2016 Case Updates in Criminal Law Criminal Procedure and Evidence

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The key takeaways are the definitions and elements of murder, treachery, evident premeditation, and the requirements to prove use of firearm as a special aggravating circumstance.

Murder is defined under Article 24810 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation.

The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. For evident premeditation, the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

2016 CASE UPDATES

Part One

CRIMINAL LAW
MURDER
Murder is defined under Article 24810 of the Revised Penal Code as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Treachery
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without
risk to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely,
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. People of the Philippines v.
Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty.
Segundo was attended by treachery because appellant shot the said victim
suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon, thus: x x x Atty.
Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his teenage niece as passenger
sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally unaware that he will be
treacherously shot just 200 meters away from his residence. He was unarmed and
was not given any opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly
assault. After he was hit when the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his
niece and after he lost control of his jeep which bumped an interlink wire fence
and stopped, he was again shot three times by the gunman. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016

Evident Premeditation
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court
conceded that the specific time when the accused determined to commit the crime,
and the interval between such determination and execution, cannot be
determined. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CAs
finding that no evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of
evident premeditation. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No.
206291 18 January 2016
Presentation of Firearm Unnecessary to Prove Special
Aggravating Circumstance of Use of Firearm
In People v. Dulay [561 Phil. 764, 771-772 (2007)] the Court ruled that the
existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even without the
presentation of the firearm. In the said case, it was established that the victims
sustained and died from gunshot wounds, and the ballistic examinations of the
slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a
.30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm, and
it was also proven that he was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, the trial court
and the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as a special
aggravating circumstance. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R.
No. 206291 18 January 2016
Despite the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired from
the gun recovered from appellant when he was arrested, were different from the
2 slugs recovered from the body of the victim, the prosecution was still able to
establish the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime. Given that the actual firearm used by appellant in
shooting the victim was not presented in court, the prosecution has nonetheless
proven through the testimony of Delos Reyes that the firearm used by appellant
was a short gun. It has also established through the testimony of SPO3 Ronnie
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Eleuterio and the Certification35 from the FESAGS of the PNP that appellant was
not issued a firearms license, a permit to carry or permit to transport firearms
outside of residence. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No.
206291 18 January 2016
Notably, the term unlicensed firearm includes the unauthorized use of
licensed firearm in the commission of the crime, under Section 536 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 8294.37 Assuming arguendo that the actual firearm used by appellant
was licensed, he still failed to prove that he was so authorized to use it by the duly
licensed owner. The prosecution having proven that appellant was not issued a
firearms license or permit to carry or permit to transport firearms, the burden of
evidence is then shifted to appellant to prove his authorization to use the firearm.
All told, the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said aggravating
circumstance in imposing penalty against appellant. People of the Philippines v.
Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Use of Motor Vehicle as Special Aggravating Circumstance
Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either
to commit the crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely
incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense
or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. In
People v. Herbias [333 Phil. 422 (1996)] the Court held: "The use of motor vehicle
may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime. The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in
trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellants back
rider mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt
that the motorcycle was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their
escape after they accomplished their mission." People of the Philippines v. Zaldy
Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos
Reyes that appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he
twice shot Atty. Segundo who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed
into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then stopped near the
jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene
aboard the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime.
People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016

100,000 as Current Rate of Civil Indemnity for Murder


In addition, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the
heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the award of civil indemnity of 75,000.00 is proper, because it is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the offense. In recent jurisprudence, the Court has increased the
award of civil indemnity from 75,000.00 to 100,000.00. People of the Philippines
v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Moreover, in line with current jurisprudence48 on heinous crimes where
the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A.
No. 9346, the award for moral damages has been increased from 75,000.00 to
100,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages has likewise been increased
from 30,000.00 to 100,000.00. Hence, while the CA correctly affirmed the trial
courts award of 100,000.00 as moral damages, the award of civil indemnity and
exemplary damages in the amounts of 50,000.00 each should be both increased to
100,000.00. The award of moral damages is called for in view of the violent death
of the victim, and these do not require any allegation or proof of the emotional
sufferings of the heirs. The award of exemplary damages is also proper because of
the presence of the aggravating circumstances of use of unlicensed firearm and
use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines
v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
PARRICIDE
Violence between husband and wife is nothing new. Marital violence that
leads to spousal killing is parricide. Perceived as a horrific kind of killing, penal
laws impose a harsher penalty on persons found guilty of parricide compared to
those who commit the felony of homicide. People of the Philippines v. Manuel
Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what
actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. People of the
Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016

