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EN BANC
ROMMEL C. ARNADO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 210164

Present:
SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., *
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,**
PERLAS-BERNABE,

-versus -

LEONEN,and
JARDELEZA, *** JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and FLORANTE CAPITAN,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 18, 2015

x------------------------------------

o/-f~ ~ ~ : --~(ji,., ~-

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic ofthe Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relatio~
.J.
2
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution dated/P""~
1

On Official Leave.
OnLeave.
No part.
Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2
Id at 20-32; signed by Chainnan Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R Yusoph,
Christian Robert S. Lim, Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, Al A Parreno and Luie Tito F. Guia

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in

SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2013
of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner Rommel C.
Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, set aside his
proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared
respondent Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America
(USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in
the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255
(RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA.
He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008
and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among
others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid
Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Baluas petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty
post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution
holding that Arnados continued use of his US passport effectively negated his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for
public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The
3
4
5

Id. at 37-46; signed by Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph, Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, and Luie Tito F. Guia.
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the
rule on succession should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode
Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First
Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution
reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnados use of his
US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec
En Banc found merit in Arnados explanation that he continued to use his US
passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport
at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that,
after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent
trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed
as G.R. No. 195649.
While G.R. No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for
local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October
1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position. Respondent Capitan also
filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting
10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Bancs February 2, 2011
Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May
10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined
that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or
recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
Arnados act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation. This does not mean that he failed to comply with
the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Rollo, p. 73.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual

citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were
to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
xxxx
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even
from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.7

The issuance of this Courts April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the
present controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling,
Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnados Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009.8
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnados lone rival for the
mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of
this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and
was raffled to the Comelecs Second Division. The resolution of said petition
was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered
8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the
total votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify
Arnados proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this
Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for
any local elective office. Hence, Arnados proclamation is void and without any
legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualifying
7
8
9
10

Supra note 4, at 453-455.

Rollo, p. 74.
Id. at 47-53.
Id. at 442-454.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it
ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still
failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled
when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in
Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute
another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections.
While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnados Affidavit of
Renunciation dated April 3, 2009 was submitted in evidence, the same would not
suffice because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on
October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Divisions Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted.
Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May
2013 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12 He
argued that the Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming
that the said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitans
Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing
of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their
overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec
Second Divisions September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be
declared as eligible to run for mayor of Kauswagan.
On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the
Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado
and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive
portion of the Comelec En Bancs Resolution reads:

11
12

Id. at 45.
Id. at 75-84.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for

reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED.
The Proclamation of Private
Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN
is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
SO ORDERED.13

Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with
ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order
or Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En
Banc of a Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the
respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. In the same
Resolution, this Court granted Arnados ancillary relief for temporary restraining
order.
Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary
Restraining Order dated January 14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought to be
restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En
Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and pursuant thereto a Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office.
Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office.
In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance
of a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue
performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.
Issues
In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 31.
Id. at 85-94.
Id. at 116-117
Id. at 133-142.
Id. at 143-146.
Id. at 418-421.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF

RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING
AND/OR LATE FILING, ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE
PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE
WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF
KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.
IV
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE
FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.19

Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and
violated his right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitans Petition in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because
the latter subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In
addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period
reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.
Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered
with procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules in
deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitans motion to
consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the
reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its
own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave
abuse of discretion but also violated his constitutional right to due process when it
allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in
the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division. Furthermore, the
Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him
from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the
voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.
Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial
register of his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he
19

Id. at 8.

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on November

30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen
of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and,
therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013
elections.
Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Petition for certiorari is limited to the
determination
of
whether
the
respondent tribunal acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not
interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had
committed grave abuse of discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand,
defines grave abuse of discretion as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.22 Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough; it must be grave.23 Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been
defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.24
In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the
Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9,
2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.
Arnados allegations that Capitan
violated the rule against forumshopping and that the latters petition in
SPA No. 13-309(DC) was filed late, are
unsubstantiated and erroneous.

20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 84.
Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172, 1183 (2008).
Mayor Varias v. COMELEC, 626 Phil. 292, 314 (2010).
Id.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 464 Phil. 173, 190 (2004).

