909 F.

2d 15
17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 709

Alfred LANCELLOTTI, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.
Honorable Thomas F. FAY, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants.
No. 90-1122.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.
Heard June 7, 1990.
Decided July 18, 1990.

Michael P. DeFanti with whom Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, was
on brief, for defendants, appellants.
Marty C. Marran with whom Joseph E. Marran, Jr., was on brief, for
plaintiff, appellee.
Before BREYER, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Appellants seek to persuade us that the district court applied too relaxed a
behavioral standard in considering, and rejecting, their motion for sanctions
against plaintiff-appellee Alfred Lancellotti and/or his counsel. The point is
well taken.

Prior Proceedings
2

This case arises from the ashes of a decade of matrimonial litigation in the
Rhode Island courts which sparked, among other things, two published
opinions by the state's highest tribunal. See Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d
7 (R.I.1984); Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 543 A.2d 680 (R.I.1988). Rather than
repastinating that terrain, we skip directly to the spot where the domestic
dispute focused on monies unpaid and overdue. The state supreme court

resolved that quarrel conclusively:

3 therefore remand the case and instruct the Family Court to order that Alfred pay,
We
first, the arrearage and attorney's fees ordered by the Family Court judge on March
7, 1986 [and] ... second, the unpaid support from February 15, 1986, until April 7,
1987, the date of the hearing denying the motion to hold Alfred in contempt for
continuing failure to pay support.
4* * * * * *
5

In addition, we order Alfred to pay the unpaid alimony that has accrued since
the date of the erroneous Family Court decision....

Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 543 A.2d at 682.

Lancellotti declined to appear at the hearing on remand. The family court judge
held him in contempt and ordered him incarcerated unless he paid the
arrearages. When the judge issued a writ of arrest to enforce the order,
Lancellotti petitioned for certiorari, claiming that the judge had abridged his
constitutional rights by ordering him jailed without proof of ability to pay. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the petition on the ground "that in the
proceedings below petitioner did not choose to offer evidence of his inability to
comply with the Family Court's order respecting alimony, and the burden of
establishing such inability to pay was clearly the petitioner's burden."
Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, No. 89-596-M.P. (R.I. Feb. 23, 1989) (unpublished
order).

Unfazed, Lancellotti sued in the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island. Again invoking the Constitution and making substantially the
same argument, he sought to enjoin the state supreme court justices and the
family court judge from enforcing the outstanding orders. Appellee's former
wife, Alma Lancellotti, intervened. The six defendants and the intervenor
moved for dismissal and imposition of sanctions. The district court referred the
matter to a United States magistrate, who filed a written report (Report)
recommending that the suit be dismissed and sanctions imposed. Plaintiff
objected. The court heard argument and dismissed the complaint with prejudice
because:

9 [W]ere we to permit this type of proceeding to continue, we would in effect be

...
sitting in appeal on determinations of the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode
Island. [We] have neither that right nor that responsibility.... In effect, were we to
participate in this type of inquiry, we would effectively serve as an Appellate Court

to the Family Court of the State of Rhode Island in domestic matters.

10

Lancellotti v. Fay, No. 88-0735, bench decision at 2-3 (D.R.I. Jan. 11, 1990).1
The lower court's judgment on the merits was unarguably correct, see District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303,
1311, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (federal district court "is without authority to
review final determinations of [a state court] in judicial proceedings"); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296,
90 S.Ct. 1739, 1748, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) (same); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co. 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (same), and
Lancellotti has not appealed the dismissal order.

11

As to the Rule 11 motion, the magistrate recommended sanctions on the ground

that, "[g]iven the longevity and clarity of the law governing the instant action ...
plaintiff's complaint [was] not warranted by existing law, nor by a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Report at
9.2 The district court ruled that more was needed to justify sanctions. Bench
Dec. at 5-6. Without faulting the finding of groundlessness, the judge declared
that Rule 11 established a conjunctive, multi-part test, and found "the test ... not
met here [because] ... this action is not brought for any improper purpose
[and].... Plaintiff's Counsel sincerely believes that there may be an opportunity
here for the Plaintiff to obtain relief." Id. at 6. On that basis, the judge declined
to sanction Lancellotti or his counsel. The judicial defendants appealed.

