2016 Case Updates in Criminal Law Criminal Procedure and Evidence
2016 Case Updates in Criminal Law Criminal Procedure and Evidence
2016 Case Updates in Criminal Law Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Part One
CRIMINAL LAW
MURDER
Murder is defined under Article 24810 of the Revised Penal Code as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Treachery
The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without
risk to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely,
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. People of the Philippines v.
Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty.
Segundo was attended by treachery because appellant shot the said victim
suddenly and without any warning with a deadly weapon, thus: x x x Atty.
Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his teenage niece as passenger
sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally unaware that he will be
treacherously shot just 200 meters away from his residence. He was unarmed and
was not given any opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly
assault. After he was hit when the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his
niece and after he lost control of his jeep which bumped an interlink wire fence
and stopped, he was again shot three times by the gunman. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Evident Premeditation
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. People of the
Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court
conceded that the specific time when the accused determined to commit the crime,
and the interval between such determination and execution, cannot be
determined. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CAs
finding that no evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of
evident premeditation. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No.
206291 18 January 2016
Presentation of Firearm Unnecessary to Prove Special
Aggravating Circumstance of Use of Firearm
In People v. Dulay [561 Phil. 764, 771-772 (2007)] the Court ruled that the
existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even without the
presentation of the firearm. In the said case, it was established that the victims
sustained and died from gunshot wounds, and the ballistic examinations of the
slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from a
.30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm, and
it was also proven that he was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, the trial court
and the CA correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as a special
aggravating circumstance. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R.
No. 206291 18 January 2016
Despite the result of the ballistic examination that the slugs test-fired from
the gun recovered from appellant when he was arrested, were different from the
2 slugs recovered from the body of the victim, the prosecution was still able to
establish the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime. Given that the actual firearm used by appellant in
shooting the victim was not presented in court, the prosecution has nonetheless
proven through the testimony of Delos Reyes that the firearm used by appellant
was a short gun. It has also established through the testimony of SPO3 Ronnie
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Eleuterio and the Certification35 from the FESAGS of the PNP that appellant was
not issued a firearms license, a permit to carry or permit to transport firearms
outside of residence. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No.
206291 18 January 2016
Notably, the term unlicensed firearm includes the unauthorized use of
licensed firearm in the commission of the crime, under Section 536 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 8294.37 Assuming arguendo that the actual firearm used by appellant
was licensed, he still failed to prove that he was so authorized to use it by the duly
licensed owner. The prosecution having proven that appellant was not issued a
firearms license or permit to carry or permit to transport firearms, the burden of
evidence is then shifted to appellant to prove his authorization to use the firearm.
All told, the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said aggravating
circumstance in imposing penalty against appellant. People of the Philippines v.
Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Use of Motor Vehicle as Special Aggravating Circumstance
Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either
to commit the crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely
incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense
or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. In
People v. Herbias [333 Phil. 422 (1996)] the Court held: "The use of motor vehicle
may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime. The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in
trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellants back
rider mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt
that the motorcycle was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their
escape after they accomplished their mission." People of the Philippines v. Zaldy
Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos
Reyes that appellant was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he
twice shot Atty. Segundo who thus lost control of his owner-type jeep and crashed
into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then stopped near the
jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene
aboard the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime.
People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
Absolutory Cause
Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime
but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. The
defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the
accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour
in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Having admitted the
stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of
Article 247. As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man,
the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the
absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is not applicable in the present case.
People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Elements of Qualified Rape
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or
intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of
force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving
consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress
between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In the
present case, the prosecution successfully established that the first rape indeed
took place and that the appellant was the malefactor. People of the Philippines v.
Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
First, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing her pain. xxx Notably, both the RTC and CA
found AAAs testimony credible and convincing. We see no reason to disbelieve
the testimony of AAA either with respect to the first rape, which the trial and
appellate courts found to be credible and straightforward. Given the victims
mental condition, it is highly improbable that she could have concocted or
fabricated a rape charge against the accused. Neither was it possible that she was
coached into testifying against appellant considering her limited intellect. People
of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January
2016
Second, the prosecution successfully established AAAs mental condition.