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings,

founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 It exists when the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when in both actions
there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.27
Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely
made a general averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No. 13309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second
Division, failed to comply with this Courts Revised Circular No. 28-91,28 without
demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not
shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved
the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit
to this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation
case). As the party insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado
bears the burden of establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he who
alleges has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not sufficient.29
Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the
parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent. There is
also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of
Arnados proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitans Petition in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of
Capitans allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in
stating that the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed to
Arnados herein petition states that it is a petition to disqualify and/or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain
25
26
27
28

29
30

Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., 652 Phil. 234, 239 (2010).
Id.
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 624 Phil. 396, 400 (2010).
ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR PETITIONS FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO PREVENT FORUM SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE FILING OF PETITIONS AND
COMPLAINTS (1991).
Morales v. Skills International Co. and/or Maher Daas, 531 Phil. 579, 590 (2006).
Rollo, pp. 47-51.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 210164

terms that it is one for disqualification based on Arnados failure to comply with
the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Thus, the
Comelec Second Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification
with the alternative prayer to cancel Arnados CoC. It is elementary that the
nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the petition.31
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition
for disqualification should be filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. Here,
Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013.33 Thus, the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34
The other procedural lapses allegedly
committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated.
Assuming
the
allegations of Arnado to be true, the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Arnados claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitans motion to consolidate
likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of
said motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his
Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being
accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.35 Also, it
was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant,
Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the Comelec on said
motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and subsequently appealing to this
Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively
abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36 it was held
that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is
deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with
31
32

33
34
35

36

Banaga, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 596, 605 (2000).

Rule 25Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
For further discussion on the period for filing a petition for disqualification, see also Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 660
Phil. 225 (2011) and the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992, 216
SCRA 760, cited therein.
Rollo, p. 68.
Id. at 47.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that [t]he petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy
of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
489 Phil. 735 (2005).

Decision

11

G.R. No. 210164

the tribunal of origin. [I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked
the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction.37
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases. When an action or proceeding involves
a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another
action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding
bearing the lower docket number.

In Muoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated that the term may is indicative of
a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is
vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to
exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto, which in
this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of
law and fact.39 In this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC
No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do
not even involve the same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.
Arnados protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it
decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant
consideration. The proceedings in a special action for disqualification of
candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in
nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with.40 In Diangka v.
Comelec,41 this Court held that:
Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not
be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law calls
for the proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualifications are
subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said
Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether
clarificatory questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether the
adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-examine said witnessesaffiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a
partys petition, or as in the case at bar, a partys answer and the supporting
papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.42

37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 749.
527 Phil. 733 (2006).
Id. at 741-742.
Section 4 of Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure; Nolasco v. COMELEC, 341 Phil. 761, 773 (1997).
380 Phil. 859 (2000).
Id. at 873-874.

Decision

12

G.R. No. 210164

Arnados claim that the Comelec En

Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion and violated his right to due
process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation
of the assailed Comelec En Banc
Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.
Arnados claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6,
2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph,
together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F.
Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that
Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The
September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who
the ponente is. The same goes true with the questioned December 9, 2013 Per
Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was
arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente.
Hence, we need not belabor Arnados claim of denial of due process as his basis
therefor lacks factual moorings.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA
9225 at the time he filed his CoC for the
May 13, 2013 elections; subsequent
compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with dual
citizenship is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In
Mercado v. Manzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase dual citizenship in said
Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.45 Subsequently,
43
44
45

Rollo, pp. 20-31.

367 Phil. 132 (1999).
Id. In this case the Court differentiated dual citizenship from dual allegiance as follows:
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Decision

13

G.R. No. 210164

Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who

have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon
compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office
in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of
their CoC. Thus:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the

Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The Comelec
also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming
his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having
been belatedly executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of
discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division
disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the
reason for Arnados disqualification to run for public office during the 2010
elections being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the

46
47

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Section 5(2), R.A. 9225; Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354, 368 (2009).
Entry of judgment was made on August 16, 2013.

Decision

14

G.R. No. 210164

Republic of the Philippines still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling
of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion
had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the
opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this
Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for
filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D.
Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, [t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the
chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an
unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
Besides, shortly after learning of the Courts April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or
on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an
affidavit affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case
dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run
for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case
that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath
of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the
fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of
using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or
benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing
with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue
as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to
run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his
qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more
reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the
qualifications to run for local elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for
public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for
emphasis, are the same. Arnados use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his
oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of
Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC
for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.
Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the
salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.48 Under the doctrine,
[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
48

Lazatin v. Hon. Desierto, 606 Phil. 271, 281 (2009).