In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between


the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be
considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is
not contested. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13
January 2016
JUSTIFYING AND EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Self-Defense
Basic is the rule that in every criminal case, the burden of proving the guilt
of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty of establishing all the
essential elements of the crime. However, in cases where the accused interposes
the justifying circumstance of self-defense, this prosecutorial burden is' shifted to
the accused who himself must prove all the indispensable ingredients of such
defense, to wit: (I) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Consequently, weighed
against the unshaken, straightforward and positive declaration of eyewitness
Vicente that the victim was suddenly stabbed thrice without any provocation, the
self-serving, uncorroborated and doubtful accused-appellant's claim of selfdefense deserves no consideration. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G.
R. No. 218396 10 February 2016
After taking into account the location and the number of stab wounds
sustained by the victim, the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense further
crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino's back jibing with Vicente's
assertion that the former was stabbed from behind. Then, when the victim was
totally caught by surprise with the initial attack, the second and third stab blows
were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered by Severino
invalidates the accused-appellant's allegation that he was only defending himself
for the number of wounds inflicted are rather demonstrative of deliberate and
criminal intent to end the life of the victim. Likewise weakening accusedappellant's contention that he acted in self-defense was his behavior immediately
after the incident. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant himself admitted that
upon seeing the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep to go to his sister's
place in San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the
authorities for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates his plea of selfdefense and indicates his guilt. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R.
No. 218396 10 February 2016

Defense of Accident Presupposes Lack of Intent to Kill


The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to
release the accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision,
the essential requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person
is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by
mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. A close scrutiny of
the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was
not performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This can be gathered
from the narration of the accused appellant during cross-examination conducted
by Prosecutor Percival Dolina. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R.
No. 211062 13 January 2016
The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly
does not hold true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the
accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within
hearing distance from the bedroom, testified that they distinctly heard Auria
screaming that she was going to be killed by the accused-appellant. Given these
testimonies, the accused-appellants defense of accident is negated as he was
carrying out an unlawful act at the time of the incident. It also bears stressing that
in raising the defense of accident, the accused-appellant had the inescapable
burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, of accidental infliction of
injuries on the victim. In so doing, the accused-appellant had to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence. As aptly pointed out by the CA, the defense failed to discharge the
burden of proving the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident that
would otherwise free the accused-appellant from culpability. Aside from the
accused appellants self-serving statement, no other proof was adduced that will
substantiate his defense of accidental stabbing. People of the Philippines v.
Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
Further, contrary to what the accused-appellant wants the Court to believe,
his actuations closely after Auria was stabbed tell a different story. If Auria was
really accidentally stabbed by him, the accused-appellants natural reaction would
have been to take the lead in bringing his wife to a hospital. Instead, his priority
was to come up with an improvised bladed weapon that he could use to hurt
himself. Additionally, the fact that the accused-appellant ran away from the crime
scene leaving Aurias relatives and neighbors to tend to his dying wife is indicative
of his guilt. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13
January 2016

Absolutory Cause
Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime
but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. The
defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the
accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour
in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Having admitted the
stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of
Article 247. As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man,
the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the
absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the present case.
People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Elements of Qualified Rape
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or
intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of
force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving
consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In the
present case, the prosecution successfully established that the first rape indeed
took place and that the appellant was the malefactor. People of the Philippines v.
Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
First, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing her pain. xxx Notably, both the RTC and CA
found AAAs testimony credible and convincing. We see no reason to disbelieve
the testimony of AAA either with respect to the first rape, which the trial and
appellate courts found to be credible and straightforward. Given the victims
mental condition, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or
fabricated a rape charge against the accused. Neither was it possible that she was

coached into testifying against appellant considering her limited intellect. People
of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January
2016
Second, the prosecution successfully established AAAs mental condition.
Maribel Tico, a psychologist from the Philippine Mental Health Association,
testified that she conducted a mental status examination on AAA, and found her
to be suffering from mild mental retardation with a corresponding [m]ental [a]ge
of 7 years and 1 month. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander"
Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
When a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. Thus, the lone testimony
of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict
of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only
the offended party's testimony. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito
G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016
That AAA's credibility is doubtful due to the fact that she did not see the
perpetrator's face, and only recognized him for his built, voice, and smell, is of no
moment. As We have held before, a person may be identified by these factors for
once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy
task. Even though a witness may not have seen the accused at a particular incident
for reasons such as the darkness of the night, hearing the sound of the voice of
such accused is still an acceptable means of identification where it is established
that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years. Here, it cannot be denied that AAA personally knew appellant's
built, voice, and smell, having lived with him her entire life. People of the
Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016
Neither does AAA's silence on the incident nor failure to shout or wake up
her siblings affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found that there is
no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of
being sexually molested. While there are some who may have found the courage
early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there are those who have opted to
initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and attempted to move on with
their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by
fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of
extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror for the
perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally
expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to

