Pieris, Aloysius 2003.

What Happens to Via in the

Cessation Attainment? An Exegesis of M.I. 295296.
Bukky Kenky 31:4368.

What Happens to VinniiTJ,Q.

in the Cessation Attainment ?
An Exegesis of M.I. 295-296
Aloysius Pieris, s.j.
1. The State of the Question: The Twofold Controversy.a>

The sta~ of nirodha-samapatti or 'cessation attainment' (hence forward

NS) is consistently referred to in the Suttas as saiiiiii-uedayita-nirodha
( henceforward SVN) , that is to say, as "cessation of ideation and
sensation". Both expressions designate a very special meditative state
about which there is an unresolved dispute among scholars, both ancient
and modern. The disagreement is about the question implied in the title of
this article, namely, "Does uiniuu.ia cease or does it persist in the person
who attains NS ?". Furthermore, this question is of such a nature that
whoever attempts to answer it on the basis of the texts is invariably
confronted with another related issue which is equally debated among
scholars today, namely, whether or not NS ( == SVN) and Nirvana refer to
the same thing. This second question needs to be resolved before
discussing the first question, which, of course, remains the main focus of
this investigation .
The Canon as well as the Commentaries are clear that uinii.dr.ia is
arrested in the attainment of Nirvana. Whatever causes dukkha must
cease in that state in which dukkha is totally eliminated. Since the arising
of dukkha is conditioned by uiiiiiiin.a, it follows that dukkha would not
arise with the cessation of consciousness (uiMlu).a-nirodhena n'atthi
dukkhassa sambhauo) .ll Thus, those who identify Nirvana with SVN have
to conclude quite logically that uiiiiia.TJ,a ceases in the state of SVN. Those
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What Happens to Viiiiial)a

in

the Cessation Attai nment ?

who do not mab that equation , such as for instance Buddhaghosa, have
to find another mode of reasonmg to answer the q uestion implied in the
title of this paper, as we shall demonstrate later.
As already stated above, there 1s no consensus of opinion among
contemporary scholars as to whether Nirvana is the same as SVN or is
something totally other. A preliminary assessment of the two opinions
about it could be quite helpful in achieving the main focus of our
investigation, which is to ascertain whether the canonical texts say
anything definite about the survival or cessation of uihnarJa in the s tate
of SVN .
Although the ultimate answer to this question must come from
practice and experience (patipatti and patiuedha) , we haue euery right to
probe into the matter within the restricted area of scriptural study
(pariya tti). Hence, 1 insist that SVN is not the object of my study because
it is beyond my competence. My focus, I repeat, is on what the texts say
or do not say about what happens to uiimiiri in the SVN . This invariably
includes also the dispute about what the texts say or do not say about the
identity or the difference between Nirvana a nd SVN.

2. Nirvana and the NS : The Position of the Pali Exegetes

The Pali exegctea when commenting on the relevant texts have subscribed
to the theory that Nir vana and SVN are entirely two different things.
They have also discovered two sharply defined conceptual tools which
would serve them as "precision instruments" to present t heir case with
absolute clarity:
(a) the notion of sabhlluadhamma (a positively existing reality) as
opposed to asabhlluadhamma (a privative state defined by the
absc!nce of a positive existing reality) ;
(b) the notion of nipphann.a, namely, that which is produced or created
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What Happens to Vi.iiiUm,a in the Cessation Attainment ?

by var ious causes (including human endeavour) , as opposed to

anipphanna (unproduced).SJ

Employing these terms, the exegetes demonstrate that SVN and

Nirvana a re mutually exclusive. The former is a privative state (asabhauadho.mma) which is produced ( nipphanna) by various causes, whereas
Nirvana, by contrast, is a positively existing entity (sabha.uadhamma)
which is unproduced ( anipphan.na) by any cause! Quite understandably ,
therefore, the scholiasts insist that such categories as sarrikhata
(composed) and asarrik/lata ( uncomposed) or lokiya (cosmic) and
lokuttara ( metacosmic) cannot be predicated of Nirodha Samapatti, since
it does not exist as a real thing (sabbha.uato natthitaya).' Thus any
equation of Nirvana with SVN ( = NS) is ruled out by this scholastic
a rgument.
I am obliged to parenthesize, here, that Paul Griffiths, in his
otherwise excellent study of relevant texts from different Buddhist
traditions dealing with NS,'' has failed to notice this scholastic distinction
and has a lso misread a text of Buddhagosa as seemingly identifying NS
with Nirvana ..,, Besides mistranslating an impor tant exegetical passage of
Buddhaghosa, thus missing the point of the latter's argument (see nt.33
below) , he has failed to notice the set of clearly defined scholastic terms
which, as I explained above, are utilized by Buddhaghosa, Ohammapala
and all t he Pali scholiasts to demonstrate that Nirvana and the NS cannot
be the same thi ng.
Besides, in each context, one must decide whether nirodha (cessation)
refers to Nirvana or simply to the NS. Thus in Vsm 705, Buddhaghosa
clearly uses t he phrase nirodhaT(l. nibbana11t which clearly means "that
cessation which is Nibbana"; the implication is that ho is not alluding to
"that cessa t ion which is SVN". Hence Griffith's doubt tha t , here,
Buddhaghosa might seem to identify Nirvana with NS is not only not
warranted by t he text itself, but runs counter to the clear a nd consistent
differentiation that Buddhghosa makes between tho t wo states elsewhere
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What Happens to ViiiMl;ia in the Cessation Attainment?

in his writings. Note also how Nagasena a nswers Milinda's question,

"Nirodh-0 nibbtznan ti?" . After answering in the affirmative, ( "Yes, Great
King, Cessation is Nibbana") he immediately clarifies what kind of
Nirodha Nibbana is. Thus, the Pali Abhidhammika writers have left no
room whatsoever for anyone to conclude that they identify SVN with
Nibbana !

