Ten Economic Facts About Crime and Incarceration in The United States

POLICY MEMO | MAY 2014
Ten Economic Facts about Crime and

Incarceration in the United States
Melissa S. Kearney, Benjamin H. Harris, Elisa Jcome, and Lucie Parker
W W W. H A M I LT O N P R O J E C T. O R G
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Hamilton Project is grateful to Karen Anderson, E. Ann Carson,
David Dreyer, Jens Ludwig, Meeghan Prunty, Steven Raphael, and
Michael Stoll for innumerable insightful comments and discussions.
It is also grateful to Chanel Dority, Brian Goggin, Laura Howell,
Peggah Khorrami, and Joseph Sullivan.
MISSION STATEMENT
The Hamilton Project seeks to advance Americas promise of
opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
We believe that todays increasingly competitive global economy
demands public policy ideas commensurate with the challenges
of the 21st Century. The Projects economic strategy reflects a
judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering
economic growth and broad participation in that growth, by
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role
for effective government in making needed public investments.
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure social
safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework, the Project
puts forward innovative proposals from leading economic thinkers
based on credible evidence and experience, not ideology or
doctrine to introduce new and effective policy options into the
national debate.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nations
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern
American economy. Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy,
believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would
drive American economic growth, and recognized that prudent
aids and encouragements on the part of government are
necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The guiding
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
Ten Economic Facts about Crime and

Incarceration in the United States
Melissa S. Kearney, Benjamin H. Harris, Elisa Jcome, and Lucie Parker
Introduction
Crime and high rates of incarceration impose tremendous costs on society, with lasting negative
effects on individuals, families, and communities. Rates of crime in the United States have been falling steadily, but still
constitute a serious economic and social challenge. At the same time, the incarceration rate in the United States is so
highmore than 700 out of every 100,000 people are incarceratedthat both crime scholars and policymakers alike
question whether, for nonviolent criminals in particular, the social costs of incarceration exceed the social benefits.
While there is significant focus on Americas incarceration policies, it is important to consider that crime continues to
be a concern for policymakers, particularly at the state and local levels. Public spending on fighting crimeincluding
the costs of incarceration, policing, and judicial and legal servicesas well as private spending by households and
businesses is substantial. There are also tremendous costs to the victims of crime, such as medical costs, lost earnings,
and an overall loss in quality of life. Crime also stymies economic growth. For example, exposure to violence can inhibit
effective schooling and other developmental outcomes (Burdick-Will 2013; Sharkey et al. 2012). Crime can induce
citizens to migrate; economists estimate that each nonfatal violent crime reduces a citys population by approximately
one person, and each homicide reduces a citys population by seventy persons (Cullen and Levitt 1999; Ludwig and
Cook 2000). To the extent that migration diminishes a localitys tax and consumer base, departures threaten a citys
ability to effectively educate children, provide social services, and maintain a vibrant economy.
The good news is that crime rates in the United States have been falling steadily since the 1990s, reversing an upward
trend from the 1960s through the 1980s. There does not appear to be a consensus among scholars about how to account
for the overall sharp decline, but contributing factors may include increased policing, rising incarceration rates, and
the waning of the crack epidemic that was prevalent in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Despite the ongoing decline in crime, the incarceration rate in the United States remains at a historically
unprecedented level. This high incarceration rate can have profound effects on society; research has shown
that incarceration may impede employment and marriage prospects among former inmates, increase poverty
depth and behavioral problems among their children, and amplify the spread of communicable diseases among
The Hamilton Project Brookings
Introduction continued from page 1
disproportionately impacted communities (Raphael 2007). These

effects are especially prevalent within disadvantaged communities
and among those demographic groups that are more likely to
face incarceration, namely young minority males. In addition,
this high rate of incarceration is expensive for both federal and
state governments. On average, in 2012, it cost more than $29,000
to house an inmate in federal prison (Congressional Research
Service 2013). In total, the United States spent over $80 billion
on corrections expenditures in 2010, with more than 90 percent
of these expenditures occurring at the state and local levels
(Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013).
A founding principle of The Hamilton Projects economic strategy
is that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering economic
Ten Economic Facts about Crime and Incarceration in the United States
growth and broad participation in that growth. Elevated rates of

crime and incarceration directly work against these principles,
marginalizing individuals, devastating affected communities, and
perpetuating inequality. In this spirit, we offer Ten Economic
Facts about Crime and Incarceration in the United States to
bring attention to recent trends in crime and incarceration, the
characteristics of those who commit crimes and those who are
incarcerated, and the social and economic costs of current policy.
Chapter 1 describes recent crime trends in the United States and
the characteristics of criminal offenders and victims. Chapter 2
focuses on the growth of mass incarceration in America. Chapter
3 presents evidence on the economic and social costs of current
crime and incarceration policy.
CHAPTER 1: The Landscape of

Crime in the United States
Crime rates in the United States have been on a steady decline since the 1990s. Despite this
improvement, particular demographic groups still exhibit high rates of criminal activity while
others remain especially likely to be victims of crime.
1. Crime rates have steadily declined over the past twenty-five years.
2. Low-income individuals are more likely than higher-income
individuals to be victims of crime.
3. The majority of criminal offenders are younger than age thirty.
4. Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier criminal behavior.
Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States
1.
Crime rates have steadily declined over the past

twenty-five years.
After a significant explosion in crime rates between the 1960s and

the 1980s, the United States has experienced a steady decline in crime
rates over the past twenty-five years. As illustrated in figure 1, crime
rates fell nearly 30 percent between 1991 and 2001, and subsequently
fell an additional 22 percent between 2001 and 2012. This measure,
calculated by the FBI, incorporates both violent crimes (e.g., murder
and aggravated assault) and property crimes (e.g., burglary and
larceny-theft). Individually, rates of property and violent crime have
followed similar trends, falling 29 percent and 33 percent, respectively,
between 1991 and 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] 2010b).
Social scientists have struggled to provide adequate explanations
for the sharp and persistent decline in crime rates. Economists
have focused on a few potential factorsincluding an increased
number of police on the streets, rising rates of incarceration, and
the waning of the crack epidemicto explain the drop in crime
(Levitt 2004). In the 1990s, police officers per capita increased by
approximately 14 percent. During this same decade, sentencing

policies grew stricter and the U.S. prison population swelled,
which had both deterrence (i.e., prevention of further crime by
increasing the threat of punishment) and incapacitation (i.e., the
inability to commit a crime because of being imprisoned) effects
on criminals (Abrams 2011; Johnson and Raphael 2012; Levitt
2004). The waning of the crack epidemic reduced crime primarily
through a decline in the homicide rates associated with crack
markets in the late 1980s.
Though crime rates have fallen, they remain an important policy
issue. In particular, some communities, often those with lowincome residents, still experience elevated rates of certain types of
crime despite the national decline.
FIGURE 1.
Crime Rate in the United States, 19602012
After being particularly elevated during the 1970s and 1980s, the crime rate fell nearly 45 percent between 1990 and 2012.
Crime rate per 100,000 residents
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: DOJ 2010b; authors calculations.

