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    Samuel Leiser v. United States of America, Libelant, 234 F.2d 648, 1st Cir. (1956)

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    This document is a court case summary from 1956. It summarizes that: 1) Samuel Leiser was traveling by plane with diamonds in his possession but his flight was diverted to Boston due to weather. He failed to declare the diamonds to customs. 2) He was criminally acquitted of smuggling and failing to declare the diamonds. However, the US then initiated a civil case to seize the diamonds. 3) The court affirmed the lower court's ruling allowing the seizure of the diamonds, finding that anyone arriving in the US by air, even involuntarily, is required to declare items to customs. Involuntary arrival does not exempt the requirement to declare goods.

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    Samuel Leiser v. United States of America, Libelant, 234 F.2d 648, 1st Cir. (1956)

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    Scribd Government Docs
    34 views4 pages
    This document is a court case summary from 1956. It summarizes that: 1) Samuel Leiser was traveling by plane with diamonds in his possession but his flight was diverted to Boston due to weather. He failed to declare the diamonds to customs. 2) He was criminally acquitted of smuggling and failing to declare the diamonds. However, the US then initiated a civil case to seize the diamonds. 3) The court affirmed the lower court's ruling allowing the seizure of the diamonds, finding that anyone arriving in the US by air, even involuntarily, is required to declare items to customs. Involuntary arrival does not exempt the requirement to declare goods.

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    Filed: 1956-06-13 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 234 F.2d 648 Docket: 5098_1

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    This document is a court case summary from 1956. It summarizes that: 1) Samuel Leiser was traveling by plane with diamonds in his possession but his flight was diverted to Boston due to weather. He failed to declare the diamonds to customs. 2) He was criminally acquitted of smuggling and failing to declare the diamonds. However, the US then initiated a civil case to seize the diamonds. 3) The court affirmed the lower court's ruling allowing the seizure of the diamonds, finding that anyone arriving in the US by air, even involuntarily, is required to declare items to customs. Involuntary arrival does not exempt the requirement to declare goods.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    34 views4 pages

    Samuel Leiser v. United States of America, Libelant, 234 F.2d 648, 1st Cir. (1956)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is a court case summary from 1956. It summarizes that: 1) Samuel Leiser was traveling by plane with diamonds in his possession but his flight was diverted to Boston due to weather. He failed to declare the diamonds to customs. 2) He was criminally acquitted of smuggling and failing to declare the diamonds. However, the US then initiated a civil case to seize the diamonds. 3) The court affirmed the lower court's ruling allowing the seizure of the diamonds, finding that anyone arriving in the US by air, even involuntarily, is required to declare items to customs. Involuntary arrival does not exempt the requirement to declare goods.

    Copyright:

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    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    of 4

    234 F.

    2d 648

    Samuel LEISER, Claimant, Appellant,


    v.
    UNITED STATES of America, Libelant, Appellee.
    No. 5098.

    United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.


    June 13, 1956.

    Paul E. Troy, Boston, Mass., Arthur Brogna, Boston, Mass., on the brief,
    for appellant.
    George H. Lewald, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., Anthony Julian, U.S.
    Atty., and Andrew A. Caffrey, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., on the
    brief, for appellee.
    Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and WOODBURY and HARTIGAN,
    Circuit Judges
    HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.

    This is an appeal from a decree entered January 31, 1956, in the United States
    District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowing appellee's motion for
    summary judgment in a libel proceeding instituted by the appellee against
    532.33 carats, more or less, of cut and polished diamonds.

    The appellant, Samuel Leiser, with the diamonds in his possession, was
    traveling by air from Frankfort, Germany to Gander, Newfoundland by way of
    Paris. His ultimate destination was Bermuda. His tickets called for no stop in
    the United States, but owing to adverse weather conditions his plane overflew
    Gander at about 11:30 p.m. on June 6, 1954, and appellant, contrary to his
    original expectation and intent, landed at Boston, Massachusetts on the
    morning of June 7, 1954. Before any customs officer approached him in Boston
    he made arrangements to return to Canada by the next available plane which
    was scheduled to leave at 7 a.m. Appellant failed to declare the diamonds in his
    possession. Subsequent discovery by the customs officers led ultimately to a
    criminal indictment alleging, in Count 1, that appellant '* * * did knowingly

    and willfully * * * smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States
    certain merchandise * * *,' and, in Count 2, that appellant '* * * did
    fraudulently and knowingly * * * bring into the United States certain
    merchandise * * * contrary to law, in that said merchandise was not included in
    the declaration and entry as made, and was not declared either orally or in
    writing before examination of his baggage was begun as required by the
    provisions of 19 U.S.C. 1497 and 1498 * * * in violation of 18 U.S.C. 545.' In
    January 1955, appellant was tried and acquitted on both counts. Shortly
    thereafter appellee instituted the present libel proceedings against the diamonds
    in question.
    3

    Without pausing to consider appellant's first contention that the libel does not
    set forth a cause of action entitling the United States to forfeiture, which is
    without merit, we turn directly to his second and somewhat more substantial
    claim that goods involuntarily brought into the United States by wreck, distress
    of weather, or vis major are exempt from customs and other local laws of the
    United States.
    Title 19 U.S.C.A. 1498 provides that:

    '(a) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe rules and


    regulations for the declaration and entry of--

    5* * * * * *
    6

    '(6) Articles carried on the person or contained in the baggage of a person


    arriving in the United States; * * *.'
    Title 19 U.S.C.A. 1624 provides that:

    'In addition to the specific powers conferred by this title, the Secretary of the
    Treasury is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
    to carry out the provisions of this title.'

    Pursuant to the authority conferred in the aforementioned sections, the


    Secretary prescribed by regulation, set forth in 19 C.F.R. 10.19: 'Declaration
    and entry-- (a) Declaration required. All articles brought into the United States
    by any individual shall be declared to a customs officer. * * *'

    Congress has further provided in Title 19 U.S.C.A. 1496:

    10

    'Examination of baggage

    11

    'The collector may cause an examination to be made of the baggage of any


    person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are
    contained therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited
    notwithstanding a declaration and entry therefor has been made.'

    12

    ' 1497. Same; penalties

    13

    'Any article not included in the declaration and entry as made, and, before
    examination of the baggage was begun, not mentioned in writing by such
    person, if written declaration and entry was required, or orally if written
    declaration and entry was not required, shall be subject to forfeiture and such
    person shall be liable to a penalty equal to the value of such article.'

    14

    As we understand appellant's argument, he contends that the word 'arriving' as


    it appears in 1496 and 1498 is to be construed in a limited technical sense,
    under the authority of various cases involving ships which he has cited, as
    meaning not mere physical arrival but rather 'a voluntary or intentional arrival
    of such goods 'with intent to unlade' same * * *' in the United States. We cannot
    agree with this contention.

    15

    The structure of the customs laws and regulations reflects a distinction in the
    requirements applicable to merchandise brought into the country as ship's
    cargo, on the one hand, and items carried on the person or in baggage on the
    other. We are not convinced that any and all exemptions which may be
    accorded to ships in distress must of necessity be likewise granted to
    individuals arriving involuntarily by air. Moreover if it had been the intent of
    Congress to extend similar exemptions to such individuals, we believe it would
    not have been done inferentially by relying upon some highly technical
    interpretation of an ordinary word such as 'arriving', but, on the contrary, would
    have been spelled out in some detail as was done in 1441(4) relating in part to
    vessels arriving in distress. An examination of this section reveals that it is not
    every vessel arriving involuntarily which is exempt from an obligation to make
    entry at the customhouse, but only those '* * * which shall depart within
    twenty-four hours after arrival without having landed or taken on board any
    passengers, or any merchandise other than bunker coal, bunker oil, sea stores,
    or ship's stores * * *.' We can think of no reason why Congress would wish to
    grant a much more generous blanket exemption in the case of persons arriving
    involuntarily by air. On the contrary, the necessity of qualifying and
    circumscribing any such exemption would appear to be equally imperative.

    16

    We believe the word 'arriving' as it appears in relevant sections of the statute


    does not bear the construction for which appellant contends. We believe that
    1497 subjected to forfeiture the diamonds which appellant failed to declare
    regardless of the fact that he came into this country involuntarily and with no
    'intent to unlade.'

    17

    We make no mention of appellant's contentions with respect to res adjudicata


    and double jeopardy except to note briefly that each is based upon the same
    underlying error. At page 50 of his brief appellant says:

    18

    'It has been pointed out under point V above that the issue in both the criminal
    case and the present proceedings is the same, viz., whether or not the appellant
    violated 19 U.S.C.A. 1497 by failing to declare the diamonds which were on
    his person when he was involuntarily flown into the United States. In both
    cases he was charged with violating that section.'

    19

    It seems to us clear that the issues are not the same. The indictment charged
    that appellant did fraudulently and knowingly violate 19 U.S.C.A. 1497. The
    instant case does not concern itself with what intent 1497 was violated. If it
    has been violated in good faith the diamonds are nonetheless subject to
    forfeiture. United States v. 20 Strings Seed Pearls, etc., D.C., 34 F.2d 142.

    20

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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