Itopf-Ipieca - Oil Spill

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION
A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
A joint
IPIECA/ITOPF
Briefing Paper
March
2000
IPIECA
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited
PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE

Those who conduct clean-up operations or who suffer damage as a result of an oil
spill from a tanker need to be assured that they will receive prompt and adequate
compensation. It is therefore in everyones interest to ensure that the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention and 1992 Fund Convention are widely ratified. The purpose of
this Guide is to provide a summary of the fundamental features of the Conventions,
and to provide a basis on which tanker owners, oil companies and other interested
parties can promote their ratification by all coastal States.
The Guide comprises an explanatory text, a PowerPoint presentation (which can be
downloaded from either the IPIECA or ITOPF website) and a series of answers to
commonly asked questions.
CONTENTS
Introduction
Fundamental features of the compensation Conventions
Compensation limits
Scope of compensationadmissible claims
Record keeping
10
Claims presentation
11
Compensation in States that are not party to the Conventions
12
Conclusions
12
Useful addresses
13
PowerPoint presentation on oil spill compensation
14
Answers to commonly asked questions
16
A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE

A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
INTRODUCTION
The Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 provided a
major stimulus to the development of two voluntary
agreements and two international Conventions
through which compensation is available to those
who incur clean-up costs or suffer pollution damage1
as a result of a spill of persistent hydrocarbon mineral
oil2 from a tanker3.
The international Conventions were developed under

the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). The original Conventions were
the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 CLC) and the 1971
International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention). This
old regime was amended in 1992 by two Protocols
which increased the compensation limits and
broadened the scope of the original Conventions.
The amended Conventions are usually known as the
1992 Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC) and
the 1992 Fund Convention.
The voluntary agreements of TOVALOP (Tanker

Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability
for Oil Pollution) and CRISTAL (Contract
Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution) were established by the tanker and oil
industries in the late 1960s as interim arrangements
pending the widespread ratification of the two international Conventions. The voluntary agreements
lasted far longer than anyone expected, although their
relevance was progressively eroded as countries
around the world ratified the equivalent Conventions.
In view of this, and the entry into force in 1996 of
Protocols which updated the original Conventions,
the voluntary agreements of TOVALOP and
CRISTAL were terminated on 20 February 1997.
More than 100 countries have ratified one, or a

combination of, the Conventions (up-to-date information
can be found on the websites of the organizations
listed in this Guide) and compensation equivalent to
many hundreds of millions of US dollars has been
paid to the victims of oil spills, without the need in
the vast majority of cases for recourse to litigation.
The system is therefore highly successful.
Pollution damage is defined in the 1992 Conventions as loss or damage caused by contamination. The costs of reasonable preventive
measures (which include clean-up) also fall under this definition, as does any further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. For
environmental damage (other than loss of profit from impairment of the environment) compensation is restricted to costs actually incurred or
to be incurred for reasonable measures of reinstatement.
2
The term persistent oil is not precisely defined in the 1992 Conventions but, as a guide, it can be taken to include crude oil, heavy and
medium fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil. Guidelines based on the distillation characteristics of oils have been developed by the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds.
Although this Guide refers throughout to tankers, the 1992 Conventions actually use the term ship, defined as any sea-going vessel and
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carrying
oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such
carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil aboard.
Because of the entry into force on 30 May 1996 of the

1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention, the 1969
CLC and 1971 Fund Convention are being
denounced by States as they ratify or accede to the
1992 Conventions. The original Conventions are
therefore rapidly losing significance. For this reason
this Guide deals primarily with the new 1992 regime.
It aims to provide a summary of the fundamental
features of the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund
Convention, the various bodies involved in the
payment of compensation, and some general issues
regarding the types of claims for compensation that
are likely to be admissible. Brief guidance is also given
on record keeping and on the presentation of claims.
For a more complete understanding of the international compensation Conventions, including the
particular conditions which have to be met for each to
apply in the case of an incident, reference should be
made to the full texts of the 1992 CLC and 1992
Fund Convention, or to explanatory publications
produced by the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Funds 1971 and 1992 (IOPC Funds
or 1971 and 1992 Fund). The Secretariat of the
IOPC Funds, whose address appears in this Guide, is
also able to give detailed advice on matters relating to
the ratification of the Conventions, implementing
legislation and the operation of the 1992 Fund.
Source of money
Who pays
Supplementary layer of compensation

IOPC Fund
FUND
CONVENTION
Levies on oil receivers in

Fund-Member States
(collected retrospectively)
Primary layer of compensation

Tanker owner
(legally liable party)
CIVIL LIABILITY
CONVENTION
Insurance
(P&I Clubs)
The two-tier system of compensation established by the international Conventions: the owner of the tanker that caused the spill is
legally liable for the payment of compensation under the first tier; oil receivers in Fund-Member States contribute to the second
tier once the tanker owners applicable limit of liability has been exceeded.
FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE COMPENSATION CONVENTIONS
As shown in the diagram on the previous page, a twotier system of compensation is established by the
international Conventions, with the owner of the
tanker that caused the spill being legally liable for the
payment of compensation under the first tier, and
with oil receivers in general contributing once the
tanker owners applicable limit of liability has been
exceeded. It should be noted that neither the charterer
of the tanker nor the owner of the oil cargo involved
in an incident has any liability to pay compensation
under the terms of the international Conventions.
the gross tonnage of the tanker involved in the

incident (see later). If it is proved, however, to the
satisfaction of a Court that the pollution damage
resulted from the owners personal act or omission,
done with intent to cause pollution damage, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result, the owner will be deprived of
the right to limit his liability.
Who can be held liable?
Claims for pollution damage under the 1992 CLC can
be made only against the registered owner of the
tanker concerned or his pollution liability insurer. The
Convention prohibits making such claims against the
servants or agents of the owner, members of the crew,
the pilot, the charterer (including bareboat charterer),
manager or operator of the tanker, or any person
carrying out salvage operations or preventive
measures (including clean-up measures). This last
aspect should provide considerable reassurance to
responders. Taken with a high degree of certainty of
reimbursement for the costs of technically justified
(reasonable) clean-up measures, the 1992
Conventions should facilitate prompt response.
First layer of compensationthe tanker owner

and his P&I Club
Scope of application
The 1992 CLC covers pollution damage suffered in
the territory or territorial sea or exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) or equivalent area of a State Party to the
Convention. The flag State of the tanker and the
nationality of the owner are irrelevant for determining
the scope of application. As the 1992 CLC covers
spills of persistent cargo and fuel (bunker) oil from
sea-going tankers, it can apply to both laden and
unladen tankers (but not to dry cargo ships).
Strict liability
The 1992 CLC is based on the principle of strict
liability. This means that the owner of the tanker
which spills the oil is liable regardless of whether or
not he was actually at fault, subject to very few
exceptions (e.g. if the damage resulted from an act of
war or grave natural disaster, was wholly caused by
sabotage by a third party, or was wholly caused by the
negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights
or other navigational aids). As a result, claimants can
receive compensation promptly, without the need for
lengthy and costly litigation.
Limitation of liability
Under the 1992 CLC the tanker owner will normally
be entitled to limit his liability to an amount based on
The 1992 Conventions apply to sea-going vessels and seaborne craft

constructed or adapted to carry persistent oil in bulk as cargo.
owner lost the right to limit his liability under the

CLC in a very expensive case.
Compulsory insurance
In order to be able to meet their potential financial
obligations under the 1992 CLC, owners of tankers
carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil in
bulk as cargo are required to maintain insurance or
other financial security, and to carry on board each
tanker a certificate attesting to the fact that such
cover is in force. Most tanker owners arrange oil
pollution insurance with a Protection and Indemnity
Association (P&I Club). Under the 1992 CLC, claims
for pollution damage (including clean-up costs) for
which the tanker owner would be liable may be
brought directly against the insurer or provider of
financial security.
Each P&I Club has full-time managers who deal with

the day to day business of the Club. They are assisted
by a worldwide network of commercial representatives
(correspondents) who act as the Clubs local contact at
the site of an incident.
Second layer of compensationthe 1992 Fund
Who administers the 1992 Fund?
The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
1992 (1992 Fund) has the responsibility of administering the regime of compensation created by the
1992 Fund Convention. By becoming a Party to the
1992 Fund Convention a State automatically
becomes a Member of the 1992 Fund. The organizations Secretariat is based in London.
P&I Clubs
P&I Clubs are mutual, non-profit making associations
which insure their shipowner members against various
third party liabilities, including oil pollution. Whilst
each Club bears the first part of any claim, the concept
of mutuality is extended by the pooling of large
claims by the major P&I Clubs that are members of
the International Group. To safeguard members in the
event of a catastrophic claim above the limit of this
pool, excess reinsurance is placed by the International
Group Clubs on the worlds insurance markets, in the
case of oil pollution up to US$1 billion. It should be
emphasized, however, that this sum has no relevance in
the majority of oil spill cases since it would only be
available in rare circumstances, for example if a tanker
When does the 1992 Fund pay?

Supplementary compensation may be available from
the 1992 Fund when the compensation available
from the tanker owner under the 1992 CLC is insufficient to meet all valid claims (the definition of
pollution damage is identical in the two
Conventions). In some rare cases, the 1992 Fund may
meet the totality of claims for compensation if, for
example, the tanker owner cannot be identified, is
uninsured and insolvent, or if the tanker owner is
exonerated from liability under certain provisions in
The use of booms and skimmers (left) and the aerial application of chemical dispersants (right) are examples of at-sea preventive
measures.
the 1992 CLC which do not apply in the case of the

1992 Fund Convention.
contributor. The Secretariat then issues invoices to

the individual oil receiving companies and other
entities in 1992 Fund-Member States.
The 1992 Fund will not pay compensation if the

damage occurred in a State which was not a Member
of the 1992 Fund, or if the pollution damage resulted
from an act of war or was caused by a spill from a
warship. It also has to be proved that the oil
originated from a tanker, as defined in the 1992
Conventions (see footnote 3 on page 1).
It may be of interest to note that oil receiving

companies located in Japan are, in total, the largest
contributors to the 1992 Fund, currently followed by
those located in the Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, France, UK, Singapore, Germany and
Spain. Italy will be high up this list after the 1992 Fund
Convention enters into force there in September 2000.
At the other end of the spectrum, small island States or
other countries that do not import large quantities of
crude or heavy fuel oil can become Members of the
1992 Fund without imposing a financial burden on
their oil industry or power generating companies.
Who contributes to the 1992 Fund?

Payments of compensation and the administrative
expenses of the 1992 Fund are financed by contributions
levied on any private company or other entity (private
or public) in a 1992 Fund-Member State that receives
an annual quantity of more than 150,000 tonnes of
crude oil and/or heavy fuel oil (contributing oil)
following carriage by sea. As well as oil imported
from other countries, receipts after coastal
movements of crude oil and heavy fuel oil also qualify
as contributing oil. This is particularly significant in the
case of some countries, such as Japan.
Approval and settlement of claims

The Director of the 1992 Fund is authorized to settle
claims and pay compensation if it is unlikely that the total
payments in respect of the incident will exceed SDR 2.5
million (about US$3.5 million)1. For incidents leading to
higher claims, the Director needs the approval of the
settlement from the Executive Committee of the 1992
Fund. In certain circumstances and within certain limits,
the Director may also make provisional payments of
compensation before a claim is settled, if victims
would otherwise suffer undue financial hardship.
Whilst private companies and other entities bear the

cost of the 1992 Fund, rather than governments, it is
important to stress that there is no regular levy on
such entities which would lead to the establishment of
a large standing fund. Instead, the Assembly of the
1992 Fund, on which are represented the States which
are Party to the 1992 Fund Convention, decides the
total amount that should be levied each year to meet
the general operating expenses of the 1992 Fund and
the anticipated payments of compensation in respect
of major incidents. The Secretariat then calculates the
required levy per tonne of contributing oil by
reference to the total quantity of contributing oil
received in all 1992 Fund-Member States. The
quantity of oil received by each contributor is multiplied
by this amount per tonne to give the amount in UK
pounds sterling which has to be paid by that
Working together
To whom should a claim be addressed?
Claims for compensation under the 1992 CLC should
be brought against the tanker owner, or directly
against his P&I insurer. To obtain compensation from
the 1992 Fund, claimants should submit their claims
directly to the Secretariat of the 1992 Fund (see
address on page 13 of this Guide). Whilst it is
necessary to notify the relevant bodies in writing of
the existence of a claim, it is not normally necessary
to submit full supporting documentation to both the
tanker owner/P&I Club and the 1992 Fund.
Compensation limits in the Conventions are expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which is a currency unit created by the
International Monetary Fund. Conversion rates are given in various newspapers.
that neither local surveyors nor local claims offices may

decide on the admissibility of claims; this is the
responsibility of the P&I Club and the 1992 Fund.
In all cases, whether or not a joint claims office is
established, the P&I Club and the 1992 Fund will
make every effort to settle valid claims promptly,
either in whole or in part, in order to minimize any
financial hardship suffered by claimants. Difficulties
and/or delays can arise, however, if submitted claims
are unlikely to be admissible, if they are poorly
presented and have insufficient supporting evidence,
or if it appears early on that the total of valid claims
may exceed the maximum amount of compensation
available. As explained later, this last concern can
result in approved claims being paid at less than 100
per cent until the full claims picture becomes clearer.
Technical experts
The cooperation between the P&I Clubs and the 1992
Fund usually extends to the appointment of the same
technical advisers and experts. In most cases, a
member of the technical staff of The International
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) will be
asked to attend on-site at a tanker spill by both the
P&I Club and 1992 Fund. ITOPF staff have
extensive, first-hand practical experience of combating
marine oil spills as a result of having attended on-site
at over 400 incidents in more than 80 countries. Their
primary role at the site of a spill is to give advice and
assistance to whoever is in charge of the response
operation with the aim of reaching mutual agreement
on the clean-up measures which are technically
justified in the particular circumstances. This not only
helps to ensure that the clean-up is as effective as
possible and that the minimum of damage is caused,
but also that subsequent claims for compensation can
be dealt with promptly and amicably. ITOPF is almost
invariably involved in the post-spill assessment of the
technical merits of claims for clean-up costs and
damage arising from cases attended on-site. However,
the final decision on the admissibility of claims and the
appropriate settlement level rests solely with the
relevant P&I Club and 1992 Fund.
Prompt and effective protective measures, either using

specialized booms (top) or improvised materials (bottom),
may prevent or reduce damage to economic resources.
Cooperation between the P&I Clubs and the

1992 Fund
The 1992 Fund will take a very active interest early on
in any incident in a Member State when it appears that
it may ultimately be called upon to pay compensation.
The P&I Club and the 1992 Fund will usually jointly
investigate the incident and assess the damage, and
will cooperate closely in the settlement of claims in
order to ensure a consistent and efficient approach.
Joint claims offices
In some cases claimants are advised to channel their
claims through the P&I Clubs local correspondent, or
the office of a designated local surveyor. In the event of
a major incident the P&I Club involved and the 1992
Fund may establish a joint claims office at an early
stage of the incident to facilitate the submission and
handling of claims. Details of such claims offices will
be given in the local press. It should be emphasized
COMPENSATION LIMITS
The approximate amounts of compensation available

under the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention are
set out below and illustrated in Figure 1. (The limits
of liability are actually expressed in Special Drawing
Rights [SDR]. The value of the limits in a national
currency will therefore vary depending upon the
exchange rate at the particular time. For ease of
comparison, an approximate US dollar equivalent is
given, based on 1 SDR = US$1.4.)
Figure 1: Limits of compensation under the 1992 CLC

and 1992 Fund Convention
200
1992 Fund Convention
180
160
140
US$ (millions)
1992 CLC
For a tanker not exceeding 5,000 gross tons, a set

maximum limit of SDR 3 million (approximately
US$4.2 million); for a tanker in excess of 5,000
gross tons, SDR 3 million (US$4.2 million) plus
SDR 420 (approximately US$588) for each
additional gross ton up to a maximum (reached for
a tanker of 140,000 gross tons) of SDR 59.7
million (approximately US$84 million).
120
100
1992 CLC
80
60
40
20
A maximum of SDR 135 million (approximately

US$189 million) per incident, irrespective of the
size of the tanker but including the sum paid by the
tanker owner or his insurer under the 1992 CLC.
What if the total amount of compensation is
insufficient to pay all valid claims in full?
If the total of all approved claims for pollution
damage exceeds the total amount of compensation
available under the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund
Convention, the compensation paid to each
claimant will be reduced proportionately. All
claimants are required to be treated equally and no
class of claim has priority. Concerns in the early
stages of an incident that this situation might arise
can result in payments being made at a fixed
percentage of approved claims, with later adjustments
as the claims position becomes clearer. However,
this situation is only likely to arise following major
oil spills.
20
40
60
80
100
gross tonnage (000s)
120
140
160
Maximum amounts of compensation available

(US$ million) for various sizes of tanker
Gross
tonnage
1992
CLC
1992 Fund
Convention
5,000
189
25,000
16
189
50,000
31
189
100,000
60
189
140,000
84
189
Notes: The approximate maximum amount of compensation shown as

potentially available under the 1992 Fund Convention includes the
compensation payable by the tanker owner under the 1992 CLC.
SCOPE OF COMPENSATIONADMISSIBLE CLAIMS
For a claim to be admissible it must fall within the

definition of pollution damage or preventive measures
in the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention. A
uniform interpretation of the definitions and a
common understanding of what constitutes an admissible
claim are essential for the efficient functioning of the
international system of compensation established by
the Conventions. For this reason, the Governments of
the Member States of the 1992 Fund have established
clear policies and guidelines (while accepting the need
for a certain degree of flexibility). Further information
on these policies and guidelines, as well as on claims
presentation, can be found in the 1992 Funds Claims
Manual. It is strongly recommended that all those
potentially involved in this area of activity obtain a
copy of the Claims Manual from the 1992 Fund (see
address on page 13 of this Guide).
would be any consequential loss or damage caused by

the preventive measures. For example, if clean-up
operations result in damage to a road, pier or
embankment, the cost of any work carried out to
repair the damage should be an admissible claim,
subject to deductions for normal wear and tear.
Claims for preventive measures are assessed on the
basis of objective criteria. The fact that a government
or other public body decides to take certain measures
does not in itself mean that the measures and the
associated costs are reasonable for the purpose of the
Conventions. Reasonable is generally interpreted to
mean that the measures taken or equipment used in
response to an incident were, on the basis of an expert
technical appraisal at the time the decision was taken,
likely to have been successful in minimizing or
preventing pollution damage. The fact that the
response measures turned out to be ineffective or the
decision was shown to be incorrect with the benefit of
hindsight are not reasons in themselves for disallowing
Claims in respect of pollution damage can fall under

one of the following broad categories:
Preventive measures (including clean-up)

Damage to property
Economic losses
Reinstatement/restoration of impaired environments
Each of these categories is considered briefly below.

Preventive measures
Claims for measures aimed at preventing or
minimizing pollution damage may in some cases
include a proportion of the costs of removing oil
(cargo and fuel) from a damaged tanker posing a
serious pollution threat, as well as the costs of cleanup measures at sea, in coastal waters and on shorelines.
Such measures may require the use of specialized
equipment and materials such as booms, skimmers
and dispersants, as well as non-specialized boats,
vehicles and labour. The costs of disposing of
recovered oil and associated debris are also covered, as
Shoreline clean-up can often be labour intensive.
a claim for the costs involved. A claim may be

rejected, however, if it was known that the measures
would be ineffective but they were instigated simply
because, for example, it was considered necessary to
be seen to be doing something. On this basis,
measures taken for purely public relations reasons
would not be considered reasonable.
Most oil spill clean-up techniques have been in
existence for many years and their practical limitations
are well understood through worldwide experience of
their use during actual incidents. It is recognized,
however, that the boundary between reasonable and
unreasonable measures is not always clear-cut even
after a full technical evaluation has been made.
Furthermore, a particular response measure may be
technically justified early on in an incident but may
become inappropriate after some time has elapsed due
to the weathering of the oil or other changes in
circumstances. It is therefore important that all cleanup operations are closely monitored by experienced
personnel to assess their effectiveness on an on-going
basis. Once it has been demonstrated that a particular
method is not working satisfactorily, or it is causing
disproportionate damage, it should be terminated.
Above: removal of bulk oil from shorelines often calls for the
use of locally-available non-specialized equipment.
Below: the temporary storage and final disposal of recovered
oil and debris is frequently a major component of any
clean-up operation.
Property damage
Claims under this category would include, for
example, the costs of cleaning contaminated fishing
gear, mariculture installations, yachts and industrial
water intakes. In cases of very severe contamination
of fishing gear and mariculture equipment where
effective cleaning is impossible, replacement of the
damaged property may sometimes be justified, with a
reduction for normal wear and tear.
category is the fisherman who cannot fish because his

boat and gear are contaminated with oil, whereas in the
second case the fisherman remains in port while there
is oil on the water in order to avoid damaging his
property but still suffers pure economic loss as he is
thereby prevented from catching any fish or shellfish.
Economic loss
Spills can result in economic losses through, for
example, preventing fishing activity or causing a
reduction in tourism. Such economic losses may be the
direct result of physical damage to a claimants property
(consequential loss) or may occur despite the fact that
the claimant has not suffered any damage to his own
property (pure economic loss). An example of the first
Claims for pure economic loss are admissible only if

they are for loss or damage caused by oil contamination.
The starting point is the pollution and not the incident
itself. In order to qualify for compensation it is necessary
that there is a reasonable degree of geographic and
economic proximity between the contamination and
the loss or damage sustained by the claimant.
Reinstatement/restoration of an
impaired environment
Claims for impairment of the environment are
accepted only if the claimant has sustained an
economic loss which can be quantified in monetary
terms. Concern about the use of theoretical and
speculative models to calculate the value of
environmental damage led to the 1971 Fund passing
a Resolution in 1980 affirming that the assessment
of compensation to be paid by the IOPC Fund is not to be
made on the basis of an abstract quantification of damage
calculated in accordance with theoretical models.
The revised definition of pollution damage in the 1992
CLC and 1992 Fund Convention includes compensation for impairment of the environment but
limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken. However, for
any such reinstatement measures to be considered
admissible they would have to satisfy a number of
criteria aimed at demonstrating that the measures were
technically justified and likely to enhance natural
recovery, and that the costs were reasonable and not
disproportionate to the expected results.
Tourism can be adversely affected by an oil spill.
The costs of post-spill environmental studies will

only be considered admissible by the 1992 Fund to
the extent that they concern pollution damage as
covered by the 1992 Fund Convention. The 1992
Fund will not pay for studies of a general or purely
scientific character.
RECORD KEEPING
The speed with which claims are settled depends

largely upon how long it takes claimants to provide the
P&I Club and the 1992 Fund with the information
they require in a format that readily permits analysis.
For this reason it is vital during any counter pollution
incident that all those involved keep records of what
was done, when, where and why in order to support
claims for the recovery of the money spent in clean-up.
Pressures, frequently severe, to deal with new issues
and problems will often unfortunately result in record
keeping being relegated to a lesser priority.
overall charge of the response, as well as actions taken

at individual work sites. Records should therefore
extend from minutes of decision-making meetings to
records of the source and number of personnel, plant
and materials used on particular beaches on specific
days. Daily work sheets should be completed by
supervisory personnel to record the operation in
progress at each major work site, the equipment in
use, consumable materials used, where and how they
are being used, the number of personnel, and how
and where they are deployed. The appointment of a
financial controller at an early stage of an incident can
be extremely valuable, both to coordinate expenditure
and to ensure that adequate records are maintained.
It is important that the financial records can be linked

with policy/strategy decisions taken by those in
10
CLAIMS PRESENTATION
the 1992 Fund within three years of the date on

which the damage occurred. Although damage may
occur some time after an incident takes place, Court
action must in any case be brought within six years of
the date of the incident. Claimants are recommended to
seek legal advice on the formal requirements of Court
actions, to avoid their claims becoming time-barred.
Who is entitled to compensation under the 1992

Conventions?
Anyone may make a claim who has suffered pollution
damage (including the taking of preventive measures)
in a State which is Party to the 1992 CLC and/or
1992 Fund Convention. Claimants may be private
individuals, partnerships, companies (including ship
owners, charterers and terminal operators) or public
bodies (including central and local government
authorities and agencies).
Formal legal action to enforce a claim will usually be

the last resort since P&I Clubs and the 1992 Fund
always endeavour to settle claims out of Court.
However, claimants are advised to present their claims
well in advance of the expiry of the periods mentioned
above. This allows time for claims to be examined and
settled out of Court, but also ensures that claimants
will be able to prevent their claims from being timebarred, if they and the P&I Club/1992 Fund are unable
to agree on amicable settlements.
Within what period must a claim be made?

Claimants should be aware that claims under the
1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention are subject to
time limits and so they should submit their claims as
soon as possible after the damage has occurred. If a
formal claim cannot be made shortly after an
incident, the P&I Club and 1992 Fund should be
notified as soon as possible of a claimants intention to
present a claim at a later stage.
How should a claim be presented?

Claims should be presented clearly and in sufficient
detail so that the amounts claimed can be assessed on
the basis of the facts and the documentation
presented. Each item of claim must be supported by
Claimants will ultimately lose their right to

compensation unless they bring a Court action
against the tanker owner and his P&I Club, or against
Oil spills can have serious economic consequences for those engaged in
The 1992 Conventions provide compensation for technically-justified
mariculture and coastal fisheries.
measures to reinstate a damaged environment.
11
an invoice or other relevant documentation, such as

work sheets or explanatory notes. Photographs or
videos can be helpful to explain the extent and nature
of the contamination and the problems which had to
be confronted. If there is any doubt as to the source
of the pollution, chemical analysis of correctly
preserved samples may be necessary.
Claimants would be well advised to contact the

relevant P&I Club, 1992 Fund or ITOPF early on in
an incident to seek advice on the preparation and
submission of claims. The 1992 Funds Claims
Manual, referred to earlier, provides helpful guidance.
COMPENSATION IN STATES THAT ARE NOT PARTY TO THE CONVENTIONS
and financial responsibilities of the main parties

involved (e.g. tanker owner, cargo owner, P&I Club),
as well as the amount of compensation that will be
available to pay for clean-up and damage. This is not
always conducive to the rapid implementation of
required response measures or to the prompt and
complete settlement of valid claims. This can result in
significant financial and political problems for the
government and, potentially, for local oil
companies, even if they do not have a direct
involvement in the incident. These problems can be
overcome if governments accede to the 1992 CLC
and 1992 Fund Convention.
Some States which have not ratified the international

compensation Conventions have their own domestic
legislation for compensating those affected by oil
spills from tankers within their territory. Some of
these national laws may be highly specific, such as the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the USA, and are beyond
the scope of this Guide.
In other countries that have not acceded to the
international compensation Conventions reliance in
the event of an oil spill may have to be placed on
broader laws originally developed for other purposes.
In such cases there can be considerable uncertainty in
the event of a tanker spill as to the legal, operational
CONCLUSIONS
The 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention provide a

straightforward mechanism whereby the costs of
clean-up measures and pollution damage can be
recovered on a strict liability (no fault) basis from
the individual tanker owner and P&I Club involved in
an incident and from the 1992 Fund. So long as the
clean-up measures taken in response to an incident
and the associated costs are reasonable in the
particular circumstances, and the claims for compensation are well presented and supported by relevant
documentation and evidence, few difficulties should
be encountered. The total amount of compensation
available under the 1992 Conventions (approximately
$189 million) should be more than adequate to deal
with the vast majority of cases.
12
USEFUL ADDRESSES
International Maritime Organization

4 Albert Embankment
London SE1 7SR
United Kingdom
International Oil Pollution Compensation

Funds 1971 and 1992
4 Albert Embankment
London SE1 7SR
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7735 7611

Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: www.imo.org
Tel: +44 (0)20 7582 2606

Fax: +44 (0)20 7735 0326
Web: www.iopcfund.org
NOTE: With effect from the beginning of
June 2000 the IOPC Funds address will be:
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd

Staple Hall, Stonehouse Court
8790 Houndsditch
London EC3A 7AX
United Kingdom
Portland House
Stag Place
London SW1E 5PN
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7621 1255

+44 (0)142 691 4112 (out-of-office hours)
Fax: +44 (0)20 7621 1783
Web: www.itopf.com
Tel: +44 (0)20 7592 7100

Fax: +44 (0)20 7592 7111
13
IPIECA/ITOPF SLIDE PRESENTATION ON OIL SPILL COMPENSATION
This slide presentation can be downloaded in PowerPoint format from the IPIECA and ITOPF websites.
Conventions
1992 Civil Liability Convention

(1992 CLC)supersedes 1969 CLC
A Guide to the
Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions

(1992 FC)supersedes 1971 FC
Note:
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992
(1992 Fund) administers the system of compensation
for oil pollution damage established by 1992 FC
IPIECA
Tanker spills
1992 CLC
Spills of persistent oil from tankers covered

by two-tier compensation system
Persistent oil includes crude oils, heavy

fuel oils and lubricating oils
Individual tanker owner /oil pollution

liability insurer (P&I Club) legally liable for
the first tier under 1992 CLC
Tanker owners required to maintain oil

pollution insurance and to carry certificate
Supplementary compensation (second

tier) paid by 1992 Fund, financed by oil
receivers in Member States
Ensures approximately US$ 4.2 million for

tanker of less than 5,000 gross tons
Enables direct action against insurer
Up to approximately US$ 84 million for

tankers > 140,000 gross tons
1992 CLC / Fund

200
Reasonable pollution prevention and

clean-up measures (e.g. booms, skimmers,
dispersants and shoreline clean-up)
Who pays: 1992 Fund
Fund Convention
Scope of compensation
150
Source of money: oil receivers
US$ millions
Supplementary layer
100
Who pays: Tanker Owners
CLC
Damage to property (e.g. oiling of

fishing boats and gear)
1992 CLC
Economic losses (e.g. lost income by

fishermen, hotel operators)
50
Primary layer
Source of money: insurance (P&I Clubs)
20
Costs of reasonable measures to

reinstate a damaged environment
40 60 80 100 120 140 160

gross tonnage (000s)
14
Advantages of 1992 CLC
Limitations of 1992 CLC

(without 1992 Fund Convention)
Tanker owner and P&I Club insurer strictly liable

to pay compensation:
Spill must be attributed to specific tanker
up to high levels
whether or not at fault
regardless of flag/ownership
Amount of compensation determined by

size of tanker regardless of amount spilled
Provides reasonable protection for responders

and high level of certainty of reimbursement for
technically-justified clean-up measures and
damage, which facilitates quicker response
Prompt payment of compensation without litigation
Government, citizens and local industry financially
protected in the event of an oil spill within EEZ
Spill in sensitive area from a small tanker

can easily exceed available compensation
In rare instances tanker owner may be
exempt under CLC (e.g. acts of war or
sabotage) or unable to pay compensation
10
1992 Fund
Advantages of 1992 Fund
Provides up to approximately US$ 189 million

(including amount paid by tanker
owner/insurer)
Amount of compensation not dependent on

size of tanker
Compensation is available even if tanker
owner exempt or not insured; only exceptions
are acts of war and spills from warships
Covers bunker spills from unladen oil tankers,
and cargo spills proven to be from a tanker,
even if specific tanker cannot be identified
Government, citizens and local industry
financially protected in the event of an oil
spill within EEZ
Funds provided by levies on oil companies

and other entities in Fund-Member States
receiving >150,000 tonnes per annum of
crude and /or heavy fuel oil (contributing
oil) after sea transport
No direct cost to governments
Same scope of damages as 1992 CLC
11
12
Issues for governments and /

or industry related to 1992 Fund
Action plans to address

local government and industry concerns
Who pays for the 1992 Fund?
Educate Company affiliates in country first
Our local risk is small, so why should we pay

into the 1992 Fund?
Work with 1992 Fund Secretariat to estimate 1992

Fund contributions, if any, for oil receiving companies,
based on contributing oil volumes
Why should we pay for a spill in another part of

the world?
Utilise insurance experts to explain business logic for

governments joining the 1992 Fund
Why do governments need to leave the 1971

Fund and join the 1992 Fund?
Avoid confusing CLC and Fund discussions with other

insurance policies carried by tankers
Why the greater emphasis from industry for

governments to accede to the Conventions and
join the 1992 Fund?
Coordinate efforts with other oil companies in country

Encourage governments to contact 1992 Fund directly
Why join if tanker owners already have at least

$1 billion in oil pollution insurance?
Provide local governments and industry with ITOPF /

IPIECA Guide
15
ANSWERS TO COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS RELATING TO

COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
What types of ship are covered by the 1992 Civil

Liability Convention (1992 CLC) and 1992 Fund
Convention?
Both Conventions apply to pollution damage caused by
spills of persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil (whether
carried as cargo or as bunkers) from any type of seagoing ship that is constructed or adapted for the carriage
of such oil in bulk as cargo. Thus the Conventions can
apply to spills from tankers, combination carriers (when
they are carrying a cargo of persistent oil) and barges.
Spills of bunker fuel from other types of ship (e.g. dry
cargo ships, container liners, bulk carriers) are not
covered by these Conventions.
Which States are party to the various compensation

Conventions?
This is constantly changing. Up-to-date information
can be found on the following websites:
www.iopcfund.org
www.imo.org
www.itopf.com
What are the main differences between the 1971 and
1992 Funds?
The main difference is that the amount of compensation
available from the 1992 Fund is much higher than
from the 1971 Fund (about US$189 million as
compared to about US$84 million). The scope of
application of the 1992 Fund Convention is also
broader than the 1971 Fund Convention. The 1971
Fund is therefore rapidly losing significance as more
and more countries denounce the 1971 Fund
Convention and accede to the 1992 Fund Convention.
What is persistent oil?

The term persistent oil is not precisely defined in the
1992 Conventions but, as a guide, it can be taken to
include crude oil, heavy and medium fuel oil, heavy
diesel oil and lubricating oil. Guidelines based on the
distillation characteristics of oils have been developed by
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds.
Why should governments be encouraged to denounce

the 1971 Fund Convention and leave the 1971
Fund?
Levies for the Funds are apportioned to individual oil
receiving companies and other entities in Fund-Member
States, based on their per cent of the total oil received by
all such entities in all Fund-Member States. Most of the
States with the largest receivers of oil have now left the
1971 Fund and joined the 1992 Fund, and the number of
contributors to the 1971 Fund continues to decline. In
the event of a significant tanker spill in one of these
remaining 1971 Fund-Member States the financial
burden of contributing to the payment of compensation
by the 1971 Fund would therefore be shared among very
few oil receiving companies. As a result, any such
company that might in the past have only been called
upon to pay a total of 1 to 2 per cent of a spill costing, say,
US$50 million might now be exposed to 10 to 20 per
cent of the total, with even greater exposure as more
States leave the 1971 Fund. By transferring to the 1992
What do the 1971 Fund and 1992 Fund stand for?

1971 Fund and 1992 Fund (as well as IOPC Fund 1971
and IOPC Fund 1992) are commonly-used abbreviations
for the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Funds 1971 and 1992. These are the intergovernmental
bodies that were established to administer the regime
of compensation created by the 1971 and 1992
International Conventions on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (1971 and 1992 Fund Conventions).
By acceding to a Fund Convention a State automatically
becomes a Member of the appropriate Fund.
Who can join the IOPC Funds?
Only States can become Members of the IOPC
Funds. States should consider becoming Members of
the 1992 Fund, but not of the 1971 Fund as the latter
will be wound up in the near future.
16
Fund, such States can reduce the financial exposure of

their oil receiving companies and at the same time gain
access to larger amounts of compensation.
Why do oil exporters not contribute?

This was a decision taken when the original
Conventions were being developed, partly on the
grounds that it would be more straightforward to
count oil quantities for contribution purposes when
they were received at a port in a Member State after
sea transport. This means that the financial burden of
paying compensation falls mainly on consumers in
industrialized countries since it is ultimately they who
require the oil to be moved on the worlds oceans and
seas, and around the coast of individual countries.
What are the advantages of joining the 1992 Fund?

If a pollution incident occurs involving an oil tanker,
compensation of more than SDR 135 million (about
US$189 million, depending on the exchange rate) is
available to central and local government authorities,
private companies and individuals who incur costs for
clean-up operations and preventive measures, or who
suffer damage within a 1992 Fund-Member State as a
result of the oil pollution. The flag of the tanker and
ownership of the oil do not affect the right to
compensation. The total amount of compensation
available from the 1992 Fund is not affected by the
size of the tanker but does include the compensation
paid by the tanker owner under the 1992 CLC.
What happens if there are no entities in a Member

State that receive oil?
If there are no entities in a State that receive more
than 150,000 tonnes of contributing oil (i.e. crude
and heavy fuel oil), that State will have financial
protection for oil spills at no cost at all.
How does a State become a Member of the 1992

Fund?
A State must accede to the 1992 CLC and to the 1992
Fund Convention by depositing a formal instrument of
accession with the Secretary-General of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). The Conventions should
also be incorporated into the national law of the State
concerned. A State will automatically become a Member
of the 1992 Fund twelve months after the instrument of
accession to the 1992 Fund Convention has been
deposited with IMO. Assistance in these matters can be
obtained from the Secretariat of the 1992 Fund.
How much does it cost a company or other entity that

receives crude oil or heavy fuel oil if the State in which
it operates becomes a Member of the 1992 Fund?
The amount that a company or other entity will have to
pay cannot be predicted since it will vary from year to
year, depending on the incidents that occur and the
amounts of compensation that the 1992 Fund has to
pay. The total amount required each year is decided by
the Assembly of the 1992 Fund. This amount is divided
by the total quantity of contributing oil received in all
1992 Fund-Member States, to give an amount per
tonne of contributing oil received. The quantity of oil
received by each contributor is multiplied by this
amount per tonne to give the amount in UK pounds
sterling which has to be paid by that contributor.
Invoices are then issued by the Secretariat of the 1992
Fund to the individual companies and other entities.
Who pays for the 1992 Fund?