Historical Perspective
12

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 was substantially revised in 1983.3 Prior thereto, the Rule had
not been "effective in deterring [litigatory] abuses." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory
committee's note (1983 amendments). This was partially because the "old"
Rule spoke in subjective terms. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746,
757 n. 12 (1st Cir.1988). Before the Rule was amended, therefore, Rule 11
sanctions could be awarded only upon a showing of bad faith. See, e.g.,
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir.1980) (per curiam). Over time,
the purely subjective standard proved to be a toothless tiger. The need for
stiffening the Rule--fueled by "[w]idespread concern over frivolous litigation
and abusive practices of attorneys," Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The New
Federal Rule 11--A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 181 (1985)--was
correspondingly great. This background is critically important since any
"interpretation of the current Rule 11 must be guided, in part, by an
understanding of the deficiencies in the original version of Rule 11 that led to
its revision." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., --- U.S. ----, ----, 110 S.Ct.
2447, 2454, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).

13

The redrafted Rule was designed to give the tiger some bite by "impos[ing]
much more specific and extensive obligations" on parties and their counsel.
Schwarzer, supra, at 181. These obligations included holding attorneys and
parties alike to an affirmative duty of reasonable inquiry "more stringent than
the original good-faith formula." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note
(1983 amendments). In consequence, the amended Rule, "although derived
from precedents resting on bad faith, is not so limited." Schwarzer, supra, at
185; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983 amendments)
(pointing out that "reference in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite to
disciplinary action has been deleted"); Ballard's Serv. Center, Inc. v. Transue,
865 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir.1989) (after 1983 amendments, "purely subjective
bad faith" no longer required). In a nutshell, the revisers sought to expand Rule
11 to reach groundless filings which failed the test "of objective reasonableness
under the circumstances existing at the time [of filing]," Kale, 861 F.2d at 758,
irrespective of the filing party's state of mind.

Discussion
14

The court below construed amended Rule 11 to preclude sanctions unless an

attorney or party not only failed to make a "reasonable inquiry," but also did so
without a "sincere[ ] belie[f]" that the challenged pleading might be availing.
We strongly disagree. Such an interpretation would make the "new" Rule 11
less useful than its predecessor in combating abusive practices and would
thereby undermine the goal of the 1983 amendments. Providing an automatic
escape hatch from the duty of reasonable inquiry for pleaders who, while
oblivious to the facts or the law, nevertheless blunder ahead in subjective good
faith, would eviscerate the amended Rule and skew its laudable aim.

15

We do not believe that the drafters' language requires the result which the
district court decreed. Although the wording of the amended Rule may possibly
be ambiguous in this respect, the historical context and advisory committee
notes unquestionably override any syntactical uncertainties. Not surprisingly,
then, the amended Rule has rather consistently been read by federal appellate
courts to reach groundless but "sincere" pleadings, as well as those which,
while not devoid of all merit, were filed for some malign purpose. See, e.g.,
Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir.1988); Brown v.
Federation of State Medical Boards, 830 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (7th Cir.1987);
Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir.1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C.Cir.1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108
S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); see also Schwarzer, supra, at 185. We,
ourselves, have arrived at the same conclusion, albeit without extended

discussion. See Unanue-Casal v. Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839, 841 (1st

Cir.1990).
16

In sum, Rule 11, in its present incarnation, should be read as requiring

sanctions "when it appears that a pleading has been interposed for any improper
purpose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not
form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254 (emphasis
in original). In other words, the "new" Rule contains not one, but two, grounds
for sanctions: the "reasonable inquiry" clause, see, e.g., Fred A. Smith Lumber
Co. v. Edidin, 845 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir.1988); Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir.1986),4 and the "improper purpose"
clause, see, e.g., Brown, 830 F.2d at 1435; Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831-32. While
bad faith remains sanctionable, it is now not a sine qua non to a Rule 11 impost.
Put bluntly, a pure heart no longer excuses an empty head.

17

In this instance, appellants' motion charged appellee and his counsel with
defying Rule 11's reasonable inquiry clause. Rather than assessing this charge
under a standard of objective reasonableness, the district court applied a
subjective test. This was error: appellants were plainly entitled to a
determination of whether, viewed objectively, their litigation adversaries had
made the "reasonable inquiry" which Rule 11 mandates. See Figueroa-Ruiz v.
Alegria, 905 F.2d 545, 548 (1st Cir.1990) ("in normal circumstances, a district
judge when confronted with a proper [Rule 11] motion has a duty to make an
'up' or 'down' ruling").