the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the sense of


helplessness and the degree of fear. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor
G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016.
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has, in fact,
been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only
her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. Considering that AAA was only four (4) years old
when she was raped and was only five (5) years old when she took the witness
stand, she could not have invented a horrible story. For her to fabricate the facts of
rape and to charge the accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental
capacity. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret,
usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. Thus,
the accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole testimony
provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing. Moreover,
the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and credence considering
that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily expose herself and
her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. People of the Philippines v. Allan
Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016
The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she is
incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. Children of sound
mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their
view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than
that of older persons. In fact, AAA had consistently, positively, and categorically
identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and
replete with details of the rape. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R.
No. 202978 1 February 2016
In the case of mentally-deficient rape victims, mental retardation per se
does not affect credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court. People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016

Rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible
and untainted with serious uncertainty. With more reason is this true when the
medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, as in this case. When the
victim's testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physical evidence of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal
knowledge. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29
February 2016
At any rate, it is not proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions
of children who have undergone traumatic experiences. Certainly, a child more
so in the case of AAA who is suffering from mild mental retardation cannot be
expected to act like an adult or do what may be expected of mature people under
similar circumstances. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy
G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the
stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a
standard in testing the credibility of a witness. Moreover, the Court considers
AAA's alleged inconsistency in testifying, with respect to the place where the first
and third rapes were committed, as a minor inconsistency which should generally
be given liberal appreciation considering that the place of the commission of the
crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is decisive is
that accused appellant's commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently
proved. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
Finally, we find no merit in the appellants contention that the absence of
lacerations in the victims hymen negated sexual intercourse. The rupture of the
hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms
that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. Additionally, in
the present case, the genital examination on AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005,
or more than one year after the rape took place. At any rate, Dr. Marjorie Rebujio,
Medical officer III at the Benguet General Hospital, clarified that the lack of
hymenal injuries does not mean that no sexual abuse took place. Dr. Rebujio
further explained that the hymen could heal fast and that it could go back to its
normal structure. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G.
R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
Proof of Victims Minority Essential in Prosecution for Qualified Rape
The appellant cannot be held guilty crime of rape in its qualified form.
Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances
are present in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen ( 18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by

10

consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. Hence, in a conviction for qualified rape, the
prosecution must prove that ( 1) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the
time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of both the minority
of the victim and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a
special qualifying circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of
death. Thus, it is imperative that the circumstance of minority and relationship be
proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall
be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her relationship with
the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be
imposed. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24
February 2016
Thus, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth
certificate or certified true copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If
the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible
testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient
under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other
authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. People of the
Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016
Penalty for Qualified Rape
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental
age of below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape.22 Notably, AAA was also
below 12 years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing
that she was born on March 1, 1993. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. In the present case, however, the relationship of the
appellant to the victim was not alleged. People of the Philippines v. Alexander
"Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and
that the appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the
crime from statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty cannot be

11

imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole imposed by the RTC on the
appellant. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No.
204047 13 January 2016
100,000.00 as Current Rate of Civil Indemnity for Rape
In People v. Gambao, [G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533].
the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the
imposition of the death penalty, if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as
follows: (1) 100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) 100,000.00 as moral damages which
the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) l00,000.00
as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. We thus increase the
awarded civil indemnity from 75,000.00 to l00,000.00; moral damages from
75,000.00 to l00,000.00; and the exemplary damages from 30,000.00 to
l00,000.00. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No.
204047 13 January 2016
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the AntiCamapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of thecommission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This third amendment clarifies the law's
intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis
paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the AntiCarnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it
must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof" Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Camapping Act would cease to be applicable
and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13
April 2016
VIOLATION OF THE GUN BAN

12

In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be in possession of a


firearmoutside of his residence within the period of the election gun ban
imposed by the COMELEC sans authority. In Abenes v. Court of Appeals [544 Phil.
614 (2007)] this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the Gun Ban: 1)
the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons;
2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried
in a public place. This court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the
burden to show that he or she has a written authority to possess a firearm is on the
accused. We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for
violation of the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioners bag.
Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry the firearms outside his
residence during the period designated by the Commission on
Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a
public place. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.
209387 11 January 2016
VIOLATION OF COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
Elements of Illegal Sale of Shabu
For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. xxx The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165,
the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have
been preserved. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454
13 January 2016
Elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
On the other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016
Elements of Illegal Transport of Dangerous Drugs
The essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. As
defined in the case of People v. Mariacos [635 Phil. 315 (2010)] "transport" means