The 1992 Fund levies contributions on private
companies and other entities in 1992 Fund-Member
States that have received more than 150,000 tonnes of
crude and/or heavy fuel oil (contributing oil) in a
year after sea transport, either from international or
domestic sources (including coastal oil movements).
Member States provide the Fund Secretariat with
information on quantities of oil received but invoices
are sent directly to each contributing company or
other entity. Normally, therefore, governments do not
pay any contributions to the 1992 Fund. (See page 5.)
The local risk of a major oil spill is small and so why

should we encourage the government to accede to the
1992 Fund Convention, especially as my company
would have to contribute to the 1992 Fund?
The perceived local risk may be small due to the small
amount of oil being imported, which would call for
correspondingly small contributions to the 1992 Fund.
17
However, it would be wise not to overlook the threat

from tankers carrying exported crude, tankers passing
the country en route to elsewhere, and the potential for
very high clean-up and damage costs as a result of a
small spill of a difficult oil in a sensitive location.
Whilst statistically the risk of a major spill is small for
any part of the world, the consequences could exceed
local financial resources. Such an event could therefore
pose major problems for the government, as well as for
all the oil companies in a country, whether or not they
are directly involved in the incident. Like all forms of
insurance, it can appear uneconomic if no claims are
made. However, the real issue is the risk of inadequate
compensation in the event of a major spill if a State is
not a Party to the 1992 Fund Convention. This could
result in delayed implementation of required response
measures and the delayed or only partial payment of
valid claims. This could have serious financial and
political consequences for the government and
resident oil companies. These problems can be
overcome by the governments accession to the 1992
CLC and 1992 Fund Convention.
The maximum for a large tanker is SDR 59.7 million

(about US$84 million). (See page 7.)
Why is it necessary to join the 1992 Fund if tankers
already have at least US$1 billion in oil pollution
insurance?
Under the terms of the CLC, tanker owners are able to
limit their liability based on the gross tonnage of the
tanker from which the oil is spilled (see previous
answer). The US$1 billion oil pollution insurance
cover that most tanker owners arrange is therefore only
relevant in circumstances where an owner loses his
right to limit his liability. Under the 1992 CLC this can
occur if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted
from the owners personal act or omission, committed
with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and
with knowledge that such damage would probably
result. This is generally difficult to prove.
What happens if the tanker owner cannot pay?
Under the terms of the 1992 CLC, the owner of a tanker
carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil in bulk
as cargo is required to maintain insurance (normally with
one of the P&I Clubs) or other financial security, and to
carry on board a certificate attesting to the fact that such
cover is in place. It is therefore rare that a tanker owner
cannot meet his financial obligations under the 1992
CLC, but it can happen, for example in the case of small
tanker that is not required to carry insurance. It can also
happen if one of the exonerations that are applicable
under the 1992 CLC but not under the 1992 Fund
Convention is relevant (e.g. the incident was caused by a
grave natural disaster). In these circumstances the 1992
Fund would meet all the claims, rather than just those
that exceed the tanker owners limit under the 1992
CLC. These two examples of the extra protection
provided by the 1992 Fund should give governments and
oil companies considerable reassurance.
Why should I pay for a spill in another part of

the world?
The 1992 Fund exists to share the costs of spills,
particularly very expensive incidents where the tanker
owners limit of liability under the 1992 CLC is
exceeded. The concept of contributing to the 1992
Fund is based on the premise that consumers in the
major industrialized countries are ultimately responsible for crude oil being shipped on the oceans and
seas of the world. The CLC/Fund regime recognizes
that it would be inequitable for tanker owners to bear
all the compensation attributable to extensive
pollution damage, and that receivers of crude oil and
heavy fuel oil cargoes in all States which are Members
of the 1992 Fund should contribute to a supplementary
layer of compensation.
Can the amounts of compensation available under the

1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention be increased?
Yes, in two possible ways. The 1992 Fund
Convention provides that the maximum amount of
compensation available from the 1992 Fund shall be
How much does the tanker owner pay?

This depends on the size of the tanker. Under the
1992 CLC, the maximum paid by the owner of a
small tanker is SDR 3 million (about US$4.2 million).
18
automatically increased from SDR 135 million

(equivalent to approximately US$189 million) to
SDR 200 million (approximately US$280 million)
during any period when the combined quantity of
contributing oil received by all relevant entities in
any three 1992 Fund-Member States during the
previous calendar year equalled or exceeded 600
million tonnes. This has not yet occurred.
Governments of the 1992 Fund-Member States

within the Executive Committee and, ultimately, the
Assembly of the 1992 Fund. Great importance is
placed on the uniform application of the 1992 Fund
Convention in all Member States and on a common
interpretation of what constitutes an admissible claim.
To this end the claims admissibility principles and
policies established by the 1992 Fund are publicised in
a Claims Manual. However, ultimate jurisdiction is
with the Courts within individual Fund-Member
States. Ratification of the 1992 Fund Convention does
not therefore prevent litigation if claimants wish to
pursue this route, though in countries where the
CLC/Fund regime is in force very few oil spills from
tankers have historically resulted in Court actions.
Secondly, the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention

incorporate a mechanism whereby the limits of liability
under both Conventions can be increased, up to a
maximum of six per cent per annum calculated on a
compound basis since 15 January 1993 (the date on
which the IMO opened the 1992 Protocols for
signature by States). The maximum possible increase
of the combined 1992 CLC/Fund limit permitted by
this mechanism as at 1 January 2000 would be a little
over fifty per cent (to approximately SDR 203 million
or about US$284 million).
It is worth noting that the CLC/Fund regime protects

various parties, including the charterer of the tanker
involved in a spill and the owner of its cargo, from
liability for pollution damage under the Conventions.
Any proposal to amend the limits of the 1992 CLC and

1992 Fund Convention in this way would require the
support of one quarter of the contracting States to the
respective Conventions before it could be considered by
IMOs Legal Committee. Adoption of the proposal
would require a two-thirds majority of the contracting
States present and voting in the Legal Committee. All
contracting States would then have to be notified of the
amendment, which would be deemed to have been
accepted 18 months later unless by that time not less than
one quarter of the contracting States had informed the
IMO that they did not accept the amendment. So long as
this did not happen, the increased limits would
automatically enter into force in all contracting States in
a further 18 months time. (See pages 5 and 7 of this
Guide for more information on the calculation of contributions to the 1992 Fund and on the current limits
under the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention.)
Who decides what is a reasonable claim?

The P&I Club involved and, when relevant, the 1992
Fund decide on the nature and quantum of valid
claims, but they will pay heed to the advice of the
technical experts they employ, including those from
ITOPF. Guidance on these issues and on the presentation
of claims is contained in the 1992 Funds Claims
Manual. In the case of clean-up measures, emphasis is
placed on the technical merits (reasonableness) of
response actions and associated costs in the light of
information available to decision makers at the time.
Claims for the costs of response actions carried out for
purely political and public relations reasons will be
regarded as invalid. (See pages 8 and 9.)
How is the payment of claims expedited?
During major incidents, a Joint Claims Office may be
established in the spill locality by the P&I Club and
1992 Fund and its presence advertised. All claims
should be supported by good documentation and
relevant evidence. Inadequate supporting documentation
frequently results in the payment of compensation being
delayed. Guidance can again be found in the 1992
Funds Claims Manual. (See page 6.)
Does the 1992 Fund protect contributing companies

from excessive and speculative compensation claims
or legal action?
The admissibility of claims and the general policies
relating thereto are decided by representatives of the
19
resources are recovering naturally or being restored.

These and other theoretically-based assessments of
environmental damage are not covered by the definition of pollution damage agreed by governments in
the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Convention. (See
page 10.)
Why has the USA never become a Party to the

international compensation Conventions?
The United States did contemplate becoming a Party
to the CLC and Fund Convention in the mid-1980s
but concerns were expressed about the maximum
amount of compensation available and about the
rights of individual States in the USA to have their
own supplementary liability and compensation laws
(not permitted if a country has ratified an international
Convention). These concerns were exacerbated by the
Exxon Valdez accident in 1989, which resulted in the
USA adopting its own comprehensive legislation in
the form of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This is not
a viable option for most other countries. (See page 12.)
Why the greater interest from industry for States to

accede to the Conventions?
Prior to 20 February 1997, tanker owners and major
international oil companies participated in
TOVALOP and CRISTAL. These voluntary industry
oil spill compensation agreements were designed to
provide worldwide coverage until enough States had
ratified the international compensation Conventions.
Under TOVALOP and CRISTAL claimants in any
country that experienced an incident involving a
participating tanker and cargo could receive prompt
and adequate compensation. Since the termination of
TOVALOP and CRISTAL in 1997 a State must have
acceded to the 1992 CLC and Fund Convention to
ensure that the costs of clean-up operations can be
reimbursed and that those who suffer economic losses
can be compensated. Failure to ratify the Conventions
can result in significant problems for all parties,
including government agencies and local oil
companies, in the event of a major tanker spill
affecting a States waters and coastline.
Didnt the Exxon Valdez spill cost billions of dollars

to clean up? Surely even the 1992 Fund would have
left many people out of pocket?
Some of the clean-up in the case of the Exxon Valdez
would not have been regarded as technically valid by
the 1992 Fund and significant costs would therefore
have been ruled inadmissible. Also, a high proportion
of the financial sums quoted in relation to this spill
relate to punitive fines, legal actions, Natural
Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) and scientific
studies, none of which would have been compensable
under the 1992 Fund Convention.
Does the 1992 Fund put a financial value on
environmental damage in the same way as provided
for by the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
regulations in the USA?
The simple answer is no. The 1992 CLC and 1992
Fund Convention do provide for the payment of
compensation for the reasonable costs of technicallyjustified reinstatement/restoration measures. Such
measures might equate to primary restoration under
the USAs Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) regulations. However, these NRDA regulations
also provide, amongst other things, for compensatory
restoration for the services that might have otherwise
been provided by the injured resources (to the public
and other components of the environment) and
which are deemed to have been lost while the
How can I contact the 1992 Fund?

The Secretariat of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund 1992 is based in London and can
be contacted at the address on page 13 of this Guide.
20
IPIECA

2nd Floor, Monmouth House, 8793 Westbourne Grove, London W2 4UL, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7221 2026 Fax: +44 (0)20 7229 4948
E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.ipieca.org
The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association

(IPIECA) is comprised of petroleum companies and associations from around the
world. Founded in 1974 following the establishment of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), IPIECA provides the petroleum industrys
principal channel of communication with the United Nations. IPIECA is the single
global association representing the petroleum industry on key environmental issues
including: oil spill preparedness and response; global climate change; urban air quality
management; and biodiversity.
Through a Strategic Issues Assessment Forum, IPIECA also helps its members
identify new global environmental issues and evaluates their potential impact on the
oil industry. IPIECAs programme takes full account of international developments in
these global issues, serving as a forum for discussion and cooperation involving
industry and international organizations.
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited

Staple Hall, Stonehouse Court, 8790 Houndsditch, London EC3A 7AX, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)20 7621 1255 Fax: +44 (0)20 7621 1783
E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.itopf.com
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF) is a nonprofit making organization involved in all aspects of combating oil spills in the marine
environment. Its highly experienced technical staff have responded to more than 400
ship-source spills in more than 80 countries to give advice on clean-up measures,
environmental and economic effects, and compensation. They also regularly
undertake contingency planning and training assignments. ITOPF is a source of
comprehensive information on marine oil pollution through its library, wide range of
technical publications, videos and website (http://www.itopf.com).
IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME FIVE
DISPERSANTS AND
THEIR ROLE IN OIL
SPILL RESPONSE
2nd edition, November 2001
IPIECA
IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME FIVE
DISPERSANTS AND
THEIR ROLE IN OIL
SPILL RESPONSE
2nd edition, November 2001
IPIECA

Telephone: +44 (0)20 7221 2026 Facsimile: +44 (0)20 7229 4948
E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.ipieca.org
IPIECA 2001. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without the prior consent of IPIECA.
This publication is printed on paper manufactured from fibre obtained from sustainably grown softwood
forests and bleached without any damage to the environment.
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
DISPERSANTS AND HOW

THEY WORK
Natural dispersion
Water-in-oil emulsification
The effect of dispersants
ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF
DISPERSANTS
TYPES OF DISPERSANTS
AVAILABLE
WHAT DISPERSANTS CAN

AND CANNOT DO
Spilled oil properties
Oil weathering
Dispersant type, application method
and treatment rate
15
DISPERSANT USE AT THE

SEA EMPRESS OIL SPILL
17
EFFECTIVENESS AND
TOXICITY TESTING
19
TO SPRAY OR NOT TO
SPRAY?
Net environmental benefit analysis
Dispersed oil in the water column
Field experiments
Economic considerations
24
THE SEARSPORT
EXPERIMENT
26
DISPERSANTS AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Dispersant pre-approval
28
EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS
30
APPLICATION OPTIONS
31
DISPERSANT USE ON
SHORELINES
32
CONCLUSIONS
33
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS,
FURTHER READING AND
REFERENCES
PREFACE
This report is one of a series commissioned by the International Petroleum Industry

Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA). The first edition of this report was published
in 1993; this second edition provides updated information on significant developments in the
field of oil spill dispersants. The full series of reports represents the IPIECA members collective
contribution to the global discussion on oil spill preparedness and response.
In preparing these reportswhich represent a consensus of membership viewsIPIECA has
been guided by a set of principles which it would encourage every organization associated with
the transportation of oil products at sea to consider when managing any operations related to
the transportation, handling and storage of petroleum and petroleum products:
It is of paramount importance to concentrate on preventing spills.
Despite the best efforts of individual organizations, spills will continue to occur and will
affect the local environment.
Response to spills should seek to minimize the severity of the environmental damage and
to hasten the recovery of any damaged ecosystem.
The response should always seek to complement and make use of natural forces to the
fullest extent practicable.
In practical terms, this requires that operating procedures for transportation, storage and
handling of petroleum and petroleum products should stress the high priority managements
give to preventative controls to avoid spillages. Recognizing the inevitability of future spills,
management responsibilities should also give high priority to developing contingency plans that
will ensure prompt response to mitigate the adverse effect of any spills. These plans should be
sufficiently flexible to provide a response appropriate to the nature of the operation, the size of
the spill, local geography and climate. The plans should be supported by established human
resources, maintained to a high degree of readiness in terms of personnel and supporting
equipment. Drills and exercises are required to train personnel in all spill management and
mitigation techniques, and to provide the means of testing contingency plans which, for greatest
effect, are carried out in conjunction with representatives from the public and private sectors.
The potential efficiencies of cooperative and joint venture arrangements between companies
and contracted third parties for oil spill response should be recognized. Periodic reviews and
assessments of such facilities are encouraged to ensure maintenance of capability and efficiency
standards.
Close cooperation between industry and national administrations in contingency planning
will ensure the maximum degree of coordination and understanding between industry and
government plans. This cooperative effort should include endeavours to support
administrations environmental conservation measures in the areas of industry operations.
Accepting that the media and the public at large have a direct interest in the conduct of oil
industry operations, particularly in relation to oil spills, it is important to work constructively
with the media and directly with the public to allay their fears. Reassurance that response to
incidents will be swift and thoroughwithin the anticipated limitations of any defined response
capabilityis also desirable.
It is important that clean-up measures are conducted using techniques, including those for
waste disposal, which minimize ecological and public amenity damage. Learning and
disseminating the lessons from research and accidental spills is accepted as an important
component of managements contribution to oil spill response, especially in relation to
prevention, containment and mitigation methods, including mechanical and chemical means.
INTRODUCTION
Consider some of the worst and most distressing effects of major oil spills. Dying
wildlife covered with oil; smothered shellfish beds on the shore; mangrove
swamps full of oil and dying trees. Any method of response that can help to
minimize this destruction is worthy of consideration.
Dispersants are such an option. By breaking up slicks they can lessen those
effects associated with oil coating and smothering. There is clear scientific
evidence that in some cases they can reduce biological damage. However,
dispersants are not a panacea. This aim of this report is to provide a balanced
view about when it is appropriate to use them and when it is not, with particular
reference to environmental concerns.
Real life information from spills and field experiments is used whenever possible,
and the dispersant option is considered in relation to contingency planning.
Jenifer M. Baker
DISPERSANTS AND THEIR ROLE IN OIL SPILL RESPONSE
DISPERSANTS AND HOW THEY WORK
It is common knowledge that oil and water do not mix easily. Spilled oil floats on
the sea surface in calm conditions. The mixing action of the waves can cause oil
and water to combine in two ways:
Natural dispersion: Waves will break up the oil slick and form oil droplets
that become temporarily suspended in the water. The vast majority of

these oil droplets will be large enough to float quickly back to the surface
and reform the slick. However, a small proportion of the oil will be in the
form of tiny droplets and will have almost neutral buoyancy. These very
small oil droplets will remain dispersed in the water almost indefinitely,
being repeatedly pushed back down into the water by wave action as they
slowly rise.
Water-in-oil emulsification: The mixing action of the waves can also cause
water droplets to be incorporated into the oil to form water-in-oil emulsion,

often referred to as chocolate mousse. The emulsion has a much higher
viscosity than the oil it is formed from. The volume of the emulsion can
eventually increase by up to four times that of the spilled oil, because
emulsions typically contain up to 75 per cent water, by volume.
While emulsions are viscous, persistent and can create serious shoreline cleaning
problems, dispersed oil can be diluted into the sea to reach extremely low
concentrations, well below those that could cause impact on marine life.
The driving force for both natural dispersion and water-in-oil emulsification
is wave energy; low viscosity crude oils will naturally disperse to a significant
degree in rough seas, but rough seas can also cause rapid emulsification. The
increase in viscosity caused by the evaporation of more volatile components in
an oil will resist the effects of the waves in converting the oil slick into small
droplets. This viscosity increase also encourages emulsion formation because
the water droplets are slower to drain from higher viscosity oil. Stable
emulsions are formed when asphaltenes precipitate from within the oil.
Asphaltenes are heavy, tar-like substances that are present in some proportion
in all crude oils. They are not in true solution, but are held in microscopic
suspension by other materials in the oil. As the composition of spilled oil
DISPERSANTS AND HOW THEY WORK
changes due to evaporation of the more volatile components the asphaltenes

precipitate. Precipitated asphaltenes form an elastic, stabilizing coating
around the entrained water droplets and prevent them from coalescing and
settling out.
The relative rates of natural dispersion and emulsification depend on the sea
conditions and the composition of the oil. Lighter, freshly spilled crude oils
initially tend to disperse naturally, but the rate of dispersion is greatly reduced as
the oil emulsifies. Those oils which are weathered and high in asphaltenes tend
to preferentially form emulsions.
The effect of dispersants
Dispersants alter the balance between natural dispersion and emulsification,
pushing the balance strongly towards dispersion and away from emulsification.
The active ingredients in dispersantsthe surfactants or surface active agents
(see box on page 6)alter the properties of the oil/water interface so that the
same amount of wave energy produces a much higher proportion of very small
oil droplets and emulsification is suppressed.
By applying dispersant onto the spilled oil, it is possible to inhibit emulsion
formation while promoting oil dispersion.
Dispersion and emulsification of oil in waterwithout and with dispersant

1. Without dispersant, floating oil may either naturally disperse or form a water-in-oil emulsion
oil
+ water
+ energy
water-in-oil emulsion
(mousse)
dispersion
2. The addition of dispersant enhances dispersion of oil droplets in the water and suppresses emulsification
WITH DISPERSANT
oil
+ water
+ energy
water-in-oil emulsion
(mousse)
dispersion
DISPERSANTSTHE ACTIVE INGREDIENTS

Dispersants promote the formation of numerous tiny oil
seeking) head groups that associate with water
droplets, and retard the re-coalescence of droplets into
molecules, and oleophilic (oil-seeking) tails that
slicks, because they contain surfactants (surface active
associate with oil. Oil droplets are thus surrounded by
agents) which reduce interfacial tension between oil and
surfactant molecules and stabilized. This helps promote
water. Surfactant molecules possess hydrophilic (water-
rapid dilution by water movements.
Surfactants consist of two parts; a

water-seeking hydrophilic
headgroup and an oil-seeking
oleophilic tailgroup. This allows
them to stabilize oil droplets.
Surfactant
Surfactant-stabilized
oil droplet
hydrophilic (water-seeking)
headgroup
water
oleophilic (oil-seeking) tailgroup
Figure shows surfactant locating

at oil/water interface (1), and oil
dispersed into surfactant-stabilized
droplets (2).
1. Surfactant locating at oil/water interface

dispersant spray
oil slick
2. Oil dispersed into surfactant stabilized droplets
oil
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

OF DISPERSANTS
Dispersing the oil has several advantages:

Removing oil from the surface of the sea benefits creatures, such as seabirds
and marine mammals, and habitats at risk from contamination by floating oil.
The formation of myriads of tiny oil droplets improves the opportunity for
biodegradation of the oil by increasing oil surface area and so increasing

exposure to naturally-occurring bacteria and oxygen.
Oil dispersed in the water column no longer drifts with the wind, being only
under the influence of currents and tides. Dispersion can be a good technique
to protect shorelines or sensitive resources located downwind of an oil spill.
Aircraft can apply dispersants, so large areas can be rapidly treated compared
to alternative response methods.

Naturally or chemically dispersed oil droplets might become associated with
suspended sediments where the suspended sediment concentration is very

high (in the surf zone or in some estuaries). The slight buoyancy of the oil
and the density of the sediment will produce a neutrally buoyant aggregate.
These aggregates will be transported long distances by the slightest currents
and the oil will be distributed in a very diffuse way, over a very large area at
extremely low concentrations.
The main potential disadvantage of dispersion of oil is the localized and
temporary increase in oil in water concentration that could have an effect on the
marine life within the immediate vicinity of the dispersant operation.
Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of these and other aspects of
dispersant use is a process of primary importance which is addressed in
subsequent sections of this report.
TYPES OF DISPERSANTS AVAILABLE
Low toxicity dispersants were developed at the beginning of the 1970s. These
were known as hydrocarbon-base, conventional or Type 1 (UK classification)
dispersants. The solvent used was kerosene with a very low aromatic content and
they also contained a low concentration of surfactants. This was needed so that
they could be sprayed from the available equipment fitted to boats and ships.
Although of low toxicity, these early dispersants (some of which are still available
today) are of low effectiveness and need to be used at very high treatment rates of
1 part dispersant to 2 or 3 parts of oil. Boats had to return to port frequently to
replenish dispersant supplies. More effective dispersants were needed.
Dispersants with a higher surfactant content would have been more effective, but
this caused higher dispersant viscosity than could be easily sprayed with the
Dispersant-treated oil breaking up into
clouds of droplets.
available equipment. This difficulty was overcome by using seawater as a

substitute for some of the solvent. The water-dilutable or Type 2 (UK
classification) dispersants were added to seawater during spraying.
Higher performance dispersants were produced by employing blends of different
surfactant types. These are known as concentrate or 3rd generation dispersants.
The first concentrate dispersant was developed in 1972 and improvements in
formulations continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Modern concentrate
dispersants contain a much higher surfactant content than the older dispersants
(hence the name concentrates). They can be sprayed undiluted (as Type 3
dispersants in the UK classification system) or diluted with water (Type 2 in the
UK classification). When sprayed undiluted from aircraft (fixed-wing or
helicopters) or from ships, the recommended treatment rate is 1 part dispersant to
2030 parts of oil. This is the most effective way of using modern dispersants.
Most modern dispersants can also be sprayed from boats and ships as mixtures of
dispersant and seawater. This can only be done through appropriate spraying
equipment that mixes the correct amount of dispersant (10 per cent volume) into
seawater (90 per cent volume), as the mixture is sprayed. When sprayed in this
way, it is recommended that 1 part of the mixture is sprayed onto 23 parts of
spilled oil. Although this spraying method is suitable for dispersing light to
medium crude oils, it should not be used on heavy oils or on oils that have been
at sea for some time, because the water-diluted dispersant is easily washed off by
wave action before it can have the required effect.
WHAT DISPERSANTS CAN

AND CANNOT DO
Dispersants function by greatly enhancing the rate of natural dispersion caused

by wave action. They are more effective when breaking waves are present than in
a very calm sea. Dispersants are effective on the majority of crude oils but they
have some limitations.
Dispersants work best if applied as soon as possible after oil has been spilled. The
changes in oil composition and physical properties, caused by the loss of more
volatile components from the oil by evaporation and the formation of emulsion
(collectively known as oil weathering), progressively decrease the effectiveness
of dispersants. These changes occur at a rate that depends on oil composition
ship/spill location
observations
1979: Betelgeuse,
south-west Ireland
It is estimated that about 1000 tonnes of crude oil were

successfully treated over 12 days. The oil was leaking from
the wreck near the shore, and aerial application of
dispersant allowed efficient location and treatment of the
most threatening slicks.
1983: Sivand,
east England
Estimates of chemical dispersion range from one-sixth to onethird of the crude oil. Because the spill occurred in an estuary,
some of the oil stranded quickly, before it could be treated.
1989: Phillips Oklahoma,

east England
800 tonnes of crude oil were spilled about 7 nautical miles

offshore. Aerial application of dispersants started within
3.5 hours and continued over two days. No oil reached the
shorelinechemical dispersion played an important role but
there was also some loss by burning, evaporation and
natural dispersion.
1990: Rosebay,
south-west England
It is estimated that about 75 per cent of the 1100 tonnes of

crude oil spilled was removed from the sea by a combination
of evaporation, and chemical and natural dispersionwith
chemical dispersion playing an important role. If this had not
happened much greater volumes of mousse would have
formed and polluted the shore.
1999: Blue Master,

US Gulf of Mexico
45 tons of IFO -180 bunker which spilled after a collision

was completely dispersed by 2.3 tonnes of a modern
concentrate. This was the first reported successful dispersion
of a bunker in an actual spill.
The table summarizes information on

dispersant effectiveness from selected
accidental spills. The estimates are generally
based on visual observations, not on
quantitative analyses.
and the prevailing temperature, wind speed and sea conditions. The length of
time for which dispersant use is effective, the window of opportunity, is closely
linked to the rate at which an oil weathers. It can be as short as an hour or less
for heavy oils or as long as several days or more for light crude oils.
Field tests in various parts of the world have been conducted in attempts to
identify the conditions under which dispersants work best. Since the 1980s, several
well-documented field tests have been conducted in several countries, including
Canada, France, Norway, the USA and the UK. Ultra Violet Fluorometry
(UVF) has been used to measure the dispersed oil concentrations in the water
beneath and around test slicks that have been sprayed with dispersant. These
comprehensive measurements, combined with surface sampling and extensive use
of remote sensing from aircraft, have allowed a quantitative estimate to be made
of the amount of oil dispersed with time. These field trials have demonstrated
Sea trial off Gabon, West Africa; dispersant is
being applied from a boat to a light crude oil,
at an application ratio of about 510 per cent.
conclusively that dispersants can be very effective, that is, they have been
successful in rapidly removing the majority of the volume of some crude oils from
the sea surface, even when the crude oils have been on the sea for several days.
Dispersants have been used successfully at real oil spills on many occasions. The
action of dispersants is often visible as the formation of a light brown plume, or
cloud, of dispersed oil in the water column. Such observations are best made from
aircraft. Dispersant-treated oil will usually disperse rapidly, leaving only a thin
film of oil sheen on the surface. While it can be fairly easy to observe dispersants
working on some occasions, the viewing conditions can make it more difficult on
others. In poor visibility, it may not be possible to clearly observe dispersed oil in
the water. It can then be difficult to assess whether the dispersant is working.
Qualitative evidence of the dispersion of oil can be obtained by visual
observation, but estimating the degree of dispersant effectiveness at a real oil
spill is much more difficult. There will always be difficulties in accurately
estimating how much oil has been dispersed, even when UVF monitoring is
carried out, because the amount of oil spilled or on the sea surface at any time
may not be accurately known. It is also extremely difficult to make
comprehensive measurements of sub-surface oil concentrations under very large
oil slicks. Distinguishing between the relative proportions of natural and
chemical dispersion can be difficult. UVF measurements showing a significant
increase in dispersed oil concentration at depths of 2 to 5 metres below the
dispersant treated oil is a good indicator that the dispersant is working.
Estimates of dispersant effectiveness should be compared with estimates of the
effectiveness of physical methods, which are more constrained by rough sea
conditions than dispersant application. When appropriate, and under most
circumstances, dispersants can generally remove a significantly greater
proportion of oil from the water surface than physical methods.
10
WHAT DISPERSANTS CAN AND CANNOT DO
VISCOSITY
Viscosity is the resistance of a fluid to flow. The viscosity of an oil is an
indication of how easily it flows or moves with an applied force, such as a
breaking wave. Some liquids, such as water, have a low viscosity while
other liquids, such as syrup, have a high viscosity. The viscosity of an oil
increases as the temperature decreases. However, the degree of viscosity
change with temperatures varies with oil type.
The value of the viscosity of an oil may be measured and expressed in
several ways:
Dynamic (or absolute) viscosity
Dynamic viscosity is measured by some analytical techniques, such as

rotating spindle viscometers. The units of dynamic viscosity are
Newton seconds per square metre or Pascal seconds (Pa.s) in SI units.
Values in milliPascal seconds (mPa.s) have the same numerical value
as centiPoise (cP) as measured in the earlier metric system.
Kinematic viscosity
Kinematic viscosity is measured by other methods, such as capillary

tube viscometers. The units of kinematic viscosity are Stokes (St) or,
more usually, centiStokes (cSt). 1 cSt is equal to one millimetre
squared per second (1 cSt = 1 mm2/s). Kinematic viscosity is the
dynamic viscosity divided by the density of the liquid (at the
temperature that the viscosity is measured).
Kinematic viscosity (cSt) = Dynamic viscosity (mPa.s)
Density (g/ml)
Other viscosity scales
Various simple methods have been devised to measure and describe oil
viscosity. These include measuring the time it takes oil to flow through
a standard size orifice in a standardized apparatus. The units include:
Engler degrees (Europe)
Redwood No. 1 seconds (Europe)
Saybolt Universal Seconds (USA)
These units are tending to fall out of use; conversion factors and
charts are available.
11
The potential for natural dispersion of light

crude oil was spectacularly demonstrated
when the Braer grounded in severe weather
on the Shetland Isles, Scotland, in January
1993, losing its entire 85,000 tonne cargo.
Some 120 tonnes of dispersant were applied
from aircraft but the majority of the
dispersion was attributable to the very severe
weather and the nature of the oil.
However, dispersants do not work well in all circumstances. For example, dispersant
spraying was ineffective on heavy fuel oil spilled from the Vista Bella (Caribbean,
1991). The specific physical and chemical interactions controlling dispersant
effectiveness are not thoroughly understood. Many of them are inter-related and it
is difficult to separate them completely, but the evidence from field and laboratory
tests shows that the factors discussed in the following sections are important.
Spilled oil properties
Most crude oils can be dispersed, provided that they are sprayed with dispersant
soon after they have been spilt. Low to medium viscosity crude oils (with a
viscosity of less than 1,000 mPa.s at the prevailing sea temperature) can be easily
dispersed. Higher viscosity oils are less easy to disperse as the effect of increasing
oil viscosity is to slow down the dispersion process caused by the prevailing wave
action. Crude oils with a pour point significantly above sea temperature cannot
be dispersed because they are solid. Some oils have a high wax content and may
not disperse well, even though the viscosity of the oil is relatively low.
It has been known for many years that it is more difficult to disperse a high
viscosity oil than a low or medium viscosity oil. Laboratory testing had shown
Ineffective use of dispersant on weathered
heavy crude oil: the oil remains visible on the
surface and the white plume indicates
dispersant only entering the water.
that the effectiveness of dispersants is related to oil viscosity, being highest at an

oil viscosity of about 1,000 or 2,000 mPa.s and then declining to a low level with
an oil viscosity of 10,000 mPa.s. It was therefore considered that some generally
applicable viscosity limit, such as 2,000 or 5,000 mPa.s, could be applied to all
oils. Recent work has shown that this is not the case. Modern oil spill dispersants
are generally effective up to an oil viscosity of 5,000 mPa.s or more, and their
performance gradually decreases with increasing oil viscosity; oils with a viscosity
of more than 10,000 are, in most cases, no longer dispersible. However, oil
composition appears to be as important as viscosity. These are only two of
several factors that affect dispersant performance; the amount of energy from the
waves, dispersant type and dispersant treatment rate are also important factors.
12
WHAT DISPERSANTS CAN AND CANNOT DO
Many heavy oils have complex flow properties at the temperatures encountered
on the sea. A simple viscosity value is not a good indicator of flow properties for
these oils at low sea temperatures.
Dispersion of the lighter grades of Intermediate Fuel Oils (IFOs), such as IFO30 and IFO-80 is possible. Some medium fuel oils (MFO, IFO-180 or No. 4
Fuel oil) may also be dispersed, especially in warmer waters and rougher seas.
Some heavier fuel oils (HFO, IFO-380, Bunker C, No. 6 Fuel Oil) might be
dispersible in very warm seas under some conditions, such as those encountered
in tropical waters, provided that they are sprayed with dispersant almost as soon
as they are spilled. They are unlikely to be dispersible in colder waters. Heavy
industrial fuel oils, such as that spilled at the Erika incident, cannot be dispersed;
they have far too high a viscosity and also tend to float as very thick patches on
the sea, too thick to be sprayed with dispersant. However, the grade of a fuel oil
(which is defined by the oil viscosity at 50C or 100C) is only an approximate
indication of the oil viscosity and dispersibility at sea temperature. The
maximum permitted pour point for MFOs and HFOs is +30C. Not all fuel oils
have such a high pour point, but those that do would be solid below this
temperature and will therefore not be dispersible.
The initial viscosity of any oil can be used to give a broad indication of the likely
performance of dispersants. The use of dispersants on spills of most crude oils is
likely to be successful, provided that the dispersant can be sprayed before the oil
has weathered to a substantial degree. The way that the composition and
physical properties change with time as an oil weathers is the main
characteristic that will determine the dispersibility of oil. In almost every case,
light fuel products (e.g. kerosene, diesels, gasoline) are not considered to be
suitable for treatment with dispersants because of their highly volatile nature and
the fact that they spread quickly on the sea surface to form a thin layer, which
dispersant droplets would pass on application.
Oil weathering
The physical properties and composition of spilled oil change as the more
volatile oil components are lost by evaporation and as the oil incorporates water
droplets to form water-in-oil emulsion. The flexing and compression of the
emulsified oil, caused by wave action, reduces the average size of the water
droplets within the oil. This causes the emulsion viscosity to continue to increase
even when the water content has reached a maximum, typically 75 per cent
volume. Asphaltene components precipitate from the oil to form a stabilizing
coating around the water droplets and the emulsion becomes more stable with
time. All of these processes cause an increase in the viscosity and stability of the
emulsified oil and can cause dispersants to become less effective with time. The
rate at which these processes occur depends on oil composition and the
prevailing temperature, wind speed and wave conditions.
13
UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency

maintains aerial dispersant capability and
associated surveillance aircraft. The
dispersant strategy was heavily utilized
during the Sea Empress oil spill in 1996.
The reduction in dispersant effectiveness is partly due to the increase in viscosity,

but is also due to the stability of the emulsion. Some recently developed
dispersants have the capability to break the emulsion (cause it to revert back to
oil and water phases), particularly when the emulsion is freshly formed and not
yet thoroughly stabilized. Some freshly formed emulsions have been dispersed. A
double treatment of dispersant, the first stage at a low treatment rate (e.g. 1 to 60
dispersant to oil ratio) followed after an hour or so by a second treatment at a
higher rate (e.g. 1 to 20 dispersant to oil ratio), has been found to be effective.
However, as emulsified oil undergoes further weathering, the emulsion becomes
more stable and dispersants become less effective. There is a need for prompt
dispersant spraying even though some modern dispersants can extend the
window of opportunity compared to other products.
Dispersant type, application method and treatment rate
Although many dispersants may be capable of meeting the minimum level of
performance specified in different national approval procedures, not all dispersants
are the same. It is particularly important to recognize the considerable difference in
performance between the older, conventional or hydrocarbon-base dispersants and
the much more effective concentrate dispersants available today. Hydrocarbonbase dispersants are much less effective than concentrate dispersants, even when
used at ten times the treatment rate. Even amongst the most recently developed
dispersants, there are significant differences in capability. Some dispersants are better
at dispersing some oils than other dispersants. Specific testing during contingency
planning may reveal the best dispersant for a particular oil and weathering state.
The performance of a dispersant will depend on the prevailing sea conditions.
Dispersants promote more rapid dispersion in rougher seas. There will be an
upper limit of sea conditions when dispersant spraying is not practical because
the spilled oil will be constantly submerged by waves. Dispersant can be sprayed in
very calm conditions if rougher seas are expected to occur within a few hours. The
dispersant will stay with the oil and will cause rapid dispersion when sufficient
wave action occurs. Dispersants can therefore be quickly applied and can be used
under sea conditions where physical collection of the oil would be impossible.
Dispersant needs to be applied as evenly and as accurately as possible to spilled
oil. The recommended treatment rate for modern dispersants, applied undiluted,
is a dispersant to oil ratio of 1 to 2030. Lower treatment rates have been shown
to be effective with light, freshly spilled crude oils. It is always difficult to achieve
exactly the recommended treatment rate because oil slicks have large and
localized variations in oil layer thickness. Undiluted spraying from ships or
aircraft is the preferred method of using dispersants, although seawater dilution
can be used from vessels if the appropriate equipment is available. Note that
seawater-diluted application is efficient only on low viscosity oils; for oils with
viscosity above 1,000 mPa.s undiluted dispersant application is necessary.
14
DISPERSANT USE AT THE SEA EMPRESS OIL SPILL

Shortly after eight oclock on the evening of 15
the water column affected bivalve molluscs and other
February 1996, the oil tanker Sea Empress, laden with
sediment-dwelling species. Populations of amphipods
131,000 tonnes of Forties blend crude oil, ran aground
(small crustaceans) disappeared from some areas and
in the entrance to Milford Haven in Pembrokeshire,
were severely depleted from others. Recovery of these
one of Britains largest and busiest natural harbours.
populations was slow. There appeared to have been no
In the days that followed, while the vessel was brought
impacts on mammals. Although tissue concentrations
under control in a difficult salvage operation, some
of oil components increased temporarily in some fish
72,000 tonnes of Forties light crude oil and 480 tonnes
species, most fish were only affected to a small degree,
of heavy fuel oil spilled into the sea, polluting around
if at all, and very few died. Fishery stocks were not
200 km of coastline recognized internationally for its
affected. The fishing bans that were imposed caused
wildlife and beauty. The ship was successfully
hardship for the 700 fishermen in the 20 million/year
refloated on the evening high tide on Wednesday 21
local fishing industry until compensation claims and
February and moved to a jetty where the remaining
payments were sorted out. Within two years, the
crude oil was pumped off.
fisheries were operating normally
The Sea Empress oil spill caused the deaths of many
It appears that although a large amount of oil was
thousands of sea birds, but the populations of these
spilled in a particularly sensitive area, the impact was far
species were not seriously affected and there was no
less severe than many people had expected. This was
evidence of any effects on seabird breeding success.
due to a combination of factorsin particular, the time
The population of the most affected sea bird, the
of year, the type of oil, weather conditions at the time
common scoter, was recovering within two years.
of the spill, the clean up response and the natural
Large numbers of marine organisms were killed either
resilience of many marine species. If the accident had
as freshly spilled oil came ashore (for example, limpets
continued
and barnacles) or when raised levels of hydrocarbons in
Date
(February 1996)
15
16
17
18
18
19
19
20
21
21
22
total
Time (GMT)
Estimate of oil
release (t)
20:0022:00
2,000
20:0023:00
10:0013:00
21:0024:00
10:0013:00
22:0001:00
10:0013:00
00:0002:00
11:0014:00
5,000
2,000
5,000
8,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
72,000
Applied
dispersant (t)
2
2
29
57
110
179
67
446
15
Table from The net environmental

benefit of a successful dispersant
operation at the Sea Empress
incident presented at the IOSC
1997.
Dispersant use at the Sea Empress oil spill (continued)

happened a few weeks later, if the wind had been
bivalve molluscs and other species and the decrease of
blowing from a different direction in the days following
amphipod populations in some areason balance it is
the spill or if the oil had been of a heavier type, then the
likely that it was of benefit by reducing the overall
wildlife and the economy of south-west Wales would
impact of the spill. It was estimated that approximately
have suffered to a much greater extent.
one-half to two-thirds of 37,000 tonnes of the spilled oil

that was estimated to have been dispersed was caused to
From the 1622 of February a fleet of seven DC-3
do so by the use of dispersants. The 20,000 to 25,000
dispersant-spraying aircraft and an ADDS pack in a
tonnes of oil that was dispersed in this manner had the
Hercules, guided by remote sensing aircraft, sprayed
capability of being converted into up to 100,000 tonnes
oil at sea with a total of 446 tonnes of dispersant. Each
of emulsified oil. Some of this would certainly have
day brought a fresh release of oil at low tide. No
impacted the coastline, caused ecological damage and
dispersant spraying took place after 22 February
would have had to have been removed in a very costly
because any remaining surface oil was in patches too
clean up procedure. The use of dispersants certainly
small to treat effectively, or was emulsified and
reduced the cost of the response andon balance
weathered to an extent where it was no longer
reduced the overall environmental impact.
amenable to the use of dispersants.

