FORCE

C O MPARISONS

NATO

ANDTHE

WARSAW
P AC T

FORCE
COMPARISONS

N A T O I N F O R M A T I O N S E R V I C E B R U S S E L S * 1 984

CO NTENTS

Page
Foreword

IN TRO D U C TIO N
-

G e n eral

Com paring NATO and W arsaw Pact Forces

The Prob l em s of M o b ilisa tio n a n d Reinforcem ent

C O N V EN TIO N A L FORCES
-

Land Forces

Air Forces and Air Defence Forces

10

M aritim e Forces

14

REG IO NA L C O N SID ER A TIO N S

-

Northern and Central R egions

19

Southern Region

21

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE A N D THE NUCLEAR EQ UATIO N

-

Strategic Nuclear Forces

26

Interm ediate- and Short-R ange Nuclear Forces

30

Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

43

NATO A N D W A R S A W PACT D E F E N C E /M IL IT A R Y EXPEN D ITU R E

45

M IL IT A R Y PRO D UC TIO N A N D TE C H N O LO G Y CAPABILITIES

47

E X P L A N A T O R Y NOTES FOR DATA

49

Editorial Note
France and Spain are members o f the North Atlantic Alliance but do not participate in its
integrated m ilitary structure. A t their request therefore no account o f French and Spanish forces
is taken in this comparison, although fu ll statements o f these forces are available in documents
published nationally.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Geographical D issim ilarities - A NATO Problem

Fig. 1

NATO - W a rsaw Pact Force Com parison

Fig. 2

Relative Trends in M ain Battle Tanks and Artillery

Fig. 3

NATO - W arsaw Pact C om bat A irc ra ft: quantitative com parisons

Fig. 4

Relative Trends in Anti-A ircraft A rti l lery and M o b ile Surface to Air M issile s

Fig. 5

Defence of Northern and Central R egions

Fig. 0

Defence of Southern Region

Fig. 7

Strategic Nuclear Force - M od ernisation Com parison :

introduction of selected system s year by year

Fig. 8

Total Strategic M issile s and Bombers

Fig. 9

Strategic Forces - Trends in Relative Advantages

Fig. 10

Short and Interm ediate Range Delivery System s : range com parison

Fig. 11

Short and Interm ediate Range Delivery S y s te m s : m odernisation com parison

Fig. 12

Longer-Range INF M issile System s deployed end 1 9 8 3

Fig. 13

Longer-Range INF M issile W arheads (global deploym ents)

Fig. 14

Target Coverage of S o viet S S -2 0 and Target Coverage of

NATO Pershing II and G LCM

Fig. 15

Coverage of Europe from S S -2 0 Bases East of the Urals

Fig. 1 6

NATO G LCM and Pershing I I Coverage

Fig. 17

Land-Based INF Aircraft deployed end 1 9 8 3

Fig. 18

Short-R ange Nuclear Forces (SNF) deployed end 1 9 8 3

Fig. 19

NATO and W arsaw Pact Countries in Europe and S oviet M ilita ry Districts

Fig. 2 0

FOREWORD

In 1982 NATO published for the first time an official comparison of the
forces belonging to the nations in the integrated military structure o f the
Alliance with those o f the countries o f the Warsaw Pact. The objective o f this
publication was to provide an authoritative, factual and objective source from
which the public could assess the relative strengths o f the two alliances and
hence the existing balance o f power. In order to continue this process member
nations have decided to publish a new edition providing more recent and up-todate information.
Any comparison o f military forces is inevitably a highly complex process
involving a wide range ofjudgements, each of which is capable of a wide range
o f interpretations. Furthermore a NATO Force Comparison represents the
consensus o f fourteen nations. A definitive assessment is therefore difficult to
achieve. However, every effort has been made to ensure a high degree of
accuracy and consistency. In this respect, and mindful of the need to retain as
much continuity as possible, several changes in the presentation of material
have been made in order to improve the document. In particular the method of
counting NATO and Warsaw Pact forces readily available in Europe has been
changed in order to present a more realistic picture.
The maintenance of an adequate balance offorces between East and West
is a fundamental requirement for Alliance security. NA TO remains determined
to pursue peace and stability through all possible means, including those of
dialogue and communication. But this can only be done on the basis o f a sound
military posture. The last 35 years bear testimony to NATOs success in
maintaining the peace. This document also serves to demonstrate the very
substantial resources and capabilities member nations have made and continue
to make available for the common defence of the Alliance. But perhaps more
significantly it illustrates that while we can be reasonably satisfied with our
performance in the past, the future gives less room for comfort. Disparities in a
number o f critical areas exist which if left unattended could further reduce the
flexibility of response necessary for credible deterrence.
This document demonstrates that our basic defence posture remains
sound. I believe it also underlines that continued efforts are necessary if we are

IN TR O D U C T IO N
General
1.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a defensive alliance of
sovereiqn and independent nations. It is dedicated to safeguarding the
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, and is founded
on the principles of individual liberty and the rule of law. The Alliance
aims to prevent war; indeed the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance
is to achieve a lasting peaceful order accompanied by appropriate security
guarantees.
It works to achieve this by strivinq to improve understanding
between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an
attack on any member of the Alliance.
The Treaty provides that Alliance
members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed
attack upon any one of them.
2.
At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn in June
1982, the Heads of State and Government declared:
"Our purpose is to
prevent war, and while safeauardinq democracy, to build the foundations of
lastino peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to
attack. We respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorial
inteqrity of all states.
In fulfilment of our purpose, we shall maintain
adequate military strength and political solidarity.
On that basis, we
will persevere in efforts to establish, whenever Soviet behaviour makes
this possible, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue,
negotiation and mutually advantageous co-operation."
3.
While NATO must ensure that its defences are adeguate to meet any
threat, it has consistently striven, through the pursuit of balanced,
verifiable and militarily significant arms control agreements, to ensure
s e c u r i t y at a r e d u c e d l e v e l of a r m aments.
On the ba s i s o f a W e s t e r n
initiative, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
Follow-up Meeting held in Madrid agreed to a mandate for a Conference on
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the
CDE, which opened in Stockholm in January 1984.
The Allies co-ordinate
their policies in this Conference and as a result a package of concrete
measures was presented to the CDE which, if agreed, will lead to greater
o p e n n e s s in t h e m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h t a k e pl a c e in the w h o l e of
Europe.
In addition, the NATO governments concerned continue to pursue
actively reductions and limitations on conventional forces in Central
Europe in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna.
At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States has presented
a comprehensive proposal for a comple te ban on chemical weapons.
4.
The Soviet Union discontinued the two negotiations with the
United States on intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons in November and
December 1983.
Nevertheless, in keeping with the 1979 two track decision,
the Allies continue to consult actively with a view toward the eventual
resumption of the talks on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). On the
basis of a concrete, balanced and verifiable agreement, the Allies are
willing to halt, modify or reverse the deployments now under way, in order
to obtain reductions to the lowest possible level on United States and
Soviet longer range INF.
The Allies also fully support the efforts of the
United States in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) to achieve
r e d u c t i o n s in U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c w e a p o n s .
Progress

achieved thus far in the INF negotiations and S TART indicate that results
are possible but these obviously require the return of the Soviet Union to
the negotiating table in Geneva.
Meanwhile, negotiations to reach mili
tarily significant, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements remain
an integral part of the security policies of the NATO Allies.
5.
Negotiations for phased arms limitations and reductions need to
take ac c o u n t o f the m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s o f the o t h e r s i d e so that the
Alliance's defensive capabilities remain guaranteed at each stage of the
negotiating process. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by NATO would give the
Soviet Union, which could not be relied upon to follow suit, an over
whelming military advantage. These efforts need the backing of a firm
defence policy and sufficient military strength to implement it. NATO must
continue to make clear to any potential aggressor that it has both the
political will and the military capabilities to defend its members.
This
is deterrence.
Such a policy is the greatest safeguard against an attack
on any member of the Alliance or against the use of a threat of military
force as a means of coercion.
6.
The size and type of forces which could be used against NATO
influence the kinds of forces the Alliance needs to deter a military threat
and t h e r e b y to p r e v e n t a g g r e s s i o n in any form.
N A T O as a d e f e n s i v e
alliance does not seek superiority nor does it attempt to match the Warsaw
Pact man for man or system for system. However, if peace and stability are
to be preserved, the relationship between the overall military capabilities
both nuclear and conventional of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must not become
so unbalanced that the credibility of N A T O
s deterrent could be called into
question.
In other words, the Alliance requires enough forces of the right
kinds to make clear that it would be able to respond to any type of aggres
sion in an e f f e c t i v e way.
The N A T O d e t e r r e n t c o m p r i s e s c o n v e n t i o n a l
forces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces and strategic nuclear
forces.
Adequate conventional forces are required in order to deprive the
Warsaw Pact of the chance of military success without recourse to other
capabilities.
To achieve this, NATO's conventional forces must be capable
of the forward defence of NATO's territories and the safeguarding of the
sea lines of communication. The United States strategic nuclear forces are
the ultimate guarantee of NATO's security in that they link an aggressor's
decision to attack with the incalculable risk of total destruction. Well
balanced intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces are essential to NATO
as the link between the conventional and strategic legs of the NATO Triad.
Possession of these capabilities is necessary to enable the Alliance to
choose amongst a number of options and to ensure that an aggressor is left
in no doubt about NATO's readiness and will to defend itself while leaving
it uncertain about the form that defence would take.
This is the essence
of NATO's overall strategy known as "flexible response". For deterrence to
be effective the Alliance must be able both to make credible its capability
and willingness to defend itself and to make the risks unacceptable for
any potential aggressor.
7.
The Warsaw Pact leadership has repeatedly stated that the Warsaw
Pact is strictly defensive in nature.
Past and present policies have
however contradicted their statements. Further, the Warsaw Pact's military
strength is on a scale well in excess of that reasonably justifiable for
defence.
The Warsaw Pact maintains large-scale strategic nuclear forces,
intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces, and massive conventional
forces. Moreover, Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature

2 -

and military exercises calls for large scale penetration into enemy ter
ritory in order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasise
the element of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations.
8.
Warsaw Pact forces are organised and equipped and trained to take
the o f f e n s i v e right from t h e b e g i n n i n g of a c o n f l i c t .
This i n v o l v e s
combined arms operations in which all forces, conventional and nuclear, can
be brought to bear in a unified manner, using all necessary assets.
To
this end, some fundamental reorganisation and restructuring of Soviet
forces has been in progress for several years and is still incomplete. The
main outcome has been leaner combat units with proportionately higher
combat power in support of updated tactics and concepts. For example, the
reorganisation of the Soviet tank and motorised divisions is resulting in
an increased number of tanks and especially artillery pieces. With regard
to t he air forces, the c o n t r o l of the S o v i e t S t r a t e g i c and T a c t i c a l
Bomber forces has been centralised recently under the command of four air
armies in those parts of the Warsaw Pact which face NATO. Soviet military
capabilities would enable the use of chemical weapons on a large scale.

Comparin g NATO an d Warsaw Pact Forces

9.
Many factors contribute to the capability to deter or defend
against aggression.
These include political and social stability, geo
graphy, economic strength, human resources, industrial and technological
resources, as well as military capabilities. The military forces possessed
by each side are clearly important but are not the only elements in this
equation and in comparing each side's military forces it is important to
avoid over-simplification.
A complete assessment of the global balance of
power would have to take into account forces other than those that are
available to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Even if consideration was to be
restricted to NATO and the Warsaw Pact capabilities only, a full assessment
would have to take into account not just the conventional forces deployed
by each side in Europe but also certain worldwide deployments by a number
of NATO countries as well as by the Soviet Union.
For instance, both the
United States and the Soviet Union maintain substantial forces in Asia and
the Pacific.
10.
In addition to quantifiable force differences there are also
other elements important to an understanding of the balance. These include,
for example, differences in military strategy and structure, political
organisation and cohesion, the qualitative aspect of forces and the avail
ability of timely reinforcements.
Other important considerations are the
amount of ammunition, fuel and other stocks possessed by each side, the
quality of their equipment, the quality of their civil and military infra
s t r u c t u r e , t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n , t h e i r p e r s o n n e l , their l e a d e r s h i p a n d
morale, as well as each side's economic, industrial and technological
ability to sustain a military conflict. This publication cannot attempt to
cover all these issues. Instead, it supplies up-to-date information on the
more important aspects of the military postures of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, thus providinq the reader with a basis for forming his own judge
ments. In addition, it must be realised that both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact deploy a number of weapon systems capable of being used both in a
conventional and a nuclear role; in general such systems are considered in
both the conventional and the nuclear sections.
The allocation of forces
shown in this publication is for comparative purposes only and does not
necessarily correspond to any specific scenario or situation.

