(2)(b).
••• uee § 3-5 11 (2)(a). Presentment for payment was excused in a case where the bank
informed the holder that the check would not be honored when the parties to the underly-
ing transaction had a specific agreement that tbe bank had to "bonor" the check in order
for it to constitute payment. Prevo v. McGinnis, 142 Ariz. 298, 689 P2d 557 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984). However, telephone advice from the payor bank that it has insufficient funds
to pay a check does not amount to a presentment of the check for payment. Without a
presentment, there cannot be a dishonor; absent dishonor, the underlying obligation for
which the check was taken remains suspended and not in default. Rose v. U.S. Naf! Bank,
218 Neb. 97.351 NW2d 594 (1984). Moreover, when the cbeck is forwarded to tbe payor
bank for payment with the instructions to hold the check until sufficient funds become
available, Ihis is not a presentment, and there is no dishonor of the check. Id.
f 21.10(7] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-56

expect or to require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument. 210 For
example, when the drawer has stopped payment or has no money on deposit
with the drawee-bank, and when no arrangement has been made for payment
arid the drawer knows of these facts, the drawer is not entitled to have the
instrument presented. 271 It is not clear what circumstances are required for
insufficient funds to excuse presentment for purposes of holding the drawer
liable. 272
An indorser who has indorsed the instrument after maturity is neither
entitled to presentment nor is he entitled to notice of dishonor. 273

[7] Duty of Payor Bank to Pay

[a) When Payment May be Refused Without DIshonor. The UCC does not
provide for any "days of grace," which existed under former law in some
jurisdictions, but it does recognize some situations in which payment may be
refused without the occurrence of dishonor of the instrument. The bank hall a
right to defer payment pending "reasonable examination to determine whether
it is properly payable. "270 It may require identification of the person making
presentment and proofofhis authority to act. 215 It can require production ofthe
instrument. 271 Payment may properly be delayed under emergency condi-
tions. m A collecting bank can agree to extend the time for payment in good faith
attempt to obtain payment. 271 There are also special rules for documentary
drafts and letters of credit. 271

[bl What Is DIshonor? An instrument is dishonored by nonpayment when it is

duly presented for payment and payment has been refused or cannot be
obtained.'10 When, as indicated previously, presentment is excused and the

2TOvee § 3·511(2)(b).
2" Id.
m See vee § 3-511(2). This section appears to excuse presentment ifthe insufficient
funds are a circumstance where the drawer should be viewed as having no reason to expect
payment. See generallyH. Bailey, Brady On Bank Checks, ~ 14.14at 14-18 (6th ed. 1981).
See also cases cited note 269, supra.
mvee § 3-501(4).
274 vee § 3-506(2).

21. vee § 3-505.

21IId.
m vee § 4-( 08(2).
271 vee § 4·108(1).
.,. vee §§ 4·502, 5-112.
"0 vee § 3.507.
21-51 COLLECI10N cl PAYMENT 1121.10181

instrument is overdue and unpaid, it must be treated as dishonored..' After an

instrument has been dishonored, notice must be given at once to charge parties
secondarily liable. When an instrument is dishonored, the holder may sue either
on the instrument or on the underlying obligation for which the instrument was
given.U2

18) Presentment for Acceptance

Acceptance ofa draft by a drawee constitutes a legal contract to pay the draft
and occurs when the drawee signs it. 2U There are certain situations in which
instruments must be presented for acceptance in order to hold the parties. Thus,
if an instrument is payable after sight or after presentment, it must be presented
for acceptance or negotiated within a reasonable time. 1M If a draft is payable
elsewhere than at the residence or place ofbusiness of the drawee, or ifthe draft
so stipulates, it must be presented for acceptance. m The holder of a draft
payable at a stated date is not required to present the draft for acceptance, but
has the option ofpresenting it on or before the date it is payable. lu Ifthe holder
exercises the option to present the draft for acceptance and acceptance is
refused, dishonor of the draft has oceurredand the holder will need to give
notice of dishonor.
The formalities of presenting an instrument for acceptance are the same as
those required for presentment for payment, except that the party to whom
presentment for acceptance is made may wait until the close of the next business
day without dishonoring the instrument. 91 The holder may extend the time for
acceptance one more business day without dishonor occurring. 2U Intentional
failure to return the instrument within the time allowed will make the bank
liable for the instrument. m
When an instrument has been presented properly and dishonoredby nonac-
ceptance, the holder has an immediate right of recourse against the drawers and
indorsers and presentment for payment is not necessary. HCl Once the instrument
has been dishonored by failure to accept, the holder must take prompt a~tion to

.,. uee §§ 3-507( 1)(b), 3-511(3).

212 uee §§ 3-410-3-411, 3-413-3·414, 3-802(I)(b). See 11 21.0314).
113uee §§ 3·410-3-411, 3-413.
214 uee § 3-503(1 )(b).
21Suce § 3-50I(l)(a).
211 uee §§ 3-50 I( 1)(a), 3-503( 1lea).
m uee § 3-506(1).
21. uee ~ 3-506(2).
muec§ 3-419(1).
I " .UCC §§ 3-507(2), 3-511(4).
1121.11 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-58

give notice of dishonor to indorsers and other secondary parties. 211 If proper
notice has been given at nonacceptance, subsequent presentment for payment is
not necessary. 212

1f 21.11 PROTEST AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR

To hold parties secondarily liable, such as indorscrs and drawers, it is
necessary for the person holding the instrument at maturity to meet all the
requirements of presentment, protest (when necessary), and notice ofdishonor.
Failure in anyone of these particulars automatically releases indorscrs. The
circumstances unc!er which drawers are released from liability are more limited,
but even drawers may be discharged. For example, under the uee, failure to
make a necessary presentment discharges the drawer when the drawee becomes
insolvent during the delay,- and failure to make a necessary protest is a com-
plete discharge.II'

[11 Protest
Protest is a formal declaration by a holder that an instrument has been
dishonored. It is rarely necessary. The uee requires protest only of drafts that,
on their face, are drawn or payable outside of the United States, its "territories,
dependencies, and possessions," and Puerto Rico. 2H There are procedural
advantages in making a protest because it creates presumptions ofdishonor and
notice of dishonor. Banks, however, can obtain the benefit of these presump-
tions without the formality of protest through the use of any official stamp or
writing on the instrument, or any accompanying writing, that states the instru-
ment is dishonored and gives a sufficient reason therefor. 2tI
Although protest is usually made before a notary public, it can be made by
any United States consul, vice consul, or other person authorized by the law of
the place where the instrument is dishonored. 297
The formality of protest is not necessary when the bank exercises its right to
revoke a provisional settlement and charges back its customer's account for
items that have not been paid. 20'

2" VCC § 3-501(2) & comment 3.

212 VCC § 3-511(4).
2I3VCC §§ 3-50I(l)(c), 3-501(2)(b), 3-502(1)(b).
2t4VCC §§ 3-501(3), 3-502(2).
...vcc § 3-501(3).
2tlVCC § 3-510(b).
207 vec § 3-509. Compare VCC § 3-508 on notice of dishonor. See also 1 21.11 [2].
"'Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunter, 31 Colo. App. 200,501 P2d 486 (1972).
21-59 COllECTION & PAYMENT 1I21.1l[2l[al

The protest is a written statement, made under seal.- It must identify the
dishonored instrument, certify that either due presentment was made or state
why presentment was excused, and certify that the instrument was dishonored
by nonacceptance or nonpayment.-

[2) Notice of Dishonor

la) When Notice of Dishonor I. Necessary. Whether the instrument requires
protest or not, notice of dishonor must be given to each indorser liable on the
paper unless ICflally excused, and anyone to whom such notice is not given
cannot be held on his conditional secondary liability'O' unless he has waived this
condition. Unlike protest, no special form of notice is required. Anything that is
sufficient to bring the dishonor to the attention ofthe parties secondarily liable is
satisfactory.:102 The notice itself may be written or merely oral, but it must
identify the instrument and state that the instrument has been dishonored. 3D3 If
the instrument was protested, a copy ofthe protest is sufficient..lIM Notice may be
given personally, by telephone, or through the mail,:lOli and the form is immate-
rial so long as it conveys the necessary information. 301 Unless a bank is involved,
the notice may be oral. Banks, however, should give written notice ofdishonor.
When a bank ex.ercises its right to revoke a provisional settlement and
charge back its customer account for an item that is dishonored, it must give
notice of dishonor as well. 3D? When a payor bank ex.ercises the right to charge
back, it must either return the item or send written notice of dishonor.:lOl When

m VCC § 3-509.
300 Id.
30' vee § 3.501(2). Brannons Number Seven,lnc. \'. Phelps, 665 P2d 860 (Ok\a. Ct.
App. 1983) (indorser not liable unless notice of dishonor given). The Federal Reserve
System has ils own regulations regarding notice of dishonor. These are discussed in
, 21.11 [2][d). See also f 21.03[8).
:102 vec § 3-508.
30. VCC § 3.508(3). When oral, il must be given in a reasonable manner. Compare
vee §§ 4·212(1). 4·30 I(l)(b) on notice by collecting and payor banks. These rules are
discussed below,
3Q4 vce § 3-51 O(a).

:105 vec § 3.508(3).

•06/ d,
307VCC §§ 4-212(1), 4-30I(l)(b),
:IO'vec ~ 4.301(l)(b). See Available Iron & Melal Co, v. First NaCI Bank, 56 Ill, App,
3d 516, 371 NE2d 1032 (I 977}; Security Trust Co, v, First Nat'l Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 523,
358 NYS2d 943 (1974); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Fedual Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., S54
P2d 119 (Okla, C1. App, 1976) (Federal Reserve rules allowing oral notice control),
When a payor bank dishonors a check and returns ii, uce § 3-5fl8(3) requires the
bank to give notice of dishonor in a reasonable manner. Sending the dishonored check to
the collecting bank al a city where there is no branch of the collecling bank i5 not
11 21.11[2]1b] NEGOT~LEINSTRUMENTS 21·60

the collecting bank charges back, the UCC is not clear whether the notice must
be written.1Ilt There are requirements imposed by Regulation J and Regulation
CC for giving notice of nonpayment. These are in addition to the UCC and are
discussed in the following sections.

Ibl Giving Nodee. Notice may be given by the holder of a dishonored instru-
ment, by an agent ofthe holder, or by any other person who brings the facts to the
attention of the parties secondarily liable. 310 The notary who protests the instru-
ment is also a proper penon to give notice. In When a bank is agent for collection,
it may give notice. 312 When such notice comes to the attention of prior parties
within the proper time, it is effectual for the benefit not only of the person on
whose behalf it was given but also for all persons who have rights against the
parties who have received the notice. 3 ,a

[elWho Should Be Notified. Notice is effective when given to the person

whose name appears on the instrument or to any agent acting on his behalf. a..
Notice left with a third person, however, who is not the agent of the party to be
charged, is not sufficient. In the ease of partnership paper, notice to anyone of
the partners is notice to all of the partners. III When persons are not partners but
are jointly liable on the paper, however, each individual, unless one ofthem has
authority to act for the others, must be given notice. 316 In such a case, only the
indorsers actually notified can be held to have received adequate notice. 3t7 The
UCC has general rules on when notice is received and how an organization
receives notice. a"

reasonable. Financial Universal Corp. v. Mercantile Nat'! Bank. 683 SW2d 815 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984). Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC now imposes return duties on banks
that return checks. See ~ 21.03[8).
3IltUCC § 4·212( I). See Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Sahadi. 32 Conn. Supp. 172,345
A2d 53 (CP 1975) (oral notice effective); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. First Sec. Bank, 538
P2d 298 (Utah 1975) (written notice required). Oral nOlice of dishonor from a bank
clearinghouse to the depositary bank was held to be effective in Greer v. White Oak State
Bank, 673 SW2d 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Because the depositary bank waited until it
received written notification, it lost the right to hold its customer to liability on his
indorsement as well as the right to charge back to its customer's account under UCC § 4·
212.
310 UCC § 3.508( I).
31' uce §§ 3.509(1), 3-509(3).
312 uee § 3.508(1).

muee § 3-508(8).
3.. uee § 3.508(1).
a"uce § 3-508(5).
316 See vec § 3·508( I).
3t7 uee §§ 3-502(1 lea), 3-508(1).
316uec §§ 1.201(26)-1-201(27), 3.508(4).
21-61 COLLECITON & PAYMENT 121.11(2J(d)

(d) Deadlines for Notice Under uee and Federal Retlerve DoanrRuies. The
time and manner for giving notice is set by law. Under the uee, notice may be
given immediately after the dishonor and must be sent within the prescribed
time.'" Notice given after the prescribed time has elapsed is ineffective unless
excused.
Under the uee, the time allowed for banks to give notice is before their
midnight deadline (midnight of the next business day following dishonor).a2D
Individuals have until midnight of the third business day after dishonor. a21
These rules are also subject to change under the vee provisions for bank
collections, which may give collecting banks a longer time, when provided by
agreement, by clearinghouse rules, by Federal Reserve regulations, or when the
bank can establish reasonableness under certain circumstances.au There are
Federal Reserve regulations, explained later in this chapter, which supersede the
vee deadlines to some exteot.
Delay in giving notice of dishonor, like delay in presentment, may be
excused by circumstances beyond the control ofthe holder and not caused by the
holder's default or misconduct. But when the cause of the delay is removed,
notice must be given with reasonable diligence. a23 Unforeseen employee absen·
teeism does not automatically trigger this provision. uc Nor do delayed returns of
dishonored items caused by employee illnesses, Christmas overloads. or
machine breakdown, none ofwhich alone or in combination constitute "circum·
stances beyond [the] control" of the bank. 32s
When an individual who is secondarily liable on an instrument receives
notice, he or she has three business days after receiving notice ofdishonor to give
notice to prior parties. A bank must give notice of dishonor before its midnight
deadline. 32t

vee § 3-508(2).
111
so·vec §§ 3·508(2), 4.104(1 )(h).
m VCC § 3.508(2).
3>2 VCC §§ 4-202(2), 4·212.
"'vcc § 3·51 J.
3,cRich v. Franklin Sav. Bank, 18 vec Rep. Sere. (Callaghan) 451 (NY Sup: Ct.
1975).
32SBlake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 SW2d S89 (Ky. Cl. App. 1977).
Computer malfunction and/or electrical power failure may justify a bank's failure to
return a check before the bank's midnight deadline under vee § 4-302 if the bank
exercises diligence. Whether these circumstances constitute an emergency or other cir·
cumstance beyond the control of the bank within vee § 4-108 is a question of facl.
Congress Factors Corp. v. Extebank, 34 vec Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1258 (NY Sup. Ct.
1982).
". uee §§ 3-508(2), 4·212( I), 4-301. The deadline is midnight on the banking day
following the banking day when the bank dishonored or received notice ofdishonor. VCC
§ 4-104(1)(h). Federal Reserve Board Regulations J and ec also apply and impose
different deadlines which are discussed laler in this section.
 , 21·1l12)[dJ NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-62

For example, ifa bank that is a collecting agent gives notice ofdishonor only
to the person depositing the instrument, the depositor, in tum, can give notice to
prior indorsers and can hold them liable even though the bank failed to notify
them. Every person receiving notice of dishonor should immediately give such
notice to prior parties who might be liable, otherwise, they may be discharged by
failure to receive notice. 327 When timely notice has been given by any party, the
notice operates for the benefit of all parties who have rights on the instrument
against the party notified. UI
In Lufthansa German Airlines v. Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings
Association,32t the customer of a depositary bank claimed that the bank could
not charge back a check to the customer's account because the bank failed to give
timely notice to the customer of its dishonor. A check for over $63,000 was
deposited by the customer and forwarded to the drawee bank, who dishonored
it. Following Federal Reserve rules, the drawee bank gave notice by telephone to
the depositary bank of its dishonor of the check. The telephone message was
received on June 21, but the bank did not give notice of the dishonor to its
customer until it received the check on June 28, which was timely ifit was proper
to calculate the time for giving notification from the date the check was received
by the depositary bank. The court upheld the ruling of the trial judge that the
customer received timely notice. The telephone call to the depositary bank did
not create a duty to advise the customer of the dishonor because the telephone
message did not identify the branch where the check was deposited or the
customer who deposited it. 3:10
In a different case, the payor bank gave timely notice of dishonor to the
collecting bank when the payor bank orally told the collecting bank that a
$30,000 check was drawn against insufficient funds. This triggered an obligation
on the collecting bank to notify its customer of the dishonor. Since the collecting
bank did not give notice before its midnight deadline, the indorsers on the check
were discharged from liability. The collecting bank could not avoid responsibil-
ity for giving notice of the dishonor by instructing the payor bank to continue to
hold the check in the hope that it eventually would be paid.33'
A depositary-collecting bank became liable for failing to give its customer
notice of dishonor of a check deposited by the customer. The customer pre-

327 UCC §§ 3-502(1), 3-508{1}, 3-508(8}.

3Z1 UCC § 3-508(8).
3Z1652 F2d 835 (9th Cir. 1981).
330 The telephone message did give the depositary bank the amount ofthe dishonored
check, the reason for the dishonor, the dale ofthe Federal Reserve cash letter, the name of
the maker of the check, and the routing number. Id. at 836. Regulation CC, discussed
·below, places a duty on a depositary bank to give nolice of nonpayment to its customer by
the bank's midnight deadline or "a lorrger reasonable time." Regulation CC § 229.33(d)
(1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.33(d)). The duty is not limited to checks of$2,5oo
or more, although that is the regulation that creates the duty. ld.
331 Clements v. Cenlral Bank, 155 Ga. App. 27, 270 SE2d 194 (I 980}.
21-63 COLLECTION &. PAYMENT , 11.11{lUd}

sented a classic showing of loss because the customer shipped goods for which
the dishonored check had been given in payment and would not have released
the goods if it had received timely notice of the dishonor. The depositary bank
received notice of the dishonor of the check on April 2nd, but the bank did not
give notice to its customer. Noting that the customer did not have enough in its
account to cover the check and believing that the payor bank had been late in
returning the check, the depositary bank sent the check back to the payor bank. A
month later, the payor bank again returned the check to the depositary bank.
Then, for the first time, on May 20th the depositary bank advised its customer of
the situation. The court held that the delay in payment had caused the loss to the
customer and further held that a provision in the bank's regulations that it had
discretion to "resubmit returned checks" did not excuse the bank from its
negligence in failing to notify its customer of the dishonor.m
When a collecting bank charges back its customer's account because the
account was credited for a check that was subsequently dishonored, UCC § 4-
212(1) requires the bank to act by its midnight deadline or "within a longer
reasonable time." One court found that a circumstance justifying delay beyond
the midnight deadline was the intervention of the Christmas holiday between
the time the bank received notice the check had been dishonored and the time
the bank took action to notify its customer."' The bank satisfied tbe require-
menu ofthis section by giving oral noticeefthe-ch1trge-back and dishonor to its
customer.33'
A payor bank has no duty to notify the payee that it will dishonor checks
drawn on its customer's account even in circumstances in which the payor bank
knows that numerous checks are being returned to the payee for insufficient
funds. The bank satisfies its standard ofcare by returning the checks in a timely
fashion (before its midnight deadline).us Although a Federal Reserve regulation
required the payor bank to give notice by wire to the Federal Reserve bank when
it returned items in excess of a specified amount, the failure ofthe payor bank to
give this notlee, while amounting to lack ofordinary care under UCC § 4-1 03(S),
did not result in the bank's liability to the payee to whom the dishonored checks
were returned. The payee could not show how the failure of the bank to give
notice to the Federal Reserve bank had hanned the payee's chances ofcollecting
the dishonored checks. 33I However, the Federal Reserve Board has adopted
regulations since this decision in which paying banks may have liability to a
payee for lack of due care.

mUnited Ky. Bank, Inc. v. Eagle Macl1. Co., 644 SW2d 649 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
333Bank of Commerce v. De Santis, 114 Misc. 2d 491, 496, 451 NYS2d 974,979
(N.Y. eiv. Ct. 1982).
33'ld. at 497, 4S 1 NYS2d at 980.
m Whalen & Sons Grain Co. v. Missouri Delta Bank, 496 F. Supp. 211, 214 (ED Mo.
1980). afl'd mem., 657 F2d 274 (8th Cir. 1981).
3)' Id. at 215.
11 21.11(2][dJ NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·64

The Federal Reserve Board in Regulation J requires payor banks to give

notice directly to the depositary institution when they dishonor checks or other
cash items of $2,500 or more that are processed through the Federal Reserve
System. The notice must be received by the depositary institution by midnight of
the second banking day following the day on which the payor bank dishonored
the check. Failure to provide proper notification will result in liability to the
depositary institution for losses sustained up to the amount of the check. 337
A paying bank that fails to act in good faith in giving notice as required by
Regulation J may be liable for other consequential damages of the depositary
bank as well. In the event of litigation between the paying bank and depositary
bank over the notice requirements, the prevailing party may recover court costs
and attorney fees. 331 The contents of the notice and the method by which it is
given to the depositary bank are governed by the Board's regulations and the
operating circulars oithe Reserve bank ofthe paying bank. 3H The paying bank's
liability under the regulation for failure to use ordinary care in giving notice runs
only to the depositary bank. 340
The notification and return responsibilities of payor and collecting banks
have been greatly enlarged by the Board's Regulation ee, effective September 1,
1988. 3" Regulation ee places a duty of "expeditious return" on paying banks
that decide not to honor a check 3" and on the returning banks that participate in
the return process. 34• These rules apply to all depositary institutions, not just to
banks who use the check collection services of the Federal Reserve System. The
rules preempt any provisions of the vee that are inconsistent, to the extent of
the inconsistency,34' and establish new deadlines and procedures for banks to
follow in returning checks. 345
Regulation ee expands the requirement that paying banks give direct
notice to the depositary institution when checks of $2,500 or larger are not
paid. 301 The duty to give notice now exists for all depositary institutions that the

337 12 CFR § 210.12(c) (1987). Effective September I, 1988, the Regulation CC

notification provisions discussed later have replaced the Regulation] rule. 53 Fed. Reg.
21,985 (1988).
331 12 CFR § 210.l2(c)(6) (1988) (deleted and replaced by Regulation CC effective
Sept. 1, 1988).
"". 12 CFR §§ 21 0.12(c)(2)-21 0.12(c)(3) (1988). In contrast to the UCC, the deadline
in the regulation is based on when the notice is received. 12 CFR § 210.12(2)(1988).
3" 12 CFR § 210.12(c)(6) (1988) (deleted and replaced by Regulation CC effective
Sept. I, 1988). See Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank, 719 F2d 8 12 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed
at 1121.0\\31.
341 To be codified at 12 CFR pan 229.
3" Regulation CC § 229.30(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.30 (a».
343 Regulation CC § 229.31(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.31(a».
... Regulation CC § 229.41 (I 988)(to be codified at 12 CFR §229:41).
"'These procedures are discussed at 11 21.03[8J.
3'" Regulation CC§ 229.33(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CFR § 229.33(a».
21-65 COLLECfION &. PAYMENT , 21.11(2)[e)

regulation classifies as paying banks and not just institutions who pay checks
that have been collected through Federal Reserve System facilities. S47 The dead-
line for giving notice has been shortened. Notice of nonpayment must be
received by the depositary bank by 4:00 P.M. local time "on the second business
day following the banking day on which the check was presented to the paying
bank. "3Q The content and manner ofnotification are specified in the regulation.
Timely return ofthe check to the depositary bank is effective on notice. S41 Upon
receipt of the notice or returned check, the depositary bank has a duty to
promptly notify its customer of the nonpayment of the check.-
The liability rules of Regulation CC makes all banks liable for failure to
exercise ordinary care or act in good faith in carrying out the duties established
by the regulation. 311 Liability runs to "the depositary bank, the depositary bank's
customer, the oWner ofa check, or another party to the check.""1 The damages
recoverable by the injured party for lack ofdue care are "the amount ofthe loss
incurred, up to the amount ofthe check, reduced by the amount of the loss that
party would have incurred even if the bank had exercised ordinary care."au
When there is failure to act in good faith, damages may include other conse-
quential damages." There is, however, a comparative negligence rule so that
negligence or bad faith attributable to the injured party will diminish that party's
recovery.'u The regulation specifically preserves liability that a paying bank
might have under the UCC or Regulation J or other parts of the Regulation CC
for failure to comply with the deadlines under such laws for check return, and,
although the matter is not clear, the commentary suggests it preserves the
liabilitY of a collecting bank under the eee § 4-202 as well. asl

lei When Notice of Dishonor Is Received. The uce provisions provide that
written notice is given "when sent. "'57 It does not have to be received to have

3<7 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release p. 24 (May 13,
1988).
341 Regulation CC § 229.33(a) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CPR § 229.33(a».

'''Id.
,.. Regulation CC § 229.33(d) (l988) (to be codified at 12 CPR § 229.33(a». The
depositar)' bank mUS1"send notice to its customer of the facts by midnight ofthe banking
day following the banking day on which it received the returned check or notice, or within
a longer reasonable time," Id.
311 Regulation ee § 229.38{a) (l988) (to be codified 8tl2 eFR § 229.38(a».
mId.
,s'ld.
3s'ld.
,s'Regulation CC § 229.38(c) (1988) (to be codified at 12 CPR § 229.38(c».
m Regulation ec §§ 229.38(a). 229.38(b). &. commentary (a» (b) (1988) (to be
codified at 12 eFR § 229.38(a) & Appendix).
35J VCC § 3.508(4).
1I2l.11[21lfl NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-66

been timely and to have been "given" properly by the bank.- (The Federal
Reserve regulations, discussed in the previous sections, take II. different
approach.) When the party to be notified has become insolvent after the instru-
ment is issued, the UCC permits notice to be given to the party, to the bank-
ruptcy trustee, or to any other representative of the estate. II' When the party is
dead or incompetent, notice may be sent to his last known address or may be
given to his personal representative. HO In other cases, the general rule under the
UCC is that notice should be sent "in the case of an instrument to an address
specified thereon or otherwise agreed, or if there be none, to any address reason-
able under the circumstances."., In giving notice, the bank must act reasonably
in ;l manner calculated to inform the person concerned. 312 To send written notice
the bank must "deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual
means ofcommunication with postage or cost oftransmission provided for and
properly addressed. . .. ".3
As indicated previously, it is not necessary that the person actually have
knowledge ofthe facts. 3'< Ifa person actually receives the notice within the time
allowed, the notice is effective, even though it was improperly sent or there were
other defects in the manner of giving it. liS

[f] When Notice of Dishonor Is Excused. Although it is safer to give notice of

dishonor in all cases, the UCC does not require giving notice ofdishonor to the
drawer when the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawer or
acceptor will honor the instrument, as, for example, when the drawer has no
account in the drawee bank or when the drawee has stopped payment. 35' When
the drawer is the person to whom the instrument is properly presented for
payment, no further notice is needed.m

35. Id. The motion of nonpayment oflarge amount checks by paying banks must be
rtceived by the depositary bank by the stated hour on the second business day following
the banking day on which the check was presented. Regulation ee § 229.33(a) (1988) (to
be codified at 12 eFR 229.33(a». The depositary's duty to its customeris to send notice by
its midnight deadline. Id. § 229.33(d). The elCpeditious return duties are different. See
1121.03[8}.
35tvee § 3-508(6).
300 vee § 3-508(7).
361 vee § 1-201(38).

312 vee § 1.201(26).

"'uec § 1.201(38).
'''vee §§ 1-201(26),3-508(4).
"·vee § 1-2Cl(38}.
35'vee § 3-511(2)(b).
:lI7 Id.
21-67 COLLECTION & PAYMENT II 21.11(5}

Indorsers need not be given notice of dishonor when the indorser has "no
reason to expect or righ~ to require that the instrument be accepted or paid.""
Notice of dishonor is excused when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence,
such notice does not reach or cannot be given to the parties sought for
charging.3I1

(3] Presentment of Previously Dishonored Checks

Authorities disagree on the rules on dishonor ofre-presented checks. One
school ofthought says that ifthe item was properly dishonored the first time, the
payor bank is not bound by its midnight deadline when the item is re-pre-
sented. 3TO The other school believes little reason exists for treating the re-pre-
sented item any differently from the originally presented item. It would apply
the same rules and time constraints to both situations, since to do otherwise
would put the depositary bank at a true disadvantage. 3 "

(4] Waiver of Presentment, Notice, and Protest

Any or all of the steps required in presentment, protest, and notice of
dishonor may be waived. 312 Waivers may be embodied in the instrument. If the
waiver is "embodied in the instrument itself," it binds aU parties, whether their
signatures appear on the face or the back ofthe instrument.m When the waiver is
written above the signature ofa particular indorser, however, it binds only that
indorser.•"

(5] Consequence of Failure to Give Notice of Dishonor to Drawer

Under the uec, it is necessary to give notice ofdishonor to hold the drawer
to secondary liability, but, like failure of presentment for payment, failure to
give notice of dishonor discharges the drawer of a check or draft only to the
extent of the loss caused by the insolvency of the bank upon which the instru-

36' Id.

"'uce § 3-511(2).
310 Leaderbrand \'. Central State Bank, 202 Kan. 450,450 P2d I (1969); Goodman v.
Norman Bank of Commerce, 551 P2d 661 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
31' Wiley v. People's Bank & Trun Co., 438 F2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971); Financial
Universal Corp. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 683 SW2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Blake v.
Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 SW2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Sun River Cattle Co. v.
Miners Bank, 164 Mont. 237, 521 P2d 679 (1974).
m UCC § 3-511(2)(a).
S13 UCC § 3-511(6).
"Old.
121.12 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-68

ment is drawn. us In such a case, the drawer must assign his or her rights in the
account in the defunct drawee bank to the holder, as would the maker of a note or
the acceptor of a draft payable at the bank. This must be in the amount of the
draft and will relieve the drawer from further liability. Otherwise, the drawer
will remain liable on the draft. 371

'J! 21.12 COLLECTION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CHECKS

Checks issued by the U.S. Treasury are property of the United States and
are governed by federal law, not by the uee, which is state law. Although courts
will look to the general law of negotiable instruments to assist in resolving issues
in which the statutory or regulatory law of the United States gives incomplete
direction, and the uee as the statement ofthe general law applicable in all ofthe
states should be a primary source of guidance when such situations arise, there
are significant differences when U.S. government checks are involved. The
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue checks or drafts on the Treasury
for the payment of debts of the United States, and the Secretary also may
designate a depositary to issue checks to pay obligations of the U.5. m Federal
statutes cover some, but not all, aspects ofthe rights and duties associated with
payment by U.S. Treasury check, and the Secretary has issued regulations. sr•
The rights associated with fiscal agency checks are different from those for
U.S. Treasury checks. Fiscal agency checks are those issued by a Federal Reserve
bank in its capacity as fiscal agent of the United States. These are checks issued
on behalf of the United States for payments in connection with U.S. Securi-

375UCC §§ 3-501(2)(b), 3·502(l)(b).

371 UCC §§ 3·50 I(2)(b), 3-502( I)(b). See Beutel, "The Liability of'Secondary Panies'
Under the Unifonn Commercial Code, Drawers and Indorsers," I Rut.-Cam. U 15
(1969).
m 31 USC § 3327 (1982). See discussion at , 3.04( I] of federal depositories.
m Some ofthe key statutes are 31 USC § 3328, as amended by the act, (paying checks
and drafts); Section 3329 (withholding checks to be sent to foreign countries); Section
3330 (payment of Veterans' Administration checks for the benefit of individuals in
foreign countries); Section 3331 (substitute checks); Section 3332 (checks payable to
financial organizations designated by government officers and employees); Section 3333
(relief for payments made without negligence); Section 3334, as amended by the act,
(cancellation and proceeds distribution of Treasury checks); Section 3712(a) (claims over
forged or unauthorized indorsements). Some ofthe key regulatory provisions are 31 CFR
pt. 235 (settlement checks for forged checks); pan 240 (indorsement and payment of
checks drawn on the Treasury); pt. 245 (issue of substitutes of lost. stolen, destroyed,
mutilated and defaced checks drawn on the Treasury); pt. 248 (issue of substitutes oflost,
stolen, destroyed, mutilated and defaced checks drawn on depositary banks); pt. 355
(fiscal agency checks) (1987). The Secretary also has regulations covering direct payments
to financial institutions or through automated clearinghouse systems. 31 CFR pts.
209-210 (1987).
21-69 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 1121.12

ties. 3ft The drawer ofa f1S~ agency check is the United States and the drawee is
a Federal Reserve bank. 3lO The rules for flScal agency checks are oontained in
Regulation J of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,311 and
"to the extent not otherwise inconsistent with these regulations [31 CFR part
355] and Regulation J, the Uniform Commercial Code...."312
Detailed rules on the indorsement of government checks restrict the oppor-
tunities for persons other than the designated payee or payees to indorse the
government check on behalfofthe payee or payees. Even a person with authority
to act as agent for the payee, can indorse a government check on behalf of the
payee only by indorsing in the manner prescribed in the regulations and in the
circumstances permitted by the regulations. Otherwise, as discussed in the next
section, the indorsement may be treated as a "forgery" or as "unauthorized" and
"unacceptable," with all the consequences of responsibility based on breach of
the indorser's and presenting ~anks' guaranty of title to the check. W
The regulations make the indorsers and the presenting bank guarantee to
the Treasury "that all prior indorsements are genuine whether or not an express
guaranty is placed on the check."3" Also, when the first indorser on a check is
someone other than the payee personally, the indorsers and presenting bank
guarantee as a matter of law "that the person who so indorsed had unqualified
capacity and aUlhority to indorse the check in behalf of the payee."·& The
regulations establish procedures for the Treasury to reclaim amounts paid out on
checks with unauthorized indorsements or a "material defect or alteration" that
was not discovered before being paid.:lII The Treasury has a procedure for
offsetting charges aiainst presenting banks when a specified period of time
elapses after the Treasury has sought reclamation of the amount of the item. 3I1
The regulations specify that the Treasury "shall have the usual right of a
drawee to examine checks presented for payment and refuse payment of any
checks, and shall have a reasonable time to make such examination. Checks shall
be deemed to be paid by the United States Treasury only after first examination
has"been fully completed."3" Payment of a Treasury check may be deferred,

371 31 CFR§3S5.0(1987).
3101d.
31' 12 CFR pI. 210 (1987).
382
31 CFR § 355.1 (1987).
mThe definition of "presenting bank" in the regulations is somewhat different from
that in the l:CC as the regulations use the term to mean "a financial institution which,
either directly or through a correspondent banking relationship, presents checks \0 and
receives credit from a Federal Reserve bank ..... 31 CFR § 240.2(h) (1987).
314 31 CFR § 240.4 (1987).

·"Id.
38& 31 CFR § 240.5 (1987).
•" 31 CFR § 240.7 (1981).
m 31 CFR § 240.3 (1981).
11 21.12(1) "NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21·70

pending settlement, when checks are presented where there is a "doubtful ques-
tion of law or fact. ""I

(I) Indorsement, Transfer, and Collection of Government Checks

There are extensive regulations on the indorsements of U.S. government
checks. Under the regulations, the only manner in which one person can indorse
a government check on behalf of another person who is the named payee is by
using a form that identifies that the "indorser is indorsing on behalf of the
named payee or payees, pursuant to authority expressly conferred by or under
law or other regulation," and the indorsement must contain the signature ofthe
person who indorses. 310 The regulation gives as an example an indorsement
reading: "John Jones by Mary Jones," but states that this is only the minimum
required and in some circumstances the regulations require more than this
minimum to be acceptable. It is not acceptable for a person other than the
named payee to indorse by only signing the name ofthe payee. Ifthis occurs, the
indorsement, "regardless of the relationship between the indorser and the
named payee or payees, will be rebuttably presumed to be a forgery and is
unacceptable.,,3" When there is an indorsement by one purporting to act for the
named payee by indorsing in the name of the payee and giving the indorser's
signature with "no indication of the indorsing person's representative capacity,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the indorsing person was not authorized
to indorse for the named payee{s)."312 The bank will be responsible for the
authority of the indorser in this case.
The regulations provide guidelines for some specific situations which recur
frequently. When a payee has been declared an incompetent, the indorsement by
a legal guardian or fiduciary should indicate the legal capacity with which the
signer is acting, as in "John Jones by Mary Jones, guardian of John Jones."313
Similarly, when the payee is deceased, an executor or administrator may
indorSe by showing the legal capacity under which the indorser is acting as in
"John Jones by Mary Jones, executor ofthe estate ofJohn Jones."3t4 An executor
or administrator can indorse only when the right to payment of the government
check does not terminate with the death ofthe payee and only includes payments
which are (1) payments for the redemption of currencies or for principal or

311Id.
380 31 CFR § 240.10 (1987).
31' Id.
m 31 CFR §240.10{c){2}(1987).
... 31 CFR § 240.11 (1987). The regulations indicate that only in the case of certain
classes of checks maya guardian or fiduciary indorse for an incompetent payee without
submitting the check with proofofauthority to act to the government, but the regulations
do not identify what these classes are. ld. § 240.11 (b).
384
31 CFR § 240.12{a){1) (l987).
21·71 COLLECTION & PAYMENT , 21.12(1)

interest on U.S. securities; (2) payments for tax refunds; and (3) payments for
goods and services.- In all other cases, the checks must be returned to the
government for a decision whether payment is due and, if it is, to whom.
In the case of checks issued to minors to pay principal or interest on U.S.
securities, either parent with whom the minor resides, or the person who pro-
vides the minor's chief support when the minor does not reside with a parent,
may indorse for the minor by presenting a signed statement giving the minor's
age, stating that the payee either resides with the parent or receives the chief
support from the indorser, and certifying that the minor will receive the benefit
of the proceeds of the check.3M
When a social security benefit check is issuedjointly to two or more individ-
uals of the same family and one of tbe payee1l dies after the check issues, before
the checlc may be negotiated, it should be returned to the appropriate Social
Security or Treasury office where payment to the surviving payee may be
authorized by having the check stamped with a legend that redesignates the
payee as the survivor. The check then may be indorsed as ifit were issued in the
name of the persons who are designated as the survivors. S17
There are provisions dealing with signatures of government checks made
under powers ofattorney. When the check is issued for payment for the redemp-
tion of currencies or for principal or interest on U.S. securities, for tax refunds,
or for goods and services, the indorsement of the payee may be made under a
general power of attorney "in favor of an individual, financial institution or
other entity ... ":IN There are certain additional circumstances prescribed by the
Comptroller General whereby classes of checks may be negotiated under a
special power ofattorney that names a financial institution as "attorney in fact,
and recites that it is not given to carry into effect an assignment of the right to
receive payment, either to the attorney in fact or to any other person."'" The
attorney in fact must indicate such capacity in the indorsement. All types of
powers of attorney are revoked by the death of the person who granted the
authority, and the person granting the authority may expressly revoke it at any
time by notice "to the parties known, or reasonably expected, to be acting on the
power of attorney." Giving notice to the Treasury ordinarily will not be ade-
quate to revoke a power of attorney. The regulations provide standard forms for
use with powers of attorney.·oo
Financial institutions have special authority to indorse. When a financial
institution has authority from the payee to credit a check to the payee's account,

315 3\ CFR § 240.12 (1987).

306 31 CFR § 240.13 (I 987}.
391 31 CFR § 240.\ 0(1) (\987).
3·'31 CFR § 240.14 (1987).
'''CFR § 240.I4(c) (1987).
'00 31 CFR § 240.14(h} (J 987}.
Y2U2[2) NEGOtIABLE INSTRUMENTS 21-72

the institution may indorse in langliage substantially like "Credit to the account
of the within-named payee in accordance with the payee's or payees' instruc-
tions. Xyz. "<01 By using this indorsement, the institution guarantees to "an
subsequent indorsers and to the Treasury that it is acting as an attorney-in-fact
for the payee or payees, under the payee's or payees' authorization, and that this
authority is currently in force and has neither lapsed nor been revoked either in
fact or by the death or incapacity of the payee or payees. "<02
When U.S. government checks are payable directly to the financial institu-
tion to be deposited for the account of a person who designated payment to be
made in this manner, the financial institution may simply indorse the check in
the institution's name as payee in the usual manner. These checks subject the
fmanciaI institution to the regulations dealing with direct payments.....
When a government check is indorsed "for collection" or "for deposit only
to the credit of the within named payee or payees," the regulations state the
indorsement is "acceptable without any signature."co. Without a signature,
however, the bank guarantees its good title to the check to the Treasury and to
subsequent indorsers. 405
There also is a procedure provided in the regulation for the issuance of
substitute checks when a government check is not received, lost, destroyed,
mutilated or defaced. The owner making claim for a substitute may be required
to post indemnity. 401

(2) Deadlines for Payment of Government Checks and for Making

Claim to Recover Payments for Checks With Forged or
Unauthorized Indorsements
In Title X of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Congress
adopted rules on the payment of U.S. Treasury checks. Under the new legisla-
tion, the Treasurer cannot be required to pay a Treasury check that is negotiated
to a financial institution after twelve months. from the date on which the check
was issued:·7 The Act then directs the Secretary to establish a procedure for

40'31 CFR § 240.IO(d) (1987).

'.2Id.
···See 31 CFR pt. 209 (1987).
'"'31 CFR § 240.IO(c)(I)(1987).
'.5Id.
• 01 31 CFR part 245 (I 987) (implementing 31 USC § 3331). See also id. at part 248.
407 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Public L. No. 100-86, tit. X,§ 1002(a),
101 Stat. 552 (hereinafter CEBA), amending 31 USC § 3328(a)(I). This rule applies to
Treasury checks issued after the effective date of this section, which is 6'months after the
date the act was enacted or when the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes. CEBA, § \ 0()6.
For previously issued checks, the Secretary ofthe Treasury is not required 10 pay when the
21-73 COLLECTION & PAYMENT 11 21.12[2]

cancellation of checks that are more than twelve months old and return of the
proceeds'to the agency concerned. 4OI
Thelegislation also places a time limit on the period iliat the Secretary of the
Treasury has to assert a claim based upon a forged or unauthorized indorsement.
When ilie Secretary seeks to reclaim the amount ofthe check from the presenting
bank or from a prior indorser who has breached its guaranty of indorsements,
the claim must be made before the end of one year running from the date the
check was paid.•,01
Corresponding with the bar on claiins by the Secretary to recover for breach
of warranty with respect to forged or unauthorized indorsements, the act estab-
lishes a one year limit on claims on account of a Treasury check. A claim for
payment is barred unless the claim is presented "to the agency that authorized
the issuance of such check within one year after .the date of the issuance of the
check.... "410 Although the claim based upon the Treasury check will be barred if
the claim is not presented within one year, this bar on obtaining payment of the
check does not affect the underlying obligation of the United States or any
agency of the United States that was the basis for issuing the check. m

check is negotiated to a financial institution more than twelve months after the effective
date of this section of the act. CEBA, § 1002(a).
401 CEBA, § 1003, amending 31 USC § 3334(a).
"'CEBA, § 1004. amending 31 USC § 3712(a). In the case of claims received under
31 USC § 3702, the Secretary has an additional period of time. Id.
4loCEBA, § 1004, amending 31 USC § 3702(c)(I).
on CEBA, § l004(b), amending 31 USC § 3702(c)(2).
 III
Security Transactions
in Personal Property
and Related Credit Practices
 22
Creation of Security Interests
in a Debtor's Personal
Property
~ 22.01 Security Interests in Personal Property Under the uee. . . . . . . . 22-2
[I] Scope of uee on Security Interests 22-3
[2] Leases and Consignments as Security Transactions . . . . . . . . 22-6
[a] Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-6
(b J Consignments 22-9
11 22.02 Creating a Security Interest . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 22-10
[I) The Security Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 22-10
[2) Purchase Money Security Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .. 22-16
II' 22.03 Perfection, Termination, and Transfer of Security Interests . . . .. 22-18
[1] Filing Requirements ..................•........•.• 22-19
[2] Requirements of Financing Statements . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . •. 22-22
[a) Information Requirements . . . • . . . • • . . . . • . • . . . . . .. 22-22
[b] Other Requirements as to Effectiveness. • • . . • . . . . . . .. 22-25
[3J Termination Statements and Partial Releases of Collateral. .. 22-27
[4} Transfer of Security Interests . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . .. 22-28
[5J Place of Filing UCC Financing Statement. . • . • . • . • . . . . .. 22-30
TABLE 22-1 1972 and Pre-I 972 Versions ofUCC ..•........ 22-32
TABLE 22-2 Slate Filing Systems for Article 9 Security
Transactions (UCC § 9-401) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . • .. . . . . .. .. 22-34
TABLE 22-3 State Filing Locations for Article 9 Security
Transactions (UCC § 9-401). . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . ... 22-40
t 22.04 Security Interests When the Secured Party Has Possession ofthe
Collateral •..•.••................. . • . • . . . • . . . . • • • •• 22-45
(l) The Pledge ................•....•.••.........••. 22-45
[al Creating a Security Interest by Pledging Collateral. . . . .. 22-45
(bI Perfectin& the Security Interest in Pledged Collateral . . .. 22-46
[2] Field Warehouse Systems " ...• " ...• : . . . . • • . .. 22-49
PI Duties ofa Pledgee ... ,........................... 22-50

22-1
 SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 22-2
1,1 22.01

, 22.05 Automatic Perfection and Perfection of Security Interests in

Collateral Governed by Systems Other Than the UCC. . . . . . . .. 22-5 I
't 22.06 Security Interests in Goods and Chattels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-52
[IJ Consumer Goods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-53
[2J Equipment .....•............................... 22-54
(3) Farm Products. . . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-54
(4J Inventory ...............•...................... 22-56
(5J Fixtures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-59
(6] Motor Vehicles .....•.......•.................... 22-60
'1122.07 Security Interests in Intangibles and Like Property . . . . . . . . . .. 22-61
[IJ Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-61
[2J General Intangibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-66
{3] Instruments , 22-61
[4J Chattel Paper 22-68
(5J Documents of Title .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-69
(6J Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-70
(a] Certificated Securities. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22·72
(b) Cases Involving Certificated Securities .....••....... 22·73
(e) Uncertificated Securities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 22·77
[d) U.S. Securities . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . • . • . .• 22-78
(7] Bank Accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-78
(8] Insurance Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22-80
[9J Real Estate-Related Interests 22-81

1122.01 SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERJ'Y

UNDER THE UCC
When a creditor takes an interest in a debtor's personal property as collat-
eral to secure an obligation owed by the debtor to the creditor, the transaction, in
most cases, is a secured transaction governed by Article 9 of tile Uniform
Commercial Code. The term "personal property" is used in the same sense here
that it has in the legal classification of all property as either real property, which
involves interests in"land, or personal property, which involves everything else,
including chattels and intangible things.' Because many different kinds of prop-
erty can serve as collateral for obligations, the law relating to these transactions
is complex, and must account for the different characteristics of the collateral
concerned. Before the UCC, and depending on the type of collateral involved,
there were many separate statutes that applied, including the Uniform Trust

, The scope of the UCC's treatment of security interests in personal property is

discussed at 11 22.01[1). For an eltceUent discussion of the legal sYstem's classification of
property as "real" or "personal," see R. Cunningham,W. Stoebuek & D. Whitman, The
Law Of Property § 1.4 (1984). .
22-3 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.01(1)

Receipts Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Chattel Mortgage Acts, Fac-
tors Lien Acts, Assignment of Accounts Receivable Acts, and others. All of this
prior legislation is superseded by the UCC. Sometimes the terms used under the
former statutes continue to be used in business transactions, This does not
impair the validity of the security interests created, because the UCC applies
regardless of the terminology used. 2 As long as the parties intend a security
transaction, it does not matter whether their agreement is called a chattel mort-
gage, a conditional sales agreement, or a trust agreement.'
The UCC provisions on secured transactions were extensively revised in
1972. All but a handful ofstates have adopted the 1972 amendments. Table 14-1
in Chapter 14 lists the states that have adopted the changes, along with their
effective dates. This book discusses the UCC as revi5Cd by the 1972 amend-
ments. The m9,ior changes made by these amendments are mentioned where
they are relevant to an understanding of the reasons for the changes. Where
changes have occurred in the law, it is important to note whether decided cases
or transactions in dispute are controlled by the current version ofthe UCC.·

(1) Scope of Dee on Security Interests

The general policy ofthe UCC is to provide a comprehensive framework for
aU transactions involving security interests in personal property. Any transac-
tion that creates a security interest in any kind of personal property (goods, bills
ofladin~ warehouse receipts, instruments, accounts, contract rights, etc.) falls
within the scope ofArticle 9, unless specifically excluded.s A security interest is
defined simply as "an interest in personal property or fIXtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation...• This definition includes a seller's
retention oftitle until the seller obtains payment for goods sold. It also includes
transactions which, according to their form, do not state that they are security
transactions but which are "intended" to create security interests.'
When a seller reserves title to goods that the seller has delivered to a buyer,
Article 9 treats the seller's interest as a security interest. Often the seller will
attempt to argue that a relationship other than that of buyer and seller existed
between the parties with respect to the goods. For example, in one case, a

2UCC § 9-102(2). All UCC references are to the Uniform Commercial Code 1978
Official Text (West 1978).
'Id.
4There is a special transition section, Article II, of the UCC that specifies when the
1972 amendments apply to transactions having some relation to the period before the
state in question adopted those amendments.
·ucc § 9·102(1)(a).
·ucc § 1·201(37).
·UCC §§ 9-102(1)(a), 1-201(37). See additional discussion of creation of a security
interest infra 'I 22.0 I[2].
1122.0111] SECURITY TRANSACfrONS 22-4

question arose as to whether the debtor held cattle as a bailee with an option to
purchase or as a buyer under a conditional sale arrangement.' If the latter, the
debtor would have an ownership interest in the collateral in the debtor's posses-
sion, to which the secured party's security interest could attach. If the former,
that the cattle were held by the debtor as a bailee, the debtor would have no
ownership interest to which the secured party's security interest could attach.
The correct characterization of the debtor's interest in the cattle would depend
on the parties' intent.' The uee applies "to any sale of accounts or chattel
paper" unless one of the exceptions applies. 10 Thus, a fmancer who buys the
accounts ofa business or takes an absolute assignment, without right ofrecourse
against the assignor, is subject to the rules ofthe uee. The definition ofaccount
is broad and includes many types of payment obligations, not just those rights
often referred to as "accounts receivables."l1 Likewise, a bank or other financer
who purchases chattel paper is engaging in a transaction controlled by uee
rules. .
There are twelve transactions to which the uee does not apply. They are as
follows:
1. Security interests governed byfederal statutes. Federal statutes governing
mortgages on ships, liens on aircraft, assignments of copyrights, and assign-
ments of patents prevail over the uee. In some cases, these federal statutes may
not regulate all the rights of the parties and the uee may, in part, be used for
guidance. 12

'Rohweder v. Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765 F2d 109, 111-112 (8th Cir. 1985).
• rd. at 113. See Horizon Processing Co. v. Charter Int'l Oil Co. (In re Charter Co.), 49
Bankr. 513 (Bankr. MD Fla. 1985). A seller had oil in the storage tanks of the buyer,
having previously sent the oil to the buyer for processing and holding. The seller reserved
title to the goods in the agreement with the buyer. The seller argued that no delivery ofthe
goods had occurred, because the parties to the arrangement had agreed that title would not
pass until the buyer paid for the goods. The court held that as the parties were contracting
with respect to goods that were not going to be moved from their place of storage at the
time ofcontracting, the delivery ofthe goods occurred at the time of contracting, since the
seller had not retained control over the delivery process. Thus, the court found that the
reservation oftitle by the seller, in the goods already in the buyer's possession, constituted
a security interest. 49 Bankr. at 517.
IOUCC § 9-102(l)(b). See infra '1122.07(4] for a deflnition of chattel paper.
Ii See infra' 22.07[1] on accounts.
12UCC § 9-104{a). In CIM Int'l v. United States, 641 F2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980); the
court considered the Federal Aviation Act scheme for recordation of aircraft ownership
and creditors' liens. The court held that "A security interest in an aircraft is not necessarily
invalid against all parties for all purposes and under all conditions solely because it is not
f1ledwith the FAA." 641 F2d at 680. A federal statute let UCC principles govern
subrogation rights in cases involving federal tax liens. 641 F2d at 676. In Gary Aircraft
Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Gary Aircraft Corp.), 681 F2d 365 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 US 1131 (1983), the court held that Conacess did not intend to
displace state law assignment of priorities to interests in aircraft when it enacted the
22-5 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.01[11

2. Landlord liens. These liens are created under other state law. The vee
has no application to their creation or enforcement.,a
3. Liensfor services or materials provided. These liens, such as garagemen's
liens or warehousemen's liens, are not covered by Article 9 except to the extent
that they may conflict with interests created under Article 9."
4. Assignments of claims for wages, salary or employment compensation.
These are not covered by the vee.'s
S. Transfers by governmental agencies. The creation of security interests in
property of governmental bodies is not covered by the vee."
6. Certain isolated sales of accounts or chattel paper. When the sale of
accounts occurs as part of a sale of a business, when an assignment is made for
the purpose of collection only, when a right to payment under a contract is
assigned to the person who is going to perform the contract, or when a "single
account" is assigned to satisfy a prior debt, the vee
does not apply. n
7. Insurance policies. Generally, insurance policies are not affected by the
uee. There are limited circumstances, when insurance policies insure collateral
subject to a security interest," in which the vee
applies.

Federal Aviation Act. After an extensive review of the authorities, the court conCluded
that "the main concern ofConvess was to create a central minlsystem,leaving the effect
of mini to the states." Holding that the act "does not preempt state law on priorities," it
applied UCC § 9-307(1) to find that the purcbaser ofthe airplanes had the rights ofa buyer
in the ordinary course ofbusines,. 681 F2d at 372, 376. For a case discussing the methods
for perfectinl a security interest in an aircraft under the Federal Aviation Act, see
Armstrong v. State Balik (In re Gelking), 754 F2d 778 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 473 US 906
(1985). The Armstrong case held that the debtor had sufficient rights in the collateral to
enable the secufed party to perfect a security interest when the debtor had an equitable
interest, but not full legal title, in the aircraft. 754 F2d at 781.
A security interest in a patent may be perfected by the ming ofa financing statement.
According to one court it is not necessary to record an interest with the patent office in
order to perfect the security interest. In re Transportation Design &; Technology, Inc., 48
Bankr. 635, 639 (Bankr. SO Cal. 1985).
An Article 9 filing has been held to be sufftcient to perfect a security interest in a
trademark or tradename registered under tbe federal Lantham Act (15 USC
§§ 1051-1127). In re TR-3Indus., 41 Bankr. 128,131 (Banu. CD Cal. 1984).
See generally Note, "The Choateness Doctrine and the Federal Loan Proarams-A
Plea for Federal Legislation," 33 Me. L. Rev. 269 (1981).
'IUCC § 9-104(b).
"uee § 9·104(c). See § 9.3 to.
1SUCC § 9·104(d).
"ucc § 9·104(e).
1TUCC § 9.104(1).
"ucc § 9·104(g). See iafra '22.07[8]. Unearned insurance premiums that were
refunded to the debtor, as a result ofthe canccllaiion of certain insurance policies, did not
11 22.0112](a) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 22-6

8. Judgments. Tbe UCC does not apply to rights based upon judgments."
20
'9. Rig/us a/setoff. The UCC does not apply to rights ofsetotT.
10. Real estate interests. Except as related to fIXtures, the UCC has no
application to real estate interests such as leases, rights to rent, or other transfers
of real property.2' Tbere is considerable disagreement in the cases as to what
constitutes a real estate interest subject to this exclusion. 22
11. Tort claims. The UCC does not apply to tort claims or to the transfer of
any interest in them.23 Thus, Article 9 would not allow a creditor to take a
security interest in a debtor's personal injury action or libel suit.
12. Bank accounts. Except as banle accounts may constitute proceeds of
collateral, the UCC does not apply.24

[2) Leases and Consignments as Security Transactions

(a) Leases. Sometimes a lease functions like a security transaction. In some
situations, a lease may be an alternative to buying equipment on credit terms.
The lease may be arranged to give the lessee e!\.ioyment ofthe equipment during
its useful life, while also offering a deferred payment similar to that which might
be required under an installment purchase or conditional sales plan. The lease
may provide that the lessee assume the burdens, normally assumed by the
owner, ofmaintaining and insuring the equipment and may further provide that
the equipment become the property of the lessee, for little additional payment,
at the end of the lease. In such cases, it is reasonable to view the lease essentially
as a security transaction. When this is so, Article 9 ofthe UCC applies. The lessor

constitute collateral in which a secured party had a security interest. There could be no
security interest in the premiums, because UCC § 9-104(1) provides that Article 9 does not
apply to the transfer ofan interest in a policy ofinsurance. Because Article 9 did not apply,
the court turned to the common law. Under that approach, the court classified the interest
as a future intangible and held for the trustee. The court reasoned that the debtor had no
property interest in the refund until it became due on cancellation ofthe insurance policy.
At the time of cancellation, the trustee was entitled to the property. In re Duke Roofmg
Co., Inc., 47 Bankr. 990, 993 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1985).
1·UCC § 9-104(h).
20UCC § 9-104(i). See' 22.07[7]. See generally Annot., "Effect ofU.C.C. Art. 9 Upon
Conflict, as to Funds in Debtor's Bank Account, Between Secured Creditor and Bank
Claiming Right to Setoff," 3 ALR4th 998 (1981).
21 UCC § 9-1040).
22 See discussion infra 11 22.07[9J for a discussion of security interests in real estate
related interests. .
23UCC § 9-104(k),
uucc § 9-104(1). See infra '1122.07[7] for a discussion ofsecurity interests in bank
accounts.
22-7 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.01(2)[11

is regarded as a secured party; the lease agreement is treated as a security

agreement; and the lessee has the rights of a debtor. This arrangement has the
very serious consequence of making the transaction subject to uee require-
ments for perfection of security interests. Unless the secured partynessor takes
action to perfect the security interest (normally by filing a fmancing statement),
the lessor/secured party will have an unperfected security interest, which will be
subordinate to tbe claims of lien creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, or other
secured parties. II Additionally, the uee provisions on remedies when there is a
default will apply, and the secured party will need to comply with those notices
and other rules. 25
Not every lease of personal property is a security transaction. This depends
on the facts of each case. 21 While there are two guidelines regarding these

2'See 1 23.01 for a discussion of priority rules.

21lf a lease is found to be a security agreement, the secured party must be careful to
comply with the Article 9 positions for repossessing the collateral, when default occurs.
See Las Vegas Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Davis, 98 Nev. 169,643 P2d 1217 (1982); BJL
Leasing Corp. v. WhittingtoD, Singer, Davis & Co., 204 NJ Super. 314, 498 A2d 1262
(App. Div. 1985) (when default occurred under a lease that was a disguised security
agreement,the lessor had to follow Article 9 procedures for repossession and disposition
of the collateral). Although court found an equipment lease was not intended for security,
it applied UCC standards of commercial reasonableness to the lellSOr's repossession and
sale of the equipment by drawing an analogy to uec § 9-S04. W.L. Scott, Inc. v. Madras
Aerotech, Inc•• 103 Idaho 736, 6S3 P2d 791, 79S-797 (1982). See also United Counties
Trust Co. v. Mac Lum, Inc., 643 F2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981), where the court applied uec
§ 9-206 on waiver of defense clauses to a lease that the court found was not intended for
security.
27UCC § 1·201(37). See generally Coogan, "Is There a Difference Between a Long"
Term Lease and an Installment Sale ofPersonal Property?" 56 NYU L. Rev. 1036 (1981);
Leary, "The Procrustean Bed of Finance Leasing," S6 NYU L. Rev. 1061 (1981); Annot.,
"Equipment Lease as Security Interest Within Uniform Commercial Code,» 76 ALR3d
11 (1977).
Defendant claimed that its construction equipment lease was a security agreement
subject to Article 9. In form, the transaction was set up aa a lease. The defendant
attempted to prove that the transaction was a security agreement by using parol evidence
to show it included an option to buy. The trial court excluded the evidence on the grounds
that it violated the parol evidence rule and the statute offrauds. The Supreme Court of
Utah reversed. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Conatr. Co., 731 P2d 483, 486-487
(Utah 1986). The court concluded that the statute of frauds in UCC § 2-201(1) did not
apply. If a transaction is a security transaction, UCC Article 2 does not apply to such a
transaction. uec § 2-102. Furthermore, the statute of frauds does not prevent a party
from proving the true nature of an agreement when that is at issue, rather than enforce-
ability. In this case, the defendant was not attempting to enforce the agreement but rather
had invoked the protective provisions ofArticle 9 relating to disposition ofthe collateral.
The court also said the trial court must first determine whether tile ap-eement was an
integrated agreement. "The parol evidence rule applies only if the writing was intended by
the parties to represent the full and complete agreement ...... Although the terms of the
lease agreement were specific, the character of the agreement was in dispute, and so the
trial court needed to hear evidence on that issue. 731 P2d at 486-487.
, 22.01(2)(_1 SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 22-8

leases," the UCC does not give guidelines for all possible circumstances. The
UCC states:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of
each case; however, <a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that
upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has
the option to become the owner ofthe property for no additional considera-
tion or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for
security."
Before a bank accepts as collateral any paper that, on its face, appears to be
an equipment or other lease of personal property, careful consideration should
be given as to whether the lease might be a security transaction. It is possible,
under the UCC, to me a financing statement perfecting a security interest in
leased goods, without admitting that the transaction is a security transaction

"UCC § 1-201(37). In In re TulsaPon Warehouse Co., 690 F2d 809, 811 (lOth Cir.
1982), the coun treated a lease as a security agreement, although it did not contain an
option to purchase, because the lease was the economic equivalent of a purchase agree.
ment. See also Steele v. Gebetsberaer (In re Fashion Optical, Ltd.), 653 F2d 1385 (10th
Cir. 1981). In Aoki v. Shepherd Mach. Co. (In re JA. Thompson & Son, Inc.), 665 F2d 941
(9th Cir. 1982), the conn found that when a lease contains an option to purchase for no
additional consideration or for nominal consideration, the lease "is conclusively pre-
sumed to be 'intended as security', without reference to other facts from which the
opposite inference might be drawn." 665 F2d at 947. In American Standard Credit, Inc. v.
National Cement Co., 643 F2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981), the court discussed the effect that
should be given to a filing of a fmancing statement and self-serving recitals in the leue
agreement in characterizing the transaction as a lease or security 8ITlIIliement.
In trying to decide whether "an option to purchase under a lease made the lease one
entered into for security," anothercoun noted that an option to purchase at the end ofthe
lease for the fair market value of the leased goods is consistent with a true lease but does
not automatically save the lease from being a lease "intended for security." The conn
further ruled that in deciding whether the purchase price was a "nominal consideration"
under UCC § 1-201(37), the coun would compare the price under the option with the
value ofthe goods to the lessee for future use, salvage, or resale. The conn said, "nominal
consideration should mean that the leased equipment is wonh considerably more to the
lessee for future use, salvage, or resale than the amount of the option price," In rc
CeleryvaleTransp., Inc., 44 Banler. 1007, 1014 (Bankr. ED Tenn. 1984), afl'd, 822 F2d 16
(6th Cir. 1987).
A leue term that gave the lessee the functional equivalent of an equity interest in
equipment at the end ofthe term, although not an option to purchase, could be regarded as
a factor indicating that the lease was intended as a security arrangement. Wentwonh &
Irwin, Inc. v.United States Nat'l Bank, 80 Or. App. 500, 503, 723 P2d 1016,1019 (1986).
ZlUCC § 1-201(37). A new Anicle 2A on leases has been approvedforinclusion in the
UCC. This addition amends the definition of security interest, § 1-201(37), to provide
more guidance on when a lease is for security. Uniform Commercial Code 1987 Official
Text § 1.201(37) (West 1987).
22-9 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.01(2)(b)

rather than a true lease.:IlI This may be useful when other considerations indicate
that a lease is preferable to a secured transaction, as for example, when the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or the Bankruptcy A.ct affect the
transaction. Further, it is possible to use the UCC provisions for assigning
security interests to help protect the financer's position in such situations.'1
Finally, consideration also should be given as to whether the papers of the lease
agreement fall within the UCC definition of chattel paper, so that the secured
party will be able to take steps to protect an interest in the chattel paper as well as
the equipment. a2

(bl Cons1anments. Similar problems exist for those who sell goods on consign-
ment. 33 However, even when a consignment is not treated as a security tral,lS8C-
tion under Article 9 ofthe UCC, it is advisable to follow the UCC rules on fIling a
financing statement to protect the consignor against the claims of other creditors
of the consignee.:14 This does not mean that filing a financing statement consti·
tutes an admission that the consignment is a security transaction. JI
Consignments are covered by special provisions of their own regardless of
whether they are intended as security transactions." The consignment provi-
sions make goods delivered to a buyer on consignment for purposes of resale
subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors while the goods are in the buyer's
possession.n Further, when goods are delivered to a person who sells goods at a
place of business under a name other than the name of tbe penon who has
consigned the goods, the creditors ofthe person who is engaged in reselling them
will have a claim to those goods that can defeat the claim of the owner or
consignor, unless the consignor takes one of three steps to give notice of the
interest he or she claims in the goods. One of these procedures is to me a
financing statement on the goods using the Article 9 procedures."
Manger v. Davis'· discusses the applicability of the UCC to consignments.
The court found that a true consignment had been established where the con-

:so uee § 9-408.

31 See discussion on transfer of security interests at 11 22.03[4].
·'See discussion of chattel paper at 122.01[4).
13 uec §§ 9-102, 1-201 (31). See generally Winship, "The 'True' Consianment Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, and Related Peccadilloes," 29 Sw. U 825 (1915).
30UCC §§ 2-326, 9-114.
!SUCC § 9-408.
II uee § 1-201(37). "UnJessa ... consignment is intended assecurity, reservation of
title thereunder is not a 'security interest' but a consianment is in any event subject to the
provisions on conslanment sales (§ 2-326)."
nuee § 2-326(2).
B UCC § 2-326(3), 9-408.
31 619 P2d 687, 691 (Utah 1980).
'122.02(1) SECURIIT TRANSACfIONS 22·10

signee was only an agent without authority to sell or pledge the collateral. In the
court's view, such true consignments were not governed by VCC §§ 2-401 and 2·
403 on passage of title, as there was no transaction of purchase between the
consignor and consignee. The consignee did not even acquire voidable title to
the goods. Because the consignee in this case was not a person who maintained a
place of business where he dealt in goods of that kind, VCC § 2-326(3) on
consignment sales did not apply. The court then turned to agency law, as found
in Restatement (Second) 0/Agency § 20 I, and held that the pledge ofthe goods by
the consignee could not affect the consignor's interest in the goods, because the
pledge was a transaction of a different kind than what was contemplated by the
consignment. <0
ANevada case illustrates a different type ofconsignment problem. A dealer
in mobile homes financed its inventory through General Electric Credit Corpo-
ration (GECq, who had a perfected security interest in the inventory. When the
dealer sold a mobile home, a local savings association, Homes Savings Associa-
tion (HSA), fmanced the purchase. The savings association would take a per·
fected security interest in the mobile horne by following the procedures
contained in the motor vehicle title statutes that applied to mobile homes. When
a purchaser of a mobile home defaulted on the financing agreement, the savings
association would repossess the unit, and, under an agreement with the dealer,
would give the unit to the dealer to hold, recondition, and resell. However, when
the dealer defaulted on its financing arrangement with GECC, GECC claimed
all the inventory, including the mobile homes that had been repossessed by HSA
and entrusted to the dealer. In the dispute between GECC and HSA, the Nevada
Supreme Court ruled in favor ofGECC. The court reasoned that the act ofgiving
the repossessed units to the dealer constituted a consignment not for security
that was governed by VCC § 2-326. Vnderthat section, the consignor (HSA) had
to perfect its interest using the methods provided there, which did not include
the procedure in the state's motor vehicle laws that HSA followed."

1122.02 CREATING A SECURITY INTEREST

II] The Security Agreement
The VCC makes a security agreement effective between the parties, against
purchasers ofthe collateral and against creditors, unless the VCC provides to the
contrary.42 Thus, the g~neral rule is that security agreements are enforceable.
When the collateral is not in the possession of the secured party. the agreement,

40 Id.
at 692•
•, Homes Sav. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 101 Nev. 595, 600-601, 708 P2d
280, 285-286 (1985).
··uec § 9-201.
22-11 SECURITY INTERESTS 11 22.0211)

with a description ofthe collateral, must be in writing and must be signed by the
debtor.43 When the coUateral is crops or timber, the security agreement must also
describe the related land." Possession of the collateral by the secured party. as in
the case of a pledge, constitutes a substitute for a signed, written agreement. 6.
Three conditions must be met to have an enforceable security interest:

1. There must be a written security agreement signed by the debtor or the

secured party must have possession of the collateral;
2. The secured party must have given value (which may be either the
advance offunds or only a binding commitment to advance funds);oII and
3. The debtor must have rights in the collateral. 07
When these three events occur, the security interest is said to "attach," l!Ud it
becomes enforceable. The terms ofenforcement depend on the provisions of the
security agreement and on the rights granted under the DCC. This is discussed
further in Chapters 23 and 24.
When the debtor does not have title to the goods, the debtor may nOI be able
to give a secured party any rights to the goods. In a 1981 case, for example, a
debtor corporation had agreed to sell two automobiles prior to entering into a
security agreement granting the secured party a security interest in the vehicle."
The court held that according to UCC § 2-401(3), title to the vehicles passed to
the purchaser at the time of contracting, because the purchaser was in posses-
sion. Although formal transfer ofthe certificate of title had not taken place, title
to the goods could pass without compliance with the motor vehicle certit'kate of
title procedures. Thus, the debtor had no rights in the collateral to which a
security interest could attach. The debtor, however, need not have absolute
o.
ownership. In Armstrong v. State Bank, the court held that the debtor's rights in
the collateral were sufficient to qualify as a security interest, when the debtor had
an equitable interest in the property, but not full legal title. It

43UCC § 9-203(1)(a).
.. Id. See First Nat'l Bank v.. First Sec. Bank, 721 P2d 1270 (Mont. 1986) (a descrip-
tion ofcollateral in a security agreement as livestock located at a certain place did not have
to identify the location to be effective, but when the location was included it had the effect
of limiting the security interest to livestock only at the place).
"uee § 9-203(I)(a).
"uee § 1-201(44).
47 uee § 9-20J( I). See generally Sanford, "Debtor's Rights in Col1ateral as a RequIre-
ment for Attachment of a Security Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code," 26
SOL Rev. 163 (1981 l.
oil Montco, Inc. v. Glatzer (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 665 F2d 36 (2d Cir. 1981).
41 (In re Gelkins, Inc.), 754 F2d 778,781 (8th eir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 US 906
(1985).
.. See also Weld Colo. Bank v. E & E Constr., Inc., 6SJ P2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
The court held that a secured party with a security interest in the debtor's accounts did not
It 22.02(1) SECURITY TRANSACflONS 22-12

The parties to the security agreement may agree to defer the time at which
the security interest attaches by an "explicit agreement" postponing the time of
attaching!' In Allegaert v. Chemical Bank, 52 the court held that there must be
"an unequivocal showing of an explicit agreement" to effect a postponement of
the attachment, because the "ordinary expectation" is that a security interest
will attach immediately and automatically."
According to the definitions, a "security agreement" must be an "agreement
which creates or provides for a security interest."54 When the written agreement
does not say in so many words that the debtor grants to the secured party a
security interest, parties have questioned whether a security interest has been
created. Resolution of this issue has been treated as a matter of ascertaining the
parties' intent,55 but a well-drafted security agreement should leave no room for

acquire a security interest in funds placed in escrow, pending resolution of a controversy

between debtor and a party apinst whom the debtor had a claim, because the debtor had
not established a right to the fund. The case arose under the pre-I 972 UCC provisions on
"accounts." Id. at 760. In Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Riviana Foods, Inc., 648 F2d 1059,
1061·1062 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that a security interest granted by the debtorin
all of its inventory did not attach to Soods that the debtor warehouse held as a bailee. The
rules on "sale or return" in UCC § 2·326 did not apply because the debtor had no
authority to sell the goods. In In re Cook, 63 Bankr. 789, 797-798 (DND 1986), the debtor
did not have sufficient "rights in the collateral" to create a security interelt because the
collateral were cattle in the possession of debtor but owned by another, who neither gave
authority nor was estopped from denying authority in the debtor to encumber them.
Under Kansas partnership law, a partner may not convey an interest in specific
partnership property without all of the partners joining in the transfer. A partner may
assign his or her profits from the operation of the partnership, however. In Wellsville
Bank v. Nicolay, 7 Kan. App. 2d 172,638 P2d 975 (1982), one partner assigned his rights
to receive benefits under a contract of the partnership to the plaintiff. The assignment was
made as security for a loan plaintiff made to the partner. A second partner in the
partnership claimed the assignment was void because it attempted to convey specific
partnership property, the contract. The court rejected this analysis and held that the fmt
partner had not assigned specific partnership property. He had only transferred to plain.
tiff his rights to profits and surplus from the partnership attributable to that partnership
asset. 7 Kan. App. 2d at 175, 638 P2d at 978. This interest constituted personal property
in which an Article 9 security interest could be created. 7 Kan. App. 2d at 176, 638 P2d at
979.
5' UCC § 9-203(2).
52 657 F2d 495 (2d Cir. 1980).
53 657 F2d at 503.
54 UCC § 9.105(1).
slln WYHY Fed. Credit Union v. Burchell, 643 P2d 471 (Wyo. 1982), the court
found .that the panies had entered into an effective security agreement although the
docUments did not expressly contain language formally &ranting a security interest in the
collateral to the secured pany. 'The court applied the test that "[iJfan intention to provide
a security interest can be found from the parties' course of deB1ings, then, so Ions as the
minimal formal requirements are satisfied, a security interest exists." 643 P2d a1474. See
also United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 641 F2d 185 (4th
22·13 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.02(11

doubt. The description of the collateral in the written security agreement does
not have to be a specific description," and it is not necessary to the validity ofthe

Cir. 1981), holding that a security interest can be created by a document that lacks express
lanauaae aranting a security interest. When there is language in a promissory note stating
that certain property constitutes "collateral" security, and there is a filed financing
statement identifying the same property, it is logical to infer that the note creates a
security interest in the property listed. Eames & Woodcock Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Alles, 40
VCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1438, 1442-1443 (Masl. Super. Ct. 1984). However, a
financing statement, together with a note that had no reference to the collateral or to the
financing statement, was not sufficient to qualify as a security aareement. The documents
lacked language indicating an intent to create a security interest. In re Modafferi, 45
Bankr. 370, 373 (Bann. SONY 1985).
In Pontchartrain State Bank v Poulson, 684 F2d 704 (10th Cir. 1982), on the 'other
hand. the court found that the document did not establish that the parties had agreed to
create a security -interest. In this case the creditor aJ'lued that the execution of a promis-
sory note and a letter to the bank could be construed in combination to show that a
security interest was intended. After reviewing the case law on this question. the court
held that the document must "specifically arant a security interest" to the secured party.
684 F2d at 707. Although a [mancing statement may qualify as a security all'eement,
where the parties intended to create a security agreement, parol evidence is not admissible
to establish this intent according to the court in In re Shinville Assocs., Inc., 46 Bankr.
352, 354 (Bankr. WD Mich. 1985).
See generally Boyd and Saxon, "The A·9: A Program for Drafting Security Agree-
ments Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
637 (1981); McLaughlin, '''Add on' aauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financina:
Too Much of a Good Thing," 49 Fordham L. Rev. 661 (1981); Walker, "Creation,
Perfection, and Enforcement of Security Interest Under the 'Tennessee' Commercial
Code," 48 Tenn. 1. Rev. 819 (1981); Note, "The Formal Requirements of Uniform
Commercial Code § 9.203( I)(a) Are Satisfied When a Financing Statement, a Promissory
Note and the Course of Dealing Between the Parties Collectively Reveal an Intent to
Create or Provide for a Security Interest (In re Bol1inaer Corp., 614 F2d 924 (3d Cir.
1980»," 50 U. Cin. 1. Rev. 225 (1981).
The drafters of the UCC lUted that the requirement for a security 8Il'Cement "is not
intended to reject, and does not reject, the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale,
although absolute in form, may be shown to have been in factaiven as security." UCC § 9·
203, comment 4. In Beardv. Newsome, 76 NCApp. 476, 333 SE2d 527, 529(1985), parol
evidence was permitted to show that a transfer of personal property that was absolute on
its face was in fact a transfer for security purposes.
..ucc § 9·110. The court refused to cure defects in a security agreement relating to
the description of the collateral by construing the security ~ment together with the
financing statement in In re Permian Anchor Servs., Inc., 649 F2d 763, 766 (lOth Cir.
1981). A description of the collateral in a security agreement as "all farm personal
property" was not an effective description because it was too general. In re Becker, 46
Bankr. 17, 19 (Bankr. WD Wis. 1984), aft'd, 53 Bankr. 450 (WD Wis. 1985). On the other
hand, a description oflivestock as collateral in a security 8Il'eement did not have to meet
the requirements of the state livestock blll of sale law in order to be an effective descrip-
tion. Moffat County State Bank v. Producen Livestock MIct~ Ass~n, 598 F. Supp. 1562,
1566 (D. Colo. 1984), atrd, 833 F2d 908 (lOth Cir. 1987).
See In re Deeb, 47 Bankr. 848, 851-852 (Bankr. NO Ala. 1985), wbere the court held
that a security agreement, giving the secured party a Sllcurity interest in an individually
, 22.0211) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-14

agreement that the collateral be described item by item. It is enough that the
description "reasonably identifies what is described." The comments make
clear that requirements under pre·UCC law for detailed, serial-number types of
descriptions have been eliminated."
The security agreement may provide for a broad blanket security interest
that reaches property acquired by the debtor after the security agreement is
executed and that secures advances made by the secured party after the making
of the agreement, regardless of whether the secured party was bound to make
those advances, A However, the secured party cannot obtain an automatic inter-

named horse, without referring to products of the collateral or othelWise indicating that
any interest was to be created in offspring of the horse, was nevenheless effective iQ
creating a security interest in foals that were born after the security interest had been
perfected in the mare. The court relied on a pre·UCC case, Meyer Bros. v. Cook, 85 Ala.
417, 5 So. 147 (1888).
. Boilerplate language granting a security interest in "all property" of debtor was not
effective in creating a security interest. In re Wolsky, 68 Bam. 526 (DND 1986).
17 UCC § 9.110 and comment. The secured party was engqed in providing financing
for the debtor's restaurant business. The financing statement identified the collateral as
"furniture, fIXtUres, and small wares." The court viewed this description as ambiguous
because two different classes of property could be referred to as fixtures: (I) true fixtures,
which had a relationship to the real estate, and (2) trade fIXtUres, which would be classified
as personal property. The court held that the general reference in the financing statement
to "fIXtures" was sufficient to cover trade fIXtures. However, the use ofthe same general
language in the security lIiTccment would not suffice. The court impostd a strieter
standard of specificity for the dclIcription of the property in the security agreement. In re
FR ofND, Inc., 54 Bankr. 645 (DND 1985).
Both the financing statement and the security agreement described the cattle subject
to plaintiffs security interests as livestock branded "-Won right ribs with an orange ear
tag right ear." The court held that this description was adequate to identify the collateral
and to create a security interest in cattle with the "W" brand. Althouah the cattle did not
have the ear taa, the court said that the p\aintiffhas a perfected security interest because
the ear tag clause was nothing more than an additional or surplus identification. American
Indian Agric. Credit Consonium,Inc. v. Fort Pierre Livestock, Inc., 379 NW2d 318, 320
(SD 1985).
A UCC § 9·204. See generally "Priorities of 'Future Advances' Under Previously
Perfected Security Interests and Article 9 of the UCC," 58 Marq. 1. Rev. 759 (1975).
When a debtor signs a security agreement that includes a clause under which future
advances are also secured by the collateral, how does a court determine what obliptions
are covered by the "future advances" clause? This question was discussed in In re
Sunshine Books, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 712, 714 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1984), where the court con-
cluded that check overdrafts were within the purview of the future advances provision.
The court discussed the application of a "relatedness rule." For an example ofconfusion
over whether a refinancing was secured by collateral provided for in the first agreement,
see Nutting v. Bradford Nat'l Bank (In re Nutting), 44 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984).
When a secured party enlers into a financina arrangement with a debtor, in addition
to agreeing on the amount ofthe loan the debtor will be obligated to repay; the pai1ies may
also agree that the debtor will undertake additional obligations, such as the payment of
interest on the unpaid loan, the obligation to pay attorney fees and other costs in the event
22·15 SECURITY INTERESTS 1f 22.02[11

est in property acquired by a consumer more than ten days after receiving value
from the secured party." Thus, it is not necessary to have separate security
agreements for each advance the creditor makes. One agreement may cover all
future advances, whether obligatory or optional, but it is advisable to have
appropriate evidence of each advance the agreement secures. Similarly, when
the collateral constantly changes, there is no need to execute a new security
agreement with each change in the collateral. A single master agreement can
cover all property, whenever acquired, as long as the agreement properly
describes the collateral.eo
The uee's liberal provisions relating to the requirements for describing the
collateral may cause uncertainties, when other parties wish to determine what
property of the debtor is subject to the security interest of the secured party.
There is a procedure in the uee that permits the debtor to send a statement,
including the amount the debtor believes to be the unpaid indebtedness and the
collateral covered, to the secured party. The secured party need only approve or
correct the statement submitted. 11 (Third parties need to be careful about relying
on such statements. Doubtless, common-law estoppel principles could arise, but
the uee itself does not make the secured party's approval of the statement
binding as to third parties.)U

of collection, and indemnity obliptions. When a lien creditor obtains a judicial lien on
the propeny of the debtor after the security interest was perfected, but before the obliga-
tions to pay interest, attorney fees, and other costs came due, does the lien have priority
over these later maturing obliplions? A lien creditor argued thaI only future advances
that fell within the exact language ofUCC § 9-301(4) were entitled to protection, and that
obliaations such as attorney fees for collection of the debt could not be classified as
"advances." The coun rejected this interpretation in Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp.
v.AetnaBusiness Credit, Inc., 746 F2d 126. 133 (2d Cir. I984)(Friendly, J.). Itslated that
there had been a drafting failure because the language ofSection 9·30 I did not cover such
obligations, but there was no reason to believe that the drafters of the UCC intended to
give the lien creditor priority. Although the obligations did not mature untillatet, they
were incurred as part of the original transaction, which was well before the judicial lien
was attached. In the coun's opinion, UCC § 9-301(4) does not apply to all types of
obligations, but only to those that represented "sums put at the disposal of the bor-
rower-not expenditures made by the lender for his own benefit." 746 F2d at 130. The
types of obligations involved in the case, such as legal expenses in enforcing the debt,
ought not to be analyzed under uce § 9-301(4). These obligations fall under the tradi-
tional rule ofUCC § 9-30J(1)(b), which protects the priority of the secured pany ifa
perfected security interest was obtained before another party became a lien creditor. The
case also raised the issue of how 10 treat monthly charges for interest and commissionl,
but the coun did not have to resolve-it. 746 F2d at 135.
"uec § 9-204(2).
10 Although the aareement is effective to create a security interest, there still may be
sipificant priority questions. See Chapter 23.
.. UCC § 9-208.
12 UCC § 9-208(2). See uee § 1-103.
1122.02(2] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-16

A security agreement automatically gives the secured party a security inter-

est in any proceeds that derive from the sale or transfer of the collateral.1:!

[2] Purchase Money Security Interests

The UCC contains special rules that favor purchase-money security inter-
ests. A purchase-money security interest can arise in two ways: (1) when the
seller ofthe collateral takes a security interest in the goods or other property sold
to secure its price" or (2) when a third-party filiancer makes advances or

I:!UCC § 9-203(3). Proceeds that derive from the sale or transfer of collateral are
discussed at f 23.03[1].
84 UCC § 9-1 07(a). To qualify as a purchase money security interest it is necessary that
the secured party give value either by making advances or "incurring an obligation." In
United States v. Cahall Bros., 674 F2d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 1982), the coon held that a
secured party gave such value by giving a binding commitment to extend credit. There-
fore, although the disbursement offunds may have been delayed until some time after the
loan agreement was entered into, the commitment to malee credit available constituted
value. The subsequent disbursement offunds would be merely tenderina money pursuant
to a preeltisting legal duty. On the other hand, if there had been no prior commitment, the
disbursement of the funds would constitute value. (It is not clear why the court felt
compelled to remand the case to the district court to determine when value was given by
the secured party. It is not a requirement to the creation of a purchase money security
interest under Section 9·107 that value be given at a certain time, so long as it is used by
the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. The court did not discuss whether the funds
were actually so used, but it appears that this was the case.) It is necessary, however, under
the purchase'money priority provision in UCC § 9-132(4) to perfect the purchase money
security interest within ten days. Value must be given to perfect the security interest. UCC
~ 9-203(l)(b), 9-303(1). The case was unique because there could be two parties with
separate purchase money security interests in the collateral. The court assumed, without
discussing, that the first of these secured parties to file would prevail. 674 F2d at 581.
In one case, a bankruptcy trustee araued that a secured party could obtain a purchase
money security interest in a riabt to payment under a contract (an "account" under the
classification scheme of Article 9). The court d,id not decide whether a purchase money
security interest could eltist in assets other than "goods," but ruled that the money
advanced by the creditor was not used to enable the debtor to "acquire rights in" the
contract but simply provided funds for the performance ofthe contract. In re Woodworks
Contemporary Furniture, Inc., 44 Banlu. 971, 973 (Bankr. WD Wis. 1984). In coming to
this conclusion, the court cited Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Lectro Sys., Inc., 262 NW2d
678 (Minn. 1977), which drew a distinction between the expenditure of funds used to
purchase an identifiable asset and that used to enable the debtor to conduct business
under a contract already in existence.
Defendant held a blanket security interest in equipnient of the debtor under a
security agreement, which also contained an after-acquired property clause. The debtor,
without authority, traded in some of the equipment in which defendant had a perfected
security interest to dealer to purchase new equipment. Defendant claimed that because
equipment used as trade-in was equipment in which it had a perfected Sl'Curity interest;
defendant should be viewed as having a purchase money security interest in the new
equipment. The court rejected this argument. The court said that the defendant "cannot,
22·17 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.02[21

otherwise provides value so that the debtor may acquire rights in collateral.u An
example of this situation is a bank loan enabling the debtor to purchase a car
from an automobile dealer. If the bank has the debtor enter into a security
aiTecment, which gives the bank a security interest in the car, the bank's interest
is a purchase money security interest because tile loan was used by the debtor to
buy the car. It is important in cases of this second type that the value given by the
third party "in fact" be used to enable the debtor to obtain rights in the collat-
eral." One way ofaccomplishing this is to disburse the funds ofthe loan directly
to the seller ofthe collateral. Under the DCC, purchase money security interests
are often favored over other types ofsecurity interest. (Sec discussion on priori-
ties in Chapter 23 and discussion on perfection of security interests in consumer
goods later in this chapter.)
Because of the liberal rules in Article 9, which permit collateral to serve as
security for antecedent debt and for advances made in the future, ifthe parties
agree to such arrangements, and permit cross-collateral provisions where tbe
collateral serves as security for its own purchase price and for the price of other
collateral, it is possible for a security interest in the same collateral to have both a
purchase money aspect and a non-purchase-money aspect. This has stirred
debate as to whether the security interest must be viewed as unitary, so that the
non-purchase-money obligation might be regarded as tainting the entire security
interest and preventing it from being classified as a purchase money interest, or
may be viewed as divisible, so that the collateral may be subject to both a
purchase money interest and a non-purchase-money interest."
Tn rt! Manuel" concluded that a purchase money security interest did not
exist in fumiture that the debtor bought and financed underarrangemcnts where
both the fumiture and a television purchased subsequently served as security for
the total obligation until it was paid in full. It This reasoning was rejected in a
Third Circuit decision. 70 The Third Circuit held that a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods does not lose its quality as a purchase money interest
when the debtor subsequently purchases additional goods on credit, where the

therefore, transform its prior non-purchase money security interest into a purchase
money security interest in satisfaction of the antecedent debt owed by" its debtor. John
Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ass'n, 39 UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1882, 1884 (NY
Sup. Ct. 1984).
HUCC § 9-107(b).
"Id.
Ir See Note, "Preservins the Purchase Money States of Refinanced or ComminsIed
Purchase Money Debl," 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1133 (1983).
"In re Manuel, 507 F2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975).
II Sec In re Norrell, 426 F. Supp. 435 (MD Ga. 1977), In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 3S I
(Bankr. ED Tenn. 1980), In reSlay, 8 Banler 355 (Bankr ED Tenn. 19S0), lore Simpson, 4
UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 243 (Banlcr. WD Mich. 1966).
rapristas V. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F2d 797, 80G-SOI (3d Cir. 1984).
, 22.03 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-18

additional debt is "added on" to the debt secured by the original collateral. vee
§ 9.107 defines a purchase money security interest as being such an interest "to
the extent" that it secures all or part of the price of goods, which, to the court,
meant that the security interest could have a dual status, with both a purchase
money and a non-purchase-money aspect.?' In a nonconsumer goods financing
context, however, a court has held that (I) a secured party has a purchase money
security interest in inventory, notwithstanding that the security agreement pro-
vided that after-acquired collateral would also secure the debt as well, and that
(2) existing collateral would secure future advances. In this case all of the credit
extended by the secured party was for goods purchased on conditional sale. n

11 22.03 PERFECTION, TER.'1INATION, AND TRANSFER OF

SECURITY INTERESTS
In general, a security interest must be perfected in order to be superior to the

?lld. The court also discussed how the debtor's payments should be allocated among
the different items of collateral to determine to what extent a purchase money security
interest existed in each item of collateral. It included within its definition of "purchase
price" "not only the actual cost of the goods but also financing charges and sales tax."
Pristas, 742 F2d at 800. A similar problem arose in the case ofln re Mason, 46 Bankr. 119
(Banler. ED Mich. 1985). In this case debtor originally financed the purchase ofa stereo by
a loan from Household Finance Corporation. This was a purchase money transaction.
About a year later, the loan was rewritten, the original loan was retired, and addit\onal
funds were made available to the debtor. The lender took a security interest in the stereo
and other household goods. The coun held that the new loan could not be treated as a
purchase money transaction. Therefore, Household Finance did not have a perfected
security interest, since it had not filed or taken possession of the goods. 46 Bankr. atl2t.
The coun said further that it would not examine tbe transaction to determine if a portion
ofthe loan should be viewed as a purchase money transaction, because the loan agreement
itself contained no provisions for the allocation of payments. In the coun's view, the
preferred approach would be to view the transaction as a non-purchase-money transac-
tion, as Ions as there was no statutory basis or contractual formula for apportioning the
transaction into purchase money and non-purchase-money parts. 46 BanJcr. at 121. See
also in re Matthews, 724 F2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984). Abankruptcy court held that a creditor's
purchase money security interests in consumer goods remained intact for purposes of
determining bankruptcY exemptions, even though the consumer debtor had later consoli-
dated the purchase money debt with other debts in which there were non-purcbase-money
security interests. In re Klanish, 56 BanJcr. 184, 185-186 (Banler WD Penn. 1986).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. obtained a perfected purchase money security interest in
consumer goods purchased by debtors under its revolving charge account plan by includ-
ing appropriate provisions in its basic charge agreement and sales slip documentation.
The charge agreement gav.e Sears a security interest in goods purchased, and the sales slips
generated at the time of purchase required a consumer signature, had a statement that
referred to the basic charge agreement, and gave notice of Sears security interest in
merchandise charged. This documentation was held to be adequate to create a perfected
security interest in the consumer goods purchased pursuant to this plan. In re Orecchio, 54
Banler. 685, 686-687 (ON] 1985).
72 In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co., 26 VCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 203, 204 (Banler. ED
Pa. 1979).
22·19 SECURITY INTERESTS 11 22.0311}

claims to the collateral of third-party purchasers and crediton. Although a

security agreement is enforceable unless the UCC provides to the contrary,13 the,
rights of many third-party creditors and purchasers are superior to the right ofa
secured party who holds an unperfecled security interest. As a result, although a
secured party may enforce an unperfected security interest against the debtor,
perfection of the security interest is necessary for priority over most third party
rival claimants, including the trustee in bankruptcy. Since perfection is usually a
simple procedure, failure to perfect a security interest is usually the product ofa
mistake rather than a considered legal decision. (See Chapter 23.)
A perfected security interest is one that has attached, as described in an
earlier section, and for which the secured party has completed the additional
steps required for perfection under the uec. There are three ways in which a
security interest may be perfected under the Uec. The first is by ming a
financing statement at the public office designated by state law; the second is by
the secured party's taking possession of the collateral; and the third is when the
transaction qualifies as one where perfection occurs automatically.1' The classi-
fication of the collateral will determine which method of perfection is applica-
ble. Some types ofoollateral may be perfected by more than one method. Goods,
for example, may be perfected either by filing or by possession and, in a proper
case, perfection may arise automatically. Security interests in other types of
collateral may be perfected only by one 9fthese methods. For example, the only
way to perfect a security interest in an account is by filing. The proper methods
for perfecting security interests in the different types of collateral are discussed
in later sections of this chapter.

11J Filing Requirements

The uec requires secured parties to me a financing statement to perfect
s.ecurity interests in certain types of collateral, to provide notice to creditors,
buyers, or other third parties who deal with the debtor,fJ Possession of the
collateral is permitted as an alternative method of perfection for some types of
collateral, because the drafters of the uec believed that creditors and other
third parties would obtain notice of the possible interest of the secured party
from the ract of the secured party's possession of the collateral.

roUCC § 9·201.
r·UCC § 9.303.
uSee UCC § 9-402, comment 2. See generally Hogan, "Bankruptcy Refonn and
Delayed F~ Under the U.C.C.," 3S Ark. L. Rev. 35 (1981).
For an' example of a case where the court upheld the comprehensive scope of the
Article 9 fIling system and refused to rellard a separate state registration law relating to
persons in the business of operating feedlots as overriding the filing provisions of Article
9, see In re Black & White Cattle Co., 46 Bankr. 484, 488 (Banke. 9th Cir. 1984).
, 22.03(1] SECURIlY TRANSACTIONS 22-20

The place for filing a fmancing statement depends on the type of collateral
involved. There are three alternative provisions in the UCC, so the procedure
for fIling varies according to the alternative adopted in a particular state. Filing
may need to be at a central office of the state, such as the Secretary ofState, at a
county office, or at the office where real estate records are kept. 7' The latter
provision applies when the collateral is fixtures, timber, minerals, or the like. In
some states, fIling in two offices is necessary. n The proper place offIling may be
determined by the debtor's residence, the place ofbusiness, or the location ofthe
collateral. Because of these variations, the law is not uniform from state to state
as to where fIlings should be made, and local counsel should be consulted.
Once a filing is made in the proper place or places, a subsequent change in
residence of the debtor, location of the collateral, or debtor's place of business
does not destroy the perfection ofthe security interest. 71 This rule applies only to
different filing offices within the same state. It does not cover circumstances
where more than one state may be involved in the transaction!' An alternative
provision makes the filing effective for only four months after the change. When
the debtor's name changes or, in the case ofan organization, its "name, identity,
or corporate structure" changes, there are circumstances in which a secured

"UCC § 9-401. The rules governing the place where a financing statement must be
filed are discussed infra V22.03[5], which contains tables on the filing requirements of
various states.
When a secured transaction affects more than one state, the UCC provides rules to
determine which slate law the secured party must follow in order to perfect a security
interest. These rules vary, depending on the type ofcollateral. See UCC § 9·103. Often, the
best solution and the safest approach is to perfect the security interest in all possible
concerned jurisdictions. A 1984 Massachusetts case illustrates the type of problem that
may arise. The secured party held a purchase money security interest in two printing
presses owned by the debtor corporation, a New York corporation located in New York
State. The debtor installed the presses at the plant of its wholly owned subsidiary in
Springfield, Massachusetts. Under the Massachusetts filing rule, a financing statement
had to have been filed at the debtor's "place ofbusiness," which was Springfield, Massa-
chusetts. Because the secured party failed to file in Massachusetts, the security interest
was not perfected, and the trustee in bankruptcy ofthe debtor corporation had an interest
in the presses that prevailed over the secured party. Trans Union Leasing Corp. v.
Alithochrome Corp. (In re Alithochrome Corp.), 751 F2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1984).
"UCC § 9-40l.
"ucc § 9-401(3).
"ucc § 9-401, comment 6; see Section 9-103. When collateral subject to asecurity
interest is moved from one state to another, if a ming is needed to perfect a security
interest in the collateral the secured party must reme within four months after the removal
of the collateral to the new state. If the secured party does not reme, the security interest
becomes unperfected. When the secured party only gives notice to the debtor within the
four-month grace period of its security interest and demands the return of the collateral,
this action is not suffiCient to keep the security interest from becoming unperfected at the
end ofthe four-month period. United States v. Handy & Harman, 750 F2d 777, 783 (9th
Cir. 1984).
22-21 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.03(1)

party needs to make a new filing to assure perfection of the security interest in all
of the debtor's collateral. (This is discussed later in this chapter.)
When a secured party makes a fUing in good faith but files in the wrong
office, the filing will be effective as to any collateral for which it is proper. 1O It is
also effective to create a perfected security interest in the collateral against
persons who have actual knowledge of the contents of the financing statement."
A financing statement is considered filed when it has been accepted for
filing by the appropriate ming officer and when the filing fee has been ten-
dered. A In general the filing remains effective for a period oftive years, after
which time it lapses. a3 (Some states have adopted different periods.) When the
filing lapses, the security interest becomes unperfected as of that date, unless
some other method of perfection applies." The period of perfection may be

IOUCC § 9-40H2). The Georgia Supreme Court has held that oral notice to a lien
creditorthat a holder ofan unperfected security interest was claiming a security interest in
the property is not the equivalent of knowledge of the "contents" of the financing
statement within the meaningofUCC § 9-401(2). United States v. Waterford No.2 Office
Center, 246 Ga. 475, 477, 271 SE2d 790,792 (1980).
11 uec § 9.401(2).

"uec § 9-403(1). Failure to comply with state law requiring documentary tax
stamps when a fmancing statement is filed does not invalidate the filinl- The ming is
effective to perfect a security interest. Aswciate's Commercial Corp. v. Sel-o-raJc Corp.,
746 F2d 1441,1444 (lIth Cir. 1984).
A continuation statement is effectively filed on proper presentation to the filing
officer, notwithstanding the officer's return of the continuation statement to the secured
party, as long as the statement substantially complies with Article 9 requirements when it
is presented. MUlti-Mart Branch Office, First State Bank v. Appliance Buyers Credit
Corp., 757 F2d 1573, 1578 (5tb Cir, 1985).
13 UCC § 9-403(2). Absent an aareement to provide for a shorter termination period,
the financing statement remains effective throughout the statutory period as to all
advances made by the secured party, which are secured by collateral covered by the
fmancin& statement. The fmancinl statement does not lapse when the debtor pays in full
the obU&ation owed the secured party regardless of whether future advances are men-
tioned in the financing statement or security a~ment. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Je~
Coal Co., 688 F2d 10, B-14 (3d Cir.1982). Although the court suggested it miallttake a
view contrary to the Crtdit Atliallu coun on the effectiveness ofa fmancinl statement to
cover future advances not provided for in the original security agreement, it avoided
reaching this issue by finding that the second advance was a refinancing of the oriain&l
debt and. therefore, covered by the original fIling. Blue v. H·K Corp., 629 P2d 790. 792
(Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
"UCC § 9-403(2). See generally zaretsky, "Lapse ofPerfeetion in Secured Transac-
tion: A Search for a Consistent Approach," 22 BeL Rev. 247 (1981). See Avant Petro-
leum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 652 F. Supp. 542 (SDNY 1987). Paribaa has a perfected
security interest in accounts receivable ofits debtor Crysen. Another creditor, SP, gar-
nished funds due Crysen from Avant that were covered by the Paribas security interest.
Avant flIed an interpleader action and paid the funds to coun. While the court had
custody of the funds, the financing statements <i{ Paribas lapsed because offailure to f~e
continuation statements before the end of five years. The court held uec § 9-403(2) did
122.0312) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-22

extended by filing a continuation statement within six months before the filing
lapses. IS The continuation statement must identify the original statement by me
number, must state that it is still effective, and must be signed by the secured
party. It is not necessary to have the signature of the debtor on a continuation
statement." The continuation statement extends the effectiveness ofthe original
statement for five additional years, and then lapses, unless another continuation
statement is med. 17
The ming officer is required to index the financing statements according to
the name ofthe debtor and to make available for public inspection the document
itselfor a microfIlm ofit." An optional provision ofthe uee requires the filing
officer to provide copies of statements on file.n

(2) Requirements of Financing Statements

The uee adopts a philosophy of "notice fUing." Under this approach, it is
not necessary to make public all the terms ofthe security agreement between the
secured party and the debtor. It is sufficient notice to third parties to me an
abbreviated statement with less information. In uee terminology, this state-
ment is what is referred to as a "financing statement. "10 The fmancing statement
ordinarily is a different document than the written security agreement, but a
security agreement may be ftled as a fmancing statement when it contains all of
the information the uee requires for fmancing statements.11

la] Information Requirements. A financing statement must give the names of

the debtor and the secured party, must be signed by the debtor,l2 must give an

not apply, and BP could not claim that its interest in the fund became superior to Paribas
whose security interest had become unperfected as a result ofthe lapse. It would defeat the
purpose ofthe interpleader to give effect to the lapse after the funds had been placed in the
custody of the court. 652 F. Supp. at 548.
I. UCC § 9-403(3). In a continuatiou statement, the omission ofa reference to the file
number of the original fmancing statement was a technical error that was not seriously
misleading, because the continuation statement did refer to an amendment to the original
fmancing statement that contained a proper reference to the original statement. In re
Edwards Equip. Co., 46 Banlcr. 689, 691-692 Banke. WD Olda., 1985).
.. UCC § 9-403(3). Atypewritten name constituted an effective signature on a tinane-
ina statement. Multi-Mart Branch Office, Fint State Bank v. Appliance Buyen Credit
Corp., 757 F2d 1573, 1577 (5th Cir. 1985).
17 UCC § 9-403(3).
I. UCC § 9-403(4).
I·UCC § 9-407.
10 UCC § 9-402.
t1 UCC § 9-402(1).
12 Id. Note, "Financina Statement Signature Requirements (In re Save-on-earpets of
Arizona, Inc., 545 F2d 1239, 9th Cir. 1976)," 3 U. Dayton L. Rev. 211 (1978).
22-23 SECURITY INTERESTS , 21.0312Ua}

address of the secured party from which information about the security interest
may be obtained, and must contain "a statement indicating the types, or describ-
ing the items, of collateral. "'3 By requiring only a description of the "types" of
the collateral. the uee expressly permits the parties to use general classifica-
tions and to avoid the detailed. item-by-item description of the collateral. An
extensive body oflaw deals with what constitutes an adequate description." The
financing statement must give additional information for special types ofcollat-
eral. When the collateral is crops. a description of the land must be given to
provide notice to parties who deal with the real estate involved." When the
collateral is timber, minerals, oil and gas, or, in some circumstances, fixtures, the
financing statement must also describe the real estate." In some states, the
financing statement must contain a legal description of the real estate," must
recite that the fmaneing statement will be filed in the real estate records relating
to the property, and, when the debtor does not have an interest of record in the
real estate, must show the name of tbe record owner.·' A real estate mortgage
covering items of personal property or ftxtures may be effective as a financing
statement if it satisfies tbe uec requirements for a financing statement."

Failure of the debtor to sign the financing statement was fatal in Hobart Corp. v.
North Cent. Credit Serv., Inc., 29 Wash. App. 302, 304-305, 628 P2d 842, 844-845
(1981).
The officer ofthe debtor corporation signed the'financing statement for the corpora-
tion prior to its being incorporated, but the signature was effective for purposes ofArticle
9. The court reasoned that the signature was sufficient to give notice. Moreover, the
debtor corporation could be said to have ratified it. John Deere Co. v. First Interstate
BaPlc, 147 Ariz. 256, 258-259, 709 P2d 890, 892-893 (Ct. App. 1985).
13UCC § 9-402(1),
"See B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transaction Under the Uniform Commercial
Code'l 2.9(5] (1980). A Texas coun has held that the statement "aU fixed assets" of the
debtor is not a sufficient description in the financing statement ofcollateral by "types." In
re Volpe Enters., Inc., 42 Banke. 90, 93 (Banke. SD fla. 1984).
A fuumcing statement stated the wrong number of bushels of grain in which the
secured party held a security interest, but the court still held the financing statement to be
effective. The statement had effect because it correctly identified the debtor, the secured
party, and the nature of the collateral. In re Nelson, 45 Banke. 443,444 (Banke, DND
1984).
"UCC § 9·402( I). In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Farmers &. Merchants BaPk. 425 So. 2d 452,
453 (Ala. 1983), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a financing statement describing
the collateral as ''all crops grown and harvested in 1980 , •• on land rented or leased in
Baldwin County. Alabama" was not a sufficient description of the real estate.
"UCC§ 9-402(5).
11 Id. A bankruptcy coun has held that a street address is substantial compliance with
a requirement for 1\ legal description of ttle real estate in ftxture transactions. In re
Mistura, Inc., 13 Banke. 483, 484 (Banke. D. Ariz. 1981).
Huee § 9-402(5).
"UCC § 9-402(6).
11 22.03(2J(a) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-24

The proper name to use of the debtor is the individual, partnership or

corporate name. It is not necessary to use trade names or the names ofindividual
partners.'OG A court provided a useful analysis ofthe cases dealing with improper
names in a 1985 bankruptcy decision:,a,
The cases adjudicating the effects of improper names on financing state-
ments are legion and they arrive at widely divergent resulls. The apparent
unpredictability of the holding of these cases is often attributable to an
insensitivity to the principle that these decisions are-or should be-based
on determinations other than the mere discrepancy between two names.
The decisions should not be predicated on a sterile and abstract comparison
between two names but rather on "whether a reasonable searcher would
find the financing statement or would be put on notice to inquire elsewhere
about it."(citations omitted.] .... The resolution ofthe question cannot be
made simply by comparing two names, but must be settled with an eye
toward the intended operation of the UCC indexing system in which the
errors are manifest. A reasonable searcher properly using the index is look-
ing for the name ofthe debtor amid a host ofsimilar names. The system may
contain hundreds or millions of names, depending on the size of the index.
The extent to which a reasonable searcher may correctly identify an errone-
ous listing as that of the debtor is dependent, of course, on the size of the
index. Analogizing the UCC index to a telephone book is apt. Searching
under an erroneous name would be much more difficult with the Manhattan
phone book than with an eight page phone book for some rural county.
The question of whether the disparity of names is seriously misleading is
likewise dependent on the distinctiveness of the names at issue. If the
debtor's name and the spurious name are significantly different from the
bulk ofthe names in the index-for instance, because ofthe highly stylized
name ofthe debtor or because its ethnicity is in stark contrast with the other
listings from that locale-the searcher is more likely to succeed in fmding
the accurate listing. Furthermore, the type of index in use is a pertinent
concern. The "me box" method, the standard bearer ofindexing for genera-
tions, with drawers full of cards that allowed a searcher to riffle through
myriad cards, is becoming outmoded. The vanguard, of course, is the
computer retrieval system, which in its simplest form would allow for no
"riffiing" through related names. The entry ofa single name into the system
may well cause the computer to cite only those fmancing statements on
which the name is identical to the name entered. No similar names would
surface. These and a plethora of other factual concerns are imaginable to
illustrate the need for a factual record to support a determination ofwhether
an error between names is seriously misleading. '01

lOG UCC § 9-402(7). This is a clarification made by the 1972 Am~ndments.

la'In re McGovern Auto Specialty. Inc., 51 Bankr. 511 (ED Pa. 1985).
lO2Id. at 514. There are numerous cases dealing with the identification of the debtor.
In McCauley's Reprographics, Inc. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank (In re McCauley's
22-25 SECURITY INTERESTS 11 22.03(2)lb)

When the debtor changes his or her name or when a debtor organization changes
its identity, the financing statement filed under the old name remains effective
as to any collateral acquired by the debtor before the change and also for new
collateral acquired within four months thereafter.,o3 A new financing statement
may be filed by the secured pany before the four month period expires, to assure
perfection as to subsequently acquired collateral.''''

(bJ Other Requirements as to Effectiveness. A photocopy, carbon. or other

reproduction of a financing statement (or a qualifying security agreement) may
be used as a financing statement when the security agreement allows copies to be
filed or when the original document already has been filed in the state.'1llI This
should make it easier for secured panies to file financing statements in multiple
offices within the same state. when there is a question as to which is the proper
office.

Reprographics. Inc.). 638 F2d 117 (9th Cir. 1981), the secured party mistakenly identified
a predecessor partnership, McCauley's Reprographics and Mapping, as the debtor rather
than the corporation with whom it dealt. Because there was no indication in the financing
statement that the debtor was a corporation, rather than the pannership, the coun did not
apply the traditional standard for determining whether the financing statement was
seriously misleading. 638 F2d at 119. In this case, it would not be enough that someone
searching the records could find that a financing statement was executed by an individual
named McCauley on behalfof the partnership because there would be no indication that
the corporation was the debtor. Moreover, in this case, even if the search led to the
underlying security agreement, the same error would have misled the searcher.
In In re Glasco, Inc., 642 F2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981). the financing statement identified
the debtor as "Elite Boats, Division of Glasco. Inc." The lepI corporate name of the
debtor was "Glasco. Inc." Because the company only did business under its trade name,
Elite Boats, the coun held that the notice purposes ofthe statute were satisfied and treated
the error as not seriously misleading. 642 F2d at 796. The ClW arose under the Florida
version of the UCC, which was the pre-1972 version. The current version ofUCC § 9-
402(7) contemplates that the corporate name rather than the trade name should be used
although it does not resolve ifuse of the trade name alone would be a minor error that is
not seriously misleading.
In Records & Tapes. Inc. v. Argus, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d 255, 256, 655 P2d 133, 134
(1982), the coun found the financing statement contained an error that was not seriously
misleading when it incorrectly identified the debtor as "ArJus Tapes and Records"
although the correct corporate name was "Argus, Inc."
In In re McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc., 51 Bankr. 511, 514 (ED Pat 1985), the
financing statement named the debtor as "McGovern Auto & Truck Pans, Inc." rather
than McGovern Auto SpecialtY. Inc.," the correct name. The court concluded that the
failure to ule the correct name was seriously misleading; so the security interest was not
perfected.
1113UCC § 9-402(7).
04
' Id.
'os uec § 9.402(1).
, 22.0312J[bJ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-26

In some situations the secured party may file a financing statement without
the signature ofthe debtor. This is permitted under the following circumstances:

1. The collateral is brought into the state from another state or the location
of the debtor within the state has changed. (The financing statement
must explain these circumstances.)
2. The filing is made to perfect a security interest in proceeds when the
original collateral was subject to a perfected security interest. (The
financing statement must describe the original collateral in this case.)
3. A previous filing on collateral has lapsed.
4. A new filing is necessary because of a change of name or a change in
identity of the debtor. 101

The vee permits the parties to me a financing statement in advance,

before they enter into a security agreement and before they take any of the other
steps required for attachment of the security interest. 107This allows the secured
party to malce an early ming ofa fmancing statement to establish a priority date
for subsequent transactions. One ming is enough, as long as the collateral is
adequately described; it is therefore unnecessary to reme on each of a series of
transactions. The financing statement may encompass transactions "not in
existence and not contemplated at the time the notice was filed, if the descrip-
tion of collateral in the financing statement is broad enough to encompass
them. "101 For the same reasons, the fmancing statement will be effective to cover
after acquired property and any future advances under the security agreement.
The financing statement does not have to state that future advances or after
acquired property is covered;101 nor does it have to say that proceeds are
covered. 110

101 UCC § 9-402(2).

107 UCC § 9-402(1).
101 UCC § 9-402, comment 2.
101 Id. Although tbe UCC does not require a financing statement to describe tbe
amount of the debt, a secured pany who flied a financing statement that did describe the
amount ofthe loan was unable to claim a security interest greatertban the amount stated.
The fmancing statement constituted a representation to the public of the size of the debt.
McLemore v. Farmer's Home Admin. (In re Davis), 40 UCC Rep. Serv. 1133, 1134-1135
(MD Tenn. 1985).
When tbe security agreement expressly covers after-acquired property, it is not
necessary for tbe financing statement to mention after-acquired propeny. in re Taylor, 45
Bankr. 643, 646 (Bankr. MD Pa. 1985).
110 UCC §§ 9.306, 9-402.
22-27 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.03(3)

The UCC drafters intended that the financing statement be effective "even
though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleadin&-""1 There is a
growing body of law on what constitutes a minor error under this provision."2
Sometimes the question arises as to whether a filed financing statement
should be effective as a method of perfection for a subsequent transaction. The
UCC in Section 9-402(1) permits a secured party to file a financing statement
before a security agreement is made. UCC §§ 9-403 and 9-405 establish proce-
dures for the secured party to fIle continuation statements and to disclose
assignments. Similarly, the UCC, in Sections 9-402(2Xd) and 9-402(7), provides
a method for the secured party to make a filing in the new name ofa debtor that
has changed its name, identity, or corporate structure.
Generally, a financing statement continues to be effective, notwithstanding
a change of name or identity of the debtor, as to collateral the debtor acquired
before the change.ll3 However, the secured party must proceed carefully; as a
Texas case indicates. In Barr ~'. White Oak State Bank, "4 the bank held a security
interest perfected by filing in the debtor's equipment and inventory. When the
debtor sold the business, the bank executed a new security agreement and filed a
new financing statement with the buyer as debtor. The original debtor guaran-
teed the loan made by the bank to the buyer of the business, and the old loan was
canceled although the original financing statement remained on file. When
default occurred and the bank foreclosed on the property, it discovered that
there was another creditor with a security interest in the inventory perfected by a
financing statement that had been filed between the filing dates of the two
financing statements fIled by the bank. The court held that the other creditor
prevailed under the "first to file" rule. The bank's security interest could not
relate back to the first financing statement covering the obligation ofthe original
debtor because the security interest terminated on the payment of that obliga-
tion. Although the original debtor guaranteed the bank's loan to the buyer, the
loan to the buyer was a new transaction and the guarantee did not cause the
original security interest to remain effective.

(3] Termination Statements and Partial Releases of Collateral

When the debtor has no outstanding obligation to the secured party and the
transaction is over, the debtor is entitled to make a written demand for a
termination statement from the secured party to state that the secured party no
longer claims an interest in the property ofthe debtor."1 On proper demand, the

111 uee § 9-402(8).

112 See B. Clark, supranole 94, 1 2.10; J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial
Code § 23·16 (2d ed. 1980).
113 UCC § 9-402(7).
114 677 SW2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).

115 UCC § 9-404(1).

1122.03(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-28

secured party must send the debtor such a termination statement, disclaiming a
security interest in the collateral covered by the financing statement concerned;
the statement is identified by the me number ofthe original financing statement.
The debtor is entitled to a termination statement for each office in which the
original financing statement was fIled."1
When the financing statement covers consumer goods, the secured party's
responsibilities extend further. Within one month after discharge of the obliga-
tion, the secured party must flIe a termination statement with each office at
which the original financing statement was flled.· When the debtor makes a
written demand for a termination statement, it must be fIled sooner than other-
wise-within ten days of the demand. 117 Failure to satisfy these responsibilities
will subject the secured party to liability for $100, plus any loss caused by
violation of these rules. 11I
Financing statements may be amended. Both the debtor and the secured
party must sign a writing containing the amendment.'" An amendment, unlike a
continuation statement, does not extend the period of effectiveness of the
financing statement.'· When the amendment adds new collateral to the financ-
ing statement, it is effective as to the added collateral only from the date offlling
of the amendment ,2' In contrast, it is possible to release the collateral from the
fmancing statement on flIe. The statement of release need only be signed by the
secured party but it must contain a description of the collateral being released,
the name and address of the debtor, the name and address ofthe secured party,
and the flIe number of the original fmancing statement. 122

(4] Transfer of Security Interests

Security interests may be transferred or assigned. When the security interest
is a perfected security interest, it is not necessary to take further steps to continue
the perfection against creditors ofand transferees from the original debtor. '13 In

11IId.
117Id.
"lId.
'"uee § 9-402(4).
'20uee § 9-402(4). In re Vermont Fiberglass, Inc., 44 Bankr. 505, 509 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1984).
'21 uee § 9-402(4).
'22uee § 9-406. In In re Pacific Trencher &. Equip., Inc., 27 Baw. 167 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1983), afi'd, 735 F2d 362 (9th Cir. 1984), the secured party mistakenly filed a
temlination statement when he intended to file a partial release. The effect ofthe mistake
was to cause the security interest in the remainina collateral to lapse, and ajunior secured
party was elevated to priority. The court refused to treat the mistake as not seriously
misleading under uee § 9-402(8) or to utilize common law equitable doctrines ofmistake
under uee § 1-103 to protect the secured party from his mistake. 27 Bam. at 169.
",.uee § 9-302(2).
22-29 SECURITY INTERESTS W22.0314)

many situations, however, the secured party who is the assignee may want to
take further steps to obtain protection against parties who might deal with the
assignor without knowing of the assignment of the security interest. For exam-
ple, the assignor could take action with respect to the collateral or transfer the
assignor's interest to another or be subject to claims by the assignor's own
creditors. A secured party who acquires a security interest in collateral by
assignment will want to have the security interest perfected in the secured party's
own name, ifperfection is by filing, or by taking possession, in cases where that is
appropriate. When the security interest has been perfected by tiling, the UCC
permits the parties to assign all or part of the secured party's rights under the
financing statement by filing a notice ofthe assignment in the place at which the
original financing statement was filed. m Upon filing of the assignment, the
assignee becomes the secured party of record.'21 After this filing, only'the
assignee will be able to me a termination statement, a release, or an amendment
to the financing .statement.
When there is an assignment of an account, contract, chattel paper, or
general intangible, the assignee may want to give notice to the party who was
obligated to make payment under the account or other obligation. If there is no
notice that payment must be made to the assignee, a debtor may continue to pay
the assignor. us Moreover, unless the agreement between the account debtor and
the assignor provides to the contrary, the assignee will be subject to any defense
or claim, accrued before notice ofthe assignment, by the accouDt debtor against
the assignor.'2' Such defenses may be waived by agreement, however. '21 The
assignment cannot prevent the account debtor and the assignor from modifying
their contract in good faith, insofar as it involves any right to payment that has
not yet been fully earned by performance. 12I The modification, if in good faith
and if in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, will be effective
notwithstanding notice of the assignment, but the good faith requirement will
probably sharply curtail the parties' freedom to make modifications.'·
Assignments of some obligations are classified under Article 9 as secured
transactions. An assignment of accounts, for example, is a secured transac-
tion.'" When the seller ofgoods sells an item to a purchaser, retaining a security
interest in the goods sold, the paper taken by the seller that contains the security
agreement and the obligation of the buyer to pay constitutes chattel paper. The

124 UCC § 9-405(2).

uee § 9-405(3).
'21
usuec § 9-318(3).
1J7uec § 9-318(l)(b).
muec § 9-318(1).
In uee § 9-318(2).
uoId.
,,, uee § 9-102. Sec" 22.01[1], 22.07[1] for a discuuion ofwhcn an assignment is
treated as a secured transaction.
122.03(5) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-30

assignment of this chattel paper to the assignee also is a secured transaction

under the uee. 132 In such transactions, the assignee needs to take the appropri-
ate steps to perfect a security interest in the accounts and chattel paper to protect
the assignee against the claims of creditors and other transferors from the
assignor. When the collateral is chattel paper, the safest procedure, ofcourse, is
for the secured party to take possession of the paper. na

[5] Place of Filing vee Financing Statement

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the filing of a fmancing statement is a
method for perfecting a security interest in some types ofcollateral. Within each
state, the place offiling varies according to the type ofcollateral, the variation of
the uee enacted by the state, and any local modifications to the uee rules.
There is probably less uniformity in the law on where to file a financing state-
ment than in any other part ofthe uee. Thus, it is essential for the bank officer
to consult with local counsel before entering into any secured transaction that
has contacts with a state whose ming requirements are unfamiliar to the bank
officer. In addition, federal legislation, effective December 24, 1986, affects the
steps needed to perfect a security interest in farm products against certain
purchasers and others who deal with those products. These rules are explained in
Chapter 23.
The complexity in state filing practices initially stems from the provisions
of the uee itself. The relevant provision is uee § 9-401(1). The drafters ofthe
uee offered the states three alternative versions ofthii paragraph, from which
each state was to select one. When Article 9 was extensively revised by the 1972
amendments (mentioned at the outset of this chapter), uee § 9-401(1) contin-
ued to offer three alternatives, paralleling the approach taken in the original
uee § 9-401(1). However, the 1972 amendments revised each alternative to
some extent. As a result, there are a total ofsix possible uniform variations (three
under the original uee § 9-401 (1) and three under the 1972 version of that
section). Each alternative contains blanks, which are a further source of varia-
tion, for the state to designate its ftling office. Additionally, states have liberally
revised the language ofUee § 9-401 (1) to deal with local concerns and practices.
To address this complexity, this section presents a series oftables describing
the ftling systems adopted by each state. It is hoped that these tables will be
useful to the bank officer in checking to determine if transactions comply with
local law. It must be stressed, however, as mentioned at the outset, that this is an
area of extensive local variation so that consultation with local counsel is impor-
tant. These tables are intended to provide only a general view ofthe local law to
be used as an initial step in investigating ming requirements.

132UCC § 9-I02(l)(b).
32
' UCC § 9·308. See U 22.07[4] for a discussion of chattel paper.
22-31 SECURITY INTERESTS If 22.03(5}

Because the place of fJ.1ing depends initially on which of the six uee
alternatives a state has adopted, these are set forth in Table 22-1. Table 22-2,
which follows, indicates for each state the alternative that has been adopted.
This table also contains some briefand general notes on the extent to which the
version enacted by the state departs from the uniform version. The following
table, Table 22-3, should be consulted to determine the state filing office. This
table lists each state office for each ofthe six uee alternatives. To facilitate use
of Table 22·3, the superscripts • through • have been assigned first to the
bracketed material andblanks in the text herewith oruec § 9-401 ( 1) and then to
their corresponding items in the table. The special rules governing farm products
are covered in Chapter 23.
(continued page 22·47)
, 22.0315] SECURITY TRANSACflONS 22-32

TABLE 22-1 1972 and Pre-1972 Versions of uee

1972 VERSION OF VCC

§ 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Collateral
First Alternative Subsection (1)
(I) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral is
goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on
the real estate would be flied or recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office ofthe [Secretary of State"l.

Second Alternative Subsection (1)

(I) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of
farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office ofthe .......•bin
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of this state
then in the office of the ........• in the county where the goods are kept, and in
addition when the collateral is crops growing or to be grown in the office ofthe
•• , • • • • •d in the county where the land is located;
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9·103, or when the
fmancing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collateral is
goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on
the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [SecretaI'}' of State"],
Third Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to flIe in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of
farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office ofthi: " in
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of this state
then in the office of the ,g in the county where the goods are kept, and in
addition when the collateral is crops growing or to be grown in the office of the
•......." in the county where the land is located; .
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or when the
financing statement is fIled as a fixture flIing (Section 9-313) and the collateral is
goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage oil
the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office ofthe [Secretary ofStatell and in addition, if
the debtor has a place ofbusiness in only one county ofthis state, also in the office
of 1 ofsucb county, or, if the debtor has no place ofbusiness in this state,
but resides in the state, also in the office of, .... , , .. of the county in which he
resides.
Note: One ofthe three alternatives should be selected as subsection (1),
22-33 SECURITY INTERESTS \I 22.03[S)

PRE-1972 VERSION OF vee

Section 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Collateral
First Alternative Subsection (1)
(I) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the coUateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches
are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
concerned would be filed or recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State').

Second Alternative Subsection (l)

(I) The proper place to me in order to perfect a security interest is as fo1,1ows:
(a) When the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, or accounts, contract rights or general intangibles arising from or relat-
ing to the sale offarm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office
of the m in the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor i$ not a
resident of this state then in the office of the ..•..... " in the county where the
goods are kept, and in addition when the collateral is crops in the office of the
•....•.. • in the county where the land on which the crops are growing or to be
grown i$ located;
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches
are or are to become fIXtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
concerned would be f1led or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of StatePl

Third Alternative Subsection (1)

(I) The proper place to me in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in fuining operations, or farm
producta, or accounts, contract rights or general intangibles arising from or relat-
ing to the sale of farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office
of the .•.•.... • in the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is DOt a
resident of this state then in the office of the ' in the county where the
goods are kept, and io addition when the collateral is crops in the office of the
••.••.•. • in the county where the land on which the crops are growing or to be
grown is located;
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest attaches
are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
concerned would be med or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office oftbe (Secretary ofState'] and in addition, if
the debtor has a place ofbusiness in only one county ofthis state, also in the office
of .•.•.••. • ofsuch county, or, if the debtor has no place ofbusiness in this state,
but resides in the state, also in the office of of the county in which he
resides. .
Note: One ofthe three alternatives should be selected as subsection (1).
, 22.03(5) SECURITY TRANSACflONS 22-34

TABLE 22-2 State Filll1l Systems for Article 9 Security Transactions

(Vee § 9-401)"

1972 Pre-I 972

Am~ndm~nlS Am~ndm~nts
Adopted AdoPI~d
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd NOI~s on Varialion
Slal~ Alt. All. Alt. All. Air. Alt. From UCC § 'MOl

Ala. X Omits "minerals or the like". Subsec.

S refers to subsecs. (3), (4) and (SXa)
of section 9-302.
Alaska X Only slight rewording; no substan-
tive change.
Ariz. X No change; for notice of disposition
of collateral not contained in UCC,
see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-9409.
Ark. X No substantive change.
Calif. X Omits any special scheme for farm
products, etc. (subsec. (lXa»; adds
crops to subsec. (lXb). Subsec. (l)(b)
omits fixtures; adds subsec. 7 which
calls for fixtures filings to be filed in
office where real estate mortgage
would be filed.
Colo. X Modification in filing location for
subsec. (I)(b).
Conn. X No change; for requirements ofming
pursuant to subsec. (IXa), not con-
tained in UCC, see Conn. Gen. Stats.
§ 42a-9-409.
Del. X Subsec. (3), alternative subsection
adopted.
D.C. X File in all cases in Office ofRecorder
of Deeds; omits subsecs. (5) and (6).
Fla. X Various modifications; subsec. (I)
(a) omits reference to consumer
goods; defmes place of business for
filing purposes. For filing require·
ments not contained in UCC, see
Fla. Stats. § 679.4011; due to refer-
ence to place of business in (l Xa),
replaces subsec. (6r with language

"Table 22-2 was revised based on materials available to the author on July IS, 1987.
22-35 SECURITY INTERESTS 122.03(5]

1972 Prt-1972
Amtndmtn/$ Amtndmtnls
Adopltd Adopltd
lSI 2nd lrd lSI 2nd Jrd NOltS on Varialion
Slalt All. All. All. All. All. All. From UCC § 9-401

that validates statements filed only

with the Department ofState during
the period 1-)-80 until 7-1-81, but
upon expiration new financing state-
ments as required byUCC 11-106(4)
must be fl1ed as described in
11 (1)(a). At the beginning of subsecs.
(2) and (3) insert the words: "except
as provided in 9-313 (2)"; subsec. (5)
omits second sentence.
Ga. X Adds reference to crops in subsec.
(I lea); defines place of business in
subsec. (l)(b); omits subsecs. (5), (6).
Hawaii Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 490: 9-401 (I):
Proper place to flIe in order to per-
fect a security interest is with the reg-
istrar of conveyances, Bureau of
Conveyances. (2) Reserved. (3) Re-
served.
Idaho X No substantive change.
Ill. X No substantive change.
Ind. X Adds "corporations" to subsec.
(l lea). Filing for corporations in of-
fice of county recorder and secretary
of state. Adds subsections (7)-( 12),
which deal with the payment ofjudg-
ments against filing officers and rees.
For ming requirements and criteria,
not contained in UCC, see Ind. Code
§§ 26-1-9-408 through 26-1-9-412.
Iowa X Adds paraaraph to subsec. (1) for m-
ing location for consumer goods
when debtor resides in state.
Kan. X In subsec. (I lea) filing is to be made
with the registrar ofdeeds only when·
the collateral is consumer goods ef-
fective 1-1-84.
Ky. X Subsec. (lXc) has modest change of
wording. '.
Me. X Subsec. (l ) (a) adds reference to
crops. Omits sec. (6).
(continu«l)
 SECURIIT TRANSACI10NS 22-36

TABLE 22-2 (cont'd)

1972 Prt!-1972
Amtndmtnts Amtndmtnls
Adopled Adopltd
lsI 2nd lrd lSI 2nd lrd Hotts on Varialion
Slale All. Alt. Alt. All. Alt. Alt. From vee § 9-401

Md. X Subsec. (5) filing is with Maryland

State Department of Assessments
and Taxation. Subsec. (7) adds "as
used in this section 'County' includes
Baltimore City." Adds new § 9.40 l.l
dealing with modification state-
ments.
Mass. X Subsec. (IXa) changes "county" to
"town"; omit! reference to crops;
subsec. (lXc) also uses "town."
Mich. X No substantive change; adds at end
of subsec. (IXa): ", but shall not be
recorded in the real estate records of
the county."
Minn. X Subsec. (I)(a) adds reference to mo-
tor vehicles that are not covered by a
certificate of title; differentiates be-
tween resident debtor individuals
and resident debtor corporations,
partnerships, or other organizations;
subsec. (3) deals with subsequent
changes in debtor's residence; sub-
sec. (7) defmes motor vehicle and
adds the words "and vehicles that are
inventory of licensed dealers,"
Miss. X Subsec. (1)(a) requires filing with
Secretary of State as well as Chan-
cery Oerk where collateral is farm
products or crops growing or to be
grown and debtor is non-resident.
Mo. X Modifies subsec. (I)(b) to indicate
that filing is to be for record; see Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 400.9-408 for additional
requirement!.
Mont. X In SUb5CC. (l), insert "except for fi-
nancing statements filed pursuant to
30-9-409," at the beginning thereof.
Deletes references to farm equip-
ment, produCt!, and aocounts, and
"crops growing or to be grown" from
subsec. (I)(a). Omit! subsec. 5.
22-37 SECURITY INTERESTS ~ 22.03[51

1972 Pre-1972
Am~ndm~nts Am~ndm~nts
Adopl~d Adopled
lSI 2nd 3rd JSI 2nd 3rd Notes on Variation
Slat~ Alt. All. All. Alt. All. Air. From uee § 9-401

Neb. X Subsec. (I lea) adds farm products

which become inventory of a person
engaged in farming and crops grow·
ing or to be grown.
Nev. X Subsec. (l )(a) deletes reference to
farm equipment, farm products or
accounts or general intangibles aris·
ing from or relating to the sale of
farm products by a farmer.
N.H. X Subsecs. (lXa) and (I)(c) substitute
"town" for "county."
N.J. X Subsec. (I lea) adds sentence defining
"recording officer." Omits subsec. 5.
N.M. X No substantive change.
N.Y. X Omits reference to non·resident
debtor in subsec. (I lea); additional
paragraphs in subsec. (1) are defini-
tional.
N.C. X Omits crops. Farm products require
additional filing with Secretary of
State.
N.D. X Reference to crops in subsec. (lXa) is
diverted to subsec. (l)(b). which in-
cludes reference to crops; collateral
brought into state from another ju-
risdiction is subject to rules in N.D.
Cent. Code § 41-09-03 (see subsec.
(4».
Ohio X Subsec. (1) adds paragraph pertain-
ing to consumer goods.
Okla. X Subsec. (1 lea) includes livestock. For
requitements of filing not contained
in UCC, see Okla. Stats. tit. lA, § 9·
401A. Optional subsec. (3) adopted.
Ore. X For multiple state transactions, see
subsec. (4); for filing requirements
not contained in the UCC, see Ore.
Stat. §§ 79.4015 and 79.4025.
Pa. X No substantive change.
R.I. X Subsec. (1 lea) omits consumer goods.
Filing in subsec. (1 )(a) is with the reo
corder of deeds in the city or town.
(continued)
121.03(5) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-38

TABLE 22-2 (cont'd)

1972 Pr~1972
A.m~ndm~nts Am~ndm~nts
Adopted Adopl~d
1st 2nd Jrd lSI 2nd 3rd NOI~s on Variation
Slal~ Alt. All. A.lt. Alt. All. Alt. From UCC § 9-401

S.C. X Filing can be in office of register of

mesne conveyances or clerk of court
in county.
S.D. X Subsec. (l )(a) repealed. Omits sub-
sec. 6.
Tenn. X No substantive change.
Tex. X Subsec. (l )(a) deals only with con-
sumer goods. Omits subsec. (5).
Adds a subsec. (t) dealing with farm
products, equipment, accounts, and
general intangibles. Adopts alterna-
tive subsec. (3).
Utah X Subsec. (1)(a) is subdivided into two
paragraphs; (l XaXi) is substantially
the same as subsec. (l)(a) of UCC
with slight chanae in description of
filing office; subsec. (l)(aXii) sets out
separate filing location for a secured
party that is a selleror purchase mon-
ey lender.
Vt. X Subsec. (IXa) substitutes "town" for
"county"; slight word change with no
substantive change; subsec. (l)(c)
also uses "town" for "county."
Va. X Subsec. (lXa) uses "county or city"
for "county"; subsec. (l)(b) omits
"med"; subsec. (lXc) substitutes
"county or city" for "county." Addi-
tional filing with State Corporation
Commission required when crops
are grain (dermed as including com,
wheat, rye, oats, barley, milo, soy-
beans and sunflower). New subsec.
(1Xd) provides for continuation of
security interests in grain perfected
before January I, 1984.
WaSh. X No substantive change.
W. Va. X No substantive change; adopts alter-
native sulJsec. (3).
22-39 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.03(51

1972 Pre-1972
Am~ndm~nls Am~ndme"ts
AdoplN Adoplni
lsi 2nd 3rd /SI 2nd 3rd Nol~s 0" Variation
Stale Alt. All. All. All. All. All. From vee J 9-401
Wis. X No substantive change.
Wyo. X Subsec. (l lea) substantial changes;
for accounts, ming is with Secretary
of State, and County where assignor
has principal place of busine$S. Sub-
sec. (l)(b) refers only to goods which
are to become fIxtures-file where
real estate mortgage is filed. Subsec.
(l Xc) filing is with clerk of county
where debtor has principal place of
business, otherwise debtor's resi-
dence, or Secretary of State for non-
residents. Uses flISt sentence ofalter-
native subsec. (3) without four-
month limitation.
, 22.03[5] SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 22-40

TABLE 22-3 State Filing Locations for Article 9 Security Transactions

(VCC § 9-481)*

A. JURISDICTIONS ADOPTING 1972 AMENDMENI'S

FIRST ALTERNATIVFJ WUhbagtOD
SUBSEC. (l){b) Bracketed material:" Department of
Licensing
Conaecticut Variation: No change.
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Variation: No change.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE!
Delaware SUBSEC. (l)(a)
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Variation: No change. Alabama
lst,b 2nd,· and 3rd d blanks: Judge of
District of Columbia Probate
Brawted material:" Recorder of Deeds Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Alaska
Georaia 1st,b 2nd: and 3rd d blanks: Office of
Recorder
Bracketed material:" Office of Clerk of
Superior Court Variation: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Arizona
Idaho 1st,b 2nd," and 3rd d blanks: County
Recorder
Bracketed materia!:" Secretary of State
Variation: No chanle.
Variation: No change.
CaIlfornia
Iowa
lst b and 2nd" blanks: County Recorder
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Variation: See Variation Note. Table 8.
Colorado
MaIne
1st, b 2nd: and 3rd d blanks: Office of
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State the County Clerk and Recorder
Variation: No change. Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Oretl°D Florida
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State 1st, b 2nd,· and 3rd d blanks: Office of
Variation: No change. the Clerk of the Circuit Court
Variation: See Variation Note,Table 8.
Utah
Bracketed material:" Division of lUiDols
Corporations and Commercial Code 1st,b 2nd," and 3rd d blanks: Recorder
Variation: No change. Variation: No change.
"Table 22-3 was revised based on malerials available to the author on July IS, 1987.
22-41 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.03(5)

Indiana North Dakota

1st,· 2nd," and lrd" blanks: County 1st· and 2nd" blanks: Register of Deeds
Recorder Varia/ion: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Oklahoma
Kansas ls/," 2nd: and lrd" blanks: County
1st,· 2nd! and lrd" blanks: Register of Clerk
Deeds Variation: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Rhode Island
Michigan 1st," 2nd: and lrd" blanks: Recorder of
Deeds
1st,· 2nd," and lrd" blanks: Register of
Deeds Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. South Dakota
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Minnesota
lst b and lrd" blanks: Office of the Tennessee
County Reoorder 1st," 2nd: and lrd" blanks: Office of
2nd" blank: Secretary of State the Register
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Variation: No cbange.
Texas
Montana
1st," 2nd: and lrd" blanks: County
1st,· 2nd! and lrd" blanks: County Clerk
Clerk and Recorder
Varia/ion: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Wisconsin
Nebraska 1st," 2nd: and lrd" blanks: Register of
1st,· 2nd! and lrd" blanks: County Deeds
Clerk Variation: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
Nevada SECOND ALTERNATIVEI
1st,· 2nd," and lrd" blanks: County SUBSEC. (tXc)
Recorder Alabama
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
New Jeney Variation: No change.
.1st,· 2nd! and lrd" blanks: Reoording Alaska
Officer Bracketed material:" Department of
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Natural Resources
Variation: No change.
New Mexico
1st,· 2nd: and lrd" blanks: Office of Arizona
the County Clerk Bracketed material:· Secretary of State
Variation: No change. I Varia/ion: No change.
U22.03(5J SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-42

California New Jersey

Bracketed material:" Secretary of State Bracketed malerial:" Secretary of State
Variation: No change. Variation: No change.
Colorado New Mexico
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State Bracketed material:· Secretary of State
Variation: No change. Variation: No change.

Florida North Dakota

Bracketed material:· Department of Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
State Variation: No change.
Variation: No change. Oklahoma
Illinois Bracketed material:· County Clerk of
Oklahoma County
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State
Variation: No change.
Variation: No change.
Rhode Island
Indiana
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State Variation: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
South Dakota
Kansas Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State Variation: No change.
Variation: No change.
Tennessee
Michigan Bracketed material:· Secretary of State
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State Variation: No change.
Variation: No change.
Texas
Minnesota Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State Variation: No change.
Variation: No change. Wisconsin
Montana Bracketed material:" Secretary of State
Bracketed materiat.· Secretary of State Variation: No change.
Variation: No change.
Nebraska THIRD ALTERNATIVEJ
Bracketed materiat." Secretary of State SUBSEC.l1)(a)
Variation: No change. Arkansas
1st,' 2nd,' and 3rd" blanks: Clerk of the
NeYada Circuit Court and Ex-officio
Bracketed material:· Secretary of State Recorder
Variation: No change. Variation: No change.
22-43 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.03(5)

Maryland West Virginia

1st,' 2nd,' and lrd' blanks: Office of 1st,' 2nd.' and lrd h blanks: County
the Clerk of the Circuit Court aerie
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Variation: No change.
Musachuletta
1st,' 2nd,' and lrd' blanks: Office of Wyoming
the Clerk oCthe Town 1st,' 2nd,· and lrd h blanks: Secretary of
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. State and County Clerk
Variation: See Variation Note. Table 8.
Mississippi
1st.' 2nd,' and lrd"blanks: Chancery
Clerk
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. THIRD ALTERNATIVE!
SUBSEC. (1)(e)
New Hampshire
1st.' 2nd.' and lrd h blanks: Office of
tne Clerk of the Town Arkansu
Variation: No change. Bracketed material:' Secretary of State
Is~ and 2nd' blanks: Oerk of the
New York Circuit Court and Ex-Officio
1st' and lrd h blanks: Office of the Recorder
Filing Officer
Yariation: No change.
Variation: See Variation Note. Table 8.

North Carolina Maryland

1st.' 2nd,' and lrd h blanks: Register of Bracketed material:' State Department
Deeds of Assessments and Taxation
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. ls~ and 2nd' blanks: Office of the
Oerk of the Circuit Court
Ohio
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
1st,' 2nd.' and lrd h blanks: County
Recorder
Variation: No chanae. Massachusetts
Bracketed material: l State Secretary
Pennsylvllllia
1s~ and 2nd' blanks: Office of the
1st,' 2nd,' and lrd h blanks: Office of Oerk of the Town
Prothonotary
Variation: See Variation Note. Table 8.
Variation: No change.

Vir&lnla Mississippi
1st' 2nd,' and 3rd h blanks: Office of Bracketed material~ Secretary of State
{he Oerk oCthe court in which deeds
are admitted to record 1s~ and 2nd' blanks: Chancery CIerk
Variation: See Variation Note. Table 8. Variation: No change.
'1122.03[51 SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 22-44

New Hampshire Pennsylvania

Bracketed material:' Secretary of State Bracketed material: Secretary of the
Commoowealth
1stl and 2nd" blanks: Office of the
Oerk of the Town 1st' and 2nd" blanks: Office of
Prothonotary
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Variation: No change.

New York ViJ'Kinia .

Bracketed material:' Department of Bracketed material:' State Corporation
State Commission
1st' blank: Office ofthe Filing Officer 1st' and 2nd" blanks: Office of the
Oerk of the court in which deeds are
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. admitted to record
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.
North Caronna
Bracketed material:' Secretary of State Wett ViJ'Kinia
1stl and 2nd" blanks: Register of Deeds Bracketed material:' Secretary of State
Variation: No change. 1st' and 2nd" blanks: County Oerk
Variation: No change.
Ohio
Wyoming
Bracketed material:' Secretary of State Bracketed material:' Secretary of State
1st' and 2nd" blanks: County Recorder Ist l and 2nd" blankr. County Oerk
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.

B. JURISDICTIONS NOT ADOPTING 1972 AMENDMENTS

SECOND ALTERNATIVE! THIRD ALTERNATIVE!

SUBSEC. (l)(a) SUBSEC. (l)(a)

South Caronna Kentucky

1st," 2nd" and 3rd o blanks: Register of 1st, q 2nd,' and 3rd O blanks: Office of
Mesne Conveyances, or Oerk of the County Qerk
Court
Variation: No change. Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.

SECOND ALTERNATIVEI
SUBSEC. (l)(c)
Missouri
South Caronna ]st,q 2nd,' and lrd" blallkr. Recorder of
Bracketed material:" Secretary of State I)(:eds
Variation: No change. Variation: No change.
22·45 SECURITY INTERESTS f 22.04(1)(8]

Venuont Missouri
1st,' 2nd,' and 3rd o blanks: Town Clerk Bracketed material:' Secretary of State
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. 1st,' and 2nd' blanks: Recorder of
Deeds
THIRD ALTERNATIVEI Variation: No change.
SUBSEC. (1)(c)
Vermont
Kentucky
Bracketed material:' Secretary of State
1st,' and 2nd' blanks: Office of the
County Oerk 1st" and 2nd' blanks: Town Clerk
Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8. Variation: See Variation Note, Table 8.

1122.04 SECURITY INTERESTS WHEN THE SECURED PARTY

HAS POSSESSION OF THE COLLATERAL
11) The Pledge
The pledge is a security arrangement with ancient roots. UDder this arrange-
ment, the debtor delivers property to the secured party to be held as collateral
security for the obligation owed. The property pledged can be ofmany different
types. Common examples are stocks and bonds that are in certificate form,
chattel paper, and goods. Whatever property is used as the collateral. the com-
mon thread to this transaction is that the secured party takes possession of the
property and holds it until the obligation is discharged. The rights of the secured
party and the debtor in this arrangement are determined by their agreement and
by the uce.
la] Creadng a Securlty Interest by Pled,lng Collateral Under the UCC, a
pledge is one permissible method of creating a security interest.'" Moreover,
when the secured party has possession of the collateral, the formal rules for
creating an enforceable security interest are relaxed. It is not necessary to have a
written security agreement signed by the debtor.':lI To have a valid pledge,
however, the secured party must have obtained possession of the collateral by
agreement with the debtor-involuntary seizure by the secured party is not
recognized as a pledge.'· Agreement, of course, is desirable for evidentiary
purposes and to reduce subsequent disputes between the secured party and the
debtor over the terms of their transaction.

'''uee §§ 1-201(37),9-102(2).
13luec § 9-203(1)(a).
'.Id. The 1972 amendments clarified the uec in this respecl. Accord Bank of
Wallowa County v. Gary Mac. Inc., 49 Or. App. 403. 408, 619 P2d 1310, 13lS (1980).
122.04[l](b) SECURIIT TRANSACI'IONS 22-46

The uce does not define "possession" of the collateral. m Under cases
prior to the uee, problems arose when the secured party was lax in exercising
dominion over the collateral, as in cases in which the debtor was allowed to
continue to use and dispose ofthe collateral. The liee does not change any of
the prior common-law rules, which limited the extent to which the debtor could
have access to and control of the collateral without jeopardizing the secured
party's possession. (Of course, when the collateral is property in which a security
interest may be perfected by filing, the secured party may do so, and the debtor's
control over the collateral will then have no effect on the validity or perfection of
the security interest.)

[hI Perfecting the Security Interest in Pledged Collateral. Possession ofthe

collateral is not just a means for creating a security interest that substitutes for a'
formal written security agreement; it is also a permissible method ofperfeeting a
security interest in that collateral. When the security interest is perfected in this
manner, it is not necessary to me a fmancing statement.'· It is important to
note, however, that there are some types ofcollateral in which it is not possible to
perfect a security interest by possession. The kinds ofcollateral in which security
interests may be perfected by possession include goods, checks. negotiable notes,
instruments, money, negotiable bills of lading, negotiable warehouse receipts,
and chattel paper. 131 A security interest in a letter ofcredit can only be obtained
by taking possession of the writing.'co Security interests in securities (stocks and
bonds, etc.) are subject to special rules discussed later in this chapter.
The secured party may take possession ofthe collateral through an agent.'"
One form of agency is a bailment. When the collateral is held by a bailee,
notification to the bailee of the secured party's interest in the collateral is
sufficient to perfect a security interest in that collateral, as long as the property
held by the bailee is not subject to a negotiable document of title (such as a

'31 ucc § 9·205 comment 6. Where a warehouseman obtained possession of crops

but the possession was for the purpose of storing the crops and selling them at the
direction of the debtor, the warehouseman did not have sufficient possession to perfect a
security interest. The court said that the quality ofpossession needed to perfect a security
interest must be possession that demonstrates an ownership interest and indicates the
person in possession has a perfected security interest. It is a substitute for a ming and must
satisfY the requirement that notice be given to other creditors. Because the debtor retained
the authority to determine what crops to sell, at what price to sell the crops and to whom
the crops should be sold, the warehouseman did not have apparent control of the collat-
eral, and there was sufficient notice to other creditors. Harton v. Rogers, 39 UCC Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1878, 1880 (WD Ky. 1984).
, 31 UCC § 9·302(lXa).
3I
' UCC § 9-305.
'co UCC §§ 5.116, 9·305.
'41 UCC § 9-305, comment 2.
22-47 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.041 1Jlb]

negotiable bill oflading or a warehouse receiPt).'" When the property is covered

by a negotiable document oftitle, the only way to penect a security interest in the
goods is to perfect a security interest in the document oftitle. 103 In some cases, a
security interest in a negotiable document of title may be penected by ming;
however, it is safer to take possession of the documents. .
In one case, a security interest in an instrument was not perfected because
the penon holding the writing could not qualify as a bailee. 1" The person with
possession of the instrument was an interested stake holder who had a perfected
security interest in the obligation in its own right. In explaining why an inter-
ested party could not be a bailee for purposes ofperfecting the security interests
claimed by another, the coun said:
The reasoning for this distinction is clear although not expressly stated in
the cases which address the point. By requiring the bailee to have no intere&t
in the instrument in its possession, the danger ofthe bailee trying to pass the
instrument off as his own is averted. The commercial world can rely upon
an independent agent to represent accurately that the liens on the instru-
ment do, in fact, exist. To require an interested party to inform the world of
all other Lien claimants, without an express agreement, would be a duty
which the case law does not impose for the reason that the interested lien
holder, who is also a bailee, would communicate conflicting signals to the
commercial world, for he would exercise unilateral control over the instru-
ment while supposedly holding it for the benefit of another secured party.
These are inconsistent positions that would cause chaos in commercial
transactions. '41

The coun found it significant that there was no agreement under which the
secured party was holding tile note for the other secured parties.
Placement ofthe collateral in the possession of an escrow agent, who serves
as agent both for the secured party and the debtor, should be an effective means
ofperfecting a security interest in the collateral. The arrangement gives notice of

142UCC § 9-305. For an explanation of how documents of title work, see' 14.05111.
The coun held that equipment was in the possession ofa bailee and, therefore, a security
interest had been perfected by possession in Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 671 F2d
842, 845 (4th Cir. 1982). Although there was no actual contract creatin. a bailment, the
court reco8llized a constructive bailment. The case is potontiaUy far-reaching because it,
in effect, treats an agent of the debtor, who was using and paying for the equipment
pursuant to a contract with the debtor, as the bailee. 671 F2d at 845. Compare In re
Phillips, 24 Bank!'. 7 I2, 7I4 (Bank!'. ED Cal. 1982), where the court held that the
possession ofproperty by a state-appointed receiver pursuant to the secured party'S action
in a state court does not constitute possession by the secured party for pu1"pOSC1 of
perfection oftile security interest, because the receiver acts as an agent ofthe court and not
as an agent of the secured party.
103 UCC §§ 9-304, 9-305.
,4<1 In re Coral Petroleum, Inc.• 50 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. SD Tel<. 1985).
,., Id. at 839-840.
, 22.04(1)(b) SECURITY TRANSAC£IONS 22-48

the secured party's interest. At least one court, however, held that such an
arrangement is not effective.'"
Further, there are certain kinds ofcollateral in which a security interest may
not be perfected by possession. If the collateral falls within the UCC classifica·
tion as an account or a general intangible, a secured party may perfect a security
interest only by filing a financing statement.,·r It makes no difference whether
the agreement was called a pledge or whether one party took possession of a
writing that purported to be something other than an intangible.
Once a security interest is perfected by possession, that perfection continues
only for as long as the secured party retains possession of the collateral, or, in
cases where other methods of perfection are possible, the secured party perfects
the security interest in some other way. While there are certain narrow circum-
stances where there may be a temporary period of perfection in the absence,
either of filing or of possession,'" these exceptions operate only in special
circumstances. A security interest that is perfected by possession ofthe collateral
becomes perfected ilt the time. that possession is taken. It does not relate back to.
an earlier time. lOt When the collateral is such that a security interest may be

... Stein v. Rand Consll. Co., 400 F. Supp. 944, 948 (SONY 1975). See also In re
Dolly Madison, 351 F. Supp.1038(EOPa. 1972),atl'd, 480F2d917(3d Cir. 1973); Note,
"Attachment Under Section 9·204 and Perfection Under Section 9-305 of the Uniform
Commercial Code of Pennsylvania: Explicit LanJUage Delaying Attachment and Escrow
cr.
as Satisfaction ofPossession," 5 Rut.-Cam. U 336 (1974). But In re Hinds Estate, 10
Cal. App. 3d 1021, 89 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1970); I Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property § 7.2 (1965).
An escrow account was established between a buyer and seller of farm land. Under
the contract, the buyer made payments to satisfy a note held by the escrow agent. The
seller subsequently assigned to the bank his interest in the proceeds due from the sale of
the fann land. Bank notified the escrow agent of the assignment but did not give any
notification to the buyer ofthe land. The court held that UCC § 9·318(3) applied to the
assignment and that because the bank had failed to instruct the buyer to make payments
directly to the bank, the buyer was authorized to make payments directly to the seller and
could, if the seUer agreed, terminate the escrow arrangement. First Fidelity Bank v.
Matthews, 692 P2d 1255, 1260 (Mont. 1984).
A person who was entitled to the debtor's funds that had been placed in an escrow
account under an aareement between the party and the debtor was entitled to the funds
against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee argued that the pany had an
unperfected security interest only. The court held that the party had a perfected security
interest because the party had given notice to the escrow agent ofthe interest asserted. The
court reasoned that the collateral involved was money that the escrow agent was holding
as a bailee under uee § 9·305. (The court rejected an argument that the collateral should
be classified as a general intangible.) Notice to the bailee constituted an appropriate
method for perfecting the security interest. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 46 Banlci.
661 (Banke. SONY 1985).
107 uee §§ 9-302(1), 9·305 & comment 1. For a discussion ofperfeclion by filing, see
tt 22.03 and 22.05.
,.. ucc § 9-304(5).
,•• UCC § 9·305 & comment 3.
22-49 SECURITY INTERESTS 'i111·04111

perfected by filing as well as by possession, there is nothing to prevent the

secured party from perfecting a security interest in both ways. Doing so may
have some advantage for the secured party, in case possession is ever relin-
quished. Moreover, doing so will give the secured party tbe benefit ofthe general
priority rule that dales the priority of the security interest under Section 9-
312(5)(a) from the time the fIling is first made or the security interest is first
perfected, whichever is first, as long as there is no gap in the period where there is
neither filing nor perfection. '$0

(2J Field Warehouse Systems

One variant of the pledge is the field warehouse arrangement. This form of
security, which arose prior to the UCC, was often used to obtain a security
interest in goods in the process of manufacture. Under this scheme, unfinished
goods in the process of manufacture, as well as finished goods not yet sold, were
put in the possession ofa separate bailee or trustee. Normally, the place at which
the goods were held was tbe factory where they were being processed or the
company's usual warehouse for storing the goods before sale. The theory of the
field warehouse arrangement was that the trustee took possession of the collat-
eral on behalf of the secured party-the debtor had access to the goods only
under the control of the secured party according to the specific terms of the
security agreement. For the field warehouse to be a valid security arrangement,
the transaction had to create a valid bailment or entrustment. This required that
possession of the collateral be in tbe trustee or bailee rather than the debtor. The
existence of possession by the bailee often could be attacked when the secured
party was lax in enforcing control over the goods, thereby allowing the debtor
free access to the collateral and rights to use and dispose of it. 111
Under the uee, the field warehouse system still may be an appropriate
method ofobtaining a security interest in collateral. As discussed in the previous
section, the pledge, in which the secured party takes possession ofthe collateral,
is a method recognized under the uec for obtaining and perfecting a security
interest. Possession may be by a bailee or an agent, as well as by the secured party
personally.1St The uee does not define what constitutes "possession," either by
the secured party or by an agent. The comments to the uec indicate that the
prior law on what constitutes possession continues to be relevant. 1A In most
cases, it will be to the advantage ofthe secured party to perfect a security interest
by flling a financing statement, rather than to rely on the uncertainties of
establishing a possession that satisfies the common raw rules. When the security
interest is perfected by filing, it makes no difference whether the debtor has
access to or use of the collateral.1Iot Of course, allowing the debtor access to the

1$OUCC § 9-312(S)(a). The priority rules are discuued in , 23.01.

151 See UCC § 9-20S. comment 6.
1UUCC § 9-30S & comment 2.
1hUCC § 9-20S. comment 6.
154UCC § 9-20S.
1122.04(31 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-50

collateral may create a risk that the debtor might transfer the collateral to a good-
faith purchaser, who would obtain rights in the collateral superior to those ofthe
secured party.

[3J Duties of a Pledgee

When collateral is in the possession ofa secured party, the secured party has
a duty to use reasonable care in its custody. 'II .When there is a failure of
reasonable care, the secured party is liable to the debtor for any loss caused
thereby. 'II Failure to exercise reasonable care does not result in a loss of the
security interest in the collateral.'17
When the collateral is an instrument or chattel paper, reasonable care
includes taking steps necessary to preserve rights against prior parties. III A
secured party may have to collect periodic interest,take steps to collect instru-
ments, preserve rights against parties secondarily liable on the instrument, and
take other steps to maintain the value ofthe collateral. lII
The parties may enter into an agreement as to the terms under which the
secured party will hold the collateral. In the absence of such an agreement, the
secured party is entitled to recover reasonable expenses incurred in caring for the
collateral.'" The expenses incurred by the secured party are secured by the
collateral.'" If the collateral is accidentally lost or damaged without fault of the
secured party, the risk oftoss is on the debtor, to the extent that it is not covered
by insurance. Thus the debtor has the responsibility ofinsuring the collateral. 'II
When the collateral produces further profits or increases in value, this additional
value may be held by the securedparty as additional security, '&2 but, ifthe profits
are money, the money must either be applied to reduce the obligation owed, or
be remitted to the debtor. '14
The secured party has a duty to keep the collateral in an identifiable form,
unless it is of a fungible nature. 'II The secured party is permitted to rcpledge the
collateral, but the terms of any repledge may not impair the debtor's right to
redeem the collateral when the debtor fulfills the obligations owed the secured
party. 'II

lIIUCC § 9-207(1).
'II UCC § 9-207(3).
tl71d.
'IIUCC § 9-207(1).
"'See generally B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under The Uniform
Commercial Code 1/7.14 (1980).
'IOUCC § 9-207(2Xa).
"'Id.
'&2UCC § 9-207(2)(b).
'AUCC § 9·207(2Xc).
14
' ld.
lIIUCC § 9-207(2Xd).
111 UCC § 9-207(2)(e).
22-51 SEC1JRrrYINrrERESTS , 22.05

11 22.05 AUTOMATIC PERFECfION AND PERFECTION OF

SECURITY INTERESTS IN COLLATERAL GOVERNED
BY SYSTEMS OTHER THAN THE UCC
As discussed previously, filing a financing statement is one method of
perfecting a security interest in certain kinds of collateral. Security interests in
collateral classified as accounts or general intangibles may be perfected only by
filing. ,., When the collateral is goods, chattel paper, or negotiable documents, a
secured party may perfect a security interest 'either by filing a financing state-
ment," or by taking possession ofthe collateral.,.. In some cases, taking posses-
sion is the preferred method, to reduce the risk that third-party transferees or
otherclaimants may obtain superior rights to those ofthe secured party.'1'0 When
the collateral is money or instruments (notes, drafts, checks, etc.), it is generally
not possible to perfect a security interest by filing. Except for several narrow
exceptions, the method of perfecting a security interest in, such coIlateral is by
taking possession of it, because it is so negotiable. m Filing also may be impor-
tant to assure the secured party of a perfected security interest in proceeds
arising from the collateral. 172
However. there are certain other transactions for which the uee defers to
otber ming or registration systems and makes these alternative systems the
equivalent ofming a financing statement under the uee. 11I In some states, for
example, motor vehicles are covered by a certificate oftitle. To obtain a Security
interest in a vehicle covered by such a certificate of title, the state law often
requires that the secured party note the security interest on the certificate. When
this is required, compliance with the certificate of title reaulations is, under the
uee, the equivalent of ming a financing statement. 174 Similar results are
obtained for collateral that would be covered by registration systems established
under federal law or treaties of the United States. 1II
Additionally, in a few limited situations, a secured party's security interest
will be automatically perfected, without either fl.ling a fmancing statement or
taking possession of the collateral. These situations occur as follows:

,., vee §§ 9·302, 9-305.

111 uee § 9-302.