Note: The crime rate includes all violent crimes (i.e., aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder, and robbery) and property crimes (i.e., burglary, larceny-theft,
and motor vehicle theft).
2010
2.
Low-income individuals are more likely than

higher-income individuals to be victims of
crime.
Across all types of personal crimes, victimization rates are

significantly higher for individuals living in low-income households,
as shown in figure 2. In 2008, the latest year for which data are
available, the victimization rate for all personal crimes among
individuals with family incomes of less than $15,000 was over three
times the rate of those with family incomes of $75,000 or more
(DOJ 2010a). The most prevalent crime for low-income victims was
assault, followed closely by acts of attempted violence, at 33 victims
and 28 victims per 1,000 residents, respectively. For those in the
higher-income bracket, these rates were significantly lower at only
11 victims and 9 victims per 1,000 residents, respectively.
Because crime tends to concentrate in disadvantaged areas, lowincome individuals living in these communities are even more likely
to be victims. Notably, evidence from the Moving to Opportunity
programa multiyear federal research demonstration project that
combined rental assistance with housing counseling to help families
with very low incomes move from areas with a high concentration
of povertysuggests that moving into a less-poor neighborhood

significantly reduces child criminal victimization rates. In
particular, children of families that moved as a result of receiving
both a housing voucher to move to a new location and counseling
assistance experienced personal crime victimization rates that
were 13 percentage points lower than those who did not receive any
voucher or assistance (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2000).
Victims of personal crimes face both tangible costs, including
medical costs, lost earnings, and costs related to victim assistance
programs, and intangible costs, such as pain, suffering, and lost
quality of life (Miller, Cohen, and Wiersama 1996). There are
also public health consequences to crime victimization. Since
homicide rates are so high for young African American men, men
in this demographic group lose more years of life before age sixtyfive to homicide than they do to heart disease, which is the nations
overall leading killer (Heller et al. 2013).
FIGURE 2.
Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 or Older, by Type of Crime and Annual Family
Income, 2008
In 2008, individuals with annual family incomes of less than $15,000 were at least three times more likely to be victims of personal
crimessuch as rape and assaultthan were individuals with annual family incomes of $75,000 or more.
Victimization rate per 1,000 persons
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Completed violence
Attempted violence
$0$14,999
Rape/sexual assault
$15,000$34,999
$35,000$74,999
Robbery
Assault
$75,000 or more
Sources: DOJ 2010a; authors calculations.

Note: The victimization rate is defined as the number of individuals who were victims of crime over a six-month period per every 1,000 persons age twelve or older.
3.
The majority of criminal offenders are

younger than age thirty.
Juveniles make up a significant portion of offenders each year.

More than one quarter (27 percent) of known offendersdefined
as individuals with at least one identifiable characteristic that were
involved in a crime incident, whether or not an arrest was made
were individuals ages eleven to twenty, and an additional 34 percent
were ages twenty-one to thirty; all other individuals composed
fewer than 40 percent of offenders. As seen in figure3, this trend
holds for all types of crimes. More specifically, 55 percent of
offenders committing crimes against persons (such as assault and
sex offenses) were ages eleven to thirty. For crimes against property
(such as larceny-theft and vandalism) and crimes against society
(including drug offenses and weapon law violations), 63 percent
and 66 percent of offenders, respectively, were individuals in the
eleven-to-thirty age group.
A stark difference in the number of offenders by gender is also

evident. Most crimeswhether against persons, property, or
societyare committed by men; of criminal offenders with
known gender, 72 percent are male. This trend for gender follows
for crimes against persons (73 percent), crimes against property
(70 percent), and crimes against society (77 percent) (DOJ 2012).
Combined, these facts indicate that most offenders in the United
States are young men.
Some social scientists explain this age profile of crime by appealing
to a biological perspective on criminal behavior, focusing on the
impaired decision-making capabilities of the adolescent brain in
particular. There are also numerous social theories that emphasize
youth susceptibility to societal pressures, namely their concern
with identity formation, peer reactions, and establishing their
independence (ODonoghue and Rabin 2001).
FIGURE 3.
Number of Offenders in the United States, by Age and Offense Category, 2012
More than 60 percent of known criminal offenders are under the age of thirty, with individuals ages eleven to twenty constituting
roughly 27 percent of offenders, and individuals ages twenty-one to thirty making up an additional 34 percent.
Number of offenders (in thousands)
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
Ages 10 and under
Ages 1120
Crimes against persons
Ages 2130
Ages 3140
Crimes against property
Ages 4150
Ages 50 and over
Crimes against society
Sources: DOJ 2012; authors calculations.