Although the rapid, large scale use of dispersants at sea
Summarized from The Environmental Impact of the Sea
probably increased exposure to oil of animals on the sea
Empress Oil SpillFinal Report of the Sea Empress
bedand may have contributed to the strandings of
Environmental Evaluation Committee (SEEEC).
16
EFFECTIVENESS AND TOXICITY TESTING
Unless the oil completely disappears from the surface very soon after dispersant
spraying on actual spills, estimating the degree of effectiveness can be challenging.
Dispersant effectiveness is usually judged visually and there are difficulties relating
this to actual concentrations of dispersed oil in the water column. The level of oil
in the water has been measured by laboratory analysis of water samples taken
during many tests and actual spills and the available data indicate that oil
concentrations following dispersion are not high. In the upper few metres of the
water column they rarely exceed 100200 ppm and usually range from 2060 ppm
for a short duration (generally 1 or 2 hours). Levels measured at the Sea Empress
spill were generally below 10 ppm. In the past decade, use has been made of UVF
techniques to continuously monitor levels of oil in the water column. However,
the technique only allows qualitative estimates of effectiveness. Its main value is to
confirm that the dispersants are having a positive effect.
Reasonable material balances have been obtained in large-scale pilot tests. There
are also a number of small-scale laboratory tests available for evaluation of
dispersant effectiveness. The purpose of these tests is to compare the relative
effectiveness of dispersants. In such tests, dispersants are added to oil at defined
dispersant-oil ratios, and mixing energy is applied by various means, such as air
flow, rocking, swirling, mixing, etc. The test results are very much a function of
the level of applied energy and other test parameters. Effectiveness is measured
using criteria such as the amount of oil dispersed in the water, droplet size, and
stability. These tests are useful in ranking various products in terms of
effectiveness but do not accurately predict what will happen when dispersants are
applied at sea.
Similarly, there are many different laboratory procedures for testing toxicity.
The data are useful for discriminating between high- and low-toxicity products
or mixtures, but cannot be used reliably for predicting environmental effects for
oil spill events. This is due in part to the various experimental conditions used in
laboratory tests and the different ways of assessing an organisms actual exposure
to oil, dispersant, and dispersed oil. Even more important is the extended,
constant exposure durations common in standard laboratory tests (4896 hours)
compared to the much shorter and rapidly diminishing exposures experienced by
marine organisms when oil is dispersed in open waters. New test procedures
developed to mimic environmentally realistic, short-term, declining exposures
17
Exposure to dispersed oil
concentration of dispersed oil

or dispersant (ppm)
Exposure to a constant dispersed oil

concentration for a prolonged period in most
standard laboratory toxicity tests is much
more severe than the transient exposure
experienced by marine organisms at sea.
constant exposure for 96 hours

in standard laboratory test
exposure regime in open water
24
28
72
96
exposure time (hours)
have demonstrated that dispersed oil is up to 100 times less toxic compared to
characterizations using standard, continuous exposure test methods.
Laboratory and field studies have shown that toxicity concerns should be focused
on potential environmental effects of dispersed oil, rather than on dispersants
themselves. In some countries, including the USA, dispersant toxicity is measured
in the laboratory but not used as an approval criterion. Modern dispersants are
much less toxic than dispersed oil, so environmental tradeoffs must weigh
exposures of water column organisms to dispersed oil against potential impacts of
that same oil remaining on the surface and/or stranding on shorelines.
18
TO SPRAY OR NOT TO SPRAY?
Net environmental benefit analysis

Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of dispersant spraying is of
primary importance in the decision-making process. Moreover, even if potential
disadvantages are perceived, these need to be weighed against the likely outcome
if dispersants are not used. During such a net environmental benefit analysis,
many factors need to be taken into account, for example:
the concentrations of dispersed oil which may be expected under a dispersant-
treated slick, and the dilution potential in different types of water-body;

the toxicity of the likely concentrations of dispersed oil to local flora and fauna;
the distribution and fate of the dispersed oil in water, sediments and
organisms;
the distribution, fate and biological effects of the oil if it is not treated with
dispersantfor example, whether it will harm shore habitats or wildlife;

if mortalities should result, the expected ability of the affected populations
to recover.
When considering these issues, it is valuable to look at the evidence that already
exists from spill case histories and experiments. A range of this evidence is
summarized below.
Dispersed oil in the water column
As stated earlier, information on concentrations of oil below dispersant-treated
slicks comes mainly from field experiments in open water. The results of
extensive experiments in France, the United Kingdom, Norway, the United
States and Canada, have been reported in the scientific literature. The
measured oil concentrations range from less than one to more than 100 ppm.
However, most of the data are less than 60 ppm. There is a rapid diminution
of concentration with both time and depth. The highest concentrations
typically occur in the top metre of water during the hour after treatment (see
graphs overleaf).
How damaging are such exposures to marine life? A detailed review by the
National Research Council (1989) concluded that field exposures in the water
column for both untreated and chemically dispersed oils generally are much
lower than exposures required to cause mortality or behavioural effects on a large
19
number of species and life stages. This conclusion is backed up by numerous

laboratory studies. Moreover, since the amount of dispersant applied is a small
fraction (35 per cent) of the oil present, it is generally agreed that the potential
for toxic effects could result primarily from exposure to high concentrations of
dispersed oil, not from exposure to the dispersant.
Particular concern is often expressed about nearshore areas where shallow
water restricts the dilution potential. Nearshore information is available from
the Searsport, TROPICS and BIOS experiments (see pages 22, 24 and 25 for
further details) where the discharges involved were of premixed oil and
dispersant, deliberately released in shallow water. In the Searsport
experiment, concentrations 10 cm above the seabed in shallow water (not
more than 3 metres deep) peaked between 20 and 40 ppm, and decreased to
background levels within two tidal cycles. There was no evidence of adverse
biological effects.
Considering extreme or worst case scenarios: in the TROPICS experiment the
average water depth was less than 1 m, and concentrations of dispersed oil
reached as high as 222 ppm. Though the mangroves benefited from dispersion,
there were declines in the abundance of corals and other reef organisms, reduced
coral growth rate in one species, and minor or no effects on seagrasses. The
highest concentration recorded for the BIOS experiment was 160 ppm at 10 m
depth, but in this case the controlled discharge was sub-surface and of pre-mixed
oil and dispersant. There were marked acute behavioural effects on some of the
sub-tidal fauna, but no large-scale mortality.
Depth-concentration profiles for three crude oils following dispersant treatment

0
2
4
La Rosa crude
23 minutes
55 minutes
80 minutes
8
10
0
depth (metres)
The graphs show depth-concentration

profiles for three crude oils following
dispersant treatment. The data were
obtained from sea trials off the New Jersey
and California coasts and show that
dispersed oil concentrations diminish with
time and depth, and at a depth approaching
10 metres are typically less than 1 ppm at
any time.
2
4
Murban crude
23 minutes
51 minutes
81 minutes
8
10
0
2
4
Prudhoe Bay crude
15 minutes
54 minutes
3hr 40 min
8
10
0.1
1
10
measured oil concentration in water (ppm)
20
100
The sub-surface oil concentrations were monitored using UVF at the

Sea Empress oil spill. The oil concentrations found under the untreated oil were
3 ppm (parts per million) at 1 metre depth and less than 0.4 ppm at 4 metres
depth. After dispersant spraying, the oil concentrations increased to 10 ppm at
1 metre depth and, 3 ppm at 4 metres depth and 3 ppm at 15 metres depth. The
oil concentrations at all depths dropped to 1 ppm within 2 days. Despite the
large volume of oil that entered the water, there were no obvious mortalities of
adult fish, there was no clear evidence of any damage to commercial stocks of
fish and shellfish and it was not possible to attribute the impact observed on
shellfish (mainly bivalves) specifically to the use of dispersant.
The use of dispersants in freshwaters is not normally recommended. However
their use may be justified if the river is large and fast flowing, especially in cases
where non-use would result in features susceptible to direct oiling, such as
bordering wetlands, being affected.
Successful dispersion of weathered oils is

possible under some circumstances. The
picture shows Alaskan North Slope crude oil
being dispersed in the AEA Technology
1997 sea trial after 55 hours weathering
and a viscosity of 15,00020,000 mPas; the
dispersed oil cloud can be seen clearly.
Field experiments comparing the environmental effects of

chemically dispersed and untreated oil
Dispersed oil may in some circumstances cause adverse effects, but how do these
compare with the effects of untreated oil? There have been a number of field
experiments comparing chemically-dispersed and untreated oil, and the results of
these are of particular interest to contingency planners.
There is very little comparative information for birds and mammals. It is clear
that direct fouling of birds and fur-insulated mammals (such as sea otters) is
disastrous for them, and it is evident that dispersion of surface slicks must be
beneficial because it reduces the risk of such fouling. Moreover, dispersion
reduces the risk of birds ingesting oil.
In general, despite the range of sensitivities of the different species towards the
dispersed oil, comparison between toxicity test results and actual observation in the
field shows that oil concentrations measured at sea after dispersant application are
generally much lower than the lethal concentrations recorded in laboratory studies.
Relative toxicity range for dispersed oil: in

proper use conditions, due to the dilution
process, the actual toxicity of dispersed oil is
usually far less than lethal.
Relative toxicity range for dispersed oil

lethal concentrations
sub-lethal concentrations
dispersed oil concentration
in the water column
increasing toxicity
21
Table summarizes published information

comparing the effects of chemically-dispersed
and untreated oil (major field experiments).
habitat/location/reference
findings
Mangroves, Malaysia. Lai

& Feng (1985)
Undispersed crude oil was more toxic than dispersed crude to

mangrove saplings. Untreated oil in the upper sediments
required a longer time to weather and depurate than
chemically-dispersed oil.
Mangroves/coral
reefs/seagrass, TROPICS
experiment, Panama.
Ballou et al (1989)
Fresh untreated oil had severe long-term effects on survival of

mangroves and associated fauna. Oil which was
chemically dispersed just offshore had minor effects on the
mangroves but affected corals and seagrasses. (This
experiment is described in more detail in the IPIECA report
Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs.)
Coral reef, Jurayd Island,

Saudi Arabia. LeGore et al
(1989)
During a one-year observation period, there were no visible

effects on corals exposed to floating crude oil (0.25 mm thick)
or to dispersant alone (at 5 per cent of oil volume). With
dispersed oil there was no effect following a 24-hour
exposure, and minor effects following a 5-day exposure. These
effects comprised bleaching and failure to survive the cold
winter season for not more than 5 per cent of the total coral.
Inter-tidal sediments,
Searsport, Maine, USA.
Page et al (1983),
Dispersant-treated and untreated crude oil was discharged

nearshore. There was no evidence of any adverse effects on
fauna from the exposure of the inter-tidal sediments to the
dispersed oil. The untreated oil had clear effects including
some mortality of a commercially important bivalve. For further
details of this experiment see the feature on pages 2425.
Gilfillan et al
(1983,1984)
Arctic inter-tidal and

nearshore, Baffin Island,
BIOS experiment,
Canada. Sergy and
Blackall (1987)
The untreated oil was released in a boomed test area and

allowed to beach. The dispersed oil cloud was created by
discharging an oil/dispersant/seawater mixture through a
sub-tidal diffuser nearshore. Despite unusually severe
conditions of exposure to chemically-dispersed oil, the
impact on a typical shallow-water benthic habitat was not of
major ecological consequence. Sub-tidal organisms
accumulated dispersed oil rapidly but most of this was
degraded or depurated within one year. Untreated oil
residues remained on the beach after two years, with some
transport to adjacent sub-tidal sediments.
Inter-tidal rock, sedimentary

shores, saltmarsh, UK.
Baker et al (1984)
Oiled plots were treated with dispersant to simulate beach

cleaning. Dispersant did not generally increase the biological
damage done by the oil, but cleaning effectiveness was
limited. In some sediments, dispersant-treated oil was retained
at greater concentrations than untreated oil.
COSS mesocosm
experiment Texas, 1999
Fuller et al (1999)
Large mesocosm experiments were carried out in order to

assess the lethal and sublethal effects of dispersed and
untreated oil on coastal marine fauna. Results show that
dispersing the oil exerts no more toxicity that the untreated
oil alone would have but accelerates the departure of the oil
from shoreline areas.
22
Work summarized by the US National Research Council (1989) shows that use
of dispersants as shampoos in cleaning experiments increases the wettability of
fur and feathers, which can lead to death by hypothermia. This suggests that
direct accidental spraying of wildlife with undiluted dispersants can be harmful.
The conclusion is that all efforts should be made to keep spraying as far from
birds and mammals as possible.
Economic considerations
Economic factors will inevitably play an important part in the decision of
whether or not to spray dispersants. For example, a tourist beach or marina
may generate considerable income for the local economy (at least seasonally),
and so be a priority area for protectionusing offshore dispersant spraying if
appropriate. Other areas may be industrialized, with water intakes for cooling
systems, desalination plants, or aquariums. In such cases the response must
minimize deleterious effects on industrial operations, and dispersant use near
intakes may not be the best option. Economic and biological considerations
may coincide; for example, a mangrove swamp may be important both
ecologically and economically and so require priority protection, which could
involve offshore spraying in some cases. Economic considerations are included
in some of the hypothetical scenarios in Dispersants and Contingency
Planning on page 26.
23
THE SEARSPORT EXPERIMENT
The objective of this field experiment was to obtain quantitative information on

the fate and effects of chemically dispersed and untreated oil in a nearshore area.
Two controlled 250-gallon discharges of Murban crude, one untreated and one
I
II
III
chemically dispersed, were made in shallow water (less than 4 m deep) within test
plots at Searsport, Maine, in August 1981. Water, sediments and marine

A
Long Cove
12
oil
tank
farm
organisms were sampled during a one-year baseline study before the discharges
were made, and during the post-spill study period.
Kidder Pt.
Stockton
Harbour
Important findings from this experiment included the following:
18
chemically dispersed oil lost volatile hydrocarbons as the droplets diffused
E
coal
terminal
Mack
Pt.
downward;
Sears Island
south-west
wind
500
metres
there was little incorporation of oil into sediments exposed to the cloud of
dispersed oil;
there was significant incorporation of oil into sediments exposed to untreated
Map of the Searsport experiment, showing

locations of inter-tidal test plots (I-III) and
sub-tidal sampling stations (A-E). Plot I was
exposed to untreated oil, Plot II was the
unoiled reference plot, and Plot III was
exposed to oil plus dispersant.
oil, with more being found in the upper shore than the lower;
there was considerable evidence that the sediment fauna suffered no adverse
effects from exposure to dispersed oil;

there was clear evidence that exposure to untreated oil adversely affected the
sediment fauna.
Concentration of petroleum hydrocarbons in clams

800
discharge
I. untreated oil
700
II. control
concentration (ppm)
600
III. dispersed oil
500
400
300
200
Concentration of petroleum hydrocarbons

(aromatics) in clams, Searsport experiment.
Inter-tidal clams from Plot I (untreated oil)
took up large amounts; clams from Plot III
(dispersed oil) took up very little. Similar
results were obtained for aliphatic
hydrocarbons and for mussels.
100
0
July
June
begining of
August
pre-discharge
24
end of
August
begining of
end of
September September
post-discharge
October
THE SEARSPORT EXPERIMENT
1. Discharging dispersed oil
2. Mixing dispersed oil into the water

column
3. Aerial view of chemically dispersed oil
4. Discharging untreated oil
5. Aerial view of untreated oil in contact

with shore
6. Untreated oil on the shoreline
7. Water sampling boat
8. Clam sampling
25
DISPERSANTS AND
Dispersant pre-approval
The window of opportunity for effective dispersant spraying following a spill
starts immediately the oil is spilled onto the sea. In many large oil spills, there
have been sequences of oil releases as a ship breaks up or as oil is released on
each tide. The window of opportunity will relate to each of the sequential oil
spills and its duration depends on a number of factors. For light oils, the
window of opportunity may last up to a week or more. For heavy oils, the
window of opportunity may be too short to be practically useable. It
generally does not last beyond two to three days, so it is crucial to begin
spraying as soon as possible. For this to occur, it is essential that the dispersant
option has pre-approval.
First, there has to be approval in principle that dispersants can be sprayed at
specified locations under defined conditions. This will require consideration of
factors such as the relative importance of the resources at risk, water depths,
currents, wave characteristics and mixing energy, and distance from sensitive
resources. For any area covered by an oil spill contingency plan it is essential to
have environmental information, preferably presented on sensitivity maps. Such
information can be used in conjunction with prior case-history and experimental
evidence (such as is summarized in this report) to help identify where dispersants
are a valid option.
Second, named products have to be approved and stocked for use in particular areas.
Product approval usually involves testing both for effectiveness and toxicity. Local
conditions (e.g. salinity, key species of local flora and fauna) should be considered.
Third, there are logistical requirements, such as approval in principle for aircraft
to operate in certain areas, with necessary back-up such as air traffic control and
availability of refuelling and loading facilities.
The pre-approval process should be established by potential responders in
discussion with all relevant organizations (government departments,
conservation organizations, research institutions), and involves:
definition of oil types, scenarios and geographical locations where dispersants
are a viable option from the logistical point of view;
26
DISPERSANTS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
net environmental benefit analysisconsideration of advantages and
disadvantages of dispersant use compared with advantages and disadvantages

of other response options; and
in the light of the above, identification of locations and situations where
dispersant use can, and cannot, be pre-approved; any restrictions should be

clearly indicated on sensitivity maps.
Some countries have defined zones along their coast lines where dispersant use
may be restricted. They may be based on water depth or distance from the
shore, or a combination of both. Outside of these zones, dispersant can be
used with minimal impact to the environment. Spraying dispersant within
these zones may be prohibited or require specific prior permission from a
national authority.
Definition of geographical limits for the use of dispersant along the coast
of France
Volume of the pollution
to be dispersed
Minimum depth
required
Minimum distance
to the shore
Up to 10 tonnes of oil
5m
0.5 nautical mile
Up to 100 tonnes of oil
10 m
1 nautical mile
Up to 1,000 tonnes of oil
15 m
2.5 nautical miles
These zones may be extended if there are particularly sensitive resources such as
sea farms, marine reserves, fish ponds or estuaries nearby, or by the seasonal
presence of migratory species, nesting and spawning activities. The existence of
currents that will carry dispersed oil towards sensitive resources may also cause
the zones to be modified.
Key questions in relation to dispersant use:

Questions that need to be answered
Information needed to answer question
Is dispersion possible?
Type of oil
Viscosity of oil
Weathering characteristics of oil
Is dispersion acceptable?
Location
Sensitive resources
Geographical limits
Is dispersion feasible?
Quantity of oil
Available dispersant
Available spraying systems
27
Example from France of dispersant use

restriction zones:
O: coast line
A: limit to disperse up to 10 tonnes of oil
B: limit to disperse up to 100 tonnes
C: limit to disperse up to 1,000 tonnes
The figure illustrates the geographical
limits described in the table on the left.
The dispersant option for a number of hypothetical scenarios is discussed below,

with respect to environmental considerations. In each case it is assumed that the oil
is of a type which is dispersible, and that it is logistically feasible to apply dispersants.
Scenario: the open sea, slick moving rapidly towards coastal fishing ground and
islands with important bird colonies
The evidence is that dispersed oil will rapidly be diluted in the open water to
concentrations that are unlikely to harm fish; moreover, dispersed oil will not be
driven by wind toward the coastline. Eggs and larvae are more susceptible than
adult fish but they are mainly located in the coastal water and fish populations
are likely to quickly recover from short-term localized exposure to dispersed oil.
Chemical dispersion is a good technique to protect fishing ground and the
coastline by reducing the amount of oil drifting toward these sensitive areas.
Untreated oil will probably kill many birds. If effective physical containment is
not possible, the preferable option would be to spray dispersant as far from the
islands as possible to avoid any direct contact between the sprayed dispersant and
the birds. However, there may be seasonal variation, with large aggregates of
birds during the breeding season and widely scattered birds at other times of
year. If so, dispersant spraying during the breeding season would have a greater
net environmental benefit.
Scenario: large river
Physical containment is difficult in strong currents. Dispersant use may be
justified if the river is large and fast flowing, and if non-use of dispersants
increases the chances of oil entering sensitive riverside wetlands. Of course,
before any application in a river, it will be necessary to check if there are no
sensitive resources, (such as fish farms, water intakes, etc.) down stream. The
dispersant used must be chosen for good performance in fresh water. Due to the
lack of wave energy in river, addition of mixing energy (usually with water jets)
will be needed to initiate the dispersion while the stream should be turbulent
enough to keep the dispersed oil in the water column (usually >0.4 m/s).
28
Scenario: nearshore, slick moving through area of shallow water with coral
reefs, towards a mangrove area
Dispersed oil is likely to damage some of the coral reef organisms but untreated
oil can be devastating to mangroves. Moreover, untreated oil trapped in
mangroves can leach out into nearshore waters over a period of time,
constituting chronic pollution that affects coral reefs. If it were impossible to
collect the oil from the water surface physically, or to protect the mangroves
with a physical barrier, then it would be justifiable to use dispersantsas quickly
as possible in the deepest possible water. (For more information on this type of
scenario, see the IPIECA report Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs.)
Scenario: nearshore, slick moving through area of shallow water with coral
reefs, towards a sandy shore
Dispersed oil is likely to damage some of the coral reef organisms. The sandy
shore is probably relatively unproductive from the biological point of view, and
easy to clean. Therefore it would be best not to use dispersant and then to clean
the oil from the beach using manual methods.
Scenario: nearshore, slick moving towards industrial water intakes or harbours
If the oil is dispersed, it may go under protective booms, enter water intakes and
damage industrial processes if the water intakes cannot be turned off for the time
it takes the dispersed plume to move through the area. It is preferable not to use
dispersant, so that the oil can be physically deflected, contained and recovered.
Physical collection is relatively easy in the calm waters of harbours.
Scenario: nearshore, slick moving through area of shallow water with sub-tidal
shellfish, towards tourist resort
Use of dispersants in the shallow water will increase the likelihood of sub-tidal
shellfish accumulating oil. Large-scale mortality is unlikely, and the shellfish can
eventually clean themselves; however, they will be unmarketable for some time.
Oiling of the tourist facilities will be minimized by dispersant use. If dispersant is
not used the shellfish will be less affected and the oil that lands at the resort can
be cleanedbut there will be loss of tourist revenue for some time. In this case
the use of dispersant is primarily an economic decision. The question to be
answered is which resource is of greatest economic significance? Seasonal
variations may have a bearing when answering this question.
Scenario: rocky shore, with sub-tidal seafood resources (e.g. lobsters) near the shore
Dispersant cleaning of the shore is likely to carry oil into the nearshore water, and
increase the likelihood of the seafood accumulating oil. If the oil is left onshore, oil
may in any case gradually leach into the nearshore waters. The preferred option is
physical removal from the shore or use shoreline cleaning agents that allow oil to
be removed from the water. However, any aggressive cleaning of the shoreline is
likely to carry oil back into nearshore waters with consequent effects.
29
APPLICATION OPTIONS
Ideal spraying systems deliver dispersant uniformly to the slick in a way that
maximizes dispersant-oil mixing and minimizes wind drift. Spray droplet size is a
key variable influencing dispersant effectiveness, with very small droplets being
liable to excessive wind drift. The various dispersant application systems all have
their own advantages and disadvantages, and these are summarized below.
Boat-based systems are relatively cheap and can be fitted to many types of
vessel, but the oil encounter rate is quite low. Studies over the past decade have
shown that the boat encounter rate can be increased by making use of a vessels
2
fire spraying system to apply the dispersant, if proper dispersant spraying gear is
not fitted. In this case however, the dispersant is diluted with water and so is
less effective than systems designed for applying dispersant neat or undiluted.
As slicks are not of uniform thickness, boats need to be directed by spotter
aircraft to areas of thicker oil. Older systems are designed to spray conventional
dispersant or concentrate prediluted into sea water, while recent ones can apply
neat concentrate with sometimes adjustable application dosage rate.
Fixed-wing aircraft based systems allow a rapid response and a high treatment
rate. The lesser payload of small aircraft such as crop sprayers can be offset by
3
their flexibility as they have simple logistics requirements and can operate
from rudimentary runways. However these aircraft may not be readily
available. Larger aircraft, either dedicated or using large tanks in the cargo
space, can apply large quantities of dispersant but are costly and require
considerable operational support.
Helicopter-based systems can operate from a base near the spill and can be
used in confined or inaccessible situations. Helicopters are often readily

available and spray buckets widely held. However treatment rate is typically
4
lower than fixed wing systems.
1. Bow-mounted spraying systems, shown here on these French Navy vessels, can provide an
effective means to apply dispersants
2. ADDSPACK (Airborne Dispersant Delivery System)a spray system which does not
require permanent installation of wing-mounted spray booms
3. Spraying aircraft adapted to apply dispersant for emergency oil response purpose
4. Helicopter demonstrating dispersant spray bucket
30
DISPERSANT USE ON SHORELINES
The use of dispersants on shorelines requires careful consideration of the risks

and benefits.
In general, the use of dispersants should not be regarded as a routine shoreline
clean-up method. Mechanical or manual removal, perhaps aided by water
flushing and shoreline cleaning agents may be a better approach.
In contrast to dispersant use at sea, there is a risk that marine organisms living
close to and on the shore will become exposed to high concentrations of
dispersant, or of dispersed oil. Serious, but localized, effects on marine organisms
have been caused when dispersants have been sprayed into rock pools. Without
dilution, the marine creatures are exposed to high concentrations of dispersant
and dispersed oil for prolonged periods.
There is also the danger that, on some shoreline types, the use of dispersants will
allow the oil to soak into the shoreline. This will be the case when emulsified oil
has drifted ashore. Thick mats of high viscosity emulsion will not soak into most
shorelines. Spraying with dispersant may break the emulsion and the liberated
oilnow containing dispersant and of much lower viscositywill soak in.
It is therefore essential to remove the bulk oil before considering dispersant use.
In some circumstances, it may then be justifiable to spray dispersant onto oil in
the inter-tidal area, just before the incoming tide will disperse it. This might be
the case if the shoreline is a tourist beach that is required to appear clean for
aesthetic and commercial reasons. If dispersants are to be used to clean oiled
rocks or man-made structures within an amenity area, then the dispersant should
be mixed into the oil using scrubbing brushes. This is to ensure good mixing of
oil and dispersant before flushing the mixture with sea water. However, the
consequences of dispersing the oil into very shallow water must be considered.
The dispersed oil concentration may briefly be high enough to affect sensitive
marine organisms and filter-feeding shellfish may ingest it, although they are
most likely to have already been affected by the original oil spill.
Specialized shoreline cleaning agents are now available. These have been specially
formulated to loosen and release oil from shoreline surfaces, without dispersing it.
The oil released from the shore can then be contained in booms and recovered.
These cleaning agents should be considered in preference to dispersants.
31
Use of dispersants should not be regarded as

a routine shoreline clean-up method
CONCLUSIONS
Various advantages and disadvantages of dispersants have been mentioned

throughout this report, and may be summed up as follows. On the positive side,
dispersants allow a rapid response that can be used under a wide range of
weather and sea conditions and this is the most significant advantage over other
response options. Dispersion can reduce damage to those organisms that are
sensitive to oil coating and smothering (e.g. birds, sea otters, and mangroves).
Mousse formation and shoreline contamination can be reduced, and
biodegradation increased.
On the negative side, even with advances in developing better products,
dispersants do not work on all oils and in all conditions. The window of
opportunity for application, though longer than for earlier dispersants, can still
be relatively short in some cases due to natural weathering processes which
progressively render the oil less dispersible. It may not be logistically possible to
treat all the spilled oil before the window of opportunity has passed. Successful
dispersion redistributes oil into the water column, where in some cases with
insufficient dilution it can affect marine organisms, e.g. coral reef organisms, or
be temporarily accumulated by sub-tidal seafood.
These advantages and disadvantages need to be considered with reference to
local conditions during the contingency planning process. Decision making is
not a purely scientific process; it involves balancing a variety of interests. In most
regions it is likely that the dispersant option could offer a net environmental
benefit for some oil spill scenarios.
32
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, FURTHER
READING AND REFERENCES
Acknowledgements
Dr Jenifer Baker carried out the preparation of the first edition of this report
published in 1993. H. Aston, S. Horn, A. Ladousse, D. Lessard and P. Shirt
provided valuable input and the assistance of E. Gilfillan, P. Taylor and the
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) for constructive
comments and for some of the photographs is gratefully acknowledged. Material
for the figures on pages 6, 20, 24 comes respectively from Canevari/NRC (1989),
NRC (1989), McAuliffe et al. (1980, 81) and Gilfillan et al. (1984). Photographs
supplied for the 2nd Edition by AEA Technology, Australian Marine Oil Spill
Centre (AMOSC), Centre de Documentation de Recherche et
dExperimentation sur les pollutions accidentelles des eaux (CEDRE), Oil Spill
Response Limited (OSRL) and the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency
(MCA) are gratefully acknowledged.
The revisions for this second edition (2001) were principally carried out by
F. Merlin (CEDRE) and A. Lewis (Oil Spill Consultant). The IPIECA Oil Spill
Working Groups review team consisting of M. Al-Zayer (Saudi Aramco),
D. Lessard (ExxonMobil), D. ODonovan (Marine Spill Response Corporation),
A. Saeed (Kuwait Petroleum Corporation-Kuwait Oil Company), P. Taylor
(OSRL), J. Thornborough (BP) and S. Seddon-Brown (IPIECA) provided useful
comments and advice. Other valuable feedback was received from H. Parker
(ITOPF), T. Bracher (ChevronTexaco), R. Holten (ChevronTexaco), A. Mearns
(US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA), T. Lunel
(AEA Technology) and D. Blackmore (AMOSC).
Further reading and references
Published Guidelines
Several other guidelines on the use of dispersants are available:
CEDRE and French Institute of Petroleum: Use of Dispersants for Controlling
Offshore Oil Slicks: Field Guide for the treatment of slicks by boat
DEFRA (Department of the Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs), formerly
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) Publications, London, UK:
The approval and use of oil dispersants in the UK
33
ExxonMobil Research & Engineering Company (2000), ExxonMobil Dispersant

Guidelines, Fairfax, NJ.
IMO/UNEP Guidelines on Oil Spill Dispersant Application, including Environmental
Considerations; 1995 edition, International Maritime Organisation, London, UK
Institute of Petroleum (2001), Planning for the Use of Oil Spill Dispersants, London, UK
Scientific papers
A large number of scientific papers on dispersants have been published in various
journals. Papers of specific topics described within this report can be found in
the following references.
Aurand, D. et al. (2001) Ten years of research by the US Oil Industry to evaluate
the ecological issues of dispersant use: an overview of the past decade, Proceedings
of the 2001 International Oil Spill Conference, API, Washington, DC.
Aurand, D. et al. (2001) Goals, Objectives and the Sponsors Perspective on the
Accomplishments of the Chemical Response to oil Spills: Ecological Effects
Research Forum (CROSERF), Proceedings of the 2001 International Oil Spill
Conference, API, Washington, DC,
Aurand, D. et al. (2001) Ecological risk assessment principles applied to oil spill
response planning, Proceedings of the 2001 International Oil Spill Conference, API,
Washington, DC.
Baker, J. M. et al. (1984) Comparison of the fate and ecological effects of
dispersed and non-dispersed oil in a variety of inter-tidal habitats. In Oil Spill
Chemical Dispersants: Research, Experience and Recommendations, STP 840.
T. E. Allen, ed., American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia,
p 239279.
Ballou, T. G. et al. (1989) Effects of untreated and chemically dispersed oil on
tropical marine communities: a long-term field experiment. Proceedings 1989 Oil
Spill Conference, API Publication Number 4479, American Petroleum Institute,
Washington, DC, p 447454.
Bonn Agreement (1988) Position Paper on Dispersants. Bonn Agreement, New
Court, 48 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JE.
Etkin, D.S. (1999) Oil Spill Dispersants: From Technology to Policy, Cutter
Information Corp., Arlington, MA.
Fuller, C. and Bonner, J. S. (2001) Comparative toxicity of oil, dispersant and
dispersed oil to Texas marine species, Proceedings of the 2001 International Oil Spill
Conference, API, Washington, DC.
34
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, FURTHER READING AND REFERENCES
Fuller, C. et al. (1999) Comparative toxicity of simulated beach sediments

impacted with both whole and chemical dispersions of weathered Arabian
medium crude oil. Proceedings of the 22nd Arctic and Marine Oil Spill Programme
Technical Seminar, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, p 659670.
Gilfillan, E. S. et al. (1983) Effect of spills of dispersed and non-dispersed oil on
inter-tidal infaunal community structure. Proceedings 1983 Oil Spill Conference,
API Publication Number 4356. American Petroleum Institute, Washington, DC,
p 457463.
Gilfillan, E. S. et al. (1984) Effects of test spills of chemically dispersed and nondispersed oil on the activity of aspartate amino-transferase and glucose-6phosphate dehydrogenase in two inter-tidal bivalves, Mya arenaria and Mytilus
edulis. In Oil Spill Chemical Dispersants: Research, Experience and Recommendations,
STP 840. T. E. Allen, Ed., American Society for Testing and Materials,
Philadelphia. p 299313.
IPIECA (1992) Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs. IPIECA Report
Series, Volume 3. International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association, London.
IPIECA (2000) Choosing Spill Response Options to Minimize DamageNet
Environmental Benefit Analysis. IPIECA Report Series, Volume 10. International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, London.
ITOPF (1987) Response to Marine Oil Spills. International Tanker Owners
Pollution Federation Ltd., London. Pub. Witherby and Co., London
(ISBN 0 948691 51 4).
Lai, H. C. and Feng, M. C. (1985) Field and laboratory studies on the toxicity of
oils to mangroves. Proceedings 1985 Oil Spill Conference, API Publication
No. 4385, American Petroleum Institute, Washington DC, p 539546.
LeGore, S. et al. (1989) Effect of chemically dispersed oil on Arabian Gulf corals:
a field experiment. Proceedings 1989 Oil Spill Conference, API Publication
Lessard, R.R. and DeMarco, G. (2000) The Significance of Oil Spill Dispersants,
Spill Science and Technology Bulletin, Vol. 6, No.1, pp 5968, Elsevier Science
Ltd., UK.
Lewis, A. and Aurand, D. (1997) Putting Dispersants to Work: Overcoming
Obstacles, API Publication Number 4562A, Washington, DC.
Lunel, T. et al. (1997) The net environmental benefit of a successful dispersant
operation at the Sea Empress incident, Proceedings of the 1997 International Oil Spill
35
Lunel T. and Lewis A. Optimisation of Oil Spill Dispersant Use. Proceedings of

the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference, Seattle, 187193, 1999.
Merlin, F. et al. (1989) Optimisation of dispersant application especially by ship.
Proceedings of the 1989 International Oil Spill Conference, API, Washington, DC.
Merlin, F. et al. (1991) Towards a French Approval Procedure for the Use of
Dispersants in Inland Waters. Proceedings of the 1991 International Oil Spill
McAuliffe, C. D. et al. (1980) Dispersion and weathering of chemically treated
crude oils on the ocean. Environ. Sci. Technol. 14, p 15091518.
McAuliffe, C. D. et al. (1981) The 1979 southern California dispersant treated
research oil spills. Proceedings 1981 Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum
Institute, Washington DC, p 269282.
National Research Council (1989) Using Oil Spill Dispersants on the Sea. National
Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Page, D. S. et al. (1983) Long-term fate of dispersed and undispersed crude oil in
two nearshore test spills. Proceedings 1983 Oil Spill Conference, API Publication
Singer, M. M. et al. (2001) Acute effects of fresh versus weathered oil to marine
organisms: Californian findings, Proceedings of the 2001 International Oil Spill
SEEEC (1998) The Environmental Impact of the Sea Empress Oil Spill. The
Stationery Office, London
Sergy, G. A. and Blackall, P. J. (1987) Design and conclusions of the Baffin
Island oil spill project. Arctic Vol. 40, Supplement 1, p 1-9.
36

including: oil spill preparedness and response; global climate change; operational
issues; and biodiversity.
Company Members
Association Members
Amerada Hess
American Petroleum Institute (API)
BHP Billiton
Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP)
Bitor
Canadian Association of Petroleum

Producers (CAPP)
BP
British Gas
ChevronTexaco
Conoco
ENI
Enterprise Oil
Canadian Petroleum Products Institute

(CPPI)
CONCAWE
European Petroleum Industry Association
(EUROPIA)
Exxon Mobil
Gulf Area Oil Companies Mutual Aid

Organisation (GAOCMAO)
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
Institut Franais du Ptrole (IFP)
Maersk Olie og Gas
International Association of Oil & Gas

Producers (OGP)
Marathon Oil
Metasource Pty Ltd (WOODSIDE)
Nexen
Pertamina
Petroleum Development of Oman
Petronas
Saudi Aramco
Shell
STATOIL
TOTALFINAELF
Unocal
Oil Companies International Marine Forum

(OCIMF)
Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ)
Regional Association of Oil and Natural
Gas Companies in Latin America
and the Caribbean (ARPEL)
South African Oil Industry Environment
Committee (SAOIEC)
IPIECA

2nd Floor, Monmouth House, 8793 Westbourne Grove, London W2 4UL
IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME TWO
A GUIDE TO
FOR OIL SPILLS ON WATER
2nd edition, March 2000
IPIECA
IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME TWO
A GUIDE TO
FOR OIL SPILLS ON WATER
2nd edition, March 2000
IPIECA

CONTENTS
PREFACE
PREFACE
This report is one of a series commissioned by the International Petroleum Industry
INTRODUCTION
collective contribution to the global discussion on oil spill preparedness and response. The
THE TIERED RESPONSE
COOPERATION WITH
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), representing the IPIECA members

report series forms one of the key elements of IPIECAs global education programme, which is
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
10
INFORMATION
aimed at both industry and governments.

This contingency planning report was initially produced in 1991 in the wake of major
incidents in 198990 and ensuing industry reviews of oil spill preparedness. This version
updates the 1991 publication in the light of lessons learnt from oil spills through the 1990s. It
also takes into account the effect of increasing ratification amongst maritime nations of the
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990 (the
GATHERING AND RISK
OPRC Convention). Although there has been a significant drop in the number of major tanker
ASSESSMENT
spills through the 1990s, developing effective oil spill contingency plans remains a very
important goal for industry and governments.
15
SENSITIVITY MAPPING OF
In preparing these reportswhich represent a consensus of membership viewsIPIECA has
THE ENVIRONMENT AT
been guided by a set of principles that it would encourage every organization associated with the
RISK
transportation, handling and storage of oil to consider:

It is of paramount importance to concentrate on preventing spills. In practical terms, this
17
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
19
PLANNING FOR
RESPONSE OPTIONS TO
MINIMIZE DAMAGE
requires that operating procedures should stress the high priority senior management
gives to preventing spills.
Despite the best efforts of individual organizations, some spills will still occur and will
affect the local environment.

Response to spills should seek to minimize the severity of the environmental and socio-
economic damage and to hasten the recovery of any damaged ecosystem.

20
EQUIPMENT AND
SUPPLIES
The response should always seek to complement and make use of natural forces to the
fullest extent practicable.