Maribel Tico, a psychologist from the Philippine Mental Health Association,
testified that she conducted a mental status examination on AAA, and found her
to be suffering from mild mental retardation with a corresponding [m]ental [a]ge
of 7 years and 1 month. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander"
Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
When a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. Thus, the lone testimony
of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict
of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to the nature of the offense, the only
evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt of the accused is usually only
the offended party's testimony. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito
G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016
That AAA's credibility is doubtful due to the fact that she did not see the
perpetrator's face, and only recognized him for his built, voice, and smell, is of no
moment. As We have held before, a person may be identified by these factors for
once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy
task. Even though a witness may not have seen the accused at a particular incident
for reasons such as the darkness of the night, hearing the sound of the voice of
such accused is still an acceptable means of identification where it is established
that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years. Here, it cannot be denied that AAA personally knew appellant's
built, voice, and smell, having lived with him her entire life. People of the
Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016
Neither does AAA's silence on the incident nor failure to shout or wake up
her siblings affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found that there is
no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of
being sexually molested. While there are some who may have found the courage
early on to reveal the abuse they experienced, there are those who have opted to
initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and attempted to move on with
their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by
fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of
extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror for the
perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally
expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to
Rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible
and untainted with serious uncertainty. With more reason is this true when the
medical findings supported the testimony of the victim, as in this case. When the
victim's testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physical evidence of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal
knowledge. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29
February 2016
At any rate, it is not proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions
of children who have undergone traumatic experiences. Certainly, a child more
so in the case of AAA who is suffering from mild mental retardation cannot be
expected to act like an adult or do what may be expected of mature people under
similar circumstances. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy
G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the
stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a
standard in testing the credibility of a witness. Moreover, the Court considers
AAA's alleged inconsistency in testifying, with respect to the place where the first
and third rapes were committed, as a minor inconsistency which should generally
be given liberal appreciation considering that the place of the commission of the
crime in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is decisive is
that accused appellant's commission of the crime charged has been sufficiently
proved. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
Finally, we find no merit in the appellants contention that the absence of
lacerations in the victims hymen negated sexual intercourse. The rupture of the
hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms
that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. Additionally, in
the present case, the genital examination on AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005,
or more than one year after the rape took place. At any rate, Dr. Marjorie Rebujio,
Medical officer III at the Benguet General Hospital, clarified that the lack of
hymenal injuries does not mean that no sexual abuse took place. Dr. Rebujio
further explained that the hymen could heal fast and that it could go back to its
normal structure. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G.
R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
Proof of Victims Minority Essential in Prosecution for Qualified Rape
The appellant cannot be held guilty crime of rape in its qualified form.
Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances
are present in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen ( 18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
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consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. Hence, in a conviction for qualified rape, the
prosecution must prove that ( 1) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the
time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of both the minority
of the victim and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a
special qualifying circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of
death. Thus, it is imperative that the circumstance of minority and relationship be
proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall
be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her relationship with
the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be
imposed. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24
February 2016
Thus, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth
certificate or certified true copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic
documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If
the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible
testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient
under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other
authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. People of the
Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016
Penalty for Qualified Rape
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental
age of below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape.22 Notably, AAA was also
below 12 years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing
that she was born on March 1, 1993. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. In the present case, however, the relationship of the
appellant to the victim was not alleged. People of the Philippines v. Alexander
"Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13 January 2016
Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a mental retardate and
that the appellant knew of this mental retardation. These circumstances raised the
crime from statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty cannot be
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imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole imposed by the RTC on the
appellant. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No.
204047 13 January 2016
100,000.00 as Current Rate of Civil Indemnity for Rape
In People v. Gambao, [G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533].
the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the
imposition of the death penalty, if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as
follows: (1) 100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) 100,000.00 as moral damages which
the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) l00,000.00
as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. We thus increase the
awarded civil indemnity from 75,000.00 to l00,000.00; moral damages from
75,000.00 to l00,000.00; and the exemplary damages from 30,000.00 to
l00,000.00. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No.
204047 13 January 2016
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the AntiCamapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of thecommission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This third amendment clarifies the law's
intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis
paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the AntiCarnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it
must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof" Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Camapping Act would cease to be applicable
and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13
April 2016
VIOLATION OF THE GUN BAN
12
13
"to carry or convey from one place to another." People of the Philippines v. Juan
Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited
drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport
and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the
perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. People of the
Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
Elements of Illegal Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Appratus and Other Drug Paraphernalia
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has convincingly
established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly
aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence. Amado Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.