- 3 -

11.
Geographic and economic dissimilarities between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact directly affect the roles and missions of their armed forces.
For example, the Warsaw Pact is one geographic entity in contrast to NATO,
which is separated by oceans, seas and in some regions, particularly in the
south, by the territory of nations which are not members of the Alliance.
This allows the Warsaw Pact to transfer land and air forces and support
b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t ar e a s v i a i n t e r n a l a n d g e n e r a l l y s e c u r e l i n e s of
communications.
It also contributes to enabling the Warsaw Pact to select
the time and place in which to concentrate its forces.
However, Soviet
naval forces are divided into four widely separated fleets; this makes it
difficult for them to mass naval power for joint operations or to maintain
an effective naval presence for sustained periods away from home ports.
12.
NATO, on the other hand, must transfer resources along lengthy
and vulnerable air and sea routes to and around Europe. The most powerful
partner in NATO, the United States, is separated from its European allies
by an ocean 6,000 km wide. Moreover, NATO nations, to a far greater extent
than those of the W a r s a w Pact, d e p e n d on s h i p p i n g for vi t a l e c o n o m i c
purposes. Thus, unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a fundamental dependence
on shipping during peace and war.
This fact requires markedly different
missions for Warsaw Pact naval forces on the one hand and NATO naval forces
on th e other.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , N A T O l a c k s g e o g r a p h i c a l d e p t h in E u r o p e
between the possible areas of conflict and the coasts, so rendering its
rear areas, headquarters and supplies more vulnerable to enemy attack and
more difficult to defend.
13.
The Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of some 6 million
personnel of which some 4 million face NATO in Europe.
In addition, there
are over 800,000 personnel with some military training enrolled in the
national security forces.
Warsaw Pact active and reserve forces worldwide
include 246 divisions plus 29 brigades, with 61,000 main battle tanks and
air forces equipped with nearly 13,000 aircraft.
Ground and air forces in
Europe are forward deployed, well structured, positioned and prepared for
offensive operations. The Warsaw Pact possesses an impressive inventory of
na v a l forces, the largest c o m p o n e n t o f w h i c h is the S o v i e t Navy.
In
addition to ballistic missile submarines Warsaw Pact active naval forces
include nearly 290 other submarines (a number of which are equipped to
launch Cruise missiles), about 40 major surface combatant ships (Kiev
class ships and cruisers) and about 400 naval bombers (most of which are
equipped to deliver anti-ship missiles).
A large number of these forces
are not in the NATO/ Warsaw Pact area and indeed some, primarily those of
the Soviet Union, are deployed worldwide. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has, in
re cent years, s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p r o v e d t h e q u a l i t y of e q u i p m e n t in all
components of its armed forces; strategic, ground, air and naval.
14.
The standing forces of the NATO nations total 4.5 million per
sonnel, of which nearly 2.6 million are stationed in Europe.
There are
also nearly 400,000 other militarily trained personnel, such as Home Guards
a nd G e n d a r m e r i e .
Total a c t i v e a n d r e s e r v e f o r c e s b e l o n g i n g to NATO
nations, but not all committed to NATO, include 82 divisions and over 180
independent brigades (normally in NATO 3 brigades equal 1 division), with
about 25,000 main battle tanks and air forces equipped with approximately
11,200 combat aircraft.
NATO forces are well trained and, given the full
ra n g e of c a p a b i l i t i e s at t h e i r d i s posal, are c a p a b l e of p r e s e n t i n g a
credible defence of Alliance territory. In most NATO countries, modern and
effective aircraft, tanks and anti-tank weapons are being introduced into

- 4 -

GEOGRAPHICAL D ISS IM ILA R I T IES

A NATO PROBLEM

00

Reinforcements 650 km
from Western Borders of USSR

Reinforcements 60
km
from North America

FIGURE 1

the armed forces.

The naval forces of some NATO nations include elements
deployed on a worldwide basis. Of an overall total of just over 200 attack
submarines, 45 major combatant ships (carriers and cruisers), and some
3,700 land and sea based maritime aircraft (including helicopters), not all
could be made available in the NATO area. That is to say, the forces shown
as available to NATO are not a simple aggregation of the forces possessed
by each member country, but are based on availability and allocation(1).
15.
The global figures given in the previous paragraphs have been
mentioned so that the statistics and comparisons which follow can be seen
in the i r p r o p e r p e r s p e c t i v e .
For the most part, the d i s c u s s i o n that
follows includes only those forces which could be expected to be available
to NATO (less those of France and Spain) and those of the Warsaw Pact
which it is considered would be facing them.
The focus is on Europe.
Brief reference is made to the United States, Canadian and Soviet naval
forces in the Pacific but the Soviet forces facing China have not been
included.

The Problems of Mobilisation and Reinforcement

16.
NATO and Warsaw Pact forces rely heavily on the mobilization of
r e s e r v i s t s to b r i n g a c t i v e duty f o r m a t i o n s up to s t r e n g t h a n d to man
mobilizable formations.
However the closely controlled social structures
of the Warsaw Pact nations and the length and intensiveness of the training
of their military conscripts permit them to maintain a more significant
pool of trained reserve manpower than is maintained by NATO.
17.
The bulk of NATO's reinforcements of men and equipment must be
moved across the Atlantic and the English Channel largely by sea.
The
Warsaw Pact on the other hand can move many of its central reserves rapidly
by means of internal road, rail and air links.
NATO could not sustain an
effective defence against these reinforced Warsaw Pact forces solely with
in-place forces. Therefore a successful defence would be largely dependent
upon the timely arrival of substantial reinforcements, principally from the
United States, but also from Canada and in Europe itself from the United
Kingdom and Portugal.
However, the problems would be considerable even
with reasonable warning time.
The rapid reinforcement of land forces is a
very complex operation that demands the timely availability of numerous
resources, particularly transport aircraft and shipping as well as recep
tion and prepositioned equipment storage facilities.
Reinforcement of
air forces involves infrastructure and logistic problems of a different but
also complex nature, particularly in the areas of survivability and combat
support.
W h i l e t h e r e are a c o n s i d e r a b l e n u m b e r of r e i n f o r c e m e n t air
squadrons available to cross the Atlantic within a few hours, they would
have to wait for the subsequent arrival of their ground crew and support
equipment before they could become operational.
18.
As will be seen from the sections that follow, standing Warsaw
Pact forces are more numerous than those of NATO.
This advantage for the
Warsaw Pact is likely to remain and indeed could increase at least for some
considerable time as both sides reinforce.
NATO would have to bring most
of its reinforcements, and particularly the associated equipment, across
the Atlantic, while the Warsaw Pact would benefit from internal and shorter
lines of communication.
(1)

For more detailed explanation see Explanatory Notes.

6 -

C O N V E N T IO N A L FORCES
Land f o rces
19.
Warsaw Pact forces facing Allied Command Europe (ACE), which is
the NATO military command which stretches from the northern tip of Norway
to the eastern borders of Turkey, consist of about 167 active and mobilis
able divisions plus the eguivalent of 9 divisions of airborne, air assault
and air-mobile formations, which could be used in a number of different
areas.
T a k i n g a c c o u n t o f the f o r c e s of t h e N o n - S o v i e t W a r s a w Pact
countries, the Soviet forces located in those countries but only the high
readiness forces of the six Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union,
there are some 115 divisions positioned well forward or considered ready to
fight at very short notice.
Moreover, these standing Warsaw Pact forces
can be reinforced by about 16 divisions from the Strategic Reserve based in
the central Military Districts of Russia (Moscow, Ural and Volga Military
Districts). Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than
NATO divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby producing
similar combat power.
Their principal offensive conventional capabil
ities consist of tanks, modern mechanised infantry vehicles and highly
mobile long-range artillery and mortars; large numbers of these are to be
found in all their units. Soviet forces possess a wide variety of chemical
agents and delivery systems and are the best eguipped in the world to
sustain operations in a chemical environment.
Growing numbers of trans
port, support and attack helicopters provide the Warsaw Pact with a quick
assault and reaction capability, and with a supplement to their fixed-wing
tactical aircraft in the battlefield area.
A significant number of new
electronic warfare helicopters have appeared in Soviet units during the
past two years.
20. Land forces committed to NATO and stationed in or rapidly deploy
able to Europe, consist of the equivalent of some 88 active and mobilisable
divisions (includinq three airborne/air mobile divisions), many of which
are also ready to fight at very short notice.
There are in addition the
equivalent of 12 active United States divisions plus one Armoured Cavalry
Regiment, two United States Marine divisions and a Canadian brigade in
North America which could be made available in Europe in due course. Four
of these United States' divisions have their eguipment prepositioned in
Europe.
Almost half of NATO's tank and mechanised divisions are equipped
with modern weapons although a very unfavourable ratio continues between
NATO anti-tank guided weapons and Warsaw Pact tanks and armoured personnel
vehicles. NATO similarly has a lower proportion of armed attack heli
copters.
Only the United States has a retaliatory chemical capability,
and a number of NATO nations lack even adequate protection against chemical
weapons.
21.
The comparison of NATO and the Warsaw Pact division equivalent
strenqth and numbers of major equipments has been made in a different way
from that used in the 1982 edition of this publication. Figure 2 illus
trates the imbalance of land forces in favour of the Warsaw Pact under two
conditions - forces in place in Europe reinforced by rapidly deployable
f o r c e s ; a nd f o r c e s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of full r e i n f o r c e m e n t .
W i t h the
exception of helicopters, the ratios of major formations and eguipments
worsen appreciably with full reinforcement.
The total number of Warsaw
Pact armoured vehicles includes armoured personnel carriers and infantry

- 7 -

NATO - WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON

NATO

tegiSf/issi

W A R S A W PACT |
Forces in Place in Europe
Reinforced by Rapidly
Deployable Forces *

T O T A L M ILIT ARY
IN C L U D IN G
NA VA L F O R C E S

NO TE S:

Fully Reinforced Forces

DIV ISION
E Q U IV A L E N T S

M A IN B A T T L E T A N K S
{Main armament SO mm
and above)

A N TI-TA N K
GUIDED W EA PON LAUNCHERS
(Crew served and/or mounied)

W A R S A W PA C T D IVISIO N S N O R M A L LY CO N S IS T OF FEW ER PERSONNEL TH AN M A N Y NATO D IVISIO N S

BU T CO NTAIN M O R E TANKS A N D ARTILLERY, THEREBY O BTAINING S IM ILA R C O M B A T POWER.

A R T IL L E R Y / M O R T A R S
{tubes 1 0 0 mm and above
including Rocket Launchers)

ARM OURED PERSONNEL

C A R R IE R S & IN FA N T R Y
F IG H T I N G V E H IC L E S
6 OTHER ARM OURED
V E H IC L E S

A T TA C K
H E L IC O P T E R S

TRANSPORT/SUPPORT
H E L IC O P T E R S

R A P ID LY DEPLO YABLE FORCES - IN C L U D E THOSE U.S. FORCES W HO SE E Q U IPM EN T IS STORED IN

EUROPE A N D H IG H -R E A D I NESS SO VIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE BALTIC. BELORUSSIAN, CARPATHIAN. O DES SA
K IE V A N D NO RTH C AUC ASU S M ILIT A R Y DISTRICTS.
FU LLY REINFORCED FORCES - IN C LU D E NORTH A M E R IC A N REINFO RCEM ENTS A N D ALL W A R S A W PACT FORCES
LOCATED W ES T OF THE URAL M O U N TA IN S

FIG U R E 2

RELATIVE TRENDS IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND ARTILLERY

(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)

MAIN BATTLE TANKS

ARTILLERY/MORTARS
(TUBES 100mm A N D A B O V E

(M A IN A R M A M E N T 90m m A N D A B O V E )

IN C LU D IN G RO CKET LA U N C H E R S )
FIGURE 3

fighting vehicles, and additional armoured vehicles whose primary role is

command and control, forward air control and reconnaissance but which also
have a secondary rle of direct combat. NATO forces have been counted in a
s i m i l a r m a n ner.
The a n t i - t a n k g u i d e d w e a p o n s m o u n t e d on W a r s a w Pact
vehicles for self-defence have been included in the total figures as have
been helicopter-mounted anti-tank guided weapons to ensure an accurate
comparison with NATO forces.
The number of NATO and Warsaw Pact crewserved anti-tank guided weapon launchers in place in Europe is about the
same but a significant imbalance exists in favour of the Warsaw Pact for
launchers mounted on helicopters and armoured vehicles.
22.
Relative trends over the last few years for NATO main battle
tanks and artillery/mortars in place in Europe and those of the Warsaw Pact
including all those located in the six Western Military Districts, are
shown in Figure 3.