13

"to carry or convey from one place to another." People of the Philippines v. Juan
Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited
drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport
and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the
perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. People of the
Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
Elements of Illegal Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Appratus and Other Drug Paraphernalia
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has convincingly
established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly
aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.
205472 25 January 2016
Coordination with PDEA is not Required in a Buy-Bust Operation
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation
report to the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the
non-presentation of the unnamed civilian informant who allegedly brokered the
transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust
operation. There is no merit in this contention. xxx [C]coordination with the PDEA
is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buybust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will
not invalidate a buy-bust operation. People of the Philippines v. Fernando
Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
Presentation of Informant Unnecessary
in Prosecution of Drug-Related Cases
Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in
prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless
their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their
testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely

14

corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team. People of the Philippines


v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
Faithful adherence to the Chain of Custody Rule
Vital in Prosecution of Drug-Related Cases
It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug
that the drug, which is the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence,
the identity of the prohibited drug must be established without any doubt. Even
more than this, what must also be established is the fact that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. People
of the Philippines v. Anita Miranda G. R. No. 205639 18 January 2016
Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited
drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the
evidence to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the
successful prosecution - of illegal possession or illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11
January 2016
Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure
integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug
paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a miniscule amount of dangerous
drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused. Howard Lescano v. People
of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2)
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the fact of its delivery and/or sale
are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. And
more than just the fact of sale, [o]f prime importance therefore x x x is that the
identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt.
In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as
that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs
this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche
Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016

15

The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain
of custody as duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.
People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11
January 2016
The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy bust
situation are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of
the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and ( 4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G.
R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
As the first step in the chain of custody, "marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the dangerous drug seized. It is meant to ensure that the objects seized are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in evidence, as well as
to protect innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. While
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify a time
frame for marking or the place where said marking should be done, the chain of
custody rule requires that the marking should be done ( 1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 17 Marking upon
immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad
G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in
reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
As such, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly
difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the
police officers to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their
respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the
drug. In some cases, the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer
the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody
of the shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling of the evidence

16

before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the government
to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. People of the
Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
More importantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were duly preserved as the chain of custody remained intact. The Court has ruled
in People v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013] that the links that must
be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Romel
Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016
Effect of Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements
anent the Custody and Disposition of Seized Drugs
Compliance with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of
two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as
to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be
immediately after seizure and confiscation. As to where, it depends on whether
the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the
physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that
the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be
done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable. Howard Lescano v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present
during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the
accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected
public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service.
There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the
accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to
the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place. Section 21 spells out matters that are
imperative. Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but
17

do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. This
is especially so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug
paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here.
Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, yet another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty
about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to the noncompliance
by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative
to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1) Article II of
RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and
control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never
ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph the same
in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated.
There was no physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from
appellant. Neither was there any explanation offered for such failure. People of
the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict
compliance with the requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as
stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the
evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we
stressed in People v. Guru [G.R. No. 189808, October24, 2012, 684 SCRA 544, 558].
In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug
had been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the
identity of the item in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this
light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded
the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise. People of the Philippines v.
Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
Exception to Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165
In many cases, this Court has held that "while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain." Since the law itself provided exceptions to its requirements., the
non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR is not fatal and does not make the items
seized inadmissible. The most important factor is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." People of the Philippines
v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016

18

In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral
certainty that the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive
for dangerous drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was
the same illegal drug that was confiscated. People of the Philippines v. Juan
Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
The records of the case show that the authorities were able to preserve the
integrity of the seized marijuana, and establish in the trial that the links in the chain
of custody of the same were not compromised. While it is true that the drugs were
not marked immediately after its seizure and not in the presence of the accused,
the prosecution was able to prove, however, that the bricks of marijuana contained
in five sacks and a plastic bag confiscated during the buy-bust operation were the
same items presented and identified before the court. People of the Philippines
v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the
police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of
the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory
nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary
value of shabu seized from the petitioner had been preserved under the chain of
custody rule even though the prescribed procedure under Section 21 ( 1 ), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR ofR.A.
No. 9165, was not strictly complied with. Roberto Palo v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016
Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items were preserved as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. People of the Philippines
v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016
Human memory is not infallible. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous
drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established

19

with moral certainty. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No.