111 See vee § 9-305.

'10 See Chapter 23.
m uee § 9.304(1). The exceptions concern situations where then: is temporary
perfection, vee § 9·304. and when: the proceeds rules operate, uee § 9·306. See
" 22.07[3]. 23.03[1], 23.02[3] for a discussion of security interests in instruments and
proceeds.
112 vee § 9-306. See' 23.03[3] on proceeds.
mvee § 9-302(4).
". vee § 9-302(3)(b).
mvee § 9·302(3)(a).
, 22.06 SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 22-52

1. A security interest is temporarily perfected in certain transactions

involved instruments. documents, and proceeds.17t
2. A security interest involves the assignment of a trust or a decedent's
estate.in (In jurisdictions where ,trusts are used as commercial financing
devices, this rule may present problems.)l71
3. The security interest is a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods (other than motor vehicles, which are subject to registration
requirements and fIxtures).171
4. An assignment ofaccounts is made, which, by itselfor with other assign-
ments to the same assignee, does not transfer "a signifIcant part of the
outstanding accounts ofthe assignor ,"'10 This has the effect ofpermitting
isolated assignments, for which no fInancing statement is filed, to be
made without the risk that they might be viewed as unperfected security
interests, which would be unenforceable against lien creditors and good-
faith purchasers.
5. The security interest of a collecting bank in checks and other items that
are in the process of collection and certain security interests that arise
under other Articles ofthe DeC.'" For these other provisions, there may
be requirements or procedures that must be met in such cases.
6. An assignment is made for the benefit of all creditors ofthe transferor.'ft

1) 22.06 SECURITY INTERESTS IN GOODS AND CHAITELS

Security interests in goods may be perfected either by filing or by taking
possession ofthe collateral.'N In the case ofa purchase money security interest in
certain kinds of consumer goods, perfection occurs automatically, without
I'"
either filing or possession. Even when the collateral is consumer goods, filing

l11UCC § 9-302(1)(b).
mUCC§ 9-302(l)(e).
111 In Arizona, there is a nonuniform variation that requir'cs the filing of a fmaneing
statement to perfect a security inteTCSt in a subdivision trust, which is a special financing
device used in some real estate transactions. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-
9302(A)(3) (1988) with UCC § 9-302(1 Xc). The Arizona statute accomplishes this by
deleting the exception for a beneficial interest in a trust.
17·UCC § 9-302(I)(d).
"oVCC § 9-302(1)(e).
'" vce § 9-302(1 )(t).
,,·vcc § 9-302(1)(g).
"' VCC §§ 9-302, 9-305,
'''vee § 9-302(l)(d). For an explanation of purchase money security interests. sec
supra 11 22.02.
22·53 SECURITY INTERESTS 11 22.06111

is necessary if the collateral is a motor vehicle subject to a state law registration

requirement. Filing also is necessary when the colJateral is a fixture and is
governed by the special rules on security interests in fixtures. 'M
V oder the vee, goods are defined as all things that are movable. '" Goods
do not include money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general
intangibles, minerals, or the like. Goods do include standing timber that is to be
cut, growing crops, and animals both born and yet to be born. tar
Under the VCC, goods are classified in the following four categories: con.
sumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory.'" Additionally, there
are special rules for fIXtures and for goods subject to separate registration
schemes, such as motor vehicles. The rules for perfection of security interests
and determining priorities vary depending on the classification of the goods.
Classification depends on tile bolder's particular use of the goods and each
clasSification is exclusive of the otbers. Thus, an automobile would be inventory
in the hands oflhe car dealer, equipment in the hands ofa business that bought
the car for use by its sales force, and consumer goods in the hands of someone
who purchased the car for personal travel.

Il} Consumer Goods

Consumer goods are those that are "used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes. "". In most cases, goods that fall into
this category are easy to classify, but borderline situations do arise. The drafters
of the vee indicate that "in borderline cases-a physician's car or a filrmer's
jeep which might be either consumer goods or equipment-the principal use to
which the property is put should be considered as determinative. "'10
When a purchase money security interest is obtained in conlumer goods, it
is neither necessary to file a financing statement nor to take possession of the
goods to perfect a security interest in the goods. Only when the consumer goods
consist of a motor vehicle or a fIXture to be attached to the real estate is filing
possibly required,'" Thus, any.person dealing with property owned by a con-
sumer should be certain to investigate whether that property is subject to an
outstanding security interest, even though there is no financing statement on
me. Although the purchase money security interest in consumer goods will be
perfected without filing, there may be situations involYing large value consumer

"'Id.
'''uec § 9-10S(1}(h).
"ltd.
'"uee § 9-109. See ~~ 22.06[1l-22.06[4}.
'''uec § 9·109(1).
'''uee § 9·109, comment 2.
'"'uec § 9-302{l)(d).
11 22.0612) SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 22-54

items, where the secured party may want to fIle anyway. The filing ofa financing
statement gives the secured party greater protection against persons who might
be regarded as good faith purchasers of the collateral from the debtor. When a
fmancing statement is on fIle, these purchasers may not take free of the secured
party's interest in the goods.'ft
When the collateral is consumer goods, the secured party is limited in the
extent to which he or she may claim after-acquired property as additional
security for the obligation. An after-acquired property clause is effective against
a consumer only when the consumer-debtor acquires rights in this property
within ten days after the secured party has extended value to the consumer.'13
Consumer transactions are subject to many further consumer protection laws,
both federal and state. Chapter 26 discusses some of the special credit regula-
tions applicable in consumer transactions.

[2] Equipment
Goods are classified as equipment if they are "used or bought for use
primarily in business." Business includes farming or one of the professions.
When the debtor is a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency, the
goods are also classified as "equipment.'N When goods do not fall within the
defmitions of the other three classifications (inventory, farm products, or con-
sumer goods) they are to be treated as equipment.'" Security interests in equip-
ment may be perfected either by the secured party taking possession of the
collateral or by filing a financial statemeni:'"

[3] Farm Products

Farm products include crops, livestock, supplies used in farming opera-
tions, and products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured state. The
goods must be in possession of a debtor who is engaged in some form of

, t2 UCC§ 9-307(2).
lf3UCC § 9-204(2).
lNUCC § 9-109(2).
lMid.

1M UCC §§ 9-302, 9-305. Before the 1972 amendments to Article 9, it was unnecessary
to me a fmancing statement to perfect a purchase money security interest in farm
equipment with a purchase price not in excess 0($2,500. See UCC § 9-302( 1Xc}. This
provision was eliminated by the 1972 amendments, and a financing sta'tcment must be
filed to perfect all security interests in farm equipment. Sec also UCC § 9-307(2}, which in
its pre-1972 version treated a good faith purchaser of farm equipment similarly to the
good faith purchaser of consumer goods.
22-55 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.06(31

farming. 1I7 Farm products may not be equipment or inventory. 1M In some cases,
farm products may be difficult to distinguish from equipment. (Equipment
includes goods used in the business of farming.) In such cases, the only safe
course is to follow the'rules for both kinds of collateral.
Since farm products are goods, the secured party may perfect a security
interest by taking possession or by filing. III In some cases, as for example when
the collateral consists ofcrops growing or to be grown, or timber to be cut, forthe
secured party to have an enforceable security interest the security agreement
must contain a description ofthe land involved.- Also, the financing statement
may have to contain a description of the real estate, as is required wben the
collateral consists of crops growing or to be grown, or timber to be cut. 201
Depending on the jurisdiction, when the collateral is growins crops, the financ-
ing statement may have to be filed with the county office where the land is
located. Filings as to standing timber, minerals, and some fixtures must be in the
offIce for recording real estate mortgages.2G2

111 uec § 9.109(3). In Vnited Statesv. Newcomb, 682 F2d 758 (8th Cir. 1982), the
court rejected the argument of a creditor who held an interest in the debtor's real estate
that real estate law, rather than Article 9 ofthe vec, should govern security interests in
crops that are still growing. The court read VCC §§ 9·104{j), 9.10S(hl, 9·109(3), 2.107, as
classifying arowing crops as "personal property, not real estate," and therefore Article 9
applies to govern security interests in such collateral. 682 Fld at 761. The competing
creditor could not rely upon pre·Vee law holding that arowing crops unsevered from the
land are subject to the lien ofa deed oftrust on the land.
Grains in a cooperative warehouse, although still owned by the farmer, but held by a
warehouse as bailee, are inventory. The court reasoned that they were not farm products
because the farmer did not have possession, but the PCA obtained a security interest that
was properly perfected by filing when the grain was a farm product in the possession ofthe
farmer. The security interest continued to be perfected notwithstanding the change in its
classification. In re Walkington, 62 Banke. 989, 994-997 (WD Mich. 1986).
mUCC § 9-109(3). An $800,000 registered quarter hone stallion, that the debtor
acquired primarily for the purpose of selling syndicated shares of ownership but subse-
quently used for the purpose of providing breeding services, was not collateral that was·
intended to be used in farming operations. Therefore, it did not constitute either a farm
product or equipment used in farming operations. (The an.wer might be different if the
debtor who owned the stallion intended to breed mares and raise the offspring himself.)
Thus, tile stallion must be classified as either equipment or inventory used in a b\lSiness
enterprise. In re Butcher, 43 Banke. 513, 521-522 (Banke. ED Tenn. 1984).
II' uce §§ 9-302. 9-305. A California registration law relating to feedlot operators
does not override Ar1;icle 9 of the vec. Article 9 gives a secured party who has financed
the cattle business of the owner of the collateral a perfected security interest in cattle
subsequently transported to the feedlot. In re Black & White Cattle Co., 46 Bam. 484,
489 (Banke. 9th Cir. 1984).
-VCC § 9·203(1Xa). See generally Annot., "Sufficiency of Description of Crops
Under U.C.C. § 9·203(I)(b) and 9-402(1)," 67 ALR3d 308 (1975)..
2D1 UCC §§ 9-402(1), 9-402(5).
202 uec § 9-401.
If 22.06141 SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 22-56

Persons who pun:hase farm products from a person engaged in farming

operations must exercise caution. Although purchasers in the ordinary course of
business generally take free ofany security interest created by their seller, buyers
from farmers are not so protected. The secured party's interest in the farm
products is effective even against a buyer in the ordinary course ofbusi?ess.-
However, if the secured party authorizes the sale, expressly or othel'wlSe, the
buyer will take free of the security interest.204 Protection of such purchasers is
now a matter for which federal law may override the UCC. As discussed later in
Chapter 23, the Food Security Act of 1985 contains new rules for buyers and
dealers in farm products.

(4] Inventory
Goods are inventory when they are held by a person for sale or lease or are to
be furnished under a contract of service.:lOI Inventory also includes raw materi-
als, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business. 201 Inventory is
not equipment.
A security interest in inventory may be perfected by the secured party's
taking possession ofthe collateral or fUing a imancing statement. In most cases,
however, the debtor will want to retain possession of the inventory to make it
available for sale. Thus, the only practical method available, unless some form of
field warehousing is adopted (discussed earlier in tbis chapter) is to perfect the
security interest by fuing. The UCC's liberal rules, which allow the security
agreement to cover after-acquired property and to extend to future advances,
enable the parties to execute a single security agreement that will create a
security interest in all of the inventory of the debtor, whenever acquired. Simi-
larly, it is necessary to flIe only one fmancing statement to perfect the security
interest in the collateral, whenever acquire<1.207

203 UCC § 9-307( I). See 11 23.02[ 1] for a definition of "buyers in ordinary course."
Buyers offarm products under the Food Security Act of 1985 are discussed at 1 23.02(2].
20.. UCC § 9-306(2).
205 UCC § 9-109(4). An interesting problem in classifYing collateral was presented in
In re Ronco, Inc., 46 Bankr. 444, 451-452 (NO Ill. 1984), appeal dismissed, 793 F2d 1295
(7th Cir. 1986). In this case, the debtor's business involved shipping goods to out-of-state
retailers for resale. The nature of the arrangements under which the debtor supplied the
goods to the retailers affected the classification of the property under the uee's perfec-
tion rules. Ifthe transaction were a "sale-or-retum." the property that served as collateral
would consist of a series of accounts with the various retailers. On the other hand, if the
transaction were viewed as a delivery on consignment, the collateral would be the goods
themselves, which would remain as the inventory of the debtor.
201 UCC § 9-109(4).
207 See supra f 22.02 on creation of security interest and 1 22.03 on fmancing state-
ments. The owner of a tractor gave the tractor to his local dealership for sale and lost his
ownership interest in the tractor to the dealer's inventory financer. The court regarded the
22-57 SECURITY INTERESTS ~ 22.0614)

Persons who engage in financing inventory must take into account that
allowing the debtor to sell the inventory to purchasers gives the debtor the power
to cut otrthe security interest of the secured party in the collateral. Any transfer
ofthe collateral that the secured party authorizes in the security agreement "or
otherwisc" will result in the transferee or buyer taking the collateral free from the
security interest. llGt Regardless of the terms in any written agreement between
the secured party and the debtor, when the secured party permits the debtor to
exercise control over the inventory (as is normally the case) and to make sales to
buyers, the secured party is likely to be regarded as having "authorized" the sale
of the collateral, and the buyers of the collateral will take free of any interest
claimed by tbe secured party.2ot In any event, the UCC protects buyers in the
ordinary course ofbusiness, regardless ofwhat the secured party authorizes. 2,0 A
person who buys in the ordinary course of business takes free of any security
interest created by the seller, even though the buyer knows that the goods were
subject to the security interest. 21' A buyer in the ordinary course of business is
someone who buys in good faith from someone who is in the business ofsellins
goods of that kind. 212
Because the financing of inventory often involves the sale of the collateral,
this form of financing usually involves security interests in the proceeds of the
collateral as well, including accounts, money, instruments, chattel paper, and
other property produced when the inventory is sold. There are special rules,
discussed in Chapter 23, that govern the security interests in proceeds.
Although the UCC recognizes that goods may be delivered on consignment
to persons who are in the business ofselling such goods, under terms that do not
qualify as creating security interests within the UCC's definition, there are rules
that the consignor must follow to preserve the consignor's interest against other
creditors of the consignee.11 ' Under UCC § 2-326, when goods on consignment
are delivered to a person who maintains a place of business where such person
"deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the
person making delivery," the consignor must take certain stePs to ensure that
notice is given of the consignor's interest in the goods. Thc UCC makes the

owner's delivery of the tractor to the dealer as a transaction that constituted a sale or
return under UCC § 2-326(3). Because the owner did not file a financiJll statement or
otherwile comply with the conditions in Section 2.326, the inten:st of the owner was
subordinate to the interest ofthe dealer's financer who held a perfected security interest in.
all ofthe dealer's inventory. Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga.
App. 368,323 SE2d 259 (1984).
101 uee ~ 9-306(2).
IOIld. See discussion at t 23.02.
2lOUCC § 9-307(1).
211Id.
212 vee § 1-20 J(9).
2"See vee §§ 1-201(37),2-326,9-114, 9-302(1)(f), 9-408.
'1122.06(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-58

goods on consignment for sale subject to the claims of the consignee's creditors,
while the goods are in the consignee's possession, unless the consignor can
demonstrate that one ofthree circumstances applies: (I) the consignor complied
with a local law providing for the consignor's interest to be evidenced by a sign
on the consignee's premises or the like; (2) the consignor establishes that the
consignee is "generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in
selling the goods ofothers ... ;" or (3) the consignor makes a filing as permitted
for secured transactions under Article 9.21 '
Because these provisions, if not followed, m8.ke the goods subject to the
claims of the consignee's creditors, persons with a security interest in the con-
signee's goods who are creditors of the consignee will have a claim to the goods
that is superior to that of the consignor. When the consignor must make an
Article 9 tiling to protect the consignor's interest in the goods against creditors,
the consignor must give notice in writing, to secured parties who are creditors of
the consignee and who would have had a perfected security interest in the goods
if the goods were the property of the consignee, in a manner similar to the
notification rules that apply to purchase money security interests in inventory.11I
Given the complexity ofthe consignment prov.isions, a prudent course would be
for a consignor to take all the steps necessary to perfect a security interest in the
goods, as ifthe transaction were one that created a security interest under Article
9. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a consignor may file a financing state-
ment without admitting that the transaction creates a security interest.I"
A consignment transaction may be a transaction that creates a security
interest.11T When it does, the rules in Article 9 with respect to creation and
perfection of security interests should apply. When perfection occurs by filing,
the consignor needs to take all the steps, including notification to prior secured
parties, that a nonnal inventory fmancer must make. 111 Additional confusion
exists because of the langullie used in uee § 1-201(37) that even when a
consignment may be "intended as security" so that the consignment creates a
security interest, "a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on
consignment sales (§ 2_326)."211 This language could be construed as requiring
that the consignor comply with both the Article 9 rules for creation and perfec-
tion of a security interest and the rules in section 2-326 for protection against
creditors generally. As uec § 2-326 permits a consignor to protect against the
claims of the consignee's creditors by complying with the filing provisions of

2,.UCC § 2-326(3).
21'UCC § 9-114. For a discussion of the inventory rules, see' 23.01.
Z1I UCC § 9-408. For a discussion ofming offmancing statements, see supra' 22.0:>.
21T See UCC §§ 1-201(37), 9-114, 9-408, all ofwhich contemplate a consignment, may
create a security interest. See 11 22.01 [2][b].
211 See UCC § 9-312(3).
211UCC § 1-201(37).
22-59 SECURITY INTERESTS 'i 22.06(5)

Article 9, perhaps the potential problems arising from the direction to comply
with both sets of provisions may be harmonized by a finding that Article 9
compliance is satisfactory for the purposes of Section 2-326, as well. tJO

IS) Fixtures
Fixtures are goods that have become so related or connected to real estate
that, under the real estate law ofthe jurisdiction, persons who have an interest in
the real estate also acquire an interest in the goods. 01 Since transactions involv-
ing fIXtures have some features that are close to real estate transactions, the uee
has special rules for fIXtures. Security interests in fixtures are created in the same
way that security interests are created in other personal property, although to
perfect a security interest in fIXtures a "fixture filing" is sometimes necessary.223
A fixture ming is one that is made in the office where real estate mortgages are
filed or reoorded. m The financing statement must meet special requirements,
such as the requirement that a description of the involved real estate be
included. 224
The uee rules governing fIXtures were extensively revised by the 1972
amendments. Prior to these amendments, the only way that a security interest in
fIXtures could be perfected was by a fixture filing. Vnder the new amendments,
there are certain categories of fIXtures in which a security interest may be
perfected by ordinary Article 9 methods. When the goods are "readily remova-
ble factory or office machines," the security interest may be perfected by an
ordinary filing. m Similarly, when the fIXtures are "readily removable replace-
ments ofdomestic appliances which are consumer goods," the security interest
may be perfected by any method, including the automatic perfection for pur-
chase money security interests in consumer goodsftl allowed by the vee for
perfecting security interests in consumer goods. To the extent that the secured
party is concerned only about conflicting interests in the fIXtures arising from

220 There Is an excellent discussion in 1. White & R. Summer, Unlfonn Commercial

Code § 22-4 (2d cd. 1980), which gives a detailed analysis of the potential problems in
reconciling uee § 2-326 and the Article 9 rules.
231 uee § 9·313(1)(a). The parties to a financing transaction may enter into an
agreement that a given structure is to be classified as personal property for the purposes of
their transaction. The agreement binds the parties to the agreement, but it cannot bind
other persons who have no notice of the arrangement. In re lTestle Valley Recreation
Area, Inc., 45 Bankr. 458, 460 (Bankr. DND 1984).
222uec § 9.313(I)(b).
mId.
234uee § 9-402(5).
2.. UCC § 9-313(4)(c).
"tId.
, 22.06(6) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 22·60

liens obtained by judgment creditors or other legal proceedings on the real

estate, perfection by the ordinary means offiling under the UCC is sufficient. 227
Complex rules govern priorities between secured parties who claim an
interest in fixtures and other persons who claim an interest as owners of the real
estate, or creditors with an interest in the real estate. These rules were exten-
sively revised by the 1972 amendments. Counsel should be consulted before one
engages in any transaction involving fixtures. 2111

(6) Motor Vehicles

Motor vehicles require registration in most states and are the subject of
special state legislation that provides for the issuance of a certifIcate of title
showing the ownership interests in the vehicle. When this is the case, the uee
rules on perfection ofsecurity interests are modified to accommodate the certifi-
cate-of-title requirements. m Security interests in the motor vehicle will be per-
fected only by notation of the security interest, in compliance with the
certificate-of-title law of the jurisdiction,- on the certificate of title. Compli-
ance with the special certificate-of-title requirements is regarded by the UCC as
"equivalent to the filing of a fmancing statement" and so perfects the security
interest in the vehicle. The uce, however, continues to govern the transaction,
as it applies to questions involving the validity and enforceability ofthe security
interest, to priorities between the secured party and other creditors, and to rights
of purchasers of the collateral.231 Prior to the 1972 amendments, the UCC was

227UCC § 9-313(4)(d}. A ming in the place where financing statements are filed to
perfect a security interest in personal property is effective to perfect a security interest in a
fIXture against the claims ofthe trustee in bankruptcy that are based on the trustee's power
as a hypothetical lien creditor. It is not necessary to me in the real estate records, so long as
the competing claimant to the property is someone with a claim against the unsecured
chattels ofthe debtor, rather than someone claiminl to be a bona fide purchaser ofthe real
estate or a creditor with a real estate interest. In re Trestle Valley Recreation Area, Inc., 45
Bankr. 458, 462-463 (Bankr. DND 1984).
221 The UCC fIXtures rules and a description of the changes made by the 1972
amendments are described in detail in Schroeder, "Security Interests in Fixtures," 1975
Ariz. St. U 319. See lIenera1ly Note, "Leases in Fixtures (Courtright Cattle Co. v. Do/sen
Co., 94 Wash. 2d 645, 619 P2d 344 (I 980})," 17 Gonz. L. Rev. 209 (I 982}.
mUCC § 9-302(3). See generally Note, "In re Littlejohn: Equitable Departure From
State Certificate ofTitle Act Filing Requirement (In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir.
1975»," 1975 Utah L. Rev. 726-739 (1975); Note, "Interstate Movement of Motor
Vehicles: Certificates of Title Acts and the Uniform Commercial Code," 9 Creilhton L.
Rev. 373 (1975). .
-UCC § 9-302(4).
' Id. The provisio~s of UCC § 9-402(8} that a filing of a financial statement is
5I

effective notwithstanding minor errors that are not seriously misleading has been held to
apply to perfection oCa security interest by compliance with certificate oftitle legislation.
In re Circus Time, Inc., 641 F2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1981). See Yampolslcy v. White Motor
22·61 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22·0711}

unclear as to the extent to which its provisions should give way to the require-
ments of the motor vehicle laws.
Motor vehicles are not the only type of oollateral subject to certificate-of-
title statutes. Statutes of this nature also apply to mobile homes, boats, farm
tractors, trailers, and similar items. The DCC provisions are drafted so that the
rules discussed in this section apply to any type of collateral that is oovered by a
certificate of title. 232 Financing this type of collateral involves the interplay of
two sets of laws and, often, substantial questions arise relating to interstate
conflicts. Counsel should be consulted for guidelines on how to proceed.

1122.07 SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTANGIBLES AND LIKE

PROPERTY
tl] Accounts
An account is any "right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or
not it has been earned by performance. "133 A security interest in an account may
be perfected only by filing, except i.n the limited situations in which perfection
arises automaticaJIY.* Prior to the 1972 amendments, the DCC recognized a
classification ofobligations called "contract rights."us A contract right was any
right to payment under a oontract not yet earned by performance."' This classi·
fication was eliminated by the 1972 amendments, and what formerly were
classified as contract rights were not classified either as accounts or as general

Credit Co. (In re Angier), 684 F2d 397 (6th Cir. 1982) (applyinJ a similar standard of
compliance without reference to VCC § 9-402 (8».
mUCC § 9-302(3)(b).
I33UCC ~ 9-106. Airline tickets are not "instruments," and money collected in
payment for the sale of airline tickets constitutes proceeds of "accounts." In re Air Fla.
Sys., Inc., 49 BanJcr. 321,324-325 (SO Fla. 1985).
n 4 Seeuce § 9·302. See supra 1 22.05.
IS·UCC § 9.106.
131 Id. Under the pre-I 972 definition of "account," problems arose becall5e of diffi.
culty in classifying certain rights to payment. These risht might fall within the definition
of "contract right," "general intangible," or "account" in that version of the uee. The
classification given to the right could affect the enforceability or perfection ola security
interest ifthe security agreement and fmancing statement did not rccopize the possible
definitional problems. In Utica Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated Prod. Co., 622 P2d
1061, 1064 (Okla. 1980), forexamp!e,the court wasca1led upon to decide at what point a
right under a contact bad been earned by performance so the collateral had ripened from a
"contract right" into an "account," Similar problems existed under the prc-1972 UCC,
when the amouDt due under the account was not fIXed because subject to dispute. The
classification of claims for damages for breach of contNlct or other liability lilso has been
an issue. See Merchants Nat'! Bank v. Ching, 681 F2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982).
1122.07[1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-62

intangibles. As a result, the defmition of an account, under the uec, is much

broader than what might traditionally be thought of as an "account receivable"
byaccountants.D7
As discussed at the start of this chapter, most transactions involving the
sale, transfer, or assignment of accounts in any form will fall within the scope of
the UCC, which is broadly drafted to apply to transfers of accounts that are
absolute in form. 2M Unless the transaction may clearly be classified as one that
falls under an exemption from Article 9 coverage, it should be treated as within
the scope of the article. 211
Accounts often are proceeds of inventory.2OO For such accounts, security
interests that have been created in the inventory may continue into the accounts
that arise from the sale of the inventory. However, situations may be created i.p.
which there are conflicting claims made by two or more secured parties. These
conflicts and their resolution are discussed in Chapter 23.
Article 9 contains provisions governing the rights of the parties to an
account when the account is assigned. 241 There are three parties to this transac-
tion: the original account debtor; the assignor who is the party to whom the
account is originally owed; and the assignee to whom the right to payment is
transferred. When an account is assigned, the original agreement between the
account debtor and the assignor may provide for a waiver of defenses that the
account debtor otherwise would have against the enforcement of the obligation
by the assignee. 142 Such waivers are discussed in Chapter 16. When there is no
waiver of defenses by the account debtor, the UCC provides that "the rights of
an assignee are subject to (a) all the terms of the contract between the account
debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and (b) any
other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues
before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment.,,243
In Michelin Tires (Canada), Ltd. v. First National Bank,I " an account
debtor claimed it had the right to recover aff111lllltively from the assignee pay-
ments that the debtor mistakenly made. The case involved a construction con- .
tract. Michelin agreed to make progress payments as work was done when the
contractor, lCC, submitted proper certification. lCC assigned the right to these
payments to First National Bank (FNB). Michelin made payments as the work

137 See VCC § 9-106. See e.", Sun Bank v. Parkland Design &; Dev. Corp., 466 So. 2d
1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (obligation to pay a real estate commission is an account).
muee § 9-102(1)(b).
:!USee supra '1122.01[1] on the scope of Article 9.
l40uec § 9-306(1).
241 See uee §§ 9"206, 9-318.
242uce § 9-206(1).
243uee § 9-318(1).
2"666 F2d 673 (1st eir. 1981).
22-63 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.07(1)

was completed, upon receipt ofthe certifications, only to discover that JCC had
failed to pay its subcontractors and had submitted false certifications. Michelin
sued FNB to recover the payments, claiming a right to restitution for urUust
enrichment under general common law equitable principles, as well as under
UCC § 9-318(1)(a).
The court held that Section 9-3 I 8 did not give an account debtor a right to
recover affirmatively from an assignee. In the court's view, the stated section
"concerns only the preservation ofdefenses" that the account debtor might have
when the assignee presses claims against the account debtor. 241 The section does
not prohibit the assertion of claims against an assignee, but any such recovery
depends on the common law of restitution, not the UCC. The court recognized
that cases did exist which allowed recovery by the account debtor. but it distin-
guished such cases on the grounds that in those cases "the assignee actively
participated in the transactions to a degree not approached here:·... The
assignee was not liable under principles of restitution as set forth in Restatement
o.fRestitution, § 28(d) (I 937}. For the assignee to be liable, it had to have notice
that Michelin had no duty to pay, because ICC had submitted fraudulent
certifications or had failed to pay subcontractors. Under UCC § 1-201(25).
although the bank was aware of ICC's financial strugz!.es and difficulty in paying
creditors, the bank could not be charged with notice of ICC's non-payment of
subcontractors or with notice of the fraudulent certifications. As noted by the
court, imposing a duty on the bank to discover those aspects of ICC's business
would have required the bank "to initiate an investigation of ICC's business
practices under the Michelin contract, not aimed at determining the company's
financial health for purposes of the bank's continued financing, but aimed at
verifying ICC's compliance with the Michelin contract .... We are willin& to
impose such a responsibility on lenders. "247

141
666 F2d at 680.
~"Id. at 679. See Benton State Banle v. Warren, 263 Ark. 1,562 SW2d 74 (1978);
Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. DeLozier, '178 Colo. 291, 496 P2d 1016 (1972); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank. 159 Ohio St. 423. 112 NH2d 636 (1953); K Mart
Corp. v. First Pa. Bank, 29 DCC Rep. Serv. (Callashan) 701 (Pa. Ct. CP 1980). Cases
supporting the court's interpretation are: lames Talcott, Inc. v. Brewster Sales Corp., 16
DCC Rep. Servo (Callashan) 1165 (NY Sup. Ct. 1975); Meyers v. Postal Fin. Co.• 287
NW2d 614 (Minn. 1979).
lA7666 F2d at 682-683. See also ~ 16.01 [2J.
uce § 9·318(a) makes the rishu ofan assignee of an account subject to any defense or
claim that arises from the contract between the account debtor and the aHianor. A
contract for the purchale of pipe for $300.000 wal aasigned by the leUer to the defendant
bank. The bank notified the buyer ofthe assignment and buyer completed all payments on
the contract made directly to the banle. After making the payme~t on the contract, buyer
discovered the pipe was defective and brousht a claim under Section 9.318(a) against the
bank as assilPlee of the contract. The court held that Section 9-318(a) did not give an
account debtor, such as the buyer. the right to make an affirmative claim against the
1122.07(11 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-64

A more traditional problem was presented in First National Bank v. Master

Auto Service Corp.241 Bank had made loans to IRI, a tire manufacturer, secured
by the manufacturer's accounts receivables. Master Auto purchased tires from
IRI for resale under a dealer agreement that permitted Master Auto to make
adjustments with its customers for defective tires and receive credit from IRI. As
a result of adjustment of defective tires sold its customers, Master Auto had a
claim of over $265,000 against IRI. When Master Auto was notified of the
assignment of its account debt to the bank, IRI as~erted its claim for the war-
ranty adjustments it gave the customers. The court held that under uee § 9-
318(I)(a) the bank's ability to recover on the account against Master Auto was
subject to the $265,000 claim. The adjustments were authorized under the
dealer agreement between IRI and Master Auto. Finding that Master Auto had
complied with all the requirements ofthe dealer agreement, the court held thal'
the bank was not entitled to recover any sum from Master Auto, because the
$265,000 recoupment claim exceeded the debt on the account to IRI.
uee § 9-318(4) clarifies the transferability of accounts. Early in the devel-
opment ofthe law ofcontracts, a tenn in a contract prohibiting the assignment of
proceeds under the contract was effective. Section 9-318(4) now flatly abolishes
that rule. It makes ineffective any tenn in a contract between an account debtor
and an assignor that purports to prohibit assignment of the account or to

assqnee. Phil Greer & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Bank, 614 F. Supp. 423, 426-427 (ED
Pa. 198~).
Under UCC § 9-318, the account debtor may continue to pay tbe assignor, even
though the account debtor knows the account bas been assigned, so long u the assignee
bu not given notice to the account debtor to make payment directly to tbe assignee.
Vacura v. Haar's Equip., Inc., 364 NW2d 387, 391 (Minn. (985).
Warrinaton v. Dawson, 798 F2d 1533, 1~38 (~th Cir. (986), found that tbe notice
given to the account debtor to make payments directly to assignee as joint payee was not in
a manner reasonably required to inform the account debtor. UCC §§ 9-318(3), 1-201(26).
The assignor gave notice by bavins debtor, a farmer, sign a letter containing the notice
wbile he was engaged in farm work on a tractor in the field, without bis readinS glasses.
The usignor failed to leave a copy of tbe letter with tbe debtor, and the assipee did not
object to not receiving the payments directly.
241
693 F2d 308 (4th Cir. (982). In Business Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AGNDev. Corp., 143
Ariz. 603, 694 P2d 1217 (Ct. App. 1984), the account debtor was allowed to set off
payments made to third parties for materials and labor against the obligation tbat had
been assigned to the assignee. Under tbe terms of the original contract between· the
account debtor and the assignor, the contract gave tbe account debtor tbe right to make
payments directly to persons whQ supplied material and labor and to deduct those
payments from the amounts due the assignor. Furthermore, the contract did not permit
tbe assignor to enforce payment unless the assignor presented proofof satisfaction ofthe
obligations of sucb third party laborers and materialmen. Because of tbese terms, wben
tbe assignor assigned the contract to tbe assqnee, UCC § 9-318 made the rights of tbe
assignee subject to tbe terms ofthe contract. 143 Ariz. at 606-607, 694 P2d at 1220-1221.
Accord Business Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Butler & Booth Dev. Co., 147 Ariz. 510, 711 P2d 649
(Ct. App. 1985).
22-65 SECPRITY INTERESTS 1122.07(11

prohibit creation ofa security interest in a general intangible for money due or to
become due, or a term in such a contract, that conditions such an assignment or
security interest upon the consent of the debtor. 14lI
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a secured party who has possession of
collateral must use reasonable care in its custody and preservation. However, the
assignee of accounts does not have a comparable duty to police provisions in the
contract, which has been assigned according to one court. The case concerned a
requirement in the contract ofsale ofthe goods that required the account debtor
to maintain insurance on the goods. After the contract was assigned to the
secured party, the goods were destroyed by a fire while uninsured. The assignor
of the contract contended that the secured party could not exercise its recourse
rights against the assignor, because the secured party had failed to monitor the
contract to make sure that the goods were insured. The court rejected the
argument. In this case, the assignor was in at least as good a position, if not a
better one, to supervise the insurance requirement. 1tO
The assignee of an account may claim no better right to the amount owing
on the account than that of the assignor, absent a waiver of defenses by the
account debtor. In United Parcel Service. Inc. 1'. Weben Industries, Inc./llt the
court applied this principle to a bank's perfected security interest in funds owed
its debtor under a construction contract. The bank's debtor, a contractor,
became bankrupt. Both the bank and a subcontractor, who had filed a material-
men's lien, claimed entitlement to a fund retained by the owner, who had
contracted with the debtor. The court held that the subcontractor was entitled to
the funds. The owner was entitled to withhold the money owed to the contractor
because the contractor had failed to pay the subcontractor, and the bank could
not assert a right to the fund superior to its debtor, the contractor. Although the
materialmen's lien did not extend to the fund, the state law ofconstruction trust

241 VCC § 9.318(4) & comment 4. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Bedford-Stuyvesant
Restoration Constr. Corp., 90 AD2d 474,475,455 NYS2d 265, 266 (1982).
Federal or state law may prohibit the debtor's rights ofassignment or encumbrance.
For example, government benefits for health and welfare may be 10 restricted. In one case,
the bank took a security interest in the accounts ofdebtor, a nuning home operator. The
accounts included payments from medicare and medicaid. Although federal law limits the
assignability of such payments the court ruled the bank's arranlement did not violate the
statute. 42 USC § 1396a. Texas had adopted a broader prohibition, but the court found
that this conflicted with the federal scheme. Wilson v. Fint Nat'l Bank (In re Missionary
Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.), 796 F2d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1986).
250Forest·All Corp. v. New EnaJand Merchants Nat'l Bank, 31 UCC Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 183, 187 (D.. Mass. 1981). The court also expressed doubt that the impair.
ment ofcollateral rule in UCC § 3·606(l)(b) applied atall, because the secured party did
not have possession ofthc goods. 31 VCC Rep. Servo at 186-187, Sce UCC§ 9-207. Thc
duties of a secured party in possession of collatcral under UCC § 9·207 are discussed In
~ 22.0413].
21'794 F2d 1005, 1009-1010 (5th Cir, 1986).
, 22.07(2) SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 22-66

gave the subcontractor an interest in the fund that was superior to the perfected
security interest ofthe bank. Under the state version ofUee § 9-310, a perfected
security interest has priority over a materialmen's lien, but the court held that
this statute was not applicable to the construction trust interest asserted by the
subcontractor.

(2] Generallntangibles
A general intangible is any personal property that is not within the classifi-
cations of goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, or money.
Thus, a general intangible is what is left over when the other classifications oftbe
uee do not apply.252 It includes legal claims. Examples of general intangibles
are goodwill, literary rights, rights to perform, and other miscellaneous contract
rights.:lSS The only way in which a security interest in a general intangible may be
perfected is by ming. 254
The court considered the scope of a security interest in general intangibles
in Capital National Bank v. McDonald's Corp.2M Bank financed debtor's
McDonald's franchise under a security agreement that broadly gave a security
interest in accounts, contract rights, instruments, general intangibles, furniture,

1'2 UCC § 9-106. Reasoning that a restaurant liquor license is not personal property,
one court concluded that the license could not be property in which a security interest may
be created. In re Revocation ofLiquor License No. R-2193, 12 Pa. Commw. 367,456 A2d
709, 711 (1983). Another court, however, held thata secured party may obtain a security
interest in a liquor license because it is classified as property that is a ceneral intangible.
Althouah the law of North Dakota prohibited the transfer of a liquor license to a new
person without complying with the statutory requirements for a transfer, the court held
that a security interest in the license in favor of a creditor did not amount to a transfer of
the license to the creditor. The debtor was not called upon to give up its license to the
creditor and the creditor did not have to foreclose on the license such that a transfer had
occurred. The statutory policy is not offended by permitting a creditor. to assert a right to
have its security interest reeopized by payment of the debt owed to the creditor out of
proceeds from the sale of the liquor license. Crew v. Dorothy (In re O'Neill's Shannon
Village), 750 F2d 679,683 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Donnelly v. Boufsko, Inc. (1n re
Boufsko), 44 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1984) (discussing whether, under the law of
Michiaan, a creditor may obtain a security interest in a liquor license). See also In re
Ratcliff Enters., Inc., 44 Bankr. 778 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1984) (holding that a security
interest could be obtained in a liquor license under Michigan law).
A trade name and the goodwill it represents is intangible property, which uec
classifies as a general intangible. Reisv. Ralls, 250 Ga. 721,723,301 SE2d 40, 42 (1983).
A court has held that a newsletter entitled "Day Care and Child Development" is a general
intangible for which a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest in the
property. In re Washington Communications Group, Inc., 10 Bankr. 676, 678 (Bann.
DOC 1981).
wUCC § 9-106.
254 uee §§ 9-302, 9.305.
211
625 F. Supp. 874 (SDNY 1986).
22-67 SECURITY INTERESTS 'i 22.0713)

fixtures and equipment, and all other personal property, including inventory.
The bank claimed that this broad security agreement gave it the right to pursue
legal claims of the debtor under antitrust and other laws that the bank claimed
debtor had against McDonald's for wrongful termination of the franchise. In
ruling that the debtor had not assigned these causes of action to the bank under
the security agreement, the court reasoned that the debtor did not have such
causes of action in existence when the parties entered into the security agree-
ment. (V nder traditional Article 9 analysis,. a security agreement can create
rights in after acquired property, but the court did not discuss this.) The court
also araued that the parties had not intended to assign the causes of action to the
bank, when they used ordinary language in their security agreement, because the
type of property involved is not customarily used as commercial security within
the scope of the ordinary security agreement.

(3) Instruments
An instrument includes all those things that constitute negotiable instru-
ments (e.g., checks, drafts, notes, and certificates of deposit). It also includes a
certificated security. In addition, an instrument includes "any other writing
which evidences a right to the payment of money" but which is not a security
agreement or lease, as long as the writing "is ofa type which is in ordinary course
of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assign·
ment."2H This definition of "instrument" is broader than that given in vee
Articles 3 and 4 on negotiable instruments. It obviously coven instruments that
are not negotiable.
A secured party may perfect a security interest in an instrument by taking
possession of the instrument or by filing. In certain limited circumstances,
perfection may occur automatically, for a temporary period of up to twenty-one
daYS.217 V oless the secured party takes possession ofthe instrument, however, a
security interest that is perfected by fIling or that is under the temporary perfec-
tion rules may be cut off by the debtor's transfer of the interest to good-faith
purchasers or to other transferees. Under the vee, any person who purchases an
instrument for new value and in the ordinary course ofbusiness will be free from

2" UCC § 9-105(1 Xi). An ownership interest in a cooperative apartment evidenced by

a share of stoclc and a proprietary lel1!le has been classified as an instrument rather than a
general intangible. Superior Fin. Corp. v. Haskell, 556 F. Supp. 199,201 (SONY 1983).
A writiDg that did not qualify as a negotiable instrument was treated as an "instru-
ment" for purposes of perfecting a security interest under Article 9. Because the aecured
party faiied to take possession or establish a valid bailment, the secured party's security
interest was not perfected and was voidable by the bankruptcy trustee. In rc Coral
Petroleum, Inc., 50 Bankr. 830, 841 (Banler. SO Tex. 1985). The court classified it as an
instrument because it was the type of writing that would be deliycrcd with endorsements
and assignments when transferring an interest in it.. 50 Bankr. at 838.
2S7UCC §§ 9-304(4), 9·305.
1122.67(4) SECURITY TRANSACflONS 22-68

the security interest, if such purchaser acts without knowledge that the instru-
ment is subject to a security interest.2M A purchaser under the uee includes
someone who obtains a security interest in the instrument, so a second lender
may obtain rights superior to those ofthe first secured party by taking possession
of the instrument. 2St If the instrument is negotiable, it may be negotiated to a
holder in due course, who also would take free ofany security interest claimed by
a fIling made by a secured party.2tO
Although a secured party may take possession ofa negotiable instrument to
protect a security interest in that instrument, the secured party will not be a
holder and, therefore, may not be a holder in due course, unless the instrument is
payable to the order ofthe secured party oris payable in blank. This may present
problems for the secured party. In one case, a bank took as collateral for a loan a
note that was the obligation of a third: party and that had been indorsed payable
to the bank's debtor. The bank took possession of the note and held a written
assignment as well. However, the bank could not qualify as a holder under the
indorsement to its debtor. The bank's debtor retained an ownership interest in
the note and could deal with the obligor under the note to modify the terms ofthe
instrument. Because the bank had not given notice to the obligor of its interest
and did not qualify as a holder in due course, the modifications were binding on
the bank. 2111

[4] Chattel Paper

Chattel paper is a writing or group ofwritings that contains both a debt and
a security interest in goods or a lease ofgoods. For example, when a consumer
purchases a refrigerator from a seller on credit, and signs a promissory note
along with a separate security agreement giving the seller a security interest in
the refrigerator, the note and security agreement together constitute chattel
paper. By itself, the note would be classified as an "instrument"; in combination
with the security agreement, the note is treated as "chattel paper."·
As the previous example illustrates, chattel paper is likely to be assignable
and transferable and may share many of the aspects 'ofnegotiability that instru-
ments have. Accordingly, many ofthe rules for chattel paper are similar to those '
for instruments. A security interest in chattel paper may be perfected either by
filing a financial statement or by taking possession ofthe paper. 2U Also, as in the
case of instruments, the secured party will be in a safer position by taking

2IlUCC § 9.308.
2UUCC §§ 1·201(32), 1·201(33),9·308.
..auee § 9·309.
:M'In re Governor's bland, 39 Bankr. 417, 421 (Bankr. EDNC 1984).
282uee § 9·105(l)(b).
m uee §§ 9·304( I), 9·305.
22-69 SECURITY INTERESTS 1) 22.07(5)

possession of the chattel paper. This is because the purchaser of chattel paper
who gives new value for it and who takes possession ofit in the ordinary course
of the purchaser's business will take free of any security interest perfected only
by filing in the chattel paper, as long as the purchaser acts without knowledge
that the paper is subject to a security interest.2"lfthe purchaser has notice ofthe
security interest orofassignment to the secured party, the purchaser will only be
able to acquire an interest in the chattel paper that is subject to the secured
party's interest. 215
When a secured party takes chattel paper as security, the secured party may
find it advisable to give notice to the person oblipted on the chattel paper to
make payment directly to the secured party. Until such notice is given, the
account debtor may continue to make payment to the assignor of the paper.2M

(5] Documents of Title

The U CC uses the term "document" to mean a document of title that is a
bill oflading, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, order for the delivery ofgoods, or
similar document. 21T The definition is not limited to these specific types of
documents. A document of title is any document which in regular business
transactions would be regarded as adequate evidence that the person who has the
document "is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the
goods it covers,"2" A document of title may be negotiable or nonnegotiable.
Because a document of title frequently represents commodities in storage or
transportation, it sometimes is referred to as commodity paper, by persons who
deal in such paper, to distinguish it from "money paper," such as notes and
investment securities. 2ft
While the goods are in the possession ofa bailee who has issued a negotiable
document covering the goods, the only way to perfect a security interest in the

214 UCC § 9-308(a). A creditor who purchases chattel paper through a setoff of
preexisting unsecured debts does not give new value. In re Dr. C. HlifTCo., 44 Bankr. 129,
132 (Bankr. WD Ky. 1984). In this case, the creditor purchased the chattel peper by
payins both a ponion ofthe price in cash and paying the remainder of the price throu!h a
setoff of preexisting debts. The court held that \be creditor bad Jivennew value "only to
the extent ofthe cash given" to the debtor. 44 Bankr. at 133. Because the coun held that it
ultimately lackedjonsdiction over the matter, the commentl by the coun were dicta. 44
Bankr. at 135.
215UCC f 9-308 & comment 3.
2MUCC f 9-3.18(3). see supra 122.07[1].
21Tvce §§ 1·201(15), 9.102(1){a), 9.105(1)(0. See 7-201(2).
2IIUCC § 1-201(15). The definition further requires that a document of title "mUllt
purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purpon to cover goods in the bailee's
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass." Id.
See id., comment 1S.
2ItSee vee § 7·104 comment.
'V 22.0716J SEeURI1Y TRANSACTIONS 22-70

goods is to perfect a security interest in the document.21o Of course, to the extent

that the goods were subject to a valid security interest before creation of the
bailment, that security interest will continue. Once the goods are in the posses- .
sian ofthe bailee and a negotiable document oftitle issued, the document of title
controls the goods. A perfected security interest in the document may be
obtained either by filing or by taking possession of the document,21I Failure to
take possession ofthe document oftitle and reliance on filing alone may result in
a loss of the security interest, however, because when the document is duly
negotiated to a transferee who purchases it in good faith without notice of any
defense or claim to it and for value in the regular course ofbusiness or financing,
the transferee takes free oftbe security interest. J72 When the goods are in the
possession of a bailee who has not issued a negotiable document covering the
goods, a security interest may be perfected by (1) notifying the bailee of tbe
secured party's interest; (2) having the bailee issue a document in the secured
party's name; or (3) ftling as to the goods.273

[6] Securities
Stocks and bonds and similar instruments are classified as securities by the
UCC. Prior to 1977, the UCC, by applying its rules on security interests,:I7·
treated a security as an "instrument." As such, except for brief periods of
temporary perfection, the only manner in which a security interest could be
perfected was by taking possession of the security.:I71 The typical way for estab-
lishing a security interest in securities was through a pledgeP'
Under the pre-1977 UCC, a secured party could obtain a security interest in
securities of the debtor without taking possession of the securities, when there
was a signed security agreement, but that security interest· would be
unperfected. 217 In such a case, absent competing claims ofthird-party purchasers

210uee § 9-304(2). When a person who holds a security interest in goods acquiesces
in the issuance of a document of title that covers the goods, that person runl the risk of
losing his or her interest in the goods to a party who obtains a superiorinterest, based upon
rights in the document of title. In re Jamestown Fanners Elevator, Inc., 49 Bankr. 661,
664 (Bankr. DND 1985).
21' uee §§ 9-304, 9.305.
muee §§ 7-501(4), 9-309. Documents of title are discussed funher in" l4.05[1},
23.02[3].
us uee § 9.304(3).
274uee § 9-105{I)(i).
171 uee §§ 9-304(1), 9-305. Physical possession ofa stock certificate was sufficient to
create an enforceable and perfected security interest. Rafoth v. Smith '" Schmidt Assocs.,
Inc. (In re Swedenborg), 55 Bankr. 820, 825 (NO Ohio 1985).
211 See 'l 22.04[1]. See generally Haydoclc, "When Is the Broker a Bailee or Is an
Interest in Securities a General Intangible?" 35 Ark. L. Rev. 10 (1981).
tnuce §§ 9·203, 9-303.
22-71 SECURITY INTERESTS 1122.07(6)

and other creditors, the secured party could enforce the security interest against
the debtor. IT' However, the claims of a creditor who had only an unperfected
security interest would be subordinated to the claims ofany other secured party,
who had perfected a security interest by taking possession ofthe security, or to
the claims of any bona fide purchaser of the security.17I
While the system previously described for perfecting security interests in
securities assumes that the security is represented by a tangible certificate that
can be transferred and held by the secured party, that is not always the case.
Spurred by the technological revolution in electronic data processing and by the
need for speed and efficiency in handling large volumes of paper transactions
involving securities, there has been a growing use of arrangements that give
persons an interest in a company or describe an obligation ofthe company that is
not evidenced by a paper certificate, but is only registered on the books of the
enterprise or of an agent or a broker.- To deal with this development, the
uee's Anicle 8 on investment securities was amended extensively in 1977. As a
result, it now distinguishes between "certificated securities," which are repre-
sented by a tangible instrument, and" uncertificated securities," which are not
represented by such an instrument, and the transfer ofwhich is simply registered
upon books maintained by or on behalf of the issuer. o ' As of the writing of this
book, many states have adopted the official Article 8 revisions (see Table 14-1),
but there are some states that continue to abide by the pre-1977 version.
Under the 1977 amendments to the vee,
Article 8, not Article 9, controls
most aspects of security interests in securities.·.. Article 8 governs the enforce-
ability, attachment, perfection, and termination of security interests in securi-

l7Iuee § 9-201. An unperfected security interest in shares of stock was enforced

between the parties in Lojek v. Pedler, 22 Ohio St. 3d 71, 488 NE2d 864, 866 (1986), a
case arising under the pre-I 977 UCC. The security interest was enforceable even though
the stock was issued subject to conditions that restricted Its transfer.
•nuec §§ 9-301, 9-309. See also UCC § 9-308, which gives a purchaser, in the
ordinary course ofbusiness, rights superior to those claimin, an interest in the security by
temporary perfection, either by taking possession or by establishing an interest in pro-
ceeds of inventory.
- An example is the recommendation, on September IS, 1975, ofthe American Bar
Association's section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, to amend the Model
Business Corporation Act to permit the issuance ofcorporate stock in uncertificated form.
The reporters for the amended Article 8 noled that Federal Reserve banks operate the
most significant uncertificated securities system in operation for handling transactions in
U.S. bonds. Reporters Comment, Uniform Commercial Code, App. 1 (West 1978).
I.,UCC §§ 8-102(I)(a), 8-102(1)(b). For an analysis ofArticle 8, see Coogan, "Secur-
ity Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1979).
"'ucc § 9·203(1); see also UCC §§ 9.302(l)(f), 9-304(1), 9.304(4). 9-30S, 9-309.
, 22.07[6)(a) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-72

ties.us Article 9 governs in other respects. such as in its rules on the

responsibilities of a pledgee."'

raj Certificated Securides. Certificated securities are stocks, bonds, and the
like. The 1977 version of Article 8 dermes them as interests "represented by
instruments" that are issued in "bearer or registered form"; that are of the type
commonly traded on securities exchanges or markets or recognized as a medium
for investment; that are one of a class or series; and that provide evidence of a
share, a participation, or another interest in an issuer's property enterprise, or
obligation. 215 While certificated securities are negotiable instruments,ua they are
governed by the vec's Article 8 on investment securities rather than by the
articles on negotiable instruments. 217
The definition of certificated security is sufficiently broad so that it may..
sweep under its coverage instruments that, on first impression, might not be
thought of as securities. The definition does not require that the interest in
question actually be traded upon a securities exchange or other market. It is
enough, as the comments indicate, that the interests are "'of a type' commonly
traded in those markets. "IH When the interest is classified as a security, it is
governed by Article 8, rather than by Article 9, on questions of enforceability
and perfection of security interests. The rules in Articles 8 and 9 for perfecting
security interests in instruments and securities are generally comparable, as they
both require possession, but there are some differences.
As a general rule, a security interest in a certificated security is perfected in
the same way as under the prior version ofthe DCC. The secured party must take
possession, or, when the security is in the hand ofa bailee, must give notice to the
bailee.l"lt is possible for a security interest to be temporarily perfected, as was
the case under the former version of the vee, no for a period oftwenty-one days
without possession by a secured party. When the certificated security is trans-
ferred outright to the secured party, no written security agreement signed by the
debtor is needed to make the security interest enforceable.2t1 A written security
agreement signed by the debtor and describing the collateral is required when
the security is in the possession of a bank or broker holding the security in an

2t3 UCC § 8-32l.

214 UCC § 8-321 (3).
I15UCC § 8.102(1).
21·UCC § 8.105(l}.
2I'uce § 8-102(1}(c).
2Auee § 8-102, comment 2.
21·UCC §§ 8-313(I)(a), 8·313(I)(c}, 8·313(1}(e). 8-313(1)(h). 8·321(1).
2tO UCC §§ 8-321 (2), 8-321 (4). Compare UCC § 9-304.
211 UCC § 8-321(3)(b).
22-13 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.07(61lbl

account for the debtor (who is the banker's or broker's customer), or when the
security is held by some other third person.tII
The new Article 8 makes a significant change in requiring that the secured
party or the secured party's agent possess the certificated security, not only to
perfect a security interest (in cases where the temporary perfection rules do not
apply) but also for the security interest to attach and to be enforceable.1ft Under
the previous version of Article 8, although the security interest would not be
perfected until the secured party took possession, the secured party would have
in the security an unperfected security interest, which could be enforced against
the debtor as long as a sufficient written security agreement existed and there
were no third parties with superior rights to the collateral.-

Ihl Cases Involving Certlflcated Securities. In a case decided under the pre-
1977 version of Article 8 of the UCC, the court was required to decide whether
the plaintiffwas a bona fide purchaser of securities. 2" The plaintiff, the Louisi-
ana State School Lunch Employees Retirement System, sued the Irving Trust
Company for conversion of bonds the plaintiffclaimed belong to it. Irving Trust
served as a clearinghouse for a dealer in government securities, Legel, Braswell
Government Securities, Inc., from whom the plaintiff bought the bonds. Plain-
tiff contracted with Legel, Braswell to buy the bonds in a transaction, which so
described the securities that they only could be bonds evidenced by a Certificate
No. 92, which Lesel, Braswell was scheduled to repurchase from another cus-
tomer. Legel Braswell instructed the defendant,lrving Trust, to acquire Certifi-
cate No. 92 from the customer and to pay the customer for the certificate. Soon
thereafter Legel, Braswell became bankrupt. Irving Trust. who was in possession
of Certificate No. 92, prepared to mail the certificate to the plaintifTbut, after
the certificate had been placed in an envelope in the mailroom with a registered
mail receipt attached, Legel, Braswell instructed Irving Trust not to send the
certificate. In the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, Irving Trust claimed the
bonds on the theory that it had a security interest in them to secure the money
advanced to Legel, Braswell to pay for.them. The plaintiffclaimed to be a bona
fide purchaser. Under the pre-I 977 version ofthe VCC, ifplaintifTqualified as a
bona fide purchaser, plaintiffhad rights in the bonds superior to Irving Trust.·M

tl2UCC §§ 8·3 I 3(h)(i). 8·313(h)(ii) & comments 2,3. Compare UCC § 8·313(I)(e),
which does not require a written security agreement when the security is held by a third
person other than a bank or a broker who acknowledges that he or sbe is holdina for the
secured party.
tl3UCC § 8321(1).
21< UCC §§ 9.20 I, 9·203.
'"' Louisiana State School Lunch Employees Retirement Sys: v. Leael, 'Braswell Gov't
Sec. Corp., 699 F2d 512 (II th Cir. 1983).
..·UCC §§ 8·301(2), 9·309.
11 22.07[6J[b] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-74

Plaintiffs status as a bona fide purchaser depended on the bonds having

been delivered to plaintiff. The court held that delivery had occurred, because,
under the uee, delivery could take place without the purchaser taking physical
possession of the securities. Under uee § 8-313(1 )(c), delivery to a purchaser
occurs when the broker sends a purchaser confirmation, and also identifies "by
book entry or otherwise" a "specific security in the broker's possession" as
belonging to the purchaser. The court regarded this requirement as having been
satisfied when Legel, Braswell confirmed the sale to plaintiff, although Certifi-
cate No. 92 was not specifically identified. In any event, the court believed that
when Irving Trust put the certificate in the envelope, this constituted an identifi-
cation under the "or otherwise" method for identification permitted by this
section. As Irving Trust acted as Legel, Braswell's agent, the possession of the
certificate by Irving Trust was sufficient to satisfy the possession requirements.
of the section.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Legel, Braswell had authority
to rescind the transaction and could cancel it by instructing Irving Trust not to
mail the certificate. In the court's view, uee § 8-313(1)(c) does not require
physical delivery of the certificate to the purchaser, so the attempt at cancella-
tion by Legel, Braswell was not effective. The court further noted that this case
presented a dispute simply between Irving Trust and the plaintiff. The trustee in
bankruptcy did not assert a claim to the securities under the Bankruptcy Act.
Therefore, the court was not called upon to consider whether the trustee in
bankruptcy might be in a position to object to the transfer as violating the
Bankruptcy Act or that the transfer occurred while Legel, Braswell was without
legal authority to transfer the security. ZIT
A second case involving Legel, Braswell and Irving Trust had Irving Trust
contending to be a bona flde purchaser of a security. In this case, Plano Savings
and Loan Association gave Legel, Braswell a $300,000 GNMA certificate to
secure an obligation Plano had to Legel, Braswell. Plano sent the certificate to
Irving Trust for deposit, with a letter ofinstructions that it was to be held for the
account of LegeI, Braswell on deposit for Plano. Plano sent an assignment form
that permitted the certificate to be assigned to Legel, Braswell, but a portion of
the form authorizing reregistration of the certificate was deleted. Acting on
instructions from Legel, Braswell, Irving Trust reregistered the certificate. When
Legel, Braswell became bankrupt, Irving Trust claimed the certificate, because
Irving Trust had advanced money to Legel, Braswell and had a security interest
in all of Legel, Braswell's properties and securities in Irving's possession. Irving
Trust claimed to be a bona fide purchaser under uee § 8-302, free from the
claim of Plano.
The question for decision was whether Irving Trust acted in good faith and
without notice· of an adverse claim. Irving Trust argued that the repledge of

ZIT 699 F2d at SIS.

22-75 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.0716llbl

securities is commonly allowed by owners ofsecurities, so it should not be held

to have notice that Legel, Braswell's actions in pledging Plano's certificate with
Irving Trust were improper, unless Irving Trust had notice that repledging the
security was wrongful. While the court held that Plano's action in not authoriz-
ing reregistration of the certificate was not enough to give notice of Plano's
adverse claim, because the certificate could be transferred without change in
registration, the court also held that there were suspicious circumstances that
constituted bad faith. In the court's view, the critical facts were (I) that Irving
Trust knew Plano claimed an interest in the certificate, from the letter of
transmittal; (2) that Irving Trust knew Plano acted to indorse the certificate to
Legel, Braswell specifically rather than in blank; and (3) that Irving Trust knew
that the action it took at the request ofI..egel, Braswell to reregister the security
violated Plano's instructions. Irving Trust could have learned the facts by
telephoning Plano, but did not. 211
In Jones v. C~ntral States Investment CO.,2" an owner of stock in a grazing
association effectively transferred the securities by indorsing them in blank: and
delivering them to the attorney for the purchaser. Although the grazing associa-
tion's rules required the board of directors to approve stock transfers, tbe
owner's failure to obtain approval from the board did not prevent the valid
transfer of the ownership of the shares.
New Jersey Bank )/. Bradford Securities Operations, Inc.- discussed the
liability of a firm acting as a transfer agent for securities that were stolen in
blank, forged, and pledged as collateral to a bona fide purchaser. In this case,
Bradford Securities (BSOI) served as an agent in executing transfers ofSouthern
California Edison stock. BSOI stored blank stock certificates bearing facsimile
signatures of Southern California Edison's corporate officers. The signature
spaces for the transfer agent and the registrar remained blank, however. A
number of certificates were stolen from BSOI and eventually traced to New
Jersey Bank, which was holding them as collateral for a loan. Following seizure
oftbe forged certificates by the federal government, New Jersey Bank demanded
that BSOI either accept the ce11ificates or pay their face value to it. New Jersey
Bank asserted claims under both the VCC and negligence theories.
In dealing with the bank's claim under the UCC, the court first acknowl-
edged that it was not certain the certificates constituted a "security" under
Article 8, because the UCC defines a security as an instrument that is "issued" in

21'ln re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 695 F2d 506 {11th Cit. 1983). To be a good
faith purchaser ofsecurities held as collateral, a bank must satisfY the requiremeut ofdue
diligence in investigating the validity of the securities. First National Bank of Cicero v;
United States, 625 F. Supp. 926 (NO 111. 1986), on reconsideration, 653 F. Supp. 1312
(ND Ill. 1987).
21'654 P2d 727, 733 (Wyo. 1982).
300 690 F2d 339 (3d CiT. 1982).
f 22.07[61[b1 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-76

bearer or registered form.:lO t To be "issued," there must be a "voluntary transfer

ofpossession," and the theft ofthe certificates from BSOI should not be viewed
as a voluntary transfer of possession by the issuer.- The court did not decide
this issue, however, because it ruled on alternative grounds that BSOI had a
defense to the claim under the UCC even ifthe certificates were assumed to be
securities.
New Jersey Bank's claim under the UCC failed, in the court's view, because
UCC § 8-202(3) provided that lack of genuineness of a security is a complete
defense, even against a bona fide purchaser, except as otherwise provided in the
UCC. The exception to this general defense, which makes the issuer liable to a
bona fide purchaser "if, but only if, the unauthorized signature is that of an
employee or aaent of the issuer entrusted with the signing of the certificates or
with the responsible handling of such document,"303 was not available to New
Jersey Bank, because New Jersey Bank could not show that the unauthorized
signatures were those of B50I employees. Thus, the court stated the extent of
liability under the exception as follows:

This exception to the lack-of-genuineness defense, as we interpret it, pro-

tects an innocent third party from losses occasioned by a dishonest
employee of the issuer or transfer agent. But the issuer or its agent bears the
risk ofloss only when employees within its control are responsible for the
unauthorized signatures; when a person outside this group commits the
forgery, even a bona fide purchaser must succumb to the familiar principle
of caveat emptor.304

Although the UCC claim failed, the court upheld a judgment that B50! had
been negligent in safeguarding the blank securities. BSO! argued that the UCC
rules constituted New Jersey Bank's exclusive remedy and thus eliminated any
liability based on negligence. The court rejected this theory, reasoning that
recognition ofa remedy in tort actually advanced the policy ofArticle 8 and that
placement of the risk of loss on the party most able to minimize that risk
promoted the negotiability ofsecurities. lOS The possibility ofa third party's theft
ofthe blank certificates should have been reasonably foreseen by BSOI, and thus
BSOI could not defend on the grounds that the loss was caused by the interven-
ing criminal conduct ofsome third party.- Nor was New Jersey Bank contribu-
torily negligent. There was credible testimony that standard banking practice

lO'vee § 8-102 (pre-197i version; see vee App. I § 8-102).

JC2 690 F2d at 343. vec §§ 1·201(14),3·102(1).
:lO3 690 F2d at 343-344.
aN Id. at 345.

3G5Id. at 347. See uee § 1-103.

"'690 F2d at 347-348.
22-77 SECURITY INTERESTS 11 22.07[6J(c]

did not require New Jersey Bank to conduct an independent investigation ofthe
authenticity of the certificates pledged as collateral.~1

[c) Uncertlficated Securities. The major change wrought by the 1977 amend-
ments to Article 8 is the treatment given "uncertificated securities." The scope
and application ofthe new rules are complex, and banks should seek the advice
ofcounsel as to their precise requirements. In general, the amendments take the
position that there are two means by which a security interest in an uncertifi-
cated security may be perfected. The first method is to actually have tbe interest
transferred to the secured party, on the books of the company that issued the
security.3111 There are provisions in the uee that govern the procedures for
accomplishing this registration and that specify the duties ofthe issuer to r~ster
tile transfer. H ' The second method is by registration ofpledge."o This method
involves procedures similar to those for outright transfer, but it preserves the
rights of the security's registered owner to vote and to exercise certain other
powers.'"
Although the definition of an uncertified security"2 parallels that of a
certifiCated security, there are two key differences. Firstly, the interest is one that
is not represented by an instrument; instead, it is registered on the books of the
issuer or on books maintained "on behalf of the issuer." Secondly, the interest
must be one that is of a type commonly dealt in lln securities exchanges or
markets. It is not enough that the interest is recognized as a medium for invest-
ment, as is true ofthe certificated security.3t3 Omission ofthe "media ofinvest-
ment" language from the definition was intended to prevent the defmition from
being too broad. However, if this language had been included in the definition,
interests such as bank accounts might have fallen within it. They do not, how-
ever, fall within the definition ofan uncertificated security, because they are not
of a type commonly traded. 314
Prior to the J 977 amendments to Article 8, the rules applicable to perfection
of a security interest, in what is now defined as an uncertifieated security, were
not clear. The definition ofsecurity in Article 8 contemplated a security that was

... 690 F2d at 349.

30tuec §§ 8-313(1)(b), 8-321(1).
:JlItuee §§ 8-308(4). 8-308(7). 8-401, 8-408.
:J,ouec §§ 8-321(1)..
"11 uee §§ 8-108, 8-207, 8.308, 8-401, 8-408.
112 uec § 8-1 02( I)(b). See generally, Note, .. uncertificated Securities. Article 8 and 9
of the U.C.c. and the Texas Business Corporation Act: A New System to Acx:ommodate
Modem Securities Transactions," 11 Tex. Tech. 1.. Rev. 813 (1980).
313uee § 8-102(l)(a)(ii).
31' uee § 8-102, comment 2.
, 22.07[6](d) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22·78

evidenced by a certificate.a18 It is possible that such interests (in uncertificated

a1l
securities) would have been viewed as general intangibles under Article 9.
However, a security interest in a general intangible is perfected by the filing ofa
financing statement317 - a procedure that has obvious deficiencies, since it does
not provide actual notice to the issuer ofthe security. A safer approach might be
the outright transfer of the interest to the secured party, on the books of the
issuer, although even that approach, if the secured party fails to me a financing
statement, might be attacked as one creating an unperfected security interest in
general intangibles. Obviously, one should employ great care when dealing with
interests that might qualify as "uncertificated securities" under new Article 8 or
under the former version.

[d) U.S. Securities. As discussed in Chapter 14, federal law governs the rights
associated with securities issued by the United States and by federal agencies.
There are special laws and regulations relating to such securities. 31I U.S. securi-
ties increasingly are held in uncertificated form. The Federal Reserve System
has facilities that permit the wire transfer of such securities.a11

(7) Bank Accounts

Although the UCC excludes from Article 9 coverage the transfer ofinterests
in bank accounts, this exclusion is a limited one only.- It is possible for a
security interest to exist in a bank account when that bank account consists of
"proceeds" ofcollateral.:I21 A bank account is treated as cash proceeds. 32t As long
as funds in the account may be identified as those derived from the sale or
exchange ofcollateral, a security interest in the original collateral will continue,

3l1UCC § 8.102(1)(a).
311UCC § 9.106.
317 UCC § 9-302(1).
311 See 31 CFR subch. 13 (1987); see also 1 8.02 on the Government Securities Act of
1987.
311 See discussion in 1 3.04[5) ofthe role ofthe Federal Reserve System in transfers of
U.S. securities.
32lIUCC § 9-104(1). The assignment of a deposit in.a bank as seCurity for a debt is
treated as a common law pledge not subject to the UCC by some courts. Because the UCC
does not apply, there is no need to me a fmancing statement to perfect a security interest.
Thus, a trustee in bankruptcy cannot avoid the pledge under the powers granted the
trustee to set aside unperfected security interests. In re Tigert Printing Co., Inc., 648 F2d
364,367 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord Duncan Box & Lumber Co. v. Applied Energies, Inc., 29
UCC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1731, 1736 (W. Va. 1980).
321 UCC § 9-104(1).
-UCC § 9.306(1).
22-79 SECURITY INTERESTS If 22.07(7)

and will follow the proceeds into the bank account. 123 The security interest will
be a perfected security interest, so long as the interest in the original collateral
was a perfected security interest.-
The language is specific that for the security interest to continue into the
bank account, the interest in the bank account must be "identifiable" as cash
proceeds of the collateral. 325 However, the vee does not define what is "identi-
fiable." It has been argued that any commingling of proceeds with funds not
constituting proceeds destroys the identifiability of the proceeds. m An argu-
ment can be made, and has been accepted by ,orne couTt$, that tracina methods
used in the law of trusts may apply in this instance to enable the secured party to
identify that portion ofa bank account which constitutes proceeds.3Il' From the
standpoint of the secured party who wants to protect a security interest in
proceeds deposited in a bank account, the safe procedure would be to require
that the bank account contain only proceeds, thus eliminating any question as to
the identifiability of funds in the account as proceeds.
The security interest that can arise in a bank account may conflict with the
depository bank's right ofsetoff. The vee states that its provisions on secured
transactions do not apply to any right of setoff. 33. The matter is not clear,
however, since the vee also states that a security agreement generally will be
effective against all other creditors, unless specifically provided to the con-
trary.- This latter approach has been accepted by some courts. 33ll
When a debtor becomes insolvent, the vee has special rules that permit the
secured party to claim an interest in bank accounts into which proceeds from

mUCC §§ 9-306(2), 9-306(3).

314UCC § 9-306(3)(b).
3"uce §§ 9·306(2), 9·306(3)(b).
311 See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 146, § 24.4.
mBrown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F2d 998,1003 (7th
Cir. 1974); Univena\ C.l.'l'. Cl'lldit Corp. v. Farmers 'Bank, 35% F. Supp. 317, 3'26 (ED
Mo. 1973). See B. Clark, supra note 94, , 10.3.
321UCC § 9-104(1). Setoff by a bank when the customer becomes bankrupt is eli..
cussed in 1125.09[3]. The UCC's exclusion ofa bank's right ofset offfrom the coverage of
Article 9 does not mean the bank's set off right will always be superior to a conflietina
security interest ofanother party. ]n one case, a court gave priority over the bank's rijllt of
set off to a holder of a perfected purchase money security intel'llst in a vehicle, when
proceeds from the sale ofthe vehicle were deposited with the bank. The purchase money
security interest continued into the proceeds and gave the secured party rights superior to
the bank. Coachmen Indus., Inc. v. Security Trust&: Say. Bank, 329 NW2d 648, 650(lowa
1983).
"'uce § 9·201.
330See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid·States Dev. Co., 177 Ind. App. 549, 380 NE2d
1243 (1978); Annot., "Effect ofU.C.C. Article 9 Upon Conflict, as to Funds in Debtor's
Bank Account, Between Secured Creditor and Bank Qaiminll Right ofSetoff," 3 ALR4th
998 (1981).
1122.0718) SECURITY TRANSACflONS 22·80

collateral have been deposited. I3' In such situations, the bank's right of setoffis
superior in those accounts in which proceeds have been commingled with other
funds. S32 The validity of this provision against the trustee in bankruptcy is
disputed.
The uee rules discussed above, governing proceeds and security interests
in bank accounts, were the result of substantial revisions made by the 1972
amendments. Before the amendments, it was still possible for a security interest
to be claimed in bank accounts. The revisions ma¢e by the 1972 amendments
clarify the rights of the secured party.

(8) Insurance Policies

Although the uee generally excludes from its coverage ofsecured transac-
tions any application to insurance policies, a security interest may arise in an
insurance policy to the extent that amounts payable under the policy by reason
of loss or damage to the collateral are treated as proceeds. au The amounts

33\ ucq 9·306(4). VCC § 9·306(d)(4) contains a formula for computing the extent to
which a secured party may claim a security interest in a bank account in which proceeds
have been commingled with other deposits. AlthOUgh the secured pany could claim a
greater amount of the account as proceeds throuah use of common-law tracing methods,
the VCC formula must be applied. First Nat'l Bank v. Manin, 48 Banke. 317, 320 (NO
Tex. 1985).
S32 VCC § 9·306(4).
mVCC §§ 9-104(&), 9-306(1).
Disposal of the collateral before settlement of an insurance claim prevented the
secured pany from claiming the insurance as proceeds. In this case, GMAC had a
perfected security interest in a truck and its proceeds. The truck was damaged, and
GMAC subsequently repossessed and sold it. After the sale, GMAC released its security
interest. Shortly after the sale, the insurance company issued a check for $5,638 payable
jointly to the debtor, GMAC, and the dealer who repaired the vehicle. Soon thereafter, the
debtor became bankrupt and gave the check to the trustee. The coun held that the trustee
was entitled to the check. Although the insurance payment was proceeds ofthe truck and
GMAC would have had an automatically perfected security interest in the insurance
payment, once GMAC disposed of the vehicle without preserving its rights in the insur·
ance claim, GMAC lost its security interest in the vehicle and its proceeds. In re Star
Safety, Inc., 39 Bankr. 755, 756-757 (Banke. DND 1984). Caution should be exercised in
considering this ruling. Obviously, a seller may seU goods in a manner authorized by its
inventory fmancer with the result that no security interest in the goods survives the sale,
but the fmancer gets a security interest in the accounts, chattel paper, and other "pro-
ceeds" of the sale.
In Bradt v. Woodlawn Auto Workers F.C.V., 757 F2d S12 (2d Cir. 1985), the secured
pany and the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy disputed who had the prior right to insurance
paid after the debtor's car was damaged. The district coun said that the insurance could
not constitute proceeds, because Section 9·306(1) requires a "disposition" of the collat-
eral in order for proceeds to exist. Repair of damaged property is not a disposition. The
appellate coun revened on other grounds. In its view, the insurance payment constituted
proceeds belonging to the bankruptcy estate. The automatic stay prevented the secured
22·81 SECURITY INTERESTS , 22.0719]

payable under the policy will constitute "proceeds" only to the extent that the
policy is payable to one of the parties to the security agreement.:l24
The followin; example may illustrate the operation of the veC's rule.
Assume that the collateral is a motor vehicle. The vehicle is security for a loan
made by Secured Party A in the amount o(SI,ooo. It also is security for Secured
Party B, who is junior in priority toA, for a debt of$I,200. There is a policy of
insurance on the vehicle for $1,000, payable to Debtor, who owns the vehicle. If
the vehicle is damaged and, under the policy, $1,000 becomes payable, the
proceeds of the policy constitute "proceeds of the collateral." Secured Party A
will be able to claim the entire $1,000, because A's security interest has priority.
On the other hand, if Secured Party B had taken the precaution of having an
insurance policy on the vehicle specifically payable to B, the proceeds of that
policy would not be considered as proceeds of the collateral, so far as the
transaction between A and Debtor is concerned. That policy is payable to
someone other than the parties to the security agreement between A and Debtor.
Therefore, Secured Party B could claim all of the amount payable under that
policy.

19) Real Estate-Related Interests

Although interests in real estate are excluded from the scope of Article 9,
obligations secured by interests in real estate usually are viewed as a separate
form of property, which may be collateral in which a security interest can be
created under Article 9. Such obligations are often classified as instruments.:l2S

pany from obtainina possession ofthe payment or enforcina its security interest apinst it.
7S7 F2d at S16.
astUCC §§ 9·104(&), 9.306{1). The pre·1972 version of the UCC was silent on
whether insurance could constitute proceeds in which a security interelt would continue.
The pre·1972 version ofthe UCC did provide that Article I) did not apply "to a transfer of
an interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance," UCC § 9.104(&}, A number of
couns held that insurance payments were not "proceeds" under the pre.1972 UCC.
Sanchezv. United States, 696 F2d 213,216 (2d Cie. 1982); First Nat'l Bankv. Merchants
Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 725, 402 NE2d 1168,426 NYS2d 267 (l980); Third Nat'l Hankv.
Continental Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 240, 242, 446 NE2d 380, 382 (1983); In re Boyd, 6S8P2d
470,474 (Okla. 1983).
I2SSee In re Maryvale Sav. &. Loan Corp., 27 Banler. 701 (Banler. ED Tenn. 1983)
(Article 9 applies to the creation ofsecurity interelts in deeds oftrost and lLCICOmpan)'ing
notes). This decision was subsequently reversed in In re Maryvale Sav. &. Loan Corp. 31
Banler. 597 (ED Tenn. 1983). The coun held that Section 47·9-401(1) of the Tennessee
Commercial Code, which provided that Article 9 did not apply to "the creation or transfer
ofan intcl'C5t in or lien on real estate including a lease or rents thereunder," precluded the
application of Article 9 to the instruments involved in that case. '31 Bankr. at 598. The
Sixth Circuit Coun of Appeals ultimately held that Article 9 applied to the .securlty
interest in the promissory notes, but not to the deeds ortrost. In re Maryvil1e Sav. &. Loan
" 22.07(9] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 22-82

A federal court applying Minnesota law concluded that the assignment ofa
seller's interest in a contract for the sale of real estate should be treated as the
transfer of an interest in real estate, rather than as a transaction under Article 9.
Thus, the court found that vee § 9-104(j) excluded the assignment from the
coverage of the vee, and the creditor had to perfect the security interest by
recording the assignment in the office where real estate instruments were
recorded, rather than by filing a financing statement under Article 9. S:II Con-
versely, other courts have concluded that the assignment ofa seUer's interest in a
real estate contract is not the transfer ofan interest in real estate, but is a general
intangible. Any security interest created in a general intangible falls under
Anicle 9, and may be perfected only by the filing of a financing statement.:I37
Following this approach, a court has concluded that a beneficiary under an
Illinois land trust has an interest that can be classified as personal property and;
thus, the provisions ofArticle 9 apply, permitting a creditor to obtain a security
interest in such personal property.:lOlI
A federal court of appeals has said that it is necessary to separate the
collateral into its real property and personal property components. The case
involved a debtor who assigned to the bank various promissory notes that were
secured by real estate deeds oftrust. Subsequently, the debtor became bankrupt.
The trustee claimed that the bank's security interest was not perfected because
the bank failed to take possession of the notes. The court concluded that the
collateral should be viewed as consisting of two parts: (1) the promissory notes,

Corp., 743 F2d 413, 416-417 (6th Cir. 1984), opinion supplemented by 760F2d 119 (6th
Cir. 1985).
UI Shuster v. Doane (In re Shuster), 784 F2d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 1986). See also In re
Hoeppner, 49 Bankr. 124 (Bankr. ED Wis. 1985) (assianment ofvendor's interest under a
land sales contract as collateral not a transaction covered by Article 9); Garnett State Say.
Bank v. Tush, 232 Kan. 447, 657 P2d 508 (1983) (the buyer's equity acquired under a
contract for the sale of real estate is an interest in the real property itself; a creditor who
acquires an interest in the buyer's equity as security obtains an interest in real estate, not
in personal property, and Article 9 does not apply).
:137 In re Simpson, 56 Bankr. 586, 588 (DNM 1986); Crichton v. Himlie Properties (In
reHimlieProperties, Inc.), 105 Wash. 2d 191,193,713 P2d 108, 110(1986). See In re D.I.
Maltese, Inc., 42 Bankr. 589 (Banler. ED Mich. 1984) (Article 9 governs the creation of
security interests in the right to payment under a contract for the sale of real estate); In re
Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd., 24 Bankr. 57 (Banler. SD Fla. 1982) (creation of security
interest in proceeds aocounts from condominium sales is an Article 9 transaction); In re
Southworth, 22 Bankr. 376 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (assignment of real estate contracts is
an Article 9 security transaction); Erickson v. Seattle Trust & Say. Bank (In re Freeborn),
94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P2d 424 (1980) (Assignment oCa real estate contract is an Article 9
transaction); Krasnowiecki, Miller, and Ziff, "The Kennedy Mortgage Company Bank-
ruptcy Case: New Light Shed on tbe Position of Mortgage Warehousing Banks," 56 Am.
Bankr. U 325 (1982).
:l3a Melrose Park Nat'l Bank v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 123 Ill. App. 3d 282, 284,
462 NE2d 741, 743 (1984).
22·83 SECURITY INTERESTS , 21.07(91

which should be classified as personal property and (2) the deeds of trust, which
should be classified as a real estate transaction. The court then concluded that
tbe bank's security interest in the notes was not perfected, but that Article 9,
whicb treated the bank as having a properly perfected security interest, did not
apply to the deeds of trust. The court did not explain further how the collateral
would be allocated between the trustee and tbe bank, as a result of this
conclusion."'
In a later case a conflict arose between the party holdina promissory notes
and the bank that held title to real estate wider deeds of trust securing the
promissory notes. The court held that Article 9 governed creation of a security
interest in the notes and gave tbe holder of the notes the right to tbe payments
made on the debt. The court suggested, without decidinl, that the result might
have been different had there been a foreclosure of the deeds oftrost. The issue
then would be to determine who had priority in the proceeds obtained as a result
of the foreclosure.:lolO
In summary, a security agreement may cover both real property and per-
sonal property as collateral. Real estate law governs the rights related to the
security interest in the real property; Article 9 of the UCC governs the rights
relating to the security i,nterest in the personal property.U1 In some cases, the
recordation of a mortgage or other real estate security instrument may be treated
as equivalent to the ming ofa financing statement on fIXtures under Article 9. 34'

""'In re Maryville Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 743 F2d 413, 416-417 (6th Cir. 1984).
3401n re Maryville Sav. & Loan Corp., 760 F2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1985).
u'See United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'! v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 641 F2d
185 (4th Cif. 1981); Wileyv. Bank of Fountain Valley, 632 P2d 282 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
3<2 UCC § 9.402(6). See aencrally Note, "An Article Nine Scope Problem: MortP&es,
Leases, and Rents as Collateral," 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 449 (1976).
 23
Priorities: Rights of
Competing Creditors,
Purchasers, and Transferees
11 23.0 I Priorities Between Parties With Security Interests in the Same
Collateral 23-2
[I] Unperfected Security Interests '" . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 23-2
[2] Perfected Security Interests 23-4
[a] Purchase Money Security Interests ...•...•......... 23-5
[b] Security Interests in Crops ........•........•..•.. 23-7
11 23.02 Rights of Buyers and Purchasers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-8
[I] Buyers of Goods ..................•.............. 23-8
[al Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business 23-8
[b] Buyers From Debtors Who Have Authority to Sell. . . . .. 23·11
[c] Scope of Protection for Buyers in the Ordinary Course of
Business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .. 23·15
[2] Buyers of Farm Produets-The Food Security Act of 1985 •. 23-16
[a] Reasons for Enactment. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. .. 23·16
[b] Provisions of the Act •....... . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • .. 23-18
[c] Presale Notice Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • . . . .. 23-19
[d] Notification Through a Central Filing System 23-22
[e] Debtor's Duty to Identify Buyers, Commission
Merchants, and Sales Agents. • . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . •. 23-26
[f] Scope of the Act and Federal Preemption ...•......•. 23-27
13] Purchasers ofInstruments, Chattel Paper, and Documents •.. 23-31
11 23.03 Special Priority Rules .; ...................•.•.•. _... , 23-32
{I] Proceeds .................•....•..•.•......... ;. 23-32
[2] Fixtures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23-34
[3] Rights of Unpaid Sellers of Goods ;........... 23-36
{41 Conflicts With Liens Arising Under Other Laws , 23-38
[5] Commingled or Processed Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 23-39
[6] Subordination Agreements , 23-40

23-1
1123.01 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-2

~ 23.01 PRIORITIES BETWEEN PARTIES WITH SECURITY

INTERESTS IN TIlE SAME COLLATERAL
This section explains the rules that detennine the priorities between secured
parties when there is more than one secured party with a security interest in the
same collateral. The rights of the holder of an unperfected security interest as
against other claimants of all types, purchasers, lien creditors, and so forth, are
discussed first. The situation in which there are, two secured parties who both
have a perfected security interest in the same collateral is discussed next. The
rights of buyers of goods and other purchasers of property in which a secured
party has a perfected security interest are discussed in a later section, as are the
priority rules for proceeds, fixtures, processed goods and other special cases. It is
important to keep in mind that secured party and security interest refer to terins
defined in Article 9 of the Dec. A security interest is a consensual interest
created in personal property or fiXtures as discussed in Chapter 22. The discus-
sion of priorities focuses on persons who hold such interests.
Resolution of priority disputes is important, as it determines the rights of
competing creditors who may have to resort to the collateral to satisfy their
claims in the event of debtor default. It also may have consequences for the
detennination of rights in the collateral when lhe debtor becomes bankrupt.
Default is covered in Chapter 24 and bankruptcy in Chapter 25.

(1] Unperfected Security Interests

The secured party who fails to perfect a security interest in the collateral is
vulnerable to other creditors, purchasers, or transferees who have claims to the
same collateral. Although the general rule of the UCC is that a security agree-
ment is effective between the parties "against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors" except as otherwise provided,' there are exceptions where a
person with an unperfected security interest will lose to the claims of third
parties. The unperfected security interest is inferior to the following claimants:
1. Another secured party who has a perfected security interest in the collat-
eral. 2 It does not matter that the party with the perfected security interest
had notice of the prior unperfected security interest. 2
2. Lien creditors who obtain a lien on the collateral before the security
interest is perfected.' A lien creditor is a creditor who obtains a lien on
the property by attachment of the collateral,levy, or other judicial pro-

1 UCC § 9-201. All UCC references in this chapter are to the Unifonn Commercial
Code 1978 Official Text (West 1978).
·UCC §§ 9-301(I)(a), 9-312.
'See uee § 9-312(5)(a).
'uce § 9-301(1)(b).
23-3 PRIORITIES 1123.0111)

ceeding. A trustee in bankruptcy is viewed as a lien creditor under the

uee.' Prior to the 1972 amendments to the uee, the lien creditor had
to be without knowledge of the security interest. The 1972 amendments
deliberately eliminated the lack of knowledge requirement.'
3. A buyer of the collateral who gives value and receives delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest' and before it is
perfected, when the collateral is goods, instruments, documents, chattel
paper, or farm products.' The buyer offarm products must be a buyer in
the ordinary course ofbusiness to prevail. The buyer ofthe other types of
goods may be a purchaser in bulk or not a buyer in the ordinary course of
business.'
4. A buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness ofgoods. Except for the buyer
of farm products in the ordinary course of business, these buyers take
free of any security interest, including perfected security interests,'·
created by the seller of the goods.
S. A buyer of consumer goods. When a consumer buys consumer goods,
from a seller ofconsumer goods, that are subject to a security interest not
perfected by a flled financing statement, the buyer takes free of the
security interest in the goods if the buyer buys without knowledge of the
security interest, for value, and for his or her own personal use. '.'
6. A good faith transferee of accounts and general intangibles. A person
who is not a secured party but who acquires an interest in accounts and
general intangibles for value, without knowledge of the security interest

'veq 9-301(3).
'uee § 9-301(l)(b).
'vee § 9-301 (l){c) provides that a buyer not in the ordinary course ofbusiness who
gives value without knowledge ofthe security interest takes priority over an unperfected
security interest. In order for the secured pany to defeat the rights ofthe buyer under this
clause, the secured pany must show that the buyer had "actual knowledge" ofthe security
interest. It is not enough to show that the buyer had "reason to know." uee § 1-201(2S);
Broadway Nat'l Bank v. G&LAthleticSupplies, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d43, 47-48, 691 P2d
400,403-404 (1984).
'uee §§ 9·301(1){c), 9-301(IXd). It is not enough under this rule for the buyer or
purchaser to give value before obtaining knowledge of the security interest. The buyer
must take physical delivery of the property before knowing of the security interest when
the property consists of goods or other property, such as instruments, documents or
chattel paper, where there is a "representative piece of paper whose physical delivery is
the only or the customary method of transfer." uee § 9-301, comment 4.
'uee § 9·301(1)(c).
,. vee § 9-307( I). There are special rules for buyers in tlie ordinary course of
business of farm products under federal legislation. See infra 11 23.02[2}.
11vec § 9-307(2).
1123.01(2) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-4

and befOre it is perfected, will take an interest in that collateral, which

interest is superior to the unperfected security interesl. 12

The vee provides a ten-day grace period for a secured party to perfect a
purchase money security interest in the collateral. The secured party has ten
days, after the debtor receives possession ofthe collateral, to perfect the security
interest by filing a financing statement. 13 If the security interest is perfected
within this period, the rights of the secured party. are superior to the claims of
any transferee in bulk or lien creditor that arose between the date ofthe attach·
ment ofthe security interest and the time ofthe ming.'· This provision permits a
secured party to sell or to finance the sale ofcollateral to a debtor. It also allows
the secured party to give the debtor immediate possession and to complete the
steps required for perfecting the security interest in the collateral after deliveJ'y
to the debtor. It should be noted that this grace period does not apply to rights
that may be asserted by claimants other than transferees in bulk or lien creditors.
A comparable grace period applies to claims of competing secured parties.

(2] Perfected Security Interests

When there is more than one perfected security interest in the collateral, the
general rule ofthe vee is that priority is determined by the date of filing or the
date of perfection of the security interest. The first secured party to file or to
perfect has priority. Thus, when A holds a security interest in equipment that
was perfected by a filing on January I, and B holds a perfected security interest
in the same equipment, perfected by a filing on March 1 of the same year, A has
priority because A filed first. Under the vee, the date of filing oftha financing
statement establishes priorit}', even when the remaining steps for attachment of
the security interest to the collateral have not yet taken place.
If, in the previous example, A had taken possession of the collateral on
January 1, rather than filing a financing statement, the priority date for A would
stilI be Januaryl, assuming that the other steps for perfection of the security
interest were completed by January 1 of that year. If A then files a financing
statement on April I and releases the equipment to the debtor after the filing, A
will retain the priority previously established by possession. Priority is deter-
mined from the time A first perfected a security interest in the collateral, which
was January I, because A had a continuously perfected security interest in the
equipment since that date.· 5

.2UCC § 9-301 (J)(d).

"uee § 9-301(2).
" Id.
'·vce § 9-312(5)(a).
23-5 PRIORITIES "I23.01[2](a)

[al Purchase Money SecuritJ Interests. A secured party with a purchase

money security interest has a favored position under the Uec." When the
collateral is anything other than inventory, a person with a perfected purchase
money security interest takes priority over any other person with a conflicting
security interest in the same collateral. The following example illustrates the
operation of that rule. Assume that X has a blanket security interest in all of
debtor's equipment, including any equipment that might be acquired at a later
date, and that X filed a financing statement perfecting this security interest on
January I ofa given year. Assume further that Yfinances the sale ofa new piece
ofequipment to debtor and that Yacquires a purchase money security interest in
the new equipment that is perfected by a filing on March I of that same year.
Under the roles that give special priority to purchase money security interests, Y
has priority so long as Y perfects the security interest by filing a financing
statement within ten days of the time the debtor received the new piece of
equipment."

"See generally Jackson & Kronman, "A Plea for the Financing Buyer," 85 Yale U 1
(1975).
"uec § 9·312(4). When does the ten-day period provided for in UCC § 9-312(4)
start to run? In Bank One v. Farmers Prod. Credit (In re Miller), 44 Bankr. 716 (Bann.
ND Ohio 1984), the debtor purchased a tractor but there was evidence that the seller had
allowed the debtor use of the tractor for a week prior to the date on which the debtor
became obligated to pay for it by signing the note. A financing statement was filed within
ten days of the execution of the note, but the filing occurred more than ten days from the
date that the debtor first obtained physical possession ofthe tractor. The court said that it
must determine when the buyer was "possessed of this tractor as a debtor." The only
evidence in the record that showed when the purchaser became a debtor was the time the
debtor signed the promissory note and security agreement. Thus, the filing was within the
ten-day period. See also Note, "Purchase Money Security Interest Priority Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: When Does Section 9-312(4)'s Grace Period Begin to Run?"
48 Temp. LQ 1025 (1975).
In International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32,
34-35 (Fla. 1974), noted 26 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 708 (1976), the Florida Supreme Court
held that a party with a security interest that was perfected by filing and included after-
acquired property takes priority over a subsequent creditor with a purchase money
security interest who failed to perfect the purchase money interest within the ten-day
period orucc § 9.312(4), but that the priority ofthe first secured party extended only to
the debtor's equity in the after-acquired property. This position is contrary to the UCC
priority rules and was repudiated by legislation in Florida in 1978. Relying on this
legislation, a Florida court concluded that the "debtor's equity" principle no 10nJe[
applies. Regan v. ITT Indus. Credit Co., 469 So. 2d 1387, 1390-1391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. APP.
1984). The court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the .
debtor's equity concept ofthe International Harvester case survived the enactment ofthe
new Florida legislation. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that the "debtor's equity"
concept did not survive the enactment of Florida Statute 679.312 "thereby bringing our
interpretation ofSection 679.312, ... , the Uniform Commercial Code provision relating
to the priority of purchase money security interests, into conformity with other jurisdic-
11 23,OI(211aJ SECURITY TR4NSACTIONS 23-6

This purchase money priority provision gives the debtor some freedom
from the restrictions of the blanket prior encumbrance held by X, It promotes
purchase money financing because it relieves y from the task of checking what
prior security interests may be claimed against debtor before financing the sale
of the new equipment. The priority given to the holder of the purchase money
security interest also extends to any proceed& of the collateral in which the
purchase money security interest was held when the goods are not inventory."
Thus, in the example given, if debtor swaps the equipment in which Yholds the
purchase money security interest for some other equipment, Y's priority contin-
ues into this new equipment, "
When the collateral is inventory, a similar purchase money priority provi-
sion exists. 20 However, the secured party seeking to claim the benefit of the
special priority must take additional steps. One ofthe most important of these is
to give notice to the holder of any conflicting security interest in the inventory
that is perfected by a filed financing statement. 2' In addition. a purchase money
security interest must be perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the inventory.22 A similar purchase money priority rule exists for goods deliv-
ered on consignment. according to the 1972 amendments to the Uec.u

tions and the express intent of the Florida Legislature,"ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Regan,
487 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1986).
When a debtor traded in old equipment in which the bank held a non-purchase
money security interest for new equipment in which the seller took a perfected purchase
money security interest, the bank did not have a priority interest in the new equipment.
VCC § 9-306(2) is not a priority provision. VCC § 9-312(4) applies and gives priority to
the sel1er's purchase money security interest. Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Lynch Farms.
Inc., 387 NW2d 593, 595-596 (Iowa 1986).
"vcc § 9-312(4). Proceeds are discussed infra 1123.03{1).
"When Ii transaction involves a contracl with a U.S. aaency, federal rights may
override vec provisions. In one case, a manufacturer had a contract with the Oopan-
ment ofthe Army to supply cylinder heads. The Army contract contained a "title-vestinl"
clause that gave the Army title to all materials, inventories, special tooling, and so fonh.
that were chargeable to the contract. The manufacturer purchased a machine for use in
performing the contract, and financed the machine with a bank who took a purchase
money security interest in it. Even though VCC rules permit the purchase money security
interest of the bank to have priority if the bank had complied with all of the Anicle 9
provisions, the question arises as to whether the "title-vestina" provisions of the U.S.
contract created a federal interest superior to the bank's Article 9 security interest, A
bankruptcy coun, using archaic title-passing reasoning, concluded that the federal inter-
est should prevail. but the opinion was vacated by the district coun for lack ofjurisdiction
over the subject matter. In re Denalco Corp., 5 I Bankr. 77, 78. 80-81 (Bankr. ND 111.
1935), dismissed, 57 Bankr. 392 (ND Ill. 1986).
20uee § 9-312(3).
u vec § 9-312(3Xb).
"vec § 9-312(3Xa).
"UCC§ 9-114.
23·7 PRIORITIES , 23.01[2)(b)

When a purchase money security interest has priority in inventory, that

priority carries over into any "identifiable cash proceeds" received before deliv-
ery ofthe inventory item to a buyer.'· Thus, ifinventory is sold and an account is
established representing the amount owed by the buyer to the seller, the secured
party with the purchase money security interest may not claim the special
purchase money priority in the account, even when the accQunt is identifiable as
proceeds, because it is not "cash proceeds. "8 On the other hand, if cash or a
check is received on sale of the inventory, the holder of the purchase money
security interest may claim priority in these proceeds, so long as they are
"identifiable" and received by the debtor "on or before the delivery of the
inventory" to the buyer." Prior to the 1972 amendments to the uee, the rules
were unclear as to whether the purchase money priority extended into proceeds
obtained upon the sale of the inventory.
Further, the uee is not clear on how to determine relative priorities when
the conflicting security interests are both purchase money security interests. In
United States \I. Cahall Bros.," the court assumed, without directly addressing
the issue, that the first party to file would have priority. However, it could also be
argued that the parties should be equal in priority with a pro rata interest in the
collateral. In John Deere Co. \', ProdU1:tion Credit Ass'n," two secured parties had
purchase money security interests in the same equipment. One obtained the
purchase money security interest by advancing funds enabling the debtor to
acquire the equipment; the other obtained a purchase money security interest
because he sold the equipment and retained a security interest for the unpaid
portion of the purchase price. The court determined that priority should be
based on the principal of"first to file" and rejected a pro rata apportionment of
the collateral between the two creditors.

[b) Security Interests In Crops. A special rule exists for a security interest
perfected in crops that is similar in concept to the priority for purchase money
security interests. This rule applies when the secured party has given the debtor
new value to enable the debtor to produce the crops during the current produc-
tion season, and when the value is given not more than three months before the
crops are planted. The perfected security interest in the crops takes priority over
an earlier perfected security interest to the extent that the earlier security interest
secures older obligations ofthe debtor that were due more than six months prior
to the planting ofthe crops. 2' The priority for the new crop financing holds even

2·UCC § 9.312(3).
"See UCC § 9-306(1).
•• UCC § 9-312(3}.
27 674 F2d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 1982).
'·686 SW2d 904, 908 (Tenn. Ct. App. (984).
2t UCC § 9.312(2),
, 23.02(1 )(al SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-8

when the secured party who gave the new value knew of the earlier security
interest. For example, assume that Bank A has made a loan of $800.000 to a
farmer debtor. That loan, which obligates the debtor to pay monthly amounts
representing payments on the principal amount of the debt plus interest and
taxes of S12,000 per month, is secured by a mortgage on the real estate, which
mortgage also creates a security interest in all crops grown on the land. The
special priority rule for new crop financing allows Bank B to loan funds to debtor
to grow a new crop, as long as the loan is made and the value given within three
months of the time "the crops become growing crops by planting or other-
wise ...• "10 Ifthe planting date is April I, the value from the loan by BankBmust
be made after January 1. Bank B will not have priority over the full amount of
the obligation owed to Bank A, as occurs with the regular purchase money
prioritY rule, because the priority extends only to tile obligations to Bank A,
which became due more than six months before the crops were planted or
otherwise started growing. The six months' date under'this example WQuld be
October 1. The obligations to Bank A that become due after October 1 are not
subject to the special priority rule. As to this part ofthe debt owed to Bank A, the
priority dispute with Bank B over whose security interest had priority would be
governed by the normal first-to-file-or-perfect rule. Under this rule, Bank A
takes priorit)' to the extent of the obligations that became due after October 1.
Further, this special priority rule applies only to security interests in crops that
Bank B financed. The priority of security interests in other collateral will be
determined by the general rules, such as the first-to-file rule discussed
previously.

~ 23.02 RIGHlS OF BUYERS AND PURCHASERS

[1] Buyers of Goods
(al Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business. Special protection is given the
buyer in ordinary course ofbusiness for goods other than farm products. 31 Such a

:&II vee § 9-312(2).

31uee § 9-307(1). The special farm products rules are discussed supra f 23.02[2].
Bulk transfers receive special treatment under the UCC. See Hansell & Austin, "Bulk
Transfers Under Anicle 6 of the Iowa Uniform Commercial Code Revisited," 31 Drake
L. Rev. 383 (1981). The vee definesa bulk transfer as "any transferin bulk and not in the
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies,
merchandise or other inventory ... ofan enterprise subject to this Article." § 6-102( I). It
also includes "a transfer of a substantial part of the equipment ... of such an enter-
prise ... if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory." § 6-102(2). The
scope ofthe article was examined in Republic Steel Corp. v. Canyon Culvert Co., 104 NM
396. 398-400, 722 P2d 641, 649-650 (1986). Buyer purchased equipment from seller,
who soon after went out of business by selling its inventory and remaining equipment to
another firm. Seller's creditor claimed the sale ofequipment was a bulk sale within uee
23-9 PRIORITIES 11 23.02(1)la)

buyer takes free of any security interest that the seller created in the goods, even
though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows that
the security interest exists. 3' To be a buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness, the

§ 6-102(2), because it was "in connection with" a bulk transfer of inventory. The court
took a narrow view ofSection 6·( 02(2) to protect the interests ofthe buyer, who the court
found had no reason to know ofthe seller's plans to make a bulk transfer at the time ofthe
sale, even though the purchase contract promised that the seller would comply with any
applicable bulk sales requirements. Id. at 400, 722 P2d at 650.
A buyer ofgoods on credit cannot qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business
ifthe debt owed for the price ofthe goods is satisfied by canceling an offsetting debt owed
to the buyer that was in existence at the time the goods were purchased. The court said that
it did not have to decide if "all defenses to, or offsets of, a buyer's promise to pay will
disqualify the buyer from status as one in ordinary course ofbusiness... It decided this case
on the grounds that the buyer would not be in the "ordinary course of business" when the
buyer offset the promise to pay with a debt that was in existence at the time the goods were
bought. Vnited States v. Handy & Harman, 750 F2d 777, 782 (9th eir. 1984).
When a secured party seeks to enforce his or her interest in the collateral against
someone who purchased the goods from the secured party's debtor, the buyer may seek to
raise as a defense obligations owed to the buyer by the debtor that sold the goods. The
buyer may have valid rights against the debtor. When can the buyer assert such a setoff
against the secured party? When the buyer purchases the goods on credit, the promise to
pay his or her seller (the debtor) becomes an account under the vee. The secured party
gets an interest in this account as proceeds ofthe original collateral. vee § 9-318, which
covers assignments of accounts, makes the assignee of the account (the secured party)
subject to setoff rights held by the buyer. On the other hand, ifthe secured party's security
intetest continue'S in the coUateral and i'S not cut offb~ the sa\e, the secured party may sue
the buyer for conversion. In a suit for conversion, the secured party is entitled to recover,
"since the basis for a conversion suit is the secured party's superior property interest in the
inventory itself, not the assignment of the account held by the debtor." 750 F2d at 786.
The result ofthis analysis is that ifthe security interest is not cut off, the secured party may
sue and not be subject to the setoff. But if the security interest in the collateral is cut off,
the secured party must sue on the account and is subject to the setoff rights. Id.
3. vee § 9-307(1). A secured party held a security interest in an airplane that was
under construction by the seller. The seller had contracted with the buyer for the delivery
of the plane being manufactured under the condition that the buyer pay in three install·
ments: on signing the contract, on two-thirds completion, and on final delivery. The
secured party was the seller's inventory financer, who held a security interest in all ofthe
seller's work in progress. The secured party seized the plane to satisfy the seller's debt
when the plane was substantially completed. As the buyer had made two of the progress
payments on the plane, the buyer brought an action against the secured party to recover
the aircraft and tendered the third installment payment directly to the secured party, after
a deduction for work required to be completed. The court held that the buyer's remedies
against the secured party were not limited to those the buyer might have had to recover the
goods directly from the seller, because this was a situation where a third party had
wrongfully interfered with the buyer's rights. Holding that the buyer was a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, the court ruled that the buyer's interest in the plane was
superior to the secured party's, notwithstanding that there had been no passage oftitle nor
delivery of the goods. This interest entitled the buyer to possession of the aircraft or
damages for conversion. Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 Bankr. 458,
459-460, 462-463 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
11 23.02(ll1al SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23·l0

buyer must purchase from someone who is in the business ofdealing in goods of
that kind.:13 Thus, this provision applies primarily to buyers who purchase goods
that, in the hands of the seller, constitute inventory.
A buyer in the ordinary course of business buys in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale violates any ownership rights or security interest of a
third party." Under these limitations, the buyer takes free of any security
interest "if he merely knows that there is a security interest which covers the
goods." However, the buyer who knows, "in addition, that the sale is in violation
of some term in the security agreement not waived by the words or conduct of
the secured pany" will take subject to the security interest." This rule was
applied in a case where officers of the debtor, an automobile dealer, arranged a
sham sale to themselves of automobiles in the debtor's inventory in order to.
obtain double financing of the inventory in violation of the security agreement'
with the first secured party. The officers could not qualify as buyers in the
ordinary course of business. The party who financed their purchases was subject
to the original security interest of the first secured pany because that security
interest continued in the collateral, notwithstanding the sale, and was not cut off
by the sale to the officers. 3I
One court has held that a purchaser may qualify as a buyer in the ordinary
course ofbusiness even though title to the goods purchased had not yet passed to
the buyer and delivery of the goods had not taken place. In this case, the buyer
bought a drill from a dealer. The dealer had to obtain a drill to fill the order from
a supplier. The supplier delivered a number of drills to the dealer retaining a
security interest to secure their price. Upon receipt of the drills, dealer arranged
for one to be delivered to the buyer, but before delivery could occur, the supplier
seized the drill under its security agreement. The buyer then sued the supplier
demanding the drill. The court held that the buyer was entitled to prevail as a
buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness even though title had not yet passed and
the drill had not yet been identified to the contract. 31
A buyer in the ordinary course of business does not include one to whom
goods have been transferred "in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.'..
Thus, although a secured party may be a "purchaser" under the UCC, "it will be

33 UCC § J·201(9).
.. Id. A purchaser of a car qualified as buyini in good faith under Dee § 9·307(2),
even though he did not receive a certificate of title with the sale. Dion v. Silver City
Dodge, Inc., 398 Mass. 58, 495 NE2d 274 (1986).
35 UCC § 9-307 comment 2.
"First Nat'j Bank & Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 231 Kan. 431,434-435,646
P2d 1057,1061-1062 (1982).
3' Wilson v. M '" W Gear, 110 III. App. 3d 538, 539-541, 442 NE2d 670, 671-673
(1982).
"'ucc § 1-201(9).
3' See UCC § 1·201 (32).
23-11 PRIORITIES , 23.02[1][b]

difficult for a secured party to qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of

business." In one case, property was given by tile owner to the bankrupt under a
contract of bailment. A secured creditor of the bankrupt claimed the property
under its security interest. Because the bankrupt was a bailee, the owner's
interest was not a security interest and thus uee § 9-307, relating to the rights of
buyers in the ordinary course of business, did not apply. The case in fact arose
under uee § 2-403, dealing with bona fide purchasers. Under that section, only
buyers in the ordinary course of business prevail over the rights of owners who
have entered into bailment arrangements. The result is that the uee provides
greater protection for a bailor ofgoods than for a seller who reserves a security
interest. 0' Although the bailment was attacked as being a contract for the sale of
goods at a future time rather than a bona fide bailment, the court found that the
transaction showed an intention to avoid any ownership rights in the bailee until
the condition called for in the' contract had occurred. 02 That condition was the
destruction ofthe goods. The bailor, Kodak, had compelling business reasons for
retaining control over the goods until their destruction. The goods were fIlm of
an inferior quality, fIlm that Kodak did not want to get into the possession of
others."'
In another case in which goods were purchased under circumstances where
the buyer would otherwise have qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, except that a portion'ofthe purchase price was paid with new value and
another portion paid by treating the transfer as in satisfaction of an antecedent
debt, one court has held that the transaction may be fractionalized. That portion
for which new consideration was given was treated as a transaction where the
buyer had bought in the ordinary course of business. That portion of the goods
purchased by releasing the antecedent debt did not qualify for buyer in the
ordinary course of business treatment."

[bl Buyers From Debtors Who HaTe Authority to Sell. When a secured party
entrusts goods to a debtor who is in the business of selling such goods, the
circumstances may justify the finding that the secured party has waived or is
estopped from enforcing the security interest against a buyer ofthe gocxis. Under
the uee, buyers of goods take free of any security interest created by the seller

.. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Inc.), 639 F2d 1213,
1215-1216 (5th Cir. 1981), reb'g denied.
"639 F2d at 1216.
42Id.at 1217.
Old. at 1214, 1217.
"Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bohemia, Inc., 61 Or; App. 57,62-63, 655 P2d
1073, 1078-1079 (1982). But see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co.,
302 F. Supp. 958, 964 (D. Or. 1969).
11 23.02[lJ(b! SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-12

when the secured party has authorized the sale or disposition of the goods...
Authority to sell may be found in the security agreement or "otherwise,"" thus
leaving open the possibility that a purchaser ofgoods could establish that under
the circumstances, the secured party should be estopped from denying authority,
in the debtor, to sell the collateral. Notwithstanding an express term in the
security agreement forbidding the debtor to sell the collateral without the
secured party's consent, the course of performance or course ofdealing between
the parties may be the basis for finding a modification or waiver of the need for
consent. If such waiver can be shown, the sale by the debtor may be deemed to
have been authorized by the secured party, with the result that any buyer, not
just the buyer in ordinary course, may take the goods free from the securitY
interest."
A secured party who was financing debtor's cattle operations was held to
have waived in its security agreement the term prohibiting the debtor from
selling cattle without the consent of the secured party by allowing the debtor to
follow a course of business of selling the cattle without the secured party's
consent. At first, the debtor promptly acoounted and remitted to the secured .
party for the sales. When the debtor encountered financial difficulties, the
debtor diverted the proceeds to other creditors. The secured party then
attempted to recover from the persons to whom the debtor had sold the cattle.
claiming that the sales had been unauthorized and constituted conversion of its
collateral. The court held that the secured party's acquiescence in this pattern of
conduct constituted authorization for the sale of the collateral resardless of the
express terms of the security agreement." Numerous cases on this issue involve

"VCC § 9-306(2).]n Home Sav. Ass'n v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 101 Nev. 595,
597-598,708 P.2d 280, 282-283 (1985), General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC)
financed dealer's inventory of mobile homes. As the dealer sold mobile homes, the
purchasers financed their acquisition through Home Savings. The dealer continued to
hold one unit on its lot although it had been sold. The reasons for holdina the unit were not
clear; the court suggested it might have been for lack of a sufficient down payment to
remove the unit or might have been because the purchasers had not yet located a lot on
which to install the mobile home. In any event, when the dealer defaulted, GECC and
Home Savings both claimed the unit. The court concluded that as GECC had authorized
the sale to purchasers, those purchasers took free of the security interest of GECC and
gave Home Savings a valid security interest in the unit. The court could have come to tile
same conclusion by finding that the purchasers were buyers in the ordinary course of
business unc1cr uec § 9-307, but they would then have had to decide if the special
circumstances of the sale where the dealer retained possession were relevant to buyers'
status as buyers in ordinary course of business. Id. at 602, 708 P2d at 287.
"ucc § 9-306(2).
41 UCC §§ 2-208(2}, 2-208(3). See Comment, "Federal Leaislation Provides Protec-
tion For Buyers of Farm Products: Food Security Act Supersedes The Fann Products
Exception ofUCC Section 9-307(1 )," 47 U . Pitt. L. Rev. 749 ([986).
46 Anon, Inc. v. Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n, 446 NE2d 656, 661-6()2 (Ind. Ct. ApI'.
1983) (discussing cases on implied waiver by a secured party oflimitations on the debtor's
authority to sell the collateral). See Miami Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Klipfer (In re
Klipfer), 62 Bankr. 290, 295-296 (SD Ohio 1986). A secured party waived its security
23-13 PRIORITIES ~ 23.02111ibl

farm products, since the '''farm products" exception in UCC § 9-307( I) makes a
security interest in such collateral effective even against a buyer in the ordinary
course of business." The problems with the farm products exception led to
federal legislation, which is discussed later in this chapter.

interest in farm products when it told the sales agent to malee the check for the sales
proceeds payable only to the debtor and to deliver it to him. UCC § 9·306(2).
•• When a secured pany allowed a farmer whose livestock he was financing to sell the
livestock and account for the proceeds from the sale to the secured pany, the farmer had
authority under uee § 9-306(2) to sell the livestock free of the secured pany's security
interest. notwithstanding tnat the security agreement did not authorize the farmer to sell
or to use the proceeds for any purpose other than to repay the loan. Therefore. the secured
pany could not sue the purchaser of the livestock for conversion, because there was no
security interest in the livestock in the hands of the purchaser. Ottumwa Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Heinhold Hog Market, Inc., 340 NW2d 801, 802-803 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).
However, when the debtor sells livestock in violation of the security agreement in a
manner that is different from their established course of dealing (as when the debtor
transferred the livestock in panial satisfaction ofa preexisting debt), the transaction is not
otherwise authorized by the secured pany as provided by UCC § 9-306(2), under the
theory that a prior course of dealing could constitute authority in the debtor to dispose of
the collateral. Thus, the secured pany's perfected security interest would continue,
notwithstanding the sale, and would have priority over the interest of the transferee.
Larsen v. Warrington, 348 NW2d 637,641-642 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). See also Humboldt
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Entler, 349 NW2d 778, 781-782 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the disposition of the collateral was within a prior course of dealing).
A course of dealing was established wherein the secured pany never required the
debtor to obtain the secured pany's consent before selling cattle subject to the security
interest, as required by the security agreement. The debtor's sale ofthe cattle was therefore
free of the security interest. Parkersburg State Bank v. Swift Indep. Packing Co.• 764 F2d
512,514 (8th Cir. 1985). Although the security agreement may require the debtor to
obtain the secured pany's written consent before selling collateral (in this case, cattle), if
the secured pany authorizes the sale, the security interest in the collateral will not be
effective against the purchaser, even though the secured pany's authorization was not in
writing. Colorado State Bank v. Hoffner, 701 P2d lSI, 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). Where
the creditor has orally consented to the sale ofcattle in which it held a security interest, the
purchasers ofthe cattle take free ofthe security interest, despite the secured pany's having
expressly conditioned the sale upon the debtor's remitting the proceeds of the sale to the
secured pany. People's Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Excel Corp., 236 Kan. 687, 690-692, 695
P2d 444, 447-449 (1985).
When the. debtor transfers collateral without authorization from the secured party
and does so under circumstances where the transferees do not otherwise qualify for the
rights of!lood faith purchasers who would take priority over the secured party, the security
interest in the collateral continues and remains effective asainst the transferee. The
secured pany has a cause of action against the transferee for conversion. Ranier v.
Gilford, 688 SW2d 753, 754 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). In United States v. New Holland Sales
Stable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1379, 1382, 1386 (ED Pa. 1984), a broker who sold cattle for the
debtors was found liable for conversion of the cattle, because the cattle were subject to a
security interest and were sold without the consent of the secured pany. The case was
decided under federal law because the United States, through the Farmers Home Admin-
istration (FHA), held a security interest in the cattle. Liability was fOllnd, even though the
broker lacked knowledge of the defect in the debtor's title to the cattle. If the case had
a.risen under UCC § 7-404, it might. have prodUCed a different result. UCC § 7-404
provides that a bailee' who acts in good faith and who observes reasonable commercial
OJ 23,02{11lb1 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23·14

In Farmers State Bank v. Webel, $0 the court had to determine whether goods
were farm products purchased from a seller engaged in farming operations or
inventory purchased from a person in the business of selling, to decide if the

standards in dealing with goods that the bailee has received will not be liable for such
actions.
A coun concluded that a secured bank should be deemed to have consented to its
debtor's sale of collateral, even though the security agreement prohibited sale without the
bank's consent and the bank's consent was lackinJ. The coun reasoned that if the debtor
had given the secured pany the proceeds from the sale, the secured party would not have
objected to it. Moffat County Slale Bank v. Producer's Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 598 F.
Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo. 1984), aff'd, 833 F2d 908 (lOth Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Coun of South Dakota held that a secured pany did not waive its
security interests by its course ofconduct nor otherwise authorize the debtor to disposl: of
Ihe goods in a case where the debtor had a history of cattle sales without obtaining written
advance consent required by the security agreement. The suit was brought by Aberdeen
Production Credit Associalion against the auction company that sold the livestock. The
credit association held a perfected security interest in the livestock. The relevant security
agreements required the debtor, Bellman Fanns, to obtain advance written authorization
of the credit association before selling the cattle. Although the credit association antici-
pated that the debtor would sell cattle to meet its obligation, this expectation did not
amount to a waiver of the requirement for advance written consent, and there was no
conduct "otherwise" authorizing sale of the collateral by the debtor. The coun stated:
The previous course of dealing amounted to nothing more than PCA's failure to
impose some form of creditor discipline against Bellman Fanns for selling cattle on
prior occasions without written consent. Considering the fact that these particular
sales were made without PCA's knowledge, sale barns' argument that PCA failed to
protect itself ignores reality, . , . When Bellman Farms sold secured J:attle and paid
over the proceeds to PCA, peA was presented with an accomplished fact. Since PCA
was not prejudiced by such sales. to now argue that PCA's failure to nevertheless
rebuke Bellman Farms or to call the loan constituted a waiver ofthe security agree-
ment in the subsequent unreported sales is not persuasive.
Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Redfield Livestock Auction,Inc.• 379 NW2d 829; 832 (SD
1985).
The FHA held a lien on fanner's cattle and sued commodity brokers who sold the
cattle for conversion, because their debtor, the farmer. had not fully paid the proceeds
received from the sale to the FHA. In an alternative holding, the court mled the FHA had
consented to the sale, thus tenninating its security interest. The court reached this result
by using UCC § 9-306 as the source for what the federal law should be, recognizing that
United States v. Kimbell Foods. Inc., 440 US 715 (1979), made the question a matter of
federal law. The FHA had adopted a regulation that it claimed preempted state law on this
point. Alternatively. the coun maintained that the regulation did not apply under the facts
of the case, and, if it did, would not displace the UCC as the source of the federalla",:
"Kimbell's holding is in effect a finding that in the area of federal lending programs
regulations such as [this], enacted under a general enabling provision. do not constitute
the son of explicit 'congressional directive' that will displace the application ofstate law
as the federal rule of decision," United States v. Walter Dunlap &. Sons, Inc. 800 F2d
1232. 1237, 1239 (3d Cir. 1986).
But see United States v. Missouri Fanners Ass'n, Inc., 800 F.2d .185, 187-188 (8th
Cir. 1986). which held that the FHA regulation applied, rather than state law. but that
conditions for release of the lien were met.
110 113 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90-92, 446 NE2d 525, 528-530 (1983).
23-15 PRIORITIES , 23.0211 JI c]

purchaser was entitled to protection as a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-

ness. If the goods were farm products, the farm products eltception in UCC § 9-
307( I) would allow the security interest to prevail, even as against a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. The buyer bought pigs from a seller whose business
was buying and selling feeder pigs and, sometimes, fattening them. The court
concluded that the seller was a marketing agency that sold inventory and not
farm products. Therefore, the purchaser could be a buyer in the ordinary course
ofbusiness who took free ofany security interest in the pigs granted by the seller.

Ie] Scope of Protection for Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business. A

buyer in the ordinary course of business only takes free of security interest that
the buyer's seller creates in the goods. If the seller has obtained goods already
subject to a security interest, created by the person who transferred the goods to
the seller, the buyer takes the goods subject to that security interest. This
situation often arises with automobiles. In one case, First Tennessee Bank had a
security interest in a car owned by the Brughs. The Brughs took the car to Tom
Woods Used Cars to sell it. Woods sold the car to plaintiff, who paid Woods, but
Woods did not payoff Tennessee Bank for its interest in the car or pay the
Brughs. Woods then went bankrupt. Plaintiff sued First Tennessee Bank to
establish her title to the car. The court said that plaintiff would not take free of
the security interest as a bu}'er in the ordinary course of business from Woods,
because the security interest in the car was not created by Woods.
The court avoided having to reach that result. It decided the case under the
provisions ofUCC § 2-403, which deals with the rights ofgood faith purchasers
ofgoods against persons claiming an interest in the goods. Although that section
does not expressly identify whether a secured party may fall within its provi-
sions, it does state that Article 9 governs the rights "ofother purchasers ofgoods
and oflien creditors .... "51 In any event, Section 2-403(2) provides that one who
entrusts goods to a merchant who sells goods of that kind will have no claim to
the goods from a buyer in the ordinary course of business from the merchant.
When the Brughs gave the car to Woods, their action constituted an entrustment
under UCC § 2-403(2). First Tennessee Bank acquiesced in the delivery of the
car to Woods. Woods notified the bank that Woods was holding the car for sale
and the bank did not object. Although it was argued that Section 2-403 should
not be used, because Section 9·307(1) implicitly limits the scope of that section
(Section 2-403), the court regarded the two sections as compatible. The entrust-
ment provisions ofSection 2·403(2), which recognize that a party may authorize
the sale of goods by acquiescing in the conduct of the person entrusted with the
goaPs, reflect a· principle similar to that in Section· 9-306(2), which cuts off Ii
security interest when the secured party has authorized the sale ofthe collateral.
Having had knowledge ofthe delivery ofthe goods to the seller, the secured party

51 UCC § 2-403(4).
, 23.02(2)(a) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-16

"cannot lie in wait until the merchant has misled some innocent buyer and then
recover the collateral on the ground that it did not authorize the sale in
writing."12

[ll Buyers of Farm Products-The Food Security Act of 1985

[a] Reasons for Enactment. The special protection given by UCC § 9-307 for
buyers in the ordinary course of business does not apply to "a person buying
farm products from a person engaged in farming operations...., Under the
normal rule of UCC § 9-307( I), when a buyer purchases goods from a dealer
under circumstances in which the buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary.
course of business, the buyer takes free of any security interest that may exist in
the purchased goods as security for the lender who is financing the seller. The
buyer in the ordinary course of business obtains title to the goods free from the
claims of the seUer's financer, even though the buyer knew that the tinancer had
a security interest in the goods. Because of the express exception to this rule for
buyers offarm products, such buyers are exposed to significantly different risks.
The farm products buyer acquires a title to the goods that is subject to the
security interest of the seller's fmancer. This occurs regardless of the buyer's
good faith or ignorance, at the time of purchase, of the existence of the security
interest.
Application of the farm products exception to the buyer in ordinary course
rule generated a spate oflitigation. Most of this litigation focused on the ques-
tion ofwhether the financer who claimed a security interest in the goods should
be deemed to have consented to tne farmer's sale of the goods. Under common
lending arrangements, the secured party is aware of the debtor's practices in
selling farm products subject to the secured party's security interest. The secur~
ity agreement sometimes permits the sale if the debtor accounts to the secured
party for the proceeds. If a court views these arrangements or practices as

621n re Woods, 25 Bankr. 924, 926-929 (Bankr. ED Tenn. 1982). The Kansas
Supreme Court followed the entrustment theory to protect the buyer of a tractor.
Although the transaction Qualified as the ordinary course ofbusineas, uce § 9-307(1) did
not apply, because the dealer that sold the tractor did not create the security interest. The
dealer had obtained the tractor from a partnership that had acquired the tractor from the
secured party under a financing lease arrangement. Thus, the partnership "created" the
security interest in the deal with the secured party. The secured party argued that the
provisions of Article 9 should be exclusive, but the court held that the actions of the
secured party in allowing the dealer to retain possession and control of the tractor
amounted to an entrustment under uec § 2-403 to a merchant dealing in goods of that
kind. Thus, the buyers took free ofthe security interests because they bous!tt tbe tractor in .
the ordinary course of business. F.xecutive Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pagel, 238 Kan. 809,
813-815,715 P2d 381, 385-387 (Kan. 1986).
"vee § 9-307(1).
23-17 PRIORITIES 'I 23.02t2}la}

tantamount to the secured party's consent to the debtor's sale, the buyer acquires
a title to the farm products free from the security interest ofthe secured party.s,
Where there was a course of dealing or of performance between the debtor
and the secured party over a period of time, which course indicated a pattern of
acquiescence by the secured party in the sales. the course of performance or of
dealing could be viewed as a modification of the security agreement or as a
waiver by or estoppel of the secured party, which precluded the secured party
from invoking clauses in the security agreement requiring debtors to get advance
consent to the sale of the collateral. The law was further complicated as numer-
ous states amended their versions ofUCC § 9-307 to change the result for certain
purchasers of farm products.
The controversy and confusion over the rights of purchasers of farm prod-
ucts led Congress to enact the Food Security Act of 1985, which provides
legislative protection for buyers in the ordinary course of business of farm
products. The act extends its protection not just to buyers but also to commis-
sion merchants and sales agents who deal in farm products. Commission
merchants and sales agents are included because some UCC case law has made
auctioneers and other agents subject to conversion liability when they sell farm
products that were subject to security interests. The act, effective December 24,
1986, establishes a new federal rule for buyers of farm products. Congress
explained the purpose for the legislation in the following way:
This exception [in UCC § 9-307(1) for farm products] presents significant
commercial problems for buyers and sellers of farm products. With the
advent of 24-hour final payment rules for some commodities, there is
insufficient time to check for liens and, thus, greater potential liability for
buyers. In addition, with some lenders pursuing buyers several years follow-
ing their purchases, many buyers limit who they do business with, thus
restricting the markets offarmers and inhibiting the free-flow-of-commerce
in the United States.
Current State law forces innocent buyers of farm products to become
unwilling loan guarantors, in essence assuming the credit supervision
responsibilities that rightly belong with the lender who is making the profit
off the loan to begin with. At the same time, farm product buyers have no
control over the lender's practice, and receive no compensation in the form
ofinterest to cover the risk exposure and jeopardy unknowingly and unwill-
ingly assumed.
Moreover, the current exception for farm products places an undue finan-
cial burden on markets to which producers sell their commoditiC1l, thUl!>
reducing the economic vitality of our nation's domestic agricultural mar·
kets. As the problem worsens, it adversely affects individual farmers, as well

54 UCC § 9-306(2). These cases are discussed supra 1 23.02[1]. See generally B. Clark,.
The Law ofSecured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 8.4[3] (1980 &
1987 Cum. Supp.).
, 23.02(2](bl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-18

as their markets. Farmers buy products from other farmers, such as feeder
catde and pigs, breeding stock, grain and hay, and potentially may be forced
to pay twice for these products as their suppliers default on secured debts.
Risk exposure and actual losses from double payment are reflected in the
prices paid to farmers and are passed on to other producers in terms of
higher marketing fees and processing costs. and eventually are reflected in
higher consumer prices for meat, milk, and eggs, etc.
Additionally, there is a Question ofequity-is it fair to require a purchaser
of fann products to pay a second time for those commodities simply
because of a financial dispute between the producerlborrower and his
lender?
These considerations have led 20 states to "opt out" of the farm product!l
exception and establish their own central filing or notice systems. Under
such conditions, the Uniform Commercial Code is hardly "uniform" any-
more in this particular field. And with the increasingly interstate nature of
agricultural marketing, this patchwork ofrules and regulations has become
intolerable for buyers and sellers offarm products alike. Application ofthe
current myriad ofState laws has created a substantial burden on interstate
commerce in agricultural products. A single Federal rule is needed to restore
consistency to this area of the law, and remove that burden.1S

{bl Provisions of the Act. The heart of the Food Security Act reads as follows:

Except as provided in subsection (e) ofthis section and notwithstanding any

other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a buyer who in the ordinary
course of business buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming
operations shall take free of a security interest created by the seller, even
though the security interest is perfected; and the buyer knows of the exis-
tence of such interest. II
Commission merchants or selling agents receive similar protection when they
sell, "in the ordinary course of business, a farm product for others."$1
Section § 1631(b) sets forth an absolute rule protecting a buyer in the
ordinary course of business of farm products from a seller engaged in farming,
unless the person who claims a security interest in the farm products qualifies
the security interest under the notification and filing procedures of the act.
There are three circumstances under which the buyer offarm products will lake
the goods subject to a security interest that the buyer's seller created in the

15H.R. Rep. No. 271, 99th Cong., IstSess. 109, reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1213. See generally. Comment, "Farm Products Collateral: Still A Prob-
lem?" 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241 (1981); Comment. "Federal Legislation Provides Protec-
tion for Buyers of Farm Products: Food Security Act Supersedes the' Fami Products
Exception ofUCC Section 9·307(1)," 47 U. Pitt. 1.. Rev. 749 (1986).
117 USC § 1631(dl (Supp. IV 1986).
51 7 USC § 1631 (8)( I 1(Supp. IV 1986).
23-19 PRIORITIES 11 23.02[2)(c)

goods. 51 The first circumstance occurs when the buyer receives a formal written
notice of the existence of the security interest prior to the sale of the farm
products to that buyer. The other two circumstances arise when a state has
established a central filing system that qualifies under the act. If a state has a
central filing system. the security interest will be effective against a buyer who
has received an official written notice ofthe security interest from the Secretary
of State. pursuant to this central filing procedure. It also may be effective when
the buyer fails to register with the Secretary ofState prior to the purchase of the
farm productFt. Each of theFte three alternativeFt iFt discuSFted in the text that
follows.

[c) Presale Notice Procedures. If a farm products buyer gets written notifica-
tion before the sale of the security interest in the farm products, the security
interest will be effective against the buyer. Similarly, written notice preserves a
security interest against commission merchants and selling agents. The act states
the following:

(e) Purchases subject to security interest

A buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by the
seller if-
(I)(A) within I year before the sale of the farm products, the buyer has
received from the secured party or the seller written notice of the security
intereFtt organized according to farm products that-
(i) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(ii) contains.
(I) the name and address of the secured party;
(II) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured
party;
(III) the social security number of the debtor. or, in the case of a
debtor doing buFtiness other than aFt an individual. the Internal Reve-
nue Service taxpayer identification number of such debtor;
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the security
interest created by the debtor. including the amount ofsuch products
where applicable. crop year. county or parish, and a reasonable
description of the property; and
(iii) must be amended in writing. within 3 months. similarly signed
and transmitted. to reflect material changes;
(iv) will lapse on either the expiration period ofthe statement or the
transmission of a notice signed by the secured party that the statement
has lapsed. whichever occurs first; and

51 7 USC § 1631(e) (Supp. IV 1986). Regulations ofthe Secretary of Agriculture offer

additional detail on the operation of the Act. See 9 CFR pt. 205 (1987).
, 23.02(2Hc] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23·20

(v) any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by the secured

party as conditions for waiver or release ofthe security interest; and
(B) the buyer has failed to perform the payment obligations, or ... "Of

For the secured party to prevail under this section, there must be a timely
notice that is in writing and that contains the informalion required by the act. To
be timely, the buyer must receive the notice "within I year before the sale ofthe
farm products."'" The act defers to the general law of the state for when notice is
"received. "11
The notice must be given in writing by either the secured party or the seUer.
Oral notification or knowledge by the buyer of the security interest from other
sources will not suffice to protect the secured party. The buyer in ordinary course
takes free of the security interest, as long as no written notice is received, "even
though the security interest is perfected ... and the buyer knows of the existence
of such interest. "12 Further, in defining who is a "buyer in the ordinary course of
business," the act does not require the buyer to be tither in good faith or witl!.out
knowledge that the transaction violates the rights of a party with a security
interest in the goods." Taken together, these provisions seem to point to the
conclusion that formal notice must be given or the buyer prevails. This, of
course, provides greater protection for buyers than that provided by UCC § 9·
307( I). In a curious phrase, the act also states that the "written notice of the
security interest ... [must be] ... an original or reproduced copy thereof,""
The contents of the notice are set forth in the act. The notice must be
"organized according to farm products." What qualifies as an appropriate
organization is not stated. Presumably the purpose of this requirement is to
allow buyers easy identification of notices relating to the types offarm products

··7
IOId.
USC § 163t(e) (Supp.IV 1986) (footnote omilled);

11 7 USC § 1631(f) (Supp. IV 1986). There may be different definitions of receipt of

notice under state law, depending on the particular circumstances or statutory scheme,
but it would be appropriate to look to the uee in light ofthe general application ofArticle
9 of the uee to security transactions. The general provisions of the uee in Article I.
which apply to all of the other articles unless specifically modified,. state that a penon has
received notice or a notification when "(a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly
delivered at the place of business through which the contract was made or at any otber
place held out by him as the place for receipt of such communication." uee ~ I-
201(26)(a), 1-201 (26)(b). Sec also uee § 1.201(27) on notification received by an organi·
zation. See discussion of notice at 1 16.0 I[2].
82 7 USC § 1631 (f) (Supp. IV 1986).

u 7 USC § 1631 (c)( I) (Supp. IV (986).

54
7 USC § 1631(e)(l)(AXi)(Supp. IV 1986). Since every notification would seem to
be an original in its own right. and there is no one official "written notice," it is difficult to'
discern the purpose of the phrase.
23-21 PRIORITIES Il 23.02(2J(c)

they are purchasing. In addition, the notice must contain the following
information:
(I) the name and address of the secured party;
(II) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured party;
(III) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a debtor
doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue Service
taxpayer identification number of such debtor;
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest
created by the debtor, including the amount of such products, where
applicable, crop year, county or parish, and a reasonable description of
the property, etc....."
The act requires a statement in the written notice ofwhat the buyer must do
to obtain a release of the security interest, although it is grammatically difficult
to read the language ofthe subsection as saying this expressly." It is hoped that a
simple notice ofthe person to contact for directions as to payment and release of
the security interest, without elaborate detail on the amount of payment, would
be sufficient. Giving proper notice ofthe buyer's payment obligations to obtain a
release of the security interest is important since the security interest will be
effective against the buyer only if "the buyer has failed to perform the payment
obligations... .""
The notice to the buyer is effective for only one year, because the buyer must
receive it within one year of the sale of the farm product. When "material
changes" occur, which changes are not spelled out in the act, the notice must be
amended in writing and sent to the buyer within three months. For example,
under some credit arrangements, the amount of the debtor's obligation will
fluctuate as payments are made to the secured party and fresh advances are
received. Yet the notice procedures, which do not require any disclosure ofthe
amount of the debtor's unpaid debt, could become both cumbersome and unin-
formative if such changes were deemed to trigger the need for notice. Since the
"material changes" term refers to the "written notice" given to the buyer, it
would be appropriate to limit the concept to material changes in the information
required in the notice, such as, perhaps, changes in the identity or legal organiza-
tion of the debtor.
A question may arise as to when the sale has occurred, whether it be the time
of contracting, the time of payment, the time of delivery of the products to the
buyer, or some other point in time. The act offers no clarification. However,
vee § 2-106(1) may offer an analogy, as it distinguishes a "contract for sale"
from a "sale," and then defines "sale" as ."the passing oftitJe from the seller to

05
7 USC § 1631(e)(I)(AXii) (Supp.IV 1986).
"7 USC § 1631(eXI)(AXv) (Supp.IV 1986).
17
7 USC § 1631(e)(I)(B)(Supp.IV 1986).
11 23.0212J(d) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 23-22

the buyer for a price." However, under this approach, a buyer in the ordinary
course could enter into a contract with the farmer·seller and make a substantial
payment in advance of taking delivery ofthe products, but receive no protection
from security interests in the products, ifwritten notice under the act is received
after the time ofpayment but before title to the products has passed to the buyer.
The secured party or the seller may send the notice to the buyer. The act tries
to help secured parties obtain information from their debtors about the buyers,
commission agents, and selling agents with whom the buyer deals.

Id) Notification Through A Central Filing System. Ifa state chooses to estab-
lish a central filing system that the Secretary of Agriculture certifies meets the
standards of the act, there are two additional ways in which a security interest in
farm products may prevail over a buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness. The
first situation arises when the buyer fails to register with the central filing system
prior to purchasing the farm products. The second arises when the central filing
system has generated a written notice of the security interest that the buyer has
received. Similar procedures exist for registration of and notification to com·
mission merchants and selling agents. The subsection of the act applicable to
buyers is set forth below:
(e) Purchases subject to security interest
A buyer offarm products takes subject to a security interest created by the
seller if- ....
(2) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has estab-
lisbed a central filing system-
(A) the buyer has failed to register with the Secretary of State of such
State prior to the purchase of farm products; and
(B) the secured party has filed an effective financing statement or
notice that covers tbe farm products being sold; or
(3) In the case of a farm product produced in a State that has estab-
lished a central filing system, the buyer-
(A) receives from the Secretary of State written notice as provided in
subparagraph (c)(2)(E) or (cX2XF) that specifies both the seller and the
farm product being sold by such seller as being subject to an effective
fmancing statement or notice; and
(8) does not secure a waiver or release ofthe security interest specified
in such effective financing statement or notice from the secured party by
performing any payment obligation or otherwise; and ..."
Before turning to a discussion of the methods by wbich a security interest
may be made effective against buyers and others as a result of the central filing
system, the nature of this filing system and the financing statements that are to

•• 7 USC §§ 1631 (e)(2), 1631 (el(3) (Supp. IV 1986) (footnotes omitted).

23-23 PRIORITIES 11 23.0212J(d)

be filed must be reviewed. Although the terminology is familiar to persons

conversant with the scheme in Article 9 ofthe vee, the federal system is vastly
different. Following are the parts of the act that define "central filing system"
and "effective financing statement."
(2) the term "central filing system" means a system for filing effective
financing statements or notice of such financing statements on a statewide
basis and which has been certified by the Secretary of the United States
Department of Agriculture; the Secretary shall certify such system if the
system complies with the requirements 'of this section; specifically under
such system-
(A) effective financing statements or notice of such financing state-
ments are filed with the office of the Secretary of State of a State;
(B) the Secretary ofState records the date and hour ofthe filing ofsuch
statements;
(C)the Secretary of State compiles all such statements into a master
Iist-
(i) organized according to farm products;
(ii) arranged within each such product-
(I) in alphabetical order according to the last name ofthe individ-
ual debtors, or, in the case of debtors doing business other than as
individuals, the first word in the name of such debtors; and
(II) in numerical order according to the social security number of
the individual debtors or, in the case ofdebtors doing business other
than as individuals, the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer identifi-
cation number of such debtors; and
(III) geographically by county or parish; and
(IV) by crop year;
(iii) containing the information referred to in paragraph (4)(D);
(D) the Secretary of State maintains a list of all buyers of farm prod-
ucts, commission merchants, and selling agents who register with the
Secretary of State, on a form indicating--
(i) the name and address of each buyer, commission merchant and
selling agent;
(ii) the interest of each buyer, commission merchant and selling
agent in receiving the lists described in subparagraph (E); and
(iii) the farm products in which each buyer, commission mer mt,
and selling agent has an interest;
(E) the Secretary of State distributes regularly as prescribed by the
State to each buyer, commission merchant, and selling agent on the list
described in subparagraph (D) a copy in written or printed form of those
portions ofthe master list described in paragraph (e) that cover the fann
products in which such buyer, commission merchant, or selling ageIit has
registered an interest;
11 23.0212Ud\ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-24

(F) the Secretary of State furnishes to those who are not registered
pursuant to (2XD) ofthis section oral confirmation within 24 hours orany
effective financing statement on request followed by written confrrma-
tion to any buyer offarm products buying from a debtor, or commission
merchant or selling agent selling for a seller covered by such statement."
The financing statement under the act is not the same as that in Article 9 of the
lICC.
(4) The term "effective financing statement" means a statement
that-
(A) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(D) is signed and filed with the Secretary of State by the secured party;
(C) is signed by the debtor;
(D) contains,
(i) the name and address of the secured party;
(ii) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured
party;
(iii) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a
debtor doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Reve-
nue Service taxpayer identification number of S\1ch debtor,
(iv) a description ofthe farm products subject to the security interest
created by the debtor, including the amount of such products where
applicable; and a reasonable description of the property, including
county or parish in which the property is located;
(E) must be amended in writing, within 3 months, similarly signed and
filed, to reflect material changes;
(F) remains effective for a period of 5 years from the date of ming,
subject to extensions for additional periods of 5 years each by refiling, or
ming a continuation statement within 6 months before the expiration of
the initial 5-year period;
(0) lapses on either the expiration of the effective period of the state-
ment or the filing of a notice signed by the secured party that the state-
ment has lapsed, whichever occurs fust;
(H) is accompanied by the requisite ming fee set by the Secretary of
State; and
(I) substantially complies with the requirements of this subparagraph
even though it contains minor errors that are not seriously misleading. 7D .
The central filing system in the Secretary of State's office under the act is not
the same as the ming system provided for in Article 9 of the UCC. Firstly, the
financing statement the act refers to is not the same as the financing statement

I' 7 USC § 1631 (e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (footnotes omitted).

70
7 USC § 1631(c)(4)(Supp. IV 1986)(footnote omitted).
23-25 PRIORITIES , 23.02(2][dJ

provided for in uee § 9-402. The federal financing statement must meet
additional descriptive requirements, including the social security number ofthe
debtor or the debtor's Internal Revenue Service taxpayer identification number,
when the debtor is doing business other than as an individual. The description of
the farm products must include the amount of such products "where applica-
ble." The act requires that it be amended within three months "to reflect
material changes," although it is not clear what is intended by "material
changes." In shon, although a financing statement may be drafted that contains
enough information to satisfy requirements of both the Act and the uee, a
financing statement that meets only the minimal requirements of uee § 9-402
does not qualify under the act.
The federally prescribed central ming system also varies from the uee
ming system in Anicle 9, because it imposes considerably greater information
burdens on the Secretary of State. The Secretary must organize information
penaining to the med financing statements according to the type offarm prod-
uct involved, with subcategories for each product that is comprised in the
financing statements, according to:

1. The name of the debtor;

2. The social security number or taxpayer identification number of the
debtor;
3. The geographic location by county; and
4. The crop year.

The Secretary ofState also must maintain a registry for buyers offarm products,
commission merchants, and selling agents. f ' Finally, the Secretary must dis-
tribute regularly to the persons on the registry for buyers, commission
merchants, and selling agents a list of the financing statements "that covers the
farm products in which such buyer, commission merchant, or selling agent has
registered an interest."72 The Secretary is bound to provide confumation, ini-
tially on an oral basis within twenty·four hours of the request, to buyers who are
not registered,7'
The central filing system set fonh in the act is not mandatory; states may
elect not to establish such a system. If a state does not have a central filing
system, a secured creditor may obtain a security interest in farm products that
will prevail over a buyer in the ordinary course of business from the fmancer's
debtor only by complying with the prenotification procedure. When a state
adopts a central ming system, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture must certify its
compliance with the act.

" 7 USC § 1631 (c)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1986}.

"7 USC § 1631 (c)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
"7 USC § 1631(c)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 1986).
11 23.02(2](e] SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 23-26

When a state has a central filing system, the secured party must have an
effective financing statement on file for the security interest to prevail over
buyers in the ordinary course of business and the other protected parties. If the
secured party has filed, the security interest is effective under two alternative
circumstances. The first such circumstance is if the buyer failed to register with
the Secretary of State "prior to the purchase of farm products."" The second
circumstance arises when the buyer has received a notice froin the Secretary of
State ofthe existence ofthe security interest. The first circumstance is one that a
secured party may determine from periodic checks with the Secretary of State.
However, this is not a first-ta-file rule. The buyer may register at any time prior
to purchase. Once the buyer has registered, the security interest will be effective
against the buyer only if he or she has received notification.
The second circumstance (namely, notification from the Secretary ofStat~)
is the critical issue in cases in which the buyer has registered. For what obliga-
tions does the Secretary have to give notice and what happens if the Secretary
fails to give notice? The act states that the central filing system must be one
where tile Secretary "distributes regularly as prescribed by the State" a notice to
the registered buyers of financing statements on file covering the farm products
in which the buyers have indicated an interest. The act leaves it to state law to
define "regular" distribution and for how long a notice, once given to a buyer,
remains effective!' Because the act imposes a burden of receipt of notice by the
buyer from the Secretary of State, a secured party cannot rely on the sending of
notice at regular intervals to give complete protection. A buyer who registers
with the central filing system between the intervals ofthe distribution ofnotices
will not be subject to the security interest ifthe Secretary ofState fails to give the
buyer notice at the time of registration and if the purchase of the farm products
occurs before the next regular distribution of notice. Thus, as a practical matter,
the burden of notification may fall to the secured party even under the central
ming system procedures.

[e) Debtor's Duty to Identify Buyers, Commission Merchants, and Sales

Agents. The act contains a penalty provision to assist secured parties in
obtaining information from their debtors about persons who have purchased
farm products subject to their security interests. The penalty provisions become
applicable when the secured party includes a requirement in the security agree-
ment that the debtor furnish "a list of the buyers, commission merchants, and
selling agents to or through whom the person engaged in farming operations may

"See the earlier discussion ofwhen a "sale" occurs. There is no reason to believe that
the tenn "purchase" was used in Section 163l(eX2)(A) with an intent to mean a different·
time than that in Section 1631(eXI)(A) where the term "sale" i' used.
75 7 USC § 1631 (cX2)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
23-27 PRIORITIES ~ 23.01(lUIJ

sell such farm product." When the security agreement contains this require-
ment, the debtor must give the secu~d party written notice of sales to buyers
who have not been listed at least one week before the sale or who must account to
the secured party for the proceeds received from the sale of the farm products
within ten days of the sale. 7f The act does not say what the debtor must do to
"account" for the proceeds of the sale. However, the House report explains the
provision as follows:

Under this provision, an off-list sale offarm products is not wrongful if the
producer/seller promptly accounts to the lender for the proceeds ofthe sale.
The term "accounted" is used in a broad sense to permit the seller to settle
up with the secured lender through a cash payment, check, electronic trans-
fer of funds, automatic account debit, or any other comparable payment or
settlement technique that satisfies or replaces the security interest in the
farm products that were sold. For example, after sale offarm products to an
off-list buyer, the seller might endorse the buyer's check and transmit it to
the secured party; or the seller might deposit the buyer's check in his
account and then initiate an electronic transfer or debit ofthose funds to the
secured party; or the seller might, with the secured party's assent, make
arrangements for deferred payments, or even substitute other collateral for
that sold, such as other farm products, farm equipment, instruments or
documents. 77

It appears that the security agreement may specify for which obligations the
debtor has to account for proceeds of sales of farm products. In the absence of
any requirement in the security agreement to make an accounting within ten
days, the act might be read to impose a requirement on the debtor to account,
which requirement had not been agreed to in the security agreement. It would be
curious, however, for federal law to impose an obligation to account on the
debtor that is more stringent than what the secured party had provided for in tlte
security agreement itself. If the debtor fails to follow the procedures for giving
notification of off-list sales or fails to account for the proceeds, the debtor is
subject to a penalty. That penalty is a fine of $S,OOO or I S percent of the value
received for the farm product, whichever is greater. 7I How practical a remedy
this will be against debtors whose financial straits have impelled them to sell the
collateral furtively is an open question.

(1] Scope of the Act and Federal Preemption. The act is limited to transactions
in which farm products that are subject to a security interest created by their

11 7USC § 1631(h)(2)(Supp. IV 1986).

Rep. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 110, reprinted in ) 985 U.S. Code Cong. &
1f H.R.
Admin. News 1214 (hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 271).
71
7 USC § I 631(h)(3)(Supp. IV 1986).
, 23.02(21lfl SECURITY TRANSAcrlONS 23-28

seller are sold to buyers in the ordinary course of business. The key terms that
limit the scope of the act are fann products, security interests, and buyer in the
ordinary course of business. .
The term "fann product" is defined in the act with language that varies
from that of the uee; however, the differences do not appear to produce
substantially different reSUlts. The act defines farm product as "an agricultural
commodity ... or a species of livestock . . . or poultry used or produced in
fanning operations, or a product ofsuch crop or livestock in its unmanufactured
state ... that is in the possession of a person engaged in farming operations. "rl
The uee definition in Section 9-109(3) includes in the term "farm products"
goods that are "supplies used or produced in fanning operations," but there is no
comparable language referring to "supplies" in the act. The definitions under
both the act and the uee do not extend to goods such as machinery or other
equipment, although such goods may be used in farming operations.
In defining "buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness," the act and the uee
are similar. The act defines such a buyer as "a person who, in the ordinary course
of business, buys fann products from a person engaged in farming operations
who is in the business ofselling farm products. "10 The uee definition in Section
1-201(9) requires that such a buyer act "in good faith" and also be without
knowledge that the sale of the goods, although subject to a security interest,
violates the rights of the person holding the security interest in the goods." The
omission in the act of the good faith requirement appears to be deliberate. The
House conference report on the act noted that the original House bill defined
"buyer in the ordinary course of business" differently than the Senate bill. The
House definition required that a buyer who "buys the products in good faith
without knowledge of[sic] the sale is in violation ofthe ownership rights of[sic]
security interest ofa third party." The Senate bill did not include this language,
and the act follows the Senate version." Unlike the uee definition, the act is
silent on whether a buyer in the ordinary course of business may include a
purchaser on credit.
The term "security interest" in the act is comparable to the basic definition
in the uee. The uee defInition describes a security interest as "an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performaDee of an
obligation. "'3 The definition then provides details on circulJUtances involving
leases, consignments, and title reservation transactions generally, to assist in
determining when a security interest is created. The act simply states that a

1t 7 USC § 1631 (c)(5)(Supp. IV 1986).

10 7USC§ 1631(c)(I)(Supp. IV 1986).
11 See supra f 23.02[1]; vee § 9-307. comment 2.

"'H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 447. 99th Cong., lst Sess. 486, reprinted 10·1985 U.S. Code
Congo & Admin. News 2412.
13 vec § 1-201(37).
23-29 PRIORITIES t 23.02(2)(f]

security interest means "an interest in farm products that secures payment or
performance of an obligation..···1t does not provide the elaboration ofthe vee
on title reservation arrangements. Further, the broad reach of the language
defining a security interest in the general definitions of vec
§ 1-201 (37) is
limited by the scope provisions of Article 9, excluding certain transactions from
coverage. IS There is no express reference in the act that indicates an intention to
confine the definition of security interest to consensual interests created under
laws other than the UCc. For example, a mortgage lien that created an interest
in fann products is not specifically addressed by the language of the act, but the
definition is literally broad enough to apply to those interests, and the policies
underlying the act support such inclusion, regardless of whether one views the
interest in the farm products created by the mortgage as an interest arising under
real estate law or DCe Article 9."
The act affects the rights of four groups of persons:

1. Secured parties;
2. Buyers in the ordinary course of business;
3. Commission merchants; and
4. Selling agents.

It reduces the rights of secured parties from those that are granted to secured
parties under Article 9 of the veeand it expands the rights of buyers in the
ordinary course of business, commission merchants, and selling agents from
those that they otherwise would have under the vec.
Failure to follow the requirements set forth in the act does not affect the
enforceability of a security interest against parties other than those protected
under the act. In other words, as long as the secured party is concerned only
about claims from persons other than buyers in the ordinary course of business,
commission merchants, and selling agents, compliance with the act is not neces-
sary. The provisions of Article 9 of the vcestill determine when a security
interest prevails over the claim of a lien creditor and purchasers who are not
buyers in the ordinary course ofbusiness. Article 9 also controls if the issue is a
dispute over priorities between two secured parties who have financed the
debtor and who both claim a security interest in fann products of the debtor.
Thus, one strategy for secured parties might be to forgo an attempt to obtain
protection against buyers under the cumbersome procedures of the act and
instead to rely on Article 9 perfection for protection against other creditors and
to engage in a more thorough "policing" to guard against unauthorized sales..

•• 7 USC § I 63I(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).

"uee § 9·104.
"See 11 22.01[ I] for a discussion of the scope of Article 9.
11 23.02(2](fJ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23·30

The preemptive effect of the act is explicit.17 1t gives protection to the buyer
in ordinary course of business "notwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law..... The House report elaborates on the relationship of the Act
to state law in this fashion:
The bill is intended to preempt state law (specifically the so-called "farm
products exception" of Uniform Commercial Code section 9·307) to the
extent necessary to achieve the goals ofthis legislation. Thus, this Act would
preempt state laws that set as conditions for buyer protection of the type
provided by the bill requirements that the buyer check public records,
obtain no-lien certificates from the farm products sellers, or otherwise seek
out the lender and account to that lender for the sale proceeds. By contrast,
the bill would not preempt basic state-law rules on the creation, perfection,
or priority of security interests. II .

From the standpoint of the buyer in the ordinary course of business (as well
as that of the commission merchant and the selling agent), the act offers protec-
tion against the claims of persons who have financed their sellers and have taken
a security interest in the farm products to secure their financing. As indicated
previously, the scope of who is a secured party with a security interest is not
wholly clear; the term "security interest" is defined broadly, without the limita-
tions and exclusions imposed by Article 9. Nonetheless, there will be interests in
the goods that the act does not cover. For example, interests based upon involun-
tary attachment by creditors would not be security interests from which a buyer
in the ordinary course of business could take free. Also, the buyer in ordinary
course ofbusiness only takes free from security interests "created by his seUer."1O
For a security interest that was created by a debtor who then transferred the farm
products to the seller in such a form that the security interest continues, the
security interest would not be one that had been created by the buyer's seller and
would be effective even under the act against a buyer in the ordinary course of
business.
The act will probably have little effect on the line of cases that have found
protection for buyers of farm products on the theory that the secured party's
acquiescence in sales by the debtor amounted to consent to sell the farm prod-
ucts free from the security interest, and the secured party who complies with the
act will probably remain subject to an argument from the buyer that there is no
security interest to continue in the goods, because ofthe secured party's consent.
The "consent to sale" doctrine is based on UCC § 9-306(2). Although Congress
clearly expressed its intent to override the exception in uce § 9-307(1) for farm

"7 USC f 163I(d)(Supp. IV 1986).

uSee also 7 USC § 1631(g)(Supp. IV 1986).
ItH.R. Rep. No. 271, supra note 77.
""7 USC §§ 1631(d), 1631(e). uee § 9.307(1) has a comparable provision that u
discussed supra 11 23.02[1].
23-31 PRIORITIES II 23.02[3[

products, there is no mention of UCC § 9-306(2). Furthermore, congressional

purpose is to protect buyers, not secured parties, and there is no expression of
any intent to remove any other protections the law may afford buyers. Finally, as
the act became effective on December 24, 1986, it applies to existing security
interests in farm products that are sold after that date.

(3) Purchasers of Instruments, Chattel Paper, and Documents

As previously discussed in Chapter 22, instruments. chattel paper, and
documents have elements of negotiability that make them freely transferable.
Because of the transferable nature of this paper, pun:hasers to whom it is duly
transferred may acquire rights that are superior to those ofany party who claims
a security interest that is perfected in these types ofcollateral by filing. A holder
in due course of a negotiable instrument takes free of the claims of any other
persons, including secured parties, to the instrument. t1 A holder of a negotiable
document of title who has received it by due negotiation, which is a form of
transfer comparable to that which creates rights of a holder in due course on
instruments, takes title to the document free of the claims of secured parties. 12
The filing of a financing statement under the UCC does not constitute notice of
the security interest to holders of instruments or to purchasers of negotiable
documents of title. 13
When the collateral consists of chattel paper or instruments, purchasers of
this paper who give new value and who take possession in the ordinary course of
business have priority over persons with any security interest, in the paper or
instrument, created by filing. The purchaser, however, must act without knowl-
edge that the paper or instrument is subject to a security interest." When the
claimed security interest in the chattel paper or instruments exists only because
the paper or instrument constitutes the proceeds of inventory that were subject
to a perfected security interest, the purchaser's rights are superior, even in cases
where the purchaser knows that the paper or instrument was subject to the
security interest." The result ofthese rules is that a secured party who holds a
perfected security interest in inventory, and who wants additional security from
chattel paper generated when the inventory is sold, cannot be assured ofpriority
either by ming to perfect a security interest in the chattel paper or by relying on
having a proceeds interest perfected by filing. The only safe course ofaction is to

., vee §§ 3-302, 9-309.

"vee §§ 7-501, 9-309. Due negotiation is explained at f 14.05[1].
nld.
.. vee § 9-308(a).
•• vee § 9-308(b). Knowledge of the existence of the security interest wiIl be fatal,
however, where it is not "merely" a proceeds interest as would be the case when the
secured party's advances are based upon the value ofooth the inventory and the chattel
paper.
~ 23.03(1] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-32

take possession of the chattel paper, so that it may not come into the hands of a
good faith purchaser.
When inventory is sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, the
buyer takes free of the security interest held by the inventory fmancer. Ifthe sale
to the buyer is financed, the buyer has rights in the collateral that are superior to
the former inventory secured party. The buyer may use these rights to transfer a
security interest to a creditor willing to finance the buyer's purchase. A pur-
chaser of chattel paper evidencing the buyer's obligation to pay the seUer is
treated by the UCC as a transaction that finances the buyer's purchase of the
goods. Whether the buyer obtains the credit for the purchase by a direct loan
from the creditor or through an indirect arrangement in which the creditor buys
the chattel paper from the seller, the UCC pertnits the creditor who finances the
buyer to prevail over the inventory financer who had a perfected securiW
interest in the goods when they were inventory in the hands of the dealer." The
inventory financer has a proceeds interest in any chattel paper received by a
dealer on the sale of the goods, but the purchaser of the chattel paper may
acquire an interest that is superior to the proceeds interest of the inventory
financer by following the rules discussed previously in this section.
Under the UCC, a purchaser includes someone who obtains a security
interest in the collateral. '7 Thus, a second secured party may obtain priority over
an earlier secured party when the second party takes possession of the paper or
instrument and otherwise qualifies under these rules. to These rules make ming a
hazardous method for perfecting security interests in chattel paper, negotiable
documents, or instruments.

1123.03 SPECIAL PRIORITY RULES

[lJ Proceeds
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received when the collateral is sold,
exchanged, or disposed of otherwise." Proceeds may be cash proceeds (money,

., See Aetna Fin. Corp. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 482, 485 (80 Ind.
1985). The priority afforded buyers in the ordinary course of business is discussed supra
, 23.02[1).
.. ucc ~ 1-201(9), 1-201(33).
to UCC § 9-308.
"UCC § 9-306(1). Cash generated through the operation of video equipment is not
"proceeds" of that equipment; therefore, a security interest in the video equipment will
not extend to such cash. In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 Bankr. 249 (Banler. SD Fla. 1984).
A federal agricultural program's payment-in-kind payments to a farmer for not
producing a particular crop do not constitute proceeds that a secured party holding a
security interest in crops may claim. In re Binning, 45 Bankr. 9, 12 (Bankr. SD Ohio
1984); Koch v. United States (In re Mattick), 45 Bankr. 615,617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
23-33 PRIORITIES 'I123.0311J

checks, bank accounts, and the like) or noncash proceeds.'oo For example, if a
debtor sells his or her car (in which the debtor's bank has a security interest) for a
buyer's check in the amount ofS800, a buyer's promissory note for $3,000, and a
used motorcycle, the check, note, and motorcycle all constitute proceeds.
The general rule under the uee is that a security interest will continue in
any identifiable proceeds of coUateral.'o, Thus, if the security interest in the

On the other hand, in Osteroos v. Norwest Bank, Minot, 604 F. Supp. 848, 849 (DNO
1984), the court held that a security agreement covering crops and the proceeds and
products of crops was broad enough to create a security interest in payments made to the
debtor under the Federal Agricultural Payment in Kind (PIK) Program. Two decisions by
the Seventh Circuit oonsidered when a secured party's security interests extend to rights of
the debtor under a government payment-in-kind contract. In the first case, J. Catton
Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 779 F2d 1242, 1244, 1247 (7th Cir. 1985), the court held
that the secured party's interest did extent to the rights due the debtor under a payment-
in-kind contract with the Department of Agriculture. (In this case, these were rights that
arose out of a contract not to grow corn.) The security agreement covered the debtor's
crops, receivables, and proceeds ofreceivables. The second case, In re Schmaling, 783 F2d
680,683-684 (7th Cir. 1986), came to a different conclusion and held that there was no
security interest in the payment-in·kind contract. This opinion said that the rights being
claimed under the government contract were general intangibles. These general
intangibles were not proceeds of crops because no crop had been grown to exchange for1he
payment·in-kind proceeds. Thus, a security agreement covering only "crops" and "pro-
ceeds of crops" was not sufficient to give a security interest in payments made under the
payment-in-kind contract. The opinion distinguished Catton as a case where the security
agreement had been drafted broadly enough to cover the payment·in·kind contract.
A security agreement covering livestock and farm products will give the secured party
a security interest that continues to apply to the milk produced by the debtor's cows and to
the payments owed to the debtor for the sale ofthe milk. In re Potter, 46 Bankr. 536, 538
(Bankr. ED Tenn. 1985); In re Johnson, 47 Bankr. 204, 206 (Bankr. WD Wis. 1985).
For an example ofa case presenting a complex tracing issue involved in the determi·
nation of whether property qualified as proceeds in which a security interest continued,
see In re Hugo, 50 Banu. 963, 969-968 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1985). In this case, the
questions were whether the original security interest in one crop continued into funds the
debtor received for that crop, whether it then continued into the subsequent year's crop
planted by the debtor, and finally whether it continued into checks received from the sale
of that second crop.
The priority ofa chattel paper financer over an inventory financer in returned goods
continues into the new chattel paper created when the goods are sold the second time.
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc. 1 vec Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1710, 1711-1712 (WD Wash. 1986).
'oovcc § 9-306(1).
'0' VCC § 9-306(2). In Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 301 Or.
407,410-414,723 P2d 996, 999-1003 (1986), the plaintiffowned lumber that the debtor
cut and sold. The defendant finance company held a security interest in the debtor's
inventory and accounts. The court held that because the debtor did not have title to the
lumber, the defendant acquired· no interest in the convened lumber or in the accounts .
created on the sale of the converted lumber. The security interest could not att~ch,·
because the debtor had no rights in the collateral claimed by defendant. The plaintiff
could make a tracing claim to proceeds in the hands of the defendant but the defendant
1123.03(2) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 23-34

collateral was perfected originally, the security interest in the proceeds will also
be a perfected security interest for ten days following receipt by the debtor ofthe
proceeds, and will continue beyond the ten days as a perfected security interest,
when anyone of the following occurs:

1. The financing statement on the original collateral is filed in the office

where a security interest would be perfected by filing on the proceeds;
2. The financing statement covers the original cOllateral and the proceeds
are identifIAble cash proceeds; or
3. A security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the ten days
expire. '1l1

Special rules are provided when the debtor becomes insolvent. These rules allow
the secured party to trace his or her security interest into the bank accounts ofthe
debtor.'03
As with security interests in other types of collateral, the mere fact that a
secured party has a perfected security interest in proceeds does not automati-
cally give the secured party priority. The other priority rules discussed in this
chapter dealing with different types of collateral apply to proceeds as well. The
general rule is that the date offiling or ofperfection as to the original collateral is
the date of filing or of perfection as to proceeds, for purposes of applying the
"first to file or perfect" rule. 14M As discussed earlier in this chapter, purchase
money priorities sometimes carry over into proceeds.
It is important to note that under the DeC, a security agreement gives the

I.
secured party an interest in proceeds regardless of whether the Blfeement
expressly states it. 'os Also, since the 1972 amendments, there is no requirement
that the financing statement filed on the original collateral mention proceeds.

