Thomas O'COnnOr v. Venore Transportation Company, 353 F.2d 324, 1st Cir. (1965)

353 F.
2d 324
Thomas O'CONNOR, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.
VENORE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant,
Appellee.
No. 6588.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Dec. 6, 1965.
Nathan Greenberg, Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Hiller B. Zobel, Boston, Mass., with whom Robert J. Hallisey, Francis H.
Fox and Thomas H. Walsh, Jr., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, HASTIE * and McENTEE, Circuit
Judges.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by one Thomas O'Connor under the Jones Act for
injuries sustained by him while working as a seaman on defendant's vessel. The
complaint sets forth counts in negligence, unseaworthiness, and for
maintenance and cure. By agreement of the parties the question of maintenance
and cure was left to the trial judge and he found for the defendant on this issue.
The jury found for the plaintiff on the other two counts and rendered a verdict
for $2500. Thereupon the court entered judgment in this amount.
On appeal plaintiff contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling
permitting defendant to question him concerning his income and his income tax
returns. He further contends that the court erred in finding for the defendant on
the question of maintenance and cure.
Plaintiff testified that he was injured on or about April 15, 1964, when his head
struck a protruding wire from an overhead pipe band-it while working on
defendant's vessel. He stated that he was walking to the machine shop when the
accident occurred and that the wire 'went through (his) head and knocked (him)
back' causing bleeding and dizziness. He further testified that he suffered from
dizzy spells and severe headaches and was unable to work for three weeks.
4
On May 4, 1964, the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Panama found him
fit for duty and he resumed his regular duties for the rest of the voyage which
ended on May 26, 1964. The plaintiff also received treatment at the U.S. Public
Health Service Hospital in Brighton, Massachusetts. He was first treated there
as an outpatient from June 11 to August 20, 1964 and as an inpatient from that
date to September 1, 1964, when he was released as 'fit for full duty.' Plaintiff
was paid $544 for maintenance covering the period he received treatment as an
outpatient. O'Connor states that he was treated by a Doctor McDonald from
September 9 to October 22, 1964. His claim for maintenance and cure and
medical bills is for the period between his discharge from the hospital on
September 1 to October 22, 1964, when he was released by his own doctor.
During the trial, defendant's counsel sought to impeach the plaintiff's credibility
in several respects. Plaintiff testified that 'the wire went through my head' and
caused 'a gash right down the center of my head;' but on cross examination he
admitted that no stitches were necessary and there was no mark or scar
anywhere. He claimed that aboard the vessel he was having dizzy spells and
severe headaches, yet on cross examination he admitted that after the accident
he refused to go to the ship's hospital and that frequently he drank champagne
and played cards late at night. Also his testimony that it was dark in the area
where the accident occurred was contradicted by testimony of the ship's
officers that a 150 watt bulb in the area was lit both before and after the
accident.
In cross examination defendant also sought to elicit information from the

plaintiff with reference to his income tax returns for the prupose of impeaching
his credibility. The plaintiff had testified on direct examination that he was a
merchant seaman and stated on cross examination that he never was anything
other than a seaman. The plaintiff's income tax return for 1963, a portion of
which the court read to the jury,1 (over plaintiff's objection) showed that he had
been employed in other capacities. When examined further about his various
employments he admitted that in 1963 he had also been employed by the New
England Airlift Company from which he had received income of about $3300.
Neither the name of this company nor the amount of $3300 appeared on
plaintiff's tax return.
Plaintiff objected to this 'entire line' of questioning contending that it was

irrelevant and prejudicial. The court in admitting this evidence stated: '* * * it's
relevant because it's on the issue of credibility and it's also relevant as to other
kinds of work that he can do. It's my opinion that the jury is entitled to hear this
tesimony, and I will over-rule your objection.'
8
One of the purposes of cross examination is to test the credibility of the witness
and, subject to the judge's control, 'that cross-examination may go rather far.'
United States v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1956). The extent to which
counsel may go in such an attempt to discredit the veracity of the witness is a
matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge. And his action will not
be interfered with unless there has been a plain abuse of discretion. Young Ah
Chor v. Dulles,270 F.2d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Bender, 218
F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Lawinski, 195 F.2d 1, 7 (7th
Cir. 1952).
We cannot say that the cross examination permitted by the trial court with
reference to plaintiff's income and income tax return constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Inasmuch as the accident was unwitnessed and all of plaintiff's
symptoms were subjective, the issue of plaintiff's credibility or veracity was
crucial.
10
Furthermore, even if the trial court had erred in permitting such questioning, an
examination of the entire record shows that it was harmless error since the
plaintiff's credibility was otherwise impeached in several respects. See Camps
v. New York City Transit Authority, 261 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1958).
11
On the question of maintenance and cure, the trial court based its decision on
findings which are clearly supported by the evidence.2 It is fundamental that in
reviewing a judge-tried issue, we are not to substitute our judgment for that of
the district court, Evans v. United States, 319 F.2d 751, 753 (1st Cir. 1963), but
may reverse only where, upon a consideration of the entire record, we are 'left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'
McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 8, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954).
12
This court will not reverse unless the judgment below was 'clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.' Evans v. United States,supra, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a),
28 U.S.C.
13
Upon a careful review of the entire record in this case we cannot say that the
judgment below was 'clearly erroneous.'
14
Affirmed.
Sitting by designation
'THE COURT: III short cut it by saying that on these United States individual
Income Tax Returns for the fiscal calendar year 1963 according to his own
declaration, the employers' names to whom he received compensation were
City Service of Massachusetts, $2,448.05; Isaac Blair Company, seventy eight
dollars; Bay State and Company, Boston, $18.48; and there are certain other
items in connection with this return which either have no possible concern to
the jury in this case.'
'The injury was so far as the breaking of flesh was concerned relatively minor
because no scar is left today and there never was any need so far as the
appearance, of any stitching. * * *
'I'm satisfied from the evidence that he at once was able to play cards, to stay
up late, and in general was able to carry on recreational activities. And other
indicia of his habits with respect to drink would not warrant him in recovering a
single day of maintenance after the end of the voyage; and he did receive
maintenance, of course, during the whole time of this voyage.
'With respect to cure which means medical care: the plaintiff received at the
Public Health Hospital at Panama and in Boston most of what he needed, if he
needed anything or any medical assistance. Attention has been drawn to the fact
that Dr. Maxwell McDonald rendered as Dr. McDonald claims treatment
amounting to $145. I frankly do not believe that Dr. McDonald did render
treatment; but the issue is moot because $145 of Dr. McDonald's bill is more
than covered by the amount heretofore paid for cure and maintenance. * * *'

Thomas O'COnnOr v. Venore Transportation Company, 353 F.2d 324, 1st Cir. (1965)

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Thomas O'COnnOr v. Venore Transportation Company, 353 F.2d 324, 1st Cir. (1965)

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353 F.

Thomas O'CONNOR, Plaintiff, Appellant,

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Nathan Greenberg, Boston, Mass., for appellant.

In cross examination defendant also sought to elicit information from the

Plaintiff objected to this 'entire line' of questioning contending that it was

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