174481 10 February 2016
The purpose of Section 21 is to [protect] the accused from malicious
imputations of guilt by abusive police officers[.]" Nevertheless, Section 21 cannot
be used to thwart the legitimate efforts of law enforcement agents. Slight
infractions or nominal deviations by the police from the prescribed method of
handling the corpus delicti [as provided in Section 21] should not exculpate an
otherwise guilty defendant.Thus, substantial adherence89 to Section 21 will
suffice. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10
February 2016
In crimes committed in airports, the prosecution relies heavily on airport
security personnel and procedures for evidence. Recently, cases of illegal
possession of ammunition committed in airports have been on the news, with
some suggesting that airport security personnel are behind this laglag-bala modus
operandi. Whether or not there is truth in these reports, the public has since been
more concerned with airport security procedures. The rise in cases of laglag-bala,
however, does not excuse the laxity in processing other pieces of evidence. Drugs
equally destroy lives, as do bullets fired with a gun. Prosecuting drug dealers and
users should be given equal vigilance. People of the Philippines v. Cristy
Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed
by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention
is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment
and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. People of
the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January
2016

20

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his
liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R.
No. 174471 12 January 2016
PLUNDER
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section i 53 of RA 7080, as amended,
has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten' wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) 154 thereof; and (c) that
the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million
Pesos (50,000,000.00). Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R.
Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos.
213163-78 15 March 2016
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES
Civil Forfeiture as Criminal Penalty
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages
for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Republic Act No.
1379 [referred to as the Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property
Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings therefor] provides for the procedure by which
forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who
"[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or
employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired." Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Jurisdiction over Civil Forfeiture Cases
Violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture

21

of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. Republic of the


Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11
January 2016; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 614 (2005);
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 674676
Difference between a Civil Forfeiture Case and a Plunder Case
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and
different from a plunder case. ... In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine,
by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent's
properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired
said properties. Xxx the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions
of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act
committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal
wealth. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez,
G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil.
589, 614 (2005)
ANTI-DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING ACT OF 2013
The policy behind Republic Act No. 10586 is to penalize the acts of driving
under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and other intoxicating substances,
and to inculcate the standards of safe driving and the benefits that may be derived
from it through institutional programs and appropriate public information
strategies.
The law covers all acts of driving and/or operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, and/or dangerous drugs and similar substances.
Motor vehicle refers to any land transportation vehicle propelled by any power
other than muscular power, including: (1) Trucks and buses, which are motor
vehicles with gross vehicle weight from 4501 kg and above; and (2) Motorcycles,
which are two- or three-wheeled motor vehicles and which may include a side-car
attached thereto.
A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle and committing the
act of DUIA or DUID shall be penalized as follows:

22

a. If the violation did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the


penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from
Php 20,000 Php 80,000.00 shall be imposed;
b. If the violation resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided
in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in
the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine
ranging from Php 100,000 to Php 200,000 shall be imposed;
c. If the violation resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Php
300,000 to Php 500,000 shall be imposed; and
d. The non-professional drivers license of any person found to have
violated the law shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period
of twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually
revoked for the second conviction. The professional drivers license
shall also be confiscated and perpetually revoked for the first
conviction. The perpetual revocation of a drivers license shall
disqualify the person from being granted any kind of drivers license
thereafter.
e. The prosecution for any violation of this law shall be without
prejudice to criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and existing
local ordinances, whenever applicable.
The owner and/or operator of the motor vehicle driven by the offender
(including owners and/or operators of public utility vehicles and commercial
vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container trucks, school and company
buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like) shall be directly
and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and the award
against the offender for civil damages unless he/she is able to convincingly prove
that he/she has exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision
of his/her drivers in general and the offending driver in particular.