Air Forces and Air Defence Forces

23.
The o v e r a l l g l o b a l total of W a r s a w Pact a i r c r a f t is n e a r l y
13,000(2).
More than 10,000(2) of these are facing NATO Europe, of which
7,500(2) are of types technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
The majority of these aircraft would likely be used in conventional attacks
over NATO Europe. The total number of combat aircraft in operational units
facing NATO Europe is 7,430 (see Figure 4 ). Warsaw Pact air defence forces
as far east as the Ur a l s (but e x c l u d i n g th o s e in t h e M o s c o w M i l i t a r y
and Air Defence Districts) consist of some 4,195 interceptor/air-combat
aircraft.
Many of these aircraft can be used in offensive roles such as
assuring air superiority over the battlefield and they are backed up by
extensive modern surface-to-air missile systems.
Additionally there are
some 2,250 ground-attack fighter bombers, 585 reconnaissance aircraft and
about 400 bombers (including 65 Backfire bombers), the majority of which
w o u l d lik e l y be u s e d in a c o n v e n t i o n a l role.
The B a c k f i r e and o t h e r
strategic bombers however, are dealt with in the nuclear section.
These
air forces could be reinforced rapidly with some 540 combat aircraft from
S ignificant numbers of new combat aircraft are introduced
central Russia.
each year, replacing older models which were less capable than NATO air
craft of the same generation.
The introduction of these modern tactical
aircraft has considerably increased the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability.
These latest aircraft are capable of carrying up to twice the payload, can
t r a v e l o v e r t h r e e t i m e s t h e range, at h i g h e r s p e eds, a n d c a n c o n d u c t
operations at lower altitudes than the aircraft they are replacing; this
renders them less vulnerable to NATO air defences.
Their increased combat
radius would allow for Warsaw Pact operations from more distant bases in
case of Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO.
This would mean that NATO
fighter-bombers would have to penetrate much deeper into defended enemy
airspace to counter-attack Warsaw Pact airbases. Additionally, an increa
sing proportion of these modern aircraft can operate in adverse weather
conditions by day or by night.

(2)

These totals include all aircraft of corribat types includinq those in

non-combat units as well as combat units (a criterion essential for
arms control); all other numbers are based on aircraft in combat
units.

10

NATO-WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFT

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS
SELECTED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE
(EXCLUDING M O SCO W AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT)
4195
W A R S A W PACT
TU-22M
BACKFIR E
T U- I6
BAD GER
T U- 22
BLIN DER
YAK-28
BREWER
SU-24
FENCER
FIDDLER
TU-28
FISH BED
MIG-21
SU-7
FITTER A
F I TTE R C/ D / H / E / G / H / J SU -I7 /22
S U-I5
FLAGON
FLO GGE P B/G
M IG - 2 3
FLOG GER D/J
MI G- 2 7
MIG-25
FOXB AT A/B /D/ E
FO XHO UND A
MIG-31
FR OGFOOT
S U-25
FULC RUM
MIG-2 9

2,990 Total in Europe

A-7
F-I5
F-I6
F -5 .RF-5

FIDD LER
FI SH B E D
FLAGON
F L O G G E R B/G
FOXB AT A/E
FOXH O U N D
FU L C RUM

F E NC ER
FITT ER
FL G GER D/H/J
FR OGF OOT

A L P H A -JE T
BU CC A N E E R
C O R SA IR II
F I G H T I N G FALCON
F R E E D O M FIG HTE R
HAR RIE R
J A GU AR
PH A N TOM
STARFIGHTER
T H U N D E R B O L T II
TO RN A D O
F-III
----------------> -

NATO
ALPHA-JET
BUCCANEER
C O R S A I R II
EAGLE
F IG H T I N G FALCON
F R E E D O M F IGH T E R
H AR R I E R
JAGUAR
MIRAGE 5
MI RA G E
PH AN T O M
STARFIGHTER
T H U N D E R B O L T II
TORNADO

W ARSAW PACT
Aircraft
7,430 Total in Europe

NATO Aircraft

----------

2250
1960

EAGLE
F I G H T I N G FALCON
M I RA GE
PHANTOM
STARFIGHTER

FR EE D O M FIG H T E R
JAGUAR
MIRAGE 5
PHA NTO M
STARFIGHTER
TO RN A D O
EF-III
TR-I

BA CKFIRE
BADGER
BLINDER

BADGER
B L I ND ER C
BREWE R
FISHBED H
FITTE R H
FOXBA T B/D

M5BR.M5BA
F-I
F-4. RF- 4
F- I 04, R F -10
A-IO

NATO

NATO

F-III
EF-III
TR-I

1974

1983

BOMBERS

1974

1983

1974

1983

1974

1983

FIGHTER BOMBERS
GROUND/ATTACK

1974

1983

1974

1983

INTERCEPTORS

1974

1983

1974

1983

RECONNAISSANCE

NB. A L AR GE P RO P O R T I O N OF I N T E RCE PTO R A I R C R A F T CAN BE USE D IN G R O U N D / A T T A C K ROLES.

THE FIGUR ES M E N T I O N E D A BOV E R E FE R T O C O M B A T A I R C R A F T IN O P E R A T I O N A L U NI TS ONLY.

FIG U R E 4

RELATIVE TRENDS IN ANTI-A IRCRAFT ARTILLERY

AND MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES
(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)

ANT I-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

20m m CA LIB R E A N D OVER

MOB ILE SURFACE TO AIR

MISSILE LAUNCHERS
-p o r t a b l e
IN F A N T R Y W E A P O N S

e x c l u d in g

FIGURE 5

m a n

24.
The Warsaw P act airlift capability is substantial. Soviet mili
tary transport aviation alone, consisting of over 610 long and medium
range aircraft, provides sufficient airlift to transport one complete
airborne division and its equipment at any one time up to distances of
2,000 km.
This capability can be supplemented in particular by Aeroflot
civilian aircraft.

NAT0-WARSAW

PACT

Fighter-Bomber
Ground-Attack

COMBAT

AIRCRAFT

Interceptor

IN P L A C E

Reconnaissance

NATO

1,960

795

235

WARSAW PACT

2,250

4,195

585

N .B.

IN E U R O P E
Bombers

400(3)

Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

25. The overall qlobal total of aircraft belonging to NATO countries

is sliqhtly more than 11,000.
The land-based air forces, available in
place for NATO's Allied Command Europe, consist of 1,960 qround-attack
fighter bombers, 795 interceptors and 235 reconnaissance aircraft.
In
addition to fiqhtinq the air battle air forces would have to assist NATO
qround forces in repulsing a Warsaw Pact attack.
The United States and
Canada could reinforce rapidly with some 1,750 more combat aircraft, though
airlift would be required for qround crew and equipment.
The quality of
NATO aircraft has improved with the introduction into service of the F15,
F-16 and the Tornado.
These aircraft have a qreater ranqe, payload and
all-weather capability than the previous qeneration of NATO aircraft.
However, since NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft now have comparable ranqe and
payload characteristics the quantitative advantaqe of the Warsaw Pact is
more siqnificant than formerly.
26.
NATO's military airlift assets consist of nearly 750 transport
aircraft, which can be augmented by the civil air fleets of the Allied
countries.
These are considerably larger than the civil air fleets avail
able to the Warsaw Pact.
However the latter are centrally controlled.
27.
NATO nations have made considerable progress in improving the
ability of their air forces to operate and survive in a hostile environ
ment, particularly by providing better protection for vital operational and
logistical facilities.
To a considerable degree, NATO air forces maintain
a hiqh state of readiness and are qualitatively superior to those of the
W a r s a w Pact in t e r m s o f t r a i n i n o and w e a p o n s systems.
The t a c t i c a l
flexibility of NATO air forces and the ability to augment in-place forces
rapidly in time of tension or war are also positive factors.
air

(3)

28.
Warsaw Pact forces have an extensive range of static and mobile
defences, including a variety of surface-to-air missiles and guns.

This fiqure does not include Bison and Bear strateoic bombers or
support aircraft such as tankers or those used for command and control
or electronic warfare.

13 -

F i g u r e 5 s h o w s the r e l a t i v e t r e n d s over the past few y e a r s for NATO

anti-aircraft artillery and mobile surface-to-air missile launchers in
place in Europe and those of the Warsaw Pact including all those located in
the six Western Military Districts. As Figure 5 shows, the Warsaw Pact has
nearly 4,000 more anti-aircraft guns than NATO has and more than three
times as many mobile surface-to-air missile systems (SAM) as NATO.
This,
together with large numbers of interceptors, produces a very hostile air
e n v i r o n m e n t over a n d b e h i n d a d v a n c i n g en e m y g r o u n d f o r m a t i o n s ; this
requires a combination of low-level tactics and electronic countermeasures
for NATO air c r a f t .
A l l this w o u l d m a k e it very d i f f i c u l t to c o n d u c t
operations successfully over and behind the battle area.

Maritime Fo rces
29.
As noted earlier there are fundamental differences in the mis
sions of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO that result from
qeographic and economic dissimilarities.
The security of NATO nations
depends on the unimpeded use of the sea both to link the potential of North
America and Europe and to provide access for trade, raw materials and
energy. The role of the NATO navies as for all NATO forces is in the first
instance to deter aqqression.
They must be able to demonstrate a capabil
ity in peace and take action in war to preserve, protect and maintain the
sea lines of communication, neutralise hostile forces, and to project
maritime power in support of land and air forces. In other words, the role
of NATO maritime forces is sea control, which means using the seas for
NATO's p u r p o s e s .
C o n v e r s e l y , as c o n t i n e n t a l powers, t h e W a r s a w Pact
nations have far less dependence on the sea. The role of their navies
includes the denial to NATO of its use of maritime power, the disruption of
NATO's sea lines of communication and possibly the conduct and support of
amphibious operations in North Norway, on the Baltic exits and in Northern
Turkey.
30. Historical precedents demonstrate that the defence of the use of
the sea demands far greater resources than the denial of its use, and thus
the maritime balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be seen in this
perspective. Accordingly, in the Atlantic, NATO's emphasis would be on
protection of reinforcement and supply shipping primarily from submarine
attacks; whereas in the critically important Channel area in addition to
submarines the greatest risks to reinforcement and supply routes would be
from mines, aircraft and missile systems.
31.
Allied control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of conflict
would have to be sufficient to inhibit access by Soviet naval forces into
the Atlantic.
It would also be necessary in conjunction with land and air
forces, to protect NATO's Northern Region as a whole, including Norway,
especially its air and naval facilities, Iceland, Denmark and the Faroes
and to control the Baltic Straits to prevent the Soviet Fleet from trans
iting to and from the North Sea and Channel areas.
32.
The Iberian Atlantic area is of importance to NATO's defence
because of the vital sea lines of communication to the NATO Southern Region
and to sources of vital raw materials and oil.
33.
In NATO's Southern Region itself, maritime forces have a major
part to play in the defence of the region as a whole.
Their role is to

14 -

support the land and air forces and maintain the sea lines of communication
in the Mediterranean in the face of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
They also have the task of securing the Turkish and Gibraltar Straits,
in order to deny the Soviet Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean and
to guarantee the flow of reinforcements and resupplies to NATO Southern
Region.
34.
These and other differences in the naval missions of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact are reflected in the different types and quantities of their
naval forces.
Simple numerical comparisons of types of ships do not tell
the full story.
The naval balance may be more usefully compared in terms
of the abilities of the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to accom
plish their respective missions in the face of opposi
tion by the other side.