Note: The FBI defines crimes against persons as crimes whose victims are always individuals. Crimes against property are those with the goal of obtaining
money, property, or some other benefit. Crimes against society are those that represent societys prohibition against engaging in certain types of activity
(DOJ 2011). Offender data include characteristics of each offender involved in a crime incident whether or not an arrest was made; offenders with unknown
ages are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, incidents with unknown offenders1,741,162 incidents in 2012are excluded. For more details, see the
technical appendix.
Total
4.
Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier

criminal behavior.
Youths from low-income families (those with incomes at or below

200 percent of the federal poverty level) are equally likely to commit
drug-related offenses than are their higher-income counterparts.
As seen in figure 4, low-income youths are just as likely to use
marijuana by age sixteen, and to use other drugs or sell drugs by age
eighteen. In contrast, low-income youths are more likely to engage in
violent and property crimes than are youths from middle- and highincome families. In particular, low-income youths are significantly
more likely to attack someone or get into a fight, join a gang, or steal
something worth more than $50. In other words, youths from lowincome families are more likely to engage in crimes that involve or
affect other people than are youths from higher-income families.
A standard economics explanation for the socioeconomic profile
of property crime is that for poor youths the attractiveness of
alternatives to crime is low: if employment opportunities are
limited for teens living in poor neighborhoods, then property
crime becomes relatively more attractive. The heightened
likelihood of violent crime among poor youths raises the issue
of automatic behaviorsin other words, youths intuitively
responding to perceived threatswhich has become the focus of
recent research in this field. However, the similar rates of drug
use across teens from different income groups is consistent with

a more general model of risky teenage activity associated with the
so-called impaired decision-making capabilities of the adolescent
brain.
Some intriguing recent academic work has proposed that adverse
youth outcomes are often the result of quick errors in judgment
and decision-making. In particular, hostile attribution bias
hypervigilance to threat cues and the tendency to overattribute
malevolent intent to othersappears to be more common among
disadvantaged youths, partly because these youths grow up with
a heightened risk of having experienced abuse (Dodge, Bates, and
Pettit 1990; Heller et al. 2013). Some experts have consequently
begun promoting cognitive behavioral therapy for these youths
to help them recognize and rewire the automatic behaviors and
biased beliefs that often result in judgment and decision-making
errors. Promising results from several experiments in Chicago
in particular, improved schooling outcomes and fewer arrests for
violent crimessuggest that it is possible to change the outcomes
of disadvantaged youths simply by helping them recognize when
their automatic responses may trigger negative outcomes (Heller et
al. 2013).
FIGURE 4.
Adolescent Risk Behaviors by Family Income Level
Although youths from low-income families are as likely to use or sell drugs as are their higher-income counterparts, the former are
significantly more likely to engage in criminal activities that target other people.
40
Percent of youths
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Use marijuana
Use other
drugs
Youths from low-income families
Sell drugs
Attack
someone/get
into a fight
Become a
member of
a gang
Youths from middle-income families
Steal something
worth more
than $50
Carry
a gun
Youths from high-income families
Source: Kent 2009.

Note: Original data are derived from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Adolescent risk behaviors are measured up to age eighteen, except for
marijuana usage, which is measured up to age sixteen. Low-income families are those whose incomes are at or below 200 percent of the the federal poverty level
(FPL). Middle-income families have incomes between 201 and 400 percent of the FPL. High-income families have incomes at or above 401 percent of the FPL.
CHAPTER 2: The Growth of

Mass Incarceration in America
The incarceration rate in the United States is now at a historically unprecedented level and is far
above the typical rate in other developed countries. As a result, imprisonment has become an
inevitable reality for subsets of the American population.
5. Federal and state policies have driven up the incarceration rate over
the past thirty years.
6. The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times that of the typical
OECD nation.
7. There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African American man
without a high school diploma will be imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
Chapter 2 : The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America
5.
Federal and state policies have driven up the

incarceration rate over the past thirty years.
The incarceration rate in the United Statesdefined as the number

of inmates in local jails, state prisons, federal prisons, and privately
operated facilities per every 100,000 U.S. residentsincreased during
the past three decades, from 220 in 1980 to 756 in 2008, before
retreating slightly to 710 in 2012 (as seen in figure 5).
The incarceration rate is driven by three factors: crime rates, the
number of prison sentences per number of crimes committed, and
expected time served in prison among those sentenced (Raphael
2011). Academic evidence suggests that increases in crime cannot
explain the growth in the incarceration rate since the 1980s (Raphael
and Stoll 2013). However, the likelihood that an arrested offender will
be sent to prison, as well as the time prisoners can expect to serve,
has increased for all types of crime (Raphael and Stoll 2009, 2013).
Given that both the likelihood of going to prison and sentence lengths
are heavily influenced by adjudication outcomes and the types of
punishment levied, most of the growth in the incarceration rate can
be attributed to changes in policy (Raphael and Stoll 2013).
Policymakers at the federal and state levels have created a stricter
criminal justice system in the past three decades. For example,
state laws and federal lawssuch as the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984established greater structure in sentencing through specified
guidelines for each offense. Additionally, between 1975 and 2002,
all fifty states adopted some form of mandatory-sentencing law

specifying minimum prison sentences for specific offenses. In fact,
nearly three quarters of states and the federal governmentthrough
laws like the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986enacted mandatorysentencing laws for possession or trafficking of illegal drugs. Many
states also adopted repeat offender laws, known as three strikes
laws, which strengthened the sentences of those with prior felony
convictions. These policies, among others, are believed to have made
the United States tougher on those who commit crime, raising the
incarceration rate through increased admissions and longer sentences
(Raphael and Stoll 2013).
The continued growth in the federal prison population stands in
contrast to recent trends in state prison populations. Between 2008
and 2012, the number of inmates in state correctional facilities
decreased by approximately 4 percent (from roughly 1.41 million
to 1.35 million), while the number of inmates in federal prisons
increased by more than 8 percent (from approximately 201,000 to
nearly 218,000) (Carson and Golinelli 2013). This increase in federal
imprisonment rates has been driven by increases in immigrationrelated admissions. Between 2003 and 2011, admissions to federal
prisons for immigration-related offenses increased by 83 percent,
rising from 13,100 to 23,939 (DOJ n.d.).
FIGURE 5.
Incarceration Rate in the United States, 19602012
Federal policies, such as the Sentencing Reform Act, and state policies, such as three strikes legislation, were major contributing factors
Incarceration rate per 100,000 residents
to the 222 percent increase in the incarceration rate between 1980 and 2012.
800
700
600
Twenty-four states adopt or

strengthen three strikes legislation
500
400
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
300
200
100
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau
2001; Glaze 2010, 2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper 2010; authors
calculations.
Note: Incarceration rate refers to the total number of inmates in custody of local jails, state and federal prisons, and privately operated facilities within that
year per 100,000 U.S. residents. The three events highlighted in this figure are examples of the many policy changes that are believed to have influenced the
incarceration rate since the 1980s. For more details, see the technical appendix.
6.
The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six

times that of the typical OECD nation.
The United States is an international outlier when it comes to

incarceration rates. In 2012, the incarceration rate in the United
Stateswhich includes inmates in the custody of local jails, state
or federal prisons, and privately operated facilitieswas 710 per
100,000 U.S. residents (Glaze and Herberman 2013). This puts the U.S.
incarceration rate at more than five times the typical global rate of 130,
and more than twice the incarceration rate of 90 percent of the worlds
countries (Walmsley 2013).
The U.S. incarceration rate in 2012 was significantly higher than those
of its neighbors: Canadas and Mexicos incarceration rates were 118
and 210, respectively. Moreover, the U.S. incarceration rate is more
than six times higher than the typical rate of 115 for a nation in the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
(Walmsley 2013). As seen in figure 6, in recent years incarceration rates
in OECD nations have ranged from 47 to 266; these rates are relatively
comparable to the rates seen in the United States prior to the 1980s.
Indeed, mass incarceration appears to be a relatively unique and recent

