Today is Friday, June 17, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144

October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE
J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S.
ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members
of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution
on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., Member of the House of
Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour
privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the
following:.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free
things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are
for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out
forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and
without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of
37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose
said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the
Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such
purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges,
as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show
cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of
its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if
other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor
nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority
decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently
aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative
session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself,
submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such
report, the House approved on the same daybefore closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga,
Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power
of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact
that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose members are the sole respondentshad
thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having
made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from
office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960,
found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth

and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in
his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of
Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby is,
declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and
so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for
which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to
do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position
(4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to
hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by
the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before
us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds'
Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds'
Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but
invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison 3,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion
regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign
country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of
the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my
speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59
was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts
or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions
that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired
vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At
any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has been said
that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure." 6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all
deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of
business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs.Somerville, 127
Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23
Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12
Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N.
W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the
case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a
resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had
intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea
may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established that the courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since
each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the
court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p.
902.) [Emphasis Ours.].

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who
had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of
an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power
of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs.
Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent
in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision
authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a
member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house
thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly
forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation.
Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar:
the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of
action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions
which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of
governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position
upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino
was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body
or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to
compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution
because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning)
gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that
"each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without
restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer
particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty
to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who
had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law 10;
whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the
Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine
Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the
Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of
suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit
one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task,
reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of
course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask
for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express
at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman Osmea, Jr. does not make out a case either for declaratory
judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings, and certiorari is
available only against bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely fact finding,
was not properly subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmea was entitled to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of prohibition
against the committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No. 175) constituted an unlawful attempt
to divest him of an immunity from censure or punishment, an immunity vested under the very Rules of the House of
Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V, provides as follows:
If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the Member making such request

shall indicate the words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in writing by the Secretary and read aloud to
the House; but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the
House therefor, if further debate or other business has intervened.
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmea had delivered his speech and before the House adopted, fifteen days
later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and empowering it to investigate and recommend proper action
in the case, the House had acted on other matters and debated them. That being the case, the Congressman, even before the
resolution was adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the express
wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as
it attempts to divest him of the immunity so acquired and subject him to discipline and punishment, when he was previously not
so subject, violates the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally
obnoxious and invalid on that score. The rule is well established that a law which deprives an accused person of any substantial
right or immunity possessed by him before its passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-A, section 144, p.
153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp. 1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs.Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 849).
The foregoing also answer the contention that since the immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the House
could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules, and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment by
implication. the right of the House to amend its Rules does not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the petitioner of an
immunity he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the
House only affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. then
incurred was extinguished when the House thereafter considered other business; and this extinction is a substantive right that
can not be subsequently torn away to his disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44 Phil., 437 has
ruled:
In regards to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal actions pertains to remedial and
not substantive law, it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or prescription of
actions are invariably classified as substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions for the
prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and not in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in reality
a more logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking, a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off
the right to punish the crime and consequently, goes directly to the substance of the action. . . . (Emphasis
supplied.).
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the
objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and not statutes. In so far as the position of petitioner Osmea is
concerned, the essential point is that he is being subjected to a punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. And while
he was only meted out a suspension of privileges that suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which the
House could have inflicted upon him had it been so minded. Such punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the
constitutional provision against ex post factolegislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was inflicted in the exercise of
disciplinary power. "The ex post facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled, "can not be evaded by giving civil
form to that which is essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104, 1106; Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed.
276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to protect the freedom of action of its members and to relieve
them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or
pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without the immunity so provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the
haunting fear that his most innocuous expressions may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever a
majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure that
members of the House of the House may freely act as their conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the
parliamentary immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation

and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as instances of disciplinary taken notwithstanding intervening business, are
not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by Deschkler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of Congressman
Watson of Georgia involved also printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the
debate immunity rule afforded no defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was one of censure for actual disorderly
conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657); while the cases of Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of
Kentucky (II Hinds, sec. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the U. s. House of Representatives as it stood
before the 1880 amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the
following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):
This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention of the gentleman
from Iowa (Mr. Wilson) top the language of that rule, as it settles the whole question:
62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the person calling him to be order shall repeat the
words excerpted to
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in debate "and they shall be taken done in writing at
the Clerk's table; and no Member shall be held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the House, for words
spoken, or other business has intervened, after the words spoken, and before exception to them shall have been
taken.
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is "excepting to words spoken in debate." the second part
of the rule declares that a Member shall not be held subject to censure for words spoken in debate if other
business has intervened after the words have been spoken and before "exception" to them has been taken.
Exception to the words of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Harding), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also
by the Speaker of the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe will show. The distinction is obvious
between the two parts of the rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member excepting to language of another and
having the words taken down. In the last part of the rule it says he shall not be censured thereafter unless
exception to his words were taken; but it omits to add as an condition that words must also have been taken
down. The substantial point, indeed the only point, required in the latter part of the rule is, that exception to the
objectionable words must have taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily apparent.
As Rule 62 of the United States House of Representatives stood before 1880, all that was required to preserve the disciplinary
power of the Hose was that exception should have been taken to the remarks on the floor before further debate or other business
intervened. Under the rules of the Philippines House of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes absolute if other
debate or business has taken place before the motion for censure is made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have
been made to the remarks complained of at the time they were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the members
being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I have
noted, include the right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts
can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress should be
deprived of the same protection. Surely membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the
individual citizen.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. If may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraint or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these

limitation all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36
Law Ed., 324-325.)
Court will not interfere with the action of the state senate in reconsideration its vote on a resolution submitting an
amendment to the Constitution, where its action was in compliance with its own rules, and there was no
constitutional provision to the contrary. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963) (Emphasis supplied.).
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it
from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has been
disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require adjudication by this Court.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:

I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even the Congress in
the exercise of the power conferred upon it to discipline its members, must follow the rules and regulation that it had itself
promulgated for its guidance and for that of its members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmea delivered the
speech declared by the House to constitutes a disorderly conduct provides:
. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House
therefor, if further debate or other business has intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7, Rules, House of Representatives.)
Congressman Osmea delivered the speech in question on June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23, 1060
when the House created the committee that would investigated him. For fully 15 days the House took up other matters. All that
was done, while the speech was being delivered, was to have certains portions thereof deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own
Rules the House may no longer punish Congressman Osmea for the delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman Osmea immediately after its delivery, except to have some
part of the speech deleted, show that the members of the House did not consider Osmea's speech a disorderly conduct. The
idea to punish Congressman Osmea, which came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that
Congressman Osmea is being made to answer for an act, after the time during which he could be punished therefor had lapsed.
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that the
House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principle of law that an amendment takes place only after its approval,
or, as in this case, to the extent of punishing an offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed. Since the rule, that a member
can be punished only before other proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time Congressman Osmea delivered his
speech, the House may not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority opinion that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a
penalty for a speech to the day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With due respect to the majority, we do not think that it
is merely a rule of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time in which the House may take punitive action against
an offending member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out,
the rule is substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored when invoked.
If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a member
after the period for indictment and punishment had already passed. Not because the subject of the Philippic is no less than the
Chief Magistrate of the nation should the rule of the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is based on the
principle of separation of powers between the three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition that this Court

should not interfere with the legislature in the manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court cannot abandon its
duty to pronounce what the law is when any of its (the House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the law.
Congressman Osmea had invoked the protection of a rule of the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the rule
being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being violated in meting out punishment for his speech; we should
not shirk our responsibility to declare his rights under the rule simply on the board excuse of separation of powers. Even the
legislature may not ignore the rule it has promulgated for the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a
coordinate branches of the Government is involved, should not deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess the
power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses to disregard the same. In such case the members thereof stand before the
bar of public opinion to answer for their act in ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent personally believe that vitreous attacks against the Chief Executive, or
any official or citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules, promulgated by the House itself, fix the period
during which punishment may be meted out, said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be prejudicated thereby. Only
in that way may the supermacy of the law be maintained.

Footnotes
1

These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the views of petitioner.

Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.

Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189; Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray. 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.

Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly
and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870)
4

Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870.

South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151 s. w. 515.

146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.

Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William Willet, Jr. of New York); par. 2498 (Louis v. Mc Fadden of
Pensylvania).
8

Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of Representative by Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382.

the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs
as can be given them, without in the meantime impairing the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United
States." (Preamble)
10

Apart from the view that power to remove includes the power to suspend asan incident. (Burnap vs. U. s. 252,
U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693, 695.) This view is distinguishable from Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil., 175.(See
Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we need not explain this now. Enough to rely on congressional inherent
power.
11

12

See appendix par. VII, Cushing.

This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for declaratory judgments, and (b)
availability of certiorari or prohibition against respondents who are not exercising judicial or ministerial functions
(Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2).
13

14

See supra.

15

Phil., 83.

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