3. Nirvana and the NS: The Posit ion of the Canonical Authors
Hence this critical comment made on Griffith's opinion must be directed
also against Wijesekera 's equivocal understanding of nirodha I nirujjhati
( in a passage l am going to quote below) , where he does not seem to have
perceived the difference between nirodha predicated of Nirvana and
nirodha predicated of SVN.
The same observation may be valid with regard to other
contemporary scholars who rigorously maintain that in the Pali Canon
Nirvana and NS are considered to be one and the same thing. The late Ven.
Yakka(juve Pai'inaramall and the late Ven. Palahane Vajiran8.Qa,.., can be
cited as two eminent examples. This s hows that the two opinions on this
matter continue to divide the scholars of our own times.
How does one account for the persistence of this disagreement to this
day? One explanation would be to take 0.C. Panda's lead and suggest
that it is the ambiguity in the Canonical texts themselves that allows for
both interpretations. For instance, in M.1.295 ( the Sutta passage under
investigation, he~e), as also in S.IV.294 (and Vsm 703-704), according to
Pande, "the description of 'nirodha-samapatti' comes nearer that of
catalepsy than of sambodhi" .'0 But elsewhere, e.g. in S.U.146, NS seems to
presuppoae the attainment of the andgdmi as well as the arahan st.ate, the
implication being that it could also occur after Nirvana or Full Release.If)
ln other passages, however, Pande thinks that the tendency is to "equate
Nirvanic experience to Nirodhasamipatti" .111
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What Happens to Viiiiial;la in the Cessation Attainment?

How valid is this conclusion ? I have the impression that the
observation I made above with reference to the commentaries dealing with
this question is valid also in the case of the Suttas :- a confusion, if any,
is not in the texts as such but in the failure to note where nirodha
(cessation) is used as a term for SVN and where it stands for Nirvana.

Let us study a typical instance of alleged ambiguity, e.g., the

experience of Sariputta described by the Buddha himself in the Anupada
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. In all the trances that precede SVN, one
hears the Buddha saying that Sariputta emerging from each stage of
attainment realizes that "There is a further escape" [meaning that
liberation is not complete as yet] and therefore, "There is zealous practice
for him concerning that" [meaning that the practice of mental
development bas to continue further towards that further goal of
liberation).1-0 But what happens after reaching and ~biding in SVN is
explicitly described as follows:
on realizing [the goal] by wisdom (paniiiiya) his cankers are
destroyed (iisauti parikkhiTJii honti) . But as he adses "from that
attainment" (tiiya samiipattiyii) , he is detached and freed with no
need to practise further, as now "there is no further escape.Ill
Now the doubt is about "that attainment" from which he rose
mindful. Since he is said to have been abiding in SVN, does "that
attainment" refer to SVN ? Does not the text also say very clearly that
while in that state of SYN, Sariputta's cankers were destroyed (which
means he attained Nirvana ) "on seeing with wisdom" ? Hence, is not the
Nirvanic experience associated with intuitive wisdom which dawned on
him while abiding in the SYN ? The least we can say is that there is no
way of inferring from the text that SYN is Nirvana. This, in fact, is the
way the Commentary also understands the text:"On seeing with wisdom, his cankers were destroyed" means this:- on
seeing four truths through the wisdom of the Path, the four cankers
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What Happens to Viiiiiai}a in lhe Cessation Attainment?

were destroyed. For Sariputta it is also the occa sion for attaining
Arahatship by resorting to the harmonious combination of
Tranquility and Insight; here the occasion of attaining NS is regarded
as the occasion of attaining Arahantship, for, they say that cessation
is reached in successive stages thanks to one's mas tery gained through
practice. Here when [the practice] is aimed at NS, the occasion comes
for NS while the attainment of the fruit is hidden, just as when the
aim of the practice is the attainment of the Frui t , then the occasion
comes for the attainment of the fruit, while the NS remains hidden.
But the Indian Elders say this: The Elder Sariput t.a, by resorting to
the combined method of Tranquillity-Insight realized the fruit of the
non-returner and then attained Cessation CNS), and arising from
Cessation CNS) he attained Arahatship.lll
Thus neither Buddhaghosa nor the Indian Theras whom he quotes as
holding another opinion treat the attainment of arhatta (i.e. Nirvana) as
if it. were the same as the cessation trance.
Would it not be safer , then, to conclude that neither this Canonical
text nor the Commentary on it can make us say that NS and Arahatship
are identical attainments, though t hey could happen at the same time?
That the two attainments are, de facto, two and not one ?
Once we accept this conclusion, namely, that the Canonical texts
clearly differentiate between Nirvana and NS, we can proceed with the
main theme of this investigation:- What happens to uiiiiilLTJ4 in a Nirodha
Samapanna (i.e.. in the one who has attained the cessation attainment) ?
What does the C~on say about it ?

4. Vinnsos and NS: the Tacit Intent in M.1.295~

The lOCU$ cla.&&icu$ in the Canon, which seems to deal with this question is
M.1.295-6. Though this text seems 'ambiguous' at first sight, a closer

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What Happens to Viniial;la in the Cessation Attainment ?

scrutiny reveals t hat the Sutta compilers have exercised a discreet silence
on the matter we are discussing: textus tacet. This silence, presumably, is
an eloquent testimony to a pre-textual history yet to be discovered.
The way I read M.1.295-296, as explained below, has suggested to me
that the controversy about the fate of uiiiiilif}a in t he cessation
attainment, in aU probability, predates the compilation of that passage.
This remote origin of the controversy, however, lies beyond the present
state of scholarship. But one can quite comfortably locate the proximate
origin of the controversy in the Sutta itself. This distinction between the
immediate and the remote context will not sound overly speculative when
our investigation is completed.
The technical phrase for the cessa tion attainment, as I have already
noted, is saiiiid-uedayita-nirodha, namely, cessation of ideation a nd
sensation. Now saiiiid and uedanii. a re not identical with uifliiar)a
(o r cit ta), but are said to be aspects of t he latter and hence they are
classed as cetasikii., "concomitant constituents of citta", that is to say,
phenomena associated with consciousness, a nd not the phenomenon of
consciousness as such. Thus the technical phrase for cessation attainment
consistently mentions only the arrest of ideat ion and sensation, and not
that of consciousness as such. The cessation of uinnlu')a is therefore not
explicitly mentioned in t his scriptural phrase. Does the Mahavedalla Sutta
(M .1.296) offer an explicit teaching a bout it ?
This text mentions three kinds of activities that cease at the NS: kii.yasarrr.khii.rii. (bodily activities), uaci-sarrikhii.rii (verbal activities) and manosarrr.khii.rii. ( mental activities). In t he very next Sutta (Cullavedalla Sutta,
M.l.301) , these three terms are explained as follows :-

1. bodily activities

= asstisa-passasa (breathing in and out)

2. verbal activities = uitakka-uicltra (i.e. deductive and discursive

processes [of the mind] which a re implied in ver bal formulations)
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What Happens to Viiiii.dl}a in the Cessation Attainment. ?