American phenomenon.
A variety of factors can explain the discrepancy in incarceration rates.
One important factor is higher crime rates, especially rates of violent
crimes: the homicide rate in the United States is approximately four
times the typical rate among the nations in figure 6 (United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime 2014). Additionally, drug control policies
in the United Stateswhich have largely not been replicated in other
Western countrieshave prominently contributed to the rising
incarcerated population over the past several decades (Donahue,
Ewing, and Peloquin 2011). Another important factor is sentencing
policy; in particular, the United States imposes much longer prison
sentences for drug-related offenses than do many economically
similar nations. For example, the average expected time served for
drug offenses is twenty-three months in the United States, in contrast
to twelve months in England and Wales and seven months in France
(Lynch and Pridemore 2011).
FIGURE 6.
Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries
With an incarceration rate of 710 inmates per 100,000 residents, the United States stands in stark contrast to the typical incarceration rate
of 115 among OECD nations.
United States
Chile
Estonia
Israel
Poland
Mexico
New Zealand
Slovakia
Hungary
Turkey
Czech Republic
Spain
United Kingdom
Portugal
Australia
Luxembourg
Canada
Greece
Belgium
Italy
South Korea
France
Austria
Ireland
Switzerland
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Slovenia
Finland
Japan
Iceland
154
147
147
136
130
122
118
111
108
106
99
98
98
88
82
82
79
73
72
67
66
58
51
47
100
238
223
217
210
192
187
186
179
200
710
266
300
400
500
600
Incarceration rate per 100,000 of national population

Sources: Glaze and Herberman 2013; Walmsley 2013; authors calculations.
Note: All incarceration rates are from 2013, with the exception of the rates for Canada, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United States; of these countries, all rates are from 2012, with the exception of Canada, whose rate is from 201112. The incarceration
rate for the United Kingdom is a weighted average of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. For more details, see the technical
appendix.
10
700
800
7.
There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an

African American man without a high school
diploma will be imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
For certain demographic groups, incarceration has become a fact

of life. Figure 7 illustrates the cumulative risk of imprisonment for
men by race, education, and birth cohort. As described by Pettit and
Western (2004), the cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected
lifetime likelihood of serving time for a person born in a specific year.
Specifically, each point reflects the percent chance that a man born
within a given range of years will have spent time in prison by age
thirty to thirty-four. Notably, most men who are ever incarcerated enter
prison for the first time before age thirty-five, and so these cumulative
risks by age thirty to thirty-four are reflective of lifetime risks.
Men in the first birth cohort, 194549, reached their mid-thirties
by 1980 just as the incarceration rate began a steady incline. For all
education levels within this age group, only an 8-percentage point
differential separated white and African American men in terms of
imprisonment risk (depicted by the difference between the two solid
lines on the far left of figure 7). As the incarceration rate rose, however,
discrepancies between races became more apparent. Men born in the

latest birth cohort, 197579, reached their mid-thirties around 2010;
for this cohort, the difference in cumulative risk of imprisonment
between white and African American men is more than double the
difference for the first birth cohort (as seen on the far right of figure 7).
These racial disparities become particularly striking when
considering men with low educational attainment. Over 53
percentage points distance white and African American male high
school dropouts in the latest birth cohort (depicted by the difference
between the two dashed lines on the far right of figure 7), with male
African American high school dropouts facing a nearly 70 percent
cumulative risk of imprisonment. This high risk of imprisonment
translates into a higher chance of being in prison than of being
employed. For African American men in general, it translates into a
higher chance of spending time in prison than of graduating with a
four-year college degree (Pettit 2012; Pettit and Western 2004).
FIGURE 7.
Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 3034 for Men Born Between 194549 and
197579, by Race and Education
Among men born between 1975 and 1979, an African American high school dropout has nearly a 70 percent chance of being imprisoned
Cumulative risk of imprisonment (percent)
by his mid-thirties.
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Born
194549
Born
195054
Born
195559
Born
196064
Born
196569
Born
197074
Born
197579
Birth cohort
White, male high school dropouts
White males, all education levels
African American, male high school dropouts

African American males, all education levels
Source: Western and Wildeman 2009.

Note: Cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected lifetime likelihood of imprisonment for a person born in a specific range of years. For more details, see
the technical appendix.
11
CHAPTER 3: The Economic and Social Costs

of Crime and Incarceration
Todays high rate of incarceration is considerably costly to American taxpayers, with state governments
bearing the bulk of the fiscal burden. In addition to these budgetary costs, current incarceration
policy generates economic and social costs for both those imprisoned and their families.
8. Per capita expenditures on corrections more than tripled over the

past thirty years.
9. By their fourteenth birthday, African American children whose
fathers do not have a high school diploma are more likely than not to
see their fathers incarcerated.
10. Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts on a young persons
future.
12
Chapter 3 : The Economic and Social Costs of Crime and Incarceration
8.
Per capita expenditures on corrections more

than tripled over the past thirty years.
In 2010, the United States spent more than $80 billion on