Decision

15

G.R. No. 210164

state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
facts are substantially the same.49 It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and
bars relitigation of the same issue.50
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a
petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport
might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his
CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of his US
passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact
on his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that time, Maquiling had already
reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed against him questioning his
qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on October 1,
2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013
elections and without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the
argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in
his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a
CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16,
2013 ruling in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his
inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions
about his qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof was
not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of
the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case.
Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this
Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process
considerations. Thus:
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasijudicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
49
50
51

Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 395 Phil. 169, 177 (2000).

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC, 633 Phil. 590, 603 (2010).
592 Phil. 661 (2008).

Decision

16

G.R. No. 210164

process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of
evidence. Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February
2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that
In the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy
or in suppletory character and effect. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally
presented:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this
document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.52

Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport

on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus:
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010, certifying that the name Arnado, Rommel Cagoco appears in the
available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010,
with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival
NATIONALITY
PASSPORT
DATE OF Arrival
NATIONALITY
PASSPORT

:
:
:
:
:
:

01/12/2010
USA-AMERICAN
057782700
03/23/2010
USA-AMERICAN
05778270053

Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why

Arnado never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented
evidence in this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using
his US passport.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same
position he had taken in Maquiling that Arnados use of his US passport in 2009 is
an isolated act justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado
started to use his Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11,
52
53

Id. at 675-676.
Supra note 4 at 433.

Decision

17

G.R. No. 210164

2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnados

Philippine passport.
With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not
only reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling
case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for
clarity, Arnados argument in this case that he is qualified to run for mayor as he
has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13,
2013 elections is premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30,
2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US
passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In
Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues
neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that have never been raised
before them. Equally settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be,
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot
be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due
process underlie this rule.55 The same goes true with J. Brions theory that
what was cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the
July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with it an implied abdication of
foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, [t]he requirement of an express renunciation x x
x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of
allegiance. Again, this was never raised in this petition. At any rate, the
execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356 of RA 9225. For
those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office,
Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of
filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or
meaningless surplusage.
When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming
that Arnados 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been
negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.
54
55
56

74 Phil. 560, 568 (1944).

Penera v. Commission on Elections, 615 Phil. 667, 708 (2009).
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of the foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Decision

18

G.R. No. 210164

Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an

express one specifically required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnados use
of his US passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already
become final and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues
that have already been resolved there with finality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad
in the first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to the
rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnados Philippine passport57 is a
mere CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACHINE COPY ON FILE as attested
to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer III of the Comelec.58 This is clearly
stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnados Philippine passport. A machine copy or
photocopy is a mere secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in
evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due execution and the
subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.60 In this case, however, Arnados
Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnados Philippine
passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the
Bureau of Immigration that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and
March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the recently discovered
November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and
authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and
March 23, 2010, which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot
override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide
majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same
cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications.61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced that
election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will
become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government
officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the
57
58
59
60
61
62

Rollo (G.R. No. 195649), pp. 242-245.

Emphasis supplied.
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, 669 Phil. 205, 216 (2011).
Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, 458 Phil. 480, 489 (2003).
Supra note 4 at 459.
Supra note 21 at 1195.

Decision

19

G.R. No. 210164

required qualifications under Section 39,63 a fortiori, there is no reason why the
Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications
enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all, [t]he qualifications set
out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local public
offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the
circumstances that disqualify local candidates.65
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In
that case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy
for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007
without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still
affirmed the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a
local elective position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section
5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began
to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
63

64

65
66

SECITON 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities,
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at
least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least
eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code Revisited, 2011 ed., 164.
581 Phil. 657 (2008).

Decision

G.R. No. 210164

20

constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of

. 67
populanty.

In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division
disqualifying Amado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in
accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by this Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
,,,.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

fa~~,~.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

ChiefJustice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

~~h~

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

67

Id at663.

J. VELASCO, JR.

As'Sociate Justice

~ m11 JJft:e.11 r

JR~fJJ~
Associate Justice

Decision

21

Official Leave)

(On

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

G.R. No. 210164

JOS

Associate Justice

2:1Cn:l4 /)A-c r/.A)~

I

J.~v-Y' 1J~

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(On

Jos:E cMIRAL MENnoZA

Leave)

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELA~~ERNABE
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

(No part)
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

ChiefJustice

/~