18

We have carefully considered our options, given what occurred below. Because
the answer appears fairly obvious, it is tempting to do as appellants ask and
pass directly on whether the duty of reasonable inquiry was flouted. On
reflection, however, we believe the ends of justice would be best served if the
district court, applying the proper legal principles, made the initial
determination. For one thing, we have regularly preached "that the district court
should be the focal point of Rule 11 determinations." Figueroa-Ruiz, supra, 905
F.2d at 548; see also Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 393-94
(1st Cir.1990); Kale, 861 F.2d at 758.5 For another thing, even if sanctions are
in order, we would not avoid a remand by saying so at the appellate level. After
all, the decision as to whether Lancellotti or his counsel or both should be
sanctioned calls for an exercise of the trial court's sound discretion. See, e.g.,
Hale, 786 F.2d at 692. It is likewise for nisi prius to decide what sanction is
"appropriate" anent a particular violation. See, e.g., Anderson, 900 F.2d at 394
("Sanctions come in a wide variety of guises. The trial judge is best positioned

to decide what sanction best fits a particular case or best responds to a particular
episode or pattern of errant conduct."); Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d at 842
(similar); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983
amendments) (discussing trial court's "discretion to tailor sanctions to the
particular facts"). On balance, therefore, we believe the district court should
determine, in the first instance, whether reasonable inquiry was made, and if
not, the consequences which should ensue.
Conclusion
19

We need go no further.6 Amended Rule 11 sets up an objective standard of

reasonableness under the circumstances. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 757. That
standard is transgressed by (1) a violation of either subpart of the "reasonable
inquiry" clause, or (2) a violation of the "improper purpose" clause. In effect,
the court below impermissibly merged the two clauses; subjective good faith,
i.e., lack of an improper purpose, no matter how abundant, does not absolve a
lawyer's or litigant's failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and
the law. The sanctions motion must be reappraised under the correct legal
criteria.

20

We vacate the order denying sanctions to the judicial defendants and remand
for further proceedings consistent herewith. We authorize the same district
judge as before to act and leave to his discretion the nature of the further
proceedings, if any, which may be required. Costs to appellants.

The district court also cited and relied upon the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2283, a statute which severely limits the power of a federal court to enjoin
state court proceedings. The court observed that it was "being asked to ... enjoin
the highest judicial officers of the State of Rhode Island from carrying out their
constitutional mandate," and that it was barred from doing so in circumstances
where no exception to the Act applied. Bench Dec. at 3-4

The magistrate did not levy sanctions but merely recommended their
imposition. Report at 10-11. Accordingly, the district court reviewed the
sanctions question de novo. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b). Because all parties acquiesced in the methodology employed below, we
need not confront today the vexing standard-of-review question recently
considered by a Ninth Circuit panel in Maisonville v. F2 America, Inc., 902
F.2d 746 (9th Cir.1990). We intimate no view, therefore, on whether Rule 11
sanctions ordered by a magistrate are properly characterizable as "dispositive"
or "non-dispositive" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636 and Rule 72

The following text shows the additions and deletions effected by the 1983
amendments [Emphasis indicates additions; brackets indicate deletions; text
also includes subsequent technical amendments]:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of
one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support it]
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though
the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney
may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party,
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.

This portion of Rule 11, referred to by some courts as the "frivolessness

clause," e.g., Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830, is itself subdivided into two facets. A
party or lawyer can run afoul of the "reasonable inquiry" clause by failing
either (1) to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts or (2) to make a reasonable
inquiry into (and an informed assessment of) the law. See Brown, 830 F.2d at
1435; Thomas v. Capital Security Serv., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir.1987),
aff'd in relevant part en banc, 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.1988); see also Ryan v.
Clemente, 901 F.2d 177, 179-81 (1st Cir.1990) (applying both facets). A

violation of either subpart of the "reasonable inquiry" clause triggers Rule 11,
see Thomas, 812 F.2d at 989, mandating the imposition of an appropriate
sanction
5

To be sure, if the district court found that there was no Rule 11 violation, we
would need to address on appeal whether that determination was an abuse of
discretion. See Cooter & Gell, --- U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 2460; Figueroa-Ruiz,
supra, 905 F.2d at 548. On the present record, we seriously doubt whether we
could uphold such a finding--but a cogent explanation by the trial court might
possibly make a difference

Because the intervenor did not appeal, the denial of her motion for sanctions
has become final and is unaffected by our holding today