corrections expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels.
Corrections expenditures fund the supervision, confinement,
and rehabilitation of adults and juveniles convicted of offenses
against the law, and the confinement of persons awaiting trial
and adjudication (Kyckelhahn 2013). As figure 8 illustrates, total
corrections expenditures more than quadrupled over the past
twenty years in real terms, from approximately $17 billion in 1980
to more than $80 billion in 2010. When including expenditures for
police protection and judicial and legal services, the direct costs of
crime rise to $261 billion (Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013).
Most corrections expenditures have historically occurred at the state
level and continue to do so. As shown in figure 8, in 2010, more than
57 percent of direct cash outlays for corrections came from state
governments, compared to 10 percent from the federal government
and nearly 33 percent from local governments. Increased
expenditures at every level of government are not surprising given
the growth in incarceration, which has far outstripped population
growth, leading to a higher rate of incarceration and higher
corrections spending per capita (Census Bureau 2001, 2013; Raphael

and Stoll 2013). Per capita expenditures on corrections (denoted by
the dashed line in figure 8) more than tripled between 1980 and
2010. In real terms, each U.S. resident on average contributed $260
to corrections expenditures in 2010, which stands in stark contrast
to the $77 each resident contributed in 1980.
Crime-related expenditures generate a significant strain on state
and federal budgets, leading some to question whether public funds
are best spent incarcerating nonviolent criminals. Preliminary
evidence from the recent policy experience in Californiain
which a substantial number of nonviolent criminals were released
from state and federal prisonssuggests that alternatives to
incarceration for nonviolent offenders (e.g., electronic monitoring
and house arrest) can lead to slightly higher rates of property
crime, but have no statistically significant impact on violent crime
(Lofstrom and Raphael 2013). These conclusions have led some
experts to suggest that public safety priorities could better be
achieved by incarcerating fewer nonviolent criminals, combined
with spending more on education and policing (ibid.).
FIGURE 8.
Total Corrections Expenditures by Level of Government and Per Capita Expenditures,

19802010
In real terms, total corrections expenditures today are more than 350 percent higher than they were in 1980, while per capita
expenditures increased nearly 250 percent over the same period.
Total expenditures
(in millions of 2010 dollars)
80,000
250
70,000
200
60,000
50,000
150
40,000
30,000
100
20,000
50
10,000
0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Federal
State
Local
Per capita expenditures

(in 2010 dollars)
300
90,000
Per capita expenditures
Sources: Bauer 2003a, 2003b; Census Bureau 2001, 2011, 2013; Gifford 2001; Hughes 2006, 2007; Hughes and Perry 2005; Perry 2005, 2008; Kyckelhahn
2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013; authors calculations.
Note: The dollar figures are adjusted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U-RS (Consumer Price Index Research Series Using Current Methods). Population estimates for
each year are taken from the Census Bureaus estimates for July 1 of that year. The figure includes only direct expenditures so as not to double count the value of
intergovernmental grants. For more details, see the technical appendix.
13
9.
By their fourteenth birthday, African American

children whose fathers do not have a high
school diploma are more likely than not to see
their fathers incarcerated.
In 2010, approximately 2.7 million children, or over 3 percent of

all children in the United States, had a parent in prison (The Pew
Charitable Trusts 2010). As of 2007, an estimated 53 percent of prisoners
in the United States were parents of children under age eighteen, a
majority being fathers (Glaze and Maruschak 2010). Furthermore, it
is not the case that these parents were already disengaged from their
childrens lives. For example, in 2007, approximately half of parents
in state prisons were the primary provider of financial support for
their childrenand nearly half had lived with their childrenprior
to incarceration (ibid.). Furthermore, fathers often are required to pay
child support during their incarceration, and since they make little
to no money during their incarceration, they often accumulate child
support debt.
Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative risk of imprisonment for parents
or the projected lifetime likelihood of serving time for a person
born in a specific yearby the time their child turns fourteen, by
childs race and their own educational attainment (Wildeman 2009).
Regardless of race, fathers are much more likely to be imprisoned
than are mothers. These risks of imprisonment are magnified when

parental educational attainment is taken into account; high school
dropouts are much more likely to be imprisoned than are individuals
with higher levels of education. Fathers who are high school dropouts
face a cumulative risk of imprisonment that is approximately four
times higher than that of fathers with some college education. An
African American child with a father who dropped out of high school
has more than a 50 percent chance of seeing that father incarcerated
by the time the child reaches age fourteen.
Young children (ages two to six) and school-aged children of
incarcerated parents have been shown to have emotional problems and
to demonstrate weak academic performance and behavioral problems,
respectively. It is unclear, however, the extent to which these problems
result from having an incarcerated parent as opposed to stemming
from the other risk factors faced by families of incarcerated individuals;
incarcerated parents tend to have low levels of education and high rates
of poverty, in addition to frequently having issues with drugs, alcohol,
and mental illness (Center for Research on Child Wellbeing 2008).
FIGURE 9.
Cumulative Risk of Parents Imprisonment for Children by Age 14, by Race and Parents
Education
An African American child whose father did not complete high school has a 50 percent chance of seeing his or her father incarcerated by
the time the child reaches his or her fourteenth birthday.
Cumulative risk of parents

imprisonment (percent)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Father
Mother
Father
White children
High school dropout
Mother
African American children

Parental education
High school only
Some college
Source: Wildeman 2009.

Note: Cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected lifetime likelihood of a parents imprisonment by the time his or her child turns fourteen.
Children included in the analysis were born in 1990. For more details, see the technical appendix.
14
10.
Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts

on a young persons future.
After increasing steadily between 1975 and 1999, the rate of youth
confinement began declining in 2000, with the decline accelerating
in recent years (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2013). In 2011, there
were 64,423 detained youths, a rate of roughly 2 out of every 1,000
juveniles ages ten and older (Sickmund et al. 2013). Detained juveniles
include those placed in a facility as part of a court-ordered disposition
(68 percent); juveniles awaiting a court hearing, adjudication,
disposition, or placement elsewhere (31 percent); and juveniles who
were voluntarily admitted to a facility in lieu of adjudication as part of
a diversion agreement (1 percent) (ibid.).
Youths are incarcerated for a variety of crimes. In 2011, 22,964
juveniles (37 percent of juvenile detainees) were detained for a violent
offense, and 14,705 (24 percent) were detained for a property offense.
More than 70 percent of youth offenders are detained in public
facilities, for which the cost is estimated to be approximately $240 per
person each day, or around $88,000 per person each year (Petteruti,
Walsh, and Velazquez 2009).
In addition to these direct costs, juvenile detention is believed to