Recognizing the inevitability of future spills, senior management should also give high
21
RECOVERED OIL AND
priority to developing contingency plans that will ensure prompt response to mitigate the
DEBRIS MANAGEMENT
adverse effect of any spills.
MANAGEMENT,
These should be trained and maintained to a high degree of preparedness. Plans should be
TRAINING, EXERCISES
sufficiently flexible to provide a response appropriate to the nature of the operation, the size of
AND PLAN REVIEW
the spill, local geography and climate. Drills are required to familiarize personnel in oil spill
Personnel and equipment must be identified and established to support contingency plans.
22
management and mitigation techniques. Such exercises will provide the means of testing
25
27
28
APPENDIX ONE
Preparing a contingency plan
APPENDIX TWO
Functional responsibilities in the
response organization
APPENDIX THREE
Follow-up further reading
contingency plans and they should be carried out in conjunction with representatives from all
stakeholders for greatest effect. This will help ensure that all resources available will be brought
to bear in the response.
The potential efficiencies of cooperative and joint ventures for oil spill response should be
recognized. Cooperative facilities and any mutual support agreements should be included in
exercise programmes to ensure their effective integration into response efforts.
Close cooperation between industry and national administrations in contingency planning
will ensure the maximum degree of coordination and understanding. When all involved parties
work together there will be the greatest likelihood of achieving the key objective of mitigating
potential damage.
INTRODUCTION
The movement of oil from the dominant production centres of the world to the
worldwide market is achieved primarily by the use of tankers and pipelines. The
global pattern of marine transport is well established as shown in Figure 1. The risks
posed by oil transportation lead governments, oil companies and ship owners alike
to recognize the need to have in place an effective and tested crisis management
capability. Oil spill response planning is one facet of that activity.
An oil spill contingency plan should comprise three parts:
a strategy section, which should describe the scope of the plan, including the
geographical coverage, perceived risks, roles/responsibilities of those charged
with implementing the plan and the proposed response strategy;
an action and operations section, which should set out the emergency procedures
that will allow rapid assessment of the spill and mobilization of appropriate
response resources;
a data directory, which should contain all relevant maps, resource lists and data
sheets required to support an oil spill response effort and conduct the
response according to an agreed strategy.
This guide is offered by IPIECA to assist industry and governments in the

preparation of such plans. It focuses on oil spills on water, primarily from ships, but
also contains information relevant to spills from exploration and production
activities. Useful technical companions to this publication are listed in Appendix 3.
Figure 1
Pattern of major marine oil transportation
A GUIDE TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OIL SPILLS ON WATER
It is widely accepted that those countries and companies that have a properly
developed contingency plan are better prepared to deal with an oil spill
emergency than those that do not. The potential benefits of contingency
planning include:
more effective and efficient response to an incident by using and developing

appropriate response strategies with the aim of reducing ecological, economic
and amenity damage and subsequent compensation claims;
clear reaffirmation of business/governmental environmental priorities;
improving the public and media understanding of industrys efforts to be a

positive force in the protection of the environment.
The preferred industry approach to oil spill contingency planning tackles three
main issues:
1. To enable effective escalation of a response to changing circumstances
companies should develop plans based on the tiered response as described in
this report.
2. Maximum credible and most likely case scenarios should be identified, based
on a risk analysis of the geographic area covered by the plan.
3. A cooperative approach by all parties concerned is essential in ensuring an
effective response. When developing plans companies should seek the
cooperation of those who share the risk and those who will participate in the
response by integrating their plans with those of national authorities and
industry partners.
Figure 2 summarizes the contingency planning process indicating which
information should be gathered, then interpreted and developed into appropriate
Figure 2
The contingency planning process
Information gathering
Risk assessment
oil properties
current and wind data
sea conditions
movements and fate
historic data
Environment at risk
ecological
industrial
amenity
sensitivity maps
strategies, towards the final outcome of operational procedures. This report will
provide guidance and explanations concerning the steps in this process.
Strategy development
Strategy options
NEBA
(see page 19)
Spill scenarios
Tiered response
Priorities
Response objectives
Liaison, training, exercising and updating are essential
Operational plan
Organization
Responsibilities
Communication
reporting
assessment
mobilization
documentation
Resources
Waste plan
Review
Updating
THE TIERED RESPONSE
The size, location and timing of an oil

spill are unpredictable. Spills can arise
from oil loading, unloading or pipeline
Tier
three
large
spill
operations, and from a collision or

grounding of vessels carrying crude oil
and products in local ports or coastal
Tier
two
medium
spill
waters. They can also arise from

tankers or barges operating on inland
small
spill
Tier
one
waterways, or from exploration and

production operations and tankers
operating in international waters.
local
vicinity
remote
proximity to operations
Oil spill risks and the responses they require should be classified according to the size
of spill and its proximity to a companys operating facilities. This leads to the concept
of Tiered Response to oil spills. A company should seek to develop response
capability in a way that allows it to be escalated as required for each incident.
A contingency plan should cover each Tier and be directly related to the
companys potential spill scenarios. The amount of equipment and trained
personnel identified at each Tier will vary for each operation, depending on a
variety of factors such as the risk, location, oil type and environmental or socioeconomic sensitivities under threat.
Figure 3
The Tiered response
Tier 1: operational-type spills that may occur
at or near a companys own facilities, as a
consequence of its own activities. An
individual company would typically provide
resources to respond to this type of spill.
Tier 2: a larger spill in the vicinity of a
companys facilities where resources from
other companies, industries and possibly
government response agencies in the area can
be called in on a mutual aid basis. The
company may participate in a local
cooperative where each member pools their
Tier 1 resources and has access to any
equipment that may have been jointly
purchased by a cooperative.
Tier 3: the large spill where substantial
further resources will be required and
support from a national (Tier 3) or
international cooperative stockpile may be
necessary. It is likely that such operations
would be subject to government controls or
even direction. (It is important to recognize
that a spill which could require a Tier 3
response may be close to, or remote from,
company facilities.)
Tier 1
Small local spills
This should cover operations at
company-owned, operated (or shared)
facilities where events are largely
controlled by the companys operating
procedures, and personnel and
equipment can be made available to
respond immediately to an on-site
incident. Such an incident would
generally be associated with ship
transfer or bunkering operations at a
Tier 1 spills typically occur at a jetty, pier or

mooring, or near waterside storage tanks.
jetty, pier or mooring, and around
Near right: Tier 2 responses will have to

deal with spills where the company has
limited control of events and is beyond Tier 1
capabilities
Far right: Tier 3 spills will result typically
from major incidents at sea, such as those
from tankers and offshore platforms.
waterside storage tanks. The contingency plan should recognize the need for the
local operators to control events and to establish a rapid response capability
aimed at quickly containing and, if possible, recovering the spill. If this is
achieved there will be no need to involve other parties apart from meeting legal,
reporting or alerting requirements.
Tier 2
Medium spills that may be local or at some distance from operational centres
This will cover company operations at their own facilities and within public or
multi-user facilities where a company has limited control of events and the
physical area of the spill is larger than in the Tier 1 case. The risks here would
typically be associated with shipping accidents in ports or harbours, in estuaries
or coastal waters, but could also be from pipelines, tank failures or nearshore
exploration and production operations. Other users/operators of the facility
should recognize that they run similar risks and be encouraged to join in
establishing an oil spill plan and response capability. As public amenities might
be threatened, local government services and agencies may act as the principal
coordination and control agency. The contingency plan should carefully define
the conceptual response capability, the roles and responsibilities of the various
parties, the scope of the plan and procedures for escalating the response to the
Tier 3 level.
Tier 3
Large spills which may exceed national boundaries
This will cover major incidents, the scale and scope of which is beyond the
capabilities of the Tier 2 response.
Typically Tier 3 plans cover larger oil spills at sea where the operating company
may not have any capability to deploy resources immediately and government
takes the leading role.
The oil spilled may have an impact on the property or operations of the
company, or occur near a company installation and be too large for the
THE TIERED RESPONSE
company to handle alone. Equally, it might be very remote from all companyowned or -operated resources. The likelihood of such incidents may be low but
pollution damage can be considerable and coastlines over a wide area are
potentially at risk.
The contingency plan should aim to access and mobilize local, national and
international resources (from regional stockpiles and elsewhere) quickly and
efficiently. Because such incidents often become high profile and politically
sensitive, the Tier 3 plan will most probably form part of a National Emergency
Plan headed by an appropriate national agency or government department. The
contingency plan must identify the agreed role for all participants within that
National Emergency Plan.
In actual incidents, spills do not always fall into convenient categories and the
boundaries between Tiers will inevitably be blurred. It is, therefore, important to
be prepared to involve the next highest Tier from the earliest moments. It is
easier to stand down an alerted system than to try to escalate a response by
calling up unprepared reserves at a late stage.
International resources
International or regional capabilities established by industry or government
Governments have recognized the serious threat posed by Tier 3 spills and the
potential requirement for international assistance to help mitigate the
consequences. Mutual support for Tier 3 incidents, with the associated ability to
enhance national capability across political boundaries, is a basic tenet of the
OPRC Convention.
Against this background, industry has established and funds a network of Tier 3
Centres. The use of these Centres is explained in a joint briefing paper prepared
by IPIECA and the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd.
(ITOPF). It is important that local industry is aware of these Centres and
incorporates them into their plans where appropriate. Equally, governments
should be aware of the need to facilitate customs and immigration procedures to
allow any international resources to be mobilized effectively.
COOPERATION WITH
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Government policies on responding to oil spills vary from nation to nation.

Governments are encouraged to ratify the IMO International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990 (the OPRC Convention) and
develop their own laws and procedures for preparing for, and responding to oil
spills. These should be encompassed within a national oil spill contingency plan,
under the auspices of an agreed national authority. It is crucial that industry
works with governments to develop a clear, common interpretation of the
national requirements and the responsibilities foreseen for government agencies,
industry and others.
If governmental authorities assume command, this could greatly assist
mobilization of national resources and help resolve the possible conflict of
interests. In a port or harbour spill, the Port Authority might be best placed to
control the response. In the case of a major spill, the national authorities might
be best placed to take overall control, using their existing organization and
support. There is a clear relationship here to the concept of tiered response, as
command and control may change as an incident escalates. There needs to be
absolute clarity within both government and industry plans as to who are
responsible for which actions under all situations. Joint exercises are the best
means of testing the roles and expectations of the involved parties.
Government agencies must be consulted at an early stage and encouraged to
participate in the development of contingency plansfor example, by acting on a
consultative committee and accepting specific responsibilities in the management
of an emergency. The understanding and relationships thus developed will pay
dividends in times of crisis. Where feasible, governments and private business
should be encouraged to purchase oil spill equipment for strategic deployment,
e.g. for the protection of defined areas of sensitivity such as ecologically
important habitats and recreation areas, as well as water intakes of power
stations, desalination plants, refineries and other important utilities.
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation, 1990
In the wake of global concerns in the late 1980s, the IMOs Marine Environment
Protection Committee developed this Convention to provide a framework for
international cooperation for combating major oil pollution incidents, taking
COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
into account the experience gained within existing regional arrangements dealing
with these matters. The Convention has the following key elements at its heart:
precautionary and preventative measures are important in the avoidance of
Table 1: the parties involved

Parties to be consulted in the
development of contingency plans
oil pollution in the first instance;
national government agencies
prompt and effective action is essential to minimize possible damages in the
local government agencies
event of pollution;
port authorities
contingency planning needs to be emphasized and the role of the oil and
coastal authorities
shipping industries should be included within these plans;
emergency services
the need for mutual assistance, international cooperation and information
other oil companies
exchange (on response capabilities and reporting incidents);
contractors
the polluter pays principle; and
environmental organizations
the importance of related international instruments on liability and
local communities
compensation, including the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC)

Interests to be reconciled in a major
shipping incident
and the 1992 Fund Convention.
ship owner and insurers

(e.g. P&I Clubs)
administrative and technical aspects. In summary, these call for Parties to carry
cargo owner
out the following actions in relation to oil spill contingency planning:
other oil companies
The OPRC Convention has 19 Articles and 10 Resolutions covering both
salvor
ships, ports and oil industry facilities posing a risk of oil spills should have oil
local authorities
pollution emergency plans, under the coordination of a national contingency
national authorities
plan for major incidents;
environmental organizations
there should be clear oil pollution reporting procedures;
flag state authorities
reports of oil pollution should be properly assessed and all States whose
media
interests may be affected informed;
national and regional systems for preparedness and response should be

developed, including the designation of competent national authorities and
the compilation of national contingency plans;
provision should be made for the supply of technical support and equipment
to Parties requesting assistance to combat spills;
the necessary legal and administrative measures should be taken to facilitate

customs and immigration procedures in an emergency, where outside
assistance has been mobilized;
technical cooperation between Parties should be active in the fields of

training, planning, research and development; and
Parties should work together with the oil and shipping industries to establish
suitable pollution combating equipment stockpiles and training programmes.
The IMO is able to supply the OPRC Convention text and a current list of
signatories; the latter can be accessed through their Web site (www.imo.org).
INFORMATION GATHERING AND

RISK ASSESSMENT
The consequences of a spill in a specific location are easy to imagine if one

considers the well-documented experiences of other incidents. If the oil is
persistent and does not rapidly evaporate or disperse and comes ashore, the
implication in terms of clean-up effort, ecological and economic consequences,
and the loss of business and reputation, can be considerable. Fish and bird
breeding grounds and sensitive areas such as salt marshes, estuaries, coral reefs
and mangroves are environmental areas justifying high priority in defensive
actions. Commercial resources requiring priority protection include industrial
plants with seawater intakes, ports and harbours, fisheries, mariculture and
tourist facilities.
Historic data, oil properties, climate, local meteorology and environmental
sensitivities are important factors in assessing the risk, behaviour, fate and
potential consequences of spilled oil. Organizations producing contingency plans
need to collate information about these factors in order to develop appropriate
response strategies to best mitigate the threat posed by oil pollution.
Historic data
Many assessments have been made of the quantities of oil entering the marine
environment but all recognize the relatively small contribution arising from
tanker incidents. The results of an assessment by the US Academy of Sciences
are shown in Figure 4.
atmosphere
9%
tanker
accidents
12%
natural
sources
7%
exploration
production
2%
The goal for any company should be to conduct its operations without oil spills,
but, despite best efforts, they will happen and companies need to be prepared.
The analysis of oil spill scenarios to which a company might be exposed will
define what happens to any spilled oil, what resources are at risk and what
damage might be done to those resources.
The data in Figure 5, provided by ITOPF, indicates the prime causes of spills
during 197498 as a function of spill size, cause and product carried.
vessel
operations
33%
industrial
discharge and
urban run-off
37%
Figure 4
Major inputs of petroleum to the marine
environment.
In this 25-year period 1,332 accidents were recorded by ITOPF involving the
loss of more than 7 tonnes (~50bbls) of oil. These global data include only 17
spills greater than 50,000 tonnes (~375,000bbls). There were many spills of less
than 7 tonnes.
10
INFORMATION GATHERING AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Oil spills (197498)

Percentage of spills involving oil types
unknown
29%
Major causes (all spills)
bitumen bilges
lube oil
1% 3%
3% tank washing
4%
white product
7%
loading/
discharging
34%
fires and explosions

2%
Major causes (spills < 7 tonnes)
collisions
5%
bunkering
6%
groundings
6%
other
27%
Major causes (spills 7700 tonnes)
loading/
discharging
28%
other
routine
operations
15%
other routine
operations
13%
fuel oil
(cargo)
15%
bunkering
2%
hull failures
7%
hull
failures
7%
fuel oil
(bunkers)
10%
crude
27%
loading/
discharging
35%
collisions fires and explosions

2% 2%
groundings
3%
bunkering
7%
other
29%
Major causes (spills >700 tonnes)

2%
other routine operations
5%
hull failures
7%
loading/
discharging
6%
groundings
35%

6%
other
11%
other
15%
hull failures
13%
collisions
22%
groundings
19%
Figure 5
Petroleum products in oil spills and
causes of spills, 197498.
collisions
29%
The historical experience is that major spills from exploration and production
operations are far less common than those from oil tankers.
Oil spills can happen almost anywhere and at any time, and the contingency plan
should recognize this. There is no miracle cure and a major near-shore spill from
a tanker will usually have a severe impact on shorelines, unless winds and
currents carry the oil out to sea where it can disperse and degrade naturally.
There is an ongoing need to help the public, politicians, media and others to
understand the problems of combating oil at sea. It is also important for them to
appreciate that industry and government agencies are constantly reappraising
equipment and material resources. This process of communication should also
emphasize that investment in larger stockpiles will not necessarily result in any
marked reduction in the impact of oil on the shoreline, which is the most
important aspect of oil pollution incidents.
This is particularly true of large instantaneous releases from tankers. The
statistics indicate that major oil spill accidents are exceptional, and it is
11
impossible to predict either where and when the next one may occur or the
Table 2: factors affecting risk
problems that it will create. It would be unrealistic to believe that as a result of
type of oil/product
lessons learnt from previous spills, it will be possible to clean up any future spill
geographic location
within a few hours and thereby prevent any environmental impact. However,
weather
there are geographical areas that can be identified as being at higher risk and
sea conditions
these areas must be emphasized when developing a contingency plan.
coastline
vigilance
volume of traffic
time of day
navigation hazards
war
terminal design
condition of facilities
Table 2 indicates the factors that planners should consider when assessing their
legislation
spill risk and Table 3 shows how estimations can be made of credible releases
quality of shipping/vessel types
from collisions or groundings. This type of approach can help identify the
types of operation
necessary response capability at Tiers 1, 2 and 3.
quantities handled
frequency of handling
Oil properties
training programmes
The base properties of an oil will determine the physical and chemical changes
Those responsible for contingency planning will use the information from risk
assessment along with information about technical resources, social, economic
and political values, and control and response options to determine what action
to recommend or take to reduce the risk.
that occur when it is spilled onto water and will account for its persistence and
toxicity. It is recommended that organizations prepare a list of the properties of
oils commonly traded in their area or produced from exploration and production
operations. They should be aware of their probable behaviour on water and the
implications regarding the effectiveness of different types of on-water recovery
devices (skimmers) and chemical dispersants. Table 4 indicates the important
properties and gives some generic examples.
Many oils have a tendency to incorporate seawater and form a water-in-oil
emulsion, which can increase the volume by a factor of three or four, and the
viscosity by several orders of magnitude. Oils with asphaltene contents greater
than 0.5 per cent tend to form stable emulsions, called chocolate mousse,
which are particularly difficult to handle.
Table 3: impact of tanker size on credible spill potential (tonnes)

Note on Table 3:
Tankers have a series of wing and centre
tanks that run along the length of the vessel.
These carry either cargo or ballast. Modern
vessels have narrow wing tanks and a wider
centre tank so that, in the event of a
collision, the oil spill is limited Many tankers
are double-hulled which offers protection of
the cargo spaces in the event that the outer
hull is breached. However it will not prevent
oil spillage if the inner hull is also breached.
typical tonnage
(dead-weight)
slight grounding
or collision
(one wing tank)
30,000
50,000
70,000
100,000
200,000
240,000
700
1,100
3000
5,500
10,500
15,000
12
grounding with
rupture (two wing
plus one centre tank)
3,000
5,000
12,500
21,000
45,000
60,000
bunker
fuel
450
750
1,800
2,300
2,750
4,000
INFORMATION GATHERING AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Table 4: characteristics of different oil types

oil type
density (kg/l)
at 15C
viscosity
mPas at 20C
pour point
C
flash point
C
crude oil
gasoline
kerosene
jet fuel
diesel oil
light fuel oil,
IFO 60
medium fuel oil,
IFO 180
heavy fuel oil,
IFO 380
0.80.95
0.700.78
0.8
0.8
0.85
1100
0.5
2
1.52
5
+10 to -35
na
<-40
<-40
-5 to -30
variable
<0
3860
3860
>55
0.9
60 at 50C
+50 to -20
>60
0.9
180 at 50C
+30 to -20
>60
0.99
380 at 50C
+30 to -20
>60
Current and wind data

Apart from spreading, which causes the oil to cover a progressively larger area,
the slick moves at about the speed of surface currents and at about 3 percent of
wind speedthe resultant movement being a vector sum of the two (see Figure
6). A spill is likely to spread until an average thickness of about 0.1mm (ranging
from 100nm to 10mm) is reached. At this stage the oil breaks up into strands of
varying thickness called windrows which are aligned to the wind direction and become
patchy. Local current data and weather forecasts will assist in determining oil spill
response strategies and allow prediction of the slicks movement. Information about
tides, water currents and wind distribution can be obtained from official agencies and
commercial organizations. In addition, experience has proved that similar information
from local fishermen and watermen can be invaluable. In practice, predicted oil
slick trajectories may be used to identify the time available to protect sensitive
resources and to help develop feasible personnel and equipment mobilization times.
3%
win
d2
0k
not
Figure 6
The influence of 3 per cent of the wind
speed combined with 100 per cent of the
current speed results in the movement of
oil from A to B.
t at 2.08
men
oil move
knots
100%
current 2 knots
13
Sea conditions
Sea conditions influence the behaviour of spilled oil and determine the
effectiveness of response techniques. For example, a rough sea assists in the
dispersal of the oil, whether naturally or chemically induced, but makes the
mechanical containment and recovery of oil difficult. Data about prevailing
winds, sea states and temperature (with its bearing on oil viscosity) should be
available to planners.
Computer trajectory modelling
Various organizations and companies have developed oil spill computer models;
they can provide valuable support to both contingency planners and pollution
response teams. It should be mentioned that though their use may be desirable
such models are not essential for effective planning and response. The models
are able to make predictions about the trajectory and fate of spilled oil. In the
planning stage numerous modelling runs based on historical weather data
(stochastic modelling) may be performed to generate the likelihood of sensitive
resources being threatened and associated timescales. This can influence
decisions concerning strategy development and the identification of necessary
response capability.
The operation of all computer models requires trained personnel. It is very
important that users of these models understand their various limitations, such as
the quality of information on water currents programmed into a model and the
inherent difficulties in predicting some oil fate processes (e.g. emulsification).
Modelling is only a predictive tool and cannot readily replace the need to
monitor a spill physically in the event of an actual incident. This can be done
effectively only from aircraft, by personnel fully trained in the interpretation of
visual observations of oil on water.
14
SENSITIVITY MAPPING OF THE ENVIRONMENT AT RISK
SENSITIVITY MAPPING OF THE

ENVIRONMENT AT RISK
Making and updating sensitivity maps are key activities in the planning process.
These maps convey essential information to spill responders by showing where
Table 5: examples of areas of

special value to be identified
the different coastal resources are and by indicating environmentally sensitive

areas. The making of a map involves assembling information on commercial,
ecological and recreational resources and deciding what guidelines for spill
response may be included. Mapping may be either paper based or link into a
geographic information system (GIS) to provide a comprehensive tool to advise
and support decision makers. A wide range of contingency planning information
can be included within a GIS (e.g. equipment stockpiles, environmental
sensitivities, response procedures, trajectory modelling etc.), but care has to be
taken to avoid paper maps becoming too cluttered and difficult to interpret. The
IMO/IPIECA Report Series Volume One, Sensitivity Mapping for Oil Spill
Ecological: coral reefs; saltmarshes;

estuaries; fish spawning areas;
bird breeding/feeding and roosting
areas; mangrove stands; seagrass beds
Recreational: tourist areas;
bathing beaches; marinas; watersports
Commercial: water intakes;
shipyards/ports; fish farms;
other mariculture
Response, gives guidance on this subject.

A desirable way to categorize beaches is by typefor instance, cliffs, rocks,
boulders, cobbles, pebbles, shingle, sand, mud-flats, swamps, marshes and
estuaries. The maps could show the agreed response tactics for each zone.
Priorities for protection should be agreed with the involved administrations and
agencies. Maps can then be annotated to show the priority level attributed to
each zone. Authorized access points and possible temporary storage areas may
also be identified on the maps.
15
Vulnerable shore features: mangrove

swamps (under rehabilitation, below left);
and a coastal amenity resort (below right).
Vulnerability index of shores

(in order of increasing vulnerability to oil spill
damage, after Gundlach and Hayes 1978)
1. Exposed rocky headlands
Wave reflection keeps most of the oil

offshore. No clean-up necessary.
2. Eroding wave-cut platforms
Wave swept. Most oil removed by natural

processes within weeks.
3. Fine-grained sand beaches
Oil does not usually penetrate into the

sediment, facilitating mechanical removal if
necessary. Otherwise oil may persist several
months. (some evidence suggests that
penetration can occur, depending on watertable movements in sediments.)
4. Coarse-grained beaches
Oil may sink and/or be buried rapidly,

making clean-up difficult. Under moderate to
high-energy conditions, oil will be removed
naturally from most of the beachface.
5. Exposed compacted tidal flats
Most oil will not adhere to, nor penetrate into,

the compacted tidal flat. Clean-up is usually
unnecessary.
6. Mixed sand and gravel beaches
Oil may penetrate the beach rapidly and

become buried. Under moderate to lowenergy conditions, oil may persist for years.
7. Gravel beaches
Same as above. Clean-up should concentrate

on high-tide/swash area. A solid asphalt
pavement may form under heavy oil
accumulations.
8. Sheltered rocky coasts
Areas of reduced wave action. Oil may persist

for many years. Clean-up is not recommended
unless oil concentration is very heavy.
9. Sheltered tidal flats
Areas of great biological activity and low

wave energy. A number of interpretations of
the biological activity are possible. In this
case, it is taken to mean a combination of
high productivity, biomass and possibly
bioturbation. Oil may persist for years. Cleanup is not recommended unless oil
accumulation is very heavy. These areas
should receive priority protection by using
booms or oil-absorbing materials.
10. Salt marshes/mangroves
Most productive of aquatic environments. Oil

may persist for years. Cleaning of salt marshes
by burning or cutting should be undertaken
only if heavily soiled. Protection of these
environments by booms or absorbing material
should receive first priority.
16
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Having defined a range of oil spill scenarios, consideration should be given to

viable response strategies (e.g. monitoring and evaluation, containment and
recovery, dispersants, shoreline clean-up and in-situ burning). These may have to
be adaptable to different locations, under different conditions and at varying
times of the yearand must be established in consultation with the relevant
authorities and stakeholders.
The realities of the situation and the limitations of techniques and equipment
must be well understood. When spilled, most oils dissipate quickly through the
natural processes of evaporation, dissolution and dispersion. Depending on the
temperature and sea conditions and the volume of the spill, light products will,
under favourable conditions, virtually disappear from the sea surface within 12
days, light crudes within 25 days and medium crudes within 510 days. Heavy
or waxy crudes and heavy oil products persist for much longer periods but are
still naturally dissipated over time.
When oil is spilled close to land, or when currents and wind would bring it
inshore, an active response may be necessary. It is important however, to
recognize that there are instances when a choice of no active response other
than monitoring and evaluation might be the most appropriate response. This
could be a spill in mid-ocean or of a very light, volatile oil. In this situation it
Figure 7
A spill of typical medium crude oil onto
water will follow a certain pattern. The line
length denotes the duration of each stage;
line thickness denotes the most critical phase
of each stage.
spread
drift
evaporation
dissolution
dispersion
emulsification
sedimentation
biodegradation
photo-oxidation
0
1 hour
10 hours day
week
month
17
year
will still be necessary to notify local authorities and to alert response

organizations. The spill should always be carefully monitored using aircraft
whilst in remains on the sea.
Spills occurring at exploration and production facilities have a known position;
the flow rate and oil characteristics may also be known. This should enable
reasonable predictions of the oil movement and natural dissipation to be made.
The selection of the appropriate clean-up response should also be simpler.
The effectiveness of the response using modern equipment varies with sea and
weather conditions. A range of boom, skimmer and dispersant spray systems is
available which, under certain conditions, can contain and recover or assist in
dispersing a proportion of an oil spill. This may be a significant percentage if the
spill is small, or if conditions are favourable.
In rougher conditions, booms are less effective and if deployment is not possible
immediately, the spill may have spread too far to be contained at sea. In the case
of a larger spill, it is often impossible to assemble and deploy sufficient
equipment quickly enough to significantly influence the fate of the oil. If the spill
then threatens a shoreline, the response strategy must become defensive. This
may involve protecting critical coastal resources and preparing for beach cleanup operations. Lighter, more volatile oils may be susceptible to ignition
immediately after being spilled. These characteristics will favour in-situ
burninga response option with the potential to remove substantial quantities
of oil from the sea surface, but which will also produce copious black smoke and
a small amount of persistent residue. The associated safety and environmental
risks must be carefully evaluated alongside operational limitations and associated
approvals, as is the case for all response options.
Figure 8
Processes following a spill
shoreline
oil/water emulsion
formation (mousse)
photooxidation
evaporation
aerosol
formation
spreading
release
dissolution
dispersion
penetration
ingestion by
animal life
biodegradation
uptake and release from sediment
18
sorption
PLANNING FOR RESPONSE OPTIONS TO

MINIMIZE DAMAGE
Ecological, recreational and commercial concerns should be carefully balanced,

and the consequences of applying or not applying a particular strategy or technique
should be fully understood by all parties. This balancing process should aim to
achieve maximum benefit for the environment overall and should take account of
varying priorities and concerns in a given location. The process has been described
as net environmental benefit analysis (NEBA) and provides a framework for
science based planning away from the emotive atmosphere prevalent at the time of
spills. However, conflicts do occur in this process; common sense and consensus
forming are important requirements. Ultimately some value judgements may be
needed as to the relative values of threatened resources.
Through the adoption of NEBA, all stakeholders in contingency planning should
be able to understand the reasons why certain strategies are being proposed. NEBA
uses natural clean-up (i.e. no intervention) as the benchmark against which to judge
response actions. If the use of invasive clean-up techniques on remote shorelines is
not going to bring meaningful socio-economic benefits and exacerbate the
ecological damage, then serious consideration should be given to its validity.
The application of chemical dispersants to enhance natural dispersion may be
regarded as a negative option if viewed in isolation. Observers may focus on the use
of dispersants as adding further chemical pollutant and exposing underwater marine
life to oil and dispersant mixtures. However a deeper analysis will take into account
dispersants benefits of mimimizing seabird and shoreline contamination, weighing
them against the actual (rather than perceived) disadvantages. With a proper
understanding of the action of dispersants and the resultant dilution of dispersed oil,
NEBA can point to the use of dispersants as the best option for the environment.
If shorelines become oiled, NEBA again provides a useful framework by which to
consider both the level and intensity of any clean-up. There is clear evidence that
for some habitats, certain clean-up techniques bring little ecological benefit and
may worsen damage if too invasive. This fact has to be balanced against
recreational, industrial and wildlife uses of shorelines (e.g. seal haul-outs or bird
roosting) and the possibility of bulk oil remobilizing to spread contamination
further afield. Planners and responders should be able to take account of these
factors, ultimately leading to rational decision making. It should be clear that for
NEBA to be properly undertaken, reliable information about an area needs to be
available. This emphasizes the need for sensitivity maps.
19
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
The assessment of risk, the necessary collection of data and the development of
response strategies, as described in the foregoing sections, are the cornerstones
to a logical determination of equipment requirements. The specification of
equipment capabilities is not an exact science and levels of achievable
performance will be very much a function of the specific local circumstances.
Performance on the day will also be crucially dependent on a number of factors,
especially weather and sea conditions.
The time needed to transport and deploy equipment, and its effectiveness in
different oil spill situations, needs to be evaluated. This can be achieved through
Resource stockpiles should be identified in
plans. Proper storage, maintenance and care
of equipment is needed at all response tiers.
field deployments during exercises. Notification and table-top simulations will

test communication channels and the coordination of resources. Thus, a
combination of exercises will assess whether existing resources meet the
requirements of each contingency plan, whether additional equipment and
supplies are required.
Because there is an opportunity to react rapidly and contain a small oil spill in the
vicinity of a company operating area, the acquisition of some equipment (such as
booms, skimmers and absorbents) to provide Tier 1 capability is an essential
component of an effective plan. On-site personnel must be trained and aware of
how this equipment should be deployed and operated. This will enable a response
within minutes of a spill being
detected. This equipment, when
Table 6: typical response equipment

on-water
combined with that of other operators,

shoreline
contractors or authorities in the area
booms
shovels
and supplemented by a strategically
skimmers
diggers/loaders
placed communal stockpile could form
absorbents
drums/skips
the resources to support the Tier 2
sprayers
trucks/tankers
contingency plan. The ability to call on
dispersants
vacuum trucks
Tier 3 resources, if a spill exceeds the
radio communications
plastic sheeting
response capability at Tier 2, should be
boats/tugs
protective clothing
built into plans.
pumps/hoses
communications
tanks/barges/storage
control room
Table 6 lists the typical primary and
aircraft
transportation
support equipment that may be used

to carry out on-water and shoreline
20
RECOVERED OIL AND DEBRIS MANAGEMENT
response activities. An inventory should be made of all oil spill response

equipment and supplies that would be available to the response organization in
the case of an oil spill. Such lists should be appended to contingency plans and
updated on a regular basis. The main purpose of keeping these lists is that, in
times of emergency, there will be a ready source of information about where to
obtain equipment, its specifications, the methods of transport and delivery times,
the costs involved, and the names and telephone numbers of contact points.
RECOVERED OIL AND DEBRIS

MANAGEMENT
Recovered oil, oily debris and contaminated beach material has to be properly
disposed of. It may also need to be transported to, and handled through,
temporary storage sites. Suitable equipment, vehicles, temporary storage sites
and final disposal methods/locations need to be identified and their availability
agreed with the local authorities at the contingency planning stage. Waste
management is a major logistics problem that can also raise serious legal issues in
some countries; it must always be coordinated with the relevant authorities.
The handling and disposal of contaminated oil and oily waste have major
implications for an oil clean-up operation. It can frustrate the entire operation by
causing bottlenecks and delays, unless suitable arrangements can be made. It is
best to treat and dispose of collected materials as near to the point of pick up as
possible and adopt the principles of waste minimization and where possible
segregation into different waste streams.
Oil recovered from the water could, for instance, be held initially in an opentopped tank or vacuum tank. Road tankers could be employed to carry out
regular transfers to a plastic lined holding pit where the recovered material can
be treated before transportation to the final disposal point. Solid waste is usually
recovered manually and stored in plastic bags or drums. These are then taken to
temporary off-beach storage by front-end loader or dump truck where they
might be processed before final disposal.
Processing and final disposal of oil and debris in an acceptable manner according
to local regulations also requires planning. Care must be taken not to create
another environmental problem.
21
Oil wastes in temporary storage near the

shoreline
MANAGEMENT, TRAINING, EXERCISES

AND PLAN REVIEW
In order to react quickly to an oil spill, response staff should be assigned specific
roles and responsibilities, properly trained and regularly rehearsed and available
for 24-hour call-out. For spills that cannot be contained at source and are likely
to cause damage to property and the environment, a clean-up operation can
make considerable demands on management and manpower resources over a
period of weeks or months.
Management
There are four fundamental elements that make up effective management of an
Response personnel will derive great benefit
from periodic training and oil spill
simulation exercises.
oil spill:
1. A response organization: typically with functional teams to address
command, planning, operations, logistics and finance/legal. The key aim of
the organization will be to obtain timely assessments to allow the response
effort to rapidly move from reactive to proactive management. This may also
be conceived as turning the oil spill emergency into a managed project. A
generic organization for emergency response is shown in Figure 9.
2. Clear roles and responsibilities: amounting to a job description for each
of the identified roles with the organization. Short descriptions of typical
functional group responsibilities are set out in the Appendix 2.
3. Effective communications: information flow within the organization and to
the outside world is a serious challenge and requires both modern technology
and disciplined personnel.
4. Suitable resources (at Tiers 1, 2 and 3): the availability of appropriate
equipment and staff.
Is it important that the management structure is able to function effectively at
Tiers 1, 2 and 3 with clear functions identified if the incident escalates. It should
be noted that all the functions indicated in Figure 9 may not be required or they
may be combined for small incidents. An industry organization must be flexible
and able to interface with existing government arrangements such as a national
plan, particularly at Tiers 2 and 3.
Industry has established international Tier 3 centres as outlined earlier in this
report and these centres have procedures for rapid mobilization of their
resources. However the organization utilizing these resources must have the
22
MANAGEMENT, TRAINING, EXERCISES AND PLAN REVIEW
Figure 9
Typical organization chart for a large oil
spill (see Appendix 2)
Crisis Management
Incident Command
Planning
Legal
Safety
External Liaison
Public Affairs
Operations
Logistics
Finance
safety
marine
manpower
claims
environment
shoreline
food/housing
administration
documentation
aviation
transportation
accounts
specialists
maintenance
communications
procurement
support
means to expedite their arrival into countries and integrate them into the overall
response. Note that these centres will not have either the capability or authority
to assume control of an incidenttheir role is one of support. Figure 10
demonstrates the likely activities that make up the effective utilization of Tier 2
or 3 support, referred to as a response chain. By defining this response as a
chain, it becomes clear that all links need full consideration to maintain
integrity. A seemingly small weakness can compromise the entire response.
Various experts and advisers can be brought in and contractors hired to
undertake some portions of the organizations workload. The key management,
advisory and supervisory roles should be representatives of the company and/or
government agencies involved.
Training
It is vital that staff with an identified role in a response organization are given
effective training. The training should include the appropriate level of tuition in
oil spill response theory and equipment deployment, depending on their role.
Familiarization with relevant contingency plans and procedures will also form
part of the training package.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has produced syllabuses and
materials for three Model Oil Spill Training Courses (at Senior Manager,
Supervisor and Operator levels) along with a train-the-trainer course and advice
23
on specialist courses. Information on these is available from the IMO. A number

of countries who have ratified the OPRC Convention have either accredited or
approved organizations and institutions to deliver training either commensurate
with IMO Model Courses or to specific national syllabuses.
Exercises
Spill simulations (or spill drills) are an excellent way to exercise and train
personnel in their emergency roles and to test contingency plans and
procedures. Valuable lessons can be learned from such exercises and these can
be used to improve plans. Personnel will not only feel more comfortable after
constructive exercising, they will also benefit from strengthened team spirit.
Important relationships with external organizations and contractors are made
during larger scale or multi-agency simulations. During times of real
emergency a well-rehearsed team should hit the ground running and be more
effective. IMO/IPIECA Report Series Volume Two provides guidance on
exercise planning.
Plan Review
The planning process is not a one-off event and contingency plans require
periodic review and maintenance. This may be at the basic level of ensuring
contact details and equipment listings are current but could involve more
fundamental changes in the light of experiences from either exercises or actual
spill response. It is clear that all plan holders need to be appraised of updates and
that issued plans need thorough document control procedures.
Figure 10
Response chain for Tier 2 and 3 support
Grey lines: Tier 3 only

Responder
get
aircraft
call out
load
trucks
transport
to airport
mobilize
staff
Good
communications
are essential
load
aircraft
load
trucks
flight
transport
unload
boats
management
labour
24
Mobilizing party
storage
APPENDIX ONE:
preparing a contingency plan
3. Spill response strategy
A contingency plan should comprise three parts:
a strategy section, which should describe the scope of
3.1 Philosophy and objectives
the plan, including the geographical coverage,
3.2 Limiting and adverse conditions
perceived risks, roles / responsibilities of those
3.3 Strategy for offshore zones
charged with implementing the plan and the proposed
3.4 Strategy for coastal zones
response strategy;
3.5 Strategy for shoreline zones
an action and operations section, which should set out the
3.6 Strategy for oil and waste storage and disposal
emergency procedures that will allow rapid assessment

4. Equipment, supplies and services
of the spill and the mobilization of appropriate
response resources; and
4.1 On water oil spill equipment
a data directory, which should contain all relevant
4.2 Inspection, maintenance and testing
maps, resource lists and data sheets required to
4.3 Shoreline equipment, supplies and services
support an oil spill response effort and conduct the

5. Management, manpower and training
response according to an agreed strategy.

What follows sets out the proposed sections and sub-
5.1 Crisis manager and financial authorities
sections of each part of a typical oil spill contingency plan
5.2 Incident organization chart
and may be used either as a template when writing a new
5.3 Manpower availability (on-site, on-call)
plan or as a checklist when reviewing an existing plan.
5.4 Availability of additional labour

5.5 Advisors and consultants
Strategy
5.6 Training/safety schedules and drill/exercise

programme
1. Introduction and scope

1.1 Authorities and responsibilities, coordinating
6. Communications and control
committee
1.2 Statutory requirements, relevant agreements
6.1 Incident control room and facilities
1.3 Geographical limits of plan
6.2 Field communications equipment
1.4 Interface with other plans/representation at joint
6.3 Reports, manuals, maps, charts and incident logs
control centres
Action and operations
7. Initial procedures
2. Oil spill risks
7.1 Reporting incident, preliminary estimate of
2.1 Identification of activities and risks
response Tier
2.2 Types of oil likely to be spilled

2.3 Probable fate of spilled oil
7.2 Notifying key team members and authorities
2.4 Development of oil spill scenarios
7.3 Establishing and staffing control room
2.5 Shoreline sensitivity mapping
7.4 Collecting information (oil type, sea/wind

forecasts, aerial surveillance, beach reports)
2.6 Shoreline resources, priorities for protection
7.5 Estimating fate of slick (24, 48 and 72 hours)
2.7 Special local considerations
25
APPENDIX ONE CONTINUED
Data directory
7.6 Identifying resources immediately at risk,
Maps/charts
informing parties
1. Coastal facilities, access roads, telephones, hotels, etc.