Warsaw Pact Naval Fo rces

35.
The Warsaw Pact navies include an increasingly modernised sub
marine force which poses a serious threat to NATO's sea lines of commun
ication.
There is also a wide range of modern surface vessels fitted with
anti-submarine weapons systems, anti-air missiles and some which carry
fixed-wing aircraft and/or helicopters.
The capabilities of these naval
forces, c o m p l e m e n t e d by a for c e of l a n d - b a s e d n a v a l a t t a c k ai r c r aft,
include stand-off weapons and cruise missiles.
Approximate numbers of
Warsaw Pact naval forces expected to face NATO (i.e. excluding the Pacific
Fleet) are shown on page 16 for 1971, 1981 and 1983, to provide a trend in
quantitative terms.
36.
Together with the numerical increases in larger ships, nuclearpowered submarines and attack aircraft, major qualitative improvements are
being made in Soviet naval forces, particularly in submarines and large
warships but also in naval aircraft.
The Soviet Navy has thus been trans
formed during the last decade from a mainly coastal defence force to an
offensive force capable of global power projection. This improved capabil
ity is demonstrated by the number of new classes of Soviet major warships
and nuclear submarines in their construction programme.
The Soviet Navy
continues to develop its modern anti-ship missile forces by constructing
four new classes of heavily armed missile cruisers and destroyers including
the 25,OOO ton nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov. In the Kiev class ships, the
Soviet Union, for the first time, has sea-based fixed-wing Forger aircraft
in operation.
In the last three years the Soviet Navy has introduced
higher-performance submarines.
The Oscar class was deployed in 1980, the
first Typhoon class, the largest submarine ever built, was commissioned in
1981; and the new 40 knot Alpha class boats, with titanium hulls which
enable them to dive deeper and thus make them harder to detect, are in
service.

Soviet Pacific Fleet

37.
In addition to the Warsaw Pact maritime assets that face NATO,
there are significant Soviet naval and naval air forces located elsewhere

15 -

that could be deployed against NATO forces.

aircraft are:

The numbers of major units and

Cruise missile
1 submarines
Long-range attack
submarines
13
Naval aviation
74 aircraft
including helicopters
31

Kiev class ships

Cruisers
Destroyers and frigates
Ballistic missile submarines

22
43
440

W arsaw Pact Auxiliary Fleets

38.
The Warsaw Pact merchant, fishing and oceanographic fleets,
unlike those belonging to NATO nations, are state-owned and under cen
tralised command and control:
this enables them to operate on a regular
basis in support of naval forces.
Particularly important are their intel
ligence gathering and logistic support operations. In wartime these assets
would become even more valuable.
Additional roles would then include
support of amphibious operations and possibly minelaying.
NATO A ND WARSAW PACT M A R ITIM E FORCES IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC AND S EAS BORDERING EUROPE
NATO

W A R S A W PACT

CA TEGO RY
1971

1981

1983

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS : VSTOL CARRIERS

10

KIEV CLASS SHIPS

HELIC OPTER CARRIERS

11

15

14

DESTROY ER S A ND FRIGATES

381

274

COASTAL E SCORTS AND FAST PATROL BOATS

180

- O C E A N -G O IN G
- IN D E P E N D E N T
COASTAL CRAFT

1971

1981

1983

20

21

23

277

142

182

187

167

192

553

551

515

24

41

44

16

19

62

69

69

190

155

174

MINE WARFARE SHIPS

349

257

273

374

360

378

TOTAL SU B M A R IN ES (ALL TYPES)

195

190

197

248

258

246

CRUISERS

A M PHIBIOUS SHIP S

'

- BALLISTIC MISSILE SU B M AR IN ES

38(1)

35(1)

35(1)

- LON G RA N GE ATTACK SU B M AR IN ES

72

60

67

115

149

142

- OT H E R TYPES

85

95

95

95

57

55

- % SU B M AR IN ES NUCLEAR P OW E R ED

50%

49 %

50 %

32 %

45 %

64%

SE A -B A S E O TACTICAL A S W AN O SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT IN CLUDIN G HELIC OPTERS

801

712

685

U N O - B A S E D TACTICAL A N D SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT IN CLUDIN G HELIC OPTERS

112

180

366(2)

LA N D -B A S E D A N TI-S UB M A RIN E WARFARE

FIX ED-W IN G AIRCRAFT A ND HELIC OPTERS

471

450

454

(1) Also referred to in the section on nuclear forces

(2) For 1983. includes U.S. M arine Corps aircraft and helicopters
(3) About 300 o f these are bombers

16 -

38(1)

36

52(1)

49(1)

146

181

52 1 (3)

7 1 9 (3)

700 (3)

225

179

228

NATO Naval Fo rces

39.
There have been major qualitative improvements in individual
naval units and supporting systems of the NATO navies which are reflected
both in new construction and modernisation programmes.
Included amongst
such improvements are the capabilities of shipborne aircraft, anti-surface
s h i p m i s s i l e s , a n t i - s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e d e t e c t i o n s y s t e m s , c o m m a n d and
control, electronic warfare, and submarine noise suppression.
The strat
egic missile submarine forces have been enhanced with the introduction of
the OHIO class submarines and the Trident missile system.
Despite these
improvements, the high cost of ship construction has set a trend towards
less than one-for-one replacement.
40. The numbers in the tables comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime
forces indicate the strengths and capabilities called for by the different
missions of the forces concerned. For example, NATO is strong in sea-based
tactical air, land-based ASW/surveillance patrol aircraft, anti-submarine
systems, long-range amphibious forces and endurance at sea through under
way l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t a n d n u c l e a r p r o p u l s i o n .
On the o t h e r hand, t he
Warsaw Pact is particularly strong in anti-ship missile equipped ships,
submarines, and land-based attack aircraft, as well as in torpedo-attack
submarines and mine warfare forces.
Warsaw Pact naval forces have the
geographic handicap of long access routes from Murmansk around the North
Cape and the choke points created by the Baltic and the Turkish Straits.
However, since NATO is a defensive Alliance, the Warsaw Pact holds the
initiative of time and place in deploying its forces and in interdicting
In these cir
NATO sea lines of communicatio n upon which NATO depends.
cumstances, a substantial numerical advantage is needed by NATO as the
defending side.
41. However, NATO does not have the numerical advantage necessary for
a satisfactory or safe balance of maritime forces.
This is made worse by
the responsibilities which have fallen to some nations of the Alliance,
particularly the United States, to deploy forces outside the NATO area to
deter aggression and to respond to reguests by nations for help in resist
ing threats to their security and independence.
If this imbalance were to
continue the effect would be that essential maritime tasks could not be
carried out concurrently and that the priorities would be imposed by the
Warsaw Pact; moreover, a severe price might be paid in loss of control in
certain regions and this would result in early shipping losses before the
Soviet naval threat could be countered.

United States and Canadian Maritime Assets

42.
the seas
deployed
maritime
of these

In addition to maritime forces located in the North Atlantic and

bordering Europe and 34 United States ballistic missile submarines
w o r l d w i d e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s and C a n a d a m a i n t a i n a d d i t i o n a l
assets elsewhere that could be deployed in support of NATO. Some
forces are already earmarked for NATO.

Aircraft carriers
6
Cruis e rs
15
Destroyers a n d frigates
73
Long-range attack submarines
42
S e a - b a s e d tactical, anti-submari n e
warfare (ASW) and support aircraft
including helicopters
687

Land-based tactical and support

aircraft including helicopters

31

United States Marine Corps aircraft 1,203

Land-based ASW fixed wing aircraft
and helicopt e rs

17 -

284

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Northern and Central Regi ns

Land Fo rces
43.
Warsaw Pact forces facing this area consist of the equivalent of
s o m e 1 0 4 d i v i s i o n s d r a w n f r o m the a r m i e s o f the Soviet Union, G e r m a n
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and deploying some 27,380
tanks and 20,800 artillery and mortar pieces.
In the far north the Warsaw
Pact has two Soviet divisions.
Further south within the same Military
District are an additional 7 divisions including one airborne division.
The equivalent of 95 divisions face the southern part of the Northern
Region and Central Europe. Of these, the equivalent of almost 61 divisions
w i t h 1 6 , 6 2 0 t a n k s and 1 0 , 2 7 0
a r t i l l e r y and m o r t a r p i e c e s are e i t h e r
deployed in the forward areas or are held at high states of readiness. The
Warsaw Pact also has considerable amphibious capabilities in the Barents
Sea and the Baltic.

44.
Opposing the Warsaw Pact, NATO's in-place and rapidly deployable
land forces are composed of armed forces from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
The in-place and rapidly deployable
land forces of NATO in this area consist of the equivalent of nearly 43
divisions including those forces in the United Kingdom, fielding about
8,165 tanks and 4,920 artillery and mortar pieces including prepositioned
equipment. Most of these Northern and Central Region land forces are kept
in a high state of readiness, but deficiencies include some maldeployment,
and lines of supply which run too near and parallel to the border.
All
N A T O f o r m a t i o n s are d e p e n d e n t in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s on m o b i l i s a t i o n a nd
redeployment:
despite these problems approximately 75% of these forces
could be in position very quickly indeed. There are in addition active and
mobilisable United States forces located in North America amounting to some
20 divisions and 24 brigades which together with their associated equipment
a n d tanks, d r a w n from an o v e r a l l t o t a l o f some 4 , 1 0 0 t a n k s a n d 3 , 6 7 0
artillery/mortars, could be available to move to Europe in due course.
Some of these could be allocated to the Southern Region.
Up to three of
the divisions would arrive quickly by air. Other United States divisions,
with their equipment, would arrive later by sea. A Canadian brigade group
would also reinforce the area.

45.
As mentioned previously, some 61 of the 104 divisions in the
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Northern and
Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union could launch operations
within
a few d a y s of m o b i l i s a t i o n .
In the best s i t u a t i o n , a s s u m i n g
simultaneous mobilisation and deployment forward within the region, NATO
could count on the equivalent of nearly 43 divisions, which would have to
hold out until additional United States and Canadian forces arrive by sea.
In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact forces could be quickly expanded to their
full 104 divisions, plus a proportion of the 16 Strategic Reserve Divisions
from the three Central Military Districts.

19 -

DEFENCE OF NORTHERN A ND CENTRAL REGIONS

W A R S A W PACT
D IV IS IO N S
TANKS
A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R
N A TO
14 B R IG A D E G R O U P S
115 T A N K S
5 2 0 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R
W A R S A W PACT
D IV IS IO N S
1300 T A N K S
1 9 5 0 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R
N A T O A IR F O R C E S
1 3 45 F IG H T E R /B O M B E R S
5 0 0 IN T E R C E P T O R S
145

R E C O N N A IS S A N C E

N A TO
38 D IV IS IO N S
8050 TANKS
W A R S A W PACT

4 4 0 0 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R
61

D IV IS IO N S

16620 TANKS
1 0 2 7 0 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

W A R S A W PACT
1 5 5 5 F IG H T E R /B O M B E R S
2635

IN T E R C E P T O R S

3 9 0 R E C O N N A IS S A N C E

Depicts Forces in place in Europe reinforced by rapidly deployable forces.