have significant effects on a youths future since it jeopardizes his or
her accumulation of human and social capital during an important
developmental stage. Studies have found it difficult to estimate
this effect, given that incarcerated juveniles differ across many
dimensions from those who are not incarcerated. Aizer and Doyle
(2013) overcome this difficulty by using randomly assigned judges
to estimate the difference in adult outcomes between youths sent to
juvenile detention and youths who were charged with a similar crime,
but who were not sent to juvenile detention. The authors find that
sending a youth to juvenile detention has a significant negative impact
on that youths adult outcomes. As illustrated in figure 10, juvenile
incarceration is estimated to decrease the likelihood of high school
graduation by 13 percentage points and increase the likelihood of
incarceration as an adult by 22 percentage points. In particular, those
who are incarcerated as juveniles are 15 percentage points more likely
to be incarcerated as adults for violent crimes or 14 percentage points
more likely to be incarcerated as adults for property crimes.
FIGURE 10.
Effect of Juvenile Incarceration on Likelihood of High School Graduation and Adult

Imprisonment
Juvenile incarceration reduces the likelihood of high school graduation by more than 13 percentage points, and increases the probability
of returning to prison as an adult by over 22 percentage points, as compared to nondetained juvenile offenders.
35
Entered adult prison by age 25, by crime type
Percentage point change in likelihood
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Graduated high school

Violent crime
Property crime
Any criminal offense
-5
-10
-15
Source: Aizer and Doyle 2013.

Note: Bars show statistically significant regression estimates of the causal effect of juvenile incarceration on high school completion and on
adult recidivism. For more details, see the technical appendix.
15
Technical Appendix
1. Crime rates have steadily declined over the past

twenty-five years.
Figure 1. Crime Rate in the United States, 19602012
Sources: DOJ 2010b; authors calculations.
Note: The U.S. crime rate is the sum of the violent crime
rates (i.e., aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, and robbery) and property crime
rates (i.e., burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft)
from the FBIs Uniform Crime Reporting Program. This
program includes crime statistics gathered by the FBI from
law enforcement agencies across the United States.
2. Low-income individuals are more likely than

higher-income individuals to be victims of crime.
Figure 2. Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 or Older,
by Type of Crime and Annual Family Income, 2008
Sources: DOJ 2010a; authors calculations.
Note: Victimization data come from the FBIs National Crime
Victimization Survey. The victimization rate is defined as
the number of individuals who were victims of crime over a
six-month period per every 1,000 persons age twelve or older.
Persons whose family income level was not ascertained are
excluded from this figure. Income brackets are combined
using population data for each income range.
3. The majority of criminal offenders are younger

than age thirty.
Figure 3. Number of Offenders in the United States, by Age
and Offense Category, 2012
Sources: DOJ 2012; authors calculations.
Note: The FBI defines crimes against persons as crimes
whose victims are always individuals (e.g., assault, murder,
and rape). Crimes against property are those with the goal
of obtaining money, property, or some other benefit (e.g.,
bribery, burglary, and robbery). Crimes against society are
those that represent societys prohibition against engaging in
certain types of activity (e.g., drug violations, gambling, and
prostitution) (DOJ 2011).
Offender data come from the FBIs National Incident-Based
Reporting System. This includes characteristics (e.g., age,
sex, and race) of each offender involved in a crime incident
16
whether or not an arrest was made. The data, which aim

to capture any information known to law enforcement
concerning the offenders even though they may not have
been identified, are reported by law enforcement agencies.
An additional 1,741,162 incidents had unknown offenders,
meaning there is no known information about the offender.
Offenders with unknown ages are excluded from this
figure. (This paragraph is based on the authors email
correspondence with the Criminal Justice Information Series
at the FBI, March 2014.)
4. Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier criminal

behavior.
Figure 4. Adolescent Risk Behaviors by Family Income Level
Source: Kent 2009.
Note: Original data are derived from the 1997 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which followed a sample of
adolescents in 1997 into young adulthood and recorded
their behavior and outcomes through annual interviews.
Adolescent risk behaviors are measured up to age eighteen,
with the exception of marijuana use, which is measured up to
age sixteen. Low-income families are defined as those whose
incomes are at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty
level (FPL). Middle-income families are defined as those
with incomes between 201 and 400 percent of the FPL, and
high-income families are defined as those with incomes at or
above 401 percent of the FPL.
5. Federal and state policies have driven up the

Figure 5. Incarceration Rate in the United States, 19602012
Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal
communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau 2001; Glaze 2010,
2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013;
Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper
2010; authors calculations.
Note: The incarceration rate refers to the total number of
inmates in custody of local jails, state or federal prisons,
and privately operated facilities within the year per 100,000
U.S. residents. Incarceration rates for 1960 and 1970 come
from Cahalan (1986). Incarceration rates for 1980 to 1999
are calculated by dividing the total incarcerated population
(both prison and jail) by the U.S. resident population on

January 1 of the following year taken from Census Bureau
(2001). Estimates of the total incarcerated population come
from personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014. This quotient is then
multiplied by 100,000 in order to get the incarceration
rate per 100,000 residents. Incarceration rates for 2000 to
2006 come from Sabol, Couture, and Harrison (2007). The
incarceration rate for 2007 comes from Sabol, West, and
Cooper (2010). The incarceration rate for 2008 comes from
Glaze (2010). Incarceration rates for 2009 and 2010 come
from Glaze (2011). Incarceration rates for 2011 and 2012
come from Glaze and Herberman (2013).
Dates for the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986 come from Raphael and Stoll (2013).
The number of states that adopted or strengthened the three
strikes legislation between 1993 and 1997 come from Austin
and colleagues (2000). The three events highlighted in the
figure are examples of the many policy changes that are
believed to have influenced the incarceration rate since the
1980s.
6. The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times

that of the typical OECD nation.
Figure 6. Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries
Sources: Glaze and Herberman 2013; Walmsley 2013; authors
calculations.
Note: The typical Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) incarceration rate refers to the
median incarceration rate among all OECD nations. The
incarceration rate for the United States comes from Glaze
and Herberman (2013). Data for all other OECD nations
come from Walmsley (2013). All incarceration rates are
for 2013, with the exception of Canada, Greece, Israel,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States. Of these countries, all rates are for 2012, with the
exception of Canada, whose rate is from 2011 to 2012. The
incarceration rate for the United Kingdom is a weighted
average of the prison population rates of England and Wales,
Northern Ireland, and Scotland based on their estimated
national populations. The incarceration rate for France
includes metropolitan France and excludes departments and
territories in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania.
7. There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African

