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Identifying Pitfalls in the Arc Flash

Calculation Process
Oct 16, 2013 D. Edwin Scherry, P.E. | Electrical Construction and Maintenance

Why arc flash hazard assessments and analysis results aren’t always foolproof?

An electrical arc flash can occur when someone is verifying the presence of
voltage, checking the balance of current, operating a switch, inspecting an
energized cable or bus connections during routine maintenance, or simply
standing in the vicinity of energized equipment. This is a reason to perform an
arc flash hazard assessment study — to discern the degree of arc flash hazard
present and the level of PPE required at a given location on the power
distribution system. In addition, this type of study helps determine the possible
means to reduce the energy through time and/or distance adjustments. Many
times, however, this requires you to run through a series of calculations using
available commercial engineering software or lengthy hand calculations.
However, mistakes can be made during the calculations process. That’s why it’s
critical for you to understand the limitations of these methodologies.

The basics

Arc flash studies require input from short circuit and coordination analysis to
calculate incident energy based upon bolted and arcing fault current levels,
arcing time duration, and distance to arc. Arcing faults are the result of current
passing through the air. At a particular point in the distribution system, this
current is always less than that possible for a bolted fault, which is a result of
the direct metallic connection between conductors. The incident energy created
during an arcing fault is calculated in the form of calories per square centimeter
(cal/cm2).

The approach taken by the engineering professional performing the analysis

needs to consider some items that are not necessarily addressed in performing
short circuit and coordination analysis. This discussion will concentrate on the
approach taken using IEEE Std 1584-2002 with two amendments: IEEE Std
1584a-2004 and 1584b-2011.

The objective of any arc flash assessment is to calculate the incident energy
and determine the arc flash boundary distance. The arc flash boundary is
defined as the approach limit, at a distance from exposed live parts, within
which a person could receive a second-degree burn if an electrical arc flash
were to occur. The reliability of overcurrent protective devices is critical to
escalation of an arc flash to higher levels than expected, so system
maintenance is very important.
Required data

An arc flash hazard assessment requires the following input data about the
distribution system:

• Single-line diagram of the power distribution system from the electric utility
source to the low-voltage panelboards and motors (50 hp and larger).

• Electric utility source data, indicating minimum and maximum available bolted
fault current, X/R ratio, and supply voltage.

• Transformer data, indicating ratings, impedances, types, and

primary/secondary protection.

• Equipment type and voltage rating of current transformers (CTs), breakers,

switches, and fuses in switchgear, motor control centers (MCCs), and
panelboards, indicating manufacturer, types, ratings, ratios, settings, and short
circuit withstand capabilities.

• Protective device characteristics from time current curves (TCCs), indicating

CT ratios, manufacturer, model, type, and settings.

• Feeder cable material (Cu/Al), sizes and lengths and raceway material
(magnetic / non-magnetic).

• Size and rating of motors or loads, especially 40kW or larger, connected to

switchgear, distribution panels, or MCCs.

• Working distance of worker to equipment bus or energized component.

Fig. 1. Radial portion of a distribution system.

Example scenario

Let’s begin with a simple example of a radial portion of a distribution system

(Fig. 1) having a 5kV overhead electric utility distribution line, using a pole-
mounted fused disconnect, to feed an underground feeder serving an oil-filled,
pad-mounted 1,500kVA transformer with 5.75% impedance. The primary full
load ampacity (FLA) of the transformer is 208A. According to NEC Table
450.3(A), a primary fuse up to 300% could be used.

Let’s begin with a 500A, 5kV fuse, which is about 240% of primary FLA. There
are cables connecting the 480/277V wye transformer secondary with a solidly
grounded neutral to a main power circuit breaker in 480V switchgear. The
secondary FLA of the transformer is 1,804A. Again, according to the NEC, a
protective device could be sized up to 250% (in supervised locations), but a
125% limit (for unsupervised locations) is more common and useful for arc
flash considerations. So 1.25 × 1,804A = 2,255A. However, because there is
not a device of that rating, let’s begin with a 2,400A power circuit breaker. This
main breaker could be set with a long time pick-up of 0.9 or 2,160A to properly
protect the transformer and possibly the secondary conductors. One of the
feeders from this switchgear is an 800A power circuit breaker feeding an 800A
rated MCC. Finally, there is a 600A fused switch in the MCC serving a
downstream panel load.

The primary conductors are routed in underground PVC conduits. The

transformer primary is 100 ft of 2-250kcmil shielded copper 5kV conductors per
phase with a 90°C conductor temperature — and each rated to carry 260A. The
secondary conductors are routed in an underground ductbank, so you can use
copper conductors with a 90°C conductor temperature using 6-500kcmil
conductors per phase to carry the 1,804 FLA. However, these should be
increased to 6-750kcmil per phase to carry 2,190A, which would then be
protected by the secondary main breaker from a downstream fault. The
conductors between the switchgear and the MCC are copper conductors with a
75°C conductor temperature in a steel conduit. Using 2-500kcmil per phase to
carry 760A would allow the breaker to be set with a long time pick-up of 0.95 or
760A.
Fig. 2. Initial TCC 1,500kVA unit substation.

Once the available fault level is obtained from the electric utility, you can use
the above data to evaluate the available fault levels at the switchgear and the
MCC. In addition, when the equipment manufacturer and types of breakers are
determined, a TCC can be prepared reflecting the operating conditions of this
system (Fig. 2). Then, with the push of a button, if using commercially
available software, the arc flash incident energy and arc flash boundary can be
determined. But do you really have the necessary information for safe operation
of the equipment at that point?

Other considerations

There are many locations within the power distribution system that are critical
to appropriately understanding the exposure to arc flash energies. First, a
device cannot protect itself. Thus, to evaluate the incident energy at any point,
you must look upstream from the point of the fault to the protective device
ahead of the point being evaluated. Second, to use the main to protect the bus
during an arc flash, it must be physically isolated from the bus and from the
downstream feeders.

Fig. 3. Partially modified portion of distribution system.

To accomplish appropriate arc flash evaluation, one suggestion is to add buses

(Fig. 3) at system connection points into the model. A bus could be added after
any impedance item like a transformer or cable and before any protective
device. A main breaker would have a bus shown on the input and output of the
breaker. For our example, to calculate the arc flash energy at the main breaker,
the primary fuse protecting the transformer must be investigated. However, to
permit the main breaker to provide protection of the equipment bus and feeder
breakers, it needs to be determined if the main breaker is isolated from the bus
and feeder breakers (e.g., for switchgear).
In considering a distribution board with an included main, generally in a
common enclosure with the bus and feeders, the main would not be considered
isolated. The same is true for many switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards. One
way to use a main to protect its downstream bus is to place the main in its own
isolated enclosure and then use cable and conduit to the bus with fire stop in
the conduit. The isolated main would have higher arc flash incident energy than
the bus and downstream feeders.

Available fault current

Fig. 4. Calculating transformer secondary short circuit current.

In the past, it was useful to consider an infinite electric utility short circuit
current and then, from the transformer size and impedance, evaluate the
maximum available bolted fault current. This was — and still is — helpful for
ensuring the equipment has suitable short circuit withstand ratings. However,
with arcing current being a lower current than the bolted fault current, it is also
important to consider the actual or minimum available electric utility fault
capacity. Compare the secondary available bolted fault current of a 10,000MVA
source to a 90MVA source supplying a 480V, 1,500kVA transformer. Note that
instead of a 31kA bolted fault, you could be looking at 24kA (Fig. 4). If you
would plot a series of available source MVA versus transformer secondary
faults, you could arrive at results depicted in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Transformer 480V secondary fault vs. source MVA.

However, it is not the bolted fault but the arcing fault that is important. It is
well known that an arcing fault is lower in value than the available bolted fault
for any point in a circuit. Using IEEE Std 1584 Equation 1 for under 1,000V, you
can calculate that 480V equipment arcing faults are roughly between 40% and
60% of the available bolted fault current level. For quick calculations, a value of
50% can be used. For 208V equipment, arcing faults are roughly between 20%
and 35% of the available bolted fault. For quick estimated calculations, a value
of 25% can be used.

In addition, according to IEEE Std 1584, there is a recommendation to calculate

a second arc current equal to 85% of the calculated arcing fault current. This is
done to allow for discrepancies in matching the equation to the test points.
Then, from the bolted fault, the arcing fault and 85% of the arcing fault can be
estimated.

Arcing faults are not predictable

Let’s recap what we’ve discussed so far. The electric utility is asked to provide
an estimate of the fault current at the point in its system where the equipment
that is being evaluated is said to exist (the position of which is an estimate).
You use the manufacturer’s estimate of the transformer impedance, which
varies from no load to full load — and with temperature. The conductor size and
length are chosen, and, as a result, its impedance is estimated — again, as it
varies with temperature. Calculations provide an estimate of the bolted fault
current and subsequently estimate the arcing fault current. Manufacturers’
estimated TCCs depict how a properly maintained protective device is expected
to respond to the bolted and arcing fault current. In other words, our resulting
calculation is a reasonable approximation of what is expected to occur.

Expanding our facility distribution system to include bolted and arcing fault
levels, it should be realized that the fault current also has an impact on the
conductors’ ability to transmit that level of fault current. If a fault current of
24kA is available at the transformer secondary, then a conductor rated to
normally carry a full load current could experience a lower fault current at a
distance from the source to an estimated point by as much as 200 ft (Fig. 6).
With a 24kA available bolted fault, an 800A feeder circuit of 100 ft for the MCC
would only see 83% of that available fault, or 20kA; and the arcing fault would
be roughly 50%, or 10kA. The 85% point is 8.5kA. So what started as 24kA is
now seen as 8.5kA. This certainly has an impact on the setting of the circuit
protective device.

Fig. 6. Bolted fault vs. feeder length for 480V, 24,000A fault.