205472 25 January 2016
Coordination with PDEA is not Required in a Buy-Bust Operation
The appellant contends that the belated submission of the pre-operation
report to the PDEA after the buy-bust operation violates RA 9165; and that the
non-presentation of the unnamed civilian informant who allegedly brokered the
transaction with him casts serious doubts on the factuality of the buy-bust
operation. There is no merit in this contention. xxx [C]coordination with the PDEA
is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buybust operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will
not invalidate a buy-bust operation. People of the Philippines v. Fernando
Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
Presentation of Informant Unnecessary
in Prosecution of Drug-Related Cases
Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in
prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless
their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their
testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely
14
15
The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain
of custody as duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction.
People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11
January 2016
The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy bust
situation are as follows: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of
the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and ( 4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G.
R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
As the first step in the chain of custody, "marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature
on the dangerous drug seized. It is meant to ensure that the objects seized are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in evidence, as well as
to protect innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. While
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify a time
frame for marking or the place where said marking should be done, the chain of
custody rule requires that the marking should be done ( 1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 17 Marking upon
immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad
G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in
reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
As such, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the case at bench, this Court finds it exceedingly
difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the
police officers to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their
respective possession resulted in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the
drug. In some cases, the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer
the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody
of the shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling of the evidence
16
before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the government
to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. People of the
Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
More importantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were duly preserved as the chain of custody remained intact. The Court has ruled
in People v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013] that the links that must
be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. People of the Philippines v. Romel
Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016
Effect of Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements
anent the Custody and Disposition of Seized Drugs
Compliance with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of
two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as
to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be
immediately after seizure and confiscation. As to where, it depends on whether
the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the
physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that
the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be
done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable. Howard Lescano v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present
during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the
accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected
public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service.
There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the
accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to
the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place. Section 21 spells out matters that are
imperative. Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but
17
do not actually comply with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. This
is especially so when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug
paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here.
Howard Lescano v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 214490 13 January 2016
Here, apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, yet another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty
about the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to the noncompliance
by the buy-bust team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative
to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1) Article II of
RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and
control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never
ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever photograph the same
in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was confiscated.
There was no physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from
appellant. Neither was there any explanation offered for such failure. People of
the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict
compliance with the requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as
stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only when the
evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we
stressed in People v. Guru [G.R. No. 189808, October24, 2012, 684 SCRA 544, 558].
In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and integrity of the alleged illegal drug
had been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is generated on the
identity of the item in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. In this
light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded
the buy-bust team by the courts below cannot arise. People of the Philippines v.
Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11 January 2016
Exception to Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165
In many cases, this Court has held that "while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain." Since the law itself provided exceptions to its requirements., the
non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR is not fatal and does not make the items
seized inadmissible. The most important factor is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." People of the Philippines
v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
18
In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court. The prosecution must establish with moral
certainty that the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive
for dangerous drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against the accused was
the same illegal drug that was confiscated. People of the Philippines v. Juan
Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
The records of the case show that the authorities were able to preserve the
integrity of the seized marijuana, and establish in the trial that the links in the chain
of custody of the same were not compromised. While it is true that the drugs were
not marked immediately after its seizure and not in the presence of the accused,
the prosecution was able to prove, however, that the bricks of marijuana contained
in five sacks and a plastic bag confiscated during the buy-bust operation were the
same items presented and identified before the court. People of the Philippines
v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the
police station, and not at the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of
the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared that "marking upon immediate
confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory
nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary
value of shabu seized from the petitioner had been preserved under the chain of
custody rule even though the prescribed procedure under Section 21 ( 1 ), Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR ofR.A.
No. 9165, was not strictly complied with. Roberto Palo v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016
Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items were preserved as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. People of the Philippines
v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016
Human memory is not infallible. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous
drugs is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established
19
20
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his
liberty in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R.
No. 174471 12 January 2016
PLUNDER
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section i 53 of RA 7080, as amended,
has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten' wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) 154 thereof; and (c) that
the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million
Pesos (50,000,000.00). Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman G. R.
Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos.
213163-78 15 March 2016
QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES
Civil Forfeiture as Criminal Penalty
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages
for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Republic Act No.
1379 [referred to as the Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property
Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings therefor] provides for the procedure by which
forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who
"[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or
employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired." Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Jurisdiction over Civil Forfeiture Cases
Violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture
21
22
23
Part Two
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
NATURE OF PROCEDURAL RULES
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is
to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence
of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value in the context
of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion
as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court
will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is
deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading. Republic of the Philippines v.
Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant
weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by both parties
should not be encouraged. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Duty of Prosecutors in Criminal Proceedings
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with
moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes
the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that
it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life. The constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R.
No. 207662 13 April 2016
ARRESTS
Valid Warrantless Arrest
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance
does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is
apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a
24
valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Amado Saraum v. People
of the Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty
for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In
the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified
in seizing them. Considering that Saraums arrest was legal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence
for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction. Amado Saraum v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 205472 25 January 2016
Illegality of Arrest Must Be Raised Prior to Entry of Plea
It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived. xxx Appellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner
of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the
trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v.
People of the Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State
of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial
had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been
rendered against her. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.
R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
25
26
27
In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of
Davis. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this
case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court. Unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was made in this case,
in the eyes of the law, Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled
to seek relief from the courts. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato
Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R. No. 213607 25 January 2016
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Right to Counsel Cannot Be Claimed in the
Course of Identification in a Police Lineup
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right
to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person
is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime
under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only
during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police lineup. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and
Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12 January 2016
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Preliminary Investigation is not a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Secretary Leila De
Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A quasijudicial function is the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Otherwise stated, an administrative
28
29
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines
G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot
be forced to issue the arrest warrant. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines G. R. Nos.
213163-78
Finding of Probable Cause may be based on Hearsay
Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely hearsay,
it must be reiterated that xxx probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, so long as there. is substantial basis for crediting the same. As
aforestated, the modus operandi used in advancing the PDAF scam as described
by the whistleblowers was confirmed by Tuason herself, who admitted to having
acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile. The
Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy, Sula, Sufias,
and Tuason find support in the following documentary evidence: (a) the business
ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator
Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his 'commission" from the so-called PDAF
scam; (b) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit (COA) Report documenting the
results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that there were
serious irregularities relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects,
including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and ( c) the reports on the
independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO
which secured sworn statements of local government officials and purported
beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent. Clearly,
these testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably
conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and,
hence, must stand trial therefor. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable
Ombudsman G. R. Nos. 212593-94 15 March 2016; ; Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the People of the Philippines
G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
30
31
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to
act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the
trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of
arrest. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11
January 2016.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of
Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city
prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11
January 2016.
Justice Secretarys Review of Resolutions Not a Ministerial Function
The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not
perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justices review of the
resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function. An act is considered
ministerial if an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts,
in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. In contrast, an act
is considered discretionary [i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.
Considering that full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation, the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not
ministerial. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930,
11 January 2016.
Justice Secretarys Determination of Probable Cause
May be subject to Judicial Review
However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of
judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. xxx
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v.
Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January 2016.
32
CRIMINAL INFORMATION
As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further,
paragraph 2 of the same section, it provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. It is further provided under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a complaint or information to be filed in court must contain a
designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference
should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it and the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. People of the Philippines
v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
In Patula v. People [685 Phil. 376, 388 (2012)] the Court emphasized the
importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation
in the information: x x x An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
Criminal Information Should be Filed by
Officer Properly Authorized to Do So
The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to
file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be
raised at anystage of the proceedings. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016
[T]he Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the
crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated
review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature
therein. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved
by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakatis division chiefs
or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz
which stated, among others, that DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na
ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o
pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig28 which translates to and that the
33
filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City
Prosecutor. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13
January 2016
In [previous cases] the Court had already rejected similarly-worded
certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations
were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either
lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written
authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of
the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13 January 2016
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof
that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information
before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City
Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior
written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of
OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz
sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized
pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite
frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya
approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the
Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in the
OCP Makati. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920 13
January 2016
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the
Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz
considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De
La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior
written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information
before the RTC. Girlie M. Quisay v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 216920
13 January 2016
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's
motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable
infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of
the criminal case against petitioner. As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he
Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the
Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained
therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm
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35
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is established that notices have
been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of
his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus,
the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional
right to due process are doomed to fail. Napoleon Senit v. People of the
Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
DUTIES OF THE ACCUSED
Accuseds Primary Duty is to be Interested in His Own Case
It is Petitioners [Accuseds] duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel
so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its
counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot
expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is
also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt
of mail intended for them. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No.
192914 11 January 2016
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the
criminal case against him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance
of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the incident,
and the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at
bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him
of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the petitioner
himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor
law which specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received
by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. Napoleon Senit v.