3. ment a l activities

saiiiUi and uedana (ideation and sensation)

Here again, consciousness is not explicitly mentioned as an item that

ceases in the cessation trance. The same Sutta (M.1.302) also says that in
someone who attains SVN, verbal activities cease first, then the bodily,
and finally the mental.
Hence it is quite legitimate to raise the question whether the cessation
of mental activities (cetasika) implies also the a rrest of the mind (citta
or uiiiiia!Jli) it.aelf. Buddhaghosa's answer is

unambiguous in

bis

declaration that NS is a state in which there 1s cessation of citta together

with the ~tasikli. 11: The question, nevertheless, has to be asked because
there seems to have been a school of thought that dcmed this implication.
According to that school of thought, the mind seemed to have continued 10
the NS unaccompanied by the mental activities. It is precisely against this
t heory that Buddhaghosa seems to be arguing, in the course of his
exegesis, as will be indicated later .
This theory, so severely censored by Buddhaghosa finds a couple of
advocates even among contemporary Buddhist scholars. The late Prof.
0.H. de A. Wijesekera was cer tainly one of them, at least in the forties,
though there is evidence o f a retraction in the sixties. Apparently the first
in recent timea to recognize the crucial importance of the Sutt.a passage
examined here (M.l.295-296) , as he himself has insinuated,.... he had
interpreted it. to mean that only the "mental activity", i.e., saiiiia and
ued.oAfi ceaee at the cessation t rance, and not ui.iiii.ari, this latter being a
"proceaa other than mere mental activity" . 11 A variation of the same view
had been put forward by Rune Johansson for whom uinniil)a is only an
aspect of citta, and would cease completely only in Nirvana, but seemed to
he dormant in the state of nirodha-sam(Jpatti.
The Pali scholiasts, led by Buddhaghosa, firmly held the opposite
thesis that a Nirodha-samapanna is acittako (Vsm 708), for his uin.nti.r)a
too ceaeoa with the cessation of mental factors. This is also the position

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What Happens to Viiiiial;l.a in the Cessation Attainment?

taken by Theravadins in our own day, who have identified Nirvana with
SVN.11>
Such polarization of opinion could not have occurred if M.1.295-296
had been explicit with regard to this point. As it stands, the text lends no
support to either theory. Neither the survival nor the suspension of
uiiiiilu}a is asserted there. What we notice is not textual ambiguity of any
sort but the impression that the Sutta compilers have chosen to be silent
with regard to this matter. Such would be the conclusion that dawns upon
us when we examine the literary structure of t his Sutta passage.
It should be noted in advance that this passage is not concerned
directly with the question we are studying, namely the fate of uiiiiiluJa in
the cessation trance. The immediate intention of its compilers is to
determine tM di/f erence between a dead person and a Nirodha-S4mapanna.
The reason for this interest could have been the belief that untrained
observers, as clearly testified in a nother Sutta, could mistake a Nirodhasamapanna for a dead person, with rather dangerous consequences, such as
for instance, attempting to cremate such a person while being alive.Ill
Since, however, there is no uiniUir}.a in a dead person, the canonical
authors could hardly avoid the question about the fate of uiniiiir;la in a
Nirodha-samapanna; for, the whole purpose of this Sutta passage is to
show the difference between the two states. A comparative study of death
and NS cannot evade this issue. Yet the strange fact is that this obvious
question has actually been left out of considera tion by the authors of the
Sutta, and this is precisely what the literary structure of t he Sutta
reveals.

5. The Literary Structure of M.1.296-296.

In view of this hypothesis, which I am about to establish, I wish to recall

that the Mahavedalla Sutta (as also the Cullavedalla Sutta that follows
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What Happens to ViiinaJJa in the Cessation Attainment ?

it) belongs to a genre literaire of a catechetical nature, and therefore, to a
later stratum of the Pali Canon, as Pande suggests. The statements are
not attributed to the Buddha ; and the way they are orgaruzed into
questions and answers indicate an incipient Abhidhammic tendency to spell
out unclarified questions with the aid of categories already existing or
developed by the earl y systematizers for that. purpose.
Therefore, this Sutla allows us to presume that its authors were
aware of the difference of opinion resulting from unclarified questions,
and were probably reluctant to take a partisan view. It would seem that
their task was to make a pedagogically clear presentation of the common
doctrines of the Elders without. unnecessar ily pushing sectarian theories
into what was deliberately intended to be a catechesis. Hence the
importance of studying the literary structure.
This literary structure which serves t he catechetical methodology of
the compilers, revolves round various 'categories of phenomena' organized
into three 'paradigms'. Each of these three paradigms consists of a cluster
of three inter-related phenomena or factors of experience ( and existence).
In the order of their appearance, they can be listed as follows:

Paradigm A : ayu, usma. indriyani "" life, heat and senses

Paradigm B : ayu, usma viiinAr:ia = life, heat and consciousness
Paradigm C : kaya-. vaci-, citte-sarrikhara = physical, verbal and
mental activities

It is in terms of these three paradigms that the Sutt.a compares death

and NS. We have already noted above that in paradigm C, physical
activities ( kaya-sarnkhara) usually refers mainly to respiration , while
verbal activities <vaci-samkhiira), are sub-vocal activities of the mind
that account for verbalization.'" It is also very important to note that
irulriyani in Paradigm A stand for the five senses. I say this because, the
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What Happens to Viiiiial;ia in the Cessation Attainment ?