23

Part Two

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
NATURE OF PROCEDURAL RULES
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is
to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence
of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value in the context
of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion
as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court
will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is
deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading. Republic of the Philippines v.
Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant
weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by both parties
should not be encouraged. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Duty of Prosecutors in Criminal Proceedings
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with
moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes
the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that
it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life. The constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R.
No. 207662 13 April 2016
ARRESTS
Valid Warrantless Arrest
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance
does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a

24

valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Amado Saraum v. People
of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty
for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In
the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified
in seizing them. Considering that Saraums arrest was legal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence
for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction. Amado Saraum v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
Illegality of Arrest Must Be Raised Prior to Entry of Plea
It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. xxx Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner
of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the
trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v.
People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State
of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial
had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been
rendered against her. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.
R. No. 209387 11 January 2016

25

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES


Voluntary Submission to Routine Baggage Inspection
Constitutes Consent to Search and Seizure
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done
without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public. Erwin Libo-on
Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used
x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers bags. When the results of
the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities
had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioners bag. Erwin Libo-on Dela
Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion
when the baggage inspector opened petitioners bag and called the attention of the
port police officer? We rule in the negative. The port personnels actions proceed
from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within
the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The presentation of
petitioners bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not
want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection
upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are
part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing
through ports or terminals. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary
persons right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the
security in the port facility. xxx Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the
presentation of person and effects for port security measures is a permissible
intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society caused
by lawless persons. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R.
No. 209387 11 January 2016

26

Distinction between Consented Search and Customs Search


Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search
warrant, are allowed when persons exercising police authority under the customs
law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws. The
Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search.
Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11
January 2016
[T]o be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s
conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law;
(2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched
is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of
routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the
Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches
usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be
for the enforcement of customs laws. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
RIGHT TO BAIL
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If the offense charged is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion. In case bail is granted, the accused must appear whenever the
court requires his presence; otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited. People of the
Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25
January 2016
Jumping Bail results in Loss of Standing to Appeal
When the R TC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his
counsel were present in the courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail
pending appeal before the RTC or the CAI Nonetheless, any motion for bail
pending appeal should have been denied because Davis violated the conditions of
his previous bail. Necessarily, as he previously jumped bail and no bail pending
appeal was secured, the R TC should have immediately issued a warrant of arrest
against him. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo
Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016

27

In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of
Davis. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this
case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was made in this case,
in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled
to seek relief from the courts. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato
Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Right to Counsel Cannot Be Claimed in the
Course of Identification in a Police Lineup
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right
to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person
is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime
under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only
during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police lineup. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and
Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Preliminary Investigation is not a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Secretary Leila De
Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A quasijudicial function is the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Otherwise stated, an administrative

28

agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the


rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment
of a court. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930,
11 January 2016.
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. Secretary
Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.
Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that
the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and
is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-9415 March 2016; Jessica Lucila
Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the
Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations,
the "technical rules of evidence should not be applied" in the course of its
proceedings, keeping in mind that "the determination of probable cause does not
depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented." Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila
Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the
Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
Probable Cause
There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the

29

existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines
G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot
be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos.
213163-78
Finding of Probable Cause may be based on Hearsay
Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay,
it must be reiterated that xxx probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, so long as there. is substantial basis for crediting the same. As
aforestated, the modus operandi used in advancing the PDAF scam as described
by the whistleblowers was confirmed by Tuason herself, who admitted to having
acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile. The
Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Sufias,
and Tuason find support in the following documentary evidence: (a) the business
ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator
Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his 'commission" from the so-called PDAF
scam; (b) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report documenting the
results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that there were
serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects,
including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and ( c) the reports on the
independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO
which secured sworn statements of local government officials and purported
beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent. Clearly,
these testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably
conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and,
hence, must stand trial therefor. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; ; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines
G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016

30

Judicial Review of Ombudsman's Determination of Probable Cause


At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained
from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence
of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed.
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action
when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines
G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion,
attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling - that. is: preliminary
investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there
is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and
belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there
is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila
Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the
Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
Authority of the Justice Secretary
to Conduct Review Motu Propio
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors
and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions
of her prosecutors. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No.
20930, 11 January 2016.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the
authority to directly act on any probable miscarriage of justice within the
jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial
prosecutor or the city prosecutor. Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step
in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party
in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice. Secretary Leila De Lima
et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.

31

The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to
act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the
trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of
arrest. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11
January 2016.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of
Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city
prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11
January 2016.
Justice Secretarys Review of Resolutions Not a Ministerial Function
The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not
perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justices review of the
resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function. An act is considered
ministerial if an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts,
in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. In contrast, an act
is considered discretionary [i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.
Considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation, the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not
ministerial. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930,
11 January 2016.
Justice Secretarys Determination of Probable Cause
May be subject to Judicial Review
However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of
judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. xxx
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v.
Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.

