G.R. No.

143377

February 20, 2001

SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MELO, J.:
FACTS : On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381 was issued in favor of Rafael
Galvez, over four parcels of land - Lot 1 with 6,571 square meters; Lot 2, with 16,777 square meters;
Lot 3 with 1,583 square meters; and Lot 4, with 508 square meters.
On April 11, 1960, Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril,
Cleopatra Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale which was
inscribed(engraved) as Entry No. 9115 OCT No.0-381 on August 10, 1960. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate No. T-4304 was issued in favor of the buyers covering Lots No. 1 and 4.
On August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company.
The deed of sale covering the aforesaid property was inscribed as Entry No. 9173 on TCT No. T4304. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate No. T-4314 was issued in the name of Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company as owner of Lots No. 1 and 4.
On February 1, 1963, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, issued an Order in Land Registration Case No. N361 (LRC Record No. N-14012) entitled "Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos, et al., Parties-InInterest; Republic of the Philippines, Movant" declaring OCT No. 0-381 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of La Union issued in the name of Rafael Galvez, null and void, and ordered the
cancellation thereof.
On October 28, 1963, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company sold to herein petitioner Lots No. 1
and 4, with the deed being entered in TCT No. 4314 as entry No. 12381. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-5710 was thus issued in favor of the petitioner which starting since then exercised proprietary
rights over Lots No. 1 and 4.
In the meantime, Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration against the order issued by the
trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void. The motion was denied on January 25, 1965. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in a Resolution
promulgated on August 14, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 36061-R. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued
an Entry of Judgment, certifying that its decision dated August 14, 1973 became final and executory
on October 23, 1973.
On April 22, 1974, the trial court in L.R.C. Case No. N-361 issued a writ of execution of the judgment
which was served on the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974.

Twenty four long years, thereafter, on January 14, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General received
a letter dated January 11, 1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation, stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in
L.R.C. No. N-361 have not been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union
despite receipt of the writ of execution.
On April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6346 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, represented by Teresita Tan, Reynaldo Mamaril, Elisa
Bustos, Erlinda Balatbat, Regina Bustos, Shipside Incorporated and the Register of Deeds of La
Union, Defendants."
The evidence shows that the impleaded defendants are the successors-in- interest of Rafael Galvez
over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381, namely: (a) Shipside Inc. which is presently the
registered owner in fee simple of Lots No. 1 and 4 ; (b) Elisa Bustos, Jesusito Galvez, and Teresita
Tan who are the registered owners of Lot No. 2 ; and (c) Elisa Bustos, Filipina Mamaril, Regina
Bustos and Erlinda Balatbat who are the registered owners of Lot No. 3 .
In its complaint in Civil Case No.6346, the Solicitor General argued that since the trial court in LRC
Case No. 361 had ruled and declared OCT No. 0-381 to be null and void, which ruling was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael
Galvez have no valid title over the property covered by OCT No. 0-381, and the subsequent Torrens
titles issued in their names should be consequently cancelled.
On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss, based on the following
grounds: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and executory judgments
may be subject of an action for revival of judgment; (2) .the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest
because the real property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of
Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were under the ownership and administration of the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227; (3) plaintiff's cause of
action is barred by prescription; {4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ of
execution, no action for revival of judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of Article
1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment had been rendered.
An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General on August 23, 1999,
alleging among others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines; and (2)
prescription does not run against the State.
On August 31, 1999, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and on October 14, 1999, its
motion for reconsideration was likewise turned down.
On October 21, 1999, petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 55535, on the ground that the orders of the trial court

denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for reconsideration were issued in excess of
jurisdiction.
On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 55535 on the
ground that the verification and certification in the petition, tinder the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr.,
was made without authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was authorized to institute the
petition for and in behalf and of petitioner.
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration on the
grounds that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a corporation can be made only if authorized by its
Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the petition cannot prosper and be granted due
course; and (2) petitioner was unable to show that it had substantially complied with the rule
requiring proof of authority to institute an action or proceeding.
Hence, the instant petition.
In support of its petition, Shipside, Inc. asseverates that:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition
when it made a conclusive legal presumption that Mr. Balbin had no authority to sign the
petition despite the clarity of laws, jurisprudence and Secretary's certificate to the contrary;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition, in
effect affirming the grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court when it refused to
dismiss the 1999 Complaint for Revival of a 1973 judgment, in violation of clear laws and
jurisprudence.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the instant petition based on the
following considerations: (1) Lorenzo Balbin, who signed for and in behalf of petitioner in the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping portion of the petition, failed to show proof of his
authorization to institute the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, thus the
latter court acted correctly in dismissing the same; (2) the real party-in-interest in the case at bar
being the Republic of the Philippines, its claims are imprescriptible.
In order to preserve the rights of herein parties, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on
June 26, 2000 enjoining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 6346.
The issues posited in this case are:
(1) whether or not an authorization from petitioner's Board of Directors is still required in order for its
resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the corporation; and
(2) whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of judgment
herein.
We find for petitioner.

Anent the first issue:

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that Lorenzo Balbin, the
resident manager for petitioner, who was the signatory in the verification and certification on nonforum shopping, failed to show proof that he was authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file
such a petition.
A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents.
Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged
with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers (Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v.
CA, 264 SCRA 11 [1996]). In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by
a specific act of the board of directors.
It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioner's Resident Manager Balbin filed the
petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and
non-forum shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which the petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, attaching to said motion a certificate issued by its "board secretary stating that on
October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin had been authorized by
petitioner's board of directors to file said petition.
The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal,
not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification, against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. InLoyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. , the Court considered the filing of the certification
one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement.
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the

filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In "Uy v. LandBank, supra, the
Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit
certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special
circumstances or compelling "reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification
and certification on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner' case should be considered special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. Moreover, inLoyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the
instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to
show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a
secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner
likewise, mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, .255 SCRA
108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.
While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice
is an even more urgent ideal.