Today is Saturday, July 25, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 138570

October 10, 2000

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO
LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR,
and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON,
DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON,
and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 138572

October 10, 2000

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT

INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National
Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 138587

October 10, 2000

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 138680

October 10, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and HON.
DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 138698

October 10, 2000

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN,

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C.
RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL

DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G.
BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND
INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues
relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America -the Visiting Forces Agreement.
The antecedents unfold.
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which
formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.1
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United
States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.2 With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between the two countries were held in abeyance.
Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America
continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on "the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the AsiaPacific region." Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a
final series of conferences and negotiations3 that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon
and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA.4
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,5 the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President6 and the VFA,
for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to
its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint
public hearings were held by the two Committees.7
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 4438 recommending the concurrence
of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation.
Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote9 of
its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.10
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder:
"Article I
Definitions

"As used in this Agreement, United States personnel means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.
"Within this definition:
"1. The term military personnel refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
"2. The term civilian personnel refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary
residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who are
accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the American Red Cross
and the United Services Organization.
"Article II
Respect for Law
"It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular, from any
political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within
its authority to ensure that this is done.
"Article III
Entry and Departure
"1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel
and their departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this agreement.
"2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon
entering and departing the Philippines.
"3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in
respect of United States military personnel who enter the Philippines:
"(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full
name, date of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and
photograph;
"(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority,
authorizing the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States
military personnel; and
"(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of
health, and when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the
Philippines, shall conduct a quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel
is free from quarantinable diseases. Any quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or
United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be conducted by the United States
commanding officer in accordance with the international health regulations as
promulgated by the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
"4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present,
upon demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the Philippines.
"5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States
personnel from its territory, the United States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the
person concerned within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the
Philippines.
"Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration
"1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license
issued by the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of
military or official vehicles.

"2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall
have appropriate markings.
"Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
"1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States
over United States personnel in the Philippines.
"2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the
Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable
under the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to
security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
"3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2 (b),
and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
United States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to.
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely
against the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other
government to waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good
order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the
United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular
importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the Philippines determines that the
case is of particular importance, it shall communicate such determination to the United
States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities receive the United
States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by
authorities of the Philippines against United states personnel arises out of an act or
omission done in the performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate
setting forth such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate
authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of performance of official
duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of
the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall
consult immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any
information bearing on its validity. United States military authorities shall take full account

of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States military authorities will take
disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the
Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify
the authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the
disposition of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United
States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
"4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United States shall
assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handling them over
to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
"5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention
of United States personnel who are subject of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine
authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.
"6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission
of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which
the person has been charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its
position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall
take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year,
the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not
include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any time during which
scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by
Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
"7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each
other in the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for
the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in
proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
"8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article and
have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have
had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the
same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States
military authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising
from the act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine
authorities.
"9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine
authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines.
At the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to
have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as
nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and

(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to
have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public
unless the court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the
proceedings.
"10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried
out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States
Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
"11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction,
and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
"Article VI
Claims
"1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of
offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any and all
claims against each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each others armed
forces or for death or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which
this agreement applies.
"2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which
paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in accordance with United States law
regarding foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious
claims for damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States
personnel, or otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.
"Article VII
Importation and Exportation
"1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into
or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection
with activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and
other similar charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United States, which may
remove such property from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other
similar charges. The exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any duty, tax, or
other similar charges which would otherwise be assessed upon such property after importation
into, or acquisition within, the Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines,
or disposed of therein, provided that disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or
entities not entitled to exemption from applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of
such taxes, and duties and prior approval of the Philippine Government.
"2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the
personal use of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines free of
all duties, taxes and other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in the
Philippines. Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges
may only be made upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities including
payment by the recipient of applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines. The exportation of such property and of property acquired in the Philippines by
United States personnel shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.
"Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
"1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon
approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in
implementing arrangements.
"2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon
approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in accordance
with international custom and practice governing such vessels, and such agreed implementing
arrangements as necessary.
"3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be
subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other

use charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for
the United States armed forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the
Philippines. Vessels owned or operated by the United States solely on United States
Government non-commercial service shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage at Philippine
ports.
"Article IX
Duration and Termination
"This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in
writing through the diplomatic channel that they have completed their constitutional requirements for
entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on
which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement."
Via these consolidated11 petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners - as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents
grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:
I
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA?
II
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
III
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military
personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher?
IV
Does the VFA violate:
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for the
equipment, materials supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by, or on
behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any
interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the operation of the VFA.12 Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA
is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing.13
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has
been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.14
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in
danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not