American man without a high school diploma will be
imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
Figure 7. Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 3034
for Men Born Between 194549 and 197579, by Race and
Education
Source: Western and Wildeman 2009.
Note: In this figure, imprisonment is defined as a sentence
of twelve months or longer for a felony conviction. The
cumulative risk of imprisonment for men is calculated
using life table methods, and requires age-specific firstincarceration rates. Though this cumulative risk is
technically the likelihood of going to jail or prison by age
thirty to thirty-four, these estimates roughly describe
lifetime risks because most inmates enter prison for the first
time before age thirty-five. For more details, see Pettit and
Western (2004).
8. Per capita expenditures on corrections more than

tripled over the past thirty years.
Figure 8. Total Corrections Expenditures by Level of
Government and Per Capita Expenditures, 19802010
Sources: Bauer 2003a, 2003b; Census Bureau 2001, 2011,
2013; Gifford 2001; Hughes 2006, 2007; Hughes and Perry
2005; Perry 2005, 2008; Kyckelhahn 2012a, 2012b, 2012c;
Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013; authors calculations.
Note: Total corrections expenditures by type of government
come from the Department of Justices (DOJs) annual
Justice Expenditures and Employment Extracts. Only direct
expenditures are included so as to not double count the
value of intergovernmental grants. Expenditure figures are
adjusted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. Estimates of the
U.S. resident population are the Census Bureaus population
estimates for July of that year. Per capita expenditures are then
calculated by dividing the total corrections expenditures by
the resident population in that year.
17
9. By their fourteenth birthday, African American

children whose fathers do not have a high school
diploma are more likely than not to see their fathers
incarcerated.
Figure 9. Cumulative Risk of Parents Imprisonment for
Children by Age 14, by Race and Parents Education
Source: Wildeman 2009.
Note: Children included in the figure were born in 1990.
The cumulative risk of parental imprisonment for children
by the time they turn fourteen is calculated using life table
methods, and relies on the number of children experiencing
parental imprisonment for the first time at any age. Original
analysis was performed using three data sets: the Surveys
of Inmates of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, the
year-end counts of prisoners, and the National Corrections
Reporting Program. For more details, see Wildeman (2009).
18
10. Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts on

a young persons future.
Figure 10. Effect of Juvenile Incarceration on Likelihood of
High School Graduation and Adult Imprisonment
Source: Aizer and Doyle 2013.
Note: Bars show statistically significant regression estimates
(at the 5 percent significance level) of the causal effect of
juvenile incarceration on high school completion and on
adult recidivism. The sample includes all juveniles charged
with a crime and brought before juvenile court, though not
necessarily all were subsequently incarcerated. The analysis
includes a vector of community x weapons-offense x yearof-offense fixed effects, uses randomly assigned judges as
an instrumental variable, and controls for demographic
characteristics as well as for court variables. The regression
results for homicide and drug crimes are not included in the
figure since they are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent
significance level. For more details, see Aizer and Doyle (2013).
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Puzzanchera. 2013. Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in
Residential Placement. National Center for Juvenile Justice,
Office of Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. http://
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2014. Intentional
Homicide, Count and Rate per 100,000 Population (1995
2011). UNODC Homicide Statistics. United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria. http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2001. Monthly Estimates of the United States
Population: April 1, 1980 to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term
Projections to November 1, 2000. Population Estimates
Program, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau,
Washington, DC. http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/
totals/1990s/tables/nat-total.txt.
. 2011. Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population
by Sex and Age for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1,
2010. Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington,
DC. http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/
nat2010.html.
21
. 2013. Monthly Population Estimates for the United States:

April 1, 2010 to November 1, 2013. Population Division, U.S.
Census Bureau, Washington, DC. http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/historical/2010s/vintage_2012/national.html.
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 2010a. Criminal Victimization
in the United States, 2008 Statistical Tables. Table 14.
content/pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf.
. 2010b. Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. FBI, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC. http://www.
ucrdatatool.gov/.
. 2011. Crimes against Persons, Property, and Society.
National Incident-Based Reporting System, FBI, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC. http://www.fbi.
gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2011/resources/crimes-againstpersons-property-and-society.
. 2012. National Incident-Based Reporting System 2012.
FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2012/data-tables/.
22
. n.d. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics. Bureau of

Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department
of Justice, Washington, DC. http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/.
Walmsley, Roy. 2013. World Prison Population List (tenth
edition). International Centre for Prison Studies, London,
United Kingdom. http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/
prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf.
Western, Bruce, and Christopher Wildeman. 2009. The Black
Family and Mass Incarceration. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 621: 22142. http://
scholar.harvard.edu/brucewestern/publications/black-familyand-mass-incarceration.
Wildeman, Christopher. 2009. Parental Imprisonment, the Prison
Boom, and the Concentration of Childhood Disadvantage.
Demography 46 (2): 26580. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2831279/.
Hamilton Project Papers Related to Crime and

Incarceration
A New Approach to Reducing Incarceration While
Maintaining Low Rates of Crime
Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll propose reforms that would
reduce incarceration while keeping crime rates low by reforming
sentencing practices and by creating incentives for local
governments to avoid sentencing low-level offenders to prison.
Think Before You Act: A New Approach to Preventing
Youth Violence and Dropout
Jens Ludwig and Anuj Shah propose a federal government
scale-up of behaviorally informed interventions intended to
help disadvantaged youths recognize high-stakes situations
when their automatic responses may be maladaptive and
could lead to trouble.
Thirteen Economic Facts about Social Mobility and the