Mitigation
What can be adjusted to affect the arc flash incident energy in a system? The
fault level from the electric utility can’t be modified by the facility distribution
system. The transformer size and impedance can be adjusted, especially for
large units, but this may not allow for the appropriate total capacity of service
to the facility. The location of equipment could be adjusted, but other factors
generally have the principal impact on equipment location. The electrical
protective devices and their settings can be selected and have the greatest
effect on the available incident energy at points throughout the distribution
system.

Looking back at the initial system TCC (Fig. 2), can anything be adjusted to
reduce the arc flash incident energies in the system? The primary fuse could be
resized. This would still allow for transformer inrush and full load capability. In
general, medium-voltage fuses do not provide a real means to reduce incident
energy, especially on the low-voltage side of the transformer.

For the 1,500kVA transformer with a 90MVA source, there is 12.5kA bolted fault
current at 4,160V. The medium-voltage arcing fault is roughly 1% to 2% less
than the bolted fault per Equation 2 of IEEE Std 1584. Then, looking at 85%,
the 4,160V arcing fault level is approximately 10.6kA. A 500A fuse would
respond in about 0.02 sec, yielding an arc flash energy at the transformer
primary of less than 1cal/cm2. The secondary 24.3kA of bolted fault at 480V
would have about 12kA of arcing fault and 10.3kA of reduced arcing fault. The
medium-voltage fuses respond much too slowly, resulting in energy above 50
cal/cm2. However, looking at Fig. 7, the short-time pickup (STPU) of the
secondary main could be reduced from 5 to 3. This would reduce the reaction
time for the main breaker from 12 sec to 0.31 sec and thus, the arc flash
incident energy from 50 cal/cm2 (for 2 sec maximum) to 12 cal/cm2. The MCC
feeder STPU could be reduced from 9 to 5 to maintain coordination with the
main. This would overlap the 600A fuse, but if the fuse size could be reduced to
400A, coordination would be maintained.
Fig. 7. Revised TCC 1,500kVA unit substation.

Option for Class L fuses

During this design, you could use other protective devices, such as a 2,000A
secondary main fuse. When large low-voltage fuses are used, they respond in
about 1 sec to a fault at seven to eight times their FLA rating and in about 0.01
sec to about 15 times their FLA rating. Keeping in mind that the arcing fault
level is less than the bolted fault level (about 10kA for our example), a 2,000A
secondary Class L fuse would respond to the arcing fault in about 7 sec. In fact,
smaller fuses (even of the same current rating) of different types have differing
responses at various current levels.

Various breaker types

Breakers also have differing characteristics. For example, an 800A adjustable
power circuit breaker and an 800A thermal magnetic breaker are quite
different. The power circuit breaker has long time (LTPU & LTD), short time
(STPU & STD), and instantaneous (INST) settings, as well as, I2t and zone
selective interlock options. The thermal magnetic breaker typically has LTPU
and INST settings with possible adjustment of the INST (5 to 10 or some similar
range) and possible zone selective interlock option.

It should be noted, with experience, that 480V equipment reaction times over
approximately 0.5 sec for bolted fault values above 42kA — and reaction times
of 1 sec for bolted fault values above 22kA — result in PPE Class 4 protective
clothing level or higher.

In addition to the re-evaluation of protective devices and their settings, there

are other mitigation approaches to consider:

• Replace the medium-voltage fuse or add a medium-voltage breaker with a

short time adjustment to reduce secondary arc fault energy.

• Add a maintenance switch to provide lower relay settings or an instantaneous

adjustment to a lower fault pick-up level in accordance with the arcing current.

• Add an arc mitigation relay that senses a flash of light from an arcing fault
and the rate of rise of the current from the fault.

• Provide a reactor in the distribution circuit to reduce a high fault current

• Use zone selective interlocking to recognize and localize a fault more quickly.

• Install an ultra-fast earthing switch (UFES) between the medium-voltage fuse

and transformer primary.

In many situations, the above may require an alternate scenario to the original
design.

Increase the distance to equipment especially during operating and racking

procedures:

• Provide a longer cranking rod to rack breakers. At 480V, doubling a nominal

18-in. distance would reduce the energy to about one-third. At 15kV, doubling a
nominal 24-in. distance would reduce the energy about in half.

• Provide a remote racking device.

• Provide a remote operator.

Other non-direct effects on incident energy:

• Be aware of standby generators having lower available fault current than the
electric utility power feed.

• Install arc resistant switchgear (Note: This equipment is only arc resistant
when the doors are closed).

• A neutral grounded resistor (must be supervised) reduces the magnitude of

single-phase arcs.

• Insulate the bus, which reduces the probability for single-phase and 3-phase
arcs.

Conclusion

Although arc flash is a serious workplace hazard, there are means to evaluate
its intensity and to mitigate the affect on electrical workers. IEEE Std 1584 and
NFPA-70E provide mechanisms to calculate its intensity and to recommend
appropriate PPE. Engineers should also be encouraged to determine other
effective mitigation techniques such as providing barriers, increasing working
distance from an arc, and reducing the time an arc would exist.

Scherry is a registered professional electrical engineer with Scherry Engineering

and Consulting, Inc. in St. Louis. He can be reached at
[email protected].