FIGURE 6

Air Fo rces
46.
The Warsaw Pact is numerically superior in terms of fixed-wing
tactical aircraft in this area.
The NATO figures shown below include
United Kingdom based aircraft and United States aircraft based in Europe in
peacetime.
The high proportion of ground-attack fighter bomber aircraft
in NATO air forces is partly required to counter the Warsaw Pact prepon
derance in armour on the Central Front.
Against this force, however, the
Warsaw Pact can deploy interceptor forces, many of which can also be used
for ground attack, and exceptionally strong surface-to-air defence systems.
Aircraft of the Moscow Military and Air Defence District are excluded from
t h e f o l l o w i n g ta b l e b e c a u s e of their d i s t a n c e from the
Northern and
Also nearly 1,800 United States and Canadian-based
Southern R egions.
reinforcement aircraft, which are situated even further from these regions,
are excluded.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS - IN PLACE AIR FORCES

F ighter/Bomber
Ground/Attack

Interceptors

Reconnaissance

NATO

1,345

500

145

WARSAW PACT

1,555

2,635

390

N.B. Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

Southern Region
Land Forces
47.
The Warsaw Pact has 10 Soviet and Hungarian divisions, equipped
with over 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces which could be employed
against North-East Italy.
These divisions, located in Hungary, could be
reinforced by 7 more divisions including 2,000 tanks and 1,300 artillery
pieces coming from the Kiev Military District. These 7 divisions, however,
are not maintained at high states of readiness.
Warsaw Pact forces addi
tionally include the equivalent of 3 divisions of airborne, air mobile and
air assault troops which could be used anywhere within the region. Further
more, options against the Central Mediterranean could be possible.
NATO
l a n d f o rce s c o n s i s t of the e q u i v a l e n t of 8 I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s (i.e. 4
divisions and 12 independent brigades) with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artillery
and mortar pieces.
The Italian forces are generally well deployed and
i m p r o v e m e n t s are p l a n n e d to meet the support
r e q u i r e m e n t s for the ir
reinforcement.
Portugal also participates in the collective defence of
this region by providing a reinforcement brigade for deployment in Northern
It a l y .
48. The equivalent of 34 Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian divisions are
available in the area north of Greece and Turkish Thrace. These forces are
largely mechanised and are equipped with a total of 6,570 tanks and over
6 , 4 0 0 a r t i l l e r y a n d m o r t a r pieces.
T h e y are on t e r r a i n s u i t a b l e for
armoured offensive operations and could be reinforced by amphibious forces

21

D EFENCE OF SOUTHERN REGION

WARSAW P AC T
WARSAW PACT

10 DIVISIONS
NATO

WARSAW P AC T AIR FORCES

2340 TANKS

8 DIVISIONS

1560 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

1250 TANKS
1400 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

695
1560
195

F IG H TE R /BO M B E R S
INTERCEPTORS
RECONNAISSANCE

WARSAW PAC T
22 D I VISIONS
3680 TANKS
2940 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

NATO
12 DIVISIONS
1000 TANKS
1800 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

NATO AIR FORCES

615 FIG H T E R /B O M B E R S
295 INTERCEPTOR S
90

RECONNAISSANCE

NATO
25 DIVISIONS
3000 TANKS
2800 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

FIGURE 7

12 D IV IS I O NS
2435 TANKS
2735 A R T IL L E R Y /M O R T A R

and by the Warsaw Pact airborne/air mobile divisions referred to above. Of

these 34 divisions, the equivalent of just over 22 divisions with 3,680
tanks and 2,940 artillery and mortar pieces are either deployed forward or
are maintained at high states of readiness.
NATO's 25 Greek and Turkish
divisions in the area are mainly infantry.
Their task is rendered dif
ficult for defensive operations by the narrowness of the area between the
borders and the Aegean.
49.
There are 20 Soviet divisions which could be committed against
Eastern Turkey equipped with about 4,300 tanks and over 4,800 artillery
pieces.
Of this number, just over 12 divisions with 2,435 tanks and 2,735
artillery and mortar pieces are deployed forward.
These forces could
be reinforced by the airborne or air assault/mobile divisions referred to
above and by amphibious forces.
The Turkish Army retains 8 divisions in
North-East Turkey.
Four more divisions in South-East Turkey are for use
there to protect its extensive borders, but would be available for defence
against the Warsaw Pact.
50.
Greece and Turkey together have 4,000 tanks and 4,600 artillery
pieces, in comparison with 11,000 tanks and 11,300 artillery pieces oppo
sing them.
The geographical separation of the Italian, Greece/Turkish
Thrace and Eastern Turkish territories would make reinforcement and re
supply among the respective theatres difficult, particularly when lines of
communication are under attack.

Air Forces
51.
As with other regions, the flexibility of air forces renders
comparison difficult.
In-place forces available to the Warsaw Pact and
NATO are approximately as follows:

SOUTHERN REGION - IN PLACE AIR FORCES

F ighter/Bomber
Ground/Attack

Interceptors

Reconnaissance

NATO

615

295

90

WARSAW PACT

695

1,560

195

N.B. Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

The range of some of the modern Warsaw Pact aircraft is such that they have
the potential to operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering the
security of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to the
NATO nations in the Southern Flank.
The geography of the Mediterranean
emphasises the interaction between the maritime land and air situations.
The NATO naval forces and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would have to face
opposing land-based and naval aviation; naval operations would in turn
greatly influence land/air operations in the three sub-regions.
External
air r e i n f o r c e m e n t s from t h e A l l i a n c e c o u l d be of c r u c i a l i m p o r t a n c e .

- 23 -

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND

THE NUCLEAR EQUATION
Nuclear Fo rces in NATO's Strategy
52.
As part of NATO's strateqy, nuclear forces exist in combination
with conventional forces to maintain peace through deterring aggression.
To deter successfully, NATO's nuclear forces must be viewed by the Warsaw
Pact as being credible by providing a wide range of options for their use
in response to aggression.
They must be, and be seen to be, capable of
being employed effectively and adequately, to convince a potential aggres
sor that in any attack against NATO the costs would outweigh any conceiv
able gains.
53.
At the same time, it is NATO's policy to maintain these forces
at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat, taking
account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.
In
pursuance of this policy, NATO decided in October 1983 at Montebello,
C a nada, to r e d u c e t h e n u m b e r of w a r h e a d s in Eur o p e by 1, 4 0 0 over the
followinq five to six years, in addition to the withdrawal of 1,000 war
h e a d s c o m p l e t e d in 1 9 8 0 i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any arms c o n t r o l agre e m e n t.
Moreover, this overall reduction of 2,400 warheads in NATO's stockpile
in E u r o p e w i l l not be a f f e c t e d by the d e p l o y m e n t of L o n g e r - R a n g e INF
(LRINF) m i s s i l e s s i n c e one f u r t h e r w a r h e a d w i l l be r e m o v e d for each
PERSHING II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed,
as envisaged in the December 1979 dual-track decision.
This sustained
programme of reductions will reduce NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe
to the lowest level in over 20 years.
54.
T h i s r e d u c t i o n w i l l not be a l l o w e d to d e g r a d e d e t e r r e n c e ;
hence, for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contri
bution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must
be survivable, responsive, and effective. A range of possible improvements
to these ends has been identified.
The strengthening of conventional
forces also remains important.
Moreover, the Alliance must take account
at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities.
55.
The primary role of nuclear weapons is to support deterrence.
They are not generally direct military counters to each other.
Thus,
it is not necessary for the Alliance to match the Warsaw Pact system-forsystem or warhead-for-warhead. Individual nuclear weapon systems cannot be
considered in isolation from other nuclear systems or from conventional
forces.
However, to avoid miscalculation by a potential adversary and to
ensure the preservation of stability and peace, there must be a balanced
relationship in the overall capabilities of the nuclear forces of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in order that the credibility of NATO's deterrent is not
called into question.

Note on

C omparison of Nuclear Forces

56.
The following sections (Strategic Nuclear Forces, Intermediateand Short-Range Nuclear Forces, and Sea-Based Nuclear Forces) present an
assessment of systems that are broadly comparable and, where possible,
identify clearly discernible trends.
In categories other than strategic

25 -

nuclear forces, comparisons are affected to a greater extent by qualitative

and quantitative differences between forces which result in individual
systems often not being directly comparable.
The following sections list
the numbers of aircraft, missile launchers and artillery tubes in each
category; several of these systems' are capable of firing additional mis
siles and warheads, and aircraft are capable of performing more than one
mission.

o s

Strategic Nuclear F rce

57.
Strategic nuclear forces consist of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and bom
bers.
Each of them is different with respect to readiness, survivability,
fl e x i b i l i t y , a c c u r a c y a n d a b i l i t y to p e n e t r a t e en e m y d e f e n c e s .
They
complement each other - thus the strategic forces need to be viewed, in
their entirety.
58. NATO's ultimate deterrent is provided by the strategic forces of
the United States.
The United Kingdom also provides national strategic
forces which contribute to this deterrent.
On the Warsaw Pact side, the
Soviet Union maintains all types of strategic nuclear forces.
Over the
past decade the Warsaw Pact has improved the quality of these forces to a
significantly greater extent than NATO and has also substantially increased
their number.
Figure 8 , which compares the main developments in strategic
n u c l e a r s y s t e m s on both sides, d e p i c t s a g r o w i n g m o m e n t u m in Soviet
modernisation.
The comparison shows that this momentum has increased in
the last decade in contrast to the modernisation proqramme pursued by NATO.
For example, excluding major variants of existing systems, the Soviet Union
has deployed at least three new types of ICBMs, four new SLBMs, and a new
bomber, while in the same period the United States deployed only one new
SLBM and the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).
To ensure that stability
is preserved in the future, programmes are now underway in the United
States and the United Kingdom to maintain the continued adequacy of this
essential part of NATO's overall deterrent.
59.
Over the last decade the Soviet Union has surpassed NATO in
several critical measures traditionally used to evaluate the strategic
balance.
For instance, by 1973, the Warsaw Pact achieved, for the first
time, a superiority in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
(see Figure 9 ).
Similarly, the relative advantage has shifted to the
Warsaw Pact in the important categories of equivalent megatons, the capa
bility to hold hardened targets at risk and especially the capability to
hold these targets at risk with ballistic missiles with their short flight
time (as shown in Figure 1 0 ).
NATO retains a slight advantage in the
number of strateqic warheads but this has been rapidly reduced by the
c o n t i n u i n g Sov i e t d e p l o y m e n t o f m u l t i p l e w a r h e a d s , k n o w n as M u l t i p l e
I n d e p e n d e n t l y - T a r g e t a b l e R e - e n t r y V e h i c l e s (MIRVs).
The q u a l i t a t i v e
and quantitative enhancements of the Soviet strategic forces result in
c a p a b i l i t i e s whi c h t h r e a t e n to u n d e r m i n e t h e s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e .
F or
example, increases in the number and accuracy of Soviet ICBM warheads,
especially those on the SS-18 and SS-19, provide the Warsaw Pact with
the potential of holding at risk the bulk of the current United States
ICBMs using only a part of its overall ICBM force.
Almost three quarters
of Soviet strategic warheads are deployed in their ICBM forces; by com
parison, less than one quarter of United States warheads are so deployed.

26 -

s t r a t e g ic n u c l e a r f o r c e

m o d e r n is a t io n c o m p a r is o n

in t r o d u c t io n o f s e l e c t e d s y s t e m s b y y e a r
UN IT ED STATES and UNITED K I NGDOM

BOMBERS

INTERCONTIN ENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES

t ita n

S U B M A R IN E-LA U N CH E D
BALLISTIC MISSILES

TITAN II

M IN UTEM AN I

POLARIS A -2

SUBM AR IN ES

B-52 H

M IN UTEM AN III

POLARIS A-3

ETHAN ALLAN
CUSS

MINUTE MAN II

FB-ffl

P OSEIDON C-3

M IN UTEM AN III
(MK 12A)

B -1B

PEACEKEEPER
(MX)

TRID EN T 1 (C-4)

OHIO CLASS

8ENJ FRANKLIN CLASS

ctASS

ur.o L

1960

1965

1970

'

A
IN TERCON TIN ENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES

SS-7

SS-8

S S -6

A
A

SS-9

s s-13

SS-9 Mod 2

SS -9 Mod 3
A S S -13

SS-11

1980

1975

BOMBERS

MOd 2

BACKFIRE

A
A

S S - 1 1 Mod 2

S S - 1 1 Mod 3

S S -18 A

S S -N -5

S S -N -6

SU B M AR IN ES

GOLF II

HOT EL II

YANKEE

Dss-m

A
A
A

S S - N - 6 Mod 2

DELTA 1

SS-N-8
S S - N - 6 Mod 3

S S -N -8 Mod

DELTA II

2A

s s -19

BEAR H

S S - 1 9 Mod 3

O BLACKJACK

O S S -X -25
O SS-X-24

A S S - 1 7 A S S - 1 8 Mod 3
A

S S - 1 7 Mod 2

S S - 18 Mod 2

A s s -i9

S U B M A R IN E-LA U N C H E D
BALLISTIC MISSILES

1985

S S - 1 7 Mod 3

A s s -i8 M o d 4
M OD 2

A
A

S S - N - 18

A s S -N -2 0

SS -N -18A
Mod 3

A
A

O SS -NX -2 3

S S - N - 1 8 Mod 2

DELTA III

SS-N-17

TYPHOON

YANKEE II

KEY.
SOVIET UNION

A A

O PERATIO NAL S Y S T E M S

A A

S Y S T E M S N O W O U T OF SERVICE

ss

SURFACE TO SUR FACE M IS S IL E

S S -N S U B M A R IN E TO SUR FACE M IS S IL E

FIGURE 8

O o

S Y S T E M S IN F L IG H T TEST
S S -1 6 OPERA TIONALL Y CAPABLE. A VAILABLE
IN F O R M A T IO N DO ES N O T A L L O W C O N C L U S IV E
J U D G E M E N T O N W H E TH E R THE S O V IE T U N IO N
H A S DEPLO YED THE S S -1 6 B U T D O ES IN D IC A T E
PROBABLE D EPLO YM ENT.

TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS

B. TO TA L ST R A TE G IC D E L IV E R Y V E H I CLES
BY C O M P O S IT IO N

M IS S I LES AND

BOMBERS

A . N U M B E R OF S T R A T EG IC D E L IV E R Y V E H IC L E S

YEAR

(a) W ARSA W P A C T figures include So viet stra te g ic m issiles and BEAR. B IS O N , a n d B A C K F IR E bom bers; the B A C K F IR E bom ber has been included
in this figure because it has an inh eren t in te rc o n tin e n ta l capability although in its m aritim e an d European la n d -a tta c k rles it poses a serious th reat
to N A T O Europe.
(b) NA TO figures include U n ite d S ta te s strateg ic missiles, 6 4 British strateg ic P O L A R IS S L B M s and o peration al U n ite d S ta te s B -5 2s a n d FB- 111s.
The U n ite d S ta te s -b a s e d F B -1 11 is inclu ded because it has a strateg ic mission.

FIGURE 9

STRATEGIC FO R CES
TRENDS IN RELATIVE ADVANTAGES
YEAR
73

75

77

79

81

83
6 : 1
5 .1

4: 1

NATO
ADVANTAGE

3 :1

2 :1

PARITY

1:1

3 :1

4 :1

5 :1
6

YEAR

FI GURE 10

PARITY

W A R S A W PACT
ADVANTAGE

The United States maintains about half of its strategic warheads in its
SLBM forces.
This mode of deployment is more stable due to the great
survivability of submarines at sea.
60.
The Soviet Union is continuing to produce existing strategic
systems such as the BACKFIRE bomber and the TYPHOO N submarine (the world's
largest) which is being deployed with the new SS-N-20 SLBM. It also has in
an advanced stage of development two ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25), a
n e w SLBM (the S S - N X - 2 3 ) a n d a n o t h e r s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r , the B L A C K JACK.
Long-range cruise missiles for launch from sea and air are also under
development; their deployment could take place within the next year or
two. These cruise missiles, with ranges estimated at up to 3,000 kms, will
be primarily for nuclear strike. In addition, the Warsaw Pact air defences
- already the most comprehensive in the world - are being modernised with
improved sensors, interceptors and ground-to-air missiles.
61. In the light of the continuing Soviet modernisation programme and
the age of United States strategic systems, the United States has initiated
a modernization programme to be carried out over the next decade.
In
addition to the deployment of TRIDENT submarines, TRIDENT I (C-4) missiles,
and ALCMs on B-52 bombers, and the forthcoming deployment of SLCMs as part
of the reserve force, this programme includes the deployment of Command,
Control and Communications systems that are more survivable and effective;
the procurement of a limited number (100) of B-1B bombers; the deployment
o f a l i m i t e d n u m b e r (100) o f P E A C E K E E P E R (MX) l a n d - b a s e d m i s s i l e s in
MINUTEMAN silos beginning in 1986; and for the longer term the development
of the TRIDENT II (D-5) SLBM, the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) and a
new small ICBM.
62. During this modernisation process deterrence is maintained by the
overall capabilities of NATO's strategic deterrent forces.
Submarines at
sea a n d b o m b e r s ( a l t h o u g h f a c i n g d e n s e a n d e f f e c t i v e W a r s a w Pact air
defences) contribute highly survivable strategic systems. The diversity of
strategic forces also provides a hedge against an unexpected Soviet techno
logical breakthrough in countering one or another part of NATO's deterrent
forces. In the absence of an effective NATO ICBM force, a potential aggres
sor would be able to concentrate his efforts on overcoming the deterrent
capabilities of strategic submarines and bombers.
The realisation of the
United States strategic modernisation programme will reduce Soviet asym
metries (see Figure 1 0 ) and thereby contribute to stability and to the
assurance of deterrence into the next century.
It will also contribute
to the creation of more stable conditions for negotiating far-reaching,
sound and verifiable arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union.

Intermediate- and Short-Range Nuclear Forces

63.
Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have a variety of systems of less
than inter-continental range capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
These
include Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), further sub-divided into
longer- and shorter-range INF missiles and INF aircraft, and Short-Range
Nuclear Forces (SNF). INF and SNF consist of land-based missiles, aircraft
and tube artillery. There are major differences between the forces of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has a substantial numerical
advantage. This is particularly significant in the case of land-based
INF and SNF missiles where the Warsaw Pact maintains about 2,000 delivery

30 -

SHORT ND INTERMEDIATE RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

RANGE COMPARISON (a)

155 m m

203 mm
H O N E ST J O H N
LAN CE

NATO
F-4, F -10 4, F-16, JA G U A R
P E R S H IN G ia
TORNADO. BUCCANEER
F-111
P E R S H IN G II
GLCM

50

100

200

"H
Change
30 0
of

> c , ,le

500

1000

'

2000

3000

4000

5 0 0 0 km

I_ _ _ _ _ I_ _ _ _ _ J _ _ _ _ _ 1 =

R A N G E, IN K IL O M E T E R S

240 mm

152, 2 0 3 m m

W A RSAW PACT
FROG
SS-21

scuo

FITTE R. F IS H B E D
S S -1 2 /2 2

FLOGGER

FEN C ER
S S -4
B LIN D ER
B AD G ER

S S -2 0
(a)

B a r le n g th gives the ran ge o f th e system s B ar thickness gives a g e n e ra l ind icatio n o f the re la tiv e n u m b e r o f d eliv e ry
system s. For fu rth e r inform ation, including counting rules, s ee p aragraph s 6 3 to 71. F o r N A T O the d ata re fle c t forces
d ep lo y e d in NA TO Europe: for the W A R S A W P A C T forces facing NA TO Europe, e x c e p t for S S -4 a n d S S -2 0 w h e re
g lo b a l figures are given

F I G U R E 11

SHORT A ND INTERMEDIATE RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

MODERNISATION COMPARISON
in t r o d u c t io n

o f s y s t e m s

by y ea r

NATO
Aircraft

AF'1M

Missiles

</)

oo
C/5

Buccaneer

A f-1 1 1

^Jaguar

A f-1 6

A rm a d o

A f-4
Pershing I

Honest John

Lance

Pershing II

GLCM

Aircraft

-< Artillery

>*
w.
22
'
t
Y Par I
1955
2
5W.
<

Missiles

'5;

k.

A ' 203mm
,

JL

1
1960

A
JBfc, Scud

CO

Blinder

S S -5

1970
Flogger

Mi Fishbed

1975

I
1980

S U - 1 7 Fitter
Fencer

A s s -12
A

Arti llery

A S S -4
Frog

15 5 m m

1965

A s U - 7 Fitter

Badger

ss

-21

S S 20
A

SS-23 O
s s -22

240mm

152mm

k 203mm

WARSAW PACT
A

OPERATIONAL SYSTEM S

O DEVELOPMENT COMPLETED.
AS OF END 1983.

FIGURE 12

NOT DEPLOYED

systems as opposed to about 300 for NATO.

This Warsaw Pact advantage is
further increased by the fact that missiles in flight are far less vulner
able than aircraft which form the greater proportion of NATO's INF. Since
the 1950s the Warsaw Pact has maintained forces of sufficient range and so
deployed as to, be able to strike NATO Europe from all its member countries
including the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact SNF and INF systems have tended to
have longer ranges than the NATO systems.
The Warsaw Pact now has an
advantage in every range band as can be seen in Figure 11. In fact, the
Warsaw Pact retains a complete monopoly in land-based forces over 2,500 kms
in range, and retains a very substantial advantage in the longer-range INF
categories even following initial deployments of GLCM and Pershing II
in Europe.
A Warsaw Pact monopoly in these categories would give it the
potential to destroy any target in Europe without using strategic weapons,
while NATO would lack a sufficient capability, short of strategic weapons,
to put targets on Soviet territory at risk and thus to deter the Soviet
Union from exploiting this military advantage in Europe.
Furthermore,
taken as a whole, the Warsaw Pact's arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe is
more modern than that of NATO.
Figure 12 depicts this advantage, showing
that the extent of modernisation is much greater for the Warsaw Pact than
for NATO.

Longer-Range INF Missile Systems

64.
At the end of 1983 the Warsaw Pact had deployed in the Soviet
Union a large force of these land-based missiles consisting of the SS-20,
SS-4 and SS-5 (the SS-5 was being retired at end-1983 and has now been
withdrawn from service).
The capabilities added to Warsaw Pact forces by
the deployment of the mobile SS-20 missile which became operational in 1977
were a particular source of concern that contributed to the NATO 12th
December 1979 dual-track decision to deploy PERSHING II and Ground-Launched
Cruise Missiles and to pursue arms control negotiations involving these
systems between the United States and the Soviet Union.
At the end of
1983, in t h e a b s e n c e of a c o n c r e t e arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t o b v i a t i n g
the need for deployment, NATO began the deployment of LRINF missiles (see
Figures 13 and 14).
NATO has always made clear that deployments can be
halted, modified or even reversed upon achievement of a balanced, equitable
and verifiable agreement calling for such actions.
65.
Figure 14 depicts the global number of land-based LRINF missile
warheads.
Since 1977 the Soviet Union has been deploying SS-20 launchers
at an a v e r a g e rate of about o n e per week.
It c o n t i n u e s to c o n s t r u c t
additional bases in both the Eastern and Western Soviet Union. While the
overall number of Soviet missile-launchers has remained roughly the same in
recent years the number of warheads on launchers has increased considerably
during the period.
This is because each SS-20 has three independently
targetable warheads.
The number of SS-20 warheads has almost trebled
since December 1979 (when NATO decided, as part of its dual-track decision,
to deploy 572 PERSHING II and GLCMs) to 1,134 at end 1983.
These SS-20
warheads, together with the warheads on earlier deployed LRINF missiles,
amounted to a total of close to 1,400 missile warheads.
There is also
evidence for the existence of reload missiles for the SS-20 which would
raise the overall number of warheads substantially.
A long-range qroundlaunched cruise missile is also under development by the Soviet Union and
c o u l d be d e p l o y e d w i t h i n the next year or two.
By c o m p a r i s o n to the
Warsaw Pact's LRINF build-up, NATO's deployment did not begin until late

33 -

LONGER-RAN GE INF MISSILE SYSTEMS

DEPLOYED END 1983 (a)
S S -5

W a rh e a d s

3 M IR V

W a rh e a d s

Range (k m )

2 .0 0 0

4 ,1 0 0

4 ,4 0 0 - 5 ,0 0 0

1800

2500

R a ng e (km )

O p e ra tio n a l
M ode

F ixed

F ixed

M o b ile

M o b ile

M o b ile

O p eratio nal
M ode

G lo b a l N u m b e r
D e p lo ye d

224

13 (b)

3 7 8 (c)

3 2 (d)

G lo b a l N u m b e r
D ep lo yed

Y ea r
O p e ra tio n a l

Late 1 9 5 0 's

Early 1 9 6 0 's

1977

1983

1983

Year
O p e ra tio n a l

(a) This table is prepared on the basis o f m issiles on launchers.