121 Fixtures
Goods are fixtures when they become so related to the real estate that a
person who has an interest in the real estate also obtains an interest in the goods.

could raise a defense of bona fide purchue. Also, the plaintiff might be able to recover
proceeds from the defendant on a theory of unjust enrichment.
102 uec § 9-306(3). These rules represent a substantial revision of the uee prior to
the 1972 amendments. Under the earlier venion ofthe uee, it was thought that security
interests could exist in collateral where there was no adequate notice to third parties.
' 03 uec §9-306(4). See 11 22.07[7] on security interests in bank accounts.
4M
' uee§ 9-312(6).
'''uee § 9·203.
101 uee § 9402. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the financing statement had to
indicate that proceeds were claimed.
23-35 PRIORITIES 11 23.03(2}

This may happen when the goods, such as an elevator or a central heating unit,
become permanently attached to the land, depending upon local law. '0'
The DeC contains an elaborate set of rules designed to govern priorities
between persons who claim security interests in goods and persons who claim
interests in goods as a result of their interest in the real estate. These rules were
extensively revised by the 1972 amendments to the DeC. In some instances, the
revisions were clarifications of what was originally intended. In other instances,
the 1972 provisions establisll major new rules for priority. As a general rule, the
priority goes to the party wllo is first in time. A security interest that is perfected
by a fixture filing'" has priority over the interest of any owner of the real estate
or creditor with an interest in the real estate when (I) the security interest is
perfected before the real estate claimants acquire an interest ofrecord in the real
estate and (2) the secured party has priority over the real estate claimants'
predecessors in title as well.'01
A secured party can obtain a purchase money security interest that has
priority over any interest of a competing real estate claimant."o To obtain this
priority, the security interest must be perfected by a fixture ming before the
goods become fixtures.'" (In certain cases, the secured party will have a ten-day
grace period after the goods become fixtures within which to make a fixture
filing.)
In addition to these general rules and comparable to the ordinary priority
rules ofthe DeC, there are several special rules that apply to fixtures. When the
collateral consists of"readily removable factory or office machines" or "readily
removable replacements ofdomestic appliances which are consumer goods," the
secured party will obtain priority if the security interest is perfected before the
goods become flXtures. 1l2 In such a situation, the security interest may be per-
fected by any method allowed by the DeC, including an ordinary ming.'" When
the conflicting claimant is a creditor who holds a lien on the real estate as a result
ofajudgment or other legal proceeding, the secured party also has priority if the
security interest was perfected by any method allowed by the DeC.'" This latter
rule was intended to give the secured party protection not only against lien
creditors but also against trustees in bankruptcy who have the rights of lien
creditors.

"'uec § 9-313{l).
'01 See'22.06[5J for a discussion of security interests in fIxtures.
'''uee § 9-3l3(4)(b).
"ouee § 9-313(4)(a).
,,, Id.
112uee § 9-313(4)(c).
""Id.
". vee § 9-3l3(4)(d).
1123.0313] SECURITI' TRANSACTIONS 23-36

Special rules protect construction mortgages. Security interests in fixtures

are subordinate to the holder of a recorded construction mortgage when the
goods become fIXtures before the completion of construction.'"
It is possible for the party with an interest in the real estate to consent in
writing to the security interest in the fixture or otherwise to disclaim an interest
in the goods as fixtures."1
When the secured party establishes priority, he or she has the right, on
default, to sever the collateral from the real estate.'" This requires, however, that
the secured party reimburse any holder ofan interest in the real estate who is not
the debtor for the cost of repairing physical damage to the property.'" The
secured party is not obligated to make any payment for diminution in value of
the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed.'''The secured party.
can be compelled to give security before being allowed to sever the collateral.'20
Lastly, goods that are "ordinary building materials incorporated into an
improvement on land" are not fixtures.'2' Such materials become part ofthe real
estate, and the only way that one can obtain an interest in them is by following
appropriate procedures under real estate security law.'~

{3] Rights of Unpaid Sellers of Goods

Ordinarily, someone who sells goods on credit without securing an interest
is simply a general creditor of the buyer. The seller retains no title to or interest in
the goods. Any attempt by the seller to reserve title is treated as an effort to create
a security interest and so must be in compliance with the provisions of Article 9
to be effective. 1l3
When a seller contracts for a cash sale but the buyer fails to pay on delivery
of the goods, the seller has a right to reclaim the goods from the buyer under
Article 2 of the vee, which generally covers sales of goods. th When the buyer

'uec § 9-313(6).
15

"'ucc § 9-313(5).
'" UCC § 9-313(8).
118 Id.
119Id.
12°ld.
12'UCC§ 9-313(2).
122 See llenerally M. Schroeder, "Security Interests in Fixtures," 1975 Ariz. S1. U 319.
'23 See UCC §§ 1-201(37),9-102.
'"" See vec §§ 2-507,2-511. A good faith purchaser from the original buyer will cut
off the rights ofthe cash seller, however. VCC § 2-403. When the purchaser has resold the
goods to a person who qualifies as a good faith purchaser, the right of reclamation is lost.
Although the good faith purchaser may have paid the original buyer who is still holdina
these proceeds, one court has held that the right ofthe seller to reclaim the goods does not
extend to a right to reclaim the proceeds. Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In
re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F2d 686, 690-691 (9th Cir. 1984).
23-37 PRIORITIES ff 23.03(3)

pays by a check that subsequently is dishonored, this rule also applies.'2s In some
cases, the goods may be sold to a buyer who has given a security interest in them
to some secured party. In such cases, the unpaid seller's right of reclamation
conflicts with the security interest. The question ofwho has the best claim to the
goods has attracted considerable attention. The case law has favored the claim of
the financing bank over that of the unpaid sellers.' 26
Persons who sell goods to buyers who become insolvent immediately after
receipt of the goods have a limited right to reclaim the goods under the UCC.'27
It is possible for similar conflicts to arise between a seller of the goods who is
entitled to reclamation because of the buyer's insolvency and a secured party
who claims a security interest in the goods. Under the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit, the secured party would prevail. 121
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 clarifies the rights of unpaid sellers to reclaim
goods when the goods are delivered to a buyer who becomes insolvent. Section
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code makes the trustee's rights to the goods subject to
any "statutory right or common-law right" of the seller, such as the right con-
tained in the DeC discussed previously, if the seller makes a demand in writing
for the goods within ten days after the debtor receives them.
The DCC gives the seller a related right over goods that are in the possession
ofa carrier or other bailee for delivery to the buyer when the seller discovers that
the buyer has become insolvent. The seller can stop delivery of such goods in
transit.'2' In a case involving the delivery of 6,550 tons of raw sugar, the trustee
in bankruptcy claimed that the seller could not stop delivery, because the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act gave the trustee power over the goods that was
superior to the rights ofthe unsecured seller. The trustee argued that the seller's
right to stop delivery in transit constituted a statutory lien that the trustee could
avoid under Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code, and that in any event, the
trustee had obtained a perfected lien in the goods on the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code § 544(aXl), and that perfected
lien was superior to the interest of the seller. The federal district court rejected
the trustee's arguments and upheld the right of the seller to stop delivery while
the sugar was in transit. The court reasoned that Section 546(c) of the Bank-

125UCC § 2-S 11(3).

'21 The leading case is In re Samuels & Co., S26 F2d 1238 (Sth Cir. I 976),cert. denied,
429 US 834 (1976). Accord First Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, I S3 Ind. App. 71,286 NE2d 203
(1972). See generally B. Clark. The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform
Commercial Code U 8.4[S], 10.6[S] (1980 & Cum. Supp.) (hereinafter B. Oark).
127 UCC § 2-702(2).
'2' In re Samuel & Co., S26 F2d 1238 (Sth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US 834(1976).
It should be noted that the Packers and Stockyard Act has been amended to reverSe the
result in the Samuels case. 7 USC § 196 (1982). But see In re American Food Purveyors,
Inc., 17 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 436, 441-443 (ND Ga. 1974). See generally J. White
& R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 24-9 (2d ed. 1980); Romans, "Seller's Right
of Reclamation Under the Bankruptcy Code," 41 La. L. Rev. 1159 (1981).
'2'UCC § 2-705.
1123.03(4] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-38

roptcy Code gave the seller a limited right to reclaim, even after the goods came
into the possession of the debtor, so the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code must
have contemplated that the seller would retain the leiS drastic remedy of
preventing delivery of the goods to the insolvent buyer in the first place. The
court also held that the automatic stay provisions did not apply to the seller's
action in exercising the right to stop in transit.':SO

(4] Conflicts With Liens Arising Under Other Laws

On occasion, collateral subject to a security interest may become subject to a
lien arising under common law or other law apart from the vee.
Examples
include liens given to persons such as garagemen, and other people who provide
materials or perform services with respect to the collateral. The vee
makes
these liens superior to the security interest in the collateral, so long as the lien
claimant furnishes the services or the materials in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. '3' The security interest prevails only when there is an express statutory
direction to the contrary. '32

130 10 re National Sugar Ref. Co., 27 Bankr. 565. 567, 572-573 (Bankr. SONY 1983).
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Act permits the seller to reclaim lOods from a buyer
who received the goods while insolvent if the seller has such a right to reclaim under state
law. The UCC provision that allows a seller to reclaim also requires the buyer to have
received the goods while insolvent. The standard for insolvency under the Bankruptcy Act
is more restrictive than the definition ofinsolvency in the UCC, which includes someone
who has ceased to pay his or her debts in the ordinary course of business or who cannot
pay debts as they become due. The federal bankruptcy definition of insolvency in Sec-
tion 101(29) ofthe Bankruptcy Act requires that the debtor be insolvent in a balance-sheet
test ofshowing more debts than assets. Two bankruptcy courts have held that the provi-
sion ill the Bankruptcy Act should be interpreted as requiring the buyer to be "insolvent"
u that term is defined in the Federal Act. In re Storage TechnolOlY Corp., 48 Bankr. 862,
863-864 (D. Colo. 1985); In re Furniture Distrib., Inc., 45 Banler. 38, 42 (Banu. D. Mass.
1984).
A seller who has made a timely demand under UCC § 2·702 and Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c) for the return of unpaid goods delivered to a bankrupt does not lack a remedy
when the bankrupt fails to return the goods under Oliver Rubber Co. v. Griffin Retreadina
Co., 56 Banke. 239, 240-241 (D. Minn. 1985), affd, 795 F2d 676 (8th Cir. 1986). In that
case, where the seller had made a timely demand but the bankrupt disposed ofthe goods
before the seller could sue to enforce the claim to the goods, the coun held that the seller
was entitled to the priority of an administrative expense claim.
'3' UCC § 9-310. In United Parcel Servo v. Weben Indus. Inc., 794 F2d 1005, 1009
(5th Cir. 1986), the interest of a subcontractor under a state law "trust" doctrine gave the
subcontractor an interest in retained payments under a construction contract that was
superior to the perfected security interest of a bank in the payments owed under the
construction contract to its debtor, the contractor. This result was obtained although the
state version ofUCC § 9-3 10 provided that a perfected security interest was superior to a
materialman's lien.
132UCC § 9-310. See generally Note, "Priority Between Security Interests and Liens
Arising by Operation ofLaw in Oregon," J 2 Willamette U 173 (1975). A state statute that
23·39 PRIORITIES 1I23.03[5J

Another situation in which uee security interests may conflict with other
liens is that of the landlord's lien. The uee does not apply to landlord's liens
and there is no rule in the uee to govern priority between these conflicting
claimants. Another area ofconflict that has proven troublesome is that involving
rights of equitable subrogation, such as those rights claimed by sureties on
construction performance bonds. These conflicts are not governed by the uee
either, and the local law of each state will control.'33

15] Commingled or Processed Goods

Security interests in goods that subsequently become manufactured into
another product, or that become commingled with other goods to become part of
another product, are not lost by the transformation ofthe goods-they continue
into the product produced.'" The security interest must originally have been
perfected. Then, when the new product produced as a result of the manufactur-
ing or the assembly is one in which the original goods have lost their identity, the
security interest attaches to the completed manufactured or processed product.
The security interest will also continue into the product when the financing
statement on the original goods covers the product into which they have been
manufactured, processed, or assembled. In this case, it makes no difference that
the original goods may remain identifiable; the security interest attaches to the
final product and tbe security interest in the original goods used in the process-
ing, manufacturing, or assembly is 10st.'35 When there is more than one security
interest that attaches to the product, all ofthe security interests rank equally in
priority; their interest in the collateral is prorated according to the proportion of
the claim to the total cost of the product. Under this rule, the time when the
security interest in each separate component becomes perfected or filed is
irrelevant-all security interests share on a pro rala basis.'31

created a lien in favor of persons who built or repaired ships created an interest in the
property superior to a perfected security interest under the uec. First Md. Leasecorp v.
MN Golden Egret, 764 F2d 749,753-757 (11th Cir. 1985).
"'''See generally B. Clark, supra note 126, at 111 1.7, 1.8 (discussing surety's right of
subrogation, landlord liens, and other excluded transactions).
,,. UCC § 9-315(I)(a). See generally Nickles, "Accessions and Accessories Under Pre-
Code Law and U.C.C. Article 9," 35 Ark. L. Rev. 111 (1981).
When three secured parties, each having a perfected security interest in different
cattle and the offspring of that cattle, have their collateral commingled and sold, the iS$Ue
to be decided is one of allocation under UCC § 9-315 dealing with commingled goods,
rather than under UCC § 9-312, dealing with priorities among conflicting security interest
in the same COllateral. Farmer's Bank v. First-Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 39 UCC Rep. Servo
(Callaghan) 355, 358-359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
, 35 UCC § 9-3l5(I)(b).
,.. UCC § 9-315(2).
, 23.03(6) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 23-40

[6] Subordination Agreements

The uee rules on priority may be varied by agreement between the par-
ties.1:t1' Any secured party who is concerned about the priority of his or her
security interest may enter into an agreement with the other persons who claim
an interest in the collateral to clarify their respective rights. Although the uee
filing provisions permit minas to show the release ofcoUateral on the assignment
ofa security interest, there is no procedure for filing a subordination agreement.
This could be troublesome when lack of notice tbrouah filing leads other parties
to draw faulty conclusions as to the state of priorities. Any party who becomes
the assignee of a security interest would be well adviaed to check for possible
subordination agreements and to obtain appropriate assurances.

vec
131 § 9-316. In Western Auto Supply Co. v. Bank ofImboden, 17 Ark. App. 4; 8.
701 SW2d 394. 395 (1986), the court enforced an oral subordination agreement hGldina
that the statute of frauds did not require that the agreement be in writing.
 24
Debtor Default and
Enforcement of Security
Agreements
, 24.01 General Rules on When an Obligation Is Due. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-2
[I J Obligations Based on Promissory Notes ..............•. 24-2
faJ Notes Payable on Demand .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . 24-2
[b J Acceleration aauses. • . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-4
{i] Good faith requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-4
fii] Types of acceleration provisions. . . . • . . • . . . . . • . . 24-5
[iii] Scope of UCC § 1-208 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 24-6
fcJ Due-on-Sale aauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . 24-9
Ii] Enforceability in real estate transactions. . . . . . . . . . 24-9
[ii] Garn-St Germain Act 24-11
f2J Notes With Special Contract Provisions , 24-14
[3] Waiver or Cancellation of Debts. . • . . . . • . . . . • . • . • . • • •. 24-15
fa] Problems With Renewal Notes ..•.•..••.......... , 24-16
[b] Full Payment Checks '" . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 24-17
, 24.02 Special Duties of Good Faith and Fiduciary Responsibility of
Bank to Customer ...•...................•...•...... , 24-21
[IJ The Bank as a Fiduciary , 24-21
[a] Fiduciary Relationships Generally .•...••.......•.. , 24-21
(b] Transactions Where a Bank Is a Fiduciary •..•.••..•• , 24-23
[2J A Bank's Duty of Good Faith and Related Obligations ..... 24-26
[a] Theories Underlying Lender Liability Cases. . . . . . . . . .. 24-27
[b) Liability Cases • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 24-30
, 24.03 Enforcement of SecuritY Interests Under UCC Article 9 24-31
[I) Default ......................•..•.•..•........ , 24-31
(2) Repossession of the Collateral .......•..•••....•...•. 24;-32
[3} Constitutional Limitations on Secured party Remedies •••. , 24-3"-
(a) Supreme Court Due Process Decisions ............•. 24-34
[bJ Self·Help Repossession and the Issue of State Action .. " 24-36

24-1
1124.01(IJ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-2

[4J Disposition of Collateral After Default . 24-39

Ia) Requin:ments for Disposal of Collateral . 24-)9
[b 1 Cases Illustrating Requirements . 24-41
[5) Retention of Collateral in Discharge of the Obligation . 24-44
[6) Creditor Liability for Failure to Comply With UCC
Procedures . 24-45
11 24.04 Special Consumer Credit Rules ~ . 24-48

'II 24.01 GENERAL RULES ON WHEN AN OBlJGATION IS DUE

[IJ Obligations Based on Promissory Notes

The rules on when a promissory instrument is due, and what procedures
must be followed to establish a cause of action based on the instrument against
parties who are liable to pay it, have been discussed in Part 2 ofthis book. That
section also covers the related issues ofwhen a cause ofaetion on the instrument
arises and when the statute of limitations begins to run. t
The time at which an obligation is due under a negotiable note will depend
on whether the note is payable on demand or payable at a stated time. When the
note is payable at a particular time, the existence ofan acceleration clause in the
note may make the obligation due in advance of the stated time for payment.
The text that immediately follows discusses the use of demand notes and of
notes that are not payable on demand but that contain acceleration clauses.

(a] Notes Payable on Demand. When a promissory note is payable on demand,

the holder may require the maker to pay it at any time. Although the holder has
the power to compel payment; the obligor on the note may contend that the
bolder has a duty not to exercise this power in bad faith. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 1·203 imposes a general obligation afgood faith, but tMsprovision
bas not been applied to demand for payment ofinstruments that are payable on
demand. 2 This approach is supported by a comment to UCC § 1·208, which
imposes a good faith requirement when the holder of an obligation exercises a
power to accelerate the due date of the obligation under a provision giving the
right to accelerate "at will" or in the event of "insecurity." The comment to the
section states:

1 See n 14.04(2][1], 14.04[2][11,2J.02(1).

2 Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 SW2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See also
Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 171 Oa. App. 625; 320 SE2d 767 .
(1984); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Oa. App. 846,269 SE2d 916
(J980); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricaton, Inc. v. People's Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530,
518 P2d 734 (J974), cert. denied, 419 US 967 (1974).
24-3 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.01(I)(a)

Obviously this section has no application to demand instruments or obliga-

tions whose very nature permits call at any time with or without reason.
This section only applies to an agreement or to paper which in the first
instance is payable at a future date. 3

Further, any evaluation of a creditor's rights to demand payment immedi-

ately, without advance notice, must consider the possibility of collateral agree-
ments between the creditor and the debtor. uee § 3-119 permits agreements
between the immediate parties to a transaction to limit or condition the terms of
a negotiable note. In one case, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., which did not
indicate ifthe debtor had signed a promissory note and so did not discuss what
the creditor's rights would have been under a demand note, the court held that a
financer had an obligation ofgood faith when the financer agreed to provide the
debtor with a specific line of credit to carry on the debtor's business. Although
the financing agreement stated that the amount loaned was repayable on
demand, when the financer refused to make further advances within the credit
line without any period ofnotice that would have allowed the debtor time to seek
alternative financing, the financer breached its implied obligation ofgood faith
and became liable for damages of$7.5 million, based on the loss of the value of
the business. In this case, the termination of financing put the debtor out of
business because all of the debtor's receivables werelocked up by the lender in a
controlled account. Altbough this case is distinguishable from the "payable on
demand" issue, as it involves a refusal to extend additional credit that had been
committed to under an ongoing line-of-credit arrangement, it is nevertheless
relevant because demand notes often are used in contexts in which an ongoing
financing relationship is intended. 4
A court in Florida declined to follow the K.M.e. Co. decision in Flagship
National Bank v. Gray Distribution Syste11U, Inc. s The bank bad workout
arrangements with its debtor whereby the bank agreed to loan up to $400,000
under a loan agreement that the bank could make payable on demand. Pursuant
to the agreement, the bank took control of the debtor's inventory and accounts
and imposed certain practices on the debtor, including the liquidation of some
of debtor's assets, in order to reduce the debt. After the credit amount grew to
$600,000, the bank gave notice of default, demanded payment in full, and
liquidated the collateral. The debtor counterclaimed and raised defenses to the
bank's action for a deficiency judgment, asserting malicious interference with a

IUCC § 1·208 comment.

4K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). The role ofgood faith
in exercising acceleration rights is discussed infra 11 24.01[IJ[b]. There is a growing use of
the implied covenant of good faith to regulate creditor agreements. Perdue v. Crocker
Nat'IBank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475
US 1001 (1986). See the discussion of a bank's duty of good faith infra 1 24.02(2].
6485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 497 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986).
11 24.01(lJlb] SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24-4

business relationship, failure to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable

manner, usury, indemnification, and other claims.
The trial court gave an award of $700,000 in compensatory damages and
$2.5 million in punitive damages to the debtor, but this was reversed in part on
appeal. The conduct ofthe bank in continuing to extend credit above the amount
of the loan did not constitute a course of dealing that modified the initial loan
aareement. The specific terms of the note controlled in the event of a conflict
between a course of dealing and the writings. When it was not reasonable to
construe the written agreement and course of action as consistent with one
another, the express terms ofthe agreement must control. Further, the court held
that the good faith provisions ofUCC § 1-203 had no application to demand
instruments in which the holder may call the loan obligation at any time with o~
without reason. Accordingly, the court ruled that there was no breach ofcontraci
by the bank for refusing to continue lending beyond its loan limit.'

[bl Acceleration Clauses. The uee recognizes the use of acceleration clauses
in negotiable instruments and in other types of contracts. 7 As discussed previ·
ously, the presence of an acceleration clause does not make an instrument non-
negotiable.' Although a note may be subject to an acceleration term, a holder in
due course of the note who is not aware ofany acceleration may be excused ifthe
holder is late in presenting the note for payment.' Although one cannot be a
holder in due course ifone takes an instrument with notice that it is overdue, a
holder who is not aware of the exercise of an acceleration term does not have
l'
notice that the instrument is overdue. The acceleration clause may be con·
tained in a separate agreement apart from the note itself. In such a case, as with
other writings that purport to modify the terms of an instrument, the accelera-
tion clause does not bind a holder in due course who does not have notice of it.
The clause may be effective, however, as to the immediate parties or persons
who are not holders in due course. l1
(I) Good faith requirement. The existence of an acceleration clause in a
contract or a note is not the same as making the obligation due on demand. Even
when the acceleration clause provides that the holder may require payment of
the obligation "at will" or when the holder "deems himself insecure" or any

'Id. at 1340. For support, the court relied upon the following cases: Midlantic Nat'!
Bank v. Commonwealth Gen., Ltd., 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) Grandin
Indus., Inc. v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 267 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
'ucc § 3·109. See also UCC § 1·208.
·UCC § 3·109.
·ucc §~ 3-109. comment 4. 3·SII( I).
'·UCC §§ 3·302(I)(c), 3·304(4)(1).
11 UCC § 3.119 & comment 3.
24-5 DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT , 24.0111][b)

similar language, the holder may exercise the power to accelerate "only if he in
good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. "12
As the comments to the vee indicate, the acceleration clause is not to be
construed as converting what on its face appears to be an instrument payable at a
stated time into one that is payable on demand "at the whim and caprice of one
party." Such a construction of an acceleration clause, the comments indicate,
could be challenged as one making the "agreement void as against public policy
or to make the contract illusory or too indefinite for enforcement...."'3 Thus,
the architects of the vee drew a distinction between instruments payable on
demand and obligations payable at a definite time subject to an acceleration. In
the latter case, the holder must act in good faith. In the former ease, where the
instrument is payable on demand, the drafters stated that the instrument could
be called for payment "at any time with or without reason."" The relevant
comment states in full, "Obviously this section has no application to demand
instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time with or
without reason. This section applies only to an agreement as to paper which in
the first instance is payable at a future date."
Although the drafters indicated in the comment quoted earlier that the
good faith requirement for exercising acceleration powers should not apply to
demand instruments, these comments are directed at vee§ 1-208. The com-
ments do not consider what effect, if any, the general obligation of good faith
contained in vee § 1-203 has on the holder of a demand note who calls for its
payment. II Thus, while it is clear that the holder ofan instrument who chooses to
exercise an acceleration power must do so in good faith, it is not clear that these
same standards are applicable to the exercise of the right to demand payment
under a demand note. In view of the expanded growth of the banker's duty of
good faith, as discussed further in this chapter, even the holder ofa demand note
is advised to proceed cautiously.
[iiI Types of acceleration proYisions. While there arc different types of
acceleration provisions, they all concern obligations that, apart from the opera-
tion of the clause, would not be due in full until some future date. The applica-
tion of the clause makes the entire obligation due at an earlier time, which
usually is immediately or on demand. Some such clauses are drafted in terms
that make it operate automatically, so that when the stated event ocellI'! the
entire obligation represented by the instrument becomes due and payable. More
often, however, the provision is worded to give the holder of the instrument the
option to declare a default and require payment of the obligation immediately

12UCC § 1-208.
'3UCC § 1-208 comment.
14Id.
15 The obligation ofgood faith in UCC § 1-203 provides that "[e)very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
11 24.01llJIbJ SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24·6

when the stipulated event occurs. The events in the agreement that give rise to
the right to accelerate may include specific acts ofdefault. such as failing to make
an installment payment when due or removing collateral from the jurisdiction,
and other conditions that may even be beyond the control ofthe parties, such as
destruction of collateral or actions taken by other creditors against the debtor.
An acceleration clause may give rights not only to require payment but also to
demand other performance by the obligor such as supplying additional collat·
eral. Defining the events ofdefault and rights of acceleration, obviously, should
be done with care and with a view to the needs of the particular type of
transaction.
[1111 Scope of uee § )-208. uee § 1·208 refers to and limits rights of
acceleration founded on language in clauses that give such rights "at will': or
when a party "deems himself insecure," or "words ofsimilar import." .. By way
of contrast, terms in clauses that give a party rights to accelerate when specific
events of default occur appear to be outside the scope of this section, which is
directed at language that on its race is susceptible to interpretation 50 as to give
an unreasonably broad discretion in a party to accelerate. However, vee § I-
203 imposes an obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of
any contract or duty under the uee, regardless of the scope ofSection 1-208. A
federal court has interpreted the scope of Section 1-208 broadly and has ruled
that a party must act in good faith in exercising acceleration rights even under a
clause that identifies specific acts of default.17 The clause in question gave a
creditor the right to accelerate "at its option" when the debtor leased the
collateral without the consent of the creditor. Recognizing that a default clause,
where the occurrence of the event of default was within the debtor's control,
differed from an insecurity clause, where the creditor might act capriciously, tbe
court believed that even the default clause could be the occasion for abuse. The
power to accelerate the debt "could be used as a sword for commercial gain
rather than as a shield against security impairment."" Both vec § 1·208 and
general equitable principles require more than "a good faith beliefthat a techni-
cal breach occurred..•." There should be a showing of a good faith belief that
performance of the contract or the security for the obligation has been impaired,
as Section 1-208 requires. The court reasoned that it was proper to apply Section
1·208 to such a clause, because the uee drafters indicated that the good faith
standard of Section 1-208 was the safeguard against abuse from acceleration
clauses of all types,1' and because a right to accelerate at the "option" of the
creditor when default occurs is within Section 1-208, which applies when a party
may accelerate "at will" or when there are "words of similar import."

1·UCC § 1-208.
17 Brown V. Avemco lov. Corp., 603 F2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
1IId. at 1379.
1'See VCC § 3·109, comment 4.
24-7 DEBTOR DEFAULT'" ENFORCEMENT , 24.01(1)lb)

Other courts have taken a different view than Brown. In Bowen v. Danna,20
the court held that the good faith standard in UCC § 1-208 did not apply to a
tenn in a note that provided that acceleration of the debt would occur in the
event of any "default" of the debtor. The court reasoned that the good faith
requirement applied only to circumstances in which acceleration was at the will
ofthe holder, and did not apply to circumstances in which the acceleration was
within the control of the debtor, which was the case with the occurrence of
"default" in the agreement. Also, in Hersch v. Citizens Savings & Loan Associa-
tion,2' a court concluded that a creditor's use of an acceleration clause when a
debtor breached an obligation to maintain collateral did not violate a duty of
good faith, although the creditor may have been motivated to accelerate and
foreclose on the debtor's collateral in order to profit from an opportunity to
reinvest the proceeds of the collateral in more lucrative alternatives. The court
said:

None of defendants' evidence was offered to prove that plaintiffs' con·

duct was dishonest or corrupt. Even ifit could be established that plaintiffs
profited economically by foreclosure, and that the collateral when sold and
the proceeds invested at the rates then current was worth far more than
perfonnance by defendants upon the note would have been, the plaintiffs
were entitled to exercise their rights under the security agreement. They
were not required to choose the least profitable manner of doing so. Like-
wise, even if it were proved that the plaintiffs were motivated not to
forebear further by economic factors outside this transaction, or even by
outright greed, no dishonesty is shown where only legal rights are being
enforced. Reasons or lack of reasons are thus irrelevant and the court
properly refused evidence thereof. 22

When the holder's good faith in demanding payment pursuant to a power of

acceleration is placed in issue, the burden ofshowing lack ofgood faith is on the
party who is being charged with the obligation to pay.n The UCC definition of
"good faith" is relevant. Although the general definition is the narrow one of
"honesty in fact, "24 there is a higher standard of good faith on persons who are
professionals for purposes ofsome types oftransactions. Thus, under Article 2,
which deals with the law relating to the sales ofgoods, a merchant must not only
act with "honesty in fact" but must also observe "reasonable commercial stan-

20
276 Ark. 528, 631 SW2d 560 (1982).
2. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1983).
221d at lOll, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
23 UCC § 1-208. The UCC defines "burden of establishing': in UCC § 1-201 (8) as
meaning that "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is
more probable than its non-existence."
2·UCC § 1-201(19).
'11 24.01[llIb) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-8

dards of fair dealing in the trade...•• As discussed previously, for purposes of

determining when a person takes an instrument in good faith in order to qualify
as a holder in due course, the uee in Article 3 has specifically adopted the
narrow definition of good faith of "honesty in fact."· When a party, even a
holder, is enforcing an acceleration clause under a contract or a promissory note,
the standard of good faith required to invoke the acceleration term will not
necessarily be the narrow standard of"honesty in fact." The question at the time
that the holder enforces the instrument will not be whether the holder was acting
in good faith when the holder acquired the instrument (which is the holder in
due course test), but rather whether the holder is acting in good faith in demand-
ing payment under the power granted by the acceleration clause. The former
good faith test is intended to promote the free circulation and marketabilitr of
commercial paper. Those policies have no application to conduct by the holder
after the instrument has been acquired.·J
The case law reflects the willingness ofcourts to use the good faith require-
ment to restrict the power of a creditor to exercise rights of acceleration. In
Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment CO.,·I the promissory note provided that the
holder could accelerate the note when he regarded the debt insecure. Afler taking
this note, and in the course of seeking financing for a second transaction with the
same debtor, the holder learned that the debtor was a bad credit risk. The court
held that the holder's acceleration of the debt was not in good faith as required
by uee § 1-208. Relying on principles established before adoption ofthe uce,
the court said that insecurity clauses are "meant to apply to possible changes in
conditions or circumstances, or new developments affecting the mortgagee's
security" and that no such showing had been made in this case, namely, that the
debtor had suffered any deterioration in credit from the date ofthe signing ofthe
first note or that the debtor had failed to meet any required payments under the
contract.
In another case, a vice-president ofthe bank promised the plaintiff, a maker
ofa promissory note to the bank, that he would renegotiate its terms to convert it
from an obligation that would come due on August 16, 1979 to an installment
loan. About two weeks before the original note became due, the plaintiff tele-
phoned another officer of the bank to complete the arrangements for changing
the note to an installment obligation. The second bank officer said that he knew
nothing about the arrangements that had been negotiated with the otber vice-
president, who was not in town. During the conversation, the plaintiff told the
bank officer he would not be able to pay the note when it came due. The bank,

2Iuee § 2-103(l)(b).
•1uee § 3.302; see discussion at 11 16.01[3J.
• J For a good discussion of the factors that are considered in detetmining good faith,
see Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank. 303 Or. 557, 739 P2d 554 (1987); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205, comments a, d (1979).
•1655 P2d 1125 (Utah 1982).
24-9 DEBTOR DEFAULT'" ENFORCEMENT V24.01[IJ1c)

anticipating that the note would not be paid, then accelerated the obligation and
set off the amount of the note from funds that were on deposit in the plaintiff's
checking account with the bank. The plaintiff received first notice oftbe setoff
when he attempted to cash a check the following day. Approximately $850 in
checks were dishonored as a result ofthe setoff. The court held that the bank had
breached the obligation ofgood faith in UCC § 1-203. The court further held that
because the obligation ofgood faith had been imposed by law, rather than as a
matter of contract, the breach was tortious and thus punitive damages could be
recovered. 2t
In Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.,:10 the court ruled that a bank
acted in good faith in exercising its rights under an acceleration clause when the
debtor threatened bankruptcy. Although the debt to the bank was secured by a
certificate ofdeposit (CD) in the same amount as the debt, the interest payable
was 11 percent on the note but only 9 percent on the CD. Thus, the collateral did
not cover the entire indebtedness, and the bank's acceleration for "insecurity"
was in good faith, given "the nature and value of the collateral."s1
It has been held that a lender cannot accelerate payment on a loan and then
make the borrower pay a prepayment penalty.1I

[c) Due-on-Sale Clauses

[i) Enforceability in real estate transactions. A special form of acceleration
clause is the due-on-sale or due-on-transfer clause. These terms are used fre-
quently in real estate financing. They have been extensively litigated when
creditors have sought to enforce them apinst consumer purchasers of residen-
tial real estate, and there is an extenshre body ofstate law on the enforceability of
such clauses. As discussed later in this section, this dispute became a federal
issue when consumers challenged the use of such clauses by federally insured
banking institutions. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision giving supremacy to
the regulations of the federal banking agencies led to enactment of a broad
federal law applying to use of due-on-sale provisions.
Due-on-sale clauses have been attacked as invalid when they are used in
connection with real estate security devices, on the theory that they constitute an

2tFirst Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).

:10 705 SW2d 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
I1Id. at 209. See Kamer v. Willis, 238 Kan. 246, 710 P2d 21 (1985).
12 Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Ill. App. 3d 646,
424 NE2d 939 (1981). The California Coun ofAppeals also has held that a lender may not
charge a prepayment penalty when the lender exercises its rights to accelerate the debt
under a due-on-sale clause. In the coun's view, the prepayment penalty was linked to a
privilege granted the borrower to voluntarily prepay the note, and should not apply when
the prepayment is not the voluntary choice ofthe borrower. Tan v. California Fed. Say. '"
Loan. Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 800, 189 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1983).
11 24,OIll)[c) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-10

unreasonable restraint on the alienation of propeny. Most couns do not view

such clauses as unenforceable on their face, but engage in a scrutiny of the
particular circumstances to determine ifthe enforcement ofthe clause is reason-
able.» The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, has held that the use ofa due-
on-sale clause in an installment real estate contract cannot be attacked on such
grounds, absent a showing of unconscionability. The court said that such a
clause is per se reasonable, and it rejected requiring the lender to prove on a case-
by-case basis the reasonableness of his interest in including the clause in the
contract. Although the debtor may challenge the lender's exercise of the clause
on the ground that enforcement is unconscionable, the debtor must bear the
burden ofshowing why the lender should not be permitted to enforce a provision
that the debtor voluntarily entered into." But other jurisdictions have taken.a
more restrictive view toward lender enforcement of such clauses.·
The U.S. Supreme Coun upheld the authority of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to promulgate regulations for federally chartered savings and loan
associations that allow federal associations to use due-on-sa\e acceleration
clauses in lending instruments, in disregard of any state law limiting their use or
enforcement. sa The decision that the federal regulation preempts state law was
based upon the Coun's conclusion that Congress had committed to the FHLBB
a broad discretion to regulate federal savings and loan associations in accord-
ance with what the Board considers the "best practices" ofthe industry. Follow-
ing this decision, the enforceability ofdue-an-sale clauses became bewilderingly
complicated, depending on the identity of the lender and on local law. Thus,
Congress was prompted to address the use of such clauses.

"One oftbe leading early cases is Wellenkamp 'Y. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,
582 P2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). For a thorough discuuion, see G. Nel!On & D.
Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law §§ 5.21-5.26,7.6-7.8 (2d ed. 1985).
Mlncome Realty & Mortgalll, Inc. v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n, 661 P2d 257
(Colo. 1983).
-See generally id.; G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law
§§ 15.24-15.26 (2d ed. 1985).
3& Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 US 141 (1982). Fora collection
of earlier state and federal cases, see llenerally Annotation, "Validity, Construction and
Application of Provisions Entitling Mortgagee to Increase Interest R.te on Transfer of
Mortgaged Property," 92 ALR3d 822 (1979); Annotation, "Validity, Construction and
Application of Clause Entitling Mortgagee to Acceleration of Balance Due in Case of
Conveyance or Transfer of Mortgaged Property," 69 ALR3d 713 (1976). Acceleration
clauses making obligations due on sale are also used in transactions where penonal
property is the collateral. Although UCC § 9-311 provides that the debtor's rights in
collateral may be transferred voluntarily or involuntarily, this sec1.ion Qoes not prevent
the parties from entering into a security agreement that makes a transfer by the debtor a
default. Brummund v. First Nat'l Bank, 99 NM 221, 656 P2d 884 (1983). Accord Layne v.
Fort Carson Nat'l Bank, 655 P2d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
24-11 DEBTOR DEFAULT'" ENFORCEMENT , 24.0111J[c)

Iii) Gam-5t Germain Act. The Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions

Act of 198231 contains far-ranging provisions that deal with use of due-on-sale
clauses in residential real estate transactions.:II Except for a three-year "window
period," discussed subsequently, the act broadly authorizes use of due-on-sale
clauses. At the heart of the act is the following provision: "Notwithstanding any
provision of the Constitution or laws (including the judicial decisions) of any
state to the contrary, a lender may...[subject to the window period provisions]
enter into or enforce a contract containing a due-on-sale clause with respect to a
real property loan. "II The act further provides that a lender's exercise of rights
pursuant to a due-on-sale clause "shall be exclusively governed by the term ofthe
loan contract, and all rights and remedies ofthe lender and the borrower shall be
fixed and governed by the contract."40 The act encourages lenders to permit
assumptions ofreal property loans at market rates, but it does nothing to compel
a lender to do so. o.
The act applies to lenders ofall kinds, both institutional and individual, and
it includes government agencies who make real property loans. 02 The act does
not require that a lender be chartered, insured, or otherwise regulated by a
federal agency in order for the act to apply. The coverage of the act literally
extends to purely private transactions between two individuals.
The loan must be a "real property loan" in order for the federal due-on-sale
rules to apply. Real property loans are transactions involving the extension of
credit that is secured by a lien on real property or an interest in a cooperative
housing unit, a mobile home, or other residential manufactured home. U All real
property loans containing a due-on-sale clause," except those that come within
the window period, are governed by the act. With respect to these loans, the
federal law preempts all state provisions limiting the right to enforce due-on-sale
clauses, whether those limitations are based on state constitutions, statutes, or

37 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (I 982)(codified in scattered sections oftitles 12,
15 and 18 USC). For an excellent review of the act, see G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real
Estate Finance Law § 15.24-15.26 (2d ed. 1985).
31 Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. m,
§ 341, 96 Stat. 1505 (codified at 12 USC § 1701j·3 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986»(hereinafter
Act).
31 Act § 341(b)(I)(codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(b)(1)(1982».
40 Act § 34 I(b)(2)(codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(b)(2)(1982».
., Act § 34 I(b)(3)(codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(b)(3)(1982».
•2 Act § 34 1(a)(2)(codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(a)(2)(1982». See 12 CFR § 591.2(g)
(1987).
UAct § 341(a)(3) (codified al12 USC § 170Ij-3(a)(3) (1982».
"The act defines a due-on-sale clause as "a contract provision which authorizes a
lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's security
instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein,' securing the real
property loan is sold or transferred without the lender's prior and written consent." Act
§ 341(a)(I) (codified at 12 USC § 170Ij-3(a)(l) (1982».
II 24.01(1J(c) SECURITY TRANSAC110NS 24-12

judicial decisions; further, the law creates a federal right to enforce due-on-sale
clauses in accordance with the terms of the loan agreement."
The act recognizes nine situations in which there may be a technical transfer
ofan interest in property. but which may not be used by a lender as the basis for
enforcement of a due-on-sale clause. 41 These situations are as folIows:

1. The creation of a lien on the property that is subordinate to the lender's

interest in the property, and that does not relate to a transfer ofrights of
occupancy in the property."
2. The creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances.
3. A transfer ofan interest in the property "by devise, descent, or operation
of law" on the death of a joint tenant.
4. The granting of a leasehold interest in the property ofthree years or less
that does not contain an option to purchase. (This ellception applies even
when there has been a change of possession ofthe property pursuant to
the lease.)41
S. A transfer of an interest in the property to a relative. as a result of the
death of the borrower.
6. A transfer of ownership to the spouse or children of the borrower.
7. A transfer of ownership of the property as a result of a divorce decree.
separation agreement, or property settlement.
8. A transfer of the property to an inter vivos trust in which the borrower
remains a beneficiary ofthe tmst and which does not relate to a transfer
of rights of occupancy in the property.
9. Other transfers or dispositions as provided in regulations by the
FHLBB.~·

45 The act also provides thaI the Federal Home Loan Bank Board reaulalions restrict·
ina the use of balloon payments do nol apply to loans covered by the act. Act § 341 (g)
(codified at 12 USC § 1701j.3(g) (1982».
41 Act § 341(d) (codified at 12 USC § 170Ij·3(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986».
01 Some slates have allowed lenders 10 enforce due-on-sale clauses when their deblors
further encumber the property. on the theory thaI in some ofthese situations the deblo~s
lack of financial stake in the property can increase the risks to the lender that the debtor
will impair the security in the property or will fail to pay. The federal act broadly prohibits
exercise of the due·on-sale clause even in these cases. Moreover, since the statute applies
to "the creation of a lien or other encumbrancc," it can be read as preventina resort to.a
"due-on-encumbrancins" clause when judgment or judicial liens attach to the property.
See Act § 341(d)(l) (codified at 12 USC § 170Ij-3(dXl) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986».
41See Act § 341 (dX4)(codified at 12 USC § 170Ij.3(d)(4)(J 982 &·Supp. IV 1986).
"the FHLBB has general authority to intelllret the act and to issue rtllUlalions 10
implement it. Act § 341(e)(I) (codified at J2 USC § J70Ij-3(e)(I) (J 982».
24-13 DEBTOR DEFAULT &: ENFORCEMENT T1 24.0J(JJlcl

When any ofthese nine exceptions exist, the rights given a lender under the act to
enter into or enforce a due-on-sale clause do not apply. Moreover, given the
broad manner in which this part of the act is drafted, it appears that the act
affirmatively prohibits a lender from exercising due-on-sale rights when any of
these situations are present and preempts any state law to the contrary. As
originally enacted, the exceptions listed were unlimited, and applied to any real
property transfer otherwise within the act. In 1983, Congress narrowed the scope
of these exceptions by providing that they apply only when the property con-
sisted of "less than five dwelling units. "10
The act establishes a "window period" during which state law provisions
that limit enforcement of due-on-sale clauses may continue to apply. The pur-
pose of the window is to afford some protection to owners of property who own
property subject to mortgage loans that they might have regarded as "assuma-
ble" on transfer of the property under the relevant state law at the time their
ownership arose. The window period expired on October IS, 1985, three years
after the date of enactment of the act. The window period varies for each state
that can qualify as a window state. The window begins on the date when the state
took legal action to limit the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. Specifically, the
statute states that the period begins "on the date a state adopted a constitutional
provision or statute prohibiting the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, or the date
on which the highest court in such state has rendered a decision (or ifthe highest
court has not so decided, the date on which the next highest appellate court has
rendered a decision in a final judgment if such decision applies statewide)
prohibiting such exercise ...."If
During this window period, for any real property loan that is made or
assumed or otherwise transferred, the state limitations on the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses continue to be effective. 52 However, also during this window
period, a state may enact a law allowing enforcement ofdue-on-sale clauses with
respect to loans originated in the state by lenders other than federally chartered
depository institutions. 13 Additionally, the Comptroller of the Currency, as to

10 12 usq 1701j·3(d)(Supp. IV 1986).

ifAct § 341(c)(I)(cDdified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(c)(l) (1982». The window period
rules have led 10 litigation to delermine if a state is a window state. For example, the
Arizona Supreme Court has held that Arizona is a window state under the Gam·St
Germain Act. Scappaticci v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 135 Ariz. 456,662 P2d 131
(Ariz. 1983). (The court relied upon its prior decision in Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham,
IS Ariz. App. 78,486 P2d 190 (1971), petition denied, 108 Ariz. 192,494 P2d 1322
(1972) and Ariz. Rev. Stal. Ann. § 33-801 (1988).) A New York court has ruled that New
York is not a window state. However, the court prevented enforcement ofa due-on-sale
clause in the case before it, which involved a lransaction that occurred prior to the
effective date of the act, because the Gam-St Germain Act does not apply retroactively.
Home Sav. Bank v. Baer Properties Ltd., 92 AD2d 98, 460 NYS2d 833 (I 983}.
12 Act § 341(c)(I) (codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(c)(l) (1982».
53 Act § 341(c)(I)(A) (codified at 12 USC § 1701j-3(c)(I)(A) (1982».
11 24.0112) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24·14

national banks, and the National Credit Union Administration Board, as to

federal credit unions, may permit those institutions to adopt regulations enforc·
ing due-on·sale clauses in loans originated by those institutions." Action by
these bodies to authorize enforcement ofdue-on·sale clauses for window period
loans may not apply to any transfer that occurred prior to the date the act was
adopted, October 1S, 1982. The exemption of window period loans is not
complete. Lenders may enforce due-on·sale clauses even for window period
loans when it is done to enforce customary credit standards followed by the
lender in making loans on similar property.1I
The window period exception to enforcement of due-on-sa1e clauses does
not apply in the case oftransfers ofloans originated by federal savings and loan
associations or federal savings banks.· These loans are covered by the Suprem~
Court decision in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Associations v. de la Cuesta,"
discussed previously, which held that FHLBB regUlations authorizing due·on·
sale clauses for such loans preempted state limitations.1I

[2] Notes With Special Contract Provisions

Promissory notes frequently contain conditions, such as the acceleration
term discussed previously, that deal with debtor duties to maintain collateral
and other duties relating to the financing arrangement. The UCC recognizes this
practice, and it specifically provides that the inclusion of certain terms of this
nature does not destroy the negotiability of the instrument. Thul, the note may
contain statements to the effect that collateral secures the obligation, the holder
may have recourse against the collateral when default occurs, the debtor
promises to protect the collateral or to give additional collateral, the holder may
enter a confession ofjudsment when the instrument is not paid at the time it is
due, and other such terms in which the obligor purports to waive the benefit of
laws intended to protect the obligor.11 Although the UCC stipulates that the

64 Act § 34 I(c)(1)(8) (codified at 12 USC § I 70Ij·3(c)(tXB) (1982».

15 Act § 341(c)(2){A) (codified at 12 USC § 170Ij·3(c)(2)(A) (1982».
M Act § 341(c)(2)(C) (codified at 12 USC § 170Ij.3(c)(2)(C) (1982».
17 458 US 141 (t 982).
n The de la Cuesta decision does not resolve whether state limitations on due-on·sale
clause! would be preempted as to mortgages originated by state institution! and subse-
quently acquired by a federally chartered savings and loan association. This question was
presented in I. 1982 cue. The court said thl.t it did n()t have to reach the question of
whether the FHLBB has the authority to preempt state law in such a cue, because it
concluded that the Board did not intend to preempt state law in such casea under its
current regulations. The court came to this conclusion because the BOl.rd represented to
the court that "the Board has never reached the question of, nor taken a formal positi()n
on, federal preemption in the specific factual situation before this court." Bleecker AsSOCI.
v. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794 (SDNY 1982).
61uec § 3.112.
24-15 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT 11 24.01(3]

inclusion of such tcrms in a notc does not affcct thc notc's negotiability, it is
important to bear in mind tllat thc UCC stipulation does not authorize or
validate any sucll term that might otherwise be illegal. Thus, use of confessions
ofjudgment and waivers of rights ofobligors may be invalid and may subject the
creditor who uses such terms to other legal consequences. In consumer transac-
tions in particular, the use of confession of judgment clauses will be invalid
under the FTC Credit Practices Rule discussed later in this chapter. Other
waivers also may be invalid. A
Additionally, a promissory note ordinarily will be part of a larger transac-
tion. The terms of the broader transaction may modify or affect the terms ofthe
note. 11

[3) Waiver or Cancellation of Debts

The obligation on a negotiable instrument may be discharged by any "act or
agreement with [the obligor on the instrument] which would discharge his
simple contract for the payment of money. "12 The simplest form ofdischarge is
waiver or cancellation ofa debt. Although the general rule in contract law is that
some type of consideration is necessary to support a binding agreement to
discharge a debt, there are exceptions to this rule. One exception involves the
cancellation of negotiable papers such,as notes, checks, or other instruments.
liability on these instruments may be discharged. without giving any value,
simply by the creditor's canceling the instrument or surrendering it to the
debtor. 13 No consideration is necessary when the creditor cancels the obligation
in this way.14
The UCC also carves out another broad exception where a debt may be
discharged without consideration in its rules on waiver. It is a general rule under
the UCC, not limited to the law of negotiable instruments, that "any claim or
right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged in whole or in part
without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered
by the aggrieved party." .. A waiver made in accordance with this provision will

IQ UCC § 3-112(2) provides that the section does not "validate any term which is
otherwise illegal." The comments indicate an express intent to allow local rules on these
matters to govern. so long as the negotiability of the instrument is not affected. UCC § 3-
112 comment 2. The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule, of course, also affects the use of
waivers of consumers' rights to assen claims and defenses. See discussion at f 16.06.
11 These matters are discussed in ! 16.05
12 UCC § 3-601(2).
13UCC § 3-605. See discussion at f 15.07.
14UCC § 3-605.
•5 UCC § 1-107. This is similar to the provision expressly incorporated in UCC § 3-
605 on the cancellation of negotiable instruments, which recognizes a written renuncia-
tion signed and delivered to the obligor.
11 24.0113)[al SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-16

be effective regardless of whether any consideration was given for the waiver.
The person seeking to enforce the waiver, of course, must comply with the UCC
provisions on good faith." Oral waivers may be effective when there is consider-
ation or, in some circumstances, as a waiver even when no consideration exisu."
Additionally, there are circumstances in which a course of dealing or course of
performance between the parties may give rise to a modification or waiver under
the provisions of Article 2 on sales of goods." The rules on modification of
contracts generally, in UCC Article 2 on sales, permit modifications without
consideration, although the effectiveness of a modification rna., depend on
whether a signed writing containing the modification will be necessary. The
VCC provides a basis for enforcing even oral modifications when a person
makes a material change of position in reliance on the circumstances.·'
While the issue of contract formation and modification is too broad to be
discussed fully in this text,70 emphasis is placed on the special rules applicable to
debts represented by a negotiable instrument. The general circumstances con-
cerning discharge from the obligation on such an instrument have been dis-
cussed in Chapter 15. The present chapter discusses several special situations.

lal Problems With Renewal Notes, When a note is canceled and a renewal
note executed, some cases regard the renewal note as not discharging the original
note. These cases view the new note as extending the time for paying the original
indebtedness. This rule has been applied to preserve security given for the first
note as security for the renewal note. 7t In Peterson v. Crown Financial Corp.,n a
bank extended the debt ofits customer by having the customer execute a renewal
note. As part of the transaction, the bank canceled the original note. The bank
neglected to collect all of the interest due undertbe original note and did not add
it to the face amount of the renewal note. When the bank sued to enforce the

II UCC § 1·107 comment.

I? See UCC §§ 1·109 comment, § 2.208, § 2-209.
II UCC §§ 2-208, 2-209•
.. ucc § 2.209(5).
7D For good general sources on this subject, see Restatement of the Law (Second) of
Contracts Ch. 4 (1981); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code Cb. I (2d ed.
1980) (hereinafter White & Summers). .
7. See cases collected in Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F2d 287 (3d Cir. 1981). In
Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 221 Neb. 590, 379NW2d 142(\9&6),tnecoun
held that cancellation of an old note and execution ora new note resulted in the release of
security given for the old note.
When a note is canceled by mistake, the cancellation is not effective to discharge the
parties to the note from their obligations. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. DoyJling,.4 Conn.
App. 376, 494 A2d 1216, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 808, 499 A2d 58 (1985). See UCC
§ 3-60S( I )(a), which refers to "intentionally cancelling" an instrument.
72
661 F2d 287 (3d Cir. 1981).
24-17 DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT , 24.01[31(b)

renewal note, the debtor argued that the cancellation ofthe original note resulted
in a discharge ofliability for the uncollected interest on the old note. The court
held that this case did not involve either an unintentional cancellation or a
mistake, (If the cancellation had been unintentional or a mistake, it would not
discharge liability.) Additionally, the court did not regard the, case as being
similar to those where the security given for the original note or guarantees ofthe
original note were continued for the renewal note. This case, the court said,
involved the existence of the debt itself. In such a case, the documents must
reflect the obligations of the parties. Accordingly, the court held that the subjec-
tive intent of the parties was irrelevant, and that cancellation of the old note
constituted a discharge to the extent that the debt was not carried forward in the
face amount of the renewal note.
The need for care in handling renewal note transactions also is apparent in
American Bank ofCommerce v. Boger-Hare Manufacturing Co. n In this case,
two notes were executed by individuals who subsequently formed a corporation.
A third note was executed in the corporate name for an amount equal to the two
prior notes. The individuals claimed that the corporate note was a renewal note
intended to discharge the previous two notes on which the individuals were
obligated. The court held that since the original two notes had not been canceled,
there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the third note was intended to
discharge the two individual notes. Rather, it should be interpreted as an
assumption of the debt by the corporation without release of the two individual
obligors.
In HubbardRealty Co. v. First National Bank, n the court held that the intent
ofthe parties determined whether the issuance ofa renewal note and the cancel-
lation of the former note accomplished a discharge ofthose liable on the former
note that was canceled. The court rejected an argument that UCC § 3-60S{I)(b)
makes intent irrelevant. By the court's finding that the former parties to the note
were not discharged, the holder ofthe note was able to collect from the corporate
maker ofthe note, although the renewal note had been 'executed without author-
ity under circumstances in which the bank had notice of the lack of authority.

(b) Full Payment Checks. When the amount of an obligation is disputed in

good faith, an agreement may be made that settles the dispute. Such agreement

73
633 P2d 1270 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). See Gullette v. FDIC, 231 Va. 486, 344 SE2d
920(1986). Gullette executed a note with another party. Subsequently, the bank, who was
payee, stamped the note, "Paid by Renewal," and a new note was executed to which
Gullette was not a party. The new note also differed from the old note in that it allowed for
additional collateral, a longer term, and additional credit. The court held that Gullette
remained liable on the old note because he failed to establish that a novation was
intended. Although its terms were different, the new note was only cOnditional payment of
the old one. VCC § 3-605(1) did not apply, because the note was not marked "canceled:'
.. 704 F2d 733 (4th Cir. 1983).
,. 24.0113)[b) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-18

will be binding without any further consideration." Acceptance of a check

stating that it is in full payment, when the amount to be paid is in dispute, will be
regarded as within this rule, and will amount to an agreement to the settlement
proposed. 71 This general rule does not apply when the claim is for a fIXed amount
that is not in dispute. In such cases, although the debtor may attempt to treat the
payment, ifthe payment is accepted, as indicating an agreement by the creditor
that the debt is discharged, the law has permitted the creditor to accept payment
and to continue to enforce the original obligation. Althoup the general rule
requires a good faith dispute as to the amount that is owed before tbere can be an
"accord and satisfaction" that discharges the obligation, a creditor obviously
cannot safely accept payment in partial satisfaction of an obligation for which
the amount is in dispute and for which the payment is tendered as a full
settlement.
The uee muddies these general principles. Under the uee, there is a
provision that permits a party to preserve that party's rights by making clear that
any tendered performance has been accepted "without prejudice" or "under
protest.''17 This suggests that a creditor could, in circumstances in which the
uee applied, accept payment with the statement that such payment was being
accepted "without prejudice," and, by doing so, the creditor would not be bound
to the offered settlement. The exact scope ofthis section in the uee is not clear,
however, because it runs contrary to the general contract principles, which
would not regard such a reservation of rights as effective."
Debtors frequently seek to accomplish an "accord and satisfaction" under
these rules by tendering to a creditor a check that contains language stating that
acceptance of the check or indorsement of the check or obtaining collection of
the check constitutes "full payment" of the debtor's obligation. The applicabil·
ity ofthe common·law accord and satisfaction doctrine, and the extent to which
the uee varies that doctrine, ifat all, in its provision in Section 1·207 allowing a
party to "reserve all ripts," has been a matter ofconsiderable commentary and
litigation. Althoup there are some who suggest that such a "full payment"
notation on a check perhaps should have no effect," the case law recognizes
circumstances in which such language may be given effect as a common-law
"accord and satisfaction." Making clear in a separate writing accompanying the

75 SeeRestatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts § 73 (1981).

71 See H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks '114.12 (6th ed. 1987).
nUCC§ 1·207.
"See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Contracts M 58, 59 (1981). See a1Io
Caraballo, "The Tender Trap: U.C.C. § 1-207 and Its Applicability to an Attempted
Accord and Satisfaction by Tendering a Check in a Dispute Arisiqg From a Sale of
Goods," 11 Seton Hall L. Rev. 445 (1981).
"See H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks 11 4.12 (6th ed. 1987); Shanker, "The Folly of
Full Settlement CheckS-And a Declaration of Their Independence," 90 Com. U 7
(1985).
24-19 DEBTOR DEFAULT'" ENFORCEMENT , 24.01(3)(b]

check that the check is tendered as an accord and satisfaction in full payment, as
long as the writing and the check are delivered to the creditor under circum-
stances in which there is evidence oftheir receipt by parties authorized to accept
such offers, is probably a more effective manner of accomplishing the accord
and satisfaction than by language noted on the check itself.1lI
A number of courts have decided that VCC § 1·207 does not permit the
payee to accept a check tendered as "full payment" by noting that it is accepted
under protest. One oftbe leading opinions on this matter is by Justice Peters for
the Connecticut Supreme Court.II In the Connecticut case, the defendant ten-

10 See H. Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks 11 4.12 (6th ed. 1987). Checks issued to large
companies, where payments are routinely collected by persons who have no author:ity to
contract for the company, obviously present questions whether an accord and satisfaction
has been entered into by the action of such a limited agent in collecting payment of the
check for the company.
II County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 520 A2d 1028
(1987). See also Milgram Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550 F. Supp. 992 (WO Mo.
1982). In Milgram Food Stores, the payee crossed out the language on the check referrini
to full settlement and neaotiated it to obtain paymenL The court held that striking out the
fu11seltlement languBie had no effect, and obtaining payment constituted an accord and
satisfaction. Accord In re Zerodec Mega Corp., 47 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. ED Pa.), aff'd in
part '" rev'd in part, 60 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1985). See also Stultz Electric Works v.
Marine Hydraulic Engineerini Co., 484 A2d 1008 (Me. 1984), indorsement "under
protest without prejudice and with a reservation ofour rights to the balance of"; Hixson v.
Cox, 633 SW2d 330 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), indorsement "without prejudice" would not
prevent an accord and satisfaction.
On the other hand, in Charleston Urban Renewal Authority v. Stanley, 346 SE2d 740
(W. Va. 1985), an accord and satisfaction was found in a landlord/tenant dispute over the
amount of rent owed where the tenant paid the landlord with a check that on its face
contained the notation, "January rent in full." Although the landlord crossed out the "in
full" prior to depositing the check, the notation was proof that the landlord knew the
check had been tendered on the condition that acceptance and use of the money consti-
tuted a full satisfaction ofthe debt. But the court declined to find an accord and satisfac-
tion for a series of monthly rent checks that stated only. "February rent," "March rent,"
and so forth, because strict application ofthe rule requires that the debtor make clear the
conditional nature ofthe tendered payment. The court noted that other jurisdictions had.
applied UCC § 1-207 to defeat the full payment check rule, and the court reserved its
judgment as to what decision it would make when faced with a transaction to which that
section applied. As the case involved a lease of land, the court found UCC § 1·207
inapplicable. Also, in United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 590 F. Supp. 266 (SONY
1984), the court pve effect to the payee's statement that was added to the check, noting
that the check was accepted under protest.· The facts of the case did not make clear
whether the check itselfbore the statement that it was offered in full payment. In Niebler
& Muren, S.c. v. Brock-White Co., 122 Wis. 2d 445, 361 NW2d 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984),
the court held that the payee's obtaining the bank certification of a check constituted an
acceptance of an offer of accord and satisfaction. In this case, after the payee received it
check tendered in full payment ofa disputed amount, the payee had the bank certify the
check and then pursued collection ofthe full amount ofits debt. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed ajury verdict for the payee. The court held that obtaining the certification
, 24.0113ltbl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24·20

dered a check that provided that the payee, by indorsing, accepted the check in
full satisfaction of all claims ap.inst the defendant. The plaintiff took the check
but wrote above his indorsement, "This check is accepted under protest and
with full reservation ofrights to collect the unpaid balance for which this check is
offered in settlement." The court ruled that this language did not prevent an
accord and satisfaction by taking the check as payment. Harmonizing Section 1-
207 with Articles 2 and 3 of the UCC. the court pointed to the conclusion that
Section 1-207 did not change the common-law rule ofaccord and satisfaction. In
the view oftbe court, Article 3 was not intended to incorporate the Section 1·207
result. The section in UCC § 3-407 on alteration proclaimed a policy against
unauthorized alterations and allowed enforcement of an instrument only in
accordance "with its original tenor." Article 2, on the other band, could be
consistent with Section 1-207, because many of the Article 2 provisions were
intended to encourage the parties to a contract that was not fully performed but
to which a dispute had arisen, to engage in negotiations to resolve the disagree-
ment rather than terminate the contract. This policy ofArticle 2 is different from
Article 3, where "the contracts encapsulated in various forms of negotiable
instruments instead envisage conduct of negotiation or transfer, indorsement or
guarantee, payment or acceptance, and honor or dishonor." Thus, in a case
where "performance of a sales contract has come to an end, {UCC ~ 1-2071 was
not intended to empower a seller, as payee of a negotiable instrument, to alter
that instrument by adding words of protest to a check tendered by a buyer on
condition that it be accepted in full satisfaction ofan unliquidated debt. 12
The Connecticut case also found an accord and satisfaction, although the
amount of the check submitted did not represent a compromise of the parties'
dispute as to the amount owing. As discussed previously, under the common-law
rule, ifa claim is unliquidated. there will be an accord and satisfaction when the
debtor offers and the creditor accepts a check in payment of the dispute. The
Connecticut court said that the claim in that case was unliquidated, because
there were two different amounts in dispute, only one ofwhich could be correct.

ofthe bank was the equivalent ofobtaining payment because the certification substituted
the bank's obligation for that of the drawer of the check. See generally Annotation,
"Application of UCC ~ 1·207 to Avoid Discharae of Disputed Claim Upon Qualified
Acceptance ofCheck Tendered as Payment in Full;' 37 ALR4th 358 (1985); Annotation,
"Creditor's ~rtification of Checlc Purportina to Be Final Settlement of Disputed .
Amount as Comtitutinl Acoord and Satisfaction," 42 ALR4th 95 (1985); Annotation,
"Creditor's Retention Without Negotiation ofCbeck Purporting to be Final Settlement of
Disputed Amount as Constituting Accord and Satisfaction," 42 ALR4th 117 (1985);
Annotation, "Modern Status of Rule That Acceptance of Check Purportina to Be Final
Settlement of Disputed Amount Constitutea Accord and Satisfaction," 42 ALR4th 12
(1985).
IaCounty Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 271, 520 A2d 1028
(I 987), citing cases from other jurisdictions indicating that the majority rule was the one
adopted by the court.
24-21 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.02(ll1a]

Although the defendant did not pay any more than the amount he calculated as
due and owing, such a payment is sufficient consideration when tendered in
settlement of the dispute.

1124.02 SPECIAL DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND FIDUCIARY

RESPONSIBILITY OF BANK TO CUSTOMER
When default occurs, banks seeking to enforce obligations against debtors
may encounter claims and defenses asserted by the debtor that the bank itselfhas
breached a duty of good faith or other obligation owed to the debtor in the
transaction. There is an extensive body of trust law establishing the duties of a
fiduciary to the principal, which have governed some of the obligations bankers
have undertaken for many years. Additionally, there is an emerging case law
imposing similar types ofobligations to act in good faith based on contract and
tort law doctrines. Similar duties have been found under other general principles
ofliability. This handbook cannot canvass fully the extensive and rapidly devel-
oping case law on all of these fronts. This section is intended to introduce some
understanding of the general body of law applicable to fiduciaries and to give
illustrations ofsome ofthe new developments on the banker's duty ofgood faith
to customers.

(11 The Bank as a Fiduciary

[al Fiduciary Relationships Generally. When one person conducts business
for another in a representative capacity, whether gratuitously or for profit, the
one who acts for the other is said to act in a fiduciary capacity. The person for
whom the party acts is usually called the principal or beneficiary. The relation-
ship between the parties is termed a fiduciary relationship. Thus, the term
"fiduciary" includes any sort of trustee, executor, administrator, guardian,
receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors, agent, partner when acting for
other partners, attorney, officers and directors of public and private corpora-
tions, public officials, and any other person who acts as an agent or deals with
property on behalf of another. U Corporations, partnerships, and other business
units may act as fiduciaries." In such cases, the agents and officers of such
organizations have the duties of fiduciaries, first, to the corporation that
employs them" and, second, to the person for whom the corporation or business
unit acts."

uUniform Fiduciaries Act § I, 7A ULA 395 (1985).

MId.
"See First Nat'l Bank v. Hall, 143 Ga. App. 300,238 SE2d 284 (1977) (lending
officer who knew of improper loans liable to bank).
"See Tettenborn, "Fiduciary Duties of Banks," 1980 J. Bus. L. 10.
1124.02(I)(a) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24·22

The general responsibilities of fiduciaries under tbe common law of trusts

and agency are supplemented by additional requirements under the specific laws
of each state dealing with the obligations of corporate officers, partners. and
other agents, as well as by the federal securities laws. Directors and other
"insiders," for example. are prohibited from taking advantage of nonpublic
information in the purchase and sale of securities of corporations with which
they are connected.'7
The details ofthe duties of fiduciaries vary, depending on the closeness of
the relationship between the parties and the extent to which the principal or
beneficiary is dependent on and confides in the fiduciary. In general, however,
under the common law and rules of equity, it can be said of all cases that the
fiduciary owes the principal the strictest loyalty, and that the fiduciary must
exercise the utmost good faith and must do nothing to prejudice the interest- of
the principal or beneficiary. II There are many applications of this duty of
loyalty. Contracts made by a fiduciary in a representative capacity must be for
the benefit of the principal or beneficiary, and all profits arising out of the
relationship belong to the principal.·1 The fiduciary may not use his or her
position as a fiduciary to make a personal profit when the transaction is for the
beneficiary, and a fiduciary who does so must tum the profit over to the
principal or beneficiary." A fiduciary may not compete with the principal in
business concerning the subject matter of their relationship. II A fiduciary may
not make contracts in the capacity as a fiduciary with himself or herself in an
individual capacity and may not sell property that the principal has entrusted to
the fiduciary unless the principal or beneficiary gives permission and the fiduci-
ary conducts the transaction at arm's length and under conditions of fuU
disclosure. 12
Unless specifically agreed upon, a fiduciary may not represent interests that
conflict with those of the principal or beneficiary in the matters in which the
fidUciary is employed. U For example, a fiduciary may not without permission of
the principal accept commissions from third parties who deal with the principal
through the fiduciary, and, if the fiduciary does accept such commissions, the

17 See discussion of the securities laws in Chapter 7.

II Restatement of the Law (Second) ofTrusts § 170 (1959) (hereinafter Restatement
Trusts); Restatement of the Law (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958) (hereinafter Restate-
ment Agency); Loring, Trustees Handbook 67 (6th cd. 1962) (hereinafter Trustees
Hmdboo~. .
"Restatement Trusts, supra note 88, at §~ 172, 181, 182.
10 Id. at § 203; Restatement Aaency, supra note 88, at §§ 388, 404.
II Restatement Agency, supra note 88, at § 393.

12 Restatement Trusts, supra note 88, at § 170(2); Restatement Agency, supra note 88,
at § 389; Trustees Handbook, supra nOle 88, at 68.
13 Restatement Agency, supra note 88, at § 391.
24-23 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.0211)(11)

fiduciary must surrender them to the principal." In fact, any profit the fiduciary
might make of any nature arising from violation of the duty or loyalty to the
principal belongs to the principal, and the fiduciary must account for it or its
value to the principal or beneficiary .15
Any property ofthe principal or beneficiary that comes into the hands ofthe
fiduciary as a result of the relationship must be kept separate and treated with
special care to protect the interests of the principal in the same manner and skill
that the fiduciary would use in administering his or her own property." How-
ever, if the fiduciary treats property entrusted to the fiduciary as the fiduciary's
own personal property or mingles it with the fiduciary's own property, the
fiduciary is guilty of conversion. lIT
Although these duties may be varied by contract between the parties, and
although the principal may relieve the fiduciary ofmany ofthese strict duties, no
contract ofthis nature is effective to relieve the fiduciary ofliability for breach of
duty in bad faith, done intentionally or with reckless indifference to the interests
of the principal. Similarly, a contract term where a principal waives his or her
right to claim any profit that the fiduciary has derived from a breach offiduciary
duty is not enforceable."

[b) Transactions Where a Bank Is a Fiduciary. Determining whetber a bank is

acting in a fiduciary capacity may be a difficult matter." The relationship
between bank and depositor ordinarily is that ofa creditor and a debtor, not ofa
fiduciary and a principal. '00 Circumstances exist, however, in which a fiduciary
relationship will be implied as a matter of law, because the relationship between
the parties involves a special confidence placed by one person in the other.'o, In

MId. at §§ 392, 394, 403.

"Restatement Trusts, supra note 88, at § 205(b); Restatement Agency, supra note 88,
at §§ 403, 404.
lIfRestatement Trusts, supra note 88, at §§ 174, 179; Restatement Agency, supra note
88, at §§ 402(1), 404.
17 Restatement Agency, supra note 88, at ~ 398, 402.
"Restatement Trusts, supra note 88, at § 222; cf. id. § 216.
"See generally Annot., "Existence of Fiduciary Relationship Between Bank and
Depositor so as to Impose Special Duty Upon Bank," 70 ALR3d 1344 (1976); Hagedorn,
"The Impact of Fiduciary Principles on the Bank-Customer Relationship in Washing-
ton," 16 Williamette L. Rev. 803 (1980).
'00 See Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P2d 1235 (1982).
'0' An example is an escrow deposit. An escrow depository owes a fiduciary duty to
the parties to the escrow transaction. The escrow depository does not have a duty to
others, although, under proper circumstances, notice ofthe interests ofa third party may
justify imposing a constructive trust upon property held by the depository. DeMello v.
Home Escrow, Inc., 4 Haw. App. 41, 659 P2d 759 (1983). An escrow agent has two
fiduciary duties to the principals to the transaction. There is a duty of strict compliance
with the terms of the escrow agreement, and there is a duty to disclose known fraud;
 SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24-24
11 24.01(1Ilb)

Denison State Bank v. Madeira,'ot a person who borrowe~ funds from ~ bank to
acquire a business claimed that the bank brea~heda fi~UClary duty t~ hIm by not
disclosing infonnation relevant to the financlal standlng of the busmess he was
acquiring. The borrower argued that the bank h~ a fiduciary ~Iationship to
him because the bank had superior knowledge In the transactIon. The court
declined to hold the bank to the standard of a fiduciary. The borrower was a
knowledgeable and experienced businessman who had full access to the relevant
financial records of the business he was acquiring. In the view of the court, the
borrower could not avoid responsibility for his own lack of diligence in investi-
gating the financial status ofthe business. This was an ordinary business transac-
tion with the bank, and not a fiduciary relationship.
In Dolton v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Association,'G2 the court
reversed entry of summary judgment for the plaintiff savings and loan associa-
tion in a case in which a customer of the savings and loan claimed that the
association improperly deprived him of a business opportunity by purchasing
land the customer was negotiating to obtain. The customer sued on theories of
tortious interference with prospective business advantage and breach offiduci-
ary duty. The court held that Questions of facts were presented on both issues
requiring a trial.
Although there is no per se fiduciary relationship between a borrower and
lender, the court said, "a fiduciary duty may arise from a business or confiden-
tial relationship which impels or induces one party 'to relax the care and vigi-
lance it would and should have ordinarily exercised in dealing with II
stranger.' ..104 The jury was entitled to detennine if the borrower had trusted the
association to deal with him on a fiduciary basis and if the association had
invited or accepted such a trust. In referring these questions to the jury, the court

MaJlll1ll! v. Northroup, 13S Ariz. S73, 663 P2d S6S (1983). "A corrospondent ba.ik
relationship, standing alone, does not create an agency relationship ...." Accordingly, no
fiduciary relationship existed. Aaron Ferer & Sons., Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731
F2d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 1984).
The deposit of a check: with an escrow depository without the indorsement the of
payee prevents an escrow relationship from being established because the payee retains
control over the instrument. To create an escrow, it must be possible for the check: to be
delivered to the party entitled to it upon the performance of all the terms of the escrow
agreement without any further conditions. Patel v. Gannaway, 726 F2d 382 (8th Cir.
1984).
,at 230 Kan. 684, 640 P2d 1235 (1982).
'G2 642 P2d 21 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). See also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. United Health
Club, Inc., 704 F2d 120 (3d Cir. 1983). In Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 99
Nev. 284, 662 P2d 610 (1983), the court rejected a claim forinterference with prospective
economic advantage brought against a bank. The plaintiffclaimed that the bank: discour-
aged buyers from dealing with him about the sale ofplaintifl's property in order to depress
the price that would be bid for the property at a mortgage foreclosure ....e.
'04 642 P2d at 23.
24-25 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.02[l](b]

noted that the nature ofbanking involved a "constant invitation" to prospective

borrowers to place trust in the bank. If there was a fiduciary relationship, then
the savings and loan association had a duty to refrain from engaging in transac-
tions "antagonistic to its customer." In this case, the transaction involved a
purchase of real estate. Although the savings and loan knew of the property
previously and had a prior interest in obtaining it, there would be a breach of
fiduciary duty if the circumstances justified finding that there was a fiduciary
relationship. With respect to the claim of tortious interference with a prospec-
tive business advantage, the court also ruled that a trial should be held. 1'he court
recognized that competitors do not act improperly by obtaining a business
advantage over other competitors, but it concluded that the savings and loan
association should not be viewed as a competitor in the field of real estate
development. .
A bank that made a real estate loan to a purchaser of a condominium unit
did not breach a fiduciary duty to its debtor by misrepresenting the extent to
which the units in the condominium complex had been sold, because the bank
did not owe a fiduciary duty to its borrower even when the bank had special
knowledge of the circumstances of the condominium development.'01 Here, the
bank participated in the construction financing, and the developer referred
purchasers of condominium units to the bank for financing.
In Aaron FeTer &&ns'Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,'01 the court discussed
the issue of when a bank engaged in business negotiations has a duty to disclose
information to participants in the transaction. Under circumstances in which
there is a duty to disclose, omissions of material fact can constitute fraud. But
there is a disclosure duty only in two situations: "first, where the parties enjoy a
fiduciary relationship . . . and second, where one party possesses superior
knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that the other is acting
on the basis of mistaken knowledge. "'07 In determining whether there is a
fraudulent concealment because of superior knowledge, it is necessary to con-
sider the extent to which the information may be public, the extent of disclosure
made, and the extent that the party claiming injury pursued obtaining the
information under procedures available for discovering it. Accordingly, when
there was a failure to inquire, a failure to follow up on information disclosed,
and a failure to utilize existing litigation to obtain the information, as well as
when the bank had reasonable grounds for not volunteering information so as to
protect the confidentiality ofits customers' affairs, the court declined to fmd the
bank had a duty of disclosure.'01

' 05 lndermill v. United Sav., 5 Ohio App. 3d 243,451 NE2d 538 (1982).
101 731 F2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984).
'07Id at 123. Access to the fmancial record! ofa business corporation doeS not create
a fiduciary relationship~ Under New York law, "the usual relationship of bank and
customer is that of debtor and creditor" absent an intent to make the relationship
something more. Id. at 122.
'01 Id. at 123-124.
,. 24.02(2] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24·26

In a California case, a court found that a bank had a special duty to its
customer to act in good faith because the nature of the relationship between
bank and customer was a special one, like that ofa fiduciary, because ofthe trust
and confidence placed in the bank and because the business of banking is a
"highly regulated" one that involves "performing vital public services substan-
tially affecting the public welfare." Depositors are dependent on their banks to
act honestly and competently to protect the funds entrusted to the banks. Thus,
the court viewed the bank-depositor relationship as at least a "quasi-fiduciary"
one, characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary
responsibility. Because ofthis relationship, a bank impliedly covenants to act in
good faith and to deal fairly, and so may be held liable in tort for breach of its
covenant when it raises spurious defenses and engages in stonewalling tactics
to prevent its depositor from recovering funds lost through the bank's
negligence.'o,
A decision by the Ninth Circuit, although not involving common-law fidu-
ciary principles, presented a similar issue. In the case, a bank honored its
customer's overdrafts to enable the customer to pay wages, on which withhold-
ing and FICA taxes were due the Internal Revenue Service, to its employees. The
court held that a trial was necessary to determine if the bank was liable for the
failure of the borrower to pay the taxes. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a
person who supplies funds for wages with notice that the employer will not pay
the required withholding and FICA taxes is liable for payment of the taxes. 110
The district court had held that the bank did not violate this statute by honoring
the overdrafts. The court ofappeals reversed and remanded the case for tria1." 1

[2J A Bank's Duty of Good Faith and Related Obligations

A series of cases, often loosely referred to as lender liability cases, has
sharpened awareness of a bank's obligation to treat its customers fairly and in
good faith. Although many of these cases have involved situations in which a
bank has moved to collect a loan or to exercise what the bank thought were its
remedies under various financing arrangements, the principles involved in the
cases are broader than the specific circumstances of the particular financing
arrangement. In some of these cases, large jury awards were obtained against
banks by parties who claimed that the bank's conduct in handling the fmancing
relationship was wrongful and injurious. In one of the earliest in this series of
cases, State National Bank v. Farah Mamifacturing CO.,m the court upheld a

101 Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551 (1985). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is discussed IIllpra , 24.02(2).
110 26 USC § 3505(b) (1982).

'''United States v. First Nat'! Bank, 652 F2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981).
"'678 SW2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
24-27 DEBTOR DEfAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.021211_1

jury award of S18 million against a bank that had loaned funds to the plaintiff
company, because the bank's actions in threatening to invoke a management
change clause in its loan agreement with the plaintiff was held to constitute
fraud, duress, and interference with the business relationships and governance
of the company.

lal Theories Underlying Lender Uabillty Cases. The cases that fall in the
lender liability category are based upon a number of different legal theories.
Some of these are new, and some of them are familiar common-law concepts.
While this section cannot give a detailed analysis ofthe various theories,us the
discussion that follows illustrates the major developments.
There is a general duty of good faith in the vee, which attaches to every
contract and to every duty under it. The relevant section simply states, "Every
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement. "'14 This is intended to be an overarching principle
of the vec. 11i What constitutes the obligation of good faith is refined and
developed to some extent in the particular provisions ofthe vee that deal with
specific transactional matters. In general, as discussed here previously,tt. the
vee defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."m In some circumstances, there may be a higher duty. A merchant
who engages in transactions subject to Article 2 on the sales ofgoods is required
to observe "reasonable commercial standards offair dealing in the trade. "111 The
standards of the trade that are relevant, according to the uee, are those "cur-
rently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even thoU&h dissidents
ready to cut comers do not agree. "11_ The concept ofgood faith is necessarily an
open-ended and general idea, which permits courts to exercise some leeway in
seeing that justice is done under the particular circumstances, and there is no
hard, bright line rule to distinguish good faith conduct from that which is not.

m There is a growing literature on the issue oflender liability. See .enera1ly Grarioff,
"Emerging Theories· of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts," 104
BankingU 492 (1987).
... ucc § 1·203.
115UCC § 1·203 comment.
118 See discussion at f 16.01 of good faith with respect to the qualifications to be a
holder in due course.
1l1UCC § 1-201(19).
11IUCC § 2·103(1)(b).
lIIUCC § 1·205, comment 5. In Van Bibberv. Norris, 419 NE2d 115 (Ind. 1981), the
court indicated that a lender is not held to the merehant duty of fonowing reasonable
commercial standards. See the discussion ofthe development ofthe concept of good faith
in the vec in Wiseman, "The Limit! ofVision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules,"
100 Harv. L Rev. 465 (1987).
11 24.0212](a) SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 24-28

Under the UCC, any right or obligation recognized by the UCC "is enforce-
able by action" unless there is a specific declaration in the UCC that limits the
availability ofenforcement.'20 The type ofreliefthat might be available, whether
in the nature of specific performance or equitable relief, the comments say
should be determined by the specific provisions of the UCC and supplementary
principles oflaw that the UCC incorporates.'2' This invites actions by aggrieved
parties to enforce the duty of good faith. Further, it leaves open the question of
what relief might be appropriate under the circumstances.
There are provisions in the UCC that limit the award ofdamages, particu-
larly in the sections on bank collections, which provide that the measure of
damages for not exercising ordinary care in "handling an item" is limited to "the
amount ofthe item reduced by an amount which could not have been realized by
the use of ordinary care .... "'22 This limitation on damages is not applicable
when there is bad faith. In cases ofbad faith, the measure of damages "includes
other damages, if any, suffered by the party as a proximate consequence."'11
Although the UCC adopts as a general principle thatihe remedies provided in
the UCC are to be liberally administered to put the injured party "in as good a
position as ifthe other party had fully performed" the obligation, the UCC also
takes a stance that "neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be
had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule oflaw."'2' There
are few circumstances in the UCC itself in which punitive damages are
addressed, but the reference to "other rule oflaw" indicates an intent to incorpo-
rate general rules oflaw on measuring damages from outside the UCC.
There is a line of cases, discussed earlier in this chapter, that deal with the
bank's duty of good faith when a bank decides to demand payment of a note
under an acceleration clause or by making demand on a demand note. 'II As these
cases reveal, there are divergent views on the extent to which the duty of good
faith may limit a bank from exercising rights that otherwise are specifically
provided for in the lending agreement.'·
A growing body ofcases holds that a bank may be liable in tort for breach of
an implied covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing. 121 The covenant ofgood faith

'·VCC § 1.106(2).
'2' UCC § 1-106, comment 2.
'22 UCC § 4-103(5).
'%lId.
'2'UCC § 1.106(1).
'21 See discussion supra' 24.01 [I].
,. See Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), where the duty of
good faith limited the ability ofthe bank to exercise a default provision entitling the lender
to accelerate the debt.
'USee Commerciil1 Colton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 55 I (1985).
24-29 DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT , 24.0212J(a)

and fair dealing is not based on the uee obligation of good faith, but rather is a
tort duty whose origin is founded upon the existence of a special relation&hip
between the parties, such as that in which a fiduciary relationship exists."l' A
1985 California case found that there was a special relationship between a bank
and a customer who had a checking account with the bank, because of the
importance ofthe public service provided by the bank and the regulated nature
of the banking industry.·21
Breach of the duty of good faith is but one of the many theories on which
recovery from banks for wrongful conduct in dealing with customers has been
sought. Some of the additional theories are fraud, both for deliberate misrepre-
sentation as well as for fraudulent nondisclosure where there is a duty to dis-
close.'. Interference with business relationships and theories based on lender
control of the debtor also have been the basis for recovery.·11
When a debtor becomes bankrupt, claims asserted against the bankrupt
may be challenged under principles of equitable subordination."2 Under this
doctrine, a bankruptcy court may subordinate the claims of creditors whose
conduct is inequitable to the claims of other creditors. 'II Liability issues also
arise when a secured lender acts to repossess collateral or to exercise other
Article 9 riihts on default. These problems are discussed in the sections of this
chapter that deal with the enforcement of security interests. The remainder of
this section provides examples ofsome ofthe cases involving various theories of
liability, such as those referred to previously.

•21 See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 1S2, 686
P2d 1158,206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). This principle has been applied in wrongful dis-
charge from employment cases and in cases involving insurers' dealinp with their
policyholders.
12ISee also Best v. United States Nat. Banlc, 78 Or. App. t, 714 P2d 1049 (1986),
alrd, 303 Or. 551, 139 P2d 554 (1987). In this case, plaintiffs brought a class action to
recover $30 million for bank charges for return of insufficient funds checks on the
arounds, among others, of breach of the covenant of good faith and unconscionability~
Although the court held that unconscionability could not be an affirmative basis for relief,
the court ruled that recovery could be obtained for breach ofan implied covenant ofgood
faith. See generally Annot., "Bank's Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing," 55 ALR4th 1026 (1981).
•30 State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 618 SW2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See also
Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984), which
found a bank officer improperly failed to disclose material information.
II. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co.• 678 SW2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
U2 See II USC §§ 5 IO(c) (1982). which recognizesthe principle of equitable subordi-
nation in making distributions to bankruptcy claimants.
'" See lenerally Taylor v. Standard Gas &: Electric Co., 306 US 301 (1939); Pepperv.
Litton. 308 US 295 (1939); In re Westgate-Cal. Corp., 642 F2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1981); lnre
Mobile Sleel Co., 563 F2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
11 24.02(2)[b) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-30

(b) Liability Cases. In State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co., '10 the
court upheld ajury award oU 18 million against a bank that had loaned funds to
the plaintiff company, because the bank's actions in threatening to invoke a
management change clause in its loan agreement with the plaintiff in order to
influence the management of the company amounted to fraud, duress, and
interference with the business relationships and governance of the company.
The secured party should carefully investigate the possibility ofother credi-
tors with priority rights in the collateral to avoid interfering with their property
interests in the collateral. In Barr v. White Oak State Bank, ':15 a secured party
repossessed collateral and disposed of it only to discover that there was another
secured party with a superior interest. The foreclosing secured party, a bank,
knew that other creditors needed to be informed before disposing of the collat-
eral, and that the interests of other secured parties could be found by a search of
the records held by the Secretary of State, but it failed to conduct such a search.
The court found that these circumstances were "sufficient to raise the issue that
the bank acted with reckless disregard for the rights of the other secured credi-
tor ...," entitling the other secured creditor to exemplary damages.
In the K.M. C. Co. case, the bank entered into an agreement to provide a line
of credit stipulating that advances under the line of credit were within the
discretion of the bank and, further, that the bank could require all funds
advanced to be repaid on demand. When the bank terminated the credit, the
court found that the bank had a duty ofgood faith that required giving advance
notice to its borrower for a period that would allow the borrower to arrange
alternative financing. 'H A different court declined to follow K.M.C. Co. and
ruled that past advances made by the bank beyond the credit limits of the loan
agreement did not constitute a course ofdealing that modified the bank's power
under the loan agreement to make the loan due on demand.'" In Finley, Inc. v.
Longview Bank & Trust Co., 'M the court ruled that a bank acted in good faith in
exercising its rights under an acceleration clause when the debtor threatened
bankruptcy. Although the debt to the bank was secured by a CD in the same
amount as the debt, the interest payable was II percent on the note but only 9
percent on the CD. Thus, the collateral did not cover the entire indebtedness,
and the bank's acceleration for "insecurity" was in good faith given "the nature
and value of the collateral. "13'
A federal appellate court afllrmed a $100,000 award for breach of the duty
ofgood faith when a bank called due a loan of$25,OOO and took steps to collect it

'S< 678 SW2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).

135
677 SW2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
'HK.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
m Flagship Nat'l Bankv. Gray Distribution Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), reviewed denied, 497 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986).
131
705 SW2d 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 198 S).
"·See Kamer v. Willis, 238 Kan. 246, 710 P2d 21 (1985).
24-31 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT '124.03(1)

by setoff of other bank credits and seizure of the borrower's personal automo-
bile. Although the loan involved a demand note, the court ruled that the bank
still had a duty to act in good faith and pointed to other loan documents
Oll
indicating that the bank's right to demand payment had been qualified.'
A Texas state courtjury awarded over $59 million to a couple who borrowed
$1.5 million from the Texas Commerce Bank·McAllen to build a furniture store.
The award was the result of the bank's failure to release its lien on propeny that
secured a second loan to the couple of$ I85,000 when that loan was repaid. The
suit was based on fraud by misrepresentation and breach oftbe bank's duty of
good faith and fair dealing,'" In Conlon v. Wells Fargo Bank,1t2 ajury awarded
S10 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages to
borrowers who claimed that. the Wells Fargo bank engaged in fraudu}en~ can·
duct, breach of contract, and infliction of emotional distress by its actions in
tenninating an 58 million crop loan financing program previously established
for the borrowers.

11 24.03 ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER

UCC ARTICLE 9
(lJ Default
Default occurs when the conditions const.ituting default, as stipulated in the
security agreement, arise. "3 Subject to the UCC's good faith rules, the security
agreement may stipulate those actions of the debtor or those other circum·
stances that constitute a default.'« The agreement may contain an "accelera·
tion" clause establishing that the debtor's obligation will become due at the "will
of the secured party" or when the secured party "deems himselfinsecure," but
these clauses may be exercised only when the secured party "in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired," as discussed
earlier in this chapter.•45
When default occurs, the secured party has the following options. It may sue
and obtain a judgment against the debtor for the obligation and then utilize the
nonnal procedures available to creditors for enforcement ofjudgments; it may
use the provisions provided in the UCC, which permit the secured party to take

.40 Reid v, Key Bank, 821 F2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).

• 41 Robinson v. McAllen State Bank, 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1004 (No. C-1948-84-
D, Tex. 206th Dist. Ct. May 12, 1987).
'''48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1041 (No. 82852, Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. June 10,
1987).
• 43 uec § 9-501{1).
'«Id.
'''uec § 1-208. See supra 1 24.0 I(I][b}.
1124.0312] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-32

possession of the collateral;'" or it may have further rights provided by the

security agreement.'47 The rights and remedies of the secured party are cumula-
tive and nonexclusive.'"
Although the DeC ordinarily allows the parties to modify the way its rules
apply by agreements made in good faith, there are some rules on the rights and
duties ofthe parties on default that cannot be changed by agreement. Those rules
requiring the secured party to account for any surplus money received from the
sale of collateral, those dealing with the method ofdisposing ofcollateral, those
governing the rights of the secured party to keep the collateral in satisfaction of
the obligation, those giving the debtor the right to redeem the collateral, and
those that establish the secured party's liability for failure to comply with the
uee procedures cannot be varied by agreement.'41

(2) Repossession of the COllateral

One of the more important rights of a secured party, which distinguishes
secured from unsecured creditors, is the right to use the collateral as a source of
payment for the obligation when default occurs.'so Although the DeC gives the
secured party all the rights and remedies that may be available generally to
unsecured creditors, lSl the secured party may also take steps to obtain possession
ofthe collateral (assuming that the secured party does not already have posses-
sion) when default occurs. m Upon obtaining possession, the secured party may
in some cases retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, as discussed
later, or it may resell it and apply the proceeds of the sale to the obligation.
The right to take possession ofthe collateral arises when default occurs.'" In
determining whether a default exists, not only must the terms of the security
agreement be considered, but also attention must be given to the possibility that
the course of dealing between the parties or other conduct may have created a
waiver, estoppel, modification, or other ground for asserting that default has not

,.. UCC § 9-501(1).

'"'Id.
'41 Id.
' 41 UCC § 9-501(3).
'10 See generally Skilton & Dunham, "Security Interests in Returned and Repossessed
Goods Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 15 Willamette L. Rev.
779-858 (1978); White, "Consumer Repossessions and Deficiencies: New Perspectives
From New Data," 23 BCL Rev. 385-418 (1982); Annotation, "Validity, Under State
Law, of Self-Help Repossession of Goods Pursuant to UCC § 9-503," 75 ALR3d 1061
(1977); Annotation, "Punitive Damages for Wrongful Seizure ofChattel by One Oaiming
Security Interest," 35 ALR3d 1016 (1971).
,., UCC § 9-501(1).
'52 UCC § 9-503.
lS3Id.
24-33 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.03(11

occurred. The secured party also must act in good faith in deciding whether to
declare a default.'SA
The uee permits the secured party to repossess the collateral by self·help
when that may be done without "breach of the peace."'· Numerous cases, both
under the uee and prior to the uee, have dealt with the question of what
constitutes a breach ofthe peace. lS' A secured party's unconsented entry into the
debtor's home to retak.e collateral, or the secured party's forcible seizure ofthe
collateral from the debtor's possession, will be a breach of the peace under the
usual rules, but there will be no breach of the peace when the debtor voluntarily
consents to the removal. m It is important to consult the law ofeach jurisdiction
carefully on this question, as the issue ofwhat constitutes a breach ofpeace is one
for decision on a case~y-case basis, and definitions vary among the states. Even
when the retaking may in fact be accomplished peacefully, the potential of the
circumstances for a violent confrontation has led to decisions in other areas of
the law that the remedy cannot be used.'SI Alternatively, the secured party may
utilize judicial process to take possession of the collateral.'" Typically, this will
be by an action in the nature of replevin. Such remedies have been challenged on
constitutional grounds. These issues are discussed later in this section.
Of course, when the secured party is already in possession of the collateral,
no further action is necessary to obtain possession of it, although there are
procedures that the secured party must follow in order to dispose ofthe collateral
or to apply it toward satisfaction of the debt. The secured party is subject to the
obligations, discussed subsequently, to preserve and maintain the collateral.'·
The security agreement may provide that the debtor, upon default, assem-
ble the collateral and mak.e it available to the secured party at a place designated
by the secured party as reasonably convenient."' When the collateral consists of

'54 See UCC § 1-203; discussion supra 11 24.0 I.

'HUCC § 9·503.
'SI See B. Clark, The law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code' 4.5 (1980 &. Supp.) (hereinafter Clark), White &. Summers § 26-6 (2d ed. 1980).
'57 Id.

'SlSee Berg v. Wiley, 264 NW2d 145 (Minn. 1978) (landlord repossession). For a
discussion of breach of the peace under UCC Article 9, see generally T. Crandall, R.
Halledom &. F. Smith, Jr., Debtor-Creditor Law Manual 1 7.0S[6] (1985). Some facton
that have been considered in determininll whether there has been a breach ofthe peace lIJ'e
the following: using actual foroe by the Creditor, using threats and intimidation, havinll a
police officer accompany the creditor, continuina repossesaion action after a debtor
threatens violence or is in a position ofbodi1y harm, and entering a residence without the
debtor's consent. Id.
,s'UCC § 9-503.
lIOUCC §§ 9-501(1), 9·207.
"' UCC§ 9-S03. See Clark Equip. Co. v. ArmstronlEquip. Co., 431 F2d S4 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 US 909 (I 971) (allowing tbe secured party to obtain an injunction
requiring assembly of the collateral.)
11 24.03(3](a) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24-34

an account, chattel paper, general intangibles, or an instrument, the secured

party may give notice to the account debtor or obligor to make payments directly
to the secured party.'" The secured party is permitted to take possession of the
collateral by rendering equipment unusable.'" The secured party also may
dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises by following the procedures pro-
vided for disposition of the collateral. 1M

(3) Constitutional Limitations on Secured party Remedies

(a) Supreme Court Due Process Decisions. Since the U.S. Supreme Court
decided the case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'U serious constitutional
issues have surrounded use of crediton' remedies involving seizure of property
of the debtor without prior notice orjudicial proceeding. Sniadach involved the
garnishment ofwages ofthe debtor before ajudicialjudgment was obtained. The
court held that, absent "extraordinary situations," due process requires giving
notice to the debtor and allowing the debtor an opportunity to be heard prior to
seizure of the property. Because the state garnishment statute did not afford
these safeguards, the court held it unconstitutional.
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Fuentes v. Shevin. '" This case
involved the validity of the replevin remedy. The creditor obtained from the
clerk of the court a writ of replevin, ex parte, directing the sheriff to seize the
property in which the creditor claimed an interest. Under the statute, it was not
necessary to give prior notice to the debtor or to hold a hearing. The court held
that this procedure also violated due process. As in Sniadach, there had to be
notice and a hearing before seizure.

II' UCC § 9.502(1). See VCC § 9-318(3). This right may be exercised by the secured
party, when there is an agreement with the debtor pennitting such action, and may be
exercised even without aareement on default. UCC § 9-502(1). Presumably, the obligor on
a negotiable instrument would still be entitled to have the instrument canceled on pay·
ment to avoid the risk ofdouble liability from the instrument's transfer to a holder in due
course. uec §§ 3·505, 9-318(3). With this type of collateral, the secured party may act
more freely to liquidate the debt. See § 9-502(2} and comments.
"'uec § 9-503.
"'ld.
115 395 US 337 (1969). See generally Annot., "Post-SniadachStatus ofBanker's Right
to Set Off Bank's Claim Against Depositor's Funds," 65 ALR3d 1284 (1975); Annot.,
"Modem Views as to Validity, Under Federal Constitution, ofState Prejudgment Attacb-
ment, Garnishment, and Replevin Procedures, Distraint Procedures Under Landlord's
lien Statutes, and Like Procedures Authorizing Summary Seizure ofProperty," 18 ALR
Fed. 223 (I 974); Annat., "Replevin or Claim and Delivery: Modem View as to Validity of
Statute or Contractual Provision Authorizing Summary Repossession of Consumer
Goods Sold Under RetaillnstaIlment Sales Contract" 45 ALR3d 1233 (I 972).
111407 US 67 (I 972).
24-35 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT 11 24.03(3]1b]

Subsequently, in 1974, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., the Court upheld a

Louisiana statute that contained a procedure similar to replevin. 1IT Under the
Louisiana statute, however, there were safeguards for the protection of the
debtor that were absent in Fuentes. Among the differences referred to by the
Court was the fact that the Louisiana statute required the creditor to set forth
specific facts justifying the creditor's claim-not just to provide conclusory
allegations. It was required thai the application for the remedy be made to a
judge, not to a clerk ofthe court. The Louisiana statute gave further protection to
the debtor by requiring a prompt hearing after the seizure.
Although some observers of the Court thought that Mitchell might have
marked a retreat from the broad principles indicated in Sniadach and Fuentes,
this conclusion was proved wrong in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem
Inc. 16I In that case, the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a Georiia
garnishment statute that permitted a creditor to garnish funds in a bank account
before judgment and without notice to the debtor. As the debtor in Di-Chem was
a corporate business debtor, the case put to rest any notion that the constitu·
tional due process protections of Sniadach and Fuentes apply only to consumer
debtors. Di-Chem followed Sniadach in finding the garnishment procedures
lacking in due process, but it also distinguished Mitchell on the grounds that the
safeguards existing in the Louisiana statute were not present in the Georgia
garnishment statute in Di-Chem. Thus, although Di-Chem makes clear that the
due process limitations on creditor's remedies are to be taken seriously, it
perpetuates the ambiguity in the law as to what may be needed to have a remedy
that will pass constitutional muster.
In light of these discussions by the Supreme Court, it seems clear that a
creditor should move cautiously prior to exercising any remedy to seize goods of .
the debtor before the creditor has obtained a judgment against the debtor. In
most instances, it will be necessary to give notice and to provide an opportunity
for a hearing before property can be seized prior to judgement. Indeed, this is
reflected in the revisions made by most states in their replevin procedures,
which require some kind of preseizure hearing.

[b) Self·Help Repossession and the Issue of State Acdon. The application of
the constitutional principles announced by the Supreme Court in these cases to
the remedies given secured parties by the UCC has attracted considerable
attention. Underthe UCC, upon default the secured party is entitled to repossess
the collateral either by self-help, when that can be done without breach of the
peace, or by appropriate judicial action.'" The customary procedure by which
creditors may obtain possession of collateral in the hands of the debtor is the

'"1 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 US 600 (1974}.

111419 US 601 (1974).
'" UCC § 9-503.
, 24.0313](11] SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24-36

replevin remedy. As indicated previously, it is clear that in most cases, before

this remedy can be safely used prior to judgment against the debtor, the secured
party must give notice to the debtor and some sort of preseizure hearing must be
held. To a creditor, the consequences ofusing an unconstitutional procedure are
serious. The creditor could be liable under federal statutes for violating the civil
rights ofthe debtorYo
The UCC's self-help repossession provision has generated considerable
litigation. If statutory replevin procedures are unconstitutional when no notice
or hearing is afforded, one may ask why the ·even more unsupervised and
potentially abusive remedy of self-help repossession should not be unconstitu-
tional. The courts that have considered this question generally have rejected the
attacks on the self-help repossession remedy.'f'
The reason given by the courts for rejection of the constitutional attack is
that a creditor's use of the repossession remedy does not involve any "state
action." The due process clause applies only to "state action." It does not limit
purely private conduct. m Because the UCC is a state statute and contains a
provision indorsing the self-help remedy, there is at least the gloss ofstate action
when this remedy is employed. The decided cases reject this line of reasoning,
but the Supreme Court has not decided the question. In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks,1n the court rejected an attack on the constitutionality of a warehouse-
man's lien provided under Section 7·210 of the UCC for unpaid storage bills.
The court, notwithstanding the statutory provision creating the lien, held that no
state action was involved. The court reasoned that the UCC provision only

uo 42 USC § 1983 (1982). Lugarv. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 US 922 (1982). Although
one coun has held that there was no civil rights act violation when the creditor used the
Pennsylvania replevin statute later invalidated by the Supreme Court in Fuentes (Kacher
v. Pittsburgh Nat'! Bank, 545 F2d 842 (3d Cir. 1976», liability has been imposed upon a
creditor for usina a defective replevin statute, after the Court had decided Fuentes, similar
to the one used in that case. Guzman v. Western Stale Bank, 540 F2d 948 (8th Cir. 1976).
1rt Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978); Calderon v. United Furniture Co.,
505 F2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974); Gary v. Darnell, 505 F2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v.
Impala Motors, 503 F2d 607 (6th CiT. 1974); Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F2d 1107 (3d Cir.
1974), ccrt. denied sub nom Gibbs v. Garver, 419 US 1039 (1974); Grandey v. Union
Bank & Trust Co., 498 F2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974), ccrt. denied, 419 US 1034 (1974); Nichols
v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional AUIO Sales,
Inc., 496 F2d 16 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 US 1006 (1974); lames v. Pinnix, 495
F2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F2d 739 (2d Cir. J 974), eert.
denied, 419 US 1006 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 US 1006 (1974); Biehel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Mar-
quette Nat'l Bank, 487 F2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
mThe cases are collected in Annot., "Validity, Under Federal Constitution and
Laws, ofSelf-Help Repossession Provisions of§ 9-503 ofUniform Commercial Code," 29.
ALR Fed. 481 (1976). See generally, J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & 1. Young, Constitutional
Law § 13.5, at 476 (3d ed. 1986).
""436 US 149 (1978).
24-37 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.0313]1b)

codified a remedy that existed apart from the statute at common law. But the
court was careful to add, "This is not to say that dispute resolution between
creditors and debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject
to constitutional constraints...... Similarly, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., "' the Supreme Court found that the due process clause did not apply to an
action by a public utility to cut off electric service of ils customer unilaterally
following a dispute over the amount owed the utility. Although the utility was a
regulated monopoly and the utilization of the service eutofThad been approved
by the state utility commission in a rate tariffhearing, the court said that no state
action was involved. 171
Where the creditor's actions involve the participation of state officials in a
procedure that leads to seizure ofthe debtor's property, there will be state action
as a result of the involvement of the state in the process. Such was the ruling in
Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., In a case that involved a prejudgment writ of
attachment againM a debtor's property. Under the state procedure, the county
sheriffand the court system were involved in the issuance and execution of the
writ ofattachment. This created state action. The test articulated by the court for
determining whether state action was implicated in the attachment of debtor's
property was as follows: "First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the state, or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the state, or by a person for whom the state is responsible ...• Second, the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor because he is a state official, or because he has acted together with or
has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the state."'" Notwithstanding this statement, substan-
tial difficulties remain in determining how to apply this test to particular situa-
tions. Further development of the state action doctrine by the U.S. Supreme
Court is likely to occur.
What constitutes state action was at issue in Harris v. City ofRoseburg. 171
The facts in this case illustrate the difficulties in making that determination on a

mId. at 149,162 n. 12 (1978).

m419 US 345 (1974).
1T1 A number of state court decisions also have upheld the constitutionality of the
vec self-help repossession provision. MeJara v. Kennedy, 541 F2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976);
McDufTyv. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257 (ED Va. 1974); Kipp v. Cozens,
40 Cal. App. 3d 709, 115 Cal. Rptr. 423 {I 974); John Deere Co. v. Catalano, 186 Calo.
101,525 P2d 1153 (1974); A&S Excavating, Inc. v. International Harvester Credit Corp.,
31 Conn. Supp. 152,325 A2d 535 (1974); Kingv. SouthlerseyNat'1 Bank, 66NJ 161,330
A2d 1 (1974); Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P2d 951 (Okla. 1977); Cook v. Lily, 208 SE2d
784 (W. Va. 1974).
m 457 US 922 (1982).
"'Id. at 922,938-939 {I 982).
17t 664 F2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1981).
1f 24.03(3Ilb) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-38

practical level. A seller acted to repossess a truck from the debtor by self-help
measures and arranged for a police officer to accompany him during the repos-
session. The officer, Bergman, informed the seller that the police could not
participate in the repossession, but the officer accompanied the seller to be
available to stop a fight if one should occur during the effort to repossess the
vehicle. When the seller found the truck parked on the street near the debtor's
residence, he began to take it. The debtor discovered him, and a verbal confron-
tation followed. The police officer was present during the controversy. Eventu-
ally the debtor returned to his house, to avoid becoming violent, and the seller
took the vehicle while the debtor was inside. The debtor subsequently was
successful in state court action against the seller claiming that the repossession
was unlawful. He then brought suit against the city under the federal Civil Rights
Act contending that his constitutional rights had been denied. Under the law of
the state, the debtor had a right to resist the repossession by the seller, whose only
remedy then would be to resort to legal process. The debtor claimed that the
presence of the police officer constituted a participation in the repossession in
denial of the debtor's rights. The court concluded that the debtor was entitled to
a trial of his claim:
We conclude that there may be a deprivation within the meaning of§ 1983
not only when there has been an actual "taking" of property by a police
officer, but also when the officer assists in effectuating a repossession over
the objection ofa debtor or so intimidates a debtor as to cause him to refrain
from exercising his legal right to resist a repossession. While mere acquies-
cence by the police to "stand by in case oftrouble" is insufficient to convert
a repossession into state action, police intervention and aid in the reposses-
sion does constitute state action. 110
The court further held, however, that the police officer could claim a good faith
immunity defense based on his sincere and honest belief that his actions were
lawful and necessary to prevent violence from occurring.
The remedy of setoff often used by banks has also been challenged as
violating due process because it is used without notice or hearing prior to its
exercise. Nonetheless, this procedure has been upheld based on the same reason-
ing as that used in cases upholding the self-help repossession remedy. III
As this discussion indicates, there remain some substantial uncertainties in
the law pertaining to creditor's remedies. The safe course, and the one that may

flOld. at 1127.
fll Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F2d 927 (ht Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 US 1001 (1974); Kruaer v. Wells Fargo Bank, II Cal. 3d 352, 521 P2d 441, .
I 13 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Nietzel v. Farmers and Merchants State Bank, 307 Minn. 147,
238 NW2d 437 (1976). There is a comprehensive discussion of the cOll,Stitutional prob-
lems involved with these creditor's remedies in Oark, supra note 156 at 11l4.S( I), 12.5(4).
See generally Chiaw, "The Banker's Duty oreare with Respect to Security Documents,"
1986 J. BU!. L. 113 (1986).
24-39 DEBTOR DEFAULT & ENFORCEMENT , 24.03(4](a)

engender the most good will, is to use judicial process and to conform to the
notice and hearing requirements established for these procedures. Any devia-
tion should be undertaken only after seeking advice of counsel as to the risks
involved under the law applicable in the particular jurisdiction.

14) Disposition of Collateral After Default

la) Requirements for Disposal of CollateraI; After obtaining possession ofthe
collateral upon default, the secured party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of
it and use the proceeds of the disposition to satisfy the obligation. '12 The sale
may be ofthe property in its then present condition, or after any "commercially
reasonable preparation or processing. "'13 Proceeds from the disposition go
firstly, toward satisfying expenses of the secured party in talcing possession and
disposing of the collateral, including reasonable' attorney fees and legal
expenses;'" secondly, to satisfy the indebtedness secured by the security interest
concerned; 115 and thirdly, to satisfy any indebtedness that is subordinate to the
security interest being enforced, when the secured party receives a written notice
of the junior interest before completing distribution of the proceeds.,. When a
surplus exists, the secured party must account to the debtor for such surplus,
unless the transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper. If the security
transaction was such a sale, the debtor is entitled to the surplus only when the
security agreement so provides; otherwise, it is presumed that the sale was
absolute.'17
When disposition of the collateral does not produce enough proceeds to
satisfy the expenses of disposition and the indebtedness secured, the debtor
remains liable for the deficiency unless the security agreement provides other-
wise. 111 If, however, the secured transaction was an absolute assignment or sale
ofaccounts or chattel paper, the debtor will be liable for a deficiency only when
the security agreement so stipulates.'"
The procedures established by the UCC for disposing of the collateral are
critical, and close consultation with counsel is essential. There is a general
requirement that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, man-

112 vee § 9·504( I).

lI~Id.

"'uce § 9·504(I)(a).
15
' UCC § 9·504(1)(b).
'" uee § 9·504(1 )(c).
'17 vee § 9.504(2).
'" Id. See generally Page, "A Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After
Noncompliance with the Resale Provisions of Article 9," 60 NDL Rev. 531 (1984).
'" vee § 9-504(2).
1[ 24.03(4)(al SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-40

ner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable."'1Q The secured
party must give notice to the debtor of the time and place of any public sale or
notice ofthe time after which a private sale or disposition will be made. In the
case of collateral other than consumer goods, notice must be given to any other
secured party from whom the first secured party has received written notice of a
claim of an interest in the collateral. 1I1 When the coIlateral is perishable, or is
sucb that it will quickly decline in value as a result ofany delay, notification need
not be given."2 This also holds true when the collateral is ofa "type customarily
sold in a recognized market." (This last provision presumably applies to collat-
eral for which there is a standard price established by a public market, such as a
stock exchange or commodities excbange.)'13
The secured party is permitted to buy the collateral at any public sale. ,.. The
secured party also may purchase the collateral at a private sale when the collat-
eral is of the type customarily sold in a recognized market or is the subject of
widely distributed standard price quotations.,••
Apart from the requirement of commercial reasonableness, there is little
specificity regarding the type of notice, the manner in which it should be sent,
and the procedures for conducting any sale. This is an area in which problems

should be consulted. t.
may arise, and the law may vary between jurisdictions. In any case, local counsel

A properly conducted sale will transfer all of the debtor's rights to the
purchaser and will discharge the security interest that is being enforced, as well

1IQUCC § 9-504(3). See infra 1[ 24.03[6] on liability for failure to follow correct
procedures. In some states, the secured pany may be unable to obtain a deficiency
judilIlent if these are incorrect procedures. Note, "Secured Transactions: Commercial
Reasonability ofSecured Pany's Sale ofCollateral After Default Under UCC § 9-504(3),"
29 Olda. L. Rev. 486-505 (1976); see generally Annot, "What Is 'Commercially Reason-
able' Disposition of Collateral Required by UCC § 9-504(3}," 7 ALR4th 308 (1981);
Annot., "Uniform Coiiunercial Code: Burden of Proof as to Commercially Reasonable
Disposition of Collateral," 59ALR3d 369 (1974).
.., UCC § 9-504(3). See generally Annot., "Sufficiency of Secured pany's Notifica-
tion of Sale or Other Intended Disposition of Collateral Under § 9-504{3)," 11 ALR4th
241 (1982); Annat., "Loss or Modification ofRight to Notification ofSale ofRepossessed
Collateral Under Uniform Commercial Code § 9-504," 9 ALR4th 552 (1981); Annot.,
"Construction of Term 'Debtor' as Used in UCC § 9-504(3), Requiring Secured Pan to
Give Notice to Debtor ofSale ofCollalerai Securing Obligation," 5 ALR4th 1291 (1981).
112 UCC § 9-504(3). See generally Annot., "Nature ofCollateral Which Secured Pany
May Sell or Otherwise Dispose of Without Giving Notice to Defaulting Debtor Under
DCC § 9-504(3)," 11 ALR4th 1060 (1982).
,.. See Clark, supra nole 156, at , 4.8(7).
1M UCC § 9-504(3).

"lId.
1. See generally Qark, supra note 156, at 'I 4.8.
24-4\ DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT 11 24.03(4I1b)

as any subordinate security interest or lien. ,t1 The purchaser takes free of all of
these interests, even though there may be a defect in the procedures required for
disposing of the collateral, as long as the purchaser buys in good faith in the case
of any private disposition, or has no knowledge of the defects and is not in
collusion with the secured party in the case ofa public sale.'·
The debtor has a right to redeem the collateral at any time before the
collateral has been disposed of or before the secured party has entered into a
contract for its disposition.'" The debtor must tender to the secured party
satisfaction of all obligations secured by the collateral. as well as all expenses
incurred by the secured party including reasonable attorney's fees and legal
expenses. 200 Secured parties who hold security interests junior to the enforcing
secured party may also exercise a right to redeem the collateral by following the
same pr.ocedures. 2D1 Numerous cases illustrate the application of these require-
ments. Some ofthe cases that demonstrate important aspects of the enforcement
procedures are described subsequently.

(b) Cases Illustrating Requirements. In a case decided under the pre-1972

version of Article 9, a court concluded that a guarantor should be classified as a
"debtor" under UCC § 9-1050Xd) after default occurs, because the guarantor
then "owes payment or other performance ofthe obligation secured" as set forth
in the definition. Thus, the guarantor is entitled to the same protection of notice
that the provisions ofArticle 9 extend to a debtor, and the secured party may not
dispose of the collateral without giving reasonable notice to the guarantor. The
court also discussed the circumstances under which a guarantor could waive
notice of disposition of collateral. It drew a distinction between waivers that
occurred prior to default under the security agreement, before the guarantor
became primarily liable on the obligation, and postdefault waivers made after
the guarantor became primarily liable on the obligation. In the latter situation,
the court held that the guarantor could not waive his right to notice; the contract
as guarantor cannot alter the mandate that notice be given under UCC § 9-
50I(3), which states that the rules relating to compulsory dilposition of coUat·
eral may not be waived other than as provided in those provisions. It should be
noted that the 1972 version of UCC § 9-504 does pennit the debtor to waive

"'UCC § 9-504(4). A secured party has no duty under UCC § 9-504(3) to search the
record to identify the interests ofother secured parties before disposing of the collateral.
The court further stated that although the interest ofa scnior lienholder in the collateral
remained effective, the foreclosin& secured party had no duty to give the lienholder the
name ofthe buyer of the collateral. Utility Trailers ofWichita. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co.• II Kan. App. 2d 421,726 P2d 282 (1986).
"' UCC § 9-504(4).
l"UCC § 9-506.
2OOId.
"" Id.
1 24.03{411b) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-42

notice when the waiver is made after default has occurred. (The waiver in the
case at hand was contained in the original contract of guaranty that the guaran-
tor signed.)203
The cosigner ofa note is a debtor under Article 9 who must receive notice of
the sale of collateral, even when the signer is not the owner of the collateral.203
Notice requirements are strictly enforced. It is not sufficient to show that the
secured party acted in good faith and sold the collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner and in substantial compliance with the objectives of the
statute, ifthe notice requirements are not strictly followed. In Ford Motor Credit
Co. 1/. Price,2M a secured party was denied recovery of a deficiency judgment
because the notice of sale of collateral was published in the wrong county. In
First National Bank ofMaryland 1/. DiDomenicO,205 the secured party, who had
voluntarily obtained possession ofthe collateral, sent the debtor a notice stating
that the secured party would conduct a private sale in fifteen days and that the
debtor had fifteen days within which to redeem the goods. The court held that
the notice was not reasonable because it stated incorrectly that the debtor's
redemption rights were limited to fifteen days, when UCC § 9-506 provides that
the debtor may redeem the collateral at any time prior to its disposition. A
guarantor of an obligation is entitled to notice under UCC § 9-504(3) as a
"debtor," because a guarantor has potential liability for any deficiency arising
on the disposition of the collateral. 2OI
In Midwest Bank & Trust Co. 1/. Roderick;"07 a codebtor complained that he
had not received notice ofthe disposition of the collateral. The court held that
UCC § 9·504 does not require that notice be given, because that section applies
to disposition ofcollateral by the secured party, not to disposition by the debtor.
In another case, a letter stating the bank's intent to sell the collateral within ten
days in a commercially reasonable manner was not adequate notice of disposi-
tion, because it failed to disclose the time or place of the public sale. The letter
was also defective when the sale was not held within ten days. A follow-up letter,
which gave notice that some of the items of the collateral (in this case, cattle)
would be sold at a particular date and place, was not adequate notice as to the
remaining collateral (other cattle) not sold at the original date and place. The

202McEntirev.lndianaNat'l Bank, 471 NE2d 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Prescott v.
Thompson Tractor Co., 49S So. 2d S13 (Ala. 1986), held that UCC § 9·S01(3) precludes a
guarantor from agreeina in a guaranty agreement entered into prior to default to waive
rights to notification of disposal of the collateral and conduct of the disposition by the
secured party in a commercially reasonable manner. (The opinion collects the cases on
this point.)
2U Stockdale, Inc. v. Baker, 364 NW2d 240 (Iowa 1985).
-163 Cal. App. 3d 74S, 210 Cal. Rptr. 17 (I 98S).
'"' 302 Md. 290, 487 A2d 646 (1985).
201 Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga. 61 S, 331 SE2d S89 (198S).
'"7132 Ill. App. 3d 463,476 NE2d 1326 (198S).
24-43 DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT 11 24.0314J[bJ

court said there was a further obligation on the part of the bank to advhe the
debtor of when the balance of the collateral would be sold. fOI
A secured party's notice of disposition of the collateral should reach the
debtor in time to allow tlte debtor a reasonable amount of time, usually several
business days, in which to arrange alternative financing. Furthermore, the court
found that an issue of good faith existed when the price of $1 ,000 paid by the
secured party at the sale was grossly disproportionate to the purchase prioe of
$306,000 for the goods six years earlier. 2OI
In another case, the notice of disposition was not held to be commercially
reasonable when it failed to state the manner in which, and the date on which,
the collateral would be sold. The posting ofa notioe with the correct information
in the lobby ofthe bank that was the secured party was not adequate to provide
the notice required. 21 0 .
Other difficulties arose when a secured party took separate action against
different items ofthe collateral, and distinguished between new and used equip-
ment that it was financing for its debtor. The debtor was an agricultural imple-
ment dealer with both new and used equipment. The secured party foreclosed
against all the equipment. Because it had sold the equipment to the debtor, the
secured party, when it took back the new equipment, gave the debtor credit in
the amount ofthe invoice price for which the equipment had been sold. The used
equipment was then sold at a private sale. A deficiency judgment resulted, and
the secured party pursued recovery against the defendant guarantors. The court
held that when the new equipment was taken for credit, at the invoice price
against the debt, there was an "other disposition" of the collateral under UCC
§ 9·504, for which disposition the secured party was required to give statutory
notice. 211
In another case, the assignor of chattel paper became responsible for the
duties of the secured party when it reacquired the paper.212 A mobile home
dealer assigned chattel paper on a mobile home unit to a financer, but, when the
purchaser of the mobile home defaulted on the installment contact, the dealer
took back the unit under a repurchase agreement with the financer. The dealer
had the duties of a secured party to give proper notice of the sale of Ihe mobile
home because of the repurchase arrangement. 2U
Where a secured creditor did not make a serious effort to intere8t potential
buyers, but ran only one inconspicuous ad in a trade publication and no one

201 Havelock Bank v. McArthur, 220 Neb. 364, 370 NW2d 116 (1985). See generally
Annot., "What Constitutes Secured Parties' Authorization to Tran8fer Collateral Free of
Lien Under 9-306(2)." 37 ALR4th 787 (I985).
2otpaco Corp. v. Vigliarola, 611 F. Supp. 923 (EDNY 1985).
210Bank of Sheridan v. Devers, 702 P2d 1388 (Mont. 1985).
211 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Haumont, 220 Neb. 509, 371 NW2d 97 (1985).
212 Joyce v. Cloverorook Homes, Inc., 81 NC App. 270, 344 SE2d 58 (1986).
21sld. at 272, 344 SE2d at 600. See uce § 9-504(5).
'II 24.03(5) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 24-44

showed up for the sale except the secured party, the sale was held to be not
commercially reasonable because the notice was not adequate. However, the
court said that the fair market value of the collateral at the time ofthe sale was
adversely affected by a lis pendens that the debtor had flIed against it. The value
ofthe collateral (in this case an airplane) must be evaluated with the lis pendens
against it, because the debtor must accept the consequences ofhaving flIed the lis
pendens. 214
Where a secured party has a blanket security interest in various assets of the
debtor securing multiple advances ofcredit, the secured party must exercise care
in taking steps to foreclose its security interest. The action taken to dispose ofthe
collateral should be appropriate to the interests ofall parties who are debtors and
of all guarantors who might be affected by the disposition. In Reeves v. Haber-
sham Bank,·" the guarantors on a $35,000 note that represented a subsequent
advance under an earlier security agreement were relieved from responsibility
for a deficiency judgment, because the secured party had failed to give notice
and had proceeded in an unreasonable manner in disposing of the original assets
that secured the original debt. The future advance clause and cross-collateral
provisions in the security agreement gave tbe guarantors of the later obligation
an interest in the disposition of the original collateral.
A secured party who cannot recover a deficiency from its debtor because of
the party's having proceeded in a commercially unreasonable manner in dispos-
ing of the collateral may make a claim against the debtor in bankruptcy. How-
ever, the secured party's claim extends only to the value ofthe collateral to which
the secured party is entitled, because of the bar against recovery of a deficiency
judgment. Thus. the secured party's claim will be disallowed to tbe extent it
exceeds the value of remaining collateral.•11
In Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond,·17 the court upheld the
secured party's sale ofcollateral on an item-by-item basis, rather than as a single
group, fmding that the sale was commercially reasonable regardless ofwhetber a
higher price could have been obtained by selling the collateral as a group.

[5] Retention of Collateral in Discharge of the Obligation

In certain cases, a secured party may elect to retain the collateral in full
discharge of the obligation.•11 The rules for consumer goods in tbis respect are

2'4 Contrail Leasing Partnel'll, Ltd. v. Consolidated Airways, Inc., 742 F2d 1095 (7th
Cir. 1984).
15
• 254 Ga. 615, 331 SE2d 589 (1985).
• 11 In re Gerber, 51 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
17
• 285 SC 277, 330 SE2d 82 (Ct. App. 1985).
211 UCC § 9-505( 1). See generally Annot., "Construction and Operation ofUCC § 9-
505(2) Authorizing Secured Party in Possession of Collateral to Retain It in Satisfaction
of Obligation," 55 ALR3d 651 (1974).
24-45 DEBTOR DEFAUL1' &. ENFORCEMENl 4;t 14.o3{61

different from those for other collateral. When consumer goods are involved,
and the consumer-debtor has paid either 60 percent of the cash price of a
purchase money security interest or 60 percent of the loan in the case of other
security interests, the vee compels the secured party to dispose ofthe collateral
within ninety days after taking possession of it. l1 ' In this case, the provisions on
disposition of collateral (discussed previously) must be followed. Failure to
dispose of the collateral subjects the secured party to liability to the debtor for
conversion or other injury.no The consumer-debtor may waive or modify these
rights in writing after default occurs. It is not possible to waive this provision in
the security agreement or prior to default. ft'
In cases where the collateral is not consumer goods, or in cases involving
consumer goods where the 60 percent payment has not been satisfied, the
secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation by
sending a written notice to the debtor proposing to retain the COllateral. In cases
involving collateral other than consumer goods, notice also must be sent to other
secured parties who have notified the secured party of their interest in the
collateral.= If any person who is entitled to receive notification objects to the
secured party's retention of the collateral, the secured party must dispose of it
under the procedures discussed earlier in this section. an The debtor may waive
receipt oftbis notice after, but not prior to, default.ft•

[6] Creditor Liability for Failure to Comply With UCC Procedures

Failure to comply with the vee provisions on repossession and disposition
of the collateral will result in liability of the secured party to the debtor and to

A lICcured party may not talee advantage ofits own failure to pve notice to the debtor
of an intent to retain collateral in satisfaction of the debt where the secured party later
disposes of the coUateral and proceeds against the debtor for a deficiency. When tbe
secured party retained the collateral and used it for a period of almost three yean, the
court found that the secufed party had elected to retain the coUateral as Illtisfaetion ofthe
obligation. Scbmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 219 Neb. 209, 361 NW2d SS7 (l98S).
Althouah in some C8lIC. it is appropriate to view the use of coUaterai as evidence of
intent to accept collateral in satisfaction of the debt, use of collateral was not viewed as
acceptance where the secured party had made clear his intention not to accept the·
collateral by timely and continued notification to tbe debtor. Johnson Equip., Inc. v.
Nielson, 108 Idaho 867, 702 P2d 90S (Ct. App. 1985).
". UCC § 9·S0S( l).
no UCC §§ 9-S0S( 1), 9-S07{l).
22' UCC §§ 9-501(3), 9·S0S( I).

222 UCC § 9-S05(2).

221ld. See 11 24.03[4].
224ld.
'124.03(6) SECURITY TRANSACI'IONS 2446

other secured parties who suffer loss as a result of such failure to comply.225 The
general rule adopted by the vee recognizes that a person who may be harmed
by a secured party's failure to follow the vee procedures for enforcing the
security interest may have a right to injunctive relief to restrain the manner in
which the secured party is proceeding, as well as a right to recover damages for
losses caused by the secured party's noncompliance. 22t The applicable section
states that when the secured party is not following the provisions of the vee
dealing with default, "disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate
terms and conditions. ''227 This language, as well as the comments, makes clear
that such reliefmay be obtained "prospectively before the unreasonable disposi·
tion has been concluded."m The provision recognizes that a court may impose
appropriate conditions and suggests that the power of a court to controUhe
manner ofdisposition to assure its commercial reasonableness may require that
the collateral be liquidated, in conjunction with other property ofthe debtor not
subject to the security interest, when the combined liquidation would enhance
the value of the debtor's estate for the benefit of all creditors. m
The vee rule clearly recognizes a right to damages, which extends to any
person entitled to notification ofthe disposition ofthe collateral orto any person
whose security interest in the property has been made known to the secured
party before the disposition occurs. Such persons have "a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of
[the vee on default in Article 9] •.•."230 The language of this section does not
indicate whether the recovery should be based upon contract damages principles
or on the measure ofdamages appropriate in tort actions. The general principles
vee
in the on the recovery ofdamages, discussed previously, should apply, and
would permit the incorporation of supplemental principles oflaw from outside
the vee. 23
'

22IUCC § 9-507(1). When the secured party disposes of the collateral in a commer-
cially unreasonable manner, even though the sale may have produced a sUl']llus over the
outstanding debt, the debtor has a right to bring an aetion for recovery ofthe losi sUl']llus
value of the collateral if a sale in a reasonable manner would have produced a llllier
sUl']llus than the actual sale. Chadron Energy COI']l. v. FIrSt Nat'l Bank, 221 Neb. 590, 379
NW2d 742 (1986).
221 UCC § 9-507(1). See generally Schecter, "The Principal Principle: Controlling
Creditors Should Be Held Liable for Their Debtor's Obligations." 19 UC Davis L. Rev.
875 (1986).
227 UCC § 9-507(1).
-UCC § 9-507, comment!.
:mId.
230UCC § 9-507(1).
23' See discussion supra 1124.02. For a discussion of the availability of damages and
the different measures possible, see, Clark, supra note 156, at 114.12. Under this provision,
punitive damages may be appropriate. See id., citing Davidson v. First Bank & Trust Co.,
559 P2d 1228 (Okla. 1976); Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Col']l., 439 F2d 1303 (10th
24-47 DEBTOR DEFAULT &. ENFORCEMENT , 24.03(6)

When consumer goods are involved, there is a statutory penalty under

which the debtor has a right to recover an amount not less than the sum of any
232
credit service charge, plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the debt. In
addition to these provisions, courts have held that failure to comply with the
uee procedures may result in tbe )055 ofthe secured party's right to a deficiency
judgment. m There is a division of views here, with some courts finding an
absolute bar to a deficiency, while others treat the circumstances as a presump-
tion in favor ofthe debtor, with the secured party having the burden of proving
the value of the collateral and the reasonableness of the sale in order to recover
the deficiency. The cases in the latter category emphasize that the Dee gives the
debtor a remedy in Section 9-507(1) to recover from the secured party for any
loss caused by the secured party's failure to follow proper procedures. In appro-
priate cases, the secured party's conduct may give rise to liability in tort, based
on conversion or other wrong committed. Certain creditor conduct may even be
punishable as a crime.~" When a consumer is involved, the standards for debt
collection practices under federal and state statutes must also be followed.
The Dee does provide tbat failure to obtain the best price does not in itself
make a disposition of the collateral "commercially unreasonable."231 Further,
following the customary procedures used by dealen of the type of property

Cir. 1971); Franklin lnv. Co. v. Homburg, 252A2d 9S (DC 1969). But in Tellas Nat'l Bank
v. Karnes, 717 SW2d 901 (Texas 1986), the court held that punitive damages were not
appropriate for creditor noncompliance with the Article 9 default procedures.
232UCC § 9-507(1); Clark, supra note 156 at 114.12. See generally Whitford, "The
Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer Transactions," 7 Cardolo L. Rev.
959 (1986).
23lI See generally Clark, supra note 156, at , 4.12; White &. Summers, supra Dote 156,
at t 26·15; Annot., "Failure ofSecured Party to Make 'Commercially Reasonable' Dispo-
sition of Collateral Under UCC § 9-504(3) as Bar to Deficiency Judgment," 10 ALR4th
413 (1981); Annot., "Uniform Commercial Code; Failure of Secured Creditor to Give
Required Notice ofDisposition of Collateral as Bar to Deficiency Judgment," 59 ALR3d
401 (1974).
See generally Warkentine, "Consumer Liability for Deficiencies in Washington," 4
U. Puget Sound I.. Rev. 99-122 (1980); Note, "Adequacy ofSale Price: A Secured Party's
Burden ofProofin Seeking a Deficiency Judgment After Resale of Collateral," 33 Mercer
L. Rev. 397-405 (1981).
For examples of cases in jurisdictions holding that when a secured party fails to give
proper notice of the sale of collateral, the secured party is not barred from obtaininJ a
deficiency judgment against the debtor, and there is a presumption that the value of the
collateral at the time ofsale equals the .mount oftbe debt, see Fint Galesburg Nat'] Bank
& Trust Co. v. Joannides, 103111. 2d 294, 469 NE2d 180 {I 984); Weiner v. American
Petrofina Mktg., Inc. 482 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1986). See generally Annot., "Sufficiency of
Secured Party's Notification of Sale or Other Intended Dispositions of Collateral Under
§ 9·504(3)." ALR4th 241 (1982).
23-4 For example, the Consumer Credit Protectiori Act establishes aiminalpenaIties
for extortionate collection practices. 18 USC §§ 891-896 (1982).
235 UCC § 9-507(2).
1124.04 SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 24-48

involved, or obtaining the price current in any recognized market for the coUat-
eral constitutes a disposition that is commercially reasonable. 2:11

~ 24.04 SPECIAL CONSUMER CREDIT RULES

Often there are special rules that apply to credit practices when the debtor is
a consumer. The scope of creditor and debtor rights and duties in consumer
transactions is a subject too large for comprehensive coverage in this handbook.
Some of the major laws that affect consumer transactions are described in
Chapter 26. 237
The Federal Trade Commission has a set ofrules governing consumer credit
practices. Under these rules it is an unfair act or practice under the Fedetal
Trade Commission Act for a lender or a retail installment seUer to use instru-
ments or contracts in consumer transactions that contain a confession ofjudg-
ment or other waivers of the consumer's right to notice the opportunity to be
heard. 2>1 The rules also prohibit such lenders or sellers from requiring the
consumer to waive exemptions that might be available to the consumer under
state law from attachment or execution on the property of the consumer, both
real estate and personal property, except as to the specific property subject to the
security interest that was "executed in connection with the obligation. "221
Finally, and most importantly, the rules make it an unfair trade practice for such
a lender or seller to use an instrument or contract that has an obligation contain-
ing "a non-possessory security interest in household goods other than a purchase
money security interest. "200 Household goods are dermed to include "clothing,
furniture, appliances, one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery,
kitchenware, personal effects (including wedding rings, clothes (of the consumer
and his or her dependents» . . .'! with certain exceptions for works of art,
electronic entertainment equipment, antiques, andjewelry.zlt
The FTC credit rules also regulate cosigner practices,Z'2 the collecting oflate
charges that arise as a result ofthe assessment ofprior assessments oflate fees or
delinquency charges,2a and assignments of wages· or other earnings. 2"

Id.
2341

237For general coverage of debtor-ereditor relationships, see T. Crandall, R.

Hagedorn & F. Smith, Jr., Debtor-Greditor Law Manual (1985 & Cum. Supp.).
231
16 CFR § 444.2(a)(l) (1987).
131
16 CFR § 444.2(a)(2) (1987).
240 16 CFR § 444.2(a)(4) (1987).
,"t t6 CFR § 444.l(i) (1987).
2" See discussion at 'I 15.06[4].
2a 16 CFR § 444.4 (1987).
'''16 CFR § 444.2(a)(3) (1987).
 25
Bankruptcy
~ 25.01 Source of Law, Jurisdiction, and Procedure . 25·2
~ 25.02 Different Types of Bankruptcy Proceedings . 25·5
II] Chapter 7: - Liquidation . 25·5
12J Chapter 13: - Debt Adjustment . 25·6
[3) Chapter II: - Reorganization . 25·8
{4) Chapter 12: - family Farmer . 25-11
'125.03 Voluntary Versus Involuntary Proceedings . 25-14
1125.04 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate ........•.............. 25·15
(I J Determining What Constitutes Property . 25-15
(2) Exemptions . 25-16
(3] Lien Avoidance for Exempt Property . 25-17
(4) Turnover of Property Belonging to the Estate . 25·18
'125.05 The Automatic Stay . 25-19
(I) General Rule ..........•.............•........... 25-19
(2J Exceptions . 25·21
[3) Procedure for Obtaining Relief From the Stay . 25-23
(4J The secured Creditor, the Collateral, and Adequate
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-24
'125.06 Creditors' Claims: Procedures and Priority of Distribution ..•.. 25-26
II 25.07 Powers and Duties of the Bankruptcy Trustee . 25-28
(I) Trustee as Lien Creditor .............•....•......... 25-29
[2] Trustee as Successor to the Riihts of Actual Unsecured
Creditors ..........................•............ 25-30
[3] Power to Set Aside Statutory Liens ..................•. 25-.31
14) Power to Set Aside Preferences ..........•............ 25-31
(a) Elements of a Preference ..••....•...•............ 25-32
[b] Statutory Exceptions .......•.•.............•.... 25-36
(5) Power to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances . 25-39 .
(6) Rights of Transferees in Avoided Transfers. " ••.•....... 25-41
(7) Other Specific Powers of the Trustee •.•... : . 25-42
{a) Executory Contracts ..........•................. 25-42
[b} Waiving the Attorney-Glient Privilege . 25-43

25-1
11 25.01 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-2

[c] Abandoning Property ofthe Estate ..•.............. 25-44

'il 25.08 Discharge of the Debtor .......................• " . 25-45
[1] Nondischargeable Debts .•.......................... 25-45
[2] Objections to Discharge ...•........................ 25-49
[3] Reaffirmation of Debt by the Debtor . 25-50
W25.09 Issues Involving the Rights and Duties ofa Bank .•.......... 25-52
(l] Checks in the Process of Collection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-52
(2] Letters of Credit as Preferences . 25-53
[3] The Bank's Right of Setoff and the Automatic Stay . 25-57
[a] Requirements of General Right of Setoff . 25-57
[b] Prepetition Setoff . 25-58
[c] Postpetition Setoff; "Freezing" Accounts •....•....... 25-60
[d] Setoffs and the Involuntary Bankruptcy . 25-61
[4] Credit Card Purchases as Nondischargeable Debts . 25-62
[5 J Employees Who File Bankruptcy .•••................. 25-65
[6) Environmental Protection, Hazardous Wastes, and the
Bankrupt Debtor .................•.•.•........... 25-66
(a] Environmental Proceedings and the Automatic Stay .... 25-67
[b] Dischargeability of Orders and Fines Arising From
Environmental Violations .....•.......•......•... 25-67
[c] AbandonmeI't of the Property and Liability for Oeanup 25-68
[d] Priority Status for Claims Resulting from Oeanup ..•... 25-70

11 25.01 SOURCE OF LAW, JURISDICTION, AND PROCEDURE

Bankruptcy is a complex and technical system of federal law that attempts
to give relief to fmancially strapped debtors while ensuring fair treatment ofthe
creditors.' This chapter provides a brief outline of the general concepts and
provisions of bankruptcy law. Other sources are available for more thorough
treatment of these topics, and should be consulted for further information. 2
To begin with, in any discussion of bankruptcy proceedings, the parties
generally involved should be identified, and the various terms used in the
Bankruptcy Code should be defined, to establish a common point of reference.
The bankrupt is known as the debtor. Creditors of the debtor generally are

, The primary author for this chapter is Catherine R. Hardwick,I.D. 1988, Arizona
State University. College of Law, Tempe, Arizona. .
2 The following references contain more detailed information about bankruptcy:
Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed. 1979) (updated through looseleafservice); Norton Bank-
ruptcy Law & Practice (Callaghan 1982) (updated through looseleafservice); R. Aaron,
Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals (1984); see especially R. Aaron, Bankruptcy Law Hand-
books, published annually, for issues ofcurrent debate and interest in bankruptcy law, B.
Weintraub & A. Resnick. Bankruptcy Law Manual, (rev. ed. 1986 and Cum. Supps.).
 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.01
25·3

divided into two categories: secured and unsecured. Secured creditors are those
that have a lien on property in which the debtor has an interest, generally under a
security agreement. Unsecured creditors include all creditors that do not have
secured claims.
The trustee is the person appointed by the court to liquidate or operate the
business (depending on the purpose of the bankruptcy petition) during the
bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee's duties and powers are explained later in
this chapter. A "debtor in possession" is a debtor who is authorized to continue
to operate the business during the pendency of the bankruptcy case in a Chapter
II proceeding. A creditor's committee is also created in Chapter II proceedings,
and is made up of the debtor's creditors to watch over the operation of the
business during the pendency of the proceedings. The general definition section
of the Bankruptcy Code is Section 101.
A petition in bankruptcy must be filed to begin a bankruptcy proceeding.3
The Bankruptcy Code does not require that the debtor allege it is insolvent or
unable to pay its debts. No minimum debt is required, but maximum debt limits
do apply to certain types of bankruptcy proceedings. A filing fee generally must
accompany the petition, along with documents containing financial informa-
tion, such as a list of assets and liabilities, and a list of creditors."
The Bankruptcy Code, enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978,' provides the substance of bankruptcy law today. Substantial amend-
ments were made in 1984 in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984,1 particularly to the jurisdiction provisions. The Code was again
amended in 1986, by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Fam-
ily Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. 7 The substantive law is supplemented by the
Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, which govern the procedural matters under the
Code.·
Under the Bankruptcy Code, as amended, jurisdiction over proceedings
arising in, arising under, or related to a bankruptcy case, and all property of the

3 Venue provisions in 28 USC § 1408 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) outline where a
bankruptcy petition should be filed. The petition may be filed in the district court for the
district in which the domicile, residence, principal place ofbusiness, or principal assets of
the person or entity that is the subject of the petition have been located for the 180 days
immediately preceding the filing. If the person or entity had more than one location in the
preceding 180 days, it should file in the district in which the person or entity was located
for the longer portion of the 18o-day period.
"See Bankr. R. 1002, 1006 and 1007. For a discussion ofthe maximum debt limits
applicable to certain types of bankruptcy proceedings see infra 1 25.02.
sPub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
I Pub. L. No. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
7 Pub. L. No. 99·554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
•The Bankruptcy Rules were promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and
took effect August 1, 1983. They were substantially amended in 1987, effective August I,
1987.
, 25.01 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-4

debtor. is originally vested in the United States district court.' Bankruptcy

I.
courts have been established and operate under the supervision of the district
courts. All proceedings are initially begun in the bankruptcy courts, although
later proceedings may have to be withdrawn and decided in the district court.
lI

The Bankruptcy Amendments divide bankruptcy proceedings into two

categories: "core" proceedings and "related" proceedings.'2 Bankruptcy courts
have jurisdiction to enter final orders for all core proceedings.'9 A bankruptcy
court does not, however, have power to enter a final order for a related proceed-
ing without consent of the parties." In related proceedings the bankruptcy court
is limited to submitting proposed findings offact and conclusions oflaw to the
district court. The district court may adopt those findings, or may disregard
them and make its own decision. I!
Core proceedings generally are those that arise under the bankruptcy law
itself including objections to claims, orders turning over property of the debtor,
motions to avoid preferences or to terminate the automatic stay, and objections

928 USC § 1334 (Supp. III 1985).

1·28 USC § I 57(a) (Supp. III 1985).
11 See 28 USC § 157 (Supp. III 1985). A proceeding must be withdrawn if its resolu-
tion requires consideration of both bankruptcy and other laws of the United States
regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce (for example, anti-
trust, civil rights laws, etc.). Similarly, personal injury and wrongful death tort claims are
to be tried in the district court.
"See 28 USC § I57(b)(Supp.III 1985).
13 28 USC § 157(b)(I)(Supp. III 1985).
.. 28 USC § I 57(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985). Consent may be implied, however, by conduct
ofthe parties. If a pany fails to object to the bankruptcy COUrt'sjurisdiction, the party may
be deemed to have consented to it. See In re Men's Sportswear, Inc., 834 F2d 1134 (2d Cir.
1987); In re Daniels-Head & Assoc., a19 F2d 914 (9th Cir. 1987); In reAlloy Metal Works,
Inc., 52 Bankr. 39 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1985); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 49, 54
(Bankr. SO Ohio 1985) (consent may be implied from failure to object or from any act
indicating a willingness to have the bankruptcy court determine a claim). But see I Collier
on Bankruptcy 1 3.01(2)[d)[ii] (15th ed. 1987) ("[S]ection I 57(c)(2) may contemplate the
informed and actual consent ofthe panies, as opposed to consent implied from the failure
to object to jurisdiction").
In In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc., 794 F2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1986), the filing ofa proof
of claim was deemed consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Accord In re Axton,
641 F2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1981).
See also In re I.A. Durbin, Inc. 62 Bankr. 139 (SO Aa. 1986) (promissory note maker,
who was comaker of note with debtor, and who voluntarily joined debtor's counterclaim
against promissory note payee without indication that she objected to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, had implicitly consented to the bankruptcy coun'sjurisdiction). But see In re
Interconnect Tel. Serv., Inc., 59 Bankr. 397 (SONY 1986) (pany did not impliedly
consent to jurisdiction by conducting discovery and moving to dismisS plaintiff's com-
plaint while the action was pending in the bankruptcy court).
"28 USC§ 157(c)(I)(Supp. III. 1985).
 BANKRUPTCY '125.02(11
25·5

to discharges." Related proceedings are proceedings other than core p~oceed.

ings that arc related in some way to the bankruptcy case. Examples mclud~
claims of the debtor against third parties," or actions brought by secured credI-
tors against guarantors of the debtor."
Appeals (rom bankruptcy court decisions may be taken to the district court
or to a bankruptcy appellate panel, if one is available in that district.'9 Subse-
2O
quent appeals to the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal are available as of right.

11 25.02 DIFFERENT TYPES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

(1) Chapter 7: - Liquidation
In a Chapter 7" liquidation proceeding, the debtor seeks a discharge from

1128 USC § I 57(bX2) (Supp. III 1985). The statute lists several core proceedings, but
the list is not exclusive. Core proceedings listed include matters concerning the adminis-
tration of the estate, counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims, orders
pertaining to Obtaining credit, proceedinas to detennine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances, determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts, determina-
tions of the validity, ellent, or priority of liens, confirmations of plans, and orders
approving the use, lease, or sale of property. Id.
•T Adversary proceedings that rest solely on state law, such as collection suits by a
debtor in bankruptcy againn noncreditor defendant., are not "core proceedings," but
rather, are "related or non-core matters." M '" E Contractors, Inc. v. Kugler-Monis Gen.
Contractors, Inc., 67 Bankr. 260 (ND Tex. 1986). See also UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continen-
tallns. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319 (ND 111. 1985) (proceeding by debtor against insurers and
insurance broker seeking recovery for their conduct with respect to company's insurance
fell under bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction).
There is disaareement as to whether a debtor's suit on account receivables is a "core"
or "related" proceeding. See In re Nell, 71 Bankr. 305 (D. Utah 1987) (related); In re
George Woloch Co., 49 Bankr. 68 (ED Pa. 1985)(related); In re Century Brass Prods.lnc.,
58 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986), (related); I Collier on Bankruptcy13.01 (15th ed.
1986) (describing as "egregious" error In re All American ofAshburn, Inc., 49 Bankr. 926
(Bankr. ND Ga. 1985), which held that a suit to collect prepetition accounts receivable
was a core proceeding). But see In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 67 Bankr.
692 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1986) (core), In re National Equip. & Mold Corp., 60 BR 133 (Bankr.
ND Ohio 1986) (core); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. SD Ohio 1985)
(core).
11 See Howard Brown Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 66 Bankr. 480 (ED Pa. 1986) (sup..
plier's adversary proceeding against debtor's surety to recover on contract bond is a
"related" proceeding); In re Showcase Natural Casing. Co., 54 Bankr. 142 (Bankr. SD
Ohio 1985) (secured creditor's suit against debtor's guarantors is a "related" proceedina).
•, 28 USC §§ 158(a), 158(b) (Supp. III 1985). Currently only the Ninth Circuit has a
system of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs) (made up of three bankruptcy court
judges) to review bankruptcy court decisions.
'"' 28 USC § I 58(d) (Supp. III 1985).
""Chapter 7" refers to Title II, Ch. 7 of the United States Code. See generally II
USC §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 25.02(2) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 25-6

personal liability of his or her debts through a liquidation of the debtor's assets
and distribution ofthem to creditors. One ofthe stated purposes ofthe Chapter 7
discharge is to relieve the debtor of prior debts and to give the debtor a "fresh
start."n
Any individual, partnership or corporation may file a petition under Chap-
ter 7, except for railroads, government entities, insurance companies, and finan-
cial institutions. 23 Partnerships and corporations, however, cannot receive a
discharge from debts; only individuals can'" One ofthese entities may still wish
to file under Chapter 7, however, to liquidate its business and distribute all its
assets to creditors.

(2] Chapter 13: - Debt Adjustment

Under a Chapter 13 individual debt adjustment proceeding, the debtor
obtains a discharge from personal liability of his or her debts after payment to
creditors to the extent possible from the debtor's future income, according to a
court-approved payment plan. This type of proceeding is only available to an
individual. Further, the debtor must have regular income. Regular income is
defined as income that is sufficiently stable and regular so that payments under a
Chapter 13 plan may be made. 25 The definition is broad, and includes both wage
earners and individuals who are self-employed. It also includes individuals
whose primary source of income is from pensions, disability benefits, invest-
ments, or similar sources. 21 It is questionable, however, as to whether Social
Security benefits may be considered "regular income" because the 1983 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act preclude the assignment ofbenefits.27 There is a

22 HR Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 384, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 5963, 6340. See also Jackson, "The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,"
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1985).
23
11 USC §§ IOI(35), 109(b) (1982 & Supp. IV I 986). For proceedings related to
insolvent financial institutions, see Chapter 10.
2. II USC § 727(a)(I) (1982). See generally infra'll 25.08 on discharae.
25 II USC § 101(29) (Supp. IV 1986). This definition expressly precludes stockbro-
kers and commodity brokers.
21 In re Cole, 3 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. SDWV 1980) ("This test is no longer the nature of
the income but rather its stability and regularity"); HR Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Scss.
311-312, reprinted in 1978 US Code Cona. & Admin. News 5963, 6268-6269 ("ThUs,
individuals on welfare, Social Security, fixed pension incomes, or who live on investment .
incomes, will be able to work out repayment plans with their creditors rather than being
forced into straight bankruptcy"). See In re Hammonds, 729 F2d 1391 (lith Cir. 1984)
(income from Aid to Families with Dependent Children proaram); In re Iacovoni, 2
Bankr. 256 (Banler. D. Utah 1980) (welfare); In re Overstreet, 23 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. WD
La. 1982) (unemployment benefits); In re Wood, 23 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. J;:D Tenn. 1982)
(pension benefits); In re Taylor, 15 Bankr. 596 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) (child support
payments); In re Dawson, 13 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. MD Ala. 1981) (disability benefits).
27Under II USC § I 325(b) the bankruptcy court has the power to "order any entity
 BANKRUPTCY '1 25.02(2)
25-7

limitation in Chapter 13 proceedings on the amount of debt a debtor may have..

The debtor must have noncontingent liquidated unsecured debts of less than
$100,000 and noncontingent liquidated secured debts of less than S350,OOO
measured as of the date of the filing of the petition. 2t
Under Chapter 13, the debtor files a plan, which must provide for repay-
ment of his or her debts within a three-year period.~' Under this plan, tax
liabilities must be paid in full; secured creditors must receive the value oftheir
security; and unsecured creditors must receive more than they would have
received from a Chapter 7 liquidation. 30 A trustee is appointed to collect the
31
funds and to distribute the payments to the creditors under the plan.
To encourage debtors to adjust their debts under Chapter 13, the 1984
Bankruptcy Amendments require the clerk of the court to give written notice to
individuals with primarily consumer debts about both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
proceedings. 32 The amendments also require an individual consumer debtor
filing a Chapter 7 petition to state in the petition that he or she (I) is aware that
he or she may proceed under 7 or 13; (2) understands the reliefavailable in both;
and (3) chooses Chapter 7. 33

from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or any part of such income to the
trustee." Couns had generally held that Social Security benefits could be assigned to a
Chapter 13 trustee, despite the nonassignability provision of the Social Security Act. See
UnitedStateH. Devall, 704 F2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1983), Toson v. United States, 18 Bankr.
371 (NO Ga. 1982); In re Moore, 17 Bankr. 55 I (Bankr. MD Fla. 1982). In 1983, Congress
amended the antiassignment clause ofthe Social Security Act specifically to overrule these
decisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 83 reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code
Congo & Admin. News 143. It now appear.; the Social Security Administration cannot be
compelled to pay benefits due to individuals to the trustee of a Chapter 13 proceeding. In
re Buren, 725 F2d 1080 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 469 US 818 (1984). Butsee In re Baxter, 34
Bankr. 911 (Bankr. ED Tenn. 1983)(antiassignment provision of the Social Security Act,
which has the effect of preventing social security payments from becoming part of a
bankruptcy estate and thus prevents a recipient with no other income from becoming
eligible for Chaptet 13 relief, denies such recipienu equal protection of the laws, and is
thus unconstitutional).
21 II USC § 109(e) (1982). The same debt limits apply if an individual files a joint
petition with his or her spouse. Id. A debtor can file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter
J 3 in good faith that the extent of the debts do not exceed the limit for Chapter 13
petitions, despite a subsequent determination that the debts exceed that amount, if, atlhe
time ofthe filing ofthe petition, the debt was not liquidated and the value ofthe property
securing it was uncertain. In re Pearson, 773 F2d 751 (6th Cir. 1985). See also lnre King, 9
Bankr. 376 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
29 II USC§ I 325(c) (Supp. IV 1986). Thecoun may approve a longer payment period
for cause, but not longer than five years.
)Q II USC § I 325(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

31 11 USC ~§ 1302, 1326 (1982 & SuPp. IV 1986).

32 1 J USC § 342(b) (Supp. IV J 986).

33 Bankr. Rule 9009; Official Bankr. Form No. J. The debtor's attorney mus!sign lin
exhibit to the petition declaring he has informed the debtor of availability ofboth Chapter
, 25.02131 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-8

(3) Chapter 11: - Reorganization

A Chapter II bankruptcy proceeding is generally called a reorganization.
The objective of Chapter II proceedings is to rehabilitate a viable business
entity that has run into financial trouble so that it may continue in business. In
Chapter 11, the debtor's assets arc not entirely liquidated, but rather, under the
guidance of the court, the obligations of the debtor arc readjusted. The House
report explains the purpose of these proceedings:

The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is

to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for
its stockholders. The premise ofa business reorganization is that assets that
are used for production in the industry for which they were designated'arc
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.... It is more economi-
cally efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets.'·

Chapter 11 proceedings arc available to all types of entities: individuals,

partnerships, trusts, and corporations. 35 There is disagreement, however, on
whether a consumer who does not run a business, or who does not have business
debts, may file under Chapter 11.:11 Entities specifically excluded from Chapter

7 and 13, and has explained the reliefavailable under both chapters. Official Bankr. Form
No. I, Exhibit B.
:l4 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cona.
and Admin. News 5963, 6179.
:1511 USC § 109(d)(Supp. IV 1986).
31 See In re MOOi, 774 F2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1985) (court held that housewife
with no regular income (and thus ineligible for Chapter 13) and only consumer debts
could file under Chapter II. "We sec nothing in the current Bankruptcy Code or its
legislative history or the prior Bankruptcy Act that would suggest that a consumer debtor
may not seek relief under Chapter 11.") Accord In re Warner, 30 Bankr. 528 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1983); In re Greene, 57 Bankr. 272 (Bankr. SDNY 1986); In re Gregory, 39 Bankr.
405 (Bankr. MD Tenn. 1984). See also In re Bock, 58 Bankr. 374 (Bankr. MD Fla. 1986)
("[nhe faet that an individual debtor is not engaged in business is certainly a relevant
factor to be considered when his or her right to maintain a Chapter II is challenged. Thus,
when an individual debtor who is not engaged in business in an orthodox sense seeks relief
under this chapter but flied a petition in order to achieve a legitimate readjustment of his
debts and to salvage valuable property interests, there is no reason why such individual
debtors should be left without remedy and should not be given reasonable opportunity to
seek and achieve rehabilitation").·
But see In re Wamsganz, 54 Bankr. 759, 763 (ED Mo. 1985), aff'd, 804 F2d 503 (8th
Cir. 1986) ("To qualify for reliefunder chapter II, a person must be a business enterprise
or operate a business. A salaried person who displays the characteristics of a wage earner,
does not operate a business, and whose debts and assets are primarily consumer debts and
assets is not eligible to proceed under Chapter 11."). Accord In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4
Bankr. 226, (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
25-9 BANKRUPTCY '125.02(3]

II reorganization include financial institutions,11 governmental units,:II insur-

ance companies,3" railroads," and stock and commodity brokers."
After a bankruptcy petition is filed in a Chapter II proceeding, the debtor
usually remains in possession of the business and continues to operate it. The
debtor remaining in control is called the "debtor in possession."" If an inter·
ested party so requests, the bankruptcy court may appoint a trustee to operate
the business. 43 The court may appoint a trustee "for cause," including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement by the current management
of the debtor, either before or after the bankruptcy petition is filed, or where it is
in the interests ofthe creditors. any equity security holders, and other interests of
the estate'"
Because the purpose of a reorganization is to keep the debtor business
operating, provisions in the Bankruptcy Code ensure protection ofthe assets'and
allow the business to keep operating without interference from creditors or other
interested parties. These provisions protect the debtor from actions by creditors
by automatically staying actions against the debtor and by giving the trustee
special powers to enforce obligations to the debtor and to avoid certain transfers
of property of the debtor. If a trustee is not appointed, the debtor in possession
has the same rights and duties as a trustee. These provisions are discussed later
in this chapter. In addition, the trustee, or debtor in possession, is required to file
reports on the operation of the business, including disbursements and receipts,
and any other information the court may require. 41 .

31 II USC §§ 109(b), I09(d)( 1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also Chapter 10.
38 Govemment bodies and municipalities must seek relief under Chapter 9, II USC
§§ 901-946 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), Adjustment of Debts ofa Municipality.
3·See II USC§§ 109(b),109{d)(1982&Supp. IV 1986).
411 Railroads may proceed under specific provisions of Chapter II. II USC
§§ 1161-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), which differin some respects from the principles
of general reorganization under Chapter II .
., Stock and commodity brokers are trealed separately under §§ 741-752 and
761-766 of Chapter 7, but are not eligible for reorganization. II USC § 109(d) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). The special rules relating to stockbroker and commodity broker Iiquida.
tions are designed to give preferential protection to customers. CongrCl!s recognized that
an application of these customer protection features to the reorganization principles in
Chapter II would be unworkable. Liquidation is the only option available to stockbrokers
and commodity brokers under the Bankruptcy Code. See B. Weintraub & A. Resnick,
Bankruptcy Law Manual ~ 8.05 (Rev. cd. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
"See II USC § 1101(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
43
11 USC § 1104(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
44 Id. The House report defines the duty of the court as follows: "The court may order
appointment only if the protection afforded by a trustee is needed and the costs and
expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately higher thlln the value of the
protection afforded." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 402, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Congo '" Admin. News 5963, 6358.
45
11 USC § 1106(aXI) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (referring to II USC § 704(8».
'125.02(3) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-10

Because the debtor continues operating, the debtor's business needs the use
ofassets, and may otherwise need to lease or sell property. The Bankruptcy Code
provides authorization for the business to conduct such transactions, without
notice, as long as it is within the ordinary course of business:" If unusual
transactions are required, the trustee or debtor in possession may request
authorization to conduct such transactions after notice and a hearing." A trustee
or debtor in possession, however, may not use cash collateral, which, in addition
to cash, consists of negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities,
deposit accounts or other cash equivalents," unless the secured creditor con-
sents, without authorization from the court."
Shortly after the case is filed, the court schedules a meeting of the creditor.s.
The debtor must attend this meeting, and must submit to questions by the
creditors. 50 A creditors committee must subsequently be appointed by the
court. 51 This committee has fiduciary obligations and must act for the benefit of
all creditors. In addition to watching over the operation ofthe debtor's business,
it may investigate possible wrongdoing and generally has an active role in the
formulation and approval of the reorganization plan.12
To reorganize the debts ofthe business, the debtor has the exclusive right, if
a trustee has not been appointed, to propose a plan of reorganization during the
first 120 days after filing a petition. 5 ' After the 120-day period, any party in
interest may submit a plan ofreorganization. A reorganization plan is basically a
repayment plan, under which the debtor will operate. The plan must provide for
full payment of taxes within six years, for payment to secured creditors of the
value of their security, and unsecured creditors must receive more than they
would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 50 The plan also must provide for ade-
quate means by which the debtor may implement the plan, and such means may
include selling certain assets, merging with another entity, restructuring inter-
nally, or issuing securities.