Role of Education
The Hamilton Project examines the relationship between
growing income inequality and social mobility in America. The
memo explores the growing gap in educational opportunities
and outcomes for students based on family income and the
great potential of education to increase upward mobility for all
Americans.
From Prison to Work: A Proposal for a National Prisoner
Reentry Program
Bruce Western proposes a national prisoner reentry program
whose core element is up to a year of transitional employment
available to all parolees in need of work.
23
24
ADVISORY COUNCIL
GEORGE A. AKERLOF
Koshland Professor of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
ROGER C. ALTMAN
Founder & Executive Chairman
Evercore
ALAN S. BLINDER
Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor
of Economics & Public Affairs
Princeton University
JONATHAN COSLET
Senior Partner & Chief Investment Officer
TPG Capital, L.P.
ROBERT CUMBY
Professor of Economics
Georgetown University
JOHN DEUTCH
Institute Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.
Dean and Professor, Boalt School of Law
BLAIR W. EFFRON
Founding Partner
Centerview Partners LLC
TIMOTHY GEITHNER
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary
RICHARD GEPHARDT
President & Chief Executive Officer
Gephardt Group Government Affairs
ROBERT GREENSTEIN
President
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
MICHAEL GREENSTONE
3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
GLENN H. HUTCHINS
Co-Founder
Silver Lake
JIM JOHNSON
Chairman
Johnson Capital Partners
LAWRENCE F. KATZ
Elisabeth Allison Professor of Economics
Harvard University
MARK MCKINNON
Former Advisor to George W. Bush
Co-Founder, No Labels
ALICE M. RIVLIN
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Professor of Public Policy
DAVID M. RUBENSTEIN
Co-Founder & Co-Chief Executive Officer
The Carlyle Group
ROBERT E. RUBIN
Co-Chair, Council on Foreign Relations
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary
LESLIE B. SAMUELS
Senior Counsel
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
SHERYL SANDBERG
Chief Operating Officer
Facebook
RALPH L. SCHLOSSTEIN
President & Chief Executive Officer
Evercore
ERIC SCHMIDT
Executive Chairman
Google Inc.
ERIC SCHWARTZ
76 West Holdings
ERIC MINDICH
Chief Executive Officer
Eton Park Capital Management
THOMAS F. STEYER
Business Leader & Investor
SUZANNE NORA JOHNSON

Former Vice Chairman
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
LAWRENCE SUMMERS
Charles W. Eliot University Professor
Harvard University
ROLAND FRYER
Robert M. Beren Professor of Economics
Harvard University
CEO, EdLabs
PETER ORSZAG
Vice Chairman of Global Banking
Citigroup, Inc.
PETER THIEL
Technology Entrepreneur, Investor,
and Philanthropist
MARK T. GALLOGLY
Cofounder & Managing Principal
Centerbridge Partners
RICHARD PERRY
Managing Partner & Chief Executive Officer
Perry Capital
LAURA DANDREA TYSON

S.K. and Angela Chan Professor of Global
Management, Haas School of Business
TED GAYER
Vice President & Director
of Economic Studies
The Brookings Institution
MEEGHAN PRUNTY EDELSTEIN

Senior Advisor
The Hamilton Project
JUDY FEDER
Professor & Former Dean
Georgetown Public Policy Institute
ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
Distinguished Institute Fellow and
President Emeritus
The Urban Institute
MELISSA S. KEARNEY
Director
Incarceration Rate in the United States, 19602012
Incarceration rate per 100,000 residents
Federal policies, such as the Sentencing Reform Act, and state policies, such as three strikes legislation, were major
contributing factors to the 222 percent increase in the incarceration rate between 1980 and 2012.
800
700
600
Twenty-four states adopt or

strengthen three strikes legislation
500
400
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
300
200
100
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau
2001; Glaze 2010, 2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper 2010; authors
calculations.
Note: Incarceration rate refers to the total number of inmates in custody of local jails, state and federal prisons, and privately operated facilities within that
year per 100,000 U.S. residents. The three events highlighted in this figure are examples of the many policy changes that are believed to have influenced the
incarceration rate since the 1980s. For more details, see the technical appendix.
rates have steadily declined over the past
1. Crime
twenty-five years.
individuals are more likely than higher2. Low-income
income individuals to be victims of crime.
majority of criminal offenders are younger than
3. The
age thirty.
youths engage in riskier criminal
4. Disadvantaged
behavior.
and state policies have driven up
5. Federal
the
U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times that of

6. The
the typical OECD nation.
is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African
7. There
American man without a high school diploma will be
imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
capita expenditures on corrections more than tripled

8. Per
over the past thirty years.
their fourteenth birthday, African American children
9. Bywhose
fathers do not have a high school diploma are
more likely than not to see their fathers incarcerated.
incarceration can have lasting impacts on a

10. Juvenile
young persons future.
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POLICY MEMO | MAY 2014

Ten Economic Facts about Crime and

Ten Economic Facts about Crime and

The Hamilton Project Brookings

Introduction continued from page 1

disproportionately impacted communities (Raphael 2007). These

growth and broad participation in that growth. Elevated rates of

CHAPTER 1: The Landscape of

The Hamilton Project Brookings

Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States

Crime rates have steadily declined over the past

After a significant explosion in crime rates between the 1960s and

approximately 14 percent. During this same decade, sentencing

Crime Rate in the United States, 19602012

Crime rate per 100,000 residents

Sources: DOJ 2010b; authors calculations.

Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States

Low-income individuals are more likely than

Across all types of personal crimes, victimization rates are

of povertysuggests that moving into a less-poor neighborhood

Victimization rate per 1,000 persons

Sources: DOJ 2010a; authors calculations.

The Hamilton Project Brookings

Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States

The majority of criminal offenders are

Juveniles make up a significant portion of offenders each year.

A stark difference in the number of offenders by gender is also

Number of offenders (in thousands)

Crimes against persons

Crimes against property

Ages 50 and over

Crimes against society

Sources: DOJ 2012; authors calculations.

Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States

Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier

Youths from low-income families (those with incomes at or below

use across teens from different income groups is consistent with

Adolescent Risk Behaviors by Family Income Level

Youths from low-income families

Youths from middle-income families

Youths from high-income families

Source: Kent 2009.

The Hamilton Project Brookings

CHAPTER 2: The Growth of

Chapter 2 : The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America

Federal and state policies have driven up the

The incarceration rate in the United Statesdefined as the number

all fifty states adopted some form of mandatory-sentencing law

Incarceration Rate in the United States, 19602012

Incarceration rate per 100,000 residents

Twenty-four states adopt or

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986

The Hamilton Project Brookings

Chapter 2 : The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America

The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six

The United States is an international outlier when it comes to

Indeed, mass incarceration appears to be a relatively unique and recent

Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries