Chavez V Pea

VOL.
309, JUNE 28, 1999

193
Villarico vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105912. June 28, 1999.*
SPOUSES TEOFILO C. VILLARICO and MAXIMA A. FAUSTINO, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
MARCOS CAMARGO, respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Petition for Review; Pleadings and Practice; It is well-settled
that in a petition for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.It bears stressing
that the first, second, and third assigned errors relate to factual and
evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court does not inquire into in an
appeal on certiorari. It is well-settled that in a petition for review on certiorari
as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court.
Land Registration; Forest Lands; Land within the unclassified forest zone is
incapable of private appropriation.As aptly observed by the respondent
court, the primordial issue here is the character or classification of the
property applied for registrationwhether or not the same still forms part of
the public domain. On this crucial question, the trial court a quo and the
Court of Appeals correctly adjudged the area at stake as within the
unclassified forest zone incapable of private appropriation.
Same; Same; Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons, and
possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable
title.Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession
thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable title. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
__________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
194
194
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Teofilo C. Villarico for petitioners.
Manuel T. de Guia for private respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22608, affirming the decision of Branch 22 of the
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, which dismissed the application for
confirmation of title in LRC Case No. 604-V-77.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 31, 1977, an application for confirmation of title was filed by the
spouses, Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico, over a 1,834 square meter
parcel of land in Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as LRC Case No.
604-V-77 before the then court of First Instance of Bulacan. Among others,
applicants alleged that they are the absolute owners of subject property,
having bought the same from the spouses, Segundo Villarico (Teofilos father)
and Mercedes Cardenas, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for more
than thirty (30) years, that they are not aware of any mortgage or
encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or interest therein,
and that the land involved is not within the forest zone or government
reservation.
The application for land registration at bar was opposed by Marcos Camargo,
who claims to be the real owner thereof.2 The Government interposed its
opposition, through the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest

Management), averring that the land in question is part of the public domain,
within
____________________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente and concurred

by Associate Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Quirino D. Abad-Santos, Jr.
2 Comment of Private Respondent, Rollo, pp. 66-73.
195
VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999

195
the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan per LC Map No. 637 dated
March 1, 1927 of the Bureau of Forest Management and consequently, not
available for private appropriation.
On May 23, 1989, the trial court of origin dismissed the case, ratiocinating
thus:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title is void when it
covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and
mineral lands. Any title thus issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, should be cancelled (Lepanto
Consolidated Mining vs. Dumyang, L-31666, April 30, 1979). There being no
concrete evidence presented in this case that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or by the private oppositor (as attested to by
the proceedings of B.L. Claim No. 38 [N] before the Bureau of Lands) or by
their respective predecessors-in-interest either by composition of title or by
any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property in question
must be held to be part of the public domain, especially so that the private
parties had not presented any Certification from the Bureau of Forestry
attesting to the fact that the subject property is no longer within the
unclassified region of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thus, if the land in question still
forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Therefrom, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which came out
with a judgment of affirmance on June 26, 1992. Respondent court affirmed
the findings of facts below, holding that subject parcel of land is within the
public domain not available for private appropriation.
____________________
3 Comment of Republic of the Philippines, Rollo, pp. 35-36.

196
196
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition
for review on certiorari; placing reliance on the assignment of errors, that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS

OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT BEFORE 1948 THERE WAS NO DOCUMENTATION
IN FAVOR OF EITHER PARTIES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF

THE TRIAL COURT THAT BUENAVENTURA VILLARICO APPARENTLY DIED PRIOR
TO 1914.
III

THE TRIAL COURT THAT TAX DECLARATION NO. 3912 IN THE NAME OF
BUENAVENTURA VILLARICO COULD HAVE BEEN CONTRIVED SENSING THAT A
CONFLICT OVER THE PROPERTY IN THE NEAR FUTURE WAS INEVITABLE.
IV

THE TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS EVER ACQUIRED BY THE
APPLICANT OR BY THE PRIVATE OPPOSITOR OR BY THEIR RESPECTIVE
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
THROUGH
LAWFUL
MEANS
FOR
THE
ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC LANDS.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE CASE AT BAR.
The appeal is without merit and cannot prosper.
It bears stressing that the first, second, and third assigned errors relate to
factual and evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court does not inquire
into in an appeal on certio197
VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999

197

rari.4 It is well-settled that in a petition for review on certiorari as a mode of
appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised.5 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.6 Findings of fact by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court.7
In the case under consideration, the Court discerns no compelling reason to
reverse such findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the
respondent court, absent any showing of any error, mistake, or
misappreciation of facts. Records on hand indicate that the decisions under
attack accord with the law and the evidence.
As aptly observed by the respondent court, the primordial issue here is the
character or classification of the property applied for registrationwhether
or not the same still forms part of the public domain. On this crucial
question, the trial court a quo and the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged
the area at stake as within the unclassified forest zone incapable of private
appropriation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held:
x x x In the case at bar, as found by the court a quo, there has been no
showing that a declassification has been made by the Director of Forestry
declaring the land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record
indeed discloses that applicants have not introduced any evidence which
would have led the court a quo to find or rule otherwise. x x x
And so, considering the foregoing, possession of the land in question by the
applicants and/or their predecessors-in-interest even for more than 30 years,
as they allege, cannot convert the land into private property capable of
private appropriation. (Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 4-5)
__________________
4 Alicbusan v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336.

5 Laza v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654.
6 David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677; Union Insurance Society of
Canton v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 431.
7 Willex Plastic Industries Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 478.
198
198
Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.8 Possession
thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a registrable title. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 22608 AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Actg. Chairman), Panganiban and GonzagaReyes, JJ., concur.
Romero (Chairman), J., Abroad on official business.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed in toto.
Notes.The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is
descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. (De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 230 [1998])
It is a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
them into private property. (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296
[1998])
Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there
must be a positive act from the governmenta positive act of the
government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. (Ituralde vs. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA
293 [1999]) [Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 193(1999)]

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VOL.

309, JUNE 28, 1999

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

opposition, through the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest

1 Penned by Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente and concurred

VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999

3 Comment of Republic of the Philippines, Rollo, pp. 35-36.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

VOL. 309, JUNE 28, 1999

Villarico vs. Court of Appeals

4 Alicbusan v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 336.

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