"II USC § 363(c)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra t 25.05[4] for a discussion ofthe
adequate protection necessary to allow the business to use collaleral.
.. 11 USC § 363(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
os II USC § 363(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
"11 USC § 363(c)(2) (1982 & SuPP. IV 1986).
50
11 USC § 341(c)(Supp. IV 1986).
51 11 USC § 11 02(a){ I) (Supp. IV 1986). The coun has authority to appoint several
committees, including a committee ofshareholders, or limited partners, or various types
of creditors: suppliers of goods, institutional lenders, etc. .
52 11 USC § 1103(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
53 11 USC § 1121 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
64 11 USC § 1129 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Creditors may agree to receive less than

statutorily required, and once the plan is approved. the debtor and all creditors are bound
by it. See 11 USC §§ 1129(7), 1I41(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25-11 BANKRUPTCY 1125.02(4)

Once a plan has been proposed, there are basically two methods of confirm-
ing the plan. both ofwhich require that the court hold a hearing expressly for that
purpose. s, In the first method, the proponent ofthe plan seeks acceptance ofit by
all the creditors. Any holder ofa claim may accept or reject a plan. H A plan must
be confirmed by each class of claim holders. For creditors, the plan is accepted
by a class if the members who hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number of the total allowed claims of the class who vote accept it. 17
Classes of stockholders or other interested holders accept a plan ifit is accepted
by class members holding at least two-thirds the amount of the total allowed
interests held by the members of the class who yote. SlI
Ifany class that is impaired under the plan fails to accept it by the minimum
required votes, as outlined earlier, the proponent of the plan may still requ.est
confirmation under the "cram down" method, which is the second method of
confirmation. Under this method, at least one class must have accepted the plan
with the required number of votes, the plan must not "discriminate unfairly"
with respect to a class that does not accept the plan," and the plan must be "fair
and equitable" with respect to each class that did not accept the plan.1O If these
requirements are met, the court may confirm the plan. If more than one plan is
proposed that meets the requirements for confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code
provides that the court may confirm only one plan after considering the prefer-
ences of creditors and equity security holders."

[4] Chapter 12: - Family Farmer

In 1986, Congress passed legislation aimed specifically at tbe plight of the
family farmer. Farmers are seldom able to file for relief under Chapter 13
because their debts have usually exceeded the statutory maximum and their
income was not regular. Additionally, family farmers often operate as partner-
ships or corporations, which are ineligible for Chapter 13 relief. Further, Chap-
ter II is not a practical solution because of the specific problems and needs of

55 II USC § I I 28(a) (1082 & Supp. IV 1986). There are certain requirements that
must be met before the court may confirm a plan. They are outlined in 11 USC § I I29(a),
and include that the plan must have been proposed in good faith.
51 II USC § I I 26(a)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51 11 USC § I I 26(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51 II USC § I I 26(d)(SIIPP. IV 1986).
51
11 USC § 1129(b)(I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally Booth, "The
Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settlement," 60 Am. Bankr. U 69
(1986).
to Id. The "fair and equitable" standard has come to mean an absolute priority rule
among the classes; that is. the plan is fair and equitable to a class if that class receives full
compensation for its allowed claims before any junior class receives anythina.
•, II USC § I I 29(c) (1982 & Supp.IV 1986).
11 25.02(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-12

family farmers." Thus farmers facing serious financial difficulties were left
without any form of rehabilitative relief until Congress created the Chapter 12
alternative.
Chapter 12 was "designed to give family farmers facing bankruptcy a
fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land. It offers family
farmers the important protection from creditors that bankruptcy provides
while, at the same time, preventing abuse of the system and ensuring that farm
lenders receive a fair repayment,"13
Chapter 12, titled "Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular
Annual Income," is modeled after Chapter 13, but contains provisions tailored
to meet the family farmer's needs. To qualify under Chapter 12, the petitioner
must be a "family farmer with regular annual income."'" An individual, or l/-n
individual and spouse, engaged in farming operations l5 is a family farmer if (1)
aggregate debts do not exceed S 1500,000; (2) 80 percent ofaggregate noncontin-
gent liquidated debts arise out of a farming operation; and (3) income received
from the farming operation accounts for at least 50 percent of the individual's,
or individual and spouse's, gross income for the prior tax year."
A corporation or partnership may be a family farmer if the following
conditions are met: (l) more than 50 percent of the stock or equity is held by one
family, or by one family and the relatives of the members ofsuch family, and the
family or relatives conduct the farming operation; (2) more than 80 percent of
the value of its assets consists of assets related to the farming operation; (3) its
aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000; (4) 80 percent or more ofits aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated debts arise out ofthe farming operation; and (5) ifthe
corporation issues stock, it is stock that is not publicly traded. 17
Once an entity qualifies as a family farmer it must be determined that the
farmer has "regular annual income. "II This requirement is not as strict as the

.2 Congress found that Chapter II proceedings for family fanners were needlessly
complicated. unduly time-consuming, inordinately expensive and. in many cases,
unworkable. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 5246, 5249.
13 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5246, 5249. See generally Annstrong, "The Friendly Fanner
Bankruptcy Act of 1986: An Analysis for Fann Lenders," 104 Banking U 189 (1987).
.. II USC § 109(1) Supp. IV 1986).
15 "Farming operations" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include fanning, tillage
of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock,
and production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state. II USC
§ 101(20) (Supp. IV 1986).
"II USC § 101 (l7)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). Debt for the principal residence of the
individual or individual and spouse is excluded in calculating the 80 per.cent requirement,
unless the debt arises out of fanning operations. Id.
17
11 USC§ 101(17)(B)(Supp. IV 1986).
II II USC § 10 I(I8)(Supp. IV 1986).
 BANKRUPTCY ~ 25.02(4)
25-13

"regular income" requirement under Chapter 13, because Congress recognized

that agriculture's business cycle has long intervals between harvests that result in
irregular cash flow. A family farmer will meet the income requirement if the
farmer's annual income is sufficiently stable and regular to make payments
under a Chapter 12 plan."
Under Chapter 12, the debtor must file a plan within 90 days of filing the
bankruptcy petition case.7° Creditors have no right to file a plan under Chapter
12; however, if the debtor does not file a plan in a timely fashion, the case may be
dismissed. 71 The plan must provide tliat all or a ponion of the debtor's future
income be submitted to the trustee for repayment of creditors. '2 The plan must
provide for full payment of creditors with priority claims (generally, taxes)
unless a claim holder agrees to different treatment.7' Similarly. if the plan
classifies claims and interests (for example, secured versus unsecured claims), it
must provide the same treatment for each claim within a panicular class, unless
the claim holder agrees to less favorable treatment." Repayment under the plan
must be made within three years, but the coun can approve a longer repayment
period, not to exceed five years, for cause. 75 As in Chapter 13, a discharge is
usually granted after the debtor completes all payments provided for under the
plan!'
Lastly, it is imponant to note that Chapter 12 relief is an experiment, a
solution to what hopefully is a temporary crisis. 77 The amendments of 1986
include a sunset provision, which provides that unless Congress takes funher
action, Chapter 12 will be repealed automatically on October I, 1993. 71

"Id.
7°11 USC § 1221 (Supp. IV 1986).
"II USC § 1208(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
7'11 USC § I 222(a)(I)(Supp. IV 1986).
73
11 USC § 1222(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). Creditors with priority claims are those
whose claims meet the requirements of Section 507.
7< II USC § 1222(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).

75 II USC § I 222(c) (Supp. IV 1986). This three or live year deadline does not apply,
however, to certain secured claims, where the debtor may modify payments and make
them for a longer period of time. For example, the family farmer's mortgage on his
principal residence may be modified under the plan to decrease monthly payments, but
pay over a longer period of time. See Section I 222(b)(9)..
75
11 USC § 1228(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Under this section, the court muslgrant a
discharge as soon as practicable after completion of all payments under the plan, other
than payments to holders of allowed long-term obligations.
77 "Because this is a new chapter aimed at a specific class of debtors, Congrt$s will
want to evaluate both whether the chapter is serving its purpose and whether there is a
continuing need for a special chapter for the family farmer." H.R. Conl. Rep. No. 958,
99th Congo 2d Sess. 48. reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cona. &. Admin. News 5246, 5249.
71 Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, title III, § 302(1),100 Stat. 3124.
1125.03 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-14

1125.03 VOLUNTARY VERSUS INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

Bankruptcy takes two general forms. A debtor who desires to be relieved of
financial obligations may unilaterally file a petition in bankruptcy." In this
instance, the court takes over the debtor's assets, calls in the creditors, and
carries out the bankruptcy procedures. This process is known as voluntary
bankruptcy, and its counterparts also apply in corporate reorganization.
In cases where the debtor does not desire to go into bankruptcy, creditors on
their own motion may file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. 10 The number
of creditors required to file an involuntary petition varies from one to three,
depending on the amount of the debtor's obligations and the size of the credi-
tor's claims." The debtor may, however, oppose the involuntary petition and
force a trial of the facts before the bankruptcy jUdge.'; The creditors must prove,
at this trial, that the debtor generally is not paying his or her debts as they
become due, or that, within 120 days before the involuntary petition was filed, a
custodian was appointed or took possession of debtor's property. 13
Involuntary petitions may be filed only against debtors who are able to file
voluntary petitions under Chapters 7 or 11." A further exception is that while
farmers, family farmers and corporations that are not moneyed, business, or
commercial corporations may file voluntary petitions, they are not subject to
involuntary petitions. U Farmers include any persons that received more than 80
percent of their gross income, during the taxable year preceding the date· of
bankruptcy, from a farming operation owned or operated by such persons." A

"11 USC § 301 (1982).

• 0 J I USC § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 II USC § 303(b) (1982 &. Supp. IV 1986). Generally, if the debtor has twelve or
more creditors, three entities are required to file an involuntary petition. Ifti)e debtor has
less than twelve creditors, one creditor may file the petition ifits claim is over $5,000. Id.
12 See I I USC §303(h}{1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
13 Id. Debts that are subject to a bona fide dispute are not considered as past due for
the purpose of determining whether debtor is paying debts as they become due. Id. The
creditor's burden of proof requires evidence that debts are past due, that debts are not
being paid in the "regular course of business," and of when creditors actually expected
payment, regardless of when the obligation arose. In re Trans.High Corp., 3 Bankr. I
(Bankr. SONY 1980). See generally Annot., "Involuntary Bankruptcy: When is Debtor
'Generally Not Paying Such Debtor's Debts as Such Debts Become Due' so as to Warrant
Relief Against Debtor in Involuntary Bankruptcy," 73 ALR Fed. 763 (I 985}.
As to who is a custodian, Section 101 (I) of the Code defines a custodian as a receiver
or trustee of the property of the debtor appointed in a case or proceeding (but not
including a trustee in bankruptcy) or an assignee under a general assignment for the
benefit ofthe debtor's creditors. See also In re Williams, 6 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. ED Mich.
1980) (repossessing secured creditor was held to be a custodian).
,. 11 USC § 303(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
I"Id.
la J I USC § 10 J( 19} (SuPP. IV 1986).
25-15 BANKRUPTCY 125.0411]

family farmer is a farmer that meets the standards required to file under Chapter
12. ,7 Non-profit institutions such as churches, schools, charitable organizations,
and foundations are exempt from involuntary bankruptcy as they are
nonmoneyed corporations." Involuntary proceedings are not available under
Chapters 12 or 13.
Because creditors can force a debtor into liquidation or reorganization,
involuntary bankruptcy is a special weapon available to creditors who do not
want to join in a general composition or assignment for the benefit of creditors,
who want to prevent the debtor from transferring his or her assets, or who want
to force a reorganization of the debtor.

1125.04 PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

(1] Determining What Constitutes Property
An estate is created as soon as a voluntary or involuntary petition is filed
under the Bankruptcy Code." Generally, only property of the estate is adminis-
tered in the bankruptcy case, so that the determination of what constitutes such
property is a very important one, particularly in liquidation cases. The Code
provides that the estate includes all the property in which the debtor has an
interest on the date the petition is filed, wherever located and by whomever
held. 1O Property of the debtor includes, but is not limited to, cash and bank
accounts, the debtor's interests in copyrights, patents, trademarks, accounts
receivable, causes of action, licenses, books and records, insurance policies,
leaseholds, security interests or liens held by the debtor, vested rights in pension
plans, and general tangible property such as machinery, equipment, and furni-
ture.· ' A letter ofcredit generally is not part ofthe bankruptcy estate, when it was
procured by the debtor.·2

'711 USC§ IOI(17){Supp. IV 1986). See also supra' 25.02[4] on who may ftIe under
Chapter 12.
"See In re United Kitchen Assoc., 33 Bankr. 214 (Bankr. WD La. 1983).
"II USC § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
ooId.
" See B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual1! 4.03 (rev. ed. 1986 &
Cum. Supp. 1987), and cases cited within.
e:! Couns have generally held that letters of credit represent irrevocable obligations of
the issuing bank to pay third panies from the bank's own assets. See In re Elegant
Merchandising, Inc., 41 Bankr. 398 (Bankr. SDNY 1984); In re L.B.G. Propenies, Inc. 33
Bankr. 196 (Bankr. SD Fla. 1983); In re Page, 18 Bann. 713 (DOC 1982). Iflhe debtor has
pledged propeny to secure the letter ofcredit, however, that is propeny oflhe estate. In re
Val Decker Packing Co., 61 Bankr. 831 (Bank!. SD Ohio 1986); In re W.L. Mead, Inc., 42
Bankr. 57 (Bankr. NO Ohio 1984). See infra 125.09[2] for a discussion ofpayina letters of
credit procured by the debtor.
, 25.04(2) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-16

Property acquired by the debtor after the filing ofthe case generally does not
become part ofthe bankruptcy estate.n However, out of concern for the possible
abuse of this principle by debtors filing bankruptcy just prior to receiving a
planned or fortuitous sum, Congress made three exceptions to this rule. These
exceptions include any property a debtor acquires or becomes entitled to
acquire, within 180 days of filing a petition in bankruptcy, (I) by bequest,
devise, or inheritance; (2) as a result ofa property settlement agreement with the
debtor's spouse or a divorce decree; or (3) as a beneficiary of a life insurance
policy or death benefit plan. Such propeny becomes pan of the bankruptcy
estate."

[2J Exemptions
The Bankruptcy Code provides that certain property shaH be exempt from
inclusion in the bankruptcy estate of individual debtors. When property is
exempt, it will not be distributed to creditors but will remain the property of the
debt or free from the claims of creditors. Under the Code, debtors have a choice
ofexemptions; they may use those exemptions provided in Section 522(d) of the
Code or those provided for by the laws of the state of domicile and federal
nonbankruptcy laws."1 Any state, however, may pass legislation allowing the
debtor only the exemptions provided by its state law (and federal nonbank-
ruptcy law.)" Most states have done so, and constitutional chaHenges to such
legislation have been struck down. IT
Exemptions generally include the basic necessities: homes, household furni-
ture, clothes, and food, although limits on the value of each exemption may be
imposed. For example, the Bankruptcy Code eltempts a home, but only up to a
value of $7,500'" Vehicles frequently are included but, again, their value may
not exceed a certain amount. Other typical exemptions include tools or machin-

13 II USC § 54 \(a)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Conversion ofa case from one cbapterto
another does not affect the commencement date for these purposes. Property acquired
postpetition but preconversion is ordinarily not property of the estate. See Koch v.
Myrvold, 784 F2d 862 (8th Cir. 1986); II USC § 348(a) (1982). But in a Chapter 12 or 13
proceeding, property acquiredpostpetition and earnings (rom services performed post-
petition also become part of the bankruptcy estate, because of the nature of the relief
granted. See II USC §§ 1207(a), 1306(a).
"II USC § 541 (a)(5)(1 982 & Supp. IV 1986).
till USC§ 522(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Federal nonbankruptcy laws that contain
exemption provisions include the Social Security Act, the Foreign Service Retirement and
Disability System, benefits from the Veterans Administration, Railroad Unemployment
Insurance, and retirement pensions for United States civil service employees.
.. II USC § 522(b)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
"' See In re Sullivan. 680 F2d 1131 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 US 992 (1982); In re
Stinson, 36 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
"11 USC § 522(d)(I) (1982).
25-17 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.0413)

ery of trade, books used in business, and farming implements. Professionally

prescribed health aids and insurance policies also are frequently exempt!·

[3) Lien Avoidance fOT Exempt Property

Judicial liens on, and nonpossessory nonpurchase money security interests
in, most types ofexempt property may be set aside by the debtor, but only to the
extent that they impair the exemption.' oo For example, under the Bankruptcy
Code exemptions, if the debtor owns a residence worth $30,000, which is not
subject to a mortgage, but is subject to a judicial lien for $30,000, the debtor may
reduce the lien to $22,500 to preserve the $7,500 exemption on a residence. The
creditor is thus secured for $22.500, but is unsecured for the remaining $7,500.
Ajudiciallien is defined as a lien obtained by judgment, levy. sequestration.
or other legal or equitable process or proceeding. '01 By definition. this does not
include statutory liens. which are liens arising by operation oflaw,I02 or consen-
sual security interests. Nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests
avoidable under this section generally include security interests arising under
Article 9 ofthe UCC, in collateral that is exempt property, that does not include
mortgages on real estate. '03 By definition, the liens avoidable under this section
may not be purchase money security interests, and the debtor must retain
possession of the goods.
Most courts hold that the debtor may avoid judicial liens even ifhe has no
equity in the property.'04 The rationale is that interests in the property, other
than an equity interest, such as a possessory interest or a right to redeem, are also
protected by this section. ,osIn re Brown'OIl held that the debtor is permitted, even

H See II USC §§ 522(d)(7), 522d(9) (1982).

'00 II USC § 522(1) (1982). Liens in effect prior to November 6, 1978, the date the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted, may not be avoided by the debtor. United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 US 70 (1982). See generally Annot.. "Avoidance ofNonposses-
sory Nonpurchase Money SecurilY Interest in Debtor's Exempt Personal Property," 55
ALR Fed. 353 (1981).
10'11 USC § IOI(32)(Supp.IV 1986}.
102 II USC § 101(47)(Supp. IV 1986) defines statutory lien as liens arisinlJ solely by
force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or a lien of distress for rent,
whether or not statutory, but it does not inClude a security interest or a judicial lien,
whether or not such interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether
or not such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute. Examples of statutory liens
include mechanics liens and anisans liens. See infra 'i 25.07(3) on the power ofthe trustee
to avoid statutory liens.
'0' See II USC § 522(f)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'04 See In re Brown, 734 F2d 119 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Bland, 793 F2d 1172 (II th Cir.
1986); AJu v. New York ex reI. Dep't ofTall8tion & Finance, 41 Ban'kr.-9S5 (EDNY 1984).
lOS See In re Chesarow, 25 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).

'OIl 734 F2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1984).

11 25.0414] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-18

ifhe lacks an equity interest in the property. to avoid the fIXing ofajudiciallien
on the property if that avoidance would allow the debtor to enjoy an exemption
provided by Section 522(b). In Brown, a creditor had ajudgment against Brown,
which became a judicial lien against Brown's real estate. A local bank held a
mortgage on the property, and foreclosed. The bank was fully paid from the
proceeds of the sale. By operation of law. the creditor's lien was transferred
automatically to the surplus funds from the foreclosure sale. Brown claimed the
surplus funds as a state homestead exemption. They were paid into state court
until distribution rights were resolved. Brown and her husband then filed a
petition in bankruptcy, and claimed the surplus funds as an exemption. The
Second Circuit Court ofAppeals held that the surplus funds were exempted, and
the lien by the creditor on those funds was avoided. In this case the full amount
ofthe lien was avoided because the amount ofthe allowable exemption exceeded
the lien amount.
Another circuit, however, recently held that a debtor could not avoid a
judicial lien on exempt real property when mortgages, which were not subject to
avoidance by the debtor, exceeded the stipulated sale price.'OT In In re Simon-
son,'01 the debtors had a first mortgage on the real estate for $25,000, two judicial
liens were next in priority, totalling $14,000, and a second mortgage on the
property had a balance of $41,000..The parties stipulated that the property
should be sold for $58,000. The debtors argued that the first $25,000 belonged to
the first mortgagee, but that the next $14,000 belonged to them as an exemption,
because they could avoid the judicial liens to enjoy their exemption. The Third
Circuit Court ofAppeals disagreed, and held that Section 522(f)(1) of the Code
did not apply because the debtors had no equity in the property in that the first
and second mortgages exceeded its value. The fact that the judicial liens pre-
ceded and had priority over the second mortgage was held irrelevant.

[4] Turnover of Property Belonging to the Estate

To assure that all property ofthe estate is placed in the custody ofthe trustee
or debtor in possession, any entity that holds property ofthe estate on tbe date of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition must tum over such property to the
debtor. '01 This includes debts that are owed the debtor.110 This turnover provi-
sion is very broad, and includes property ofthe debtor repossessed by a secured
creditor.'11 Prior to turning over the property, however, the creditor is entitled to

'07 In re Simonson, 758 F2d 103 (3d Cir. 1985).

101 Id.

'01 I I USC § 542 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

110 II USC § 542(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11' United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 US 198,205-206 (1983).
 BANKRUPTCY , 25.05[1]
25·19

adequate protection of his or her interest.'" The U.s. Supreme Court explained
this provision as follows: "In effect, § 542(a) grants to the [bankruptcy) estate a
possessory interest in certain property of the debtor that was not held by the
debtor at the commencement of reorganization proceedings. The Bankruptcy
Code provides secured creditors various rights, including the right to adequate
protection, and these rights replace the protection afforded by possession."'"
The Supreme Court held that this turnover provision could be asserted by
the trustee against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to require the IRS to
return to the trustee tangible personal property seized by the IRS, pursuant to its
power to levy a tax lien for unpaid federal taxes withheld from employees. The
Court indicated that the result might be different had the IRS obtained owner-
ship of the property seized, but this was not the case as the interest ofthe IRS was
only a lien on the property to secure the unpaid taxes. The trustee's turnpver
power does not destroy the IRS's interest in the property. The IRS was entitled to
adequate protection ofits interest, but had to seek this protection in accordance
with the procedures established in the Bankruptcy Code, "rather than by with-
holding the seized property from the debtor's efforts to reorganize......
The only exceptions to this turnover provision include property of inconse-
quential value or benefit to the estate,115 or property that the holder of the
property has transferred in good faith, without knowledge of the bankruptcy
petition. us

1125.05 THE AUTOMATIC STAY

(I) General Rule
The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prevent interference
with the property of the estate by staying al1lawsuits, foreclosure proceedings,
collection efforts, and creation or enforcement ofsecurity interests. 1l1 The stay is
very broad; basically any proceeding that could potentially interfere with the
administration of the bankruptcy estate will be stayed. 111 The stay applies to all

... See 11 USC § 363(e)(Supp. IV 1986). See also infra n5.05[4)(discussingadequate

protection ofa creditor's interest).
113 Whiling Pools, 462 US at 207.
,.. Id. at 198.
,'s 11 USC ~ 54~(a) (1982). The value or benefit to the bankruptcy estate does not
have to be monetary 10 nature. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st Seas. 369, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 5963, 6325.
,1& II USC § 542(c) (1982). The trustee may, however, be able to recover the property
transferred in good faith under section 550. See infra ~ 25.07[6) on the rights oftransfer·
ees of avoided transfers.
117 11 USC § 362 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'" Section 362(a) specifically outlines eight types ofactions that are prOhibited by the
stay. They include:
11 25.05(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-20

creditors; secured creditors have no greater right to enforce repayment than do

general creditors.
The stay begins automatically with the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
whether voluntary or involuntary.11t It continues until the property in question
is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate, the case is closed or dismissed, the
debtor is discharged, or the stay is modified or terminated by court order.· ft
Any action taken by a creditor in violation of the stay may be void. '2' A
common reaction by the courts is to deprive the violator ofthe stay ofany fruits
ofthe violation, or to prevent any injury to the debtor or the debtor's estate. This
could include refusing to give effect to a garnishment,'22 declaring a foreclosure
proceeding ofno effect,'23 or declaring ajudgment obtained void. '24 Ifa violation
of the stay consists of a transfer of debtor's property, in good faith and without
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy petition, Section 542(c) will protect the
transferor from liability.'2$
If the requirements of Section 542(c) do not apply. a violator of the auto-
matic stay may be held in contempt.'· If a creditor is found to have willfully
violated the stay. it may be liable for actual damages, costs. attorney's fees and

1. Any commencement or continuation of a judicial. administrative, or other action

against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the bankruptcy
petition was filed, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
petition was filed;
2. The enforcement ofa judgment obtained before the bankruptcy petition was filed,
either against the debtor or against property ofthe bankrupt<:y estate;
3. Any act to obtain possession or exercise control of property of the bankruptcy
estate;
4. Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
5. Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property ofthe debtor to the
extent the lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy ClI!e;
6. Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
_ bankruptcy petition was filed;
7. The setoffof any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case against any claim against the debtor;
8. The commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court conceming the debtor.
..911 USC § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20
• 11 USC §§ 362(c), 362(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'2' Kalbv. Feuerstein. 308 US 433 (1940); Borg-Warner Acceptance v. Hall, 685 F2d
1306 (11th Cir. 1982).
'22ln re Baum, 15 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. D. Va. 1981).
mIn re Wheeler,S Bankr. 600 (Bankr. NO Ga. 1980).
mIn re Seafare Fiber Glass Yachts, Inc., I Bankr. 358 (Bankr. EDNY 1979).
25
' 11 USC § 542(c) (1982).
126 See In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Ellis, 66 Bankr. 821 (NO Ill. 1986); In re DeLay, 48 Bankr. 282 (WD Mo. 1984).
25-21 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.05(2J

punitive damages.'·7 The purpose of the automatic stay is best described in the
House Report on the 1978 Bankruptcy Act:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws. II gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure
actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization
plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy.
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is
designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all credi-
tors are treated equally. ,,.

Because the automatic stay suspends the ability of a creditor to pursue remedies
to collect the debt owed to the creditor, the circumstances that entitle a creditor
to be freed from the stay are of great importance. These are discussed in the
following sections.

(2) Exceptions
There are several exceptions to the automatic stay provisions. 'If These
include criminal proceedings against the debtor (either pending or commencing
an action),1:IO collection of alimony, maintenance or support from property that

127 II USC § 362(h)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Generally a creditor must act intention-
ally and with knowledge ofthe bankruptcy to be beld liable undertbissubsection. See In re
Santa Rosa Truck Stop, Inc., 74 Bankr. 641 (Bank NO Fla. 1987) (a violation ofthe stay
is willful when the party acts with knowledge of the filing of bankruptcy); In re Rinehart,
76 Bankr. 746 (Banler. OSO 1987) (where there is actual notice ofthe filing ofbankruptcy,
it is presumed tbat tbe creditor's setoff in violation of the stay was deliberate or inten--
tional); In re Stuclea, 77 Banler. 777, 783 (Bankr. CD Cal. 1987) (A party "willfully"
violates a stay, for purposes ofSection 362(h), wbere he ..acts in violation oftbe stay with
knowledge or notioe of sufficient facls to cause a rell$onably prudent person to make
additional inquiry to detennine whether a bankruptcy petition has been filed"). But see
Budget Servo Co. v. Better Homes, Inc. 804 F2d 299 (4th Cir. 1986) (a finding of civil
contempt is not a necessary predicate to impose Section 362(h) sanctions).
'" H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cons- &
Admin. News 5963, 6296-6297.
'29 II USC § 362(b) (I982 & Supp. IV 1986).
..a II USC § 362(b)(1) (1982). A creditor, however, cannot initiate or encouraae the
commencement of criminal proceedings against tbe debtor for the purpose of trying to
collect on its debt. In In re Ohio Waste Serv., Inc., 23 Banlcr. 59 (SO Ohio 1982) the
bankruptcy COUI1 found that the creditor had violated the automatic Slay provisions by
writing a letter to the county attorney requesting investigation into an insufficient funds
check written by the debtor. But see In re DeLay. 48 Hankr. 282 (WO Mo. 1984), where a
11 25.0512) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-22

is not pan of the bankruptcy estate,131 actions brought by the government to

enforce its police or regulatory powers,'32 a notice ofa tax deficiency, '33 presenta-
tion of negotiable instruments and giving notice of dishonor or making a pro-
test,134 and evictions of commercial tenants.'35

creditor filed a criminal complaint for conversion against the debtor. The creditor was not
held in contempt as the coun found his actions were not for the purpose of collecting the
debt. The creditor had already written off the debt before he filed the complaint. Because
the creditor was seeking to "get even" only in an emotional sense. not in a monetary sense,
the district coun reversed the contempt citation.
131 Collection of alimony, maintenance, and suppon is excepted from the automatic
stay only to the extent that it is against propeny that is not pan ofthe bankruptcy estate.
Under Chapter 7 and Chapter II proceedings. for example, postpetition assets and
income are not propeny of the bankruptcy estate, so effons to collect alimony, mainte-
nance or suppon from those assets will not be affected by the automatic stay. Under
Chapters 12 and 13, however, postpetition assets and income earned from services
performed after the petition is filed are pan of the bankruptcy estate, so enforcement
proceedinas, including garnishments, will be stayed upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. Exempt propeny of the debtor is not propeny of the bankruptcy estate, so will
always be subject to collection of alimony, maintenance, and suppon.
See In re Summerlin. 26 Bankr. 875 (Bankr. EDNC 1983) (former wife entitled to
pursue collection of alimony from ex-husband debtor's postpetition assets and future
income in a Chapter II case); In re Renzulli, 28 Bankr. 41 (Banke. NO 111. 1982)
(postpetition assets and income ofa Chapter 7 debtor were not propeny ofthe bankruptcy
estate, so collection effon by a former spouse against that propeny was not stayed). But
see In re Mack, 46 Bankr. 652 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1985) (The Depanment ofPublic Welfare of
Pennsylvania, the assignee of a claim for alimony and child suppon from the debtor's
fonner wife, was held in contempt for violating the automatic stay by continuing a wage
garnishment after the Depanment had knowledge that the debtor filed a Chapter 13
petition in bankruptcy). See also Annot., "Exception From Bankruptcy Estate ofEarninll5
From Services Perfonned by an Individual Debtor After Commencement ofthe Case," 76
ALR Fed. 853 (1986).
132 11 USC § 362(b)(4) (1982 & Supp.lV 1986). Examples ofthis type ofproceeliing
include actions by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for unfair labor practices;
NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F2d 934 (6th Cir. 1986), Ahrens Aircraft,
Inc. v. NLRB, 703 F2d 23 (1st Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F2d 291 (5th
Cir. 1981); employment discrimination actions; EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F2d 318
(8th cir.) cen. denied 107 S. Ct. 307 (1986); EEOC v. Guerdon Indus., 76 Bankr. 102 (WD
Ky. 1987); some types of environmental reaulations, both federal and state; In re Com-
monwealth Oil Refining Co., 80S F2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228
(1987) (see also infra ~ 25.09[6][a) for funher discussion of environmental regulation
proceedings and the automatic stay); and state professional licensing actions; In re
Thomassen, IS Bankr. 907 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981 )(physician's license revocation proceed-
ing); In re Hanson, 71 Bam. 193 (ED Wis. 1987) (attorney disciplinary hearing). See
generally Tabb, "Competing Policies in Bankruptcy; The Governmental Exception to the
Automatic Stay," 21 Tulsa U 1&3 (1985).
13
' 11 USC § 362(bX9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
134This exception was added in the 1984 amendments. Holders of checks drawn by
the debtor may deposit them for the purpose ofpreserving their rights, despite the filing of
25-23 BANKRUPTCY '25.os13]

(3) Procedure for Obtaining Relief From the Stay

Any party in interest may request relief from the stay, such as modifying or
terminating it, for cause. m "Cause" specifically includes the lack of adequate
protection of the party's interest,137 but is otherwise not defined in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In addition, if the debtor has no equity in the property and the
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization, the stay may be modi·
fied or terminated.'3*
Congress anticipated that "for cause" be determined by the facts in each
case. '31 Similarly, the House Report gave the examples of allowing an action to
be completed in another tribunal, and lhe lack ofconnection with or interference
with the pending bankruptcy case, as other possible reasons to modify a stay, "0
Couns have defined "for cause" to include the bad faith of the debtor.'"
The party requesting relief muSl file a motion with the bankruptcy court. "2
The stay automatically terminates thirty days after the motion is filed, if the
court does not order a continuance of the stay.'4S In any hearing, lhe party
requesting relief has the burden of proof on the issue of debtor's equity in the
propeny, but the pany opposing the motion has the burden on all other issues.".
Section 362(0 of the Bankruptcy Code provides relief from the stay without a

a bankruptcy petition. 11 USC § 362(b)(1 J) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Seealso Chapter 21
on presentment and notice of dishonor. The payment of a check where the bankruptcy
debtor is the drawer is, however, subject to the automatic stay. See infra ~ 25.09(1] on the
bank's rights and defenses for checks in the process of collection.
131 11 USC § 362(b)(IO) (1982 & Supp.IV 1986).
131 11 USC § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
mSee infra f 25.05(4).
131 11 USC § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In determining whether a debtor has
equity in the property, courts generally look to all encumbrances on the propert)', and not
merely the lien ofthe creditor requesting relieffrom the stay. In re Louden, 69 Bankr. 723
(Bankr. ED Mo. 1987); In re Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 Bankr. 784 (Bankr. DN] 1986),
m H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5963, 6300.
"old. See In re Baker, 75 Banu. 120 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) (debtor's former wife was
entitled to proceed with a family court action to determine her rights in the marital
property, since it was family court, and not the bankruptcy court, that had expertise in
these matters). See also In re Elliott, 66 Bankr. 466 (Bankr. SD Fla. 1986) (automatic stay
was modified to permit parties to conclude litigation in state court to settle the amount of
the claim).
'" See In re Thirtieth Place, Inc. 30 BR 503 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); In re Corporalion
Deja Vu, 34 BR 845 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983).
102 11 USC § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
143 11 USC § 362(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

,•• II USC § 362(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

11 25.05(4] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-24

hearing, only ifit is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interests ofan
entity in property that will occur before there is an opportunity for notice and a
hearing."s

(4) The Secured Creditor, the Collateral, and Adequate Protection

As discussed earlier, a secured creditor may not begin or continue ajudicial
proceeding to collect on debts owed, may not enforce a previous judgment, and
cannot foreclose on the collateral securing the debt once a debtor has filed its
petition in bankruptcy.'" Secured creditors may, however, request protection of
their property interests pending the stay, through requesting a modification or
termination of the stay.'47 For example, while the automatic stay is pending, the
collateral is depreciating in value. As a result, the secured party is deprived ofthe
value of the collateral to the extent of the depreciation. If the court orders the
debtor to provide adequate protection, the trustee may do so in a variety of
ways..., The trustee may (1) make periodic cash payments to the secured credi-
tor equal to the loss in value;·4t (2) provide an additional or replacement lien to
the extent of the loss in value;'50 or (3) provide other relief that is equal to the
"indubitable equivalent" of the secured creditor's interest in the property.151

105 II USC § 362(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

''I II USC § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
,.. 11 USC § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
,•• A Family Farmer Chapter 12 proceeding has its own rules on what constitutes
adequate protection. See II USC § 120S (Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of these
provisions, see B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law ManuaI119A.06 (Cum. Supp.
1987).
'41 11 USC § 361(1)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See In re Byker, 64 Bankr. S40 (Bankr.
NO Iowa 1986) (debtor's offer of cash payment to be made after harvest of crops on the
property that was the subject of the real estate contract between the debtor and the
creditor was adequate protection, and the stay would not be lifted); In re Shriver, 33
Bankr. 176 (Bankr. O. Ohio 1983). But see In re Walton, 77 Barn. 617 (Bankr. NO Ohio
1987) (if the source of adequate protection payments is uncertain or overly speculative,
debtor's offer ofcash payments is not "indubitable equivalent" ofcreditor's bargained for
rights).
'50 II USC § 361(2) (1982). See In re Island Helicopter Corp., 63 Bankr. SIS (Bankr.
EONY 1986) (creditor holding security interest in debtor's fleet of helicopters was ade-
quately protected where debtor had taken significant steps to maintain and upgrade the
value of the helicopters, had offered replacement liens on all new components purchased
for and installed in the collateral, had offered to provide insurance policies on collateral
with the creditor as the loss payee, and had proposed to grant the creditor replacement
liens in helicopters to be purchased with recently received insurance proceeds).
'51 II USC § 361 (3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See In re Ahlers, 794 F2d 388 (8th Cir.
1986) (a debtor's offer of adequate protection should, as nearly as posSible under ihe
.circumstances, provide the creditor with its bargained for rights). rev'd on other grounds,
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 56 USLW 4225 (US March 7,1988).
25-25 BANKRUPTCY II 25.05[4)

One method is to require debtors to provide insurance against destruction ofthe

collateral. .52
If, however, the secured party has a sufficient "equity cushion" in the
collateral, it is usually deemed adequately protected. When the debtor has a
significant amount of equity, the secured creditor is oversecured and the loss in
value during the stay generally will not harm the creditor.'·'
Courts have sometimes required debtors to compensate secured creditors
for their lost opportunity cost in that they were unable to repossess and sell the
collateral and reinvest the proceeds.'''' This type of protection essentially
amounts to interest, but there is controversy as to whether it applies to both
oversecured and undersecured creditors."5
The trustee or the debtor in possession may use the collateral during the
pendency of the bankruptcy.'sa This use may, however, be conditioned on the
creditor receiving adequate protection, as discussed above. 157 In addition, use of
the collateral entitles the secured creditor to an administrative priority,'st and, if
the provisions for adequate protection prove to be insufficient (for example, if

'USee In re Marchand, 61 Bankr. 81 (Banlcr. ED Ark. 1986) (debtor ordered to

purchase insurance on fann equipment).
,.. See In re Liana Corp., 68 Bankr. 761 (Banb. ED Pa. 1987) (in calculating the
equity cushion the coun compares the value ofthe collateral to the sum ofthe claims ofthe
secured pany seeking relief from stay and secured claims senior to that of the party
seeking reliel). The costs of foreclosure and sale are generally included also; In re Pittl, 2
Banler. 476 (CD Cal. 1979).
! ... In re American Mariner Indus. Inc., 734 F2d 426 (gth Cir. 1984). The Founh
Circuit has followed American Mariner. Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp.,
754 F2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985).
,sa See In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) (analysis
implies it applies to both over and under secured creditors). But see In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc. Ltd., 808 F2d 363 (Sth Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Adequate protection
does not require postpetition payments for interest or lost oppOrtunity costs to an under-
secured creditor as compensation for delay in Chapter 11 cases); In re Brigas TranSpOrta-
tion Co., 780 F2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985) (undersecured creditors are not entitled to interest
as matter of law, disagreeing with American Mariner, but interest payments may be
required on a case-by-case basis, within the sound discretion of the coun). This split in
circuits will probably have to be resolved by Congress or the Supreme Coun. See generally
Eisenberg, "The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security,"
38 Vand. L. Rev. 931 (/985); Note, "Adequate Protection alIAI the Availability of Post-
Petition Interest to Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1106
( 1987).
'so II USC §§ 363(b), 363(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Cash collateral, which includes
cash, negotiable instruments, documents oftitle, securities, deposit accounts or other cash
equivalents may not be used without consent or coun approval. Id. at § 363(c)(2).
101 II USC § 363(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). .
'''See II USC § 503(b){I), 507(a){I)(1982 & Supp.IV 1986). See infra 1/ 25.06 on
priority of claims.
, 25.06 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-26

the collateral is destroyed and debtor had no insurance), the claim may be
entitled to priority over all other administrative expense claims.'·'

11 25.06 CREDITORS' CLAIMS: PROCEDURES AND PRIORITY

OF DISTRIBUTION
Anyone who has a claim against the debtor may share in the distribution of
the estate.'60 A "claim" is defined broadly as aright topayment.'I' It mayor may
not be reduced to judgment, liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, disputed,
legal, equitable, or secured."2
Anyone with a claim may file a proof ofclaim with the bankruptcy court. '13
There are deadlines for filing proofs ofclaim. In a Chapter 7, 12, or 13 proceed-
ing, it must be filed within ninety days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors.'·o In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the court fixes the deadline for filing
claims. II. An untimely filing, or no filing, may result in subordination of the
claim to timely claims, or in possible discharge of the debt without the creditor
receiving any benefits or pro rata share of the estate. In Chapter 11 proceedings,
however, a creditor will be deemed to have filed a proofofclaim if it is named on
the schedule of creditors that the debtor files.'" ,
Once a proof of claim is filed, it must go through an allowance process. A
claim is considered allowed unless a party in interest objects to it on one of the
statutory grounds. '17 The trustee has a duty to review the claims filed and to
object to any improper ones. 'II Such grounds include the following: ( I) the claim
is unenforceable against the debtor; (2) the claim is for unmatured interest; (3) if
it is a claim for property tax, the tax assessment exceeds the value ofthe debtor's
interest in the property; (4) ifit is a claim for services ofan insider or an attorney
of the debtor, the claim exceeds the reasonable value of the services; (5) unma-
tured claims for alimony, maintenance or support; (6) landlord's claims over a

'6'11 USC § 501(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

'10 See II USC § 501 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 101(9) defines creditor as "an
entity that has a claim against the debtor....n
"' See 11 USC § 101(4)(1982).
112
11 USC § 101(4)(1982).
113 II USC § 50I(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Filing a proof ofclaim also assures the
creditor of notice of the proceedings.
'10 See Bankr. R. 3002 & 3003.
11. See Bankr. R. 3OO3{c)(3).
111 11 USC § 1111 (a) (1982). If the claim is disputed, contingent or unliquidated,
however, the creditor must file a proof of claim. Id.
m II USC § 502(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'USee 11 USC§§704(5), 1106(a)(l), 1202(b)(1), 1302(b)(I)(l982 &Supp. IV 1986).
25-27 BANKRUPTcY 11 25.06

cenain amount; (7) claims by employees for breach of employment contracts

exceeding a cenain amount; and (8) employment tax claims...•
Once a claim is allowed, it must be determined whether the claim is secured
or unsecured, and to what extent. If the creditor has collateral of greater value
than the amount of the claim, it is fully secured.'10 If the amount owed by the
debtor is greater than the value of the collateral, the creditor is secured as to the
value of the collateral, but unsecured for the deficiency.'" A secured creditor
who looks only to the value of the collateral for recovery does not need to file a
proofofclaim. 172 State law generally determines whether a lien is valid, although
it still may be subject to avoidance by the trustee. 113 If a claim is subject to a
subordination agreement between the debtor and creditors, the bankruptcy
coun is authorized to enforce it on equitable grounds.'"
Distributions to creditors under Chapters II, 12, and 13 are made accord-
ing to the approved plan. In a liquidation proceeding, the Code provictes as
follows, for the specific order of distribution of the estate:'1!

1. Secured claims are to be paid in full out ofthe proceeds of the collateral
before any of the proceeds may be used to pay the remainder of the
claims. 111
2. The priority claims, as outlined in Section 507(a), are paid in order of
their priority. m They include (in order) administrative expenses, 111
involuntary gap claims,17' wages, salaries and commissions,"o claims for
contributions to an employee benefit plan,"' grain producer and fisher-

10t II USC § 502(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

170
11 USC § 506(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
HI Id. See generally "Butler, "The Insecurity of Secured Creditors Under the Bank·
ruptcy Code," 59 Am. Bankr. U 277 (1985).
112 See II USC § 506(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
173 See infra 11 25.07.
74
' 11 USC § 510 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
175 11 USC § 726 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally Buckley. "The Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle," 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1986).
111 See 11 USC § 725 (Supp. IV 1986).
1fT II USC § 726(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

''I See II USC § 503(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

111 See 11 USC § 502(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
100 II USC § 507(a)(3)(1982 & Supp.IV 19116).lheae claimsarefofwageseamed by
an individual within ninety days before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. or the
date the debtor's business stopped, whichever is first, but not exceeding $2,000.
11111 USC § 507(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This priority is also limited in
amount. The benefits must have accrued to employees during the last 180 days of the
business, Of by the filing ofthe petition. whichever was first. In addition, the tOlal amount
given priority is equal to the number of employees under the plan. multiplied by $2,000.
, 25.07 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-28

men claims against storage facility debtors, '12 consumer deposits, '12 and
tax claims.'"
3. Allowed unsecured claims are paid, as long as they were filed before the
deadline.'ls
4. Allowed unsecured claims that were filed after the deadline. lIS
5. Claims for fines, punitive damages, and penalties. "7
6. If any property of the estate remains, postpetition interest is paid on all
unsecured claims at the legal rate. It is prorated among ail unsecured
claims, without regard to priority.'"
7. If any surplus remains, it goes to the debtor."1
If at any of the distribution levels there are insufficient funds to pay the full
amounts due, the proceeds are prorated. '10

11 25.07 POWERS AND DUTIES OF mE BANKRUPTCY

TRUSTEE
The trustee is the officer who represents the estate in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing. '91 Generally trustees are appointed by the bankruptcy judge,,n and must file

minus the total amount paid to other benefit plans or to employees under the wage
priority.
112
11 USC § 507(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In the 1984 amendments Congress
gave this priority status to those who delivered &rain or fish to a stol'lliC facility that
subsequently went bankrupt. The limit is $2,000.
'12 II USC § 507(a)(6) (1982 & SuPp. IV 1986). Consumers that have made deposits
to retail institutions that subsequently filed bankruptcy are entitled to a priority of up to
5900. The deposit must have been made in connection with the purchase, lease or rental
or property or services of a consumer nature (not commercial).
'"II USC § 507(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This tax priority includes various
types ofincome tax, property tax, social security and employment tax, excise tax, customs
duties, and penalties relating to any of the listed taxes.
'IS I I USC § 726(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'1111 USC § 726(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
117
11 USC § 726(a)(4) (1982 & SuPp. IV 1986).
•11 See II USC § 726(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11111 USC § 726(a)(6)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'10 11 USC § 726(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
", I I USC § 323(a) (1982).
112 In liquidation cases under Chapter. 7, the unsecured creditors nave the right to
elect a trustee by a majority vote if creditors holding at least 20 percent of the amount of
the outstanding unsecured claims request an election. II USC § 702(b), (c) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
 BANKRUPTCY ~ 25.07(11
25-29

a bond.'" The role ofthe trustee is to act in the best interests ofthe creditors in
collecting and preserving the bankruptcy estate. To accomplish this goal, the
trustee is given special powers to avoid several different kinds ofliens, transfers,
and executory contracts.

[II Trustee as Lien Creditor

Under Section 544(a) of the Code, known as the "strong-ann" clause, the
trustee has, as of the date the petition in bankruptcy is filed, all the rights and
powers that a lien creditor might have, if that lien creditor had obtained a lien on
the property at the time the bankruptcy case commenced, to set aside or avoid
any transfer ofproperty by the debtor.'" A lien creditor is a creditor who obtains
an interest in the property by attachment or legal process, and does not include a
creditor with a security interest in the property. These rights are the rights of a
hypothetical lien creditor; one does not in fact have to exist. IN The hypothetical
lien creditor is one who is deemed to have obtained a lien on the property in
question, as of the date of bankruptcy.
This power involves a mixture of federal and state law. While the federal
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the rights of a lien creditor, state law defines
what rights such a lien creditor has. In cases involving personal property, the
controlling state law is the UCC, and the UCC gives a lien creditor priority over
a security interest in collateral that is unperfected.'" As a result, this proVision
gives the trustee power to set aside all security interests created by the debtor
that are unperfected as of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.'"

,11)II USC § 322{a) (1982 &. Supp. IV 1986).

'·'11 USC § 544(a) (1982 &. Supp. IV 1986).
'Il5Section 544(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 specifically overruled a
Ninth Circuit case, Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962), which held
that despite the trustee having the power ofa hypothetical lien creditor, the trustee did not
have those powers if there was no creditor that could have obtained a lien. Under the
Code, there is no requirement that an actual creditor exist who could have obtained the
lien. See 124 Cong. Rec. H32400 (1978).
,.. ucc § 9-301(I)(b).
,., II USC § 544{a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also UCe. 9·301. Perfection of a
security interest is discussed at , 22.03. A purchase money security interest is superior to
the claim ofa lien creditor whose lien attaches while the security interest was unperfected,
if the purchase money security interest is perfected within ten days of delivery of the
goods, because the perfection relates back to the date the security interest attached to the
goods. uec. 9-301(2). Thus, a lien creditor's rights under the relevant state law are not
superior to the secured party whose purchase money security interest became so per-
fected, and a trustee in bankruptcy, who only has the rights of such a lien creditor under
this section of the Bankruptcy Code, will not be able to avoid the security interesl. ,
For example, assume debtor buys goods from a seller on credit on day I, seUer takesa
purchase money security interest in the goods which attaches on day I, debtor takes
possession of the goods on day 2, and deblor's bankruptcy filing occurs on day 4. Seller's
II 25.07(2J SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-30

[2J Trustee as Successor to the Rigbts of Actual Unsecured Creditors

The trustee may also assert the same rights that any unsecured creditor who
has a claim against the debtor might exercise. 111 Under this provision, ifthere is
an actual unsecured creditor who has the power under any applicable state law to
avoid a security interest. lien, or any other transfer of an interest in the debtor's
property. the trustee in bankruptcy will have a similar power to set aside such
transfers for the benefit of all creditors. This gives the trustee the powers ofany
type of unsecured creditor. not just those ofa lien creditor. It permits the trustee
to void a debtor's transfer of an interest in the debtor's property that could have
been avoided by any particular unsecured creditor ofthe debtor, as long as there
is an actual unsecured creditor with such power under the relevant state law. l "
The theory underlying this power is that the trustee, as the representative of all
creditors, should be able to recover for the estate what any actual creditor miglit
recover.
The potential iiability under this section can be great, because the transfer
avoided is not limited by the amount ofthe unsecured claim on which it is based.
Under the Moore v. BayOll rule, the entire transfer is avoided. For example.
suppose a bankrupt debtor made a bulk sale under Article 6 of the uee, selling
$500,000 in inventory. The buyer, however, failed to give proper notice to all
debtor's creditors, as required by the uee. The debtor received the proceeds
from the sale and paid all its creditors, but inadvertently missed one general

security interest is unperfected on the date ofbankruptcy, so ordinarily the trustee's power
as a hypothetical lien creditor would enable the trustee to set aside the security interest.
But if the seller files to perfect the security interest by day 12 (within 10 days after the
debtor received possession ofthe collateral), the perfection will relate back 10 the date the
security interest attached (day I), and the seller's perfected security interest will be
effective against the trustee. Section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically recog-
nizes the validity in bankruptcy of Ihis relation-back of perfection for purchase money
security interests. Section 362(b)(3) ofthe Bankruptcy Code allows a secured party to file
to perfect such a security interest as an exception to the automatic stay. For further
discussion of priority rights relating to security interests. see t 23.0 I. .
IN II USC § 544(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
m Actions under state-enacted uniform codes such as the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance ACI (UFCA), the newer Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFfA) and bulk
transfers under the Uniform Commercial Code (Article 6) are common under Section
544(b). See In re Sleele. 79 Bankr. 503 (Bankr. MD Aa. 1987) (trustee avoided transfer of
real property from debtor to arandmother under Aorida state fraudulent conveyance
statute); In re Zarling, 70 Bankr. 402 (Bankr. ED Wis. 1987) (UFCA voided a transfer of
real property to an alleged religious society); In re Kenval Marketing Corp., 69 Bankr. 922
(Bania. ED Pa. 1987) (bulk sale avoided under Pennsylvania law); In re Express Liquors,
Inc. 65 Bankr. 952 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (trustee avoided transfer under Maryland UCC
on bulk transfers).
'00 In Moore v. Bay, 284 US 4 (1931). the U.S. Supreme Court h~ld that the bank-
ruptcy trustee can succeed to the rights of a creditor wilhout being limited by the amount
of the creditor's claim.
25-31 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.07(3]

trade creditor who held a $1,000 claim. The debtor subsequently filed bank-
ruptcy. The actual creditor with the $1 ,000 unsecured claim has a cause ofaction
against the buyer in the bulk sale because of the defective notice. The trustee,
under Section 544(b), succeeds to the rights ofthe unsecured creditor and may
avoid the entire bulk transfer; that is, the trustee may require the return of the
entire $500,000 of inventory, or its value, from the buyer in the bulk sale
transaction. Thus even though the trustee's claim was based on a $1.000 debt,
the entire $500,000 transfer is set aside.
The trustee's recovery under this section is for the benefit ofthe bankruptcy
estate. 201 The actual creditor, on whose claim the recover is based, is in no better
a position than any other actual unsecured creditor with regard to the proceeds
recovered.
The uee however, decreases the number ofopportunities for this potential
liability to result. Under the uec, an unperfected security interest is vulnerable
only to a perfected security interest or to a lien creditor. m Under the Bankruptcy
Code, Section 544(b), the trustee succeeds only to the rights of an unsecured
creditor; those creditors having perfected security interests, or liens, are secured
creditors.2 • 2

(31 Power to Set Aside Statutory Liens

Statutory liens, such as mechanics' liens, artisans' liens, and landlord liens,
are interests in the debtor's property that arise by force of statute. 2O• Statutory
liens are generally valid against a bankruptcy trustee. A statutory lien is different
from a uee Article 9 security interest because a security interest is created by
the voluntary action of the parties in agreeing to create the security interest,
while the statutory lien arises without the need for any particular agreement,
simply from the operation of the statute on the circumstances. Nevertheless, the
Bankruptcy Code classifies holders ofstatutory liens as secured creditors. 2OI The
trustee may avoid statutory liens in only the following three circumstances:1OI
1. A statutory lien that becomes effective only upon the bankruptcy or
insolvency of the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee this
power, so that states may not create lien statutes whose sole purpose is to
alter the order of distribution in bankruptcy cases dictated by the

201See id.
UCC ~~ 9.201,9.301.
202 See

203 For a more detailed analysis, see J. White & R. Summers. Uniform Commercial
Code § 24-7 (2d ed. 1980).
20' 11 USC § 10 I(47)(Supp. IV 1986).
205 II USC § 506 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
201 See II USC § 545 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
If 2!5.07[41 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-32

national policies established in the Code. 201 To prevent this, the trustee
may avoid statutory liens that, by their own terms, become effective
upon certain events indicating insolvency. 201
2. A statutory lien if it is not perfected or enforceable as of the date the
bankruptcy petition is filed against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser. 201
The most common liens under this category are tax liens. Notices of tax
liens generally must be filed in the county recorder's office before they
are effective against a bona fide purchaser. If not filed prior to the date
the bankruptcy petition is filed, they may be avoided by the trustee. 211
3. A landlord's statutory lien. ' " A landlord is treated as a general creditor,
with respect to prebankruptcy rent claims, unless the landlord's claim is
secured by a security interest in the property of the debtor created by·
agreement of the parties prior to bankruptcy.m

(4] Power to Set Aside Preferences

la] Elements of a Preference. When a debtor who is insolvent transfers prop-
erty shortly before bankruptcy to satisfy a prior debt, this transfer is called a
"preference." The trustee has the authority to set aside the transfer and to
recover the property for the benefit of the estate.I " Five elements must be

201 See B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual It 7.04[1] (rev. ed. 1986
& Cum. Supp. 1987).
200 These events include: (I) debtor flies a petition in bankruptcy; (2) when any other
insolvency proceeding is commenced; (3) when a custodian is appointed or authorized to
take, or does take, possession; (4) when the debtor becomes insolvent; (5) when the
debtor's financial condition fails to meet a specified standard; or (6) at the time of an
execution against properly of the debtor levied by an entity other than the holder of the
statutory lien. II USC § 545( I ) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
201
11 USC § 545(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
210 For a thorough discussion of the trustee's avoiding powers under Section 545(2),
as applied to federal tax liens, see In re Coan, 72 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. MD Fla. 1987). See
also In re Barnett, 62 Banke. 638 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (trustee can avoid tax lien where
the United States had filed a notice of it in the wrong county, despite its subsequent
correction of the error). This subsection applies to other types of statutory liens as well.
See In re Nicholson. 57 Bankr. 672 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (attorney's lien, which was
unperfected due to lack of notice to debtor at the time of commen<;ement of debtor's
bankruptcy case, was statutory lien avoidable by the trustee under Section 545(2)}.
2" II USC § 545(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
212 See In re Brittain, 81 Banke. 7 (Bankr. WD La. 1987); In re Zaison, Inc., 80 Banke.
832 (Banke. SD Tex. 1987); In re John Deskins Pic Pac, Inc., S9 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. WD
Va. 1986).
213 11 USC § 54 7(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). On preferences, see generally Country-
man, "The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy," 38 Vand. L. Rev. 713
(1985); Duncan, "Loan Payments to Secured Creditors as Preferences Under the 1984
Bankruptcy Amendments," 64 Neb. L. Rev. 83 (1985).
25-33 BANKRUPTCY fI 25.071411-J

present before a trustee can treat a transfer as a preference and recover the
property that was transferred. 21 ' A preference is any transfer of the debtor's
interest in property that is (I) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made;
(3) made While the debtor is insolvent;211 (4) made within ninety days before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition;21t and (5) one that gives the creditor more than
it would receive in a liquidation case, if the transfer had not been made. 211
More specifically, there must be a "transfer"'" within the relevant period of
time of an "interest of the debtor in property," to or for the benefit of a
creditor. 21I The transfer must be made while the debtor was insolvent,no and it
must enable the creditor to receive more than the creditor would have been
entitled to receive under Iiquidation. 221 To illustrate, assume debtor has an
outstanding debt of$1 ,000 to C, which debtor incurred for the purchase orsome
goods. Within the ninety-day period before bankruptcy, and at a time while the
debtor was insolvent, the debtor pays C. (There is a presumption the debtor is

214 Transfer is defined very broadly in the Code: it means "every mode, direct or
indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, ofdisposing ofor paning with
property or with an interest in property...." It includes retention ofa security intel'e1t,
and foreclosure ofthe debtor'sequity of redemption. II USC § IOI(50)(Supp. IV 1986).
2'1 The debtor is assumed to have been insolvent during the ninety-day period preced·
ing the date a bankruptcy petition was filed. 11 USC § 547(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
211 If the creditor is an insider, a transfer made within one year before the bankruptcy
petition is filed is vulnerable as a preference. II USC § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
Because the transfer must be made within 90 days ofthe filing date, wh~n the transfer
is made is crucial. A transfer is made at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee, if the transfer is perfected at or within ten days after such
time. If it is perfected later than ten days after, it is made at the time the transfer is
perfected. Ifthe transfer is not perfected by the time the bankruptcy petition was flied it is
deemed to have been made immediately before the filing date. See 11 USC § 547(e)(2}
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A transfer is not made, however, until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred. Id. at § 547(e}(3).
2'711 USC § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
211 The term "transfer" is defined in the Code as meaning "every mode, direct or
indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, ofdisposing ofor parting with
property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest
and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption . . . ," 11 USC § 101(50)
(Supp. IV 1986).
21tll USC § 547(b}(1982 & Supp. IV 1986}.
220The Code defines "insolvent." The test is whether the debtor's debts exceed the
value of its property computed as prescribed in the Code to exclude certain property that
has been fraudulently transferred or may be exempt from the property of the estate. II
USC § 101(31) (Supp. IV 1986). There is a special definition fOr when a partnership is
insolvent. Id.
221 II USC § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 25,07[411_' SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-34

insolvent throughout the ninety-day period before the filing ofthe petition.)222
The payment is a transfer of property of the debtor to the creditor, C, for an
antecedent obligation. The transfer has the effect of preferring C over other
creditors, because Cwould not likely receive full payment ofthe debt had there
been a bankruptcy liquidation proceeding in which C, for example, might be
given 40 percent of the claim. The transfer to the creditor does not have to be a
payment of money; any interest in property ofthe debtor will do. Thus, if C held
an unsecured obligation, and shortly before bankruptcy the debtor gave C a
security interest in property owned by the debtor, the creation of the security
interest in favor of C also will qualify as a preference.
There must be an "antecedent debt" for a preference to exist. The contem-
poraneous substitution of property of equal value does not create a preference,
because there is no transfer of property for an antecedent debt but only an
exchange of property of equivalent value. The creditor is not preferred over
other creditors because the value ofthe bankrupt's estate remains unchanged by
the exchange. Thus, when a debtor purchases goods on credit but gives the seller
or other secured party a security interest in the goods, there is no transfer on
account of an antecedent debt if the security interest is granted by the debtor at
the same time that the debtor receives the goods. It is a simultaneous exchange.
If the debtor subsequently pays the obligation to the secured party, the payment
is not necessarily a transfer for an antecedent debt, because the release by the
secured party ofthe security interest in the goods, in exchange for payment, is a
similar exchange of property of equivalent value. Moreover, as long as the
collateral fully secures the debt, the payment to the secured party does not give
the secured party any more than the secured party would get on liquidation,
because the claim is fully secured.
What happens when the security interest is unperfeeted or does not become
perfected until sometime subsequent to the creation of the debt within the
ninety-day period prior to the filing of the petition? In such cases, the Bank-
ruptcy Code contains rules that define when the transfer of property to the
creditor shall be deemed to have occurred. If the security interest is never
perfected, the transfer of the security interest to the secured party is viewed as
having occurred immediately before the date of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. m This makes the security interest a transfer for an antecedent debt
because the transfer is deemed to occur immediately before bankruptcy while
the debt arose at an earlier time. Thus, according to this rule, a debtor is
prevented from concealing from other creditors security interests in the debtor's
property by not following the rules for perfecting the security interest. Perfection
is defined, as far as personal property or fixtures are concerned, as the moment
"when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is

11 USC § 547(f) (1982).

222

mil USC § 547(e)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

25-35 BANKRUPTCY fI 25.07(4I1a}

superior to the interests ofthe transferee."".. This definition ofperfection makes

Article 9 of the uee applicable. Vnder Section 9·301(IXb) of the vee, a
judicial lien creditor will not prevail over a perfected security interest. Thus,
perfection for these purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, will occur when the
secured party has perfected a security interest under Article 9 of the vee.
When there is a delay in perfecting the security interest, the Bankruptcy
Code establishes a grace period often days. If the security interest is perfected at
or within ten days after the security interest is created in the goods, the transfer is
regarded 8S having taken effect at the time the security interest "takes effect,"
which would be the time at which the security interest attached under Article 9
of the Vec. m The consequence of this rule is that the transfer ofthe security
interest to the secured party occurs simultaneously with the acquisition of rights
by the debtor in the goods, if the secured party has taken the proper steps to make
sure the security interest attaches at that moment. The transfer will not be for an
antecedent debt and thus will be secure against the trustee in bankruptcy. The
ten-day grace period corresponds neatly with the ten-day period in the uee for
perfecting a purchase money security interest in goods. 221 The bankruptcy provi·
sion is broader than the uee, however, because the ten-day grace period is
applicable for purposes ofthe preference rules, regardless ofwhether the security
interest is a purchase money interest.
Ifthere is a delay in perfection ofthe security interest ofmore than ten days,
the transfer will be deemed to occur at the time the security interest is perfected.
V sing the example above of a purchase of goods on credit, secured by a security
interest in the goods, the delay of more than ten days in perfecting the security
interest makes the transfer one that is subsequent in time to the creation of the
obligation to pay for the goods, and thus constitutes a transfer on account of an
antecedent debt.:I27
When the transfer is one that is made to an "insider," the relevant period in
which the transfer may be subject to attack as a preference is extended to reach
transfers that occur before the ninety-day period, but which are within one year
prior to the date offtling the bankruptcy petition, so long as the creditor who gets
the benefit of the transfer was an "insider" at the time of the transfer. 22I As

>2411 USC § 547(e)(1 )(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). There iss bona fide purchaser test
for transfers of real propeny other than fixtures. The interest in real propeny ofa seller or
purchaser is perfected "when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an
interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee...."
225" USC § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV t 986).
22tl See discussion of the purchase money security interest perfection procedures in
n 22.02[2], 22.03[ I].
mil USC § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
221
11 USC § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 25.0714)[b) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25·36

defined in the Bankruptcy Code,22t when the debtor is an individual, an insider

includes relatives of the debtor, a general partner, or a partnership in which the
debtor is a general partner, and a corporation of which the debtor is a director,
officer, or person in control.'30 When the debtor is a corporation, an insider
includes a director, an officer, or a person in control ofthe corporation, as well as
a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner or a general partner ofthe
debtor or relatives of a general partner, director, officer, or control person. 231
There are similar definitions of "insider" for debtors that are partnerships and
debtors that are municipalities. 232 The rules on what constitutes a preference are
otherwise similar to those stated earlier, but the trustee must establish that the
creditor was an insider, and further the trustee does not have the benefit of the
presumption of insolvency during the ninety days immediately preceding the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.
A case involving an escrow transaction posed the question of how to deter-
mine the time at which a "transfer" took place. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that payments arising out of an escrow agreement created prior to
the ninety-day period preceding bankruptcy, even though they occurred during
the ninety-day period, could not be avoided as preferences or postpetition
transfers. 233 The debtor had set up the escrow to provide for payment to the
creditor, in the event that a judgment against the debtor was upheld on appeal.
The judgment was upheld, and the court said that the creditor became entitled to
the escrowed funds, although the debtor had since become bankrupt. The court
reasoned that "to be avoidable [under the Bankruptcy Act) a transfer must
deprive the debtor's estate of something ofvalue that could otherwise be used to
satisfy creditors. Once the escrow was created, the only interest in the escrow
funds remaining in the debtor was a contingent right to the funds ifthe judgment
was reversed. This interest is worthless in light of the affirmance (of the judg-
ment.] Therefore, the 'transfer' of this interest did not deprive the estate· of
anything of value. ".34

(b) Statutory Exceptions. The Code contains a number ofstatutory exceptions

that are recognized as transfers, which the trustee may not set aside. 235 These
exceptions in party codify doctrines recognized in case law prior to the Code.
Thus, the Code provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer which was

229 11 USC § 101(30)( 1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

m II USC § 101(30XA) (1982 &: Supp. IV 1986).
231 II USC § 101(30)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
232
11 USC § 101(30)(C), (D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
WIn re Newcomb. 744 F2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984).
'''Id.
235See 11 USC § 547(c)(1)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25-37 BANKRUPTCY 11 2S.0714](b)

intended to be "a contemporaneous exchange for new valueUi given to the

debtor" and was in fact "a substantially contemporaneous exchange.... "131 For
example, ifa debtor buys new equipment and pays the creditor with a check, it is
contemporaneous payment, because the check is generally deemed to be pay'
ment when it is delivered, rather than when it is honored. 23& If the check is
dishonored, however, it will not have been contemporaneous payment in fact, as
required by Section 547(c}( I)(B}, and may, if the other requirements are met, be
voided as a preference. A similar exception exists for cenain ordinary course of
business transactions."' The trustee may not avoid a transfer by the debtor to

2:ll New value Is defined and includes "money or money's wonh in goods, services, or
new credit, or release by a transferee of propeny previously transferred to sucll trans-
feree .. ." in cenain transactions "but does not include an obliaation substituted for an
eltisting obligation." II USC § 547(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23'11 USC § 547(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). To come within this eltception, the
panies must intend the exchange to be a contemporaneous exchange for value. In re
Prescott, 805 F2d 719 (7th Cir. 1986) (trustee could avoid transfer of a CO to a bank
where the parties intended it to be additional security for a loan, rather than a contempo-
raneous exchange for debtor's overdrafts). Release of a security interest may constitute
new value, but forbearance from foreclosure on collateral, or exercising a riabt to cancel a
contract, may not constitute new value. If it did, unsecured and undersecured creditors
could extract payments out of debtors at the eltpense of general creditors. Orabkin v. A.I.
Credit Corp., 800F2d 1153 (OCCir. 1986). Accord In re Air Conditioning Inc., 72 Bankr.
657 (Bankr. SO Fla. 1987). See senerally Annot., "What Falls Within 'Contemporaneous
Exchanae' Exception to Bankruptcy Trustee's Power to Avoid Transfer of propeny by
Debtor," 77 ALR Fed. 14 (1986).
231 II USC § 547(c)( I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 US Code Congo & Admin. News 5787, 5874. The report states
that payment by check is contemporaneous payment if the check is presented for payment
in the nonna1 course of affairs (within thiny days, under VCC 3-503(2)(a». See In re
White River Corp., 799 F2d 631 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Standard Food Serv., Inc., 723
F2d 820 (I Ith Cir., 1984);ln re FasanolHarriss Pie Co., 71 Bankr. 287 (WO Mich. 1987);
In reAImarc Mfg., Inc., 61 Bankr. 684 (Bankr. NO Ill. 1986) (andcalelcited therein). But
see In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 78 Bankr. 787 (Bankr. ED Va. 1987), holding
that transfer occurs when a check is delivered and subsequently honored only if panies
intended to rely on the check as a cash transaction, and only if such reliance was reason-
able under the circumstances. Otherwise, transfer occurs when the check Is honored. In
this case the coun found that the panies did not intend a cash transaction because the
checks were postdated and were for an antecedent debt (earlier checks had been dishon-
ored). As a result, only goods delivered after the checks were honored could be deemed as
"new value!'
Where the date of delivery ofthe check was not known, a district court held that the
date the check was signed would be adopted as a proxy for the date ofdelivery. In re Fuel
Oil Supply & Tcnninaling, Inc., 72 Bankr. 752 (SO Tex. 1987).
A Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel recently held that, because a sight draft is
the practical and leaal equivalent of a check, payment was made when the sight draft was
delivered. In re Gaildeen Indus. Inc., 71 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987).
231To be considered normal course of business, three requirements must be met:
(1) the debt must have been incurred in the ordinary course of business; (2) the payment
, 2S.07(4I1bl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-38

pay "a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course ofbusiness or financial
affairs of the debtor..." as long as the payment was made in the ordinary course
of business and was made "according to ordinary business terms...."2,w,
Additionally, there is also a statutory exception to deal with cenain transac-
tions involving after acquired propeny. For example, assume debtor enters into
a security agreement with a lender on day I to borrow money to purchase a
particular piece of equipment in which the security interest will attach. Twenty-
one days later the debtor takes delivery of the equipment, and the security
interest attaches at that time. In answer to the question as to whether there is a
transfer on account ofan antecedent debt, because the security interest attached
on day 21 to secure a debt created 20 days earlier, the current version of the
Bankruptcy Code contains a provision specifying that a transfer may not occur
"until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred."24' Under this'·
rule, the transfer would occur on day 21. The statutory exception says that the
trustee may not set aside this transfer as a preference if( I) the transfer creates a
security interest in property acquired by the debtor; (2) the security interest
secures "new value" given to enable the debtor to acquire the property; (3) the
debtor did use the new value to acquire the propeny; and (4) the security interest
is perfected "on or before ten days after the debtor receives possession of such
property...."242 In the preceding example, the secured party's loan to buy the
equipment constitutes "new value," and as long as the loan was given to enable
the debtor to buy the equipment, as long as the debtor in fact used the proceeds
of the loan to buy such equipment, and as long as the security interest is timely
perfected, the transaction cannot be attacked as a preference.
The statutory exceptions in the current Bankruptcy Code also apply to
circumstances in which a creditor gives new value to the debtor after the transfer
has occurred. This exception would assist creditors who make a subsequent
advance to a debtor that is secured by a security interest already created in
property of the debtor.m It also covers the case in which the debtor makes a
payment on a debt that otherwise could be attached as a preference, but for

must have been made in the ordinary course of business; and (3) the payment must have
been made according to ordinary business terms. 11 USC § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
The purpose of this exception is to leave debtor's normal financial relations undis-
turbed, while prohibiting any unusual conduct that allows some creditors to gain an
advantage over others. See In re Day Telecommunications, Inc., 70 Bankr. 904 (Bankr.
EDNC 1987). See generally De Simone, "Section 547(c)(2) ofThe Bankruptcy Code: The
Ordinary Course of Business Exception Without the 45 Day Rule," 20 Akron L. Rev. 95
(1986).
240 11 USC § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
•4'11 USC § 547(e)(3)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
242 11 USC § 547(3)(1982 &< Supp. IV 1986).
2"11 USC § 547(c)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
25-39 BANKRUPTCY ~ 25.0715)

which the creditor subsequently makes an offsetting advance, as in a revolving

credit plan.
Treatment of the UCC security interest that floats in inventory and receiv-
ables, and proceeds of such property, has been the object of considerable
debate.'" When there is a constantly shifting mass of inventory or accounts or
proceeds, whose value may fluctuate over time, one may ask whether the crea-
tion of ilecurity interests in new property coming into the mass that serves as
collateral is to be regarded as a preference. In answer to this question, it i!
possible for the secured part)' to obtain an improved position when there is a
buildup of such collateral in the ninety-day period. The Bankruptcy Code con-
tains a series of rules to determine whether the change in value ofthe collateral in
relationship to the debt should be regarded as a preference.'45
The Code also contains exceptions for statutory liens that are not avoidable
under other provisions of the Code, and for transfers by individual debtors
whose debts primarily are consumer debts, when the total value of the property
that is involved in the transfer is less than $600. 241

15) Power to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances

The Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee to avoid fraudulent convey-
ances ofdebtor's property. '47 Such transfers ofa debtor's interest in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, must have been made within one year
before the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. '41 The trustee's power to avoid
the transfer exists whether the debtor made the transfer voluntarily or
involuntarily.
There are two general categories of fraudulent conveyances: (1) transfers of
a debtor's property made deliberately, with intent to harm creditors and (2)
transfers of a debtor's property that are financially damaging to the debtor and
deprive creditors of assets, but which are not necessarily made with any actual
intent to prevent payment to creditors. Any transfer made with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor may be avoided as a fraudulent convey-
ance. 249 The actual intent required distinguishes a fraudulent transfer from a
preferential transfer. Proof of actual intent is difficult, but where assets are
transferred to relatives, or obligations are incurred to relatives, corporations are

2<4 For an e~cellent discussion ofthe lepl issues in applying the preference provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code to floating liens, after acquired propeny, and proceeds under the
UCC, s~e 1. White & ~. Summers,. Unifonn Commercial Code §§ 24-5,24-6 (2d cd. 1980);
2 G. Gtlmore, Secunty Interests 10 Personal Propeny § 45 (1965). .
24S 11 USC § 547(c)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2~ 11 USC § 547(c)(7)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
247 II USC § 548(a) (I 982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24' Id.
249
11 USC § 548(a)(I)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11 25.07(5) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-40

used to manipulate assets, or the transfer is conducted in secrecy, such "badges

of fraud" may give rise to a presumption of actual intent. zSG For example,
transfers ofnonexempt property to family members shortly before the filing ofa
petition in bankruptcy generally constitute fraudulent conveyances and so may
be avoided by the trustee. m
Under the second category, the transfer ofdebtor's property for less than its
"reasonably equivalent value" is suspect as a fraudulent conveyance. If, in
addition to receiving less than the reasonably equivalent value, the debtor (I)
was insolvent when the transfer was made, or became insolvent as a result ofthe
transfer; (2) was engaged in business or a transaction with unreasonably small
capital; or (3) intended to incur debts that would be beyond its ability to pay as
the debts matured, the transfer may be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance. aIa
Neither an intent to defraud nor a demonstration of bad faith is necessary for
this type of fraudulent transfer.:I53
Whether a foreclosure of real property may be avoided as a fraudulent
conveyance, if the price paid at the sale is significantly below the fair market
price, is an unresolved issue. In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance CO. ZS4
the Fifth Circuit held that a nonjudicial foreclosure ofa deed oftrust, within one
year before debtor filed bankruptcy, was a fraudulent conveyance because the
property sold for 57.7 percent ofits fair market value. The court found that this
price was not the "reasonably equivalent value" of the property, so that the sale
could be avoided. The court stated that it had found no decisions approving a
transfer for less than 70 percent offair market value, which encouraged subse-
quent courts to use a 70 percent rule for determining fraudulent conveyances. 211
In In re Madrid/ s• however, a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held
that ifthe sale is a noncollusive and regularly conducted mortgage foreclosure,
the price received is, as a matter oflaw, the "reasonably equivalent value" ofthe

25G See In re Kaiser, 32 Bankr. 701 (DNY), aft'd, 722 F2d I S74 (2d Cir. 1983).
2S1 See In re Duque Rodriguez, 77 Bankr. 936 (Bankr. SD.Fla..1987) (Debtor's
transfer of$2.1 Smillion to his wife, two days before filing bankruptcy, for no considera-
»;
tion and while under pressure from creditors was avoidable under Section S48{a){ I In re
Jones, 68 Bankr. 483 (Bankr. WD Mo. I984){debtor's transfer of real estate to his brother,
while retaining use and enjoyment of it, and acknowledging the intent of the transfer was
to keep it out of creditors' hands, was avoidable by the trustee as a fraudulent
conveyance).
zsa II USC § S48{a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2S3Id.
2S4 621 F2d 201 (Sth Cir. 1980).
m See In re Willis, 48 Bankr. 29S (SD Tex. 1985); In re Fargo Biltmore Motor Hotel
Corp., 49 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. DND 1985); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. ND Ala.
1983). .
2'·21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). aft'd on other grounds, 72S F2d 1197 (9th
Cir.) cert. denied, 469 US 833 (1984).
25-41 BANKRUPTCY , 25.07(6)

property, so that it cannot be the grounds for a fraudulent conveyance. m The

court reasoned that "a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all
creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers to relatives
and favorites:,m
A third view now exists, holding that what constitutes the "reasonable
equivalent value" should be determined by the facts, on a case-by-ease basis. In a
thoughtful opinion that reviews the precedent of the various circuits, a bank-
ruptcy court, in In re Pruitt,au held that the issue of whether a foreclosure sale
price is reasonably equivalent to the value of the foreclosed upon property
should be determined on a case-by-ease basis, rather than by a standard 70
percent role (Durell) or by a conclusive presumption that the price at the ~Ie is
fair (Madrid). The issue appears to be as yet unresolved, despite changes in
wording of the text of the Bankruptcy Code in the 1984 Amendments. 1tIO

16) Rights of Transferees in Avoided Transfers

A further complication in collecting the assets ofthe estate is the protection
given by the code when the property that the debtor has transferred is transferred
by the transferee to a subsequent party, and when such party has acted in good
faith in the transaction, has paid value, and is without knowledge that the first
trans-

257 See also In re Bundles. 61 Bania. 929 (Bankr. SD Ind. 1986) aff'd, 78 Banler. 203
(SD Ind. 1987); In re Vema, 58 Bankr. 246 (Bankr. CD Cal. 1986); In re Ristich, 57 Bankr.
568 (Bankr. ND 111. 1986); In re Upham, 48 Bankr. 695 (Banlo', WDNY 1985).
m Madrid, 21 Bank at 424-425.
2St 72 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. EDNY 1987). In Pruitt, the court found that the purchase
price at the foreclosure sale, $22,500, was not the reasonably equivalent value of the
property where the fair market value was estimated at S11 0,000-5 11 5,000, and the
purchaser took the property subject to a first mortgage of$27,000 and liens ofS3,600. See
Tn re Hulm, 738 F2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 469 US 990 (1984) (remanded for an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of reasonably equivalent valU'll; declined to fonow
Madrid). See also In re Adwar, 55 Bankr. III (Bankr. EDNY (985); In re Ruebeclc:, 5S
Bankr. 163 (Bania. D. Mass. 1985).
26lI In the 1984 Amendments Congress added the languaae "voluntary or involun-
tary" to the text ofSection 548(a). Also, it added langUage in the definition of transfer that
included "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." These chimges may imply
that Congress wanted to overrule Madrid, and agreed with Durrell. .;
see also David & Standiford, "Foreclosure Sale as Frauduient Transfer Under ihe
Bankruptcy Code: A Roasonable Approach to Reasonably Equivalent Value," 13 Reai
Est. U 203 (1985); Henning, "An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal
Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications," 63 NCL Rev. 257 (1985).
1 25.07(7)[a] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-42

fer was avoidable by the trustee. The trustee may not recover the property, or the
value of the property, from a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value. The
trustee may only recover such property or its value from the first tram,feree.211
Moreover. in situations where the trustee is able to recover the property trans-
ferred, but the first transferee acquired the property in good faith, the Code gives
such a good faith transferee a lien on the recovered property to secure any
improvements he or she made to the property. ala

[7] Other Specific Powers of the Trustee

(a] Executory Contracts. The trustee has the power either to assume or to reject
executory contracts and unexpired leases, subject to court approval. an The
purpose of this provision is to allow the trustee to take advantage of a contract
that will benefit the estate, or to relieve the estate of a burdensome contract by
rejecting it. Before allowing the trustee to accept or reject the contract, the court
must first find that it is "executory." The Bankruptcy Code does not define
"executory contract," but the majority of courts now accept as the definition a
contract that has not been fully performed by either party at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed.as<
Various types of contracts have been held to be executory, and thus the
trustee may reject them. For example, contracls to sell goods to be delivered in
the future may be executory contracts,215 but if either party has accepted deliv-
ery, the contract generally will no longer be executory.211 Other examples of

211 II USC § 550(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally B. Weintraub & A.
Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual, 1 7.07 (rev. ed. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
212 I I USC § 550(d)(1 982 & Supp. IV 1986). The lien forimprovements given to good
faith transferees from whom the trustee recovers property also is given to subsequent good
faith transferees. Id.
213 I I USC § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally Note, "Executory Con-
tracts & Unexpired Leases: Section 365," 3 Banke. Dev.1. 217 (1986).
214 A commonly used definition was proposed by Professor Countryman: "an execu-
tory contract is one under which the obligation ofthe bankrupt and the other party to the
contract i! so far unperformed that the failure ofeither to complete its performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." See Countryman,
"Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, "57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973). See also
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F2d 1043 (4th Cit.
1985); cen. denied, 475 US 1057 (1986); In re Placid Oil Co., 72 Bankt. 135 (Bankt. NO
Tex.. 1987).
2uDiLauro v. Electronic Wholesales, Inc., 239 A2d 162 (ODe 1968).
all See In re Pester Refining Co., 66 Bankr. 80 I (Bankt•• SO Iowa 1986) (a contract for
the sale and purchase of nalural1l8s was not an executory contract where the supplier had
completed its performance by executing product transfer order forms,-and could not stop
the product in transit); In re Air Vermont, Inc., 47 Bankr. 540 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985)
(contract for sale of aircraft was not executory because the aircraft had been delivered to
and accepted by the debtor-airline, and thus performance was complete by the seller).
25·43 BANKRUPTCY 11 2S.07(71Ib]

executory contracts include options and rights of first refusal for real estate
purchases,"' and collective bargaining agreements. 211
The right of the trustee to assume or reject executory contracts and
unexpired leases is limited in some respects. If the trustee assumes an executory
contract, the debtor must cure or compensate the creditor for any default. and
provide assurance offuture performance. 2U Another limitation is that the trus-
tee may not assume a contract that requires a third party to extend credit to the
debtor. 2JO A trustee also may not assume a COntract that requires the personal
services and skills of the debtor. 2"
The trustee must choose whether to assume or reject a contract or lease
within certain deadlines. m If a contract is rejected, it constitutes a breach that
relates back to the date immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing. 2'2 The other
party to the rejected contract or lease will have a claim against the bankruptcy
estate for damages from the debtor's breach. and will be treated as a general
unsecured creditor. 2"

(bl Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege. In certain situations, the trustee

may have the power to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege, requiring
testimony that normally wouid fall under that privilege. In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Weintraub, m the Supreme Court held that the trustee of
a corporate debtor in a Chapter 7 proceeding could waive the attorney-client
privilege and require the debtor's counsel to testify in an investigation into the
debtor's alleged misappropriation of customer funds and fraud (debtor was a

21' See In re Jackson Brewing Co., 567 F2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Coordinated Fin.
Planning Corp., 65 Bankr. 711 (Bankr., 9th Cir. 1986).
.. See NUB v. Bildisco, 465 US 513 (1984). Afterthe Bildisco decision, holding that
collective bargaining agreements could be rejected by the trustee in bankruptcy, Congress
amended the Code to establish strict procedural requirements for rejecting collective
bargaining agreements in Chapter 11 proceedings. See II USC § 541 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
28'11 USC § 365(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2'0 II USC § 365(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
271
11 USC § 365(c)(1982 &: Supp. IV 1986).
272 See II USC § 365(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In a Chapter 7, there is a presump-
tion ofrejection unless the trustee assumes it within sixty days after the order for relief, or
within additional time ordered by the court, for cause. In a case under Chapters 9. 11.12
or 13, the trustee may assume or reject such a contract any time before the confirmation of
a plan, but the court may require the trustee to decide within a specified period of time if
requested to so order by any party to a contract or lease affected.
112
11 USC § 365(g)(I) (1982 &: Supp. IV 1986).
oro See 11 USC § 36S(g) (1982 & Supp. IV J 986). See also In re laman, 71 Bankr.938
(Bankr. NO Ill. 1987); In re McFarlin's, Inc. 46 Bankr. 88 (Banke. WONY 1985).
2'·471 US 343 (1985).
11 25.0717)(c) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-44

commodity broker).211 The Court found that the successor management of a

corporation, whether by shareholder vote, takeover, merger, or statutory succes-
sion, had the power to waive the privilege ofthe corporation. Because the trustee
has broad authority to operate the debtor business or to wind up its affairs, it is
the only meaningful holder of management power, and thus has the authority to
waive the attorney-client privilege. This power, however, must be exercised in a
fiduciary capacity, as the trustee must act in the best interests of the general
creditors. The Supreme Court refused to comment-on the trustee's powers to
waive the attorney-client privilege when the debtor is an individual. m Lower
federal courts generally have aUowed waiver of the attorney-client privilege in
the corporate context, but not when the debtor is an individual. 271

Ie) Abandoning Property of the Estate. The trustee may abandon property of
the estate if it is in the best interests of the creditors to do SO.27' This generally
occurs when the property is encumbered to such an extent that the costs of
collecting and disposing ofthe property may outweigh any benefit received from

mId.
mId. at 356.
m See In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv. Inc., 670 F2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982) (trustee could
waive debtor corporation's attorney client privilege where all officers and directors had
resigned); Citibank v. Andros, 666 F2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981) (trustee can waive debtor
corporation's attorney client privilege over the objections of the officers); In re Vantage
Petroleum Corp., 40 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. EDNY 1984) (trustee cannot waive attorney client
privilege of debtor corporation if the corporation has officers and directors who could
make that decision); In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean Dev., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. SO
Fla. 1982) (in ajointly administered liquidation involving a corporation and the individ-
ual who owned all the corporate stock, the trustee could waive the corporation's attorney
client privilege, but not the individUal's). But see In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. SO Fla.
1982), where the bankruptcy court held that the trustee of an individual debtor bank- . _
ruptcy could waive the attorney client privilege for the individual. Debtor had suffered a
$4 million wrongful death judgment precipitating the bankruptcy. Thejudgment creditor
sought information in an examination under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 that might support a
malpractice claim against the insurance company attorneys who represented the debtor
andlorthe insurer for a bad faith failure to settle within policy limits. Debtor's trustee was
willing to waive the attorney client privilege because a subsequent recovery might provide
income to the estate and some dividend to the bankruptcy creditors. The debtor asserted
the attorney client privilege, upon the advice of his attorney, who was recommended and'
paid by the insurance company. At oral argument debtor's position was argued primarily
by the insurance company lawyers who had defended the debtor in the wrongful death
action. These unusual facts may have been the reason for the holding that the trustee can
waive an individual debtor's attorney client privilege. See also Annot., "Power ofTrustee
in Bankruptcy to Waive Privilege ofCommunications Available to Bankrupt," 31 ALR3d
SS7 (1970 & Supp. 1987).
mIl USC § 554 (Supp. IV 1986).
25-45 BANKRUPTCY ~ 2S.081I]

it. The trustee must give notice to all creditors of its intent to abandon certain
property, and anyone with an interest in the property may file an objection. 2IO
One limitation on this power was outlined by the Supreme Court in Mid/an-
tic National Bank v. New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection.2" In
Mid/antic, the trustee had abandoned deteriorating drums of hazardous chemi-
cals at two different sites. The Court held that a bankruptcy trustee may not
abandon property in contravention ofa state statute or regulation that is reason-
ably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.
Before authorizing abandonment of the property, the court must formulate
conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety.2t2

~ 25.08 DISCHARGE OF THE DEBTOR

The ultimate goal of the debtor is to obtain a discharge from debts. A
discharge voids any judgment for a debt discharged, and acts as an irijunction to
prevent any further attempts to collect on any discharged debt. 213 Only individu-
als may be discharged in Chapter 7, 12, or 13 proceedings. Individuals, corpora-
tions, and partnerships may be discharged under Chapter II reorganizations.

(I) Nondischargeable Debts

A discharse serves the purpose ofgiving the debtor "a fresh start." Weighed
against this interest, however, are policy considerations that may justify contin-
uation ofsome financial obligations even after a discharge. As a result, Congress
provided for ten categories of nondischargeable debts, also called "exceptions to
discharge." Nondischargeable debts are not extinguished by a discharge, and the
debtor subsequently remains liable on these even after all bankruptcy proceed.
ings are finished. Exceptions to discharge are to be strictly construed, and the
burden is on the creditor to prove the exception. 214

no II USC §§ 554(a), 554(b) (Supp. IV 1986).

21'474 US 494 (1986).
212 For further discussion ofthe abandonment of hazardous waste sites, and potential
lender liability for clean-up costs, see infra 11 25.09(6)[c].
212 II USC § 524 (1982 & SuPp. TV 1986). On discharae. see generally Sleeper,
"Discharge: Sections 727, 524 & 523," 2 Bankr. Dev. 1. 115 (1985).
!USee Gleason v. Thaw, 236 US 558 (1915) (because of the veJY nature andphiloso-
phyofthe bankruptcy law, the exceptions to discha'lleability are to be construed strictly).
See also In re Hunter, 780 F2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1986).
11 25.08(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-46

Nondischargeable debts include most taxes,215 liabilities incurred through

fraud,us debts that were not listed by the debtor,D'debts arising out of debtor's

215
11 USC § 523(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2.. II USC § 523(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The premise of this exception is that bank-
ruptcy is designed to benefit only the honest debtor. Two types offraudulent conduct are
included in this exception. The first type is when the debtor obtains money, property,
services, or an extension, renewal or refinance of credit by "false pretense, false represen-
tation, or actual fraud, other than a statement regarding debtor's financial condition." II
USC § 523(a)(2)(A).
Courts are split on whether silence or nondisclosure constitutes false pretense. See In
re Hunter, 780 F2d 1577, 1580 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[Nlot making full disclosure is not
within the exception"); In re Reder, 60 Bankr. 529, 535 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) ("[Tlhere
must be actual overt false pretense or representation to come within the exception to
dischargeability."). But see In re Schmidt, 70 Bankr. 634 (fraud for nondischargeability
may consist of silence, concealment or intentional nondisclosure of material fact); In re
Frye, 48 Bankr. 422 Bankr. MD Ala. 1985} (failure to disclose fact tnat debtor was in
Chapter 13 at time she entered a contract to buy property inferred intent that she never
intended to go through with purchase, together with willful and malicious injury to
vendors in abandoning property without protection or insurance precluded a discharge of
judgement of$40,000 for the propenyl; In re Milbank, I Bankr. 150 (Bankr. SDNY 1979)
(concealment of extramarital affair was false pretense in obtaining loan from father-in-
law).
There has been much litigation regarding the nondischargeability of credit card
balances under this subsection. See infra 11 25.09[41 for a discussion of this issue. The
second category of fraudulent conduct is the use of a materially false financial statement
in writing regarding the debtor's financial condition, that was made or published with
intent to deceive and on which the creditor reasonably relied. II USC § 523(a)(2)(B)
(Supp. IV 1986). See In re Wolf, 67 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (financial state-
ment that failed to disclose that debtors had concluded a loan with one bank two days
before completing a loan application with the second bank that did not list the first loan or
the fact that the equipment and inventory of the debtor were used as security for the first
loan was grounds for nondischargeability. Without the value in inventory and equipment,
the second bank would not have made the $20,000 loan to the debtor). .
The reasonableness of the creditor's reliance is an important issue in these cases. See
In re Bogstad, 779 F2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (debtor's financial statement was not materi-
ally false because lender would have made the loan even had it known the debtor's true
financial condition); In re Breen, 13 Bankr. 965 (SD Ohio 1981) (reliance on financial
statement held to be unreasonable, because creditor could have discovered an undisclosed
mortgage by conducting a title examination or by telephoning the mortgagee that was
listed as the holder of another mortgage). But see In re Allen, 65 Bankr. 752 (ED Va. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 823 F2d 548 (4th Cir. 1987) (there is no per se requirement that the
creditor verify the correctness of the statement before it can assen reasonable reliance;
inquiry into the business practices and industry custom in extending credit is appropriate
(refusing to follow Breen» .
•" II USC § 523(a)(3) (1982). Under Section 521 (I), the debtor has the duty to file a
list of creditors along with a schedule of assets and liabilities and other documents. The
coun can then identify and notify all creditors. Ifa debtor neglecu to include a creditor on
such list, the creditor may never be notified and thus should not be subject to the discharge
of the debtor.
25-47 BANKRUPTCY Ii 25.08111

embezzlement, larceny, or certain misconduct when acting as a fiduciary,2M

alimony, maintenance and child support, H' willful and malicious injury,210 fines
and penalties payable to any governmental unit,"" government-insured student

211 II USC § 523(a)(4) (1982).

119 II USC § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
zaG II USC § 523(a)(6) (1982). A variety of acts have been held nondischargeable as
beina "willful and maiiciousinjury." See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Owens, 807 F2d 1556
(II th Cir. 1987) (conversion of creditor's collateral is willful and malicious injury);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Perry Chrysler Plymouth, 783 F2d 480 (5th Cir. 1986) (taking
trust funds and going to Las Vegas with hopes ofwinning enough to save the car dealership
was willful and malicious injury to the property ofanother); Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F2d
392 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 108 S. Ct. 156 (1987) (malpractice judgment was willful and
malicious injury when acts were done intentionally. without just cause and necessarily
produced the patient's harm); In re Massier, 51 Bankr. 229 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)
(copyright infririgement constituted willful and malicious injury). See also In re Allen, 75
Bankr. 742 (Bankr. CD Cal. 1987) (garden variety breaches ofcontract are not included in
"willful and malicious injury" category); but the ton of intentional interference with
another's contract may be. In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (state
court judgment that debtor intentionally interfered with contractual relations estopped
him from assening that the debt did not arise out of his "willful and malicious" conduct).
Whether driving while intoxicated constitutes "willful and malicious" injury has
been heavily litigated, see infra note 293 for a discussion of this issue. Other traffic
violations or accidents are generally held not to meet the standard of "willful and mali-
cious." See In re Frazee, 60 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. WD Mo. 1986) (speeding); In re Leifheit,
53 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. SD Ohio 1985) (speedina); In re Hoppa, 31 Bankr. 753 (Bankr. ED
Wis. 1983) (defective brakes causing fatal accident; driver had no license); In re Donnelly,
6 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (guilty plea to reckless driving). See also Annot.,
"Debtor's Traffic-Related Liability as 'Willful and Malicious Injury' Excepted by II
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) From Bankruptcy Discharge." 85 ALR Fed. 643 (1987).
It is not clear what standard of conduct is required to constitute "willful and mali-
cious" injury. Under the old Bankruptcy Act "reckless disregard" was generally the
standard. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 US 473 (1904). The legislative history of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code indicates a stricter standard was intended. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 5963,
6320-632 I. Several coutts have since applied a "deliberate and intentional" standard.
See In re Wrenn, 791 F2d 1542(1lth Cir. I986)(reckless disregard ofemployer's rights in
bringing a frivolous discrimination claim was not willful and malicious injury); Wheeler
v. Laudani, 783 F2d 610 (6th Cir. 1986) (libel judgment is nondischargeable if author
knew statements were false, but reckless disregard for the truth or falsity ofthe statements
is not willful and malicious injury). Generally the acts must be intentional, but no malice,
ill will, or intent to injure is required. See In re Condict, 71 Bankr. 485 (ND Ill. 1987)
(finding of "malice," does not require finding of ill will, but rather, requires only lack of
just cause or excuse); In re Cecchini, 780 F2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) ("When a
wrongful act ... done intentionally, necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or
excuse, it is 'willful and malicious' even absent proof of a specific intent to injure").
291 11 USC § 523(a)(7) (1982). The Supreme Court recently held that a state court
restitution order constituted a nondischargeable fine or penalty under Section 523(aX7).
Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353 (1986). Costs assessed by B state criminal court,
intended as a condition of probation, were nondischargeablc debts notwithstanding a
11 25.08[1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-48

loans,212 judgments and consent decrees resulting from driving while intoxi-
cated,2t3 and debts from a previous bankruptcy in which discharge was waived or
defined. 2t4
Family farmers proceeding under Chapter 12 are subject to the same non-
dischargeable debts. 2t5 If the debtor proceeding under Chapter 13 makes all
payments according to the plan, he or she is discharged from all debts, even
"nondischargeable" debts, except for alimony, maintenance, and support. 291 If
the Chapter 13 debtor receives a "hardship" discharge under Section 1328(b),
the debtor is still subject to all the nondischargeable debts of Section 523(a),
listed previously. 2.7

state statute that said costs shall not be deemed pan ofthe penalty in a criminal case. In re
Hollis, 810 F2d 106 (6th Cir. 1987}. Accord In re Zarzynski, 771 F2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985).
Fines from traffic violations are another example of nondischargeable debts falling under
this subsection.
2.2 II USC § 523(a}{8} (Supp. IV 1986). Student loans included under this subsection
are those that are insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any
program funded in whole or pan by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution, unless
the loan became due more than five years prior to the filing ofbankruptcy, or if requiring
the debtor to pay such loan would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents. Id. See generally Annot., "Bankruptcy Discharge ofStudent Loan on
Ground of Undue Hardship," 63 ALR Fed. 670 (1983).
2.. II USC § 523(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1986). In 1984, Congress added this new subsection
to penalize drunk drivers. If a debt arises from a judgment or consent decree entered in a
coun of record against the debtor, and the liability was incurred as a result ofthe debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated, the debt is nondischargeable. If
there is no judgment or decree, it may still be nondischargeable as a willful and malicious
injury to persons or propeny under § 523(a}{6) (see supra note 290). See In re Fielder, 799
F2d 656 (11th Cir. 1986) (consuming quantities of alcohol and immediately driving a
vehicle on the public highways is a malicious and wanton act and one in which the result
can be predicted. A debt directly resulting from driving while so intoxicated is not
dischargeable); but see In re Compos, 768 F2d 1155 (10th Cir, 1985) (Section 523(6)
requires an intent to injure before a debt is nondischargeable; facts of driving while
intoxicated cannot meet that standard); accord Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F2d 340 (8th Cir.
1986). Since Congress added Subsection (9), some couns view the addition as a clarifica-
tion that driving while intoxicated meets the standard of a willful and malicious injury,
and ifSubsection (9) does not apply, the debt will be nondischargeable under Subsection
{6}. In re Adams, 761 F2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Moore, 53 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. SO
Ohio 1985). .
2"11 USC § 523(a)(IO)(Supp. IV. 1986).
295
11 USC § 1228 (Supp. IV 1986).
... See II USC § I 328(a)(2)( 1982).
207 II USC § I328(c)(2) (I 982}. See also id. at § 523{a). Under a "hardship" discharge,
the debtor may be discharged any time after confirmation of the plan, and thus has not
made all the payments required under the plan. This type of discltarge is available only if
modification of the plan is not practical. See id. at § 1328(b).
25-49 BANKRUPTCY '&25.08(2)

In a Chapter 11 reorganization case, if the debtor is an individual, the

debtor will still be subject to the nondischargeable debts outlined earlier. 2M Ifthe
debtor is a corporation or partnership, however, it will be discharged from all
debts, even those nondischargeable as to an individual. 2119 The policy behind this
is that many of the nondischargeable debts relate to honesty or undesirable
conduct on the part ofthe debtor. When the debtor is a corporation or partner-
ship, dishonest management will most likely be replaced, and if the debts are
held to be nondischargeable, the statute would be punishing new management
and the stockholders and creditors for the conduct of former employees.:lDO

[2] Objections to Discharge

Objections to a debtor's discharge must be distinguished from nondis-
chargeable debts. Nondischargeable debts are those that, for policy reasons, will
not be discharged and thus survive the bankruptcy, even though the debtor
receives a general discharge of his or her other debts. Objections to discharge,
however, bar the debtor from receiving any discharge at all; if a successful
objection is made, the debtor will not be relieved of any debts. The debtor
generally receives an automatic discharge unless someone objects. The only
parties with authority to object are the creditors and the trustee.''''' A creditor
who wants to block the debtor's discharge must file a timely objection. A
deadline for objections generally is set in the initial notice to creditors. In
Chapter 7 proceedings, the deadline is within sixty days of the first date set for
the meeting ofcreditors. In Chapter II proceedings, tbe deadline for objections
to discharge is the first date set for the hearing on confirmation of the plan.
An objection to the debtor's discharge is an adversary proceeding, and is
instituted by the filing ofa complaint before the deadline. 302 The complaint must
state a ground for objection to discharge, and if the debtor contests the com-
plaint by ming an answer, a trial will be held. At trial the objector has the burden
to prove all facts essential to the objection.:103
The basic grounds for denial ofa discharge under Chapter 7 include fraudu-.
lent transferring or concealing of propertY,304 'failure to keep books and

"'See II USC § 1l41(d)(2) (1982).

mil USC § 1141(d)(I)(1982).
300 See B. Weintraub and A. Resnick, Bankruptcy LawManual, 118.24 (rev. ed. 1986 &
Cum. Supp. 1987).
:llI1 II USC § 727(c) (Supp~ IV 1986).

302 See Bankr. R. 4004(d), 7001(4), 7003, 500S.

303 See Bankr. Rule 4005.
304
11 USC § 727(a)(2) (1982).
~ 25.08131 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25·50

records,3DS commission of a "bankruptcy crime,"3OC failure to explain loss of

assets,2IlT refusal to obey a court order,:lllI commission ofthese acts in connection
with an insider's bankruptcy,3llt a prior discharge in bankruptcy of the debtor
within six years,'10 or the debtor waives a discharge. 3u
Chapter 7 grounds also apply to Chapter 11 cases. 312 In proceedings under
Chapter 12 and 13, however, the traditional grounds for objecting to a discharge,
listed previously, do not apply.313 A debtor who received a discharge within the
previous six years is thus not barred from receiving a discharge under Chapter 12
or 13. Similarly, if the debtor was discharged under Chapter 12 or 13 in the
previous six years, it may not prevent a subsequent discharge under Chapter 7.
For example, if the debtor made payments totalling 100 percent of the allowed
unsecured claims, the Chapter 12 or 13 discharge does not prevent a Chapter 7
discharge within the next six years. 3"

13) Reaffirmation of Debt by the Debtor

A debtor may reaffirm a particular debt, prior to discharge, if it so desires.
The effect of such agreement is that the debt is revived, and is enforceable
against the debtor. To be effective, a reaffirmation agreement must meet certain
conditions outlined in the Bankruptcy Code. 31S These provisions apply when-
ever a creditor and the debtor enter into an agreement, the consideration for
which is in whole or in part based on a dischargeable debt. 311 The Code requires a
written agreement, and such agreement must contain a clear and conspicuous
statement that the agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or
within sixty days after the agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs
later, by giving notice of rescission to the creditor. 3fT The agreement must be
made before the discharge.

50S II USC § 727(a)(3) (1982).

:lOS II USC § 727(a)(4) (1982). These crimes include making a false oath, presenting or
using a false claim, giving or receiving a bribe, or withhOlding records.
'll7 II USC § 727(a)(5) (1982).
301 II USC § 727(a)(6) (1982 &. Supp. IV 1986).
309 II USC § 727(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
3'0 II USC § 727(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1986).
311 II USC § 727(a)( I0) (1986).
312
11 USC § 114 I(d)(3XC) (1982).
313 See II USC § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). nlere are no similar provisions in
the disc1large subsections of Chapter 12 (Section 1228) or Chapter 13 (Section 1328).
314 See II USC § 72 7(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1986).
315 See II USC § 542(c) (1982).
·"Id.
317 11 USC § 542(c)(2) (1982).
25-51 BANKRUPTCY 1125.08(3)

Ifthe debtor is represented by an attorney, the agreement must be accompa-

nied by an affidavit or declaration of the attorney that states that the reaffirma-
tion agreement is a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor, and
does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor. 3'1 Ifthe debtor is not represented by an attorney. the court must approve
the reaffirmation agreement and may do so only if it finds that the agreement
does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
and that it is in the best interests of the debtor. 3"
If the case involves an individual debtor, the court must, at the discharge
hearing, inform the debtor that reaffirmation is not required by law or by
agreement not made in accordance with the stated requirements, and ofthe legal
effect and consequences of reaffirmation and default."o Reaffirmation ofadebt
will not categorize the debt as nondischargeable in a subsequent bankruptcy.32'
The sanction for failing to comply with the statutory requirements is unenforce-
ability of the reaffirmation agreement. 322

3'111 USC § 542(c)(3) (1982).

311 II USC § 542(cX6)(A) (1982). These findings do not have to be made if the debt
reaffirmed is a consumer debt secured by real property. Id. at § 542(cX6)(B).
The courts are generally reluctant to find that reaffmnation is in the best interests of
the debtor. See In re Griffin, 13 Bankr. 591 (Bankr. SO Ohio 1981) (reaffirming a debt to
prevent a creditor from filing a criminal complaint concerning the debtor's bad check was
not in the best interests of the debtor); In re Jones, 6 Bankr. 336 (Bankr. SO Ohio 1980) (a
moral obliption to repay is insufficient to justify reaffirming a debt); In re Sampson, 5I
Bankr. 13 (Bankr. OOC 1984) (reaffirming a debt arising out ofthe purchase ofhousehold
furnishings was not in debtor's best interest and would in fact impose undue hardship
where she could make the payments only with outside financial assistance, and the
marginal value ofthe collateral made repossession by the creditor unlikely); In re Bryant,
43 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. EO Mich. 1984) (unemployed debtor whose unemployment bene-
fits would soon run out was not entitled to reaffirm a debt owed on an expensive luxury
automobile because there was no adequate showing that her extremely high car payments
would not impose an undue hardship on her family, or that reaffirmation, which could
expose her to a deficiency judgment in the future, was in her best interests).
320 II USC § 542(d)(I) (1982). Several bankruptcy courts have held that the require-
ment ofthe bankruptcy court to admonish the debtor of the consequences of the reaffir-
mation agreement cannot be waived, thus the failure of the court to do so renders the
reaffirmation agreement unenforceable. See In re Roth, 43 Bankr. 484 (NO Ill. 1984); In
re Jackson, 49 Bankr. 298 (Bankr. O. Kan. 1985).
32' In re Lones. 50 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. WD Ky. 1985).
'''In re Jackson, 49 Bankr~ 298 (Bankr. O. Kan. 1985). The rationale is generally thaI
reaffirmation agreements must -be strictly construed to protect the debtor's interest, and
not the creditor's, because of the danger that creditors may coerce debtors into undesir-
able reaffirmation agreements. See In re Eccleston, 70 Bankr. 210 (Bankr. NONY 1986);
In re ,Gardner, 57 Bankr. 609 (Bankr. O. Me. 1986).
, 25.09 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-52

1125.09 ISSUES INVOLVING TIlE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A

BANK
(lJ Checks in the Process of Collection
A bank has a duty to dishonor checks or other items payable from a
customer's account once it receives actual notice that its customer has filed
bankruptcy. Under Section 549, postpetition transfers are prohibited; if a bank
honors checks written on debtor's bank account after a petition in bankruptcy
has been flied, it is transferring assets that belong to the bankruptcy estate. an
A bank will be protected, however, if it honors a check ofa bankrupt debtor
without actual notice or knowledge, and acts in iOod faith. In Bank ofMarin v.
England,no the U.S. Supreme Court held that a bank was not liable for honoring
a bankrupt debtor's check where it had no knowledge of the bankruptcy. 1'I:!e
check was drawn before the petition was filed, but honored subsequent to the
filing. The Court based its holding on equitable principles. This rule was subse-
quently codified as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. 315 Under Section
542(c), a bank is not liable for honoring a check written on its customer's
account, after the customer has filed a petition in bankruptcy, provided that the
bank did not have actual notice or actual knowledge ofthe bankruptcy filing, and
acted in good faith. 321 Once a bank has actual notice or knowledge of a cus-
tomer's bankruptcy, however, it must refuse to honor any checks written on the
customer's accounts. Although the bank will not be liable for transferring
debtor's property when the bank acts in good faith and without knowledge, the
transferee may be liable to the trustee for the property or it! value as a post-
petition transfer. m
The interplay of federal and state law in the context of paying checks is not
clear. Under the UCC, a bank has a ten-day grace period in which it is authorized
to accept, pay, or collect an item after it receives notice ofthe incompetence ofits
customer. 321 This provision cannot be used as an analogy to the bankruptcy ofa
customer, however, because the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a specific
grace period, once the bank receives actual notice or knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy petition.
Two additional issues arise on the interplay ofstate law and bankruptcy law.
Firstly, uec § 4·303 outlines certain events that amount to a "payment" from

m See II USC § 549 (Supp. IV 1986); and In re Hoffman, 51 Bankr. 42, 46 (Bankr.
WD Ark. 1985).
3t4 385 US 99 (1966).

325 II USC § 542(c) (1982). See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Iat Sess. 369 (1977);
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1978) "[tjhis subsection codifies the result of .
Bank ofMarin v. Eng/and, 385 U.S. 99 (1966)."
m II USC § 542(c) (1982).
m See II USC §§ 549(a)(2)(A), 550(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
321 See UCC 4-405.
25-53 . BANKRUPTCY 11 25.0912)

the account ofa bank's customer. Although there is no equivalent provision in

the Bankruptcy Code, the events listed in UCC § 4-303 should be effective as to
defining the timing ofwhen payment occurs for bankruptcy purposes, Secondly,
UCC § 4-303 defines the time at which notice of a garnishment, a stop payment
order, or other legal notice, such as notice ofa customer's bankruptcy, is effec-
tive as against a bank. The bank generally has a "reasonable time" to act upon
notice it receives before it will be effective. 321 If any of the outlined events has
already occurred, the notice was too late to be effective as against those items.
The Bankruptcy Code makes no provision as to when actual notice or knowledge
of, for example, the debtor's bankruptcy will be effective in the context of a bank
paying or collecting items.

12] Letters of Credit as Preferences

The general rules regarding creation and enforcement ofletters of credit are
discussed in Chapter 17, but there are special issues that arise when the customer
of the issuing bank becomes bankrupt. One such issue concerns whether a letter
of credit can be attacked as a preference under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code. This issue arises when a debtor (the customer) files bankruptcy after
procuring a letter of credit, and one of the parties involved in the transaction
seeks a court injunction to prevent the issuing bank from paying the letter of
credit.
In re Twist Cap, Inc. 33O started the controversy. In that case, a bankruptcy
court in Florida issued a temporary restraining order against payment under a
standby letter of credit for the benefit of several of the debtor-customer's credi-
tors. 331 On March 28, 1978, Twist Cap entered into a securit}' agreement with the
Southeast Bank of Tampa under which Twist Cap transferred collateral to the
bank. Between December S, 1977 and March 19, 1979, the bank issued three
letters of credit for the account of Twist Cap. On August 22, 1979, Twist Cap
filed a petition for relief under Chapter II. Six days later, Twist Cap fIled suit to
restrain the bank from honoring the letters of credit.
The bankruptcy court found that allowing tbe bank to bonor the letters of
credit would diminish the assets of the debtor available for distribution to the
general unsecured creditors, because the bank held collateral to secure its obliga-
tion. The court reasoned that by paying the beneficiary, the bank would substi-
tute itself as a secured creditor for the unsecured holder ofa letter ofcredit. This
would then be a preference, in violation of the Bankruptcy Act.

..Iuee § 4-303( I).

33' 1Bankr. 284 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1979).
331Id.
11 25.09(2) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-54

In re Twist Cap, Inc. was heartily criticized.:m There arc generally three
major criticisms of the court's analysis of the letter of credit as a prefe~ence.
Firstly, the requirements for a preference include a transfer. When .the Issuer
honors a letter of credit, there is no transfer ofdebtor's property. The Issuer uses
its own funds to satisfy an independent obligation, not the funds or property of
the debtor. Secondly, the transfer of debtor's property as collateral for the
issuer's obligation occurs when the property is pledged, not when the issuer
honors the letter of credit, so that in the majority of cases the transfer will have
occurred before the preferential period. Thirdly, even if there is collateral secur-
ing the bank's obligation, the transfer of debtor's property is not in payment of
an antecedent debt, as long as the debtor pledged the collateral before, or
contemporaneous with, the issuer's extension of credit. .
Several courts subsequent to the In re Twist Cap. Inc. decision declined to
follow it. m In re Page'" represents the more accepted view today, i.e., that
letters ofcredit are independent obligations ofthe issuer, and neither the letter of
credit nor its proceeds are property ofthe estate. In addition, in In re Page, the
creation and perfection of the issuer's security interest in debtor's collateral
occurred prior to the filing of bankruptcy. and therefore the honoring of the
letter of credit would not be an act to "create, perfect or enforce" a lien, in
violation of the automatic stay provisions. The court did find, however, that the
bank would be stayed from executing against the debtor's collateral under the
automatic stay provisions. m Jt thus appears that Twist Cap is probably not the
law today.
In re Air Conditioning, Inc.,n" however, indicates that there is still a poten-
tial for enjoining payment of letters of credit when the collateral is transferred
during the ninety days preceding bankruptcy, and is in contemplation ofantece·
dent debt. The debtor in In re Air Conditioning leased computer equipment and
granted the creditor a blanket security interest on personal property as security
for creditor's claims under the lease. When debtor defaulted, the creditor sued
for both damages and repossession of the computer equipment. Subsequently,
the creditor obtained two writs: one for the computer equipment and the other
for the personal property of the debtor. The creditor executed the first writ and

332 Baird, "Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy," 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 130 (1982);
Chaitman & Sovern. "Enjoining Payment on a Letter ofCredit in Bankruptcy: A Tempest
in a Twist Cap," 38 Bus. Law. 21 (1982); Mclaughlin, "Letters of Credit as Preferential
Transfers in Bankruptcy," SO Fordham L. Rev. 1033 (1982).
333 See In re Planes, Inc•• 29 Bankr. 370 (Bankr., ND Oa. 1983); In re North Shore &
Cent. Ill. Freight Co., 30 Bankr. 377 (Bankr. ND Ill. 1982); In re M.J. Sales & Distributing
Co., 25 Banler. 608 (Danler. SDNY 1982).
324
18 Bankr. 713 (DDC 1982).
mId. at 716.
036 55 Dankr. 157 (Danler. SD Fla. 1985); afrd in part and rev'd in part, 72 Bankr. 657
(SD Fla. 1987).
25-55 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.09(21

repossessed the computer equipment. The debtor agreed to provide a letter of

credit to the creditor, so that the creditor would not execute on its personal
property. The purpose was to give debtor some time to get things turned around.
Debtor's bank issued a letter of credit in exchange for debtor's promissory note,
secured by a $20,000 certificate ofdeposit (CD). The debtor filed for bankruptcy
a month later.
The creditor demanded payment under the standby letter of credit for its
deficiency claim against debtor. The issuing bank sued the creditor, asking that
it be required to cancel the letter of credit and return the CD to the debtor's
bankruptcy trustee. Over the creditor's objections, the court found for the bank,
nullified the letter of credit, and ordered the bank to tum over the CD to the
trustee. The court held that the action was a preference because it was a transfer
ofthe debtor's property (the CD) for the benefit ofthe creditor, it was on account
of the creditor's antecedent debt, and it was within ninety days ofbankruptcy. 337
Commentators seem to agree with the decision reached by the court in In re
Air Conditioning.'31 The letter of credit transaction allowed the creditor to
obtain security for its antecedent debt within ninety days of the bankruptcy. If
the creditor had directly taken the CD as security, there is no question that the
transaction would be a preference. Allowing a letter of credit transaction to
insulate the creditor would be elevating form over substance.
Other commentators assert, however, that the same result could have been
obtained without nullifying the letter ofcredit, thus reconciling the decision with
the independence principle of letters of credit. The court could have enforced
the letter of credit, requiring the issuer-bank to honor the letter of credit and to
pay the creditor the face amount. The next step would have been to require the
bank to tum over the CD as property of the debtor that was preferentially
transferred within the ninety-day period. It was the grant of the security interest
in the CD, and not the issuance ofthe letter ofcredit, that violated the preference
statute. The bank would then be left with an unsecured claim in its customer's
bankruptcy. The method outlined here places the risk of bankruptcy on the
issuer, when the transfer of collateral takes place within ninety days of
bankruptcy.331
To make the issuing bank bear the risk is problematic in this type of case
because that bank did not receive property of the debtor to secure an antecedent
debt. The bank's obligation to pay the letter ofcredit was created contemporane-
ously with the receipt of the collateral from the debtor. The antecedent debt was
owed to the creditor but, under the approach suggested, the bank bears the loss
while the creditor gets the benefit of the performance. This may be a rare case,

'37 Id.
'31 See B, Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, 1 8.11
(1981 & Cum. Supp. 21987); Borowitz & Gross, "A New Twiston'Twisl Cap: Invalidat-
ing A Preferential Letter of Credit in Tn re Air Conditioning," I03 Banking U 368 (1986).
330 See B. Clark. supra note 338, at ~ 8.11.
11 25.0912) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25·56

however, because in most situations a standby letter of credit will be issued as

part ofa transaction in which there is a contemporaneous exchange ofvalue, not
as security for an antecedent debt, as was the case in In re Air Conditioning.
On appeal, the district court upheld the decision of the bankruptcy court,
but on a different theory.:MG The district court allowed the bank to honor the
letter of credit, but held that Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code required the
creditor to tum over the proceeds to the trustee. The court found that the pledge
ofthe CD to the bank was a transfer for the benefit ofthe creditor, and thus the
creditor could be required to return the proceeds to the trustee.'" The court
rejected the creditor's argument that the pledge of the CD was for the benefit of
the bank, to secure the bank's independent obligation on the letter ofcredit, and
not for the benefit of the creditor (who had as security the letter of credit itself).
In a third case, In re Compton Corp.,"" the Fifth Circuit reached a result
similar to that in In re Air Conditioning, but it did so because the court found
that the creditor had received an "indirect preference." In In re Compton, Blue
Quail Energy, a trade creditor, delivered a shipment of oil to debtor Compton
Corporation, and debtor failed to make timely payment. Compton induced its
bank to issue an irrevocable standby letter of credit on May 6, 1982. Under the
terms of the letter of credit, payment for the oil (over $550,000) would be made
by the letter ofcredit ifdebtor failed to pay Blue Quail by June 22nd ofthat year.
Compton paid the bank over $1,400 to issue the letter of credit, and gave it a
promissory note payable on demand for the amount due. The bank had a prior
security agreement with Compton, entered into in 1980, which included a future
advances provision. The collateral for the security agreement included a variety
of Compton's assets.
On MaY 7, 1982, the day after the bank issued the letter of credit, several of
debtor's creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Compton.
On June 22nd, Blue Quail requested payment under the letter of credit, and the
bank honored it. In the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding tbe bank's secured
claims against the debtor, including the letter of credit payment made to the
creditor, were paid in full from liquidating the debtor's assets that served as the
bank's collateral. The trustee did not contest the payment of the letter of credit,
or the bank's subsequent repayment through the debtor's assets. The trustee did,

''0 In re Air Conditioning, 72 Bankr. 657 (SD Fla. 1987).

••, 11 USC § 550(a) (Supp. IV 1986) allows the trustee to reoover the property
transferred under a preference in violation of Section 547, or the value of the property,
from the initial transferee or the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made.
342
831 F2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987), on reh'g. 835 F2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988) (rehearing was
granted for the purpose of remanding an additional matter to the district court: there was
a discrepancy in the evidence as to what amount Blue Quail had actually, received under
the Jetter ofcredit. and the court ordered the district court, on remand. to make the factual
finding. necessary to determine what amount was recoverable against Blue Quail by the
trustee).
25·57 BANKRUPTCY , 25.09[3)(a)

however, file suit against Blue Quail, asserting that it had received a preference
through payment of the letter of credit, and sought to recover the $550,000
payment.
The Fifth Circuit held that the bank properly paid the letter of credit,
upholding the independence principle, because it was obligated to do so by the
terms of the letter. The bank had not transferred any of the debtor's property,
and there was no preferential transfer to the bank because the security agreement
had been entered into two years prior.
The court went on to hold, however, that Blue Quail had received an
indirect preference, and thus was liable to the trustee for the amount it received
under the letter of credit. 343 The letter of credit was for an antecedent debt, and
the transfer occurred a day before the bankruptcy, when it received the letter of
credit, which certainly was within the ninety-day period required for prefer-
ences. The court found that a creditor cannot protect itself, at the expense of
other creditors, by utilizing a letter of credit. 344 A direct transfer of debtor's
assets as security, within the ninety-day period, would have been a clear prefer-
ential transfer. The court expressly held that a creditor cannot secure payment of
an unsecured antecedent debt through a letter ofcredit transaction when it could
not do so through any other type oftransaction. 345 Under Section 550(a)(l),the
trustee could recover the value ofthe transferred property from Blue Quail, the
entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.
Thus the courts have been more wining to uphold the independent principle
ofletters ofcredit since Twist Cap. When a letter ofcredit has been issued during
the preferential period for an antecedent debt, however, the creditor may be
required to return the payment received under the letter of credit, either under
the In re Air Conditioning or In re Compton analysis.

[3] The Bank's Right of Setoff and the Automatic Stay

[a] Requirements of General Right of Setoff. The Bankruptcy Code is not a
source of a right of setoff; it merely recognizes setoff rights a creditor may have
under applicable state law.:141 An important caveat to this rule, however, is that
after a petition in bankruptcy has been filed, the right ofsetoffis permissive, not
mandatory. Whether to permit a postpetition setoff, even.when that is proper, is

34'ld. at 594.
•....If the bankruptcy has made a transfer of his property, the effect of which is to
enable one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage ofhis debt than another creditor
of the same class, circuity of arrangement will not avail to save it," Id. at 591 (citing
National Bank v. National Herkimer County Bank, 255 US 178 (1912».
"5Id.
... See II USC § 553{a)( 1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
, 25.09(3Ilb] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-58

up to the discretion oftho court.)4T For example, where a setoff may jeopardize
the success of a reorganization, the court may not allow it. 3OI
Similarly, there are certain situations outlined in the Bankruptcy Code
where rights ofsetoffwill not be recognized. Such situations include (I) when the
creditor's claim is disallowed;3Q(2) when the creditor obtains its claim from
someone else after or within ninety days of the filing date and while the debtor
was insolvent;3S0 and (3) when the debt being set offwas incurred by the creditor
for the purpose ofobtaining a right ofsetoffduring the ninety-day period before
filing, and while the debtor was insolvent. Ul
In addition, there are two requirements that the creditor must meet before
being able to set offits claim. Firstly, there must be mutuality between the claim
the creditor has against the debtor and the debt sought to be set off. Mutuality
exists when debts are owing between the same parties acting in the same capac-'
hy. m Deposits in bank accounts must be collected funds as of the date of the
petition, for mutuality to exist. 3S3 All funds deposited or collected after the filing
of the petition are considered property of the estate and may not be set off. 3S4
Secondly, a creditor may not set off a prepetition debt against a postpetition
claim. Both the debt and the claim must be prepetition."S5

[b] Prepetitlon Setoff. When a bank sets off mutual debu prior to the debtor
filing a petition in bankruptcy, the automatic stay is not involved because it is
not yet in effect. If the setoff occurs within a ninety-day period preceding the
filing date, however, it may be subject to an action by the trustee to rerover any
amounts that were set off. As mentioned previously, the trustee may recover the
setoffamount when the creditor incurred the debt with the "purpose ofobtaining

'41 See Matter ofWaller, 28 Bann. 850 (Bankr. WD Mo. 1983); In re Princess Baking
Corp., 5 Bankr. 587 (Bann. SD Cal. 1980).
,.. See In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 24 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1982).
mil USC§ 553(a)( 1)(1982 &. Supp.IV 1986}. See supra' 25.06 on disallowance of
claims. .
50
' 11 USC§ 553(a)(2)(1982 & Supp.IV 1986). For purposes ofthese exceptions, the
debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during the ninety days preceding the filing
date. ld. at § 553(c).
SS111 USC § 553(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'52 See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 'I 553.04[2} (15th ed. 1987). See also In re Visiting
Home Services, Inc., 643 F2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981).
53
' ln re Springfield Casket Co., 21 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. SD Ohio 1982). SCle also VCC
4·201 (bank is merely agent until it receives final payment, so there is no debt owed by tbe
bank on yet uncollected funds).
U4 In re All·Brite Sign Servo Co., II Bankr. 409 (Bankr. WD Ky. 198.1).
'55 See Boston &. Me. Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 785 F2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986); In re
Braniff Airways, Inc., 42 Bankr. 443 (Bankr. ND Tex. 1984); In re Shoppers Paradise,
Inc., 8 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. SDNY 1980).
25-59 BANKRUPTCY , 25.09(3I1b]

a right of setoff against the debtor."351 Additionally, regardless of the creditor's

purpose, the trustee may recover amounts set offwhen the position of the bank
improves during that ninety-day period under rules in the Code for measuring
improvement.3!7 Setoffs are exempt from the trustee's power to avoid prefer·
ences,us but this "improvement of position" test provides similar results.
The trustee may recover the amount set off to the extent that any insuffi-
ciency on the date of the set ofT is less than the insufficiency on the first date,
within the ninety days before the petition is filed, when there is an insuffi-
ciency.35s "Insufficiency" is defined as the amount by which a claim against the
debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of the claim.:I'o
The following two examples may illustrate:

Example 1
Ninety days prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor owed the bank
$50,000, and had $15,000 in its checking account. Just prior to the ming of
the petition, the bank set ofT the mutual debts at a time when the debtor had
$18,000 in its account. The insufficiency ninety days prior to the filing date
was $35,000. The insufficiency was only $32,000 on the date of the setoff.
The trustee may then recover $3,000 ($35,000 - $32,000), because the bank
improved its position in the ninety-day period preceding the filing of
bankruptcy.
Example 2
Ninety days prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor owed the bank
$50,000, and had $20,000 in its checking account. Ten days before debtor
filed its petition in bankruptcy, the bank set off the mutual debts at a time
when the debtor had $16,000 in its account. The insufficiency ninety days
prior to the filing date was $30,000. The insufficiency on the date of setoff
was $34,000. The trustee cannot recover any amount, because the insuffi-
ciency on the date of setoff was greater than ninety days prior to filing. The
bank did not improve its position during the ninety-day period.

If the trustee recovers a setoff under these provisions, the bank's unsecured
claim against the estate will be increased by that amount.:I'1 In this situation, the

3,. 11 USC § 553(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

357 See 11 USC § 553(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
351 See 11 USC § 553(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
55 °11 USC § 553(b)(1 )(1982 &Supp. IV 1986). Ifthere is no insufficiency ninety days
before the petition is filed, the first date during the ninety.day period in which there is an
insufficiency is used as the measuring date. Id.
360 11 USC § 553(b)(2) (1982 &Supp. IV 1986). :rhis procedure is a mathematical test, .
and is not subject to equitable considerations. See In re Assiante, 28 Bankr. 903 (Bankr. D.
R.l. 1983).
381 11 USC § 502(h) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
, 25.09[311c] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25·60

bank is treated as having an uns~c\lred claim to the extent of the amount tbe
trustee recovers. As discussed subsequently, the bank would bave had the status
ofa secured claimant, had the bank waited until after the petition was filed to set
off the debts.H2
The purpose of this penalty provision is to discourage banks from prepeti·
tion setoffs, which frequently precipitate the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

[cl Postpedtion Setoff; "Freezing" Accounts. Iftlie bank has not exercised a
setoff prior to the debtor filing bankruptcy, it will run into the automatic stay
prohibition. Section 362(a)(7) explicitly prohibits a setoff after the filing oftbe
bankruptcy petition.M3 It does not, however, mean that the bank loses its sub- ,
stantive right of setoff. The banle's claim, equalling the amount it would have
been able to set off, will be allowed as a secured claim.'" This provision protects
the bank's setoff rights by providing ,secured creditor status for otherwise
unsecured claims, in addition to the right to adequate protection. The bank may
then file a motion for relief from the stay or may request adequate protection if
necessary.
A hotly contested issue, however, is whether the bank may temporarily
freeze the debtor's bank account upon notice that a bankruptcy petition was
filed, while also petitioning the court to lift the stay so that the bank can execute
the setoff or require that the debtor provide adequate protection if the stay
continues. m The withdrawal offunds by the debtor or trustee immediately after
petitioning for bankruptcy would destroy the bank's right of setoff. One line of
cases holds that although the funds are not removed from the debtor's account, a
temporary freeze is the equivalent ofa setoff, because the bank retains control of

382 See II USC § 506(a) (1982 &. Supp. IV 1986). See infra 1 25.09[3J[c].
383 Setoffs exercised without prior court approval are in violation of the stay and are
void and ofno effect. In're Voight, 24 Bankr. 983 (Bankr. NDTell. 1982), A creditor who
exercises a setoff in violation of the stay loses ils right to set ofT and must return the
amount previously set off to the bankruptcy estate. Id.; see also In re Mealey, 16 Bankr.
800 (Banlet. ED Pa. 1982).
36' II USC § 506(a)( 1982 & Supp. IV 1986).

365 For a thorough discutsion of this issue, see B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bank·
ruptcy Law Manual' 5.IO[4J(rev. ed. [986 & 1987 Supp.). See also In re Wildcat Constr.
Co" 57 Bankr. 981 (Bankr. D. VI. 1986), See generally Ahart, "Bank Setoff Under the
Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1978/' 53 Am. Bankr. U 205 (1979). Freeman. "Setoff Under
the New Bankruptcy Code," 97 Banking U 484 (1980); Groschadl... 'Freezing' the
Debtor's Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?," 57 Am, Bankr. U 15
(1983); Weintraub & Resnick, "Freezing the Debtor's Account: A Banker's Dilemma
Under the Bankruptcy Code," 100 Banking U 316 (1983).
25-61 BANKRUPTCY II 25.0913){d)

the funds.* Several other courts take the opposite view and hold that a freeze
does not violate the stay.361
Essentially four Bankruptcy Code provisions are involved in this dispute.
Section 553(a) authorizes creditors to exercise setoffrigh~s that they have under
substantive law, subject to the automatic stay and the "improvement of posi-
tion" test.... Section 362(a)(7) explicitly states that setoffs are subject to the
automatic stay, while Section 506(a) provides that creditors with setoff rights are
secured creditors. Section 363(c)(2) prohibits the trustee or debtor in possession
from using cash collateral without first obtaining a court order. (Cash collateral
is defined to include deposit accounts.)36t One authority urges that these provi-
sions, when read together, support the bank's right to freeze the account tempo-
rarily. The reasoning of this authority is as follows: because Sections 506(A) and
363(c)(2) restrain the trustee from using the deposit, while at the same time
Sections 362(aX7) and 553(a) limit the ability of the bank to reach the account,
this statutory scheme must contemplate a preservation of the status quo through
a freeze of the account, until a judicial resolution is possible. 370

(dl Setoffs and the Involuntary Bankruptcy. If involuntary bankruptcy pro-

ceedings are initiated against a debtor, different rules apply as to freezing the
bank account. Notwithstanding Section 363's prohibition on the debtor of using
cash collateral without obtaining a court order, Section 303(f) governing invol-
untary bankruptcy proceedings allows an involuntary debtor to continue to use
or to dispose ofits property as if the involuntary case had not been commenced.
Under this scenario, a bank may become liable for wrongful dishonor if it freezes
a debtor's bank account. The automatic stay, however, still prohibits the bank
from eltercising a setoff. To protect the bank's right ofsetoff, one commentator
suggests a temporary freezing of the debtor's bank account, while immediately

36. See United States v. Reynolds, 38 Banler. 725 (WD Va. J 984), aff'd, 764 F2d J 004
(4th Cir. 1985); IRS v. Norton, 717 F2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Wildcat Constr. Co., 57
Bankr. 981 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986 (dictum»; In re Burrow, 36 Bankr. 960 (Bankr. D. Utah
1984); In re LHG Resources, Inc., 34 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. WD Tex. 1983); In re Executive
Assocs., Inc., 24 Banler. 171 (Bankr. SD Tex. 1982); In re Mealey, 16 Bankr. 800 (Banler.
ED Pa. 1982); In re Hackney, 20 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982).
361 In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); Stann v. Mid Am. Credit
Union, 39 Bankr. 246 (D. Kan. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank,
22 Banler. 747 (WD Va. 1982); In re Williams, 61 Banler. 567 (Bankr ND Tex. 1986); In re
Hoffman, 51 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. WD Ark. 1985); In re Lee, 40 Banler. 123 (Banler. ED
Mich. 1984); In re Owens-Peterson, 39 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. ND Ga. 1984); In re Davis, 29
Banler. 652 (Bankr. WDNY 1983); In re Gazelle, 17 Bankr. 617 (Banler. WD Wis. 1982);
In re Carpenter, 14 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. MD Tenn. 1981).
381 See supra! 25.09{3][bJ.
36t II USC § 363(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
31GB. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual ~ 5.10[4J (rev. ed. 1986&
1987 Supp.).
11 25.09(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-62

seeking a determination by the court of the bank's right to freeze or set off the
funds.'"

r4) Credit Card Purchases as Nondischargeable Debts

An extension of credit incurred through false pretenses, false representa-
tion, or actual fraud will be deemed nondischargeable in bankruptcy under
Section 523(aX2). Much litigation has occurred over whether credit card
purchases taking place shonly before a debtor files bankruptcy constitute
grounds for nondischargeability under this section. The courts apply a fact-
oriented approacb, so that the results of these cases may vary. Generally, how-
ever, when it appears that the debtor has gone on a last-minute prebankruptcy
"sbopping spree," the courts will find that the debtor incurred the debts in
contemplation of bankruptcy, and thus will find that the debts are
nondischargeable.
In First National Bank ~'. Roddenberry,m the Eleventh Circuit held that
credit card liabilities are dischargeable until the creditor unequivocally and
unconditionally revokes the right ofthe cardholder to possess and use the credit
card.m When the creditor issued the card, it agreed to trust the cardholder and to
extend credit to him. Until the creditor decides that the credit ought to be
revoked, it cannot claim that the debtor's actions werefuudulent. This case was
decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the court left open the question
of whether the addition of the phrase "actual fraud" in the new Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 would alter its result.'74 The unconditional revocation theory has
been criticized, and generally is not followed. '75
Another line of cases follows the "implied representation" theory. Accord-
ing to this theory, the debtor's use of a credit card is an implied representation
that the cardholder has both the ability and the intention to pay for the purchases
made. 3T& Intent to defraud is inferred from the debtor's payment record, ability
to pay at the time the purchases were made, and the timing, number, amount
and type of purchase made. For example, in In re Bono"" the court held that

'" Hertzbert & Schubiner, "The Right ofSetoff Unller the Bankruptcy Code," Prac-
ticing Law Institute, I Bankruptcy Practice for Bank Counsel 1986, 561. 587.
72
' 701 F2d 927 (lith Cir. 1983).
373ld.
mId. at 929-930, n.3.
J71See In re Faulk, 69 Bankr. 743 (Banler. NO Ind. 1986) and cases cited therein.
J7I In re Burklow, 60 Bankr. 728, (Bankr. SO Cal. 1986)(each time debtorchal'lled an
item to his account with a merchant he impliedly represented that he had both the
intention and the ability to pay for the purchases). See also In re P~ucek, 73 Bankr. 110
(Banler. NO 111. 1987); In re Lipsey, 41 Bankr. 255 (Bankr. EO Pa. 1984); In re HiUS, 39
Banler. 181 (Bankr. ND Ohio 1984).
m 41 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. O. Mass. 1984).
25-63 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.09(4)

credit card debts were nondischargeable where (1) the cardholder made
purchases totalling $7,817.48 during a three-day period; (2) the previous high
balance on the account had been $2,000-$3,000; (3) the charges were over the
cardholder's credit limit; (4) the purchases were for luxury items, including an
$1,800 watch for his wife; (5) at the time ofthe purchases the cardholder's salary
was $300 a week, he had minimal assets, noncontingent liabilities of $6,400, a
tax liability ofat least $1 0,000 for the health club where he was an employee and
officer, director, and stockholder, and other personal debts of$16,600 as guar-
antor ofcorporate notes ofthe club; and (6) the health club went out ofbusiness a
month after the purchases were made. Although the debtor did not fLle for
bankruptcy until five months after the shopping spree, he had signed his bank-
ruptcy petition three months after the debts were incurred, and the court found
that his use of the card impliedly and falsely represented that he could and would
repay the indebtedness, resulting in the nondischargeability ofthe purchases. In
contrast, the bankruptcy court in In re Labuda371 held that credit card purchases
were dischargeable in a case where the debtor anticipated being called back to
work during the period in question, and subsequently returned what purchases
he could, after learning that he would not be recalled.
In Tn re Faulk,'" a bankruptcy court rejected the "implied representation"
theory and held that credit card purchases are nondischargeable, even if the
creditor has not revoked the debtor's right to use the card, only if the creditor
proves actual fraud on the part of the debtor. 38• Actual fraud exists when the
purchases are made with no intention to repay the debt. The subjective intent
required may be inferred from the actions of the debtor. The existence offraud
may be inferred ifthe totality ofthe circumstances present a picture ofdeceptive
conduct by the debtor which indicates that the debtor intended to deceive or
cheat the creditor. 38 ' A case by case analysis ofthe facts is required, and the court
gave the following list of factors to consider:
• The length oftime between the charges made and the filing ofbankruptcy;
• Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the ming of
bankruptcy before the charges were made;
• The number of charges made;
• The amount of the charges;
• The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made;
• Whether the charges were above the credit limit ofthe account;
• Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;

37' 37 Bank!'. 47 (Bankr. MD Aa. 1984).

'7' 69 Bankr. 743 (Bankr ND Ind. 1986).
'BOld.
'81 Id. at 755.
1! 25.09(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-64

• Whether or not the debtor was employed;

• The debtor's prospects for employment;
• The financial sophistication of the debtor;
• Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits; and
• Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.

The court found that the fact that the debtor exceeded her credit limit was
not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence of actual fraud to render the debts
nondischargeabJe. Similarly, the creditor's negligence in failing to prevent a
debtor from using the credit card after she reached her credit limit is not
sufficient to hold that the debt cannot have been incurred through actual
fraud. 3u
Under the facts of the case, the court held that the credit card purchases
were nondischargeable. They were incurred on just three days, with multiple
purchases made on those days, and within two to eighteen days prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition. The highest monthly balance of the debtor, prior to
these charges, was approximately S1,200, just over her credit limit of $1,180,
and it occurred in the month preceding the filing of bankruptcy. The purchases
made shortly before the bankruPtcy amounted to over $1,600. During this
eighteen-day period, the cardholder and her dependents exhibited a great
increase in buying activity, composed of an inordinate number of small
purchases. From the evidence submitted, it was clear that the cardholder had
already conferred with an attorney prior to making the bulk of the purchases.
The debtor was unemployed, and was two months behind in payments on utility
bills and one month behind on her mortgage payment, indicating that she knew
she would be unable to make the contractually required payments on the credit
card.
A defense similar to that of "actual {raud" is available to credit card issuers
in Section 523(a)(2) subsection (C), which provides a presumption of nondis-
chargeability for luxury purchases made within forty days preceding the bank-
ruptcy petition, to the same creditor, aggregating more than '$500.30
Furthermore, cash advances on credit cards, exceeding $1,000 and made within
twenty days of the petition, are subject to the same presumption. M ' While the
Bankruptcy Code does not define what "luxuries" are, it does state that "luxu-
ries" do not include "goods or services reasonably acquired for the support or
maintenance oftbe debtor or a dependent ofthe debtor. "MI This subsection was

3f2 Id. at 756.

'.311 USC § 523(a)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. lV 1986).
mId.
315 td.
25-65 BANKRUPTCY 11 25.09(5)

added in 1984 to prevent "loading up"; that is, to prevent the debtor from going
on a buying spree in contemplation ofbankruptcy.381

(5) Employees Who File Bankruptcy

Certain types of discrimination against debtors, that occur solely because
the debtor has filed a petition in bankruptcy, are prohibited under Section 525 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 31? One of the most important of these types occurs when
an employee files bankruptcy. A private employer may not discriminate against
an employee solely because the employee is or has been a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code. 318 •
It is clear that a bank may not fire or otherwise discriminate against an
employee on the basis of a bankruptcy filing, even if the bank managetnent
believes that the presence ofsuch an employee will undermine public confidence
in the institution. However, the employee must show that the bankruptcy was
a
the sole reason for the discrimination. 311 In In re Hopkins,390 bank was found
liable for firing a teller because she had filed bankruptcy. There was no evidence
of poor performance or of employee misconduct, and the bank president's
concern for public relations did not legitimize the dismissal. 311 Similarly, in In re
Hicks,392 a bank was held to have discriminated against an employee when it
transferred her, over her objections, from her teller's position to a bookkeeping
position, where she did not handle cash transactions. Mrs. Hicks' supervisor had

... In re Faulk, 69 Bankr. 743,751 (Bankr. NO Ind. I986)(citingS. Rep. No. 65, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985».
m 11 USC § 525 (Supp. IV 1986).
361 11 USC § 525(b)(Supp. IV 1986). Subsection (b), mandating this result, was added
in the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments.
Prior to the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, Se<:tion 525 consisted only ofsubsection
(a), which prohibited discrimination by governmental units in both employment and
other contexts, such as licensing or granting permits. The issue ofwhether private employ-
ers were subject to the same restrictions was disputed. Several courts held that private
employers should also be prohibited from this type of discrimination, on equitable
grounds; see In re Olson, 38 Bankr. SIS (Bankr:ND Iowa 1984); In re Green, 29 Bankr.
682 (Bankr. SO Ohio 1983); while others found no such prohibition, based on the rather
clear statutory language; see Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F2d 1246 (7th Cir.
1985); In re Amidon, 22 Bankr. 457 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), In re Barbee, 14 Bankr. 733
(Bankr. ED Va. 1981); In re Coachlight Dinner Theatre, 8 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. SDNY
1981).
38. See In re Stockhouse, 75 Bankr. 83 (D. Wyo. I 987)(debtor failed to establish that
he was fired solely because ofhis bankruptcy where evidence showed employer planned to
replace debtor long before the bankruptcy filing took place, debtor had performed poorly
in the job, and had been notified of his poor performance).
... 66 Bankr. 828 (Bankr. WD Ark. 1986).
• 0> Id.

... 65 Bankr. 980 (Bankr. WD Ark. 1986).

, 25.09(6) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-66

read ofthe bankruptcy petition in a newspaper article, and transferred her to the
non-cash position the next day. The affidavit outlining the transfer, which Mrs.
Hicks refused to sign, specifically stated that the purpose of the transfer was to
remove her from a "compromising position" and to "protect the image and
maintain the customer confidence of' the bank, and was in no way related to
previous job performance.- The transfer did not decrease her salary, and the
opportunity for advancement was the same in each position. The court rejected
the bank's reasons for the transfer, and found that the transfer was discrimina-
tory. The court ordered Mrs. Hicks be reinstated in her teller position.
The Bankruptcy Code does not outline what remedy is appropriate for an
employee who has been discriminated against by his or her employer. Courts
generally find the authority to provide a remedy under Section 105(a), which
authorizes the court to enforce the Bankruptcy Code.:lto It appears that given the
circumstances of the case, courts will provide an equitable remedy, which may
include reinstatement, back pay, injunctions, raises, and other such benefits
that, but for the discrimination, would have been awarded. One bankruptcy
court, however, found that it did not have the authority to award attorney fees,
and, given the facts of the case, saw no reason to change the standard rule that
each party bears its own costs. 3M In another case, the same bankruptcy court held
that contempt charges were not appropriate as a remedy for violation of this
statute.'"

(6) Environmental Protection, Hazardous Wastes, and the Bankrupt

Debtor
In general, there are four issues involving the interplay offederal and state
environmental law and bankruptcy law. They are (I) whether injunctions and
other cleanup orders against the debtor are subject to the automatic stay once a
bankruptcy petition is f1Ied;:It'(2) whether fines, injunctions, and other orders for
violations ofenvironmental law are dischargeable in bankruptcy;- (3) whether,
and under what terms, a trustee in bankruptcy may abandon property that is in
violation of environmental protection laws and, ifabandonment is ordered, who
pays for the cleanup; and (4) if the cleanup has already been done on the
contaminated property by the federal Environmental Projection Agency (EPA)

3I3Id. at 981.
m II USC § 105(a) (Supp. IV 1986) provides that the court "may issue any order,
process, or judgnient that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title." .
mIn re Hicks, 65 Banler. 980, 985 (Banler. WD Ark. 1986).
3"'ln re Hopkins, 66 Bankr. 828 (WD Ark. 1986).
... See supra ~ 25.05 on the operation of the automatic stay.
m See supra' 25.08[ I J for a discussion of nondischargeable debts.
25-67 BANKRUPTCY It 25.09(6)(b]

or by a state agency, does that agency's claim have priority status under bank-
ruptcy law?

lal Environmental Proceedings and the Automadc Stay. The courts generally
hold that suits by environmental agencies, both federal and state, that seek an
order from the court that the debtor cease polluting or be required to clean up
property that is in violation of environmental standards, or which seek proceed-
ings to enforce an injunction already obtained; are not subject to the automatic
stay.311 Such suits fall within the exception for proceedings by a governmental
unit under its police or regulatory powers.... Enforcement of cleanup orders will
reduce the assets of the bankrupt by the amount of expenditures necessary for
the cleanup, and thus creditors may, in reality, be subsidizing the cleanup costs.
If the governmental agency is seeking only reimbursement, or is enforcing a
money judgment, however, its action will not fit under these exceptions, and will
be stayed by the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

Ib] Dischargeability of Orders and Fines Arising From Environmental Viola-

tions. In Ohio v. Kovacs,'" the U.S. Supreme Court held that ajudgment against
the debtor was a "claim," for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, and was thus
dischargeable in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 402 The court's holding, however, is very
narrow. The debtor (an individual) was found to have violated state pollution
laws in the dumping of toxic wastes. A stipulated judgment enjoined the debtor
from further pollution, required that the industrial wastes be cleaned up within
one year, and imposed $ 75,000 damages for injury to wildlife. 403 The debtor did
not comply, and pursuant to the judgment a state receiver was appointed to
collect the assets of the debtor and to apply them to the cleanup of the toxic
wastes. The debtor then filed a voluntary Chapter II bankruptcy petition, and
later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.

31'S ee In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department ofEnvtl. Resources, 733 F2d 267
(3rd Cir. 1984); United States v. EE. Gregory & Sons, Inc., 58 Bankr. 590 (WD Pa. 1986).
<0011 USC §§ 362(b)(4), 362(b)(5) (1982).
<0'469 US 274 (1985).
402Id. Dischargeability will generally be an issue only in Chapter 7 liquidation cases
where the debtor is an individual. Few, if any, cases involving hazardous wastes will be
filed under Chapter 12 or 13, and corporate or partnership debtors under Chapter 7 are
not entitled to a discharge. See II USC § 727(a). Debtors may be discharged after
completing the terms ofa confirmed plan under Chapter II, but the governmental agency
will be a voting participant in the acceptance of the plan. See 11 USC § 1126 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). See also supra ti 25.02[3] (on acceptance and confirmation ofa Chapter 11
plan).
<0' Ohio v. Kovacs. 469 US 274 (1985).
11 25.09(611cl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25-68

The issue in the case was not whether the judgement was an exception to
discharge, but whether the judgment was a "claim" or "debt" subject to dis-
charge under the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court held that because
debtor had been ousted and thus could. no longer comply with the judgment by
cleaning up the hazardous wastes, the claim was, in reality, a claim for damages
to repay the state for the costs ofcleaning up the property. By its acts, the State of
Ohio had converted the obligation into a claim for payment ofmoney. Because it
was now a money judgment, it was dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The Court was careful to state that its decision did not detennine the
dischargeability ofother possible toxic pollution liabilities orjudgments, such as
criminal contempt, fines, monetary penalties, or injunctions against further
pollution. <04 In fact. the Court in dicta stated that if it were a fine or monetarY
penalty imposed prior to bankruptcy, Section 523(aX7) ofthe Bankruptcy Code
would except it from dischargeability. Section 523(aX7) excepts from dis-
chargeability noncompensatory penalties payable to a governmental unit. OO5
Nondischargeability also might be found ifthe facts were to indicate wilIful and
malicious injury.<011

Ie) Abandonment of the Property and Liability for Cleanup, As discussed

previously. the trustee in general may abandon property ofthe bankruptcy estate
that is burdensome. 09r This right was limited, however, in the context ofenviron-
mental and hazardous waste regulation, by Mid/antic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.- The debtor, Quanta
Resources Corporation, owned and operated waste oil storage and processing
facilities in New York and New Jersey. Almost 500,000 gallons ofPCB-eontami-
nated oil were stored in unguarded and deteriorating containers at two different
sites."" The debtor was in violation of state environmental laws in both states
when it filed a petition for ChaPter 11 reorganization, which shortly thereafter
was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee intended to abandon the
property at both sites, because the costs of complying with federal. state, and
local laws would have required substantial expenditures, rendering the property
a burden on the estate.

<•• 469 US at 284·285.

<os} I USC § 523(a)(1) (1982). See also supra 125.08(1].
<"'I USC § 523(a)(6) (t 982). See $Upra note 290 for a discussion of willful and
malicious injury that may except a debt from discharae.
<01 11 USC § 554(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
'··474 US 494 (1986) .
... According to the Court's opinion, the oil was stored in leaking and deteriorating
containers that presented risks offlre explosion, personal injury or death throUBh contact,
and water supply contamination. Midlantic, 474 US at 499, n.3.
25-69 BANKRUPTCY II 2S.0916J(c)

The Supreme Court. on appeal. held that a bankruptcy trustee may not
abandon property in contravention ofa state statute or regulation that is reason-
ably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.
Before authorizing abandonment of the property. the court must formulate
conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety.
Since Midlantic, courts have used a fact-specific analysis to determine
whether the property may be abandoned. In In re Franklin Signal Corp.• 4lO the
trustee was allowed to abandon fourteen drums of hazardous waste because the
trustee had taken precautionary measures in determining the extent and danger
ofthe hazardous substances. and had reported their existence to the appropriate
state and federal agencies. The drums were not judged to be a current threat to
public safety. Similarly, another bankruptcy court held that the truste.e was
allowed to abandon the real estate surrounding an oil refinery in bankruptcy
where the pollution did not present an immediate harm to the public health and
safety, and abandonment would not aggravate the existing situation or increase
the likelihood of disaster or of intensification of polluting agents.'"
In two other cases, however, the courts used a stricter interpretation of
Midlantic. In In re Charles Stevens, "2 the court held that the trustee could not
abandon PCB-contaminated waste oil where abandonment would threaten pub-
lic safety and contravene state laws reasonably designed to protect the public.
Similarly. in In re Peerless Plating Co...., the court decided that the bankruptcy
trustee could not abandon a hazardous waste site with less than full compliance
with environmental law. where the EPA had stated that hazardous materials
were present and there was an unspecific amount of cyanide gas in the air.
When the bankruptcy court allows the trustee to abandon property, the
issue becomes one ofdeciding to whom the property is to be abandoned. Title to
the property abandoned may vest in any party with a possessory interest in the
property to be abandoned.'" If the debtor is an individual, such individual has
an interest as the prior owner, and title to the abandoned property generally will
vest in that individual. If the bankrupt is a corporation that liquidates, the
possessory interest resides either with a party holding a secured interest in the
property, or the corporation's shareholders.
Therein lies the potential liability for lenders with a secured interest in the
property, whether it be real property. equipment. or personal property. Under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Liability Act

"°65 Bankr. 268 (Bania. D. Minn. 1986).

• 11 In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. WD Okla. 1986).
..268 Bankr. 774 (D. Maine 1987).
'13 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. WD Mich. 1987).
'''See S. Rep. No. 989. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92. reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 5787. 5878. .
11 25.09/6][dl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 25·70

(CERCLA),"S the EPA can compel legally responsible parties to clean up a

hazardous waste site, or it can clean up the site itself and hold a legally responsi·
ble party liable for reimbursement. Under CERCLA, liability is imposed in
some circumstances without regard to fault and causation. Current and former
"owners or operators" may be held liable for cleanup costs.m The term "owner
or operator" does not include a person that holds indicia ofownership primarily
to protect a security interest, as long as that person does not participate in the
management ofthe facility.m Generally this should exclude lenders from liabil-
ity, except where they are involved in the management and operations of the
debtor.
However, courts have held that where a bank was the current owner of a
hazardous waste site through a prior foreclosure of its security interest, at the
time the EPA did the cleanup, it could not avail itself of the defense that by its
security interest it·was not an owner or operator.·'· The same interpretation
could be given to a bank that had received property abandoned by the bank-
ruptcy trustee. Because the bank is the current owner, the EPA may, in some
cases, be able to impose liability without regard to fault and causation.
Environmental regulation and imposition ofliability for hazardous waste
cleanup on innocent parties such as lenders, particularly in transfers such as
foreclosures and abandonment ofproperty in bankruptcy, is unsettled. Defenses
may be available to lenders who had no prior knowledge ofthe hazardous wasie,
and took reasonable precautions when dealing with debtors in environmentally
regulated businesses...• Lenders should, however, be aware of their potential
liability when property is abandoned to them in the bankruptcy context, and
should watch for later developments, perhaps through legislation, in this unset-
tled area oflaw. 4 1!0

(d) Priority Status for Claims Resulting from Cleanup. When the EPA. or a
state regulatory agency, has expended funds to clean up a hazardous waste site or
to decontaminate property of a banlcruptcyestate, the agency will generally
claim that its costs were administrative expenses of the estate, and thus are
entitled to priority in payment. The courts have reacted favorably to this argu·

415
42 USC § 9601-96S7 (1982 & Supp.lII 1985).
." 42 USC § 9607(a) (1982).
411
42 USC § 9601 (20)(A) (1982).
mUnited States v. Maryland Bank &. Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
"'42 USC § 9607(b) (1982).
41!O For an excellent article on potential lender liability for hazardoUs waste cleanup,
including 5ugested practices for risk minimization, see Klotz &. Siakotos, "Lender Liabil-
ity Under Federal and State Environmental Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and
Deadbeats," 92 Com. U 275 (I 987).
25-71 BANKRUPTCY , 25.091611dl

ment.·21 Because cleanup costs are so great, the environmental claim may
exhaust the bankruptcy estate at the expense of other creditors. As a result, the
creditors of an environmentally regulated business may take a greater risk than
anticipated should the debtor violate environmental regulations.

421 See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. WD Mich. 1987); In re
Charles Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re Mowbray Engineering Co., 67 Bankr.
34 (Bankr. MD Ala. 1986).
 26
Interest Rate Controls and
Credit Practices· Regulation
'1126.01 Sources of Law ......................•.............. 26-2
'Il 26.02 Interest and Usury ..............................•.... 264
(1) State Law Regulating Interest Rates . 26-5
[2] National Banks ................•................. 26-8
la] Role of State Law ....................•......... 26-9
[b] Most Favored Lender Doctrine . 26·11
[e) Interstate Credit Activities . 26-12
[3] Federal Preemption of State Usury Law . 26·13
la) Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act ..........................•.•..... 26-13
[b] Preemption Provisions for Specific Categories Under the
Act ..................................•..... 26-14
Ii]
Residential real property loans ...•.•..•........ 26-14
Iii]
Obligations of depository institutions ..••.••..... 26-15
[iii]
Business and agrlculturalloans 0($1,000 or more ... 26·16
[iv]Other loans by federally insured depository
institutions ..............••....•...•..•... 26-16
Ie] State Laws Overriding Federal Interest Limits ..•••..•. 26·\8
(4) The Prime Rate •..•.•................•.....••.•.• 26·19
(5) Variable Rate and Other Nontraditional Mortgage
Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . .•.• 26·23
'11 26.03 Credit Disclosure Regulation: Truth-in-Lending Act . 26·25
[I) Scope and Requirements of the Act •....•.........•... 26·26
[2] Closed-End and Open-End Ccedit Arransements ..•..•••..• 26.31.
[al Closed-End Credit Disclosure RequirementS ...•.•...• 26-3i
[b] Open-End Credit Disclosure Requirements ....•..•... 26·3'
(3) Consumer Leases .........................•..•...• 2~O
(4) Disclosures and Rescission Rights in Real Estate
Transactions .•.....•...........•.•.•...•...•.... 26-4i
[5) General Provisions of the Act ................••.••... 26-44
{a] Duty to Revise Prior Disclosures ... ; .....•..•.••... 26-44

26-1
'I 26.01 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-2

[b] Regulation of Credit Advertising. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-44

[c] Effect of Trnth-in-Lending on State Law . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-46
[d] Credit Billing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-46
[6] Civil Liability and Administrative Enforcement 26-49
[a] Creditor Liability for Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-49
Ii} Creditor defenses 26-50
[ii] Liability of assignee from a creditor . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-51
[b] Administrative Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-52
[c] Reliance on Model Forms ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-53
'il26.04 Consumer Credit Protection Act 26-53
[1] Restrictions on Garnishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-54
[2] Debt Collection Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-55
[3} Credit Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26·57
, 26.05 Other Consumer Credit-Related Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-61
[I] Unfair or Deceptive Practices-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-61
[2] Plain English Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-62
11 26.06 Credit Discrimination and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ... 26-63
(I] Scope ofthe Act. . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-63
12} What Constitutes Discrimination Under ECOA 26-67
13] Prohibited Discrimination in Credit Application and
Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-70
[4] Special-Purpose Credit Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-71
[5] Notice Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 26-72
[6] Civil Liability for Violation ofECOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-74
[7] Relationship to State Laws Establishing Marital and Other
Property Rights . • • . • • • • • . • • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-75
[8] Relationship to Other State Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26-79

11 26.01 SOURCES OF LAW

It is often thought that consumers operate at a disadvantage in their dealings
with commercial parties in sales and credit transactions. Although the consumer
who purchases goods, borrows money, or applies for credit in theory enters into
a voluntary contract with the seller or creditor, the reality may be that the
consumer has little opportunity to bargain. no effective means of obtaining
reliable information to evaluate the transaction and possible alternatives to it,
and insufficient resources to pursue rell).edies when sellers or creditors fail to
perform tJIeir contracts faithfully. Such remedies as may exist under the law may·
be too expensive or otherwise impractical for the consumer to utilize. His\ori-
cally, the common law, at first, was not sensitive to the circUmstances of con-
sumers. The original approach of the common law was exemplified bv the
26·3 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS "16.01

maxim "caveat emptor"-"Let the buyer beware." Under this approach, the
seller of goods had only the obligations to the buyer that the seller expressly
made in the contract for sale, and no more. Lacking the economic power to
bargain for terms that would give more protection. the consumer had no
recourse when the goods proved defective. When the law did afford rights and
remedies for consumers, standard form contract provisions, which waived such
rights, effectively nullified the law's protection; on the other hand, other provi.
sions of law, such as the holder in due course rule. may have cut off the
consumers' rights.
Because of the disadvantages consumers have historically experienced in
the commercial world, there have been legislative efforts in more recent years to
redress the balance and to provide consumers with special riihts and remedies in
dealing with commercial parties ofvarious kinds. Consumer legislation is partic-
ularly extensive in the field ofcredit practices and consumer finance. Laws have
been enacted on the state and federal levels, administrative agencies have
adopted regulations with consumer protection goals in mind, and courts have
become sensitive to the special problems consumers confront.
On the state level, many statutes have been enacted to protect consumers.
Often they are of a fragmented nature, covering specific areas of interest such as
consumer installment lending, door-to-door solicitation sales, home improve-
ment loans, and a variety of similar topics. There is also a body of state law
governing the conduct of creditors in collecting debts and enforcing loan agree-
ments. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposed a comprehensive Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which was promul-
gated in 1968 and subsequently revised, including revisions in 1974. Referred to
as the UCCC, this code has substantially influenced subsequent consumer legis-
lation, but has actually been enacted by only a relatively few number of states. .
Even in the states that have adopted the UCCC. there have been substantial
revisions to the model language.
The UCCC covers finance charges and related matters dealing with con-
sumer credit sales, consumer 10ilns, and other consumer credit ttansaetioliS. It
contains provisions to regulate consumer credit transactions requiring certain
disclosures, such as those required by the federal Truth-in·r.ending Act, and it
establishes requirements for various terms ofconsumer credit agreements relat-
ing to property taken as collateral, assignments ofthe obligation, confessions of
judgment, balloon payments, and other matters. It deals with credit card holder·
rights, it covers rights of buyers in home solicitation sales and consumer credit
insurance, and it also creates special creditors' and consumers' remedies. This
description is not exhaustive of the coverage of the UCCC. but illustrates the
wide range of areas in which special consumer legislation may exist. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also has
approved a Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, which covers deceptive and
unconscionable consumer sales practices.
1126.02 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-4

On the federal level, there are a number of consumer-oriented statutes as

well. The Consumer Credit Protection Act is one of the major federal statutes
that affect consumer finance transactions. The act applies to many aspects of
consumer credit transactions. Title I covers consumer credit cost disclosure or
what is popularly known as truth in lending. It deals with credit transactions,
credit advertising, credit billing, and consumer leases. Title III of the act con-
tains restrictions on garnishment; Title V contains general provisions; Title VI
regulates consumer credit reporting; Title VII contains rules for equal credit
opportunity that prohibit discrimination in providing credit; Title VIII deals
with debt collection practices; and Title IX covers electronic fund transfers.
While this handbook cannot cover all aspects of the broad scope of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, certain of these provisions important to bankers
are discussed subsequently.
Other federal legislation exists as well. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act contains important consumer protec-
tion provisions.' The Federal Trade Commission engages in rule making to
prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices. The FTC has adopted rules dealing
with holders in due course, credit practices, door-ta-door sales regulations, and
others. Congress also has become involved in the regulation ofinterest rates that
certain lenders may charge.
The remaining parts ofthis chapter introduce the reader to this broad body
of state and federal regulation. The discussion that follows has been selected to
emphasize areas that will be of interest to the banker, and, it is hoped, will
provide an understanding ofthe type ofregulation that exists and ofthe need for
caution in the practices followed in consumer credit transactions. This is an area
in which there is not only a diverse and extensive body of law, both state and
federal, but also numerous administrative regulations that must be observed,
including quite complex and detailed regulation under the Truth-in-Lending
Act. Banks should consult experienced counsel to review all consumer lending
and finance transactions to be sure that the various requirements of state and
federal law are satisfied.

11 26.02 INTEREST AND USURY

Both federal and state laws regulate the rate of interest that banks may
charge in credit transactions. States often have a bewildering variety oflaws that
establish rules for credit transactions ofvarious sorts and that impose different
requirements, depending on the type ofthe loan, the nature ofthe lender, and the
type of debtor. For example, it is common for a state to have laws that specifi-
cally apply to residential real estate loans, consumer insta11m~nt Joans,Joans by

'IS USC§ 57a (1982).

26-5 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0211)

consumer finance companies, loans by federally insured depository institutions,

and numerous other classifications. In addition to the various state law require-
ments, federal law affects the rates of interest that may be charged in many
commercial transactions entered into by banks. There is a federal statute, dis-
cussed later in this chapter, that determines the interest rates a national bank
may charge. With the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, there has been significant federal involve-
ment in the regulation of interest rates charged by other federally regulated
depository institutions. The federal law may displace some of the state law
constraints.
Regarding the extensive body of law that governs the control of interest
rates and similar charges, the discussion that follows is intended to provide an
introduction to this body oflaw to explain the general scope and framework of
the law and to supply a background of information to help a banker develop a
sensitivity for situations in which problems might exist. As noted previously in
this book, this area is a matter of considerable complexity. Correct decision!
depended on the facts of the panicular situation and the applicable local law.
Again, a bank should consult its legal counsel to review its lending practices on a
regular basis for advice on the applicability ofthe law to the panicular business
of the inll\itution.

[I] State Law Regulating Interest Rates

All states have laws that limit the amount ofinterest creditors may charge
on loans or other credit transactions. These laws have ancient roots. Through the
passage oftime, many exceptions and distinctions have been constructed, excep-
tions and distinctions that complicate their application. Except for the applica-
tion of federal law, which in some cases preempts local usury regulation, each
state's laws are unique. Not only do the applicable rate limitations differ, but
there are numerous other differences relating to the coverage of the laws. It is
essential that lenders consult local counsel as to the law of their panicular
jurisdiction.
In general, usury amounts to the exaction of more than the legal rate of
interest on a loan or forbearance of money with wrongful intent. Although
simple to state, the nature of usury in practice is complex. Determining the legal
rate of interest depends on the type of transaction and on the identity of thl'
creditor. In addition to the general "legal" interest limit, states usually have
different rate liinitations2 for interest agreed upon in written contracts, for

2 See Benfield, "Money, Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache," 19 Case

W. Res. L Rev. 819 (1968) (hereinafter Benfield); Morris, "Consumer Debt and Usury: A
New Rationale For Usury," 15 Pepperdine L. Rev. 151-179 (1988}; Rohner, "Problems
of Federalism in the Regulation of Consumer Financial Services Offered by Commercial
Banks," 29 Calh. UL Rev. 1,313 (1979-1980).
11 26.02(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-6

interest paid by corporations or other large business enterprises (sometimes

corporate borrowers are completely exempt), for interest charged in consumer
credit transactions of various kinds, for interest charged on real estate mortgages
by approved financial institutions, and so forth. Additional complexity exists
because the maximum rates ofinterest allowed frequently are set by reference to
an index, such as the discount rate on commercial paper, in accordance with
some formula, or may be adjusted periodically by an administrative agency.
Deciding how much interest the borrower has paid can be complicated.
Charges for specific services, such as filing fees and insurance premiums, are
usually not treated as interest. Charges that are not for specific services, but are
more in the nature of a fee for making the loan, are often regarded as interest,
although the law varies among jurisdictions depending on the nature of the
charge. 3 The charging of points and commitment fees has also been treated as
interest. "
Whether a loan guarantee fee constitutes interest subject to the Arkansas
usury statute was an issue in Johnston v. Citizens Bank & Trust CO. 5 The court
held that it was not interest, because the fee was intended to be a reimbursement
to the Small Business Administration for a loan commitment fee it charged to
the lender. The fee would have been viewed as interest if it had been a charge
made to obtain additional profit for the bank or ifit had been imposed to offset
overhead expenses or general costs or doing business.'
A major exception that has been carved out is the "time-price" doctrine,
under which sellers of merchandise or services are permitted to charge a higher
price for sales in which repayment will occur over a period of time than for sales
in which repayment is made immediately in cash. The difference is not regarded
as interest. Even this exception is not without its complications, because some
states have refused to extend the exception to include revolving charge account
arrangements.' Thus, some sellers' credit is exempt from usury regulation, while
the credit of other sellers is regulated.

3 Benfield, supra note 2, at note I. See Turner v. West Memphis Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 266 Ark. 530, 532, 588 SW2d 691,693 (I 979); Freeman v. Gonzales County Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 526 SW2d 774, 779 (Tex. eiv. App. 1975), aird, 534 SW2d 903 (Tex. 1976).
"Kissell Co. v. Gressley, 591 F2d 47,52 (9th Cir. 1979); Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Mack Trucks, 263 Ark. 264, 266-267, 566 SW2d 128,130-131 (l978);Abramowitz v.
Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). But see People v. Central
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 46 NY2d 41, 43, 385 NE2d 555, 557, 412 NYS2d 815, 817
(1978); Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan Ass'n, 595 SW2d486, 489 (Tex. 1979). See
Note, "Stedman v. Georgetown Savings and Loan Association: Reasonableness Is Not a
Characteristic of a Bona Fide Commitment Fee," 21 S. Tex lJ 127 (1980); Note,
"Usury-A Bona Fide Commitment Fee Is Not Interest for Purposes of Usury Law
Violations," 11 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 971 (1980).
• 659 F2d 865, 868-869 (8th Cir. 1981).
"Id. at 868.
'Wisconsin v. J.e. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 129-130, 179, NW2d 641,645-646
26-7 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.02(1]

The form of the transaction often will determine whether it is subject to

usury limitations. In Stoddard v. Stoddard,' the defendant claimed that a trans-
action that was structured as a sale of land with a repurchase option should be
viewed, in fact, as a loan. If the transaction was a bona fide sale. the state usury
limit did not apply. If the transaction, on the other hand, was a loan, the terms
clearly were usurious. The court resolved this issue, not by considering the
function and effect of the transaction, but by considering whether the defendant
was the type of "necessitous debtor" whom the usury laws were designed to
protect. Finding that the defendant was a businessman who entered into the
transaction with a profit motive in view and with no necessitous financial
circumstances pressing him to borrow the money, the court held that the form of
the transaction as a sale should control. The Washington Supreme Court, on the
other hand, took a different approach in holding that certain automobile leasing
practices constituted loans subject to state usury limitations. The court said that
leases were the functional equivalent ofloans and therefore should be subject to
the provisions of the state usury law.'
Similar problems arise when a corporation is formed to evade the usury
rates established for loans to individuals. While courts have upheld the use of
corporations to escape the individual usury rates when the loan is for a business
purpose,'· the law of each jurisdiction should be consulted to determine what
will be required to uphold the transaction as a bona fide loan and not a sham.
In Whitaker v. Spiegel,Inc., 11 the court held that usury limitations applied to

(1970). But see Fox v. Federated Dep't Stores, 94 Cal. App. 3d 867, 876, 156 Cal. Rptr.
893,902 (1979); Kass v. Garfinckel, Inc., 299 A2d 542. 544, (DC 1973); Uni-Serv. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 349 Mass. 283, 285, 207 NE2d 906. 908 (1965); Grigg v. Robinson
Furniture Co., 78 Mich. App. 712, 719-720,260 NW2d 898, 905-906 (1977); Sliaer v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 59 NJ 465, 467, 283 A2d 904, 906 (1971).
'641 F2d 812, 814-815 (9th Cir. 1981).
'Rouse v. People Leasing Co., 96 Wash. 2d 722, 726. 638 P2d 1245, 1249 (1982).
'0 Sec In re leBlanc, 622 F2d 872, 876-877 (5th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied sub nom.
Brinkley v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust, 627 F2d 239 (5th Cir. 1980). A
Michigan court permitted a consumer borrower to assert the defense of usury. although
the consumer had established a corporation to borrow the money in order to take advan-
tage of the corporate exemption in the state's usury laws. Although the court indicated
that the defense would not be available if the consumer used the loan to further his own
personal or commercial enterprises, where the loan was made to an individual to dis-
charge personal debts and obligations, "and not in furtherance ofa corporate or business
enterprise," the defense is available. In this case. the borrower used the loan to pay
arrearages on a home mortgage, make repairs on a residence, and purchase a used truck.
The court came to this conclusion although the exemption for corporations in Michigan is.
available "whether or not [the corporation was] formed at the request of the lender...."
Allan v. M&S Mortgage Co., 138 Mich. ApI'. 28, 359 NW2d 238 (1984).
"95 Wash. 2d408, 412, 623 P2d 1147, 1151 (1981). ·On rehearing en banc, the court
held that except for the instant case its decision would only apply prospectively. 637 P2d
235 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 US 958 (1981).
v26.02[2) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-8

a sale of merchandise under a revolving credit plan. The seIler argued that the
charge was nat subject ta the usury laws, because it was a time-price differential
in which there was merely a different cash price and instaIlment sale price. The
court held that this was not a case in which there were truly two set prices, one for
cash and another for credit, because the credit price simply consisted of "the
cash price coupled with a service charge percentage which remains constant
against a fluctuating debt."'2
In Collins v. Union Federal Savings & Loan Association," the court held that
a construction loan and permanent takeout loan from the same lender shauld be
viewed as a single loan transaction far the purpose of the state's usury laws. The
court also considered when it was proper for the financial institution to charge
interest on loan funds not yet disbursed to the borrower.
In another case, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the protection's
afforded to consumer borrowers under the state Small Loan Act could not be
evaded by structuring the loan in the form of a real estate mortgage loan. If the
lender was a person in the business of making loans below the ceiling amount of
the SmaIl Loan Act, the provisions of that act applied."
An Arizona intermediate appeIlate court has interpreted the state consumer
fraud act, which covers deceptive acts "in connection with the sale or advertise-
ment of any merchandise," as applying to lending money. The court aIlowed a
consumer to bring suit under the statute for damages for a usurious loan. 's
In short, usury limits and interest controls are very much a matter ofloeal
law. Lending institutions should be careful to consult with counsel to establish
appropriate guidelines for each jurisdiction in which they do business.

(2] National Banks

Federal law determines the rate that a national bank may charge on loans,
discounts, or on notes or other commercial paper. The federal statute states that
a national bank may charge interest
at the rate aIlowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the
bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the
Federal Reserve District where the bank is located, whichever may be the
greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different

'295 Wash. 2d at 413, 623 P2d at J 152. For a collection ofdecisions on the question
whether revolving charge accounts constitute a credit transaction within the meaning of
usury statutes,see 95 Wash. 2d at 418, 623 P2d at 1153.
"Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Nev. 284, 289, 293-294, 662 P2d 610,
615,619-620 (1983).
"Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Glasby, 230 Va. 422,428,337 SE2d'291, 297 (1985).
"Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 147 Ariz. 100, 103,708 P2d 781,783 (Ct.
App. 1985).
26·9 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.02(2](8'

rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall
be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under
this chapter."

lal Role of State Law. AlthOUgh federal law controls what a national bank may
charge, the state law continues to be relevant under the federal law in two ways.
Firstly, a national bank may charge interest at the rate provided by the relevant
state law, although such rate may be greater than the federal limit of one percent
over the discount rate for ninety·day commercial paper. Secondly, the federal
statute puts a national bank on a competitive par with its state bank counterparts
by permitting a national bank that is "organized or existing" in a state to charge
the rate allowed by the state for banks organized under state law. The implica·
tions ofthese provisions for the lending acdvities ofnational banks are disclJ,Ssed
later.
The Comptroller of the Currency has adopted regulations that apply to the
service charges on deposit accounts with national banks. Under these regula.
tions, a national bank may establish "any deposit account service charge" and, if
the comptroller's rules are followed, the service charge is effective notwithstand·
ing any state law that prohibits the charge or restricts the amount of the charge."
The comptroller specifically indicated that any state law restricting such service
charges is "preempted by the comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing
the deposit·taking function of national banks. "II
Notwithstanding the comptroller's regulation and statement of intent to
preempt state law," a state court has held that the state law duty of good faith
under the UCC is a limitation on the ability of national banks to set fees for the
return of checks drawn against insufficient funds. 20 After noting that the comp-
troller had issued an interpretation clarifying that the comptroller did not intend
the rule itself to preempt state law but rather intended only to express the
position that the federal statutory scheme preempts state laws that "prohibit or
limit the amount ofa national bank's deposit account service charges," the court
held that the rule did not immunize a national bank from its obligations under
general contract law -and the vce to act in good -faith in setting charges for

tlI2 USC § 85 (1982). When the state law does not fix a rate of interest that may be
charged, the federal statute allows a national banlc to charge a rate "not exceeding 7 per
centum, or I per centum in excess ofthe discount rate on ninely-day commercial paper in
effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located,
whichever may be the greater, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the
days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run." Id.
"12 CFR § 7.8000 (1988).
"Yd.
11 See discussion of the federal preemption doctrine in Chapter 14.
"Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 30.3 Or. 557, 563-566, 739 P2d 554, 560-563
(1987).
, 26.0212][a] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-10

checks drawn against insufficient funds." The court said that the comptroller's
interpretation preempted only state laws that prohibited the charge or that
limited or restricted the amount of the charge. The doctrine of good faith did not
offend these constraints, because it allowed a bank to charge any amount so long
as it is within the reasonable expectations ofdepositors and in accordance with
contractual procedures that meet the obligation of good faith. 22
Federal law also provides a penalty for violation of the federal statute
limiting the interest that a national bank may charge. A violation of the federal
statute, "when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture ofthe entire interest
which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been
agreed to be paid thereon."" When the person has paid the interest in a case
where a national bank has charged a rate in violation ofthe law, the person who
has paid it may recover "twice the amount of the interest thus paid from 'the
[national bank] taking or receiving the same...."2< The federal penalty provision
preempts state law penalties for usury violations. According to the Washington
Supreme Court, the preemption of the state law does not prevent a state from
awarding attorney fees in connection with usury litigation, because the award of
attorney fees is regarded as a cost of litigation, not a penaity.2'
The Comptroller of the Currency also has regulations dealing with other
aspects ofinterest charges by national banks. The regulations clarify the applica-
tion ofthe most favored lender doctrine, discussed in the section that follows. 26
The regulations also permit a national bank to take "as consideration for a loan a
share in the profit, income or earnings from a business enterprise of a bor-
rower. "21 The share may be "in addition to or in lieu ofinteres I. "21 When such an
interest is taken, the borrower's obligation to repay the principal amount of the
loan "shall not be conditioned upon the profit, income or earnings of the
business enterprise.'>29

21 rd. at 60S, 739 P2d at 562, The comptroller's interpretation is reported at 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,238 (1984).
:l2ld. See also Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 923-924, 702 P2d 503,
513-514,216 Cal. Rptr. 345, 355-356 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 US 1001 (1986),
where the California Supreme Court held that a cause of action for unconscionable
conduct was established by allegations that a California bank's customen were charged
$6.00 for each check drawn on insufficient funds, although the cost to the bank of
processing such checks was only $0.30.
2' 12 USC § 86 (1982).
241d. The action must be brought within two years from the time of the usurious
transaction. Id.
2' Detonics ',45' Associates v. Bank ofCa!., 97 Wash. 2d 351, 354, 644 P2d 1170,
1173 (1982).
21 12 CPR § 7.7310 (I 988).
21 12 CPR § 7.7312 (1988).
2·ld.
2tld.
26-11 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.02[2J(b]

The comptroller's regulation on fees for credit reports or credit investiga-

tions of a borrower permits a national bank to charge a fee in addition to the
highest rate of interest pennitted under state law, thus clarifying that such fees
ordinarily will not be treated as part ofinterest. The ability ofa national bank to
make such additional charges is "subject to contrary or limiting state
statute.... "'0

[b} Most Favored Lender Doctrine. As discussed earlier, the interest rate that a
national bank may charge is statutorily related to the interest rate pennitted in
the state in which the bank is located, unless there is federal preemption. Courts
have interpreted this incorporation of state interest rates as pennitting a
national bank to charge the same rate as any similarly situated lender within the
state. This so-called most favored lender doctrine will sometimes allow a
national bank to charge a higher. rate of interest than that charged by state
banks.~l
The Comptroller of the Currency has adopted a regulation that pennits a
national bank to charge interest at the rate pennitted by state law to state-
licensed small loan companies or similar institutions for the class of loans
specified by the state statute. ~2 The regulation further provides that the national
bank will be subject only to the provisions of state law that are "material to the
determination of the interest rate" for such class of10ans.:13 The national bank
does not have to be licensed under state law in order to qualify to charge the rate
for such loans. If the state denies the usury defense to corporate borrowers,
national banks may charge corporate borrowers any rate of interest agreed
upon. M

~12 CPR § 7.7315 (1988).

.. ~ Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat') Bal\k &. Trust Co., 464 F2d &55, &64
(6th Cir. 1972). See generally Arnold & Rohner, "The Most Favored Lender Doctrine for
Federally Insured Financial Institutions-What Are lIS Boundaries?" 31 Catb. UL Rev. I
(1981).
12
12 CFR § 7.7310 (1988).
331d.
3' Id. See generally Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548 F2d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher
v. First Nat') Bank, 538 F2d )284, ) 288 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 786 (1977);
Northway Lanes v. Hackley Nat'l Bank., 464 Fld ass, &64 (6th Cir. 1911)~ Partt.in v. FiBt
Nat'l Bank, 467 F2d 167, ) 73 n.5 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Deak Nat'J Bank v. Bond, 89
Misc. 2d 95, 97, 390 NYS2d 771, 773 (NY Sup. Ct. 1976). For a discussion ofthe most
favored lender doctrine and 10 whom it applies, see Burke, "Federal Pre-Emption ofState
Usury Laws," 37 Bus. Law. 747, 764-765 (1982) (discusses wJu:ther the "most favored
lender" doctrine applies to depository institutions other than national banks); Burke &
Kaplinsky, "Unraveling the New Federal Usury Law," 37 Bus. Law. 1()79, 1094-1100
(1982).
, 26.02(211c) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-12

Ie} Interstate Credit Activities. The rate of interest that a national bank may
charge is tied to the bank's location. Under the statute, national banks may
charge interest on loans and other credit transactions at the rate allowed by the
laws of the state where the bank is located or at the rate of one percent over the
discount rate for ninety-day commercial paper at the Reserve bank in the
Federal Reserve district where the bank is located, whichever rate is greater. 35
The Supreme Court has held that a bank located in one state may "export" that
state's interest rate to other states in which the bank does business, even though
the other states have lower lending rates. The Supreme Court allowed a
Nebraska bank to charge credit-card holders in Minnesota at the interest rate
established by the laws of Nebraska, the state of the bank's location, although
Minnesota law mandated a lower rate.3I In this case, both the bank and its credit
card program were regarded as being located in Nebraska, although the bank's
service corporation would enter into agreements with banks and merchants in
Minnesota and solicit accounts of cardholders. 51
When a national bank acquires a note by assignment or transfer, the provi-
sion ofthe National Bank Act that makes the law ofthe state in which the bank is
located govern the interest rate does not apply. The transaction by the bank is
viewed as a purchase of a preexisting debt, and the lawful rate of interest
continues to be controlled by the state law that applied at the time the debt was
created.'" It is possible for the federal statute to apply when the bank discounts a
note or when the transaction was deliberately structured in this fashion to make
it appear that the bank was not the actuallender. 3I
The ability to export the interest rate ofa national bank's horne state has led
to the relocation of the credit card programs of some banks. Although the
previous case was decided before enactment of the Monetary Control Act of
1980, which substantially changed the scope of federal regulation of interest
rates by federally insured depository institutions, the provisions of the act did
not change the result reached by the court.<O
To facilitate the development ofcredit card programs that take advantage of
state laws in states with liberal interest rate controls on credit card transactions,
bank holding companies have established subsidiary banks in such states for the

35 12 USC § 85 (1982). See discussion supra 11 26.02[2]. See aeneraUy Annot., "Com-
putation ofService or Interest Charge on Bank Credit Cards as Usurious Under National
Banldns Act (12 U.S.C.S. § 85}," 38 ALR Fed. 80S (1978).
31 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 US 299, 309-310, 318
(1978); accord Fischer v. First Nat'J Bank, 548 F2d 255, 288 (7th Cir. 1977).
'7S ee Brophy, "State Usury Laws and National Banks," 31 Baylor L Rev. 169
(1979); Dobson, "Credit Cards," 1979 J. Bus. L. 33 I (1979); Note, 3 U. Ark. L. Rev. 115
(1980); Note,S J. Corp. L. 189 (1979).
"FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F2d 139, 147-149 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1981).
31Id. at 148 n.15.
411 12 USCA §§ 85, 86 (1982).
26-13 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0213)(8)

purpose ofconducting national credit card activities. Before the adoption of the
1987 amendments to the bank holding company laws. some companies estab-
lished "nonbank banks" in states with favorable interest rate laws to avoid the
problems presented by restrictions on interstate banking from locating in such
states. The 19&7 legislation deals with the use of nonbank banks to avoid
restrictions on interstate banking, but contains an important exception for
credit card banks."

[3] Federal Preemption of State Usury Law

(a) Depository Inlldtudons Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. The
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 inade
major changes in the usury limitations that apply to depository institutions ofall
kinds." The act extended the rules relating to national banles discussed previ-
ously and freed other federally regulated depository institutions from the con-
straints of state law.
The act determines what proper interest rate may be charged on loans-a
complex process. Depository institutions need to consult leia! counsel to be
certain that they are satisfying the requirements of the law. While there are
different rules for different tYl'CS-of loam, in general, the act establishes four
categories: (I) residential real property loans that are secured by first liens
(within this category there are special rules for manufactured home loans); (2)
obligations of the depository institution; (3) business and agricultural loans of
$1,000 or more;'3 and (4) other loans. The maximum interest rates vary accord-
ing to the type of loan. The role of state law varies as well. There is a federal
preemption of state interest limits, but it is not a total preemption, and the
nature of the preemption varies according to the type ofIolO." In some cases,

" This is discussed at , 6.02 on interstate bank expansion by bank holdinll companies.
See also the discussion of nonbank banks in Chapter 5 on bank holding companies. Some
states have amended their laws in an effort to court new bankini business allllfCSSively.
Delaware is one state to enact banking legislation deaianed to attract bank holdin@;
companies to locate in Delaware. One feature ofthat state's legislation is liberalization of
credit controls. See Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) at A-3 (1981).
"Pub. L. No. 96·221, 94 Stat. 132 (I 980)(codified in scattered sections of 12 USC
(1982». Preble & Herskowitz, "Recent Changes in California and Federal Usury Laws:
New Opportunities for Real Estate and Commercial Loans?" 13 Loy.!.AL Rev. I (1979);
Note, "The Federal Monetary Control Act of 1980: A Step Toward Deregulation ofState
Usury Laws," 83 W. Va. L. Rev. 509 (1981).
'3 The amount initially was set at $25,000 or more.
,. The Arkansas Supreme Coun, after initially holding the preemption provisions of
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 an unconstitutional exercise offederlil power under the
commerce clause, reversed its position on rehearing and upheld the federal act. McInnis v.
Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 508, 611 SW2d 767, 772 (1981).
'II 26.02(3J(b] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-14

the states may enact laws to override the federal rules, thus nullifying the federal
preemption.
The provisions of the act generally became effective April I, 1980. How-
ever, they do not apply to loans made before that date, except for certain
provisions on variable rate loans.'$ Some ofthe provisions of the act are perma-
nent, but others have terminated. U The provisions for business and agriculture
loans expired April I, 1983 or earlier, if the state opted to override specifically
the federal rule, as permitted under the act.
Section 501 of the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act gives the Federal Home Loan Bank Board the authority to issue rules
and to publish interpretations governing the implementation ofthe preemption
provisions of the act. C1 The Board used this authority to issue an interpretation
that the provisions of the act that preempt state laws limiting the rate ofinterest
on first mortgage residential real estate loans apply to state criminal laws. The
Board takes the position that Section 501 of the act preempts all state laws, civil
and criminal, that expressly limit the amount of interest that may be charged on
a federally related residential fim mortgage loan."
The question whether state or federal law applied in determining if a loan
was usurious was an issue in a case not involving the act. In this case, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation purchased the assets of a closed bank and then
sued under 12 USC § 1819 and 28 USC § 1345 to foreclose a mortgage it had
acquired. The defendant mortgagor tried to raise the defense that the loan
violated state usury laws. The court held, alternatively, that the state usury law
did not apply because the court'sjurisdiction was based on a federal statute and,
in any event, the defendant did not show the debt was usurious under state law
from the inception of the loan."

[b] Preemption Provisions for Specific Categories Under the Act .

[I] Residential real property loans. State law and constitutional provisions
that limit the "rate or amount of interest, discount points, finance charges, or
other charges" on residential loans do not apply if the loan is secured by a first

'$ Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 USC
§§ 86a note, I730g note, I735f·7 notes (aXI)(B), (g) (1982). See generally Burke, "Federal
Pre-Emption of State Usury Laws," 37 Bus. Law. 747 (1982).
.. 12 USC § 86a note (1982).
C1 12 USC § I735f-7 note f (1982).

"12 CFR § 590.101 (1988). The Board also has announced that it will continue to
follow the views expressed in prior interpretatior.s issued with respect to the interest
preemption legislation temporarily in effect before the Monetary Act of 1980. 12 CFR
§ 590.100 (1988). These prior interpretations can be found at 45 Fed. Rei- 2840(1980); 45
Fed. Reg. 6165 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 8000 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15,921'(1980).
"FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr.• Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1224, 1226-1227 (D. PR 1982),
afl'd on other grounds, 741 F2d 475 (1st Cir. 1984).
26-15 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS OJ 26.0213Ubl

lien on residential real property, is made after March 31, 1980, and is either
insured under the National Housing Act or made by a lender who is federally
insured or regulated institution. so Thus, no interest limitations exist with respect
to qualifying residential first mortgage loans. The benefit of the federal preemp-
tion also applies to mortgage loan transactions that are first liens on certain types
of residential cooperative housing units and on residential manufactured
homes. 51 The law allowed a state to override these provisions specifically by
enacting a measure "which states explicitly and by its terms" that the state does
not want them to apply to loans in its state. 52 This override had to have been
adopted before April I, 1983. If no override occurred, the preemption became
permanent.
Loans for residential manufactured homes, such as mobile homes, that are
secured by a first lien also are within the federal preemption of state usury laws,
but further requirements must be met for the loan to qualify for federal preemp-
tion. The loan must comply with consumer protection provisions prescribed by
the FHLBB. These regulations cover such matters as balloon payments, late
charges, notice before repossession, and interest refunds upon prepayment."
After March 31, 1980, states could further limit the application of these provi·
sions by adopting laws that limit "discount points" or other charges.·4
(U) Obliaations of depository Institutions. Effective April I, 1980, the t 980
act preempted state laws that limit interest on "any deposit or account held by,
or other obligation" ofdepository institutions that are insured under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, the Federal Credit Union Act, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act, or the National Housing Act. 55 Thus, state usury IlIWs cannot apply to
bonds and notes issued by federally insured depository institutions or to interest

5G 12 USC§ I 735f-7 note (aXI) (1982). The law and regulations of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board also permit certain other lenders to obtain the benefit of the federal
preemption. Regulations ofthe FHLBB list those who qualify. 12 CFR § 590.2(b) (1988).
Although ponions of the 1980 law expired in 1986, this did not include Section 501(a)(l)
of the act, which contains the permanent preemption rules discussed earlier. see 12 CFR
§ 590.1 (1988).
51 12 CFR § 590.3 (1987). In Bank ofNew Yorlc v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1315 (RI
1985), the coun held that the preemption ofstate usury law for residentialloans applied to
a loan issued to persons to construct a residential condominium complex of dwelling
units, which would be offered for sale to individual home buyers.
52 12 USC § 1735f-7 notes (b)(2), (b)(3}(1982). There are savings provisions for loans

entered into before adoption of the override.

51 12 USC § 1735f·7 note (c) (1982); 12 CFR § 590.4 (1988). The statute required
mobile home loans to contain provisions for refunding precomputed finance charges
when the loan is prepaid even before the regulation became effective. 12 USC § 1735£-7
note (d) (1982).
54 12 USC § 1735f-'7 note (b)(4)(1982).
5512 USC § 1735£-7 note (a)(2)(A) (1982). For the applicability to institutions in
Pueno Rico, see 12 USC §§ 1735f-7 note (a)(2)(B), 3506 note (bXII) (1982).
, 26.02f3]lbl SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-16

paid on deposits and accounts. This provision was not subject to state override
and is permanent.
[III] Business and agricultural loans of $1,000 or more. The 1980 law also
contained preemption provisions for business and agricultural loans of $1,000
or more. State laws limiting interest to less than 5 percent over the ninety-day
commercial paper rate set by the Federal Reserve bank for the Federal Reserve
district in which the person is located were preempted, and the lender could
charge interest of up to 5 percent over the ninety-day commercial paper rate. Sf
These provisions relating to business or agricultural loans became effective April
I, 1980, but are no longer in effect. They ended on either April I, 1983, or such
earlier date that the state adopted a specific legislative override. 51
[Iv] Other loans by federally iOSllled depository institutions. Federally
insured depository institutions are generally authorized to make loans at a rate
not more than one percent above the ninety-day commercial paper rate estab-
lished by the Federal Reserve, or at such higher rate as may be permitted by state
law." State laws that limit the allowable interest rate to less than one percent
over the ninety-day commercial paper rate are preempted, but the state may
override the federal preemption by adopting a measure that specifically indi-
cates that it does not want the preemption to apply.5I These provisions became
effective on April 1, 1980, and expire only when the state chooses to override
them. 50 There is no deadline for the state to act in deciding to override the federal
provisions.
The preemption rules for federally insured depository institutions give all
such federally insured institutions the benefit of the same power enjoyed by
national banks to charge interest at a rate at least as high as one percent over the
Federal Reserve ninety-day commercial paper rate." The purpose for making
the national bank rate available to these other insured depository institutions is
to avoid discriminatory treatment, particularly with respect to state-chartered
institutions. 52 The benefit of the preemption rules extends to state and federally

15 12 USC § 86(a) (1982). The loan amount was originally set at $25,000 and was later
reduced to $1,000. For a case raising questions as to the applicability of the preemption
for business loans beyond the 1983 termination date, see Union Nat'l Banlc v. Nelson, 747
F2d 310, 312-314 (5th Cir. 1984). The case involved a variaple rate note entered into
prior to the effective date of the act, but the federal preemption rule for business and
agricu!turalloans applied to variable rate loans entered into prior to the act. The court did
not have to determine for purposes ofits decision whether the variable interell rate on the
loan would continue to be subject to the protection afforded by the 1980 preemption rules
after the termination of the act's provisions on such loans in 1983. 747 F2d at 312.
17 12 USC § 86a note (1982).
I! 12 USC §§ 1730(g), 1785{g), 1831d (1982).
" 12 USC § I 730g note (1982).
'DId.
11 The law relating to national banlcs is discussed supra 'I 26.02[2J.

12See 12 USC § 183Id(a) (1982).

26-17 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0213lib1

chartered savings and loan associations that are federally insured. federally
insured state-chartered banks and mutual savings banks, and federally insured
credit unions.53 According to some authorities, these rules live all federally
insured depository institutions the "most favored lender" status that national
banks enjoy."
The federal preemption statute also imposes a penalty for knowing viola-
tions of the interest rate limits set by the statute. When there is a knowing
"taking, receiving, reserving, or charging" a higher rate of interest than the law
permits, the entire interest on the indebtedness is forfeited, or, when interest has
been paid, the person who paid may recover twice the amount of the interest
paid. IS For all types of loans, if more than one provision of law applies to the
same loan, the highest rate applies. 1f
Difficulty may arise in determining the amount of interest the federal
preemption entitles the creditor to charge. The federal statute allows the credi-

u 12 USC §§ I730(g), 1785(8), 1831 d (1982). The institutions covered include state-
chartered banks and foreign banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
12 USC § 183 Id ( 1982); savings and loan associations, both state and federally charte~d,
that are insured by the Federal Sa"ings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 12 USC § 1730g
(I 982); and credit unions insured by the National Credit UnionSha~ Insurance Fund. 12
USC § 1785(g) (1982). The language ofthe latter provision appears to cover both state and
federally chartered credit unions, but a question has been raised as to whether federally
chartered credit unions qualify. See Burke, "Federal Pre-Emption ofState Usury Laws,"
37 Bus. Law. 747, 762 (1982). See also Davis v. Redstone Fed. Credit Union, 401 So. 2d
55 (Ala. 198 I). A federal district court in Puerto Rico held that a Commonwealth statute
that provided for setting maximum interest rates on retail installment contracts did not
conflict with the federal Home Owners Loan Act, under which federal savings and loan
associations are regulated. Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor v. Oriental Fed.
Sav., 648 F. Supp. 1194, 1197-1198 (1986).
National banks, of course, have always been covered by federal law, 12 USC § 85
(1982), which also authorizes interest at a rate of one percent above the federal discount
rate on ninety-day commercial paper.
Federally chartered credit unions have a specific statutory authorization to charge
interest at a rate "not to exceed 15 per centum per annum on the unpaid balance inclusive
of all finance charges ... n 12 USC § I757(5XA)(vi) (1982). The National Credit Union
Board may approve higher interest rate ceilings for periods of eighteen months when
economic circumstances require it to protect the safety and soundness ofindividual credit
unions. Id. A knowing violation ofthe rates required by law results in the forfeiture of all
interest on the debt or a right in the person who paid to recover all the interest paid. 12
USC § 1757(5)(AXvii)(1982).
14 See supra' 26.02[2][b) for a discussion ofthe most favored lender rights ofnational
banks. See generally, T. Crandall, R. Hagedorn '" F. Smith, Jr., Debtor-Creditor Law
Manual ~ 3.01(3)[b) (l9g5); Burke & Kaplinsky, "Unravelling The New Federal Usury
Law," 37 Bus. Law. 1079, 1096-1099 (1982). For an interpretation of the FHLBB
supporting this view, see [1979·80 Transfer Binder) Federal Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
, 98,447 (1980).
os 12 USC §§ 1730g(b), 178S{g)(2), I83Id(b)( 1982).
"12 USC§ I73Sf-7 note (1982).
t 26.02(3I1c) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-18

tor, under the federal rate prong of the statutory formula, to charge up to one
percent in excess ofthe discount rate on ninety-day commercial paperin effect at
the Federal Reserve banks in the Federal Reserve district when the lender is
located, but does not specify the date on which the federal discount rate shall be
ascertained. It seems reasonable to suppose that the statute means to impose a
fixed ceiling, determined as of the time the loan is made, rather than a fluctuat-
ing interest rate tied to the variations in the federal discount rate, upon all loan
transactions. Nevertheless, this is not provided for expressly in the statute.
When a lender makes a variable rate loan, there is an obvious question whether
the maximum rate to which the interest can float is set at the time the loan is
made or must be recalculated with each change in the federal discount rate as the
interest rate on the loan floats. Similarly, there is no answer to the question
whether the date for determining the federal interest rate ceiling should be.tne
date on which the loan is extended, the date on which a loan commitment is
made, or some other time. 17

(c) State Laws Overriding Federal Interest Limits. A number of states have
taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the federal law to override parts
of the federal preemption of their local usury controls. II Thus, even in transac-

67 For a &oad discussion of these and related issues, see Burke "Federal Pre-Emption
of State Usury Laws," 37 Bus. Law. 747, 760 (1982).
I I Stales that have taken action to override part or all of the federal preemption rules
are listed later. The specific state statues should be consulted for details of the override
and for action by states that may not be included in this listing. Colorado has overridden
all federal preemption ofstate usury laws. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 5-13-101-5-13-105 (Supp. 2,
1987). Georgia has overridden federal preemption of state laws relatina to loans, mort-
gages, credit sales, and advances after March 31, 1983. Ga. Code Ann. § 7-4-20 (Harrison
Supp. I 1987). Hawaii has overridden federal preemption of state usury laws regarding
residential real property loans and business and agricultural loans. Haw. Rev. Stat. ~ 478-9
(Supp. 9 1987). Idaho has overridden federal preemption of state laws relating to loans,
mortgages, credit sales, and advances. Idaho Code §28-49-1 OS (Supp. 5B 1987). Iowa has
overridden all federal preemption of state usury laws. 1980 Iowa Acts H.C. 2492, § 32; 2
Consumer Credo Guide (CCH) '116410, at 22,638 (1987). Kansas has overridden federal
preemption of state usury laws regarding residential real property loans. Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 16-207a (198 I). Maine has overridden federal preemption regarding mobile home
consumer credit transactions and first lien mortgages on real estate granted by supervised
lenders. I Consumer Credo Guide (CCH) 11 510, at 1113 (1983). Massachusetts has
overridden federal preemption of state usury laws regarding residential real property
loans, business and agricultural loans, and other loans (not including "Small Busin.ess
Investment Companies"loans); see generally IS USCA § 687(i) (West Supp. 1983). Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 183, § 63 (West Supp. 30 1988). Minnesota has overridden federal'
preemption ofstate usury laws regarding residential real property loans. Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 47.203-47.204 (West 1988). Nebraska has overridden federal preemption of state laws
relating to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-1104 (Supp.
1983). Nevada has overridden federal preemption of state usury laws regarding residen-,
tial real property loans and business and agricultural loans. 3 Consumer Credit Guide
26·19 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.02[4J

tions in which the federal preemption rules may apply, a careful check oflocal
law for a possible state override should be made. As discussed at the beginning of
this chapter, determination of the applicable legal rate of interest is often a
sophisticated legal problem, requiring familiarity with the particular circum·
stances and with local as well as federal law. It is necessary to check local statutes
and administrative rules carefully. Many state legislatures are actively engaged
in revising and eliminating existing usury provisions. Advice of legal counsel
should be obtained before setting loan rates.

14J The Prime Rate

The prime rate is the rate of interest banks charge their largest and most
creditworthy customers. It is an important economic indicator that financial
analysIS and economists use in assessing the economy. It is also used as an index
for loans and other credit transactions, with the amount of interest payable
pegged to the prime rate.
A precise definition ofwhat constitutes a bank's prime rate is elusive. Some
studies have concluded that the prime rate does not reflect the lowest interest
rates available to corporate customers." A study conducted by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System oflarge New York City banks con-
cluded that 60 percent of the banks' business loans were below prime." This
presentS obvious difficulties in interpreting loan agreements that tie the interest
rate ofthe loan to a prime rate. Care should be taken to draft loan agreements so
that they specifically slate the interest rate intended.
Controversy over the meaning to be given loan arrangements tied to the
prime rate has produced litigation. Although the law remains unsettled, with few
opinions directly addressing the merits of the issues presented, a significant
action has occurred. 71 One case charging a bank with conspiring with other

(CCH)' 6415, at 35,650 (1987). North Carolina has overridden federal preemption of
state mortgage usury laws and state loan rates by insured financial institutions and small
business investment companies. N.C. Gen: Stat. § 24·2.3 (Supp. 1986). South Carolina
has overridden federal preemption ofstate usury laws regarding residential real property
loans. 1981 S.C. Acts H.B. 2164, § 3; 4 Consumer Credo Guide (CCH)' 6422, at 48,662
(1984). South Dakota has overridden federal preemption ofstate usury laws reprding
residential real property loans, business and agricultural loans, and small business invest·
ment company loans. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 54-3-15 (Supp. 15A 1988). Wisconsin
has overridden federal preemption of state usury laws regarding extensions, modifica-
tions, renewals and refinancing onoans and new loans by federally chartered banks, credit
unions, and mutual savings banks on or after November 1, 1981 and before November I,
1984, or after October 31, 1987. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 138.041 (West Supp. 1987).
"Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) at A·3 (1981),
'0 rd.
" The press reported that seltlements have occurred in some lawsuits for millions of
dollars. Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1984, § 2, at I. See Morosani v. Fint Nat'l Bank, 703 F7.d 1220
11 26.02(4] SECURITY TRANSAcriONS 26·20

banks to set prime interest rates resulted in a judgment against the bank in
federal district court of $1.5 million, although the judgment was subsequently
set aside. 72
A number ofcases have been brought charging banks with violation ofloan
agreements with their customers, in instances where the loan documents stated
that the interest rates on the loans would be based upon the prime rate, but the
banks made loans at lower interest rates to some other customers." Various
theories have been advanced to sustain these claims.
Whatever the theory, however, it is necessary to interpret the term "prime
rate" as it is used in these loan documents. Although court cases generally refer
to the prime rate as the interest charged by large U.S. money-eenter commercial
banks to their best business borrowers,l ' few cases have carefully examined what
this language means. The leading case to address this issue is Kleiner l'. First
National Bank. 1J In Kleiner, there were two types of notes: a promissory note
class, in which the interest was stated as a designated percent "in excess of the
rate charged by the bank from time to time to its best Commercial borrowers
with respect to ninety (90) day borrowings (the 'Prime Rate')," and a real estate
note class, providing for interest at a designated percent "plus the 'prime rate'
currently charged from time to time by the bank to its best and most credit
worthy customers. "18 Plaintiffargued that these agreements required the bankto
identify its best commercial borrowers specifically and to identifY the rate it was
willing to charge those customers. The bank, on the other hand, argued that it
had no contractual limitations on the rate it charged; prime rate simply meant
"announced rate" under standard trade meaning, and the references in the notes
to "most credit worthy customers," and so forth, were "meaningless formulaic
expressions.""

(11th Cir. 1983), reversing KJeinerv. First Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (NO Ga. 1981);
Kleinerv. First Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp. 955 (NO Ga. 1984); Kleinerv. First Nat'l Bank,
97 FRO 683 (NO Ga. 1983).
"Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, ,}7 FRO 440 (D. Or. 1983), atrd and
remanded by 815 F2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987). In Wilcox, the court ultimately concluded that
the evidence did not support a finding that a conspiracy to fix the prime interest rate
existed, and it entered judgment for the defendants. Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate
Bank, 605 F. Supp. 592, 595-597 (NO Or. 1985). See Nat'l U, June 4, 1984. at 3.
13 See 41 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 780 (Nov. 21.1983); 40 Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at 909 (Apr. 25, 1983); id. No. 14 at 736 (Apr. 4, 1983). Another pending
case is Chemical Bank v. Geller, 727 F2d 61, 63-64, reh'g denied, modified, 734 F2d 132
(2d Cir. 1984).
14 E.g., Corbin v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 475 F. Supp. 1060, 1066
(SONY 1979), afrd. 629 F2d 233 (2d Cir. 1980). cen. denied, 450 US 970 (1981).
15
581 F. Supp. 955 (NO Ga. 1984).
18Id. at 957.
11 Id. at 958.
26·21 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.02(41

The Kleiner court considered the two classes of notes separately. As to the
first class, the promissory note class, the court held that the language in the note
constituted a definition of"prime rate." However, the court went on to conclude
that because it would be impossible to determine who the bank's best customers
would be in the future or for how long the rate would remain in effect without
change, the language in the note should not be read as imposing a duty on the
bank to "conduct a daily canvass of its commercial customers to ascertain who
were the most creditworthy." Yet the language should be given some meaning
that, to the coun, was an undertaking to make a "reasonable estimate of the
lowest rate it would be wiUinll to charge commercial customers on 90-day loans
for the foreseeable future, i.e., until such time as the Bank decides to reset the
prime rate," Customers could hold the bank to a duty of good faith in making
this estimate, and a claim that the bank had not made "good faith estim'ates"
would be a question offa.ct for a jury.
The real estate notes, on the other hand, did not supply a definition for
"prime rate" in the court's view. The phrase in these notes referring to the rate
"currently charged from time to time by the Bank of its best and most credit
worthy customers" was not a formula or method for arriving at the prime rate,
but a statement as to "the expected uses to which the 'prime rate' would be put."
Therefore, the language in these notes did not specify what "prime rate" meant,
and whether it should be interpreted as the rate the bank announced as the prime
rate or as the rate determined as a result of the bank's good faith estimate of the
lowest commercial rate; which meaning the parties intended was a question of
fact for the jury.
Under the Kleiner court's approach, if the plaintiffs succeeded in persuad·
ing ajury that the bank breached a duty ofgood faith in setting the prime rate, as
discussed earlier, they would be entitleli to recover for breacb of contract. The
court also noted that alternative theories might be available, such as cornmon-
law fraud and recoupment ofan overpayment. It was not necessary for the court
to pursue either of these theories. TI
In Union National Bank .... Nelson,'" the court also considered whether a
note containing a reference to a "prime rate" was too vague to be enforceable as
a variable rate loan. The case involved the application of the federal rules
preempting state usury laws in the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The court
concluded tbat the purpose of the federal preemption rules wa.s to free lenders
from the overly restrictive curbs imposed by state interest controls, and so the
terms of the note should be interpreted libera.l1y to effect the purposes of the
act!O

.. See the discussion oflender liability for breach of the duty of good faith in 1I24~02.
'"747 F2d 310, 313-314 (5th Cir. 1984).
10 This case is discussed further infra ~ 26.02(5],
~ 26.02(4} SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26·22

Some plaintiffs have raised claims under the civil provisions of the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)." Under § I 964(c) ofthe
act, treble damages are available. Two such lawsuits charged violations of Sec-
tion 1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person ... associated with any
enterprise ... to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity...." The Morosani case12
involved a claim that such a racketeering pattern existed within the meaning of
Section I 962(c), because the bank had committed two or more acts of mail fraud
by using the mails to send interest statements that were inflated. Because tbe
case was settled, the Morosani court was not called upon to decide if the plain-
tiffs claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim." 3

" 18 USC §§ 1961-1968 (1982). In one prime rate case, the court distinguished
breach ofcontract claims from RICO mail fraud violations. The court stated that although
the lender may have breached its contract in the way it interpreted its prime rate, the
borrower's allegations failed to specify misrepresentations by the lender that rose to the
level of "mail fraud" under RICO. Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Heller, 819 F2d \5\,
152-153 (6th Cir. 1987). In NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F2d 931, 934, 936 (4th Cir.
1987), the court characterized as frivolous an appeal of a dismissal ofa civil RICO fraud
case based on alleged failure to charge interest at the prime rate. The court also found that
the bank had not exercised control over the operations of the debtor by engaging in
customary borrower-lender relations.
The bank obtained summary judgment in a prime rate RICO case in Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'! Bank & Trust. Co., 662 F. Supp. 590, 595 (NO Ill. 1987). The judie held
that in order to prove a "scheme to defraud" under RICO,
[iJt is not enough that plaintiffs think the phrase [prime rateJ should be interpreted
differently or thought it was interpreted differently or even that some financial
institution defined similar terms somewhat differently.... To prevail, plaintiffs
would need to establish that the phrase had a commonly understood meaning upon
which they relied and that ANB defined it differently without so disclosing for the
purpose of defrauding them.
12 Morosani v. FiTSt Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp. 945 (NO Ga. 1984). See also Morosani
v. First Nat'l Bank, 539 F. Supp. 1171 (NO Ga. 1982). See generally Patton, "Civil Rico:
Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy," 14 Tex. Tech. L. Rev.
377 (1983).
13 Also of interest is a case involving a RICO violation relating to the charging of
interest that violated slate usury laws. The Second Circuit held that a RICO violation of
collecting an unlawful debt does not require proof of a criminal viOlation, because the
statute requires only showing the transaction was "unenforceable under State or Federal
law in whole or in part as to the principal or interest because ofthe laws relating to usury."
Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nafl Bank, 155 F2d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 19&5)
(quoting I & USC § 1961(6». Thus, there is no basis for requiring proof of a prior
conviction ofthe defendant for usury even under the principles established by the Second
Circuit in the Sedima case. The court also concluded that the statute oflimitations in such
a case should not be the one-year state statute governing recovery of overcharges of
interest, because RICO was "concerned with evils far more significant than the simple
practice of usury." The more appropriate statute was the three-year limitation period
provided for actions to enforce a liability created by statute. Id. at 248-249.
26-23 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS t 26.0215}

(5) Variable Rate and Other Nontraditional Mortgage Transactions

Federally chanered housing lenders, such as federal savings and loan
associations and national banks, have offered mongages to their borrowers that
do not follow the traditional pattern ofa fixed interest rate, level payments, and
fully amortized debt. They make mongage loans where the interest rate is
adjustable during the life oftbe loan, the debt may mature before full amoniza·
tion, and other flexible features may exist. Authority to engage in such nontradi-
tional mOI18age transactions is not available under state law for many state-
chanered housing creditors.
The Gam-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 eliminates any
favored position that the federal institutions have to engage in such nontradi-
tional"altemative mortgage transactions," by providing for the preemption of
state laws that limit the state institutions." Under the Gam-St Germain Act,
state-chartered depository institutions and other housing creditors may engage
in alternative mongage transactions in the same manner as federally chanered
institutions by following the regulations applicable to the federal institutions,as
States that do not want their state-chanered institutions to have this authority
may override the federal authorization by enacting legislation or by having their
electors adopt a provision that "states explicitly and by its terms that such State
does not want the preemption provided {by the actl to apply" to transactions in
such state, The states had three years, until October 15, 1985, to reject the
authority granted by the act. II
The Gam-5t Germain Act authorized national banks to make real estate
loans subject to such terms and conditions as the Comptroller of the Currency
might establish by order, rule, or regulation. This provision gave the comptroller
authority to adopt regulations dealing with adjustable-rate mongages. The
comptroller had adopted regulations permitting national banks to make adjusta-
ble-rate mongages prior to the effective date of the Gam-St Germain Act. The
comptroller took the position that these regulations preempted state laws, such
as usury limitations, that restricted the ability of national banks to make loans
pursuant to the comptroller's regulation. Thus, the comptroller claimed author-
ity to override state law, even without the Gam-St Germain legislation.
In Coriference ofthe State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, a7 the coun upheld
the comptroller's authority to adopt these regulations, preempting state law. The

In another civil RICO case, a coun ruled that charging a usurious rate ofinterest does
not constitutl:la predicate act ofan "unlawful debt" as long as the interest is less than the
statutorily prohibited rate of "twice the enforceable rite." Blount Fin. Servs. v, Heller,
819 F2d 151 (6th Cir. 1987)(citing 18 USCA § 1961(6».
"Pub. L. No. 97·320, § 802, 96 Stat. 1469 (I 982)(codified at 12 USC §§ 3801-3803).
u 12 USC § 3803 (1982).
lal2 USC § 3804(8) (1982).
17 228 App. DC 367, 373-374,710 F2d 878, 884-885 (1983).
1126.02(5] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-24

court held that the former provisions of 12 USC § 371(g), which allowed the
comptroller to establish regulations governing real estate loans and a general
grant of authority to issue rules and regulations in 12 USC § 93(a),·· provided
independent statutory authority for the regulations issued by the comptroller.
Among the miscellaneous provisions in Title XII ofthe Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act of 1987 is a provision on adjustable rate mortgage loans. This
section requires creditors who originate adjustable rate mortgage loans to
include a limitation on the maximum interest rate that may apply during the
term ofthe loan." The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to adopt regulations
to implement this rule. Violations are treated in the same manner as violations
of the Truth-in-Lending Act. This rule applies to "creditors." A creditor is a
person who "regularly extends credit for personal, family, or household pur-
poses....; an adjustable rate mortgage loan is "any loan secured by a lien on a one.
to four-family dwelling unit ... where the loan is made pursuant to an agreement
under which the creditor may, from time to time, adjust the rate of interest.""
A federal case involving the Monetary Control Act of 198012 considered
whether a note was in fact a variable rate loan. The note rontained language that
made the initial interest rate subject to "annual review by Payee, and adjustment
ifindicated by increase in Prime Rate...•• Ifthe note was a variable rate loan, the
provisions of the 1980 act that preempted state usury limits on business and
agricultural loans would apply, and the rate charged would not be illegal. The
debtor argued that the provision. should not apply, because the term was too
vague to be enforceable as a variable rate clause. The note itself had no formula
for determining the interest rate, and there was no index tying the rate to a prime
rate or identifying the "prime rate" to which the note referred. The court
rejected the argument and held that the note qualified as a variable rate note
although it was "not precisely indexed to the market." The court reasoned that
the debtor had not shown "that there is any legal barrier-other than the usury
laws-to the right of a bank or other holder of a note to adjust unilaterally the
rate of interest on a loan when those are the terms to which the parties agree.....
Given the purpose ofthe federal statute to liberate lending from the constraints
of state usury limitations, the court concluded that

II Adopted as Section 708 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary

Control Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96·221, 94 Stat. 132 (J 980).
··Competitive Equality Banking ActofJ 987, Pub. 1. No. 100-86, § 1204(a), 101 Stat.
5S I (hereinafter CEBA).
"CEBA § 1204{d).
"CEBA § 1204{d)(2). It includes loans for a condominium unit, cooperative housing
unit. or mobile home.
12 See discussion supra' 26.02[2).
··Union Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 747 F2d 310, 31.0-311 (5th Cir. 1984).
"747 F2d at 314.
26-25 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 1126.03

The legal definition of variable rate ought to be read expansively, and the
precise mechanics of relating rate to market ought to be viewed as matters of
contractual negotiation rather than as definitional limits upon the legal
status of variable rate notes. Here [the bank's} unilateral right to adjust the
interest charge is limited in some sense by the prime rate, although the
precise contours oftha! limit are matters ofcontractual interpretation, as is
the issue of which 'prime rate' is referenced by the agreement. Whatever be
the answers to these contractual questions, the note remains variable in the
federal sense. 15

1126.03 CREDIT DISCLOSURE REGULATION: TRUTH-IN-

LENDINGACf
Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is popularly referred to as the
Truth-in-Lending Act." This act imposes an obligation on each creditor who
enters into a consumer credit transaction or consumer lease to disclose certain
specific information concerning the terms of the transaction to the consumer
who is obligated. '1 The form of disclosure required is regulated by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System." The statutes provide only a basic
framework. The precise duties placed on creditors can be understood only by
reference to the detailed provisions of the Board's regUlations.
The approach of the Truth-in-Lending Act is to force disclosure of credit
terms. The act does not require a creditor to extend credit on any particular
terms; credit may be extended at any legal rate as long as the disclosures man-
dated by truth in lending are made. The phUosophy underlying this approach is
that adequate disclosure will enable consumers to judge for themselves the
desirability ofentering into any particular credit transaction and to shop among
creditors for the best terms. Whether or not this is a realistic philosophy is a
matter of some dispute.
In 1976, the Truth-in-Lending Act was amended to cover most consumer
lease transactions involving not more than $25,000. Although prior to the 1976
amendments, lease transactions that were the equivalent of credit sales were

HId.
"IS USC § 1601 note (1982).
•715 USC 163I(a)(1982).
"IS USC §§ 1604,1631,1632 (1982). The Board', regulations are contained in
Regulation Z, 12 CFR pI. 226 (1988). The Board also issues interpretations ofRegulation
Z. In Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F2d 971, 976-977, reh'gdenied, S021'ld
1167 (5th Cir. 1974), the coun hetd tbat Board interpretations should be given "great
deference." After the revision of Regulation Z to incorporate !he Simplification and
Reform Act Amendments, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board publi,hed a commen-
tary explaining the requirements ofthe new regulation. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,288 (Oct. 9, 1981).
The staff commentary is revised periodically. 12 CPR pt. 226, (Supp.'I 1988).
If 26.03(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-26

subject to the act's disclosure requirements,'· the 1976 leasing provisions greatly
extended tne scope of the act. In 1980, Congress enacted the Truth-in-Lending
Simplification and Reform Act as part of the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act.'oo Except for provisions giving the enforcement
agencies the power to require creditors to make restitution to consumers, the
Simplification and Reform Act became effective October I, 1982. One feature of
the Simplification and Reform Act is a requirement that the Federal Reserve
Board issue model disclosure forms. Although creditors are not required to use
the model forms, they will be automatically in compliance with the disclosure
provisions of the act if they do.,.,

(IJ Scope and Requirements of the Act

The Truth-in-Lending Act provides that "a creditor or lessor shall disclose
to the person who is obligated on a consumer lease or a consumer credit transac-
tion the information" required to be disclosed by the act.' 02 By these terms,
disclosures will be required of a "creditor" or "lessor" when there is either a
"consumer lease" or a "consumer credit transaction." Consumer lease credit
disclosures are discussed later in this chapter. This section and the intervening
ones discuss consumer credit transactions.
Regulation Z provides a general description of the transactions to which the
disclosure requirements apply by listing the following four elements:

"IS USC § 1602(g) (1982). See infra 126.03[3J.

100 Although a lender had an option, during the transition period for revisions to the
Truth-in-Lending Act, to comply with either the former regulations under the act or the
new regulations, the lender had to elect one or the other and could not choose to use those
provisions from each that the lender found most beneficial. Cox v. First Nat'l Banlc, 751
F2d 815, 820-821 (6th Cir. 1985).
See generally Boyd, "The Truth·in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act-A
Much Needed Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come," 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1-85, 549
(1982); Griffith, "Closed-End Transactions and the Revised Truth in Lending-Some
Highlights," 33 Mercer L. Rev. 723 (1982): Pettit, "Representing Consumer Defendants
in Debt Collection Actions: The Disclosure Defense Game," 59 Telt. L. Rev. 255 (1981);
Sasamoto, "Rescission Under the Truth.in-Lending Act: Protecting Debtor and Creditor
Alike," 20 Urb. L. Annot. 169 (1981); Murphy, "aass Actions Under the Truth in
Lending Act," 26 Loy. L. Rev. 333 (1980); Note, "Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act: Changes Affecting Disclosure Requirements in Home Mortgage Transac-
tions," 12 St. Mary's U 1130 (1981). .
'0'15 USC §§ 1604(b), 1604(d) (1982). For an excellent discussion of the Truth-in-
Lending Act, see Landers, "The Scope of Coverage ofthe Truth-in-Lending Act," 1976
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 565 (1976).
'02 15 USC § 1631 (a) (1982). See generally Annot., "Lease with Option to Purchase
Agreement as Credit Sale or Consumer Lease Under Definitions in Truth-in-Lending Act
(15 USC §§ 1602(g), 1667(1); and Applicable Regulations)," 58 ALR Fed. 929 (1982).
26-27 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.03(1)

1. The credit is offered or extended to a consumer;

2, The individual or business offering or extending the credit does so
"regularly":
3, "The credit is subject to a finance charge or is payable by a written
agreement in more than 4 installments";
4. "The credit is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. "1113

The four elements referred to in the regulation summarize the requirements

set forth in the definitions of"consumer credit," "creditor," and "credit" in the
act and in the regulations. For example, consumer credit is "credit" that is
"offered or extended" to a "consumer," "primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. "'04 Further, a consumer must be a natural persOn. 105
Altbough at one time the classification ofconsumer uses included "agricultural
purposes," the Simplification and Reform Act deleted "agricultural purposes"
from the definition of "consumer credit." Because the requirement is only that
the consumer purpose be the "primary" purpose, there may be transactions
within the disclosure requirements of the act for which there is a mixture of
business and consumer purposes. A person might acquire a personal computer,
for example. for both personal and business uses. The Official Commentary to
Regulation Z stated that "[t]here is llG1'feCfse test for whfttconstitutes credit
offered or extended for personal, family, or household purposes, nor for what
constitutes the primary purpose."'"
The definition of "creditor" is more involved.,or To begin with, the creditor
must be someone who "regularly" extends consumer credit. Although the act
does not quantify what is meant by "regularly," the regulations do, and there is a
numerical test based on the number of extensions of credit made during the
preceding year for determinin& whether the creditor "regularly" extends
credit. '01 As a result, the individual who extends credit in isolated or casual
instances will not be subject to the requirements of the act.
Additionally, there must be a transaction involving either a finance charge
for tbe credit given or an installment payment 8rran&ement in which there is a

03
' 12 CFR § 226.l(c)(I) (1988). When a financial institution mates a mortgage loan
\0 a developer knowina tbat a consumer will assume the loan from the developer, the
disclosure requiremenU of the Truth-in-Lending Act apply. Adiel v. Chase Fed. Sav. &.
Loan Ass'n, 810 F2d 1051, 1054 {11th Cir. 1987}.
'04 J 2 CFR § 226.2(a)(12) (1988).
'05 12 CPR § 226.2{II) (1988).
,.. Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z § 2(a)(12), 12 CPR pI. 226, (Supp. I,
., 2{a)(I2) 1988).
'07 See generally Annot., "Who is 'Creditor' Within Meaning ot' § I03{f) ofTruth-in.
Lending Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1620(1)," 28 ALR Fed. 548 (1976).
'GO 12 CFR § 226.2{a)( 17) n.3 {19S8}.
'i\ 16.03[1[ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26·28

written agreement to pay in more than four installments.'1It When there is an

express finance charge imposed for the credit, "the obligation to pay the finance
charge need not be in writing" for the act to apply. When the transaction
involves payments of more than four installments without a stated finance
charge, the agreement must be written." O Thus, the transaction must be either
one in which there is an expressly stated finance charge that is oral or written or
one in which there is a series of installments. In the absence of the installment
payment provision, the coverage of the act could be avoided by changing the
form of an installment contract from one in which an interest rate or a finance
charge is expressly stated to one in which the charge is bidden by inclusion in the
amount of the installments, rather than set out separately.
A creditor under the definition may be a seller as well as a lender. (A credit
sale is defined as a sale where the seller is a creditor.)'" The official commentary
makes clearthat if the seller is one who directs or assists the consumer purchaser
in obtaining a loan with a financial institution in which the consumer obtains "a
direct loan from a financial institution and the consumer's note is payable to the
financial institution, the transaction is a loan and only the financial institution is
a creditor." ... Before 1982, the act included in its definition of "creditor"
persons who regularly "arranged" for the extension ofconsumer credit, but the
1982 revision to the definition eliminated the reference to "arrangers.""3
The creditor must also be a person "to whom the obligation is initially
payable, either on the face ofthe note or contract, or by agreement when there is
no note or contract. "'14 Under this definition, a person is a creditor although the
person subsequently assigns the obligation to another. In fact, the official com-
mentary includes, within its definition of a creditor, a person who "simultane-
ously assigns" an obligation to a financial institution, and it gives as an example
an arrangement between an auto dealer and a bank in which the dealer uses
contracts supplied by the bank that make the buyer's obligation payable to the
dealer, but with immediate assignment to the bank. The dealer is a creditor
because the obligation is initially payable on its face to the dealer, even though

1011
12 CFR § 226.2(a)(17) (1988).
"·Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z § 2{a)(17}, 12 CPR pt. 226 (Supp. I
~ 2(a}(l7) 1988}. The commentary also provides that "[ajletterthat merely confinns an
oral agreement does not constitute a written agreement for purposes ofthe definition."Id
111 12 CPR § 226.2(a)(1 6} (1988).

"'Official Staff Commentary § 2(a)(16), 12 CPR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).

113
15 USC § 1602(1) (1982); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 US ISS, 158
(J 981). For a description.of the prior history of this proVision, see Boyd, "The Truth-in.
Lending Simplification and Reform Act-A Much-Needed Revision Whose Time Has
Finally Come," 23 Ariz. L Rev. I, 19 (1981).
". 12 CPR § 226.2(a)(17)(i) (1988).
26-29 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 1I 26.03{1]

the contract between the dealer and the buyer may not be executed until the bank
gives its credit approval. t15
When there are two or more creditors in the transaction, only one set of
disclosures should be given, and the creditors must agree as to who among them
will provide the disclosure. However, all of the creditors to whom the regulation
applies remain respOnsible."' Special rules exist for transactions involving
credit cards. 111
The disclosure under the act must be made "to the person who is obligated
on a consumer lease or a consumer credit transaction•.. ,,,m When there is more
than one obligor in a transaction, the creditor may make only one disclosure "if
the obligor given disclosure is a primary obligor."'" At the creditor's option,
disclosure may be made to additional obligors. When a right of rescission is
involved, the creditor must make the disclosures to each consumer who .has a
right to rescind. Otherwise, according to the official commentary, it is enough to
make a disclosure to either obligor on a joint account or to either of two joint
obligors as long as the disclosure is given to an obligor with "primary" liability
on the obligation. Disclosure to sureties and guarantors does not suffice.120
Credit is defined as "the riabt to defer payment ofdebt or to incur debt and
defer its payment. "'2' The previous discussion, as to who is a "creditor," pro-
vides assistance in determining what is meant by "credit," Additionally, the
Official Staff Interpretations identify cenain transactions that the Federal
Reserve Board views as not constituting credit transactions. These transactions
include the following:

1. Layaway plans where the consumer is not legally obligated to continue

making payment;
2. Certain debts created involuntarily, including tax liens, tax assessments,
court judgments, and court approvals of reaffirmation of debts in bank·

1110fficiAl Staff Commentary § 2(a)(17)(i)(2), 12 CPR pI. 226 (Supp. 1 t 988). Com·
pare Ford Motor Credit, supra note 113. interpreting a prior version ofthe acl. Because the
oblisation is not "initially payable" to the assignee, the assignee does not have the
rcsponsibilities of a "creditor" under the current version of the act and regulations.
11115 USC § 1631 (b)(1982); 12 CPR §§ 226.S{d), 226.17(d)(1987). Both the regula-
tions provide that when there are multiple creditors "only one set of disclosures shaJl be
given and the creditors shall alTee among themselves which creditor must comply ...."
See also the Official Commentary, which interprets the regulation as requiring only one
disclosure.
117 Credit cards are discussed in Chapter lB.
111\5 USC § 1631(8) (1982).
"'Id.
120 12 CFR §§ 226.5(d), 226,1 7(d) (1987); Official StafTCommentary§§ S(d), 17(d), 12
CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).
1~112 CPR § 226.2(a)(14) (1988).
, 26.03(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-30

ruptcy, so long as there is no third party utilized by the consumer to

finance such obligations;
3. Insurance plans in which each premium purchases an amount of future
insurance coverage as long as there is no legal commitment to continue
making payments;
4. Progress payments on home improvement transactions where payments
are made as the work progresses with no obligation to continue making
payments;
S. Borrowing against "the accrued cash value of an insurance policy or a
pension account, if there is no independent obligation to repay";
6. Letters of credit;
7. Entering into option contracts;
8. "Investment plans in which the party extending capital to the consumer
risks the loss of the capital advanced"; and
9. Mortgage assistance plans administered by a government agency, where
there is a subsidy to the consumer for which no finance charge is imposed
on the subsidy amount, and the subsidy amount "is due in a lump-sum
payment on a set date or upon the occurrence of certain events. "122
The regulation also exempts from its coverage transactions that fall into
certain categories. The exempt transactions are the following:
1. Business, commercial, agricultural, or organizational credit. This cate-
gory covers credit extended "primarily" for these purposes and credit
extended to entities "other than a natural person," such as government
agencies. 123
2. Credit over $25,000 that is not secured by real property or a dwelling.
This includes both extensions of credit and circumstances in which there
is "an express written commitment to extend credit in excess of
$25,000." The reference to "dwelling" includes "personal property used
or expected to be used as the principal dwelling ofthe consumer," so that
mobile homes, which might be categorized under local tax law as per-
sonal property, would not be exempt.
3. Public utility credit. This applies to credit extended for public utility
services, where the credit arrangements are "filed with or regulated by
any government unit." It does not include "the financing of durable
goods or home improvements by a public utility...."

Staff Commentary §§ 2(a)(14), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp.11988).

122 Official
123 See generally Annot., "What Constitutes 'Business or Commercial' Purpose
Within Meaning of § 104(1) ofTruth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1063(1» Exempting
Business or Commercial Credit Transactions From Act," 54 ALR Fed. 491 (1981).
26-31 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.03(2)(a)

4. Securities or commodities accounts. Transactions with a broker-dealer

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission are exempt.
S. Home fuel budget plans. The purchase of home fuels under an install-
ment agreement where no fmance charge is imposed. This permits utili-
ties to charge for seasonal fuel bills by billing arrangements that spread
the charges over the year.
6. Student loan programs that provide guaranteed student loans under
federal law. 1\4

12] Closed-End and Open-End Credit Arrangements

The disclosures required by the Truth-in-Lending Act vary, depending on
whether the credit extended is classified as "closed-end" or "open-end." Open-
end credit is credit extended under an arrangement in which the creditor con-
templates repeated transactions. A finance charge is generally computed from
time to time on the outstanding balance of the credit, and the amount ofcredit
that may be extended to the consumer continues to be available up to the credit
line approved whenever the debtor reduces tbe outstanding balance. 12I A com-
mon example of an open-end credit plan is the revolving charge account in
which the holder of the account has discretion to make installment payments on
the outstanding obligations.
Closed-end credit is dermed simply as credit other than open-end credit.'M
It is credit tbat is extended for a specific period of time. The total amount of
credit is fixed, and the dates when payment is due are established in advance.
Closed-end credit arrangements are discussed first.

(a] Closed-End Credit Disclosure Requirements. In closed-end consumer

credit transactions, the creditor as a general rule must make the required disclo-
sures to the consumer "before consummation of the transactions."'lT Consum-
mation does not occur until "the time tbat a consumer becomes contractually
obligated on a credit transaction. "'21 The time at which a contractual commit-
ment arises is a matter decided by state law, but under the act it must be a legal
obligation to enter into a credit arrangement. For example, although a consumer
may become obligated to purchase an item and to make a down payment on it,
there is no "consummation" ofa credit transaction until the consumer becomes

"'12 CFR § 226.3 (1988). See 1S USC § 1603 (Supp. IV 1986).

125
12 CFR § 226.2(20) (1988) (Regulation Z). See Icnerally Annot., "Validity and
Construction of Revolving Charge Account Contract or Plan," 41 t,\LR3d 682 (1972).
121 12 CFR § 226.2(10) (1988).
127 12 CFR § 226. 17(b) (1988).
21
' 12 CFR § 226.2(a)(J 3) (1988).
11 26.03{2)[aJ SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-32

obligated to accept a credit arrangement. m There are special timing rules when
the credit transaction involves a real estate mortgage that is covered by the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act.
There is one very limited situation in which the creditor may delay making
disclosure until the time that the first payment becomes due. This circumstance
exists when the consumer makes a mail or a telephone request for credit that the
creditor had not solicited by prior face-to-face or telephone contact, and for
which the credit information (for "representative amounts or ranges of credit")
had been previously supplied either to the individual consumer or to the public
generally, through catalogs, brochures, advertisements, or similar material. The
exception does not apply when the creditor has solicited the request for credit
through a direct face-to-face contact or by telephone.'3O
The form of the disclosures is important. As the regulations provide:
(I) The creditor shall make the disclosures required . . . clearly and
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep. The
disclosures shall be grouped together, shall be segregated from everything
else, and shall not contain any information not directly related to the
disclosures required.... The itemization ofthe amount financed ... must be
separate from the other disclosures under that section.
(2) The terms 'finance charge' and 'annual percentage rate,' when
required to be disclosed . . . together with a corresponding amount or
percentage rate, shall be more conspicuous than any other disclosure, except
the creditor's identity. '3'

Thus, the disclosures must (1) be clear and conspicuous; (2) be segregated and
grouped together; (3) contain only information directly related to the required
disclosures; and (4) provide for more conspicuous display when a "finance
charge" and an "annual percentage rate" must be displayed.
The information disclosed must be based on the legal obligations of the
parties. This is normally what is contained in the written terms of the note or
contract, but those terms may be modified. Not every informal modification
affects the duty to disclose. As the official commentary explains, "If the parties
informally agree to a modification of the legal obligation, the modification
should not be reflected in the disclosures unless it rises to the level ofa change in .
the terms of the legal obligation." Unenforceable oral modifications do not
require a change in the information disclosed under this test. Additionally, an
informal creditor practice of allowing consumers to defer payments for holiday
season or because of seasonal employment does not necessitate a change in the

." Official Staff Interpretations § 2(a)( 13), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).
130
12 CFR § 226.17(g) (1988).
m 12 CFR § 226. 17(a) (J 988).
26-33 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS " 26.03[2I1al

information required to be disclosed from that contained in the regular payment

plan under the contract. 133
There are times when a creditor will be required to disclose information
without knowing what the amount will be for the item that must be disclosed.
The cost of insurance that will be obtained from third parties or the amount of
taxes or other fees may be unknown at the time at which the creditor must
disclose. In these cases, the credi tor may estimate the amount "based on the best
information reasonably available," but the creditor must label the disclosure as
an estimate, and may have to supply more accurate infonnation later. 133 Also,
when events occur after a creditor has delivered a disclosure to the consumer
that make the delivered disclosure inaccurate, there is no violation ofthe disclo-
sure provisions, although there may be a need to make a new disclosure to
correct the inaccuracy.'34 New disclosures are required when the creditor' refi-
nances an existing obligation and when there is an assumption by a new
consumer of an obligation relating to a residential mortgage transaction."5
There are numerous special rules to take account ofsituations where there is
an irregularity in the payment schedule, where the obligation is payable on
demand, where there is an arrangement for a series ofadvances, and so forth.'·
The treatment of complex financing arrangements involving wraparound loans,
adjustable rate mortgages, and the like also is the subject of Official Staff
Interpretations. U7
The regulations prescribe that the following information must be disclosed
when it is relevant to the transaction:

I. The identity of the creditor.

2. The amount financed, calculated by fint determining the principal loan
amount or casl) price and then subtracting any down payment; adding
other amounts financed that are not part of the finance charae; and
subtracting any prepaid finance charge.
3. There must be an itemization of the amount financed, in writing, that
shows the amount ofany proceeds distributed directly to the consumer;
the amount credited on the account of the consumer to the creditor;
amounts paid to other persons on the consumer's behalf; and the pre-
paid finance charge. The consumer may waive the right to receive this
itemization in writing.

Staff Interpretations § 17(c)(I), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp. 11988).

132 Official
133
12 CFR § 226.17(c)(2) (1988). See Official Staff Interpretations § 226.17(c), 12
CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988); 12 CFR §§ 226. t 1(0, 226.19 (1988).
'34 12 CFR § 226.I1(e) (1988).
135 12 CFR § 226.20 (1988).
"8 See 12 CFR § 226.17(c) (l988).
'37 See Official Staff Interpretations § 1?(e)( I), 12 CFR pt. 226 (SuPp. I 1988).
'II 26.03(2][a} SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-34

4. The finance charge "using that term, and a briefdescription such as 'the
dollar amount the credit will cost you.'"
5. The annual percentage rate "using that term, and a brief description
such as 'the cost of your credit as a yearly rate.' ..
6. The creditor must disclose information relating to the circumstances
under which the rate may increase and the extent of the increase.
7. The payment schedule (number, amounts, and timing of payments).
8. The total of payments "using that term, and a descriptive explanation
such as 'the amount you will have paid when you have made all sched-
uled payments.'"
9. The existence of an obligation to pay on demand when that is the case.
10. The total sale price "using that term and a descriptive explanation
(including the amount of any down payment) such as 'the total price of
your purchase on credit, including your down payment of$ .'" The
total sale price is the sum ofthe cash price, other amounts that are being
financed but that are not part of the finance charge, and the finance
charge.
11. The information concerning the possible assessment of a prepayment
penalty or a possible rebate offinance charges, on prepayment, depend-
ing on the type of credit transaction.
12. The charges for late payments.
13. "The fact that the creditor has or will acquire a security interest in the
property purchased as part of the transaction, or in other property
identified by item or type."
14. The premiums for insurance that are not part of the finance charge.
15. The amount of certain charges and fees relating to the security interest
taken to secure the obligation.
16. A statement advising the consumer to consult the contract for informa-
tion about the consumer's rights regarding "nonpayment, default, the
right to accelerate the maturity of the obligation, and prepayment
rebates and penalties."
17. A statement explaining whether subsequent purchasers ofthe dwelling
from the consumer may assume the obligation on the original terms
when a residential mortgage transaction is involved.
18. A statement that the annual percentage rate does not take into account
the effect ofthe deposit when the credit requires a deposit as a condition
to the transaction. 1:11

1:1112 CFR § 226.18 (1988).

26-35 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.031211b)

(b] Open-End Credit Disclosure Requirements. With open-end credit, as dis-

cussed previously, repeated credit transactions are anticipated in situations
where additional credit will be extended. Thus, for transactions in this category,
the regulations require that the creditor provide an initial disclosure statement
before any transaction with the consumer occurs, followed by subsequent per;-
odic statements at the end of each billing cycle. 19
The initial disclosure statement must be supplied "before the first transac-
tion is made under the plan (for open-end credit]."'· Under the Official Staff
Interpretations, certain revocable events may occur prior to the consumer's
receipt of the disclosure statement. The creditor may collect a membership fee
without having first submitted the disclosure statement, as long as the consumer
can reject the credit plan and receive a refund of the fee. A creditor may·give a
cash advance check to a consumer simultaneously with the disclosure statement
without violating the timing requirement as long as the consumer is entitled to
return the advance check without further obligation. The creditor may charge
application fees of the type that are not regarded as part ofthe finance charges
prior to delivering the disclosure statement. The creditor may activate an
account suspended for violation ofcredit limits, and so on, without supplying a
new initial disclosure statement; however, when a closed account is reopened,
the creditor must give a new statement. Also, when closed-end credit is con-
verted to an open-end plan, the creditor must give the initial disclosures
required under the regulation. 141
The timing ofthe periodic disclosure statements is leeyed to the billing cycle.
The creditor must "mail or deliver a periodic statement .•. for each billing cycle
at the end of which an account has a debit or credit balance of more than $1 on
which a finance charge has been imposed." This obligation to supply a periodic
statement is suspended in the case of uncollectible accounts, delinquent debts
where the creditor has initiated collection procedures, or cases in which there
might be a violation of federal law. 142

131
15 USC § 1637(a) (1982); 12 CFR § 226.5 (1988).
140 12 CPR § 226.5(b)(t) (1988);
101 Official Staff Interpretations § 226.5(b)(1), 12 CPR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).

'~12 CFR § 226.S(b)(2) (1988). Thc interpfCtations also providc cxemptions for
accounts where the address is inaccurate and the statement is undeliverable. Official Staff
Interpretations § 226.5(b)(2), 12 CPR pt. 226 (Supp.l. 1988). The timing for supplyingthe
periodic statcment requires sending it "at least 14 days" bcfofC the consumer incurs any
additional fmance or other charles that the creditor must disclosc. (It is not affected by
charges that may be imposed regardlcss ofthc timing of thc dilclOlUfC statement-the
interpretations givc an example of this, namely, transaction or activity chargcs.) The
timing rulcs do not apply whcn "an act of God, war, civil disorder, natural disaster, or
strikc" prcvents thc crcditor from complying. 12 CFR § 226.S(b)(2) n.IO (1988). But a
computcr malfunction is not a natural disastcr or other Cltcusing cvcnt. Official Staff
Intcrpretations 226.5(b)(2)(ii)(2), 12 CPR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).
'l 26.03[2J[b1 SECURIIT TRANSACTIONS 26-36

The fonn of the disclosures must be clear and conspicuous and must be "in
writing in a fonn that the consumer may keep." This requires that the statement
be "reasonably understandable." Unlike the closed-end credit disclosures, the
disclosures do not have to be set apart or segregated from other material on the
disclosure statement. The disclosure of the "finance cbarge" and the "annual
percentage rate" must be given special emphasis by printing in bold print or in a
contrasting color or in capital letters, so that they will be "more conspicuous."'"
As in the case ofclosed-end credit, the regulations allow for estimates when
exact information is unknown at the time of disclosure. Also, inaccuracies
"attributable to events occurring after disclosures are made" are not violations,
although there are some cases in which the creditor may need to make subse-
quent disclosures.'"
The creditor under an open-end credit plan may need to make additional
disclosures. An annual statement outlining the consumer's billing rights with
respect to matters such as the correction of billing errors, unauthorized use of
credit cards, and rescission rights in cenain transactions involving liens on the
consumer's dwelling must be sent, unless it is part of the infonnation supplied
with the periodic statement.'·s If the creditor adds credit features to the con-
sumer's account or furnishes a credit device to the consumer, additional disclo-
sures may be necessary. (A new credit feature could be the addition of a check
overdraft authorization where none previously existed; sending a consumer a
package of blank checks that could be used to access a line of credit that the
consumer has is an ellample of a "credit device.")
When there are no changes in the tenns of credit and the device or new
credit feature is made available to the consumer within thirty days after the
initial credit disclosure, no additional disclosures need be made. There are
disclosure requirements, however, whenever the creditor changes the credit
terms or if the new arrangements occur more than tbirty days after the initial
disclosure. The disclosure is simpler if the credit terms remain unchanged,
because all that is needed is a simple "reminder that the new device or feature is
covered by the earlier disclosures.",.. Although changes in credit terms trigger a
requirement to make a new disclosure that satisfies the requirements for the

103
12 CFR § 226.5(a) (1988); Official StaffInterpretations § 226.5(a), 12 CFR pt. 226
(Supp. I 1988). In a Tenth Circuit court case, although the lender printed the rate in capital
letters and boldface type, the lender failed to disclose the "annual percentage rate" of its
loan in a conspicuous manner when over thirty other terms and phrases in the lender's
disclosure statement were printed in a similar style. As the error was one of lep\ judi-
ment, the court did not excuse the lender from liability under the bona fide error provi-
sions of the regulations. Herrera v. First N. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 80S F2d 896, 900-901
(10th Cir. 1986). .
... Official Staff Interpretations § 226.5(e), 12 CFR pt: 226 (Supp. I 1988).
""12 CFR §§ 226.5(b)(2), 226.9(a) (1988).
... 12 CFR § 226.9(b) (1988); Official StafflnterpTetations § 226.9(b), 12 eFR pt. 226
(Supp. I 1988).
26-37 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 16.03[1J(b)

initial disclosure statement, as previously indicated, tbere is no need for an

additional disclosure wben the change has been previously explained in a proper
disclosure statement. For example, a creditor may offer a variable rate credit
plan under this approach without making a new initial disclosure statement if
the variable rate arrangement was properly explained in the original state-
ment.'" A creditor may send a notice of a termination or suspension of credit
privileges <an obvious cbange in credit terms) simultaneously with the termina-
tion, because no change-in-terms notice is required at all.,.. Tbe creditor, bow-
ever, may have a duty to give notice under other law, such as the Equal Credit
Opportunity (ECOA).'" Additionally, the billing dispute procedures may be
applicable and may give rise to liability if they are not followed.'so
]n making disclosures, the creditor should use terminology in the initial
disclosure statement that is consistent with that on the periodic statements,
although identical language is not necessary. '51 The initial disclosure statement
should contain the following information: l5t
1. Information regarding the finance charge: namely, when it will be
imposed and how it will be determined. This specifically includes the
following:
a. When the finance charges will begin to accrue. This should make
clear to the consumer if there is any period of time in which payment
may be made without incurring a finance charge.
b. What periodic rate will be used to compute the finance charge and
the range of the balances to which the rate will apply. The corre-
sponding annual percentage rate must be shown.
c. How the balance on which the finance charge will be computed is
determined.

141
12 CFR § 226.9(c)(1988); Official StaffInterpretations § 226.9{c), 12 CFR pt. 226
(Supp. I 1988). In most cases, the creditor must aive notice of the changes within a
specified number ofdays before the effective date of the change. 12 CFR § 226.9(c). The
regulation Slates:
No notice under this section is required when the change involves late payment
charges, charges'for documentary evidence. or over-the-limit charges; a reduction of
any component ofa finance or other charge; suspension offuture credit priVileges or
termination of an amount or plan; or when the change results from an agreement
involving a court proceedinll, or from the consumer's default or delinquency (other
than an increase in the periodic rate or other finance charge).
12 CFR § 226.9(c)(2) (1988).
'''12 CFR § 226.9(c)(2) (1988).
14. See infra' 26.06[5].
loa See infra 1! 26.03(5).
.., 12 CFR § 226.6 (1988).
152 Id.
11 26.03(2)(b) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-38

d. How the finance charge will be determined. How the amount will be
calculated and whether any charges other than those based on the
periodic rate will be imposed.
2. The amount of charges that may be imposed, in addition to a finance
charge imposed as part of the time credit plan.
3. The fact that the creditor has or will acquire a security interest in the
property purchased under the plan or in other property, identified by
item or type. 153
4. The consumer's rights and the creditor's responsibilities with respect to
the handling of billing disputes, unauthorized use ofcredit cards, and so
forth.

"':lld. The Official Staff Interpretations § 226.6(c), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988)
explain:
I. General. Disclosure is not required about the type of security interest, or about
the creditor's rights with respect to that collateral. In other· words, the creditor need
not expand on the term "security interest." Also, since no specified terminology is
required, the creditor may designate its interests by using, for example, "pledge,"
"lien," or "mortgage" (instead of "security interest").
2. Identification of property. Identification of the collateral by type is satisfied by
stating, for example, "motor vehicle" or "household appliances." The creditor may,
at its option provide a more specific identification (for example, a model and serial
number.)
3. Spreader clause. The fact that collateral for pre-existing credit extensions with the
institution is being used to secure the present obligation constitutes a security interest
and must be disclosed. (Such security interests may be known as "spreader" or
"dragnet" clauses, or as "cross-collateraiization" clauses.) A specific identification of
that collateral is unnecessary, but a reminder of the interest arising from the prior
indebtedness is required.· This may be accomplished by using language such as
"collateral securing other loans with us may also secure this loan." At the creditor's
option a more specific description of the property involved may be given.
4. Additional collateral. If collateral is required when advances reach a certain
amount, the creditor should disclose the information available at the time of the
initial disclosures. For example, if the creditor knows that a security interest will be
taken in household goods if the consumer's balance exceeds $1,000, the creditor
should disclose accordingly. If the creditor knows that security will be required if the
consumer's balance exceeds $1 ,000, but the creditor does not know what security will
be required, the creditor must disclose on the initial disclosure statement that secur-
ity will be required if the balance exceeds S I ,000, and the creditor must provide a
change-in-terms notice ... at the time the security is taken.
5. Collateral from third party. In certain situations, the consumers' obligation may
be secured by collateral belonging to a third party. For example, an open-end credit
plan may be secured by an interest in property owned by the consumer's parents. In
such cases, the security interest is taken in connection with the plan and must be
disclosed, even though the property encumbered is owned by someone other than the
consumer.
26-39 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.03(2J(b)

The creditor must disclose the following matters in the periodic disclosure
statements. 'S'
1. The account balance that was outstanding at the beginning ofthe billing
cycle. (Credit balances must be apparent as credit, not debt.)
2. The identification ofeach credit transaction. The extent ofthe informa-
tion required to be shown on the statement varies, depending on
whether the creditor supplies a copy of a sales receipt (in sales transac-
tions). Ifthe transaction involves a sale of property in which the seller is
also the creditor, the disclosure need only contain the amount of the
transaction and the date on which the transaction took place or the date
on which the consumer's account was charged when the receipts accom-
pany the periodic statement. When there is no receipt or credit docu-
ment included, the description must identify the transaction more
specifically. In the case ofcreditors who are not the seilers (as with some
credit card arrangements), the creditor must disclose, in addition to the
amount and date ofthe transaction, the name ofthe seller and the place
of the sale. ,ss
3. A statement of credits to the account during the billing cycle.
4. The periodic rate used to compute the finance charge, the range of
balances to which it applies, and the corresponding annual percentage
rate must be disclosed, whether or not the rate is applied during the
billing cycle.
S. The explanation of how the balance on which the finance charge is
computed, as well as the amount of the balance, is determined.
6. The amount of any finance charge added to the account during the
billing cycle; it must specifically be identified as a "finance charge."
7. The "annual percentage rate," labeled as such, when there is a finance
charge imposed during the billing cycle.
8. An itemization of charges to the account that are other than finance
charges. . .
9. The closing date of the billing cycle with the account balance that is
outstanding on that date.
10. The date by which or the time period within which "the new balance or
any portion ofthi: new balance must be paid to avoid additional finance
charges." When the creditor states such a "free-ride period," the credi-

1$4 12 CPR § 226.7 (1988).

'.s In transactions involving shared-use ATM systems, where the cardholder may be
charged a transaction fee by the institution that owns the terminal, but the institution is
not the one that issued the card, the card issuing institution does not have to disclose
separately the fee on the periodic statement. Official Staff Interpretations § 226.7(b). 12
eFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).
~ 26.03(3) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-40

tor may still, at its option without further disclosure, decide not to
impose any finance charge for payments received after the free-ride
period.
11. The address to be used for sending notice ofbilling errors. This address
could be included on the billing rights statement discussed previously as
an alternative.

[3] Consumer Leases

Priorto 1976, the disclosure provisions ofthe Truth-in-LendingAct applied
to leases only to the extent that such leases came within the definition ofa credit
sale. The 1976 amendments greatly extended the coverage of the act to include
consumer leases. Under the amendments, a consumer lease is any lease of
personal property by a natural person for over four months, which lease is for a
total obligation that does not exceed $25,000. The transaction must be entered
into "primanly for personal, family. or household purposes." It is covered by the
act, whether or not a purchase option is part of the arrangement.1!8 The Federal
Reserve Board has implemented the amendments by promulgating Regulation
M on consumer leasing. 157
Where there is a consumer lease transaction, before consummation of the
lease, the lessor must give the lessee a dated written statement that discloses
information about the lease specified in the regulation.'51 These disclosures
"shall be made clearly, conspicuously, in meaningful sequence, and in accord-
ance with the further requirements" of the Board's rules.'I' Numerical amounts
and percentages must be stated in figures and printed in a type of minimum size
or be "legibly handwritten. "'10 The disclosure obligations fall on lessors. The
definition ofwho is a lessor requires that the lessor be one who regularly engages
in leasing transactions in the ordinary course ofbusiness. 'II The Board requires
disclosure of the following information:
1. A description of the leased property;
2. The total amount ofany payment required at the beginning ofthe lease;
3, The number, amount, and due dates of payments scheduled, including
the total amount of these periodic payments;

151 15 USC § 1667 (1982). A consumer lease does not include a lease for "agricultural,
business or commercial purposes or one made to an organization." 12 CFR § 213.2(a)(6)
(\988).
'57 12 CFR pt. 213 (1988). There is an official staff commentary. Id. pt. 213 (Supp. I
1988).
'51 12 CFR § 213.4(g) (\988) (Regulation M).
151 12 CFR § 213.4(a) (1988).

110 Id.

'" 15 USC § 1667(3) (1982); 12 CFR § 213.2(a)(8) (1988).

26·41 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS ~ 26.03(4)

4. The amount to be paid for official fees;

S. The amount of other charges payable by the lessee, not included in the
periodic payment, with a description of the charges, including the
amount of the lessee's liability at the end of the term;
6. A description of the insurance provided or paid for by the lessor or
required of the lessee;
7. A statement identifying all express warranties and guarantees made by
the manufacturer or lessor;
8. Identification of the party responsible for maintaining or servicing the
property and the standards used for wear and use;
9. A description of any security interests held or retained by the lessor,
with an identification of the property to which the security interest
attaches;
10. Penalties or charges for late payments and default;
11. A description of any purchase option terms;
12. A statement of conditions allowing the lessee or lessor to terminate the
lease before the end of the stated term, and the amount ofany penalty or
other charges for early termination;
13. A statement that the lessee shall be liable for the difference between the
estimated value of the property and its realized value at early termina·
tion or at the end of the lease term, if such liability exists;
14. Where the lessee's liability at early termination or at the end ofthe lease
term is based on the estimated value of the leased property, a statement
ofthe lessee's right to obtain, at the lessee's expense, a binding appraisal
from an independent third party; and
15. Where the lessee's liability at the end of the lease term is based on the
estimated value ofthe leased property, a calculation of the difference
between the value of the leased property at the beginning of the lease
and the total lease obligations, an explanation of when the estimated
value at the end of the lease will be presumed unreasonable, and, a.
statement that tile lessee may consent to any final adjustment concern-
ing this liability,1I2

[4) Disclosures and Rescission Rights in Real Estate Transactions

The Truth-in-Lending Act applies to consumer credit transactions that
involve real estate. As discussed previously, the $25,000 limitation upon trans-
actions, subject to the provisions of the act, does not apply in the case of

110 12 CFR §213.4(S) (1988).

, 26.03(4) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-42

residential real estate transactions. '63 Generally, the information that must be
disclosed is the same as that required in other consumer credit transactions. In
addition, however, when the transaction results in a lien on the consumer's
residence, the consumer has a special right of rescission. This rescission right is
discussed later.
Two other federal statutes impose disclosure requirements on real estate
transactions: the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act'l4 and the Real Estate
Settlements Procedures Act. 185 These acts also require extensive disclosure, and
cannot be described in any detail here. In general, however, the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act requires anyone who sells 100 or more lots of unim-
proved land in interstate commerce to register with the Department of Housing
and Urban Development and to comply with other disclosure requirements. The,
act is patterned after the registration and disclosure requirements in the federal'
securities laws. The Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act applies to federally
related mortgage transactions involving residential dwellings, and it requires
lenders to provide borrowers with a uniform settlement statement that itemizes
the charges imposed and makes other disclosures.
Consumer credit transactions involving the creation ofa security interest in
the principal resident of the debtor were tbought by Congress to be so conse-
quential to the debtor that a right of rescission should be provided.'M In such •
transactions, the consumer has an absolute right to cancel the deal until mid-
night of the third business day, following either consummation of the transac-
tion or delivery to the consumer of a statement of disclosure of the consumer's
right to rescind and a form for accomplishing the rescission, whichever is later. 187
The right ofthe consumer to rescind is an absolute right. It does not depend
on the establishment of any breach of conduct or violation of the act by the
creditor. Because the rescission period runs from the time the required disclo-
sure and rescission forms are supplied, the time within which the consumer may
rescind the transaction may extend for a considerable period after the consum-
mation ofthe credit transaction. Ifa creditor fails to deliver the proper forms or
fails to make the proper disclosures as required by the law, the consumer will
have a right ofrescission that entitles the consumer to cancel the transaction and
to receive a complete refund. There is a limitation, however; the right to rescind
terminates three years from the date of consummation of the transaction or
when the property is sold, whichever occurs first.'"

113See 12 eFR § 226.3(b) (1988).

'14 IS USC §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
115
12 USC §§ 2601-2617 (1982).
'18 IS USC § 1635 (1982).
'87 IS USC § 1635(a) (1982).

'" I S USC § 1635(t) (1982).

26-43 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.03[4)

The rescission right does not apply to purchase money security transactions
in which the consumer obtains credit to finance the purchase or initial construc-
tion of a residence when the credit is secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or
equivalent instrument that creates a security interest in the dwelling."' It also
does not cover a refinancing or consolidation of an existing obligation and
accrued finance charges, so long as it is by the same creditor, it is secured by an
interest in the same property, and it does not involve any further advances. 17o It
does not apply when a state agency is the creditor in the transaction. 171 There is
also an exemption for certain transactions under an open-end credit plan. This
exemption applies whenever there is a "pre-existing" plan, when the security
interest had previously been retained or acquired, and when the advances are
made following "a previously established credit limit" for the plan. 172 Because of
the broad definition of "dwelling," the right to rescind includes any structure
containing one to four family housing units, a mobile home, and individual units
of condominiums or cooperatives.m
Upon giving notice ofrescission, the consumer is not liable for any amount,
including any finance charge, and the security interest in the property is void. IF'
The creditor is obligated to return within twenty days any down payment or
other property given by the consumer.m The consumer may keep any property
that has been transferred to him or her by the creditor until the creditor returns
the consumer's down payment and executes appropriate documents to eraSe any
record ofthe security interest. Upon the creditor's compliance with these obliga-
tions, the consumer must tender back the property ofthe creditor unless return is
"impractical or inequitable"; it is then sufficient for the consumer to tender its
reasonable valueY' The consumer may tender return of the property at the
location of the property or the residence of the consumer, whichever the con-.
sumer elects. Under the Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, effective Octo-
ber I, 1982, if the creditor fails to take possession of the money or property
within twenty calendar days after the tender, the consumer may keep it without
any further obligation. 1f1

"' 15 USCA § 1635(e)(I)(A) (Supp. 1988) See 12 CFR §§ 226.2(a)(24), 226.15(0,

226.23(f) (1988).
10
' 15 USCA § 1635(e)(I)(B)(Supp. 1988).
171 15 USCA § I 635(e)(1 XC) (Supp. 1988).
112
15 USCA§ I635(e)(I)(D)(Supp. 1988).
173
15 USCA §§ 1602(v), 1602(w)(Supp. 1988).
170
15 usq 1635(b)(1982), 12 CFR§ 226. I 5(d) (1988).
115
1S USC § I63S(b) (1982).
mId.
171 Id. 12 CFR § 226.1 Sed) (1988) (Regulation Z). Rescission-rights exist regardless of
whether the credit arrangement is classified as open end or closed end. 12 CFR-§§ 226.15,
226.23 (1988). Although the consumer may tender property back to the creditor at the
location of the property or the consumer's residence, as the consumer elects. the rules for
11 26.03[5I1a) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-44

[51 General Provisions of the Act

[a) Duty to Revise Prior Disclosures. When a creditor discloses information as
required by the act and when such disclosure is an accurate one when made, but
when subsequent acts or events make the disclosure inaccurate, there is no
violation of the act. HI The creditor does not have to make a revised disclosure
statement. There are certain situations in open-end credit arrangements, how-
ever, for which Board regulations require additional disclosures when the credit
terms change orwhen a new credit feature is added to the consumer's account.m
Additionally, in closed-end transactions, when a refinancing occurs or a subse-
quent consumer assumes an obligation, the creditor must make further
disclosures. OlD

[b) Regulation of Credit Advertising. The Truth-in-Lending Act regulates the

advertisement of consumer credit arrangements. lit The statute requires disclo-
sures about the credit terms when the advertising makes reference to the availa-
bility ofcredit. Even more fundamentally, the regulations require that the credit
be available when there is advertising of credit arrangements. The regulations
state that an advertisement for credit "shall state only those terms that actually
are or will be arranged or offered by the creditor.',m The regulations are more
demanding than the act, which requires only that the creditor "usually and
customarily arranges" credit as advertised.
The definition of "advertising" is broad. It encompasses any "commercial
message in any medium that promotes, directly or indirectly, a credit transac-
tion." Oral messages qualify, as well as those in print and on television. Point-of-
sale displays and price tags fall within the defmition. Telephone solicitations
also are included."3'fhe advertising requirements of the Truth-in-Lending Act
apply to "all persons." The Official Staff Interpretations expressly state that

tender back ofmoney are different. Tender ofmoney back to the creditor must be made at
the creditor's designated place of business. 12 CFR §§ 226.15, 226.23 (1988). The con-
sumer may waive his or her right to rescind when he or she certifies the credit is needed to
meet "a bona fide personal financial emergency." 12 CFR §§ 226.15(e), 2226.23 (1988).
171
15 USC § 1634 (1982).
171 12 CFR § 226.7 (1988) (Regulation Z).
'10 12 CFR § 226.20 (1988) (Regulation Z).
"' 15 USC § 1662 (J 982). Under a ruling of the Sixth Circuit, there is no implied
private remedy for violations of the Consumer Credit Protection Act provisions relating
to credit advertising, 15 USC § 1664 (1982). Smeyres v. General Motors Corp., 820 F2d
782,783-784 (6th Cir. 1987). Accord LeVick v. Skaggs Co., 701 F2d 777, 779 (9th Cir.
1983), overruling Stewart v. Traveler's Corp., 503 F2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974).
112
12 CFR §§ 226.16(a), 226.24(a) (1988).
•13 12 CFR § 226.2(a)(2) (1988). See Official Staff Interpretations § 226.2(a)(2), 12
CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988). It does not include oral communications in negotiating
specific transactions, however.
26-45 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.03(SJ(b]

"home builders, merchants, and others who are not themselves creditors must
comply with the advertising provisions of the regulation if they advertise con-
sumer credit transaction."'" The media in which the message appears, however,
are not responsible for compliance with the act.'"
The credit disclosures in the advertising must meet the general "clear and
conspicuous" standards, although no particular format, type, size, or location
requiremen15 are imposed. 1I5 When the advertising medium is a catalog or other
multipage format, the advertiser may use a table or schedule of representative
amounts. Only positive assertions regarding credit terms trigger disclosure obli-
gations. The statement, for example, that there is "no annual membership fee"
does not trigger a need to disclose. 111
When the advertising refers to items that fall within the terms required to be
disclosed in the initial disclosure statement, in the case ofopen-end credit plans,
the regulations require certain minimum disclosures. The advertising must
state:
1. Any minimum, fIXed charge, such as a transaction fee;
2. Any periodic rate that may be applied, expressed as an annual percentage
rate; and
3. Any membership or participation fee.'"
When the advertising involves closed-end credit transactions, th~ finance
charge rate must be stated as an "annual percentage rate." Additionally, when
the advertising refers to key credit terms such as the amount ofa down payment,
the amount of a finance charge, the number of payments, or period of repay-
ment, there must be disclosure of certain minimum credit information:
1. The amount or percentage of the down payment;
2. The terms of repayment, including the number of payments, period of
repayment, and amount of payments; and
3. The annual percentage rate and, if such rate may increase, a statement
that it may be increased....
When a creditor supplies credit information orally, the creditor must state
the annual percentage rate. The creditor is limited by the regulations as to how
much additional rate information may be given to the consumer. In some cases,
information may be supplied about the periodic rate or the simple annual ratc of

114 Official Staff Interpretations § 226.2(a)(2), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp.11988).

,.. 1S USC § 166S (1982). .
..I 12 CFR §§ 226.16, 226.24 (1988).
111 Official Staff Interpretations § 226.16(b), 12 CFR pt. 226 (Supp. I 1988).
'1112 CFR § 226. 16(b) (1988).
'I' 12 CFR § 226.24 (1988).
, 26.03ISJ(c] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-46

interest. The rules vary, depending on whether open-end or closed-end credit is

involved. '10

lei Effect of Truth-in-Lending on State Law. The federal Truth-in-Lending

Act overrides state laws that require disclosure ofcredit information only when
the state law is inconsistent with the provisions ofthe federal act.'" A procedure
is established under the Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 that permits a
creditor to seek a ruling from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System when the creditor is in doubt as to the validity of a state disclosure
provision. If the Board then determines that the state-required disclosure is
inconsistent with the federal act, creditors located in the state need not make
disclosures under the inconsistent state law. The creditors will be protected by
the Board's determination from any liability under the law ofthe state for failure
to comply with state law, even when the Board's determination may subse-
quently be reversed or determined to be invalid."z
The Truth-in-Lending Act does not otherwise affect the laws of any state
that deal with the types, amounts, or rates of charges permitted in that state in
connection with the extension of consumer credit,1t3 Thus, state usury provi-
sions and regulation of consumer finance agencies under state law are not
affected by the Truth-in-Lending Act.

[d) Credit BIlling. The Truth-in-Lending Act contains provisions that regulate
the procedures used by creditors to bill consumers and that give consumers
rights when a dispute arises as to the amount owed.'N When a creditor receives a
written notice from a consumer stating that the bill sent to the consumer con-
tains an error, the creditor is required to determine whether an error has been
made and to report the findings of this investigation to the consumer.'" The
creditor must respond within certain time limits established in the act. The
creditor is first required to acknowledge receipt ofthe notice within thirty days,
unless the dispute is resolved before that time. 'M The creditor then has two
billing cycles (which together can be no more than ninety days) after receipt of
the notice from the consumer either to correct the account or to send a written
explanation to the consumer stating the reasons why the creditor believes the

'10 12 CFR § 226.26 (1988). See 15 USC § 1665a (1982) (added by the Truth-in-
Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980).
'91 15 USC § 161 O(a)( I) (I 982); 12 CFR § 226.28 & App. A (1988).
112
15 USC § 1610(a)(2) (1982); 12 CFR § 226.28 (1988).
103
15 USC § 1610(b) (1982).
110 15 USC § 1666 (1982).
95
' 15 USC § 1666(a)(1982).
'HIS USC § I666(a)(3)(A) (1982).
26-41 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.03[SJldl

account is accurate. 191 Until these procedures have been completed, the creditor
cannot take any action to collect the amount in dispute.'· However, if the
creditor makes clear to the consumer that payment ofthe disputed amount is not
required, the creditor may continue to send statements to the consumer that
include the amount in dispute and any financing charges computed on it. •• The
creditor may treat the disputed amount as a use of the credit limits extended to
the consumer. 200 The creditor cannot close the account because of the con-
sumer's failure to pay the amount indicated as an error. SI '
In Gray v. American Express CO.,m the company canceled a credit card
while a billing dispute was pending without giving notice of the cancel1ation,
claiming that a provision in the credit card agreement with the customer gave
the company the right to cancel the account at any time, without notice. for any
cause or for no cause at all. The first time that the customer learned of the
cancel1ation was after presenting the card to pay for a wedding anniversary
dinner that he and his wife had consumed. A federal court of appeals held that
the cancellation was not effective. Labeling the company's argument "auda-
cious" in view of the express statutory language forbidding a credit card issuer
from closing an account because of failure of the customer to pay a disputed
amount unless the company sends a written explanation to the customer, the
court said that a "waiver of statutory rights, particularly by a contract of adhe-
sion, is hardly consistent with the legislature's purpose. "lOS In view of the facts in
the case, the court refused to permit the company to contend it terminated the
account for reasons other than the dispute over the charges, and it further held
that the customer had a cause of action under state law because the company's
interpretation ofthe contract to permit termination without notification to its
customer was unreasonable. 200 •
When the consumer debtor gives notice that the billing statement reflects
goods not delivered to the consumer, in accordance with the agreement made at
the time of the transaction, the creditor is under an obligation to determine that
"such goods were actually delivered, mailed, or otherwise sent to the obligor"
before the creditor can send the consumer a statement indicating that the
account is accurate. S05 Under the act, any item on a billing statement represent-
ing "goods or services not accepted" or "not delivered" to the consumer, in

191 15 USC § I 666(a)(3)(B) (1982).

'RId.
m 15 USC § I666(c} (1982).
200 15 USC § I666(d)( 1982}.
••• Jd.
20' 240 App. DC 10. 13, 743 F2d 10, 13 (1984).
20)240 App. DC at 15-16,743 F2d at 15-16.
04
• 240 App. DC at 19. 743 F2d at 19.
205 15 USC § I 666(a) (1982).
11 26.03ISJld) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-48

accordance with the agreement made at the time of the credit transaction, is a
billing error subject to the procedures set forth previously.2OI
Billing errors that are subject to the procedures of the act include computa-
tional errors, the inclusion ofcredit that was not given, failure to reflect properly
payments made, charges for goods or services not accepted or delivered, and
extensions of credit for which the consumer requested additional clarification
"including documentary evidence."201
In order to trigger the billing error resolution procedures, the consumer
must give notice to the creditor within sixty days after the creditor has sent a
statement to the consumer. 2OI Failure to comply with the act's billing error
requirements will lead to the forfeiture of the creditor's right to collect the
amount that the consumer has indicated is erroneous and to collect any financC'
charges on it up to a maximum of $50. 201
When the creditor receives a notice of a billing error, the creditor may not
report or threaten to report adversely on the consumer's credit rating to any
person. 210 When the creditor complies with the error resolution procedures, the
consumer must be allowed the normal number of days permitted under the
credit agreement to make payment of the resolved amount. 21 ' When the con-
sumer continues to dispute the amount owed after receiving a report from the
creditor that the account is accurate, the creditor may not report to any third
party that the consumer's account is delinquent in payment unless the creditor
also reports that the amount is in dispute and notifies the consumer ofeach party
to whom the creditor is reporting information concerning the delinquency.2'2 If
the creditor makes a report ofdelinquency to any party, the creditor must make a
supplemental report to those persons when the credit dispute is resolved. 213
When the credit plan gives the consumer a period offree credit before any
fmance charge will be imposed, the billing statement must be sent to the con-
sumer at least fourteen days before the date when the finance charge will become
effective. 214 The creditor is obligated to credit promptly payments received
under open-end credit plans!'5 It must also promptly refund the portion of any
payment exceeding the outstanding balance of the account when the consumer

200 15 USC § 1666(b)(3) (1982).

207 15 USC § 1666(b)(1982).
201
15 USC § I666(a) (1982).
ZOg 15 USC § I666(e) (1982).
210 15 USC § I666a(a) (1982).
211Id.
212 15 USC § 1666a(b) (1982).
21.315 USC § I666a(c) (I982).
... 15 USC § I666b{a) (I 982).
2'5 n USC § 1666c (1982).
26-49 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0316](1'

so requests, or credit the excess payment to the consumer's account. 2" Under the
Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, when the excess credit balance remains
in the account for more than six months and is over one dollar, the creditor is
required to make a iood faith effort to refund the amount to the consumer. 217
The Supreme Court considered the application of the act in a case in which
the creditor had issued a credit card to a company, but an individual also was
liable on the account. 21 ' A suit was brought against the creditor, claiming failure
to follow the procedures for error correction in Section 161(a) of the Fair Credit
Billing Act. tll In order for the act to apply, the creditor must have transmitted a
statement of the account "in connection with an extension of consumer
credit. "220 The Court said that there were at least three possible interpretations
of what might constitute an extension ofconsumer credit. One view would be to
find an extension of consumer credit if the account had been opened primarily
for consumer use. Another view would be to find such an extension if the
particular transaction involved was a consumer transaction. A third interpreta-
tion would be to apply the act if either the purpose for opening the account was
primarily for consumer use or if the particular transaction was a consumer
transaction. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide which one of
these views should be adopted, because none of the circumstances fit the case
before it. The card issued was primarily for business purposes, and the transac-
tions involved were business transactions. The Court admitted that it would not
always be easy to tell if the opening ofa credit account involved an extension of
consumer credit, but acknowledged that this was the approach mandated by the
aet.It'

[61 Civil Liability and Administrative Enforcement

(a] Creditor lJability for Damages. Creditors who fail to comply with the
requirements imposed by the Truth-in-Lending Act or by Regulation Z are liable
for any actual damages caused as a result of the violation, for costs (including
reasonable attorney fees in any successful action), and for a statutory penalty in
the case of an individual action. m The statutory penalty is twice the amount of

211
1S USC § 1666d (1982).
217 Id.
21IAmerican Express Co. v. Koerner, 452 US 233,237 (1981).
III15 USC § 1666(a) (1982).
220 Id.
12' American Exprns Co., 452 US at 242-245.
22215 USC § 164O(a) (1982). Any violation ofthe Board', regulations isa violation of
the act. See generally Annot., "Award of Attorney's Fees Under § 130(a) of Truth-in-
Lending Act (IS U.S.C.S. § 1640(a»," 29 ALR Fed. 906 (1976); "Civil Remedies of
Consumer for Violations of Truth-in-Lending Act (IS U.S.c. §§ 1601-1644,
1661-1665)," 11 ALR Fed. 815 (1972).
, 26.03(6](8) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-50

any finance charge involved in the transaction or, when a consumer lease is
involved, 25 percent of the total amount of the monthly payments under the
lease. In all cases, the penalty is confined to a range of a minimum of$1 00 and a
maximum of$lOOO.223 The statute does not give a penalty or minimum recovery
when a class action is brought. The total recovery in a class action for claims
based on the same failure to comply with the act by the same creditor is a
maximum of$500,OOO or one percent ofthe net worth ofthe creditor, whichever
is less. 224
When there are multiple failures to disclose the information required by the
act to a particular consumer, that consumer has only one cause of action for
damages. 22 • The statutory penalty cannot be multiplied by each violation. Simi-
larly, when one consumer credit transaction or tease involves more than one
consumer who is obligated, there can be only one recovery of the statutory
penalty for all of the obligors. 221
[il Creditor defenses. A creditor will have no liability when prompt action
is taken to correct any error made. Under the Simplification and Reform Act of
1980, if the creditor takes action within sixty days after discovering an error and
acts prior to the receipt of any written notice of the error from the obiigor and
before any action has been initiated against the creditor for violation of the act,
the creditor win have no liability. But the creditor must give notice ofthe error to
the person concerned and must make any adjustments needed to assure that the
consumer will not be required to pay any amount in excess of the charge actually
disclosed.
A creditor also has a defense to any action brought by a consumer for
violation ofthe disclosure requirements if the creditor shows that the violation
was not intentional and that it resulted from "a bona fide error notwithstanding
the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error."
Examples given by the Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 include clerical
errors, calculation errors, computer malfunction and programming errors, and
printing errors!" Errors in iegaljudgmentas to the creditor's obligations under
the act are not within this defense. 228
The Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 narrows the
liability of the creditors in another fashion. The statutory penalty, which is

223
15 USC § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)(1982).
224
15 USC § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1982).
225 IS USC § I 640(g) (1982).
22tl IS USC § 1640(d) (1982).

227 IS USC § I 640(c)(1 982). See generally Annot., "Good Faith Defense to Truth-in-
Lending Act Liability, Under § 130(f) of Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1640(1))," 50 ALR Fed. 201
(1980); "what Constitutes Truth-in-Lending Act Violation Which 'Was Not Intentional
and Resulted From Bona Fide Error' Within Meaning of § 13O(c) of Act (15 U.S.C.S.
§ I 640(c»," 27 ALR Fed. 602 (1976).
22"15 USC § I 640(c) (1982).
26·51 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.03(611_)

available in individual actions involving violation of the disclosure require-

ments, applies only to certain disclosures: namely, annual percentage rate;
amount financed; finance charge; total of payments; number, amount, and due
dates of payments; and the statement describing the security interest.'1t
Good faith reliance on Federal Reserve Board regulations and interpreta-
tions is also a defense. This defense applies to both acts and omissions in reliance
on the administrative rule, notwithstanding subsequent invalidation of the rule
or interpretation. 23D
Consumers are not permitted to offset any amount for which a creditor
might be liable under the act against amounts owing by the consumer to the
creditor until the creditor's liability has been determined by judicial action. til
Thus, the consumer cannot use the creditor's violations of the act as an excuse
for nonpayment of the debt. Under the Simplification and Reform Act of 19.80,
the consumer is permitted to set up the violation ofthe creditor as a "defense or
counterclaim" to an action brought by the creditor to collect the debt. m This is
probably intended as a clarification of, not a change in, the prior law.
(III Liability of assignee from a creditor. Assignees of creditors who fail to
comply with the provisions of truth in lending may be liable for the violations of
their assignor. An action may be maintained against the assignee when the
violation is "apparent on the face ofthe disclosure statement," except when the
assignment was involuntary.233 When an action is brought against an assignee of
a creditor, the consumer's execution of a written statement acknowledging
receipt of the disclosure statement is "conclusive proof' as against an assignee,
who had no knowledge to the contrary at the time of acquisition of the obliga-
tion, (I) that the statement was delivered to the consumer and (2) that the
creditor complied with the act 23• unless a violation is "apparent on the face ofthe
disclosure statement., - A consumer who has the right to rescind a transaction,
however, may do so against any assignee!31 Prior to the Simplification and

22t 15 USC § I 640(a) (1982).

230
15 USC § 1640(1) (1982).
23' IS USC § 1640(h)(1982).
... Id. See generally Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, 480 F. Supp. 491 (DNM 1979),
rev'd in part, dism. in part, 638 F2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980): Smith v. No.2 Galesburll Crown
Fin. Corp., 615 F2d 407 (7th CiT. 1980); Teel v. Thorp Credit, 609 F2d 1268 (7th Cir.
1979); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, 503 F2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chemi·
cal Bank N.Y. Trust, 329 F. Supp. 270 (SDNY 1971): Rayv. Acme Fin. Corp., 367 So. 2d
186 (Miss. 1979).
233 I 5 USC § 1641 (a)( 1982).
• 34 15 USC§ 164l(b)(1982).
235 IS USC § I 641 (a). The statute further defines when a violation is "apparent on the
face of the disclosure statement." It includes, but is not limited to; statements that are
incomplete and obviously inaccurate, and that rail to use correct termlnololY. ld.
231 15 USC § 1641(c) (1982).
, 26.o3(61lb] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-52

Reform Act of 1980, in cases involving securitY interests in real property, the act
required the consumer to establish that the assignee and the original creditor
were in a "continuing business relationship." The amendments of the Simplifi·
cation and Reform Act eliminated this requirement. D7
With the change in the definition of "creditor," which eliminated an
arranger of credit from the definition, it is unlikely that an assignee will come
within the rules that apply to creditors. Under the act, a creditor is someone who
"regularly extends ... consumer credit" and who "is the person to whom the
debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face
of the evidence of the indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of indebted-
ness, by agreement."231Ifthe transaction involves an open-end credit plan with a
credit card, the previous defmition is not applicable, and any card issuer or
person who honors the credit card and offers a discount that is a finance charge is
a creditor. 231

Ib} Administrative Enforcement. Enforcement of the act is entrusted in the

case ofnational banks to the Comptroller of the Currency; in the case of member
banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks) to the Board of
Governors; in the case of banks insured by the FDIC (other than the banks
already mentioned) to the Board of Directors of the FDIC; in the case of
institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or
chartered by the FHLBB to the FHLBB; and, in the case offederal credit unions,
to the administrator of the National Credit Union Administration. 2oo A viola-
tion ofthe Troth-in-LendingAct constitutes a violation ofthe acts giving general
regulatory power to these agencies and triggers any enforcement authority avail-
able under those provisions."1
Under the Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, the enforcement agen-
cies may require those who violate the act by inaccurately disclosing an annual
percentage rate or finance charge to make restitution to the consumer involved.
These amendments establish a range of tolerance or margin of error for which
restitution will not be required unless the errors are willful. The enforcement
agency does not have to order restitution in cases where the error is of a minor
nature and did not result from the following:

231 See Rogers v. Frank Jackson Lincoln-Mercury, 458 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-[390
(ND Ga. 1978); aII'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 621 F2d 130 (5th Cir. 1980);
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F2d 86, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1976); Childs v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 470 F. Supp. 708 (ND Ala. \979); Jenningsv. Edwards, 454 F. Supp.
770 (MDNC 1978), aff'd. 598 F2d 614 (4th Cir. 1979).
23115 USCA § 1602(1) (West Supp. \988).
23'Id.
2'·15 USC § 1607(a) (1982).
2" 15 USC§ 1607(b)(1982).
26-53 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.04

t. A clear and consistent pattern or practice of violations'

•
2. Gross negligence; or
3. A willful violation intended to mislead the person to whom the credit was
extended.• 4.
Further. the agency is not required to order restitution. but may impose such
remedial action as it believes will be equitable, even in cases involving a pattern
ofviolations or gross negligence, in certain speCified types ofcases, as long as the
disclosure error did not result from "a willful violation which was intended to
mislead the person to whom credit was extended, ... "143 The enforcement
agency cannot order a creditor to make an adjustment that would "have signifi-
cantly adverse impact upon the safety or soundness of the creditor ,"a« In these
cases, however. the agency may require a partial restitution or a series ofadjust-
ments over a period of time. The enforcement agency must follow the proce-
dures for obtaining a cease and desist order to require the creditor to make
restitution.•41

Ie) Reliance 00 Model Forms. Under the Simplification and Reform Act of
1980, the Board is required to publish model disclosure forms and clauses for
use by creditors. 24I The creditor is not required to use these model forms, but, if
such forms are used, the creditor shall be deemed to be "in compliance with the
disclosure provisions" of the act other than those specific numerical disclosures
depending on the particular transaction. 207 The creditor may change the format
of the model form when it does not affect "the substance, clarity, or meaningful
sequence of the disclosure......

11 26.04 CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT

In addition to the disclosure rules discussed previously, the Consumer

••• IS USC §§ 1607(e)(I). 1607(2)(1982). Unlike the other provisions ofthe Simplifi-
cation and Reform Act, these became immediately effective with enactment ofthe aet on
March 31, 1980.
•" IS USC § 1607(eX2)(1982):
••• IS USC § 1607(e)(3) (1982).
2•• IS USC §§ 1607(e)(3), 1607(eX4) (1982).
246 IS USC § 1604(b)(1982).
•'TId.
2" Id. The forms could be used by creditors before the effective date ofthe Simplifica-
tion and Reform Act amendments in 1982.
'26.04(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-54

Credit Protection Acta•• regulates other consumer credit practices as well. It

restricts the use ofgarnishment, it regulates consumer credit reports, it prohibits
discrimination in the extension of credit, and it imposes standards upon debt
collection. This section will briefly review these provisions.

III Restrictions on Garnishment

The Consumer Credit Protection Act restricts the extent to which a creditor
may garnish earnings of a consumer. 250 As a general rule, creditors may garnish
up to 2S percent of the consumer's weekly disposable earnings or up to the
amount the consumer's weekly disposable earnings exceed thirty times the
federal minimum hourly wage, whichever is less. 251 When the garnishment is
undertaken as the result of a judicial order to enforce a support obligation, a
greater percentage of the debtor's disposable income may be garnished. 252 Dis-
posable earnings are defined as the balance of an individual's earnings remain-
ing after deductions required by law have been withheld. 213 Garnishments of
earnings to collect state or federal taxes are not subject to the restrictions of the
act. 254 Orders of bankruptcy courts are similarlyexempt. m
Although the act speaks in terms of garnishment of earnings, and does not
specify that the garnishment must be a procedure directed at an employer, courts
have held that garnishment restrictions do not apply to earnings deposited in a
bank account. 256
There is special treatment for garnishment of wages to enforce a support
order of a court or an administrative agency whose procedures satisfY due
process and afford an opportunity for judicial review. 257 When there is such a
court or administrative order, the general limitations on wage garnishment do
not apply; there are other limitations. When the garnishment is directed at the
wages ofan individual who is supporting a spouse or dependent child other than

241 15 USC §§ 1631-1665, 1671-1677 (1982). See generally Annat., "Validity, Con-
struction. and Application of Consumer Credit Protection Act Provisions (IS U.S.C.
§§ 891-896) Prohibiting Extortionate Credit Transactions," 7 ALR Fed 950 (l971).
250 15 USC § 1671 (1982). See generally Annot., "Validity, Construction, and Appli-
cation of §§ 301-307 of Consumer Credit Protection Act (IS U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677)
Placing Restrictions on Garnishment ofindividual's Earnings," 14 ALR Fed. 447 (973).
251 15 USC § 1673 (l982).
252
15 USC § I 673(b)(1 982).
2.315 USC § 1672(b) (1982).
2•• 15 USC § 1673(b)(1) (1982).
mId.
256 Usery v. First Nat'l Bank, 586 F2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1978); Dunlop v. ,First Nat'l
Bank. 399 F. Supp. 855, 856 (DC Ariz. 1975); John O. Melby &. Co. Bank v; Anderson, 88
Wis. 2d 254, 257, 276 NW2d 274, 277 (1979).
a5115 USC§§ 1673(b)(I)(A), 1673(b)(2) (1982).
26-55 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.04(2)

t~e .spouse or child for which the support order was entered, the garnishment is
limited to 50 percent of the individual's disposable earnings for the week. til
When the garnishment is ofthe wages of one who is not supporting a spouse or
other dependent child, the garnishment is limited to 60 percent of the individ-
ual's disposable earnings for that week. 110 The act prohibits execution or enforce-
ment by any court, court officer, or agency of any order or process that violates
the provisions of tile Act. no The act does not disturb state laws that are more
restrictive than the act in limiting the extent to which garnishment is allowed
and in prohibiting employers from discharging employees for garnishments for
more than one indebtedness. 211
The act also prohibits any employer from discharging an employee because
his or her earnings have been subjected to garnishment for anyone indebted-
ness.'" Employer violations of this provision can result in a fine of up to $1,000
or imprisonment for up to one year, or botb. H3 There are no private remedies
under the act for violation ofthese restrictions on garnishment. 21' The Secretary
of Labor has authority to enforce these provisions of the act. 215

(2) Debt Collection Practices

Congress enacted the Debt Collection Practices Act in 1977 to control
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection procedures used by many debt
collectors. This act is a subchapter ofthe Consumer Credit Protection Act.- It
applies to procedures used by debt collectors in collecting debts in consumer
credit transactions.
The act has little application to banks or financial Institutions because its
provisions do not apply to creditors who act to collect debts owed to them.21' The

H' IS USC § 1673(b)(2)(A) (1982). This 50 percent limit increases to 55 perce~t when
the support order relates to a period of time more than twelve weeks earher. Id.
§ 1673(b)(2) (1982).
25' I 5 USC § I673(b)(2)(B)(1982). This limit increases to 65 percent when thepmish.
ment action is to enforce a suppOrt order relating to a period oftime more than twelve
weeks earHer.ld. § I673(b)(2) (1982).
2'015 USC § I 673(c) (1982).
2" 15 USC § 1617 (1982).
2&215 USC § 1674(a) (1982),
263 15 USC § I674(b) (1982).
"'LeVick v. Skaggs Co., 701 F2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1983), overruling Stewart v.
Traveler's Corp., 503 F2d 108 (9th Cir. J 974); McCabe v. City ofEureka, 500 F. Supp. 59,
60-61 (ED Mo. 1980), aff'd, 664 F2d 680 (8th Cir. 198\).
"'15 USC ~ 1676 (1982).
•,. 15 USC §§ 1692- J 6920 (J 982). .
217 J 5 USC § 1692a(4) (1982). See generally Annot., "What Constitutes 'Debt' and
'Debt Collector' for Purposes of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (l5 U.S.C.
§ 1692(5)(6)." 62 ALR Fed. 544 (1983),
, 26.04(2J SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-56

act controls "debt collectors." A debt collector is someone who regularly collects
debts due to another person or who is engaged in a business whose principal
purpose is to collect debts. 211 A creditor is not within these definitions. 2" The
definition does not apply even when the creditor acquires a debt by assignment
from another person, as long as the assignment is not after the debt is in default
and is not solely for the purpose of collecting the debt for another.no
Debt collectors to whom the act applies are restricted in their communica-
tions with third parties about the consumer's debt. 211 Their communications
with the debtor must be at a reasonable time and place and, when the consumer
is represented by an attorney, with the attorney rather than the debtor. 272 Upon
receipt of a written notice from the consumer, the debt collector must stop any
further communication with the consumer, except to give notice of the pursuit of
a specific creditor's remedy.v3 The act prohibits harassing or abusive tactics,
false or deceptive representations, and unfair or unconscionable means of col-
lecting the debt. 214 The provisions of the act are generally enforced by the FTC,

... 15 USC § I692a(6) (1982). An early version of the act excluded attorneys who are
collecting debts on behalf ofa client from the definition of"debt coUeetor." Amendments
in 1986 deleted the attorney exception. 15 USC § 1692a, as amended by Pub. L. No. 99·
361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986). To bring a lawyer within the definition of"debt caUector," the
"principal purpose" or "regular collection" tests previously referred to would have to be
satisfied.
... When a creditor uses someone else's name so that it appears that a third person is
acting as a debt collector, the creditor is subject to the act, even though the creditor is
acting to coUect his own debts. IS USC § 1692a(6) (1982).
270
15 USC § 1692a(4) (1982). See Kizer v. Finance Am. Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp.
937, 939 (DC Miss. 1978).
27' 15 USC § 1692b (1982).
272 15 USC § 1692c (1982).
273Id.
274 15 USC §§ I692d, I692e, 1692f (1982). A debtor has standing to complain of
violations ofthe Fair Debt CoUection Practices Act, althOUgh the debtor does not contest
the validity of the debt. Bakerv. a.c. Serv. Corp., 677 F2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982). The
Baker court further held that the creditor must give the debtor notice that the debtor may
dispute the validity ofthe debt. A request for verification of the debt does not satisfy this
requirement. Also, the prohibition of the act against deceptive practices applied to
language in the coUection agency's letter that implied that the agency might take lepl
action to collect the debt when the agency in fact had a policy ofnot pursuing lellal action.
The act gives debt coUeclors a defense for bona fide errors, like that in the Truth·in-
Lending Act, but the court held that this was intended to apply to unintentional clerical
errors, as in the Truth-in-Lending Act, not to mistakes aflaw, even ifin good faith and in
reliance on advice of counsel. Finally, the court held that the complainant could recover
statutory damages and attorney fees although no actual damages had been established.
677 F2d at 778-780.
 26-57 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0413)

~xc~pt t,hat the ~anking regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over the depository
InstitutIOns subject to their authority.27S

(31 Credit Reporting

The Federal Fair Credit Reponing ActUi regulates the activities of con-
sumer reponing agencies and users ofcredit reports prepared by these agencies.
A consumer reporting agency is any person who, for a fee. or on a cooperative
nonprofit basi~, ':regularl~ engages" in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credIt InformatIon for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties. m The definition, thus, does not include someone who assembles
information for the person's own purposes. There must be dissemination of the
information to third parties. .
A consumer report is any written, oral, or other communication by a
consumer reporting agency about a consumer's creditworthiness, character,
general reputation, and so forth, that is to be used in establishing the consumer's
eligibility for consumer credit, insurance, or employment, or for certain other
limited purposes. 2J8 Reporting on one's own transactions with the consumer is

275
15 USC § 1692/ (1982). See generally Annot., "Validity, Construction, and Appli-
cation of State Statutes Prohibiting Abusive or Coercive Debt Collection Practices:' 87
ALR3d 786 (1978); Annot., "Recovery of Debtor, Under Tort ofIntentional or Reckless
Infliction of Emotional Distress, for Damages Resulting From Debt Collection Meth-
ods," 87 ALR3d 201 (1978).
m 1.5 USC § 1681-1681t (1982). See generally Note, "Fair Credit Reporting: Are
Misleading Reports Reasonable?" 55 NYU L. Rev. III (1980); Annot., "Construction
and Application afFair Credit Reporting Act (IS USC § 1681 et. seq.)," 17 ALR Fed. 67.5
(1973).
2n 15 USC § 1681 a(f) (1982).
271
15 USC § 1681a(d) (1982). A firm that provides a checlc guarantee service to
merchants, which service contains a code that identifies persons who have given bad
checks, is a company that issues "consumer reports" under the act. Failure to follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of information constitutes a
violation. Alexander v. Moore &; Assoc. Inc., 5.53 F. Supp. 948. 951-952 (D. Haw. 1982).
In Kiblen v. Pickle, 33 Wash. App. 387, 388, 392,6.53 P2d 1338, 1339, 1343 (1982), the
court held that a report from a detective agency investigating an insurance claim under a
disability policy was not a consumer report within the meaning of 1.5 USC § 168Ia(d),
because that section applies only to reports used in establishing eligibility for insurance.
Subsequent use of the report to deny benefits to the claimant or to cancel or fail to renew
the policy could bring the report within the language oCthe section, but the court did noi
reach this issue in the case, because it found substantial compliance with the act. A report
requested by an insurance company on a person who had sued its insured is not a
consumer report, although it was prepared by a consumer reporting Bgency using informa-
tion originally gathered for credit purposes, because there was no "consumer relationship
... between the party requesting the report and the subject of tile report." The purpose of
the report was not within those enumerated in the definition ofan investigative consumer
report. Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F2d 1144, \148-\149 (3d Cir. 1986),
, 26.04[31 SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26·58

not a consumer report under the act. 279 Also, authorization of the extension of
credit through the use of a credit card is not treated as a consumer report.-
Transactions in which a third party makes a request for an extension ofcredit to
a consumer also are not covered, as long as the third party advises the consumer
of the person to whom the request for the extension ofcredit was made and the
third party makes the required disclosures.· It The act distinguishes between a
consumer report and an "investigative consumer report.".n The latter is a report
or a portion of a report "in which information on a consumer's character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained
through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the con-
sumer... n or others who may have knowledge about such matters relating to the
consumer.")
Consumer reporting agencies are limited in the circumstances in which they
may issue a consumer report.... The permitted purposes include those approved
in writing by the consumer, as well as any submissions to persons whom the
reporting agency "has reason to believe" intend to use the information in
connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer.·11 It is also proper
to furnish a consumer report to those whom the reporting agency "has reason to
believe" will use the information for employment purposes or in connection
with underwriting insurance for consumers or in determining the eligibility of
the consumer for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental agency in
cases where the law requires consideration of the applicant's financial responsi-
bility or status.·11 There is also a broad general category that permits a reporting
agency to supply a report to one who "otherwise has a legitimate business need
for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the
consumer."21' The reporting agency is under an obligation to eliminate obsolete
information from its report.... The agency must, upon request of the consumer,
disclose to the consumer the nature ofinfonnation in its files, the sources of the

In Kates v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 776 F2d 1396, 1397-1398 (9th Cir. 1985), a con-
sumer debtor had no right to obtain disclosure of a credit investigation requested by the
creditor bank when the investigation was not conducted after the consumer paid his
account.
27t 15 USC § 1681B(d) (1982).
"Old.
21' Id.
212
15 USC §§ 168Ia(d}, 168Ia(e)(1982).
213
15 USC § 168Ia(e) (1982).
214
15 USC § 1681b (1982).
215Id.
211
15 USC § 1681b(3) (1982).
21' 15 USC § 1681b(3)(E) (1982).
218
15 USC § 1681c (1982).
 26-59 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 1126.04(3)

information (except for certain investigative reports), and the recipients of any
reports made by the agency.'"
The act provides a Procedure for resolving disputes between the agency and
the consumer as to the accuracy of any information in the file.- When the
dispute cannot be resolved, the consumer is entitled to file a brief statement
setting forth the nature ofthe dispute. The statement must, in turn, be transmit-
ted to all persons who subsequently receive a consumer report containing the
disputed information. '11 The consumer reporting agency also is limited in the
extent to which it may disclose adverse information contained in investigative
reports regarding a consumer's character or general reputation in subsequent
reports. 21' The information can only be used in a subsequent consumer report if
either the subsequent report is made within three months of obtaining. the
adverse information or the reporting agency again verifies the information. m
These restrictions do not apply to information that is a matter of public
record. 21<
A credit reporting agency that transmits inaccurate information may be
liable for damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, even ifthe information
it transmits was supplied by creditors and tbe agency accurately reported the
information supplied to it At issue is the interpretation ofSection 607(b) ofthe
Fair Credit Reporting Act. 2tS That statute requires a consumer reporting agency
to do more than simply report information supplied by creditors. It provides
that "[w]henever a oonsumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it
shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy ofthe
information concerning the individual about whom tbe report relates. "2M
Although liability under this statute is not automatic when inaccurate informa-
tion is transmitted, there is liability when tbe credit reporting agency fails to
(I) follow reasonable procedures and (2) assure maximum possible accuracy of

2It 15 USC § 1681g (1982).

2ID 15 USC § 1681i (1982).

2J1 15 USC § 1681 iCc) (1982). Under the statute, a consumer reporting agency has a
duty to reinvestigate facts in a consumer's credit file when they are disputed by the
consumer. IS USC § 16811(a). In Dynes v. TRW Credit Data, 652 F2d 35,36 (9th Cir.
1981), the CQun held that this duty to reinvestigate continued if the credit reporting
agency's reinvestigation produced a repon that also contained inaccurate information
disputed by the consumer.
212 15 USC § 1681/ (1982).

2t3Id.
2"ld
"'IS USC § 1681e(b) (1982).
2" Id.
II 26.04[3] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-60

the information concerning the individual about whom the information

relates. m
Section 607(b) ofthe Fair Credit Reporting Act also was at issue in Equifax
Inc. v. FTC. 2M This was an action by the FTC to enforce the act administratively.
The FTC claimed Equifax was following procedures that placed pressure on its
field offices to increase the production ofadverse information about consumers,
thus creating an unreasonable risk that false information would be generated.
The FTC argued that unlike private actions to enforce the section, when the FTC
brought an enforcement proceeding, it should liot be necessary to establish
specific examples of inaccurate information as long as the company procedures
created an unreasonable risk. The court set aside the FTC's administrative
order. The FTC was required "to ascertain whether the procedures followed by
the agency pose an unreasonable risk of producing error."2t!l As the court found
that there was no unreasonable risk of error in the company procedures, it did
not have to reach the question posed by the FTC as to whether the FTC must
show "that the risk of error manifested itselfin concrete instances ofdetriment
to the credit consumer."3OQ
Users of consumer reports also are subject to regulation by the act. A person
cannot arrange for the preparation of an investigative report on a consumer's
general reputation and character unless it is clearly disclosed to the consumer
that such a report may be made, and unless the consumer is informed of his or
her right to request information on the nature of the investigation. 301 The only
exception to the duty to make such disclosure is when the purpose ofthe report is
related to employment for which the consumer has not specifically applied. 3lI2
When the consumer is denied credit or the charge for such credit is increased
because ofinformation contained in a consumer report from a consumer report-
ing agency, the creditor who has used the report must advise the consumer ofthis
fact, and must give the name and address of the consumer reporting agency to
the consumer. 303 Moreover, when credit is denied or the charges for such credit

21' Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Thompson v. San
Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 6a2 F2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982) (consumer recovered
damages of$1 0,000 for humiliation and mental distress against a credit reporting agency
that failed to program its computer to protect against excessive error and that did not have
procedures to detect error).
2N678F2d 1047, 1050-1051 (llthCir.1982).
2tt Id. at 1052.
3OOId.
:10'15 USC § 1681d(a) (1982).
3O'1d.
30$ 15 USC § 1681 m (1982). The duty to disclose information about the consumer
credit report exists even when the denial of credit is not based upon adverse information
in the report but is taken because ofinsufJicient evidence of financial capacity to handle
the credit. Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F2d 143, 150 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Fischl court left open the question whether oral disclosure to the consumer would
 26-61 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.05[11

~re incre~sed b~cause of information on a consumer's credit or general reputa-

tion .that IS obta~ned from a person other than a consumer reporting agency, the
creditor must disclose the nature of the information to the consumer upOn the
consumer.'s written request..I04 The right of the consumer to make such a request
musl be disclosed to the consumer at the lime that the adverse action is Commu-
nicaled to the consumer. lOS
. There are civil penalties under the act for failing to comply with its provi.
Slons. When the noncompliance is willful, any'consumer reporting agency or
user of information may be liable to the consumer in an amount equal to any
actual damages sustained, plus punitive damages and costs, including attorney
3111
fees. The aCI establishes criminal penallies for officers and employees of
consumer repOrting agencies who "knowingly and willfully" give infonna~ion
from the agency's files to unauthorized persons. 301 It also imposes criminal
penalties on those who "knowingly and willfully" obtain information about a
consumer from a consumer reporting agency under false pretenses. 301
The FTC has general authority to enforce the provisions of the act. JOt The
enforcement authority over depository institutions is entmsted to the federal
regulatory agencies who have general jurisdiction over them. 310

11 26.05 OTHER CONSUMER CREDIT-RELATED LAWS

(Il Unfair or Deceptive Practices-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act
The Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act'" requires the Federal
Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to prevent banks from engaging in unfair

satisfy the statutory requirements. The Fi.rch/ coun also held that the consumer could
recover damages, althoua!t the consumer succeeded in locating on his own a copy of the
consumer credit report within a brief time after learning of the adverse action•.
3GC 15 USC § 168Im(b)(1982).
»s Id.
301 15 USC ~ 1681 n (1982). The statute of limitations for bringing actions under the
act may be tolled when there is a material and willful misrepresentation ofinformation. In
Houghton v. Ins. Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F2d 322 (3d Cir. 1986), the tolling provi·
sion did not apply, because the information alleged to have been willfully and fraudulently
given to a credit bureau was not information covered by the disclosure requirements of
the act.
30' 15 USC § 1681r (I982).
»115 USC § 1681q (1982).
30t 15 USC § 16815 (1982),
31oId.

311 Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of t 975 § 202(a), 15 USC § 57a
(1982).
11 26,05(2) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-62

or deceptive practices that affect commerce, including those which are unfair or
deceptive to consumers. It provides that whenever the FTC prescribes rules
under the parent act, the Federal Reserve Board must, within sixty days after the
rules come into effect, adopt substantially similar rules unless it finds that such
acts or practices by banks are not unfair or deceptive, or that implementation of
similar regulations would conflict with the monetary policies of the Board.
The implementation of the regulations regarding banks insured by the
FDIC is left to the appropriate federal supervisory agency. The law requires that
each such agency establish a separate division of consumer affairs responsible
for receiving and taking appropriate action and complaints. Savings and loan
associations, credit unions, and other thrift institutions also are subject to FTC
rules.
The FTC has adopted rules defining unfair and deceptive practices.of
creditors. 312 The FTC rules do not apply to banks, but the Board ofGovernors of
the Federal Reserve System has adopted regulations that are similar to the FTC
rules.'13 The rules prohibit the use of consumer credit contracts that contain
confession of judgment clauses, waivers of exemptions, assignment of future
wages, and repossession of household goods beyond those for which the creditor
extended credit. The rules require specific disclosures to cosigners of consumer
credit obligations of the nature of the liability ofa cosigner has.31< It is an unfair
act or practice under the rules for a bank to levy a late charge on a payment when
the only reason for the charge is that a late fee was charged for an earlier payment
and the current installment payment is timely and is otherwise a full payment.'"

[2] Plain English Laws

Mass-market legal transactions (consumer loans, credit sales, and the like)
require preprinted, unnegotiated contract forms. But consumers can no more
expect contract terms adapted to fit their particular requirements than they can
expect to have their appliances custom-made. Realizing that standard forms,
normally drafted by creditors or sellers, will not necessarily be understood by the
consumer-debtor, many states have enacted consumer-protection laws giving
the courts the power to enjoin the use of agreements that are deceptive or that
breach standards of fair dealing. Even without such statutes, courts have regu-
larly used their inherent equity powers to strike down boilerplate clauses, hang-

312 I 6 CFR pt. 444 (1988).

313
12 CFR pI. 227 (1988). The FHLBB has adopted similaTTUles for savings and loan
associations. 12 CFR pt. 535 (1988). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has upheld the Consumer Credit Practice Rule adopted by the FI'C in Ameri-
can Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FI'C, 247 App. DC 167, 201, 767 F2d 957, 991 (DC Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 US 1011 (1986).
"'12 CFR ~ 227.14 (1988).
315
12 CFR §227.15 (1988).
 26-63 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.06[11

ing their 0pJnlOns on such legal pegs as absence of consent, fraud,

unconscionability, or some similar doctrine.
The modem approach to the standards for conscionability in consumer
contracts is reflected in § 5.108 ofthe UCCC (1974). That section gives a coun,
as a matter of law, the right to enjoin unconscionable conduct and to award
damages that may have been sustained. In determining whether conduct is in
fact unconscionable, the UCCC sets up a series of standards, one of which is
"inability to understand the language of the agreement." Lawyers should take
this language seriously in drafting consumer agreements.
This handbook cannot canvass all the state laws applicable to the draftillJ of
consumer contracts; however, the following example may help to illustrate the
development ofthe law in this area. New York State enacted a law that went into
effect on June 2, 1978 requiring the basic consumer contracts be in easily
understandable language. 3" The statute covers residential leases and contracts
for money, property, or services used primarily for "personal, family, or house-
hold purposes." These must be
1. Written in non-technical language and in a clear and coherent manner
using words with common and everyday meanings;
2. Appropriately divided into and captioned by its various sections.
Connecticut also has enacted a "plain-English" law. 3ll Other states have such
legislation under consideration. 3\1

'126.06 CREDIT DISCRIMINATION AND THE EQUAL CREDIT

OPPORTUNITY ACP"

ll] Scope of the Act

The ECOA 3ra ma"es it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any
applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis ofrace,

3IIN.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-702(b) (I918). See Note, "New YOlk's Plain EnJlish
Law," 8 Fordha"m Urb. U 451 (1979-1980). See generally Annat., "What Constitutes
'Fraudulent' or 'Unconscionable' Aareement or Conduct Within Meanina of State Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act," 42 ALR4th 293 (1985).
317 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-393a (West 1987).
311 See Siegel, "Simplicity: An Old Solution With Continuing Appeal," Nat'l U, Sept.
25, 1978. See also Blumberg, "Lawyers Can Write Oearly and Coherently," SI NYS Bl
478 (1979); Plack, "Plain Lanr;uage Movement: An Overview With Recent Develop-
ments," 36 Mo. BJ 40 (1980).
311 The principal author ant 26.06 on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is Cherry Lee
Croushore.
3'015 USCM 1691-1691f(l982 & Supp. IV 1986).
'I: 26.06(1) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-64

color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age.'" The ECOA also
makes it unlawful to discriminate because all or part ofthe applicant's income
derives from any public assistance program or because the applicant has in good
faith exercised any right afforded under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 321
The prohibitions in ECOA against discrimination in credit transactions are
not limited to consumer credit transactions. To some extent, these regulations
treat business credit transactions differently from consumer credit transac-
tions. 323 However, the basic directive against discrimination applies regardless
of whether the transaction is a commercial or consumer one. The act prohibits
creditors from engaging in the prohibited discriminatory conduct. A creditor,
under the definitions in the act, is any "person who regularly extends, renews, or
continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewlll,
or continuation ofcredit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates
in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit. "3:1< The scope of the act is,
thus, considerably broader than the credit transactions subject to the Truth-in-
Lending Act and Regulation Z.325
Any deferral ofa debt is a credit transaction within the act ifit is granted by
a creditor. 3211 As a result, the act treats certain transactions as those involving
credit, although there is no finance charge or installment payment plan. The
Board classifies these transactions as "incidental credit" transactions and
excepts such credit from some of the procedural requirements specified in the
Board's Regulation B.32T Examples ofincidental credit are transactions in which

321
15 USC § 1691(aXI)(1982). See generally Anderson&: Malliard, "Women's Banks
and Women's Access to Credit: Competition Between Marketplace and Regulatory Solu-
tions to Gender Discrimination," 20 Loy. LAL Rev. 771 (1987); Blakely, "Credit Oppor-
tunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects," 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 66S; Matheson, "The
Equal Credit Opponunity Act: A Functional Failure," 21 Harv. J. Legis. 371 (1984);
Schafer, "A Program for Compliance With the Equal Credit Opportunity Laws," 99
Banking U 422 (1982). See also Annot., "Discrimination Against Credit Applicant on
Basis of Marital Status Under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (IS USCS §§ 1691 et. seq.),"
SS ALR Fed. 4S8 (1981).
322 IS USC §§ I 691 (a)(2), 1691(a)(3) (1982)..
323 See 12 CFR § 202.3(dX2) (1988), providing that the pans ofthe regulation dealing
with information about marital status and certain pans dealing with furnishing credit
information do not apply to business credit.
324 IS USC § 169Ia(e)(1982). Under ECOA, a person is not only a natural person but
also a corporation, governmental agency, trust, or other organization. Id. § l69Ia(f).
mOfficial Staff Interpretations § 202. 1(a), 12 CFR pI. 202 (Supp. I, 1988). The
Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z are discussed supra! 26.03.
m IS USC§ 169Ia(d)(1982). See Official Stafflnterpretations§ 202.l(a), 12 CFRpt.
202 (Supp. 1 1988). .
327 12 CFR § 202.3(c) (1988); Official Staff Interpretations § 202.3(c), 12 CFR pt. 202
(SUP? I (988).
26-65 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 11 26.0611)

a service provider, "such as a hospital, doctor, lawyer or retailer ... allows the
client or customer to defer the payment of a bill...."...
. Credit transactions within the act, according to the Board's regulations,
mclude "every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an
application for credit or an existing extension of credit. ... "221 Consistent with
this broad scope, the regulations establish standards for taking credit applica-
tions, evaluating applicants for credit, extending or modifying the terms of
credit previously granted, giving notice of action taken on credit applications,
furnishing credit information to others, and retaining information on credit
transactions.
The Federal Reserve Board takes the position that ECOA does not extend to
leasing transactions that are not "credit sales." The U.S. Court ofAppeals for the
Ninth Circuit does not agree with the Board's view, and has held that ECOA
does apply to leasing transactions and that it forbids discrimination on the basis
of sex or marital status in such transactions. 33O
The purpose of the ECOA is to promote the availability of credit to all
creditworthy applicants. The essential concept of nondiscrimination in the
extension ofcredit is that each individual who applies forcredit has a right to be
evaluated on his or her individual creditworthiness. An evaluation ofan individ-
ual's creditworthiness must be based on the individual's ability and willingness
to repay an extension of credit and not on some generalization or stereotype
about persons who are similarly situated with regard to race, color, national
origin, religion, age, sex, or marital status.

321 Jd.

328 12 CFR § 202.2(m) (1988). The rellulation goes on to give as examples "informa-
tion requirements; investigation procedures; standards of creditworthiness; terms of
credit; furnishing of credit information; revocation, alteration, or termination of credit;
and collection procedures." ld. . .
'""'Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F2d 789,793 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 US 832
(1984). The Federal Reserve Board stated when it revised Regulation B in 1985 that it
believed that "Congress did not intend the ECOA, which on its face applies only to credit
transactions, to cover lease transactions unless the transaction results in a 'credit sale' as
defined in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z." 50 Fed. Reg. 48,020 (1985). The
Board "has not applied Regulation B to leasing," because it believes that the Brothers
decision, by defining "credit" too broadly, is contrary to the intent of Congress, and.
because it believes that "there is.little evidence of discrimination ofleuon bued on the
personal characteristics oflessees" (as there was with credit transactions when Congress
enacted the ECOA), while there is evidence that application of the Board's regulation
"could impose significant burdens for certain segments of the industry... ." 50 Fed. Reg.
48,020 (Nov. 20, 1985). The Board identified furniture and appliance leasing as areas that
would likely be burdened and suggested that there was no need in other areas where
lessors, such as financial institutions engaged in automobile leasing, are already comply-
ing with Regulation B. The Board will enforce the Bro/hers decision in the Ninth Circuit
and will monitor its results. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,019-48,020.
, 26.06(1) SECURITY TRANSAcrIONS 26-66

The ECOA authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System to promulgate regulations to carry out these purposes. 30' The Board in its
Regulation B has adopted rules to effectuate the unbiased extension of credit to
all creditworthy applicants. 33O Although too extensive to be set out in detail here,
the regulations prohibit discrimination on any of the grounds proscribed by the
statute and establish rules on extending credit, taking applkations, and evaluat-
ing applications. The regulations except certain classes of transactions, create
enforcement procedures and penalties, and provide detailed requirements for
notice.:l33 The Board has model application and notification forms, the use of
which deems a creditor in compliance with provisions of Regulation B.:134
The act gives the FTC general responsibility for enforcement ofECOA and
related Federal Reserve Board regulations. 335 In the case ofbanks, the traditional
banking regulatory agencies have the enforcement power.:l36 When the agency
with enforcement authority is unable to obtain compliance with a requirement
of ECOA, the FTC is "authorized to refer the matter to the Attorney General
with a recommendation that an appropriate civil action be instituted. "337 The
Attorney General is then empowered to "bring a civil action in any appropriate
United States district court for such relief as may be appropriate, including

331 15 USC § 169I b(a) (1982).

mSe e 12 CFR § 202. I (b) (I 988)(Regulation B).
333 Id. Regulation B was extensively rewritten and revised in 1985, but the revised
regulation contained few major substantive changes. For a good discussion oftile substan-
tive changes see Schellie, "Equal Credit Opportunity," 41 Bus. Law. 1029 (1986). To
compare the texts of the current Regulation B and the old Regulation B (prior to 1985
revision), see G. Azzata, Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1986 Cumulative Supp.) (Apps.I,
J, respectively).
334See 12 CFR pt. 202. apps. B. C (1987) (Reaulation B).
335
15 USC § 1691c(c) (1982). The FTC's enforcement authority is limited to the
extent that enforcement of the requirements of ECOA are specifically committed to
another regulatory agency. Sec 15 USC § 1691c(a) (1982 & Supp.lV 1986). Sec also 12
CFR § 202.14 (1988) (Regulation B). A violation of ECOA is also deemed a violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 USC § 169Ic(c) (1982). The Federal Trade
Commission Act is at 15 USC §§ 41-77 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
335 The comptroller has authority for enforcement with respect to national banks, the
Federal Reserve Board for member banks other tban national bank$. and the FDIC for
FDIC-insured banks other than member banks. 15 USC § 1691c(a)(l) (1982). The
Fl:ILBB, the FSLIC, and the administrator of the National Credit Union Administration
have enforcement powers over the depository institutions they regulate. 15 USC
§§ 1691c(a)(2), 1691c(aX3) (1982). Similar delegations of power are made to the Farm
Credit Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and some other regula-
tory agencies. IS USC § 1691c(a)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
337
15 USC § 1691e(g) (1982).
26·67 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS II 26.06(2)

il\iunetive relief."m The scope of the civil liability imposed by ECOA is dis-
cussed later in this chapter. 33'

(2) What Constitutes Discrimination Under ECOA

As noted earlier, although ECOA makes it unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant with respect to any aspect ofa credit transac-
tion on the basis of race, color. religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status,
or other prohibited basis,""" the act does not define "discrimination," It simply
makes it unlawful for a creditor "to discriminate" on any prohibited basis in the
act.,., The Board's regulations take the view that Congress intended "an effects
test" to apply in determining whether a creditor's evaluation ofcreditwortlliness
violated the act.3<2 The Board also takes the view, in its Official Staff Interpreta-
tions, that "prohibited basis" not only refers to the status ofcredit applicants but
also to "the characteristics ofindividuals with whom an applicant is affiliated or
with whom the applicant associates."343 The staff interpretation states that
a creditor may not discriminate against an applicant because of that per-
son's personal or business dealings with memben of a certain religion,
because of the national origin of any persons associated with the extension
of credit (such as the tenants in the apartment complex being financed), or

nilS USC § 169Ie(b) (1982). See United States v. ITI Consumer Fin. Corp., 816
F2d 481, 489 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Landmark Fin. Servs., 612 F. Supp. 623,
626 (D. Md. 1985}. See also United States v. Meadors, 753 F2d 590 (7tb Cir. 1985);
United States v. American Future Sys., Inc., 143 F2d 169 (3d Cir. 1984). See generally
Ilgenfritz, "The Failure of Private Actions as an ECOA Enforcement Tool: A Call For
Active Government Enforcement and Statutory Reform," 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 447 (1984).
3)1 See infra 'If 26.06[6].

"°See IS USC § 1691(a)(1982); 12 CFR § 202.4 (1 988)(Regulation B).

141 See 15 USC § I691(a) (1982).
mI2CFR§ 202.6 n.2 (1988). The Board relies on the le&islative history ofthe act. Id.
The Official Staff Interpretations state:
The Act and reaulation may prohibit a creditor practice that is discriminatory in
effect becau5C it has a disproportionately negative impact on a prohibited basis, even
though the creditor has no intent to discriminate and the practice appean neutral on
its face, unless the creditor practice meets a legitimate business need that cannot
reasonably be achieved as welt by means that arc less disparate in their impact. For
example, requiring that applicants have incomes in excess of. certain amount to
qualify for an overdraft line of credit could mean that women and minority appli-
cants will be rejected at a higher rate than men and nonminority applicants. Ifthere is
a demonstrable relationship between tbe income requirement and creditworthiness
for the level ofcredit involved, however, use ofthe income standard would likely be
permissible...
Official Staff Interpretations § 202.6(a)(2}, 12 CFR pt. 202 (Supp. I 1988). See generally
BaCT, "The Equal Opportunity Act and the 'Effects Test·... 95 Banking U 241 (1978).
1430fficia! Stafflnterprctalions § 202.2(z)(I), 12 CFR pt. 202 (Supp.11988).
1126.06(2) SECURITY TRANSACfIONS 26-68

because of the race of other residents in the neighborhood where the prop-
erty offered as collateral is located. 344

Credit practices that are discriminatory take many and varied forms. Some
violations are obvious. The denial of credit or the offering of credit on less
favorable terms solely because the applicant is a minority applicant, is elderly, or
is female is an example of obvious discrimination.
Determining what amounts to prohibited discrimination poses different
issues, depending on whether the prohibited basis of the discrimination is race,
sex, marital status, age, or one of the other prohibited grounds. There are
extensive rules that deal with when a creditor may consider the possible interests
of a spouse in property owned by a married applicant without violating the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis ofmarital status. These rules are
discussed later in this chapter.
There are equally thorny problems with regard to age discrimination. There
are two ways in which a creditor may evaluate a credit application. When the
creditor uses "an empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound,
credit scoring system, "145 the applicant's age may be a predictive variable as long
as the age ofsomeone who is elderly (62 or older) is not given a negative value. 34ll
In a judgmental system of credit evaluation, "a creditor may not take age
directly into account in any aspect of the credit transaction. "147 However, the
creditor may consider, according to the Board's staff, the "applicant's occupa-
tion and length oftime to retirement to ascertain whether the applicant's income
(including retirement income) will support the extension of credit to its
maturity,"S4t .
Likewise, it is impermissible to discriminate on the basis that the applicant
receives public assistance, but the creditor may take into account "the length of
time an applicant will likely remain eligible to receive such income..." and'

3Uld.
345 The Board's regulations s~ify the requirements for such a system. See 12 CFR
§ 202.2(p) (1988). See also Taylor, "Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specific-
ity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems," 29 Buffalo L Rev. 73
(l980).
341 12 CFR § 202.6(b)(2) (1988).
S470fficial Staff Interpretations § 202.6(b)(2), 12 CFR pt. 202 (Supp.11988). This
Official StaffInterpretation is slightly different from the language ofthe regulation, which
states that in a judgmental system, the creditor "may consider an applicant's age.••only
for the purpose of determining a pertinent element of creditworthine5.1." 12 CFR
§ 202.6(b)(2)(iii) (1988). The staff interpretation concludes that this only permits relating
the applicant's age to other information considered in determining creditworthiness, such
as the sources and continuation of the applicant's income. Official StafT Interpretations
§ 202.6(bX2), 12 CFR pt. 202 (Supp. 1 1988).
"'Official StafTlnterpretations § 202.6(bX2), 12 CFR 202 (Supp. 11988).
26-69 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.06(2)

whether the creditor can "attach orgarnish' the income" in case of default."1 The
ECOA specifkally prohibits discrimination based on national origin, but one
case has held that a private lender may discriminate on the basis of alienage
without violating ECOA.!IO In this case, Bhandari, a citizen ofIndia and lawful
permanent resident of the United States, applied to First National Bank for a
credit card. First National denied the application based on Bhandari's alienage
and shon employment history at his then current job. Bhandari received a letter
from First National stating only that his credit application had been denied
because he was not a U.S. citizen. Bhandari then brought action against First
National alleging civil rights violations!!' and violations of ECOA arising from
the bank's denial of his credit card application. The coun found no factual basi.s
for Bhandari's claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his
national origin, m but did find that First National had discriminated against him
on the basis of his alienage. The coun went on to hold that although discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin is violative of ECOA, ECOA does not
prohibit discrimination against credit applicants on the basis of alienage.au
ECOA details activities that do not constitute discrimination. For example,
ECOA provides that it is not discrimination for a creditor to engage in the
following:
(I) To make an inquiry of marital status if such inquiry is for the purpose of
ascenaining the creditor's rights and remedies applicable to the panicular
extension of credit and not to discriminate in a determination of credit-
wonhiness; (2) to make an inquiry of the applicant's age or of whether the

"'Id.
350 Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank, 808 F2d 1082, 1100-1101, reh'ggranted On other
grounds, 812 F2d 936 (5th Cir. 1987),
u, For analysis ofthe civil rights violations, see id. ftt 1085-1100. On rehearing ofthe
alleged civil rights violations, the court found that 42 USC § 1981 did not prohibit
alienage discrimination by private persons, even though the U.S. Supreme Court had held
that the statute forbade racial discrimination by private persons. Bhandari v. First Nat'[
Bank, 829 F2d 1343, 1351-1352 (5th Cir. 1987). See Runyan v. McCrary, 427 US 160,
172 (1976).
3f2 Bhandari, 808 F2d at 110I. Bhandari could have shown national origin discrimi·
nation in two ways-that the bank actually discriminated against him because of his
Indian origin or that the bank's facially permissible alienage discrimination had the effect
of specifically discriminating against Indians. The court held that Bhandari failed to
sufficiently cstablish either ground.
313 ld. at 1085, 1101. The distinction between national origin discrimination and
alienage discrimination is set out in Espinoza v. Farah Mfs. Co., 414 US 86, 95 (1973), an
employment case involvina identical language under the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act. The Bhandari court found the Court's holding in Espinoza controlling.
The Bhandari court went on to hold that First National had v10lated ECOA on other
grounds. Specifically, First National had violated EeONs notice provisions, which
require the creditor to furnish a complete list ofspecific reasons for adverse action. See 15
USC § I691(d)(1 982). See also discussion infra ~ 26.06[5].
1126.06(3) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-70

applicant's income derives from any public assistance program if such

inquiry is for the purpose of determining the amount and probable continu-
ance of income levels, credit history, or other pertinent element of credit-
worthiness as provided in regulations of the Board; (3) to use any empiri-
cally derived credit system which considers age ifsuch system is demonstra-
bly and statistically sound in accordance with regulations of the Board,
except that in the operation of such system the age of an elderly applicant
may not be assigned a negative factor or value; or (4) to make an inquiry or
to consider the age ofan elderly applicant when the age ofsuch applicant is
to be used by the creditor in extension ofcredit in favor ofsuch applicant. 35'
As this discussion indicates, the requirements of ECOA and the Board's
regulations are varied and complex. Bankers need to consult with counsel to
determine the application of these rules to credit transactions in the states in
which they do business.