established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.15 On this point, it
bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.16 Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laron17 ,
we held:
"x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment
or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public."
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any
allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have
no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not
possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution Association
vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez,18 sustained the legal standing of a member of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bull, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a
clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of Congress to
grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the
VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed however to sufficiently show that they have in
fact suffered direct injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases. As aptly
observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board
resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action.19
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the
petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier and takes
cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases,20 where we had occasion to
rule:
"x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)."
(Underscoring Supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC,21 Daza vs. Singson,22 and
Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation,23 where we emphatically held:
"Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. x x x"
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,24 thisCourt ruled that in cases of transcendental
importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for each others acts,25 this
Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with

regard to the exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section
25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in
the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States
personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or
international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of
at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or
international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not
limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into
by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is
only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement
binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities"
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by
the other contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some
common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed
prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause "No treaty x x x," and Section
25 contains the phrase "shall not be allowed." Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is
indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the
Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section
21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights
of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of
section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.
Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general
one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language
which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.26
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 we enunciated:

"x x x that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to a
special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), that a specific statute
prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs.
Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)."
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the
reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. On this score, the
Constitution makes no distinction between "transient and "permanent". Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25,
Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermenuetics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish- Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign
military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal of said
constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities." Stated
differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being
established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" collectively but treats them as
separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration,28 such that, the provision contemplates
three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops,
or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation:
"MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas.
This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is: If the country
does enter into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities-or could the treaty
entered into cover only one or two?
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three, the requirement
will be the same.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering not bases but
merely troops?
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the government can enter into a treaty covering only troops.
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We just want to
cover everything."29 (Underscoring Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the
alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as
huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country.
These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of
military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with
when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by
the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the
general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the
provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being

unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be
valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other
hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be "duly concurred in by the Senate."
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly
required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true
that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be "duly
concurred in by the Senate," it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the
clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a
treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section
25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated
under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to
concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24) Senators.30
Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on
the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article
VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made,31 will
not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred
with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this
regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as
to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall now pass
upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of America.
Petitioners content that the phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in section 25, Article XVIII, means that the
VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and
that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States.
In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is
binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the
United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted as a treaty by
the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party
accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.32 To require the other contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,33 is
to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.34
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.35 To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two
or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation."36 There are many other terms used for a
treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d arbitrage, concordat,
convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius
onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty
have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description.37
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the

present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them
in the internal law of the State."
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect
upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.38 International
law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding
obligations upon nations.39
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of
the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading,40 we had occasion to
pronounce:
"x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of
these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of
executive agreements entered into without Senate approval. (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also,
U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L.
ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15
pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [revised Edition], Vol.
2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; willoughby on the U.S. Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407).
(Italics Supplied)" (Emphasis Ours)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening and highlyinstructive:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other state is concerned, that is
entirely their concern under their own laws.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to make it a
treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty."41
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that
the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.42 For as long as the united
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations
under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should
be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as
the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed.43 A State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the
treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the
full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.44
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature.
The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.45
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the
Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of
the Constitution,46 declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all

nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any
particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for
violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the
community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our
international obligation.47 Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for noncompliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for
failure to perform this duty."48
Equally important is Article 26 of the convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which
preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law,
supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.49
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power and performing a task
conferred upon him by the Constitution-the power to enter into and ratify treaties. Through the expediency of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.50
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations
foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded."51 Wielding vast powers an
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether."52
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light,
the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely
to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.53 Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less
calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for
concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment
that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within
the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of
judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for
the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the
President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of
his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of
Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred,
much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.54 The High

Tribunals function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, "is merely (to) check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective powerIt has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error."55
As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the
Senate56 performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the
concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof.
Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be
similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
1wphi1

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character;57 the Senate, as an
independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed
agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom
rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the
principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished
rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates,
through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward
our nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining
to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court- as the final
arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people - is then without power to conduct an
incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution
no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political
branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, and Vitug, JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno.
Puno , J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
Panganiban, J., no part due to close personal and former professional relations with a petitioner, Sen. J.R. Salonga.

Footnotes
1 Article V. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported

to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council
has taken the measure necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
2 Joint Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relation and the Committee on National Defense and

Security on the Visiting Forces Agreement.

3 Joint Committee Report.
4 Petition, G.R. No. 138698, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 61-62.

"INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION
TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETINGS:
KNOW YE, that whereas, the Agreement between the government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of the
United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as VFA, was signed
in Manila on 10 February 1998;
WHEREAS, the VFA is essentially a framework to promote bilateral defense cooperation
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America and to give substance