2. Coastal charts, currents, tidal information (ranges and
8. Operations planning and
streams), prevailing winds
mobilization procedures
8.1 Assembling full response team
3. Risk locations and probable fate of oil
8.2 Identifying immediate response priorities
4. Shoreline resources for priority protection
8.3 Mobilizing immediate response
5. Shoreline types
8.4 Preparing initial press statement
6. Sea zones and response strategies
8.5 Planning medium-term operations (24-, 48-
7. Coastal zones and response strategies

8. Shoreline zones and clean-up strategies
and 72-hour)
8.6 Deciding to escalate response to higher Tier
9. Oil and waste storage/disposal sites
8.7 Mobilizing or placing on standby resources
10. Sensitivity maps/atlas
required
Lists
8.8 Establishing field command post and
1. Primary oil spill equipment: booms, skimmers, spray
communications
equipment, dispersant, absorbents, oil storage, radio

communications, etc (manufacturer, type, size,
9. Control of operations
location, transport, contact, delivery time, cost and
9.1 Establishing a management team with experts and
conditions)
advisors
2. Auxiliary equipment: tugs and work boats, aircraft,
9.2 Updating information (sea/ wind/weather
vacuum trucks, tanks and barges, loaders and graders,
forecasts, aerial surveillance, beach reports)

9.3 Reviewing and planning operations
plastic bags, tools, protective clothing,
9.4 Obtaining additional equipment, supplies and
communications equipment, etc (manufacturer, type,

size, location, transport, contact, delivery time, cost
manpower
and conditions)
9.5 Preparing daily incident log and management
3. Support equipment: aircraft, communications,
reports
catering, housing, transport, field sanitation and
9.6 Preparing operations accounting and financing
shelter etc (availability, contact, cost and conditions)
reports
4. Sources of manpower: contractors, local authorities,
9.7 Preparing releases for public and press conferences
caterers, security firms (availability, numbers, skills,
9.8 Briefing local and government officials
contact, cost and conditions)

5. Experts and advisors: environment, safety, auditing,
10.Termination of operations
(availability, contact, cost and conditions)
10.1 Deciding final and optimal levels of beach clean-up
6. Local and national government contacts: (name, rank
10.2 Standing-down equipment, cleaning,
and responsibility, address, telephone, fax, telex)
maintaining, replacing
10.3 Preparing formal detailed report
Data
10.4 Reviewing plans and procedures from lessons
1. Specifications of oils commonly traded
learnt
2. Wind and weather

3. Information sources
26
APPENDIX TWO:
functional responsibilities in the
response organization
Function
Responsibilities
Crisis management
organization
Ensuring that the response to any incident is consistent with government or company-wide, strategic,
operational and communication policy requirements.
Incident Command
Recommending response strategy and setting clear objectives for the response effort (which should eventually
include termination criteria).
Ensuring overall implementation of field activities, effectiveness and cost of the entire clean-up operation. In
many countries this role will fall within government agencies.
Ensuring safety considerations are given the highest priority.
Requires full operational and financial authority to facilitate rapid mobilization of necessary pollution
combating resources.
Safety
Provide specialist safety advice and expertise to Incident Command.
External liaison
In Tier 2 and 3 spills there will be multi-agency involvement and further interest from a wide of range of parties.
It is vital that links and communications with these parties are maintained throughout the response. Note that
some countries plan their response organization to directly incorporate personnel from all involved groups.
Legal
Provide legal advice and expertise to Incident Command.
Public affairs
Release of information to the news media and wider community on aspects of the spill and its clean-up.
Planning
Recommendations of plans to implement the agreed response strategy, with full input from environmental
expertise and other specialists as necessary.
Ensure a complete and accurate record of all events is maintained and documented.
Implementing a disciplined cycle to assessments, management meetings, decision making and feedback
from/to the field operations.
Operations
Safe and effective deployment of field operations, both at sea and on shorelines, with possible involvement
of air operations.
This group is likely to be the most numerous when shoreline clean-up is undertaken and can involve unskilled
labour, requiring close supervision.
Logistics
Support and procurement function. Transporting and maintaining effective personnel and equipment in the
field requires close liaison with the planning and operations functions.
Finance
Ensuring costs are monitored and accounted.

Ensuring claims and compensation procedures are implemented.
Provide administrative support as needed.
N.B. A response organization may be comprised of some or all of the roles listed here. Furthermore, not all positions are essential
for every operation.
27
APPENDIX THREE:
follow-up further reading
International Maritime Organization (IMO), London

Manual on Oil Pollution:
Section 1 Prevention (out of print)
Section 2 Contingency Planning (1995 edition)
Section 3 Salvage (1997 edition)
Section 4 Combating Oil Spills (1988 edition)
Section 5 Administrative Aspects of Oil Pollution Response
(1996 edition)
Section 6 IMO Guidelines for Sampling and Identification of
Oil Spills (1998 edition)
IPIECA Report Series

IPIECA Volume 1: Guidelines on Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution
IPIECA Volume 3: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs
IPIECA Volume 4: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Mangroves
IPIECA Volume 5: Dispersants and Their Role in Oil Spill Response
IPIECA Volume 6: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Saltmarshes
IPIECA Volume 7: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Rocky Shores
IPIECA Volume 8: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Fisheries
IPIECA Volume 9: Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Sedimentary Shores
IPIECA Volume 10: Choosing Spill Response Options to Minimize Damage
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,

Response and Cooperation 1990 (OPRC)
OPRC Convention 1990 text
Jointly published Reports

IMO/IPIECA Volume 1: Sensitivity Mapping for Oil Spill Response
IMO/IPIECA Volume 2: Guide to Oil Spill Exercise Planning
IPIECA/ITOPF Briefing Paper on the Use of Tier 3 Centres
IPIECA/ITOPF Briefing Paper on Oil Spill Compensation
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation

Limited (ITOPF), London.
Technical Information Papers 112,
No 1: Aerial Observation of Oil at Sea
No 2: Use of Booms in Combating Oil Pollution
No 3: Aerial Application of Oil Spill Dispersants
No 4: Use of Oil Spill Dispersants
No 5: Use of Skimmers in Combating Oil Pollution
No 6: Recognition of Oil on Shorelines
No 7: Shoreline clean-up
No 8: Disposal of Oil and Debris
No 9: Contingency Planning for Oil Spills
No 10: Effects of Marine Oil Spills
No 11: Fate of Marine Oil Spills
No 12: Action Oil Spill
Useful Websites
www.ipieca.org
www.imo.org
www.itopf.com
28

Company Members
Association Members
BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd
American Petroleum Institute
BP
Australian Institute of Petroleum
Caltex Corporation

Producers
Chevron Corporation
Conoco Inc.
Enter Na
Enterprise Oil plc
ExxonMobil Corporation
Maersk Olie og Gas A/S

CONCAWE
Gulf Area Oil Companies Mutual Aid
Organisation
Institut Francais du Petrole
Marathon Oil UK

Producers
Nexen Inc
Pertamina
Petroleum Association of Japan
Petroleum Development Oman LLC

and the Caribbean
Petronas
Saudi Arabian Oil Company
Shell International BV.
STATOIL
Texaco Inc
TOTALFINAELF
Unocal Corporation
Woodside
South African Oil Industry Environment

Committee
IPIECA

IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
OIL SPILL RESPONDER

SAFETY GUIDE
VOLUME ELEVEN
IPIECA
IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
OIL SPILL RESPONDER

SAFETY GUIDE
VOLUME ELEVEN
IPIECA

recording, or otherwise, without the prior consent of IPIECA.
CONTENTS
PREFACE
SUMMARY AND
INTRODUCTION
MANAGEMENT CONTROL
OF SPILL SAFETY
RISK ASSESSMENT
SPILLED PRODUCT AND

RESPONSE CLEAN-UP:
CHEMICAL SAFETY
PREFACE
This report is one of a series commissioned by the International Petroleum

Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA). The full series of
reports will represent the IPIECA members collective contribution to the global
discussion on oil spill preparedness and response.
12
21
25
THE WORKING
ENVIRONMENT AND
SAFETY DURING RESPONSE
OPERATIONS
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE
EQUIPMENT SELECTION
AND SITE FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT OF
VOLUNTEERS
In preparing these reportswhich represent a consensus of membership

viewsIPIECA has been guided by a set of principles which every organization
associated with the transportation of oil products at sea should consider when
managing operations related to the transportation, handling and storage of
petroleum and petroleum products:
it is of paramount importance to concentrate on preventing spills;
safety of life is the highest priority in any incident;
despite the best efforts of individual organizations, spills will continue to

occur and will affect the local environment;
response to spills should seek to minimize the severity of the environmental

damage and to hasten the recovery of any damaged ecosystem;
the response should always seek to complement and make use of natural
forces to the fullest extent practicable.
Anyone charged with planning for oil spill response activities is faced with a
vast array of tasks that must be analysed and prioritized. Often these tasks
conflict, requiring difficult decisions to be made and compromises reached.
27
CONCLUSIONS
28
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
AND FURTHER READING
imperative. Documented, safe systems of work should always be established and
APPENDIX 1
Example site safety survey form
instances will require additional personnel. However, the temptation to get the
29
31
32
APPENDIX 2
Example site safety briefing sheet
APPENDIX 3
Example gas testing record sheet
Health and safety must never be compromised, regardless of the environmental

adhered to. This will often increase the complexity of operations and in many
job done at the expense of the health and safety of the responders should be
resisted at all costs.
Health and safety should be the cornerstone of all oil spill preparatory measures.
Responses to a variety of scenarios are best formulated away from the timepressures that an actual crisis imposes. At each stage of the planning cycle, there
must be a conscious check to ensure that no unwarranted increase in health and
safety risk has occurred, or if it has, that additional control measures are put in
place to counter it. These plans must then be practised in both tabletop and
practical exercises, and refined as required by honest feedback.
The value of independent health and safety audits cannot be underestimated. A
skilled and independent auditor will often unearth weaknesses in systems and plans
that have previously remained hidden. This will allow remedial action to be taken
to improve the quality and effectiveness of preparations.
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
When an oil spill occurs, the issue of health and safety, both for the public and oil spill
responders, is the most critical consideration. The purpose of this document is to
investigate the safety aspects of oil spills and their response. It is recognized that safety
is managed in many different ways around the world. The safety regimes in different
countries vary enormously in the methods of achieving their objectives, from highly
regulated prescriptive regimes which legislate actions, to risk-based systems which
approach the problem from a totally different perspective. It would be foolhardy to try
to develop a safety document that attempted to prescribe any particular approach to
safety, as it would not succeed in meeting the expectations of at least some part of the
community. Instead this document will concentrate on identifying the principal safety
issues when an oil spill occurs, their degree of severity, and the practical steps that can
be taken to minimize the impact of the spill.
Many spills have been cleaned up safely in the past. Because clean-up activities are
usually conducted in the open air, the hazards from vapours and gases are relatively low,
and simple protective clothing can reduce contact with oil and minimize any chance of
harm. Nevertheless the oil and the working environment do introduce other hazards.
The key to safety is to recognize the risks from all sources and to be prepared to act
accordingly. The other major aspect when dealing with safety management is the issue
of liability. Although safety management systems are used to manage the liabilities that
may arise as a result of an accident, the document does not attempt to deal with this
aspect of the problem. Rather, it focuses on the practical and technical safety
considerations that need to be dealt with when responding to an oil spill. Those with
well-developed safety regimes will have the procedures in place but should find value in
the practical guidance. Those that do not have such advanced safety systems should find
the guide useful in developing safety plans to deal with the issues that are raised.
This document is divided into six broad categories, each of which needs to be
addressed. They are:
management of safety;
risk assessment;
oil and response clean-up chemical safety issues;
the working environment and safety during operations;
personal protective equipment (PPE); and
management of volunteers.
Each organization will need to establish its own strategy to ensure that health and
safety is incorporated into its own spill response provisions. These strategies should be
reviewed periodically, taking into account experience and lessons learned.
OIL SPILL RESPONDER SAFETY GUIDE
MANAGEMENT CONTROL
OF SPILL SAFETY
The safety of the general public and responders is assigned the highest priority
during spill response operations. A response management system, with safety as
its core element, should start from the top and penetrate to all levels within the
organizations participating in response activities.
To ensure that safety takes its proper place during response operations special
actions need to be taken. The management team should appoint an individual
and, if necessary, a supporting team, with a responsibility for safety management.
Responders can often become too involved in operations and not be able to take
an overall view of the situation. The safety manager needs to be able to step back
from the operation and consider wider issues.
The safety manager should be responsible for monitoring and maintaining awareness
of active and developing situations, assessing hazardous and unsafe situations and
developing measures to assure personnel safety. These measures include:
Site Assessment, during initial response, in order to: document the hazard analysis
process; address hazard identification, personal protective equipment and

control zones; and identify decontamination areas. Competent personnel, that
is to say, those appropriately trained and experienced in the issues surrounding
spill safety, should be used to manage and supervise response. Local labour
can be used to support the clean-up effort provided that they are: given training
in the safety issues that are relevant to the tasks they undertake; briefed on the
risks that they will meet; and provided with the appropriate safety equipment.
Developing and implementing a Site Safety and Health Plan (SSHP).
Information to develop the plan can be obtained from sources such as specific
site safety plans, hazard assessments and air monitoring data. The Plan should
be reviewed regularly with regard to the safety implications of the activities
proposed or in progress.
Participating in planning meetings to identify health and safety concerns
inherent in the operations daily work plan.

Correcting unsafe acts or conditions through the regular line of authority,
although the safety manager should be authorized to exercise emergency

authority to prevent or stop unsafe acts when immediate action is required.
The safety manager should also investigate accidents that have occurred
during operations.
MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF SPILL SAFETY
Establishing first-aid stations and medical facilities in accordance with the SSHP.
Site Safety and Health Plan (SSHP)

The safety manager should ensure the preparation and implementation of the
SSHP in accordance with local and national plans and regulations. The SSHP
should, ideally, address the following elements:
health and safety hazard analysis for each site, task or operation;
comprehensive operations work plan;
personnel training requirements;
personal protective equipment (PPE) selection criteria;
site-specific occupational medical monitoring requirements;
individual and area air monitoring plan;
site control measures;
confined space entry procedures, if needed;
pre-entry briefings (initial/daily/pre-shift);
pre-operations health and safety conference for all incident participants;
quality assurance of SSHP effectiveness; and
decontamination.
Site layout plans may help with making people aware of the risks and the location
of key safety elements. These should be prepared and displayed at the site
command post. A copy should be returned to the incident command centre and
should be revised as conditions at the site change.
Safety briefing and communication
One of the key methods of managing safety is by the use of safety briefings
(Appendix 2). Ideally, briefings should be held before the start of each shift to
pass along all information necessary to ensure safety on the site. All contractor
supervisory personnel should attend these safety meetings in order to pass
information to their own teams. A method of rapid communications with all field
sites should be included in the safety briefings. The information passed should be
pitched at the correct level to suit the audience; for example clean-up crews will
require a different content and style of briefing to the personnel in the command
centre. The briefings should address:
Briefing the response team prior to a

days operations
work zone characteristics;

hazard information on the spilled product;
evacuation routes;
assembly points;
first-aid post locations;
location of staging areas;
command post locations; and
how to respond to other emergencies that may arise.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Introduction
The first task that should be undertaken when preparing to conduct oil spill
response operations is a comprehensive risk assessment and hazard analysis.
When an oil spill occurs the management team will need to carry out a highlevel risk assessment of the overall situation as soon as possible to ensure that oil
spill responders or the wider population are not in danger. The initial approach
should be to answer such questions as:
An overall risk assessment should be
conducted at the start of a spill.
Is there a potential gas cloud and therefore an explosion risk?

Should people be evacuated or excluded?
Is the environment safe for people?
Will oil enter water systems that may affect people?
This initial safety assessment may lead to the establishment of safety or exclusion
zones whilst the area is monitored in more detail. This may include the use of
monitoring equipment to detect flammable or toxic gases and materials. The
persistence of these sorts of hazards is not usually great, but this issue is more
significant with the more volatile oil types and in calm weather conditions.
Monitoring should continue until it can be established that the risk has reduced
to acceptable levels. Once the overall situation has been stabilized from a safety
point of view then the work of responding to the oil spill can begin. In normal
circumstances responders are not likely to be exposed to areas in which there is
an explosion or toxic vapour risk. Specialist source control teams, who are
trained and equipped to work within these high-risk areas, are the ones most
likely to enter these environments.
When responding to a spill, the risks posed by particular operations or locations
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. One way of dealing with this situation
is through the use of a Site Safety Survey Form (Appendix 1). This form, when
completed by a competent individual from the response team, can be used to
identify the various hazards and determine if they present a risk. Once identified,
appropriate control measures can be taken to mitigate the risks. Those personnel
involved in carrying out risk assessments must have sufficient training and
knowledge to understand the potential hazards presented by the operations. The
process of risk assessment is intended to identify all of the potential hazards.
Once this has been completed, the probability and the severity of any potential
RISK ASSESSMENT
incident should be predictable. Those incidents most likely to occur frequently,

or those most likely to cause the greatest harm, should be dealt with first.
Account must be taken of who might be harmed, and how. There are a number
of techniques in common use for the assessment of risk. Some rely on descriptive
ranking, while others employ a numerical scoring system to produce an order of
priority. Whatever system is employed, it is important that all the assessments
are carried out in a consistent manner.
Once the likelihood and severity of risks have been considered, the precautions
available should then be examined to determine their effectiveness. If the hazard
continues to present a risk then additional measures should be put in place.
There is an accepted hierarchy of approach that may be summarized as follows:
1. Prevent access to the hazard
2. Organize the work in a way that exposure to the hazard is reduced
3. Use PPE
The risk assessment should be fully documented and filed. During the conduct
of operations the risk from the spilled oil will inevitably change but many of the
physical risk factors in the environment will remain constant. As a matter of
course, the workplace hazards should be periodically reassessed and the
suitability of previously selected hazard controls re-evaluated. The possibility of
reviewing previous risk assessments will assist in getting consistency of
approach. The Site Safety Survey Form (Appendix 1) is a means of
documenting the particular hazards at any particular site or those arising from
particular operations. In the main, hazards can be seen to arise from a number
of specific areas:
the spilled product itself and response chemicals;
the working environment;
risks during response operations;
risks from machinery used in the clean-up operation; and
risks from external factors.
SPILLED PRODUCT AND RESPONSE

CLEAN-UP: CHEMICAL SAFETY
Responses to oil spills inevitably put responders and chemicals together in the
same environment. Potential exposure of personnel should be assessed,
monitored, and controlled if health effects are to be avoided. Each type of
product, when spilled into the environment, will have its own set of chemical
characteristics that will determine the most effective response strategy and,
indeed, which strategies are safe to use. It should be borne in mind that the
chemical characteristics of the spilled product will usually change over a period
of time as a result of what is known as the weathering process, i.e. the action of
Some spills present specific safety risks
the elements on the product and its reaction with the surroundings.
In order to assess the measures needed to protect responders from the spilled
product, its chemical constituents and characteristics must be known. By
convention, this information is presented in a document called a material safety
data sheet (MSDS). Each MSDS contains all the information required to
complete a risk assessment of the chemical.
Oils, whether in the crude state or as refined products, represent a safety hazard.
The main hazards that can arise are as a result of the following properties:
flammability;
explosive vapours;
toxicity;
hydrogen sulphide;
exclusion of oxygen; and
the slippery nature of oil.
Flammability
Crude oils, condensates and refined products may be ignited if they are exposed
to a source of ignition. The period for which oil remains easily ignitable is
usually short because of evaporation of the more volatile components and the
inclusion of water in the oil if it emulsifies. Whilst the oil is fresh care must be
taken to exclude any potential sources of ignition from an area to minimize the
risk of fire. Responders should exercise care in the selection of equipment that is
used in response operations if it may cause ignition of the spilled product.
Additionally, smoking, sparking tools, vehicles or any other potential source of
ignition should be kept out of the spill area. Access to the spill operations areas
SPILLED PRODUCT AND RESPONSE CLEAN-UP: CHEMICAL SAFETY
should be controlled whilst any danger of ignition persists. Light products such
as gasoline or kerosene represent a particular hazard and special care should be
taken when approaching these spills.
Explosive vapours
When a refined product or volatile crude is spilled, there will be a release of
hydrocarbon vapours during the initial stages of the incident. There is potential
for this vapour cloud to drift, under the effects of the prevailing winds, into a
centre of population or to a location where there is a possibility of the vapours
being ignited. Safety exclusion zones and air monitoring stations may need to be
established to determine the vapour levels to monitor whether or not they are
within explosive limits. The release of vapours may present a specific hazard to
internal combustion engines causing them to over-speed uncontrollably if the
vapour is inducted into the engine. Internal combustion engines should not be
operated in areas where a risk of explosion exists. As a precaution, engines that
could be exposed to environments where vapours are present should be protected
by the fitting of an air inlet shut-off device that will operate if the engine speed
exceeds maximum rated limits.
Toxicity
Fears of the toxicity of oil are widespread but the risk is low because, although
oils contain potentially harmful components, it is relatively easy to prevent them
entering the body to cause harm. The spilled products toxic properties may
follow a variety of routes of entry into the body other than breathing the gases or
vapours. It may be absorbed through the skin or eyes, ingested (swallowed) or
injected. The potentially most serious exposure exists during the initial stages of
a spill, particularly when volatile crude oils, condensates or light refined products
are involved. These products can have carcinogenic components. For example,
benzene is a confirmed human carcinogen for which the risks and safe exposure
limits have been defined. If the potential exposure exceeds the prescribed limits,
then suitable PPE must be worn, such as chemical-protective clothing and
respirators. Whilst these aromatic products usually only persist for a short period
of time and will rapidly disperse in the air, they do pose a specific safety risk.
Care must be taken to monitor the levels of benzene in the environment and
protect both responders and the public from exposure. The level of aromatics
released will be a function of the specific oil type, the surface area of the spill,
temperature and the wind conditions at the time of the release. The risks must
be assessed by specialists and controls implemented to reduce their impact to an
acceptable level.
Reference to the occupational exposure limits (OELs) of any chemicals should be
made and a proper monitoring regime adopted. OELs may be either short-term
(for chemicals with acute effects) or long-term (for chemicals with chronic effects).
Hydrogen sulphide
The presence of toxic vapours must also be monitored. Sour crudes give off
hydrogen sulphide gas (H2S). Even though it can be smelled at low
concentrations, at lethal concentrations H2S is impossible to detect without
specialist equipment. There can be particular concern for the public if there is a
possibility that a gas cloud from an incident could drift into residential or
populated areas. If the levels are extremely high due to a blow out of a sour
crude well or release of a large quantity of sour crude oil, evacuation may have to
be considered as a sensible precaution. Responders should not normally be
operating in an environment where the risk of poisoning from gasses such as H2S
exist, unless they are involved in source control. If the gas is suspected, based on
information usually gained from the producer or the shipper of the oil, a
monitoring system should be established to determine the levels. Once the level
of gas present has reduced to acceptable levels, responders should be provided
with personal monitoring equipment to monitor their personal exposure and
their working time limited so as not to exceed any occupational exposure limits
that are set in respect of the gas.
Exclusion of oxygen
The gases from hydrocarbons can displace the oxygen in an environment,
particularly when they collect in confined spaces or trenches that are not
adequately ventilated. Oxygen content readings should be taken prior to entering
any confined space, trench or area where reduced ventilation may lead to an
accumulation of hydrocarbon vapours. Entry should not be permitted unless
readings in excess of 19.5% O2 are confirmed. Such areas should be monitored
Conducting air monitoring in the vicinity of
the spill site.
continually; entry by responders controlled using a permit to work system; and

the appropriate tank entry procedures implemented.
Slipperiness
The most common form of accident encountered during spill operations results
from slips, trips or falls. Many of the products encountered are, by their very
nature, slippery. Slips, trips and falls on oiled surfaces are one of the main causes
of injury and awareness of these hazards should be raised. Responders can also
find it difficult to handle equipment when wearing oily gloves, which can
increase the time taken to complete familiar tasks and may make some more
complicated tasks impossible without decontaminating the equipment first.
Air monitoring equipment and record keeping
Air and exposure monitoring can be conducted through the use of electronic
monitors, draeger tubes, personal monitors or passive diffusion monitors. The
type, level and frequency of monitoring should be based on the particular
circumstances. An example of an air monitoring record is shown in Appendix 3.
10
SPILLED PRODUCT AND RESPONSE CLEAN-UP: CHEMICAL SAFETY
Protective clothing should be suited to the oil

type and the working environment.
Skin contact with oil

Oil and some of the chemical compounds used in clean up operations can have a
degreasing effect on skin tissue and can cause problems if ingested. When
responders are working on a clean-up operation suitable PPE should be worn to
prevent oil contact with the skin which may cause dermatitis, an inflammation of
the skin. The type of PPE used must be suited to the climatic conditions at the
site as problems of heat exhaustion may arise if workers are required to wear
impermeable PPE for long periods in very hot conditions. Work periods must be
managed to ensure that adequate rest periods are given.
Protective gloves, suits and boots should be provided to protect the responder,
and moisturizing barrier creams should be provided to protect the skin.
Decontamination facilities should be established which permit responders to
remove oiled clothing in a controlled environment, and which provide them with
access to suitable washing facilities. Another ailment sometimes experienced by
responders is sickness and diahorrea caused by the accidental ingestion of
contaminated food due to inadequate hygiene. Personal hygiene and
decontamination facilities should be provided to permit workers to wash prior to
taking meal breaks, in order to guard against this type of illness.
Spill response chemicals and cleaning agents
A number of chemical materials, such as dispersant materials and solvent cleaners
are used when responding to oil spills and special care must be taken when
handling these materials. Most products are provided with guidance notes on the
risks, use and handling of the material, and this information should be made
available to all those handling the product. When handling dispersant chemicals,
gloves, goggles and protective clothing should be worn and prolonged contact
with the skin avoided, as many of the materials are hydrocarbon based and can
cause oil contact dermatitis. Similar precautions should be taken when handling
solvent cleaner chemicals, as these can contain more aromatic components. Special
care should be taken in the use of respiratory protection with the appropriate filter
cartridges. A full discussion of the safety implications of dispersant use is provided
under Dispersant Response Operations in the following section (see pages 1819).
11
THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT AND

SAFETY DURING RESPONSE OPERATIONS
The working environment

Oil spills can occur in practically any type of environment and under all climatic
and meteorological conditions. This poses a number of challenges to responders
and has an overriding influence on the response options available. Some aspects
of the working environment (such as site layout, security, working shifts) may be
controlled by the responders themselves. Others, including the weather and the
terrain, must be given consideration and accommodated when response targets
are set. In every working environment, safety must remain the top priority, and
measures to control any risks put in place.
Oil spills invariably bring out the worst in
the weather.
Weather
Extremes of temperature, humidity and precipitation all place considerable strain
on human performance. Symptoms range from heat stroke, sunburn and
dehydration at one end of the scale to frostbite and hypothermia at the other.
These conditions are, by their nature, hazardous and must be assessed
accordingly. Suitable and sufficient control measures need to be provided and
might include:
specialized clothing;
shelter;
survival training;
adjustments to work patterns to provide rest/respite for workers; and
provision of communications equipment and accurate weather forecasting.
The natural environment

The environment in which a spill can occur can range from exposed shorelines to
rugged and remote mountains in the case of pipeline spills. Safe access and egress
must be arranged for vehicles and pedestrians with account being taken of
shoreline type (mud, cliffs, mangroves etc.) and tidal patterns and ranges. Care
must be taken that workers and equipment are not cut off by rising tides when
working on shorelines. In the case of inland spills, each locality will present its
own unique set of challenges that must be overcome, including accessibility,
gradients, watercourse flow rate and depth, and water table characteristics.
12
THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY DURING RESPONSE OPERATIONS
The natural environment can present a

significant risk.
Although indigenous flora and fauna are often an important ecological and
environmental resource, they can present a very real safety issue. Poisonous
plants and dangerous animals need to be identified, and their appearance
publicized to the responders along with information on how to deal with the
threat they present. Of greater concern are those creatures that may actually
attack humans both in the sea and on dry land. Where these possibilities exist,
expert advice must be obtained and adequate protection provided.
Night operations
Night operations present particular risks for workers. Unless adequate lighting
can be guaranteed to ensure that responders can have safe and secure access to
the worksite, and that an acceptable level of operational efficiency can be
guaranteed, night clean-up operations should be avoided. It is difficult to see oil
in low light conditions and the risk of slips, trips or falls increases dramatically.
Worker fatigue will increase through night working and the operational benefits
of this work need to be assessed. Application of dispersants, particularly from
aircraft is not recommended during night time conditions as there are inherent
safety and operational efficiency issues.
Providing safe access to the worksite is
critical to reducing the risk of accidents.
Slips, trips and falls

As mentioned previously, the most common hazard to responders is the danger
from slips, trips or falls. Oil spills can occur in locations where the access to the
work site is difficult. The problem is compounded when the surface is coated
with oil, but rocky shorelines can be naturally slippery due to seaweed, wet rocks
or mud. Safe and secure access must be provided for the workforce to prevent
the possibility of injury. When working on the shoreline, it is advisable for
responders to keep clear of cliffs or rocky shorelines until a safe means of access
has been provided, either in the form of access bridges or guide ropes. Clean-up
crews should be warned of the hazards of any particular site access and be given
13
information on the safest access routes. Slips, trips and falls are also an issue
when working on vessels involved in offshore operations. Responders should
beware of falling into the water and must wear lifejackets at all times. Decks can
become extremely slippery when coated in oil. Towing lines and equipment
hoses add to the potential trip hazards. Good seamanship to maintain clean and
tidy decks is an important factor in reducing the hazard.
Manual handling and equipment lifting
Care must be taken by responders when lifting equipment or recovered waste
bags. Where possible lifting equipment should be used. If manual handling is
required, the loads should be restricted to manageable proportions and persons
instructed in the proper lifting techniques. When using lifting equipment,
responders should be provided with safety helmets and only those trained in the
operation of the equipment permitted to use it.
Transport of materials/waste disposal
When oil is recovered it is often stored in temporary pits on the shoreline. These pits
should be cordoned off from the public. Safe and secure access should be provided to
them for vehicles delivering or removing material. The pits should be well marked
with suitable signage to warn any person against accidentally falling into them.
Temporary storage tanks must be clearly

marked and secondary pollution should be
avoided.
There are potential risks from the use of

heavy machinery in public places
(near right).
Vehicle cleaning stations should be provided
at shoreline access points (far right).
14
Oil spills require significant logistics support with regard to the transportation
of equipment, and the use of specialist vehicles and personnel transport. To
prevent degradation of local road safety, care must be taken to avoid secondary
contamination beyond the initially oiled areas. Transport cleaning stations will
need to be established to prevent oil being transferred into public areas and
causing potential safety hazards.
Clean-up operations generate large quantities of waste that must be stored,
sorted and disposed of through an approved process or procedure. The transport
of materials will often require specialized vehicles. In most cases, licences will
need to be obtained from the local authorities to allow storage, transportation
and disposal of oily waste.
First aid
The arduous nature of response activities increases the risk of illness and injury
to responders. Often they are undertaking difficult tasks, under pressure and in
unfamiliar surroundings. Preventative measures need to be taken to protect
responders from infectious diseases and from other health effects of the oilcontaminated environment. Water and food quality must be of a suitable
standard to avoid illness. Responders should be trained in first aid and also have
an awareness of:
medical facilities available locally and how to access them;
vaccinations which may be required; and
medevac arrangements which should be available in the case of serious injury.
Other risks
There are other risks that need to be considered, especially when dispatching
responders internationally. Some parts of the world have their own inherent
dangers and these must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Professional advice
from embassies and government departments, or from specialist security
companies, will need to be sought in order to make an informed judgement on
how to proceed. Support and advice should be sought from the in-country staff
as to the actual risk conditions on the ground at the spill location. Issues to be
considered include:
travel arrangements (routes, visas, couriers);
airline safety;
accommodation;
language; interpreters, translation of documents;
risk of hijack or kidnap;
any country-specific risks such as terrorism, civil war, unexploded ordnance; and
evacuation.
15
The extent and potential threat of these hazards must be taken into account
before committing responders to any particular activity. If there is a risk,
suitable and appropriate countermeasures and plans should be established,
communicated and tested.
Safety during response operations
Shoreline response operations
The majority of response activities occur on shorelines. The proximity to water
presents its own set of hazards which give rise to increased risks, particularly
among inexperienced or unfamiliar responders. Notably, tides, currents and
waves contribute to creating a dynamic environment that can catch out the
unwary and needs constant monitoring and reassessment.
The nature of shoreline deployments often poses problems in terms of
communications, access and movement of heavy equipment, together with the
Shoreline deployments require extensive
management (see box below).
provision of adequate first-aid and evacuation resources. Cliffs, mud and

treacherous terrain increase the difficulties in providing these arrangements.
Unless access to spill sites and contaminated areas is properly controlled, the
local population can be exposed to risks from which they are not protected.
Additionally, vehicles and persons entering the spill area may generate
secondary contamination and possibly cause unnecessary damage to sensitive
environmental resources.
Shoreline response safety tips
Test for poisonous or explosive gases
Create safe accessslips and falls on large boulder fields are a significant
cause of injuries
Ensure adequate manpower to achieve the task safely
Ensure adequate safety briefings (Appendix 2) and supervision
Be aware of tidal conditions
Provide shelter, rest periods and nourishment for responders
Employ a buddy system to avoid lone working
Never permit entry into excavations, always clearly mark storage pits on
shorelines
Reassess operations if weather deteriorates, especially if a heavy sea is

running
Ensure adequate first aid, safety briefings and medevac facilities
Risks can be minimized by having good communications
16
Shoreline clean-up operations need to be

managed carefully to prevent accidents.
It is essential that shoreline responders are trained to recognize the hazards

present in their working environment, and are provided with adequate means to
control the risks.
Offshore response operations
Offshore working can take place either on fixed installations or on vessels. These
environments have their own special practices and procedures that should be
followed in order to remain safe. Inexperienced or uninitiated responders are at
Offshore response safety tips
Test for poisonous or explosive gases before approaching spill
Lines and chains used for lashing and towing have the potential to cause
serious injuries and must be checked periodically, especially in high seas
Keep the decks as clean as possiblehazards faced in the offshore

environment multiply as a result of poor weather, oiled decks and
equipment, and congested work areas
Ensure that all responders are familiar with the equipment to be used
Ensure that all responders are familiar with the vessel emergency
procedures
Deck operations always carry the hazard of drowning so a lifejacket must

be worn
Ensure a full briefing is conducted before commencing operations
Secure equipment with tag lines when lifting using deck cranes
Risks can be minimized by having good communications between the

bridge and the deck
17
increased risk when operating offshore and, where possible, regular local workers
acting as safety escorts should accompany them. A personal floatation device
must be worn by all responders working offshore and in vessels, because
swimming ability is impaired by clothing such as boots and helmets. Vessels
engaged in offshore response work should be suitably sized and equipped to deal
with the environment. Adequate and suitable safety and communications
equipment should be installed on the vessels. Crews should be trained and
competent in the operation of the vessels and responders should be trained and
fully briefed on their responsibilities.
High seas conditions can make vessel
operation hazardous.
It cannot be overstressed that the hazards faced in the offshore environment

multiply as a result of poor weather, oiled decks and equipment, and congested
work areas. Lines and chains used for lashing and towing have the potential to
cause serious injuries and must be checked periodically, especially in high seas.
A communications system should be established to permit all vessels working
offshore to be able to report any emergencies and provide operations status
reports. A system of notifying craft of any adverse weather reports should be
established as a precaution and is particularly important when small craft are
engaged in nearshore response operations.
Dispersant response operations
The use of dispersant chemicals to treat spilled oil brings with it a number of
health and safety issues that must be addressed. Specifically, the chemicals can
pose a hazard to health and the methods of application can leave unprotected
responders open to various modes of exposure. These include:
Breathing aerosol droplets mists. When operations present this risk,
personal issue respirators must be worn by all responders during spraying

operations, whether shoreline spraying, spraying from vessels or operating
aircraft systems. The respirators must be fitted with a particle filter, providing
Appropriate PPE must be used when using

dispersants.
18
protection against particles such as dust, oil mist, smoke and chemical aerosol
spray. On vessels, all normal doors and windows should remain closed during
spraying operations, to protect crew members located within the
accommodation, inside the engine room or on the bridge. On larger vessels,
there is the potential of dispersant mist entering the forced air engine room
ventilation. In this case, it is advisable for engine room personnel to use deck
operations PPE during spraying operations. Dispersant mist may also have a
detrimental effect on engines if ingested into air inlets. Special care should be
taken to protect all personnel when spraying is conducted in windy conditions.
Ingestion. Respirators should be used to prevent swallowing of any
dispersant mist. Personal hygiene practices must be rigorously applied to

prevent the possibility of dispersant ingestion during meal breaks.
Absorption through the skin. Dispersant is readily absorbed by the skin and
can cause irritation or organ damage. One-piece PVC suits and nitrile-rubber
gloves are required to be worn during loading and transfer operations and for boat
and shoreline spraying. Nitrile-rubber gloves are also required when coupling/
disconnecting dispersant hoses during the operation of fixed wing aircraft systems.
Splashes to the eyes. Chemical goggles are required where splash risk exists,
e.g. during loading and transfer operations, for boat and shoreline spraying
and for fixed wing aircraft operations. Medical attention should always be
sought if dispersant is splashed into the eyes.
Dispersant response operation safety tips
Assess the routes of possible exposure to dispersant chemical
Provide PPE to guard against each and every route, ensuring that all PPE is
compatible and fits the wearer
Keep decks clear and dispersant free by regular washing
Head spray vessels into wind where possible
Make sure that the PPE is resistant to the dispersant in use
Avoid uncontrolled releases of dispersant
Always refer to the Material Safety Data Sheets
Aviation operations
Response strategies often include the use of aircraft. This may be for reconnaissance,
transport or for dispersant spraying. Aircraft operations, airfields, and indeed aircraft
themselves, present numerous hazards that must be identified and controlled.
Briefings should be provided to passengers by the aircrew on the safety aspects of the
specific aircraft type and the location and use of safety equipment. Care must be taken
by personnel whilst on the airport not to enter areas in which aircraft are operating
without first gaining the necessary permission from the airport staff or aircrew.
19
Aviation safety tips
Aircraft can play a significant role in

response operations.
Never walk across airfield aprons without an escort.
When approaching or leaving aircraft, care must be taken to avoid the

intakes, exhausts, propellers and rotor blades.
A rotating helicopter blade may pass near to the ground particularly when
idling: personnel should always crouch when approaching or departing from a
helicopter with turning rotors and in the direction advised by the aircraft crew.
Approach to an aircraft should only be made when directed by the pilot or

crew, and the route should remain in the pilots field of view.
Briefings must be provided to passengers by the aircrew on the safety

aspects of the aircraft and the location and use of the exits and life saving
equipment provided.
Particular attention should be paid to hearing protection and the wearing of

high visibility garments when working on airfields.
Loose objects pose a threat to aircraft safety and should be controlled. This
includes litter, nuts and bolts, packing cases and hats.
Personnel responsibility
Whatever the working environment, safety can be considerably improved if
personnel watch out for each other as well as themselves. The working
environment in a spill situation changes constantly, and responders need to be
able to adjust to the changing conditions to mitigate any potential injury or loss.
Along with physical and chemical factors, other factors also affect the working
environment. Working long hours under hot and dry, or cold, damp and windy
conditions along with extended periods away from home can quickly lead to
fatigue. As fatigue sets in the ability to exercise good judgement and decision
making decreases rapidly. Equipment operation and working on deck becomes
more dangerous as fatigue becomes more pronounced. Personnel injuries,
unexpected environmental discharges, and property damage potentially can all
result from equipment failure. Safe working is dependent upon the experience
and training of the involved personnel and the continued close attention to
safety procedures.
20
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

SELECTION AND SITE FACILITIES
PPE selection
Personal protective equipment (PPE) is an essential element in ensuring
responders are able to work in a safe manner. The proper selection and use of
PPE requires skill and experience. The following points should be taken into
consideration when selecting the appropriate PPE:
the expected working conditions and hazards;
the activities to be performed;
A properly equipped, well motivated team is

a major asset
the person(s) being exposed; and

the compatibility of the equipmenteach piece of PPE should be capable of
performing effectively without hindering the proper operation of other pieces.