(3) Prohibited Discrimination in Credit Application and Evaluation

Detailed rules govern the application and evaluation stages of a credit
transaction. These rules cover advertising355 and the type of information that a
creditor may request. 3!l41 The rules are particularly detailed with respect to the
information that may be obtained about marital status. There are strict limita-
tions on inquiry about income from alimony, child support, or separate mainte-
nance, inquiries about childbearing or childrearing practices and intentions, and
information about spouses. 3S7
The manner in which a creditor analyzes an applicant's creditworthiness
also is subject to strict standards.3!l4I For example, the regulations prohibit a
creditor from discounting or excluding from consideration income from part-
time employment or from a pension. 351 Child support payments must be consid-
ered as income of the applicant "to the extent that they are likely to be consist-
ently made. ":le0
The rules on taking credit applications and evaluating them are too exten-
sive to be canvassed completely here. With the assistance of counsel, creditors
should carefully consult the Board's regulations. interpretations, and model
forms. 351

3"15 USC § 1691(b){1982).

3"See 12 CFR § 202.5(a) (1988).
'!l4ISee generally 12 CFR § 202.5 (1988).
357 Id.

3!8 See generally 12 CFR § 202.6 (1988).

"·12 CFR § 202.6(bX5) (1988).

350Jd.

351 The Board's regulations are published at 12 CFR pt. 202 (1987).
26·11 INTEREST RATE CONTROlS 'Il 26.06(4)

[4J Special-Purpose Credit Programs

It is not discrimination for a creditor to refuse to extend credit offered
pursuant to the following:

(1) ~ny cre~it assistance program expressly authorized by law for an eeo-
nom~c~lIy disadvantaged class of persons; (2) any credit assistance program
admmlstered by a nonprofit organization for its members or an economi-
cally disadvantaged class of persons; or (3) any special purpose credit pro-
gram offered by a profit-making organization to meet special social needs
which meet standards prescribed in regulations by the Board....
if the creditor's refusal to extend credit is required by or made pursuant to such
program.3I2 .

This provision for special-purpose credit programs responsive to special

needs of a class of persons carves out an important exception. The legislative
history of this exception indicates that Congress intended to give the Federal
Reserve Board authority to exempt classes of transactions when it has been
clearly demonstrated that the consumers involved would effectively be denied
credit without such an exemption. Therefore, when the Board's regulations
permit, credit programs may intentionally prefer members of certain economi-
cally disadvantaged classes.:ln The essential prohibition of ECOA is directed at
discrimination against applicants.
In United States v. American Future Systems. Inc." the court reviewed an
al1eged special-purpose credit program and found that it violated ECOA. In this
case the creditor was a company, American Future Systems (AFS), which admit-
tedly directed its efforts at selling kitchenware on a credit basis to a target group
of young, single, white female coeds. Under its credit program, minorities,
males, and married persons were treated less favorably. AFS contended that its
credit practices were a special purpose credit program allowed under ECOA:IM
and argued that its program was based on the social need of persons in the age
group of eighteen to twenty-one who were excluded from the customary credit
market.
The court stated that a special purpose credit program satisfies ECOA if
credit applicants either "would not receive such credit" or "probably would
receive it on less favorable terms than ordinarily available to other applicants
applying to the organization for similar type and amount of credit.""" The

:141215 USC § I 69J(c) (1982); 12 CFR § 202.8 (1988)(Regulation B).

:113 H.R. Rep. No. 873, 94th Cong.• 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 403, 428; S. Rep. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Congo & Admin. News 403, 409.
:lU 743 F2d 169 (3d Cir. 1984).
"'See 15 USC§ J69I(c)(3) (982).
068
743 F2d at 177. See 12 CFR § 202.8(a)(3)(ii) (1988) (Regulation B).
11 26.06(5) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26·72

ECOA permits a special-purpose credit program to differentiate between credit

applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or
marital status to enhance credit opportunities for disadvantaged groups with an
established social need. The court here found that extension ofcredit to persons
in the age group of eighteen to twenty-one met the requirements of ECOA in
establishing a social need group, but found that because eacn person within the
defined social need class did not receive the same credit terms solely because of
the person's sex, race, or marital status, AFS's spe~ial purpose credit program
violated ECOA. 3a7

(5] Notice Requirements

In addition to providing what does and does not constitute discrimination.
the ECOA provides specific requirements regarding notice. 3" Within thirty days
after receipt of a completed application for credit, a creditor must notify the
applicant of its action on the application.3&I
A 1987 case considered when ECOA regards a credit application as "com-
plete" for purposes of triggering the notice requirementY· In High v. McLean
Financial Corp., the court held that loan applicants were not entitled to notice
within thirty days after submitting their application, because the application was
not complete until the creditor had obtained verifying information and other
reports or information ordinarily required to evaluate a 10an. 371

7
3$ 743 F2d at 180. The court went on to hold that AFS further violated ECOA
because its credit program was not fonnally described in writing or designated as a
"special purpose credit program" as required by the Board's regulations. Id. at 177. See 12
CFR § 202.8(a)(3Xi) (1987) (Regulation B).
"'See 15 USC § 1691(d)(1982); 12 CFR § 202.9 (I 988)(Regulation B). Although the
regulatory scheme is paramount, courts have emphasized the need to hannonize the
regulatory scheme with the purpose ofECOA. See Thompson v. Galles Chevrolet Co., 807
F2d 163, 168 (10th Cir. 1986). In this case, plaintiffs filed two credit applications with the
same entity, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), for the purchase ofa
single Chevrolet pickup truck. Even though the first application was deemed incomplete
and written notification was not given to plaintiffs, credit was granted on the second
application, a more complete version of the first and filed within two weeks of the first.
The court held that the manner in which GMAC melded the two applications resulting in
the grant of credit fulfilled the underlying purpose ofECOA, and that strict adherence to
the regulatory scheme would have advanced a result contrary to that purpose.
See also Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F2d 7119. 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 US
832 (1984) (literal language of the ECOA must be construed so as to effectuate its
underlying purposes); Jochum v. Pico Credit Corp., 730 F2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984)(a
regulation should be interpreted in a manner that effectuates its central purposes);
30t 15 USC § 1691(d)(1)(1982).
370 High v. Mclean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1563-1566 (DOC 1987).
371 Id. at 1563-1564. See also 12 CPR § 202.2(t) (1988) ("A completed application
means an application in connection with which a creditor has received all the infonnation
 26-73 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS 1/26.06(5)

If a creditor takes adverse action on an application, tile creditor must

provide to the applicant a statement of reasons for the action. 272 The creditor
must provide either a written statement of reasons or a written notification of
the applicant's right to a written statement of reasons. J73 The statement of
reasons must be specific as to the reasons for tile adverse action taken.'" The
term "adverse action" is defined. It "means a denial or revocation of credit, a
change in the terms ofan existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit
in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested. ">71 Adverse
action does not include "a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing
credit arrangement where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or
where such additional credit would exceed a previously established credit
limit."m Adverse action is funher defined and refined in Regulation B.an

that the creditor regularly obtains and considers in evaluating applications for the amount
and type of credit requested....").
m 15 USC § 169 I{d)(2) (1982).
373 [d.

27'15 USC § 169l{d}(3) (1982); 12 CFR § 202.9(b}(2) (1988) (Regulation B). See
Bhandari v, First Nat'l Bank, 808 F2d 1082, 1085 reh'ggranted on other grounds, 812 F2d
936 (5th Cir. 1987) (bank that denied credit card application on basis ofalienaae and shon
employment history violated ECOA notice requirements, because statement of reasons
only specified alienage and therefore was not complete); Fischl v. General Motors Accep-
tance Corp., 708 F2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1983) (statement that "credit references are
insufficient" was not a specific enough reason).
375 15 USC § 1691 (d)(6)( (1982). But see Dorsey v. Citizens & S. Fin. Corp., 678 F2d
137,139 (11th Cir. 1982), atrd, 706 F2d 1203 (1983) (en bane), which held that the
refusal to grant credit substantially as requested does not constitute adverse action when
the rejection is coupled with an offer to grant credit on other tenns and the consumer
accepts the counteroffer.
311 15 USC § I691 (d)(6) (1982).

m Under 12 CFR ~ 202.2(c) (1988) (Regulation B) adverse action means:

(i) A refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the
terms requested in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer (to grant
c:redit in a different amount or on other terms) and the applicant usei or exprnsly
accepts the credit offered;
(iI) A termination of an account or an unfavorable chanle in the temu of an
account that does not affect all or a substantial portion of a class of the creditor's
accounts; or
(iii) A refusal to increase the amount of credit available to an applicant who has
made an application for an increase.
(2) The term does not include:
(i) A change in the terms of an account expressly agreed to by an applicant.
(ii) Any action or forbearance relating to an account taken in connection with
inactivity, default, or delinquency as to that account;
(iii) A refusal or failure to authorize an account transaction at a point of sale or
Joan, except when the refusal is a termination or an unfavorable change in the tenns
11 26.06(6) SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-74

(6) Civil Liability for Violation of ECOA

Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement of ECOA is liable for
actual damages to the aggrieved applicant.'" Actual damages may include out-
of-pocket monetary losses, injury to credit reputation, mental anguish, humilia-
tion, or embarrassment.'" The act also provides for recovery of punitive dam-
ages up to a specified amount. In individual actions, the aggrieved applicant may
recover up to $10,000. In class actions, the total recovery may not exceed
$500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the creditor, whichever is less. 3IlI
The language of ECOA, literally read, makes punitive damages mandatory
once an ECOA violation is found. 31 ' Although the statute sets out a number of
factors to be considered in determining the amount ofpunitive damages,312 none
of these requires that the underlying violation be intentional or reckless. The
courts, however, have not construed the statute literally. In Fischl v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,'" the statute was interpreted to mean that punitive
damages may be awarded "if the creditor's conduct is adjudged wanton, mali-
cious or oppressive, or if it is deemed to have acted in reckless disregard of the
applicable law." in Anderson I'. United Finance Co.,"" the court said that puni·
tive damages could be awarded "even though there was no specific intention to
discriminate on unlawful grounds" iii. order to increase the incentive for creditor

ofan account that does not affect all or a substantial portion ofa class ofthe creditor's
accounts, or when the refusal is a denial of an application for an increase in the
amount of credit available under the account;
(iv) A refusal to extend credit because the creditor does not offer the type ofcredit
or credit plan requested.
(3) An action that falls within the definition ofboth paragraphs (c)(l) and (c)(2) of
this section is &overned by paragraph (c)(2).
See also Annot., "Notification of Adverse Action on Credit Application Under Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (IS U.S.C.S. §§ 1691 et. seq.) and Regulations Promulgated
Thereunder (12 CFR Part 202)," 65 ALR Fed. 906 (1984)•
... 15 USC § 1691 e(a) (1982).
mSee Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1983);
Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
..015 USC § 1691e(b} (1982).
311 The statute states that "any creditor ... who fails to comply with any requirement
imposed under this subchapter shall b~ liable to the aggrieved applicant for punitive
damages ... ," 15 USC § 1691e(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
,uThe statute states that in determining the amount of punitive damages, the court
must consider "among other relevant factors, the amount ofany actual damases awarded,
the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of
the creditor, the number ,of persons adversely affected, and the. extent to which the
creditor's failure of compliance was intentional." 15 USC § 1691e(b) (1982).
m 708 F2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Anderson v. Unit~d Fin. Co., 666 F2d
1274 (9th Cir. 1982).
""666 F2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982).
26-75 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.06(7J

compliance. Bhandari v. First National Bank,"" relying on Fischl, also denied

the award of punitive damages.
Besides actual and punitive damages, ECOA also provides for equitable
relief,'" attorney fees, and costS."17 Civil liability, however, is not imposed if a
creditor acts in good faith in conformity with official rules and regulations.-

[7] Relationship to State Laws Establishing Marital and Other

Property Rights
A creditor cannot refuse to grant a separate, individual account to a
creditworthy applicant on the basis of sex, marital status, or other prohibited
basis.:In Other, less obvious, discriminatory practices may include requiring the
signature of a married applicant's spouse when the married applicant Qualifies
individually under the creditor's lending standards, no inquiring about an appli-
cant's marital status when the applicant neither resides in a community property
state nor is relying on community property to qualify for the credit,'" refusing to

315 808 F2d 1082, 1103, reh'uranted on other arounds, 812 F2d 936 (5th Cir. 1987).
.... 15 USC § I 69Ie(c) (1982).
3ar 15 USC § 169Ie(d) (1982). See also 12 CFR § 202.I4(b) (1988) (Regulation B}.
311 15 USC § 169Ie(e}(1982).

m 12 CFR § 202.7(a) (I 988)(Regulation B).

310 12 CFR § 202.7(d) (I 988). It is generally unlawful to require an applicant's spouse
to sign any cJedit instrument that is not ajoint credit application ifthe applicant qualifies
under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the credit requested. 12 CFR
§ 202.7(dX I) (1988). When an applicant for unsecured credit relies on property that is
owned jointly with another person to obtain the credit, it is permissible for the creditor to
require the other person's signature on the instruments the creditor reasonably believes
are necessary under state law to permit the creditor to have recourse against the property
in the event of default or death of the applicant. 12 CFR § 202.7(d)(2) (1988). In
community property states, when a married person applies for unsecured credit, the
creditor may require the spouse to sign an instrument the creditor reasonably believes to
be necessary to make recourse against the community property possible if the state law
does not give the applicant the power to manage enough community property to qualify
for the credit and the applicant does not have enough separate property. 12 CFR
§ 202.7(d)(3) (1988). When the applicant requests credit that is to be secured by some
property, the creditor may require the spouse to sign or may require other persons with an
interest in the property to sign when the creditor reasonably believes the signature is
needed under the law for the creditor to obtain a security interest in the property which, in
the event ofdefault, would permit the creditor to reach the property to satisfy the debt free
from the interest of the other. 12 CFR § 202.7(d)(4) (1988). When an applicant cannot
qualify for credit. the creditor may require a cosigner or guarantor, but the creditor may
not require that the spouse be the additional party obligat~'" ror the credit. 12 CFR .
§ 202.7(d)(S) (1988).
,., See 12 CFR § 202.S(d) (1988). Ifa married person resides In a community property
state, the earnings ofthe person during marriage will be viewed as community property in
which the person's spouse will have an interest. Although property may be held in the
1126.06(7] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-76

permit an applicant to have an account in the applicant's birth-given surname or

in a surname that combines the spouse's surname and the birth-given sur-
name,312 and furnishing credit information to a consumer reporting agency that
fails to reflect the participation of both spouses in the credit transaction for
which the information is supplied.'" Determining when creditor action discrim-
inates on the basis ofmarital status is complicated by the need to consider ifthe
relevant state property law treats married persons in a way that makes some
creditor consideration of marital status reasonable.
Some of the rules governing discrimination on the basis of marital status
derive from the express language ofthe act. ECOA provides that a creditor is not
engaging in discrimination by asking for the signature of both parties to a
marriage "for the purpose of creating a valid lien, passing clear title, waiving
inchoate rights to property, or assigning earnings...."'" The act also stipulates
that "consideration or application of State property laws directly or indirectly
affecling creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of
this subchapter."315 Additional directives exist that make inapplicable "[a)ny
provision ofState law which prohibits the separate extension ofconsumer credit
to each party to a marriage. . . in any case where each party to a marriage
voluntarily applies for separate credit from the same creditor.... ":IM The act
prohibits aggregating the separate accounts of both parties to a marriage "for
purposes of determining permissible finance charges or permissible loan ceil-
ings" under state or federal law. 317 To carry out these legislative directives, the
Board has detailed regulations on how marital property laws affect what consti-
tutes prohibited discrimination under the act.
State laws on the rights ofa married person in the property ofthe other party
to the marriage, in property acquired jointly, and other rights in property based
on the marital status are complex, and vary from state to state. In most states, the
common-law system of marital property rights prevails. In some ofthese states,
the law may create special marital rights in each spouse in the property of the

name ofone spouse only, it may still be community property in which the other spouse has
an interest and which the spouse may have legal authority to spend and to commit as
security for community debts. The regulations contain rules as to when it is appropriate to
request information about a spouse, 12 CPR ~ 202.5 (I 988}, and to require the spouse's
signature. 12 CPR § 202.7(d} (1988).
312 12 CPR § 202.7(b} (1988).
313 12 CPR § 202.10 (1988).
314 15 USC § I 69 Id(a) (1982). This provision "shall nol be construed to permit a
creditor to take sex or marital status into account in connection with the evaluation of
creditwonbiness of any applicant." Id.
3$15 USC § l69Id(b)(1982).
3$15 USC § 169Id(c) (1982). But when such a state law is preempted; the act makes
"each party to the marriage ... solely responsible for the debt so contracted." Id.
39'1 S USC § l69Id(d) (1982).
26-17 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.0617}

other. The common-Jaw right ofdower in real property is an example. A spouse

also may have certain homestead rights under the laws ofsome states. The law of
each state necessarily must be consulted to determine the scope of the marital
rights recognized in that state. Eight states folIow a regime of community prop-
erty. In these states, property acquired during the marriage, regardless ofin what
name the title is held, may be classified as community property if the state law
requirements for community property are met. For example, the earnings ofthe
parties to the marriage, and property acquired with such earnings, are usually
classified as community property. Both parties to the marriaae have an owner-
ship interest in the community property, and, depending on the particular state
law, each spouse may have rights of management, control, and disposition,
which rights mayor may not require the consent of the other spouse. The
Board's regulations address some of the questions associated with these laws on
marital property rights.
Under the Board's regulations, when a party to a marriage applies for credit
that is to be secured by a lien or security interest in property, it is not discrimina-
tion for the creditor to require the signature of both parties when that is neces-
sary to pass a clear titIe, create a valid lien, or waive rights in the property that
may exist in the spouse as a result of the state property law.- Two cases will
illustrate.
In Evans v. Centra/fed Mortgage Co., 3tI the creditor conditioned approval of
a loan for nonhomestead property to Evans, a married woman, on the inclusion
ofher husband as a grantee on the warranty deed and his signature on the deed of
trust. Evans brought suit, claiming that Centralfed's conditional titIe require-
ments discriminated against her on the basis ofher sex and marital status. The
court reviewed Centralfed's conditional requirements on two grounds: (I)
whether they were discriminatory under ECOA and (2) whether they were
commercially reasonable under Regulation B.
The court held that the conditional title requirements did not violate ECOA
for several reasons. Firstly, Centralfed did not require Evans' husband to sign a
promissory note or to assume any personal obligation for his wife. Secondly, the
determination of Evans's creditworthiness and her ability to repay the loan was
made independent of her husband's creditworthiness. Finally, the title require-
ments imposed by Centralfed were solely to eliminate any concern that Evans'
husband might have a community property interest in the property, which
would not be subject to Centralfed's security interest.- In the court's view,
Centralfed had reasonable concerns about the effect of the state community
property laws on the marketability of the title in this transaction. co ' The court

311
15 USC § 1691d(a)(1982). See 12 CFR § 202.7(dX4)( 1988).
311815 F2d 348, 348-349 (5th Cir. 1987).
"'Id. at 349, 350.
"'Id. at 351. n.3. See 12 CFR § 202.7(d)(3)(1988)(Regulation B).
, 26.0617] SECURITY TRANSACTIONS 26-78

noted that Centralfed was supported in its position by the similar practice ofthe
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) to require the nonborrowing
spouse to execute a deed of trust in community property states. 4M
In another 1987 decision, UnitedStates v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.,~
the lender followed a practice ofrequiring a married applicant's spouse to cosign
a promissory note as a prerequisite to considering the future earnings of that
spouse in assessing the creditworthiness ofthe applicant for an unsecured loan in
a community property state where each spouse, separately, had equal rights to
act as manager for the marital community and to enter into debts that bound the
community. Plaintiffs argued that this practice discriminated on the basis of
marital status. The defendant lenders argued that, even in a community prop-
erty state where each spouse has equal management authority, a married appli-
cant cannot obligate his or her spouse's future earnings, because those future
earnings may not be community property. coc The marriage could be dissolved by
death or divorce, and so the proper character of the earnings can only be
established at the time that they are earned. cos Thus, although a married appli-
cant may have control over community property, there is no control over the
applicant spouse's future earnings. To commit the applicant spouse's future
earnings to repay a loan, the spouse must agree to become liable for the debt by
signing a promissory note or other document to· evidence such intent.
On this reasoning, the court concluded that the lender was justified in
requiring the spouse's signature when the applicant relied on his or her spouse's
future earnings to qualify for the loan."" The court said that defendant's practice
"involves nothing more than a consideration of state law as it affects the appli-
cant's creditworthiness," and that such a practice does not violate the ECOA. 401

402 Evans, 815 F2d at 351, n.3. FNMA has since changed its underwriting standards.
Id.
403 816 F2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987).
404 Id. at 489.
4O!Id. at 490-491.
-In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the lending practice here from
that in Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F2d 1274 {9th Cir. 1982). In Anderson, the court
held that the ECOA and Regulation B were violated when a lender required a married
applicant's spouse to cosign for a loan tothe applicant even though the applicant qualified
individually under the lender's standard for credit. No cosigner would have been required
if the applicant had not heen married. Here, the applicant did not qualify individually
under ITT's standard ofcredit. Therefore. ITT was justified in requiring a cosignerjust as
it would have of a similarly situated unmarried applicant:
.aI ITT, 816 F2d at 49 I. See 15 USC § 1691 d(b){1982){"consideration orapplication
ofState property laws directly or indirectly affecting crC:ditworthiness shall not constitute
discrimination for purposes of this subchapter"). .
See also Taylor, "The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Spousal Cosignature Rules and
Community Property States: Regulatory Haywire," 37 Sw. U 1039 (1984).
26·79 INTEREST RATE CONTROLS , 26.06(8)

[8] Relationship to Other State Laws

In addition to the detailed rules with respect to the consideration a creditor
may give to state laws affecting marital property rights, the ECOA provides that
state laws on credit discrimination remain effective except to the extent that
they may be inconsistent with the ECOA." The act authorizes the Board to
make the detennination of whether a state law is inconsistent with the federal
act. The Board has adopted detailed regulations to implement this part of the
act. These regulations make clear that there is no inconsistency if the state law
provides a greater protection to an applicant than does the ECOA.aot

401 15 usq 169Id(f) (1982).

401 12 CFR § 202.II(a) (1988).
 Table of vec Sections
[References afe 10 paragraphs (f) and nOleS (n.).]

uec § uec §
1-102(2)(c) 14.01 n.39 1-201(24) 14.02 n.53
1-102(3) 20.12 n.379; 21.01 .-201(25) 16.01 os. 11, 14,42;
ns. 2, 28, 31 22.07[1]; 23.01[1] n.7
1-102(4) 21.01 n.28 1-201(25)(b), 16.01 n.15
1-103 14.01 n.12; 15.06 ns. 259, 1-201(25)(c) 16.01 n.16
266; 15.08 IL327; 16.02 n.129: 1-201(26) 16.Q1 nAl; 22.07[1]
19.02 ns. 71, 75, 76, 77; 20.05 n.247; 2t.1l[2)[c] n.318;
n.78; 20.08 n.177; 20.10 n.236; 21.11[2]le] ns. 362, 364
20.12 ns. 377,408; 21.05 n.160; 1-201 (26)(a) 23.02[2J[c] n.61
22.02[1] n.62; 22.07[6)[b] n.35 1-201(26)(b) 23.02[2J[c] n.61
I-lOS, Comment 3 .••..•. 14.01 n.43 1-201(27) .. 15.06 n.254; 16.01 n.38;
1-105, Comment 5 14.01 n.46 23.02[2]lc] n.61; 21.1l[2][c] n.318
1-105(1) 14.01 os. 41, 42 1-201 (28) .•.... 14.04 ns. 198, 200;
1-105(2) 14.01 nA6 16.01 nAO
1·106, Comment 2 .. 24.02[2](a] n.121 1-201 (30) 14.04 ns.198, 200
1-106(1) ......... 24.02(2)[a] n.124 )·201 (32) 22.07[3] n.259;
1-106(2) ...••.•. 24.02[2](a] n.120 23.02[1][a] n.39
1-107 24.01[3J n.65 1-201 (33) 22.07[3] n.259;
1-107, Comment •...•. 24.01[3] n.66 23.02[3] n.97
1-201, Comment 25 16.01 n.43 1-201 (37) 14.03 n.100; 15.06
1-201(3) .•.•• 21.01 n.2; 21.02 n.58 n.249; 22.011l] ns. 6,7;
1-201 (4) 19.01 ns. 14, 17 22.0l[2)[a] ns. 27, 28, 29;
1·201 (5) 15.01 n.37 22.0l[2][b] ns. 33, 36, 40;
1-201 (8) .. , 16.03 n.139; 20.05 n.71; 22.04[1)[a] n.134; 22.06[3] os.
24.01 [1][b][iii] D.23 213,217,219; 22.06{4];
1-201 (9) .•••...•..• 22.06[3] n.212; 23.02[2][f]; 22.02[2][f) n.83;
23.02{l][a] n.33, 38; 23.02[2][f]; 23.03[3] n.123
23.02[3] n.97 1-201(38) ••. 20.10 n.246; 21.11 [2][e]
1-201(11) 21.01 n.2 os. 361, 363, 365
1-201 (14) 15.01 ns. 12,21; 16.01 1-201(39) ... 14.04 n.139; 19.04 ns.
n.5; 18.05 n.310; 22.07[6][b] 127, 140
n.302 1-201(43) " 19.04 n.129; 20.08 n.181
1-201 (IS) ..••• 14.05 n.211; 22.07[5] 1-201(44) ...... 16.01 n.56; 22.02[1]
n.267 n.46
1-201 (19) .•. 16.01 ns. 44, 48; 19.02 1-201 (46) •.•.... 14.04 ns. 138, 140
n.78; 20.08 n.204; 1-201 (19), 1-203 •... 19.02 os. 69, 75, 78; 20.08
24.0l[I](b][iii] n.24; 24.02[2]a] n.204; 20.10 n.236; 24.01 [1][a];
n.117 24.0l[1]ib][i];.24.01[l][b][i] D.IS;
1-201 (20) ., 15.01 n.10; 16.04 n.156; 24.01[1][b][iii]; 24.02[2][a] n.114;
18.05 n.310 J 24.03[2] n.154

T-t
 TABLE OF UCC SECTIONS T-2

lReje"mces ore 10 poras'tJphs (f) and noles (n.).)

UCC § vee §
\-203. Comment ... 24.02(2][aJ n.1t5 2-512 17.03 n.l01
1-20S ............•.... 20.12 n.379 2·513 17.03 n.85
1-20S. Comment 5 .• 24.02\2J[a} 0.\\9 2·513(1) 17m n.88
)-205(3) 19.02 n.77 2·513(3)(b} 17.03 n.88
1.205(4) 19.02 n.77 2·514 17.03 ns.98, 101
1·207 •...•. 24.{}\[3}fbJ ns. 77, 78. 81 2-102(2) _.•.... 23.03[3] n.I27
1·208 ...... 14.04 n.175; 19.02 n.78; 2-705 23.0313) n.129
24.01 [I}(a}; 24.01 (I}{b] n.7; 3·\01., '. ' , 16.01 nS
24.01f11fbJIil n.12; 24.01[1 ][b}[iiiJ 3·102, Comment 2 14.040.114
ns. 16, 19, 23; 24.03[110.145 3-102(1) 22.07[6}(b] 0.302
1-208, Comment [1J[bl[i} n.13 3.102(d) 15.02 n.l07
2-102 ........••... 22.01[2][a] D.27 3·102(e) 19.02 n.'s1
2-103(I)(b) 16.01 0.45; 3·102(J lea) 1S.01 n.'ll
24.01 [J J(bJCiiiJ 0.2S; 24.02{2J{aJ 3-102(1 )(b) 14.04 as. 197, 19B,
n.118 199,200
2·105 (1) 14.02 n.SO 3.102(1) (d) ' •...... '" J5.02 n.106;
2-106(1) •............. 23.02[2][c) 21.10 n.234
2·107 22.06[3J 11.197 3·102(1)(e) 19.01 n.9
2·20 1(1) 22.01{2J{a) D.27 3·103( 1) 14.02 n.49
2·208 ...•.•••.• 24.01[3] ns. 67, 68 3·104 .....•. 12.02 n.16S; 14.03 ns.
2.208(2) ..•...••.. 23.02[1]{b) 0.47 83, 85, 101, I Jl; 19.02 n.60
2·208(3) .••...•... 23.020][b) 0.47 3.104, Comment 1 ••.•. 14.03 as. 85,
2·209 •.••..•.... 24.01[31 os. 67, 68 102
2-209(5) ........•.•• 24.01[3J n.69 3.104, Comment 2 •. , ••• 14.03 n.l03
2·302 19.02 DS. 69, 7S 3· I04, Comment 5 '" 14.04 ns. 11 t,
2·310 17.03 n.85 112, 114
2.310(b) 17.03 n.88 3·104(1) 14.03 n.84
2·323, Comment 2 ...•..• 11.02 n.65 3-104(1 )(a) 15.02 n.l08
2·323(2) 17.02 n.64 3-104(1 )(b) ..•. 14.04 ns. 115, 117,
2·326 ..• " 22.0J!2][bJ and ns. 34, 36; 142, 150; 16.06 n.180
22.02[]] n.50; 22.06[3J n.220; 3·104(1 )(d) 14.04 n.178
22.06[4] and ns. 207, 213 3-104(2) 19.01 1'1.9
2-326(2) .•.••..••. 22.01{2![b] n.37 ]·I04(2)(a) 14.03 n.86
2·326(3) ...•. 22.01[2}[b} and n.38; ].104(2) (b) •.. 14..03 ns. 86. 87, 90
22.06[3} 0.214; 22.06(4) n.207 3-104(2)(c) ..... 14.03n.92; IS.OS
2-401 22.01 [2][b] , n.208
2-401(3) 22.02[1] 3·105 14.04 as. 116, 118
2·403 ....•.. 22.0l[2][b]; 23.02(Il(Il}; 3·105(1 Hb) 14.04 n.129
23.02[1][c] and n.S2; 23.03[31 3-10S(1)(f) 14.04 os. 120, 121
n.llS 3-105(1) (g) •••• 14.04 ns. 120, 124
2·403(1) 16.01 n.56 3-105(l)(h) 14.04 n.128
2·403(2) 15.011'1.5 3· I 05 ( 1) (h), CommllDt 7 •••.. 14.04
2-403 (4) •.....•..• 23.02[JJ[c] n.51 n.128
2.503(5) 17.03 n.88 3-105(2) 14.04 n.ll7;
2-507 •..••. '...•..•• 23.03[3] n.124 16.06 n.180
2-511 23.03[3} n.124 3-105(2) (al 14.04 n.130
2.511(2) 21.03 ns. 100, 101, 102 3-105(2) (b) 14.04 ns. 122, 123,
2·511 (2), Comment:; '" 21.03 n.l01 126
2·511 (3) •. 2U)) n.97; 23.0313] n.125 3·106 14,()4 n.143
T-3 TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (f!) and notes (n.).]

UCC § VCC §
3-106, Comment 1 14.04 n.147 3-118, Comment 1 .•... 14.04 n.135;
3-106(1) 14.04 n.l44 15.01 n.98; 16.05 n.167
3-106(1) (d) 14.04 n.145 . 3-118(a) 14.03 n.89; 15.05 n.210
3-106(1 )(e) 14.04 n.l46 3-119 14.04 n.132; 15.01 n.96;
3-J 07 ....•............ , 14.02 n.53 24.01[1][8J; 24.01 [IJ[b] n.1 1
3-107, Comment 1 14.02 n.53 3-119, Comment 1 ..... 14.04 n.136;
3-107(1) 14.04 n.150 15.01 n.98; 16.05 n.167
3-107(2) 14.04 ns. lSI, 153 3-119, Comment 3 24.01[1][b] n.11
3-108 14.04 n.154; 19.02 n.51; 3-119, Comment 4 16.05 n.163
21.l0 ns. 236, 239 3-119, Comment 5 14.04 n.134
3-109 ...... 14.04 n.173; 24.01[l][b} 3-119-(1) ... 14.04 n.133; 15.01 n.95;
ns. 7, 8 16.05 ns. 160, 165, 170
3-109, Comment 4 ... 14.04 ns. 174, 3-119(2) 16.05 n.164
175, 176; 24.01[I][bJ n.9; 3-120 19.02 n.59; 21.04 n.141
24.01 [1]{b][iiiJ n.19 3-121 21.04 n.145
3-109(1), Comment 4 ... 14.04 n.168 3-122 15.02 n.112; 21.10 n.236
3-109(1)(8) 14.04 ns. 171, 172 3-122(1) 15.02 n.1l3; 21.10 n.253
3-109(I)(b) 14.04 n.172 3-122(1), Comment 1 .. 21.10 n.253
3-110(f) 14.04n.l92 3-122(1)(8) 21.10 n.237
3-110(1) 14.04 ns. 179,184,187 3-122(1)(b) 14.04 n.157
3-110(1 )(8) 14.04 n.188 3-122(2) 14.04 n.160
3-110(l)(c) 14.04 n.188 3-122(2), Comment 1 14.04 n.160
3-110(1 )(d) 14.04 n.189 3-122(3) 14.04 n.158; 15.06 n.288
3-110(1 )(e) 14.04 n.190 3-122(4) 14.04 n.161; 15.02 n.113
3-IIO(l)(f) 14.04 n.189 3-123 21.10 n.244
3-1l0(1)(g) 14.04 n.196 3-201 15.01 ns. 78, 79, 80, 81;
3-110(2) 14.04 n. lt9 16.04 n.150
3-110(2), Comment 5 14.04 os. 3-201 (1) 15.01 ns. 4, 14
119,183 3-201(2) 15m n.27
3-111 14.04 n.180 3-201 (3) 15.01 ns. IS, 76;
3-lt I, Comment 2 14.04 n.191 16.01 n.4; 16.04 ns. lSI, 158
3-11I(c) 14.04 n.181 3-202 .... 15.01 n.75; 16.04 os. 156,
3-lt2 14.04 n.116; 24.01[2] n.59 157; 18.05 n.310
3-112, Comment 2 ..... 24.01[2] n.60 3-202(1) 15m os. 10, 11, 18;
3-112(2) .......•.... 24.01[2} n.60 16.01 n.5
3-lt4 21.10 n.240 3.202(2) •...•.... 15.01 os. 13. 23
3-114, Comment 2 21.10 n.240 3-202(3) 15m n.24
3-114(1) 3-202(3),
20.04 n.46 3-202(4) Comment 4 15.01 n.26
15.Dl n.41; 15.06 n.285
3-114(2) 20.04 n.43 3-203, 14.04 n.194; 19.04 n.124;
3-115 ... 14.04 n.193; 20.09 ns. 212, 20.06 ns. 133, 134
. 231,234; 2l.t0 n.240 3-204 15.Dl n.33; 20.06 n.111
3-116 15.01 ns. 82, 85, 88 3-204(1) 15.01 ns. 17, 36, 38;
3-116, Comment 15.01 n.88 20.06 n.ll0
3-116(8) 15m n.86 3-204(2) 15.01 ns. 19, 34
3-lt6(b) 15.Dl n.87 3-204(3) 15.01 n:35
3-117 15.04 n.184 3-205 15.01 n.33
3-117, Comment 15.Dl n.43 3-205(8) 15.01 n.56
3-118 16.05 n.167; 20.09 n.221 3·205(b) ; 15.01 n.45
 TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS T-4

fR~/u~nc~s ar~ 10 paragraphs (0 and 1I0t~s (n.).]

VCC § VCC §
3·205(e) 15.01 n.48; 20.07 n.150 3-304( I) 20.09 n.232
3·205(d) •... 15.01 n.46; 15.08 n.334 3.304(I)(a) 16.01 n.19; 20.09
3·206(1) 15.01 ns. 59, 63 os. 215. 222
3·206(2) 15.01 os. 50.60.62, 64, 3.304(I)(b) ... 16.01 os. 20, 31, 33;
69; 20.07 n.137; 21.01 n.18; 16.02 ns. 120. 126, 127
21.03 n.89 3-304(2) .•.•.... 15.08 ns. 328, 361;
3.206(3) .•.. 15.01 os. 51.61,64,66, . 16.01 n.22
68, 69; J5.08 D.333; 20.07 ns. 136, 3-304(2), Comment 5 ... 15.08 n.346
137,138 3·304(3) 16.01 n.ll; 21.10 n.255
3.206(4) ... 15.01 os. 54, 64, 65, 66, 3-304(4) 15.08 n.339: 16.ot
67; 15.08 os. 334, 339; 21.01 ns. 13, 23, 32
n.23; 21.03 n.89 3-304(4) (b) ..••••.••. 16.05 n.\6\
3.206(4}, Comment 4 15.01 0.66 3-304(4) (e) ..... 15.08 0.329; 16:01
3-207 16.02 n.lll n.22; 20.07 n. I 5~
3·207, Comment 5 16.02 n.1l3 3-304(4)(e), Comment 5 .... 16.01
3-207 ( 1) 16.02 n.112 n.22
3·207(1 )(d) 15.08 n.340 3·304(4)(f) 24.01[lJ[b] n.1O
)-20B 15.07 n.315 3-304(5) 16.01 ns. 17, 23
3-301 15.01 D.79 3-304(6) 16.01 n.24
3-302 14.04 n.176; 16.01 D.I; 3·305 14.04 n.104; 15.08 n.331;
16.01 ns. 8, 56; 16.060.191; 16.02 n.89; 16.06 n.173
24.01[1 Ifb][iii] n.26; 23.02[3] 3-305, Comment 2 16.02 n.93
n.91 3-305. Comment 4 ....•. 16.02 n.110
3·302, Comment 2 .•...•• 16.02 n.99 3-305, Comment 5 .•.... 16.02 n.114
3·302, Comment 3 .. 16.01 ns. 85, 86 3-305. CommeDt 6 16.02 os.
3-302(a) 16.01 n.82 116, 119
3-302(1) 16.01 ns. 3, 5, 31, 48 3-305, Comment 7 .....•.. 16.02 os.
3-302(1)(a) 16.Q1 nSS 122,123
3-302(1) (h) 16.01 n.46 3-305, Comment 9 .•..•. 16.020.126
3-302(l) (e) ..•.. 16.01 os. 8, 9,33; 3-305(1) .. , 15.05 n.235; 16.020.92;
21.10 n.255; 24.01 [1J[b] n.IO 20.05 n.88
3-302(2) 16.02 n.97 3-305(2) ..... 16.02 01. 96. 98. 104;
3-302(3)(b) 16.01 n.83 16.050.160
3-302(3)(c) 16.01 n.84 3-305(2)(a) .......•.. 16.02 n.l09
3-303 15.06 n.290; 16.01 3-305(2)(b) 16.02 n.109
ns. 55, 56 3-305(2)(e) 16.02 n.121; 19.04
3·303, Comment 3 ..••.. 16.01 0.60 0.\39
3·303(a) ...••. 16.01 ns. 25, 56, 57, 3·305(2) (d) •••.••.••• 16.02 n.124
69.70 3·306 ..... ; 15.08 n.331: \6.01 D.33;
3-303(a), Comment 4 16.01 D.70 16.02 ns. 106, lOB; 16.03 0.145;
3·303 (b) 16.01 D.58 20.050.89
3·303 (e) 16.01 os. 59, 61, 62 3-306, Comment 2 16.03 n.146
3-304 14.04 0.176 3·306, Comment 5 .•... 16.02 0.108;
3·304, Comment 3 •..... 16.02 D.128 20.05 D.86
3·304, Comment 4 •. • . . .. 16m n.21 3-306 (a) ... '. \6.Q2. n.92; 20.07 n.139
3-304. Comment 5 '" 15.08 ns. 330, 3·306(b) .•. 16.02 n.105; 16.030.148
342,350 3-306(e) ...• 15.01 n.20: 16.05 n.166
3·304, Comment 7 J6.01 n.12 3-306(d) ., 15.05 n.234; 16.02 n.107;
3-304, Comment 9 ...•.. 16.05 n.162 16.03 n.136; 20.05 DS. 77, 87
T-5 TABLE OF UCC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (ff) and notes (n.).]

UCC § UCC §
3·307, Comment 2 16.03 n.141 3-405, Comment 4 20.08 n.203
3-307(1) 14.04 n.107; 16.Q3 n.137 3·405(a)(3) 20.08 n.204
3-307(2) 14.04 n.l08; 16.Q3 n.140 3-405(1) 19.04 n.131
3-307(3) 16.03 n.144 3-405(1 )(a) 20.06 n.112
3-401 15.ot ns. 100, 104; 15.04 ! 3-405(1 )(b) .. 20.06 ns. 112,118, 119
n.176; 19.04 n.140; 20.06 n.108 I 3-405(1) (c) ..... 20.06 n.122; 20.08
3·401, Comment 1 ..... 15.04 n.185; , ns. 202, 204
19.04 n.125 : 3-406 ..... 15.01 n.l02; 15.02 n.154;
3-401, Comment 2 ..... 14.04 n.141; 19.03 n.123; 19.04 ns. 130, 132,
19.04 n.127 143, 144; 20.06 ns. 103, 131; 20.08
3·401(1) .. 15.01 n.l0l; 15.02 n.124; ns. 197,204; 20.09 ns. 214, 225;
19.04 n.125; 20.03 n.19 20.10 n.239; 20.12 ns. 402, 409
3-401(2) ... 14.04 n.14O; 19.04 n.126 3-406, Comment 3 ..... 20.08 n.·198;
3-402 .. 15.01 ns.42, 105; 15.02 n.I06 20.09 ns. 226, 228, 233
3·402, Comment ....•... 15.01 n.42; 3-406, Comment 4 20.09 n.229
15.02 n.106 3·406, Comment 5 20.09 n.230
3·402(2)(a) 15.04 n.186 3-406, Comment 7 19.04 n.143;
3·403 15.01 n.90; 15.02 n.l06; 20.09 n.230
15.04 ns. 180, 182; 3-407 .... 15.07 n.316; 20.09 ns. 211,
19.04 ns. 129, 137 223, 231, 234: 24.0W][b]
3·403, Comment 15.01 n.90 3-407, Comment 20.09 n.223
3-403, Comment 1 .. 15.01 ns. 29, 30; 3-407(1) 20.09 n.219
15.04 n.178 3-407(2) 15.05 n.238; 20.09 n.216
3-403, Comment 2 15.04 n.179 3-407(2) (a) 20.09 n.211
3-403, Comment 3 15.04 n.187 3-407(2)(b) .....•..... 20.09 n.224
3-403(b) (2) 15.04 n.187 3-407 (3) 15.05 n.238;
3·403(1) ... 15.01 n.28; 15.Q2 n.155; 20.09 ns. 212,222,235
15.04 n.I77; 15.05 n.232; 3-408 ..... 14.04 n.l06; 15.06 n.290;
19.04 n.136 16.01 n.65; 16.02 n.131; 16.03
3-403 (2) .... 15.01 n.32; 15.04 n.182 n.147; 16.05 n.170; 20.050.89
3-403 (2)(b) ......•.... 15.04 n.187 3·409 ... 15.02 n.116; 20.03 ns. 18,22
3-403 (3) 15.01 n.32; 15.04 n.203 3-409, Comment 1 15.02 n.121
3-404 15.01 ns. 90, 102; 15.02 3-409(1) ... 15.02 n.119; 20.03 n.25;
n.154; 15.04 n.I77; 19.03 n.123; 21.02 n.76
19.04 ns. 128, 129, 144; 20.06 3-409(2) .... 15.02 n.118; 21.02 n.76
n.l04; 20.08 ns. 160, 180 3-409(2), Comment 3 ...•.... 15.02
3·404, Comment 1 15.01 n.90;
15.04 n.I77; 20.08 n.181 ns. 118, 122
3-404, Comment 4 ..... , 19.04 n.130 3·410 ..... 15.02 n.114; 15.05 n.224;
3-404(1) ... 15.04 ns. 181, 183; 19.03 20.03 n.18; 21.02 n.76; 21.10
n.122; 19.04 ns. 134, 135; 20.06 n.282; 21.10[81 n.283
n.l08; 20.08 ns. 160, 161, 168, 3-410, Comment 3 15.02 n.118
179,180,189 3-410, Comment 4 .. ,. " 15.02 n.123
3-405 .... 15.01 n.l02; 20.06 ns. 103, 3-410(1), Comment ..... 15.02 n.117
115, 116, 125, 127, 132; 20.08 3-410(2) 15.02 n.126; 15.05 n.225
ns. 160, 197,204; 20.10 n.239; 3-411 15.02 ns. 115,137; 15.05
20.12 ns. 404, 410 ns. 226, 230; 15.07 n.317; 21.10
3-405, Comments 20.06 n.115 ri.282; 21.10{8] n.283
3-405, Comments 3, 7 20.08 D.199 3-411(1) .... 15.05 n.231; 20.03 n.23
 TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS T-6

[R~/(m!nC~x are to paragraphx (f) and nOler (n.).1

VCC § UCC §
3.411(2) 15.02 ns. 116,139; 15.05 n.211; 20.06 n.IOO; 20.09
15.05 n.227 R.218; 21.03 n.116
3·412 .••.••.•... 15.02 ns. 134,136; 3-417, Comments .•.... 15.03 n.159;
15.07 n.318 20.08 n.l64
3-412, Comment I .....• 15.02 n.131; 3-417, Comment 1 15.03 n.174
15.05 n.247 3-4 I7, Comment 4 15.03 n.164;
3·412, Comment 3 ..••.. 15.02 n.l30 20.08 n.171
3·412(1) 15.02 ns. 128, 132; 3-417, Comment 5 15.03 n.162
15.05 n.244 3-417(1) .. 15.0J n.161; 15.050.240;
3.412(2) 15.02 ns. 129, 135 20.06 n.1 07; 20.08 n.170
).412(3) 15.02 n.133 3-417(1 )(a) .•.•.•.... 15.05 n.242:
3-413 12.02 n.165; 14.04 n.105; 20.08 os. 167,174
15.01 ns. 99,104; 15.02 n.109; 3-417(J)(b) .•.••..... 15.05 n.241:
16.03 0.132; 21.10 n.282; 20.08 n.166
21.1 O[8] n.283 3-417(2) 15.03 n.165
3-413( 1) ... 15.02 os. 108, 112. 114; 3·417(2)(b) 15.03 n.165;
15.05 n.237; 2UO 0.235 20.08 ns. 165, 169
3·413(2) .•.. 15.02 05.108,147,148, 3417(3) 15.03 n.166
152,156; 16.05 0.171 3·418 .•..•. 15.05 ns. 239,248; 16.02
3413(3) 15.02 os. 153. 154 n.90; 20.08 ns. 162, 163. 174,204;
)·414 .. 14.04 n.1 05; 15.01 ns. 33.44; 21.03 os. 114, liS, 116
16.03 n. I32; 2], 10 n.282 3-418, Comments .. 15.0305. 159, 164
3-414( 1) .... 15.02 ns. 140. 141. 142, 3-418, Comment 2 20.080.164
146. 147 3·418, Comment 4 '" 20.08 0.163
3415 ..... 14.040.105; 15.01 ns.99. 3-419 .....• 20.05 n.89; 20.06 0.106;
104; 15.06 ns. 258,274 20.08 ns. 175, 192, 195;
3·415, Comment 1 •.•• 15.06 ns. 256. 21.02 n.80; 21.03 0.102
261,278 3-419(1) ., 20.05 n.95; 20.08 ns. 175,
3·415, Comment 2 ...•.. 15.06 n.275 195; 21.08 n.216; 21.10[81 0.289
3-415. Comment 3 ....•. 15.06 n.290 3-419(I){c) ..... 20.08 ns. 175,192,
3·415, Comment 5 15.06 n.273 195, 196
3-415(1) ••...... 15.06 ns. 257. 262 3-419(3) .•.. 20.08 os. 175,176, 182,
3-415(2) .•.. 15.06 05.263,277,279. 195, 196; 21.02 n.80
290 3·419( 4) 21.0J n.18
3-415(2) Comment 1 .••. 15.06 n.263 3·501 15.02 os. 111,112,152;
3·415(2) Comment 3 •••. 15.06 n.290 21.100.252
3·415(3) .......• 15.06 ns. 274, 301 3·501 (1) 15.020.141
3·415(4) 15.06 ns. 268, 301
3·415(5) 15.06 ns. 264, 267, 272, 3.501(l}{a) •..••..... 15.02 n.125;
273 21.1 0[8] ns. 285, 286
3·416 15.06 ns. 258, 280 3-5m (l )(b) .....•..•.. 15.02 0.143
3-416(1) ....•......... 15.06n.280 3·501(l)(c) 21.11 n.293
3·416(2) 15.06 n.281 3-501 (2) ....•..•••• 21.10[8] 0.291;
3-416(3) 15.06 n.282 21.11 [2][a] n.301
3-416(4) 15.06 n.283 3·501(2), Comment 3 .. 21.10[8] n.291
3-416(5) 15.06 0.284 3-501 (2)(b) 21.11 0.293 1I0d
3.416(6) .•......... ' 15.06 n.286 (5] ns. 375, 376
3-417 ....... 2.08 ns. 164, 171; 15.03 3-501(3) 21.1l[IJ os. 294, 295
nt. 158. 159, 160, 162, 164, 174; 3·5m (4) 21.10 os. 254, 273
T-7 TABLE OF DCC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (fl) and notes (n.).]

VCC § UCC §
3·502 .• 15.02 ns. 143, 149. 152; 15.07 3-508(2) .... 21.11[2][d] ns. 319-321,
n.319; 21.10 os. 248. 251, 252 326
3-502(1) 2UO n.235; 3-508(3) 21.11[2J[aJ ns. 303,
21.11[2][d] n.327 305,308
3·502(1)(a) 21.02 n.48; 3·508(4) ......... 21.11[2][e] 0.318;
21.11[2][c] n.317 21.ll[2][e] ns. 357, 364
3-502(1 )(b) 21.02 n.47; 21.04 3-508(5) 21.1l[2][e] 0.315
0.143; 21.11 n.293 and 3-508(6) 21.11[2][e] n.359
[5] ns. 375, 376 3-508(7) 21.11[2][e] 0.360
3-502(2) 21.11 n.294 3-508(8) 21.1 I[2][b] n.313;
3-503 21.10 n.236 21.ll[2][d] ns. 327, 328
3-503, Comment 1 21.10 n.238 3-509 21.11[1] ns. 297, 299
3-503(1)(a) 21.10 n.238; 3-509(1) 21.11[2][b] h.311
21.1 0[8] n.286 3-509(3) 21.11[2][b] n.311
3·503(1 )(b) ........• 21.10[8] n.284 3-510(a) 21.11[2][a] n.304
3·503 (1 )(e) 21.02 n.44; 3-510(b) 21.11[1] n.296
21.10 os. 237, 241 3·511 21.02 n.49; 21.10 n.247;
3-503 (1 )(e) .•.....•... 21.02 0.45; 21.11[2][d] n.323
21.10 n.241 3-511(1) ... 14.04 n.177; 17.02 n.62;
3·503(2) 21.02 n.46; 21.JO n.249 21.1 0 n.266; 24.0lflJfb) 0.9
3·503(2) (a) 25.07[4][b] 0.238 3-511(2) 21.100.272
3-503(3) 21.10 n.243 3-511 (2) (a) ....•..... 21.10 n.269;
3-503(4) 21.10 n.261 21.11[4] 0.372
3·504 18.05 n.309; 20.06 n.98; 3-511 (2)(b) ..... 21.1 0 os. 268, 270;
21.10 n.256 21.11[2][fJ n.366
3-504(1) .... 20.05 0.90; 21.1 0 0.257 3-511 (2)(e) 21.10 n.267
3-504(2) (b) •.......... 21.10 n.261 3·511(3) 21.10n.281
3.504(2) (e) ..... 21.10 os. 222, 258 3·511(4) 21.10[8] ns. 290,292
3-504(4) .•........•.•. 15.02 n.130 3-511 (6) •........•.. 21.11[4] n.373
3·504(4), Comment ..•.• 15.020.130 3·601 .• 15.07 n.324; 16.02 os. 91, 125
3-505 .•..... 18.050.309; 20.06 n.98; 3·601 (2) .. 15.05 n.230; 15.07 n.320;
21.10 ns. 256, 259,275; 24.01[3] 0.62
24.03[2] n.162 3·601(3) .. 15.02 n.145; 15.07 n.308;
3-505(d)(1) •.......... 15.07 n.323 21.03 n.84
3·505(I)(b) 20.06 n.l05 3-601(3), Comment 4 ... 15.07 n.310
3-505(1)(d) 21.080.208; 3-602 .. 15.07 ns. 322, 324; 21.02 n.SO
3-602, Commeot ......•. 15.07 n.324
21.10 n.26O
3-603 •.... 15.01 n.64; 15.05 os. 233,
3-506(1) .......•.... 21.10[8] 0.287 236; 15.08 n.341; 16.03 ns. 132,
3-506(2) ......•...••. 21.10 n.274; 133; 20.05 ns. 76. 77, 78, 83;
21.10[8] n.288 20.06 ns. 98, 109; 21.03 ns. 84, 89
3-507 15.02 n.141; 20.06 n.98; 3-603, Comment 3 '" 20.05 ns. 84, 86
21.10 n.280 3-603, Comment 4 21.02 n.79
3-507(1)(a) 15.02 n.l25 3-603(1) .. 15.D7 n.307; 16.03 0.134;
3-507(l)(b) 21.10 n.281 20.05 ns. 78, 90, 92, 93, 94:
3-508 .. 22.11[1] n.297; 22.11[a] n.302 21.030.84
3-508(1) ... 21.11[2][b] ns. 310,312; 3-603(1)(a) .. : 20.05 n.81
21. 11[2][e] os. 314,316.317; 3-603 ( 1) (b) 15.01 ns. 62, 65;
21.11[2][d] 0.327 20.050.80
 TABLE OF VCC SECfJONS T-8

(Relerenus au '0 paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

UCC § VCC §
3·603(2) 15.06 n.273; 20.09 n.234; 4-J04(l)(e) .. 19.01 n.1 I; 20.03 n.38
21.03 n.BS 4-104(1)(0 17.03 n.82
3-604 '" '" 15.07 n.313 4-104(1 )(g) .. 17.03 n.87; 19.02 n.22
3-605 15.07 n.3 12; 4-104(I)(b) .. 19.01 n.12; 21.01 n.21;
24.01\3] ns. 63, 64 21.11(2][d] n.326;
3-60S(I) 24.0l[3J(aj n.73 21.11(2J[d) 0.320
3-60S(I)(a) 24.01[3][a] n.71 4-/04( I) (j) 19.01 n.16
3·60S(1)(b) 24.01(3}(a) 4.104(4) 19.01 n.14
3·606 15.06 n.258; 15.07 n.314 4·105 ......••. 19.01 n.2; 21.01 n.16
3·606, Comment 2 15.06 n.300 4·105(a) 19.01 0.1
3-6060) 15.06n.294 4.IOS(b) 19.01 n.2
3-606( I) (al IS.06 ns. 295, 297 4.IOS(e) 19.01 n.3
3·606(1 )(b) 15.06 n.296 4-105{d) 19.01 n.4; /9.02 n.22
3·606(2) 15.06 n.298 4-IOS(e) 19.01 n.5
3-802 21.03 n.9/; 21.08 n.214 4-105(f) 19.01 D.6
3-802(1) 15.07 n.321; 21.03 n.t02 4.IOS(g) 19.01 n.7
3·802(1 Ha) ...•........ 21.03 n.99 4·106 .. 19.0105.19,20; 21.07 0.20\
3-802{1 Hb) .. 21.03 n.98; 21.1 0 n.282 4·106. Comments I, 4, 5 .. 19.01 n.20
3-804 .. 20.05 n.96; 21.08 ns. 209,212; 4-108 [2](d] n.32S
21.10 n.265 4·108(1 1 21.01 n.26; 21.02 n.74;
3-804, Comment " 21.08 n.211 21.100.278
3-805 ....•.••.•......... 16.01 n.6 4-108(2) ... 21.01 n.25; 21.02 os. 75,
3-805, Comment 14.04 n.201 76; 21.03 n.123; 21.10 n.277
4·102 .•................ 14.01 n.46 4·201 ....•.. 17.03 n.89; 19.02 0.24;
4,102, Comment 2 14.01 n.4B 20.11 n.269; 21.01 0.24;
4-102, Comment 2(d) 14.01 n.46 2S.09[3J(a] 0.353
4·102(2) .... 14.01 n.47; 18.05 n.296 4-201 (l) .. 18.05 n.299; 19.02 os. 22,
4-103 •...... 3.04 n.171; 17.030.89; 25.27; 20.10 n.242; 20.11 n.265;
18.05 n.296; 19.02 n.7l; 20.10 21.01 os. 4. 5. 6; 21.01 o.I5
ns. 238, 240; 20.12 0.379; 21.01 4·201 (ll. Comment I .... 19.02 D.25
n.29; 21.02 ns. 72.77; 21.03 4-201 (I), Comment 4 •.•.• 21.01 n.S
ns. 90.13\ 4·202 ....•.... 17.03 DS. 89,91. 100;
4.103. Comment I .••.... 21.01 n.30 20.10 D.248; 21.01 n.7
4-103, Comment 2 •...... 21.01 0.36 4·202. Comment 4 .......• 2l.0] n.8
4·103. Comment 3 21.01 n.35 4-202(a) : 20.10 h.245
4·1 03, Comment 4 . . . . . .. 21.02 n.62 4.202(1) 21.01 n.ll
4.103(1) ... 14.01 n.46; 19.02 ns. 69, 4.202(1)(a) " 2l.01 n.12; 21.02 n.s3
76.77; lL(H os. 1.24.32
4-103(1 Hal 21.02 n.69 4-202(1) (a). Comment 4 .. 21.01 n.12
4-103(2) 21.01 os. 3. 33 4-202(1)(b) .• 21.01 n.14; 21.02 n.s4
4-103(3) 21.01 n.42 4-202(2) '" 2l.01 n.20; 21.02 ns. 51.
4·\03(5) ..• 17,03 0.91; 18.05 n.294; 52.54; 21.03 n.126;
20.08 n.207; 20.]0 0.254; 21.11[2]{d] n.322
21.02 n.52; 24.02[2](a] n.122 4·202(3) •..••.•• 21.01 ns. 9. 10, 24
4.104(e) 15.01 n.73 4.202(3). Comment 4 21.01 n.l0
4-104(b) 21.020.73 4-203 17.03 0.89;
4·104(1) (a) ....•.••.... 19.01 0.10 21.01 ns. 9, 17. 18. 19
4-104(1)(e) 19.01 D.13 4-204 21.01 n.14; 21.07 n.2oo
4-104(t)(d) 19.01 n.15 4-204(3) ......•• 21.10 os. 222, 263
T-9 TABLE OF VCC SECfIONS

[Rel/mmcu are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

VCC § VCC §
4-205 ...•.... 15.01 n.70; 16.01 n.78 21.03 ns. 104, 117, 132;
4-205(1) 19.03 n.114 21.11[2][d] n.322
4-205(2) Ism n.64; 4-212(1) .. 19.03 n.116; 20.10 ns. 244,
21.01 ns. 18, 19 246,247; 21.02 n.54; 21.03 n.118;
4-207 .. 15.03 ns. 157, 159, 164, 174; 21.11[2][a] ns. 307, 309;
20.06 ns. 100,101,107; 20.08 21.11[2][d] n.326
ns. 162, 164, 171; 20.09 n.218; 4-212(2) 21.01 n.14;
21.05 n.154 21.03 ns. 133, 135
4-207, Comments .. 15.03 ns. 159, 164; 4-213 .... 20.10 n.252; 20.11 ns. 268,
20.08 n.164 269,274; 21.02 ns. 68, 70;
4·207, Comment 2 20.06 n.102 21.03 ns. 91, 116
4-207, Comment 4 20.08 n.171 4·213, Comment 3 20.10 n.249
4-207, Comment 5 15.03 n.l72 4-213, Comment 4 20.10 n.251
4-207(1) .. 15.03 n.168; 15.05 n.240; 4.213(1) 19.02 n.41; 20.10 n.258
20.08 n.170 4-213(l} (a) 20.10 n.249;
4-207(1)(a) ..... 20.08 ns. 167, 174, 21.03 n.1I0
188, 189 4-213(1 )(d) 21.02 n.67
4·207(1)(b) 15.05 n.241; 4.213(3) 19.02 ns. 23, 41;
20.08 n.166 21.03 n.l07; 21.05 n.159
4-207(2) 15.03 ns. 165, 167, 4-213(3), Comment 9 .... 19.02 n.23
168, 171 4-213(4) 20.11 ns. 264, 267, 273
4-207(2) (b) 15.03 n.165; 4-213(4)(a) 20.11 n.261
20.08 ns. 165, 169 4-213(4)(b) 20.11 n.272;
4-207(3} 15.03 ns. 169, 172 21.02 D.77; 21.03 n.92
4·207(4} .......•..... 15.03 n.173; 4-214(4) 15.04 n.206
20.08 ns. 190, 195 4·301 .. 20.08 n.163; 21.02 ns. 70, 72;
4-208 ......••.•..••.•.. 21.01 n.5 21.03 ns. 114, 116, 132;
4-208(1) 21.01 n.22 21.05 n.156; 21.10 n.226;
4-208(1 )(a) .. 16.Q1 n.72; 17.03 n.86 21.1l[2](d] n.326
4-208(1 )(b) 16.01 n.73 4·301 (I) .......• 20.10 ns. 255, 257;
4-208(1 )(e) 16.01 n.75 21.02 n.77; 21.03 ns. 109, 111
4·208(2} ..•.......•.... 16.01 n.77 4-301 (1 )(b) .. 21.11 [2][a] ns. 307, 308
4-208(3) 16.01 n.76 4-301(2) 21.03 n.113
4·209 16.01 n.71; 19.02 n.24; 4-301(4) 21.03 n.135
21.01 ns. 5, 23 4·302 20.10 ns. 252, 256; 20.11
4-210 21.10 n.256 n.271; 21.02 ns. 73, 76, 78, 80;
4-211 20.11 DS. 268, 269; 21.03 ns. 114, 11 5, 116;
21.02 n.59; 21.03 n.l05 21.04 n.150; 21.1l[2][d] n.325
4-302(a} 21.03 ns. 125, 127
4-211(1) 21.03 n.l03 4-302(b) 21.02 n.79
4·211 (I), Comments 1,5 4-303 ... 19.02 n.91; 20.05 D!. 82, 89;
.................... 21.03 n.l03 25.09[1]
4-211 (l )(d) 17.03 n.98 4·303 (l) .. 20.05 n.57; 25.09[1] n.329
4-211 (2) 21.03 n.118 4-303 (1) (a) 15.05 n.232
4-211 (3)(a) 21.03 n.l08 4-401 20.01 n.2; 20.02 n.13;
4·211(3)(b) 21.03 n.l06 20.03 n.20; 20.05 n.97; 20.06 n.98;
4-211(3)(e) 21.03 n.l08 20.08 ns. 160, 173; 20.09 n.213;
4-212 19.02 n.26; 20.10 n.245; 21.05 n.151
20.11 ns. 266, 274; 21.02 n.54; 4-401, Comment 1 20.01 n.2
 TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS T-IO

[References are 10 paragraphs (f) and note" (n.).]

UCC § UCC §
4-401 (a) 19.03 n.116 5-102(1 Ha}, Comment I ., 17.01 n.30
4-401(1} 14.040.125; 19.02 n.79; 5-102(1 )(b) 17.01 ns. 15,31
20.01 ns. I, 3; 20.03 n.26 5-102(1)(c) 17.01 ns. 15,32
4-40IfZ)(a) ........•. 15.05 n.243; 5-102(2) 15.02 n.127; 17.01 n.35
20.09 n.217 5-102(3) 15.02 n.127; 17.01 n.23
4-401 (2) (b) ., 20.09 os. 231,232,234 5-103 17.01 os. I, 3, 5
4-402 17.02 n.55; 20.02 n.17; 5·103, Comment 2 17.01 n.18
20.03 os. 21, 27, 28, 31, 32, 39; 5-103(I)(a} 14.03 n.93;
20.05 n.82; 21.05 n.158 15.02 D.127; 17.01 ns. 1,13,32
4-402, Comment 3 20.03 D.31 5-103(l)(b) 17.010.17
4-403 ......•••.... 20.05 ns. 56. 82 5·103(1)(d) 17.01 n.ll
4-403, Comment 7 20.04 n.51 5·103(l)(f) 17.01 0.9
4-403, Comment 8 20.05 ns. 52, 74 5-104 17.0105.2,10
4-403, Comment 9 ......• 20.05 n.69 5·104(1} 17.01 n.26
4-403(1) 20.05 ns. 53, 57, 82 5·104(2) 17.oI n.27
4-403(2) 20.04 n.51; 5·105 17.01 n.28
20.05 ns. 54, 62 5·106 17.01 DS. 3, 41,42
4.404 .. , 20.04 ns. 48, 51; 20.04 n.51 5-108, Comment 2 17.01 n.39
4-405 ..... 19.02 n.80; 25.09[1) n.328 5-108(1) 17.01 0.37
4-405, Comment 4 19.02 0.81 5-108(2) 17.01 D.37
4·406 ..... 20.06 n.13I; 20.09 0.214; 5-108(2)(a) 17.01 n.38
20.12 os. 380, 381, 383.386,388 5-108(2)(b) 17.01 D.4O
4-406(d) 20.120.396 5·109 17.02D.60
4-406(1) 18.05 n.308; 5·109(1) .........• 17.02 DS. 50,51
20.12 na. 383, 399, 400 5·109(1)(b} 17.02 n.54
4-406(2)(b) 20.12 n.381 5·109(2) ...•••.•.. 17.02 DS. 52, 53
4-406(3} 20.12 n.393 5-112 ....... 17.02 n.56; 21.10 D.279
4-406(4} 20.12 n.383 5·113, Comment 4 17.02 n.68
4.407 20.02 n.14; 20.04 n.44; 5-113(1) 17.02 n.66
20.05 n.64; 20.10 0.239; 5-113(2) 17.02 n.67
20.12 ns. 380,403 5·114 . '" .....•...•.••. 17.02 n.76
4-407, Comment 1 .....•. 20.05 0.70 5-114(1) ........ 17.01 ns. 4,13,14;
4-407 (c) 20.02 0.16 17.02 as. 59, 61, 79
4-407(1) .. ; 20.12 n.381 5-114(2) .. 17.02 ni. 53, 60,69,71,74
4.407(3) 20.12 n.382 S-114(2) (b) •.••••• 17.02 ns. 71, 74 .
4·501 17.03 ns. 90, 93, 94 5-114(3) 17.02 ns. 57, 58
4-501, Comment 17.03 n.94 5-116 17.01 n.7; 22.04(1 ]tb} 0.140
4·502 .. 17.03 ns. 92, 95; 21.10 n.279 5-116, Commeots 1-3 15.020.124
4-503 .......•..... 17.03 os. 97, 104 5-116(1) 17.010.6
4-503(a) 17.03 n,. 98,99 5-117 17.04 ns. 112. 116
4·S03(b) 17.030.102 5-117, CommeDt ...•..•. 17.04 0.112
4-504(1) 17.G3 n.l05 5-117(1)(a) 17.04 na. 113, 114
4·504(2) 17.03 n.l06 5·117(l)(b) 17.04 0.113
5-102 14.03 n.94; 17.01 0.1; 5-117(l)(c) 17.04 n.115
17.02 n.62; 17.04 D.116 6·102(1) 23.02[1J[a] n.31
5-102, Comment 1 17.01 DS. 16, 33 7-102 ..•.••••.•••••.•• 14.05 n.210
5-102, Commeot 2 17.01 DS. 21, 7-104 ....•....•. 14.05 os. 207,208,
24,25 209, 210, 230; 22.07[5J D.269
5-102(l)(a) ...• 17.01 os. 15,29,30 7-202(3) 14.05 D.245
T-ll TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (f/) and notes (n.).]

VCC § VCC §
7-203 .......•..•...... 14.05 0.238 8-102(1 )(a), Comment 2 ..... 14.04
7-204 ............•...• 14.05 0.234 0.203
7.204(1) 14.05 0.245 8-102(1)(a)(ii) .. 14.05 os. 251, 252
7·206(3) 14.05 0.248 8-102( 1) (b) '" 14.05 n.267; 22.07{6]
7·209 14.05 0.246 n.281 aDd [e] n.312
7·210 14.05 0.247; 24.03[3][b] 8-102( I) (b), Commeot .. 14.05 n.267
7-301 14.05 0.237 8-102(1 )(e) ..... 14.05 os. 256, 258,
7-304 14.05 0.233 263; 22.07[6][a] n.287
7-304(1) 14.05 0.232 8-102(1)(d) ..•. 14.05 os. 256, 259,
7-304(1 ), Commeot . . . .. 14.05 n.232 260
7·307 .........•....... 14.05 0.246 8·( 05 14.05 os. 266. 268
7-308 14.05 115. 247, 248 8-105(1) 14.05 n.257; 22.07[6][a]
7-403 14.05 os. 231, 234 0.286
7-403 (1 ) (a) 14.05 0.235 8-106 14.01 0.45
7-403(1) (g) .•.•••...•• 14.05 0.239 8-108 ....•....... 22.07[6][e] n.311
7-403(3) 14.050.235 8-202(3) .•............ 22.07[6][b]
7-403(4) 14.05 n.236 8-207 .. 14.05 0.263; 22.011:6)1:<:11\.311
7-404 14.05 0.234; 23.02[l][b] 8-301 (2) .•....... 22.07(6)[b] 0.296
0.49 8-302 . . . . . . . . . .. 14.05 ns. 260, 262;
7-501 .... 14.05 0.213; 23.02[3] n.92 22.07[6][b]
7-501, Comment 1 14.05 n.219 8-302(1) 14.05 0.269
7-501 (1) 14.05 n.218 8-304 15.ot 0.37
7-501(2) 14.05 0.218 8-307 14.05 n.264; 15.01 n.9
7-501(3) 14.05 0.218 8-308 22.07[6][e] n.311
7-501(4) 14.05 os. 217, 219; 8-308(1) 15.01 n.41
22.07(5) 0.272 8-308(2) 14.05 0.262; 15.01
7-502 ...•....... 14.05 os. 213, 223 os. 33. 35, 37
7-502(1) (a) .•........ 14.05 0.214 8-308(4) 22.07[6)[e] 0.309
7-502(1 )(b) ...••••...• 14.05 0.215 8-308(7) .......•.. 22.07[6][e] 0.309
7-502(2) 14.05 os. 224, 227 8-310 14.05 0.261
7-503 ........•.. 14.05 ns. 213, 216 8-310, Comment 14.05 0.261
7-503 (1) .....•.. 14.05 os. 226, 227 8-310, Comment I 15.01 n.37
7-504 .•....... " 14.05 os. 210, 213 8-313(1)(a) ..••.. 22.07[6][a] 0.289
7-504(1) 14.05 0.228 8-313(1)(b) ...... 22.07[6][e] n.308
7-507, 17.03 0.107 8-313(1)(e) .•.... 22.07[6][a] 0.289;
7-508 ....•. 15.030.175; 17.Q3 0.108 22.07[6][b]
8-101, App. I 14.05 0.265 8-313(1)(e) 22.07[6][a] os.
8-101, Comment .. 14.05 os. 253, 258 289,292
8-102 ....•. 14.03 0.95; 14.04 0.204; 8-313 (h)(i) 22.07[6][a] 0.292
14.05 os. 252, 254, 255, 266; 8-313(h)(ii) 22.07[6][a] n.292
22.07[6][b] n.301 8-313(h) (ii), Commeot 2
8-102, Comment .. 14.05 os. 254, 255 .. .. .. • . . .. .. ... 22.07[6][a] n.292
8-102, Comment 2 .••.. 14.05 0.254; 8-313(h)(ii), Comment 3
22.07[6][a] 0.288; 22.07[6][e] .. . .. . . . . . .. • ... 22.07[6][a] 0.292
0.314 8-313(1 )(h) ••...• 22.07[6][a] 0.289
8-102(1) 22.07[6][a] 0.285; 8-321 22.07[6) 0.283
22.07[6][e] n.313 8-321 (1) 22.07I6][a) os. 289, 293;
8-102(1) (a) .... 14.03 0.96; 22.07[6] 22.07[6][e] os. 308, 310
0.281 and [e] 0.315 8-321 (2) ....•.... 22.07[6][a] 0.290·
 TABLE OF UCC SECTIONS T-12

(Rt!/ut!nusart! to paragraphs (ff) and nott!!t (n.).]

UCC § UCC §
9·321(3) ......•...• 22.07[6J 0.284 9-109, Comment 2 22.06[1] n.190
8·321(4) •........ 22.07[6][a) 0.290 9·109(1) 22.06[1J 0.189
8-401 22.07[6][c] ns. 309, 311 9-109(2) 22.06[2) 0.194
8-408 ...•.. 22.07[6IfcJ os. 309, 311 9·\09(3) 22.06[3] 0.197;
9-102 14.03 0.100; 22.01[2][b] 23.02[2)[f)
n.33; 22,0:)[31 n.123; 22.03[4] 9-109(4) 22.06[4], ns. 205,206
n.131 9-1\0 22.02[1} n.S7
9-102(1)(a) ....•.• 22.01{1] ns. 5,7; 9-114 .:... 22.0 I[2][b} n.34: 22.06[3]
22.07[5J n.267 os. 213, 215, 217; 23.01 [2][a] n.23
9-102(1)(b) .. 22.01[1] n.lO; 22.03[4] 9·132(4) 22.02[2) 0.64
n.I32; 22.07[1J n.238 9·201 ...•. 22.02[1] n.42; 22.03 D.73;
9·102(2) ..... 22.01 D.2; 22.04[111a) 22.07[6] n.278 and [611a) n.294
n.134 and [6][c] 0.317; 22.07[7] D.329;
9·103 14.01 n.44; 23.01 [lJ; 25.07[2] D.202
22.03[1] ns. 76, 79 9-203 22.07{6] 0.277 and [6J[a]
9·104 23.02[2][f] D.85 n.294; 23.03[1] n.l0S
9·104(1) 22.07[7) ns. 320, 9-203(1) .... 22.02[IJ D.47; 22.07[6]
321,328 n.282
9·I04(a) •........... 22.0/111 D.12 9-203(1 )(a) .... 22.02[1] os. 43. 45.
9·104(1l) 22.01 0.13 55; 22.04[[I][a] 0.135; 22.06{31
9-104(c) ....•....•... 22.01[1J n.14 n.200
9·104(0) ...••.•..... 22.0lfl] D.15 9-203(1)(b) ......•.. 22.02[2] n.64;
9·104(e) 22.01[1} n.16 22.06[3] n.200
9-104(0 ...•.••••... 22.01[1) D.17 9-203(2) 22.02[1] D.SI
9-104(g) ...•..•..•.. 22.01(1) D.18; 9-203 (3) 22.02[1] 0.63
22.07{B] n.333; 22.07[8] n.334 9-204 ............•.. 22.02[l} D.S8
9-104(h) 22.01[IJ n.19 9-204(2) .........••. 22.02[IJ 0.59;
9-104(i) 22.01(1) D.20 22.06[1] 11.193
9·104(j) .•......•... 22.01[1} n.21; 9·205 22.04([2] n.154
22.06(3) D.197; 22.07(9] 9-205, Comment 6 .•••.. 22.04[1)[a]
9·104(k) 22.01(1) n.23 D.137; 22.04[2] DS. 151,153
9·104(1) .••.•......•. 22.0][1] D.24 9-206 .•. 16.01 n.30; 22.0l[2}(a} D.26;
9·105 .....•......•.... 14.03 11.98 22.07[1) n.241
9-105(1) ...••....... 22.02[1J 11.54 9.206(1) ..•........ 22.07[1] n.242
9-105(1)(a) 15.01 0.6 9·207 ....•• 22.07[1] n.2S0; 24.03[2]
9-105(1 )(b) 15.01 0.6; n.l6O
22.07{4] 0.262 9-207(1) ...••. 22.04[3] ns. 155, IS8
9·105(1 )(d) 24.03[4](b} 9·207(2) (a) •.....•. 22.04(3) n.16O
9-105(1)(£) 22.07[5] 0.267 9-207(2) (ll) ....•.... 22.04[3] n.62
9-105(1 )(h) .........• 22.06 D.186
9-105(1)(1) ........ 22.07[3] n.256; 9.207(2) (c) 22.04[3] 11.163
22.0iI6J n.274 9·207(2) (d) ...••.•. 22.04[3} 11.165
9·106 .... 15,01 n.6; 22.07[t] os. 233, 9-207(2)(e) ....•.... 22.04[3] 0.166
235, 237; 22.07[2] ns. 252, 253; 9-207(3) .••..••••.• 22.04(3) D.156
22.07[6][c) 0.316 9·208 22.02[1] 11.61
9-107, .........•. 22.02[2] and n.64 9-208(2) ...••••..... 22.02[1J n.62
9·107(a) ....•....... 22.02(2) n.64 9-301 22.02(I] n.58; 22.07[6J
9.107(b) ..•......... 22.02[2] 0.65 0.279; 23.01[1] 0.8
9-\ 09 22.02 n.l88 9·301 (1) (a) ........•. 23.01[1J 11.2
T-13 TABLE OF UCC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (fJ and notes (n.).]

UCC § UCC §
9-301 (I)(b) •........ 22.02(1) n.58; 9·305, Comment 1 22.04[I][b]
23.01[1] ns. 4, 6; 25.07[4](a] n.147
9-301 (I)(c) .... 23.01[1] ns. 7, 8, 9 9-305, Comment 2 i2.04[l)[b]
9-301(1 )(d) ....•. 23.01(1] ns. 8, 12 n.141; 22.04[2] n.152
9-301(2) 23.01[1] n.13 9·305, Comment 3 ., 22.04[1][b] n.149
9·301(3) 23.01 [I) n.5 9-306 22.03[2][b] n.106; 22.05
9-301(4) 22.02[1] n.58 ns. 171, 172; 22.07[1] n.240;
9-302 ... 22.05 ns. 167, 168; 22.06[2] 23.02[1 ][b] n.49
n.196; 22.06[3] n.199; 22.07[1] 9·306 (I) ... 22.07[7] D.322; 22.07[8]
n.234; 22.07[2] n.254 ns.333, 334; 23.01[2][a] n.25;
9·302(1) .......•. 22.04[I][bl n.147; 23.03[1] ns. 99, 100
22.06[3] n.213 9-306(2) ... 22.06[3] 0.204; 22.06[4]
9-301(l)(a) 22.04[1]lbl n.138 n.208; 22.07[7] ns. 323, 325;
9·301(l)(c) 22.06[2] n.196 23.02[1][b] ns. 45, 46, 48, 49;
9-302(1) (d) 22.06(1) n.191 23.02[1][c); 23.02[2][a] n.54;
9-302(2) 22.03[4] n.123 23.02[2J[{); 23.01[2][a) n.17;
9·302(3) ..•..•.••.. 22.06[6) 0.229 23.02'i\l n.l0l
9·302(3)(a) 22.05 n. t75
9·302(1 )(b) ..........• 22.05 n.176 9-306(3) ... 22.07[7] n.313; 23.02[1]
9·302(l)(c) 22.05 ns. 177, 178 D.102
9-302(1)(d) 22.05 n.179; 9·306(3) (b) .,. 22.07[7] ns. 324, 325
22.06 n.184 9-306(4) ..... 22.07t7] DS. 33\, 332;
9-302(1)(e) 22.05 n.180 23.02(1) n.103
9-302(l)(f) 22.05 n.181; 9-306(d)(4) 22.07[1] n.331
22.07[6) n.282 9·307 23.02[a); 23.02[l][a];
9·302(1 Hg) 22.05 n.182 23.02[1][b] nA5; 23.02{2][f]
9-302(3) (b) 22.05 n.174; 9-307, Comment 2 ... 23.02[1][a] n.35
22.06[51 n.232 9-307(1) 15.02 n.155; 22.01[1]
9·302(4) ..... 22.05 n.173; 22.06[6] n.12; 22.06[3] n.203; 22.06[4]
n.230 n.210; 23.01[1] n.IO; 23.02{a];
9-303 ..•. 22.02 n.74; 22.07[6] n.277 23.02[1][a) ns. 31, 32; 23.02[1][b];
9-303 (l) 22.02[2] n.64 23.02[1]{c] and D.52; 23.02[2][a]
9-304 ...•.• 22.04[1][b] n.143; 22.05 n.53; 23.02[2][c]; 23.02[2J[d];
n.171; 22.07[3] n.257; 22.07[5] 23.02[2]({) and n.90
D.271; 22.07[6][a) n.290 9·307[2] .... 22.02[1] n.192; 22.06[2]
9-304(1) 22.05 D.171; 22.07[6] n.196; 23.01[1] n.ll; 23.02[1][a]
ns. 275, 282 n.34
9-304(2) ••.......•. 22.07[5) n.270
9·304(3) .........•. 22.07[5] D.273 9-308 ......•... 22.03[4) n.133, 265;
22.07[3] ns. 258, 259; 22.07[6]
9-304(4) .....•••••. 22.07[6J n.282 n.279; 23.02[3) n.98
9·304(5) 22.04[1][b] n.148 9·308, Comment 3 ... 22.07[4J D.265
9·305 22.04[1][b] ns. 139, 140,
142, 143, 146; 22.04[1][b] ns. 9-308(a) ... 22.07[4) n.264; 23.02{3]
147, 149; 22.04(2) n.152; 22.05 D.94
ns. 167, 169; 22.06[2] n.196; 9·308(b) ..........•. 23.02[3) n.95
22.06[3] n.199; 22.07[2] n.254; 9·309 22.07[3] D.260; 22.07[5]
22.07[3] n.257; 22.07(5) n.271; n.272; 22.07[61 ns. 279, 282;
22.07[6] ns. 275, 282; 22.07[6] 22.07{6][b] n.296; 23.02[[3]
n.282 ns. 91, 92
 TABLE OF VCC SECTIONS T-14

[Rt!jert!nct!s art! 10 paragraphs rf) and nott!s (n.).]

VCC § VCC §
9-310 22.07[1]; 23.03{4] 9-401 .•• 22.03{l] DS. 76, 77: 22.06[3]
ns. 131, 132 n.202
9-311 ... 15.01 D.3; 24.01 [l][c}[i] D.36 9-40 I, Comment 6 .•.. 22.03[ I] n.79
9·312 '" 23.01[1] n.2; 23.02[5) n.134 9·401 (1) 22.03[5}
9·312(2) ....• 23.0112][b} D'. 29. 30 9-401 (2) 22.03[11 DS. 80. 81
9-312(3) ..••...•... 22.06[3) n.218; 9·401 (3) 22.03[1] n.78
23.01[2J[a] ns. 20,24. 26 9·402•..... 22.03[1] n.106; 22.03[2]
9-312(3)(a) 23.01{2}[a] n.22 . n.90
9-312(3)(b) 23.01[2](a] n.21 9-402. Comment 2 .... 22.03[1] n.7S;
9-312(4) ....•• 23.01[2](a] ns. 17, 18 22.03(21Ib] n.108
9-312(5) (a) " 22.04[1][b] and n.150; 9-402( I) ., 22.03[2J D.91; 22.03[2J[oJ
23.01[1] D.3; 23.01 [2) D.15 ns. 93, 95; 22.031l2][b] and ns.
9·312(6) 23.02[1] n.104 105, 107; 22.0613] ns. 200, 201
9-313(1) 23.02(2) n.107 9·402(2) 22.03[2][b] n.106
9·313 (I )( a) 22.06{S) D.221 9.402(2)(d) 22.0312J{bJ
9·313 (1 )(b) 22.06[5] 0.222 9.402(4) 22.03[3J, ns. 119,
9-313(2) 23.02[2] D.121 120, \21
9·313(4)(a) 23.02[2] D.1I0 9·402(5) ., 22.03[2][a] ns. 96, 97. 98;
9·313(4)(b) 23.02(2) n.l09 22.06[3] n.201: 22.0615J n.224
9.313(4)(c) 22.06[5] n.2lS; 9-402(6) 22.03[2](a] n.99
23.02[2] 0.112 9-402-7 22.02[2}faJ 05. 100, 102,
9.313(4) (d) 22.06[5] D.227: 103; 22.0212][b} and D.113
23.02(2] 0.114 9-402( 8) 22.02[2J[b} n.lll;
9·313(5) 23.02[2} n.116 22.06(6] n.231
9·313(6) 23.02[2] n.IIS 9·403 22.03(2)[bJ
9·313(8) ........•.. 23.02[2} n.117 9-403 (1) 22.02[1 J D.82
9·315 23.02[S] n.134 9-403(2) 22.02[11 05. 83. 84
9·315(1 Ha) 23.02[S] D.134 9·403 (3) 22.02(1] ns. 85, 86, 87
9-315(1)(b) 23.02[5] n.13S 9-403 r4) 22.0311] D.88
9-315(2) 23.02[5] D.136 9-404(1.) 22.02[3) n.1 IS
9·316 23.02[61 n.137 9·405 ......•...•...... 22.03[2J[bJ
9-318 15.01 n.8; 22.07[1] and ns. 9-405(2} .......•... 22.03[4] D.\24
241,248; 23.02[1][a] n.31 9-405(3) 22.03[4) n.125
9·318, CommeDt 4 ... .. 22.07[1] and 9·406 22.03[3J n.122
n.249 9-407 .......•........ 22.03[11 n.89
9-318(1) .... : 15.01 n.7; 20.Q3 n.24; 9-408 ....... 21.01 rr2][b] 05. 35, 38;
22.03[4] n.128; 22.07[L] D.243 22.01 [2][a] n.30; 22.06{3]
9·318(a) 22.01[1] D.247 ns.213,216,217
9·318(1 )(a) 22.07[1] 9·501(1) ..... 24.03[1J ns. 143. 146.
9-318{l )(b) ......•. 22.03[4] n.127 160; 24.03[2] D.IS1
9-318(2) 16.06 os. 198, 199; 9-50\ (3) 24.03[[1] n.149;
22.03(4] D.129 24.03{41lb] and 1\.202;
9·318(3) ......•.... 22.03[4} D.126; 24.03[5J D.221
22.04(1)[b] n.146; 22.07[1] D.247; 9·502(1) 24.03(2] n.162
24.03(2] n.162 9-503 24.03[2] os. \52, 155, IS9,
9-318(4) 22.07[1] and n.249 161.163; 24.0m][bJ n.169.
9·318(4), CommeDt 4 22.07[1] 9-504 ... 22.01[2][a] 0.26; 24.03[4}[b]
0.249 9-504(1) 24.03[4][a] n.182
T-lS TABLE OF UCC SECTIONS

[Refuences are 10 paragraphs (fi) and notes (n.).]

UCC § UCC §
9-504(1)(a) 24.03[4)[a] n.184 9-505(1) '" 24.03[5] n.218; 24.03[5]
9-504(1 )(b) 24.03[4][a] n.185 ns. 219, 220, 221
9-504(1)(c) 24.03[4][a] 0.186 9-505(2) ..•... 24.03[5] ns. 218, 222
9-504(2) 24.03[4][a] ns. 187, 189 9-506 .. 24.03[4][aJ n.199; 24.03[4J(bJ
9-507, Comment 1 ... 24.03[6J n.228
9-504(3) 24.03[4I[a] os. 190, 191. 9·507(1) .... 24.03[5J 0.220; 24.03[6]
192, 194, 197; 24.03(4][b]; aod os. 225, 226, 227, 230
24.03(6] 0.233 9-507(2) •.......... 24.03[6] 0.235
9-504(4) 24.03(4][a] ns. 197, 198 9-3183 ...•..•...... 22.07[4] n.262
9-504(5) 24.03[4](b] 0.213 10-102 .•.•••. 14.01 D.9; 14.05 D.250
 Table of USC Sections
(References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

2 USC § 7 USC §
437c(b)(l) •........... 13.02 D.67 1631{f) 23.02 os. 61, 62
437g(a)(5)(c) 12.02 D.196 1631 (g) ....•...•...... 23.02 D.88
437g(d)( I )(A) .......• 12.02 D.197 1631 (gl( I) 23.02 n.57
441b 12.02 D.194 1631 (h)(2) 23.02 n.76
44Ib(a) 13.02 DS. 64,68 1631{h)(3) 23.02 n.78
44Ib(b)(2) 13.02 n.65
441b(2) 12.02 D.195 9 USC §
201 25.07 n.202
5 USC § 301 ....•..•..•......• 25.07 n.202
552(f) ........•....... 13.01 D,45 301 (t )(b) 25.07 n.196
552a .. . . 13.01 ns. 44, 46 11 USC §
552a(b) 13.01 n,47
552a(c) 13.01 D,48 101 (4) 25.06 ns. 161, 162
552a(d) 13.01 n,49 101(5) 25.07 n.218
552a(d)(2)(B) .......•. 13.ol n.50 101(17) 25m D.87
552a(e) 13.01 D.51 10I{l7)(A) 25.02 D.66
552a(e)(4) 13.01 D.52 tol( 17)(B) 25.02 D.67
552a(e)(6) 13.01 D.53 101 (l8) 25.02 n.68
552a(e)(8) 13.01 D.54 101 (19) 25.03 D.86
552a(f) 13.01 D.55 101(20) ...•........... 25.02 D.65
101(29) 25.02 D.25
101(30) 25.07 D.229
7 USC § 10l(30}(A) 25.07 D.230
196 23.03 D.128 101(30)(B) 25.07 D.231
163t(e) (l) 23.02 ns. 63. 80 101(30}(C) 25.07 D.232
1631 (e)(2) 23.02 n.69 101{30}(D) 25.07 D.232
1631 (e) (2) (D) ......•.. 23.02 n.71 101(32) 25.04 D.IOI
1631(c)(2) (E) 23.02 ns. 72, 75 101(35) 25.02 D.23
163l(c)(2)(F) 23.02 n.73 101(47) .•. 25.04 n.l02; 25.07 D.204
163l(c)(4) 23.02 n.70 101 (50) ••............ 25,07 D.214
163l(c)(5) 23.02 0.79 105{a) 25.09 D.394
163t(c)(7) 23.02 D.84 109(b) ....• 10.01 D.l; 25.02 os. 23,
1631(d) 23.02 ns. 56, 87, 90 37,39
163l(e) ...•.... 23.02 os. 58, 59, 90 109{d) ..... 10.01 D.l; 25.02 ns. 35,
163l(e)(I)(A) 23.02 D.64 37,39,41
163l(el(I)(A)(il) 23.02 D.65 109{e) 25.02 n.28
163l(e)(I)(A)(v) 23.02 n.66 109{f) : 25.02 n.64
1631(e)(I)(B) 23.02 D.67 301 .•.....•.•....•..•. 25.03 D.79
163t(e)(2) 23.02 D.68 303 ....••...••... ; •. " 25.03 D.80
163l(e)(3) 23.02 D.68 303(a) .•....•.••••.... 25.03 D.84

T-17
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-18

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

II USC § 11 USC §
303(b) 25.03 n.81 507(a)(3) 25.06 D.180
303(h) ............•... 25.03 n.82 507(a)(4) 25.06 D.181
322(a) 25.07 n.193 507(a)(5) 25.06 D.182
323(a) 25.07 n.191 507(a)(6) 25.06 D.183
341(c) 25.02 n.50 507(a)(7) 25.06 D.184
342(b) 25.02 n.32 507(b) 25.05 D.159
361 (I) 25.05 n.149 510 25.06 n.174
361(2) 25.05 n.150 51O(c) 24.02 n.132
361(3) 25.05 n.151 522(b) 25.04 ns. 95, 96
362 25.05 n.117 522(d)(I) 25.04 0.98
362(a) 25.05 ns. 118, 119, 146 522(d)(7) 25.04 n.99
362(b) 25.05 n.129 522(d)(9) 25.04 n.99
362(b) (I) 25.05 n.130 522(t} 25.04 n.l00
362(b)(4) .. 25.05 n.132; 25.09 n.400 522(t} (2) 25.04 n.IO~
362(b)(5) 25.09 n.4oo 523(a)(I) •............ 25.08 n.285
362(b)(9) 25.05 D.133 523(a)(2) 25.08 n.286
362(b) (10) .......•... 25.05 n.135 523(a)(2)(A) 25.08 n.286
362(c) 25.05 0.120 523(a) (2) (C) .•.• 25.09 ns. 383, 385
362(d) .. 25.05 ns. 120, 136, 142, 147 523(a)(3) 25.08 n.287
362(d)(2) 25.05 n.136 523(a)(4) 25.08 D.288
362(e) 25.05 0.143 523(a)(5) 25.08 D.289
362(f) 25.05 0.145 523(a) (6) •..•.. 25.08 n.290; 25.09
362(g) 25.05 0.144 n.406
362(h) 25.05 0.127 523(a) (7) .•.••. 25.08 D.291; 25.09
363(8) .••.. 25.02 0.48; 25.09 n.369 n.405
363(b) ..••. 25.02 D.47; 25.05 0.156 523(a)(8) 25.08 n.292
363(c) •••.. 25.02 D.46; 25.05 n.156 523(a)(9) ...•........ 25.08 n.293
363(c)(2) 25.02 n.49 523(a)(10) 25.08 n.294
363(e) ••.. 25.04 D.112: 25.05 D.157 524 .........•........ 25.08 n.283
365(a) 25.07 D.263 525 ....•....•••...... 25.09 D.387
365(b) 25.07 D.269 525(b) 25.09 n.388
365(c) 25.Q7 D.271 541 (a) 25.04 DS. 89, 93
365(1:)(2) 25.07 0.270 541 (a)(5) 25.04 0.94
365(d) 25.07 D.272 542 25.04 D.109
365(g) 25.07 D.274 542(8) 25.04 D.115
365(g)(l) 25.07 D.273 542(b) 25.04 D.ll0
501: ••........••...... 25.06 n.160 542(c) .•.. 25.04 D.116; 25.05 D.I29;
501(a) 25.06 D.163 25.08 D.315; 25.09 DS. 325,326
502(a) 25.06 D.167 542(c)(2) 25.08 D.317
502(b) 25.06 D.169 542(c)(3) 25.08 D.318
502 (f) 25.06 0.179 542(c) (6) (A) ......•.. 25.08 D.319
502(h) .....•......... 25.09 D.361 542(d)( 1) ....•....... 25.08 D.320
503 (b) 25.06 D.178 544(a) ...•...... 25.07 D8. 194, 197
503 (b)(l) 25.05 D.158 544(a)(1) 25.07 D.195
506 :................. 25.07 n.205 544(b) .•••.•..•...... , 25.07 0.198
506(a) ••.....•. 25.06 n.170: 25.09 545 ...••............. 25.07 D.206
. ~3~3M 545(2) .......•.•..... 25.07 n.209
506(d)(2) 25.06 D.I72 545(3) , .. 25.07 D.211
507(a)(1) 25.05 n.158 547(b) •. 25.07 D8. 213, 217, 219, 221
T-19 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (r) and /WIts (n.).]

11 USC § II USC §
547(b)(4)(B) ••• 25.07 ns. 216, 228 727 (a)(9) 25.08 n.314
547(c)(l) ....... 25.07 ns. 237, 238 727(a} (l0) 25.08 n.311
547(c) (2) .....• 25.07 05. 239. 240 727(c} ......•.•. 25.08 ns. 299, 3(H
547(c){4) 25.07 n.243 1101(1) 25.02 n.42
547(c)(5} 25.07 n.245 II02(aHI) 25.02 n.s]
547(c}(7) .........•.. 25.07 0.246 1103(c) 25.020.52
547(e) (l )(B) 25.07 n.224 l104(a) 25.02 n.4~
547(e)(2) 25.07 n.223 1I06(a)(l) 25.02 oA5
547(e)(2)(A) '" 25.07 n8. 225, 227 1106(1 Ha} 25.06 0.168
547(e)(3) ••..••••.••. 25.07 n.240 1111 (a) 25.06 n.166
547(f) 25.07 ns. 215, 222 1121 25.02 0.53
547 (3) ...•......•.•.. 25.07 n.242 1126(a) 25.02 h.56
548(a) 25.07 n.247 1126(c) 25.02 n.57
548(a)(1) 25.07 n.249 11 26(d) 25.02 0.58
548(a)(2) 25.Q7 1\.251 1128(a) 25m. n.55
549 25.09 n.323 1129 25.02 D.54
549(a)(2)(A) 25.09 n.327 1129(b)(l) 25.02 n.59
550(a) 25.07 n.261; 25.09 n.341 1129(c) 25.020.61
SSO( d) 25.01 n.262 1141(d)(1) 25.080.299
553(a) ..••.••.•• 25.09 ns. 346, 358 1141 (dH2) 25.08 0.298
553(a)(1) 25.09 n.349 1141 (dH3HC) 25.08 n.312
553(a)(2} 25.09 n.350 1202(b)(l} 25.06 D.168
553(a) (3) ......• 25.09 ns. 351,356 1208(c)(3) 25.02 n.71
553(b) 25.09 n.357 1221 25.02 n.70
553(b)(l) 25.09 n.359 1222(a)( 1) 25.02 n.72
553(b)(2) 25.09 n.360 1222(a)(2) 25.02 n.73
554 .........•...•.... 25.Q7 n.279 1222(a)(3) 25.02 0.74
554(a) ..•.. 25.07 n.280; 25.09 nA07 1222(c} 25.02 n.75
702(b) 25.01 n.l92 1228 25.08 0.295
702(c) 25.01 n.l92 1228(a) 25.02 0.76
7M(5} 25.06 n.168 1302 .......•..•...... , 25.02 n.31
725 ......•....•.•...•. 25.06 n.176 1302(b)(l) .....••..•. 25.06 n.168
726 .••...••.....•.•.. 25.06 n.175 1325(a} 25.02 n.30
726(a) (l) 25.06 n;l77 132S(b) 25.02 n.27
726(a)(2} 25.06 n.185 1325(c) 2S.02 n.29
726(a)(3} 25.06 n.186 1326 25.02 n.31
726(a)(4} 2.5.06 n.181 1328(a)(2) ••••••••..•. 25.08 n.296
726(a)(5) 25.06 n.188 1328(c)(2) 25.08 n.297
726(a)(6) 25.06 n.189
726(b) 25.06 n.190 12 USC f
727(a) 25.08 n.313 1 4.01 ns. 34, 36
727(8)(1) 25.02 n.24 2 4.01 n.35
727(a)(2) 25.08 n.304 14 4.m n.37
721(a}(3) 25.08 n.305 24 4.03 n.60; 8.01 n.3
727(a){4) 25.08 n.306 24 (seventh) .,. 3.03 n.81; 4.03 ns. 6,
727(a) (5) •..••.....•. 25.08 n.307 7,13,50,.59,65,68.75; 5.02
727(a)(6} 25.08 n.308 n.173; 8.01 n.S
127(a)(7) 25.08 n.309 : 258 4.03n.73
727(a}(8} 25.08 n.310 i 25a(c) 4.03 n.74
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-20

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.}.J

12 USC § 12 USC §
26 .......•... .. 4.01 n.l; 4.02 n.38 93 (a) 9.01 D.70
27 ..... 2.01 n.l; 4.01 n.l; 4.02 n.39 93 (b) 9.01 ns, 56, 62
27(b)(I) 5.02 n.l72 94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 4.0 I os. 24, 26
29 •..•..•.....••..••..•. 4.03 0.63 95(a) 4.02 ns. 48, 52; 12.020.186
30 4.01 ns. 21, 23 95(b) 4.02 n.49
35 ....•...............•. 2.01 0.6 101 .•...... 12.02 n.183; 14.02 D,62
36 6.01 0.30; 6.02 0.42 lOla 12.020.183; 14,02 D.62
36(c) .....•..... 6.01 os. 18.23,29 141 3.03 n,22
36(f) 6.01 n.4 161 ...•........ 4.02 n.40; 7.01 n.l
36(h) 6.0 I n.27 191 10.02 os. 17,19
38 12.02 0.182 193 10.02 D.46
51a ..................•. .4.01 D.12 194 10.02 m. 52. 57, 60, 71
51b 4.01 D.12 196 10.02 n.56
51b-1 4.01 D.12 215 .•..............•.. 13.03 n.94
53 •...............•.•.. 4.01 D.l1 215a .......•.....•.... 13.03 D.94
60 4.01 D.12 216a 4.02 n58
61 .........•........... 4.01 n.12 216b .............•..... 4.02 D.58
64a 4.01 0.13 221a .•..•.•....•....... 8.01 0.16
71 .......•.•........... 4.01 0.14 222 2.01 n.2; 3.03 ns. 54, 55
71a 4.01 DS. 14, 15 225a 3.03 n.18
72 .........•........... 4.01 0.16 241 ..•..•••......••.... 3.03 n.13
78 ••.•. 3.03 0.34; 8.01 os. 3, 9. 19; 242 ...•............ 3.03 os. 14, 16
9.020.140 243 ......•...•......... 3.03 D.19
78q .......•.....•...... 7.02 D.98 244 ....•............... 3.03 D.19
79q(c) 9.02 D.141 247 ....••••......•..... 3.03 D.17
81 ..•..•...........•... 6.01 D.13 247a ......••.••••••.••. 3.03 n.s3
84 ..........•.. . . . . . . .. 9.02 0.96 248 ....•.•••....... 3.03 ns. 21, 34
84(a) .•.............•.• 7.01 D.39 248a .•... 3.03 ns. 40, 89; 3.04 D.153
84(b) 7.01 0.40 248a(a) 2.01 0.7
84(c) 7.01 D.52 248a(b) ..•..... 2.01 Do 7: 3.03 D.42
84(c)(2) 17.01 D.46 248a(e) 3.04 n.154
84(d)(l) 7.01 D.41 248a(c)(2) 3.03 n.41
84(d) (2) ..............• 7.01 n.42 248(i) .•..••. 3.03 D.33; 18.05 n.255
85 26.02[2J 0.16; 26.02[2J[cJ 0.35 248(j) ••...•• 3.03 n.60; 18.05 D.255
86 . .. • • • • •• 24, 26.02[2] n.23 248(0) 18.05 0.255
86(a) 26.02[3J n.46; 26.02[3)[ii1J 263(a) 3.03 0.45
os 56,57 263(b) 3.03 n.51
90 3.04 n.l02; 4.03 D.84 263(c) 3.03 0.44
91 4.01 n.32; 10.02 n.74 265 •...•..•.•.•••..••. 3.04 0.100
92 ........•..••........ 4.03 n.86 266 ..••.....•........• 3.04 n.loo
92a 1.01 D.4; 4.03 D.61 282 3.03 n.57; 4.01 D.3
92a(a) 4.02 n.45; 8.01 n.IO; 283 3.02 n.3
12.02 D.I77 285 .•••........••....... 3.02 D.3
9la(e) 4.03 D.62 287 •..••.......•.....••. 4.01 0.3
92a(h) 12.02 n.178 288 ....•.•••..•.....•...• 3.02 n.3
928 (k) 4.02 D.46 289 ...••......•........ 3.03 D.61
93 7.01 D.47; 10.02 n.18 304 .........•.......... 3.03 D.64·
93a .................•.. 4.02 n.47 305 3.03 os. 64, 65
T-2l TABLE OF USC SEcrJONS

[References are to paragraphs (fI) and notes (n.).]

12 USC § 12 USC I
308 ....•........•...... 3.03 0.66 375b(3) 9.02 n.98
321 ... 2.050.38; 3.03 os. 18.32.33. 37Sb(4) 9.02 0.99
58,69,72,79; 6.01 n.13 37Sb(6)(F) 9.020.100
322 ...•................ 3.03 0.70 377 8.01 os. 3, 15
324 .•.....•.•••.••. 3.03 ns. 73, 74 378 .............•....... 8.01 0.3
325 ..•.•... 3.03 os. 59, 77; 7.01 0.2 378a(1) 8.01 0.17
326 3.03 0.59; 7.01 n.2 378(a) (1) 8.01 n.4
327 ...•...•.........•.• 3.03 0.87 391 ......•............. 3.04 n.97
328 3.03 os. 58, 86 939 ...............•.... 3.04 0.99
330 •......•.....•...... 3.03 0.83 395 ...•...........•.... 3.04 n.99
331 ..•...... 3.03 0.82; 12.Q2 0.188 411 ......... 3.04 n.137; 14.020.72
333 ..••...........•.•.. 2.01 0.29 412 ....•.•.. 3.04 ns. 130, 134,'135;
334 ..........•••••.•... 3.03 0.76 14.02 0.73
335 3.03 0.80; 8.ol 0.14 413 3.04 ns. 127, 133
339 .........•.......... 3.03 0.78 416 : 3.04 0.134
341 .•.•......•......... 3.03 n.56 461 9.01 n.59
341 (soventh) ...•..•.•.. 3.03 0.67 461(b)(1) 3.04 0.107
342 .•.•......••....•... 3.04 0.97 461(b)(I)(A) .•......... 2.020.33
343 ...••... 3.04 0.141; 14.04 0.109 461(b)(I)(C} 3.040.110;
347 .•.•.....••........ 3.04 0.140 19.020.45
347b .........•........ 3.04 0.140 461 (b)(l) (E) 3.04 0.125
371 .•.••......•......• 19.02 0.56 461(b)(I)(F) 19.02 n.46
371a 3.04 0.185; 19.02 os. 43, 62 46l(b)(2) 3.04 os. 109, 114, 117
371(a) 7.01 0.61 46l(b)(3) 3.04 0.118
371c ....•... 5.02 0.192; 9.01 0.58; 461(b)(4) 3.04 0.119
9.020.110 461 (b)(7) 3.04 0.145
371c(a)(1) 9.02 n.ll1 461 (b)(8) 3.04 0.121
371c(a)(3) ......•..... 9.02 0.112 461 (b) (8) (D) ....•.•... 3.04 0.123
371c(b)(7) 5.01 n.77 461 (b)(ll )(A) 3.04 0.124
371c(c)(l) 9.020.113 461 (e) 3.04 os. 106, 126
371c(d) 9.02 0.115 464 3.04 D.~4
371c-l .. 8.01 ns. 107, 110; 9.02 0.116 481 2.01 0.1; 4.02 n.41; 7.01 0.1
371c-l(a)(1) 9.02 0.118 484(a) ..........•..•... 4.02 0.57
371c-l(c) ..•......••..• 9.02'0.120 484(b) ...•..... 4.02 0.56; 7.01 n.15
372 ...•......• 3.03 n.29; 7.01 n.55 501 12.02 0.188
372(a) 7.01 J1.56 502 .........•.•.•...... 3.03 n.62
372(c) 7.01 n.57 503 .... 9.02 ns. 103, 104; 12.02 os.
372(d) 7.01 0.58 93, 132, 169
372(e) 7.01 0.59 504(8) 9.02 n.105
375 ......•...•.•...... 9.02 0.102 521 .............•...•.. 3.03 0.54
375a ......••.. 3.03 0.33; 9.02 0.87 531 3.03 0.63
375a(l) 9.02 0.88 592 12.02 n.130
375a(7) .•...........•.. 9.02 0.93 6118 2.05 D.4O
375a(8) ....•....•...... 9.02 0.94 635 ...••.•.•.•..•...•.. 2.05 0.42
375a(9) 9.02 0.92 635a .••••••••...•••.••. 2.05 n.41
375b .•.•. 3.03 0.33; 9.02 ns. 95, 101 635a-3 .••.•.•...•.....• 2.05 n.42
375(b) 9.01 0.58 635a-4 .........•.•••... 2.05 0.42
375b(2) 9.02 0.97 635a-4 ...•.......•..... 3.03 0.29
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-22

[R~/~r~ncesare to paragraphs (fi) and notes (n.).]

12 USC § 12 USC §
635a-4 5.02 ns. 200. 201 1464(d) (4) (D) 9.01 n.36
825d(b)(c) 9.02 n.142 1464(d)(4)(E) 9.01 n.34
t 424 2.01 n.30 1464(d}(4)(F) 9.01 n.38
t430{e) 11.02 n.98 t464(d) (5) (A) 9.01 n.40
1435 3.04 0.99 1464(d)(6)(A) 10.02 ns.
1440 7.01 n.4 25.35,37; 10.05 n.183
1441 11.02 n.73 1464(d) (6) (B) 10.02 0.26
t44t(b) 11.02 n.74 1464(d) (6) (e) 10.02 n.127
144l(b)(5) 11.02 n.75 1464(d) (6) (D) 10.02 n.27;
t44l(b)(6) 11.02 n.76 10.05 n.184
I 441(b )(7) 11.02 n.76 1464(d)(7HB) 9.01 n.80
1441(b)(1l) 11.02 n.77 1464(d)(8)(B) 9.01 ns. 64, 66
1441(c) 11.02 n.78 1464(d)(8)(BHi) 9.01 D.S7
1441(d )(2) 11.02 n.110 1464(d){12)(A) 9.01 n.47
144l(d )(3) 11.02 0.80 1464(i) 2,Ol 0.27; 7.01 n.75
144I(d)(4) 11.02 n.81 1464(i)(1) 2.01 n.18
1441(d)(5) 11.020.81 1464(i)(2) 2.01 0.18
144l(e) 11.02 n.84 1464{k) 3.04 D.IOO
144](e)(1) 11.02 n.82 1464(n) 1.01 n.4
144l(eH3) 11.01 n.95 1464(q) 7.01 n.81
144l(e)(5) •........... IUl2 n.llS 1464(s) 11.02 n.l05
144l(eH7) 11.02 n.86 1464(8)(A) 9.01 n.84
144l(e)(8) 11.020.86 1467(a) 11.02 n.lOO
144](f) 11.02 n.88 1467a(a) 11.02 n.102
144l(f)(4)(A) 11.02 n.93 1467a(b) 11.02 n.103
1441 (f)(4)(C) 11.02 n.92 1467a(c) 11.02 n.l04
144](g) 11.02 n.83 1467(b) (1) 11.02 n.99
I 442(a) 11.02 n.ll0 170Ij-3(c)(l) 24.01 os. 49. 52
1462(d) 2.01 0.28 170Ij-3(c)(1) (A) 24.01 n.53
1464 ...••............. 9.02 n.143 170Ij-3(c)(IHB) 24.01 n.54
1464(a) (6) (D) .••.•••.• 10.02 n.68 170Ij-3(c)(2){A) 24.01 n.55
I 464(b)(1 )(A) 7.01 n.72; 170Ij-3(c)(2)(C) 24.01 n.56
19.02 n.47 1701j-3(d) 24.01 n.46
1464(b)(I)(B) •.....•.. 2.01 n.14; nOlj-3(d) (1) 24.01 n.47
19.02 n.49 170Ij-3(d)(4) 24.01 n.48
1464(b)(1 HE) .......•. 19.02 n.48 1701j(e)(1) 24.01 n.49
1464(b)(1)(F) 7.01 n.73 170Ij·3(g) ....•••...... 24.01 n.45
1464(b)(2) 7.01 n.74 1709(a) 3.04 n.l00
1464(c)(1)(A) 7.01 n.76 1724(c) 11.02 n.60
1464(c)(1 )(B) 7.01 n.76 1725(a) 11.020.54
1464(c)(I)(G) 7.010.76 1725(b) (I)(A) .....•... 11.02 n.96
1464(c)(1)(H) 7.01 D.76
1725(b){2) .....•••..•. 11.02 0.97
1464(c)(1)(R) 7.01 0.76
1464(d) 12.01 D.63 1725(d) 3.04 0.100
1464(d)(2)(A) 9.01 ns. 3. 14, 17 1725(j)(1) 2.01 n.18
1464(d)(3HA) ......•... 9.01 D.20 1726(a) 2.01 n.31; 11.02 n.55
1464(d)(3)(B) 9.01 D.21 1726(b) \1.02 ns. 57,67
1464(d)(4)(A) 9.01 0.24 1726(c) 11.020.56
1464(d) (4) (B) ..•....... 9.01 0.24 1727 11.02 D.63
T-23 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (ff) and notes (n.).}

12 USC § 12 USC §
1727(b) 11.020.64 1730a(e)(I)(B) 5.030.213
I721(c) 11.02 0.65 1730a(e)(2) 5.03 0.214
1727(h) 1\.02 0.66 \130a(e){3) 5.03 os. 1\1, 141;
1727(h)( I) 11.02 0.94 6.04 0.120
1727 (j) I 1.02 0.90 I 730a(e) (3) (C) ••..••.. 6.04 0.121
1728(a) 11.02 os. 61. 62 1730a(h)(t) 5.03 0.218
1728(b) 10.02 0.69 1730a(h) (2) 5.03 0.219
1728(d) 11.020.62 1730a(m) 6.05 os. 128. 131
1729(b) 10.02 os. 27, 68 1130a(m) (1) (A){l) ....... 6.05 os.
1729(bHI HA) 10.020.65 130, 145
1729(b)(I)(B) 10.020.67 1730a(m) (t )(A)(iv) .. 11.02 0.106
1729(c)(t)(8)(ii)(l) 10.020.28 1730a(m)(2) 6.05 0.160
I 729(cH I )(B)(I) (II) 10.02 n.30 1730a(m) (3)(A) 6.050.139
1729(c)(2) 10.02 n.29 1730a(m)(3)(B) 6.050.162
1729(d) 10.02 D.128 1130a(n) 5.03 0.246
1729(f) 6.050.126; 10.03 1730a(0)(1) 5.03 0.228
os. 133, 153 1730a(p)( 1) 5.03 0.236
1729(0(1) 10.03 D.132 1730a(p)(2) 5.03 0.238
1729(f)(4) 6.05 D.127 1730a(r) 5.030.244; 8.01 0.115
1729(0(4)(A) 10.030.134 1730a (r)(4) 8.01 0.116
1729(f)(5)(A){iv) 10.03 0.161 1730a(1) 5.03 0.240
1729(0(5)(8) 10.03 0.157 1730a( 1 )(F) 5.03 0.239
1729(f)(5)(B)(jii) 10.030.156 1730(b)(l) 3.4,5.1, 10m 0.2
1729(f)(5)(C)(ii) 10.030.160 1730(b)(4) 11.02 0.115
1729([)(5)(E) 10.030.155 1730(d) 10,0] os. 11. 12. 15. 16
1729(f)(S)(L) 10.03 n.159 1730(e)(3) 6.05 0.143
1729(f)(6) 11.02 0.107 1730(g) ... 26.02[3][iv} os. 58. 59. 63
1730 ...•...• 9.020.143; 12.01 n.63 1730(g)(b) 26.020.65
1730a(a) (l )(B) 5.03 0.208 1730h(a) 11.02 0.100
1730a(a)( I )(D) 5.03 0.208 1730i(.) 11.02 0.102
1730a( a)( 1)(E) 5.03 0.209 1730i(b) 11.020.103
1730a(b) 5.03 0.207 1730i(c) 11.02 0.104
1730a(b)(1) S.Q3 0.206 17300) (2) .•••.•..•....• 10m 0.9
1730a(c)(I)(A) 5.03 n.220 1730(k)( I) 10.02 0.125
1730a(c)(l)(B) 5.03 n.226 . 1730(k)(2) 9.01 0.84
1730a(c)(I)(C) ...••... 5.030.227 1730(m) 10.030.135
1730a(c)(2) 5.03 0.210 1730(m) (t) 11.02 0.s8
1730a(c)(3)(A) 5.03 0.229 1730(m) (2) .......••.. 11.02 0.59
1730a(c)(3)(B) 5.03 0.230 1730(m)(3)(a) 10.D3 0.150
1730a(c)(4) 5.03 0.223 1730(q)(2) 12.01 0.83
1730(t) 11.020.105
1730a(c)(4)(B) 5.030.224 1735f.7 .,. 26.020.66; 26.02[3] 0.47;
1730a(c)(4)(C) 5.03 0.225 26.02[3][i} os. 50. 52, 53. 54:
1730a(c) (6) (A) 5.03 0.232 26.02[3Uii] n.SS
1730a(c)(6)(B) 5.03 0.233 1752(a) 2.010.22
1730a(c)(6)(C) 5.03 D.234 1756 .•.............•••.. 7.01 o.S
1730a(c) «() (D) ...••.•• 5.03 n.235 1757(5)(A)(vi) • , .. 26.02[3J(iv} n.63
1730a(d) 5.03 0.216 1757(5)(A)(vii) .. , 26.02[3J[iv} B.63
1730a(e)(l) 5.03 0.212 1759 2.01 B.19
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-24

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

12 USC § 12 USC §
1781(a) 11.03 n.116 1815(a) ..... 2.01 ns. 8, 32; 7.01 0.3;
178I(b) 11.03 n.119 11.01 0.13
1781(c) 11.03 n.1I8 1816 3.03 D.71; 4.01 n.7;
1782(a) 11.03 n.121 6.01 D.35
1782(c)(2) 11.03 n.124 1817 13.03 n.IIO
1783(a) 11.03 n.122 1817(a) 11.01 n.36
1783(c) 11.03 n.123 1817(b) 11.01 n.33
1783(d) 11.03 n.125 1817(d) .. ' 11.01 D.35
1784 11.03 n.126 1817(i) 11.01 n.27
1785(b) 6.050.135; 10.Q3 D.146; 1817(j) 9.01 n.61
11.030.131 1817(j)(l) 13.030.110
1785(0 3.040.189; 11.03 n.137 1817(j)(2) " 12.01 n.83; 13.03 n.1I2
1785(f)(I) 19.02 n.67 1817(j)(7) 13.03 n.lIl
1785(g) 11.03 0.138; 26.02[3][h·] 1817(j)(l3) 3.03 n.37
ns. 58, 63 1817(k) 3.03 n.33
1785(g)(2) 26.02 0.65 1818 5.01 n.68; 9.02 ns. 94,143
1786 12.01 0.63 1818(a) 3,4,5.7.10.01 ns, 2, II,
1786(b) 11.03 0.127 12, 15. 16; 11.01 n.51
1786(e) 11.03 n.128 1818(b) 3.03 n.37
1786(g) 11.03 n.129 1818(b) (t) 7.01 n.47; 11.02 n.53
1786(1) 11.03 n.130 1818(h)(2) 10.01 n.9
1786(j) (2) 9.01 n.84 1818(i)(t) 9.01 n.84
1787(a) 11.03 n.132 1818(i)(2)(1) 12.01 n.63
1787(b) 11.03 n.133 1818(0) 3.03 n.88
1787(c)(l) 11.03 n.135 1818(s) 12.01 n.63
1788 11.03 n.134 1819 6, 10.02 n.116; 11.01 n.5
1789a 11.03 n.136 1820(b) 11.01 n.43
1795b 11.03 0.142 1820(c) 11.01 n.45
1795c(a) 11.03 n.143 1821 (a) 11.01 ns. 14, 37
1795e , 11.03 0.140 1821(a)(2) 11.01 0.28
1795e(a)(l) 11.030.141 1821(a)(3) 11.01 n.28
1795e(b) 11.03 0.144 182I(c) 10.02 ns. 22, 62
1795f(b), 11.03 0.145 1821 (d) 10.02 DI. 45. 46, 86
1795f(b)(3) 11.03 0.146 1821(e) 10.02 n.23
1812 11.01 0.4 1821 (f) 10.02 os. 47, 49, 50
1813 (a) 2.01 0.32; 2.05 n.39; 1821 (g) .•......... 10.02 os. 49, 59
11.010.13 1821(h) 10.040.163
1813(e) 11.01 n.17 1821 (i) 10.02 n.44
1813 (f) 2.01 0.32; 2.02 n.34 1822(a) 10.02 056
1822(b) 10.02 D.51
1813 (g) 2.01 n.32; 2.02 0.34 1822(d) 10.02 os. 54. 82
1813 (h) 5.01 0.43 1823 10.03 n.138
1813(m)(l) 11.01 n.25 1823 (a) 11.01 n.39
1813 (0) 6.01 0.4 1823(b) 11.01 n.40
1813(1) 11.01 n.15 1823(c) 6.05 n.123; 10.Q3 0.133
1814 2.01 ns. 29, 32 1823(c)(l) .....•..... 10.030.132
1814(b) 2.05 n.39; 3.03 0.71; 1823(c)(2) 6.050.124
4.01 n.5; 11.01 0.11 1823(c)(2)(B) : .. 6.050.125
1815 11.01 0.12 1823(c)(4) 6.05 n.127
T-25 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

(Relert!tlces are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

12 USC § I 12 USC I

1823{c)(4)(A) 10.03 n.134 1841 ....•....•.......••. 5.0! n.l

1823(e) 10.02 11.97 I84I(a)(2) 5.01 0.4
1823(f) 6.05 ns. 123, 128. 131; 1841 (a)(3) 5.0! n.5
10.03 ns. 135, 137 !84!(a)(4) 5.01 n.6
1823(f)(2) , 6.05 n.129 184l(a)(5) 5.01 n.7
1823(f)(3) .. 6.05 n.129; 10.03 n.139 1841 (b) 5.01 n.2
1823(f)(3)(1) 6.0511.149 1841(c) .. 5.01 I1S. 28.29;5.0211.174
1823(f)(4)(0) 10.03 n.142 1842(a) 6.02 n.49
1823(f)(4)(E) 10.03 n.143 1842(a)(4) 6.02 n.50
1823(f)(5) 6.05 n.161 1842(c) 13.03 0.81
1823(0(6) 10.03 n.140 . 1842(d) 6.02 ns. 43, 44. 46, 48
1823(f)(7) 6.05 n.134 1842(d)( 1) 6.02. n.56
1823(f)(7)(A) 6.05 n.132; 1843 3.03 11.29; 5.01 0.1
10.03 n.144 1843(a) 5.02 n.82
1823(f)(7)(8) 6.05 n.133; 1843(a)(2) 5.02 ns. 84,85
10.03 n.145 1843(c) 5.02 n.90
1823(0 (8) 10.03 n.136 1843(c) (8) 4.03 11.88; 5.02 os. 89,
18230) 10.03 ns. 153. 162 94,103. 128, 131
1823(i)(2)(C) 10.03 n.156 1843(c)(14) 5.02 0.184
1823(i)(5) 10.03 n.155 1843(c)(14)(A)(i) 5.020.185
1824 11.01 ns. 2. 42 J843(c)(14)(A)(iv)(T) .. 5.020.186
1828(b) 12.02 n.180 1843(c)(14)(A)(iv) (II) .. 5.02 n.187
1828(c) 11.01 n.46; 13.03 n.72 1843(c) (I4)(A) (iv) (III)
1828(c)(I)(A) 13.03 n.97 ..•........ , 5.02 n.188
1828(c)(2)(B) 13.03 n.95 1843(c)(14)(B)(i) 5.02 os. 189,
1828(c)(2)(C) 13.03 n.96 194
1828(c)(3) 13.03 n.loo 1843(c)(14)(B)(ii) 5.02 n.194
1828(c)(5) •...... : 13.03 I1S. 81, 98 1843(c) (14)(B) (iii) 5.020.193
1828(c)(6) ...•....... 13.03 n.IOI 1843(c)(14)(C) 5.02 os. 180. 183
1828(c)(7) .....•..... 13.03 n.l01 1843(c)(14)(D) 5.02 ns. 180. 195
1828(d) •. 6.01 ns. 34, 35; 11.01 n.47 1843(c)( 14)(E) 5.02 n.198
1828(d)(l) 6.01 ns. 18.21 1843(c)(14)(F)(i) 5.02 os. 180,
1828(g) 3.04 n.186 181
1828(g)(1) ..• 11.0111.49; 19.02 n.43 I 843(c)(14)(F)(ii) 5.020.182
1828(g)(2) 19.02 n.62 I843(c)( 14)(F)(jv) 5.020.191
1828'!) 9.02 ns. 110. 117 I 1843(d) 5.02 n.87
1828(J)(2) 9.02 n.l0l '. 1843 ({) (3) 8.01 n.105; 9.02 n.121
1829(b) 12.01 n.3 I843(f) (3)(B) .......... 8.01 n.l02
1829b(a) 12.01 n.2 1844(b) ..•.•.. 3.03 n.37; 5.01 0.32
1829b(c) 12.01 n.4 1846 6.02 0.55
1829b(d) 12.01 n.5 1848 5.02 n.l40
1829b(e) 12.01 n.6 1849 •••.....•......•.•..• 5.01 n.1
1830a(m)(I)(A)(iii) 6.05 n.147 i 1850 .......•..•....••. 5.02 0.141
1830a(m) (5) ......•.... 6.05 0.148 I 1861 5.02 0.l65
1831d .•.•.•.. 26.02[3][iv] ns. 58, 63 1861(b)(2) 5.02 n.166
183Id(a) ...•.•.... 26.02[3][iv] n.62 1862· 5.02 n.167
183l(d)(h) ...........• 26.02 n.65 1863 .•........ ; .•..... 5.02 n.168
1832(a) '19.02 ns. 44,57,64 1864 5.02 n.169
1832(a)(2) 19.02 n.58 1951(a) 12.01 0.2
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T·26

IReferencesare to paragraphs (fI) and notes (n.).)

12 USC § !
12 USC §
1953 12.01 D.5 2264 2.05 n.81
1953(a) 12.01 D.3 2265 2.05 n.81
1953 (a)( 1) 12.01 D.8 2268 2.05 n.%2
1953(b), II 12.01 D.7 2269 2.05 D.82
1971 9.02 D.108 2277a-I 2.05 DS. 106, 107
1972 9.02 os. 107, 122 2277a-4 2.05 D.108
1972(1) 9.02 D.123 2217a-\O 2.05 n.I09
1972(2)(A) 9.02 D.I09 2278a-6 2.05 n.102
1972(2)(B) 9.02 0.109 2278b 2.05 D.I03
1972(2)(C) 9.020.109 2278b-6 2.05 n.I04
1972(2)(0) 9.020.109 2278b-7(b) ....•........ 2.050.105
2001 (b) 2.05 n.s7 2279a 2.05 0.91
2002 2.05 D.88 2279f 2.05 0.9.2
2011 2.05 D.60 260 I 26.03 n.165
2012 2.05 DS. 60, 64, 11 2803 13.04 n.1I5
2013 2.05 0.64 2901 (a) 13.04 D.1l8
2014 2.05 n.62 290l(b) 13.04 n.119
2015 2.05 DS. 62, 85 2902 ..........•...... 13.04 0.121
2016 2.05 D.62 2903 ........•.. , .. , ., 13.04 D.120
2018 ...............•... 2.05 n.61 3001 2.05 n.53
2019 2.05 D.61 3101 3.04 0.100
2031 2.05 D.65 3102. . .. .. .. • .. .. . 3.04 D.1 ()()
2073 2.05 D.68 3106. . . . . . . . • • . • • . . . . .. 3.03 n.37
2074 2.05 D.67 3108 3.03 D.37
2075 ....•....... 2.05 DS. 67, 68, 85 3201 •................. 9.02 D.I44
2091 2.05 D.65 3202 9.02 0.145
2093 2.05 0.68 3203 9.02 0.146
2096 ......•..•......•.. 2.05 0.68 3205 9.02 0.146
2128 2.05 D.70 3206 9.02 0.147
2131 (a) 2.05 D.8S 3301 2.03 0.36; 7.01 D.6
2142 2.05 D.71 3303(a) ........•....•..• 7.01 D.7
2154 2.05 D.83 3303(b) 7.01 D.8
2155 2.05 D.95 3303(e) 7.01 D.8
2159 2.05 0.95 3305(a) 7.01 D.9
2183{b) 2.05 D.84 3305(b) 7.01 D.l0
2199 2.05 D.1I0 3305(e) 7.01 D.I0
2199{b) 2.05 D.l11 3305(d) 7.01 D.l0
2200 2.050.112 3308 7.01 D.ll
2201 2.05 D.1I3 3401(4) 13.01 D.33
2202 2.05 D.113 3401(5) 13.01 DS. 33, 34
2202a(b} 2.05 D.1I4 3402 13.01 D.16
2202d 2.05 0.116 3403(e) 12.01 DS. 80, 81; 13.01
2202(e) (l) 2.05 D.115 D.36
2205 .•.......•...•..•.. 2.05 D.86 3409 .......•.....•... , 13.01 D.18
2224 .•......•.......•.. 2.05 D.71 3410. • . . . • . • . . . . . • . . .. 13.01 0.19
2242(a) 2.05 D.73 3413 12.01 n.82; 13.01 n.20
2244 ~. 2.05 D.75 3413(h) 13.01 D.25
2254 .....•............. 2.05 0.80 3413 (i) 13.01 D.23
2261 2.05 D.79 3413(k) 13.01 0.24
T-17 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

IRtI/tlrtlncu artl to paragraphs (fl) and no/tis (n.).]

12 USC § 12 USC §
3414(a)(5) .•.......... 13.01 0.29 4002(c)( 1)(B)(ii) ..... 20.11 0.301
3414(a) (5) (A) ....••... 13.01 0.30 4002 ( c) (2) 20.11 os. 297, 302
3414(a)(5)(B) 13.Dl 0.31 4002(e)(3) 20.11 D.295
3414(a)(5)(C) 13.01 0.31 4002(d)(I) 20.11 D.313
3414(a)(5) (D) ..•.•..•. 13.01 0.32 4002(d)(2) 20.11 D.314
3415 3.030.35; 13.01 os. 39,40 4002(e) 20.11 0.307
3417(a) 13.01 0.41 4oo2(e)(1) 20.11 0.308
3420 13.01 0.26 4002(e)(2)(A) 10.11 D.310
3420(2) 13.01 0.27 4002( e}(2)(B) .•...... 20.11 0.309
3502 3.04 0.191 4002(e)(2)(C) 20.110.311
3503 3.04 0.187; 7.01 0.77 4002(e)(3) 20.11 0.312
3503 (e) 19.020.68 4002(f) 20.\1' n.:HS
3503(e)(1) 7.01 0.78 4003 20.11 0.316
3503 (e)(2) 7.01 0.79 4003(a)(l) 20.11 D.317
3503(c)(3) 7.01· 0.80 4003(a)(2) 20.11 D.318
3506b 3.04 0.190 4003(a)(3) 10.11 D.319
3506(b)(1) 3.04 0.187 4003(b) 20.11 0.320
3601 .•........•...•.... 2.05 0.52 4003(c) 20.11 D.321
3801 26.02 0.84 4003(e)(l) 20.11 0.322
3802 26.02 0.84 4003(e)(2) 20.11 0.324
3803 26.02 os. 84, 85 4003(d) 20.11 0.325
3804(a) 26.02 0.86 400J(e)(l) 20.11 0.326
3904 7.01 0.17 400J(e)(1) 20.11 0.327
3905 7.01 0.19 4003(e) (3) 20.11 D.327
3906 7.01 0.18 4003(f}(1) 20.\1 0.328
3907(a)(1) 7.01 0.22 400J (f) (1 )(A)(ji) 20.11 0.329
3907(a)(2) 7.01 0.23 4003(f)(2) 20.11 0.330
3907(b)(1) 7.01 0.24 4003(f)(3) 20.11 D.331
3907(b)(3)( A) 7.01 0.25 4004(a) 20.11 0.332
3908 7.01 0.20 4004(b) 20.11 D.333
4001 20.11 0.279 4004( e)( I) ;. 20.11 0.334
4001 (3) ......•••••... 20.11 0.342 4004(d) 20.11 0.335
4001 (9) 20.11 0.292 4004(e) 20.11 0.336
4001 (II) 20.11 0.288 4004( f) 20.11 0.337
4001(16) 20.11 0.305 4005(a) 20.11 0.338
4001(18) 20.11 0.306 4005(b) 20.11 0.340
4001 (25) 20.11 0.284 4005(c) 20.11 0.341
4002(a)(l) 20.11 n.283 4006(a) 20.\1 0.343
4002 (a)(2) 20.11 0.285 4006(b) 20.11 0.344
4002(a)(2)(B) 20.11 0.286 4007(a) 14.01 0.36; 20.11 0.277
4002(a)(2)(C) 20.11 0.286 4001(b) 14.01 n.35; 20.11 n.276
4002(a) (2) (P) ••.•.... 20.11 n.289 4008(b) ~ 14.01 D.37
4002(b) (1) 20.11 os. 291, 293 4oo8(d) 14.01 0.38
4002(b)(2) 20.11 0.294 4oo9(a) 20.11 0.347
4002(b)(3) : 20.11 n.304 4009(c) 20.11 D.348
4002(b) (3) (A) .•...•.. 20.11 0.298 4010(a) 20.11 D.349
4002(b}(3}(B) 20.11 0.299 4010(a)(2)(A).· 20.11 0.350
4002(c)( I )(A) 20.11 0.296 401O(a) (3) ....•...•.. 20.11 0.3.51
4002(c)(1 )(B) .. 20.11 os. 300, 304 4010(c) 20.11 0.352
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-28

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

15 USC § 15 USC §
19 9.02 n.138 80b-2(a)(1l) 7.020.100
45(a)(2) 13.03 n.88 80b-2(a) (12) 7.02 n.lOO
57a 26.05 n.311 631 2.05 D.50
57(a) 26.01 n.l 1601 26.03 n.96
57a(f) 3.02 D.12; 3.03 D.38 1602(f) 26.03 n.238
57a(f) (1) 13.03 D.89 16021 g) 26.03 11.99
77b(l) 7.02 n.122 1602(k) 18.03 n.149
77e(a) (2) ........•..... 7.02. 0.92 \602(0) 18.040.198
77e(a)( 10) 7.02 D.123 1602(v) 26.03 0.173
17d(2) 7.02 D.95 1602(w} 26.03 0.173
17ddd 7.02 0.99 1603 18.03 0.146
17g .•.................. 7.02 0.96 1604 26.03 D.98
17k 7.02 n. 110 1604(b) 26.03 os. 101,246
771 7.02Ds.1II,lI2 1604(d) 26.03 n.l0\
77q(a) 7.02 D.llS 1607(a) 26.03 D.240
78e 3.03 D.36 1607(b} 26.03 D.241
78e(a)(4) 7.02 0.108 I 607 (c)( I) .•......... 26.03 D.242
78e(a)(S) 7.02 0.108 1607(c)(2) .•... 26.03 os. 242, 243
78e(a)(6l 7.02 0.108 1607(c)(3) 26.03 os. 244, 245
78e(a)(12) 8.02 0.126 1607(c)(4) 26.03 D.24S
78e(a)(34) 8.02 0.142 1610(a) 18.02 11.128
78e(a)(42) 8.02 D.126 1610(a)(I) 26.03 n.191
78e(42) 8.02 0.136 1610(a)(2) .••.•...... 26.03 n.192
78e(43) 8.02 D.136 1610(b) 26.03 D.193
78e(44) 8.02 D.136 1611 18.02 D.129
78e(46) 8.02 D.137 1631 .....•. 26.03 0.98; 26.04 D.249
78ee(e) 10.02 D.113 1631 (a) .•.••. 26.03 DS, 97, 102, 118
78g 3.02 D.6; 3.03 0.36 163l(b) 26.03 D.1I6
78h ...•..••.......•.... 3.03 n.36 1632 26.03 D.98
78j(b) 7.02 115. 114, 130 1632(e) .•..•..•• 18.04 os. 196, 197
78/(g)(1) 7.02 D.97 1634 26.03 D.177
780-5 7.02 D.l05 1635 26.03 D.166
780-S(a) (l)(A) 8.02 D.136 163S(a} 26.03 D.167
7So-S(a)(1 )(B) (/) 8.02 D.138 1635(b) .......•. 26.03 os. 174, 175
7So-S(b)(l) .........•.. 7.02 D.I06 1635 (c)(I) (Al 26.03 D.169
780-5 (b)(1 HA) 8.02 n.139 1635(c)(1 )(8) 26.03 D.170
780-S(b)(3)(D) 8.Q2 n.14O 163S(c)(l)(C) 26.03 D.171
780-S(C) (2) (A) .....•.. 8.02 D.141 1635(e)(l) (D) 26.03 D.I72
7Sq •..••.••..•......... 3.03 n.36 163S(f) ; 26.03 n.168
7Sr 7.02 D.1I3 1640(a) 26.03 liS. 222, 229
7Sw ....•.......... . . . .. 3.03 11.36 1640(a) (2) (A) (i) .•.•. 26.03 n.223
80a-2(a) (5) ..........•. 7.02 n.IOI 1640(a) (2) (8) 26.03 n.224
80a-2( a) (20) ...••...... 7.02 n.104 1640(b) 18.03 D.I71
80a(3) 7.02 D.101 1640(e) 26.03 DS. 227,228
80a-3(e)(3) ' 7.02 ns. 101, 102. 103 1640(d) 26.03 n.226
80a-3(e)(lI) 7.02 n.l03 1640(f) 26.03 n.230
80b-2(a) (2) •..•...•.•.• 7.02 n.loo 1640(g) .•.•.•......•'. 26.03 n.225
80b-2(a) (3) •........... 7.020.100 1640(h) 26.03 os. 231, 232
80b-2(a) (7) ...•........ 7.02 0.100 '1641 (a) 26.03 D.233
T-29 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

[References are to paragraphs (fJ and notes (n.).]

15 USC § 15 USC I
Ill41 (b) ..........•... 26.03 n.234 1681 26.04 n.276
1641(e) ..........•.•. 26.03 n.236 1681a(d) ...• 26.04 os. 278, 279. 282
Hl42 18.Q3
n.153 168Ia(e) 26.04 os. 282. 283
1643(a) 18.04
n.189 168Ia(f) 26.04 D.277
1643(a)(1) 18.04
n.193 1681 b 26.04 0.284
1643(b) 18.04
n.194 1681 b (3) 26.04 n.286
1662 26.Q30.181 I 1681b(3)(E) ........•. 26.040.287
1664
1665
26.03
26.03
0.181 I
1681c
0.185 . 168Id(a)
26.04 0.288
26.040.301
1665 (a) 26.030.190 : 1681e(b) 26.04 0.295
1666 18.03 os. 166, 173;
26.03 1681 g 26.04 0.289
n.194 168li 26.04 0.290
1666(a) .......•. 26.03 os. 195,205, 168li(c) 26.04 11.291
208,219 1681 m 26.04 0.303
1666(a) (a) ...•.....•.. 26.D3 0.210 1681m(b) 26.04 0.304
1666(a)(b) 26.03 0.212 16810 26.040.306
1666(a) (e) .•..••••... 26.03 n.213 1681 q 26.04 0.308
1666(a)(3)(A) 26.03 0.196 1681 r 26.04 0.307
1666(a)(3)(B) 26.03 0.197 1681s 26.04 D.309
1666 (b) 26.03 0.207 1691 26.06 0.320
1666(b)(a) 26.03 0.214 1691(a) 26.06 os. 340, 341
1666(b) (3) ...••.....• 26.Q3 0.206 169Ia(d) 26.06 D.326
1666(c) .•.....•. 26.03 os. 199, 215 169Ia(e) 26.06 0.324
1666(d) ..•. 26.03 os. 200, 216, 217 169I(a)(1) 26.06 0.321
1666e 18.Q3 0.179 169I(a)(2) .•.••.•.... 26.06 0.322
1666(e) 26.03 0.209 169I(a)(3) 26.06 D.322
1666f(a) 18.03 n.175 1691(b) 26.06 0.354
1666f(b) .....••• 18.03 os. In, 178 169Ib(a) 26.06 D.331
1666g 18.Q3 0.174 1691 (e) 26.06 0.362
1666h(a) ...•..•••.•.. 18.03 0.168 1691c(c) 26.06 D.335
1666h(b) 18.03 0.169 1691(d) 26.06 0.368
16661(a) ....•.•• 18.03 DS. 157, 164 1691d(a) 26.06 0.398
1666i(b) 18.03 n.llll 1691 d(b) 26.06 D.395
1666j(c) 18.Q3 D.176 1691d(c) 26.06 0.396
1667 26.03 0:156 1691d(d) ; 26.06 0.397
1667(3) 26.03 0.161 1691d(f) 26.06 00408
1671 26.04 os. 249, 250 1691(d)(I) ..•.••..... 26.06 0.369
1672(b) 26.04 0.253 169J (d)(2) 26.06 0.372
1673 26.04 n.251 1691(d)( 3) ..•........ 26.06 0.374
1673 (b) 26.04 0.252 169Hd)(6) 26.06 os. 375, 376
1673(b)(l) 26.040.254 16910(a) 26.06 0.378
1673(b)(l)(A) 26.04 0.257 1691e(b) 26.06 0.380
1673(b)(2)(A) ....•... 26.04 n.258 16910(c) 26.06 0.386
1673(b)(2)(B) ..•..... 26.04 0.259 16910(d) 26.06 0.387
1673(e) 26.04 0.260 16910(0) 26.06 0.388
1674(a) 26.04 0.262 16910(g) 26.06 n.337
1674(b) 26.04 0.263 16910(h) ; 26.06 0.338
1676 26.04 0.265 J 692 26.04 0.266
1677 26.04 0.261 1692(a) (4) .•.... 26.04 os. 267, 270
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-30

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

15 USC § IS USC §
1692(a)(6) I
26.04 ns. 268. 269 ; 16931 18.02 n.141
1692(b) 26.04 n.271 : 1693m(a){2) 18.020.134
1692(c) 26.04 n.272 ' 1693m(b) 18.02 0.136
1692(d) 26.04 n.274 1693m(c) 18.02 n.137
1692(e) 26.04 n.274 1693m(d) 18.02 os. 126. 138
1692(f) 26.04 n.274 1693m(e) 18.02 D.139
1693 18.01 n.23 J693m(f) 18.02 n.140
1693a(b) 18.02 n.37 16930 : .............•. 18.02 n.127
1693a(l) 18.02 n.114 1693q 18.01 n.28; 18.02 D,121
1693a(5) 18.01 n.23; 18.02 n.45 1701 26.03 n.164
1693a(6) .,. 18.02 ns. 30. 31. 34.35 3121(h)(4) 8.02 D.147
I693a(6)(A ) 18.02 n.46 4001(a)(4) 5.02 D.I77
I 693a(7) 18.02 n.32 4002(a)(4) 5.02 n.180
1693a(8) 18.02 n.43 4013{a) 5.02 D.204
1693a( II) 18.04 n.236 4016 5.02 D.205
1693b 18.02 n.123; 18.04 n.236
1693c(a) 18.02 ns. 78, 83 18 USC §
1693c(b) 18.02 ns. 79, 83 2 12.02 D.86
1693d(a) 18.02 DS. 79.83 212 12.02 D.87
1693d(b) 18.02 ns. 73, 92 213 12.02 D.87
1693d(c) 18.02 D.82 215 12.02 D.88
1693d(f) 18.02 D.I05 21S{a) 12.02 n.90
1693e 18.02 D.83 215 (b) 12.02 D.89
1693e(a) 18.02 DS. 69,71 334 12.02 D.185
1693e{b) 18.02 D.70 371 12.02 n.85
1693f 18.02 n.52 474 14.02 D.74
1693f(a) 18.02 D.53 493 12.02 n.174
1693f(b) 18.02 DS. 55. 60 504 14.02 n.74
1693f(c) 18.02 D.56 656 12.02 ns. 97, 130
1693f(d) 18.02 D,57 657 12.02 DS. 127,128
1693f(e) 18.02 0.58 709 12.02 os. 191. 192
1693f(f) 18.02 D.59 98l(a)(I) 12.01 D.74
1693g(a) 18.04 DS. 228. 229, 231 98I(a)(2) 12.01 D.76
1693g(b) 18.04 DS. 230. 244 98t(b) 12.01 n.77
1693g(c) 18.02 n.117 982(a) 12.01 n.78
1693g(d) 18.02 n.118 1001 12.02 D.167
1693h(a)(l) 18.02 D.63 1004 12.02 0.188
1693h(a)(2) 18.02 DS. 62, 65 1005 12.02 D.132
1693h(a)(3) 18.02 n.66 1006 12.02 0.158
I693h(b) 18.02 D.67 1007 12.02 D.173
1693h(c) 18.020.68 1008 12.020.173
I693i(a) ; 18.02 D.I09 1009 12.02 0.198
1693i(a)(2) 18.02 n.113 1014; 12.02Ds. 167, 169
1693i(b) 18.02 D.I081029 18.03 D.181
1693i(b)(4) 18.02 DS. 111. 115 1029(c)(c) 18.02 D.133
1693i(c) 18.02 D.l10 1029(c)(2) 18.02 D.I32
1693j ...........•. 18.02 DS. 75, 77 \ 1029(e)(2) 18.03D.182
1693k 18.02 n.l06 1029(e)(3) 18.03 n.IB2
T-31 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS

(Reltmmces are to paragraphs (,) and notes (n.).]

18 USC § I 31 USC §
1343 ........•......•. 12.02 n.199 I 1058 .........•.•...•.. 12.01 0.31
1909 12.02 n.87 11059 12.01 0.31
1952 12.01 n.60 1101 12.01 n.22
1956(a) 12.01 n.46 I 1141 12.01 n.27
1956(b) 12.01 n.56 1 1142 .•....•.••.••.•••. 12.01 n.27
1956(c)(l) 12.01 nA8 5103 12.02 n.l84; 14.02 ns. 54.56
1956(c)(7) 12.01 n.51 5111 5.01 n.l; 14.02 ns. 57, 82
1956(f) 11.01 0.61 S111 5.01 n.l; 14.02 n.57
1957 12.01 n.58 5112(d)(t) 14.02 n.60
1957(d} 12.01 n.62 5112(e)(l) 14.02 0.58
1961 26.02 n.81 5115 14.02 0.61
1961 (6) 26.02 n.83 5116(b)(2) 14.02 0.70
1962 26.02 n.81 5118(b} 14.02 ns. 61, 65
1963 26.02n.81 5118(c} 14.020.65
1964 26.02 n.81 5118(d) 14.02 0.66
1965 26.02 n.81 5119 .• ; 14.02 n.67
1966 26.02 n.81 5119(b) 14.02 n.62
1967 26.02 n.81 5119(b)(l) 14.02 os. 62,69
1968 26.02 0.81 5119(b)(2) 14.02 0.62
2516(1) 12.01 n.61 5311 12.01 ns. 2. 14
5313 ........••..•••... 12.01 n.13
22 USC § 5314 12.01 n.24
283 2.05 n.44 5315 12.01 ns. 27, 28, 31
285 2.05 n.43 5316 12.01 DS. 16. 17
286 2.05 nA5 5316(a)(I) 12.01 D.38
5316(d) 12.01 D.37
26 USC § 5317(b) 12.01 os. 22,79
3406 ......•..••...... 11.05 n.153 5317(c) 12.01 n.22
6653 ......•.......... 11.05 n.156 5321(a)(l) 12.01 n.41
6676 •...•.•...•...... 11.05 n.l S5 5321(a)(4) 12.01 D.39
5321(a)(5) 12.01 0.40
28 USC § 5321(a)(6) 12.01 0.42
157 .•...........•..... 25.01 n.ll 5321( d) 12.01 11.43
157(a) 25.01 n.l0 5322 12.01 n.31
157(b) 25.01 n.12 5322(b) -.• " 12.01 0.44
157(b)(l) 25.01 n.13 5324 12.01 0.36
157(b)(2) 25.01 n.16 9107 3.04 11.98
157(c)(l) 25.01 n.l5
1.5'7(c)(2) 25.01 0.14 38 USC §
158(a) 25.01 n.19 201 .••..•..•.•....••.•• 2.05 n.51
158(b) 25.01 n.19
158(d) 25.01 n.20 42 USC §
1334 •••.....•.••••..... 25.01 n.9 1983 24.03 0.170
2675 ............•.•.•.. 11.01 n.R 3533(a) 2.05 0.47
9601 •..•..........••. 25.09 n.415
31 USC § 9601 (2)(A) 25.09 n.417
324d ......•••.•.•...•. 14.02 0.59 9607(a) : 25.09 D.4i6
463 14.02 n.66 9607(b) 25.09 n.419-
 TABLE OF USC SECTIONS T-32

[Re/erencu are to paragraphs (ft) and notes (n.).]

49 USC § I
49 USC §
81 14.04 n.206 1 89 14.05 D.231
82 14.05 n.20? I 105 14.05 D.246
83 14.05 ns. 208, 230 109i 14.05 n.210
84 14.05 D.233 1 111 14.05 D.213
 Table of Cases
{References are 10 paragraphs (f) and nOles (n.).]

A A.J. Jacksoo Chevrolet v.

Oxley 15.04 n.199
Aaron Ferer & Som' Ltd. v. Alabama Ass'o of Ins. Agents v.
Chase Manhattan Bank Board of Governors .... 4.03.n.87;
.................. 24.02 & 0.101 5.02 os. 99. 136, 156
Abbott, Shepard v. ..... 14.04 0.121 Albuquerque Nat'l Bank,
Abercrombie v. Comptroller of the Loucks v. 20.03 n.28
Currency ...•..••.... " 9.01 n.83 Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'l Bank
Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n. . . . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 4.03 n.82
Rohweder v. .••.••••••. 22.01 n.8 Alex Cooley's Ballroom, Inc.,
Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank lIT Indus. Credit Co. v..••• 19.04
· • . • . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . .. 26.02 0.4 n.137
Abyaneh v. Merchaots Bank Alioto v. United States ... 21.02 n.52
· . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . .. 18.02 n.42 Aljax Corp. v. Connecticut Mut.
A.C. Davenport & Son Co. v. Life Ins. Co. ...•..••• 20.05 n.66
United States 16.02 0.101 All Souls Episcopal Church v.
Acree, United States v 12.02 0.113 FDIC 11.01 n.22
Adamson, United States v. .. 12.02 os. Allan v. M&S Mortgage Co.... 26.02
111,136, 137 0.10
Advest, Inc. Weiss v 20.05 0.78 Allegaert v. Chemical Bank .••. 22.02
Advisory Comm., Bd. of Governors, Allen, United States v. .. 12.02 0.138
Billings Util. Co. v. •.•. 3.04 0.140 Allen, Utah Lake Irrigation Co. y.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. . ••••.....••..•..... 14.04 n.121
Hepler State Bank .. 20.08 & 0.193 Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., Virginia FHLBB 10.02 n.40
Capital Bank v. 20.09 0.235 Allstate Ins. Co., Quintana v.
Aetna Fin. Corp. v. Massey- . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • • • . .. 15.01 n.84
Ferguson, Inc. ..••••.. 23.02 n.96 Alves v. Baldaia .•...... 16.050.170
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. American Bancorp v. Board of
Hampton State Bank .. 20.06 0.118 Governors .•......... 5.02 n.133
A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Governors ....••..... 5.02 0.125 Straughan ....••..... 20.09 n.212
Agee, Bricks Unlimited, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co. v.
............. .. 16.02 Wallace 7.02 n.134
Agnew, Board of Governors v. American Bankers Asl'n v. .
• •........•.......•... 8.01 n.91 Connell ............•• 19.02 n.44
Agnew v. FDIC 17.02 n.76 American Bankers Ass'n v.
Aimor Elec. Works, Ltd. v. FHLBB 19.02 n.58
Omaha Nafl Bank .•. 17.03 & n.93 American Bank of Commerce v.
Air Atl., Inc., FDIC v... 10.02 n.119 Boger-Hare Mfg. Co.••••..• 24.01

T-33
 TABLE OF CASES T-34

[Refuences are to paragraphs (fl) and notes (n.).)