32

CRIMINAL INFORMATION
As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further,
paragraph 2 of the same section, it provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. It is further provided under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a complaint or information to be filed in court must contain a
designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference
should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it and the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. People of the Philippines
v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
In Patula v. People [685 Phil. 376, 388 (2012)] the Court emphasized the
importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation
in the information: x x x An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
Criminal Information Should be Filed by
Officer Properly Authorized to Do So
The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to
file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be
raised at anystage of the proceedings. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016
[T]he Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the
crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated
review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature
therein. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved
by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakatis division chiefs
or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz
which stated, among others, that DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na
ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o
pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig28 which translates to and that the

33

filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City
Prosecutor. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13
January 2016
In [previous cases] the Court had already rejected similarly-worded
certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations
were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written
authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of
the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof
that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information
before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City
Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior
written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of
OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz
sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized
pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite
frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya
approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the
Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the
OCP Makati. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13
January 2016
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the
Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz
considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De
La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior
written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information
before the RTC. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920
13 January 2016
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's
motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable
infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of
the criminal case against petitioner. As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he
Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the
Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained
therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm

34

of the Government." Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No.


216920 13 January 2016
Failure to Move for Quashal of Information deemed Acquiescence
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment
and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 11 7 provides that "[t]he
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads
to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash
or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule." People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta
G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon
him the proper penalty for each offense. Appellant can therefore be held liable for
all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and
proven during trial. People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124
5 April 2016
To Ensure Proper Conviction, Information
Must Contain All Necessary Allegations
[T]he Information merely alleged that "the accused is an uncle by affinity of
the latter," failing to clearly state that appellant herein is AAA's relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, as expressly required by the
aforecited ruling. Appellant herein cannot, therefore, be properly convicted of
rape in its qualified form resulting in a higher award of damages. Hence, in view
of the failure of the Information to expressly allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, as well as the absence of any discussion as to the existence of such
qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty,
the Court finds the award of damages in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages improper. Accordingly, both awards
of civil indemnity and moral damages are reduced to P50,000.00 each, in line with
existing jurisprudence. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Perez G. R. No.
208071 09 March 2016

35

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established that notices have
been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of
his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus,
the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional
right to due process are doomed to fail. Napoleon Senit v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
DUTIES OF THE ACCUSED
Accuseds Primary Duty is to be Interested in His Own Case
It is Petitioners [Accuseds] duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel
so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its
counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot
expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is
also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt
of mail intended for them. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No.
192914 11 January 2016
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the
criminal case against him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance
of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident,
and the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at
bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him
of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner
himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor
law which specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received
by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. Napoleon Senit v.
People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016

APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES


At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws
the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's

36

decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. People of the
Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016

Part Three

EVIDENCE
BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his
bag, the burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the
burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of
innocence. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.
209387 11 January 2016
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond
reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish,
with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible
therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution
throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the
burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth
of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against
the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him
to
adduce
evidence
in
order
to
meet
and
nullify,
if
not
to overthrow, that prima facie case. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
Required Quantum of Evidence in Civil Forfeiture Cases
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases preponderance
of evidence. [Exec. Order No. 14-A (1986), sec. 1, entitled Amending Executive
Order No. 14.] Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B.
Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016

37

Required Quantum of Evidence in Criminal Cases


The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accusedappellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt,
however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to
exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to
establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he
required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence,
or even to a reasonable probability. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et
al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
Equipoise Rule
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support
a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal
case is evenly balanced, the constitutional . presumption of innocence tilts the
scales in favor of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R.
No. 207662 13 April 2016
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Definition of Demurrer to Evidence
A Demurrer to evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have also
held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the
relief sought." Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B.
Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No.
184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174.
Guidelines in the Resolution of a Demurrer to Evidence
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiffs evidence together
with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does
not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be

38

sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every


proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions
fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one
or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to
support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. Republic of the
Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11
January 2016; Spouses Condes v. Court of Appeals, 555 Phil. 311, 324 (2007)
citing Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524 (2006).
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence iswhether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The
evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits
of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. Republic of the
Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11
January 2016; Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking
Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801-802 (2007)
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion,
when the Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full
statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and offered and the
interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to
evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Effect of an Order Granting Demurrer to Evidence
An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This
is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action," it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et
al, 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983); Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012,
671 SCRA 174, 185; Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking
Corporation, 559 Phil. 793 (2007); Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on
Elections, et al, 211 Phil. 623 (1983); Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 432, 440 (1997)
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or
she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he [or she] is
not entitled to the relief sought. The order of dismissal must be clearly supported

