Nicholas S. v. Ades, Ariz. Ct. App. (2014)
Nicholas S. v. Ades, Ariz. Ct. App. (2014)
Nicholas S. v. Ades, Ariz. Ct. App. (2014)
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
IN THE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
N O R R I S, Judge:
1
Nicholas S. (Father) appeals from the superior courts
order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, E.S. On appeal, he
argues the superior court should not have found he failed to appear at the
initial severance hearing without good cause. He also argues the Arizona
Department of Economic Security (ADES) failed to notify him promptly
of reunification services and failed to present sufficient evidence that he
had abandoned E.S. and that termination was in E.S.s best interests. For
the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Fathers arguments and
affirm the superior courts order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2
E.S. was born in March 2004 to Sarah M. Although Father
acknowledged paternity, he did not maintain regular contact with E.S.
after her birth. Father joined the military in 2008. On March 11, 2011,
ADES took E.S. and her sibling 1 into custody because Sarah M. was
unable to provide the children with a suitable living arrangement. ADES
placed the children with their maternal grandmother. On March 16, 2011,
ADES filed a dependency petition, alleging Father had neglected E.S. by
abandoning her. At that time, Father was stationed in Iraq.
3
On May 17, 2011, at the initial dependency hearing, Fathers
counsel accepted service of the operative dependency petition and, as
reflected in the minute entry from the hearing, asked the superior court to
find Father in default for failing to appear. The court did so, noting
Father was in the military and deployed overseas. The court then found
E.S. dependent as to Father.
1Father
2Although
7
Father first argues the superior court should not have found
he waived his rights 3 and thereby admitted the allegations in the motion
to terminate by failing to appear at the initial termination hearing. Father
asserts he was deprived of an opportunity to testify on the issue of
abandonment and argues the superior court should have stayed the
termination proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 522 of the SCRA or,
alternatively, should have granted his motion to vacate the entry of
default. We disagree.
8
We note, first, that Fathers argument is premised on a
misunderstanding of the proceedings in this case. As discussed, supra 5,
Father moved to vacate the default for failing to appear at the initial
dependency hearing; he did not move to vacate the superior courts finding
he had waived his rights by failing to appear at the initial termination
hearing. Father did not appeal the dependency ruling, even though that
ruling was separately appealable. See Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec.,
212 Ariz. 43, 45, 5, 127 P.3d 59, 61 (App. 2006). Thus, Fathers argument
that the superior court should have granted his motion to vacate the entry
of default is not properly before us. We nevertheless address Fathers
argument the superior court should have stayed the termination
proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 522 of the SCRA. See Kenneth B. v.
Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36, 12, 243 P.3d 636, 639 (App. 2010) (appellate
court reviews issues of law de novo).
9
Section 522 of the SCRA applies to any civil action or
proceeding if the defendant is in military service or within 90 days of
termination or release from service and has received notice of the
proceeding.
50 U.S.C.A. app. 522(a).
The section entitles a
servicemember to a stay of the proceeding upon a showing that, inter alia,
the
servicemembers
military
duties
materially
affect
the
servicemembers ability to appear. 50 U.S.C.A. app. 522(b)(1), (2).
3Although
13
Next, Father argues ADES was required to notify him
promptly of available reunification services. ADES, however, has no duty
to notify a parent of available reunification services before seeking
termination of parental rights when, as here, there is no parent-child
relationship and the statutory ground for termination is abandonment.
Toni W. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 61, 66, 15, 993 P.2d 462, 467
(App. 1999). Moreover, although not required, ADES attempted to
contact Father on numerous occasions by letter, phone, and email
regarding the availability of reunification services before moving to
terminate his parental rights. Yet, Father never responded to these efforts.
Abandonment
14
Next, Father argues ADES failed to present sufficient
evidence he had abandoned E.S. He asserts in particular that his failure to
establish a normal parental relationship with her was with legal
justification -- his military service. We disagree.
15
ADES must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Father abandoned E.S. A.R.S. 8-537(B) (2014); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(c).
[A]bandonment is measured not by a parents subjective intent, but by
the parents conduct: [A.R.S. 8-531(1)] asks whether a parent has
provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more
than minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and
maintained a normal parental relationship. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dept of
Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249-50, 18, 995 P.2d 682, 685-86 (2000). Failure
to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just
cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment. A.R.S. 8-531(1).
16
Here, ADES presented overwhelming evidence Father
abandoned E.S. without legal justification. Although Father was deployed
when ADES took E.S. into custody, he returned to the United States in
May 2011. He thereafter made no effort to establish a parental
relationship with E.S. and did not provide E.S. with any financial support
or medical, dental, or educational benefits which were available to E.S.
because of Fathers military service. An ADES unit supervisor also
testified Father had not sent E.S. any gifts, cards, letters, photographs of
himself, or clothing since at least March 2011. Moreover, E.S. did not
know Father was her father. Furthermore, Father failed to appear at the
initial termination hearing and thus admitted the motions allegations that
he had failed to provide E.S. with reasonable support and appropriate
parental supervision. See A.R.S. 8-863 (2014).
4We
Best Interests
18
Finally, Father argues ADES failed to present sufficient
evidence that termination of his parental rights was in E.S.s best interests.
See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(c). Specifically, Father argues termination of his
parental rights would jeopardize the relationships E.S. has established
with her paternal grandparents and half-siblings. 5 We disagree with this
argument as well.
19
ADES presented evidence that E.S.s maternal grandmother,
who had expressed an interest in adopting E.S., both allowed and
encouraged E.S. to visit her paternal grandparents on a regular basis and
had no intention of discontinuing those visits. The superior court found
that although [t]he potential loss of the relationship between [E.S.] and
her paternal grandparents is very troubling[,] . . . the Court cannot find
that it outweighs the need [for E.S.] to have the stability, security and
permanence that an adoption would provide. The court also found that
the military benefits Father could provide did not make up for the
permanence [lost by E.S.] by being a ward of the Court for years and
would not provide her with the safety and security of having a
permanent and stable home that adoption would provide. Given this
evidence, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding
termination of Fathers parental rights was in E.S.s best interests.
5The
:gsh