American Communications Anderson \'. Cronkleton ... 10.02 n.41
Telecommunications, Inc. Y. Anderson, Slate Say. & Commercial
Commerce N. Bank, . • .. 20.02 n.15 Bank Y 10.02 n.33
American Exch. Bank Y. Cessna Anderson Y. United Fin. Co. . .. 26.06
.................... 15.04 n.197 & os. 379, 383, 406
American Express Co., Anderson, United States y. .... 12.02
Gray y. 26.03 n.105
American Express CG., Sendery v. Androscoggin County Say. Bank Y.
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . •. 16.01 n.28 Campbell [9.02 n.44
American Express Co.• SGny Corp. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank
of Am. v 15.05 n.219 · 20.08 & os. 208, 209
American Express, Martin v•.•. 18.04 Anna Nat'( Bank v. Wingate ... 15.06
American Fidelity Bank & Trust n.270
Co. v. Heimann 6.01 0.25 Anon, Inc. v. Farmers Prod. Credit
American Future Sys., Inc., Ass'n 23.02 n.48
United States v....•. 26.06 & n.338 Anon. v. FDIC " '" 9.01
American Heritage Bank & Trust Anzalone, United States v••• ,. 12.01
Co. v. Isaac 20.12 n.34
American Ins. Ass'n y. Clarke Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v.
....•...........•.... 17.01 n.45 Prospect NaCI Bank ... 20.1 0 0.253
American Nat'l Bank & Trust CO. Y. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Foxboro Co.
SI. Joseph Valley Bank " 15.01 n.82 v...•................ 17.02 n.73
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Arena Auto Auction, Inc., Park
Securities Funds Servs., Inc v. State Bank Y• • • • • • • • • • 20.12 n.410
· , 18.05 n.302 Arena, Farmers Prod. Credit
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Ass'n v 14.04 n.149
State ex reI. Leonard v.... 6.01 n.7 Argus, Inc., Records & Tapes,
American Nat'l Bank, Port City Inc. v 22.03 n.102
State Bank Y. • •••••••• 21.02 n.75 Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n Y.
American Petrotina Mletg., Inc., Mack Trucks ......•... 26.02 n.4
Weiner v. •••••.•...• 24.04 n.233 Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston .........•...... 3.03 n.67
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, Armfield v. Poretsky Management,
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. Inc 21.03 n.lOl
v 21.03 n.116 Armstrong. Scott v. 10.02 ns. 58,
American State Bank, Bank of 75,76
Niles v 15.05 n.217 Armstrong v. State Bank 22.02
American State Bank, Great Am. Armstrong, Western NaCI Bank v.
Ins. Cos. v 20.08 n.195 · ...................•. 4.03 n.82
American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Arnold Tours v. Camp ... 13.03 n.l03
Nat'] Bank .... " ..... 10.02 n.78 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp .... 4.03
American Travel Corp. Y. Central n.79
Carolina Bank & Trust Co. 20.07 Arthur Andersen'" Co., Equitable
n.154 Life Assurance Soc'y v... ; .. " 7.02
Amsterdam Urban Renewal n.134
Agency v. MeGrattan .. 21.03 n.l02 Arthur Andersen, Chemical Bank v.
Anderson Y. Baker .....•..... 19.03 · ........•......... " 7.02 n.134
Anderson, Birdsell Mfg. Co. Y. Arthur, United States. v. ...•.. 12.02
· .....•.....•........ 4.03 n.l02 05. 109, 125
T-35 TABLE OF CASES

[Re!erellces are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Arvada Hardwood Floor Co. v. Banco Popular, Fedoralln!. Co. v.
James ... 15.08 n.354; 20.07 n.142 ...•...•••..••..•... 20.07 0.143
Associated Prod. Co., Utica NilI'! BankAmerica Corp. v. Board of
Bank & Trust Co. v. 22.07 n.236 Governors 5.02 ns. 106, 135
Associates Commercial Corp. v. BankAmerica Corp., International
Hammond ••..•.•••..•.... 24.03 Travellers Cheque Co, v. .... 4.01
Association of Data Processing n.28
Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Board of BankAmerica Corp. v, United
Governors 5.02 & n.98 States 9.02 n.139
Association of Data Processing Banker's Credit Serv., Inc v.
Servo Orgs. Inc. v. Camp 13.03 Dorsch 16.05 n.171
n.103 Bankers Trust Co., C.H. Sanders
Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. Constr. Co. v 15.01 n.83
Bleeker Assocs. v 24,01 n.58 Banker's Trust Co. v. Crawford "
Atari, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. · . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 16.01 n54
Bank 17.02 n.55 Bankers Trust Co., North Park
Atkinson v. FDIC ......•.... 19.03 Nat'J Bank v 21.02
Atlantic Cement Co. v. South Rankers Trust Co., Sunshine v.
Shore Bank ......•.... 20.03 n.25 · . . . . . . . . • . . . . .. 20.05 ns. 65, 72
Atlas Exch. Nat'! Bank, Austin v. Banker's Trust of S.C. v. South
. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.03 n.l02 Carolina Nat'J Bank of Charleston
Austin v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l · 15.03 n.173; 20.08 n.190
Bank 4.03 n.l02 Bank Hapoalim, Miron Rapid·Mix
Auto Servicio San Ignacio. S.R.L. Concrete Corp. v •.•••• 15.01 n.91
v. Compania Anonima Venezolano Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bank of
de Navagacion ••..•... 17.02 n.77 Mid·Jersey 21.03 n.124
Available Iron & Metal Co. v. First Bank Melli, Wyle v 17.02 ns. 74, 76
Nat'l Bank 21.11 0.308 Bank of Am., First State Bank v.
A vco Fin. Servs., I nc., Davis v. .. 7.02 · ..•........•••.....• 10.02 n.34
n.135 Bank of Am., Lawrence v..... 21.07
Avemco Inv. Corp., Brown v... 24.01 Bank of Am., Sanchez·Corea v.
n.17; 24.02 n.126 ....•......•....••.. 20.13 n.416
Bunk of Am. v. United States .. 14.01
n.15
B Bank of Am., Wellenkamp v... 24.01
0.23
Baehler, Metge v.....•.. 7.02 n.135 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trost & Say.
Baer Props., Ltd., Home Say. AsS'n, FDIC v. •...... 10.02 n.81
Bank v 24.01 n51 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Baity, United States v 12.02 n.168 Ass'n, Lufthansa German
Baker, Anderson v. .•.•...... 19.03 Airlines v. . .••..•......••• 21.11
Baldaia, AI ves v. • ..• , ... ,16.05 n.170 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Banco del Pais, S.A., Marine Ass'n, Young v 18.04 n.210
Midland Grace Trust Co. v..• 17.02 Bank of Bisbee, Slaughter v. .•• 14.04
n.62 0.121
Banco di Roma v. Merchants Bank of Camas Prairie, Riggs v.
Bank ••.•........... 15.05 n.212 · ...•....••..•...•..• 19.02 n.32
Banco Nacional de Mexico, Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l
Wolf v.....•••..••... 7.02 n.133 Bank ....•.....••...... 4.01 0.2
 TABLE OF CASES T-36

[R~/erences are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Bank of Commerce v. De Santis Bank of the United Slates,
.................... 21.11 n.333 Osborn v. 1.02
Bank of Commerce, Lincoln Nat'l Bank of Va., Consolidated
Bank & Trust Co. v 20.08 Aluminum Corp. v..•.. 11.02 n.62
nSf 192,196; 21.03 n.102 Bank of Wadley, International
Bank of Dixie v. FDIC " 9.01 Dairy Queen, Inc. v 11.01 n.46
05.7,10, 13,82 Bank of Wedowee, Haynes v. " 19.03
Bank of El Paso v. Powell .... 15.05 n.l06
0.217 Banque Paribas v. Hamilton
Bank of Everell, Lynnwood Sand & Indus. Int'l, Inc., 17.02 n.62
Gravel, Inc. v. 16.01; 20.05 Bar-Ram Irrigation Prods. v.
Bank of Hartshorne, Cirar v ... 19.02 Phenix-Girard Bank ... 11.03 D.91
n.85 BarChris CODstr. Corp.• Escott v.
Bank of Hoven v. Rausch 20.08 7.02 n.l10
n.180 Barclay Riding Academy, Inc.,
Bank of Imboden, Western Auto Continental Banle v.•• 9.02 & n.132
Supply Co. v 23.03 n.137 Barclay's Discount Bank, Ltd. v.
Bank of Independence, Mid· Levy 16.01 n.31
Continental Nat'l Bank v•.... 16.01 Barnett Bank of W. Fla. v. Hooper
n.28 . . . • . . . . • . • . . . . • . . .• . . • .. 13.01
Bank of Irvine. Woodbridge Barnell Bank, Abramowitz v••. 26.02
Plaza v....•..•. 10.02 nSf 85, 121 n.4
Bank of Lyons v. Schultz ..... 16.01 Barnelt, Sly v•••••••••••••.• 19.03
n.66 Barnhart, Provident Bank v. .., 16.06
Bank of Marin v. England .•.. 25.09 Barr v. White Oak State Bank
&n.325 . • . . • • . . . . . • . . . . • .. 22.03; 24.02
Bank of Mld.Jersey, Bank Leumi Barrell v. Odom, Mays, &
Trust Co. v.•........ 21.03 n.124 DeBuys ........••... 16.03 n.149
Banle of N.Y. v. Bersani •..... 15.06 Bassler v. Central Nat'l Bank .•. 7.02
n.289 n.116
Bank of N.Y. v. Bright .. 20.13 n.415 Baxandale, Hadley v. ... 18.05; 20.08
Bank of N.Y., Woods v.•. 21.03 D.93 n.207
Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt ..•. 26.02 n.51 Bay, Moore v.....••••. 25.01 n.2oo
Bank of Niles v. American State B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First
Bank 15.05 n.217 Nat'l Bank, ..•..••...••.... 9.02
Bank of N.C. v. Rock Island Beattie, United States v•.•. 12.02 D.99
Bank ..........•.•... 17.01 n.45
Bank of N.S., United States v... 12.01 Beaucar v. Bristol Fed. Say. &:
. & os. 66, 69 Loan Ass'n .•..•.••.•• 19.02 n.83
Bank of Odessa, Kansas Bankers Beckman CottOD Co. v. First Nat'
Sur. Co. v 20.06 n.119 Bank 17.02 0.62
Bank of Okla., Oklahoma v..... 4.03 Bell. Brown v. • . . . . • • • • •• 15.01 D.80
D.97 Bell v. United States ••..•.•.. 12.02
Bank of Okla., Okla. ex. ret, State Belmont County Nat" Bank V.
Banking Bd. v••••••.•.• 6.01 n.ll Onyx Coal Co., ..•... 15.06 n.276
Bank of the Mid-South, Bennett v. United States Fidelity &
Confederated Welding & Safety Guar. Co. ...•.....•••. 16.oI n.63
Supply, Inc. v... 15.01 D.31; 20.08 Benton State Bank v; Warren .• 22.07
n.197 0.246
T-37 TABLE OF CASES

[References Ilrt to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Beran, United States v. .... 12.02 ns. I Bluefleld Nat'l Bank. Farmers &
112, 113 I Miners v 4.03 n.90
Berg v. Wiley 24.03 n.158 Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc.,
Bernstein. Capital Bank v..... 15.06 FDIC v........•.... 15.06 n.304
n.274 BGard of Governors v. Agnew .. 8.01
Bernstein, Giacalone v... 15.04 n.193 n.91
Berry, Marine Midland Bank. N.A. Board of Governors. Alabama Ass'n
v 20.05 n.56 of Ins. Agents v 4.03 n.87;
Berryfast, Inc. v. Zeinfeld 15.04 5.02 ns. 99, 136, 156
Bersani, Bank of N.Y. v 15.06 Board of Governors, American
n.289 Bancorp v. ...•••.•... 5.02 n.133
Bertrand, Gray v. 15.01 n.92 Board of Governors, Association of
Best v. United States Nat'l Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc,
Bank 14.01 n.23; 24.01 n.27; v 5.02 & n.98
·24.02 n.129; 26.02 n.20 Board of Governors, BankAmerica
Beta Fin. & Ins. Corp., Originala . Corp. V••••••••• 5.0205. 106, 135
Petroleum Corp. v..... 17.02 n.74 Board of Governors v. Dimension
Bethlehem Naff Bank. American Fin. Corp. . .••. 5.01 & n.34; 6.02;
Sur. Co. v....•.•..... 10.02 n.78 14.01 n.28; 14.04 n.163
Better Homes, Inc., Budget Servo Board of Governors. First
CO. V 25.05 n.127 Bancorp v 5.01; 6.02 n.IOO
Bevans, United States v. 12.02 ns. Board of Governors, First Nat'l Bank
122.126,137,155 of Blue Island ESOP v.... 5,01 n.3
Bhandari V. First Nat'l Bank of Board of Governors, First Nat'l
Commerce .. 26.06 & ns. 350, 351, Bank of St. Charles v..• 5.02 n.143
. . 352.353, 374 Board of Governors, Florida Dep't
Bildlsco. NLRB V• • • • • • • 25.07 n.268 of Banking & Fin. v..•.. 5.01 n.34;
Billings Util. Co. v. Advisory 6.02 & os. 85, 88
Comm., Bd. of Governors .... 3.04 Board of Governors Girard
0.140 Bank v ' 6.02 & n.45
Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Anderson •• 4.03 Board of Governors Independent
0.102 , '
B·ISbeY v. DC N a t'l Ban.
k . 1802 . n. 57 Bankers Ass n v.... 5.02 & os. 129, 132
Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, V.
FHLBB 10.02 n.36 Board of Governors, Independent
Black v. FDIC .•...•... 10.02 n.IOI Community Bankers Au'n v... 6.02
Black v. Hart •••....•.•• 19.02 n.87 n.93
Blair v. Davis ....•...... 19.02 n.86 Board of Governors. Independent
Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Ins. Agents of Am. v... 5.02 n.l29
Co 21.11 n.325 Board of Governors v. Investment
Bleeker Assocs. v. Astoria Fed. Sav. Co. lost.•. 5.01 & n.34; 6.02; 14.01
& Loan Au'n ..•...... 24.01 n.58 n.28; 14.04 n.163
Bles, Fore v.••.••.••••. 15.01 n.81 Board of Governors, Nat'l
Block. Sharyland Water Supply Courier Ass'n v•.••.. 5.02 & n.121
Corp. v..•.•••........ 13.01 n.62 Board of Governors. Northeast
Blount Nat'l Bank, Costner v.... 9.02 Bancorp, Inc. v. ..•.•....•.• 6.02
n.126 Board of Governors, Oklahoma
Blue Chip Stamps V. Manor Drug Bankers A~'n v. 5.01 n.33; 5.02
Stores ..••••.•..••.•. 7.02 n.116 os. 129, 136
 TABLE OF CASES T-38

[References are to paragraphs (f1) and notes (n.).]

Board of Governors, Open Market Bradford Nat'l Bank, Nutting v.
Camm. for Monetary Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22.02 n.57
v. .......................• 3.03 Bradford Sec. Operations, Inc., New
Board of Governors, Republic of Jersey Bank Y•••••••••••••• 22.m
Texas Corp. v. 13.03 n.99 Bradford Trust CO. Y. Texas Am.
Board of Governors, Securities Bank 18.0J ns. 21, 22; 18.05
Indus. Ass'n v... 5.02 & ns. 49, SO, & n.301
64, 66, 67, 120; 8.02 ns. 95, 125, Bradley v. Romeo .... ,. 15.04 n.189;
129; 8.01 &: n.48 16.02 n.131
Board of Governors, Transamerica Braemoor Assoc., FDIC Y • • • • • • 10.02
Corp. v 5.01 n.18 n.123
Board of Governors, United Brannon v. First Nat'l Bank of
Stales Trust Corp. v... 5.01 ns. 34, Atlanta 14.05 n.252
40 Brannons Number Seven, Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Wilshire Phelps 21.11 n.301
Oil Co. v. .......••........ 5.01 Braverman, United States v. '" 12.02
Board of Governors, Wyoming D.J68
Bancorporation v. ..... 13.03 n.80 Breault v. Heckler . . . . . .. 19.02 D.88
Board of Managers v. Chase Brickner v. FDIC ..•...... 9.01 n.28
Manhattan Bank, N.A... 4.01 n.29 Bricks Unlimited, Inc. v. Agee .. 16.02
Board of Professional Bright, Bank of N.Y. v... 20.13 n.4IS
Responsibility, Doe v... 13.01 n.42 Brinkley v. Chase Manhattan
Board of Trade v. Swiss Credit Mortgage &: Realty Trust .•.. 26.02
Bank ......•...•.... 17 .02 n.62 D.10
Boger-Hare Mfg. Co., American Bristol Fed. Say. &: Loan Ass'n,
Bank of Commerce v. . ..... 24.01 Beaucar v•..•••••••••• 19.02 n.83
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of Blistol, Grument v. ..... 21.03 n.l02
San Francisco ........• 3.03 D.68 Brite Lite Lamps Corp. v.
Bond, Deak Nat'J Bank v..... 26.02 Manufacturers Hanover Trust
D.34 Co. . ..........•..•....... 20.07
Booker, United States v... 12.02 n.139 Brockton Nat'l Bank, McCarthy v.
Borkus v. Michigan Nat'J Bank . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 4.03 n.l0l
........... , 4.03 n.104; 7.01 n.61 Brockton Say. Bank v. Peat,
Boston &: Me. Corp. v. Chicago Marwick, Mitchell & Co. ..... 7.02
Pac. Corp. ..•••..•.• 25.09 "0.355 D.132
Bougas, Citizens & S. Nat'J BaDk Brooks, Flagg Bros., Inc. v. .... 24.03
v.....•............•.. 4.01 D.27 Brooks v. McCorkle, .... 16.05 n.170
Boutros v. Riggs Nat'J Bank ... 15.08 Brookshire, United States v..... 12.02
n.354; 19.01 n.8; 20.12 n.l24
Bowen, Thomas v. 19.02 D.88 Brotherhood State Bank, Coleman
Bower v. United States .. 12.02 n.149 v... , ....•. 19.01 n.8; 20.12 n.388
Bowers v. Winitzki ....• 15.02 n.lSS Brothers v. First Leasing ..•• " 26.06
Bowery Say. Bank, Brown v. " 19.03 ns. 330,368
n.1l3 Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp.
Bowery Say. Bank, Savemart, .•........ 24.01 n.17; 24.02 n.126
Inc. v••••..••••••.• , 15.05 n.213 Brown v. Bell, ..•.••..... 15.01 n.80
Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Brown v. Bowery Say. Bank .•. 19.03
Street Bank & Trust Co. ...• 16.04 D.113
D.159 Brown v. Danna ..•.•.•.....•. 24.01
T-39 TABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Brown v. Lee County Bank .... 20.05 C.&S. Bank v. Pi!co Plantation,
n.52; 20.13 n.414 Inc 20.07 n.155
Brown, Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Canyon Lake Bank v. New Braunfels
.•.........•...••.•• 6.02 & n.78 Utils. .....•......••• 15.08 11.358
Bruno, Daube v. • . • • • • •. 20.08 n.175 Capital Bank v. Bernstein ...••. 15.06
Bryen v. Krassner 16.01 n.41 n.274
B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., Lewis v. Capital Bank v. Schuler .•• 20.05 n'56
~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6.02 Capital Bank & Trust Co. v.
Budget Servo Co. v. Beller Homes, Lacey 16.06 n.195
Inc. .•....•••••.•..• 25.05 n.127 Capital Bank of Miami, Chilson v.
Bunge v. First Nat'l Bank .. 17.03 n.98 · . . . . • . • . . . . . • . . . . •. 15.03 n.170
Burchell, WYHY Fed. Credit Capital Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n,
Union v. ...•......... 22.02 n.5S Dolton v. ..•••••.•...•..•. 24.02
Burke. Copeland v•..•...• 15.D1 n.39 Capital Nat'l Bank v. McDonald's
Burrows v. Superior Court ..... 13.01 Corp. . ........•.•..•..... -22.07
n.61 Capps, First Nat'l Bank v. .•.•• 21.10
Bushnell, Esecson v 20.04 ns. 46, 47 n.236
Butcher, FDIC v ". 10.02 n.120 Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Oiles World
Mktg., Inc. . .••••••••. 23.02 n.32
Carleton Ford, Inc. v. Oste .... 15.04
0.196
c Carlson, Lincoln First Bank v••• 18.03
n.167
Cahall Bros., United States v. Carpenter v. Payette Valley Coop.,
•....•......... 22.02 n.64; 23.01 Inc 14.04 n.186
Caldwell, United States v 12.02 Carroll v. Mitchell-Parks Mfg. Co.
n.l08 ....••.••...•..•...• 19.04 n.140
California Bankers Ass'n v. Carlright. First Nat'l Bank &
Shultz ...••.•..• 12.01 n.25; 13.01 Trust Co. v...•....... 19.04 n.l44
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Casa Ouzman, Corrigan DIspatch
Tan v••••.•..•••..••• 24.01 0.32 Co. v.....••••...••. 14.05 n.240
Callaway, Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Cassing, Union Sav. Bank v.•.. 21.03
...................... 4.02 n.54 n.98
Cambridge Sporling Ooods Corp., Castiglione. in re ...•.... 13.01 n.28
V nited Bank Ltd. v. 17.01 n.49
Camp, Arnold Tours v 13.03 n.l03. Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony Bank
Camp, Arnold Tours, Inc. v...•. 4.03 & Trust Co 21.03
n.79 Center Coordinates, Inc. v. Morgan
Camp, Assoc. of Data Processing Ouar. Trust Co...•• 18.05 & 0.300
Servo Orgs., Inc. v. ••.. 13.03 n.103 Centerre Bank v. Distrib•., Inc.
Camp, First Nat'l Bank of · 24.0J 0.2
Fairbanks v. ...•..•.••• 6.01 n.25 Centex Corp., Futura Dev. Corp. v.
Camp, Investment Co. Inst. v.•• 8.01, · •.•......•.......... 7.02 n.134
13.03 n.l03 Central Bank v. Clayton Bank .. 13.03
Camp, Ramapo Bank v. •••• 6.01 n.24 0.75
Camp, Sterling Nat'l Bank v• ••• 4.01 Central Banle, Clements v.••..• 21.11
n.2 n.331
Campbell, Androscoggin County Central Bank of Ala. v. Peoples
Say. Bank v. ..••••..•. 19.02 n.44 Nat'l Bank . • ... • . • • • . • • • • •. 21.07
 TABLE OF CASES T-40

[References ari' to paragraphs (1/) and nOles (n.).)

Central Carolina Bank.& Trust Co., Chemical Bank, Allegaert v. '" 22.02
American Travel Corp. v. Chemical Bank v. Arthur
· ....•.............. 20.07 n.154 Andersen 7.02 n.134
Centralfed Mortgage Co., Chemical Bank-Dommerich Div.,
Evans v...........•.•.... 26.06 Gold Circle Stores v... 21.09 n.219
Central Fed. Sa,'. & Loan Ass'n, Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
People v 26.02 n.4 Krom v 15.05 n.216
Central Nat'J Bank, Bassler v... , 7.02 Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
n.116 Rose Checking Serv. v...•.. 15.05
Central Nat'l Bank. General Motors n.215
Acceptance Corp. v•.•. 20.13 n.4 t 6 Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v.
........... 13.03 n.110 · " 19.02 n.80; 20.05 n.76
Central Stale Bank, Leaderbrand v. Chemical Bank of Rochester ".
.. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .... 21.11 n.370 Haskell .......•...... J5.oJ D.31
Central States Inv. Co.• Jones v. Chemical Nafl Bank. Aldrich v.
· . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22.07 · . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . •. 4.03 n.82
Cessna, American Exch. Bank v. CHG Int'l, Inc.• Morrison-Knudson
................•... 15.04 n.197 Co. v 10.02 D.130
Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Chiarella v. United States .. 7.02 n.118
Nat') Bank 24.03 n.225 Chicago Pac. Corp., Boston & Me.
Chapman, People v....•.. 13.01 n.61 Corp. v 25.09 n.355
Charnes v. DiGiacomo .... 13.01 n.61 Childs, Commercial Credit Co. v•
Charter Int'l Oil Co., Horizon .... ..•.. 16.01 n.51
Processing Co. v 22.0 J n.9 Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank
Chase v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. · ••................ , 21.11 D.340
· . • . • • . • . . . . • . . . . . .. 20.10 n.254 Chilson v. Capital Bank of Miami
Chase Manhattan Bank, Aaron Ferllr .................... 15.03 n.170
& Sons Ltd. v....• " 24.02 & n.l01 Ching, Merchants Nat" Bank v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, Garcia v. · .....••.••..•••..•• 22.07 n.236
• •.•...•.•........ " 14.04 n.168 Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l
Chase Manhattan Bank, United Bank & Trust Co 21.07
States v , 12.01 n.72 C.H. Sanders Constr. Co. v. Bankers
Chase Manhattan Bank, Vishipco Trust Co 15.0J n.83
Line v.......•...•.... 19.02 n.37 Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC .. 10.02 n.129
Chase Manhattan Bank, Voest-Alpine ClM Int'l v. United States •.... 22.01
Inl'J Corp. v. 17.02 n.63 D.12
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Board Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. First Nat'J
of Managers v..•.•••.•. 4.01 n.29 Bank of Akron ....•..• 15.0J n.83
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Cirar v. Bank of Hartshorne •.. 19.02
United Apparel DisIrib., Inc. v. n.85
.................... 15.05 n.220 Cilibank, Five Towns College v.
Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty · ......•.••••.. 20.08 ns. 197, J98
Trust, Brinkley v..•.... 26.02 n.l0 Citibank, Judd v 18.04 D.245
Chase Nat'J Bank.. Dixon, Irmaos & Citibank, Rockwell Inl'J 5Y9.,
Cia, Ltda. v. 17.02 n.68 Inc. v....••.••.•..... 17.02 n.74
Chase Nat'J Bank v. Sanford ...• 2.01 Citibank, TraDsamerica DeJaval,
n.4 Inc. v : 17.02 D.62
Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC Citibank, Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v.
· • . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • •• 10.02 n.99 · •.......•.•.•...•• " 19.02 n.39
T-41 TABLE OF CASES

[Reltmmces art! to paragraphs (f!) and notes (n.).]

Cities Service Co. v. Pailet .... 18.04 City of Rosebura, Harris v..... 24.03
n.226 Clark, First State Bank at Gallup v.
Citizen's & S. Bank., First Nat'l .................... 14.04 n.lt7
Bank v....•........... 4.03 n.96 Clark v. Griffin 20.08 n.175
Citizen's & S. Fin. Corp., Dorsey v. Clark v. United Bank 9.02 n.125
· ....•••.....•...••• 26.06 n.375 Clarke, American Ins. Ass'n ... 17.01
Citizen's & S. Int'l Bank, Zimeri v. n.45
· " 20.13 Clarke, Dep't of Banking and
Citizen's & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas Consumer Fin. v..• , .•.. 6.01 n.28
· .........•••....•. , .. 4.01 n.27 Clarke, Investment Co. lnst. v.
Citizen's & S. Nat'l Bank v. · .......•.•.......• , .. 8.01 n.83
Youngblood 20.05 n.59 Clarke, Larimore v 9.01
Citizens Bank, Florida Nat') Bank v. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n.
· . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . .. 2 \.20 n.262 · ....•. 4.01 n.20; 6.01 &: n.7; 6.02
Citizens Bank, Kansas State Bank v. n.82; 8.01 n.44
...................... 7.02-n.134 Clayton v. Crossroads Equip Co.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., · . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . .. 24.0 I
Johnston v.....••......... 26.02 Clayton Bank, Central Bank v.•. 13.03
Citizen's Bank & Trust Co., Susen v. n.75
· . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .. 19.03 Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Clement
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-states · , 13.01 n.22
Dev. Co..•.•..•..... 22.07 n.330 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
Citizen's Nat'. Bank v. Taylor States .. . .. . .. . .. .. ... 14.01 n.14
· .........•..•...... 20.09 n.212 Clement, Clayton Brokerage Co. v.
Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, · ..................• , 13.01 n.22
Hersch v••••••.•••.•.••. " 24.01 Clements v. Central Bank ..... 21.1 1
Citizens State Bank, FDIC v. .. 10.02 n.331
n.60 Oevelllnd Chemical Co. of Ark. v.
Citizens State Bank v. Martin .. 21.04 Keller .....•.••••.•. 15.04 n.203
Citizens State Bank, Thoreson v. Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Callaway ... 4.02
· . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 20.12 n.54
Citizens Union Nat'l Bank v. Phelps Cochran v. United States ..•• " 12.02
· •.•••••.. , .••..•..•• 4.03 n.10l n.139
Citizens Valley Bank v. Douglas Coleman v. Brotherhood State Bank
Robins, Inc......•... 21.03 n.l01 ..... , ..... 19.01 n.8; 20.12 n.388
City Nat'l Bank, Bank of Colgate Palmolive Co. v. SIS Dart
Commerce v " •.. 4.01 0.2 Canada ...•.•.••••.. 14.05 n.234
City Nat'l Bank, Laurel Bank & Colin v. Penn Cent. Nat'l Bank
Trust Co. v....•....... 16.01 n.68 · ..••.•..•..•..•...• 14.05 n.252
City Nat'! Bank v. Smith .... 4.01 n.2 Collie v. FHLBB ......•• 10.02 n.40
City Nat') Bank v. Westland Towers Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. &: Loan
Apartments ..•.•...... 17.02 n.52 Ass'n .... .. .. .. .. .... 26.02 n. 13
City Nat') Bank, W.O.A., Inc. v. Collins v. Union Fed. Sav.&: Loan
· ...•.•...••......... 17.020.71 Ass'n ............•. , ... ,. 26.02
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Colonial Baking Co. of Des Moines
Djowharzadeh v 13.01 n.56 v. Dowie 15.04 n.190
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Columbia Banking Fed. Say. & Loan
Fortune v. . . . . . . . .. 19.03 & n.ll 8 Ass'n, Knox v. ..•.... 15.08 n.357
City of Hutchinson, Krantz v. Commerce & Energy Bank,
· ........•.•......... 4.03 n.100 Commerce v•......• ;. 17.02 n.74
 TABLE OF CASES T-42

(Rejerfmce:r au to paraflraph:r rfil and flotes (fl.).]

Commerce Bank v. Edco Fin. Servo Conference of State Bank
.................•... 16.01 n.27 Supervisors v. Board of
Commerce N. Bank, American Governors 5.01 n.34
Communications Conference of the State Bank
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Supervisors v. Conover 26.02
..................... 20.02 n.15 Congress Indus., Inc. v. Federal
Commercial Bank, Coulter Elecs., Life Ins. Co. •.•.•..... 19.01 n.18
Inc. v 20.08 n.196 Conlon v. Wells Fargo Bank 24.02
Commercial Credit Business Loans, Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
Inc., Mattson V••••••• 23.03 n.IOI Aljax Corp. v..•....... 20.05 n.66
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs Connecticut Nat'l Bank, United
..................... 16.01 n.51 States v 13.03 ns. 84, 85
Commercial Credit Corp., Connell, American Bankers Ass'n v.
Lamson v 15.01 n.23 19.02 nM
Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Conoco, Inc. v. Norwest Bank .. 17.01
First Alabama Bank .. 20.08 & n.20 I n.41
Commercial Nat'l Bank, Noel Estate. Conover, Conference of the State
Inc. V 4.03 n.103 Bank Supervisors v• ........ 26.02
Commercial Nat'! Bank, Conover, del Junco v..... 7.01: 9.01;
Steven-Daniels Corp. v 20.08 9.01 n.72
n.210 Conover, First Nat'l Bank of
Commissioner, Uni-Serv Corp. v. Grayson V ••••••••••••• 9.01 n.83
...........•.......... 26.02 n.7 Conover, Independent Bankers
Commodities Futures Trading Ass'n of America v. ....• 4.01 n.19;
Comm'n v. Weintraub 25.07 5.01 ns. 37, 39
Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., Conover, Investment Co. Inst. v.
Jones v 21.01 n.4 8.01 ns. 81, 84
Commonwealth Gen., Ltd., Midlantic Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Nat'l Bank v 24.01 n.6 Bank of Va. . . . . • .. . .. 17.02 n.62
Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.,
Kennedy Co 19.04 n.124 Monsen v.....•......• 7.02 n.135
Community Bank & Trust, N.A., Consolidated Edison Co., United
Pitrolo v 15.06 n.291 States v 24.01 n.81
Campania Anonima Venezolano de Consumer Nat'l Bank, Hill v... 15.04
Navigacion, Auto Servicio San n.204
Ignacio, S.R.L. v 17.02 n.77 Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding
Comptroller of the Currency, Academy, Inc 9.02 & 0.132.
Abercrombie v.....••.•. 9.01 n.83 Continental Bank v. Fitting ...• 20.05
Comptroller of the Currency, First n.73
Nat'l Bank v...•... 9.01 os. IS, 82 Continental Bank, Kersten v.... 14.04
Comptroller of the Currency, Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Groos Nat'l Bank v..•.. 9.01 ns. 6, Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc..... 15.06
83; 11.02 D.53 n.3oo
Comptroller of the Currency, Continental Bank & Trust Co., Salt
Securities Indus. Ass'n v..•... 8.01 Lake City v. Woodall •••• 3.03 n.73
os. 60, 63 Continental Credit Corp.,
Concepcion v. Tojeiro ...• 15.01 n.92 Howell v. ; .....•••••••.... 10.02
Confederated Welding & Safety Continental III. Bank & Trust Co.,
Supply, Inc. v. Bank of the Froning & Deppe, Inc. 'Y••••• 21.U~
Mid-South .. 15.01 n.31; 20.08 n.197 n.218
T-43 l' ABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Continental 111. Bank'" Trust Co., Crocker Nat'! Bank, Kates v. '" 26.04
Illinois ex rei., Lignoul v.•...• 6.01 n.278
0.11 Crocker Nat'l Bank, Perdue v... 19.02
Continental Ins. Co., Gutekunst v. n.75; 20.01 D.12; 24.01 0.4;
· " 16.01 0.28 26.02 n.22
Converser, First Nal'l Bank v...• 4.03 Crockford v. Merchants Nat'J Bank
0.102 · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .• 20.08 n.175
Cook v. Great W. Bank .•. 15.01 0.92 Cromwell v. Commerce & EnerIY
Cook, Meyer Bros. v. ••••• 2.2..02 0.56 Bank \7.020.74
Cook, United States v. .... 12.0 I 0.34 Cromwell State Bank, Yoder v.
Cook, Vallet Nat'l Bank, · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 20.1 0 n.245
Sunnymead v.••.••••• 15.04 0.191 Cronkleton, Anderson v. " 10.02 n.41
Cooper v. Republicbllnk Crosuoads Equip. Co., Clayton v..
Garland 16.06 · ...•.........•......... , 24.0 l
Cooper v. Union Bank .•• 20.08 n.178 Crown Fin. Corp., Peterson v.•• 24.01
Cooper Communities, .Mclnnis v. & n.71
• .....•.•..•..••••• " 26.02 n.44 Culver, FDIC v•.••••••. 16.02 n.123
Copeland v. Burke .•... " 15.01 n.39 Cumis Ins. Society Inc. v. Girard
Coppes, Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Bank 19.04; 20.08 n.186
· ..........•.•.••• " 15.04 n.2oo Currency Totalling $48,318.08,
Corbin v. Federal Reserve Bank United States v•••••••. 12.01 n.23
of N.Y....•.••••.•... 3.04 0.140
Corperacion Venezolaoa de Fomento
v. Vintero Sales . . . . . . . . • . .. 16.oJ D
Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa
Guzman .•..•.•..... 14.05 11.240 D&G Equip. Co., Inc. ". Fint Nat'l
Corsica Livestock Sales, Inc. v. Bank . . . . . . . • .. 20.08 ns. 196, 207
Sumltomo Bank ..........• 19.04 Dakota Nat') Bank & Trust Co. v.
Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank ... 9.02 First Nat'l Bank & Trost Co..• 6.01
n.126 0.9
Coulson, Grant Rd. Pub. Uti!. Danbury State Bank, Virtue v... 21.02
Disl. v. 14.04 n.120 o.s6
Coulter Elecs., Inc. v. Commercial Danje Fabrics Div. v. Morgan Guar.
Bank .....•.•....•.. 20.08 D.196 Trust Co 20.06 n.123
Council on Judicial Complaints, Danna, Brown v•••••••••.••• 24.01
Nichols v. '" 13.01 ns. I, 42 D'Annunzio, FDIC v•••• 13.03 0.113
Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Darwin, Rutherford v. .•.•.... 20.07
Carolina Nat'l Bank .... 17.021\.62 Da Silva v. Sanders .....• 20.05 0.89
Covington v. Penn Square Nat'l Daube v. Bruno .•.••.•. 20.08 n.\15
Bank 20.06 n.125 Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc. " 7.02
Covington County Bank, Horney v. n.135
· . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21.04 Davis, Blair v....•.•..•.. 19.02 n.86
Cox v. First Nat'l Bank .. 26.03 n.loo Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank .•.•. 10.02
Crawford, Banker's Trust Co. v. n.57
· ...•....•..•...•.. " 16.01 n.54 Davis, Glendora Bank v•.. 14.04 n.123
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Jebco Davis, Las Vegas Auto LeasIng,
Coal Co. 22.03 n.83 Inc. v••••.••••••••••• 22.01 0.26
Crenshaw v. United States ..... 12.02 Davis, United Statl!s v..•..... 12.01;
n.151 12.02 n.167
Crew v. Dorothy 22.07 n.252 Dawson, Warrington v.. , 22.07 n.247
 TABLE OF CASES T-44

[Re/lmmces are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

DC Nat'( Bank, Bisbey v... 18.02 n.57 District Court, Firsl Nat'l Bank v.
Deak Nat'l Bank v. Bond .. 26.02 n.34 ..............•....... 4.01 n.28
DeBiasi, United States v 12.02 Diversified Commercial Fin. Corp.,
DS. 169, 199 St. James v 16.01 n.51
De Jesus Velez, FDIC v 10.02 Dixon. Gibson v 24.03 n.171
ns. 100, 123, 124 Dixon, Irmaos & Cia, Ltda. v. Chase
de la Cuesta, Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Nat'! Bank 17.02 0.68
Loan Ass'n ~' 14.01 & n.24; Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'( Bank &
24.01 & ns. 36,58 Trust Co. ......•...... 13.01 n.s6
Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Doane,. Shuster v. 22.07 n.336
Hanover Trust Co 18.01 n.21; Docherty, United Slates v 12.02
18.05 n.296 ns. 146,170
Delco Corp., Saporita v 16.06 n.200 Dodge v. United States .. 12.02 n.113
del Junco v. Conover 7.01; Doe v. Board of Professional •
9.01 & n.72 Responsibility 13.01 n.42
De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
Tinker v 16.06 n.196 )0.020.96
De Mello v. Home Escrow, Inc. Dolton v. Capital Fed. Sav. & Loan
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 24.02 n.l 0 1 Ass'n 24.02
Denbigh v. First Nat'l Bank .. ,. 20.12 Donovan v. Nat'] Bank 13.01 n.35
n.378 Donovan. Pennington v.•• 13.01 n.19
Denemark, United States v..... 12.01 Donovan v. U.A. Local 38 Plumbers
n.32 & Pipe Trades Pension Funds
Denison State Bank v. Madeira ..... " 13.0/ ns. 19,35
· 24.02 & D.lOO Dorothy, Crew v 22.07 n.252
Department of Banking and Dorsch, Banker's Credit Serv.,
Consumer Fin. v. Clarke .. 6.01 n.28 Inc. v 16.05 n.171
Department of Treasury, First Nat') Dorsey v. Citizens & S. Fin. Corp.
BaDk of Eden v. 11.02 D.s3 .......•........... , 26.06 n.375
Department of Treasury, First Nat') Dougherty, Viajes Iberia, S.A.• v.
Bank v... 9.01 09.6,79; 10.05 n.185 .................... 15.04 n.194
De Santis, Bank of Commerce v. Douglas Robins, Inc., Citizens Valley
..... : 21.11 n.333 Bank v.....•.•....•. 21.03 n.10l
Devall, United States v 25.02 n.27 Dowie, Colonial Baking Co. of Des
Di-ehem Inc., North Ga. Finishing, Moines v 15.04 0.190
Inc. v. 24.03 Dreitzler, United States v•••.•. 12.02
Dickinson, First Nat'l Bank v.•.. 6.01 ns. 100, 101, 107
& ns. 6. 8: 6.03 n.112 Dubuque Packing Co. v.
DiDomenico, First Nat') Bank of Fitzgibbon . . . . .. 17.0 I nA5
Maryland v 24.03 Dunbar Transfer & Storage Co.,
DiGiacomo, Charnes v 13.01 n.61 Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v... 14.05
DiLauro v. Electronic Wholesales, n.234
Inc..•.............. 25.07 n.265 Duncan, United States v..•.... 12.02
Dimension Fin. Corp., Board of os. 107, 123
Governors v. '" 5.01 & n.34; 6.02; Durand, Yakima Adjustment Servo
·14.01 n.28; 14.04 n.163 Inc. v....•............... 19.03
Dime Savings Bank, Rapp v.... 20.11 Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v.
n.270 Flushing Nat'! Bank .. , 20.13 n.414
Distributors, Inc., Centerre Bank v. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l
· .........•........... 24.01 n.2 Ins. Co. ....•............• 25.07
T-4S TABLE OF CASES

[Rt!lerent:es are 10 paragraphs (1:) and nOle.r (n.).]

Duryea v. Third Northwest Nat'l Employers Mul. Liability Ins. Co.,
Bank .•........••.... 9.02 n.126 MBTA Employees Credit Union v.
Dynalectron Corp. v. Equitable , . . . • • .. 20.08 n.187
Trust Co. ........•.•. 15.01 n.91 Engelcke v. Stoehsler .... 16.05 n.169
England, Bank of Marin v..••• 25.09
'" n.325
Equitable Bank, Hill v.. , 20.13 n.414
E Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v.
Arthur Andersen & Co..• 7.020.134
Eagle Mach. Co., United Ky. Bank, Equitable Trust Co., Dynalectron
Inc. v.•••••.•••••••• 21.1\ n.332 Corp. v 15.01 n.9\
E & E Comtr., Inc., Weld Colo. Erickson. United States v..•.•. 12.02
Bank v.... , •.•....... 22.02 n.50 11.142
Earle v. Pennsylvania ....• 10.02 n.4\ Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder .... 7.02
East Gadsden Bank v. First City ns. 1\6, 1\7
Nat'l Bank 20.06 n.1I7 . Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Harrison · 7.02 n.110
· . . . • . • • • • . . • • • . • • . .. 23.02 nAO Esecson v. Bushnell .. 20.04 ns. 46, 47
East Nat'l Bank, In re •.. , 13.01 n.43 Estate of Eubanks, Thomas v... 15.05
East Tex. Teachers Credit Union, n.209
Wall v 14.04 n.202 Estate of Norris, in re .. , 20.09 n.2\2
Estate of Oney v. Getty 19.0~
Edco Fin. Serv., Commerce Bank v.
· ..•................• 16.01 n.27 Estate of Schenck, in re 19.02 n.84
Edick, United States v.••.•... , \2.02 Estate of Tay\or, Pargas, Inc. v.
ns. \02, 135 · " 20.07 & n.153
Edmundson Oil Co., Lugar v.. , 24.03 Estrada v. River Oaks Bank 8<
n.\70 Trust Co '" 1S.01 n.23
Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. National E.T. Clancy Export Corp., Northern
City Bank ...•.. 20.08 ns. 197, 207 Trust Co. v..•..••.•• 14.04 0.149
European Am. Bank & Trust Co.,
Edwards v. Heimann, Washington FDIC v. \1.01 n.20
ex rei.••.••..•..•. 6.0\ ns. 24, 25 European Asian Bank, A.G. v. G.
Edwards, Pacific Fin. Corp. v... 25.07 Crohn & Co 16.01
n.195 Evans v. Centralfed Mortgage
EI-Ce Storms Trust v. Svetabor Co..............••.•..... 26.06
· . . • • . . . . • • . . • . . • . .. 15.06 n.274 Evrn Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.
Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. · •... 18.0\ n.2\; 18.05 ns. 296, 297
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross
Smith, Inc.••.•.•••••• 16.01 n.49 '" Co. ........•••.••.. 7.02 oJ 34
Electronic Wholesales, Inc.,
DiLauro v 25.07 n.265
Ellinger,Oriffinv••• 15.04ns.\96,198 F
Ellis, Standard Fin. Co. v 16.02
Elmira Say. Bank. Davis v. ••.• 10.02 FArc Secs., Inc. v. United States
noS7 · .......•.......... 11.01 & n.32
Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Fairmont Supply Co., Hardesty v.
Island Hosp. Trust Nat') Bank · .....••...•.•..... " 10.02 n.41
..................... 17.02 n.73 Family Fin. Corp., Snladach v•.. 24.03
Empire Packing Co., Rock Island Fanning v. Hembree 011 Co.. ,. 15.04
Auction Sales v 21.02 n.78 n.202
 TABLE OF CASES T-46

[Refl!TImces are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Farah Mfg. Co., Stale Nat'l Bank v. FDIC v. D'Annunzio 13.03 n.113
· . . . . . . . . . . .. 24.02 & ns. 130, 131 FDIC v. De Jesus Velez , 10.02
Farber v. Sackel! ....•.. 21.1 0 n.235 ns. 100, 123, 124
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, FDIC, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
Union Tool Co. v. •••• 20.12 n.378 · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10.02 n.96
Farmers & Merchants Nat'( Bank, FDIC v. European Am. Bank &
Virginia elt rel. State Corp. Trust Co. 11.01 n.20
Comm'n v. 6.0 I n.9 FDIC, Feinberg v 9.01 n.48
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. FDIC. First Empire Bank v..• , 10.02
Ferguson ........•........ 20.03 & n.72
Farmers & Miners Bank v. Bluefield FDIC, First State Bank v..•.... 9.01
Nat'( Bank 4.03 0.90 ns. 8, 9, II, 16
Farmer's Bank v. First-Citizen's FDIC, Fitzpatrick v... 9.0\ os. 5&, 82;
Nat'( Bank .......•... 23.03 0.134 9.02 ns. 104, 106
Farmer's Bank v. Sinwellan Corp. FDIC v. Freudenfeld .... 4.03 n.103;
· " 20.03 n.39 17.01 n.45
Farmers Bank, Yahn & McDonnell, FOlC, Gilman v 10.02
Inc. v. " 14.04 & ns. 168, 170: 15.07 FDIC. Gullette v 24.01 n.73
n.309; 16.02 n.130; 21.10 & n.242 FDIC, Hibernia Nat'l Bank v.. , 10.02
Farmers Ins. Group, Friendly Nat'l ns. 76. 79
Bank v 16.01; 21.04 FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enters.
Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n, Anon, .................... 10.02 n.IOI
Inc. v 23.02 n.48 FDIC, Interfirst Bank-Abilene v.
Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n v. .. 10.02 ns. 75, 77
Arena 14.04 n.149 FDIC, Investment Co. Inst. v. .•• 8.01
Fazzari, First Nat'l Bank v...•. 16.01 n.20
n.42 FDIC v. Jennings .. , 10.02 ns. 43, 87
FeathersoD, Gainok v 15.04 FDIC. Langley v 10.02
FDIC, Agnew v 17.02 n.76 FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.
FDIC v. Air Atl., Inc 10.02 n.1 19 · 10.02; 26.02 n.38
FDIC, All Souls Episcopal Church v. FDIC v. Leach . . .. 10.02
..................... 11.01 n.22 FDIC v. Liberty Nat'( Bank &
FDIC, Anon. v 9.01 Trust Co. 10.02 ns. 78. 80
FDIC, Atkinson v. 19.03 FDIC v. Mademoiselle .... 10.02 n.79
FDIC v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & FDIC, Manen v....• 9.01 & ns. 49, 52
Say. Ass'n ........•... 10.02 n.81 FDIC v. McKnight ..•... 11.01 n.22
FDIC Bank of Dixie v....• 9.01 ns. 7, FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear
10, 13,82 Corp. ....•............... 11.01
FDIC, Black v 10.02 n.l0t FDIC, Safeway Portland B.F.C.U. v.
FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping · '" 10.Q2 n.119; 11.01 n.7
Center, Inc 15.06 n.304 FDIC, Somerfield v.•..... 9.01 n.83
FDIC v. Braemoor Assoc 10.02 FDIC, Sunshine State Bank v.
n.123 · ........•••.... , 9.01 ns. 28, 82
FDIC, Brickner v 9.01 n.28 FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr., Inc.
FDIC v. Butcher 10.02 n.120 · . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . .. 26.02 n.49
FDIC, Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, Tosco Corp. v. .... 17.02 n.62
· . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .. 10.02 n.99 FDIC v. United Stales Nat'l
FDIC v. Citizens State Bank ... 10.02 Bank :......... 10.02
n.60 FDIC v. Venture Contractors, Inc.
FDIC v. Culver 16.02 n.123 · 10.02 & n.102
T-47 TABLE OF CASES

[Rt/trtmcts art 10 paragraphs (f!) and nOltS (n.).]

FDIC, Washington Mut. Say. v. Federal Reserve Bank of San
, ..•................. 13.03 n.99 Francisco, Ballow v.••.•• 3.03 n.68
FDIC v. Wood 10.02 &. n.89 Federal Reserve Bd., First Bank &.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Lance Trust Co. v .•••••••••• 3.04 0.108
· " 12.02 n.195 FSLIC, Chupik Corp. v 10.020.129
FHLBB, Alliance Fed. Say. &. FSLIC v, Glen Ellyn Say. & Loan
Loan v, 10.02 n.40 Ass'n 9.01 0.16
FHLBB, American Banken Ass'n v. FSLIC. Getty v 10,03
· . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 19.02 n.58 FSLlC, Telegraph Say. '" Loan
FHLBB, Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v 10.020.38
Ass'n v•••.••..••.•.•• 10.02 n.36 FSLIC, York Bank &. Trust Co. v.
FHLBB, Collie v..•...... 10.02 n.40 ....•............... 10.02 n.129
FHLBB, Fidelit}· SaY. & LoaD Federated Dep't Slores, Folio v.
Ass'n v .••••..... 10.02 ns. 29, 36 .....................•. 26.02 n.7
FHLBB, Guaranty Say. &. Loan Feinberg v. FDIC 9.01 n.48
Ass'n v 10.02 n.39 . Fellows, First Naff Bank v 14.01
FHLBB, Hartigan v 10.03 n.147 n.8
FHLBB, Securities Indus. Ass'n v, Fenno, Veazie Bank v..•.•. 14.01 n.8
· 8.01 n.22 Ferguson, Farmers '" Merchants
FHLBB, Washington Fed. Say. & State Bank v.......•....... 20.03
Loan v 10.02 nAO Feuerstein, Kalb v...•... 25.05 n.121
Federal Ins. Co. v. Banco Popular Fidelity &. Casualty Co. v. First
· " 20.07 n.143 City Bank " 20.08 n.204
Federal Ins, Co. v. Groveland State Fidelity Bank v. United Nat') Bank
Bank .....•......•.. 20.12 n.380 . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • .. 20.08 0.197
Federal Kemper Ins. Co., Ward v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan As'S'n v.
· ......•..•........•. 21.03 n.98 de la Cuesta ...•••.. 14.01 &. 0.24;
Federal Life Ins. Co., Congress 24.01 &. ns. 36, 58
Indus., Inc. v 19.01 n.18 Fidelity Say. &. Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Open Markel Comm., FHLBB ......•.• 10.02 ns. 29, 36
Riegle v..............•.... 3.03 Fidelity Fed. Say. &. Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Reserve Bank v. MaHoy Gusston 14.01 n.17
..................... 21.02 n.57 Field, United States v 12.01 n.68
Federal Reserve Bank, Childs v. Fifth Third Bank/VSA v.
...... 21.11 n.340 Gilbert 18.04
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Jet Filburn, Wichard v..••...• 14.01 n.6
Courier Servs., Inc. v. .. 3.04 n.157 FinanceAmerica Private Brands, 1nco
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, v. Harvey E. Hall, Inc....•. 15.06
Armano v. ......•..... 3.03 n.67 n.1S1
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank '"
City, Guaranty Trust Co. v... 20.06 Trust Co......••.... 24.01; 24.02
0.\ 26 Firestone Bank, Stale ex. reI.
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., Gabalac v 21.01 0.1
Corbin v 3.04 n.140 First Alabama Bank, Commercial
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., Credit Equip. Corp. v. •..... 20.08
Raichle v " 3.04 n.140 '" 0.201
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., First Alabama Bank, Paraon's Steel,
United States Fidelity &. Guar. Inc. v. . •••..• ,. '••••••..••. 9.02
Co. v " . 21.02 0.61; 21.05 & First & Merchants Nat'l Bank,
11$. 162, 163 Kirby v 20.10 n.250
 TABLE OF CASES T-48

[Rejuences are to paragraphs (fi) and notes (n.).]

Fint Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, First Nan Bank, Chadron Energy
· " 5.01; 6.02 n.IOO Corp. v. '" 24.03 n.225
Fint Bank, Ivenon v..... 21.03 n.121 First Nat'l Bank v. Citizens &
Fint Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal S. Bank 4.03 n.96
Reserve Bd 3.04 n.l 08 First Nat'l Bank, Colorado ex reI.,
Fint Citizens Bank & Trust Co., State Banking Bd. v.•... , 6.01 n.11
Nationwide Homes v... 19.03 n.123 Firsl Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of
First·Citizen's Nat'l Bank, Farmer's the Currency 9.01 ns. 15, 82
Bank v 23.03 n.134 First Nat'J Bank v. Converser 4.03
First City Bank, Fidelity & Casualty n.102
Co. v 20.08 n.204 First Nat'I Bank, Cox v .•• 26.03 n.IOO
First City Nat'l Bank, East First Nat'! Bank, D&G Equip. Co.,
Gadsden Bank v 20.06 n.117 Inc. v....••.... 20.08 ns. 196,207
First Commerce Corp., Vial v... 13.03 First Nat'l Bank, Denbigh v... , 20.12
n.IOl n.378
Fint Commercial Bank v. Gotham First Nat'l Bank v. Dep't of Treasury
Originals .. 15.05 n.229; 17.02 'n.7B 9.01 ns. 6, 79: 10.05 n.185
First DeKalb Bancshares, Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson
.................... 13.03 n.102 ........ 6.01 & ns. 6,8; 6.03 n.112
Fint Empire Bank v. FDIC .... 10.02 First Nat'J Bank v. District Court
& n.72 ................•..... 4.01 n.28
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, First Nat', Bank v. Fazzari .... 16.01
Judd v 19.02 0.35 n.42
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows .. 14.01 n.8
McGee v 9.02 n.126 First Nat'l Bank v. First Sec. Bank
First Fed. Say. & Loan, Sheldon v. ................... " 22.02 n.44
· ............•....... 19.02 n.28 First Nat'l Bank, Fisher v 26.02
First Fidelity Bank v. Matthews ns. 34, 36
· . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 22.04 n.146 First Nat', Bank, Griffin Co. v••• 17.02
First Galesbur8 Nat'! Bank & Trust n.74
Co. v. Joannides 24.04 n.233 First Nat'l Bank v. Hall ... 24.02 n.85
First Interstate Bank, Angelos v. First Nat" Bank, Hamelly Int'l,
· .. . .. . .. ... 20.08 & ns. 208, 209 Inc. v. •..... . • . • . . . . .. 4.01 n.28
First Interstate Bank of Riverton, First Nat'l Bank v. Hobbs .. 20.03 n.39
First Nat'! Bank, Home Indem. Co.
Ward v 20.05 n.B3 ..................... 17.02 n.74
First Leasing, Brothers v 26.06 First Nat'l Bank, Hubbard Realty
ns. 330, 368 Co. v 24.01
First Mo. Baok & Trust Co. of Creve First Nat'l Bank, Itek Corp. v.. , 17.02
Coeur, Reese v 14.04 n.169 n.74
First Nat') Bank:, Available Iron & First Nat'l Bank, Jackson v..... 20.12
Metal Co. v , 21.11 n.308 n.391
First Nat') Bank, B.C. Recreationa) First Nat'l Bank v. La Sara
Indus. v..........•........ 9.02 Grain Co. ' , 20.12 n.396
First Nat') Bank, Beckman Cotton First Nat'J Bank v. Lightner. " 14.04
Co. v 17.02 n.62 n.121
First Nat'l Bank, Bunge v 17.03 First Nat'[ Bank v. Marlin '....• 22.07
n.98 n.331
First Nat') Bank v. Capps ....• 21.1 0 First Nat'! Bank v. Master Auto
n.236 Serv. Corp. 22.07
T-49 TABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (tf) and notes (n.).]

First Nat'l Bank, Michelin Tires First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., W.R.
(Canada), Ltd. v 22.07 Grimshaw Co. v. 20.06 n.120
First Nat'l Bank, Missouri ex rei., First Nat'l Bank of Akron,
Kostman v..•.......... 6.01 n.11 Cincinnati Ins, Co. v. '" 15.01 n.83
First Nat'\ Bank. Murdaugh First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
Volkswagen, Inc. v. •... :!O.03 n.29 Brannon v.......•••. 14.05 n.252
First Nat') Bank v. National Bank First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
, ...••.••.•.••.•.•.. " 4.01 n.22 Kleiner v. .....•..•....... 26.02
First Nat" Baak v. National Exch. First Nat'( Bank' of Blue Island
Bank .•.....••.•...... 4.03 n.1l2 ESOP v. Board of Governors
First Nat'l Bank v. Nunn ..... 20.011 · 5.01 n.3
n.205; 21.03 ns. 119. 120 First Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. United
First Nat'l Bank. Oc(ander v, .•• 18.04 States 22.07. n.298
First Nat'J Bank v. Otto Huber & First Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
Sons, Inc. ..........•. 16.0 I n.18 Bhandari v... 26.06 & ns. 350, 35 I,
First Nat'l Bank, Purtain v..... 26.02 352,374
n.34 First N at'l Bank of Eden v. Dep't of
First N at'( Bank, Patterson Treasury ..........•.. \ \.02 n.53
Produce v••••••••.••. 20.12 n.397 First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks v.
First Nat'( Bank, Perini Corp. v. Camp 6.0! n.25
........ 19.04 n.144; 20.06 n.117; First Nat'l Bank of Grayson v.
20.08 a.186 Conover ..•••.•...•... 9.0! n.83
First Nat'J Bank v. Roddenberry First Nat'l Bank of Md. v.
. . . • . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . • . . .. 25.09 DiDomenico 24.03
First Na!,1 Bank v. Smith .. ,,4.01 n.2; Firsl Nan Bank of Nev., Krump
4.03 n.87: 9,01 n.6; 11.02 n.53 Constr., Inc. v.••..•... 15.01 D.7!
First Nat'( Bank v. Smoker ...• 23.03 First Na!'1 Bank of St. Charles v.
n.126 Board of Governors. '" 5.02 n.143
First Nat" Bank, State by Lord v. First Nat'( City Bank, Garden Check
...••.•............•.. 4.02 n55 Cashing Servo v 15.05 n.216
First Nat'l Bank, Thompson Poultry, First N at'l State Bancorporation,
Inc. v. 15.05 n.217 United States v..•..•.. 13.03 n.86
First Nat'( Bank v. Twombly. " 24.01 First Nat'! State Bank v. Reliance
n.29 E!ec. Co. . ......•....•••• , 16.01
First Nat') Bank, United States v.
First N at'l Slate Bank, Santo, v.
.............••....• 24.02n.111 · ..•.••.•...•.. 21.08 ns. 213, 215 .
First Nat'( Bank, Usery v.•..•• 26.04
n.256 First New England Fin. Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Woffard .. .....••••...... , 16.06
Trust Co... , ••. 4.03 n.77; 6.01 n.6 First of Omaha Serv. Corp.,
First Nat'( Bank v. Weise .• 4.03 n.103 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. . ••• 26.02
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. D.36
Cartright ...•......•. 19.04 0.144 First Pa. Bank, Levy v..•• 15.01 D.29
First Nat'\ Bank & Trust Co., First Pa. Bank, Tose V••••••••• 9.02
Chrysler Credit Corp. v.••..• 21.07 First Republic Life Ins. Co., Republic
First Nat'( Bank & Trust Co., Dakota of Tex. Say. Au'n v. '" 16.01 n.52
Nat'( Bank & Trust Co. v••• 6.01 D.9 First Sec. Bank, First Nat'! Bank v.
First N afl Bank & Trust Co., Stone · ...........••....••• 22.02 0.44
& Webster Eng'g Corp. v..... 20.12 First Sec. Bank, Jdah.Best, Inc. v.
DA05 · ..... , 21.07 & n.202: 21.10 D,264
 TABLE OF CASES T-50

{R~f~renc~s ar~ to paragraphs (ff) and "ot~s (n.).]

First State Bank v. Bank of Forman, United Hous. Found. v.
America 10.02 n.34 ..................... 7.02 n.124
First State Bank y. FDIC , 9; 9.01 Fornea, Nat'l Bank of Bossier
ns. 8, 11,16 City v.....•.•.•..•.. 15.01 n.IOO
First State Bank, Johnson v. '" 20.05 Forrest v. Safety Banking & Trust Co.
n.63 · 14.04 n.182
First State Bank v. Spencer .... 16.02 Fort Knox Nut'l Bank v. Gustafson
First State Bank, Town & Country .. .. .. .. . .. .. ... 19.02 ns. 72, 78
State Bank v 21.03 n.116 Fortun'e v. City Nat'! Bank &
First State Bank at Gallup v. Clark
Trust Co " 19.03 & n.118
..............•..... 14.04n.117
First State Bank of Crossett, United Foster, United States v.......• 12.02
Fasteners v. ....•.... 15.04 n.203 ns. 143, 145
First Tenn. Bank N.A., SEC y... 13.01 Four Million, Two Hundred
nA3 Fifty-Five Thousand, United
Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance States v. 20.03 n.25
Corp. 26.04 n.304; Fox v. Federated Dept. Stores .. 26.02
26.06 & ns. 374, 379 D.7
Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank ..... 26.02 FOAboro Co. v. ArabiaD Am.
ns. 34, 36 Oil Co 17.02 n.73
Fithian v. Jamar , 15.06 n.276 Franklin Nat'l Bank, Huntington
Fitting, Cominental Bank v. '" 20.05 Towers, Ltd. v 3.04 n. 140
n.73 Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York
Fitzgibbon, Dubuque Packing Co. v. · . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14.01 n.23
· .................•.. 17.01 nA5 Franklin Say. Ass'n & Mortgage
Fitzpatrick v. FDIC .. 9.01 ns. 58, 82; Management Co., McCoy v. " 9.02
9.02 os. 104, 106 0.125
Five Towns College v. Citibank Franklin Say. Bank, Rich Y. '" 21.11
.•............ 20.08 ns. 197, 198 n.324
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks .•.. 24.03 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Temco Metal
Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Prods. Co. .•........ 19.04 n. I44
Distrib. SYI., Inc...•...•... 24.01; Freeman v. Gonzales Co. Say. '"
24.02 n.137 Loan Ass'n 26.02 D.3
Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon Co. Fremont Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
Teachers Credit Union' .. 19.02 n.44 W.B. Farms v........ 15.02 n.117
Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., Freudenfeld, FDIC v...•. 4.03 n.103:
Fulka v. 20.08 n.184 17.01 nA5
Florida Dep't of Banking v. Board of Friedland, Speer v 15.04 n.195
Governors .... ,... 6.02 ns. 85, 88 Friendly Nat'l Bank v. Farmers
Florida Dep't of Banking & Fin. v. Ins. Group 16.01: 21.04
Board of Governors .... 5.01 n.34: Froning & Deppe, IDC. v. ContineDtal
6.02'" ns. 85, 88 III. Bank & Trust Co... 21.09 n.218
Florida Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Bank Frost Nafl Bank v. Nicholas &
· ......•..•......•. , 21.10 n.262 Barrera .....•....... 14.04 n.185
Flushing Nat'l Bank, Durante Bros. Fuentes v, Shevin .. 19.02 0.74: 24.03
.& Sons, Inc. v...•...• 20.13 nAI4 Fulka v. Florida Commercial
Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Owens Banks, Inc. . iO.08 n. I84
· •.. '. .........••... , 25.08 n.290 Futura Dey. Corp. v: Centex Corp.
Fore v. Bles ....•....•.• 15.01 n.IH · 7.02 D.134
T-Sl TABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (fl) and notes (n.).]

G Gianni Sport, Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc.
• ........•......... " 19.02 n.75
Gabalac v. Firestone Bank, State Gibson v. Dixon ••.••... 24.03 n.17 I
ex reI. 21.01 n.1 Gilbert, Fifth Third Bank/VSA v.
Gainok v. Featherson 15.04 · " 18.04
Gale v. Mayhew 15.01 0.39 Giles, United StatCls v.•.•... " 12.02
Gannaway, Patel v..••.. 24.02 0.101 ns. 140, 154
Gantos, Inc., Gianni Sport. Ltd. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., Carey
· 19.02 n.75 Aviation, Inc. v.......• 23.02 n.32
Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank Gilford, Ranier v. 23.02 n.49
· 14.04 0.168 Gill SaY. Ass'n, Hondo Nat'l
Garden Check Cashing Servo v. First Bank v....•..•••.•••• 19.02 n.44
Nat'l City Bank 15.05 n.216 Gillen v. Maryland Nat'l Bank
Garflnckel, Inc., Kass v.•... 26.02 n.7 · .....•..•...•.•... " 19.02 n.30
Garnett State Say. Bank v. Tush Gilman v. FDIC •.......•...• 10.02
· . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 22.07 n.336 Giordano, United States v.•••• 12.02
Garpeg, Ltd. v. United Statei .. 12.01 ns. 123, 189
n.72 Giragosian v. United States .... 12.02
Garrett v. United States .•...•. 12.02 n.lI J
ns. 98, 103 Girard Bank II. Board of Governors
Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General · ...•........•••... , 6.02 '" n.45
Dynamics Corp 22.01 n.12 Girard Bank, Cumis In•. 8oc'y
Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Inc. I'••••••••• 19.04; 20.08 0.186
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Gish, Springhill Bank & Trust
Smith, Inc. .. 7.02 n.132 Co. v 19.04
Gary Sheet & Tin Employees Fed. Glasby, Valley Acceptance Corp. II.
Credit Union v. United Statell .. 26.02 n.14
.......•.•..••••..••.. 7.01 n.12 Glassey, United States v..• 12.02 n.168
G. Crohn & Co., European Asian Glatzer. Montco, Inc. v. " 22.02 n.48
Bank, A.G. v 16.01 Gleason v. Thaw ...•.•. 25.08 n.284
General Dynamics Corp., Gary Gleason, United States v. .. '" .12.02
Aircraft Corp. v...•.•. 22.01 n.12 0.172
Glendora Bank v. Davis .. 14.04 n.123
General Elec. Credit Corp., Homes Glen Ellyn Say. " Loan Ass'n,
Say. Ass'n V•••••••••• 22.01 n.41; FSUC v 9.01 n.16
23.02 n.45 Glennan v. Rochester Trusl Co.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. · ....•.......•...... '. 19.02 n.80
Central Nat'l Bank ... 20.13 n.416 Goldberg, United States v..•.• 12.01
General Motors Acceptance Corp., n.33
Fischl v•.•...•..•.•. 26.04 n.303; Gold Bond Holders Protective
26.06 & os. 374, 379 Council Inc. v. United States
Georgetown Say. & Loan Ass'n, ................... 14.02 & 0.66
Stedman v. . ...•..••.•. 26.02 n.4 Gold Circle Stores v. Chemical
Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Bank-Dommerich Div 21.09
Inc., Saxon v 4.03 01. 86, 87 n.219
Getty, Estate of Oney v. ••..•• 19.03 Golden v. United States •• 12.02 n.100
Getty v. FSLIC 10.03 Gonzales County Say. '" Loan Ass'·n,
Giacalone v. Bernstein 15.04 n.193 Freeman v. ...••..•..•. 26.02 n.3
Giancola, United States v....•• 12.01 Goodhope Refineries, River Parish
0.32 Servs., Inc. v.......•. 20.08 n.196
 TABLE OF CASES T-52

[References are 10 paragraphs (ff) and notes (n.).]

Gordon, United Stales v... 12.02 n.126 Grosberg v. Michigan Nat'l Bank of
Gotham Originals, First Commercial Oakland 15.01 n.31
Bank v.... 15.05 n.229: 17.02 n.78 Groveland Slale Bank, Federal Ins.
Gould v. Ruefenacht ..... 7.02 n.127 Co. v 20.12 n.380
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. ... 12.0 I Grumet v. Bristol 21.03 n.102
n.72 Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Grafstrom v. SEC 13.01 n.19 FHLBB . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10.02 n.39
Grand Jury Investigation, in re Guaranty Trust Co. v. Federal
..................... 12.01 n.71 Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Grand Jury Proceedings, in re .. 12.01 .................... 20.06 n.126
ns. 66, 68, 69; 13.01 n.39 Guidoni, United States v 12.01 n.71
Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist. v. Gullette v. FDIC 24.01 n.73
Coulson 14.04 n.120 Gunter v. Hutcheson 10.02 ns. 61,
Gray v. American Express Co... 26.03 63,89, 110, lIS
Gray v. Bertrand 15.01 11.92Gusston, Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Gray. United States v 16.01 n.IO Ass'n v 14.01 nJ7
Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., Flagship GLlstafson, Fort Knox Nat'l Bank v.
Nat'l Bank v.... 24.01; 24.02 n.137 ................ 19.02 01. 72, 78
Great Am. Ins. Cos. v. American GLltekunst v. Continental Ins. Co.
State Bank 20.08 n.195 ..................... 16.01 n.28
Great W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz Gwinnette Co. Bank, Ryland Group
· '" 7.02 n.134 Inc. v..........•..... 15.01 n.91
Great W. Bank, Cook v 15.01 n.92
Greater Ariz. Realty, Inc., Ness v.
.................... 15.04n.181 H
Green, Santa Fe Indus. v... 7.02 n. 117
Greer v. White Oak State Bank
· 20.10 n.245 Haar's Equip., Inc., Vacura v... 22.07
Gregoire v. Lowndes Bank .... 15.06 n.247
n.294 . Habersham Bank, Reeves v 24.03
Gregory v. Mitchell .... 10.02 n. I 19; Habib Bank, Ltd., Indyk v 16.01
11.01 n.9 n.33
Gressley, Kissell Co. v 26.02 n.4 Hackley Union Nat" Bank & Trust
Griffen, United States v 12.02 n.l71 Co., Northway Lanes v....• , 26.02
Griffin, Clark v 20.08 n.175 ns. 31, 34
Griffin v. Ellinger .. 15.04 DS. 196, 198 Hadley v. Baxendale, ....•. ,. 18,05:
Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & 20.08 n.207
Storage Co. 14.05 n.242 Hall, First Nat'l Bank v.. , 24.02 n.85
Griffin, United States v 16.06 Hamelly Int'l, Inc. v. First Nat'l
ns. 181, 191 Bank 4.01 n.28
Griffin Co. v. First Nat'l Bank .. 17.02 Hamilton Indus. Int'!, Inc., Banque
n.74 Paribas v. 17.02 n.62
Griffin Retreading Co., Oliver Hammond, Associates Commercial
Rubber Co.. v.....•... 23.03 n.130 Corp. v. .......•..... , •... 24.03
Grigg v. Robinson Furniture Co. Hampton State Bank, Aetna Life &
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26.02 n.7 Casualty Co. v. ..•..•• 20.06 n.118
Grist v. Osgood 21.10 n.251 Hancock v. Marshall ..... 13.01 n.19
Groos Nat'! Bank v. Comptroller of Handy & Harman, Upited States v.
the Currency 9.01 ns. 6, 83; . . . . . • . . . .. 22.03 n.79; 23.02 n.31
11.02 n.53 Hanna v. McCrory 14.04 n.121
T-53 TABLE OF CASES

[Rf!{f!rf!nCf!S arf! 10 paragraphs (fi) and nOIf!S (n.).]

Hardesty v. Fairmont Supply Co. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC .. 10.02
..................... 10.02 n.41 DS. 76,79
Harper v. United States .. 12.02 n.144 High v. McLean Fin. Corp..••. 20.13
Harris v. City of Roseburg .... 24.03 n.414; 26.06 '" n.370
Harris v. Hill .•......•.. 21.03 n.98 Hill v. Consumer Nat'( Bank ... 15.04
Harris & Harris v. Tabler ..... 14.04 n.204
n.ISS Hill v. Equitable Bank ... 20.13 n.414
Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Hill, Harris v...••.•••..• 21.03 n.98
Radio & Television ..• 17.02 & n.80 Hill, International Harvester Credit
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, Atari, Corp. v. .•.••.••.........• 16.06
Inc. v 17.02 n.SS Hobart Corp. v. North Cenl. Credit
Harrison, Eastman Kodak Co. \'. Serv., Inc 22.03 n.92
............. , • . • . . .. 23.02 n.40 Hobbs, First Nat'l Bank v.••.•• 20.03
Harrison, United States v•••... 12.02 n.39
os. 131,133 Hochfelder, Ernst & Ernst v....• 7.02
Hart, Black v. .•. . . . .• • •. 19.02 n.87 ns. 116, 117
Hartigan v. FHLBB ..•.. 10.03 n.147 Hockridge, United States v..... 12.02
Harton v. Rogers ....•.. 22.04 n.137 n.116
Harvey E. Hall, FinanceAmerican Home Escrow, Inc., De Mello v.
Private Brands, Inc. v... 15.06 n.287 · ...•.......•••••... 24.02 n.IOI
Harwood & Assocs., Inc. v. Tens Home Indemnity Co. v. First Nat'(
Bank & Trust 20.13 Bank ..........•......... 20.08
Haskell, Chemical Bank of Homes Say. Ass'n v. General Elec.
Rochester v. 15.01 n.31 Credit Corp.•........ 22.01 n.4l:
Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee .. 19.03 23.02 nAS
n.106 Home Say. Bank v. Baer Props.,
Heckler, Breault v••••••• 19.02 n.88 Ltd.....•......•...•. 24.0] n.51
Heimann, American Fidelity Bank & Hondo Nat'l Bank v. Gill Say.
Trust Co. v 6.01 n.25 Ass'n . . . • .. . . . . .. . . •• 19.02 n.44
Heimann, Independent Bankers Ass'n Hooper, Barnett Bank of W.
of Am. v•••••• 9.01 nS; 11.02 n.S3 Fla. v. .....•........••... 13.01
Heimann, Marshall & I1sely Corp. v. Hoover-Morris Enter., FDIC v.
...•.. . .••.. .•..•. 13.03 & n.l04 · ..•................ 10.02 n.IOl
Heimann, Washington ex ret.
Edwards . . . . . . . . .. 6.0 Ins. 24, 25 Horizon Processing Co. v. Charter
Hembree Oil Co., Fanning v. " 15.04 Int'l Oil Co. 22.01 n.9
n.202 Horney v. Covington County
Henderson, United States v•.... 12.02 Bank ........•.•......••. 21.04
n.168 HOllsehold Fin. Corp. v. Johnson
Hepler State Bank, Aetna Casualty & · , 21.10 n.265
Sur. Co. v.••..••.•. 20.08 & 11.193 Howard Brown Co. v. Reliance
Herman & McLean v. Huddleston Ins. Co 25.01 n.18
..................... 7.02 n.1I7 Howell v. Continental Credit
Herrig, United States v... 12.02 n.139 Corp ~.. 10.02
Hersch v. Citizens Say. & Loan Hoyt. Bank of New York v.••• 26.02
Ass'n .........••......... 24.01 D.SI
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., Hubbard Realty Co. v. First Nat'l
Xerographic Supplies Corp. v. Bank : .....•.••• 24.01
.................... 16.06 11.199 Huddleston, Herman & McLean v.
Hiatt v. United States ... 12.02 n.IS2 ..................... 7.02 n.117
 TABLE OF CASES T-54

[References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Hudspeth, North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Governors .. 6.02
Ass'n v 10.02 n.129 n.93
Hunt v. SEC 13.01 n.17 Independent Ins. Agents of America
Hunter, Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Board of Governors .. 5.02 n.129
Co. v 21.11 n.29R Indermill v. United Sav... 24.02 n.104
Hunterdon Co. Trust Co., United Industrial Na!'1 Bank v. Leo's Used
States v 13.03 n.75 Car Exch., Inc 16.01 n.47
Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Industria Nacionat Del Papel, Ca. v.
Na!'1 Bank 3.04 n.140 MI V Albert F 14.05 n.234
Huron County Banking Co. v. Indyk v. Habib Bank, Ltd..... 16.01
Knallay 15.02 n.106 0.33
Hutcheson, Gunter v 10.02 ns. 61, Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v.
63,89, 110, 115 Nunley 22.04 n.142
Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey rntertirst Bank-Abilene v. FDIC
Bank 19.02 n.30; 21.01 n.1 ................ 10.02 ns. 75, 77
Hykel, United Statesv... 12.02 0.157 International Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Bank of Wadley 17.01 0.46
International Harvester Credit Corp.
v. Hill 16.06
I International Minerals & Chern.
Corp. v. Matthews .. ,. 14.04 n.131
LA. Durbin, in re 15.06 n.303 International Travellers Cheque Co.
Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank v. BankAmerica Corp.... 4.01 n.28
........ 21.07 & n.202; 21.10 n.264 Investment Co. Inst., Board of
Idaho First Nat') Bank, Mercantile Governors v, 5.01 n.15;
Stores Co. v........•...... 19.04 5.02 ns. 92, 96, 120; 8.01 & n.12
Idaho First Nat'l Bank, Peterson v. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp .. 8.01;
• . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13.01 n.56 13.03 n.l03
Idaho Forest Inds., Inc. v. Minden Investment Co. Inst. v. Clarke ... 8.01
Exch. Bank & Trust Co 21.03 n.83
Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Investment Co. lost. v. Conover., 8.01
Union, Smith v 19.03 ns. 81, 84
Illinois Nat't Bank & Trust Co., Total Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC ... 5.01;
Automation, Inc. v..... 4.03 n.loo 8.01 n.20
Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd. v. Dunbar
Woodard 16.01 n.64 Transfer & Storage Co. ....• 14.05 -
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. n.234
v. Board of Governors 5.02 Irving Trust Co., K.M.C. Co. v.
ns. 129, 132 ....... 24.01 & n.4; 24.02 & 0.136
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. Isaac, American Heritage Bank &
v. Conover ...• , 4.01 n.19; Trust Co. v.........•..... 20.12
5.01 ns. 37, 39 Isaacs, Twin Cities Baok v..... 20.03
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. n.37
v. Heimann ... 9.01 n.5; 11.02 n.53 Ttek Corp. v. First Na!'1 Bank •. 17.02
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. n.74
v. Marine Midlaod Bank ITT Consumer Fio. Corp., United
N.A 6.03 States v 26.06 & n.338
Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. 'Alex
v. Smith 6.01 n.11; 6.03 Cooley's Ballroom, Inc.
Independent Community Bankers .................... 19.04 0.137
T-SS TABLE OF CASES

{Rf!ft!rf!ncu arf! to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

ITT Indus. Credil Corp., Regan v. Jones, Walker Hank & Trust
.•.....•.• , .•..••.... 23.01 n.17 Co. v.....•......••.••.... 18.04
Iverson v. First Bank ••.• 21.03 n.121 Judd v. Cilibank •.....• 18.04 n.245
Judd v. First Fed. Sav." Loan
Ass'n ...•............ 19.02 n.35
J Jupiter Orrington Corp. v. Zweifel
..................... 17.02 n.76
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank ...• 20.12
n.391
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24.03 K
Jackson, Northeast Factor &
Discount Co. v 2.01 n.4 Kalb v. Feuerstein ...•.. 25.05 b.l21
Jackson, People v ..•..•.. 13.01 n.59 Kalish'" Rice, Inc. v. Regent Air
Jamaica Say. Bank, LeBovici v. Corp..............•. 21.03 0.102
. . . . . • • . . . .. . . . . • . • • .. . .. 20.13 K&K Mfg., Inc. v. linion
Jamar, Fithian v•..••••• 15.06 n.276 Bank 20.12
James, Arvada Hardwood Floor Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Bank of
Co. ~'.... 15.08 n.354; 20.07 n.142 Odessa 20.06 n.1I9
J.C. Penney Co., Wisconsin v... 26.02 Kansas City Title'" Trust Co.,
n.7 Smith v 14.01 n.8
Jebec Coal Co., Credit Alliance Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank
Corp. v...•..•..•••... 22.03 n.83 ..................... 7.02 n.134
Jefferson Bank" Trust Co. v. Karner v. Willis .•.•.•.. , 24.01 n.31;
Stamatiou •.••••.•...•.... 16.06 24.02 n.139
Jennings, FDIC v. '" 10.02 ns. 43, 87 Kashanchi v. Texas Commerce
Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Medical Bank " 18.02 n.42
Ouar. Co.••.••.•.•.. 15.04 n.207 Kasperak, McCarthy v.•.• 16.01 n.54
Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Federal Kass v. Garflnckel, Inc...•• 26.02 n.7
Reserve Bank of Atlanta ..... 3.04 Kates v. Crocker Nat'! Bank ••. 26.04
n.157 n.278
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., Katzenbach v. McClung •... 14.01 n.6
Sztejn v 17.02 n.72 Keane v. Pan Am Bank .. 20.08 n.182
Joannides, First Galesburg Nat'l Keister v. Wade .•..•••. 21.10 n.239
Bank '" Trust Co. v. '" 24.04 n.233 Keller, Cleveland Chemical Co. of
John Deere Co. v. Production Credit Ark. v 15.04 n.203
Asstn .........•.......... 22.01 Kellerman, United States v. •... 12.02
Johnson v. Pitst State Bank •... 20.05 0.106
n.63 Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal.
Johnson, Household Fin. Corp. v. Bank 20.03 ns. 34, 39
.•.. , ....••.••..•..• 21.10 n.265 Kennedy, Malara v. ..••• 24.03 n.176
Johnsoll, Scafidi v. ...... 16.05 n.168 Kennedy, United Stales v• •••.• 12.02
Johnson, United States v. ..... 12.02 ns. 115, 148
n.168 Kennedy Co., Commonwealth Nat'l
Johnston v. Citizens Bank & Bank v 19.04 n.124
Trust Co...•.•.•.•.......•. 26.02 Kernodle, United States v•••... 12.02
Jones v. Central States IDv. m. 168, 110
Co. . ;.............. 22.07 Kersh v. Manis Wholesale Co.
Jones v. Commonwealth Bank & .................... 15.02 n.133
Trust Co. 21.01 0.4 Kersten v. Continental Bank ... 14.04
 TABLE OF CASES

[Re/ertmces are to paragraphs (fi) and notes (n.).)

Kesterson, Pine Bluff Nat'l Bank v. L
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20.12 n.392
Key Bank, Reid v 24.02 n.140 Lacey, Capital Bank & Trust Co. y.
Kienzle, Society Nat'l Bank v. . 16.06 n.195
.................... 18.04 n.224 Lake County Nat'l Bank,
Killian, United States v... 12.02 n.110 Thompson v , 15.05 n.216
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Lake Lake Warehouse Div. of Lake Erie
Warehouse Div. of Lake Erie Rolling Mill, Inc., Kimberly·Clark
Rolling Mill. Inc. ..... 14.05 n.245 Corp. v 14.05 n.245
Kings Premium Servo Corp. v. Lamson v. Commercial Credit Corp.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. . , 15.01 n.23
..................... 20.01 n.ll Lance, Federal Election
Kington, United States v.. , 13.01 n.28 Comm'n v 12.02 n.·195
Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Landaus of Plymouth, Inc.,
Bank 20.10 n.250 Pristas v 22.02 n.70
Kissell Co. v. Gressley 26.02 n.4 Landers, United States v 12.02
Kleiner v. First Nat'! Bank of ns.99, 106
Atlanta 26.02
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. Landmark Fin. Servs., United
....... 24.01 & n.4; 24.02 & n.136 States v , 26.06 n.330
Knallay, Huron County Banking Landreth, Landreth Timber Co. v.
Co. v 15.02 n.l06 ..................... 7.02 n.127
Knight, Tcherepnin v 7.02 n.128 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth
Knolt v. Columbia Banking Fed. Say. · , 7.02 n.127
& Loan Ass'n 15.08 n.357 Langley v. FDIC 10.02
Koch v. Myrvold '. .•.. 25.04 n.93 Larimore v. Clarke 9.01
Kordick v. Merchants Nat') Bank Larsen v. Warrington 23.02 n.49
& Trust Co 15.04 n.203 Larson, United States v 12.02 n.l24
Kostman v. First Nat'l Bank, La Sara Grain Co., First Nat'l
Missouri ex reI 6.01 n.l1 Bank v 20.12 n.396
Katz, Great W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Las Vegas Auto Leasing, Inc. v.
................•.... 7.02 n.134 Davis 22.01 n.26
Kovacs, Ohio v. ....•. 25.09 & n.403 Lattimore Land Corp., FDIC v.
Kovash v. McCloskey ..• 15.04 n.191; · 10.02; 26.02 n.38
16.02 Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City
Kramer, United States v..•... 12.02 Nat'l Bank 16.01 n.68
n.171 Lawrence v. Bank. of America .. 21.07
Krantz v. City of Hutchinson ... 4.03 Leach, FDIC v....•...•.•.... l<l.<l!
n.tOO Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank
Krassner, Bryen v. 16.01 n.41 ......•.............. 21.11 n.370
KremliIi, Inc., Graon, Inc. v.... 12.01 LeBovici v. Jamaica Savings
n.72 Bank 20~13
Krepps, United States v '. 12.02 Lee County Bank, Brown v 20.05
05. 140, 141 n.52; 20.13 n.414
Kreps, United States V • • • 12.02 n.114 Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp.,
Krom v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Louisiana State School Lunch
Trust Co 15.05 n.216 Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Krump Constr., Inc. v. First,Nat'1 · ..•................ 22.07 n.295
Bank of Nev 15.01 n.71 Lemaire v. United States .. 4.01 n.33
T-57 TABLE OF CASES

[References are 10 paragraphs (f) and nOles (n.).J

Leonard v. American Nal'1 Bank & Lufthansa German Airlines v. Bank
Trust Co., State el( reI. ... 6.01 n.7 of America Nat'l Trust & Say,
Leon Co. Teachers Credit Union, Ass'n .... , ..•..••........ 21.11
Florida Bankers Ass'n v. 19.02 Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co... 24.03
n.44 0.170
Leo's Used Car El(ch., Inc., Lund, Mid-America Real Estate &
Industrial Nat'l Bank v. ...• 16.01 Inv. Corp. v. 15.04 n.187
n.47 Luther, United States v 14.05 n.244
LeVick v. Skaggs Co 26.03 n.182 Lynnwood Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.
Levine, in re 14.04 n.BI Bank of Everett ...•. 16.01; 20.05
Levy, Barclay's Discount Bank,
Ltd. v 16.01 n.31
Levy v. First Pa. Bank 15.0 I 0.29 M
Lewis v. B.T.lnvestment Managers,
Inc. 6.02 MacKay, United States v. ;. 13.01 n.21
Lewis v. United States 12.02 n.147 Mack Trucks, Arkansas Sav. & Loan
Lexington Y. Union Nat" Bank Ass'n v•••..•••.•••••. 26.02 n.4
........••.......•.. 19.04 n.140 Maddox v. Westroads Bank ...• 20.08
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., n.185
FDIC v. 10.02 ns. 78, 80 Madeira, Denison Slate Bank v.
Lightner, First Nat'! Bank v.... 14.04 · ....•......•.•.•. 24.02 & n.loo
n.121 Mademoiselle, FDIC v. .•.. 10.02 n.9
Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Bank & Malara v. Kennedy ....•• 24.03 n.176
Trust Co., Illinois ex reI. ..... 6.0 I Mallen v. FDIC .... 9.01 & ns. 49, 52
n.11 Malloy, Federal Reserve Bank v.
Lincoln First Bank v. Carlson · •........•.•..•.•.• , 21.02 n.57
.................... 18.030.167 M & M Leasing v. Seattle First Nat'l
Lincoln N at'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank 4.03 0.71; 4.03 n.98
Bank of Commerce . . 20.08 ns. 192, M&s Mortgage Co., AUan v.
196; 21.03 n.102 ..................... 26.02 n.10
Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. M & W Gear, Wilson v... 23.02 n.37
Peoples Trust Bank 20.0 I 0.2 Manis Wholesale Co., Kersh v.
Lindsey v. Zeller 15.06 n.273 .................... 15.02 D.133
Locks v. North Towne Nat'l Bank Mann, United States v.... 12.02 D.99
.•.•..........•... , .. 15.01 n.79 Manor Drug Stores, Blue Chip
Logan Paving Co. v. Massey- Stamps v. 7.02 D.l16
Ferguson Credit Corp. .••... 22.06 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.
D.207 v. Murphy ..•...• 16.01 os. 48, 67
Longview Bank & Trust Co., Finley, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
Inc. v 24.01; 24.02 Brite Lite Lamps Corp. v. .. 20.07
Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
· ; •.•.... 20.03 n.28 Delbrueck & Co. v. . • •. 18.01 D.21;
Loughman, Wittoebel v.... 10.02 n.42 18.05 n.296
Louisiana State School Lunch Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
Employees Retirement Sys. v. Kings Premium Serv. Corp. v.
Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .. 20.01 n.11
· .....••.......•..•. 22.07 n.295 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
Lovejoy v. Weese •...... 20.03 n.26 New York Credit Men's Adjust-
Lowndes Bank, Gregoire Y. ment Bur., Inc. v••••• 20.12 n.379;
· , . . . . . . .. 15.06 0.294 . 21:01 n.l
 TABLE OF CASES T-S8

[Re/erencu are to paragraphs (11) and notes (n.).]

Manufacturers Hanover TruM Co., Mateo Tools Corp. v. Pontiac State
Spielman v 20.07 & n.146 Bank 15.03 n.165
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, Matthews, First Fidelity Bank v.
Spinazzola v..•....••. 20.05 n.76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22.04 n.146
Marathon Pipe Line Co., Northern Matthews, International Minerals &
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. ..... 10.02 Chem. Corp. v....•... 14.04 n.131
n.131 Mattson v. Commercial Credit.
Marcoux v. Van Wyk .... 21.01 n.24 Business Loans, Inc... , 23.03 n.IOI
Marine Bancorporation. United Maurice O'Meara Co. v. Nat'l Park
States v..•.•..•.•••.. 13.03 n.80 Bank 17.01 n.49
Marine Bank v. Weaver .... " 7.02 & Mayhew, Gale v 15.01 n.39
ns.129, 132 Mayr, United States v. .. 12.02 n.153
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. MBTA Employees Credit Union v.
Berry 20.05 n.56 Employen Mut. Liability Ins.
Marine Midland Bank, N.A., Co., 2<l.08 n.187
Independent Bankers Ass'n v... 6.03 McAnally, United States v. ... 12.02
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Price, n.136
Miller. Evans and Flowers " 15.01 McCarthy v. Brockton Nat'( Bank
n.72; 20.07 n.144 ............•.....•.. 4.03 n.101
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. v. McCarthy v. Kasperak 16.0] n.s4
Banco del Pais, S.A. ... 17.02 n.62 McCloskey, Kovash v 15.04 n.19J;
Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, West 16.02
Side Bank v 21.02 ns. 76, 77 McClung, Katzenbach v.... 14.01 n.6
Marion Nat'l Bank v. Van Buren McConnico v. Third Nat'( Bank
Bank 6.0 I n.24 .................... 20.06 n.121
Mark Twain Bank, United States McCorkle, Brooks v..... 16.05 n.170
v...........•........ 16.01 n.35 McCoy v. Franklin Say. Ass'n &
Marquette Nat'J Bank v. First of Mortgage Management Co.
Omaha Servo Corp 26.02 n.36 ..................... 9.02 n.125
Marshall, Hancock v...•.. 13.01 D.19 McCrary, Runyan Y•••••• 26.06 n.351
Marshall & I1sJey Corp. v. McCrory, Hanna v \4.04 n.l1l
HeimaDn .....•..•. 13.03 & D.1 04 McCulloch v. Maryland 1.02;
Martin v. American Express ... 18.04 14.01 n.8
Martin, Citizens State Bank v. .. 21.04
Martin, First Nat'] Bank V. McDonald's Corp., Capital Nat'!
· •••............•... 22.07 n.331 Bank v. ...............•.. 22.07
Martin, Mutual Fin. Co. v. McGee v. First Federal Say. & Loan
· . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . .. 16.01 n.sl Ass'n ....•........... 9.02 n.l26
Maryland, McCulloch v. McGinnis, Prevo v.••.•• 21.10 n.269
................. 1.02; 14.01 n.8 McGloshen v. USDA ..... 13.01 n,43
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., United McGrattan, Amsterdam Urban
States v•••...••....•. 25.090.418 Renewal Agency v. . . .. 21.03 0.102
Maryland Nat'J Bank, Gillen v. McGrew v. Mix .......•. 21.03 0.87
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19.02 n.30 McInnis v. Cooper Communities
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., ...........•......•.. 26.02 n.44
Logan Paving Co. V. •• 22.06 n.207 McKnight, FDIC V•• ; . . . . 11.01 0.22
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., Aetna Fin. McLaughlin v. Sports & Recreation
Corp. V. ••••••••••••• 23.02 0.96 Club, Inc.. ~ .. ~ •..•.. 21~03 n.lOI
Master Auto Servo Corp., First Nat'J McLean Fin. Corp., High V•••• 20.13
Bank v. . ...•.•••••..•..•• 22.07 n.414; 26.06 & n.370
T-59 TARLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (fJ) and notes (n.).)

McSweeney, United States Trust Co. Mesa N.O. Nelson Co., United Bank
of N.Y. v 19.03 v 20.08 n.183
McTaggert v. United States 13.01 Melge v. Baehler 7.02 n.135
n.14 Melro Bank, Woodward v.
Meadors, UnltedStates v. · ..................•. 7.02 n.135
· . • • • . . . • . . • • . . . • • •. 26.06 n.330 Metropolitan Bank, Minneapolis
Mead's Bread, Moore v. '" 14.01 n.6 Sash'" Door Co. v...•• 21.01 n.13
Mechanics Nat'l Bank, Nat'l Bank of Metropolitan Edison, Jackson v.
Commonwealth v. ..... 10.02 n.60 · . .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. 24.03
Medley Hardwoods, Inc. v. Novy Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
· .•••.•.•••....... " 15.04 n.202 Ward 6.02 n.73
Meeker, State'" Say. Bank v. Meyer Bros. v. Cook 22.02 n.56
.................... 21.03 n.116 Miami Nat'l Bank, Swerdloff v.
Mellon Bank, O'Mara Enters., · .....•....•..•.•.... 9.02 n.126
Inc. v.....•.......... 15.01 n.80 Michael, United States v.
Menthor, S.A. v. Swiss Bank .................... 12.02 n.l30
Corp........•...•........ 20.07 Michelin Tires (Canada), Ltd. v.
Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat') Bank .....•....• 22.07
Hunter 21.11 n.298 Michigan Nat') Bank, Barkus v.
Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. .... ........ 4.03 n.104; 7.01 n.61
Vilkins ........••.•. 21.03 & n.88 Michigan Nat') Bank, National
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Silverman Credit Union Admin. v.
.................... 20.06 n.I)4 · . . .. . • . • .. . . • • • • . •• 20.08 D.186
Mercantile Stores Co. v. Idaho Michigan Nat') Bank, Van Senus
First Nat'l Bank ••••..•.•.. 19.04 Auto Parts, Inc. v...••. 21.02 n.81
Mercantile Trust Co., St. Louis Michigan Nat') Bank of Oakland,
County Nat') Bank v•.•... 6.01 n.7 Grosberg v '" 15.01 0.31
Mercantile Trust Co. Nat') Ass'n, Mid-America Rea) Estate & Inv
Nu-Way Servo Inc. v... 20.12 n.382 Corp. v. Lund .••.••.• 15.04 0.187
Merchants Bank, Abyaneh v. Mid-Continental Nat') Bank v. Bank
.. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . • . .. 18.02 n.42 of Independence .•••.. 16.0 I n.28
Merchants Bank, Banco di Roma v. Midland Bank & Trust Co., National
.................... lS.05 0.212 Sur. Corp. v. ,.. • • . . . •. 17.oJ n.45
Merchants Nat') Bank v. Ching Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Common·
· . . . . . . . • . • • . . • • • • •• 22.07 D.236 wealth Gen., Ltd. •.•••. 24.01 0.6
Merchants Nat') Bank, Crockford v. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
• . . . . . • . • . . • . . . • . •... 20.08 n.175 Dep't of Envtl. Protection
Merchants Nat'] Bank, Southern · .........•..... , .. 25.07; 25.09
Cotton Oil Co. v....•. 21.03 n.128 Mid-Stales Dev. Co., Citizens Nat'l
Merchants NIlt'J Bank & Trust Co., Bank v. •••••.••••••• 22.07 0.330
Kordick v•..•..••••• 15.04 n.203 Midwest Bank & Trust Co. v.
Merchants Nat'J Bank'" Trost Co., Roderick 24.03
North Dakota v.••••..• 4.01 D~22 Miller, United States v• .••.••. 13.01
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner '" Milton, Pay Center Inc. v.
Smith, E)don's Super Fresh Stores, ......................... .......... IS.01 n:81
Inc. v 16.01 n.49 Minden Exch. Bank'" Trust Co.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner '" Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v.•. 21.03
Smith, Gary Plastic Packaging Mindy Mfg. Co., PolJin v.
Corp. v.•...•..•••.•. 7.02 n.132 .................................. .... 15.04 0.191
 TABLE OF CASES T-60

[Refuences are 10 paragraphs (fi) and nOles (n.).]

Minneapolis Sash & Door Co. v. Muchmore, People v. ..... 13.01 n.l
Metropolitan Bank .... 21.01 n.13 Mullaney v. United States
Miron Rapid-Mix Concrete Corp. v. · .. , '" , 12.02 n.1I2
Bank Hapoalim 15.Q1 n.91 Muni, United States v. " 12.02 n.200
Missouri Delta Bank. Whalen & Sons Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First
Grain CO. Y • • • • • • • • • 21.03 n.122; Nat'\ Bank, 20.03 n.39
21.1111.335 Murphy, Manufacturers & Traders
Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc., United Trust Co. v. ..... 16.01 os. 48, 67
States y. 23.02 n.49 Mutschler v. Peoples Nat'l Bank
Mitchell, Gregory y 10.02 0.119; · ..• ; .•.•.•.. , " 6,01 n.24
11.01 n.9 Mutual Fin. Co, v. Martin
Mitchell y. W.T. Grant Co..... 24.03 ... , .. , '" 16.01 .0.51
Mitchell-Parks Mfg. Co., Carroll M/V Albert F., Industria Nacional
Y. •••••••••••••••••• 19.04 n.140 del Papel, Ca. v.. , . . .. 14.05 n.234
Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Texas M.V. Eurychili, Tyrone Pac. Infl,
Commerce Bank " .. 17.02 n.76 IDe. v. 14.05
Mix, McGrew v 21.03 n.87 Myrvold, Koch v 25.04 n.93
Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed
Beef Co 7.02 n.135
Montana Nat'l Bank, Williams Y. N
.................... 20.09 n.225
Montco, Inc. Y. Glatzer 22.02 0.48 National Bancard Corp. v.
Moore v. Bay 25.07 0.200 Visa USA \8.Q3 0.\45
Moore v. Mead's Bread 14.01 D.6 National Bank, Donovan v..... 13.01
Moore v. Richmond Hill Sav. 0.35
Bank .........•..... 20.08 0.195 National Bank, First Nat'J Bank
Moraites, United States v. v. • •.... ,............. 4.01 n.22
...•.... , ..•.....•.. 12.02 0.118 National Bank, Wilhelm Foods.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., Center Inc. v..... 21.02 n.51; 21.04 n.142
Coordinates, Inc. v. " 18.05 & n.300 National Bank of Bossier City v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., Chase v. Fornea .....•..... , .. 15.01 n.loo
.......••....••.••.. 20.10 n.254 National Bank of Commerce, United
Morgan Guar. Trust Co., Danje States v, ...•. 19.03 & ns. 105. 119
Fabrics Div. Y•••••••• 20.06 n.123 National Bank of Commonwealth v.
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Mechanics Nat'J Bank .. 10.02 n.6O
American Sav. & Loan Ass'n National City Bank, Ed Stinn
.................... 21.03 n.1I6 Chevrolet, Inc. v.•••••••• 20.08 ns,
Morgan Guar. Trust Corp. v. Third 197,207
Nat'l Bank 14.05 n.252 National City Bank, Sokoloff v,
Morgenthau, United States Say. · •.•..•••....•... , .. , 19.02 n.37
Bank v. . . . • . . . . .. 10.02 os. 20, 32 National Courier Ass'n y, Board of
Morlock, Security State Bank v. Governors 5.02 & 0.121
..................... 15.01 n.78 National.Credit Union Admin. v.
Morrison-Knudson Co. v. eHG Michigan Nat'! Bank .. 20.08 0.186
Int'!, Inc............• 10.02 n.130 National Exch. Bank, First Nat'l
Morse v. United States .• 12.02 n.140 Bank v. • ..... ,........ 4.03 n.82
Mortimer Agency. Inc. v. National Iranian Radio & Television,
Underwriters Trust Co. ...•. 15.05 I Harris Corp. v.•.... ; 17,02 & n.80
n.24O I National Park Bank, Maurice
Mouzin, United States v... 12.01 D.33 O'Meara Co. v 17.01 D.49
T-61 TABLE OF CASES

[Re!erenceif are to paragraphs (ff) and noreif (n.).]

National Retailers Corp. v. Valley North Birminsham Am. Bank, Paul
Nat'l Bank 4.03 n.78 Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v.
National Say. '" Trost Co. v. Park .................... 19.04 n.142
Corp 21.03 n.116 North Carolina Nat'l Bank,
National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v.
, & Trust Co 17.01 nA5 ....•.•••..••....•• ,. 17.02 n.62
Nationwide Homes v. First Citizens North Cenl. Credit Serv., Inc., Hobart
Bank'" Trust Co ]9.03 n.l23 Corp. v••••••••••••••• 22.03 n.92
Nationwide Moving & Storage Co.• North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'l
Griffin v. .•.......... 14.05 n.242 Bank &< Trost Co. . ....• 4.01 n.22
Neal. Price v... 18.05 & n.311; 20.08
Northeast Bancorp v. Woolf
Neale, Tomlin Y••••••••• 14.04 n.122
· . . . . • . • . . • . . • . . • . . . .• 6.02 n.67
Nehring v. First DeKalb
Bancshares ..... ,.... 13.03 n. t 02 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of,
Nelson. Union Nat'l Bank of Laredo GovernOR 6.02
v. . ........• ',...... 26.02 '" D.93 Northeast Factor & Discount Co. v.
Ness v. Greater Ariz. Realty. Inc. Jackson ...••.••.....•. 2.01 n.4
..... .. ......• , •.. " 15.04 n.181 Northern Pipeline Conslr. Co. v.
New Braunfels Vlils .• Canyon Lake Marathon Pipe Line Co. '" 10.02
Bank v. .•..•.•.••..• ] 5.08 n.358 D.131
New HolJand Sales Stable, Inc., Northern Trust Co. v. E. T. Clarey
Vnited States v.••.•.•• 23.02 n.49 Export Corp••...•••.. 14.04 D.149
New Jersey Bank v. Bradford Sec. Northern Trost Co. v. Ox.ford
Operations. Inc. 22.07 Speaker Co. •.•....•. •• 17.02 n.57
New Jersey Bank, Hy-Grade Oil North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Dj-Chem
Co. v .•••••• 19.02 n.30; 21.01 D.I Inc. .. 0" • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24.03
"

New Jersey Bank v. Palladino North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
. , ... , , .••...... 17.01 ns. 30, 44 Hudspeth . • • • • • • • . . . • 10.02 n.129
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. North Park Naf! Bank v. Bankers
Protection, Midlantic N at'l Bank Trust Co. 21.02
v•••.•.•••.•••••••• 25.07; 25.09 North Platte State Bank, PWA
New York, Franklin Nat'J Bank Farms, Inc. v. • •.••• 20.07 & n.156
v. .•.••.•...••••••.•• t 4.01 n.23 Northshore Bank v. Palmer
New York Credit Men's Adjustment · . . • . • • • • . • . • • • • • . • •. 20.03 n.32
Bureau. Inc. v. Manufacturers North Towne Nat'l Bank,
Hanover Trust Co.... 20.12 n.379; Locks v 15.01 D.79
21.01 n.l Northway Lanes v. Hackley Union
Newcomb, United States v. N at') Bank & Trust Co. .•••• 26.02
. . • • • . • . . • • . . • • • • . •. 22.06 n.197 llS. 31, 34
Nicholas & Barrera, Frost Nat'l N arthwest N at'l Bank, Republic
Bank v 14.04 n.185 Nat'l Bank v. .•.•.••.• 17.01 nA5
Nichols v. Council on JUdicial Narwest Bank, Conooo, Inc. v.
Complaints ...•.•.. 13.01 ns. 1,42 ..................... 17.01 n.41
Nikrasch v. State ..•....• 13.01 D.38 Navy, Medley Hardwoods, Inc. v.
NLRB v. Bildlsco 25.07 n.268 · . . . . . • . . • • • . . . • • . .. 15.04 n'.202
Noel Estate, Inc. v. Commercial Nunley, Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp.
Nat'l Bank 4.03 n.l03 v..•..••••.•• , •••••• 22.04 n.142
Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, N uno. First N at'( Bank v. ...•. 20.08
Ltd. . ..••..•.• ,..... 9.02 n. I 22 0.205; 21.03 ns. 119, 120
 TABLE OF CASES T-62

[Re/erttrces are /0 paragraphs rf) alld /lOles (11.).]

Nutting v. Bradford Nat'l Bank Owensboro, Owensboro Na!,l Bank
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. 22.02 n.57 v 14.01 n.8
Nu-Way Servo Inc. v. Mercantile Owensboro Nat'l Bank v.
Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n .. 20.12 n.382 Owensboro 14.01 n.8
OKford Speaker Co., Northern
Trust Co. v 17.02 n.57
o Oxley, A.J. Jackson Chevrolet v.
.................... 15.04 n.199
O'Brien, SEC V•••••••••• 13.01 n.l1
Oclander v. First Nat'l Bank ... 18.04
Odom, Mays, & DeBuys, Barrett v. p
· . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . .. 16.03 n.149
Ohio v. Kovacs 25.09 & n.403 Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards
Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v, Board · . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .. 25.07 n.l95
of Governors 5.01 n.33; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
5.02 ns. 129, 136 Energy Resources Conservation
Okahoma v. Bank of Okla. & Dev. Comm'n 14.01 n.22
· , 4.03 n.97 Pacific Nat'l Bank, Wichita Eagle &
Old Colony Bank & Trust Co., Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Catalina Yachts v 21.03 · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17.01 n.45
Oliver Rubber Co. v. Griffin Pailet, Cities Servo Co. v 18.04
Retreading Co 23.03 n.130 n.226
Olympic Bank, Smith v 15.08 n.358 Palladino, New Jersey Bank v.
Omaha Nat" Bank, Aimor Elec. · 17.01 ns. 30, 44
Works, Ltd. v. 17.03 & n.93 Palmer, Northshore Bank v.
O'Mara Enters., Inc. v, Mellon · : ...•.. 20.03 n.32
Bank .......•...... " 15.01 n.80 Pan Am Bank, Keane v. . . 20.08 n.182
One 1964 MG, United States v. Pargas, Inc. v. Estate of Taylor
· , 12.01 n.23 · ......•..•....... 20.07 & n.153
$1,497,081.78, United States v. Park Corp., National Say. & Trust
· , " 12.01 n.23 Co. v 21.03 n.116
Onyx Coal Co., Belmont County Park State Bank v. Arena Auto
Nat'l Bank v 15.06 n.276 Auction, Inc..•...... 20.12 n.410
Open Market Comm. for Monetary Parlance Sportwear Co., Trustees of
Reform v. Board of Governors Tufts College v..•.... 14.04 n.137
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3.03 Parson's Steel, Inc. v. First Ala.
Originala Petroleum Corp. v. Beta Bank .............•....... 9.02
Fin. & Ins. Corp 17.02 n,74 Partain v. First Nat'l Bank
Osborn v. Bank of the United · . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26.02 n.34
States 1.02 Patel v. Gannaway .•... 24.02 n. tOI
Osgood, Grist v 21.10 n.251 Patterson Produce v. First Nat'l
Oste, Carleton Ford, Inc. v. Bank 20.12 n.397
......... 15.04 n.196 Paul Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co.
Otto Huber & Sons, Inc., First Nat'l v. North Birmingham Am. Bank
Bank v. , t6.01 0.18 • 19.04 n.142
Overmyer v. Trick .•.. '" 19.02 n.74 Pavers, Inc., St. Philip Towing &
Owen, Unico v..... 16.01 n.51; 16.06 Transp. CO. V• • • • • • • • • 7.02 n.127
Owens, Ford Motor Credit Corp. Pay Center Inc. v. Milton
v, ..............•... 25.08 n.290 · ......•............ , 15.01 n.81
T-63 TABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (fI) and notes (n.).]

Payette Valley Coop., Inc., ' Philadelphia Nat'( Bank, United
Carpenter v...•...•.• 14.04 n. I 86 States v. .....•.. 13.03 ns. 78, 84
'I

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., . Philips, United States v .•• 12.02 n.168
Brockton Sav. Bank v... 7.02 n.132 Phillips v. United States .. 12.02 n.150
Penn Cent. Nat'l Bank, Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, United
Colin v 14.05 n.252 States v 13.03 ns. 80, 84
Pennington v. Donovan, .. 13.01 n.19 Phoenix Steel Corp., Wilmington
Penn Square Nat'( Bank, Trust Co. v ..•...•••• 19.04 n.144
Covington v........•. 20.06 n.125 Pileo Plantation, Inc., C. & S. Bank
Pennsylvania, Earle v•..•. 10.02 n.41 v•••..•••••••••••••• 20.07 n.lSS
Penmylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Pine Bluff Naf! Bank v.
Secretary of Banking .. 14.04 n. I64 Kesterson ...•....•.. 20.12 n.392
People v. Centra! Fed. Say. & Loan Pinkney v. Wyleie .•.•.... 4.03. n.90
Ass'n 26.02 n.4 Pioneer First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
People v. Chapman 13.01 n.61 v. Pioneer Nat'( Bank 4.01 n.22
People v. Jackson 13.01 n.59 Pioneer Nat'! Bank, Pioneer First
People v. Muchmore 13.01 n.1 Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
People Leasing Co., Rouse ...............•...•.. 4.01 n.22
v...........•.•...•.•. 26.02 n.9 Pitrolo v. Community Bank & Trust,
People's Bank & Trust Co" N.A., ....•..•.•.•... 15.06 n.291
Wiley v 21.11 n.371 Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United
Peoples Nat'l Bank, Central Bank States .............•. 13.01 n.39
of Ala. v••......•••..••... 21.07 Pollack, United States v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank, Mutschler v. . ..•...•...•••.••••. 12.02 n.134
•.••..•.......•....... 6.01 n.24 Pollin v. MindY Mfg. Co.
People's Nat'l Bank, Reynolds- . . . • • . . • . • . . • . . • . . .. 15.04 1l.191
Wilson Lumber Co. v. Pontchartrain State Bank v.
.................... 21.03 n.116 Poulson .. . . .. .. • .. • .. 22.02 n.55
Pontiac State Bank, Matco Tools
Peoples Trust Bank, Lincoln Nafl Corp. v 15.03 n.165
Bank & Trust Co. v. .... 20.0 I n.2 Poretsky Management, Inc.,
Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank .. 19.02 Armfleld v........•.. 21.03 n.IOl
n.75; 20.01 n.12; 24.01 0.4; Port City State Bank v. American
26.02 n.22 Nat'l Bank •...••...•. 21.02 n.7S
Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank Porter, Valley Nat'l Bank v•••• 16.01
........ 19.04 n.I44; 20.06 n.117; . 0.34
20.08 n.186 Poulson, Pontchartrain State Bank
Peterson v. Crown Fio. Corp. v••••••••.••••••••••• 22.02 0.55
............•••.... 24.01 & n.71 Powell, Bank of EI Paso v. .... 15.05
Peterson v. Idaho First Nafl n.. 217
Baok 13.01 0.56 Preston v. United States ......• 14.05
Phelps. Brannons Number Sevlln, Prevo v. McGinnis ••..• 21.1 0 0.269
Inc. v••••...•..•••.• 21. I 1 0.301 Price v. Neal ... 18.05 & 0.311; 20.08
Phelps, Citizens Union Nat'j Bank Price, United States v..• , 12.02 n.167
v.•••.•.••.••........ 4.03 n.l0l Price, Miller, Evans and Flowers,
Phenix-Girard Bank, Bar-Ram Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v.
Irrigation Prods. v..•... 17.03 n.91 ......••.. 15.01 n.72; 20.01 n.144
Philadelphia Gear Corp., FDIC Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth,
v•••••••••••••••••••••••• 11.01 Inc. .•.•.•••.•.•••••• 22.02 n.70
 TABLE OF CASES T-64

[References are to paragraphs (fJ and notes (n.).]

Production Credit Ass'n, John Deere Regan v. ITT Indus. Credit Corp
Co. v 22.01 23.01 n.!7
Prospect Nat'J Bank, Appliance Regan v. Time, Inc 14.02
Buyers Credit Corp. v 20.10 Regent Air Corp., Kalish & Rice
n.253 Inc. v 21.03 n.102
Provident Bank v. Barnhart 16.06 Reid v. Key Bank 24.02 11.140
Puckett v. South E. Plaza Bank Reliance Elec. Co., First Nat'l
. ..•... .. .... ...•.. .. . ... 15.01 State Bank v. t 6.0 t
Puerto, United States v... 12.01 n.34 Reliance -Ins. Co., Howard Brown
PWA Farms, Inc. v. North Platle Co. v 25.01 n.11l
State Bank 20.07 & n.156 Republicbank Garland, Cooper
v. 16.06
Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest
Q Nat'! Bank 17.01 n.45
Republic Nat'l Bank, Roland v;
Quintana v. Allstate Ins. Co. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19.04 n. J24
..........•.•...... " 15.01 n.84 Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Board of
Governors 13.03 n.99
Republic of Tex. Say. Ass'n v. First
R Republic Life Ins. Co... 16.01 n.52
Residence Located at 218 3d Street,
RaDec Constr. Co., Western Bank United States v 13.01 n.28
v. 14.04 n.130 Reynolds, United States v. .... . 12.02
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & n.121; 25.09n.366
Co. .........•........ 4.0 I n.25 Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v.
Rae v. Union Bank 9.02 People's Nat'l Bank 21.03 n.116
Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of R.H. Macy & Co., Sliger v 26.02 n.7
N.Y 3.04 n.140 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Rainbolt, Central Nat'l Bank Bank, Emery·Waterhouse Co. v.
v 13.03 n.IIO .........•....•...... 17.02 n.73
Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Rich v. Franklin Say. Bank
Schnurr 6.01 n.17 • •..•.•..•....•... " 21.11 n.324
Ramapo Bank v. Camp 6.01 n.24 Richardson & Sons, Inc., Weubke
Rand Constr. Co., Stein v. v. ....•............ 15.04 n.201
. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22.04 n.146 Richmond Hill Say. Bank, Moore
Ranier v. Gilford 23.02 n.49 v 20.08 n.19S
Rapp v. Dime Say. Bank .••.•. 20.11 Riebold, United States v. ..... 12.02
n.270 n.116
Rausch, Bank of Hoven v••.••. 20.08 Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt.
n.180 Comm...............•..... 3.03
Realty Co-op, Inc. Sawgrass Riggs v. Bank of Camas
Builders, Jnc. v 15.02 11.155 Prairie 19.02 n.32
Records & Tapes, Inc. v. Argus, . Riggs Nat'l Bank, Boutros v.... 15.08
Inc ; 22.03 n.102 n.354; 19.01 n.8; 20.12
Rector v. Strauss 14.04 n.123 River Oaks Bank & Trust Co.,
Reece, United States v 12.02 n.150 Estrada v 15.01 n.23
Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co. River Parish Servs., Inc. v.
of Creve Coeur 14.04 n.169 Goodhope Refineries .. 20.08 n.196
Reeves v. Habersham Robinson Furniture Co., Grigg v.
Bank 24.03 · .......•... , ........• 26.02 n.7
T-65 TABLE OF CASES

[References are to paragraphs (fi) and notes (n.).]

Rochester Trust Co., Glennan Safeway Portland E.F.C.U. v.
v. ....••••....••..... 19.02 n.80 FDIC ..... 10.02 n.119; 11.01 n.7
Rock bland Auction Sales v. Sahara-Nev. Corp.• Saka v.
Empire Packing Co..... 21.02 n.78 · ...•.....•..•...... 20.09 n.235
Rock bland Bank, Bank of N.C. Saka v. Sahara-Nev. Corp.
v. .••••••••••••.••••• 17.01 nA5 · ........•••.••••..• 20.09 D.235
Rockwell Jnt'l Sys., Inc. v. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am.
Citibank 17.02 n.74 .................... 20.13 0.416
Roddenberry, First Nat'l Bank v Sanchez Vazquez. United States
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25.09 v.......•...•........ 12.01 n.34
Roderick. Midwest Bank & Trust Sanders, Da Silva v 20.05 n.89
Co. v.....•......•........ 24.03 Sanford, Chase Nat'l Bank v.
Rogers, Harton y • • • • • • • • 22.04 n.137 · . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . •. 2.02 n.4
Rogers v. Security Bank of Santa Fe Indus. v. Green .. .7.02 nj 17
Manchester 14.04 Santos v. First Nat'( State
Rogers, Societe Internationale Pour Bank .......... 21.08 ns. 213, 215
Participations lndustrlels et Saporita v. Delco Corp. .. 16.06 n.200
Commerciales v 12.01 n.67 Savemart, Inc. v. Bowery Say.
Rogers v. Wi11ard .••..•. 14.04 n.122 Bank 15.05 n.213
Rohweder v. Aberdeen Prod. Credit Sawgrass Builders. Inc. v. Realty
Ass'n 22.01 n.8 Co-op, Inc 15.02 n.155
Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep.
· 19.04 0.124 Ins. Agents, Inc•... 4.03 ns. 86, 87
Romeo, Bradley v....•. 15.04 n.189; Scafidi v. Johnson ..•• . .. 16.05 n.168
16.02 n.131 Scappaticci v. Southwest Say. &:
Rose Checking Serv. v. Chemical Loan Ass'n ..........• 24.01 n.51
Bank N.Y. Trust Co.•. 15.05 n.215 SCCI, Inc. v. United States Nat'l
Rotuba Extruders. Inc. v. Cappes Bank ........•.••..•. 20.01 n.l0
· • • • . . . . . . . • . . . • . . •. 15.04 0.200 Scheper, United States v...•.•. 12.02
Ronne. Suddath Moving & Storage D.I06
Co. v. ........•..... 14.05 n.249 Schleder, Texas Export Dev. Corp.
Rouse v. People Leasing Co. v..•.••...••••.•.••• 14.04 D.137
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26.02 0.9 Schmidt, United States v•••.•. 12.02
Rovin, Slale v..•...•••. 20.09 n.211 n.117
Rowhanian, Thomas C. Cook. Inc. Schmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson
v..•.•......••....•. 15.05 n.223 ...............••.. ; 24.03 n.218
Rubin v. United States .•....... 7.02 Schnurr, Rainier Nat'i Bank v.
Ruefenacht. Gould v.•••• 7.02 0.127 · ........••.••....•••. 6.01 n.17
Runyan v. McCrary ..... 26.06 n.351 Schoenhut, United States v.
Rutherford v. Darwin ....•... 20.07 .............. 12.02 ns. 110, 111
Ryland Group Inc. v. Gwinnette Co. Schreiber, Seattle First Nat'l
Bank 15.01 n.91 Bank v......... 14.04 os. 156, 169
Schuler. Capital Bank v.•. 20.05 n.56
Schultz, Bank of Lyons v.••••• 16.01
s Scott v. Armstrong .... 10.02 os. 58,
0.66

Sackett. Farber v 21.10 0.235 . 75,76

Sackett. United Stlltes v•. , 12.02 n.162 Scongal, State v. .;........ 2.02 0.4
Safety Banking & Trust Co., Sears, Roebuck .I< Co. v.
Forrest v..........•. 14.04 0.182 I Brown 6.02 & n.78
 TABLE OF CASES T-66

[References are to paragraphs (f1) and notes (n.).]

Seattle First Nat'J Bank, M & M ! Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust
Leasing v.•....... 4.03 liS. 71. 98 I Co 20.03; 20.12 n.388
Seattle First Nat'J Bank v. I Sheldon v. First Fed. Say. &
Schreiber 14.04 ns. 156. 169 Loan 19.02 n.28
SEC v. First Tenn. Bank N.A. Shell Oil Co.• in re , 18.04 n.211
..................... 13.01 n.43 Shepard v. Abbott 14.04 n.121
SEC, Grafstrom v......•. 13.01 n.19 Sherrill White Constr., Inc. Y. South
SEC, Hunt v 13.0J n.17 Carolina Nat'l Bank 20.08 n.207
SEC v. O'Brien 13.01 D.ll Shevin, Fuentes v 19.02 n.74; 24.03
SEC v. Texas Gulf SuJphur Shively, United States v. 12.02
Co 7.02 n.118 ns. liS, 160
SEC Y. United Benefit Life Ins. Shultz, California Bankers Ass'n
Co 7.02 n.128 v. •..•••.••••.. 12.01 n.25; 13.01
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Shuster v. Doane , 22.07 n.336,
Co...........•...... 7.02 n.128 Silverman, Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.....•... 7.02 ...•............... , 20.06 n.114
Secretary of Banking, Pennsylvania Siniscalchi v. Valley Bank .. 20.05 n.58
Bankers Ass'n Y•••••• 14.04 n.164 Sinwellan Corp., Farmer's Bank v.
Securities Funds Servs., Inc. v. . .........•.......... 20.03 n.39
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Skaggs Co., LeVick v... , 26.03 n.182
Co. .......•....•••. 18.05 n.302 Siailghter v. Bank of Bisbee .... 14.04
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of n.121
Governors ... 5.02 & ns. 49, SO, 64, Sliger v. R.H. Macy & Co 26.02 n.7
66, 67, 120; 8.02 DS. 95, 125, Sly v. Barnett 19.03
129; 8.01 & n.48 Smith, City Nat'l Bank v 4.01 n.2
Securities Indus. Ass'n Clarke Smith. First Nat'. Bank v 4.01 n.2;
v 4.01 n.20; 6.01 & n.7; 6.02 4.03 n.87; 9.01 n.6; 11.02 n.53
n.82; 8.01 n.44 Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Credit Union 19.03
Comptroller of the Currency Smith, Independent Bankers Ass'n
· .......••..••... 8.01 ns. 60, 63 of Am. v 6.01 n.ll; 6.03
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Smith v. Kansas City Title &
FHLBB ..•...•........ 8.01 n.22 Trust Co ~. 14.01 n.8
Security Bank of Manchester, Smith v. Olympic Bank .. 15.08 n.358
Rogers v. .......•......... 14.04 Smith, Southeastern Fin. Corp. v.
Security Cent. Nat'l Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .. 15.04 n.192
Williams ..........••• 16.01 n.50 Smith v. Witherow ......• 10.02 n.21
Security First Nat'l Bank, Smith, Woodward v..... 14.04 n.123
Vesely v. ...••......•. 15.01 n.22 Smoker, First Nat'l Bank v..... 23.03
Security Nat'l Bank, Tusso v. n.126
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .. 20.05 n.60 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. .. 24.03
Security State Bank v. Morlock Sobania Constr. CoO., St. Cloud Nat'l
· ......•............. 15.01 n.78 Bank & Trust Co. v..... 16.01 n.26
Sendery v. American Express Co. Social Sec. Admin. Baltimore Fed.
· •.....•..•...•.•.... 16.01 n.28 Credit Union v. United States
Sequoyah State Bank v. Union Nat'l ....•.....•....•.••..• 7.01 n.12
Bank .... 14.04 n.140; 15.05 n.218 Societe Internationale Pour
Shaid, United Stales v... 12.02 n.167 Participations Industrillls et
Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Commerciales v. Rogers •.... 12.01
Block ...•.••........ 13.01 n.62 D.67
T·67 TABLE OF CASES

(References are If) paragraphs (f!) and note$ (n.).]

Society Nat'l Bank v. Kienzle .. IS.04 51. Louis County Nat'l Bank v.
D.224 MercaDtile Trost Co 6.01 D.7
Sokoloff v. National City Bank 51. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
· ...••••.....•..•...• 19.02 n.37 State Bank • • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 20.09
Somerfield v. FDIC ...•..• 9.0 I n.83 St. Philip Towing & Transp. Co. v.
Sommerville Technical Servs. v. Pavers, Inc.....••..•.. 7.02 n.127
United States 15.01 Stamatiou, Jefferson Bank & Trust
Sony Corp. of Am. v. American Co. v.. , ......•........... 16.06
Express Co..•...•.••• 15.05 n.219 Standard Fin. Co. v. Ellis ..... 16.02
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, Sherrill Standard 011 Co. v. Steele •.... IS.04
White Constr., Inc. v... 20.08 n.207 State, Nikrasch v.....•.•. 13.01 n.38
South Carolina Nat'l Bank of State v. Rovin ..•••••.. 20.09 n.211
Charleston, Banker's Trust of State v. Scougal ..•........ 2.01 n.4
S.C. v. ... 15.03 n.173; 20.08 n.190 State & Say. Bank v. Meeker
South E. Plaza Bank, Puckett v. • , ..........•••.•.... 21.03 n.116
· ..••..•.. '.' • . . • • • . . . • . .. 15.01 State Bank, Armstrong v 22.02
Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. Smith State Bank, SI. Paul Fire & Marine
.•.•.......•••.••..• 15.04 n.192 Ins. Co. v 20.09
Southern Colton Oil Co. v. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Okla.,
Merchants Nat'l Bank .. 21.03 n.128 Okla. ex rei 6.01 n.ll
Southers, United States v. .•... 12.02 State Banking Bd. v" First Nat'l
n.136 Bank, Colo. ex reI 6.01 D.I J
South Shore Bank, Atlantic Cement State by Lord v. First Nat'l Bank
Co. v. . ........•..... 20.03 n.25 · ......•...••.•.•••... 4.02 n.55
Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, State Corp. Comm'n v. Farmers &
Scappaticci v.••••••••• 24.01 n.5 I Merchants Nat'l Bank, Va., ex reI
Spa Flying Serv., Inc. v. United · •....•.•...•.•.....•.. 6.01 n.9
States • . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 13.0 I n.35 State Energy Resources ConservatioD
Speer v. Friedland •...•• 15.04 n.195 & Dev. Comm'n, Pacific Gas &
Spencer, First State Bank v. .•• 16.02 Elec. Co. v 14.01 n.22
Spiegel, Inc., Whitaker v. ..... 26.02 State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co.
Spielman v. Manufacturers Hanover · ...•.••....• 24.02 & ns. 130, 131
Trust Co 20.07 & n.l46 State Say. & Commercial Bank v.
Spinazzola v. Manufacturers Nat'l Anderson ...••..•.•.• 10.02 n.33
Bank 20.05 n.76 State Street Bank & Trost Co.,
Sports & Recreation Club, Inc., Bowling Green, Inc. v..• 16.04 D.159
McLaughlin v••••.••• 21.03 n.IOI Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan
Sprague, Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Ass'n ..•.•.•..•....••• 26.02 n.4
· . . • • . . . . • . • • • • • • • • .. 10.02 n.sS Steele, Standard Oil Co. v. .... 18.04
Springhill Bank & Trost Co. v. Steffen, United States v....•... 12.02
Gish .....•.•.•..•.•.••... 19.04 l1lL liS, 147
SI S Dart Canada, Colgate Stein v. Rand Constr. Co.....• 22.04
Palmolive v. ....••... 14.05 n.234 n.146
St. Cloud Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sterling Coal Co. v. United Am.
Sobania Constr. Co...•• 16.01 n.26 Bank 9.02 n.126
St. James v. Diversified Commercial Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Camp .. 4.01 n.2
Fin. Corp. ..•...•....• 16.01 n.s 1 Steven-Daniels Corp. v. Commercial·
St. Joseph Valley Bank, AmerlcaD Nat'l Bank ..•.•••••. 20.08 n.210
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.... 15.01 Stewart v. ThorntOn ••.•••.• " 16.01
0.82 Stoddard v. Stoddard .....•.• : 26.02
 TABLE OF CASES T-68

[References are to paragraphs (ff) and notes (n.).}

Stoddard, Stoddard v 26.02 T

Stoehsler, Engelcke v. .., 16.05 n.169
Stokes. United States v .• , 12.02 n.153 Tabler, Harris & Harris v 14.04
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. 0.155
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. Tan v, California Fed. Say. & Loan
................... , 20.12 n.405 Ass'n 24.01 n.32
Straughan, American Bank & Trust Tang, Valley Nat'l Bank v 19.02
Co. v..............• 20.09 n.212 n.30; 21.01 n.l
Strauss, Rector v. 14.04 n.123 Taylor, Citizen's Nat'l Bank v.
Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller .. 13.01 .................... 20.09 n.212
n.2 Tcherepnin v. Knight .... , 7.02 n.128
Suddath Moving & Storage Co. v. Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v,
Roure 14.05 n.249 FSUC 10.020.38 •
Sullivan, Union Bank v.. , 21.10 n.235 Temco Metal Prods. Co., Fred
Sullivan County Dorms, Sullivan Meyer, Inc. v 19.04 n.144
County Wholesalers, Inc. v... 15.04 Texas Am. Bank. Bradford Trust
n.202 Co. v 18.01 ns. 21, 22;
Sullivan County Wholesalers, Inc. v. 18.05 & n.301
Sullivan County Dorms .•... 15.04 Texas Bank & Trust, Harwood &
n.202 Assocs., Inc. v.......•..... 20.13
Sumitomo Bank, Corsica Livestock Texas Commerce Bank, Mitsui Mfrs.
Sales, Inc. v............•.. 19.04 Bank v 17.02 n.76
Sumitomo Shoji N.Y., Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank. N.A.,
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. Walker v.....•....... 18.05 n.302
· , 19.02 n.80; 20.05 n.76 Texas Commerce Medical Bank,
Sun 'N Sand, Ioc. v. United Cal. Kasbanchi v. 18.02 n.42
Bank 20.07 n.135; 20.12 Texas Export Dev. Corp. v.
Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co... 20.05 Schleder 14.04 n.137
ns. 65, 72 Texas Gulf Sulphur, SEC v..••• 7.02
Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC '" 9.01 n.118
ns. 28, 82 Thaw, Gleason v.•...... 25.08 n.284
Superior Court, Burrows v. 13.01 The Knoxville News-Sentinel
n.61 Co., in re ..•........ 13.01 & 0.63
Susen v. Citizen's Bank & Theron, United States v•.. 13.01 n.27
Trost Co. 19.03 Third Nat'l Bank. McConnico v.
· ; ........•... 20.06 n.l21
Svetahor, EI-Ce Storms Trust v. Third Nat'l Bank, Morgan Ouar.
· 15.06 n.274 Trust Corp. v. .....•. 14.05 n.252
Swerdlolf v, Miami Nat'J Bank .. 9.02 Third Nat'1 Bank. United States v.
n.126 · • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13.03 n.80
Swingle v. United States .. 12.02 n.122 Third Northwest Nat'l Bank,
Swiss Bank Corp., Evra Corp. v. Duryea v. • 9.02 n.l.26
· .. , 18.01 n.21; 18.05 ns. 296, 297 Thomas v. Bowen ....•.. 19.02 n.88
Swiss Bank Corp., Menthor. Thomas v. Estate of Eubanks .. 15.05
S.A. v.•.................. 20.07 0.209
Swiss Credit Bank. Board of Trade v. Thomas C. Cook, Inc. v.
• .....•.....•....... , 17.02 n.62 Rowhanian ........• '. J 5.05 n.223
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Thomas Cook, Inc..• Xanthopoulos v.
Corp..•.............. 17.02 0.72 · ........•.•........ 15.05 n.222
T·69 TABLE OF CASES

(References are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

Thompson v. Lake County Nat'l I Turner, In re ••........ 15.04 n.187
Bank 15.05 n.216 . Turner v. West Memphis Fed. Say. &
Thompson, United States v•...• 12.01 Loan Ass'n ...•....•... 26.01 n.3
n.34 Tush, Garnett State Say. Bank v.
Thompson Poultry. Inc. v. First Nat'l .•.•...••.•........ , 22.07 0.336
Bank .•.........•.•. 15.05 n.217 Tusso Y. Security Nat" Bank ... 20.05
Thoreson v. Citiz.ens State n.60
Bank 20.12 Twin Cities Bank v. Isaacs 20.03
Thorlon, Stewart v. .•...•..... 16.0 I n.37
Ticonic Na!'l Bank v. Sprague .. 10.02 Twombly, First Nat'( Bank v... 24.01
n.58 n.29
Tidwell, United States v. .• 12.02 n.133 Tyrone Pac. Infl, Inc. v. M.V.
Time, Inc., Regan v.......•.. 14.02 Eurychili .•............... 14.05
Tinker v. De Maria Ponche Audi,
Inc. 16.06 n.196
Tito Castro Conslr.• Inc., FDIC v.
· .....•.•.•••....•.. , 26.02 0.49
u
Tobon·Builes, United States v. , U.A. ·Local 38 Plumbers & Pipe
· ..•......•.•....... , 12.01 n.34 Trades Pension Funds, DOMvan v.
Tojeiro, Concepcion v••••• 15.01 0.92 .. , ... , ........•. 13.01 ns. 19, 35
Tokoph, United States v•..•••• 12.02 Underwriters Trust Co., Mortimer
ns. 104,106 Agency, Inc. v.•••••.• 15.05 n.240
Tomlin v. Neale .••..••. 14.04 n.122 UnicO v. Owen .... , 16.01 n.51: 16.06
Toon v. Wapinitia Irrigation Co. Union Bank, Cooper v•. , 20.08 n.178
· ............•...... 19.04 n.14O Union Bank, K&K Mfg.,
Tasca Corp. v. FDIC ... ,. 17.02 n.62 Inc. v 20.12
Tose v. First Pa. Bank ...••..•. 9.02 Union Bank, Rae v..••••••..•. 9.02
Toson. United States v..• , 25.02 n.27 Union Bank v. Sullivan .. 2\.10 n.235
Total Automation, Inc. v. Illinois Union Bank & Trust Co., Shaw v.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co... 4.030.100 • .. .. .. .. .. ... 20.03; 20.12 n.388
Touche Ross & Co., Exchange Nat'l Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
Bank v..•.....••..... 7.02 n.134 Collins v 26.02 &. n.13
Touche Ross & Co., Radz.anower v. Union Say. Bank v. Cassing ... 21.03
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.01 n.25 n.98
Town & Country State Bank Y. First Union Nat'l Bank, Lexington v.
State Bank ..•..•...•. 21.03 n.116 .................... 19.04 n.140
Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Union Nat'l Bank, Sequoyah State
Governors .....•••.•• " 5.01 0.18 Bank v..• 14.04 n.140; 15.05 n.218
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. Y. Union Nat" Bank of Laredo v.
Citibank .... '" ....... 17.020.62 Nelson .•••••••.•.•. 26.02 & n.93
Transamerica Fin. Servs., Villegu v. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers &:
...••.. '" ., .......•. 26.02 n.15 Merchants Nat'! Bank 20.!2
Trend Group. Ltd., Nordic Bank n.378
PLC v.......••....... 9.02 n.122 Uni-Serv Corp. \/. Comm'r .. 26.02 iI.7
Trick. Overmyer v.....•.• 19.02 n.74 United Am. Bank, Sterling Coal
Trustees of Tufts College v. Co. v: ...............• !).02 n.126
Parlance Sportwear Co. ..... 14.04 United Apparel Dislrib., Inc. v.
n.137 Chase Manhattan Bank,
Tucker, United States v.. , 12.02 n.167 N.A. .••...••..••.•• 15.05 0.220
 TABLE OF CASES T-70

[Rejuences are to paragraphs (f) and notes (n.).]

United Bank, Clark v..•.. 9.02 n.125 United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
L'nited Bank v. Mesa N.O. McSweeney ........•...... 19.03
Nelson Co 20.08 n.183 United States Trust Corp. v. Board
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge of Governors ..... 5.01 ns. 34, 40
Sporting Goods Corp. .. 17.01 n,49 USDA, McGloshen v .•••• 13.01 n.43
United Benefit Life Ins. Co. Usery v. First Nat'! Bank ..... 26.04
SEC v 7.02 n.128 n.256
U.S.I.A. Homes, United States v.
United Cal. Bank, Kendall Yacht
Corp. v ..•.•••••• 20.03 ns. 34, 39 · ......•.... , ...•... 12.02 n.191
Utah Lake Irrigation Co. v.
United Cal. Bank, Sun 'N Sand, Allen 14.04 n.121
Inc. v 20.07 n.135; 20.12 Utah Sec. Mortgage, Inc.,
United Fasteners, Inc. v. First Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
State Bank of Crossett .. 15.040.203 · 15.06 njOG
United Fin. Co., Anderson v. Utica Na!'1 Bank & Trust Co. v.
· 26.06 & ns. 379, 383,406 Associated Prod. Co., .. 22.07 n.236
United Health Club, Zions First
Nat'l Bank v... 20.13; 24.02 n.103
United Hous. Found. v. v
Forman 7.02 n.124
United Ky. Bank, Inc. v. Eagle Vacura v. Haar's Equip., Inc
Mach. Co 21.11 n.332 · .........•....... " 22.07 n.247
United Nat'l Bank, Fidelity Bank Vahico Corp., United States v.
v 20.08 n.197 · . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . .. 15.06 n.302
United Parcel Servo v. Weben Indus., Valley Acceptance Corp. v. Glasby
Inc 22.07; 23.03 n.131 ...•...........•..... 26.02 0.14
United Sav., Indermill v••...•• 24.02 Valley Bank, Siniscalchi v••••. 20.05
n.l04 n.58
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bennett v..•.••••••••• 16.01 n.63 Weyerman Feathers .. 19.03 n.121;
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. 20.05 n.67
v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Zions
· 21.02 0.61; 21.05; 21.05 First Nat') Bank ..... 15.05 n.214:
ns. 162, 163 20.06
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., Vaney Nat'l Bank, National Retailers
Jennings v..........• 15.04 n.207 Corp. v..........•.... , 4.03 n.78
United States Nat'l Bank, Best v. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Porter
· ..... 14.01 n.23; 24.01 n.27; 24.02 · ••......•....•...... 16.01 n.34
n.129; 26.02 n.20 Valley Nat'J Bank v. Tang ..••. 19.02
n.30; 21.01 n.l
United States Nat'l Bank, FDIC v. Valley Nat'! Bank, Sunnymead v.
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10.02 Cook 15.04 n.191
United States Nat'l Bank, SCCI, Van Buren Bank, Marion Nat'l
Inc. v 20.01 n.l0 Bank v. . •..••..••.•.•. 6.01 0.24
United States Nat'( Bank, Vaughn Vance v. Vance 15.01 n.81
v 18.04; 18.05 n.220 Vance, Vance v 15.01 n.81
United States Nat'( Bank, Wentworth . Van Senus Auto Paris, Inc. v.
& Irwin, Inc. v.......•. 22.01 n.28 Michigan Nat'1 Bank 21.01 n.81
United States Say. Bank v. Van Wyk, Marcoult v 11.01 n.24
Morgenthau . . . . .. 10.02 ns. 20, 32 Varbel, United States v 12.01 n.34
T-71 TABLE OF CASES

[Relerencu are to paragraphs (fi) and note$ (n.).]

Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.• ) Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., Uniled
SEC v 7.02 n.128 , Slates v..•....•...... 23.02 n.49
Vaughn v. United States Nat'l Wapinitia Irrigation Co., Toon v.
Bank 18.04; 18.05 n.220 · .................•. 19.04 n.140
Veazie Bank v. Fenno ..... 14.01 n.8 Ward v. Federal Kemper 1m. Co.
Venture Contractors, Inc., ••••....•.•••••••••• , 21.03 n.98
FDIC v 10.02 & n.l 02 I Ward Y. First Interstate Baolt of
Vesely v. Security First Nat'l t Riverton 20.05 n.83
Bank 15.01 n.22 I Ward, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
Viaies Iberia, S.A. v. Dougherty v 6.02 D.73
· ...........•....... 15.04 n.194 Warren, Benton State Bank v.
Vial v. First Commerce Corp. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . •. 22.07 n.246
· ........••.•.•••... 13.03 n.IOI Warrington v. Dawson ••. 22.07 n.247
Vilkins, Mercantile Bank & Trust Warrington, Larsen v..•.. 23.02 D.49
Co. v 21.03 & n.88 Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Y. •
Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. FHLBB 10.02 n.40
Servs 26.02 n.15 Washington Mut Say. v. FDIC
Vinlero Sales, Corporacion · ....•...••......•••• 13.03 n.99
Venezolana de Fomento v.•. 16.0/ Washing'lon Nan Ins. Co.,
Virginia Capital Bank v. Aetna Durrett v 25.07
Casualty & Sur. Co. '" 20.09 n.235 Waterford No.2 Oftlce Center,
Virtue v. Danbury State Bank United States v.....••• 22.03 n.80
..................... 21.02 n.56 W.B. Farms v. Fremont Nat'l
Visa USA, National Bancard Corp. . Ballk & Trust Co. .•.•. 15.02 n.117
v 18.03 n,,145 Weaver, Marine Bank v...•.. 7.02 &
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan ns. 129, 132
Bank 19.02 n.37 Weben Indus., Inc.. United Parcel
Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Servo v.•.•••••• 22.07; 23.03 0.131
Manhattan Bank .•.... 17.02 n.63 Weese, Lovejoy v, 20.03 0.26
Wegel1latic Corp., United States v.
· ..... , •....... , ..... 14.01 0.16
Weiner v. American Petrofina
w Mktg., Inc. . ..••••... 24.04 n.233
Weintraub. Commodities Futures
Wade, Keister v••••••••• 21.10 n.239 Trading Comm'n v 25.07
Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, Weise, First Nat'] Bank v. • 4.03 n.l03
N.A. .....•......... 18.05 n.302 Weiss v. Advest, Inc..•... 20.05 n.78
Walker Bank & Trust Co., First Weld Colo. Banll: v. B & E Constr.,
Nat'l Bank v•.•• 4.03 n.77; 6.01 n.6 Inc. •••••.•...•...••. 22.02 n.50
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Welleoltamp v. Bank of Am.
Jones .......•............ 18.04 · . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • . • .. 24.01 n.33
Walker Thomas Furniture Co., Welliver, United States v.••... 12.02
Williams v..•..•...... 19.02 D.75 ns. 111, 119
Wall v. East Tex. Teachers Credit Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank
Union 14.04 n.202 · . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . • •. 19.02 n.39
Wallace, American Bank & Trust Wells Fargo Baolt, Conlon v... 24.02
Co. v 7.02 n.134 Wentworth & Irwin, Inc. v. United
Wallace, Wyman v...••.•. 4.03 n.82 States Nat'! Bank 22.01 n.28
Waller, Subul'ban Trust Co. v. Weslern Auto Supply Co. v. Bank
· •.................... 13.01 0.2 of Imboden ....•....• 23.03 n.137
 TABLE OF CASES T-72

[References are to paragraphs (f/) and notes (n.).]

Western Bank v. RaDec Constr. Williams v. Walker Thomas
Co 14.04 n.]30 Furniture Co 19.02 n.75
Western NaCl Bank v. Armstrong Willis, Karner v 24.01 n.31;
· 4.03 n.82 24.02 n.139
Westland Towers ApIS., City NaCI Wilmington Trust Co. v. Phoenix
Bank v 17.02 n.52 Steel Corp 19.04 n.144
West Memphis Fed. Sav. & Loan Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of
Ass'n, Turner v 26.01 n.3 Governors 5.01
Westroads Bank, Maddox v. Wilson v. M & W Gear .. , 23.02 n.37
· 20.08 n.185 Wilson, United States \' 13.01 n.19
West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Wingate, Anna Nat" Bank v.
Exch. Bank 21.02 ns. 76, 77 15.06 n.270
Weubke v. Richardson & Sons, Inc Winitzki, Bowers v 15.02 n.155
.................... 15.04 n.201 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co. "
Weyennan Feathers, Valley Bank & ...••..............•.. 26,02 n.7
Trust Co. v.•....•... 19.03 n.121; Witherow, Smith v 10.02 n.21
20.05 n.67 Wittnebel v. Loughman .. 10.02 n.42
Whalen & Sons Orain Co. v. Missouri W.I. Howey Co.. SEC v, ...•... 7.02
Delta Bank .... 21.03 n.122; 21.11 W.O.A., Inc. v. City Nat'l
n.335 Bank 17.02 n.71
Whitaker v. Spiegel, Inc 26.02 Woffard, First New England Fin.
White Motor Credit Co., Yampolsky Corp. v 16.06
v...........•....... 22.06 n.231 Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico
White Oak State Bank, Barr v. . 7.02 n.133
· 22.03; 23.02 Wood, FDIC v 10.02 & n.89
White Oak State Bank, Greer v. Woodall, Continental Bank & Trust
· ... . .. ... . . .. .. ... 20.10 n.245 Co., Salt Lake City v..... 3.03 n.73
Whiting Pools, United States v. Woodard, Illinois Valley Acceptance
.............. 25.04 ns. Ill, 113 Corp. v 16.01 n.64
Wichard v. Fitburn 14.01 n.6 Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank of Irvine
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing , 10.02 ns. 85, 121
Co. v. Pacific Nat'! Bank Woodford Bank & Trust Co., Blake
..................... 17.01 n.45 v 21.11 n.325
Wwiley, Berg v 24.03 n.158 Woodrow, Wyandotte v , 21.01 n.l
i1ey v. People's Bank & Trust Co. Woods v. Bank of N.Y.. ,. 21.03 n.93
· , . . .. . .. 21 .11 n. 371 Woodward v. Metro Bank
Wilhelm Foods, Inc. v. Nat'!
Bank 21.02 n.51; 21.04 n.142 7.02 n.135
Wilkinson, Schmode's, Inc. v. Woodward v. Smith 14.04 n.123
· 24.03 n.218 Woolf, Northeast Bancorp v.
Willard, Rogers v 14.04 n.122 6.02 n.67
Willillms v. Montana Nat'! Bank W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat'l
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20.09 n.225 Bank & Trust Co. ..... 20.06 n.! 20
Williams, Security Cent. Nat'! W.T. Grant Co., Mitchel! v 24.03
Bank v 16.01 n.50 Wyandotte v. Woodrow 21.01 n.l
Williams, United States v 12.02 WYHY Fed. Credit Union v.
n.123 Burchell 22.02 n.55
Witliams v. United Stales .... 12.02 & Wy!e v. Bank Melli .. 17.02 ns. 74, 76
n.123 Wy!eie, Pinkney v 4.03 n.90
T-73 TABLE OF CASES

[Re!erence$ are 10 paragraph$ (f) and nOle$ (n.).]

Wyman v. Wallace .....•.. 4.03 n.82 I Yoder v. Cromwell Slate Bank
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Board I' 20.10 n.245
of Governors .•.•...•. 13.03 n.80 York Bank & Trust Co. v,
FSLIC 10.02 n.129
Young v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
'" Say. Ass'n 18.04 n.210
X Youngblood, Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank v.. , 20.05 n.59
Xanlhopoulos v. Thomas Cook,
Inc....•............ 15,05 n.222
Xerographic Supplies Corp. v. Hertz z
Commercial Leasing Corp. " 16.06
n.199 Zeinfeld, Berryfast, Inc. v..... 15.04
Zeller, Lindsey v 15.06 n.273
limeri "I. Citizens & S. Inl'l •
Bank ...•...•.....•.... ,. 20.13
y Zions First Nal') Bank v. United
Health Club ... 20.13; 24.02 n.103
Yahn & McDonnell, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, Valley Bank
Farmers Bank, ... 14.04 & llS. 168, & Trust Co. v••• 15.05 n.214; 20.06
170,15.0711.309; 16.02 n.130; Zions Utah Bancorporation, United
21.10 & n.242 States v....••••••••.• 13.03 n,86
Yakima Adjustment Servo Inc. v. Zwego, Uniled Slates v..... 12.02 ns.
Durand ......•.••........ 19.03 160, 161
Ynmpolsky v. White Motor Credit Zweifel, Jupiter Orrington Corp. v.
Co. 22.06 n.231 I .....•....•..•..... " 17.02 n.76
 Index
[References are to paragraphs (f).]

A Accounts
See also Agents; Fiduciaries;
Acceleration clause Statements
Code limitations, 24.01 [I ][b ][iii] accounts receivable, 22.0 I[I]
due on sale clause definition of, 22.07[1]
enforcement, 24.01 [I ][c][i] security interests in, 22.07[1]
Gam-St Germain Act, definition of, 22.0 I[I]
24.01 [I][c][ii] security interests iri, 22.07[ J]
good faith, 24.01[1][b][i] Adhesion contracts. See Contracts;
holder in due course, 24.011:t}(b] Unconscionable agreements
promissory notes, 24.01[1][b] Administrative agencies, source of
security agreement, 24.03[1] commercial law, 14.0 I
types of acceleration provisions, Administrative Procedures Act,
24.0 I{I][b][ii] 10.02[6](b]
Acceptance application to federal regulatory
bank acceptances, 7.01[2][b][i] agencies, 14.01 [3]
certified checks, 15.05[5] Advertising
domestic transactions, 7.01[2][b][i] consumer credit disclosures.
drafts, 15.05[5] 26.03[5][b]
as exception to limitation on loan to Agents
single borrower, 7.01[2][b] See also Fiduciaries; Trustees
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, banks as, 21.01(1]
7.01[2][b][i] civil money penalties assessed against,
full payment checks, 24.01[3][b] 9.01[3]
accord and satisfaction, 24.01 [3][b] death of, 19.02[5]
Code regulations, 24.01[3][b] indorsements by, 15.01[3]
international transactions, liability of, 15.04
7.01 [2J[b][i] representative capacity, 19.02[5]
liability, 15.02[3] Agreements
bank's, 15.05[5] See also Contracts; Security
Acceptors, liability of, 15.02[2] agreements; Subordination
Accommodation parties agreements
consumer transactions, 15.06[4] check truncation, 21.0 I[4]
defenses to payment of, 15.06[3] nondeposit, 19.05
definition of, 15.06 private, 21.01[4]
legal relationships of, 15.06 repurchase, 19.05
liability on instrument, 15.06[1] signature cards, 19.03[2][d]
obligation to pay, 15.06[2] truncation, 21.06
right to recovery against principal, unconscionable, 19.02[4]
15.06[1] variation of regUlations, 21.0J{4]
type of surety, 15.06 Agricultural banks, 1.0 I

1-1
 INDEX 1·2

[Rejuenu3 are 10 paragraphs (f).J

Alterations Attachments
checks, 20.09 of individual accounts, 19.02[5J
bank's liability for accepting, of joint accounts, 19.03[2J[c)
15.05[5][b] security interests, 22.02[ I]
complete when signed. 20.09[ I] Attomey-elient privilege
issued with blanks, 20.09[2] waiver of in bankruptcy proceedings,
depositor's duty of due care, 20.12[3] 25.07[8][b]
depositor's duty to report, 20.l2[IJ, Automated clearinghouses (ACHs)
20.12[2J book entry government securitiell,
holders in due course, 16.0I[2][b1 18.05[6J
unauthorized, 19.04[2J credit transactions, 18.0J[I][b]
negligence contributing to, 20.12(3] debit transactions, 18.01(IJ[b]
Antitrust laws definition of, 18.0I [I ][b]
See also Bank Holding Company Act; Federal Reserve System services,
Bank Merger Act; Clayton Act; 3.04[5][b]
Federal Trade Commission regulation of, 18.05[5]
Improvement Act; Shennan Act clearinghouse 8.llociation rules,
application of. 13.03[1] 18.01[1][b]
scope of. J3.03[ I] Federal Reserve Board, J8.01(1][b]
Anti-tying provisions U.S. Treuury, 18.05[6]
bank holding companies. S.01(4][c] U.S. government payments
Bank Holding Company Act, 9.02(5] direct deposit program, l8.01(1][b]
entities affected. 9.02[5] regulation of, 18.05[6]
Federal Trade Commission Automated teller machines (ATMs).
Improvement Act. 13.03[2] 18.01[1 lee]
institutions exempt from bank as branch banks, 6.03
classification, 5.01 (4](c] guidelines for, 6.03
savings and loan associations. intrastate and interstate networks of,
7.01 (2){c] 6.03
Sherman Act, 9.02[5] regulatory questions raised by
transactions affected, 9.02(5J operation of, I8.0J(J][e}
Asian Development Bank, 2.05(5) restrictions on interstate banking, 6.03
state laws dealing with. 6.03
Assets
assignment to creditors. 25.06 Automatic stay
bankruptcy trust administers. 25.07 bankruptcy proceediDJI. 25.05
distribution, 25.06 environmental protection. 25.09[6][a]
liquidation, 25.02[1] Automatic transfer accounts
in reorganization, 25.02(3] authority to establish. litigation on,
transfer. in bankruptcy, 25.07[6) 19.02[2](f]
Assignment definition of, 19.02[2][f]
of assets for creditors. 25.06 Automobiles. See Motor vehicles
as secured transaction, 22.03[4J
of security interests B
filing notice of, 22.03[4]
modification of contract, 22.03(4} Bad faith
notice to party making payments, adhesion or ullConscio.nable contracts.
22.03[4] 19.02[4]
steps for perfected interest, 22.03[4] promissory notes, payable on demand,
ATMs. S~e Automated teller machines 24.01[1][aJ

Bank Conservation Act 01 l'Jjj.·

overdraft, i 9.03{i](f]
1-3 INDEX

[Refermces are /0 paragraphs (f).]

Bailee, bank as, 19.02[1][b] payable on death, 19.03[2][b]
Bailment payments made to third parties,
bona fide, 23.02[I][a] 19.02[2]
collateral held in, 22.04[ I][b] refusal to give information about,
night depository as, 19.02[1][b] 20.13
rights of owners under, 23.02[I][a] representations
safekeeping by bank as, 19.02[1][b] bank's liability, 20.13
Bailouts, nonviolation of anti-tying debt security, 20.13
provisions, 9.02[5] status of accounts, 20.13
representative, 19.02[5]
Bank accounts
savings, 19.02[2][b]
account, defined, 19.01 security interest in, 22.07[7]
Regulation CC, 21.06 share draft, 19.02[2][g]
attachments of, 19.02[5] signature cards, 19.03[2][d]
automatic transfer, 19.02[2][f] signatures, 19.04
bank's right to charge, 20.01 special deposit, 19.02[2][c]
as cash proceeds, 22.07[7] survivorship rights, 19.03[2]
certificates of deposit (CDs), suspension by court action, 19.02[5]
19.02[2][d] termination of relationship, 19.02[5]
checking, 19.02[2][a] time deposit, 19.02[2]
contracts of adhesion, 19.02[4] transaction, 19.02[2]
corporate, 19.03[4] unconscionable agreements, 19.02[4]
creditor's rights, 19.03[2][c] withdrawals,20.11[IJ
death of agent, 19.02[5] Expedited funds Availability Act,
death of depositor, 19.02[5] 2Q.lI [I ][b]
demand, 19.02[2][a] against items deposited, customer's
demand deposit, 19.02[2] right, 20.11[1]
fees charged to, 20.0 I unauthorized, duty to examine
fiduciary, 19.02[1][b] statement for, 20.12[1]
foreign branch, 19.02[1][c]
forms of, 19.03 Bank Bribery Amendments Act of 1985,
freezing of, 25.09[3][c] 12.02[1]
improper payment from, 19.03[2][g] Bank cards. See Credit cards
incompetence of depositor, 19.02[5] Bank competition
individual, 19.03[1] anticompetitive conduct
joint or multiple party, 19.03[2] antitrust regulation, 13.03[1]
kinds of, 19.02[2] change in control, 13.03[4]
legal guardillJl!hip, 19.02[5] consolidations and mergers, 13.03[3]
limited exclusion of transfer of unfair trade practices, 13.03[2]
interests in, 22.07[7] antitying provisions, 9.02[5]
Code regulations, 22.07[7] between banks and nonbank banks,
limited partnership, 19.03[3] 1.02[5] .
married women, 19.02[5] between commercial banks and thrift
miscredited proceeds, 20.07 institutions, 3.03[5]
money market, 19.02[2][h] effect of bank mergers, 13.03[1]
negotiated order of withdrawal export trading companies, 5.02[4]
(NOW), 19.02[2][e] management interlocks, 9.02[5]·
nondeposit liabilities, 19.05 between national banks and Slate
opening of, 19.02[3] banks, 4.03[2)
overdraft, 19.03[2][f] Bank Conservation Act of 1933,
partnership, 19.03[3] appointment of conservator, 10.05
 INDEX 1-4

[R~(,ftmc('s art' /0 paragraphs (f).]

Bank credit cards. S('t' Credit cards liability of examining authorities,
Bank directors 7.01[1]
civil money penalties assessed against, of member banks, 3.03(3]
9.0/[3] by National Credit Union
claims against, in receivership, Administration, juriadiction,
10.02[5] 7.01[1]
manasement interlocks, 9.02[6] by state authorities, 7.01 [I]
negligence, 10.02[6][a] Garn-St Germain Depository
preclusion from handling assets during Institutions Act, 7.01[n
receivership, 10.02(2) unclaimed property, 7.01[1]
special liabilities of, 9.01(4) uniform guidelines on capital
suspension and removal of adequacy, 7.01[1]
authority of federal regulatory uniform rating system, 7.01[1]
agencies, 9.0 I [2](a] uniform ",porting systems, 7.01[1]
limitations, 9.0J(2][a) Bank holding companies
procedure,9.0l[2)[b] S('t' also Bank Holding Company Act
Bank drafts, definition of, 14.03[1] of 1956; Nonbank banks; Savings
BankempJoyees and loan holding companies
bankruptcy filing by, 25.09[5] acquisition of thrift institutionr
civil money penalties assessed against, healthy thrifls, 6.06
9.01(3] weak thrifts, 1O.03[2][a]
management interlocks, 9.02(6) activities closely related to banking,
5.02{2]
Banl-.eTS' acceptances, 7.01[2][b][i]
antitying provisions, 5.01{4][c]
definition of, 14.03[1] bankers' banks, 5.02[3)[e]
Bankers' banks, 5.02(JJ[e] bank service corporations, 5.02[J][d]
financing and development of export Comptroller of the Currency
trading companies, 5.02[4] certification of, 4.01{1]
Bank examination control, defined, 5.01 [I]
See also Financial Institutions exceptions to prohibition on nonbank
Examination Council activities, 5.02[ I]
access to reports and records, 7.01[1] activities closely related to banking,
by Board of Governors of the Federal 5.02[2]
Reserve System, jurisdiction, determination of, 5.02[2][b]
7.01[1] Regulation Y, 5.02[2][a)
compliance with elcheat laws, 7.0 I [1] exempt companies, 5.01[1]
by Comptroller of the Cunency, 4.02 thrift institutions, 5.01[4]{f]
jurisdiction, 7.01[1] expansion into nonbanking activities,
by Fedenl Deposit Insurance 5.01 [2J, 6.02[3]
Corporation, 11.0 I export trading companies,
jurisdiction, 7.0 I [I] participation in financing and
by Federal Home Loan Bank Board, development of, 5.02[4]
jurisdiction, 7.01[1] Federal Reserve Board regulatory
of Federal Reserve Banks, 3.03[3] authority, 203
by Federal Savings and Loan Glass-Steagall Act provisions,
Jnsurance Corporation, 7.0 J[I] 8.0 I [2][b]
of foreign banks, 7.01[1) grandfather rights, 5.01["][c]
International Lending Supervision Act growth of, 5.0I[IJ, 6.02
capital adequacy, 7.01 [I] restrictions on, 5.01 [2]
loans to foreign parties, 7.0 I[1] history of, 5.01 [2]
1-5 INDEX

[R~f~r~nces ar~ /0 paragraphs (f).]

impetus for restructuring of banking immediate divestiture for new bank
market into, 1.01 acquisitions, 5.0114)tb)
incidental powers, 4.03[2] moratorium on certain nonbanking
insurance activities, 5.02[3][c] activities, 5.02[3][a]
interstate expansion through nonbank purpose of, 5.01[2]
subsidiaries, 6.02[3] Douglas amendment restrictions on
Competitive Equality Banking Act interstate banking, 6.02[1]
restrictions on, 6.02[4] Export Trading Company Act
loan and finance companies, 2.05[2] amendment of, 5.02[4]
management interlocks, 9.02[6] prohibition on nonbank activities,
1987 moratorium 5.02[1]
foreign banks, certain activities of, exceptions, 5.02[1]
5.02[3][a][i] restrictions on acquisitions, 5.01[2]
insurance activities, 5.02[J][a][iii] loophole in act's definition of
real estate dealings, 5.02[3][a][iv] "bank," 5.01[2]
securities transactions, 5.02[J][a][ii] Bank holidays
number of, 5.01[1] Comptroller of the Currency's power
organization of to declare, 4.02[1]
business trusts, 5.01[1] emergency of 1933, 1.02[4]
employee stock ownership plans, state authority's power to declare,
5.01[1] 4.02[1]
corporations, 5.01 [I] Banking
partnerships, 5.01[1} See also Branch banking; Foreign
prohibition on nonbank activities, banking; International banking;
5.02[1] Interstate banking
hearings and judicial review, activities closely related to, 1.0 I
5.02(2)[c) competition, between banks and
Regulation Y, 5.02[2][a] nonbank banks, 1.02[5]
restrictions competition in, 1.01
on growth, 5.0I[2] national banking system, 1.02[3]
on securities activities, 8.01 [8][a] nature of, 1.01
on transactions with affiliates, regulation of, history, 1.02
5.01 [4J[g] restrictions on interstate banking, 1.01
securities activities, 5.02[3][b] special organizations with banking
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 functions, 2.05
amendments on one-bank holding use of automated teller machine
companies, 5.01[2] systems, 6.03
antitrust concerns, 13.03[1] Banking Act of 1933
antitying provisions, 9.02[5] See also Glass-Steagall Act
bank, defined, 5.01 (4) control of interest rates on savings
exceptions, 5.01[4][a] accounts, CDs, 1.02[4]
bona fide trust companies, 6.02[4) establishment of Federal Deposit
civil money penalties for violation of, Insurance Corporation, 11.0I
9.01 [3] . payment of interest on demand
Competitive Equality Banking deposits, barred, 1.02l4]
Amendments of 1987 prohibition against management
broadened definition of bank, interlocks! 9.02[6J
5.01 (4) Banking agencies. See Federal regulatory
grandfathered companies, 5.0I[4)[c] agencies
 INDEX 1-6

[References Ilfe 10 paragraphs (f).)