People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
36
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. People of the
Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016
Part Three
EVIDENCE
BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his
bag, the burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the
burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of the presumption of
innocence. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G. R. No.
209387 11 January 2016
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond
reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish,
with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible
therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution
throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the
burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth
of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against
the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him
to
adduce
evidence
in
order
to
meet
and
nullify,
if
not
to overthrow, that prima facie case. Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz v. People of the
Philippines, G. R. No. 209387 11 January 2016
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
Required Quantum of Evidence in Civil Forfeiture Cases
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases preponderance
of evidence. [Exec. Order No. 14-A (1986), sec. 1, entitled Amending Executive
Order No. 14.] Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B.
Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
37
38
39
by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merit.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016; Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 783-784 (2009)
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Original Documents as Primary Evidence
Save for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. This is the Best
Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Republic
of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673,
11 January 2016; Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695
SCRA 599, 611.
[T]he best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document. xxx Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting
for the original. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B.
Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of
execution of the documents is allowed. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa
Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Secondary Evidence
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of Rule 130, Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R.
No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and
Ignacio B. Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
40
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not
conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court. People of the Philippines v.
Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
Admissibility of Identification
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
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42
43
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against
whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity
to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the
court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by
observing the demeanor of the person who made them. People of the Philippines
v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016
DIRECT EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted,
but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following. are the
guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases
expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. People of
the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
Possessor as Culprit
The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 U), Rule 13 1
of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case
the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases
where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the
instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and
adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to
him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not
seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising
from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden
shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the
defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable
to discharge. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13
April 2016
44
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6. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Third Division] and the
People of the Philippines G. R. Nos. 213163-78 15 March 2016
7. Napoleon Senit v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192914 11 January 2016
8. People of the Philippines v. Alexander "Sander" Bangsoy G. R. No. 204047 13
January 2016
9. People of the Philippines v. Allan Menaling G. R. No. 208676 13 April 2016
10. People of the Philippines v. Allan Rodriguez G. R. No. 208406 29 February 2016
11. People of the Philippines v. Anita Miranda G. R. No. 205639 18 January 2016
12. People of the Philippines v. Cristy Dimaano G. R. No. 174481 10 February 2016
13. People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Perez G. R. No. 208071 09 March 2016
14. People of the Philippines v. Eliseo Villamor G. R. No. 202187 10 February 2016
15. People of the Philippines v. Fabian Urzais et al G. R. No. 207662 13 April 2016
16. People of the Philippines v. Fe Abella G. R. No. 195666, 20 January 2016
17. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Ranche Havana G. R. No. 198450 11
January 2016
18. People of the Philippines v. Glen Piad, Renato Villarosa and Nilo Davis, G. R.
No. 213607 25 January 2016
19. People of the Philippines v. Godofredo Comboy G. R. No.218399 02 March 2016
20. People of the Philippines v. Ireneo Jugueta G. R. No. 202124 5 April 2016
21. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Pepino and Preciosa Gomez G. R. No. 174471 12
January 2016
22. People of the Philippines v. Juan Asislo G. R. No. 206224 18 January 2016
23. People of the Philippines v. Lee Quijano Enad G. R. No. 205764 3 February 2016
24. People of the Philippines v. Ma. Fe Torres Solina G. R. No. 196784 13 January
2016
25. People of the Philippines v. Manuel Macal G. R. No. 211062 13 January 2016
26. People of the Philippines v. Nestor Roxas G. R. No. 218396 10 February 2016
27. People of the Philippines v. Raul Yamon G. R. No. 207816 24 February 2016
28. People of the Philippines v. Reman Sariego G. R. No. 203322 24 February 2016
29. People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Umanito G. R. No. 208648 13 April 2016
30. People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Lagbo G. R. No. 207535 10 February 2016
31. People of the Philippines v. Romel Sapitula G. R. No. 209212 10 February 2016
32. People of the Philippines v. Ronaldo Casacop G. R. No. 210454 13 January 2016
33. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin and DeVincio Guerrero G. R. No.
208404 24 February 2016
34. People of the Philippines v. Victor Padit G. R. No. 202978 1 February 2016
35. People of the Philippines v. Zaldy Salahuddin G. R. No. 206291 18 January 2016
36. Republic of the Philippines v. Fe Roa Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez G. R. No.
174673 11 January 2016
37. Roberto Palo v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 192075 10 February 2016
38. Secretary Leila De Lima et al v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 20930, 11 January
2016.
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