Sutta begins the discussion on the difference between death and the
cessation trance almost immediately after establishing the mutual
dependence between iiyu, usmii and the paiicindriyan.i. The mind is
explicitly excluded here. Hence the triad O.yu-usmii-indriyimi ( m Paradigm
A) , taken in the context of the Sutta, clearly refers to "life, heat and the

five physical senses. This observation is important because if the mind

had also been included among the senses in Paradigm A, then one would
have to conclude t hat the Sutta holds the mind to be present during NS.

PARADIGMS

AT DEATH

LIFE (ayu)

EXHAUSTED
(parikkhir)il.)

NOT EXHAUSTED
( aparikkhu)a)

HEAT (usma)

COOLED
( uipasanna)

NOT COOLED
(auipasanna)

SENSES (indriyani/
pasddani)

DISINTEGRATED
(uiparibhinnani)

BRIGHTENED UP
( uippasanna)

LIFE (ayu)

DURING NS

HEAT (iuma)

CONSCIOUSNESS
(uiMal:ia)

ayu-usma-uiiiMJi ARE
THE THINGS
(dhamma)
THAT LEAVE
(pajahanti )
THE BODY AT DEATH

BODILY
ACTIVITIES (kii.ya8afTl/thlud)

VERBAL
CEASE ANO SUBSIDE CEASE AND SUBSIDE
ACTlVITIES ( uaci&arfl/thiira)
Niruddhb., patippassaddhb. NiruddM, patippassaddM
MENTAL
ACTIVITIES (cittalafTl/chiira)
I
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What Happens to Viiiiiat}a in the Cessa tion Attainment ?

have tabulated, here, the manner in which these three paradigms
have been employed as terms of comparison bet ween death and the
cessation attainment. Here, the following three features are noteworthy.
The first is that only paradigms A and C are employed as terms of
comparison between death and the cessation trance. Paradigm A singles
out the three a reas in which death and NS differ from each other, while
Paradigm C enumerates the three areas in which they converge. What is
significant is that uiiiiial:la is conspicuous ly lef t out as a term of
comparison in these two paradigms ! As we have already indicated the
mind is not included among the senses. In other worcts, death and NS are
compared without any direct reference to vinMTJ,a.
The other feature is even more significant: the Paradigm B, the only
paradigm which contains vinna1;1a as one of its components, is exclusively
used for describing death, and not for comparing it with the nirodha
state! If the compilers of this catechism wished to clarify the issue, they
had a tool in their hands, but they seem reluctant to use it for this
purpose.
The third feature is equally intrig uing. In Paradigm B, the question is
not what ceases at death, but what leaves the body at death. For , uinnti.r;i
does not cease but leaves when the body dies. The non-existence of the
other two elements (heat and life) in death and their survival in the NS
has been clearly affirmed in Paradigms A and C. Thus the question has
been changed in Paradigm B in such a way that neither the cessation nor
the continuance of viiiiia.r;ia is implied in answering it.
To sum up: the paradigms which compare the two states do not
include viiiiiar;ia as a term of comparison; conversely, the only paradigm
which includes viiiiiar.la is not utilized for comparing the two states. This
means that the compilers of the Sutta left the question out of their
consideration ! This observation becomes all the more clear when we
compare Paradigms A and B. The senses (in A) and consciousness (in B)

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What Happens to Viiiiial,la in the Cessation Attainment ?

do not function in the dead. But in the cessation attainment, senses

accompanied by heat and life are said to sur vive (see A) but there is an
eloquent silence about consciousness accompanied by heat and life (see B) .
What then should be the conclusion ? To the question, "What happens
to uiiiiiiu}a in the nirodha state ?", the answer implied in the Sutta seems
to be: No comments! If the literary structure of this Sutta allows us to
conclude that [the answer to] this question has been carefully avoided in
M.1.295-296, any speculation on this matter must be founded on other
grounds than on an exegesis of M.1.295-296. This conclusion is inevitable.
As a matter of fact, Buddhaghosa quite rightly, does not have recourse to
this Sutta to maintain his position that uiiiiulr)a ceases in the NS, as we
shall soon see. He argues u aliun.d.e.

6. A Note on Two Contemporary Interpretations

In other words, Wijesekera's (earlier] thesis that uinnal).a persists in the

NS has no scriptural foundation, because this very Sutta passage [M I 295296] which be cites as the basis for this theory, evades the question, as I
have shown. Actually his own words, which I quote here in full , clearly
indicate that be bas confused paradigm A ( iiyu-usmii-indriyani) with
paradigm B (ayu-usma-uiMar.la) ! For, citing this same Sutta-pasage,
where both paradigms occur, Wijesekera concludes rather hastily that
In the state of death, the body is devoid of ayu, usmii and uiiiiiiil).a
(consciousness) whereas ID the (samiipatt i) State of sannii
uedayitanirodha, the individual's mental activity such as perception
and feelings, has ceased, the three processes of ayu, usmii and
uiiiiiiu}a continue to function.>
He also makes a further inference from this same text: "This would
clearly indicate that consciousness (uiiiiiiil).a) is a process other than mere
mental activity.111>

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What Happens to ViM&Ja in the Cessation Attainment ?

Though this second inference cannot be directly derived from M.I. 295296 but demonstrable from other scr iptural loci, Wijesekera seems to
mean much more than what he says in the sentence above. He is probably
assuming another theory which is not evident in this Sutta-passage. This
other theory which seems to have influenced his eisegesis [' reading into a
text') of M.1.295-296, is that uiiliiarJ is Ma process other than mental
activity in s uch a way as to be separable from the latter. Put in another
way, what he understands by wother t han" seems to be that the mind is so
distinct from mental activities as to be able to continue in a 'pure' st.ate
in the NS where the mental activities have ceased. If transposed into the
Abhidhammika terminology, what this theory presumes is that there can
be a citta without cetasikii. For without implicitly accepting this
presupposition, one cannot interpret the text the way Wijesekera has done.
Whether or not Wijesekera has revisited M.I.295-296 in his later
writings I cannot say for the moment. But one notes that two decades
later he had undertaken a study of the canonical occurrences of uin.Tiiir)a,
and has reached the conclus ion that there are three clearly distinguishable
senses in which the Canonical writers have employed this term: a) in the
cognitive sense, b) as a medium of re-becoming and c) as a medium of
meditative trances. Referring to this third meaning, he demonstrates that
all the jhanic states prior to the cessation attainment are each a uinfulr)athiti, i.e., an abiding place or a foot-hold of consciousness a nd therefore
cannot be equated with the Mfinal state of emancipation or Nibbana".
Then - appa rently implying that the cessat ion t rance is equivalent to
Nirval)ahe concludes as follows:
The Vii'liiiil)a ceases to manifest itself altogether (n irujjhati) only in
the final state of ' the cessation of all conceptual and empirical
experience (saiiiia-uedayita-nirodha).' Nirujjhati literally means
'checked' and this can best be taken as referring to the checking of t he
flow ( sota) of Vini'lal)a, that is to say, the stopping of t he continuity
of Vii'li\aoa. In the previous states the ViiiiiS(la could find some
abiding place (thiti) but in the state of Nirodha it obtains no such

