Robert E. Howard v. United States, 345 F.2d 126, 1st Cir. (1965)

345 F.
2d 126
Robert E. HOWARD, Defendant, Appellant,

v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6315.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

May 11, 1965.
Daniel F. Featherston, Jr., Boston, Mass., for appellant.

John Paul Sullivan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr.,
U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH,
Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Senior Circuit Judge (by designation).
The appellant and one Bernard J. Champy, of Andover and Methuen,

Massachusetts, respectively, were indicted in the court below for violation of
the so-called "Anti-Kickback Statute." 60 Stat. 37, 38 (1946), 41 U.S.C. 51,
54 (1958).1
The indictment alleges and it is not questioned that from June 19 to October 20,
1958, Howard was employed by Raytheon Manufacturing Company as
assistant plant manager of its Andover plant where it was producing, or
preparing to produce, Hawk Missiles "on a cost reimbursable basis" under a
prime contract with the United States, that Howard at the time was in the
process of building a home in Andover and that Champy was the general
manager of Champy Construction Company, Inc., of Lawrence, Massachusetts,
which was a subcontractor as defined in 41 U.S.C. 52 with respect to the
contract between Raytheon and the United States. Count 1 of the indictment
charges that on several occasions during the period involved Champy
knowingly caused Champy Construction Company to furnish labor and
materials to Howard for the construction of his new home as "a fee,
commission, gift, gratuity and compensation" paid on behalf of Champy

Construction Company "as an inducement for awards of subcontracts and
orders" from Raytheon to Champy Construction and "as an acknowledgement
of subcontracts and awards previously awarded." Count 2 in like terms charges
Howard with knowingly receiving labor and materials for his new home from
Champy Construction Company for the prohibited purpose.
4
Howard and Champy were found guilty by a jury and sentenced. Howard
appealed.
Appellant's principal contention is that the trial court misinterpreted the "AntiKickback Statute" by regarding it as a "Caesar's wife law." By this appellant
means that the trial court allowed conviction on the mere appearance of guilt
whereas it should have required a showing of specific criminal intent. From this
premise he argues that the indictment fails to charge a crime, that the charge to
the jury was incorrect, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the
verdict. Wherefore he contends that his motions for a new trial and for acquittal
were erroneously denied and that at least he should have a new trial.
In accordance with his theory of the case, the appellant first argues that an
essential element of the crime as defined by the statute is the existence of a
"connection" between the acceptance of a prohibited payment and the award of
certain subcontracts. We do not agree.
Section 54 makes it a crime for any person to "knowingly, directly or indirectly,

make or receive any such prohibited payment * * *," and 51 defines the
prohibited payment, insofar as relevant to this case, as a fee or gift which is
paid or granted "as an inducement for the award of a subcontract. * * *" The
gist of the crime therefore is receipt of a prohibited payment with knowledge
that it is made for the purpose of inducing the award of a subcontract. Whether
the recipient actually induces the award of a subcontract is irrelevant. The
statute forbids the purchase of good will in the contracting process.
Appellant's interpretation of the statute as requiring a "connection" between a

prohibited payment and the improper awarding of subcontracts is based on too
narrow a view of the vice the statute was designed to correct. This vice is not
only the improper awarding of subcontracts but also the corruption of the
judgment of officers, employees or agents of prime contractors who are in some
manner participating in the awarding of subcontracts involving the use of
government funds.
We think, therefore, that the purpose of the "Anti-Kickback Statute" is