Banking days, definition of, 19.01 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Regulation Cc, 21.06 Judgeship Act of 1978, 25.01
Banking law. See Commercial banking Bankruptcy Code, 25.0 I
law; Federal law; State law bankruptcy courts, 25.0 I
Banking reforms Bankruptcy Judges, United States
establishment of national banking Trustees, and Family Farmer
system, 1.02[3) Bankruptcy Act of 1986,25.01
national bank charters, 1.02(3) Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 25.0]
reserve requirements, 1.02[4) Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, 25.0 I
Banking Report, regulatory matters checks in process of collection,
published in, 14.01(3) 25.09[1]
claim, defined, 25.06
Bank Merger Act. antitrust concerns, claims against third parties, 25.0 I
13.03[1] .
collection effom, 25.05[IJ
Bank officers collection of alimony, 25.05[2]
See a/so Agents; Bank directors; core proceedings, 25.0 I
Fiduciaries corporate reorganizations, 25.02[3J
civil money penalties assessed against, credit card purchases, 25.09[4]
9.01[3] creditor's committee, 25.01
claims against, in receivership, criminal proceedings against debtor,
10.02[5] 25.05[2]
management interlocks, 9.02[6] debt adjustment, 25.02[2]
negligence, 10.02[6][a] pensioners, 25.02(2]
preclusion from handling assets during self-employed, 25.02[2J
receivership, 10.02[2] wage earners, 25.02(2)
special liabilities of, 9.01[4J debtor in possession, 25.0 I
suspension and removal of discharge, 25.08
authority of federal regulatory nondischargeable debts, 25.08[ IJ
agencies, 9.01[2][a] objections to, 25.08[2]
limitations, 9.0I[2][a] reaffirmation of debt, 25.08[3]
procedure, 9.0 I[2](b] distributions to creditors, 25.06
Bank Robbery Act, 12.02[4] district couru, 25.0 I
Bankruptcy employees filing, 25.09[5]
See also Dissolutions; Insolvency; discrimination against, 25.09[5]
liquidations; Reorganizations environmental protection, 25.09[6]
adequate protection, 25.05[4] abandonment of property,
administration of estate, 25.05[1] 25.09[6][c]
allowance process, 25.06 automatic stay and, 25.09(6](a]
antecedent debt, 25.07[4] Environmental Prot~tion Agency,
appeals, 25.0 I 25.09[6)
automatic stay, 25.05 federal and Slate law, 25.09[6)
environmental proccedinga, liability for cleanup, 25.09(6)[c]
25.09[6][a] orders and fines, 25.09[6)[b)
exceptions, 25.05[2] priority of claims, 25.09[6J(d]
general rule, 25.05[1] equitable SUbordination, 24.02[2][aJ
protection of collateral, 25.05[4) executory contracts, 25.07[7]
refief from, 25.05[3J exempt property, 25.04[2]
setoff rights, 25.09(3)[c) family farmer, 25.02(4)
unsecured creditors, 25.05[4] foreclosure proceedings, 25.05[1]
bank account suspension on, 19.02[5) freezing of bank accounts, 25.09[3)[c)
1-7 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

involuntary petitions, 25.03 waiver of attorney-client privilege,
creditors required, 25.03 25.07[8][b]
exemptions, 25.03 Bankruptcy A.mendments and Federal
issues involving rights and duties of Judgeship Act of 1978, 25.01
bank, 25.09 Bankruptcy Judges, United States
jurisdiction, 25.0 I Trustees, and Family Farmer
lawsuits,25.05[1] Bankruptcy Act of 1986,25.01
letters of credit, 25.04 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
as preferences, 25.09[2] Bankruptcy Code enacted as part of,
making claim, 25.06 25.01
nondischargeable debts, 2.5.08[1] rights of unpaid sellers to reclaim
credit card purchases, 25.09[4] goods, 23.03[3]
perfection of security interests, Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, 25.0~
25.07[4] Banks
petitions for, 25.01 See also Federal regulatory agencies;
postpetition transfers, 25.09[1] individual classes of banks
preferences, 25.07[4] agricultural banks, 1.0 I
priority claims, 25.06 antitying provisions, 7.01[2][c]
priority of claims Asian Development Bank, 2.05[5]
adequate protection, 25.05[4] bailees, 19.02[ I][b]
order of, 25.06 bankers' banks, 1.01
procedure,25.01 bank holding companies, 1.01
proof of claim, 25.06 bankruptcy issues involving rights and
filing, 25.06 duties of. 25.09
property of estate, 25.04 Banks for Cooperatives, 2.01[8][c]
abandoning, 25.07[8][c] civil money penalties assessed against,
determining,25.04[1] 9.01[3]
exemptions, 25.04[2] competition. See Bank competition
lien avoidance, 25.04[3] conversion of, 4.02
turnover of, 25.04[4] credit unions, 2.01 [5][b]
related proceedings, 25.01 definition of, 5.01[4)
secured creditors, 25.0 I Bank Holding Company Act of
setoff rights, 25.09[3] 1956, 5.01[3]
freezing accounts, 25.09[3][c] amended definitions, 5.01[[3]
insufficiency, defined, 25.09[3][b] exceptions, 5.0IU4][a]
involuntary bankruptcy, 25.09[3][d] Regulation CC, 21.06
postpetition, 25.09[3][a], 25.09[3][c] Uniform Commercial Code, 19.01
prepetition, 25.09[3][b] directors, suspension and removal of,
source of law, 25.01 9.01[[2]
state law dissolution of, 4.02
paying checks, 25.09[1] Edge corporations, international
setoff rights, 25.09[3][a] banking, 2.05[3]
trustee, 25.0 I establishment of branch banks, 4.02
adequate protection, 25.05[4] examination of. See Bank examination
duties of, 25.07 Export-Import Bank of the United
powers of,25.07 States, 2.05[4]
unsecured creditors, 25.01 Farm Credit Banks, 2.05[8][J]
voluntary or involuntary petitions, Federal Home Loan Mortgage
25.03 Corporation, 2.05[6](a]
 INDEX 1-8

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

Danks (cont'd) savings banks, 2.01[5J[cJ
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, savings institutions, 2.01{5]
2.0S[8][b] setoff rights, 25.09(3)
Federal Land Banks, 2.0S[8][a) Solar Energy and Energy
Fcdcr1l.1 Nationa! Mongage Conservation Bank, 2.05[7)
Association, 2.0S[6][c] specific organizations with banking
fees charged to customer accounts, functions, 2.05
regulation of, 20.0 I thrift institutions, 2.01[5]; 5.01[4][1)
fiduciary capacily, 24.02[1] trustees, 19.02[ I J[bJ
transactions. 24.02[I][b) unclaimed property, 7.01[1]
trust fund exemptions, 7.02[1] underwriters, 8.01 [4] .
financial assi&tance to failing, 10.03 World Bank (International Bank for
arranging mergers and acquisitions, Reconstruction and
10.03[2] Development), 2.05[5]
direct financial aid, 10.03[1] wrongful conduct by, 24.02[2]
nel worth certificates, 10.03[3] Dank Secrecy Act of 1970
foreign trade banks. 1.01 See auo Money Laundering Control
fraud by, 24.02[2J Act of 1986
freezing debtor's actounts, 25.09[3][c] amendments regarding foreign
good faith obligation, 20.10 currency transactions, 12.01 [2J[a]
liability, 24.02[2] constitutionality of upheld, 13.01[1]
Government National Mortgage record-keeping requirements, 12.01 [I J
Association, 2.0S[6][dJ civil and criminal penalties, 12.01[1]
holidays. Su Bank holidays reporting of currency transactions,
improper payment by, 20.02 12.01[2J[a]
industrial banks, 2.0SeI) smurfing, 12.01[2][a]
Inter-American Development Bank, structured transactions, 12.01[2]{a]
2.05[5] Bank service corporations, 5.02[3][dJ
investment banks, 1.01 Banks for Cooperatives
liability, 24.02[2] central banlt, 2.05fil][c]
final payment or final settlISment district banks, 2.05[8)[c]
initialing, 19.02[IJ[d] international trade bank services,
loan and finance companies, 2.05[2] 2.05[8][cJ
management interlocks, 9.02[6J organization. 2.05[8J[ c)
mergers and consolidations of, 4.02, purpose,2.05[8][c]
13.03[3] Dank supervision. See Bank
Morris plan banks, 2.05[1] examination; Federal regulatory
National Consumer Cooperative Bank., agencies
2.05[7J Bearer, forms of instrument payable to,
officers, suspension and removal of, 20.06[2]
9.01({2]
privacy rights of customers and, Bearer paper
13.01[1) checks payable to, 20.06[2]
prohibition against political fictitious or nonexisting pa)'llCl,
contributions; 13.02 20.06[3]
recovery from, 24.02[2] special indorsement, 2O.06[2J
regulation and supervision of. See Billing disputes, 26.0J[2][b]
Federal regulatory agencies Bills of lading
regulation of political activities. 13.02 See also Documents of tit~
relationship with depositors, 19.02[1J definition of, 14.03[4]
releNe banks; 1.01 letters of credit and, 17.03
1·9 INDEX

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

Board of Governors of the Federal Bonds
Reserve System construction performance, 23.03[4]
See also Federal Reserve System; defined as a security, 7.02[3][a]
Regulation CC exemptions from disclosure and
annual report, 3.03[1] registration regulations, 7.02[1]
approval of establishment of bank performance, letters of credit as
branches, 6.01 [2] substitutes for, 17.01
automatic clearinghouse (ACH) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 7.02[1]
regulations, 18.01[1][b] Branch banking
Chairman of, 3.03[1] See also Foreign banking;
clearinghouse rules, 3.03[1] International banking; Interstate
discount rate adjustments for member banking
bank borrowing, 3.03[1] automated teller machine systems as,
duties of, 3.03[1] 6.03
establishment of, L02[4] branch, defined, 6.01[1]
examination .of state member banks, capital requirements, 6.01[2]
3.03[4] chain banking, defined, 6.01 [2]
capital adequacy, 7.01[1] Comptroller of the Currency approval,
relevant publications, 7.01 [I] 6.01[2]
funding of, 3.03[1] court interpretation of, 6.01[1]
management interlocks, regulation creation of branch by merger or
allowing, 9.02[6] consolidation, 6.01[2]
membership of, 3.03[1] customer bank communications
powers of, 3.03[1] terminals as, 6.01[1]
publication of regulations, 3.03[1] customer status at foreign branch,
regulatory authority of, 2.03 19.02[1][c]
bank holding companies, 2.03 definition of, 6.0 I[I]
check collection, 14.01[3][c] Uniform Commercial Code, 19.01
Regulation CC, 14.01 [3][c] discount brokerage activities, 6.01 [I]
electronic payments, 14.01[3][c] distinguished from affiliation, 6.0 I
export trading companies, 5.02[4] Douglas Amendment, 6.02[1]
Federal Reserve Banks, 3.03[1] drive·in facilities as, 6.01 [I]
Federal Reserve notes, 3.03[1] Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation approval, 6.0 I [2]
securities transactions, 14.01 [3][c]
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
relationship with other federal
approval,6.01[2]
regulatory agencies, 2.03
grandfather rights, 6.01 [2]
reports of member banks, 3.03[1] holding companies and, restrictions,
repurchase agreement guidelines, 19.05 6.02
reserve requirement adjustments, McFadden Act, 6.01[2]
3.03[1] preservation of state's authority to
services, list of, 3.03[1] regulate, 6.02[2]
suspension or removal of Federal purpose of branch banking law,
Reserve Bank officers and 6.01[1]
directors, 3.03[1] restrictions on, 6.01 [2]
term of office, 3.03[1] restrictions on interstate banking,
Bona fide purchasers 6.01 [2]
rights of owners under bailment, savings and 10al,l association rules.
23.02[1][a] differ, 6.04
value, as applicable to, 16.01[4] seasonal banking agencies, 6.01[2l
 INDEX 1-10

[Re[l'fences are to paragraphs (f).]

Branch banking (cant 'd) Cattle, entrusting to debtor, 23.02[ IJ{b]
state laws, limitations on interstate CBCTs. Sfle Customer bank
banking, 6.0 1[3] communications terminals
state laws on, 6.0 I[3]
CDs. See Certificates of dsposit
interplay of federal laws with,
6.01[2] Cease and desist orders
federal regulatory agencies power to
Bribery
issue, 9.01[1]
Bank Bribery Amendments Act of
preventing insolvency due to violations
1985, 12.02[1]
of regulations, 10.05
Crime Control Act of 1984, 12.02[1J
federal offense for bank officers and Certificates of deposit (CDs)
employees making or accepting, bank's liability, 15.05[1]
12.02[1] control over interest rates, 1.02[4)
guidelines for complying with federal defined as a security, 7.02[3][a)
regulations, 12.02[ I] definition of, 19.02[2][d]
penalty provisions for, 12.02[IJ negotiability, 19.02[2)[d]
savings and loan associations,
Bridge banks, 1O.04[2J 7.02[3][b]
Brokers, regulation of government treated differently from demand nDtes,
securities brokers, 8.02[2] 21.10(2]
Building and loan associations. See when mature, 21.10[2)
Savings and loan associations Chain banking, definition of, 6.01[2J
Bullion Change in Bank Control Act of 1978,
definition of, 4.03[ I J[cJ 13.03[4]
gold as, 4.03[I][c) civil money penalties for violation of,
national bank transactions, 4.03[1][cJ 9.01[3]
Bureau of National Affairs, publication Charge-back:s
of Banking Report, 14.01[3) bank's right, 20.11
Business days dishonored check, 19.02[1][a]
calculation of, 20.1l[lllb][iv] notice of dishonor, 21.11[2][a}
definition of, 21.06 timing of payment determining lOIS
Buyer. See Purchaser of, 21.03[2]
under Uniform Commercial Code,
19.02[1][aJ
breach of warranty, 20.12[3)
c forBed Dr altered signatures, 20.12[3]
Chattel mongage, 22.01
Cancellation of debt Chattel paper
as discharge, 24.01[3) See also Collateral
without consideration, 24.01(3) debtor liability for deficiency,
Carriers 24.03[41[a]
See also Bills of lading; Documents of definition of, 22.07(4]
title negotiability of, 23.02[3]
liability of, 14.0S[I][b] perfecting security interest in, filing as
lien by, 14.05(1)[c) hazardous method of, 23.02[3]
Cashier's checks security interests in, 22.07[4]
bank's liability, 15.05[2] priority, 23.02[3] .
definition of, 14.03[1] Uniform Commercial Code rules,
stop payment, 15.05[2] 22.01[1)
I-II INDEX

[References are /0 paragraphs (f).]

Check collection and fund transfers as willful misapplication of funds,
See also Electronic fund transfers 12.02[2]
by Federal Reserve System, 3.04[5][a] lost or stolen, payment of, 21.08
by private organization, 3.04[5][a] maturity of. See Maturity
Checking accounts notations on, 21.03[3]
See also Demand deposits; Negotiable NOW account draft compared with,
order of withdrawal (NOW) 19.02[2][e]
accounts; Share draft accounts paid after death, 19.02[5]
control over payment of interest, payable to bearer, 20.06[2]
1.02[4] payment at or through banks, 2U)4
definition of, 19.02[2J[a] payment by check, effect on
overdrafts, joint account, 19.03[2J[f] underlying transaction, 21.03[4]
payment through central data
Checking services processing center, 21.07
check truncation, 18.05[4J postdated, 20.04
insured credit unions, J 1.03 stale, 20.04
Checks stolen, \9.04[2]
See also Alterations; Check collection payment of, 21.08
and fund transfers; Checking U.S. Treasury checks
accounts; Checking services; collection of, 21.12[ I]
Forgery; Indorsements forged or unauthorized indorsement
bankrupt debtor of, 21.12[2]
bank dishonors checks of, 25.09[1] indorsement of, 21.12[1]
bank honors checks of, 25.09[ I) payment of, 21.121:2]
certified transfer of, 2U2[1]
bank's liability, 15.05[5] Check truncation, 18.05[4]
certification by bank officer or checks held by depository bank,
employee, 12.02[4] 20.12[2]
mistaken certification, 15.05[5][c] checks held by payor bank, 20.12[2J
collection and return, 21.06 Code provisions affecting, 18.05[4]
computer encoding of, 21.05 customer's duty to report forgeries and
computer encoding of, error in, alterations, 2O.12[2J .
21.05[1]; 21.05[2) definition of, 18.01[1][a]
credit to honor, 4.03(2)[d) Expedited Funds Availability Act,
definition of, 19.02[2][e] 18.05[4]
Regulation CC, 21.06 Federal Reserve Board proposals,
double payment, 20.06 18.05[4]
drawn by representatives, 19.02[5] not covered by Electronic Fund
fees for return of checks drawn against Transfer Act, 18.02[1]
insufficient funds, 26.02[2[a]] Claims
final payment, 21.03(7) See also Priority
form of payment, 21.02[3) bankruptcy proceedings, 25.06
full payment checks, 24.01[3][b] for collection of instruments, 21.01[3]
guaranteed,4.03[2)[d) conflicting, ioint accounts, 19.03(2](g]
improper payment, 19.03[2)[g] creditors, 23.03[3]
bank's rights of subrogation, 20.02 holders in due course, 16.02[1]
joint tenancy accounts, 19.03[2][d] Uniform Consumer Credit Code
kiting rules, 16.06[3)(d) .
disclosure of customer transactions. involving FDIC, 10.02[6)[a]
13.01[3] judicial review, 1O.02[6][a]
 INDEX 1-12

[Ref~ren£"es are to paragraphs (f).)

Claims (COnl'ti) gold coins, I4.02[ I)
involving FDIC (cont'd) iuuance .of, Federal Reserve System,
jurisdiction, 10.02(6)[a) 3.04(3)
involving FSLIC. 1O.02[6][b) nalional bank transactionl, 4.03[1][c}
judicial review, lo.o2[6)[b) guidelines, 4.03[ I)[c)
jurisdiction. IO.02[6J[bJ Collaleral
by liens. 23.0 I [I J in bankruptcy, 25.05(4]
order of crops as, 22.02[1 J
for fixtures, 23.0:3[2J financing statement. 22.03[2]
with liens, 23.01[IJ default, 24.03[1 J
with perfected security interest, disposal following, 24.03(4)
23.01[2J foreclosure foIlowing, 8.01[IJ
for purchase money security possession following, 24.03[2]
interest, 23.01[1] rules not changeable by agreement,
through instruments, chattel paper 24.03[1]
and documents, .23.01[1] disposal of
repurchase arrangements. 19.05 bankruptcY, 25.05[4J
third party purchases, 23.01£1) feJlowing default, 24.03(4)
with unperfected security intetts\,
fixtures as, financing statement,
23.01(IJ 22.03[2J
Clayton Act place for flling of, 22.03{IJ
bank mergers, 13.03[IJ minerals as, financing slalement,
compensating balances and prime 22.03[2J
rates, 13.03[ IJ place for filing of, 22.03[1 J
bolding company acquisitions, notice of sale, 24.03[4][a]
1:t03[1J oil and gas as, financing statement,
incipient monopoly. 13.03[1] 22.03[2J
management interlocks, 9.02[61 perfection of security intetellt,
price discrimination, 13.03[11 possession, 22.04[I)[b)
tie-in sales, 13.03[1] possession of, 22.02(1)
unfair trade practices, 13.03(1) in bailment, 22.04[I)[b)
Clearinghouse Interbank Payment escrow agent, 22.04[lJIb)
System (CHIPS), 18.01[1)[d] replevin. 24.03[2J
Clearinghouse rules proceeds from sale or transfer of,
assent of all members not necessary, 23.03[1]
21.01[3) property pledged as, 22.04[IJ(b]
association rules supersede Code release of, 22.03[3]
provisions. 21.01 repossession .
collection of instruments, 21.01(4] in bankruptcy, 25.05[4]
electronic fund transfers, 18.01[IJ[b] following default, 24.03[2J
given force of agreements, 21.0 I [3] by self-help, 24.03[2]
Clearinghouses . resale of. 24.03[2]
See a/so Automated clearinghouses security agreement effCl:ti'le against
(ACHs) . purchasers .of, 23.01[1] -
definition of, 19.01 self-help repossession, 24.03[2]
Code of Federal Regulations, 14.01[3J shield statute, 1O.02[5)[b)
COilU, 14.02[1] special rules with fixlures, 23.03[2J
See also Bullion stocks and bonds for commercial banle
definition of, 4.03(1](c J loan, 7.02(3)[aJ
1-13 INDEX

(References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

timber as, 22.02(1] contract belween parties controls,
financing statement, 2203(2] 21.01[4]
place for filing of, 22.03(1] credit unions, I 1.03
unknown agreements, protection from delay, 21.02[1]
for FDIC, 10.02[5][b] liability for, 21.02(1]
use following reorganizlltion, 25.02{3] from misroutings, 21.02[4J
use for source of payment, 24.03[2] unreasonable, 21.02[1J
Collecting banks depository banks, explained, 21.01 (3]
agent for depositor, 19.02[1][a] direct returns, 21.03(8J
direct 10 payor, 21.03(1]
definition of, 19.01; 2J.l>l[3]
duty of payor bank, 21.10(7]
duties under Code, 21.OI[J}
encoding errors, 21.05[1]
duty to act promptly, 21.02[2] el';peditious return, 21.03(8]; 21.06
duty to remit, 21.02(3] Federal Reserve rulings, 21.01[3]
extension of time limits, 21.01(31 final payment rules, 21.03[7J
liabilities of, 21.01(3] forged or unauthorized indorsement,
for losses, delay of presentment, 21.03[7]
21.02(2] good faith purChaser, 10.02[5][c]
midnight deadline, 21.02[2] instruments payable at or through
notice of dishonor, 21.01(2] banks, 21.04
duty to give, 21.01[2] intermediary banks, 21.01[3]
return of dishonored paper, 21.01[2] indorsements nonbinding on,
presentment by, 21.02[2J 21.0/[31
delay in, 21.02[2] joint payees, 21.03[7]
duty to act promptly in, 21.02[2] jurisdiction in lawsuits involving, 21.09
reasonableness of delay, 21.02(2] laws governing, 21.01[1]
responsibility for loss, 21.01[1] misroutings, 21.02(4]
settlements for items sent for notations on checks, 21.03(3]
collection, 2I.Q3(5] notice to payor on, 21.03[3]
finality of, 21.03[6] payable at or payable through banks,
provisional settlements, 21.03(6] 21.06
right to revoke, 21.03(6J paying banks, 21.06
warranties of, 15.03[2] payment
Collection of instruments effect on underlying transaction,
See also Charge-back; Collecting 21.03[4]
banks; Dishonor; Presentment; legal consequences of, 21.03[21
lost or stolen checks, 21.08
Regulation CC
any reasonable prompt method, medium of, 21.02[31
by remittance, 21.03[5]
21.01[2]
timing of, 21.03[2)
Anicle 4, provisions controlling when
payor banks
conflict with Anicle 3, 21.03(6] accountability for payment of items,
banks as agents, 21.01[IJ 21.03(1]
banks' duties, 21.01[2] charge-back rights, 20.11
choosing other collecting banks, dishonor by,2J.03(1J
21.01[1] . encoding errors, 21.05[1]
central data processing, 21.07 explained: 21.01 (I] .
check payment by multiplci branch final payment rules; 21.03(7)
banks, 21.07 midnight deadlines, 21.03[1]
check truncation, 18.05[4] retlirn of dishonored item, 21.03[7}
clearinghouses, 19.01; 21.01[4] return of items not paid, 21.03[8]
 INDEX 1-14

[Rejerenus art' to paragraphs (f).]

Collection of instruments (coni 'd) Commercial banks
payor banks (cont'd) Set' also National banks; State banks
right to cancel payment and recover insured by Federal Deposit Insurance
proceeds,21.03[6] Corporation, 7.01[2]. II.OI{I]
time extensions, 21.03[1] investment banking activities, 7.02
time limits, 21.03[1] traditional activities, 8.01[1]
presentment,21.02[1) management interlocks, 9.02[6)
delay in, 21.02[IJ portfolio regulation, 7.01(2)
protection against defenses, IO.02[5][c] regulatory agencies overseeing, 2.03
Regulation CC Commercial Code. See Uniform
agreement between parties Commerical Code
permitted. 21.01 [4J Commerical law
impact of. 21.0J Su a/.ro Commercial banking law,
relation between Code and, 21.0 I sources of; Constitutional law;
relation of depositor to bank, Uniform Uniform Commercial Code;
Commercial Code, 21.01[1) Uniform laws
returning bank, 21.06 definition of, 14.0 I[I J
safe harbor provisions, 21.01[4] federal power over, 14.01[1]
U.S. Treasurv checks. 21.12 history of. 14.01 [I]
warranty liability, 21.03[7] sources of, 14.01
federal government, 14.01[3]
Commercial banking state powers, 14.0I[2J
congressional powers, 14.01[IJ slatutory basis, /4.01[2]
defined, 1.0 I
Commercial paper
effons 10 maintain dual banking See also individual types of paper
system, 2.01 loan and finance companies, 2.05[2]
functions of, 1.01 negotiation of, 15.0 I
historical background, 1.02 state law regulation of state banb
regulation of, 1.01 trading in, 2.04
thrift institutions expansion into, l.01 transfer of, 15.01
Commercial banking law types of. 14.03
terminology Uled in, 19.01 documents of title, 14.03[4)
Uniform Commercial Code letters of credit, 14.03[2]
definitions, 19.01 negotiable instruments, /4.03[1]
securities, 14.03[3]
Commercial banking law, sources of' security agreements, 14.03[5]
commercial law
federal power over, 14.01[1] Commodities, gold as, 14.02[2J
state, 14.01[2] Commodity paper. See Documents of
Uniform Commercial Code, title
14.01 [2J Common law
uniform statutes, 14.01[2J joint accounts, 19.03[2][8]
conflict of laws doctrines, 14.01[4] larceny, 12.02[4J
constitutional law, 14.01[IJ Community Reinvestment Act of 1977,
federal administrative agencies, 13.04
14.01 [3][a] Competitive Equality Banking Act of
federal law, /4.01[3] 1987
preemption over state rules, See 0/50 Bank Holding Company Act
14.01 (3][b] of 1956
Federal Reserve System, 14.01[3][c] assistance to failing banks, 10.03
1-15 INDEX

[Refermces are 10 paragraphs (f).]

emergency funds for FSLlC. 11.02[2] dissolution of national banks, 4.02
expanded use of minority thrift establishment of national bank
institutions, 11.02[3][d] branches, 4.02
FH LBB establishment of holding mergers and consolidations of
corporation for troubled assets, national banks, 4.02
11.02[3][d] national bank creation and
Financing Corporation established to organization, 4.01[ I]
provide funds for FSLIC, trust activities of national banks,
11.02[2] 4.02
full faith and credit of U.S. resolution, bank competition, policy to foster,
11.04 4.01[1]
measures to improve FHLBB and bank holidays, declaration of, 4.02[ I]
FSLlC regulation of financially certification of national banks for
weak institutions, 11.02[3] FDI C insurance, 4.0 I [J]
accounting requirements, certification of nonbank banks,
11.02[3][a] 4.01 [2]
capital forbearance program chartering of bankers' banks,
requirements, 11.02[3][b] 5.02[3][e]
moratorium on certain banking chartering of national banks, 2.03
activities enforcement of due-on-sale clauses,
foreign banks, 5.02[3][a][i] authorizes, 24.0 I[1][c][ii]
insurance activities, 5.02[3][a][iii] examination of member national
real estate transactions, banks, 4.02, 7.01[1]
5.02[3][a][iv] capital adequacy, 7.01 [I]
securities transactions, 5.02[3][a][ii] location of office, 4.02
regulation of savings and loan holding mandate of, 4.02
companies, 5.03[[2) publication of national bank
rescue of federal savings and loan examination reports, 4.02
insurance system, 11.02[2] regulatory authority, 4.02
restrictions on creation of nonbank relationship with other federal
banks by bank holding regulatory agencies, 2.03
companies, 6.02[4] reporting requirements for national
restrictions on securities activities, banks, 4.02
8.01[8] restrictions on extension of credit,
restrictions on transactions between 7.01 [2][a]
member banks and affiliates, restrictions on loans, 7.0I[2][a]
9.02[4] real estate loans, 7.01[2][b][ii]
super priority to security interests of supervision of national banks, 2.03
Federal Home Loan banks, term of pffice, 4.02
11.02[2] Treasury'Secretary supervision of, 4.02
supervisory powers of FHLBB, unclaimed property, 4.02[2]
directions on, 11.02[3][c] Computer services, authorization of
Comptroller of the Currency national banks to provide,
annual report, 4.02 4.03[2][c]
appointment of, 4.02 Conditional sales agreement, 22.01
appointment of receiver, 10.02 Conflict of laws
approval Code provisions, 14.01[4]
change in location of national federal override of state laws, 2.0 I[2]
banks, 4.01[3] supremacy clause of Constitution, 4.03
conversion of national banks, 4.02· Conservators, appointment of, 10.05
 INDEX 1-16

[References are /0 paragraphs (fl.]

Consideration, modification of contract federal law prohibiting, 14.01[1]
without, 24.0J[3] relationship to state laws, 26.06[7J,
Consignments, 22.0 I[2][b] 26.06[8]
filing financing statement, 22.QI[2]{b] Federal Trade Commission rules, 26.0 I
as secured transactions, 22.0 I[2][ b] finance charges, 26.03[1]
Consolidations. Set! Mergen and holder in due course, 16.06
consolidations Federal Trade Commission rules,
Constitutional law 16.06(1], 16.06(2]
~t! a/so Commercial bankins law, transactions affected, 16.06(2}
sources of; Commercial law; Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
Federal law; State law 16.06{3]
privacy rights, 13.01[1) information subject to discrimination
resolution of confusion on applicable rules
commercial law, 14.01[1] . childrearing practi<:es and
seizure of property for creditor's intentions, 26.06[3]
remedies, 24.03[3)[a] child support, 26.06[3]
supremacY clause,J4.01[JJ income from alimony, 26.06[3]
Constitution of the United States information about spouses, 26.06[3]
commerce power, 14.01 (I] marital status, 26.06P]
separate maintenance, 26.06[3]
definition of congressional powers,
notice requirements, 26.06[5]
14.01[1]
open-end
guidelines for state and federal law,
additional disclosures, 26.0J[2][b)
14.01[1]
definition of, 26.03{2)
Construction mortgage, superior to disclosures required, 26.03[2)[b]
security interest in fixtures, 23.03[2] revolving charge account as,
Consumer credit 26.03[2)
See also Consumer Credit Protection provisional, 20. il
Act; Truth-in-Lending Act; Truth- real estate, 26.03[4 J
in-Lending SimplifICation and special purpose credit programs,
Reform Act; Uniform Consumer 26.06[4]
Credit Code; Uniform Consumer Consumer Credit Protection Act, 26.01
Sales Practices Act See also Equal Credit Opportunity
accommodation parties, J5.06[4] Act; Truth-in-Lending Act;
action against assignee, 26.03(6](a][u] Uniform Consumer Credit Code;
advertising regulation, 26.03(S](b] Uniform Consumer Sales
application and evaluation, Practices Act
prohibitions against credit discrimination, 26.06[2)
discrimination during, 26.06[3] credit reporting, 26.04[3]
billing dispute procedures, 26.03[S](d) debt collection practices, 26.04[2]
billing errors, 26.03(2][b] electronic fund transfers, 26.01
closed-end equal credit opportunity rules,
definition of, 26.03£2] 26.06[1)
disclosures required, 26.03[2][a) restrictions on garnishment, 26.04[ I]
special rules, 26.03(2)[a)
definition of, 26.03[1) Consumer goods
disclosure, 26.03 buyer of, 23.01[IJ
security interests in, 22.06[1]
discrimination, 26.06
creditworthiness, 26.06(3) Consumer protection. See Consumers
exceptions for persons with special Consumers
needs, 26.06[4} billing rights, 26.03[2J[bJ
1-17 INDEX

[Rejermces are to paragraphs (r).]

contracts, 26.05[2] modification of, 24.0 I[3)
credit card transactions, 16.06[4] determining default, 24.03[2]
credit contracts, 26.01 entrusting goods to debtor,
credit discrimination, 26.06[2] 23.02[I)[b]
credit reports, 26.04[3] oral, 24.01 [3]
disclosure of, 26.04[3] without consideration, 24.01 [3]
request for, 26.04[3J negligence waived, 19.02[4]
discrimination, 26.06 passbooks. 19.02[3]
home improvement loans, 26.0 J plain English laws, 26.05[2]
home solicitation sales, 26.01 rejection of in bankruptcy
installment lending, 26.0 I proceedings, 25.07[8][a]
laws, 26.01 standard forms, 19.02[4], 26.05[2]
promissory notes, 24.01[2] terminatio n of banking relationship,
protection law, 26.0 I 19.02[5]
absence of consent, 26.05[2] ultra vires defense to avoid
contracts, 26.05[2) performance, 4.03[2][1]
fraud, 26.05[2] unconscionable, bad faith in, 19.02[4]
plain English laws, 26.05[2] Conversion
unconscionability, 26.05[2) closed-end credit to open-end credit,
remedies, 26.01 26.03[2][b]
rescission rights, 26.03[4) of collateral, 23.02[ I][b]
real estate transactions, 26.03[4] Corporate accounts
restitution, 26.03 nature of, 19.03[4]
rights of, 26.0 I signature authorizations, 19.03[4]
cut off, holder in due course rule, Corporations
26.01 as bank holding companies, 5.01[1]
standards for determining bank service corporations, 5.02[3Jfd]
unconscionable conduct, 26.05[2] financing statements, 22.03[2)[a]
Contracts investment bank services in
See a/so Agreements; Unconscion~ble acquisitions and mergers, 1.01
agreements reorganization of, 25.02[3]
absence of consent, 26.05[2) Correspondent banles, insolvency of,
of adhesion, 19.02[4] 10.02[4][a]
signature cards similar to, Credit
19.03[2J[d) See also Consumer credit
banks and depositors, 19.02[3) finance charges, residential loans,
boilerplate clauses, 26.05[2] 26.02[3)[b)[i)
breach of, letters of credit, 17.02[2][b] local communities, needs of, 13.04
consideration, value distinct from, securities, margin requirements for,
16.01[4] 3.04[61[aJ
deposit slips, 19.02[3] Credit card banks
drafting of consumer, 26.05[2) definition of bank, exclusion from,
by fiduciaries, 24.02(1)[a] 5.0I[4][a]
formation of, 24.03 Credit Card Fraud Act, 18.02[IOJ[b]
forms, standard bank account, Credit cards
19.02[4] bank-issued, 18.03
fraud, 26.05[2] bankruptcy proceedings, 25.09[4)
good faith, 19.02[4) actual fraud, 75.09[4J
joint accounts, 19.02[4] implied representation, 25.09[4]
 INDEX 1-18

[Refertmces are 10 paragraphs (fl.]

Credit cards (COni 'd) telephone use, 18.03[1]
bankruptcy proceedings (cont 'el) terms, 18.03
loading up, 25.09(4) Truth-in-Lending Act. 18.03[1]
noooischargeable debts, 25.09{4] unauthorized use, 18.04[1]
billing, error resolution, 18.03[3) definition of, I8.04[ I][b]
clearing, 18.03 regulations. /8.04{1)[aJ
definition of, 18.03[ I J underlying transaction
disclosures, 26.03[ I] disputes, 18.03(3]
discounts to buyers, issuer's barring of, rights from, 18.03(3)
prohibited, 18.03[6] Uniform Commercial Code does not
disputes on usage. 18.03(3] cover. 18.03
employees, unauthorized use. Uniform Consumer Credit Code rules,
18.04(1]{b](iv) 16.06(3][b]
estranged spouses. unauthorized use. wrongful refusal to extend credit,
18.04[1 ][b)[ii) 18.03[5]
fraud, 18.03[8] Credit disclosure regulations. See Truth-
bankruptcy proceedings, 25.09[4] in-Lending act; Truth-in-Lending
holders Simplification and Reform Act
claims and defenses Creditors
preservation of. 18.03[3] in bankruptcy, 25.06
underlying transaction. 18.03[3] distribution of insolvent bank's assets
liability for unauthorized use, to. 10.02[3][a][i]
18.04[1][a] ratable distribution requirement,
privileges, 18.03 10.02[4]
interest rate, location affects. obtains judgment against bank.
26.02[2)[c) 10.02[1)
i!Suance of right to levy, 19.03[2}[c]
exempt credit transaction, 18.03(1] secured. 25.01
request or application, 18.03[2] unsecured,25.01
rules on, 18.03[1}
Credit reports, fees for, 26.02[2J[8)
issuers
limited liability, 18.03[3] Credit union accounts. See Share draft
rights and liabilities against claims. accounts
18.03[3] Credit unions
set-offs by, prohibition against. See also Share insurance
18.03[4J Central Liquidity Facility, 11.03
legal status unclear. 18.03 definition of, 2.01[5][b]
link with checking account, 18.03 definition of bank, exclusion from,
loan of, 18.04[I)[b}(i] 5.0 1[4]{a]
lost or stolen, unauthorized u!e, examinations of, 11.03
18.04[I]{b ][iii) payment of costs, 11.03
merchant agreement, 18.03 Federal Credit Union System,
negotiability, 18.03 2.01[5][b]
operation of, 18.03 formation of. 2.01[5](b]
payment by, 18.0I[lJ[h]; 18.03 inclusion as depository institutions.
Regulation Z, 18.03(1) 2.02
returned goods Gr credits on, seller's management interlocks, 9.02[6]
duty to notify issuer. 18.03(7) membership in. 2.01 [5][b]
set-offs, 18.03[4] mergers of financially weak,
systems, 18.03 10.03 [2][a]
1-19 INDEX

[References Qre 10 paragraphs ('J.]

National Credit Union Administration Money Laundering Control Act,
Board l2.01[2][b]
insured under, 11.03 national emergency restrictions,
regulation by, 2.03 violation of, 12.02[4]
reporting to, ll.03 obtaining money under false pretenses,
organized under state law 12.02[4]
Central Liquidity Facility, 11.03 by officers, directors, and employees,
insured by National Credit Union 12.02
Administration Board, 11.03 paying dividends on capital stock or
liquidations supervised by National interest on capital notes when in
Credit Union Administration default to FDIC, 12.02[4]
Board, 11.03 political contributions, 12.02[4]
originally established as part of Farm RICO provisions, 12.01 [3][c]
Credit System, 2.0I[5][b] state laws dealing with, 12.02
payment of premiums, 11.03 unauthorized national bank circulating
regulation of, 2.0I[5][b] notes, 12.02[4]
reserve requirements, 11.03 untrue or derogatory statements on
share insurance, 11.03 FSLIC financial standing,
termination of insurance, 11.03 12.02[4]
violation of antiracketeering laws,
terms and conditions of accounts, 12.02
11.03 violation of antitrust laws, 12.02
Crime Control Act of 1984, bribery violation of securities laws, 12.02
constituting federal felony, 12.02[ I] Crops
Criminal offenses as collateral, financing statement,
See also Bribery; Embezzlement; 22.03[2]
Forgery; Fraud; Liabilities; security interests in, priority,
Misapplication of funds 23.01[2][b]
bank notes, unauthorized issuance, Currency
12.02[4] See also Money; Notes
Bank Secrecy Act, 12.01[1] domestic and foreign, Bank Secrecy
breach of fiduciary duty, bank officer, Act regulations, 12.01[2][a]
director, or employee, 12.02[4] notes and certificates included as,
check certification by bank officer or 14.02[1]
employee prior to deposit by Federal Reserve notes, 3.04[3]
check's drawer, 12.02[4] photographic copies, 14.02[1]
check kiting, 12.02[2] records of certain foreign and
common-law larceny, 12.02[4] domestic transactions, 12.01[2][a]
conspiring to commit an offense U.S., history of, 14.02[I]
against the United States, 12.02 Customer bank communications
currency transaction reporting rules, terminals (CBCTs)
12.01[1], 12.01[2][b] See also Automated teller machines
false advertisement or representation as bank branches, 6.01[1]
of entity as member of Federal Customers
Rese~ System, 12.02[4] definition of, 19.01
false entries, 12.02[2] at foreign branch bank, 19.02[1][c]
false or misleading use of federal incompetence of, 19.02[5] .
agency names, 12.02[4] payment after death, 19.02[5]
federal wire fraud, 12.02[4] warranties of, 15.03[2]
 INDEX 1-20

[R~f~nnc~s or~ 10 porogrophs (f).]

D possession following, 24.03[2J
precondition for repossession, 24.03[2]
Debt adjustment, bankruptcy and remedial actions, 24.03[1 J
25.02[2] , rules not changeable by agreement
Debt collection accounting for surplus, 24.03[IJ
abuses prohibited, 26.04[2J dealing on collateral disposal,
practices. 26.04[2] 24.03[IJ
Debt Collection Practices Act, 26.04[2] liability for Code violations.
enforcement of provisions. 26.04[2] 24.03[IJ
intent. 26.04[2] redemption of collateral, 24.03[1]
Debt collectors retention oC collateral, 24.03[IJ
definition of, 26.04[2J security agreement, 24.03[1 J
prohibitions on tactics, 26.04[2) severance of fixture collateral from
restrictions on communications, real estate, 23.03[2J .
26.04[2] wai~r as grounds for disclaiming,
Debtors 24.03[2]
bank as debtor to depositor, Defects, holder in due course
19.02[1][a] requirements and. 16.01[2J[bJ
bankruptcy Defenses
involuntary, 25.03 holder in due coune, 16.02[2J
voluntary, 25.03 Uniform Consumer Credit Code
debt adjustment, 25.02[2] rules, [dJ, 16.06[3J[cJ
discharge of, 25.08 usury, 16.02[2][c][ii]
duty under Food Security Act of 1985, Demand accounts
23.02[2)[e] checking accounts u, 19.02[2][a]
exceptions for purchase money NOW accounts as. 19.02[2][8J
security interest, 23.01[2][a] savings accounts u, 19.02[2J[b]
family farmer, 25.02(4)
Demand deposit accounts
insol~ncy and effect on collateral
legislation, L02[4}
proceeds. 23.03[ I}
prohibition against interest payment.!,
liable for deficiency, 24.03[4][a]
liquidation, 25.02[ I] 19.02[2]
redemption of collateral. 24.03[1] Demand deposit.!
reorganization, 25.02[3] definition of, 5.01[4], 19.02[2][a]
Debts NOW accounts and, 5.01[4]
discharge of, bankruptcy proceedings, special deposits, 19.02[2][c]
25.08 Department of Housing and Urban
nondischargeable, 25.08[1] Development (HUD) ..
credit card purchases, 25.09[4} regulation of Federal National
Deception, signatures, 19.04[1] Mortgage Association,
Default Government National Mortgase
acceleration, 24.03[1 J Association, Federal Housing
definition of, 24.03[1] Authority. 2.05[6]
determination of, 24.03[2J Department of the Tn:asury
estoppel as grounds for disclaiming, Comptroller of the Currency under
24.03[2] general direction of· Secretary of,
FDIC assessments, 12.02[4] 4.02
foreclosing on collateral when, 8.01 [I] Office of the Comptroller of the
good faith, 24.03(1) Currency located in. 4.02
1-21 INDEX

[Rejnenus are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Depositary banks Depository Institutions Deregulation and
See a/so Fiduciaries; Trustees Monetary Control Act of 1980
recovering payment on checks, See a/so Truth-in-Lending
19.04[1] Simplification and Reform Act
Deposit insurance. See Federal Deposit extended commercial banking
Insurance Corporation; Federal . activities to thrift institutions, 3.03[5]
Savings and Loan Insurance extended Federal Reserve services,
Corporation 3.03[5]
Depositors provisions of, 3.03[5]
See also Bank accounts usury limitations, 26.02[3][a]
bank indebted to, 19.02[I][a] Depository Institutions Management
mistaken payments in excess of Interlocks Act of 1978, prohibition
insurance, I J.OI[I][b] against interlocking relations,
payment after death, 19.02[5] 9.02[6]
relationship to bank, 19.02[1] Deposits
termination of account, death or accrual of interest on, 20.1 I[I][b][iii]
incompetency, 19.02[5] bank as agent, 19.02[I][a]
Depository banks bank's accountability for, 19.02[I][a]
definition of, 19.01; 21.01[3] checking, 19.02[2J[a]
Regulation CC imposition of duties customer rights, 19.02[I][a]
on, 21.06 definition of, 11.01[1][a]
Depository institutions for failing banks, 10.03[1]
See a/so Commercial banks; Credit goods or chattels left in safekeeping,
unions; National banks; distinguished from, 19.02[I][b]
insurance by Federal Deposit
Nonins ured state banks;
Insurance Corporation
Nonmember state banks; Savings
amount of insurance, 11.01[1]
and loan associations; Savings
types of deposits insured, 11.01[1]
banks; State banks
letters of credit as substitutes for,
definition of, 2.02
17.01
management interlocks, 9.02[6]
risks and responsibilities, 19.02[IJ[a]
portfolio regulation, 7.01[2]
types of, 2.01[5] savings, 19.02[2][bJ
insured banks (FDIC), 2.02 special, 19.02[2J[cJ
mortgage agreements, 19.02[IJ[b]
foreign bank branches, 2.02
title to funds, 19.02[I][b]
national nonmember banks
transaction, 19.02[2J
receiving deposits, 2.02
withdrawal, rights of, 20.11 [I]
qualified state banks, 2.02
insured credit unions, 2.02 Deposit slips
insured institutions (FSLlC), 2.02 contracts on, 19.02[3]
building and loan associations, notice required on, 19.02[3]
2.02 Directors. See Bank directors
cooperative banks, 2.02 Discharge
homestead associations, 2.02 bankruptcy proceedings, 25.08
savings and loan associations, cancellation as, 24.01[3J
2.02 defense against holder in due course,
state savings banks, 2.02 16.02[2][c][iv]
members, Federal Home Loan Bank liabilities, 15m .
System, 2.02 retention of collateral, 24.03[5]
savings banks, 2.02 waiver as, 24.01[3]
mutual, 2.02 without consideration, 24.01 [3 J
 INDEX 1-22

[References are to paragraphs (').]

Disclosure requirements carrier's or warehouseman's lien,
securities transactions, 7.02{ I] 14.05[1][c]
insider trading information, 7.02[IJ definition of, 14.05[1]; 22.07[5]
Discrimination in credit, 26.06 documentary drafts with, 17.03
Dishonm leiters of credit, 17.01[2]
See a/50 Notice of dishonor liability of bailee to deliver goods,
bankrupt debtor, 25.09[1] 14.05[1](b]
bank's right of Charge-back, negotiability of, 14.03[1 J(aJ; 23.02{3J
19.02[IJ(a] security interests in, 22.07[5J
collecting bank's duties, 21.01[2J filing as hazardous method of
definition of, 21.1 O[7][bJ perfecting, 23.02[3]
documentary drafu, 17.03[2] priority, 23.02[3J
drafts, 17.02[1 J laking free of claims, 23.02[3]
effect on unpaid seller of goods, Douglas amendment, constraints on
23.03[3J bank holding company expansion,
and holder in due course 6.02[IJ
requirements, 16.01[2] Drafts
payor banks, 21.03[1 J See also Banlc drafts; Banker's
return of dishonored item, 21.03[7] acceptance; Cashier's checks;
wrongful, 17.02[1) Certificates of deposit; Checks;
bank stops payment on check, joint Documentary drafts; Noles;
aceount, 19.03[2][g] Teller's checks; Trade acceptance
letters of ctedit, 17.0211] acceptance, 7.01 [2][b][i]
liability for, 20.03
check as, 14.03{1)
Disposition, notice of, 24.03[4] definition of, 14.03[1]
Dissolutions oishonor of, 17.02[1]
See also Rankruptcy; Insolvency; effective as a note, 14.03[1]
Uquidations; lleorganizations four-party paper, 14.03[1]
appointment of receiver, Ilt.02(l J monel' order as, 14.03[1]
Distrubution, bankruptcy proceedings, notes as, 14.03[1]
25.<l6 parties to, 14.03[l]
Documentary drafts, \7.03 two-party paper, 14.03[1]
collection of, 17.03 Drawee
definition of, \7.03 See also ACl:eptor
designation of referee, 17.03[2] checks, 14.<J3[l]
dishonored, 17.03[2] drafts, 14.03[1]
duty to notify customer of effective as a note, 14.03[1]
nonpayment, 17.03(1) money orden, 14.03[1]
duty to present, 17.03[1] . trade acceptatlCC, 14.03[1]
letlers of credit, drawn against,
17.03[2) Drawer
preserving security, 17.03[2] See also Maker
procedures, 17.03 checks, 14.03[1]
underlying documents and lloads, drafts, 14.03[1]
bank's responsibility for, 11.03[2J effective as a note, 14.03(1)
liabilities, 15.02(5]
Documents of title, 14.05[IJ
See also Bills of lading; Warehouse money orders, 14.03[IJ
trade acceptance, 14.03[1 J
receipu
Article 7, 14.05 Drawers, payment on death of, 19.02[5J
1-23 INDEX

[Rejermces are 10 paragraphs (fJ.]

Due-on-sale clause. See Acceleration legal classifications created by
clause Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
Duress, defense against holder in due 18.02(1]
course, 16.02[2][c][ii] depository institutions, 3.04[5][b]
disclosure requirements, 18.02[6]
documentation requirements,
E 18.02[6][b]
as proof of transfer, J8.02[6][f]
Edge Act, bank guarantee of liabilities, error resolution, 18.02[2]
4.03[2][d] procedures, 18.02[6][e]
Edge corporations failure to make, 18.02[3]
definition of, 2.05[3] failure to stop, 18.02[3]
definition of bank, exclusion from, Federal Reserve System, 3.04[5][b]
5.01[4][a] FedWire,3.04[5][b]
domestic activities permitted, 2.05[3] handling of
Federal Reserve Board regulation and large dollar transfers, 18.05
supervision, 2.05[3] regulatory issues, 18.05
financing and development of export nonconsumer transactions, regulation
trading companies, 5.02[4] of, 18.05
notice obligations, 18.02[6]
Electronic Fund Transfer Act preauthorized, 18.02[4]
administration and enforcement preauthorized transfers,
bodies, 18.02[10] documentation required,
check truncation not covered by, 18.02 18.02[6][c]
Federal Reserve Board implementation private agreement, rules by, 18.02[10]
of, 18.01[2] restrictions, 18.02[7]
liability of institutions, 18.02[10][c] sources of law, 18.01 [2]
penalties for violation, 18.02[10][b] state law
primary application to consumers, conflict with, 18.02[9]
18.01[2] relation to, 18.02[9]
provisions of, 18.02 statement of account, 18.02[6][d]
scope of, 18.02[1] stop payment rights, 18.02[4]
Truth-in-Lending Act, 18.02[ I] suspension of obligations to third
Electronic fund transfers, 18.02 parties, 18.02[5]
See also Automated clearinghouses; malfunction in system, 18.02[5]
Automated teller machines; Check telephonic, 18.02
truncation; Credit cards; unauthorized
Electronic Fund Transfer Act; criminal enforcement, 18.02[10][b]
Home banking; Point of sale customer's liability, 18.04[2][a]
terminals; Wire transfers definition of, 18.04(2][b]
access cards, 18.02[8] notice of, oral or written,
restricted, unsolicited, 18.02[8] 18.04[2][a]
validation of, 18.02[8] regulations governing, 18.04[2][a]
Consumer Credit Protection Act, wire fraud statute applied to, 12.02[4]
26.01 Embezzlement
contribution to pressures for change in &e also Misapplication of funds
banking, 1.02[5] debtor's, 25.08[1]
Credit Card Fraud Act, 18.02[1O][b] fictitious or nonexistent payees,
definition of 20.06[3] .
general sense, 18.02 state laws, 12.02
 INDEX 1-24

(Rq~r~nus ar~ to paragraphs (f}.J

Employees. S~e Bank employees calculation of business days,
Entrustment, effect on purchaser taking 20.11 [1][bJ[iv]
goods free of security interest, check truncation, 18.0S[4]
23.02[1 J(b]. 23.02[ 1][c] customer's right to withdraw,
Environmental law, 25.09[6] 20. II [I][b]
Environmental Protection Agency definitions, 20.11(1 J[b][i)
(EPA), 25.09[6] electronic fund transfers, 18.05
Equal Credit Opportunity Act funds availability requirements,
civil liability for violation of, 26.06[6] 20.11 [I][b ][ii]
credit discrimination private remedies, 20.11[IJ(bJ(vJ
business transactions, 26.06(1] scope of, 2O.1I[1][h](i]
\:onsumer transactions, 26.06[1] special notice requirements, 19.02[3]
discrimination under Export·lmport Bank of the United
effects test, 26.06[J] States
forms of, 26.06[1] functions of, 2.05[4]
not defined, 26.06[ I] loan guarantees to export trading
relationship to state laws, 26.06[7J, companies, 5.02[4]
26.06[8J purpose of, 2.05[4]
enforcement of provisions, 26.06[1] Exporl trading companies
notice requirements, 26.06[5] competition with foreign-owncd
purpose of. 26.06[1] trading companies, 5.02[4]
scope of, 26.06[ J] financing and development of, 5.02[4J
transactions included, 26.06[ I] Export Trading Company Act of 1982,
Equipment investment by bank in bank
definition of. 22.06[2] acceptances, 7.01 [2][bJ[iJ
as goods, 22.06[2] Export Trading Company Act of 1982
perfection of security interest in, (ETCA)
23.0 I[2J[a] antitrust immunity to export trading
purchase money, 23.01 [2)[aJ companies, 5.02{4]
security interests in, 22.06[2]
definition of export trading company,
Escheat. See Property 5.02[4]
Estoppel financing and development of export
debtor's collateralatatement, 22.02[1] trading companies, 5.02{4]
denying corporate officer's
authorization, 19.03[4]
entrusting goods to debtor, 23.02[1][b] F
as grounds for disclaiming default,
24.03{2) Fair Credit Reporting Act, 26.04[3]
letters of credit, 17.02[2] False entries
Eurocurrency, reserve requirements, criminal offense, 12.02[3J
3.1)4[2][a) each entry constituting separate crime,
Examination. See Bank examination 12.02[3]
Expedited Funds Availability Act of examples of conduct constituting.
1987,20.JJ(IJ[b] 12.02[3]
&e alw Regulation CC intent to injure or defraud, 12.02[3]
accrual of interest on deposits, no limit to criminality to specific
2O.1l(1)[b)[iii] persons, 12.02[3}
administrative enforcement, sufficient action to be, 12.02[3}
20.11[1][b][v] types ot; 12.02[3]
1-25 INDEX

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

False statements. See Statements purpose, 2.05[8]
Family farmers. See Farmers restructuring of, 2.05[8][f)
Farm Credit Administration Farm equipment, 22.06[2]
Board Farmers, bankruptcy proceedings,
membership,2.05[8][e] 25.02[4]
policy for Farm Credit Farm products
Administration, 2.05[8][e] See also Crops; Food Security Act of
supervision of Farm Credit System, 1985
2.05[8][el buyers of, 2J.Ot[t]
broadened powers of, 2.05[8J[e] exception to special protection for
preemption of state usury laws, buyers in ordinary course,
2.05[8][e] 23.02[2][a]
regulation of Farm Credit System, deftnition of, 22.06[3], 23.02[2][f)
2.05[8][e] entrusting to debtor, 23.02[IJ[b}
restructuring of, 2.05[8][e] exception to special protection for
Farm Credit Banks, merger of Federal buyers in ordinary course of
Land banks and Federal business, 23.02[2][aJ
Intermediate Credit banks, as goods. 22.06[3]
2.05[8][f) security interest in, 22.06[3]
Farm Credit Boards, district boards of FDIC. See Federal Deposit Insurance
directors for Federal Land Banks, Corporation
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal administrative agencies. See
Banks for Cooperatives, 2.05[8][d] Federal regulatory agencies
Farm Credit System Federal agencies
See also Banks for Cooperatives; Farm Credit Administration,
Federal Intermediate Credit 2.05[8][e]
Banks; Federal Land Banks housing and mortgage credit agencies,
agencies composing, 2.05[8J 2.05[6]
borrowers' rights. 2.05[8][g] regulatory agencies. See Federal
creation of Federal Farm Credit Banks regulatory agencies
Funding Corporation, 2.05[8][f) Small Business Administration,
creation of Financial Assistance 2.05[7]
Corporation, 2.05[8][f) special purpose agencies with
district boards of directors, 2.05[8] financing functions, 2.05[7]
districts, 2.05[8J Veterans Administration, 2.05[7]
elimination of Farm Credit System Federal banking agencies. See Federal
Capital Corporation, 2.05[8][f) regulatory agencies
establishment of Federal Agricultural Federal Credit Union System. See Credit
Mortgage Corporation, 2.05[8][f) unions
insurance fund, 2.05[8][f)· Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
merger of Federal Land banks and deposit, defined, 11.01[I][a]
Federal Intermediate Credit banks insured deposit defined, 11.01 [2]
into Farm Credit Bank.s, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2.05[8][f) {FDlq
panicipation of commercial ftshermen, See also Federal Deposit Insurance
2.05[8] Act
participation of ranchers, 2.05[8] amount of insurance, 11.01[1]
producers encouraged to panicipate, computing, 11.0 I[2]
2.05[8] multiple accounts, 11.01[2J
 INDEX 1·26

[R~erences are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation section 29(c) of Securities
(FDIC) (colll'd) Exchange Act, 1O.02[S)[c]
approval of acquisitions shield statute, 10.02[5][b]
priorities, 10.03(2][a] establishment of, 11.0I
provisions prohibiting, 10.03[2][a] examination
approval of branch offices of state insured state nonmemhcr banb,
nonmember insured banks, 11.01[4J
11.01(4J Jpecial examinations of any insured
foreign branches, 11.01[4} bank. 1/.01[4]
approval of mergers and extent of insured funds, 11.0 I
consolidations, 11.01[4J extraordinary acquisitions of failing
assessment of insured banks, /.1.01[3] institutions, 10.0.3[2)[a]
backed by full faith and credit of U.S., financial assirtance to failing banks
11.04 direct financial aid. 10.03[1)
bankers' banks, 5.02[3)[e) merger assistance, 10.03(2)
board of directors net worth certificates, 10.03[3]
direct financial aid to faililtJ banks. holder in due course, 10.02[.5)[a}
l{1.03[1] inclusion of state banks, 1.02[4)
membership, 11.0 I interstate and interindustry mergers,
requirements of, 11.0 I 11.01[4J
terms of, 11.01 procedure for approval of,
rule-making authority, 11.0 I 10.03[2J[aJ
bridge banks, 10.04[2) loans to facilitate mergers, 10.03[2]
cease and desist orders to nonmember loans to failing institutions, 10.03[1]
state banks. 11.01{4] merger assistance for weak
preventing insolvency due to institutions, 10.03(2]
violations of regulations, 10.05 money brokers, deposits by, 11.0 I [2]
claims against, 11.01 net worth certificatea. 10.03[3]
money damagea, 11.0 I no duty to examine assets of insolvent
as receiver, 10.02[4] bank, 10.02[S)[c)
claims against officers and directors notice of bank closing. 10.02[3)[a][i]
for breach of fiduciary operation in dual capacity as receiver
obligatiollll, 10.02[5] and insurer, 1O.02[6)[a)
distribution of insolvent bank's assets. organization of new national banb
IO.02(3)ra)[i] after closings, 10.04[1]
ratable distribution requirement, bridge banks, 11).04[2]
l<l.O2{4} sell capital stock, 10.04[1]
emergency acquisitions of financially supply funds, to.04[ I]
weak banb, 6.05[1] po_n, 2.03
acquisition of bank in danger of inJure deposits, 11.0t
closing, 6.05(2)[b] rehabilitate weale banks, I /.0 I
effects of Competitive Equality scope of, I/.O I
Banking Act. 6.05(2] supervise liquidation of insolvent
special powers, 6.05[2][a] banks. 11.0 I
enforcing obligations from insolvent protection from unknown coUa1eraJ
banks, JO.02[3J[a][iJ obligations, Jo.02[5J[b]
avoidable defenses purchase and assumption agreements,
holder in due couise status, 10.02[3)[a){ii) .
1t>.02[5}[a] application to, 10.02[4][b]
1-27 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

as receiver, 10.02[1] directions on supervisory powers,
claims against, 1O.02[3J[b] 11.02[3][c]
insured state banks, 1O.02[ I] holding corporation for troubled
modified payouts, 10.02[3](a][i] assets, 11.02[3][d]
regulation of interest on deposits regulation of financially weak
eliminated, 11.01[4] institutions
relationship with other federal accounting requirements,
regulatory agencies, 2.03 11.02[3][a]
rescission of obligations transferred to, capital forbearance program
1O.02[S][c] requirements, 11.02[3][b]
reserve funds, 11.01 creation of, 1.02[4]
amount of, 11.01[3] examination of savings and loan
investment of, 11.01[3] associations, 7.0 I[I]
shield statute, 1O.02[S][b] Financing Corporation directorate
stock purchased by Federal Reserve regulatory authority over, 11.02[2]
Banks, 11.0 I selection of members of, 11.02[2]
suits against, 11.01 heads Federal Home Loan Bank
supervision of state banks, System, 2.03
nonmembers of Federal Reserve regulation of Federal Savings and
System, 11.0I Loan Insurance Corporation,
termination of insurance, 10.0I 11.02[1]
corrective action, 10.0 I regulations, 7.0 I[2][c]
types of deposits and items insured, repurchase agreement guidelines, 19.0S
11.01[1] Federal Home Loan banks, super
unsafe or unsound practices, authority priority to security interests of,
to deal with, 11.01[4] 11.02[2]
U.S. Treasury Federal Home Loan Bank Sys\em
power to borrow from, 11.01 See a/so Federal Home Loan Bank
stock subscribed by, 11.01 Board; Federal Home Loan
violation of due process, 11.01 Banks chartering of federal
violation of equal protection, 11.0I savings and loan associations,
whole-bank purchase, 1O.02[3J[aJ[iiJ 2.03
Federal deposit insurance systems. See creation of, 1.02[4J
Federal Deposit Insurance regulation of federal savings and loan
Corporation; Federal Savings and associations, 2.03
Loan Insurance Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Federal Home Loan Bank Board; Corporation
National Credit Union activities, 2.05 [6][a]
Administration Board organization, 2.0S[6J[a]
Federal funds, definition of, 19.0S purpose, 2.0S[6][a]
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Housing Authority (FHA)
(FHLBB) commissioner of, 2.0S[6][b]
appointment of receiver for members, mortgage insurance programs under
10.02[1] National Housing Act, 2.0S[6][b]
approval of federal savings and loan unit of Department of Housing and
charters, l.02[4] Urban Development, 2.0S[6][b]
Competitive Equality Banking Act of Federal Intermediate Credit Banks
1987 discount agricultural paper, 2.0S[8J[b]
 INDEX 1-28

[Refe~nusa~toparographs(f}J
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks Federal Register
(cont'dj publication of federal IIJency
loans. 2.05[8][b] regulations, 14.01[3)
organization. 2.05[8][b] proposed regulations published in
purpose. 2.05[8J(b] advance, 14.01[3J
stock held by Production Credit various publications for each
Associations, 2.05[8][b] agency, 14.01 [3J
supervision of Production Credit Federal regulatory agencies
Associations. 2.05[8][b] See also Board of Governors of the
Federal Land Bank Associations Federal Reseoe System;
member-owned stock, 2.05[8][a] Comptroller of the Currency;
Federal Deposit Insurance
membership, .2.05[8][aJ
Corporation; Federal Home Loan
Federal Land Banks Bank Board; Federal Savinp and
See auo Federal Land Bank Loan Insurance Corporation
Associations access to information on customer
loans to Federal Land Bank transactions, limitations on
AssoCiations, 2.05[8][&] Privacy Act of 1974, 13.01[2J[d]
purpose. 2.05[8J(aJ Right to Financial Privacy Act of
real estate mortgage loans to farmers 1978. 13.01[2][c]
and ranchers, 2.05[8][aJ bank examination. See Bank
examination
Federal law
cease and desist orders, 9.01[1]
constitutional authority for, 14.01[1] civil money penalties, assessment of,
credit disclosure. 14.01[1] 9.0 I[3]
credit discrimination, 14.01 [I] civil money penalties, assessed against,
electronic fund transfers. 14.01[1] violation of Right to Financial
preemption of state law. 14.01 [3][b] Privacy Act, 13.01[2][c)
source of commercial law, 14.01 cooperation among, 2.03
standards for. Constitution of the enforcement powers of
United States, 14.01[IJ antitying provisions, 9.02[5]
state law concurrent with, 14.0 I[1 J exceptions. 9.02[5J
Federal National Mortgage Association 10all5, restrictions on, 9.02[IJ.
organization. 2.05[6J[c] 9.02[2]
ownership,2.05(6)[c) antitying provisions. 9.02[5]
regulation. 2.0S[6][c] management interlocks, 9.02[6)
sale of FHA-insured and VA- exceptions, 9.02[6]
guaranteed mortgages, 2.05[6J[cJ regulating unsafe and unsound
practices, 9.01
Federal Open Market Committee transactions between member banks
(FOMC) and affiliates, 9.02[3], 9.02[4]
annual report, 3.03[1} . transactions with insidcn and
challimges to constitutionality of,. affiliates, 9.02
3.03[2)
Farm Credit Administration, 2.05{8][e]
establishment of, 3.03[2] general federal law gowrning. 14.01[3]
membership of, 3.03(2) injunctive relief sought against, 9.01[5]
powers of, 3.03[2] judicial review of agency actions.
purpose of, 3.03[2] . 9.01[5]
Federal Power Act, prohibition against membership in Financial Institutions
management interlocks, 9.02[6] Examination Council, 2.03
1-29 INDEX

[Referenus are to paragraphs (1)·]

mergers and consolidations, approval safekeeping services, 18.0I[1][c]
of, 13.03[3] stock held by member banks, 3.03[3]
overlap among, 2.03 Federal Reserve Board. See Board of
receivership, role in, 10.02[2] Governors of the Federal Reserve
regulations prevail over conflicting System
state law, 14.01[3] Federal Reserve Bulletin, 14.01 [3)
regulations published in Federal Federal Reserve Regulatory Service,
Register, 14.01[3]
restrictions on loans, 9.02[1], 9.02[2] 14.01[3]
source of commercial banking law, Federal Reserve System
14.01 [3] See also Board of Governors of the
suspension and removal of bank Federal Reserve System; Federal
officers and directors Open Market Committee; Federal
authoritY,9.01[2][a] Reserve Act; Federal Reserve
limitations, 9.0 I[2][a] Banks
procedure,9.01[2][b] book entry securities services,
18.01[1][c]
Federal Reserve Act emergency powers, 4.02[ I]
establishment of Federal Reserve false advertisement or representation
System, 1.02[4) of entity as member of, 12.02[4]
Board of Governors, 1.02[4] FedWire,3.04[5][b]
Federal Reserve Banks, functions of
member banks, 3.02 banker for U.S. government,
Federal Reserve Banks 3.04[1][b]
automated clearinghouse services, bank holding company regulation,
18.01[1][bJ 3.02
as bankers' banks, 3.03[3] check collection, 3.04[5J[a]
Board of Governors supervisory power credit controls, 3.04[6][c]
over, 3.03[3J electronic fund transfers, 3.04[5J[bJ
capital stock, 3.03[3] foreign banking regulation, 3.02
clearinghouse for collecting checks and interest rate controls, 3.04[6][b]
transferring funds, 3.03[3] issuance of notes and coinage,
districts and branch territories, 3.03[3] 3.04(3]
electronic fund transfers, 3.04[5][b]; loans to member banks, 3.02
18.01[I][b] margin requirements, 3.04[6J(a]
emergency relief, 3.03[3] open market actions, 3.02
employees, dismissal of, 3.03[3] payments system, 3.04[5]
establishment of, 1.02[4J reserve accounts, 3.04[1][a]
examination of, 3.03[3] reserve requirements, 3.04[2]
examination of member banks, 3.03[3] eurocurrency, 3.04[2][a]
exemption from taxation, 3.03(3) transaction accounts, 3.04[21
government agency accounts, 3.03[3] supervision of member state banks,
issuance of Reserve notes, 3.03[3] 3.02
liability of collecting banks, 21.01[3] truth-in-lending regulation, 3.02
loans to member banks, 3.03[3] unfair and deceptive trade practices
advances, 3.04[4][a] prevention, 3.02
discounts, 3.04[4][b] industrial banks, 2.05[1]
Federal Reserve credit, 3.04[4][c] member banks
operational profits, 3.03[3] membership requirements, 3.03[4]
powers and duties of, 3.03[3] mergers and' consolidations, 13.03[3]
reserve depository, 3.03[3] state banles, 3.03[4]
 INDEX 1-30

[References are la paragraphs (f).}

Federal Rescrve System (conI 'd) effects of Competitive Equality
membership in, 3.03[3J Banking Act,. 6.05[2J
organization of, 3.03 emergency funds, 11.02[2]
powers of. 3.03 establishment of, 1.02[4)
priority of regulations over Code examination, 11.02[ I]
provisions. 14.01[3]]c] affiliates included, I L02[ I]
relationship to nonmember depository financial assistance to failing banks
institutions, 3.03[5] direct financial aid, 10.03[1]
role in setting monetary policy, 3.02 merger assistance, 1O.03[2J
safekeeping services, 18.01[I](c] net worth certificates, 10.03[3]
source of commercial banking law, full faith and credit of United States,
14.01 (3J[c] 11.04
special authority to regulate certain merger assistance to financially weak
payment methods, 14.01[3J{c] bank.s, 10.03[2)[a]
structure of, 3.02 judicial review, 10.03[2][b]
penalties for untrue or derogatory
wire transfers, 3.04{5][bJ
statements on financial standing
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance of, 12.02[4]
CorpDration (FSLIq powers, l1.02[ I]
See also Financing Corporation purpose of, I L02[ I ]
accounts insurable, 11.02[ I} as receiver, 1O.02(3][b]
adjustments to financial statements of regulation by Federal Home Loan
applicants. II.02[ I] Bank Board, I L02[ I]
amount of insurance, 11.02[ I] regulatory authority of. 11.02[1]
assessments for financing, 11.02[ I] reserves, authority to establish,
backcd by full faith and credit of U.S., 11.02(1)
11.04 suit against, lo.o2f6)[bJ
board of directors, direct financial aid termination of insurance. 11).01
to failing banks, 10.02[1] corrective action, 10.0 I
capital adequacy, 7.0J[I] types of institutions insured, 11.02rt J
rejection of bank application, Federal supervisory asencics. See Federal
Il.02t\1 regulatory agencies
Competitive Equality Banking Act of Federal Ton Claims Act, 10.02[3][a]
1987, 11.02[2] limitation on jurisdiction, 10.02[6]{a]
financial rescue by suit against FDIC, 11.01 [1]
emergency funds, 11.02(2] Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Financing Corporation consumer credit rules, 24.04
established to infuse ncw confession of judgment clause,
funds, 11.02[2] 24.01[2]
regulation of financially weak holder in due course status,
institutions 16.06[1]. 16.06[2]
accounting requirements, t)'pes of institutions subject to rules of,
11.02[3][aJ 26.05[IJ .
capital forbearance program Federal Trade Commission Improvement
requirements, 1I.02[3J[b] Act
definition of, 11.02[ I] antitrust concerns, 13.03[1 1
emergency acquisitions of financially banking regulatory agencies' adoption
weak banks, b.05f 1] of regulations, 13.03[2]' .
acquisition of bank in danger of consumer transactions, 24.04
cloaing, 6.05[2][b] credit practices, 13.03(2)
1-31 INDEX

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

specific statutes applying to banks need to harmonize Code provisions
holding companies, 13.03[2] with, 15.08[1]
management interlocks, 13.03[2] Fiduciary relationship
regulatory approval of See also Fiduciaries
consolidations and mergers,
13.03[2] debtor-creditor relationship v.,
securities transactions, 13.03[2] 19.02[1 ][b]
tying arrangements, 13.03[2] definition of, 15.08
unfair and deceptive trade practices, Field warehouse arrangement. See
26.05[ I] Warehouse, field warehouse
FedWire,3.04[5][b] arrangement
FHA. See Federal Housing Authority Filing
FHLBB. See Federal Home Loan Bank Su also Financing statements
Board first to file rule, 22.03[2][b]
Fiduciaries fixtures, 23.03[2]
accounts in name of principal, petition in bankruptcy
15.08[2] involuntary, 25.03
bank accounts, 19.02[1][b] voluntary, 25.03
banks as, 24.02[1] termination statement, 22.03[3]
transactions, 24.02[ I][b] Finance charges
disclosure of, 13.01[3] closed-end credit, 26.03[2][a]
trust fund exemptions, 7.02[1] disclosure, 26.03[2][b]
banks as, investments permitted, open-end credit, 26.03[2][b]
8.01[6]
breach of duty, 15.08[1] Financial Institutions Examination
bank directors, officers, or Council
. employees, 12.02[4] access to reports and records of
determining, 15.08[3] federal regulatory agencies,
holders in due course, 16.01[2][b] 7.01[1]
knowledge of, 15.08[1] establishment of, 7.01[1]
notice of, 15.08[3] examination of depository institutions,
checks drawn by, 15.08[2] 2.03
claims against, in receivership, membership of, 7.01[1]
10.02[5] purpose of, 2.03
Code provisions, 15.08[1] responsibilities of
definition of, 15.08; 24.02[1][a] development of uniform reporting
deposits, 15.08[2] systems, 7.01[1]
bank's liability, 15.08[2] management of schools for
personal account, 15.08[2] examiners, 7.01[1]
funds handled by, 15.08 uniform standards and report forms,
good faith requirement, 15.08[1] 7.01[1]
national banks.as, 4.03[1][a], 12;02[4] Financial Institutiol18 Regulatory and
penalties, 12.02[4] Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
responsibilities of, 24.02[1][a] formation of Financial Institutions
restrictive indorsements, 15.08[1]
transfer of negotiable instruments, Examination Council, 7.01[1]
15.08[2] Financial Institutions Regulatory and
unauthorized signatures, 15.08[1] Interest Rate Control Act of 1978
Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 15.08[2] (FIRA), cease and desist orders,
breach of duty rules, 15.08[1] power to issue, 9.01[1]
 INDEX 1-32

(References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Financial Institution Supervisory Act of index of, 22.03[ I]
1966 (FISA), cease and desist information required, 22.03[2][a]
orders,9.01[JJ leased goods, 22.0J[2][81
Financial records, willful violation of no req uirement to mention proceeds,
requirements on, civil and criminal 23.03[J]
penalties, 12.0 I[I] perfection of security interest, 22.03[1]
Financing Corporation release of collateral, 22.03[3]
administrative expenses, 11.02(2] required under Uniform Commercial
assessments for financing, 11.02(2J Code, 22.03[2]
capital certificates nonredeemable, security agreements as, 22.03[1J
11.02[2] termination statement, 22.03[3]
capitalization of, 11.02[2J Fines. Sn Penalties
capital stock redeemable, 11.02[2] First Bank of the V nited States, history
Competitive Equality Banking Act of and demise, 1.02[1]
1987 established need for. Fixtures
11.02[2] as collateral, 22.03[2]
directorate of, J1.02[2J construction mortgage, 23.03[21
Federal Home Loan Bank Board definition of, 22.06[5]
regulatory authority over, disclaim interest in, 23.03[2J
11.02[2J filing
exit fees imposed on institutions grace period to make, 23.03[2]
leaving FSLlC·insured system, perfected by, 23.03[2]
11.02[2] financing statement, 22.03[2]
issuance of capital stock to Federal place for filing, 22.03[1]
Home Loan banks, 11.02[2] as goods, 23.03[2J
issuance of long-term bonds, I 1.02[2] priority of security intel'elt in, 23.03[2]
not backed by full faith and credit purchase money security interest,
of U.S., 11.02[2J 23.03[2J
maximum amount borrowed by, special rules, 23.03[2J
11.02[2] vec rules affecting, 23.03[21
maximum amount each Federal Home security interest in, 22.06[5]
Loan bank may invest in, 11.02[2J consent in writing to, 23.03[2]
powers of, 11.02[2] Food Security Act of 1985
proceeds channeled to FSLIC, debtor's duty to identify buyers.
II.02[2J commission merchants and sale!
Financing statements agents, 23.02[2J[e]
amendment of. 22.03[3] double payment, 23.02[2J[aJ
consigned goods, 22.01[2J[b] inclusion of commission merchants
consumer goods, 22.03[3] and sales agents, 23.02[2][8]
continuation statement, 22.03[ I] key terms, defined, 23.02{2][f]
copies of, 22.03[2][b] notification through central filing
definition of, 22.03[2] system, 23.02[2][d]
filing of preemptive effect of, 23.02[2][f]
accounts; 22.03 presate notification, 23.02[2J[c]
continuation statement, 22.03[1] provisions of, 23.02[2][bJ
early, 22.03[2][bJ reasons for enactment, 23.02[2][aJ
perfecting security interest, 23.01 [IJ scope of, 23.02[2][1)
place for 22.03[1] Foreign banking
state laws, 22.03[5] Edge corporations, 2.05[3]
in wrong office, 22.03[1 J management interlocks, 9.02[6]
1-33 INDEX

[R~f~r~nces are to paragraphs (f).]

reporting requirements, 13.0 I[I] involving bank cards, 12.02[4J
Foreign banb Fraudulent conveyances, trustee's power
S~~ also International finance to set aside in bankruptcy
organizations proceedings, 25.07[5]
branches eligible for FDIC insurance, Freedom of Information Act, effect on
11.01[1] federal regulatory agencies, 14.01[3]
definition of bank, exclusion from,
5.01[4][a] FSLIC. See Federal Savings and Loan
examination, 7.0 I[I] Insurance Corporation
reporting requirements, 13.0 I [I] Full payment checks
Foreign trade banks, 1.01 accord and satisfaction, 24.01 [3][b]
Forgery Uniform Commercial Code
&~ also Alterations; Embezzlement; regulations, 24.0 I [3 ][b]
Fraud; Imposters
checks
authorization, 19.03[4J G
bank's liability for accepting,
15.05[5J[b] Garnishment, joint accounts, 19.03[2][c]
signatures, 20.08 Garn-5t Germain Depository Institutions
corporate accounts, 19.03[4] Act of 1982
joint account, I9.03[2](e 1 assistance to failing banks, 10.03
depositor's duty to report, 20.12[1], bankers' banks, S.02[3][e]
20.12[2J bank service corporations, S.02[3J[dJ
holders in due course, 16.01[2J(b] due on sale clause, 24.01[IJ[c)(iiJ
imposter rule, 20.06[3] escheat laws, 7.01 [I]
state laws, 12.02 examination of national banks by
U.S. Treasury checks, indorsements of, state authorities, 7.0 1[11
21.12(2) extraordinary acquisitions, 1O.03[2][a]
Fraud restrictions on loans, 7.02[a]
See also Embezzlement; Imposters to single borrower, 7.02[bJ
anti-fraud provisions of federal thrift institutions
securities laws, 1.02[2] antitying provisions, 7.0i[2][c]
bank nondisclosure, 24.02(2) borrowing powers, 7.01[2][cJ
by banks, nondisclosure, 24.02[2] conversion to federal charters,
contracts, 26.05[2] 7.0 I [2][c]
fictitious or nonexistent payees, demand accounts, 7.01[2][c]
20.06[3] elimination of interest rate
interstate commerce, 7.02[2] differentials, 7.01[2][c]
letters of credit, 17.02[2][a] investments,7.01[2][c)
misrepresentation issuance of securities, 7.01[2)[c]
by banks, 24.02[2) issuance of srock, 7.01[2][c]
defense against holder in due money market account, 7.01[2][c]
course, 16.02[2](c ][iii] remote service units, 7.0l[2][c]
in obtaining signature, 19.04[1] savings accounts, 7.01[2][c]
shield statute, 1O.02[5][b] service corporations, 7.01[2][c]
state laws, 12.02
as surety, 1.01[2][c]
use of insider information, 7.02[2]
use of the mails, 7.02[2] unclaimed property. 7.01(1)
wire, 12.02[4] General creditors, rights of, 23.03[3J
application to electronic fund General intangibles
transfers, 12.02[4J definition of, 22.07[2]
 INDEX 1-34

[References are to paragraphs (fl.]

General intangibles (cont'd) two-tier price system, termination of,
security interests in, 22.07[2) 14.02(2)
Glass-Steagall Act of 1!}33 Gold and silver certificates, issued
application to Bank Holding against gold and silver reserves,
Company Act, 8.01[2][bJ J4.02(1]
bank as agent, &.01 [5)[a) Gold standard
bank holding company affiliate as International Monetary Fund, l4.02[IJ
investment advisor, 8.0Ip)[aJ Smithsonian Agreement, 14.02(21
basic provisions of, 8.0 J [IJ Good faith, 20.10
defining securities for purpOlles of, St!t! a/so Bad faith; Bona fide
8.0J[J)[bJ purchasers; Good faith
difftculty in determining, from act, purchasers; Holders in due course
permissibility of activities. 8.01 [I J bank liability, 24.02[2J
discount brokerage covenant of good faith and fair
bank holding companies, 8.01[S][b] dealing, 24.02[2J
national banks, 8.01[5J[aJ holders in due course, 16.01[3J
FDIC policy. 8.01[2)[a) notic~ of dishonor, 2I.11[2Jl:d]
Federal Reserve Board policy, promIssory notes, acceleratton,
8.01 [2][bJ 24.01 [1][bJ[i]
interpretation of, 8.01 P] simple honesty test of. 16.01[3]
subtle hazards analysis, 8.0 1[3][a] Good faith purchasers
investment securities, defined, 8.01[11 Set' also Bona fIde purchasers; Good
original intent to remove banks from faith; Holders in due course
securities business, lUH chattel paper, 23.02[3]
as part of Banking Act of 1933. entrustment, 23.02[I][c)
1.02(4) ordinary course of busineu,
purpose in separating investment and 23.02[ I ][a l
commercial banking, 8.01 protection against defenses, 10.02(5)[c]
righls of. 23.02[1][c]
restrictions on banks, underwriting
taking fnle of security interest,
commercial paper, 8.01[3)[b1
23.02(1)[a)
8.01[4]
scope of, 8.0 I[2J . Goods
Set! also Collateral; Consumer goods;
subsidiary as discount broker,
Equipment; Farm products;
8.01 [5][a]
Inventory
sweep arrangements, 8.01[3](b]
buyers of, 23.02[ I)
Gold ordinary course of business,
See a/so Bullion; Gold and silver . 23.02[ I][aJ
certificates; Gold standard c1a\lSe, priority over unperfected security
14.02(1] . interest, 23.01[1]
coins classifications, 22.06
discontinuance of, 14.02[1) commingled, 23.03[5]
payment in, 14.02[1] consignment, purchase money priority
commodity, 14.02 rule, 23.01 (2)[a]
foreign exchange, 14.02[2) definition of, 22.06
medallions, U.S. Mint, 14.02[2] . destruction of, 23.02[1][a]
redemption of currency in, 14.02{1] entrusted to debtor, 23.02[IJ[bJ
reserves, J4.02(1) field warehouse arnmgement, 22.04[2]
restrictions on private ownership, fixtures, 22.06[5J
14.02[2J manufactured. 23.03[5)
1-35 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

motor vehicles, 22.06[6] promissory notes, payable on demand,
processed, 23.03[5] 24.0I[I][a]
reclamation by seller, 23.03[3] rights of, 16.03
security interests in, 22.06 Holders in due course
seller's right to stop in transit, 23.03[3] See also Bona fide purchasers;
transfer of Purchasers
in satisfaction of antecedent debt, abolition in consumer transactions,
23.02[ Ilea] 16.06[1]
title, 23.02[ Ilea] assignee lacking status of, 16.06
in total or partial satisfaction of banks as, 21.01[1]
money debt, 23.02[1][a] cashier's checks as, 16.0I[4]
types of, 22.06 collecting bank as, 16.0 I[4]; 21.0 1[3]
unpaid seller's rights, 23.03(3] consumer credit transactions, 16,06
Government National Mortgage cutting off consumers' rights, 26:01
Association defenses against, 16.02[2]
creation of, 2.05[6][c] discharge, 16.02[2][c][iv],
loan programs, 2.05[6][c] 16.02(2][c][v]
management of government-held duress, 16.02[2][c][ii]
mortgage portfolios, 2.05[6][c] failure of consideration, 16.02[2][b]
purchase of mortgages, 2.05[6][c] fraud, 16.02[2][c][iii]
freedom from, 16.02[2]
Government securities. See Securities illegality, 16.02[2][c][ii]
Government Securities Act of 1986, incapacity, 16.02[2][c][i]
regulation of goverment securities notice of, 16.01[2][b]
brokers, 8.02[2] parties with whom holder has dealt,
Grace period to perfect security interest 16.02[2][a]
in collateral, 23.01[1] personal, 16.02[2][b]
competing secured parties, 23.01[1] real, 16.02[2][c)
in fixture filings, 23.03[2] separate agreements, 16.05
in proceeds, 23.03(1] use of parol evidence, 16.05
Grandfather rights usury, 16.02(2][c][ii]
bank branches, 6.01 [2] defenses cut off by, 16.02[2][a]
bank holding companies, 5.01[4][c] delay in presentment, 21.02[1]
nonbank banks, 8.0 I(8] depository bank as, 16.01[4]
dishonored instrument, 16.01[2]
Guarantees exclusions, 16.01(5]
letters of credit as substitutes for, FDIC status as, 10.02[5][a]
17.01 Federal Trade Commission rules, 16.06
letters of credit distinguished from, abolition of holder in due course
17.01[3] status in consumer transactions,
16.06[1]
impact of, 16.06[2][b]
H transactions affected by, 16.06[2]
fiduciary relations affecting,
Hearing, repossession of collateral, 16.01 (2][b]
24.03[3][a] forgery or alteration, defenses
Holders available when, 16.0 I(2](b]
of construction mortgage, 23.03[2] . giving value, 16.01[4]
of negotiable instruments, duty to good faith, 16.01[3]
present promptly, 21.02[1] holder requirement, 16.0 I [J]
 I:-fDEX 1-36

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

Holders in due course (cont'd) I
home solicitation sales, 16.06[4] ----- _
indorsement, 16.01[IJ Identification
knowledge of disabling facti, 16.01[2J See also Forgery
letters of credit, 17.02[2][aJ of indorsers, 20.06[1 J
notice, defined, 16.01[2]{aJ of pa)'llcs, 20.06{ I]
notice of acceleration, 24.01[IJ[b]
notice of defenses, defects or claims, Illegality, as defense, 16.02[2][cJ(iiJ
16.01[2J Impersonation, See Impostefl
elements constituting, 16.01[2][bJ Imposters
overdue instrument, 16.01[2J Code rule on, 20.06[3]
antedating, 16.0 I [2) fictitious or nonexistent payees,
postdating, 16.01[2] 20.06[3]
possession, 16.0 I [I] signatures by, 19.04[1]
purchase at discount, 16.01 [4J Impoundment, 19.02[lJ[bJ
qualifications for, 16.01 [5) Incapacity
requirements of, 16.01 as defense, 16.02[2)[c][iJ
rights of, 16.02
infancy, 16.02[2][cJ(iJ
acquisition by transfer, 16.04 types of, 16.02(2][cJ[i]
availability of, J6.0 1
freedom from claims, 16.02[1J Incompetence, termination of banker-
freedom from defenses, 16.02[2] depositor relationship due to,
slate laws limiting, 16.06[4] 19.02{S]
separate agreements, 16.05 Indemnities, leiters of credit, 17.02[2][a]
shelter principle, 16.04 Individual accounts
stopped payment, 16.0 I [4] definition of, 19.03[1]
suspicious circumstances, 16.01[2][b] minor, parent or guardian
laking free of defenses, defects or authorization, 19.03[1 J
claims, 16.01[2J; 23.02[3] Individual retirement accounts (IRAI),
value given by, 16.01[4) and pooled investment funds,
bank credit as, 16.01[4J 8.01[6]
consideration distinguished from,
16.01[4] Indorsements
agent or representative, 15.01[3)
Holidays. See Bank holidays bank's power to supply missing,
Home banking, 18.01[IJ[g] 15.(H[3][c]
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, blank, 15.01[3][a][i]
13.04 boilerplate, 21.06
Homestead associations. See Savings conditional. 15.01[3][a)[v]
and loan associations effectiveness, 15.01[3]
Housing and mortgage credit agencies forged, /9.04(1]
Federal Home Loan Mortgage customer's failure to detect, 20.12[1]
Corporation, 2.05[6][a] imposter rule and, 20.06[3]
Federal Housing Administration, payor bank pays check containing,
2.05C6][b] 21.01[7]
Federal National Mortgage statute of limitations, 20.12[1]
Association, 2.05(6][cJ U.S. Treasury checks, 21.12[2J
Government National Mortgage limitation of indorsee's rights by
Association, 2.05(6)[d) separate contract, 15.01[3]{e]
types of federal goverment programs, missing, bank's power to supply,
2.0516) 19.03[2][e]
1-37 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

partner, 15.01 [3] mistaken payments in excess of
qualified, 15.01(3)[a][iii] insurance, 11.0 III ][b}
Regulation CC standard for, 21.06 National Credit Union Administration
restrictive, 15.0l(3](a][iv] Board supervision of federal
binding on payor bank, 21.01[3] credit unions, 11.03
collecting bank exempt from, nature of, 10.02(1]
21.01[3] rights of unpaid sellers to reclaim
fiduciaries, 15.08[1] goods, 23.03[3]
miscredited proceeds and, 20.07 secured party's security interest in
stop payment, 20.05[2] proceeds, 23.03[1}
rights and duties of restrictive unclaimed property, 4.02[2]
indorsees, 15.01[3][b] Instruments
special, 15.01 [3][a][ii]; 20.06[2]
See also Collection of instruments;
transferees of instruments with
Negotiable instruments; slJCCiftc
missing, 15.01[3]{d]
types
types of, 15.01[3}[a]
definition of, 22.07[3]
unauthorized, 19.04[ I]
payor bank pays check containing, Uniform Commercial Code, 19.01
21.01 (7) negotiability, promissory notes,
U.S. Treasury checks, 21.12[2] 24.01[2]
U.S. Treasury checks, 21.12[1] security interests in, 22.07[3]
validity, 15.01[3] filing as hazardous method of
without recourse, 15.01(3}[a][iii] perfecting, 23.02[3]
Indorsers Insurance
identification of, 20.06[1] agents, authorization of national
liabilities, 15.02[4] banks to act as, 4.03[2][b]
Industrial banks bank holding company activities,
definition of bank, exclusion from, 5.02[3][c}
5.0 1[4][a} Insurance policies, security interests in,
eligibility for membership in Federal 22.07[8}
Reserve System, 2.05[1] Insured institutions, deftnition of baRk,
eligibility for FDIC insurance, exclusion from; 5.0l[4][a]
11.01[1]
Inter-American Development Bank,
management interlocks, 9.02[6}
powers of, 2.05( I] 2.05[5]
purpose of, 2.05[ I) Interest
subject to state law, 2.05[l} points and commitment fees as pan
Infancy, as defense, 16.02]2][c][i] of, 26.02[I}
withholding taxes on, 11.03
Insider trading, use of insider
information, 7.02(2) Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance
Insolvency, 4.02[2], 10.02[4][a} Act of 1983, 11.03
See also Bankruptcy; Dissolutions; Interest rates
Liquidations; Receiver; calculation difficulty, 26.02[1]
Reorganizations corporate, by state, 26.02[1]
collection and return o(checks, 21.06 export of, by national banks,
discharge, as defense against holder in 26.02[2}[c]
. due course, l6.02[2}[c][iv] farm loans, 2.05[8}[e}
FDIC supervision of insured banks, federal preemption of state usury laws,
11.01 26.02[IJ
 INDEX 1-38

rRtifeTen~s are to paragraphs (f).]

Intere!t rates (conr'd) by savings and loan associations, 6.04
Federal Reserve Interstate commerce, liabilities for
discount,3.04[4][b] fraudulent practices, 7.02[2}
regulation, 3.04[6][b]
legal, 26.02[3][a] Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
legal, by state, 26.02[1] Act, 26.03[4J
maximum, by state, 26.02[JJ Inventory
most favored lender, 26.02[2](bJ definition of, 22.06(4}
national banks, 26.02(2} field warehousing, 22.04[2J
role of state law, 26.02l2](a] as goods, 22.06[4 J
state laws, variety of, 26.02 proceeds from sale of, purchase money
time-price doctrine, 26.02(1) priority extell5ion to, 23.01[2J[a]
Jntermediary banks purchase money security interest in,
definition of, 19.01; 21.01[3] 22.02[2]
duties of, 21.01[3] security interests in, 22.06[4J
purchase money priority provision,
International banking 23.0 I [2][a]
See also Foreign banking; Foreign purchaser taking free of, 23.02[3]
banks
Banks for Cooperatives, 2.0S[8][c] Investment, in securities. See Securities
Edge corporations, 2.0S[3J Investment Advisers Act of 1940, bank
Ex.port-Import Bank of the United as investment adviser, 7.02[ I]
States, 2.0S[4] Investment banking, diminishing
international finance organizatioltJ, separation from commercial
2.05[S) banking, 7.02
International finance organizations Investment banks, activities of, 1.0 I
Asian Development Bank, 2.0S(5J
Investment Company Act of 1940, bank
Inter-American Development Bank,
as investment adviser, 7.02(1)
2.05(5]
World Bank (International Bank for Investment contracts, defined as a
Rcconstuction and Development), security, 7.02[3][a]
2.05[5] Investments
International tending Supervision Act See also Trust funds
of 1983 assets from IRAs, 8.01[6]
capital adequacy, 7.01[1] collective investment funds, 8.01[6)
loans to foreign parties, 7.01[1) savings and loan associations,
International Monetary Fund, U.S. 7.01 [2J[c]
membership in, 14.02[2] IRAs. See Individual retirement
Interstate banking accounts
by bank holding companies, 6.02 Items
expansion through nonbank at clearinghouse, 19.01
subsidiaries, 6.02[3] at collecting bank, 19.01
restrictions on, 1.0 I definition of, 19.0 I
automated teUer machine networks, at depository bank, 19.01
6.03 at intermediary bank, 19.01
Competitive Equality Banking at payor bank, 19.01
Amendments, 6.02[4] at presenting bank, 19.01
use of nonbank banks to avoid, at remitting bank, 19.01
26.02[2][c] withdrawal slip as, 19.01
1-39 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

J Legal tender
coins and notes included as, 14.02[1]
Joint accounts definition of, 14.02[1]
See also Joint tenancy; Tenancy in history of, 14.02[1]
common Lenders. See Loans
change in parties, 19.03[2][e] Letters of credit
collection of one party's tax obligation acceptance, 17.02[1]
by I.R.S., 19.03[2][g] fraudulent transactions, 17.02[2][b)
common law, 19.03[2][a] A.rticle 5, 14.03[2]
conflicting claims, 19.03[2][g] assignability, 17.0I
contract rights, 19.03[2][a] bankruptcy, 25.04
creditor's rights to levy, 19.03(2)(c] preferences, 25.09[2]
definition of, 19.03[2] Uniform Commercial Code Qot
different arrangements, 19.03[2] applicable, 17.04
garnishment of, 19.03{2)[c] clean, 17.01[2]
overdrafts, liability for, 19.03[2][f] conditional, 17.01
ownership interests, 19.03[2][d] confirmation of, 17.01
payout by bank, 19.03(2)[e] customer's obligation to reimburse
presumption of equal ownership, issuer, 17.01
19.03[2][c] definition of, 17.0 I
respective interests, 19.03[2] delay in payment, 17.02[I]
setoff rights, 19.03[2][c] direct obligation, 17.01
signature cards, 19.03{2][d] dishonor of drafts, 17.02[1]
stop payment rights, 19.03[2][g) documentary, 17.01[2]
survivorship rights, 19.03[2] documentary drafts drawn against,
Uniform Probate Code, 19.03[2][b] 17.03(2]
J oint tenancy exceptions to duty to pay
accounts, 19.03[2][c] forged or fraudulent documents,
common-law presumption of, 17.02(2)[a)
19.03[2][a] fraudulent transaction, 17.02[2][a]
survivorship rights, 19.03[2][c] invalid or nongenuine documents,
withdrawal slips, 19.03(2][d) 17.02[2][a)
Judgments, against bank, unpaid for 30 expansion of use, 4.03[2][d]
days, I0.02[ I] as extension of credit, 7.01[2][a]
forms of, 17.01[2]
fraud, 17.02[2][a]
L good faith, 17.02[1]
governing bodies, 17.01 [1]
Larceny, common law, 12.02[4] guarantee transactions distinguished,
Lease, of collateral by secured party 17.01[3]
after default, 24.03[4][a) holder in due course, 17.02[2][a]
Leases honor of drafts, 17.02[2][a]
consumer indemnities, 17.02[21[a]
definition of, 26.03[3] international transactions
disclosure required, 26.03[3] rules governing, 17.01[1]
functional equivalent of loan, subject traditional, 17.01(2]
to usury law, 26.02[1] uniform customs, 17.01 [4]
national bank transactions, .4.03[1][d] irrevocable, 11.01 [2] .
net leases, 4.03[I][d] issuer's obligations
security device, 22.01[2][a] to beneficiary, 17.02[2]
 INDEX 1-40

[R~fef'(mus are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Lellers of credit (cont'd) forged or altered paper, certifying or
issuer's obligations (cont'd) accepting, IS.05[5][b]; 20.01
to customer, 17.02[1] mistaken certification, IS.OS[SJ[c]
duty to pay, 17.02[2] money orders, 15.05[3]
ensure compliance, 17.02[I] negotiable instruments, 15.05
questions of waiver, estoppel and obligations of acceptance or
cure, 17.02[2] certification, 15.05[5][a]
liability, 17.02[ I], 17.02[2][b] on promises and representations
nature of, 17.01 with respect to customer's
notation credit, 17.01 [2] account, 20.13
parties to, 17.01 refusal to pay, 20.03
rights and obligations of, 17.01 traveler's checks, IS.OS[4]
as preferences, 25.09[2] bank's good faith obligation, 24.02[2]
revocable, 17.01 [2] civil
security interest in, 17.0I violation of Bank Secrecy Act,
standby, 17.02[3] 12.01 [1]
extension of credit, 7.01[2][a] violation of Money Laundering
purchase and assumption Control Act, 12.0I[2][b]
agreements, 10.02[4J[b] violation of Regulation CC,
purpose of, 17.01 20.llfl][b][vi]
collecting payments, depository
use of, 17.01
institutions for, 21.01[1]
straight, 17.01[2] criminal
third party beneficiary contract violation of Bank Secrecy Act,
distinguished, 17.0 I [3] 12.01 [I]
transfer, l7.01 violation of Money Laundering
traveler's, 17.01[2] Control Act, 12.0 I [2][b]
unconditional, 17.01 discharge of, 1S.07
underlying contract drawer's, 15.02(5]
breach of, 11.02[2][a], 17.02[2][b) final payment or final settlement
relationship to, 17.02[2)[b) initiating, 19.02[1 ][d]
Uniform Commercial Code indorser's, 15.02[4]
insolvency provision, 17.04 maker's, 15.02[2]
scope of, 17.01[1] negotiable instruments, 15.02
Uniform Customs, 17.01[4J nondeposit, 19.05
usage of, 17.01 overdrafts, joint account, 19.03[2][f]
as wash transactions, 17.04 primary and secondary, 15.02[1)
writing required, 17.01[2J secured party, unconstitutional
telegram as writing, 11.0 I[2] procedure, 24.03[3][b]
wrongful di3honor, 17.02[1] securities fraud, 7.02[2]
Liabilities use of undisclosed insider information,
acceptance, 15.02[3] 7.02[1]
acceptor's, 15.02[2] in warrantv, 15.03
accommodation parlics, 15.06[2] for wrongfUl dishonor, 20.03
agent's, 15.04 Lien creditors
bank's definition of, 23.01[1]
accepted drafts, 15.05(5] entrustment, 23.02[1][cl
cashier's checks, 15.05[2] fixtures, 23.03[2J
certificates of deposit, 15.05[1] knowledge of security interest,
certified checks, 15.05(5] 23.01[1]
1-41 INDEX

[Refmmces are to paragrapm (f).]

rights under grace period to perfect construction and permanent takeout
security interest, 23.0 I[I] from same lender, 26.02[ I]
trustee in bankruptcy as, 23.01[1], to failing banks, 10.03[1]
23.03[2], 25.07[ I] guarantee fee, 26.02[ I]
Liens home improvement, 26.0 I
garagemen's,23.03[4] installment, 26.01
refusal to make loans in redlined
landlord's, 23.03[4]
areas, 13.04
order of claim, 23.0 I [I] residential, 26.02[3][b][i]
protection against in fixtures with restrictions on bank loans
security interests, 23.03[2] to affiliates, 9.02[3]
set aside of statutory liens in civil money penalties for violations
bankruptcy, 25.07[3] of, 9.01 [3]
trustee as lien creditor, 25.07[1] by commercial banks, 7.01[2],
Liquidations to correspondent banks, 9.02[2]
See also Bankruptcy; Dissolutions; to directors, officers or
Insolvency; ReorganizBtions stockholders, 7.0 I[2][b],
in bankruptcy, 25.02[ I) 9.02[ I], 9.02[2]
allowance of management by national banks, 7.01[2]
interlocks, 9.02[6) by officers, 9.02[1]
credit unions, administered by real estate loans, 7.01[2][b][ii]
National Credit Union right to rescind, 10.02[5][c]
Administration Board, 11.03 state laws governing enforcement,
FDIC supervision of insured banks, 26.01
11.01 student, 26.03[ I]
distribution of assets, IO.02[3][a][i] tied to prime rate, 26.02[4]
window-period loans, due-on-sale
FDIC under no duty to examine
clause, 24.01 [1][c][ii]
assets prior to, 1O.02[5)[c]
modified payout, 10'02[3][a][i] Lotteries
ordered by state banking authority, definition of,4.03[1][e]
10.02[1] national banks disallowed from
participation in, 4.03[1 lee] .
priority of claims, 1O.02[3][a][i]
procedures, 1O.02[3][a][i] Louisiana
receiver civil law orientation of, 14.01[2]
appointment of, 10.02[1] partial adoption of Uniform
Commercial Code, 14.01[2]
FDIC as, 10'02[3][a][i]
FSLIC as, 10'02[3][b]
Loan and finance companies M
bank holding company structure,
2.05[2) Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal
competition with banks, 2.05[2] Trade Commission Improvement
generation of commercial paper, Act, consumer protection
2.05[2) provisions, 26.0 I
source of funds, 2.05[2] Maker
state licensing and supervision, 2.05[2] liabilities, 15.02[2)
types of, 2.05[2J notes, 14.03[1)
Loans Management interlocks, 9.02[6]
business and agricultural, preemption Federal Trade Commission
of state law, 26.02[3][bJ[iii] Improvement Act; 13.03[2]
 INDEX 1-42

[References are to paragraphs (f).]

Margin requirements Mobile homes, loans, 26.02[3][bJ[iJ
definition of, 3.04[6J[aJ Money
setting. Federal Reserve System, See also Bullion; Coins; Currency;
3.04[6][a] Gold; Legal tender; NOles
setting. Securities Exchange Act, borrowing, national banks, 4.03[2J[a]
'7.02(1 ] changes in legal structure. 14.02[1]
Maturity definition of, 14.02[1]
determination of, 21.10[2] gold. coins. 14.02[1]
Formalities to be met at, 21.IO[5J instruments payable in, classification
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, of, 14.02[I]
2UO[3l legal nature of, 14.02[1]
when instruments mature, 21.10[2] types of, 14.02[ I)
Mcfadden Act, restrictions on Money laundering. S~t Money
establishment of bank branches, Laundering Control Act of 1986
6.01[21 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
13.03(4)
Mergers and consolidations
amendment of Bank Secrecy Act.
antitrusl laws applicable, 13.03[3]
12.0 I[2}[b)
approval authority, 13.03[3]
amendment of Risht to Financial
bank branches created by, 6.01[2J
Privacy Act, 12.01[4)(d]
bank holding companies, 13.03[3] authority to investigate violations,
banks insured by FDIC, 11.01
12.01 [4J[aJ
collection and return of checks. 21.06 changes in bank control, 12.01[4][e)
credit unions regulated by National civil and criminal penaltles for
Credit Union Administration reporting violations. 12.01[2][b]
Board, 11.03 compelling information about foreign
Federal Reserve member bank, bank records protected under
13.03[31 foreign law, 12.01[4][b]
financially weak institutions, 13.03[3J forfeiture of property, 12.01[4][cJ
interstate mergers, 13.03[3] immunity for reports of violations,
national banks, 13.03[31 12.01[4)[d)
notice by federal banking agency, money laundering
13.03[3] controls, 12.01 [3]
Midnight deadline, definition of, 19.01 offenses, 12.01[3][a]
Minerals. as collateral, 22.03[1] money transactions involving proceeds
of crime. 12.01[3][b]
Misapplication of funds offenses based on transactions outside
aiders and abettors, 12.02[2] U.S., 12.01 [3][c]
defined, 12.02[2J RICO provisions applicable,
essential elements constituting, 12.01[3]{c]
12.02[2] special enforcement powers, 12.01[4]
examples of conduct constituting, structured transactions. 12.01 [2][b]
12.02[2J MODey market accounts
inclusion of nonbank personnel, designed to compete with money
12.02[2] market mutual funds, 19.02[2]{h]
inlent to injure or defraud, 12.02(2] Gam-51 Germain Depository
prosecution of viOlations, 12.02[2] Institutions Act of 1982
Misrepresentation. 8tH! Fraud authorization of, 7.01[2][c]
1-43 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

nature of, 19.02[2][h] N
not subject to reserve requirements,
19.02[2][hJ National Bank Act of 1863
Money orders amendments, 2.04
banks issuing, 14.03[ I ] changes from state law control,
bank's liability, 15.05[3] l.02[3]
definition of, 14.03[IJ charter of national banks, 1.02[3]
legal status, 14.03[I] establishment of national banking
negotiability, 14.03[I] system, 1.02[3]
payment in advance, 14.03[ I] issuance of bank notes restricted,
Montana, joint depositors, agreement 1.02[3]
conclusive, 19.03[2][d] preemption of other laws, 1.02[3]
ratable distribution requirement,
Morris plan banks. See Industrial banks 10.02(4](b]
~ortgage lending reserves requirements. 1.02[3]
characterization of funds paid, restrictions on lending policies, 1.02[3]
19.02[1)[b] National banking associations. See
federal preemption of state usury laws, National banks
26.02[3][b][i] National banks
by federal savings and loan See a/so Comptroller of the Currency
associations, 19.02[1 ][b] bridge banks, 10.04[2]
Mortgages capital requirements, 4.01 [I]
See also Mortgage lending; Real capital structure requirement for
Estate Settlements Procedures Act charter, 2.01[1]
construction, 23.03[2) changes in locations of, 4.01[3]
federal aid agencies, 2.05[6] changes in names of, 4.01 [3]
Federal Home Loan Mortgage charter organization, 1.02[3]
Corporation, 2.05[6][a] criteria for receiving charter, 2.01[1]
Federal Housing Administration competition with stale banks, 4.03[2]
mortgage insurance programs, conservators, 10.05
2.05[6][b] dermed,2.01(1)
Federal National Mortgage discount brokerage activities,
Association,2.05[6][c] 8.01 [5][a]
Government National Mortgage bank as agent, 8.01[5][a]
Association, 2.05[6](d] subsidiary as discount broker,.
interest rates permitted, 26.02[5] 8.01[5][a]
purchase and sale by federal discount brokerage operations;7.02[1]
government for housing, 2.05[6] establishment of customer electronic
variable rate, 26.02[5] communication devices, 4.03[2][e]
Most favored lender doctrine, exemption from SEC regulation,'
26.02[2][b] 7.02[1]
false statements, 7.02[1]
Motor vehicles
federal agencies regulating, 2.01 [1]
security interest in, 22.06[6]
Federal Reserve and FDiC
entrustment, 23.02[1][c]
membership.
Multiple party accounts. See Joint borrowing from Federal Reserve
accounts bank, 4.03[2][a]
Mutual savings banks. See Depository regulation of. trust powers,
institutions; Savings banks 4.03[1][a]
 [NDEX 1-44

[References are '0 paragraphs (f).]

National banks (COIlt'd) receivers, 10.02[3][a]
Federal Reserve and FDIC restrictions on
membership (cont'd) acceptances, 7.0 I[2J[b][i]
required stock subscription in extension of credit, 7.01[2)[aJ
Federal Reserve district bank, loans, real estate, 7.01[2][b][iiJ
4.01[1] loans to officers, 7.0 I[2)[ a1
fiduciary powen, 4.03[1)[a] loans to or purchase of securities,
financial assistance to failing 7.01 (2](b] [iii]
direct financial aid, 10.03[ I] loans to single borrower, 7.01 [2][aJ
merger assistance, 10.03[2) exceptiOn!, 7.01[2J[b]
net worth certificates, 10.03(3] real estate ownership, 4.03[I][b]
Glass-Steagall provisions, 8.01[2J[a] repurchase agreement, 7.01[2][b][iii]
guaranteeing debt of correspondent, service charges, 26.02[2][aJ '.
4.03[2J[d] suit against FDIC, 10.02[6][a]
guaranteeing debts of others, suits against, 4.01[4)
4.03[2)[d) ultra vires defense, 4.03[2][f]
incidental powers of unclaimed property, 4.02[2]
borrowing money, 4.03[2][a] National Conference of Commissioners
computer services, 4.03[2][c) on Uniform State Laws
definition of, 4.03[2J approval of Uniform Consumer Sales
guaranty agreements, 4.03[2)[d] Practices Act, 26.01
insurance activities, 4.03[2)[bJ proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
scope of, 4.03[2] Code, 26.01
travel services controversy, 4.03[2]
National Consumer Cooperative Bank
interest rates, 26.02(2J
establishment, 2.05[7]
role of state law, 26.02{2][a]
loans to eligible cooperatives, 2.05[7]
issuance of circulating notes, [2.02[4]
purpose, 2.05[7]
leasing transactions, personal property,
as secured lending transaction, National Credit Union Administration,
4.03[2][e] Set! also National Credit Union
letters of credit, 4.03[2][d] Central Liquidity Facllity
liquidation, 1O.02[ I] National Credit Union Administration
lotteries, 4.03[1][e] Board
management organization requirement application requirements, 11.03
for charter, 2.01[1] assistance to financially weak
mergers or consolidations, ,13.03[3J institutions, 11.03
net lease, 4.03[1 J[d] cease and desist orders, 11.03
new banks organized as, 10.04[1] checking services, 11.03
organization of, 4.01[1] credir unions under state law
powers of insurance of, 11.03
leasing transactions, personal liquidation administration, 11.03
property,4.03[I][d] enforcement of due-on-sale clauses,
loan equivalency, 4.03[[][d] 24.0 I [1][c ][ii)
lotteries,4.03(1J[eJ examination, 11.03
real estate ownership, 4.03[ I][b] general banking practices, authority to
transactions in coin and bullion, adopt, 11.03
4.03[I][c] insurance of all member federal credit
trust activities, 4.03[I][a] unions, 11.03
prohibition against politica[ maximum amount, J 1.03
contributions, 13.02 liquidation administration, 11.03
1-45 INDEX

[Refm!nces are 10 paragraphs (f).]

management of Central Liquidity Negotiability
Facility, I 1.03 advantages of, 14.04[1]
powers of, I 1.03 requirements for, 14.04[2]
preemption of state usury limitations, ambiguous terms and rules of
11.03 construction, 14.04[2][I]
regulation of asset transfers, 11.03 certainty as to sum, 14.04[2][d]
regulation of conversions of credit designation of payee, 14.04[2][i]
unions, 11.03' drawee must be certain, 14.04[2][j]
regulation of mergers and instruments not payable to order or
consolidations, 11.03 to bearer, 14.04[2][k]
regulations for collection and payable at a definite time,
settlement of payment items, 14.04[2][g]
11.03 payable in money, 14.04[2][e]
removal of officers or directors, 11.03 payable on demand, 14.04[2][f]
reporting to, 11.03 payable to order or bearer,
reserve requirements, 11.03 14.04[2][h]
share drafts, 11.03 promise or order, 14.04[2][a]
Uniform Commercial Code and unconditional, 14.04[2][b]
Clearing House rules, authority to in writing and signed, 14.04[2][c]
adopt, 11.03 Negotiable instruments
See also Certificates of deposit;
National Credit Union Central Liquidity
Checks; Drafts; Negotiability;
Facility
Notes
available to state and federal credit
Article 3, 14.03[I]
unions, 11.03 bank's duty to pay holder, 20.06
capital stock subscription, 11.03 bank's liability, 15.05
collection and settlement of checks or classes of, 14.03[1]
other instruments of payment, collecting payment of, 21.01
11.03 form of payment, 21.02[2]
function of, 11.03 holder's duty to present promptly,
management of, 11.03 21.02[1]
National Credit Union Insurance Fund, indorsements, 15.0I[3]
2.02 liability of parties
National emergency, restrictions on acceptance, 15.02[3]
doing business during, 12.02[4] drawer, 15.02[5]
National regulation indorser, I 5.02[4]
maker and acceptors, 15.02[2]
See also Board of Governors of the
primary and secondary liability,
Federal Reserve System;
15.02[1]
Comptroller of the Currency;
method of return of items not paid,
Federal Deposit Insurance
21.03[8]
Corporation; Federal Reserve negotiation, distinction between
System transfer and, 15.01 [2]
history, 1.02 payable at or through banks, 21.04
Negligence presentment of, liability in warranty
depository bank's liability, 19.02[4] for, 15.03
signatures, 19.04[1] purchaser's superior security interest,
suit by FDIC against officers and 23.02[3]
directors, 1O.02[6][a] transfer of, 15.01(2]
waiver illegal under Code, 19.02[4] liability in warranty, 15.03
 INDEX 1-46

[R¢erences are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Negotiable instruments (COni 'el) Competitive Equality Banking
types of, 14.03[1 J Amendments, 5.01 [4]
Uniform Consumer Credit Code rules, provisions restricting bank holding
16.06[3J[8] companies from establishing,
Negotiable lnstruments Law 6.02[4]
adopted in all states and territories, Comptroller of the Currency
14.01[2] certification of, 4.01 [2)
control of, 5.0 I [3]
checks drawn to fictitious or
retaining, 5.0.1 (4J[d]
nonexistent payees, 20.06[3] formation of, 5.01[3J
codified Jaw on negotiable paper impetus for restructuring of banking
payable in money, 14.01[2] market into holding companies,
Uniform Commercial Code 1.01
supersedes, 14.01 [2] recognition of, 5.01[3J
Negotiable order of withdrawal (l\OW) savings banks, exception for activities
accounts of,5.01[4][eJ
See also Demand deposits; Share draft use of to avoid restrictions on
accounts interslate banking, 26.02[2][c)
all depository institutions allowed to Non-bank financial institutions. See
hold, 19.02[2][e] Nonbank banks
checking privileges, 5.01[4] Noninsured state banks
classes of depositors who can hold, classification as, 2.0 I [4]
19.02[2][e] state regulation of, 2.03
definition of, 19.02[2][e) Nonmember stale banks
eligibility of government agencies, classification as, 2.0 I [4)
19.02[2)[e] false statements, 7.02[I)
eligibility of nonprofit organizations, insured by FDIC. 2.01[4]
19.02(2)(0] noninsured. See Noninsured state
limits on use, 19.02[2)[0) banks
not necessarily demand accounts, services from Federal Reserve, 2.01[3J
19.02[2][aJ supervision by Federal Deposit
right to deny payment, 19.02[2][e] Insurance Corporation
Uniform Commercial Code provisions, approval of branches, 11.0 I
19.02[2][e] approval of mergers and
consolidations, 11.01
Negotiable paper examinations, 11.0 I
See abo Documents of title; Noles
Negotiable instrumenlll; Securities See also Promissory notes
types of, 14.05 circulating, 12.02[4J
Net worth certificates, 10.03[3J cirCUlating notes
New York Clearinghouse Association, Federal Reserve banks, 14.02(1)
18.01[1][d] national banking associations,
14.02[IJ
Nonbank banks currency, 14.02[1]
acquisition by bank holding definition of, 14.03[1]
companies,5.01[3J enforcement of, 10.02(5][c]
challenges to, 5.01[3] Federal Reserve notes, 14.02[1]
affiliation with, 5.01[3] issuance of, Federal Reserve System,
certification of, 4.01[21 3.04[3]
competition with banks, 1.02[5] legal tender, 14.02[ I]
1-47 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

payable in money, 14.03(1} Order paper, identification of payees and
renewal, 24.01 [3][a] inllorsers, 20.06[ I]
rescission of, 10.02(5][c] Overdrafts
transfer of, 14.03[ I] bank not required to pay check
treasury notes of 1890, 14.02(1] creating, 20.01
unauthorized issuance of, 12.02[4] as extension of credit, 7.01[2][bJ[iii]
Notice liability on, joint accounts, 19.03[2][f]
collateral, repossession, 24.03[3][a] representing loan to depositor,
definition of, 24.03[3](a] 19.02[5]
Notice of dishonor, 21.1I[2][a] special agreements, 20.05[ I ][b]
See also Protest stop payment, 20.05[I][b]
charge.backs and, 21.11[2](a] termination of banker-depositor
collecting banks, 21.0 I [2] relationship, 19.02[5J
return of dishonored paper, 21.01(2]
deadlines, 21.1 I [2][d]
definition of, 21.11 [2][a]
delay, 21.1 I [2][d] p
drawer, notice to, 21.1I[5}
failure to give, 21.11[5J Parol evidence
effective, 21.11 [2][c] intent of joint account depositor,
excused, 21.11 [2][f] 19.03[2][d]
expeditious return, 21.1 I [2][d} signatures, 19.04(1]
form of, 21.11[2][a] Partnership accounts, nature of, 19.03[3]
given when sent, 21.11 [2][e)
good faith, 21.1 I [2][d] Partnerships
mail,21.11[2][a] as bank holding companies, 5.01[1]
oral,21.11(2][a] financing statements, 22.03[2][a]
partnerships, 21.1 1[2][c] reorganization of, 25.02[3]
persons authorized to give, 21.l1[2][b] Passbooks
prior parties, 21.11 [2][b] contracu on, 19.02[3]
proper, 21.11 (2][b] joint accounts, 19.03[2J[d]
protest obviates, 21.11 [2][aJ Payee
recipients bank subrogated to, 20.02
indorsers,21.11[2][c] drafts, 14.03[1]
third person, 21.1I[2J[c] fictitious or nonexisting, 20.06[3]
Regulation CC, 21.1 1[2][d] Code regulations, 20.06[3]
re-presented checks, 21.11 [3] effect on negotiability, 20.06[3).-
requirements of, 21.1 I [2](a] impersonation, 20.06[3]
telephone, 21.1 1[2][a] forgery, 20.06[3]
time, 21.1 I [2][d] . identification of, 20.06[1]
waiver of, 21.11 [4] imposter rule, 20.06[3]
written, 21.1 I {2][a]
notes, 14.03[1]
NOW accounts. See Negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts Paying banks, definition of, 21.06
Payment
accountability of payor bank, 21.03[1]
o bank's liability for refusal to pay,
20.03
Officers. See Bank officers cancellation of, 21.03[6]
Open Market Committee. See Federal check taken in payment, effect.on.
Open Market Committee underlying transaction, 21.03[4]
 INDEX 1-48

[Refermccs are /0 paragraphs (f).]

Payment (cont'd) Point-of-sale terminalJ (POS),
delay in. 21.02[5] 18.0/[1][£]
emergency conditions, 21.10{7][a]
duties of collecting/ payor banlc. 21.01 Political contributions, prohibition on
final, 21.03[7J national banks, their officers or
payor bank's accountability, 20.11 directors, 12.02[4J
form of, 21.02[31 Portfolio regulation
identification before, 2J.J0[71[aJ Sec also Commercial banks;
improper, 20.02 Depository institutions; National
customer's duty to report. 20.12(1] banb; Savings and loan
instruments payable at or through associations; State banb
banks. 21.04 acceptances, 7.01 [2J[b][i]
presentment for, 21.10 extensions of credit, 7.01[2][aJ
refused or deferred without dishonor, loans, 7.01 [2][a]
21.10[7][8) loans. real eatate, 7.0 I [2J[b][Ii)
return of items not paid, 21.03[8] loans to single borrower, exceptions,
time extension (or, 21.10[7][a) 7.01 [2][b]
U.S. Treasury checks, 21.12[21 securities, 7.0 I {2 ](b][iii]
usc of central data-processing center, Preferences
21.07
letters of credit 8.!1, 25.09[2J
Payor banks trustee's power to set aside, 25.07[4)
See also Collection of instruments
definition of. 19.01; 21.01[3] Presenting bank, definition of, /9.01
Penalties Presentment
civil money penalties, 9.01 [3) Su also Presentment for ecccptance;
appeal,9.01[3} , Presentment for payment
determination of amount. 9.0\[3] death of party, 21.10[6]
notice of assessment, 9.01[3) excusable. 21.10{6]
order of assessment. 9.01[3] formalities of. 21.10[5]
request for hearing, 9.01[31 identification of person presenting,
failure to meet reserve requirements. 21.10[7][aJ
9.01[3] indorsers after maturity not entitled,
violation of Bank Holding Company 21.10[6]
Act of 1956, 9.01 [3] invalid, 21.1 O[5J
violation of Change of Bank Control mail.21.10[5J
Act of 197'6,9.01(3) negotiable instruments, liability in
violation of final ce8.!le and desist warranty for. 15.03
order. 9.01[3) place for
violation of limitations on loans, business, 2/.10[5]
9.01[3] central processing center, 21.10[5]
Personal property. unclaimed. 4.02[2) none specified, 21.10[5]
Plain English laws, 26.05[2] residence, 21.10[5]
Pledge specified, 21.10[5]
creating security interest, 22.04[ Ilea] previously dishollored chccb, 21.11[3]
definition of, 22.04[ IJ reasonable hour, 21.10[5]
field warehouse arrangement, 22.04[2J through centralized processing center,
perfecting security intereM, 22.04[I][b] 21.07
pledgee time limits, 21.02[1)
duties of, 22.04[3J time of, 21.10[5]
reasonable care by. 22.04[3J waiver. 21.1 1[4]
1-49 INDEX

[Rt!ft!rmct!~ aft! 10 paragraphs (f).]

Presentment for acceptance, 21.10[8] rights of unpaid sellers of goods,
formalities, 21.10{8] 23.03[3]
necessity for, 21.10[8] special rules, 23.03
not accepted, 21.10[8] unperfected security interests, 23.0 I[I]
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, variable by agreement, 23.03[6]
21.10[3] Privagl Act of 1914, requirements for
time allowed for, 21.10[8] federal agencies, 13.01 [2][d]
Presentment for payment Privacy rights
St!t! a/so Maturity; Notice of dishonor St!t! also Bank Secrecy Act; Privacy
checks, 21.10[4] Act of 1914; Right to Financial
day after maturity, 21.10[4] Privacy Act of 1978
day before maturity, 21.10[4] for banks and customers, 13.01[1]
delay, 21.10[4] constitutional cases, 13.0 I [I]
demand instruments, 21.10[4] disclosure of customer transactions
demand paper, 21.10[2] banker-customer relationship, '.
documentary drafts, 21.10[7][a] implied contract right to
letters of credit, 21.10[7][a] confidentiality as part of, 13.01[3]
liability of primary and secondary conditions of, 13.01[2][a]
parties, 21.10[1) constitutionality of, 13.01[11
overdue paper, 21.10(4] limitation on access by federal
payable at sight, 21.10[2] agencies, 13.01[2][c],
payable on demand, 21.10(2] 13.01[2][d]
reasonable time, 21.10[4] limited immunity, 13.01[2](c]
revocation after, 21.03[7] limits to, 13.01 [2](a]
Saturday, Sundays, and holidays, limits to privacy, 13.01(1]
21.10[3] no Fourth Amendment privacy
time to make, 21.10[4] right, 13.01[1]
untimely, 21.10[4] special circumstances or procedures,
when instruments mature, 21.10[2] 13.0i [2][b]
Prime rates Fifth Amendment, 13.01[1]
definition of, 26.02[4] Fourth Amendment, 13.01[1]
loan arrangements tied to, 26.02[4] record-keeping requirements, 13.0 1[1]
usage of, 26.02[4] reporting requirements, 13.01[1]
Priority domestic, 13.01[1]
commingled or processed goods, foreign, 13.01 [I]
23.03[5) state laws, 13.0 1[31
conflicts with liens, 23.03[4] protection against invasions of
fixtures, 23.03[2] privacy, 13.01[3]
insolvency proceedings, 10.02[4][a] Proceeds
preferences, 10.02[4][a] definition of, 23.03[1]
liquidation, 10.02[3][a][iJ miscredited, 20.07
perfected security interests, 23.0 I [2J security interest in, 23.03[1]
proceeds from collateral, 23.03[1] priority, 23.03 [I]
in inventory, 23.0I[2][a] special rules for insolvency, 23.03(1]
purchase money security interests, Production Credit Associations. Set!
23.01 [2][a] Federal Intermediate Credit Banks
purchasers of chattel paper, Promissory notes
instruments and documents, acceleration, 24.0I[l](b]
23.02[3] Code limitations, 24.01[1][b][iii]
second secured party, 23.02[3] provisions, 24.01[1][b][ii]
 INDEX I-SO

[R~f~r~nc~s ar~ to paragraphs (f).]

Promissory notes (cont'd) exception to special protection for
defined as a security, 7.02[3][a] buyers in ordinary course,
due on sale, 24.01 [I ][c] 23.02[2]{a]
good faith, 24.0 I[I][b][i] priority over unperfeettd security
negotiabililY,24.0I(2] interest, 23.01(1]
payable at specific time, acceleration, insolvency of, right of unpaid ,ellers to
24.01{1][b] reclaim goods when, 23.03(3]
payable on demand of instruments, chattel paper and
creditor's rights, 24.0I(I][a] documents, 23.02[31
good faith, 24.0I(I][a] priority over any security interests,
special provisions, 24.01[2] 23.02(3)
Property priority over perfected security
of bankruptcy estate, 2S.04 interests, 23.02(3)
escheat, 7.01(1) knowledge of security agreement
transfer of, IS.OI(I] violation, 23.02[IJ[aJ
unclaimed, 7.01 (I J in ordinarY course
Protest,2UI[IJ defined:23.0I(I],23.02[1][a]
d fi .. f 2 [I] exceptions, 23.02[ I][al
e Inlllon 0, 1.11 farm products, 23.02(2][a]
form of, 2UI[I] good faith, 23.02[1](a)
place of, 2UI[I] priority of claim, 23.01(11
presumption of dishonor created by, taking free of security interest,
21.11[1] 23.01(1]
procedural advantage of, 21.1/[1) taking free of security interest,
required on drafts drawn and payable 23.02(1](b]
outside U.S., 21.11[1] entrustment, 23.02[1](c]
requirements of, 21.11(1] secured party authorizing sale of
waiver,2J.1I(4] goods, 23.02(1][b]
Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, prohibition against
management interlocks, 9.02[6] R
Purchase and assumption agreements
application to, 10.02[4][b] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
national banks in receivership, Organizations Act (RICO)
10.02[3][a] money laundering and monetary
procedures of, 10.02(3][a][ii] translIction offenses, 12.01(3][c)
purposes of, 10.02[3)[a](ii] Real estate
Purchase money security interest. St!~ interests in, exceptions to Uniform
Security interests Commercial Code, 22.07[9]
Purchasers ownership by national banks,
S~e also Bona fide purchasers; Good 4.03[I][b]
faith purchasers; Holders; Holders Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act,
in due course . 26.03(4)
bulk purchase rule, 16.01(5] Receiver
of collateral, priority of claim, See also Bankruptcy; Fiduciaries;
23.01 [I] Insolvency
of consumer goods, taking free of appointment by Comptroller of the
security interest, 23.0 I(I] Currency. 10.02 .
of farm products appointment by FHLBB, 10.02[IJ
entrustment, 23.02( I][b] contesting appointment of, 10.02[2]
I-51 INDEX

[References are /0 paragraphs (f).]

duties of, 1O.02(3J[a][i] provisional and final sell/ements, 21.06
FDIC as, 10.02[1] returning bank, defined, 21.06
claim against, 10.02[3][b] safe harbor. 21.01[4]
insured state bank!, 10.02[1] state law. preempts. 20.1I[1][b][vi]
state regulatory provisions, terminology used. 20.IIf1J(bJ(vi]
10.02[2] truncation agreements. 21.06
national banks, 1O.02[3][a] two-daylfour-day test, 21.06
FSLIC as, 10.02[3][b] variation of terms by agreement,
insured state banks, 10.02[1] 21.01(4]
liquidations, 1O.02[I] Regulation E, implementation of
powers of, 10.02[3]
Electronic Funds Transfer Act,
Receivership 18.01[2]
bank account suspension on, 19.02[5]
Regulation J, wire transfers, 18.01(2]
bank officers and directors precluded
from handling assets, 10.02[2] Regulation U, enforcement of •
discretion of regulatory agency, obligations notwithstanding
10.02[2] violation of, 10.02[5][c]
federalizing of. 10.02(1 J Regulation Y, bank holding companies,
judicial review, 10.02[2] 5.02[2][a]
liquidations, 10.02[1] Regulation Z
national banks in, 10.02[3][a] credit cards
purchase and assumption agreements, issuance of, 18.03[1 J
10.02[3][a] liability for unauthorized use, 18.04
procedures of, 10.02[3J[a][ii] disclosure requirements, 26.03[I]
purposes of, 10.02[3][a][ii]
savings and loan associations in, Remitting bank, definition of, 19.01
10.02[2] Remote service units, FHLBB
whole-bank purchase, 10.02[3][a][ii] establishment of, 7.01[2][c]
Regulation CC,20.1I[I][b][vi] Renewal notes, problems with,
account, defined, 21.06 24.01 [3][a]
bank, defined, 21.06 Reorganizations
bank duties, 21.06 See also Bankruptcy; Dissolutions;
banking day, defined, 21.06 Insolvency; Liquidations
business day, defined, 21.06 assets, 25.02[3]
check, defined, 21.06 duty to examine, IO.02[S](c]
collection and return of checks, 21.06 in bankruptcy, 25.02[3]
bank insolvency, 21.06 of trusts, 25.02[3]
bank mergers, 21.06
disclosure requirements, Replevin, secured party repossession,
20.1 I [I ][b][vi] 24.03(2J
expeditious return, 21.06 procedures, 24.03[3][a]
forward coUection test, 21.06 Reporting requirements
funds availability, 20.1I[I][b][vi] domestic currency transactions,
good faith. 21.01 [4] 12.01[2J(8J
interplay with Code regulations, 21.06 exporting or importing monetary
liabilities, 20. I 1[I][b][vi]; 21.1 I[2][d] . instruments, 12.01[2][a] .
paying bank, defined, 21.06 bank exemptions, 12.01 [2][a]
presentment of checks for payment, seizure and forefeiture, 1201[2J(aJ
21.06 foreign currency' transactions,
scope of provisions, 21.1 0 12.01[2][a]
 INDEX I-52

[Reftmmces art! to paragraphs (f).J

Reporting requirements (cont'd) s
large currency transactioIlll.
12.01 [2J[a] Safe harbor
transactions with foreign financial Code provisions. 21.01[4]
agencies, 12.01 [2][aJ Regulation CC provisions, 21.01 [4]
Representatives. See Agents; Fiduciaries; Safekeeping, Federal Reserve services.
Trustees 18.01 [IUcJ
Repurchase agreements Savings accounts
See also Federal funds See also Automatic transfer accounts;
caution in use, 19.05 Negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts; Time deposit
default on interest payment, 19.05
definition of. 19.05 accounts
guidelines for use by financial Banking Acts of 1933 and J935
institutions, 19.05 established regulatory control
over interest rates on, 1.02[4]
retail, 19.05
treatment as loan or extension of control oYer interest rates, 1.02[4]
nature of, 19.02[2](b]
credit. 7.01 [2][b ][iii]
reserved right of notice, 19.02[2J[b]
wholesale, 19.05
Savings and loan associations
Rescission rights. 26.03[4J See also Oarn-St Germain Depository
Reserves Institutions Act of 1982; Savings
FDIC reserve funds, 11.01 banks
Federal Reserve requirements, 3.04[2] certifLCates of deposit, 7.02[3]l.b)
civil money penalties for violation deposits insured by FSLIC. 2.03
of, 9.01[3] establishment of, 2.01[5J[a]
establishment of, 1.02[4] examination by FHLBB. 7.01[1)
exemption from, 3.04[2J[b] expansion into commercial banking.
FSLIC authority to establish. 11.02[1] 1.01; 7.01[2J[c]
insured credit unions, J1.03 forms of organization. 2.01[5J[a)
money market accounts not subject to Glass-Steagall Act provisions,
requirements, J9.02[2J[h] 8.01 [2][aJ
Returning banks. defmition of. 21.06 liquidation, 10.02[2]
management interlocks, 9.02[6J
RICO. See Racketeer Influenced and mutual associations, 2.01[5][a]
Corrupt Organizations Act conversion to stock associations,
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 2.01[5][aJ
See also Money Laundering Control voting rights, 2.01(5](a]
Act prohibition against political
access of federal agencies to customer contributions, 13.02
records, limitations on. receivership, 10.02[3J[b]
13.01[2][a] regUlation, historical background.
all financial institutions, application 1.02[4]
to, 13.01[2][a] regulatory authority shared by
amendments offering limited FHLBB and FSLIC, 2.03
immunity. 13.01 [2J(c] rules on branch banking, 6.04
customer defined, 13.01[2)[c] rules on interstate banking, 6.04
operation of, 13.01 [2][c] securities transactions. 7.02[3J[b]
scope of, 13.01 [2J[cJ state associations .
state regulation of disclosure examination and supervision by
preempted by, 13.01[2J[c] FSLlC.2.03
1-53 INDEX

[ReferelWes are 10 paragraphs (f).]

insured by FSLlC, 2.03 stock. savings banks, 2.0I[5][c]
stock associations, 2.01[5][a] Savings institutions
voting rights, 2.01[5]{a] See also Thrift institutions
suit against FSLlC, 1O.02[6][b] banking functions, 2.01[5]
Savings and loan holding companies types of, 2.01[5}
affiliations with securities firms, Second Bank of the United States,
5.03[2][e] history and demise, 1.02[2]
amendments on regulation of, 5.03[2] Secured party
approval of acquisitions and mergers, agreement to clarify rights, 23.03(6]
5.03[1] authorizing sale of secured goods,
definition of, 5.03[1] 23.02[ I)[b]
management interlocks, 9.02[6] automatic perfection of security
multiple savings and loan holding interest, 22.03
companies, 5.03[1] in bankruptcy, 25.05[4]
permissible activities, 5.03[1] breach of the peace, 24.03(2)
regulation by FSLlC, 5.03[1] constitutional issues of seizure,
1987 amendments, 5.03[2] 24.03[3)[a]
restrictions on interstate activity, default rules
5.03[1]. 5.03[2][d] accounting for surplus, 24.03[1)
restrictions on securities activities, disposal of collateral, 24.03[1]
8.01 [8][b] liability for Code violations,
restrictions on subsidiaries, 5.03[1], 24.03[1]
5.03[2][a], 5.03[2][b] retention of collateral, 24.03[ I]
unitary savings and loan holding due process requirement, 24.03[3][a]
companies, 5.03[1] state action, 24.03(3)[b]
Savings associations. See Savings and lessor as, 22.01 [2)[a]
loan associations liability of
Savings banks Code violations, 24.03[6]
charter organization, 2.01[5][c] unconstitutional procedure,
definition of, 2.02 24.03[3][b)
Federal Home Loan bank notice of collateral sale, 24.03(4)[a)
membership, 2.01[5][c] notice of disposition, 24.03[4]
under federal law, 2.01[5][c] notice of retention of collateral,
applicability of savings and loan 24.03[5]
associations regulations, notice to debtor, 24.03[3][a]
2.01 [5][c] notice to other secured parties,
FDIC insurance, 2.01 [S][c] 24.03[4][a]
FSLIC insurance, 2.01[S][c] possession of collateral
forms of organization, 2.0 I[S][c] in bailment, 22.04[1}[b}
history of, 2.01[5][c] escrow agent, 22.04[ I)[b]
management interlocks, 9.02[6] pledge, 22.04[1]
mutual savings banks, 2.01[5][c] as substitute for written agreement,
definition of, 2.02 22.02[1]
qualification for membership in priority among several, unperfected
Federal Reserve SYstem, security interest, 23.01 [I]
2.01 [S][c] purchase money security interest,
ownership of bank, non-inclusion as 23.01[2][a]
bank holding company, 5.01 (4][fl remedies, 24.03[11
under state law, 2.01[5][c] hearing requirement, 24.03[3][a]
FDIC insurance, 2.01[S][c] notice requirement, 24.03[3][a]
 INDEX )-54

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Secured party (cont'd) discount brokerage activities,
remedies (cont'd) 8.01 [5][b]
rendering equipment unusable, book entry, U.S. government agencies,
24.03[2] 18.01[I][c]
replevin action, 24.03[2] regulation of, 18.05[6]
self-help repossession of collateral, certificated, 22.07[6]
24.03[2] collective investment funds, 8.01[6]
use of collateral for repayment, Competitive Equality Banking Act
24.03[21 moratorium pn certain nonbanking
repair of physical damage to property activities,8.01[8][c]
23.03[2] , restrictions imposed by, 8.01 [8]
replevin procedures, 24.03[3][a] credit, 3.04[6][a]
due process, 24.03{3][b] defined,7.02[3]
r~tention of collatend, 24.03[5] definition of transactions
raghts in reorganization, 25.02[3J bonds,7.02[3][a]
rights of good faith purchasers, certificates of deposit and other
23.02[ Il[c] bank deposits, 7.02[3][b]
satisfaction from collateral disposition commercial loan agreements,
24.03[2] , 7.02[3][c]
secu~ity interest in proceeds, debtor invest.lDem contracts, 7.02[3][d]
Insolvency, 23.03[ I] promissory notes, 7.02[3][c]
self-help repossession, state action stocks, 7.02[3][a]
issue, 24.03[3][b] determining when a firm is primarily
severance of fixture collateral, 23.03[2] engaged in securities activities
8.01[7] ,
sub0:din.ation agreement, 23.03[6]
termInatIon statement, 22.03(3] discount brokerage activities
ban.k holding companies, 8.0I[S][b]
Secured transactions nattonal banks, 8.01[5][aJ
assignment as, 22.03[4] exemption from registration
consignment as, 22.01 [2][b] requirements, 7.02[1]
definition of, 22.01 fraud, 7.02(21
filing of financing statements, 22.03[1] government securities
place for, 22.03[ I] book entry, 18.01[1)[c]
lease as, 22.01[2][a] as exempted securities, 8.02[1]
exceptions, 22.01 [2J[&] Government Securities Act of 1986
revisions of Uniform Commercial 8.02(2J '
Code affecting, 22.0 I market, 8.02[1]
Uniform Commercial Code primary and secondary dealers,
governance of, 22.01 8.02[1]
prior legislation, 22.01 regulation of brokers and dealers,
Securities 8.02[2]
See also Bonds; Glass-Steagall Act; investment in, 7.02[1]
Investments; Stocks margin requirements. 3.04[6J[a]
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Article 8, 14.05[2J
regulations, 7.02[1]
1977 amendments, 14.05[2][b] moratorium on certain nonbanking
pre-1977, 14.05[2)[a] activities. 8.0 I[8][c]
bank holding Company activity in, public and private offerings
5.02[3][b], 8.01 [2][h] distinguished, 8.01 [4]
Competitive Equality Banking Act purch~e of failing banks', 10.03[1]
restrictions, 8.01 [8][a] regulation, generally, 1.02[4]
I-55 INDEX

[Reje,,:nces are /0 paragraphs (f).]

repurchase agreement treated as loan FDIC-insured nonmember banks,
or extension of credit, %.01lS][a]
7.01 [2][b][iii] prohibition against, 8.01[1]
restrictions on bank activities, 7.02 exemptions for FSLlC-insured
savings and loan holding company institutions,8.01[8][aJ
activity in, restrictions on, prohibition against interlocking
8.0 I[8][bJ management arrangements
SEC regulations, 7.02 between banks and, 8.01[IJ
security Interests in, 22.07[6] Security agreements
statutes applicable to banking, 7.02[1) acceleration, 24.01 [i][b]
uncertificated, 14.05[2][b], 22.07[6] Code limitations, 24.0 I[I][b ][iii]
underwriting,8.0i[4] broad blanket, 22.02[1]
private placement activities buyer's knowledge of violation of,
distinguished from, 8.01[4] 23.02[1][a]
Uniform Commercial Code, 14.05[2] chattel mortgage, 14.03[5]
Securities Act of 1933 conditional sales agreement, 14.03[5]
amendment, 7.02[1] copy of as financing statement,
antifraud provisions, 7.02(2] 22.03[2][b]
disclosure requirement, 7.02[1] debtor liable for deficiency,
enactment, 1.02[4] 24.03[4][a]
exemption provisions, 7.02[I] default, 24.03
registration requirement, 7.02[1] remedies. 24.03
regulations, 7.02(1] definition of, 22.02[1]
securities, defined, 7.02[3] description of collateral, 22.02[1]
violations, 7.02[1] effectiveness of, 23.01(1]
enforcement of, 22.02[ I]
Securities and Exchange Commission entities affected, 22.02[1]
(SEC) entrusting goods to debtor, 23.02[IJ[bJ
regulations, 7.02 lease agreement as, 22.01[2][a]
repurchase agreements, anti-fraud pledge as, 22.04[ I]
provisions applicable to, 19.05 required signature, 22.02[1]
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required writing, 22.02[1]
amendment,7.02[1] rights of third parties, 22.01 [2][a]
antifraud provisions, 7.02[2] security interest in proceeds, 23.03[1]
disclosure of insider information, subordination agreements, 23.03[6]
7.02[I] trust receipt, 14.03[5]
disclosure requiremeht, 7.02[1] Security interests
enactment, 1.02[4] accounts, 22.07[1]
enforcing obligations, 10.02[SJ[c] assignment of, 22.03[4]
margin requirements, 7.02[1] attachment of, 22.02[11
proxy solicitations, 7.02[1] explicit agreement postponing,
registration requirement, 7.02[1] 22.02[1]
regulations, 7.02[1] bank accounts, 22.07[7]
reports,7.02[I] chattel paper, 22.01[2][a], 22.07[4]
"securitie1;" defined, 7.02[3] consignments, 22.01 [2][b]
Securities firms consumer goods, 22.06[1]
bank affiliation with creation of, 22.02
determining when a firm is possession of collateral, 22.02[1]
primarily engaged in securities pledge, 22.0411][a]
activities,8.01[7] written agreement, 22.02[1]
 INDEX I-56

[References are to paragraphs (fl.]

Security interCIts (cont 'd) personal propeny, 22.01
definition of, 22.01[1] power to cut off, entrustment
documents of title, 22.07[5] provisions similar in principle,
enforcement of 23.02[1 }[c]
conditions for, 22.02[J] priorities, 23.01
Uniform Commercial Code, 24.03 buyer of goods, 23.01[1}
equipment, 22.06[2J commingled or processed goods,
priority, 23.0 I[2J 23.03[5J
farm products, 22.06[3] crops, 23.01 (2](b]
financing statement fixtures, 23.03[2]
consumer goods, 22.03[3] lien creditor, 23.0 I [I]
copies of, 22.03[ I] other perfected security interest,
definition of, 22.03[2] 23.01[2]
filing of, 22.03[ J] proceeds of collateral, 23.03[5]
continuation statement, 22.03[ I] purchase money, 23.01[2][aJ
early, 22.03[2][bJ subordination agreements, 23.03[6J
first to file rule, 22.03[2][b] unpaid seller of goods, 23.03[3J
lapse, 22.03{1] purchase money, 22.02[2J
place for, 22.03[J] consumer goods, 22.06[ IJ
information requirements, exceptions, 23.01[2][a]
22.03[2)[a] fixturei, 23.03[2]
security agreement filed as, 22.03[2] grace period, 23.01(1]
fixtures, 22.06[5J perfection of security interest in,
general creditor, 23.03[2J 23.01[IJ
general intangibles, 22.07[2J priority, 23.0 I [2J[aJ
goods, 22.06 proceeds, 23.03(11
instruments, 22.07[3] proceeds of, 23.03[1]
insurance policies, 22.07[8] types of, 22.02[2]
inventory, 22.06[4J real estate related, 22.07[8]
leases, 22.0J [2][aJ securities, 22.07[6]
motor vehicles, 22.06[6] taking free of, priority, 23.0J[JJ
perfection of, 22.03 termination statement, 22.03[3]
agent, trustee, or bailee holds transfer of, 22.03[4J
collateral, 22.04[J ][bJ Uniform Commercial Code
automatic, 22.03, 22.05 exceptions to, 22.01[1]
bankruptcy proceedings, i5.07[4] scope of, 22.01 [I]
claim superiority, 23.0J[2] unperfected
in crops, 23.01[2J(bJ attachment, 22.02[1]
documents, 22.05 automatic in collateral proceeds,
filing of financing statement, 22.03
22.03[1] claimants with priority over,
accounts, 22.05 23.01[IJ
genen.l intangibles, 22.05 leases, 22.01[2][.]
in goods and Chattel, 22.05 as value, 16.01[4]
instrumenlS, 22.05 Self-help
leases, 22.01[2][a] repossession by, 24.03[2]
methods of, 22.03 without breach of peace, 24.03[2J
possession, 22.04[I](bJ Sellers
in proceeds of inventory, 23.02[3J right to stop goods in transit, 23.03[3]
I-57 INDEX

(References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

unpaid sellers' rights to reclaim goods, in body of instrument, 19.04[1]
23.03[3] depositor's duty of due care, 20.12[3]
Setoff employees, 19.04[1]
See also Liens estoppel, denying corporate officer's
bank's right of, bankruptcy authorization, 19.03[4]
proceedings, 25.09{3] facsimile, 19.04[2J
due process, 25.03[3][b] forged, 20.08
joint accounts, 19.03[2](c] corporate account, 19.03[4]
preference compared with, 25.03[4][a] depositor's duty to report, [2],
ratable distribution requirement and, 20.12[lJ
25.03[4][a] facsimile, 19.04[2]
Settlements statute of limitations, 20.12[ I]
definition of, 19.0 I warranty provisions, 20.12[3]
final, 21.06 fraud in obtaining, 19.04[IJ
provisional, 20.11; 21.06 grounds for preclusion, 19.04[1] ,
Share accounts. See Share draft imposters, 19.04[1]
accounts liability, 19.04[1]
Share d raft accounts multiple, 19.04[2]
by credit unions, 19.02[2J[g] nature of, 19.04[1]
definition of, 19.02[2][g] negligence in misuse of, 19.04[2]
as NOW accounts, 19.02[2][g] parol evidence, 19.04[1]
printed, 19.04[2]
Share insurance
ratified, 19.04[IJ
administered by National Credit
representative's, 19.04[ I]
Union Administration Board,
11.03 rubber stamp, 19.04[2]
security agreements, 22.02[1]
amount of premiums, 11.03
insurance fund, 11.03 single, 19.04[2J
financing of, 11.03 subscribed. 19.04[1]
investments of, 11.03 thumbprint, 19.04[1]
trade or assumed name, 19.04[1]
Shelter principle, 16.04 typed, 19.04[1]
Sherman Act unauthorized, 19.04[2]
antitying provisions, 9.02[5] fiduciaries, 15.08[1]
application to bank competition, negligence contributing to, 20.12[3]
13.03[I] word or ma~k in lieu of, 19.04[1]
purpose of, 13.03[1J
Small Business Administration
Shield statute, 10.02[S][b] loans to small business, 2.05[7]
Signature cards organization, 2.05[7]
authorization requirement, deposits!
withdrawals, 19.04 Society for Worldwide International
joint account, 19.03[2][d] Financial Telecommunication
nature of, 19.04 (SWIF1), 18.01[1][d]
similar to contracts of adhesion, Solar Energy and Energy Cooperative
19.03[2][d] Bank, loan program promoting
stipulations on, 19.04 energy conservation and use of solar
Signatures energy, 2.05[7]
See also Indorsements Sources of banking law. See Commercial
agent's, 19.04[IJ banking law, sources of;
authorized, 19.04[1] Commercial law; Constitutional law;
bank resolutions on, 19.03[4] Federal law; State law
 INDEX I-58

[R~~r~nc~s Qr~ 10 paragraphs (f).]

Specialitcd organir.ations with bankina referred to as state bankina
functions. 2.05 commissions, 2.01[2)
State banks state statutes, 2.04
S~e also Noninsured state banks; types of, 2.01[4]
Nonmember state banks State Jaw
access to regulations, 2.04 adoption of laws allowing activitiel
audits of, 2.04 not permitted to national banks,
bank holding company structure, 2.04 2.04
capital structure requirement for automated teller machines, 6.03
charter, 2.01[2] bank notes. 2.04
charter organization, 1.02[3] as basis for privacy rights. 13.01(3)
criteria for receiving charter, 2.01[2) commercial paper, 2.04
competition with national banks, concurrent with federal law, 14.01[1]
4.03[2] constitutional. limitations on, 14.01(1)
defined, 2.01 [2] effect of Truth-in-Lending Act on,
dual state and federal regulations, 26.03[S][c]
1.02[3] embenlement, 12.02
exemptions from disclosure and family property, l4.01[1)
registration requirements, 7.02[ I] federal override of, 2.04
false statements, 7.02[ I] financing of businesses, 2.04
Federal Reserve System membership forgery, 12.02
application for, 2.01[3] fraud, 12.02
FDIC insurance to nonmember aoverning regulation fo state banks,
banks, 2.01 [4] 2.04
optional, 1.02[4] preemption by federal law. 2.04
services provided to nonmember industrial banks, 2.0S[I]
banks, 2.01 [3J interest rates, 26.02[ I]
financial statements, 2.04 issuance of charters, 2.04
Glass-Steagall Act provisions, loan transactions, 2.04
8.01 [2][a] police power, 14.01[1]
insured by FDIC, 2.04 preemption by federal law, 14.01{3][b]
liquidation, 10.02[2] real estate, 2.04
manaaement oraanization requirement scope of, 2.04
for charter, 2.01 [2] securities investments, 2.04
regulation by FDIC, 2.04 size of reserves, 2.04
restrictions on loans and investments. source of commercial law, 14.01
7.01 [2][c] standards for, Constitution of the
sources of state rules, 2.04 United States, 14.01[1]
state banking comminioners supremacy clause, 2.04
head state departments of banking, Statements
2.04 of accounts
powers of, 2.04 customer's duty to examine, 20.12
state constitutions, 2.04 in electronic transfers, 20.12[2]
state regulation of. 2.04 issuance of,20.12
state regulatory agencies nonbinding on customer or bank,
authority of, priority to federal 20.12
reauJations, 2.01[2) exceptions, 20.12
I-59 INDEX

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

false equitable, 23.03[4]
liability under Securities Exchange rights, stop payment orders,
Act of 1934, 7.02[1] 20.05[1][b]
national banles, 7.02[1] Suits
nonmember state banks, 7.02[1] to compel performance, 4.03[2][f)
state banks, 7.02[I] against FDIC, 11.01[1]
State regulation against national banles, 4.0 I[4]
history, 1.02[3] Supervision. See Banks examination
sources, 14.0 I Supervisory agencies. See Federal
Statutes, special purpose statutes regulatory agencies
intended to provide consumer Supremacy clause of U.S. Constitution,
protection, 1.0 I federal law superior to state law,
Stocks, defined as a security, 7.02[3][a] 1.01
Stop payment, 20.05 Suretyship
See also Stop payment order See auo Accommodation parties
bad faith, 20.05[2] on construction bonds, 23.03[4]
bank drafts, 20.05[3] definition of, 15.06
efforts to distinguish between guaranty
basic rules on, 20.05[1]
and, 15.06
burden of proof, 20.05[1 ][b]
national banks and, 4.03[2][d)
cashier's checks, 20.05[3] surety's rights against principal,
certified checks, 20.05[3] 15.06[1]
credit cards, 18.03[3]
Sweep arrangements, 8.0I[3]]b]
depository bank unable to collect,
19.04[1] SWIFT. See Society for Worldwide
effectiveness, 20.05[ I] International Financial
electronic fund transfers, IS.02[4] Telecommunication
holder in due course rights,
20.05[1][b] T
joint accounts, 19.03[2][g]
liability for payment after, 20.05 Teller's checks, definition of, 14.03[1]
notice of, 20.05(3] Tenancy in common
overdrafts and, 20.05[1][b] presumption of, 19.03[2][a]
restrictive indorsement, bank liable for rules of property, 19.03]2]]a]
not observing rules on, 20.05[2] Third parties
subrogation rights, 20.05[ I][b] accounts from which payments may be
third. parties, 20.05[2] made to, 19.02[2]
Stop payment order letters of credit distinguished from third
failure to honor, 20.05[I][b] party beneficiary contract,
reasonable notice, 20.05[1] 17.01[3]
timeliness of, 20.05(1][a] transaction accounts, 19.02[2]
Student loans, 26.03[1] Thrift institutions
Subordination agreements, 23.03[6]
See also Credit unions; Savings and
loan associations; Savings banks
rights under, 23.03[6] acquisition by bank holding .
Subrogation companies .
bank's rights of, improper payment, healthy thrifts, 6.06
20.02 weak thrifts, 1O.03[2][a]
 INDEX 1-60

[R~fert!nc~s ar~ 10 paragraphs (f).]

Thrift institutions (COni'll) rights in bankruptcy. 25.01[6]
charter of, 2.1>\[5) Traveler's checks, bank's liability,
commercial banking activities, 2.01[5] 15.05[4]
depClsit insurance, I 1.02 Trust agreements, 22.01
Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of Trust companies
definition of bank, exclusion from,
1980, 2.0 I [5J
5.01 [4][a]
expanded use of minority, 11.02(3)[d)
management interlocks, 9.02[6]
ownership of bank, noninclusion as
bank holding company, 5.01[4J[1] Trustees
regulation of, 2.0\[5] bank accounts, 19.02[1](b]
types of, 2.01[5J banks as, 19.02(I][b]
disclosure of customer information,
Thrifts. See Thrift institutions 13.01[3}
Timber, as collateral, 22.03[1] investments permitted, 8.01[6]
Time deposit accounts, interest paid on, traditional activities, 8.01[1]
deregulation of, 19.02[2J duties and powers in bankruptcy
Time paper proceedings, 25.07
presented for payment, 21.10[2] payment on death of, 19.02[5]
time-price doctrine, 26.02[1] trust depanment as, 19.02[1)[b)
Time-price doctrine, 26.02[1] Trust funds
exemption from disclosure
Tille
requirements, 7.02[1]
retention of, general creditors, 23.03[3] held by bank as lid uciary, 7.02[ I]
unclaimed property, 4.02[2] national banks permitted to inwlt in,
Trade acceptance, definition of, I 4.03[ I] 8.01 [6]
Transaction accounts qualified pension plan arrangement,
definition of, 19.02[2] 7.02[1]
distinction between demand deposits Trust Indenture Act of 1939
and, 3.04[2] debt securities, 7.02[1]
payments permissible to third parties, exemptions to disclolure and
19.02[2] registration requirements, 7.02[1]
reserve requirements, 3.04[2J, 19.02[2] Trust operations, national banks, powers
types of. 3.04(2] of,4.03[l][a]
Transactions Trusts
intrastate. 14.0111] business trusts, as bank holding
promissory notes, 24.01[2] companies, 5.01[1]
short-term. 19.05 reorganization of, 25.02(3]
Transfer Truth-in-Lending Act
bankruptcy trustee's avoidance of, Su also Consumer credit; Consumer
25.07[5] Credit Protection Act; Debt
negotiable instruments, liability in Collection Practices Act; Truth-
warranty for, 15.03 in-Lending Simplification and
U.S. Treasury checks, 21.12[1] Reform Act
Transferees administrative enforcement,
in bulk, 23.01 [1] 26.03(6)[b J
good faith, 23.01[1] changes in. 26.03
priority over person with unperfected civil liability, 26.03[6][a]
security interest. 23.01[1] consumer credit, defined. 26.03[IJ
1-61 INDEX

[Rtfmmcts art 10 paragrapm (f).]

credit advertising regulations, Unconscionability
26.03[5][b) boilerplate clauses, 26.05[2]
credit cards, 18.03[I) deceptive practices in obtaining
definition of, 18.03(1) signature, 19.04[1]
preservation of cardholder claims Unconscionable agreements
and defenses, 18.03[3] bad faith in, 19.02[4]
prohibitions on issuance of, 18.03[2] nature of, 19.02[4]
setoff, 18.03[4] Underwriting
unauthorized use, 18.04 bank prohibited from operating
creditor, defined, 26.03[1] mutual fund, 8.01(3)[a]
credit transactions, 26.03 private placement activities not
disclosure requirements, 26.03[1] constituting, 8,01[4]
1976 amendments, 26.03 prohibition against banks engaging in,
closed-end credit, 26.03[2][a]
credit advertisement, 26.03[5][b] 8.0I[4] •
credit card transactions, 26.03[ I] uncertainty of definition of, 8.01 [4]
exempt transactions, 26.03[1] Unfair or deceptive practices
open-end credit, 26.03[2][b] Federal Trade Commission
real estate transactions, 26.03[4] Improvement Act regulations,
scope of, 26.03[1] 13.03[2]
student loans exempt, 26.03[1] consumer protection, 26.05[1]
duty to revise prior disclosures, trade practices, 13.03[2]
26.03[5][a] Uniform Bills of Lading Act, superseded
effect on state laws, 26.03[5][c] by Uniform Commercial Code
electronic fund transfer regulation, 14.01[2]
18.04 Uniform Commercial Code (Ucq
exempt credit transactions, 18.03[1] accord and satisfaction doctrine and,
lease transactions, 26.03[3] 24.01 [3][b]
philosphy of, 26.03 all payment systems, proposed
real estate transactions, 26.03[4] revisions to cover, 18.05[3]
Regulation Z, 26.03[1] Article 3, 14.01 [2]
scope of, 26.03[1] Article 4, 14.01[2]; 21.01 .
Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Article 8, amendment of, 14.01[2]
Reform Act Article 9, amendment of, 14.01[2]
disclosure requirements, 26.03 Article 2A, 14.01 [2]
model fOnIlll, 26.03 Article 4A, proposed, 14.01[2]; 18.05
model forms, 26.03[6)[c] benefit of, 1.01
restitution to consumers, model forms, collateral
26.03 disposition of, 24.03[6]
Tying arrangements repossession of, 24.03[6]
See also Antitying provisions collecting bank duties, 21.01 [2]
bailout situations, 9.02[5] collecting proceM under, 21.01[1]
legitimacy of, conditions for, 9.02[5] Federal Reserve rule superseding,
21.01
conflict of laws, 14.01(4]
u definition of terms, 19.01
discharge of debt, without
UCC. Set Uniform Commercial Code consideration, 24.01[3]
Ultra vires defense, national banks' use filing of financing statements, 22.03[1]
of, 4.03[2][f] alternate versions, 22.03[1]
 INDEX 1-62

[References are 10 paragraphs (f).]

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(cont'd) (UCCC)
good faith, 24.01[3} availability of claims and defenses
holder in due course, 16.0J against lender. 16.06[~][dJ
indemnities, 17.02[2)[aJ balloon payments, 26.0 I
leiters of credit, J7.0J[IJ consumer credit insurance, 26.01
insolvency provision, 17.04 consumer credit transactions, 26.01
Louisiana, partial adoption of Code credit cards, 16.06[3l[b]
by, J4.01[2J consumer loans, 26.0 I
modification of contracts credit card holder rights, 26.0 I
oral. 24.01{3] credit sales, 26.0 J
without consideration, 24.01[3] disclosures required, 26.01
promissory notes finance charges, 26.01
acceleration limitations, holder in due course doctrine, J6.06[3)
24.0 I [I )[b ][iii] home solicitation sales, 26.0 I
negotiability, 24.0 I (2) purpose of, 16.06[3J
purpose of, 1.0I special remedies, 26.0 I
relation of bank and depositor under, standards for determining
21.01[IJ unconscionable conduct, 26.05[2]
revisions of, 14.0J[2J; 22.01 states adopting, 26.01
scope of, 14.0J[2J use of negotiable instruments,
secured transactions 16.06[3][a]
amendments, adoption by states, waiver of defense clauses, 16.06[3J[aJ
22.01 Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,
consignment as, 22.0 I [2)[b) deceptive and unconscionable
definition of, 22.01 consumer sales practices. 26.01
exceptions, 22.01
Uniform Customs, 4.03[2J[d]
governance of, 22.01
collected by International Chamber of
lease as, 22.0I[2][a]
Commerce, J7.0J(4J
revisions of provisions affecting,
supplements Uniform Commercial
22.01
Code, 17.01[4)
scope of regulation, 22.01{IJ
transactions intended to create, Uniform laws
22.02[IJ See a/so Uniform Commercial Code,
security interests and specific statutes
definition of, 22.01 (I J commercial transactions, 14.01[2]
fixtures, 22.01 [I] Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
perfection of, leases, 22.01[2][oJ See Negotiable Instruments Law
personal property, 22.01[IJ Uniform Probate Code, J9.02[5J
pledge, 22.04[IJ[a) joint accounts, 19.03[2][b]
purchase money rules, 22.02[21
seller's interest as, 22.0Ifl] Uniform Sales Act, superseded by
signatures, 19.04[1] Uniform Commercial Code,
supplementary principles of law 14.01[2]
applicable to/incorporated in, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act.
14.01[2] superseded by Uniform Commercial
unconscionable agreements, 19.02[4] Code, 14.01[2]
waiver, roles, 24.01 (3) United Nations, banking functions,
waiver of bank's negligence, 19.02[4] 2.05[5]
1-63 INDEX

[References are to paragraphs (f).J

United States Government Securities Act consideration distinct from, 16.01[4]
of 1986, Treasury Se<:retary to adopt definition of, 16.0\(4)
regulations to implement provisions, irrevocable commitment for, 16.01[4]
7.02[1] negotiable instrument for, 16.01[4]
U.S. bonds, Federal Deposit Insurance overdraft as, 16.01[4]
security interest as, 16.01[4]
Corporation reserve funds invested
in, 11.01[3] Veterans Administration
loan programs for veterans, 2.05[7]
U.S. Claims Court, 4.02[2] purchase and sale of VA-guaranteed
U.S. Court of Appeals, exclusive mortgages,2.05(6](c]
jurisdiction to review termination
orders, 10.01
Usury
See also Consumer Credit Protection w
Act; Illegality; Interest rates;
Truth-in-Lending Simplification Waivers
and Reform Act See also Discharge
corporations used to escape individual of attorney-client privilege, 25.07[8][b]
rates, 26.02{I] debtor's, for failure of creditor to
definition of, 26.02[1] dispose of collateral, 24.03[5]
Depository Institutions Deregulation of debts, 25.08
and Monetary Control Act, as discharge, 24.01[3]
26.02[3][aJ entrusting goods to debtor, 23.02[l][b]
federal preemption provisions, as grounds for disclaiming default,
26.02[3][b] 24.03[2]
federal preemption of state law, letters of credit, 17.02[2J
26.02[1] notice of dishonor, 21.11 [4]
business and agricultural loans, oral, 24.01[3]
26.02[3][b][iii] presentment, 21.11 [4]
depository institutions, 26.02[3] protest, 21.11[4]
insured credit unions, 11.03 UCC rules, 24.01 [3]
obligations of depository without consideration, 24.01[3]
institutions, 26.02[3][b][ii] Warehouse, field warehouse arrangement
residential loans, 26.02[3][b][iJ bailment or entrustment, 22.04[2]
state override, 26.02[3][c) creating security interest, 22.04[2J
residential loans, 26.02[3][b][i] definition of, 22.04[2]
variable rate mortgages, 26.02[5]
Warehousemen
leasing practices, 26.02[1]
See also Documents of title;
loan guarantee fee, 26.02[1], 26.02[3]
Warehouse receipts
revolving credit plans, 26.02[ I]
liability of, 14.05[I)[b]
transactions subject to limitations,
lien by, 14.05[1](c]
26.02[IJ
Warehouse receipts
See also documents of title
v definition of, 14.03[4]
letters of credit and, 17.03
Value Warranties
See also Holders; Holders in due breach of, 20.12[3]
course charge-backs., 20.12[3]
bank credit as, 16.01[4] of collecting banks, 15.03(2J
 INDEX 1-64

[Rejerenct!s are 10 paragrapm (f).J

Warranties (conI 'd) FedWire, 3.04[5][b]
of customers, 15.03[2] regulation of. 18.0S[I J
presentment, I5.0J[I] SWIFT. f8.0J[I][d]
transfer, 15.03[1] Withdrawals. See Accounts
Wire fraud. St!t! Fraud Withdrawal slips
Wire transfers Withholding, backup, I 1.05
CHIPS, 18.0l[1][d] World Bank (International Bank for
definition of, 18.01[1 l[dl Reconstruction and Development),
erroneous or wrongful, banlc's liability 2.05[5]
for, 18.05[2J Wrongful dishonor. SH Dishonor