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What Happens to Viniial}a in the Cessation Attainment?

foothold.m
Interestingly, Wijesekera makes no direct reference to M.I.295-296 in
this later study.
Rune Johansson, on the other hand , does not seem to have changed his
position. Viiiii&.la, according to him, is the stream of differentiated
conscious processes, and therefore something that "affects citta" or is
simply a name for the activities of the citta (citta-sarrtkhlua) " .111
Consequently, he is able to maintain that it is uiiiiilu}a that ceases at
Nibbana, and not citta since Nibbana is a state of citta. Now the
Nirodha state, according to his analysis of the Nikaya evidence, is to be
clearly differentiated from the Nirvanic state. Jn the former, uiiiiiiiri
[being in some way identified with the citta-Saf1lkhara] is dormant rather
than absent, while citta continues to function .., The implication again is
that citta can exit without citta-sankhara. But, more cautious than
Wijesekera had been in his earlier position, Johansson, it appears to me,
has recognized that the Mahavedalla Sutta is silent with regard to this
question, for, he seems to have derived his thesis from an overaJJ study of
the occurrence of citta and uiniiiir).a in the Nikayas and not from M.1.295296 which he quotes only once, and that, too, in quite another context. His
conclusion is recorded in a passing statement: "What happens to uiMiir;a
on the level of nirodha is not explicitly stated [ in the Nikayas] .

11>

Therefore, Jet me insist once more that beneath Wijesekera's exegesis

of M.1.295-296 in his earlier article as well as Johansson's more nuanced
position, there lurks a belief in the possibility of 'an inactive mind' - an
acetasika-citta, so to say. One is inclined to think that this belief which is
presupposed in any theory that advocates the persistence of uiiiiia.TJ.a in the
NS, is precisely what is confronted in Buddhghosa's exegesis of t he same
Sutta. Buddhaghosa cannot accept a citta minus cetasikll. Consciousness is
either active or it is nil. Hence the two schools read the text. with two
different presuppositions in mind. A discussion of these two
presuppositions is not within the ambit. of my investigation here, but I
_c;7_

What Happens to Vi~ in the Cessation Attainment ?

mention it in order to place the controversy in what I tentatively propose

as its remote, i.e. its original pre-tex tual context. That this surmise is not
farfetched will appear plausible when we analyze Buddhagosa's exegesis on

M.1.295-296.

7. MA.11.351 : Buddheghosa's Exegesis of M.1.295-296.

In thia part of his exegesis, Buddhaghosa consistently employs the word
citta in place of viiiiial)a when refuting the thesis of his opponents. Hence

I am constrained to use the same term m this section where I wtsh to

discuss his refutation of the survival theory.
It is clear from the way he argues out his case, that this master
exegete, has recognized the silence of the Majjhima text [M.I. 295-296)
because,
with regard to the question in dispute. He does not presumably, he knows that he cannotderive his position directly from
this Sutta. For, he proves his position (cessation of citta with the
cessation of mental activities) by showing the incongruity of the opposite
thesis, i.e. the endurance of citta minus mental activities in the Cessation
Trance. If he had held that the MahAvedalla Sutta had supplied the
answer, he would not have taken this circuitous path.
Note carefully the manner in which I phrased the two questions which
are implicitly presupposed in this dispute. The one is whether
coneciouaneN ceases at the nirodha state. This is evaded in the Sutta, as
we have teen. The other, which Buddhaghosa tries to settle, is whether or
not coneciouaneu should cease when the mental activities cease. Thus
Buddhaghoaa has clearly aeen that the dispute really lies in the way
coneciousneaa and other conacious activities are related to each other.
Buddhaghosa'a argument is focused on paradigm C, and consists of a
rtductio ad absurdum. This he does on two counts.
The opponent' view impliea for Buddhagbosa that mental activities

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What Happens to Viiiiidna in the Ce11ation Attainment?

(citta-14171AMra) could cease without the citta ceasing. In that case.

argues Buddhaghosa, the same should apply to uaci-sar{l.khdrfJ. which ought
to oeue without uaca ceasing ! If that were true, a Nirodhasam!panna
should be aeen to be reciting and preaching the Dhamma deapite the fact
that verbal activities have ceased !
His second argument is of the same nature. Here, he takea the case of
the dead person in whom it is agreed that citta-8tJl1lAhdra completely
cease. If, in the cessation trance, the citta can continue without cittasarriltJ&4rd, as hia opponents maintain, then in the dead person, too, this
same phenomenon should be observed. Th11 means, that the dead person
should be regarded as possessing consciousness though not the activities of
the mind [and therefore as living rather than dead] ! In that case, insists
Buddhaghoaa, to cremate a 'dead' parent or a 'dead' aralaan would
amount, respectively, to parricide and arahanti-cide" which are
immediately retributable crimes (anantariya-Juvnma) [i.e. crimes
leading to rebirth in hell in the very next life] .111 Here again, the focus of
his reasoning is the impossibility of there being a consciousneu which is
unaccompanied by mental activities. The citta ceases to eiiat when
cetasikd cease.
A further confirmation of this position of Buddhaghoaa is his
altogether logical corollary that SYN cannot be attained in the fourconstituents existence" where the physical basis [actually the body, the
fifth constituent] is not obtained. Dhammapala's comment on this
statement presupposes the theory that all mental phenome.n a cease at SYN:Since, in tbia four-constituent existence, the citta and the "tasiJt4 alone
exist and since SYN is the cessation of both citta and ceuuiJta, it would
follow that, if SYN were poasible, the reault would be something
inconceivable" (apaM.a tti.ko, mentally not deaignatable) , namely that
the hypothetical attainer of SYN would be similar to one who has
attained (J!Wpadi.sesa nibbano, because no upadi is left behind !,., Thia
reductio ad absurdum. by which Ohammapala demonstrates that SVN
cannot be attained in a sphere of becomini where only citta and ~tasiJtd

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What Happens to ViniW!Ja in the Cessation Attainment?

exist, is based on the conviction that they both cease at SVN.