Consideration should also be given to the nature of the task and the demands
placed on the worker, including:
the physical effort required to do the job;
the methods of work involved;
how long the PPE will need to be worn;
the need for adequate vision and communications whilst wearing the items;
whether high cost, durable equipment or lower cost disposable items be
selected; and
whether the task is critical to the overall clean-up.
Consultation with the safety manager and experienced responders is

advantageous in determining the most suitable type of PPE. These personnel are
best placed to provide first hand knowledge of the task, environment and any
other unique factors.
The working environment will often dictate the PPE selection criteria. For example,
cold weather environments require the use of thermally insulating clothing. This
type of clothing can be rendered unusable if it comes into contact with liquid
oils, hence a robust and well-sealed impermeable layer should be worn above the
cold weather clothing. Conversely, in hot climates, impermeable clothing will
exacerbate the problem of heat stroke. Workers should therefore be given
adequate rest breaks and liquids to ensure their welfare, or an acceptable
compromise should be reached in the type of PPE that they wear.
21
The selection of the correct type of personal

protective equipment is critical.
PPE should not be issued without information and training in its use and
maintenance. Without this, its effectiveness will be severely reduced. Proper
decontamination and cleaning facilities should be provided so that the equipment
remains in a good condition for as long as possible. Without these facilities PPE
supplies will be wasted, straining supply lines and reducing cost-effectiveness.
Where possible, systems should be established to ensure that workers remain
responsible for the condition of their own PPE. Simple systems which require
workers to hand in used PPE before new stocks are issued will assist in the
control of waste. Separate disposal facilities for used PPE should be established
to segregate the waste.
By taking an activity-based approach to PPE selection, a response organization is
able to set some working parameters. These should include mechanical
protection, the elements/climate, and hazardous substances. It is vital to
emphasise that PPE is not, in itself, the only risk control method but in most
circumstances it is inevitable that personnel will come into close contact with the
oil and PPE will be a necessity.
A guide to PPE selection is included opposite.
Safety and welfare facilities on site
Sanitation and personal hygiene facilities
Potable water, non-potable water, toilets and personal hygiene facilities should
be readily available. Details of the location of hygiene facilities should be
contained on the Site Safety Map.
Decontamination procedures
Contaminated personnel, equipment and vehicles or vessels should be
decontaminated in accordance with a decontamination plan which should
include:
22
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT SELECTION AND SITE FACILITIES
Typical minimum PPE requirements
Coveralls
Oil skin suit
Safety boots
Safety wellingtons
Chest waders
Rigger gloves
PVC gloves
Tape seals
Ear defenders
Safety glasses
Goggles
Bump hat
Safety helmet
Personal floatation
device
Tyvek suit
Thermal suit
Immersion suit
Air monitor patch
Respirator 1
TECPS 2
1
2
Chemical cartridge respirator with full facepiece & organic vapour cartridge filter with an assigned protection factor (APF) of 50
Totally encapsulating chemical protective suit
a description of the location and layout of decontamination stations for the
facility;
a list of the decontamination equipment needed;
the appropriate PPE for persons carrying out the decontamination;
appropriate procedures for specific materials that may be encountered;
methods and procedures for preventing secondary contamination of clean areas;
methods and procedures for minimizing worker contact with contaminants
during removal of PPE;

safe disposal methods for clothing and equipment which are not completely
decontaminated; and
revisions whenever the site conditions change, or the facility hazards are re-
assessed based on the new information.
23
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Decontamination facilities
Decontamination is best performed in a specific sequence to reduce levels of
contamination on personnel, PPE, equipment or transport until no contaminant
remains. Facilities should be established to deal with the waste from cleaning
stations so it can be disposed of in an approved manner in order to prevent
secondary pollution.
Decontamination stations should take personnel and equipment from the hot
contaminated zone through a warm cleaning zone to the cold exit point from
the operations area. Movement through these zones should be coordinated to
reduce the possibility of cross contamination.
Contamination zones
clean
contaminated
cold
or
support zone
24
warm
or
contamination
reduction zone
hot
or
exclusion zone
MANAGEMENT OF VOLUNTEERS
Volunteers will frequently offer their services to assist, either as part of the
clean-up team or to assist with wildlife rescue. Volunteers are often
inexperienced and untrained in spill response activity, so this resource can be
both an asset and a liability if their use is not controlled and insufficient care is
given to safety and welfare. For this reason, safe use of volunteers needs careful
thought and planning.
In some areas of the world, volunteers are prohibited from becoming involved in
the response activity unless they can demonstrate that they have undertaken formal
safety training. In other countries it has proved impossible to prevent the public
from becoming involved in the clean-up, and certain countries positively encourage
such assistance. Whichever philosophical approach prevails, the key is to ensure
safety, adequate communication and, where possible, control of the effort.
If volunteers are used in a response activity, it should be in such a way that their
safety is assured. A specific training programme should be provided, identifying
the risk and hazards and how to avoid injury. Volunteers should also be provided
with appropriate PPE and integrated in to the overall command structure to
ensure that they have the benefit of safety information briefings.
Volunteer coordination
Management of volunteers can be difficult as they can be focused on either their
own local environment or their own specific issues. To get the best out of a
volunteer workforce a volunteer coordinator can be included as part of the
response management team. The volunteer coordinator should be responsible
for managing and overseeing all aspects of volunteer participation, including
recruitment, induction and assignment.
A volunteer coordinator would:
coordinate with the response organization to determine where volunteers are
needed;
identify the local skills that are available that can be usefully employed;
identify any necessary skills and training needs;
verify minimum training required, as necessary, with safety manager or units
requesting volunteers (if special skill is required);
25
activate, as necessary, standby contractors for supplementary training needs;

coordinate nearby or on-site training as part of the deployment process;
identify and secure other equipment, materials and supplies;
provide induction safety training for volunteers;
activate pre-registered volunteers if needed;
assess, train and assign volunteers to specific tasks;
coordinate with the logistics section for volunteer housing and meal
Volunteer activities must be coordinated and

the safety aspects managed.
arrangements; and
assist volunteers with other special needs.
Volunteer responders
If volunteers are to be used during the clean-up, they will need to have attained
an acceptable level of competence in clean-up techniques and safety. Training
and supervision will be needed from experienced personnel that can be drawn
from either the response team or from local organizations.
Wildlife volunteers
Often, members of the public are distressed by the reports and sights of oiled
wildlife, and volunteer to assist. In order to minimize distress to the animals
concerned, oiled wildlife often needs special handling by trained personnel. In
some parts of the world professional organizations are available to treat and clean
oiled wildlife. In an ideal world, before volunteers are included in the response,
they should receive professional training and should be supervised during animal
collection or subsequent cleaning operations.
Logistics volunteers
Some volunteers may offer to become involved in the logistics operation
supporting the spill response. Their training needs will depend upon the role in
which the volunteer is engaged. Some support activities would not expose the
volunteer to the risks associated with clean up and therefore only basic training
in the management structure of the response organization will be required.
These types of activities include:
logistics (e.g. procurement, purchasing, inventory control);
transportation (e.g. carpools, trucking);
food preparation and distribution;
first-aid squads; and
personnel services (e.g. lodging, laundry).
26
CONCLUSIONS
The clean up of spilled oil is important, but not as important as ensuring the
safety of those who are involved or may be affected by the spill. The health and
safety of the public and the responders is a critical aspect of a successful
operation. The problem is not a particularly complex one, but one that requires
management, planning and common sense to minimize the risk of accidents.
The risks are well known, and arise for the most part from the natural
environment in which the operations are conducted rather than from the
product itself, particularly as the oil weathers and the lighter fractions evaporate.
Conducting a risk assessment is essential in preparing for safe oil spill clean up
from various operations and working environments. Response managers and
supervisors should be trained in the use of risk assessments and have the
necessary safety training to be able to determine the hazards and put in place
control measures.
Responders should be provided with appropriate training and briefings to ensure
that they are aware of the risks and how to deal with them. Communication of
safety issues is vitally important, as is the provision of appropriate Personal
Protective Equipment to workers.
This report identifies the key issues surrounding responder safety, and is intended
to provide guidance regarding the options available for carrying out safe clean-up
operations. Hopefully it will provoke thoughts to assist in the establishment of a
safety regime to prevent accidents during spill incidents.
27
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
AND FURTHER READING
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to C. Enright (UK Maritime Coastguard Agency) and
D. Salt (OSRL/EARL Alliance) for preparing the base text for this report. The
IPIECA Oil Spill Working Groups review team, consisting of D. ODonovan
(Marine Spill Response CorporationMSRC), R. Self (OSRL/EARL Alliance),
P. Taylor (OSRL/EARL Alliance), B. Dicks and H. Parker (the International
Tanker Owners Pollution FederationITOPF), and S. Seddon-Brown (IPIECA),
provided useful comments and advice. Other valuable feedback was received
from R. Santner (OSRL), D. Blackmore (Australian Marine Oil Spill Response
CentreAMOSC), D. Sobieski (UNOCAL), Gayle Hunting (ChevronTexaco),
R. Pavia (NOAA) and T. Bracher (ChevronTexaco). Photographs were supplied
by Oil Spill Response Limited and they are gratefully acknowledged.
Further reading
US Department of Labor and the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (2001). Training Marine Oil Spill Response Workers Under OSHAs
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard.
28
APPENDIX 1
EXAMPLE SITE SAFETY SURVEY FORM
1. SITE:
2. DATE:
3. TIME:
4. INCIDENT:
5. PRODUCT(S):
(Attach MSDS)
6. Site Characterization (tick all relevant boxes):

6a. Area:
6b. Use:
7. Weather:
Ocean
Shoreline
Commercial
Recreational
Bay
Sandy
Industrial
Residential
River
Rocky
Farming
Other
Saltmarsh
Cliffs
Public
Mudflats
Docks
Government
Ice/frost
Snow
Rain
Wind
Sun
Temperature
8. Site Hazards:
Bird handling
Boat safety
Chemical hazards
Cold stress
Drum handling
Equipment operations
Electrical hazards
Fatigue
Other
Fire, explosion, in-situ burn

Heat stress
Helicopter operations
Lifting
Motor vehicles
Noise
Overhead/buried utilities
Pumps and hoses
Other
Slips, trips and falls

Steam and hot water
Tides
Trenches, excavations
UV radiation
Visibility
Weather
Work near water
Other
9. Air Monitoring:
O2
Benzene
Other (specify)
LEL
10. Personal Protective Equipment:

Foot protection
Impervious suits
Ear protection
Other
H 2S
Coveralls
Eye protection
Respirators
Head protection
Personal floatation
Hand protection
11. Site Facilities Required:

Sanitation
First Aid
Decontamination
12. Emergency Plan Requirements:

Alarm system
Evacuation plan
13. Contact Details Required:

Fire
Doctor
Ambulance
14. Date Plan Completed:
Police
Hospital
Other
15. Plan Completed by:

continued overleaf
29
EXAMPLE SITE SAFETY SURVEY FORM (continued)
Site Name:
Location/Map Reference:
Include work zones, first-aid locations, primary and secondary escape routes,
assembly points, staging area and command post locations.
30
APPENDIX 2
EXAMPLE SITE SAFETY BRIEFING SHEET
Incident:
Project Code:
Site Name:
Location/Map Ref.:
Date:
Time:
Briefing Conducted by:
Topics Covered:
Weather conditions
Injuries and illnesses
Corrective actions/precautions
First aid
Site emergency plan
Site hazards
Oil/chemical hazards
PPE to be worn
Decontamination procedures
Other topics (list below)
Comments:
31
32
Signature
Name
Tests completed by
O2 = Oxygen,
#5
#4
#3
#2
Initial Test
LEL = Lower explosive limit,
Refer to current
industry practice
Benzene
#1
Refer to current
industry practice
<10%
% LEL
H2S
Limits
>19.5%< 22%
Gas Test
% O2
Acceptable
Limits
Date/
time
Date/
time
Results
2nd Follow up
Results
Date/
time
3rd Follow up
TWA = Time weighted average
Date/
time
Follow-up Tests
STEL = Short-term exposure limit,
Results
1st Follow up
H2S = Hydrogen sulphide,
Results
Initial Test
APPENDIX 3
EXAMPLE GAS TESTING RECORD SHEET

(IPIECA) is comprised of oil and gas companies and associations from around the world.
Founded in 1974 following the establishment of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), IPIECA provides the oil and gas industrys principal channel of
communication with the United Nations. IPIECA is the single global association
representing the industry on key environmental issues including oil spill preparedness
and response, global climate change, operational issues and biodiversity.
oil and gas industry. IPIECAs programme takes full account of international
developments in these global issues, serving as a forum for discussion and cooperation
involving industry and international organizations.
Company Members
Association Members
Amerada Hess
American Petroleum Institute (API)
BHP Billiton
Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP)
Bitor

Producers (CAPP)
BP
BG Group
ChevronTexaco
Conoco

(CPPI)
CONCAWE
ENI

(EUROPIA)
ExxonMobil
Institut Franais du Ptrole (IFP)

Producers (OGP)
Maersk Olie og Gas

Marathon Oil
Metasource Pty Ltd (WOODSIDE)
Nexen

(OCIMF)
Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ)
Petroleum Development of Oman

and the Caribbean (ARPEL)
Petronas
Regional Clean Sea Organisation (RECSO)
Saudi Aramco
South African Petroleum Industry

Association (SAPIA)
Pertamina
Shell
Statoil
TotalFinaElf
Unocal
IPIECA

IMO/ IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
GUIDE TO OIL SPILL

EXERCISE PLANNING
VOLUME TWO
I MO
IPIECA
IMO
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations specialized
agency responsible for the improvement of maritime safety and the prevention and
control of marine pollution. There are currently 153 member states and more than 50
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participating in its work which has led to
the adoption of some 30 conventions and protocols, and numerous codes and
recommendations concerning maritime safety and marine pollution. One of the most
important goals of IMOs Strategy for the Protection of the Marine Environment is to
strengthen the capacity for national and regional action to prevent, control, combat
and mitigate marine pollution and to promote technical cooperation to this end.
IPIECA
Through a Strategic Issues Assessment Forum, IPIECA also helps its members identify
new global environmental issues and evaluates their potential impact on the oil
industry. IPIECAs programme takes full account of international developments in
these global issues, serving as a forum for discussion and cooperation involving industry
and international organizations.
.
IMO/IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
GUIDE TO OIL SPILL

EXERCISE PLANNING
VOLUME TWO
IPIECA

IPIECA 1994. . All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
GUIDE TO OIL SPILL EXERCISE PLANNING
CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
EXERCISE CATEGORIES
PLANNING PROCESS
10
PREFACE
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and

Cooperation 1990 (OPRC Convention), which entered into force in May 1995,
Case Study:
Chevron Corporation
provides the framework for international cooperation in combating major oil

pollution incidents. An underlying premise of the OPRC Convention is the
understanding that prompt and effective action is essential in order to minimize the
damage which may result from such an incident. The Convention specifically
recognizes and emphasizes the important role which the oil and shipping industries
have in this regard.
Thus the partnership with IMO and industry is both logical and called for by
international convention. In 1993, a working group of the IMO Marine
11
DESIGN PHASE
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) charged with promoting the
15
Case Study:
implementation of the OPRC and its resolutions agreed that it would be useful for
Chevron Corporation
IMO and industry organizations to produce joint publications where appropriate,
16
Case Study:
Esso Thailand
to avoid duplication and to ensure wider acceptance and common use by

government and industry of the advice contained therein. As a result, collaboration
between IMO and IPIECA has led to the development of a series of joint
17
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
publications. This report, entitled Guide to Oil Spill Exercise Planning, is the second
20
Case Study:
in the series and will be shortly followed by others in this joint publication series.
Mobil Oil Corporation
These publications represent a consensus of industry and government viewpoints

tested through the parallel review process of IMOs Marine Environment
21
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
23
Case Study:
provided by these publications should be useful to governments and concerned
organizations, particularly those of developing countries, desiring to improve
24
Case Study:
Protection Committee and the IPIECA Oil Spill Working Group. The information
capability to deal with oil spillage. IMO and IPIECA have separately published
Petroleos de Venezuela
other manuals and reports on various aspects of oil spill preparedness and response
25
CONDUCTING THE
EXERCISE
Spill Exercise Planning in conjunction with these publications.
27
Case Study:
(see Further Reading on page 32) and the reader is encouraged to review Guide to Oil
Texaco Ltd.
28
Case Study:
Texaco Ltd.
29
REVIEW PHASE
32
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
AND FURTHER READING
INTRODUCTION

Cooperation (OPRC Convention) foresees a future in which all at risk states have
national oil spill preparedness and response plans. The Convention also encourages
the idea that national plans be developed in cooperation with oil and shipping
industries. The ultimate test of any contingency plan is measured by performance
in a real emergency. It is vital, therefore, that any programme for developing a
national contingency plan must include an ongoing programme to test the plan
through realistic exercises. An exercise programme must progressively prepare the
Oil Spill Energy Response Team to perform effectively in realistic representations
of all the risks that the contingency plan has been designed to meet.
This report has been designed to guide all those in government or industry who
are faced with the responsibility of developing and managing oil spill response
exercises at all levels. It carries with it the authority that derives from peer review
by many centres of oil spill response excellence around the world. It is wellillustrated with brief case histories of exercises that have been carried out by many
IPIECA member companies. Each of those companies has indicated its
preparedness to share more information by providing contact name and address
details within this report.
The partnership between IMO and IPIECA reflected in this new joint report
series, of which this is a second volume, is committed to fulfilling the goals of the
OPRC Convention under a project known as the Global Initiative. Within that
project, IMO and industry is committed to facilitating capacity building and the
sharing of experience with and between developing nations. Oil spill training
programmes and exercises provide excellent opportunities to support these goals.
We encourage all government agencies and company crisis management teams to
recognize their exercises and training programmes as opportunities for sharing
experience within the framework of the Global Initiative.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this Guide to Oil Spill Exercise Planning is to provide guidance on the
planning and conducting of exercises designed to evaluate a wide range of oil spill
contingency plans and to train the personnel involved. The Guide first identifies and
describes four categories of oil spill exercise and then establishes an exercise planning
process that involves four stepsdesigning, developing, conducting and reviewing.
The benefits of exercises are many. Response teams are provided with the
opportunity to practice skills that will be required in an emergency, to work
together closely and develop relationships, and to make complex decisions under
stressful circumstances. Plans, equipment and systems will be tested and, with
proper feedback, recommendations made for their improvement. And, by allowing
the public, media and key local organizations to observe and perhaps participate,
government and industry can demonstrate their commitment to managing the risk
of oil spills and protecting the environment.
The IPIECA report A Guide to Contingency Planning for Oil Spills on Water
advocates close cooperation between government and industry in developing oil
spill preparedness and proposes that contingency planning should be a stepwise
process that has an ongoing need for training, exercising and improvement of
plans. The report also advocates the tiered response approach to contingency
planning, which recommends a series of integrated plans be developed at different
levels or tiers (see below).
Right: the Tiered Response
Tier 1: for small spills, often caused during
ship loading, unloading or bunkering, the
response to which should involve local resources
immediately available to the terminal.
large
spill
Tier 2: for moderate spills, often caused by

a minor marine accident or a tank farm or
pipeline accident, the response to which
should involve local and, if necessary,
national resources.
medium
spill
Tier 3: for large spills, usually caused by

major marine accidents or well blowouts, the
response to which should involve local, national
and, if necessary, international resources.
small
spill
Tier
three
Tier
two
Tier
one
local
vicinity
proximity to operations
remote
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Spill response regulations and
The roles and responsibilities of all parties

involved in the plan are defined by the
response team at this contingency planning
seminar in Manila.
practices vary considerably from

country to country. It is essential, for
each plan and at each tier, that the
roles and responsibilities of the
different parties involvedlocal and
national government agencies, the
ship/facility owner, the cargo owner
and the local oil industry in
generalare
defined
at
the
contingency planning stage, and that

these relationships are properly
reflected in the exercising of the plan.
The final authority, however, will
almost always lie with government
and, in an emergency, governments
should be expected to take whatever
course of action they feel necessaryespecially if the plans and capabilities of
others are proving inadequate. Those engaged in contingency planning and
exercise design should always remember this.
It is thus important that government representatives are involved in industryparticipated exercises and that industry representatives participate in
government-initiated exercises. Only by doing so will all parties be able to
explore and understand fully the separate roles and responsibilities. Regular
contact such as this also serves to develop and strengthen the personal
relationships that are so important in times of emergency.
The purpose of conducting exercises is to test the plan, the equipment, and the
capabilities of the response team and the resources that are available to them. No
exercise is therefore complete without assessment and review leading to
recommendations for improvements to the plan, to the availability of resources or
to the training of personnel.
Exercises can be designed to test different aspects of a plan and to achieve different
objectives. By developing a series of exercises for Tier 1, 2 and 3 plans, the whole
oil spill contingency system of a country can be systematically tested and reviewed
as an integrated programme. In all cases, however, there are certain guiding
principles that should be observed when designing and conducting exercises, as
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Ensure that management from the top down supports the

exercise activity.
Set clear, realistic and measurable objectives for an exercise.
The thrust of exercising is to improvenot to impress.
Simpler, more frequent exercises lead to faster

improvements initially.
Do not tackle complex exercises until personnel are

experienced and competent.
Too many activities, locations and participants can

overcomplicate an exercise.
Evaluating the exercise successfully is as important as

conducting it successfully.
Planning and conducting a successful exercise is a

significant accomplishment.
PRINCIPLES
GUIDING
shown in the box below.
This Guide is written for the benefit of all those who would be involved in oil spill
response, particularly those with responsibility for planning and responding to oil
spills within national and local government authorities, oil companies and shipping
companies. All those who would be involved in responding to oil spills should be
involved in the contingency planning processthe last, but ongoing activity of
which is exercising.
EXERCISE CATEGORIES
A well-coordinated programme of oil spill exercises includes activities of varying

degrees of interaction and complexity. Separating the exercises into categories
allows different aspects of a plan to be exercised separately and promotes
understanding of the purpose and scope of the whole plan. Four exercise categories
are identified, i.e. notification exercises, tabletop exercises, equipment deployment
exercises and incident management exercises.
Notification exercise
Notification exercises test the procedures to alert and call out the response teams and
are conducted through telephone and other means of communication, as stipulated
in the response plan. They can be used to test communications systems, check
availability of personnel, evaluate travel options and the speed at which travel
arrangements can be made, and assess the ability to transmit information quickly
and accurately. Such an exercise will typically last one to two hours and may be
held at any time, day or night, announced or unannounced.
This notification exercise taking place in

Oman was designed to test alert and response
procedures in the event of a spill.
Tabletop exercises
Tabletop exercises normally consist of interactive discussions of a simulated scenario
among members of a response team but do not involve the mobilization of
personnel or equipment. They are usually conducted in a conference room or
series of rooms connected by telephone lines, and focus on the roles and actions of
the individuals, the interactions between the various parties and the development
of information and response strategies. A simple and early form of tabletop exercise
would be a response team going through the contingency plan, page by page,
testing each others activities in response to an imaginary situation. A more
complex tabletop exercise might involve several groups, including outside parties,
playing their roles. A tabletop exercise exercise might typically last two to eight hours
A tabletop exercise under way in Nigeria focuses

on the roles and actions of the individuals likely
to be involved in a real spill scenario.
and should be announced well ahead of time to ensure availability of personnel.

Equipment deployment exercise
Equipment deployment exercises involve the deployment of oil spill response
equipment at particular locations in response to an oil spill scenario and in
accordance with strategies laid down in the plan for a particular spill scenario.
These exercises test the capability of a local team to respond to a Tier 1 or 2 type
spill, provide experience of local conditions and of spill scenarios and enhance
individual skills and teamwork. It is important that other parties who would
An exercise in equipment deployment taking

place in Brazil
normally be part of such a response, such as providers of boats, barges and trucks,
be involved so that their availabilities and capabilities can be assessed; other
organizations might also be invited to observe. Such an exercise would typically last
four to eight hours and should be repeated frequently until teams are acquainted
with the equipment. In some instances, an equipment deployment exercise might be
run in conjunction with a tabletop exercise or incident management exercise. This can
enhance the reality of the exercises but can be more complicated to oversee.
Incident management exercises
Incident management exercises are often more complex in that they simulate several
different aspects of an oil spill incident and involve third parties. Such an exercise
may be of limited scope, for example, using own personnel to role-play the main
external parties, or of full scope, when outside agencies and organizations are
The deployment of booms is the focus of this
equipment deployment exercise in the
Philippines.
invited to provide personnel to play their own roles within the exercise. Whilst
internal exercises are beneficial in the early stages of team development, it is only
by exercising with the actual people who would be involved in a real emergency
that a response team can be properly tested and trained.
Incident management exercises require significant planning in terms of availability of
personnel, development of an adequate scenario and the physical arrangements for
staging such events. Normally, an Exercise Steering Committee is formed to
develop and run the exercise. Although not as realistic, it is most convenient from
the point of view of controlling the exercise and debriefing participants at the end
if the main players are accommodated in the same building. In the case of a major
tanker spill, this might, in some countries, include the incident management team,
field operations team, tanker owner, cargo owner, government/industry liaison and
An incident management exercise might only

involve own personnel, or be extended to
involve external parties to give greater
authenticity to the different aspects of a
simulated incident.
press/media. If players are dispersed over several locations, maintaining control of

external communications becomes difficult and care must be taken to ensure the
exercise does not spread beyond its defined boundaries.
Often, incident management exercises last one long day, typically 1014 hours,
followed by debriefing sessions on the second day. If the exercise is to be extended
into a second day, efforts must be made to maintain the atmosphere of emergency
overnight and to plan specific events for the following day. Debriefing might then
be scheduled for the third day.
PLANNING PROCESS
Exercise planning consists of four separate activitiesdesign, develop, conduct and

reviewthat collectively describe the process for creating and running realistic and
successful exercises. The process cycle is illustrated in the figure below and defined
as follows:
Design:
The design phase sets the objectives and scope and sets out the
timetable necessary for completion.
Develop: The development phase describes those steps that are taken to create
the exercise and prepare and organize fully for exercise activities.
This phase must take into account the public affairs/media aspects of
any exercise.
Conduct: The actual conduct of the exercise activity consists of initiating and
maintaining the exercise by simulating, monitoring, controlling and
facilitating activities to ensure that the exercise remains within the
design parameters. It also involves documentation of the participants
activities and termination of the exercise.
Review:
The review phase consists of collecting and analysing data,

documenting findings and recommendations for improvement, and
ensuring information is fed back to management. As the contingency
plan is revised and updated, the exercise programme is similarly
adjusted to take into account the lessons learned from prior exercises.
The exercise planning process
Design
appoint coordinator
set objectives
determine scope
establish plan
set the date
obtain approval
Exercise programme
Develop
establish coordination/
initiate Steering Group
develop scenario
finalize plans
set public affairs objectives
Review
collect data
analyse events
report findings
make recommendations
effect improvements
Conduct
brief participants
initiate play
maintain exercise
evaluate activities
terminate play
Contingency plan
Case study
Chevron Corporation
Equipment deployment and incident management exercise at the Chevron
Overseas Petroleum Inc. (COPI) Kutubu production site, Papua New Guinea
Exercise description
Chevron Niugini Pty. Ltd. and Chevron Emergency Response Staff jointly sponsored an
equipment deployment and incident management exercise at the Chevron Overseas
Petroleum Inc. (COPI) Kutubu production site in Papua New Guinea (PNG). This
exercise involved more than 100 people from Chevron, joint venture partners and
government representatives from Papua New Guinea and Australia. Responders
participated at four locations (three in Papua New Guinea and one in the United States).
Exercise scenario
On the morning of 12 October 1993, a barge strayed from the marked ship channel
in the Kikori River and ran into the submerged pipeline two kilometres north of
Kikori. Approximately 3,500 bbls of Kutubu light crude was spilled (simulated) into
the Kikori River.
Exercise activities are coordinated from the

Command Centre at Iagifu.
Key drill objectives
To exercise deployment of Level 1 response equipment.

To exercise the following contingency plan particulars: notification, crisis
communication, incident command and pipeline repair.
To test Chevrons company-wide resources in responding to an international spill
incident.
To demonstrate response readiness and familiarize key PNG and Australian
government staff.
Recommendations
To improve management of communication system during the early stages of a

response.
To prepare pre-event information packages (facility details, safety statistics, spill
records and easy-to-read maps) for media and government inquiries.
To continue to use standardized Incident Command and Response Management
Systems worldwide.
To continue Chevrons company-wide drill programme.
Equipment deployment at Kopi Camp
Response team arriving at airportabout

one hours drive from the Command Centre
For more information contact: Mr George Jardim, Coordinator, Emergency Response, Chevron Corporation, 575 Market Street, San Francisco,
CA USA 94105. Telephone: 1 (415) 894 2107 Fax: 1 (415) 894 7336 E-mail: [email protected]
10
DESIGN PHASE
The design phase lays the groundwork for development of the exercise and is
described in six activities: appoint exercise coordinator; set objectives; determine
scope; establish specific plans; propose date; and obtain management approval.
Appoint Exercise Coordinator
Appointment of an Exercise Coordinator assigns responsibility for the exercise.
The Exercise Coordinator is charged with the overall management of the exercise
activity, including the design, development, conduct and review phases. Neither
the coordinator nor those who may later assist him in running the exercise should
participate as a player. In the design phase, the Exercise Coordinator makes the
necessary contacts, develops broad proposals for the exercise and obtains
management approval.
Set objectives
The ultimate test of a contingency plan occurs when an oil spill happens. The
success of a response to an oil spill will be judged on the extent and efficiency with
which specific aspects are managed, including: speed of response; competency of
response team; adequacy of equipment and of its deployment; dissemination of
information; effectiveness of clean-up; management of complaints and claims;
handling media and public relations; and relations with external agencies.
Recognizing the criteria by which a teams performance will be judged in the event
of a real spill allows exercise objectives to be set to test specific aspects of a
contingency plan. It is recommended that exercises initially be kept simple with
relatively few objectives to allow team members to become acquainted with the
plan and to gain experience. Similarly, it is wise to test internal elements first
before involving external agencies and activities. Two or three primary objectives
are better than a long list of secondary objectives and will enable a specific scenario
to be developed that gives realism to the exercise, stretches the team and adds to
their knowledge and ability. At the conclusion of the exercise, performance can be
judged against the set objectives. Failure to set appropriate objectives can lead to
poorly-designed exercises and overconfident or, alternatively, demoralized teams.
Typical objectives for a Tier 1 equipment deployment exercise could cover speed of
response, equipment familiarity and correct equipment positioning and, for
example, could be described as:
11
response team assembled within 15 minutes of call out;

booms deployed in a specific manner within 30 minutes of assembly; and
oil recovery/storage systems in place and operational within 45 minutes of
assembly.
Objectives for Tier 2 or 3 tabletop exercises could emphasize the teams ability to set
up the emergency centre, gather relevant information, establish a response strategy
and order the mobilization of resources, and might be described as:
An oil spill response team makes ready their
equipment after being called out to an
equipment deployment exercise.
establish, equip and staff the emergency centre within 30 minutes of call out;
acquire information from different sources, assess and report the situation
and prognosis;
agree a realistic response strategy, estimate equipment needed and
deployment times;
identify equipment availability and authorize mobilization; and
test the strategic decision-making process, for example, for using dispersants.
Full scope Tier 2 or 3 incident management exercises require broader sets of

objectives agreed in advance with all involved parties, and a well-developed
scenario with regular detailed inputs of information and problems to fully engage
the many players. Some examples of exercise objectives might be:
practice the interconnected roles of government and industry players;
analyse information, assess situations, establish response strategies;
develop seven-day prognosis, estimate extent of impact and cost of clean up;
test ability to handle aggressive media and environmental enquiries; and
agree pollution damage assessment studies with authorized agencies.
Determine exercise scope

This step addresses the questions of how ambitious the exercise should behow
many people, parties and outside agencies should be involved, where it should be
located and how long it should last. Other factors such as what advance
information the team should receive and whether they are allowed to make
preparations are also decided. Many of these items will depend upon the exercise
objectives previously set. It is important to remember that the scope of the exercise
is not necessarily a function of the size of the supposed spill.
12
DESIGN PHASE
Some questions that should be asked when considering the scope of a given
exercise are:
Which other parties would be involved in the response and should they be
omitted, included or role-played in the exercise?

To what degree should external groups such as the media, interest groups and
members of the public be involved or role-played?

Should both personnel and physical resources be mobilized?
What time could be allowed for the exercise, including debriefing?
Establish exercise plan

It is important to plan exercises well in advance in order to ensure the
availability of personnel and to make full use of the opportunity the exercise
presents. The following are considered typical planning periods for the different
categories of exercise:
Notification exercise:
14 months
Tabletop exercise:
26 months
Equipment deployment exercise: 24 months

Incident management exercise:
610 months
A pre-brief initiation takes place before the

team embarks on their response.
The timing and duration of an exercise should be carefully considered. Although

oil spills can occur at any time of the year, there is no reason to schedule full
exercises in periods which would be inconvenient to the majority of the players (for
example, weekends, holidays, or in the middle of the night) or when there might be
specific dangers (for example, in bad weather conditions) unless the exercise is
specifically designed to test availabilities and capabilities in these periods.
Exercises should preferably be designed to last one working day, even if the day is a
long one. It may be difficult to maintain an atmosphere of crisis throughout a night
and into a second day, although probably necessary in the case of a full-scope
incident management exercise. A schedule for such an extended exercise might be:
Day 1: call-out, travel, assembly, pre-briefing, initiation of exercise.
Day 2: response, crisis management, deployment and recovery of equipment.
Day 3: completion of exercise, debriefing and travel home.
13
The objectives will determine the location for the exercisewhether it can be run
Exercise participants likely to be
involved in a full-scope
incident management exercise
involving a tanker spill
adequately from the teams own offices or whether the team needs to travel and set
up a response centre elsewhere. In the latter instance, one should first consider
areas of greatest oil spill risk or areas of particular environmental sensitivity. The
greater the variety of exercise, the greater the training benefit.
national authorities
local authorities
Exercises cost money and the more extensive the exercise the higher the cost. A
full incident management exercise, including equipment mobilization, might cost in
the order of US$500,000. Exercise budgets should include, where appropriate,
estimates for travel and accommodation, hire of facilities and equipment, and the
harbour authorities
services of external advisers and contractors. The time and cost of developing the
exercise and supporting materials is usually significant and needs to be included.
emergency services
Forward budget allocation is a good reason for planning exercise programmes on
annual cycles.
local environmental groups
oil spill response contractors
shipping company (tanker owner)
oil company (cargo owner)
local oil company association
regional oil spill centres
insurance interests (ITOPF, P&I Club)
Finally, a list of exercise participantsagencies, organizations and individuals

should be agreed and their availability and commitment to the process sought. For
a full-scope incident management exercise involving a tanker spill, such a list might
include those detailed in the box on the left.
Set the date
A date should be chosen that allows sufficient time for planning and facilitates
maximum participation and minimum work-place disruption.
Obtain management approval
It is essential that senior management approve the initial exercise proposal and
design basis, including estimates of costs and manpower, to ensure that
management at all levels understands, supports and where appropriate, participates
in the exercise activity. Exercises need to be adequately resourced in terms of
salvage companies
money and manpower and a tracking system to monitor the exercise may be
necessary to control costs.
14
Case study
Chevron Corporation
Response team training at the Chevron Niugini Pty. Ltd. Kutubu production
site, Papua New Guinea (PNG)
Response team training at the Kutubu production site included incident command
training followed by a tabletop drill to exercise the facilitys plan. The exercise
provided responders with the opportunity to become familiar with their plan and with
the Incident Command System.
Exercise scenario
On the morning of 24 April 1994 a production field gathering pipeline was damaged,
releasing 5,300 bbls of Kutubu light crude into the Arakoya River and, subsequently,
into the Hegigio River.
Team briefs are an important element of

response team training.
To ensure that PNG spill response team members are familiar with, and make
efficient use of, their contingency plan.
To ensure that the PNG spill response organization understands the Incident
Command System.
To provide the spill response team with practice in the use of the daily planning cycle.
Recommendations
To continue to use a standardized Incident Command System (ICS) and Response

Management System (RMS).
To provide periodic training to maintain proficiency in using the ICS, RMS and
contingency plan.
To prepare pre-event information packages (facility details, safety statistics, spill
records, and easy-to-read maps) for outside inquiries.
Status boards provide an effective way to track

the overall response effort.
For more information contact: Mr George Jardim, Coordinator, Emergency Response, Chevron Corporation, 575 Market Street, San Francisco,
CA USA 94105. Telephone: 1 (415) 894 2107 Fax: 1 (415) 894 7336 E-mail: [email protected]
15
Case study
Esso Thailand Ltd.
Operation TapexEsso Thailand Ltd. National Oil Spill Response Plan
exercise, Sattahip, Thailand
Exercise Description
Operation Tapex was held in September 1995 at Sattahip, Thailand and involved the
following activities:
activation of the National Plan by the Harbour Department;
establishment of Coordination and Operation Command Centres;
mobilization of local equipment and response teams;
mobilization of oil spill response (OSR) equipment from East Asia Response Ltd.
(Singapore) by the Royal Thai Airforce;
trial deployment of both containment/recovery and dispersant spraying equipment
at Sattahip Navy Base;
involvement of Esso Thailand, Exxon Regional Core Team, IESG and government
agencies in the activities of the Coordination and Operation Command Centres.
Response team deploying booms offshore
The exercise involved several government agencies (Royal Thai Navy, Royal Thai
Airforce, Harbour Department, Pollution Control Department etc.), Esso Thailand,
personnel from regional Esso affiliates and the Oil Industry Environmental Safety
Group (IESG); and a total of 300 government and industry personnel.
Exercise Scenario
Early on 4 September 1995, the Esso tanker Esso Tapex and a cargo vessel
MV September collided in the Gulf of Thailand some 12 km off Sattahip. The tanker
was damaged both above and below the waterline on the starboard side and some 5,000
tonnes of crude oil were spilled. The slick drifted to the north-east, threatening
sensitive fishing and tourist areas.
Beach boom deployment
To exercise the National Oil Spill Response Plan in conjunction with Esso
Thailand.
To mobilize national and regional resources.
To mobilize the Exxon Regional Core Team.
To exercise joint management of a major oil spill incident.
The Minister of Transport visits the OSR

equipment display
Recommendations
To improve communications between Centres and the field; existing arrangements

were found to be inadequate.
To review procedures and improve equipment availability; roles and responsibilities
were not always well defined.
To review the procedures of different parties for smooth interfacing; there could
have been better coordination of information and expertise.
To consider the establishment of a National Oil Spill Advisory Team; delays were
experienced in agreeing dispersant spraying strategies.
To establish clear guidelines for the spraying of dispersants in Thai waters.
Working togetherrepresentatives from

different participating agencies coordinate
exercise activities from a central location
For more information please contact: Mr Somrat Yindepit, Oil Spill Coordinator, Esso Thailand Ltd., 3195/17-29 Rama IV Road, Bangkok,
Thailand 10110. Telephone: 66 (2) 262 4171 Fax: 66 (2) 262 4814
16
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
The development steps covered hereestablish coordination, develop scenario,

finalize plans and select public affairs objectivesare common and may be applied
to exercises of different categories, scope and objectives.
Establish coordination/initiate Steering Group
In the development phase, the Exercise Coordinator is responsible for developing
detailed exercise plans. In the case of an exercise of limited scope, such as a
notification exercise or an equipment deployment exercise, the Exercise Coordinator is
probably able to make the necessary arrangements and manage the process himself.
However, in a fuller scope exercise that has many objectives and involves several
parties, it will be necessary to establish a small exercise Steering Group, chaired by
the Exercise Coordinator and comprising four to six people representing the major
participating organizations. The Steering Group has the responsibility of
developing the exercise, arranging for all facilities and services, and coordinating its
various parts and parties. To achieve this, it is important that the group meet
regularly and keep the exercise objectives and scope firmly in mind. Exercise
objectives of participating groups may differ, as will budgets. Steering Group
members should ensure the objectives of their own organization are incorporated
into the exercise and that their management approves the overall exercise proposal.
Develop scenario
The exercise scenario provides the details of the imagined incident and its
development over time, i.e. the circumstances of the accident, the amount and type
of oil spilled and the fate and impact of the oil. The scenario should not be made
known in advance to response team(s) and situation updates and other information
should periodically be made available and circulated amongst the players, much as
it would in an actual incident. It is this regular input of information that drives the
exercise to a conclusion, keeps the players alert and raises in a proper sequence the
issues that have to be faced.
The scenario should be realistic and the details accurate to the extent that local
conditions allow. For instance, it is more realistic to use actual weather and tidal
conditions but if these are not conducive to achieving certain exercise objectives
then it is better that these details are inputs to the exercise. It will be necessary for
the Exercise Coordinator or the Steering Group to visit the chosen location before
the exercise to ensure the information in the briefing packages is accurate.
17
Building in realism; in this oil spill exercise,

the application of dispersants is simulated
using vegetable colouring as a substitute for
the real thing.
In the more complex exercises there is plenty of scope for increasing the confusion
and stress of the initial situationfor example, by injecting misleading reports,
aggressive role-playing media, and political and local interest interventions. Such
inputs need to be carefully controlled so that they do not prevent the primary
objectives of the exercise being achieved.
Finalize plans
Certain facilities and services are critical to the success of an exercise and it is better
to ensure their availability by identifying and reserving them in advance, rather than
making these items part of the response teams activities, as would be the case in a
real incident. Included in such items are operation centre(s), communications,
meals, accommodation and transport. In addition, certain materials will need to be
developed to brief the participants on the scope of the exercise, to input and update
incident information and to facilitate reporting and assessment of the exercise.
In some locations, there will be an obvious choice of location for the spill response
centrefor example, the local authorities emergency centre or the emergency
room of a refinery. Where no such specific facility exists, hotels can often provide
18
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
rooms and reasonable communication facilities. The contingency plan should

stipulate the requirements of a spill response centre in terms of size and number of
rooms, communication facilities, etc. and should also have identified suitable
facilities within the geographical area covered by the plan. The response team
should bring with them the necessary maps, lists and reference material which
should be an integral part of the contingency plan.
All participants will require an exercise briefing which describes the scope of the
exercise, lists the locations and players who will be involved and advises procedures
for concluding the exercise and debriefing participants. The briefing should be
given immediately before the exercise starts, either verbally or via a handout, and
limited to the essentials for the good running of the exercise. The atmosphere of
uncertainty and tension should be allowed to build.
Situation updates and the method and timing of their injection into the exercise need to
be agreed and worked out in detail. Facilitators have an important role in ensuring that
this information is made available in a timely and realistic manner. Information should
be visually descriptivefor example, photographs can be shaded to give the appearance
of oil pollution and maps can be produced to simulate aircraft reconnaissance reports
on the position and extent of oil slicks. Some of the inputs can be made indirectly by
personnel role-playing third parties, causing the response team not only to consider the
dependability of the information but to manage relationships with the characters.
It is important to ensure that exercise results are captured, analysed, presented, and
utilized effectively and efficiently. It is useful for the debriefing of participants and
reporting of the exercise to record the general atmosphere and specific events by
taking photographs and using audio/video equipment. The exercise coordinator and
the steering group should agree what formal outputs from the exercise are required,
how performances will be assessed and what follow-up activities there should be.
Select public affairs objectives
Handling the media can be a considerable challenge for response team managers in
both actual emergencies and in exercises. Care should be taken when selecting
public affairs objectives so that the response team can experience realistic situations
without being pushed beyond its capabilities. A more detailed analysis of public
affairs and the role of the media is presented in the following section.
19
Case study
Mobil Regional Response Team (MRRT) exercise, Crete, Greece
On 2326 January 1995, 55 personnel from the Europe/Africa/Middle East (EAME)
MRRT were mobilized to a remote location for an exercise that included notification
and callout, emergency travel and establishment of a command centre. The team
worked with local and international (OSRL) resources and coordinated with the local
affiliate (Mobil Oil Hellas) and government agencies, principally the Hellenic Coast
Guard. The exercise did not include equipment deployment.
Exercise scenario
A Mobil VLCC en route from Sidi Kerir, Egypt to Fos, France is diverted to go to the
aid of a vessel in distress about 60 km off the southern coast of Crete. While involved
in rescue operations, the VLCC is struck by another vessel resulting in the release of
31,500 bbls (4,500 tonnes) of Arabian crude oil.
The response team holding discussions with the

Hellenic Coast Guard
To exercise activation/callout/mobilization procedures of EAME MRRT to a

remote location, and to test the preparedness of the local affiliate Crisis
Management Team (CMT).
To exercise cooperation with the local authorities, ITOPF, OSRL and local
contractors.
To test the capability of MRRT to integrate with the local affiliate CMT and to
undertake the transition from an emergency phase to a project phase for spill
response.
Recommendations
To prioritize Mobils Tier 2/3 risks in the EAME region and, in conjunction with
affiliate pre-planning activities, to assess the ability of a country to respond
effectively to major spills, thereby adapting MRRT response strategies accordingly.
To continue pre-planning efforts involving Mobil affiliates to address key issues
more quickly and to enhance the operational effectiveness of the local affiliate CMT
and the MRRT.
To ensure that key MRRT members receive periodic media training.
To design the next exercise scenario to test EAME MRRT under increasingly
realistic conditions, and to include some equipment deployment.
Incident Commanders meet with the affiliate

Crisis Management Team
For more information contact: Mr Bob DeHart, Environmental Health and Safety, Mobil Oil Corporation, 3225 Gallows Road, Fairfax,
Virginia 22037-0001, USA. Telephone: 1 (703) 846 2045 Fax: 1 (703) 846 2898
20
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Handling the media in an oil spill crisis is often crucial to the public perception of
the performance and attitude of those responding. In major oil spill incidents,
handling the media and managing the crisis consumes much of the time of
response team managers and, in turn, the time of senior personnel in government
and industry. An important part of the exercise development phase is, therefore, to
decide the extent to which public affairs aspects will be played. Exercise planners
should take care to choose public affairs objectives that create realistic situations
and provide public affairs personnel with practice of managing oil spill issues.
Selecting public affairs objectives
Public affairs objectives may include the response groups ability to:
handle enquiries, assemble facts, draft responses and obtain requisite
management approvals;
prepare public statements;
maintain government/industry liaison;
interact directly with the media in interviews or press conferences;
monitor news reports and react to them;
organize a meeting with concerned citizens/officials; and
coordinate information flow.
Experience has shown that response groups can be overwhelmed quickly by

repeated organizational and public affairs challenges, both in actual emergencies
and in exercises. Therefore, exercise planners should choose objectives carefully so
as to stretch but not over-stretch the response team capabilities. As those
capabilities are developed, more difficult situations and more complex
organizational interactions can be set.
Media relations
Where exercise planners wish to test the capability of the response organization to
handle the media, it is preferable to employ company personnel or outside
consultants to simulate media interjections. Simulations can range from phoned
questions, to one-on-one interviews, to full press conferences. Video camera
recordings can be used to increase realism and to provide a learning tool for
interviewed personnel. Questions and requests posed by the simulation group
should be realistic and demanding in the context of the drill.
21
Briefing the media: if the media are involved

in an exercise they should be encouraged to play
a particular role and should be provided with
sufficient information in advance to enable
them to play that role constructively.
It is usually better not to involve real media in exercises unless it is believed that
exercise results will promote public confidence in local or national preparedness. At
other times, the involvement of the media may be unavoidable, for example when
they are invited to observe by other parties or when the exercise is on an open
beach. Then it is better to have the media play a particular role in the exercise and
provide them with sufficient information for them to play that role constructively.
Individuals should be designated to brief them prior to the exercise and accompany
them during the exercise. When involving outsiders, special care should be taken
to ensure the boundaries of the exercise are understood and maintained so that the
incident is not inadvertently mistaken for a real emergency by the general public.
The involvement of the media may be
unavoidable; personnel should be designated to
accompany them at all times to ensure that no
part of the exercise is at any time mistaken for
a real emergency.
Special badges or passes should identify personnel engaged in the exercise and
every telephone call or written message should be prefixed by the word exercise.
External community relations
In any oil spill situation, the cooperation of the local community is essential for an
effective response. Not only will the responders need to hire local personnel,
equipment and facilities but will require assistance and information from many
local authorities, organizations and individuals. Relationships with the community,
therefore, should be established at an early stage and may be practised in an
extended exercise by simulating contacts with local officials, environmental groups,
hoteliers and members of the general public. Company personnel or consultants
may be used to simulate these roles. If other government officials and industry
representatives are invited to observe the exercise, personnel should be assigned
and an appropriate programme organized so that they are properly briefed and can
view the main exercise activities without interrupting the players.
Equipment
Equipment for successful public affairs exercises is modest but essential to create an
atmosphere of crisis. This should include two or three phone lines available to
role-players playing third party interventions, fax machines to receive written
enquiries and to send press statements and possibly video and audio recording
equipment to add realism to interviews and press conferences.
22
Case study
Mobil Regional Response Team (MRRT) exercise, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
The Mobil Regional Response Team (MRRT) exercise, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was
held over two half days from 89 May 1995. The exercise involved 25 members of the
central sub-team of the Pacrim MRRT. As outlined in the Malaysian National
Contingency Plan, this exercise emphasized the transition issues involved with the
local affiliate (Mobil Oil Malaysia) and the MRRT, and also involved government
agencies (Departments of Marine and Environment) and PIMMAG to establish the
validity of Mobils contingency plans and to promote good working relationships. The
MRRT also tested their coordination abilities with EARL and PAJthe major
response organizations in the region.
Press conference for local Kuala Lumpur media
Exercise scenario
A Mobil VLCC en route through the Malacca Straits to Japan is struck by a cargo vessel
resulting in the release of 40,000 bbls (5,700 tonnes) of crude oil. The incident occurs
near Kuala Lumpur, and the spill threatens the Malaysian coastline. The exercise did
not include equipment deployment.
To test the preparedness of the local affiliate Crisis Management Team (CMT) in
being Mobils first responders to the scene.
To work with Malaysian authorities and regional (EARL and PAJ) and local
cooperatives to develop and implement response strategies.
To simulate activation of response equipment from EARL and the PAJ stockpile in
Port Klang.
Exercise debriefing session
Recommendations
To improve communications and information flow, both within and outside the
MRRT and the affiliate CMT.
To identify the need for expert advise on marine legal issues pertaining to cargo
ownership and liability implications.
To establish arrangements with regional public affairs consultants to assist and
supplement affiliate staff with PA support.
To increase the number and effectiveness of MRRT notification drills for MRRT
members.
To continue to improve MRRT Functional Action Plans.
For more information contact: Mr Bob DeHart, Environmental Health and Safety, Mobil Oil Corporation, 3225 Gallows Road, Fairfax,
Virginia 22037-0001, USA. Telephone: 1 (703) 846 2045 Fax: 1 (703) 846 2898
23
Case study
Petroleos de Venezuela
National Contingency Plan (NCP) oil spill drill, El Palito, Venezuela
Organizations participating in the El Palito exercise included PDVSA, PDV-Marina,
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Coast Guard,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Energy and Mines, CIED. A total of 700 people
were involved. It was the responsibility of the response team to ensure that all
communications began and ended with the phrase this is a simulation. All actions were
carried out in chronological time during the daylight and personal safety was held as the
first priority. The exercise was evaluated by expert groups within the oil industry.
Exercise scenario
The tanker Caripe raises anchor from loading at terminal Cardon with a load of 364,000
bbls of oil 30 API. It crashes heavily into Dolphin 2 during manoeuvre whilst mooring
astern in El Palito terminal. Side tankers four and five suffer damage causing an oil spill
of 30,000 bbls. Eight marines are injured and one crew member dies. Wind/current
conditions cause the oil spill to spread to the national park of Morrocoy. The spill will
affect benches, a power plant and the national park if no control measures are taken.
PDVSA Regional Committee Working

Meeting for the oil spill drill
To evaluate the response capability of the plan.

To identify weaknesses and to build on strengths within the NCP.
To develop activities which were key to controlling the spill, including:
the elimination of the source of the oil spill;
actions to control and collect oil from water;
the application of dispersing agent (vegetable colouring was used in the exercise)
using helicopter, aeroplane and tug boat;
monitoring the trajectory of the oil spill using SIMAP, a mathematical simulation
program capable of projecting the theoretical pattern of the behaviour of the spill;
restoration procedures (clean-up) of coastline;
activation and review of the insurance process; and
activation and evaluation of the mass media communication process.
Equipment deployment exercise at El Palito
Recommendations
Twenty-one processes were evaluated during the exercise and the following
recommendations were made:
to reinforce the cooperation between the coastguard and the oil industry;
to continue with the training programme practices, both practical and theory, in
order to reinforce the overall organization of the plan; and
to increase the capacity of the equipment to cope with the collection of an oil spill of
15,000 bbls in the area according to the guidelines of the plan.
Rescue operations during the oil spill drill at
El Palito.
For more information, contact: Mr Jesus Acosta, Contingency Plans Manager, Petroleos de Venezuela, Avenida Libertador, La Campina,
Apartado Postal 169, Caracas 1010-A, Venezuela. Telephone: 58 (2) 708 4111 Fax: 58 (2) 708 4661
24
CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE
The conduct of an exercise consists of briefing participants, initiating play,

maintaining the exercise, evaluating activities and, finally, terminating play.
Briefing participants
All participants will require an exercise briefing, preferably verbally with a prepared
handout, that describes the category, scope and objectives of the exercise and
introduces the main players. This is best done by gathering the players together
immediately before the start of the exercise when the Exercise Coordinator can
pass out copies of a briefing note and answer any questions the players may have. If
several locations are to be involved in the exercise, facilitators should provide the
briefing simultaneously at each location. In the case of a notification exercise, when
one of the objectives is to test team members availability and response times, any
briefing should be given a couple of weeks in advance but the exact time and day of
the exercise should not be disclosed. Boundaries of the exercise should be carefully
defined and instructions given to preface initiating communications and all
contacts with outside parties with the words this is an exercise, or similar.
Initiating play
Deciding how the exercise should be initiated is important for establishing realism
and urgency. Clear responsibility for initiating play at a predetermined time and in
a prescripted manner should be established. Normally this would be by a telephone
call, from a facilitator playing the role of the captain of the ship or the operator of
the terminal, to an established notification point such as the local emergency
centre, coastguard or company offices, according to the plan. This information can
be delivered as a written message or by fax but a telephone call is more realistic and
more demanding. It is important that such information is communicated quickly to
the other participating parties. Whilst this should be by established procedures as
described in the relevant contingency plans, it is often worthwhile to check that
lines of communication have been established at an early stage, rather than risk
delays in starting the exercise.
Maintaining the exercise
The pace and direction of the exercise is set by the series of scripted and timed
interjections that provides and updates information on the imagined incident and
makes different demands on the teams being exercised. It is important to have
prepared sufficient interjections, both in number and scope, to drive the exercise to
25
All participants will require an exercise

briefing to define the category, scope and
objectives of the exercise. This is best carried out
immediately before the start of the exercise and
should also serve to introduce the main players
and to emphasize the care needed when
communicating with outside parties in order
that the boundaries of the exercise are not
misunderstood.
termination and to allow the objectives to be met. The Exercise Coordinator and
directing staff should monitor the flow of information and the activities of each
responding party carefully in order to troubleshoot problems and keep play within
the design parameters. If necessary, a temporary halt should be called to clarify
rules or to correct misunderstandings, rather than allow a confused situation to
develop to the detriment of the exercise and to individual reputations and
relationships. At other times it may be necessary to pause, regroup and review
current activities and objectives, make appropriate adjustments and then resume
the exercise.
Evaluating activities
Evaluation of exercise activities begins during the exercise as the designated
evaluators observe team members responses and compare them with the
expectations of exercise objectives. Evaluators should be elected carefully and
provided with some training to allow them to perform their tasks well. The manner
in which evaluators are to measure the performance of individuals and of the teams
in general should also be described in advance and some form of score sheet
developed to record the timeliness, quantity and quality of response activities.
Terminating play
Orderly termination of exercise activities is critical to ensuring that play ends
positively and tidily. An exercise should not end at a prescribed time but rather
when the Exercise Coordinator, in conjunction with other directing staff,
determines that exercise objectives have been achieved to the extent possible and
that there is little further benefit to be gained. The announcement that the exercise
is over should then be passed quickly between all participants.
26
Case study
Texaco Ltd.
Exercise DimitriTexaco Greek Petroleum Co. emergency response exercise,
Gulf of Elefsis, Greece
The Dimitri oil spill drill was the first live marine emergency response exercise
carried out by an oil company in Greece in conjunction with government authorities
and contractors. A Joint Response Centre was established close to the scene of the
incident, and the Texaco National Response Team, the Greek Coastguard and
participating contractors worked well together, establishing priorities and ensuring that
decisions were reached quickly and implemented effectively. The exercise attracted
considerable media attention as well as visitors from government ministries, state and
local communities, environmental groups and other petroleum companies.
Exercise scenario
The oil spill exercise begins on the shoreline of

the Gulf of Elefsis, Greece
A collision due to steerage failure took place between a coastal vessel and a Texaco
time-chartered coastal tanker more than one mile offshore in the Gulf of Elefsis. The
tanker was loaded with 1,350 tonnes of marine bunker fuel en route to the Rien
terminal. The collision breached two wing tanks with an immediate release of 25
tonnes of bunker fuel into the sea.
To test the Texaco Greek Petroleum Co. emergency response procedures for
handling a major marine incident.
To activate the Texaco National Response Team and exercise their coordination
with Texaco Europe, external Greek agencies and Government Departments.
To produce the planning and physical response to a marine oil spill in conjunction
with Ministry of Merchant Marine, Marine Environmental Protection Division and
Environmental Protection Engineering Ltd., the spill response contractor.
Emergency communications equipment in action
Recommendations
To cooperate fully with government agencies and coastguard in developing plans.

To be prepared to cope with considerable media interest and provide separate
accommodation for briefing visitors, seminar management and the press.
To plan for the unexpectedit inevitably happens.
Shipping in the Gulf of Elefsis
Exercise operation room in action

For more information contact: Mr C. J. Morris, Oil Spill Coordinator, Texaco Limited, 1 Westferry Circus, Canary Wharf, London E14 4HA.
Telephone: 44 (0)171 719 3000 Fax: 44 (0)171 719 5191
27
Case study
Texaco Ltd.
Exercise First Respondertesting the Saudi Arabian Texaco Oil Spill
Contingency Plan, Mina Sound, Kuwait
Exercise First Responder was designed to test the Saudi Arabian Texaco Oil Spill
Contingency Plan. Priority was given to the protection of areas of economic and
environmental sensitivity, including a lagoon, vacation homes and marina within 10 km
of the tanker berth, and a nearby holiday resort with recreational beaches and water
sports. It was also noted that a power and desalination plant was situated within 7 km
of the loading terminal.
Exercise scenario
At 11:00 hours, the pumpman on the 100,000 DWT tanker, whilst loading at Mina
Sound outer berth, noticed oil in the water in the region of the ships port sea valve.
On investigation he discovered that this was due to a creeping sea valve, and that
repairs would take approximately one hour. During this time an estimated 50 bbls of
Ratawi crude oil was released into the sea.
Exercise coordination centre
To test the Saudi Arabian Texaco Oil Spill Contingency Plan at Mina Sound,
Kuwait.
To commission new Tier 1 response equipment.
To exercise the notification cascade to a Tier 2/3 response and test times of
communication to relevant local government and agency level.
To seek assistance from the GAOCMAO Mutual Aid Organization.
To cooperate fully with the Kuwait Environment Protection Council and Kuwait
Oil Company.
To provide immediate protection by pre-positioning response equipment.
To practice tracking and surveillance techniques.
Boom deployment at sea off Mina Sound
Recommendations
To plan for a major exercise with KEPC, KOC and GAOCMAO.

To carry out regular deployment drills.
To standardize response equipment.
To review the Contingency Plan regularly and make necessary adjustments.
For more information contact: Mr C. J. Morris, Oil Spill Coordinator, Texaco Limited, 1 Westferry Circus, Canary Wharf, London E14 4HA.
Telephone: 44 (0)171 719 3000 Fax: 44 (0)171 719 5191
28
REVIEW PHASE
Evaluation of exercise activities is critical to the continual improvement of

emergency and crisis response capabilities. This phase of an exercise consists of
collecting and analysing data and reports, documenting the findings and making
recommendations for improvements to the plan, to the equipment or to the
training of individuals or groups. Summaries of the findings and recommendations
should be copied to exercise participants and to management, as feedback.
Collect data
The primary sources of information from an exercise are the reports from the
directing staff and designated evaluators and feedback from all the participants and
role-players who contributed to the exercise. It is recommended that feedback be
taken from the participants in two stages. Firstly, in a so-called hot wash-up
immediately after the exercise has been terminated when adrenalin levels are still
high and details still seem very important. Secondly, in a more formal session, or as
a structured report, when more considered opinions are given. Finally, the senior
members of each participating group should meet to develop an overview of the
lessons learnt and their implications to the contingency planning process. The
format for reporting the exercise and debriefing the staff and players should be
established in advance.
Analyse events
Thorough analysis of performance and effectiveness is critical. The analysis should
be based on the extent to which the identified objectives of the exercise were met
and on the performance of individuals in their allotted roles. Working relationships
between the various parties and the perceptions of the performance of one party by
the others also need to be assessed and cross-referenced. More difficult, but equally
important, is the extrapolation of individual and team performances and inter-party
relationships from exercise conditions to actual spill conditions. The analysis should
include positive and negative contributions to the achievement of established
objectives and comparison of self-assessment of performance with the assessment by
others. It is important to seek to explain differences between parties in their
perception of important issues and to resolve misunderstandings.
Report findings
This part of the evaluation process involves preparing the findings in a suitable
format and ensuring that the report represents fairly the consensus of the
29
Collecting and evaluating information gained

from exercise activities is crucial to the
continued development of emergency response
capabilities.
evaluation and coordination teams. There may be up to three levels of exercise

reporting. Firstly, a broad feedback report may be prepared for wide circulation to
all participants, listing the main achievements, failures and learning points of the
exercise and indicating changes that will be made to the contingency plans and
exercising schedule. Secondly, more specific reports may be issued to key
The purpose and scope of each of the
notification, tabletop, equipment deployment
and incident management exercises are defined
in the box below.
individuals concerning the performance and interaction of the various parties and
commenting on the practicality of the overall structure for oil spill response as
described in the relevant contingency plan. Finally, a report may be issued to the
Notification
Exercise
Purpose
Coordination
demonstrate availability
to respond
ascertain travel options
Tabletop
Exercise
Equipment Deployment
Exercise
test emergency
management knowledge
and capability
provide individual and
team training
acquaint personnel with
roles and responsibilities
Incident Management
Exercise
test equipment deployment

procedures and strategies
demonstrate spill response

management capabilities
practice individual skills

and team interaction
integration of roles of
different parties
focus on teamwork and

organization
focus on overall incident

management aspects
test communications
verify communications
systems
confirm accuracy of
information
exercise coordinator
role players
technical advisers
facilitators, role players
evaluators
evaluators
evaluators, controllers
Location
offices, homes
office, crisis centre, hotel

command post
simulated response
location
crisis room and single or

several response facilities
Personnel
all team members
response team members
local spill response team
other parties
contractors
local/central response
teams
observers
other parties
Duration
12 hours
48 hours
48 hours
12 days
Objectives
personnel notified and

ready to respond
response strategies agreed
personnel mobilized
resources identified
equipment mobilized and

working
response strategy agreed
implementation complete
crisis being managed
reports from facilitators and

evaluators
reports of individual and

team performances
reports of individual and

team performances
feedback from players
team member feedback
team member feedback
recommendations
recommendations
external party feedback
recommendations
Evaluation
reports on efficiency
and speed of
communications
recommendations
30
REVIEW PHASE
management of the authority or company sponsoring the exercise, describing the

status of local oil spill preparedness and repeating the recommendations. A
schedule should be set for reporting and discussing the findings of an exercise to
ensure details and opinions are not forgotten. A target of two to four weeks for
completion of the process might be appropriate.
Make recommendations
Once the exercise reports have been discussed and conclusions drawn and
accepted, recommendations for the improvement of overall oil spill preparedness
can be made. Recommendations might include revisions to the contingency plan,
more training, or even replacement of personnel, better maintained or differently
located equipment and more or faster communications facilities. However, there
are always monetary and manpower constraints that will limit what can be
achieved. Priority should, of course, be given to those options that can be
implemented quickly and most easily, at least cost and with greatest benefit
though sometimes more substantial commitments will be required. It is
important that management are fully involved in the review process and support
the exercise conclusions and recommendations so that the necessary resources
are made available.
Effect improvements
The cycle of the exercise planning process is nearly complete. The effort has been
made and the budget has been expended. The main outputs are the individual
lessons learnt and the collective recommendations made for improvement to the
contingency plan, to equipment and systems, to the training and exercise
programmes. Now is the time to effect those changes and achieve the
improvements. Having been responsible for managing the exercise planning
process, it is perhaps most appropriate that the Exercise Coordinator be made
responsible for implementing and communicating the changes. Alternatively, the
individual or group with overall responsibility for the contingency planning
process should effect the changes.
Exercising contingency plans, however, is a reiterative process. Any adaptation of
the plan will need further testing; different equipment and systems will need
deploying; and personnel will need more training. The process continues by
returning to the design phase to start the planning of another exercise.
31
Debriefing participants and role players

following an exercise is crucial to establish the
lessons learnt and to assess their implications to
the contingency planning process.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND
FURTHER READING
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following individuals and organizations for providing
material for this report:
Richard Bavister, Consultant, UK; Howard Rance, Shell, UK; IPIECA; MEPCOPRC Working Group representatives, Canadian Coastguard, Amoco
Corporation
Photographic material was provided by Oil Spill Response Limited, UK; Esso
Thailand Ltd; Mobil Oil Corporation (USA); PDVSA, Venezuela; Texaco Ltd
(UK); Chevron Corporation (USA); Shell International (UK).
Further Reading
National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines (1994).
Published by the United States Coastguard.
The National Marine Spill Response Exercise Program of the Canadian Coastguard.
Produced by Transport Canada Department; available from Canada
Communication Group (telephone: 1 819 956 4800/4802)
32
I MO

4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR
IPIECA

IMO/ IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME ONE
SENSITIVITY
MAPPING FOR OIL
SPILL RESPONSE
I MO
IPIECA
IMO
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations specialized
agency responsible for the improvement of maritime safety and the prevention and
control of marine pollution. There are currently 153 member states and more than 50
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participating in its work which has led to the
adoption of some 30 conventions and protocols, and numerous codes and
recommendations concerning maritime safety and marine pollution. One of the most
important goals of IMOs Strategy for the Protection of the Marine Environment is to
strengthen the capacity for national and regional action to prevent, control, combat
and mitigate marine pollution and to promote technical cooperation to this end.
IPIECA
identify new global environmental issues and evaluates their potential impact on the oil
industry. IPIECAs programme takes full account of international developments in
IMO/IPIECA
REPORT
SERIES
VOLUME ONE
SENSITIVITY
MAPPING FOR OIL
SPILL RESPONSE
IPIECA

IPIECA 1994. . All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
SENSITIVITY MAPPING FOR OIL SPILL RESPONSE
CONTENTS
PREFACE
PREFACE

Cooperation 1990 (OPRC Convention), which entered into force in May 1995,
INTRODUCTION
provides the framework for international cooperation in combating major oil

pollution incidents. An underlying premise of the OPRC Convention is the
PROSPECTIVE USER
understanding that prompt and effective action is essential in order to minimize the
GROUPS AND THEIR
damage which may result from such an incident. The Convention specifically
NEEDS
recognizes and emphasizes the important role which the oil and shipping industries
have in this regard.
MAP REQUIREMENTS
Thus the partnership with IMO and industry is both logical and called for by
international convention. In 1993, a working group of the IMO Marine
11
TYPES OF INFORMATION
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) charged with promoting the
WHICH COULD BE
implementation of the OPRC and its resolutions agreed that it would be useful for
INCLUDED ON MAPS
IMO and industry organizations to produce joint publications where appropriate,

to avoid duplication and to ensure wider acceptance and common use by
18
OBTAINING AND
government and industry of the advice contained therein. As a result, collaboration
AGREEING INFORMATION
between IMO and IPIECA has led to the development of a series of joint
FOR SENSITIVITY MAPS
publications. This report, entitled Sensitivity Mapping for Oil Spill Response, is the
first in the series and will be shortly followed by the IMO/IPIECA Guide to Oil
19
GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Spill Exercise Planning.

These publications represent a consensus of industry and government viewpoints
tested through the parallel review process of IMOs Marine Environment
21
CONCLUSIONS
Protection Committee and the IPIECA Oil Spill Working Group. The information
provided by these publications should be useful to governments and concerned
22
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS,
organizations, particularly those of developing countries, desiring to improve
FURTHER READING AND
capability to deal with oil spillage. IMO and IPIECA have separately published
USEFUL CONTACTS
other manuals and reports on various aspects of oil spill preparedness and response
(see Further Reading on page 22) and the reader is encouraged to review Sensitivity
Mapping for Oil Spill Response in conjunction with these publications.
INTRODUCTION
Making and updating sensitivity maps are key activities in the oil spill contingency
planning process. These maps convey essential information to spill responders by
showing where the different coastal resources are, and by indicating environmentally
sensitive areas. The making of a map involves assembling information on resources
and deciding on what guidelines for spill response should be included, through
consultation with relevant organizations. This can be done regardless of whether
or not the benefits of computerized Geographic Information Systems and
databases are available.
Uses of sensitivity maps range from planning practical site-specific shore
protection and clean-up to strategic planning for large remote areas. This report
provides information and guidelines on different map types, categories of
information to be included, and symbols, with reference to the different users and
their requirements.
Jenifer M. Baker
Shrewsbury, United Kingdom
Mark D. Spalding
World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Jon Moore
Oil Pollution Research Unit, Pembroke, United Kingdom
Philip Tortell
Environmental Management Limited, Wellington, New Zealand
PROSPECTIVE USER GROUPS

AND THEIR NEEDS
Prospective user groups of sensitivity maps for oil spill response have a variety of
needs related to different categories of oil spill. The tiered response approach
(IPIECA 1991) distinguishes the following types of spill.
Tier 1: small localized spills at fixed installations (such as oil terminals). For
example, a hose bursts or someone opens the wrong valve during loading or
unloading of a tanker, and before the system can be shut down perhaps
1020 tonnes of oil have been spilled.
Tier 2: medium sized spills, possibly some distance from industry facilities and
potentially having a greater impact on the environment. These might be caused

by minor collisions, e.g. with a dock or with another vessel, which lead to the
spillage of say 300400 tonnes of oil.
Milford Haven Shoreline Clean-up Guidelines

Name:
Dale Flats
Foreshore No:
Access to shore:
Footpath
Public Road
Public Track
Private Road
Private Track
Boat
Load-bearing capacity
of the sediment
Access description:
Good public road access to top of shore at southwest end of Pickleridge
(Grid Ref. SM 808 066) Steep pebble ridge onto beach with no ramp.
Good public road access to top of shore in Dale village (one way system around
village) (Grid Ref. SM 812 057), but considerable congestion during summer.
Soft ( will not support vehicular traffic )

Semi-soft ( 4-wheel drive vehicles )
Firm ( will support vehicles, tractors etc. )
Other information:
Fairly large parking and storage area at Pickleridge access point, but limited parking and considerable congestion during summer in Dale village. Possible
storage in disused quarry.
Foreshore type (CONCAWE classification):

Sandy beach
Muddy
Salt marshes
Pebbles/Shingle
Boulders
Cliffs
Other (see Comments)

Slope:
Steep
Gradual
Rocky/Pools
Industrial
Marina
Ecological value:
Vulnerability Index (Gundlach and Hayes, 1978):
Low
9 10
High
Season
Value
Comments
Spring
High
High bird interest (Curlew, Turnstone, Grey Plover), Abundant burrowing animals, Many rare species,
Moderate surface living animals and algae in rocky areas.
Summer
High
Some bird interest (Curlew, Turnstone), Abundant burrowing animals, Many rare species, Moderate
surface living animals and algae in rocky areas.
Autumn
High
High bird interest (Curlew, Turnstone, Grey Plover), Abundant burrowing animals, Many rare species,
Winter
High
Very high bird interest (Curlew, Turnstone, Grey Plover), Abundant burrowing animals, Many rare species,
Season
Value
Comments
Spring
Mod
Moderate amenity use of waterway, Small boatyard at Dale, Popular bait digging shore.
Summer
High
Moderate amenity use of shore, High amenity use of waterway, Small boatyard at Dale, Popular bait
digging shore.
Autumn
Mod
Moderate amenity use of waterway, Small boatyard at Dale, Popular bait digging shore.
Winter
Low
Small boatyard at Dale, Popular bait digging shore.
Waders
Wildfowl
Diving birds
Young fish nursery grounds
Saltmarsh
Seaweed
Important/Rare habitats
Monitoring site
Educational use
Amenity/Economic value:
Recreational use
Marina/Moorings
Fisheries/Shellfish interest
Fish/Shellfish farm
High scenic value
Water abstraction
Urban area
Industrial use
Oil Clean-up Recommendations:
Typical shoreline clean-up guidelines; this

particular example accompanies the map on the
following page, and was included in an atlas
prepared for the Milford Haven Standing
Conference on Anti-Oil Pollution Plan
(SW Wales).
Dispersant use:
Material removal:
PROHIBITED
PROHIBITED
Possible
Possible
Preferred:
If oil comes ashore leave alone if small or moderate quantites, physical removal (absorbents, skimming and collection) for large
quantites. If large quantities strand prevent remobilisation with beach guardians.
Possible:
All types of removal method of substratum and cutting of oiled weed are possible on the rocky shores and on the flats below Dale only.
Expert advice should be obtained first.
PROHIBITED:
Do not use dispersants. Do not remove shingle or other sediment from Gann Flats below Pickleridge.
Contact:
Warden of Dale Fort Field Centre (Dale 205) and district Inspector of fisheries, Milford Haven 3412 (day), 4308 (eve.)
Comments:
Due to the very high ecological value of these flats every effort should be made to prevent oil entering the Dale Roads. Dispersants
should not be used since they are likely to lead to increased penetration of oil. The Gann Flats are susceptible to erosion and substratum
removal is therefore prohibited from that area.
Produced for the Milford Haven Standing conference on Anti-Oil Pollution by the Field Studies Council Research Centre, Pembroke, Dyfed, UK.
Comments: Predominantly waterlogged muddy shingle with bedrock along uppershore at sides of Flats and boulders in places. Lagoon behind.
Abundant shallow sink areas where oil may pool.
PROSPECTIVE USER GROUPS AND THEIR NEEDS
Tier 3: major accidents (e.g. collisions, explosions or blowouts) causing spills of
thousands of tonnes and having the potential for causing considerable

environmental damage over a wide area.
It follows that uses of maps range from planning practical site-specific shore
protection and clean-up, to strategic planning on a regional scale for major accidents
in remote areas. The latter case is particularly likely to involve more than one country.
5. Dale Flats
Crabhall
farm
IH
IH
IH
Dale Flats
Windmill Farm
MS
MS
MS
Dale
Slip
Section Boundary
Coastline
Rocky shore
Boulder shore
Low-water
Waders
Pleasure Craft
Diving Birds
Recreational Beach
Fisheries
Shingle shore
Road
Grid size = 1 km
Sandy shore
Track
Pathway
Detail is only provided for the

section of coast referred to
by the title and marked by the
section boundaries.
Walkers
Monitoring Site
MS
Educational Site
ES
Muddy shore
Important Habitat
IH
Saltmarsh
Fish Farm
Seagrass bed
Water Abstraction
Refinery
Coastal Industry
Land
Sea
Access point
Houses
Town
A large-scale map relevant for a Tier 1

response, or the later stages of Tier 2 or Tier 3
responses (when the oil has come nearshore or
onshore and the protection or clean-up of
specific locations is being planned). The map is
supplied together with the shoreline clean-up
guidelines shown on page 4. This particular
example is number 5 in a black and white atlas
of 60, prepared for the Milford Haven
Standing Conference on Anti-Oil Pollution
Plan (SW Wales). Such maps can be handdrawn though this particular series was
produced using a drawing package on a
Macintosh computer, which facilitates
consistency of style and rapid revision. The
maps and guidelines are printed face-to-face in
the atlas, but may be printed back-to-back on
waterproof paper so single sheets may be used
easily on-site.
Especially in the case of a Tier 3 spill, it is likely that different types of map will be
used at different stages during the response. For example, when a large spill occurs
many miles offshore in a remote area, it may not be clear for some days if or where
oil will come ashore. The first requirement is for a strategic map covering a large
area, showing the most important resources in all the possible directions that the
oil slicks may travel. This alerts the responsible authorities to prepare for potential
problems. At a later stage in the spill it may become clear that oil is progressing
towards a particular section of coastline, notably an area for priority protection.
There will be a need for intermediate-scale tactical maps and information for the
spill responder. If oil has actually stranded on a number of shores, there will be a
need for detailed operational maps and information for clean-up teams.
For most regions a cost-effective approach is to invest in intermediate scale tactical
maps for the whole coastline, and detailed maps for those parts of the coastline
which have been identified as high risk during the contingency planning process.
This recommendation takes into account the existing availability of global strategic
information (see page 23).
A clear distinction can be made between the information on sensitive resources
needed by contingency planners (e.g. the locations of estuaries, mangroves, fish
farms or bird colonies) and practical information for spill response and shore cleanup (e.g. areas where dispersants could or could not be used, booming points, and
shore access roads). These two different types of information can be shown on
different maps and/or described in different sections of any accompanying text.
A distinction can also be made between sensitivity maps for spill response, and
detailed resource maps used by specialists. The former are based on the latter
(that is, if detailed maps are available, which is not always the case), but should
only contain information useful for contingency planners. For example, a
sensitivity map might show the location of mangrove areas, whereas detailed
resource maps might show the individual distributions of several different
mangrove species. With sensitivity maps, extra detail can be provided by
accompanying text for those that require it. The map of seabird distribution on
page 17 is an example of a specialist map at a strategic scale.
PROSPECTIVE USER GROUPS AND THEIR NEEDS
Name: Fobbing Horse

Foreshore No: 32
and saltmarsh areas of high importance for migratory and wintering waterfowl. Saltmarsh areas are
Comments:Mudflats
used as high tide roosts.
Clean-up options limited.
Consider use of flood barriers to protect sensitive areas up the creeks.
Water skiers use the creek at high states of tide.
Location map
Seasonal Sensitivity:
Conservation
Amenity
Rainham
London
Spring
Summer
Autumn
Winter
Mod
Low
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Southend
Thames
Haven
Industrial
Low
Low
Low
Low
Woolwich
M25
Erith
Tilbury
Gravesend
moveable
flood barrier
footpath
MLW
MLW
10
9
9
footpath
Prepared by the Field Studies Council Research Centre, Pembroke, Dyfed, UK.
moveable
flood barrier
track
10
9
MLW
9
10
Key to symbols
Clean-up recommendations:
PROHIBITED:
Exercise extreme caution before entering muddy areas; do not enter areas
of saltmarsh.
These habitats are fragile and easily damaged.
Recommended: Leave oil to degrade naturally. Strandline oil and debris may be collected.
Avoid unnecessary disturbance of birdlife. However, consider use of bird

scaring devices if foreshore becomes polluted.
If bulk oil accumulates along foreshore consider low pressure seawater
flushing. Remobilised oil must be collected and recovered using booms and
skimmers. Clean-up operations of this nature will require the use of small
hovercraft or shallow draft vessels at high water.,
If the flood barriers are lowered there may be opportunities to contain and
recover floating oil using booms and skimmers at high states of the tide.
Ramsar site
SPA
Special Protection Area
NNR
National Nature Reserve
SSSI
Area of Scientific Interest

Waders
Wildfowl
Seabirds
Fishing
Boating/Moorings
Access:
Recreational beach
Access limited to boats or foot for majority of foreshore.