39

by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merit.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 783-784 (2009)
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Original Documents as Primary Evidence
Save for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best
Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Republic
of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673,
11 January 2016; Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695
SCRA 599, 611.
[T]he best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document. xxx Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting
for the original. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B.
Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of
execution of the documents is allowed. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa
Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Secondary Evidence
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of Rule 130, Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016

40

Abella is challenging the probative value of the above handwritten


agreement on the ground that it is a mere photocopy. Abella reasons that since the
contents of said agreement are in issue, the best evidence rule applies. The original
of the agreement is the best evidence of Abella making representations that she
had the power to send private complainants abroad to work. The non-presentation
of the original copy of the handwritten agreement is not fatal to the prosecutions
case. Miguel personally testified before the RTC as to the circumstances of her
recruitment by Abella. Abella made verbal, and not only written, promises to
Miguel of employment abroad. The handwritten agreement merely substantiates
Miguels testimony at best. In People v. Pabalan [331 Phil. 64, 77-78 (1996)] we
affirmed the sufficiency of testimonial evidence to prove receipt by therein
accused-appellant of placement fees, even in the absence of documentary evidence
such as receipts issued by accused-appellant. People of the Philippines v. Fe
Abella G. R. No. 195666, 20 January 2016
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
Witness Credibility Subject to Court Determination
To reiterate, settled is the rule that the findings and conclusion of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because the trial
courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.
The determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed
by the appellate court, as in this case, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres
Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January 2016

The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not
conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court. People of the Philippines v.
Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
Admissibility of Identification
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In

41

resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of


suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa
Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016
Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-appellants
were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial. People
of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12
January 2016
DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI
Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. As is well-settled in this
jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses than the accused's denial and explanation concerning
the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina
G. R. No. 196784 13 January 2016
In seeking his acquittal, appellant raises the defenses of denial and alibi.
However, such defenses, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are
considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated
and concocted. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the
appellants. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18
January 2016
In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must
likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the

42

time of its commission. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No.


206291 18 January 2016
NATURAL REACTION OF VICTIMS TO VIOLENCE
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the
crime was committed. xxx It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness
to a crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe
the manner in which the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given
time. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No.
174471 12 January 2016
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances
take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner
in which the crime is committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and
his body movements create a lasting impression on the victims mind and cannot
thus be easily erased from his memory. Cordero positively identified both
accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his kidnappers. He saw both
accused-appellants faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be said that
the length of time between the crime and the identification of the accusedappellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Corderos memory, to
render his positive identification flawed. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero G. R. No. 208404 24 February 2016
HEARSAY
The term hearsay as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence
which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it
is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and
weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is
measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to
that fact, and consequently, not subject to cross examination. If one therefore
testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to
those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. People of the
Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016

43

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against
whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity
to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the
court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by
observing the demeanor of the person who made them. People of the Philippines
v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016
DIRECT EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted,
but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following. are the
guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases
expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. People of
the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
Possessor as Culprit
The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 U), Rule 13 1
of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case
the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases
where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the
instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and
adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to
him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not
seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising
from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden
shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the
defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable
to discharge. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13
April 2016

44

Regular Performance of Duty


Reliance on the legal presumptions that the police officers regularly
performed their official duty and that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to
be preserved will be inadequate to uphold appellant's conviction. After all, the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. When
moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable
doubt becomes a matter of right, irrespective of the reputation of the accused who
enjoys the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is shown. People of
the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
RECANTATION
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation
may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to
the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand. People of the Philippines v. Allan
Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016
Before allowing the recantation, the court must not be too willing to accept
it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the
substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any
other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In
that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the
reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and
observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses. People of the
Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016
CASE LIST
1. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
2. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11
January 2016
3. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016
4. Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
5. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15
March 2016

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6. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the
People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
7. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
8. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13
January 2016
9. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016
10. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29 February 2016
11. People of the Philippines v. Anita Miranda G. R. No. 205639 18 January 2016
12. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016
13. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Perez G. R. No. 208071 09 March 2016
14. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016
15. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
16. People of the Philippines v. Fe Abella G. R. No. 195666, 20 January 2016
17. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11
January 2016
18. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R.
No. 213607 25 January 2016
19. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016
20. People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016
21. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12
January 2016
22. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
23. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
24. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January
2016
25. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
26. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R. No. 218396 10 February 2016
27. People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
28. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016
29. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016
30. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
31. People of the Philippines v. Romel Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016
32. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016
33. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero G. R. No.
208404 24 February 2016
34. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016
35. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
36. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez G. R. No.
174673 11 January 2016
37. Roberto Palo v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016
38. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January
2016.

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