Hence we have every reason to conclude as follows: The Pah exegetical
tradition has implicitly acknowledged that neither the cessation nor the
continuance of uinnar).ii in the cessa tion trance can be dtrectly proved from
the scriptures, although Wijesekera's second article does insinuate that a
scriptural proof is not that far to seek if the canonical reference to
viiiiiiirJ.a-thiti are subjected to a proper exegesis. However, Buddhaghosa's

ratiocination, which reflects a long Pali scholastic tradition, revolves

round quite another issue:- whether or not citta can exist without
citta-stlJ11)thlzrii.

Further more, Buddhaghosa urges his opponents to go beyond the

letter ( uyanjana) and comprehend the spirit or the meaning of the text
(attha) by being fi rmly rooted in the traditional exegetical method of the
Teachers ( acariyanaf1l naye thatua). The implication of this appeal to
tradition, I suggest, is as follows: since M.I. 295-296 is silent with regard
to the disputed question, it needs to be interpreted correctly. i.e. in
accordance with the ancient doctrine of the teachers. Now what could this
teaching be? Perhaps that citta cannot persist in a state wherein cittasaf1lkhdra cease ? Could this be the pre-textual context which explains the

non-committal approach adopted in the Mahavedalla Sutta?

8. The Remote Context of the Controversy.

Our inveati1ation would not be complete without a reference to an
elucidation made in non-canonical Theravadin sources. The Milindapai\ha
(Mp), an apologetical treatise or about the first century CE, ranks high
among theae sources, for, not only does it antedate the Pali Commentaries
but it hu also been accorded a aemi-canonical status by the Theravada
Schohula themselves. In this work, the Indian Buddhist Recluse, Nagasena, makes a paasing but vital reference to the Cessation Trance, in the
course or explaining the phenomenon of dreams to his Greek interlocutor,

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What Happens to Vinndl}a in lhe Cessation Allainment?

Milinda (Menander) ..,

Dreams, according to Nagasena, are seen only when one has reached
the state of a monkey-nap ( kapiniddO.pareto), i.e., someone in the
intermediary state of drowsiness which lies between the waking stage
( when consciousness

is

functioning)

and

sound

sleep

consciousness is functionally nil) . In other words, a person

( when

the

sees dreams

neither when fully awake nor when fully asleep, but in the interval
between falling asleep and reachmg the Unconcious (bhavail6a) State:

okkante middhe asampatte bhauaitge etthantare supin.arr& passati (Mp .

299). Nigasena adds that consciouness ceases in the bhauan.,a state,
wherein cognition is nil ( n.a pat11fJniiti) and therefore, the possibility of
dreaming is ruled out. The impltcataon is that the citta should be
functioning for dreams to be seen, as he insists.
Even though in deep sleep the mind [citta] is in the Unconscious State

( middhasamarulhe citte bhauangagate titthamane pi), it (the mind)

ceases [ to function] in the body (sanre cittaJTl appauattam hoti), and
sinoe the mind ceases, it would not see dreams (appauatte citte
supinalp na passati) ..,
Note, here, that "the ceased mind (cittam appavattal'(l) as equated
with "the mind in the Unconscious State" (citte bhauahgagate). This
a rgument is elaborated with such lucidity in subsequent paragraphs (Mp.
299-301) that there is no room for any doubt that cessation of
consciousness is equated with the noetically inactive mind known as the
Unconscious Mind (bhauangagata-citta).
It is after having established this poaition that Nagasena makes this
significant statement about the cessation attainment:
ln two situations, O King, does the citta become non-active (nonexistent, non-functioning) even while the body continues to be [alive]:The mind of the one who has fallen into deep sleep and has [ therefore]

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What Happens to Vifiiidr.ia in the Cessation Attainment?

reached the Unconscious State, ceases even while the body remains
(alive); the mind of the o ne who has reached cessation [attainment]
ceases even while the body continues to be [alive] . 171
The implication is too obvious to restate here. The appauatta-citta in
the cessation attainment is put on a par with the appauatta-citta
identified as bhavaitgagata-citta. This would mean that the Mind of a
Nirodhasamapanna is in a fully dormant or noetically inactive state. lo
other words, the mind of such a person persists in the body minus the
mental activities. In the dead person, as we havo seen from t he canonical
texts, not even an inactive mind can exist; in death t he uiiiiWJJ.a simply
leaves the body.
If this conclusion is valid, we have to admit that there was a school
of though that advocated the existence of an inactive mind, a state of
consciousness (citta) , wherein the concomitant phenomena (cetasi/ca),
which constitute the manifold activation of the mind, do not function at
all. According to this view, the phrase sanna-uedayita-nirodha would
point to a mind which is noetically and conatively inactive, i.e., a
dormant mind or "a mind that has ceased to function" (appauatttJ/Tl

cittarri) as' Nagasena puts it. In other words, the possibility of an inactive
mind, an acetesika-citta, so to say, cannot be ruled out from the theory of
consciousness advocated ih t he Milindapai'lha. This, as I have shown
above, is exactly the position that Buddhaghosa had rejected as absurd
and, therefore, untenable.
This may also explain why Buddhaghosa does not cite the Milindapai'lba, a text ~ revered in the Southern School of Buddhism, when
arguing against that very position upheld there. To hold an opinion that
militates against such an authoritative source as the Milindapai'iha would
have been temerarious. After all, the same Buddhaghosa does allude to
this Milindapai'lha passage in AA Ill 316-318 while discussing t he
phenomenon of dreams in a context where Nigasena's reference to NS is
not relevant, and , therefore, does not require to be cited. The other locus

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What Happens to Viiiiilu}a in the Cessation Attainment ?

where this happens is VinA III 520-522 where he explains how the release of
sperm by a person who is dreaming does not amount to a conscious
release of sperm" (sa-cetanikii sukkha-uisatthi). Here, too, Nagasena is
quoted in support of this position in a context where the reference to NS
does not come in.
By contrast, MA I1 351 (discussed above) where Nagasena's equation
of the bhauanga-gata citta with an appauatta-citta requires to be quoted
at least as an opinion to be refuted, there is a deafening silence on the
part of Buddhaghosa! Does this suggest that there is a remote pre-textual
context wherein the possibility of an 'acetsi.aka-citta' has been a moot
point, which may account for the persistence of two divergent opinions in
later times, with Nagasena representing one stream within t he Pali
Abhidhammika tradition, and Buddhaghosa the other ?
In the Vibhanga Commentary, attributed to Buddhaghosa, we once
more see the same approach as the one adopted by Buddhaghosa in a
variant version in AA III 317. There is a rather long excursus on the nature
of the wakeful state, the dreaming state and dreamless sleep in VibhA 406409 ( repeated verbatim also in VinA III 521). We are warned that to say
sutto supati ("the person who is sound asleep sees dreams") would run
counter to the teaching of the Abhidhamma because "one sleeps with the
Unconscious Mind (bhauangacittena supati) while, on the other hand, to
say patibudd.ho [supinam] passati ("one who is awake sees dreams")
would contradict the teaching of the Vinaya where what one does during
dreams is not regarded as morally imputable (supinafTI. passantena pana
hate uitikkame ekantaJTI. aniipatti eua). Now, the Abhidhammika basis for
this position, as explained by the Commentator, is that during the dreamstate the mind has not reached the noetic level of jauana or perception
which is required for any action to be ethical (kusliikusala). 1
Therefore, deep sleep is a total absence of consciousness where even
the anoetic sentience or mere sensation (such as dassana-matta) is nil. If
that is so, then Nagasena's statement cited above certainly ensures that

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What Happens to Viiinm}a in the Cessallon Attainment ?

NS is such a state. But an inference to that effect is absent in the

Vibhanga Commentary. What is intriguing is that in VibhA 406-409 the
Milindapaiiha is quoted with reference to dreams, without making any
allusion to its statement about the NS, while at the same t ime, in VibhA
29 where NS is directly discussed, Nagasena 's a llusion to NS is not cited!
Hence one is compelled to conclude that t he Pali CommentariaJ tradition
strongly maintains the complete absence of Viiii'iiloa in the Cessation
Trance in opposition to another tradition represented by the
Milindapai'iha.
9. Two Corollaries
There are two corollaries that issue from this discussion. The first is the
following. If the citta ceases in the state of NS while the one who has
attained that state remains a 'living being' (in t hat he or she is endowed
with ayu and usmii) as the Pali exegetes maintain, then it follows that
there could be a "living being" (satta) having "a non-conscious existence",
that is to say, a material existence.> This r uns contra ry to the general
t rend in the Pali exegetical tradition that life and heat always accompany
consciousness, and consequently, there cannot be a "non-eonscious life", or
a living being who is not endowed with consciousness!'> This contradiction
does not arise in the position taken by the author of the Milindapanha.
For, consciousness is believed to persist in a dormant state in such a
being, who, therefore, would necessarily have to be a satta, a "living
being."
Secondly, the striking parallel, which exists between the niroclhasamApan.na and the asaiiiia-satta, raises a similar question with regard to
the vit.alistic not.ion of consciousness upheld by the Pali scholiasts who
disagTee with Nilgasena :- Does the term asaiiii.a-satta imply merely the
absence of ideation (saiiiia) and other concomitant factors in a dormantoonaciousneas (appauatta-citta as an equivalent of bhauahgagata-citta) ?
Or, as the Pali oxeget.es seem to maintain, are they to be regarded as a
species of non-conscious beings, that is to say, "material beings" that

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What Happens to ViMai:ta in the Cessation Attainment ?

have a life-faculty wi thout consciousness ?

In t he first case, their re-becoming in a another sphere of existence is
explainable, because, re-conception (patisandhi) presupposes the existence
of viiiiiar)a in such anoetic beings. But the Pali exegetes, who hold the
latter position, are compelled to treat the re-conception of such beings as
a drastic exception to that rule. They have to concede, in the words of
Abhldhammatthasangaha, 23, that "the [means of] re-conception of
anoetic beings, indeed, is matter" ( asaiiiiasattclnal7l pana rupam eva
patisandhi hoti).

1 ) All references are to the PTS editions, except the Paramatthamafljus!

which is quoted from the Burmese ChaUhasamrAyana edition, Rangoon

1960 ( two volumes) and abbreviated Pm (Bes).

2 ) E.g. Sn . 143 ( v.734) : Yaqin kiiici dukkharra sambhoti, sabbaJTI uiiiiidl)a-

paccaya; uiiiiiar)assa nirodhena, n 'atthi dukkhassa sambhauo. The

commentary (Sn .A.506) further specifies uiniial}a as kammasahajata
bhisaTT1khara-uiiiiifuJa.
3 ) See my forthcoming article, 'Sa.bhiuadhamma': an Abhdhammika
Neologism and Its Probable Meaning . As regards the Abhidhammika
concept of nipphanna, see Y Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Mat.ter,
Department of Cultural Affairs, Colombo 1967, 42 ff.
4) VibhA 29. See also Bhikkhu ~Auamob (Tr.) , The Path of Purification,
Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, 1956, Fifth Edition, 1991, 856, nt. 18
5 ) Vsm709
6 ) Paul Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-

Body Problem, Open Court, Lasalle, Illinoiso, 1986.

7 ) Ibid., 29. I shall return to this text and Griffith's interpretation towards
the end of this essay
8 ) Mp, 68-69.
9 ) Y. PaMarAma, "PAliye hA Sinhalaye Vik!sanaya" in V. Kuaaladhamma
(editor) , Yakkaduve Ndhimiyilnangl Dharmaastriya Lipi, Vidy!lamk!ra Press, Kelaniya, 1983, 94, 95.
10) P. Vajirai'IAQa, Buddhist Meditation in Theory Q/ld Practice, Gunaaena &

- 65 -

What Happens to

VlnnW}a

in the Cessation Attainment?

Co., Colombo, 1962, 464.

11) G.C. Pande, &udies in tlae Origim of Buddhism, Motilal S.naraidaa,

Delhi, 3'" Ed1t1on, 1983, 537.

12) Cr. Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary ( 1946), 3'" revised and enlarged
edition by Nyanaponika, Frawlin and Co. Ltd, Colombo,1972, s.v.

nirodhasamapatti.
13) Pande, 536-537. For the relevant passages from the Majjhima Niklya, see

ibid., 537, nt. 142.

14) M 111 25-28.
15) M 11128.

16) MA IV 9().91.
17) Varn 702: Tattha Ira nirodhasamflpatu ti yd anupubba-nirodhaIJCJ$tna
cittaceuu1Jrtuia1Tl dhamm{J/l(;&.fTl appauaw.
18) 0. H.do A. Wijesekera, vitalism and Bocoming . Umvtrsity of Ceylon

Review, April 1943, 57:- "But on the question or a vital pr inciple in the
sa1T1sAric individual, tho position of early Buddhism is made clear in a
passage which has never so far boon discussed in this connection.
19) Ibid.
20) Rune Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvana, George, Allen and Unwin

Ltd ., London,1969, 105.

21) E.g., Vaj1rai'l6.Qa, 465.
22) The instance ia recorded in the Marataj1an1ya Sulla (M .1.333). Some

cowherds and wayfarers attempted, unsuccessrully, to cremate Sanjiva

who was thou1rht dead while in the Cessation Trance !
23) Pando, 134-135.

24) Accordin1r to Varn, 142, 530-531, etc., vitalcka and uicdra are conative
functions (cetand) or the mind occurring in the spoechdoor, the former
d rivinii the mind to the object, the latter fixing it on that object.
25) Wiieaekera, loc.aupra cit.
26) Ibid.
27) 0. H.de A. Wi1eaekera,

The

Concept of Vifti\loa in Theravada

Buddhism. Journal of American Oriental Society, 84/3, JulySeptember 1964, 257.

28) J ohanuon, 132.

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What Happens to Viii.IWJ}a in tho Ceaaation Attainment ?

29) Ibid., 107.

30) Ibid. 49-50; 108.
31) Ibid . 105.
32} Ibid. 105.
33} This is a text quite clear in itself, but has been grossly mistranslated by

Paul Griffith (op.cit., 7) t.o mean something qui~ absurd: lhat the person
who had attained the NS would incur immediate retribution for killinr a
parent or arahan I

34) Pm ( Bea}, IJ 525: Yadi hi aruppt nirodharri samfJpajjeyya, cittactuuikdna

'7l aiiiiaua

ca kassaci abhliuato apailna.U1ko ua bluweyya anupddutsaya

nibbdbadhdtuya parinibbwasadiso.

KL~aya111

up&Uzya nirodharri sam4

panno ti wcceyya7Kirrt114 tt4ya ua.Uhucintdya1 Angcwdall4to ua nauhi

{lrUppc nirodhasamapatti-sal'Mpajjana111.
35} Mp, 299-300
36) Mp, 300
37) Ibid. : DvinnQ'7l Maharaja santt pi sarire ciuarri appcwattarri hoti:

middhcuamarulhassa bhavangagatassa santt pi 11wre citta111 appavoJta111

hoti; nirodhasamapannassa sante pi sanre cittarri hoti)
38) VibhA, 405. For the question of moral imputability associated with

j<Wafla, see my article "Caltkhu-vinndr}a as Dassanamatta: Visual

Perception or Non-perceptual Vision?" in Rtctnt Rtuarchts in &uidhiat
SWdit1, Essays in Honour of Profusor Y. Karunadasa ( Eds K . L.
Dhammajyoti, A. Tilakaratne, K. Abhayaval'J'lsa) , Colombo, 1997, 540

566.
39) I have diacusaed this in my article "Life, Death and Murder: An AbhidhA
rmika Perspective" (pro manu1cripto) published in Sinhala as "Jivitaya,
Maraoaya hi OhAtanaya: Abhidharmika Vicrahayak in Aaanra
Tilakaratna, Editor, Abhidharmika Adhyana, Colombo, 1996, 189-205.

40) As I have explained in the article cited above.

Aloysius P11r11,S.J .
Tulane Re11aroh Center
Kohalwlla Rd .
Gonewala-Kelanlya

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What Happens to Vinii&}a in lhe Cessation Attainment?

Sri Lanka
alypOalt.lk
Biogra phical Note on the Author
Rev. Fr Aloysius Pieris,s.j. is a Roman Catholic Priest with doctorates
in both Buddhist Philosophy (Sr1 Lanka Univ, Vtdyodaya Campus) and in

Christian Theology (Univ. of Tillburg). He is the rounder-d1 recl0r of the

Tulana Research

Centre where researches into both Buddhism and

Chiristianity are undertaken.He is also the editor of Dialogue, an

international review for Buddhists and Christians begun
His research

articles

on

Buddhism

include:

Ill

1974.

"Colophon

lO

the

Paramatthamai\Jusi and the Date of Aacariya Dhammapala (GoUingen

1978); "The notions of Citta, AttA and Attabhiua in the Pali Exegetical
Writings" ( W. Rahula Felicitation Volume,1980) ; "the R ealism of tho Pali
Scholiasts as Reveled in Their Discussion of the Notion of DhamrrW"
(Ananda Guruge Felicitation Volume, 1990) ; Life, Death and Murder : An
abhidharmika Analysis" (in Simhala, in Abhidharma Adhayama, Colombo,
1996) ; "CahkhuuirVtdl).a as Dassanamatta:

Visual perception or Non-

Perceptual Vision?" (Karunadasa Felicitation Volume, 1997) ; "Vatthu and

Dhammd' A Lexicognphical Clarification (Journal of the PIPBS, Colombo,

1999).

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