(b) By end 8 3 a ll S S -5 m issiles were being retired.
(c) Excludes refire missiles.
fd) N ot a ll o f the 3 2 GLCMs h ad reached in itia l operational capability a t end 1983.

FIGURE 13

LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS

(GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS)

1400Construction on further bases is continuing

1200-

W arsaw Pact w arheads-on-launchers

W ARHEADS

1000.

Beginning of Soviet
deployments of S S -2 0s
armed w ith 3 w arheads

800.

600-

%
%tal111111111111
/

Includes operational S S -4 , S S -5 . and S S -2 0 .

E x c lu d e s retire m issiles and additional warheads.

NATO planned
plani
w arheads-on-launchers
(W ith full LR IN F deployment)

400N A T O d e cid e d on 12 Decem ber, 1979 to d e p lo y 5 7 2 m issiles

(1 0 8 P e rshin g U s and 4 6 4 G L C M s ) b e gin n in g at the e n d o f 1983.
In the absence o f a co ncrete arm s co n tro l agre em en t obviating
the n e e d for deploym ent, N A T O began the de p lo ym e n t o f L R IN F
m issiles at the e n d o f 1983. D e plo ym e nts can be halted, m od ified
or even re verse d upon the a ch ie vem en t o f a balanced equitable
a n d verifiable agreem ent calling for such actions.

200

]
71

73

75

77

79

81

83

YEAR

FIGURE

14

1983 when the deployment uf the first

tiated as scheduled.
Moreover, this
increase in the total number of nuclear
has aqreed to remove one older nuclear
missile warhead deployed.

41 PERSHING II and GLCMs was ini

programme will not result in any
warheads in NATO Europe since NATO
warhead from Europe for each LRINF

66.
SS-20 missiles are deployed in the western, central and eastern
reqions of the Soviet Union.
From sites in the western region SS-20s can
strike all of NATO Europe including Iceland, the Azores and the Canary
Islands (see Figure 1 5 ).
Those deployed in the central region and some
of those based in the Far East can also strike substantial parts of NATO
Europe (see Figure 1 6 ).
The SS-20s in the western and central regions
comprise more than two-thirds of the SS-20 launchers and warheads deployed.
Moreover, SS-20 missiles are readily transportable and could be relocated
westward at short notice.
Figure 17 shows that the PERSHING II could
strike targets only as far as the western-most military districts of the
Soviet Union, but not Moscow and beyond.
The GLCM has a longer range than
PERSHING II but is not capable of reaching targets as far as the Ural
Mountains or further to the East.
Furthermore, since most of the Soviet
ICBM silos are beyond the reach of NATO's systems (see Figure 15) NATO's
LRINF do not present a disarming first strike threat. In addition, the
limited numbers planned for deployment and, in the case of cruise missiles
their Iona fliaht time of several hours, make NATO's LRINF unsuitable for
such use.

Shorter-Range INF Missile Systems

67. Warsaw Pact shorter-range INF missile systems such as the Soviet
SS-12/22 and SCUD can, especially when deployed forward, attack many of the
same taraets covered by the SS-20 and SS-4. There are indications that for
the first time SS-12/22 missiles are being deployed forward in the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw
Pact has deployed approximately 650 SS-12/22s and SCUDs, and, in addition,
has developed and tested the SS-23 missile which has a longer range than
the SCUD for which it is a follow-on.
In contrast, NATO's PERSHING IAs
would continue to be reduced from 171 at end 1983 to 72 upon full deploy
ment of PERSHING IIs.
Furthermore, the new Soviet missiles are much more
accurate than those they replace; thus smaller yield warheads could be used
with the same dearee of military effectiveness.
In sum, the Warsaw Pact
has substantial advantages over the whole ranqe of INF missile systems.

INF Aircraft
68. The ranges of aircraft vary considerably depending on the height
and speed at which they are flown and how much they are carrying.
Nor
mally, the majority of INF aircraft carry only one warhead but some types,
particularly those with lonqer ranges, can carry two or three.
Their
coverage could also depend on the location of suitably equipped bases
throuqh which aircraft could transit or to which they could return.
The
c o m p a r i s o n s that f o l l o w in t h i s s e c t i o n cover l a n d - b a s e d a i r c r a f t ( 4 )
(4)

Carrier-based aircraft are dealt with under Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

in paragraph 72.

36 -

TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET SS-20 AND

TARGET COVERAGE OF NATO PERSHING II AND GLCM

GLCM

S o vie t U nion

P ershing 11

M oscow

S S -2 0 l o c ation

IC B M location

F I G U R E 15

COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM SS-20 BASES EAST OF THE URALS

F I G U RE 16

NATO GLCM AND PERSHING II COVERAGE

F I G U R E 17

located in NATO Europe and, in the case of the Warsaw Pact, opposite NATO
Europe.
The BACKFIRE bomber with its primary nuclear role has been inc
luded in the strategic section because it has an inherent intercontinental
capability.
However, in its maritime and European land-attack roles the
BACKFIRE also poses a serious nuclear and conventional threat to NATO
Europe.
69. The comparison of lonqer-range INF aircraft in operational units
shows that the Warsaw Pact has a considerable numerical advantage.
NATO
has about 150 F111 aircraft in Europe; the Soviet Union has about 325
nuclear capable BADGERs and BLINDERs in its Strategic Aviation forces and
an additional 175 aircraft of these types in the Soviet Naval Aviation
(SNA) forces, makinq a total of 500 lonqer-range INF aircraft. This total
excludes BADGERs and BLINDERs not configured for weapons delivery, such as
those for Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), reconnaissance, and air-to-air
refuellinq. It also excludes trainers that can be used on combat missions.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union maintain lonqer-range INF
aircraft outside Europe (in the United States and in the Soviet Far East,
respectively).
70. Most of the types of combat aircraft of both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact are technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but not all of
these aircraft would be available for nuclear use for a variety of reasons.
A substantial portion of these aircraft would be assigned to conventional
missions and not all pilots who fly these aircraft are trained to deliver
nuclear weapons.
Takinq these factors into account, it is estimated that
overall the Warsaw Pact could employ about 3,000 of its o p e r ational
INF aircraft in a nuclear role.
On the NATO side, the number of opera
tional aircraft committed to a nuclear role is about 700 (see Figure 18).
For NATO, the decreases since the first edition of this Force Comparison
publication in 1982 in the area of INF aircraft are mainly due to the
retirement of United Kingdom VULCAN bombers and the ongoinq replacement of
older aircraft with F-16 and TORNADO.
For the Warsaw Pact, the number of
INF aircraft has increased throuqh the further deployment of FLOGGER and
FENCER aircraft. Thereby, the Warsaw Pact has increased even further its
numerical advantage over NATO with regard to INF aircraft.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces

71.
Short-Ranqe Nuclear Forces (SNF) consist of tube artillery and
missiles of much shorter maximum ranqe than INF missiles. Most SNF on both
sides are capable of beinq used to deliver either conventional or nuclear
weapons. Figure 19 gives a comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact SNF systems
that could have a nuclear role. Within this category, the Warsaw Pact has
some 700 land-based short-range missile launchers, mainly FROGs which are
being replaced by SS-21s. About 40 SS-21s are already deployed with Soviet
forces in the German Democratic Republic. By comparison NATO has about 100
LANCE and HONEST JOHN.
The qreater range, and consequently the improved
tarqet coveraae and survivability, of land-based missiles provides the
Warsaw Pact with a considerable advantaqe.
The other system in this
cateqory is artillery.
Althouqh NATO retains a sliqht advantaqe in
artillery, this has decreased very substantially in recent years as a
result of massive Soviet deployments.
Besides their 203 mm and 240 mrr
artillery which have had a nuclear capability for some time, the Soviet
Union has recently made its 152 mm artillery nuclear capable.
At this

- 40 -

LAND-BASED INF AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED END 1983 (a), (b)

3 0 0 0 j |__N u m b e r o f
S y s te m s
about
3000

NATO
a ir c r a ft

F - 1 1 1 , T O R N A D O , F - 4 . F -1 6 ,
F -1 0 4 . J A G U A R, B U C C A N E E R

W ARSAW
PACT
a ir c r a ft (c)

B A D G E R , B L IN D E R , F IS H B E D ,
F IT T E R , F L O G G E R , F E N C E R

2500

2000

1500

(a)

N u m b e r s r e f e r to d e p lo y m e n ts o f la n d -b a s e d
a ir c r a f t (in c lu d in g m a r itim e a irc r a ft) in E u ro p e .

1000
(b)
(c)

F o r c o u n tin g ru le s s e e p a r a g r a p h s 6 9 a n d 70.
T h e B A C K F IR E b o m b e r w ith its p r im a r y n u c le a r
ro le h a s b e e n in c lu d e d in th e s tr a te g ic s e c tio n
b e c a u s e i t h a s an in h e r e n t

500

in t e r c o n t in e n ta l

c a p a b ility a lth o u g h in its m a r itim e a n d E u ro p e a n

la n d -a t t a c k ro le s it p o s e s a s e rio u s t h r e a t to
N A TO E u ro p e .

NATO

W A R S A W PACT

FIG U R E 18

OF S Y S T E M S

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF) DEPLOYED END 1983 (a)

NATO

M issiles
A rtillery

: LANCE. H O N EST JO H N
: 155 mm. 2 0 3 mm

W ARSAW
PA C T

M iss ile s
A rtillery

: F R O G /S S -2 1
: 2 0 3 m m . 2 4 0 mm , 1 5 2 m m

NUMBER

M issiles

Artillery

(a) For N A T O the data re fle c t forces d ep lo yed in N A T O E urope;

for the W a rs a w Pact, forces facing N A T O Europe.
(b) This figure includes 5 0 0 152 m m guns
(see paragraph 71).

FIGURE

19

time, the number of 152

nuclear role cannot be
quantity of Soviet 152
stantiate 5). In sum, the
number of SNF systems lead.

mm Warsaw Pact artillery pieces committed to a

determined with certainty but given the large
mm artillery systems, the number could be sub
Warsaw Pact has now surpassed NATO in the overall
an area where NATO traditionally had a numerical

Sea-Based Nuclear Forces

72.
The sea-based strategic systems of both sides were discussed in
paragraphs 57 to 62 and land-based INF aircraft with a primary maritime
mission are included in paragraphs 68 to 70. In addition, both NATO and
the Warsaw Pact have other sea-based nuclear systems; these consist of air
defence, anti-ship and anti-submarine systems and are designed to support
the qeneral mission of these forces as described in paragraphs 29 to 42.
On the NATO side, these include the TERRIER surface-to-air missile, the
ASROC and SUBROC anti-submarine missiles, and air-delivered bombs.
The
Warsaw Pact has SS-N-3, SS-N-7, SS-N-9, SS-N-12 and SS-N-19 varieties of
anti-ship cruise missiles and the SS-N-15 nuclear anti-submarine missile
system.
There are A - 6 and A - 7 aircraft aboard United States aircraft
carriers which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons against targets
ashore. These aircraft, however, do not have this as a primary mission and
at any one time only a portion would be in range of land targets. Also on
the Warsaw Pact side, the Soviet Union has a small number of SS-N-5 nonstrategic ballistic missiles on board submarines.

Co nclusion
73.
The Warsaw Pact shows a continuing build-up of their nuclear
forces across the entire spectrum.
In Europe, the Warsaw Pact has an
advantage over NATO in all major categories of nuclear forces. In keeping
with its policy, NATO maintains only the minimum number of nuclear weapons
necessary for deterrence.
This minimum level must take account of what is
known of the present and future capabilities of Warsaw Pact nuclear and
conventional forces. Moreover nuclear forces are affected by the same
process of ageing and obsolescence that affect all weapons systems they cannot be maintained indefinitely and reguire improvement or when
necessary replacement with modern effective systems.
In 1983, at
Montebello, Canada, NATO decided on a programme of reductions and has also
identified a range of possible improvements to ensure the maintenance of an
e ffective deterrent.
Moreover, the Alliance has consistently sought
reductions through arms control negotiations. The United States, with the
full support of its Allies, has proposed major reductions in the total
numbers of strategic warheads through the START negotiations, and the total
elimination of, or failing that substantial reductions in, longer-range INF
m issiles through a balanced, eguitable and verifiable arms control
agreement.