basically the same as that of the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201, and should be
construed according to the same principles. And it has been long established
that the crime of bribery is complete upon the acceptance of a bribe regardless
of whether or not improper action is thereafter taken.2 Wilson v. United States,
230 F.2d 521, 526 (C.A.4, 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931, 76 S.Ct. 789, 100
L.Ed. 1460 (1956); Whitney v. United States, 99 F.2d 327, 330 (C.A.10, 1938),
and cases cited therein. What this Court said in regard to the giving of a bribe in
Kemler v. United States, 1 Cir., 133 F.2d 235, 238 (1941), also applies to the
acceptance of a kickback:
10
"The clear purpose of the statute is to protect the public from the evil
consequences of corruption in the public service. Thus the gravamen of the
offense described therein is the giving or offering of a bribe to a person acting
on behalf of the United States for the purpose of influencing official conduct.
Obviously no one would give or offer a bribe unless he expected to gain some
advantage thereby, and since attempting to gain an advantage by this means is
the evil which the statute is designed to prevent, it can make no difference if
after the act is done the doer discovers that for some reason or another, be it a
mistake on his part or a mistake on the part of some officer or agency of the
United States, there was actually no occasion for him to have done it."
11
It follows that appellant's further contention that the statute requires a showing
of a specific criminal intent to induce or influence the award of particular
subcontracts must also be rejected.
12
However, this does not mean that criminal intent is not an essential element of
the offense or that conviction on the mere appearance of guilt would be proper.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952),
cautions against interpreting criminal statutes to produce such a result.
13
The trial court did not construe the statute as imposing absolute criminal
liability. It charged the jury that "Intent is involved in this case. That may be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence." Furthermore the
trial court correctly specified the nature of the required intent when it charged
the jury that "the government must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt * *
that Howard accepted the work and materials knowing that the work and
materials were furnished for his home as an inducement for the award of some
subcontract or orders under Contract 4030."
14
In sum we think the essential elements of the crime defined by 54 are that the
parties be within the class covered by the statute, admittedly they are, a
contract covered by the statute, as there admittedly is here, and an acceptance
of a prohibited payment as defined in 51 with knowledge of its nature and
purpose.3
15
The remaining question is the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of

guilty of a crime containing the elements set out above. Appellant contends
there was insufficient evidence that a prohibited payment was made or accepted
with knowledge of its nature and purpose.
16
The suggestion that there was no evidence from which the jury could find the
work and materials provided to Howard constituted a prohibited payment or
kickback is without merit. The jury was entitled to infer from the way Champy
carried the account on his books as an account payable rather than an account
receivable, from Champy's feeble and belated attempts to collect, and from the
surrounding circumstances, that Champy intended to confer a benefit on
Howard in return for favorable consideration in the Raytheon bidding process.
17
Likewise we think the jury was entitled to infer that appellant accepted the
work and materials with knowledge of the purpose for which they were offered.
The fact remains that Howard did not pay for the benefits obtained from
Champy although he had received a substantial mortgage payment to use for
costs incurred in building his home at the same time the benefits were
conferred. And the jury could find that Howard was aware of Champy's feeble
attempts to collect and drew the appropriate conclusion therefrom. In few areas
is the admonition to give proper deference to the jury's findings of fact more
compelling than in the necessarily subjective area of intent. See Hoyer v.
United States, 223 F.2d 134, 139 (C.A.8, 1955); Jackson v. United States, 330
F.2d 679, 681 (C.A.8, 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855, 85 S.Ct. 105, 13
L.Ed.2d 58.
18
We have considered the other points raised by appellant but find nothing
meriting discussion.
19
Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.
Notes:
1
41 U.S.C. 51 prohibits: "payment of any fee, commission, or compensation of

any kind or the granting of any gift or gratuity of any kind, either directly or
indirectly, by or on behalf of a subcontractor, as defined in section 52 of this

title * * * to any * * * employee, or agent of a prime contractor holding a
contract entered into by any department, agency, or establishment of the United
States for the furnishing of supplies, materials, equipment or services of any
kind whatsoever, on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee or other cost reimbursable basis * *
*."
Section 54, id., provides: "Any person who shall knowingly, directly or
indirectly, make or receive any such prohibited payment shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."
2
Appellant's argument recalls Lord Bacon's defense to a charge of bribery,

namely that he could not be guilty because he took from both sides and that
therefore his subsequent decision would not be improper
Appellant would add that the recipient be in a position to influence the award of
a subcontract. The statute does not appear to impose any such requirement. See
United States v. Moore, 228 F.Supp. 935, 937 (D.C.S.D.Cal., 1964). But we
need not decide this question for here the jury could find appellant was in a
position to affect the award of subcontracts by informing Champy of the low
bid and inviting him to bid below the lowest figure

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345 F.

Robert E. HOWARD, Defendant, Appellant,

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Daniel F. Featherston, Jr., Boston, Mass., for appellant.

WOODBURY, Senior Circuit Judge (by designation).

The appellant and one Bernard J. Champy, of Andover and Methuen,

commission, gift, gratuity and compensation" paid on behalf of Champy

Section 54 makes it a crime for any person to "knowingly, directly or indirectly,

Appellant's interpretation of the statute as requiring a "connection" between a

We think, therefore, that the purpose of the "Anti-Kickback Statute" is

The remaining question is the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of

Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.

41 U.S.C. 51 prohibits: "payment of any fee, commission, or compensation of

indirectly, by or on behalf of a subcontractor, as defined in section 52 of this

Appellant's argument recalls Lord Bacon's defense to a charge of bribery,

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