Vehicular access to flood barriers.
Water sports
Caravans
Map No(s):
OS Pathfinder TQ 68/78
low
10 Vulnerability Index
high
An adaptation of the previous design

shown on page 5 uses oblique aerial
photographs of shores (taken at low tide).
The photographs are scanned into the
computer and then annotated with
specially designed graphics and text. This
provides a user-friendly map which can
be prepared quickly. However, updating
requires further aerial photography. This
is one of 45 maps prepared for the
Thames Oil Spill Control Association
(TOSCA). There are practical limits to
the scale at which photographs can work
for this purpose. If the users cannot easily
locate their position by looking at features
around them, the photograph loses its
value as a practical clean-up tool.
MAP REQUIREMENTS
The basic requirements for an understandable and easily useable map are listed
below. Fulfilling these requirements involves making potentially difficult decisions
about what information to include, and cartographic skills to present the
information clearly.
The maps must convey an instant message and not require too much specialist
knowledge to understand that message.

They should contain enough information to be of value, but be sufficiently
uncluttered to prevent confusion.

They should not unnecessarily bisect natural features. For example, a bay or
estuary should, where possible, be shown on one map rather than divided
between two maps.
They should use suitable symbols which do not conflict and do not convey the
wrong message.
They should be set at a suitable scale within the inherent accuracy of the data set.
They should clearly mark scale, direction, legend/key, date of production and title.
They should include a location map to show the relationship between any sub-
area and the area as a whole.
La Preneuse
MAP LEGEND
SHORELINE TYPES
1. Exposed cliffs
6. Exposed tidal flat
2. Beach rock
7. Sheltered rocky shore
2B. Low basalt
8. Coral reef
2C. Seawall
9. Sheltered tidal flat
3. Exposed boulders
10. Marsh
4. Sand beach
10B. Mangrove
5. Mixed sand/gravel
11. Built-up zones
2
19
SALT PANS
4
5
18
6
17
GRANDE RIVIERE NOIRE
16
7
9
15
14
13
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES
FP
LOCATION OF MAP
12
PS
Rivire Noire
10
11
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESOURCES
Shore birds
Fish pond
Wading birds
Fishing reserve
Sea birds
Nature reserve
Fish
Public beach
Shrimp
Coastal hotel
GRANDE RIVIERE NOIRE BAY
LES SALINES ROAD
LHarmonie
SPILL-RESPONSE FEATURES
Police station
FS
Fire station
FP
Fisheries post
SF
Sugar factories
SALT PANS
PS
lot Fortier
IA
Bois Puant
IN
Extracts of maps from the Coastal Sensitivity

Atlas of Mauritius (near right) and the
Coastal Sensitivity Atlas of Southern Africa
(far right). These are both large-format atlases
with a page of descriptive text and information
on specific resources opposite each map. These
are examples of tactical maps at intermediate
scales. Note the inset location maps.
PETITE RIVIERE NOIRE BAY
1.0
0.75
0.5
0.25
KILOMETRES
1.0
MAP REQUIREMENTS
With respect to the range of scales which may be used, maps suitable for Tier 1
responses, e.g. shore-specific clean-up, may be up to 1:10,000 whereas strategic maps
for initial response to Tier 3 spills may be as much as 1:1,000,000. Intermediate scale
maps may cover a range below and above 1:100,000. Very approximately, there is a
jump in scale of one order of magnitude from one map type to the next. The maps
reproduced in this report give a variety of examples. Whatever the scale it should be
marked on the map in the form of a scale bar, because this remains accurate even if the
map is reproduced on an enlarging or reducing photocopier (statements such as 1 cm
= 100 m obviously become misleading if the map is enlarged or reduced in size).
From the format point of view, the examples in this report illustrate both the single map
approach (where all the information for an area is on one map) and the series approach.
A single map is ideal, but a series of maps may be used to show the distribution of
different resources in cases where putting everything onto one map would result in a
cluttered and confusing product. In such a case, summary maps with the most important
information for spill responders are recommended, along the lines of the examples given
from New South Wales, Australia (see page 10). The same approach has been taken
with resource maps of the Saudi Arabian coastline. The danger to avoid is to have a
15'
18
3
Morrisons Point
13
120
Diazville
SK
SALDANHA
Tiekosklip
54
KL
URWERUG
71
EINBERG
Springfontein
13
Ondervloer
Noordbaal
MALGASKOP
78
112
Marcus Island
North Head
Malgasiland
Lynch Point
Closed estuary
Geslote monding
KARRINGBERG
YS
176
126
TERGERG
Open estuary
Oop monding
Septemberklip
67
Donka
rgat
Sk
aap
eila
nd
Hugospos
POSTBERG
113
193
Intake
Inlaat
Soutpan
SS
160
EN
Outfall
Uitlaat
133
Marine nature reserve

Seereservaat
Seeberg
on
RG
Mooimaak
BE
114
go
La
EL
189
MA
ER
132
TA B
ER
aa
KO N S
Van Niekerskspos
Nuwepos
SEEB
eb
Stony Head
ng
Meeuwklip
133
Langebaan
VLAEBERG
P ostbe rg
Nature
Re se5rve
Groenheuvel
Landing
Strip
La
South Head
COASTAL SENSITIVITY
KUSSENSITIWITEIT
Zoutekuylen
Olifantskop
Leentjiesklip
Salamanderpunt
34
Swartfontein
Wasklip
Saldanhabaai
Jutteneiland
91
R
45
Schaftplaas
Ysterfontein
Hoedjiespunt
Mreson
50
Danger Bay
Long Point
Osfontein
Kalkklipfontein
Kreefbaai
Sanctuary
Beskermingsgebied
Bottelary
Vondelingeiland
147
Recreation
Ontspanning
97
Churchhaven
55
SU
U RVYKOP
154
F
BE
119
226
Smutskraal
SW
0
10
15'
Coarse grain
sandy beaches
Zonquasfontein
Grofkorrelrige sandstrande
286
66
66
Skilpadfontein
52
Koekiespan
Baarhuis
Wavecut rocky platforms
F
Brandererosie-rotsstoepe
141
DORINGRUG
F
41
Exposed rocky headlands

Blootgelegde rotsuitlopers
ARTBERG
Swartberglei
Smutskraal
Abrahamskraal
Moordenaarsbos
Refer to biological
key
Verwys na biologiese verklaring
Langfontein
TJ IESKOP
216Pebble/shingle beaches
52
Kieselsteen/gruisstrande
F
Burgerspan
Buffelsfontein
Fine grain sandy beaches

Swartwater
Fynkorrelrige
sandstrande
181
56
5
kilometres
Suurfontein
Blombos
F
Klein
Suurfontein
Estuarine environment
Getyrivieromgewing
F
Drovlei
large number of maps (one for each resource) without any interpretative summary
map of sensitivities for planners. A series of maps may also be used to show the
distribution of resources at different times of year, in cases where this distribution has
marked seasonal variations which are well documented. An example is provided by
the monthly bird distribution maps for the North Sea (see page 17).
The practical handling of the maps should be considered. Large format atlases can
These large scale maps are extracted from the

Coastal Resource Atlas for Oil Spills in
Botany Bay (State Pollution Control
Commission of NSW) and show part of the
coast of New South Wales, Australia. They
summarize the areas of greatest sensitivity to
oil, show locations for defensive booming, and
give indications concerning the use of
dispersants. The distribution of seagrasses is an
important factor influencing the use of
dispersants in this area. As can be seen from
the maps, it was decided not to use dispersants
in seagrass areas. The seagrass map is one of a
series giving details for different resources; this
series forms the basis for the summary map
showing areas of greatest sensitivity.
AIR
conditionsimagine, for example, cramped helicopter journeys, or exposed shores

in strong wind and rain. Maps for field use should be of a suitable size for easy
handling and reproduction, and may need to be laminated or printed on
waterproof paper. The most cost-effective maps for operational use are black-andwhite, and page-sized. Colour and larger format maps have higher production costs
and there are great difficulties with rapid reproduction or transmission on standard
office equipment such as photocopiers and facsimile machines. Colour maps are
more likely to be useful for management levels of responsible organizations, and
for strategic or tactical rather than operational use. A standardized colour scheme
is available in Michel and Dahlin (1993).
Areas of extreme and high
sensitivity to oil pollution in
Botany Bay
BOTANY
BOTANY
XTE
E
RT
PO
ION
NS
PORT BOTANY
TOWRA
POINT
TOWRA
POINT
BONNA
POINT
areas of extreme
sensitivity
KURNELL
GEORGES
RIVER
WEENEY
BAY
WEENEY
BAY
WOOLOOWARE
BAY
KURNELL
QUIBRAY
BAY
TAREN
POINT
QUIBRAY
BAY
BONNA
POINT
DOLLS
POINT
areas of high
sensitivity
GEORGES
RIVER
TAREN
POINT
PORT BOTANY
BOTANY BAY
BOTANY BAY
DOLLS
POINT
Three critical locations for

defensive deployment of booms
AIR
COOKS RIVER
ION
NS
XTE
E
RT
PO
COOKS RIVER
provide excellent source material but are difficult to work with in some field
BOAT HARBOUR
N
2
WOOLOOWARE
BAY
BOAT HARBOUR
km
BOTANY
BOTANY
COOKS RIVER
Areas for immediate, possible

and no dispersant use
Areas of seagrass
distribution
BANKSMEADOW
XTE
ION
NS
ION
NS
XTE
NO
DISPERSANT
USE
E
RT
PO
AIR
E
RT
PO
AIR
COOKS RIVER
2
km
PORT BOTANY
PORT
BOTANY
IMMEDIATE
DISPERSANT
USE
BOTANY BAY
POSSIBLE
DISPERSANT
USE
FRENCHMANS
BAY
N
TOWRA POINT
DOLLS
POINT
DOLLS
POINT
NO DISPERSANT USE
KURNELL
KURNELL
QUIBRAY
BAY
GEORGES
RIVER
complex,
predominantly
Posidonia
GEORGES
RIVER
WEENEY
BAY
TAREN
POINT
BONNA POINT
predominantly
Zostera
POSSIBLE
DISPERSANT
USE
TAREN
POINT
WEENEY
BAY
WOOLOOWARE
BAY
BOAT HARBOUR
predominantly
Halophila
QUIBRAY
BAY
WOOLOOWARE
BAY
km
BOAT HARBOUR
2
km
10
TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD

BE INCLUDED ON MAPS
Shoreline types
Many sensitivity maps (especially intermediate scale tactical maps) classify
shorelines using a vulnerability or environmental sensitivity index (ESI), typically
based on the original index of Gundlach and Hayes (1978). This arranges
shoreline types on a 10-point scale, following the basic principles that sensitivity
to oil increases with increasing shelter of the shore from wave action, penetration
of oil into the substratum, natural oil retention times on the shore, and biological
productivity of shore organisms. However, the numbers on the scales do not
represent actual quantified sensitivityfor example ESI 5 is not five times as
sensitive as ESI 1. An ESI is a convenient way of summarizing information but
gives only part of the picture because it does not take into account uses of the
shore by wildlife and people. For example, an exposed rocky shore rated as ESI 1
(low sensitivity) might support a seabird colony which would be of high
sensitivity, at least during the breeding season. A sandy shore rated as ESI 3
(relatively low sensitivity) might be important for tourists, or for turtle egg laying,
at certain times of year.
There are many regional modifications, for example the six-point sensitivity index
used in the Coastal Sensitivity Atlas of Southern Africa (see map on page 9). The
UNEP system used in the Eastern African region (see symbols on page 16)
classifies shores into ten types, with particular attention being paid to ecological
value as well as geomorphology and exposure to wave action.
Subtidal habitats
Some subtidal habitats or particular species using the habitats are sensitive to
oil spills, as has been shown by case history and field experimental experience.
It is usual to show these habitats on sensitivity maps but it has not been
possible to develop an ESI for them because sensitivity is considerably
influenced by the specific circumstances of the spill. Maps have commonly
included the following:
Coral reefs: reef flat organisms may be seriously affected if oil is stranded on the
flat during low tide periods, and chemical or natural dispersion of oil in
shallow water may affect some species at greater depths. The effects of oil and
clean-up are discussed in greater detail in the IPIECA report Biological Impacts
of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs (1992).
11
Seagrass beds: these may occur both intertidally and in shallow nearshore waters.
There is some experimental evidence which suggests that the most likely
scenario for damage to seagrass and the organisms utilising this habitat is the
presence of high concentrations of dispersed oil.
Kelp beds: the various kelp species (large brown algae) grow on the lower parts
of some rocky shores, and in nearshore areas. These algae are quite resistant to
oil, but other species using the kelp beds (for example, many different
invertebrates, cormorants and sea otters) may be sensitive.
The photographs below show examples of shoreline sensitivity classification, using the
environmental sensitivity index (ESI) rankings proposed by Michel and Dahlin (1993).
Recovery times are generally rapid on exposed
headlands, such as Hillswick Ness in Shetland
(ESI 1)
ESI 1
ESI 2
ESI 3
ESI 4
ESI 5
ESI 6
and also on exposed wave-cut platforms like

Freshwater West in SW Wales (ESI 2).
A gently sloping fine-grained sand beach

(ESI 3) in Galicia, NW Spain. Oil does not
penetrate readily, facilitating mechanical
removal.
Oil penetration may be deeper, and clean-up
more difficult, in more steeply sloping shores of
medium to coarse grained sand (ESI 4) such as
this one on the Patagonian coast, Chile. The
use of this particular shore by penguins during
the breeding season would need to be taken into
account as well as the shore ESI.
ESI 5 beaches of mixed sand and coarser

sediments (gravel, pebbles and boulders), have
medium to high permeability to oil, and usually
low biological productivity. This one at Islas de
las Dos Hermanas off the Caribbean coast of
Panama has bags of oily debris awaiting
removal following spill clean-up.
Shores of ESI 6 include a range of gravel,
pebble and boulder beaches with high
permeability. The photograph shows detail of
such a beach in Prince William Sound, Alaska
(see also photograph at top left of next page).
12
TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED ON MAPS
ESI 6
ESI 6: Rip-rap, as seen here used for coastal

protection at Accra, Ghana, is the man-made
equivalent of the pebble and boulder beach
shown in the photograph at the bottom of the
previous page.
ESI 7
ESI 7: Oil does not easily adhere to or

penetrate into exposed tidal flats of compacted
sediments, but there is often significant
biomassnote these mussels on an exposed flat
in the eastern Strait of Magellan, Chile. The
ranking of ESI 7 takes into account the likely
biological damage. Exposed tidal flats with low
biomass are ranked ESI 5 in some schemes.
ESI 8
Sheltered rocky shores often have high

biological productivity. This oiled example
(ESI 8) in Milford Haven, Wales, has
abundant large algae among which live many
other organisms.
ESI 9
Sheltered tidal flats (ESI 9) such as this oystercovered area on the west coast of Florida, are
also very productive.
ESI 10
The most vulnerable shores (ESI 10) include

saltmarshes and mangroves. These examples
are from the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia (far
left) and the Niger Delta, Nigeria (near left).
The extreme shelter means that such areas act
as oil traps, often with severe consequences for
the flora and fauna.
ESI 10
Wildlife and protected areas

Maps should show the areas of greatest sensitivity for wildlife species, such as
feeding and breeding areas where there are likely to be significant concentrations
of individuals, at least at some times of the year. Examples are seabird colonies,
estuaries important for migrating shorebirds, seal haulouts, and turtle nesting
beaches. Locations which are important for threatened or endangered species
should be highlighted, because in these cases there may be the risk that a bad spill
could seriously deplete the total population of a species. It is likely that some areas
important for wildlife will have protected status (for example, nature reserve or
13
This exposed rocky shore in SW Wales would,

in itself, be rated as ESI 1, but the presence of a
gannet colony confers high priority for
protection during the breeding season. For some
spills a possible option for such protection might
be dispersant spraying offshore (see the IPIECA
report Dispersants and their Role in Oil
Spill Response, 1993).
national park). It is useful to indicate these on the map, as many have experienced
management authorities who will be well-versed with the local region. Furthermore,
there may be complex legal and economic considerations in dealing with spills in
these areas.
As mentioned in the section on shoreline types, vulnerable wildlife may be present
on some shores which, from the narrower viewpoint of the shoreline ESI, have
been rated as relatively tolerant of oil. In such cases the wildlife assessment clearly
takes precedence for the purpose of spill response.
Fish, fishing activities, shellfish and aquaculture
Both commercial and subsistence fishing need to be considered. The following are
examples of features which need to be identified and included on sensitivity maps:
nearshore shallow water fishing areas, e.g. for finfish, crabs, lobsters, shrimps or
other species;
seaweed gathering;
shellfish beds in the intertidal zone or nearshore shallow water;
fish and crustacean nursery areas;
beaches with fishing activities, e.g. hauling in nets;
permanent or semi-permanent fish traps and fishing platforms;
aquaculture facilities for fish, molluscs, crustaceans or seaweeds, e.g. intertidal
trestles, floating cages and long-lines, and fish and crustacean ponds; and
seaward entrances of rivers important for migratory fish such as salmon.
14
Sensitive areas from the fisheries point of view

include beaches from which fishing takes place
(top left), fish traps (top right), aquaculture
facilities such as these seaweed rafts (bottom
left), and the entrances to salmon streams
(bottom right). The photographs are from
Gabon, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and
Prince William Sound (Alaska) respectively.
Socio-economic features
These include the following:
boat facilities such as harbours, marinas, moorings, slipways and boat ramps;
industrial facilities, for example water intakes for power stations and
desalination plants, coastal mining, and salt evaporation lagoons;

recreational resources such as amenity beaches, bathing enclosures, water sport
and game-fishing areas; and

sites of cultural, historical or scenic significance, on or close to the shore.
Oil spill response features

For the purposes of practical spill response, it is valuable to know the following:
where dispersants could be used and where they should not be used; where
booms could be deployed and the locations of any permanent boom moorings;
which beaches of low sensitivity could, if necessary, have oil deflected onto them
to save sensitive areas; and the locations of access points. This and other response
information can be put directly on the map, or included in guidelines which are
provided with the map, either printed face-to-face with the map in an atlas or
back-to-back with the map on single sheets of paper. An example of a typical set
of guidelines and accompanying map is given on pages 4 and 5. Any protection
priorities which have been agreed by the relevant organizations should be shown
on the map and/or in the accompanying guidelines. For example, some US maps
show A, B and C areas where A indicates areas of highest protection priority, B
indicates areas which should be protected after A, and C indicates areas which
should be protected after B.
15
Symbols
Shoreline ESI ranks have been indicated on some maps primarily using symbols
(for example in the New Zealand Atlas of Coastal Resources) and on others primarily
using colours. Symbols, or a combination of symbols and colour, are recommended
for ease of copying and transmission.
mangrove
rias
gravel, boulders
exposed fine sand

seagrass
exposed sand and dunes

sheltered sand
coral
rock platforms
Symbols used for sensitivity mapping in East

Africa (above). A major advantage is that the
coastal types can be clearly distinguished on
black and white photocopies. The classification
is comparative, based on expert local assessment
of value, importance, vulnerability and
concern (with mangroves ranking highest and
cliffs lowest).
Symbols used to depict a variety of coastal
resources (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, USA).
cliff
With respect to other resources, examples of generalized symbols are given below.
These are suitable for international use. However, according to the diversity of
resources, some areas may wish to use a greater range. For example, some
Norwegian maps have a lot of detail for fishing activities, including symbols (letters)
for different fishing methods and facilities. Given that such details can vary
tremendously from one region to another, there seems little point in promoting a
standardized universal scheme to cover every possible resource worldwide. In our
experience, the users will refer to the key without any problemsthis highlights the
requirement for a key on each map.
Sensitive biological resources

diving bird
shorebird
fish
dolphin
sea otter
alligator/
crocodile
gull/tern
wading bird
nursery area
manatee
whale
turtle
lobster
pelagic bird
waterfowl
bear
terrestrial
mammal
submerged
aquatic
vegetation
other reptiles/
amphibians
oyster/clam/
mussel
raptor
coral
deer
seal
terrestrial
plant
conch/whelk/
abalone
shrimp
access
boat ramp
facility
logging
national park
subsistence
fishing
wildlife refuge
airport
camping
ferry
marina
park
village
national or state
boundary
aquaculture
coast guard
historical site
marine
sanctuary
recreational
fishing
water intake
city boundary
archaeological
site
commercial
fishing
hoist
mining
recreational
beach
water supply
park or refuge
boundary
crab
squid
Human-use features
16
Seasonal aspects
The sensitivity of many of the above resources may vary seasonally, and it is useful
to include seasonal information on sensitivity maps. Some methods of doing this
are shown below.
Methods of indicating seasonality. In Seabird
Concentrations in the North Sea: an Atlas
of Vulnerability to Surface Pollutants, a
different map is given for each month of the
year. The map for April (left) shows seabird
distribution heavily influenced by the breeding
season, with birds concentrated around coastal
and island breeding areas.
A similar approach is used in the Gazetteer
of Marine Birds in Arctic Canada: an Atlas
of Seabird Vulnerability to Oil Pollution,
but in this case the maps are for each quarter of
the year rather than each month.
N 62
type of bird in concentration
61
auk
shorebirds
diver
other seabirds
seaduck
60
size of symbol indicates scale of

importance of concentration
59
58
57
56
55
54
53
vulnerability categories
highest vulnerability
52
lowest vulnerability
unsurveyed or inland water
51
5
Colour coded symbols
10
11
12
13
An example of a four-point system
sensitive
season
Summer
Autumn
Winter
Examples from southern Africa
17
Spring
14
In the UK map series Coastal Sites Sensitive

to Oil Pollution, bird symbols (far left) show
the months vulnerable to oil pollution. They
appear in blue for concentrations of birds on the
water offshore, and in red for waders, wildfowl
and other birds on- and nearshore.
Many other maps use a four-point system
(near left) which is more generally achievable
because the level of detail required is not so great
as with the month-by-month scheme. However,
care should be taken to avoid potential confusion
for international users because the winter
months in the southern hemisphere are the
summer months in the northern hemisphere. It
is best to define what is meant by each season
using names of months (as has been done, for
example, in the case of the German Wadden
Sea maps). Many areas in the tropics or in polar
regions do not have four distinctive seasons,
though they do have times of year when
particular species are more sensitive.
OBTAINING AND AGREEING

INFORMATION FOR SENSITIVITY MAPS
In most cases, at least some of the information needed for sensitivity maps can be
obtained from existing topographic maps, charts, photographs, scientific
publications and environmental data held by organizations such as government
fisheries departments, universities and conservation groups. Available information
may range from detailed shore-specific survey results to data on a global scale
suitable for strategic planning maps. A problem is that within any particular area
there are likely to be inconsistent levels of information. Lack of information does
not necessarily mean there are no sensitive resources.
Inconsistencies can be reduced by simplifying the most detailed specialist
information on the one hand, and by filling gaps on the other. Ideally, to fill gaps
in information there should be liaison with local people and possibly some
additional survey work. In the case of local large scale maps, such work may consist
entirely of surveys of ground stations. For larger areas it is often more practical to
use aerial photographs or satellite images, with scenes chosen as far as possible for
low cloud cover and low tide. Ground station surveys are essential to interpret the
remotely sensed data. For example, Landsat scenes have been used in the
preparation of sensitivity maps for the United Arab Emirates together with 60
ground-truth stations surveyed for features such as beach profile, sediment type,
shore processes, flora and fauna.
The information to be included about priorities for protection and clean-up options
needs to be decided through consultation with relevant bodies such as fisheries
departments, tourist boards and conservation groups. Consensus may well be difficult
to achieve, but it is crucial to reach the best possible agreement in advance of a spill
occurringthere is never enough time during a response operation. In the event of a
spill, the organizations must then accept the priorities presented on the map.
The coastal zone usually represents the most heavily utilized parts of the sea and
land areas. As a consequence, features here change frequently and rapidly
whether it be through tourism or industrial development, the designation of
national parks and nature reserves, the establishment of fish farms or the
destruction of mangrove swamps. It follows that maps need to be updated at
intervals, and this may involve re-assessment of priorities.
18
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
In coastal sensitivity mapping, as in other fields, the use of Geographic Information

Systems (GIS) is growing rapidly. Nevertheless, not all organizations or areas
worldwide have access to GIS at present, and it should be stressed that first-rate
sensitivity maps can be made without them. Knowledge of an areas resources, and
agreement on priorities for spill response, are the most basic requirements. It
should also be stressed that, at the time of a spill, immediate access to hard copy
(paper) maps is usually essential.
A GIS is a software system which specializes in handling spatially referenced
data. If GIS is available it offers the following advantages for pre-spill
contingency planning. A GIS can hold information at any scaleindeed,
provided the data are correctly formatted, data from all sources can reside
together, including satellite images, air photos and standard cartographic
products. These advantages however can only be exploited with careful use of
the data, respecting issues of common data scales and data quality. In the
context of coastal sensitivity mapping it is quite legitimate to consider a limited
variation in scales allowing for the improvement of resolution in areas of
particular interest such as around ports, particularly sensitive areas or areas
which are difficult for navigation.
One of the most valuable features of any digitally mapped product is that it can be
very easily altered and updated. By assessment of the coastal features it should also
be possible to apply ESI classification. Likewise individual features such as shipping
routes can be added by different users according to their requirements. As GIS is
becoming more widely used the possibilities of linking different GIS systems and
data are increasing. In this way it is possible to exchange data between
organizations operating different systems. Furthermore it is possible to link such
systems to Global Positioning Systems which may be of value for ground-truthing,
or for further data addition or amendment. Maps can be imported into oil spill
trajectory models.
A fully utilized GIS can be much more than just a map, and indeed the data
shown on a map may simply represent the tip of an iceberg. In many cases it is
useful to link textual or tabular information to maps, such as contact details of
concession holders or administrative and management authorities. This can be
done using a GIS simply by pointing at a site and pressing a button for further
19
information. For particular sites on maps it may be relevant to link to legal

details of protected areas, lists of key or threatened species, contact details of
local experts, scientists or non-governmental organizations. Other data and
statistics may also be helpful, such as the number of tourists using particular
beaches, the nesting seasons of marine turtles or tide and current information. It
is all too easy for maps themselves to become cluttered and confusing, but a welldesigned GIS can help to avoid this problem. GIS technology is advancing
towards an open approach, making it possible to link to one or more Database
Management Systems (DBMS) to facilitate the use of other data already held.
The World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) Biodiversity Map
Library is an example of a fully functional GIS operating at a small scale; there
are also now a number of systems operating at larger scales such as the
Norwegian Marine Resources Database (financed by nine of the major operators
on the Norwegian continental shelf), and other national and local systems being
developed both for sensitivity mapping and for the modelling of oil spills.
Maps of the environmental resources in the

Andaman Sea between Sumatra and the
Nicobar Islandsproduced by WCMC on 21
January 1993 when a tanker was involved
in a collision. These are examples of strategic
planning maps for the initial stages of a Tier
3 response. The maps were supplied together
with considerable textual information
describing protected areas, mangroves, coral
reefs, and turtles, as well as contact
information for regional experts who would
be capable of providing further information.
20
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
A considerable degree of harmonization of approach for sensitivity maps worldwide

can be achieved. However, given that resources can vary tremendously from one
region to another, it seems better to promote a broad consistency with respect to
symbols rather than an exhaustively detailed scheme to cover every possible
resource worldwide. The following guidelines are intended to promote
harmonization.
Maps need to convey a clear message to spill responders and to do this quickly.
It should not be necessary to have experts on hand to interpret them. In some

cases this may require summary maps, showing the main features from sets of
more detailed resource maps.
A distinction should be made between sensitive resource information and spill
response and clean-up information. The latter could, for example, be

highlighted in a special section of accompanying text.
Scales should be marked on all maps using scale bars. The direction of north, a
legend/key, the date of production and a title to the map should also be included.
The scale should be appropriate to the type of response (strategic planning,
tactical response or operational site-specific clean-up).

Environmental sensitivity ranking of shorelines is recommended subject to two
provisos:
this may not be appropriate or practical for the largest and smallest scale
maps; and
it is essential to include additional sensitivity information, notably on the
human and wildlife usage of the shores.
The most cost-effective maps are black-and-white and page sized, allowing
easy copying and fax transmission. Reliance on colour alone is not

recommended if it is likely that black and white photocopies of the maps will
be used during a spill response operation. Different coastal types should be
indicated using symbols.
General-purpose symbols are recommended for common resources such as
fish, birds and amenity areas, but it is to be expected that map-makers in

different areas will wish to add further symbols reflecting special features of
each area. This does not present any problems provided each map has a key. A
multiplicity of symbols (showing, for example, many different species of fish) is
not recommended for sensitivity maps though they are appropriate for more
detailed resource maps.
21
The most widely-used and generally-achievable method for showing seasonality
is the four-point scheme showing the sensitive seasonsspring, summer,

autumn, and winter. However, the seasons need to be defined in terms of
named months to avoid confusion between northern and southern hemispheres.
Practical information for oil spill response (for example, areas where dispersants
may or may not be used) should be agreed between relevant organizations

before inclusion on a map.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, FURTHER READING

AND USEFUL CONTACTS
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following individuals and organizations for providing
material for this report: P. Adam, University of New South Wales, Australia;
Bundesministerium fr Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany;
Department of Transport, S. Africa; D. Emerson, Dale Fort Field Centre, UK;
Environment Protection Authority of New South Wales, Australia; Joint Nature
Conservation Committee, UK; L. Jackson, Sea Fisheries Research Institute,
S. Africa; Meteorology and Environmental Protection Administration, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia; The Department of Environment and Quality of Life of the Republic of
Mauritius; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA; Thames Oil Spill
Control Association; and the United Nations Environment Programme.
The UK maps Coastal Sites Sensitive to Oil Pollution (with symbols designed by
Robert Irving) were produced by the former Nature Conservancy Council in
collaboration with British Petroleum and the Department of Transports Marine
Pollution Control Unit.
Helpful comments at the draft stage were provided by International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF); J. Morales, Fundacin Centro de Estudios
Marinos, Spain; R. Pavia, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
USA; and R. J. Percy, Environment Canada.
Further reading
Gundlach, E.R. and Hayes, M.O. (1978). Vulnerability of coastal environments to
oil spill impacts. Mar. Tech. Soc. Jour. 12, 1827.
22
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, FURTHER READING AND USEFUL CONTACTS
IMO. Manual on Oil Pollution. Section II: Contingency Planning (1995); Section III:
Salvage (1983; under revisionnew edition scheduled for 1996); Section IV: Combating
Oil Spills (1988); Section V: Administrative Aspects of Oil Pollution Response (due 1996).
IMO/UNEP (1995). Guidelines on Oil Spill Dispersant Application including
Environmental Considerations. IMO, London.
IPIECA (1991). A Guide to Contingency Planning for Oil Spills on Water. IPIECA
Report No. 2, International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association, London.
IPIECA (1992). Biological Impacts of Oil Pollution: Coral Reefs. IPIECA Report No. 3,
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, London.
IPIECA (1993). Dispersants and their Role in Oil Spill Response. IPIECA Report No. 5,
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, London.
Michel, J. and Dahlin, J. (1993). Guidelines for Developing Digital Environmental
Sensitivity Index Atlases and Databases. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Seattle.
Tortell, P. (1992). Coastal zone sensitivity mapping and its role in marine
environmental management. Marine Pollution Bulletin 25, 8893.
Full references to the sensitivity maps consulted during the presentation of
this booklet may be obtained from IPIECA.
Useful contacts
Dr Richard Luxmoore, World Conservation Monitoring Centre *,
219 Huntingdon Road, Cambridge, CB3 0DL, UK
Fax: +44 (0) 1223 277136
* The World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) mapping service is particularly

relevant for its production of strategic Tier 3 maps. WCMC is a non-profit organization
founded by the three partners of the World Conservation Strategy: the World
Conservation Union, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Wide
Fund for Nature. IPIECA is one of the supporters of WCMC.
The role of WCMC is to gather and disseminate accurate and detailed information
relating to biodiversity and nature conservation around the world. In this capacity it has,
since 1989, been developing a very large global Geographic Information System (GIS).
Most of this information is being placed on a user-friendly ArcInfo system known as the
Biodiversity Map Library where it is simple for any user to overlay and produce maps for
any region of the world. Marine and coastal data currently available include coverages of
coral reefs, mangrove swamps, wetlands including important estuaries, turtle feeding and
23
nesting sites and protected areas (national parks and nature reserves). This dataset is
constantly expanding, both in its global scope and in particular coverages being developed
for certain countries and regions. The data, skills and contacts held at WCMC were first
put to use in the field of sensitivity mapping during the Gulf War, when WCMC was the
first organization to be able to supply a broad range of environmental data on the region.
These resources have been used regularly in Tier 3 responses since this time, as well as
providing more detailed information to aid the preparation of Tier 2 response maps by
other organizations. A number of these maps, together with linked information have
been made available to a wider audience over the Internet through a server on the World
wide Web (http://www.wcmc.org.ukResponse to Environmental Emergencies). The
use of the Internet as a medium for the rapid transmission of information is likely to be
of increasing value and use in spill response procedures.
Ms Lori Harris, Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 7600 Sand Point Way N.E., Seattle,
Washington 98115, USA.
Fax: +1 206 526 6329
(Publications on sensitive environment mapping work)

Dr Robert Pavia, Hazardous Materials Response and Assessment Division,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 7600 Sand Point Way N.E.,
Seattle, Washington 98115, USA.
Fax: +1 206 526 6329
(Technical issues)
Dr Robert Percy, National Sensitivity Mapping Program, Emergencies and
Enforcement Division, Environmental Protection Branch, Environment Canada,
4th Floor, Queens Square, 45 Alderney Drive, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia,
Canada B2Y2N6
(Publications and technical issues)
24
Fax: +1 902 426 9709
I MO

4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR
IPIECA


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OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

A GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association

The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited

PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE

Fundamental features of the compensation Conventions

Scope of compensationadmissible claims

Compensation in States that are not party to the Conventions

PowerPoint presentation on oil spill compensation

Answers to commonly asked questions

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

The international Conventions were developed under

The voluntary agreements of TOVALOP (Tanker

More than 100 countries have ratified one, or a

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

Because of the entry into force on 30 May 1996 of the

Supplementary layer of compensation

Levies on oil receivers in

Primary layer of compensation

FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE COMPENSATION CONVENTIONS

the gross tonnage of the tanker involved in the

First layer of compensationthe tanker owner

The 1992 Conventions apply to sea-going vessels and seaborne craft

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

owner lost the right to limit his liability under the

Each P&I Club has full-time managers who deal with

When does the 1992 Fund pay?

the 1992 CLC which do not apply in the case of the

contributor. The Secretariat then issues invoices to

The 1992 Fund will not pay compensation if the

It may be of interest to note that oil receiving

Who contributes to the 1992 Fund?

Approval and settlement of claims

Whilst private companies and other entities bear the

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

that neither local surveyors nor local claims offices may

Prompt and effective protective measures, either using

Cooperation between the P&I Clubs and the

The approximate amounts of compensation available

Figure 1: Limits of compensation under the 1992 CLC

For a tanker not exceeding 5,000 gross tons, a set

1992 Fund Convention

A maximum of SDR 135 million (approximately

Maximum amounts of compensation available

Notes: The approximate maximum amount of compensation shown as

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

SCOPE OF COMPENSATIONADMISSIBLE CLAIMS

For a claim to be admissible it must fall within the

would be any consequential loss or damage caused by

Claims in respect of pollution damage can fall under

Preventive measures (including clean-up)

Each of these categories is considered briefly below.

Shoreline clean-up can often be labour intensive.

a claim for the costs involved. A claim may be

category is the fisherman who cannot fish because his

Claims for pure economic loss are admissible only if

OIL SPILL COMPENSATION

Tourism can be adversely affected by an oil spill.