(5)

In this comparison, it is assumed that only the latest version of

Soviet 152 mm artillery could have a nuclear role.
There are more
than 4,000 older 152 mm guns.

- 43 -

NATO AND WARSAW PACT

DEFENCE/MILITARY EXPENDITURE
74. In NATO countries, qovernments justify their expenditures before
parliaments and detailed defence budgets are subject to public debate and
scrutiny.
Generally the Warsaw Pact countries only disclose a single
budqet entry under the heading of defence.
These figures are open to
question, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union for which NATO has
developed its own estimates. No such estimates exist for the time being on
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defence spending, owing to such problems as the lack
of reliable information, widely differinq pricing systems and the absence
of valid exchanqe rates between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.
It is
therefore difficult to produce conclusive comparisons of total NATO and
Warsaw Pact defence spendinq - expressed in a common currency, whether in
dollars or roubles.
The problem is best approached by first looking
at the defence expenditures of the Soviet Union and the United States. As
the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union account for
approximately 65% and 85?o of total defence/military spendinq of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact respectively, the chanqes that take place in their defence
spendinq tend to dominate the overall pattern of expenditures for these two
qroups of countries.
75. The Soviet Union claims that its defence spendinq is just over 17
billion roubles and its official fiqures qive the impression that Soviet
spendinq has not only not increased since 1972, but that it has actually
declined since then. This, of course, is in marked contrast to the siqnificant expansion of Soviet military procurement and is quite incompatible
with known force levels and military programmes. As the Soviets continue to
keep their real expenditure fiqures secret, NATO experts attempt to esti
mate Soviet military spending by costing the known Soviet force levels and
procurement etc.
On this basis, NATO experts agree that in 1982 Soviet
military spending was about 5 times the officially published figures,
amounting to 14% to 16% of estimated Soviet GNP which clearly underlines
the importance the Soviets attach to military strength.
76.
The Soviets have not, however, maintained the momentum of the
rapid military expenditure qrowth they had achieved durinq the years 1970
to 1976.
NATO estimates indicate that durinq this period Soviet military
spendinq increased by 4% to 5? annually in real terms.
None the less,
since 1976, accordinq to NATO assessments, overall qrowth of Soviet mili
tary spendinq is estimated to have declined to less than half the annual
averaqe rate of the early 1970s.
This slowdown mainly reflects a less
rapid rate of qrowth in procurement expenditure althouqh a decline in rate
of qrowth can also be observed in other major cateqories of expenditure.
Despite this slowinq down, military procurement remained, if compared with
NATO, at a very hiqh level throuqhout the period under review.
Experts
aqree that even if the Soviet Union does not return to the expenditure
growth of the early 1970s the improvements in its military capabilities
will continue to be substantial.
77.
As for NATO, defence budgets are well publicised and not in
frequently the subject of intense parliamentary debate.
Preliminary
fiqures put total NATO defence expenditure for 1983 at $309 billion(6). In
(6)

1981 prices and exchanqe rates.

- 45 -

many countries defence expenditure over recent years increased slightly

faster than GDP, the qrowth of which remained depressed due to the world
economic recession.
The increase was particularly marked in the United
States where defence was again given a higher priority after years of
decline in real spending. Over the period 1979 to 1983, the real increase
in defence spending in the United States averaged 6.2%. Other Allies also
increased their defence expenditures in real terms but not to the same
extent.
As a result, the share of defence in GDP grew to 6. 9% in the
United States and 5.5% for NATO as a whole.

46 -

MILITARY PRODUCTION AND

TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES
Production
78.
NATO and the Warsaw Pact each possess an extensive armaments
production capability.
In NATO, the capability is largely the aqgreqate
output of a limited number of major arms producing nations, whose defence
industries both compete and co-operate in producing equipment to meet NATO
needs.
There is thus no cen t r a l i s e d procurement in NATO, indeed the
sovereignty of NATO member countries is particularly evident in equipment
procurement decisions and all nations possess distinctive materiel acqui
sition systems and procurement regulations.
79.
The situation in the Warsaw Pact could hardly be more different.
One nation - the Soviet Union - dominates armaments production and exerts
strong influence over the planning and procurement of the other Pact
countries. The Soviet procurement process is based on rigorous, conserva
tive planninq with the result that risk takina is minimised.
The conse
quence is a dearee of inflexibility but this discipline helps new equipment
proarammes to keep to plannina schedules. Nevertheless, subsequent upqradina of desiqns often occurs with modified variants of the oriqinal
weapon systems appearina only a few years after the basic design.
BO.
These contrasting acquisition processes bring their own advan
tages and disadvantaaes.
The processes of the NATO member nations are
based on, and serve to encourage, an efficient, responsive defence industry
that has to compete in the market place. In doinq so, moreover, it draws
heavily on the more advanced civilian technologies of the West to improve
its products.
The Soviet system, on the other hand, is extremely bureau
cratic and although it shows relatively fast developments and deployments
of weapons, it does not always facilitate the speediest translation of new
technology into weapons design.
81.
There is one area where the centralised acguisition process in
the Warsaw Pact yields important dividends as compared to the decentralised
processes in NATO - and that is standardisation. Coalition warfare places
an exacting premium on the ability of equipments of different forces to
work toqether.
The hiqh degree of standardisation in the Warsaw Pact is
contrasted, on the NATO side, by glaring examples not only of a lack of
interoperability, but of the danger of mutual interference.
82.
In the area of production technology, the Soviet Union has
developed the larqest foroinq and extrusion presses in the world.
It has
considerable expertise in heavy manufacturing and enqineerinq and, as a
result, it has a lead over NATO nations in its ability to produce larqe,
single piece components.
However, NATO nations continue to lead in the
area of automated manufacturinq technolooy, such as numerically controlled
machine tools and hiqh precision equipment.
Present trends indicate that
the Warsaw Pact will continue to out-produce NATO in major military
systems.

- 47 -

Technology
83.
Technoloqy is an important qauqe of industrial and military
strenqth.
However, the differences in the levels of military technology
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot be usefully summarised in general
terms since the picture varies from one technoloqy or weapon system to
another. Any discussion of technoloqy differences is inevitably selective.
Nevertheless, a comparison of trends shows that the Soviet Union, which is
the undisputed technological leader of the Warsaw Pact, is makinq signifi
cant progress in areas where NATO has previously been leading. Moreover,
when it considers it to be to its advantage, the Soviet Union does not
hesitate to take advantage of the freedom of Western societies in order to
acguire Western technoloqy/eguipment and know-how.
84.
NATO nations until recently enjoyed clear leadership in most
areas of technoloqy though, as noted above, this lead is being eroded. A
major reason for this is that the level of resources devoted to military
related research and development in NATO nations has not in general kept
pace with worldwide inflationary trends, and the increasing costs involved
in movina into new technoloay areas.

- 40 -

EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR DATA

IN THIS PUBLICATION
Sources
1.
Sources of data for NATO forces have been taken from national
annual reports to NATO Headquarters.
These reports do not necessarily
reflect all the forces of each nation, but only those forces allocated to
NATO.
For example, some nations reserve a proportion of their forces
for national purposes. Accordingly, figures in this publication have been
supplemented with additional information, which has permitted the overall
global context to be set out in paragraphs 13 and 14. Similarly, whereas
Warsaw Pact data for the European area is from generally agreed Western
intelligence sources, additional information has been obtained to show the
Soviet Union's global strength in the Far and Middle East and other loca
tions where Warsaw Pact forces are known to be. Details are in paragraphs
13 and 14.

Conventional Forces Counted

2.
The information presented in this publication is as of the end of
1983.
All exceptions to this rule are specifically identified.
In the
main, the forces counted are those at present in place in Europe (assuming
mobilisation, since some units on both sides have only a cadre strength in
peacetime). In addition, the comparison also includes the rapidly deploy
able forces of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Fof example, NATO totals
include 3 United States divisions whose equipment is stored in Europe but
two-thirds of their personnel remain based in the United States.
For
the Warsaw Pact, the comparison includes all the forces belonging to the
Eastern European countries, all the Soviet forces s t ationed in those
countries, but only the hiqh readiness Soviet forces based in the six
Western Military Districts.
Except in the case of the 3 United States
divisions just mentioned, both United States and Canadian transatlantic
reinforcements have been excluded on the one hand, and the Soviet Strategic
Reserves from the Moscow, Ural and Volaa Military Districts have been
excluded on the other.
The forces set out below and used for the compa
risons in this publication include :
(a) For NATO
(i)

The N o rth ern a n d C e n tra l R egions

The indigenous qround and air forces of Norway, Denmark, the

United Kingdom (including those in the UK), the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxe mbourg and the Federal Republic of Germany,
plus the forces of the United States and Canada stationed in
those countries, plus the 3 United States divisions whose
eguipment is stored in Europe and two-thirds of their
personnel based in the United States.
(ii) The S ou th ern Region

The ground and air forces of Portugal, Italy, Greece and

Turkey (split into three g e o g r aphically distinct sub
regions).

- 49 -

(b) For the W arsaw Pact

The indigenous ground and air forces of the German Democratic

Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, plus all Soviet forces sta
tioned in those countries and in the Leningrad Military District
(MDs), and the Archangel and Leningrad Air Defence Districts
(ADDs) and the Legnika Air Army of the Soviet Union are con
In addi
sidered in the Northern and Central R egional balance.
tion, only the high readiness units of the Western MDs are
considered (Baltic, Byelo r u s s i a n and C a r p a t h i a n MDs).
The
Southern Region includes the Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian
and all the Soviet forces stationed in those countries together
with Soviet forces from the T r a n s -Caucasus MD, Kiev and
Sverdlovsk ADDs plus the Vinnitsa Air Army.
In addition, the
high readiness units only of the remaining three Western MDs are
considered (Kiev, Odessa and North Caucasus).
Excluded comp
letely are the Soviet forces in the Moscow, Volga and Ural MDs
(considered as the Soviet Strategic Reserves), and the Moscow Air
Defence District together with all the forces to the East of the
Ural Mountains.
(c) Naval Forces

Because naval forces frequently move from one sea area to another
and must return to port for replenishment and refits, it is
difficult to be precise on the relative strength of the NATO and
Warsaw Pact fleets in European waters at any one time. For NATO,
the greater part of the European navies has been taken to be
permanently within European waters (though here again not all
NATO nations assign all their naval assets to NATO). The United
States has the 2nd and 6th Fleets committed to the support of
NATO in the Atlantic and Mediterranean respectively; but parts of
the 6th Fleet are currently detached out of the NATO area into
the Indian Ocean.
The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact navies generally
remain in European waters, but the Soviet Union occasionally
practices deployments outside the NATO area from its Northern,
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
Brief reference has been made to
the maritime forces of the United States, Canada and the Soviet
Union that are located in the Pacific, but on balance, the
nearest correlation used in this publication has been to subtract
the Pacific Fleet from the total naval forces of each of these
countries and count all of the remaining NATO and Warsaw Pact
navies - and this is what has been done in paragraphs 29 to
42.
(d) French and Spanish forces

France and Spain are members of the North Atlantic Alliance but
do not parti c ipate in its integrated military structure.
At
their request therefore, no account of French and Spanish forces
is taken in this comparison, although full statements of these
forces are available in documents published nationally.

- 50 -

Nuclear Forces
3.
In the section on Nuclear Deterrence and the Nuclear Equation
(paragraphs 52-73) the rationale for the data given is explained in the
text.
Equivalent megatonnage (used in Figure 10 and paragraph 59) is a
technical term which measures the overall destructive power of nuclear
warheads.
4.
Denmark and Greece have expressed their positions on the INF
question in the appropriate NATO fora.

51

N ATO

AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND

SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS

F IG U RE 20