James E. McParlin v. Warden of Adult Correctional Institution, 419 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1969)
James E. McParlin v. Warden of Adult Correctional Institution, 419 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1969)
James E. McParlin v. Warden of Adult Correctional Institution, 419 F.2d 7, 1st Cir. (1969)
2d 7
James Edward McParlin was indicted, tried by jury on plea of not guilty,
convicted and sentenced in the Superior Court of Rhode Island to life
imprisonment for murder in the first degree. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island overruled his exceptions and remitted the case to the Superior Court for
further proceedings. State v. McParlin, 101 R.I. 265, 221 A.2d 790 (1966). He
then petitioned the Superior Court of Rhode Island for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that two written confessions introduced at his criminal trial were
not given voluntarily but had been coerced. Specifically he alleged that during
his interrogation he was threatened by the police, that he was struck by
different members of the State Police, that he was denied counsel, that he was
denied needed medication, that he was told he would be shot if he did not tell
the truth, that he was subjected to coercive mental pressures, that he was
interrogated by teams of state policemen for prolonged periods of time and that
he was handcuffed to the bars of his cell with his hands over his head for
twelve hours. The Superior Court granted the writ, had him brought into court
and gave him a full evidentiary hearing lasting several days at which he was
represented by counsel.
McParlin's next step habeas corpus cases are not appealable in Rhode
Island, 10-9-22, G.L. of R.I., 19562 was to apply to the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island for habeas corpus on the same grounds previously advanced in
the Superior Court. That court denied and dismissed his petition, quashed the
writ it had previously issued and remanded McParlin to custody for the reason
that the confessions of which he complained were admitted at his trial for
strategic or tactical reasons without objection by his counsel and at least with
his tacit personal consent.
McParlin then applied to the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island for habeas corpus on the same grounds advanced before in the
state courts. The District Court denied McParlin's application for habeas corpus
without giving him a hearing, but not for the reasons given by the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island. The District Court in its decision recited that a thorough
examination of the records of both McParlin's criminal trial and trial on habeas
corpus convinced it that McParlin had been given a full and fair hearing in the
Rhode Island Superior Court resulting in reliable findings of material facts that
were amply supported by the evidence. It said that it was "satisfied that
petitioner's rights were fully heard and correctly determined" in the Rhode
Island trial court, wherefore under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct.
745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), he was not entitled to another evidentiary hearing
on the same issues in the District Court. It therefore dismissed McParlin's
application for habeas corpus and he took this appeal. We agree with the
District Court and affirm its judgment.
6
The Rhode Island Superior Court in McParlin's habeas corpus case wrote a
long opinion in which it fully and we think correctly articulated the
constitutional standards which it applied and, summarizing the testimony of
each of McParlin's witnesses, made specific findings of fact based upon its
valuation of the relative credibility of all the witnesses on each one of
McParlin's allegations. It found that during his interrogation McParlin was not
threatened by the police, that he was not struck by any of them, that he was not
denied needed medication, that he was not told he would be shot if he did not
tell the truth, that he was not subjected to coercive mental pressures and that he
was not handcuffed to the bars of his cell as he asserted. It did find, however,
that McParlin had been denied counsel during his interrogation and that he had
been interrogated by "teams" of state policemen but not for prolonged periods
of time. It made no finding as to whether McParlin had been advised of his
rights in accordance with the rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).3
McParlin is not entitled to relief under the rules established by the Court in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964),
denial of access to counsel during police interrogation after arrest, or Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), warning of constitutional rights
to remain silent, and that anything he may say may be used against him and to
have counsel present, court appointed if necessary. The reason for this is that
his criminal trial began on January 23, 1961, years before either of these cases
were decided and the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721, 86
S.Ct. 1772, 1775, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), said: "We hold that Escobedo affects
only those cases in which the trial began after June 22, 1964, the date of that
decision. We hold further that Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial
began after the date of our decision one week ago."4 Although failure to comply
with the Escobedo and Miranda rules is not controlling, those failures are,
however, relevant on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession, Darwin v.
Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 20 L.Ed.2d 630 (1968); Davis
v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); Clewis
v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967); failure to
comply with the Escobedo and Miranda rules is an element of the "totality of
circumstances," Clewis v. Texas, supra, 386 U.S. at page 708, 87 S.Ct. 1338
and cases cited, to be considered in deciding the basic question whether the
accused's will was overborne at the time he confessed or whether his
confession was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
of any sort. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10
L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), and cases cited. This is the test articulated and applied by
the Rhode Island Superior Court in McParlin's habeas corpus case.
8
We are not concerned here with an impoverished Negro with a third or fourth
grade education as in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742, 86 S.Ct. 1761
(1966). Nor are we concerned with a person of subnormal mentality, or a
youthful offender, or a naive and impressionable one, as in the cases cited by
Mr. Justice Clark in his dissent in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 522, 83
S.Ct. 1336 (1963). Instead we are concerned with a healthy man of mature
years with a high school education, who was a salesman by occupation, who
impressed the state trial court as "intelligent, alert, observant and tenacious" and
as one who gave the impression from the manner in which he gave his
testimony as not tiring easily.
10
11
Affirmed.
Notes:
*
By Special Designation
"No appeal * * * shall lie to the judgment of the superior court in habeas
corpus; but if the superior court shall remand the person imprisoned * * * such
judgment shall not bar an application to the supreme court * * * for another writ
upon the same facts."
Although the police officers testified that they had not given McParlin
theMiranda warnings the then Attorney General of Rhode Island testified that
he gave McParlin those warnings when he talked with him about 1:00 P.M. on
the day of his arrest, August 11, 1960.