Tax Position, Investment Opportunity Set (IOS), and Signaling Effect As A Determinant of Leverage

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

Tax Position, Investment Opportunity Set (IOS), and Signaling Effect


as A Determinant of Leverage and Dividend Policy Simultanity
(An Empirical Study on Jakarta Stock Exchange)
By
Elok Pakaryaningsih
Abstract
Studies on corporate leverage and dividend policy usually take under the
assumption that both, leverage and dividend policy are independent. Recently, many
researchers find that, in order to lessen the agency conflict, leverage and dividend
policy are simultaneous. On that case, agency theory is capable to explain their
simultaneity. Eventhough there is an agreement on this argument, Barclay, Smith and
Watts (1995) argue that, not only agency theory can explain the leverage and dividend
policy simultaneity. Through their empirical study Barclay et.al (1995) find three
factors that can affect the simultaneity, there are: tax position, investment opportunity
set (IOS), and signaling effect.
According to Barclay et.al (1995), this study is aimed to, test the three factors
of leverage and dividend policy simultaneity in Indonesian manufacturing industry.
This study uses 100 firm samples, which consists of firms listed in Jakarta Stock
Exchange (JSX) from 1994 until 1998. The samples and data are collected, using
pooling data and purposive sampling method.
In order to test the simultaneity, this study uses two-stage least square (2SLS)
method of analysis. As dependent variables this study use market leverage ratio and
dividend payout ratio, and the independent variables are; non-debt tax shield, marketto-book value of equity, future abnormal earnings, assets tangibility, and liquidity
position. The result of the analysis shows that variables used, as a proxies for tax
position, investment opportunity set (IOS) and signaling effect have significant
influence on leverage and dividend policy simultaneity. The other variables, assets
tangibility and liquidity position also have significant effect on leverage and dividend
policy. This study also find the simultaneous positive relationship between leverage
and dividend policy.
Keywords: Leverage, Dividend, Tax Position, Investment Opportunity Set
(IOS), and Signaling Effect
I. Introduction
In making a decision about financing, company usually faces a problem on
determining the level of optimal capital structure. Generally capital structure is defined as the
relative mix of leverage and equity securities, in the long-term financial structure of a
company (Megginson, 1997). The choice between leverage and equity becomes an important
issue because it will affect the distribution of companys earning, in the form of dividend. In
this case an optimal capital structure will raise a problem about determining the proportion of
debt over total equity.
Many researchers have been developing a study about determining the proportion of
debt and the proportion of earning paid as a dividend. These studies generally take under the
assumption that, leverage decision and dividend decision are independent (not simultaneous).
Recently, the relevancy about the assumption of independent relationship between
leverage and dividend decision has been argued in many empirical studies, which have found

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

simultaneous relationship on the two decisions. In these studies, agency theory is used to
explain the simultaneity between leverage and dividend decision. This theory states that, an
agency relationship arises whenever an individual or group, called a principal, hires someone
called an agent to perform some services, where the principal delegates decision-making
power to the agent (Brigham and Daves, 2004). Further, the conflict will emerge, due to
agents personal goals that compete with principals wealth maximization. In this case,
leverage and dividend decision perform as a control mechanism to the conflict. Jensen,
Solberg and Zorn (1992) find that the level of insider ownership is strongly affecting the
simultaneity between leverage and dividend decision. Further, they find that company with
high level of insider ownership has a small dividend and also small leverage. Using the same
argument, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find that, company uses three decisions
simultaneously in order to lessen the agency cost, they are: managerial ownership, leverage
decision and dividend decision. Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) study, also find the
simultaneity, on the company, which has been characterized with low growth and no block
holder.
On the contrary, Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) argue that, not only agency theory
but also signaling theory is capable to explain the simultaneity between leverage and dividend
decisions. They have found that, three factor which are: companys tax position, investment
opportunity set (IOS), and signaling effect are capable to predict the simultaneity. Using three
method of regression analysis that is pooled regression, cross section regression and fixed
effect regression, they find that the three factors have significant effect on the simultaneity.
The consideration about tax in the companys capital structure has proposed by
Modigliani and Miller (1958), which have called irrelevance theory. On that proposition they
assume that, tax is not relevant to be considered in the companys capital structure, for there is
no such tax, either individual or corporate tax. Therefore there is no tax-shield on using
certain amount of debt. According to this view, the large amount of leverage in the companys
capital structure will not affect companys value. However, the absence of tax is unrealistic,
because it does exist, both individual and corporate (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller,
1977). In this case the amount of interest inherent in the use of debt can reduce the amount of
corporate tax. As a consequence, company will use higher leverage in their capital structure,
to capture this interest-tax shield. Therefore, higher leverage will cause higher companys
value.
Besides the advantage of interest-tax shield, there is also a non-debt tax shield that
can affect the simultaneous relationship between leverage and dividend (DeAngelo and
Masulis, 1980). In this case, company with high non-debt tax shield will prefer to use low
leverage (McKie-Mason, 1990).
As an opposite of the company, there is no tax-shield on individual income. Investors
have to pay high amount of tax on their earning paid by the company (cash dividend).
However, reinvested earning which results in the form of capital gain will caused lower tax.
Thus, investors prefer to collect lower dividend or reinvest their earning to the company in
order to capture the capital gain. Chang and Rhee (1990), find that higher individual tax
compared to capital gain tax, persist the company pays low dividend and uses high retained
earning in their capital structure.
The simultaneous relationship between leverage and dividend decision is also
determined by companys investment opportunity set (IOS). The argument about IOS is
proposed by Myers (1977). On this proposition, they argue that, mainly company is a mix
between its assets in place that is tangible, and future investment option or growth option that
is intangible. Future investment option reflects companys investment opportunity (through
the choice of many projects with positive NPV). Thus, companys opportunity to grow, will
depend on the choice between: executes those projects with positive NPV or abandons them.
The choice usually called managerial discretion.
Generally high growth companies have higher investment opportunity compared to
those slow growth companies. However they dont have sufficient collateral assets that are
tangible when external financing, such as debt, is required. With this condition, high growth

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

companies will choose low leverage or high internal financing such as retained earning to
finance those potential projects. As a result the dividend paid to investors will be low.
The opposite site happens on slow growth companies, these companies usually use
high leverage and pay high dividend (Long and Malitz, 1985; Williamson 1988). Further,
Jensen (1986) argue that the tendency on using leverage and dividend in both, high and slow
growth companies, can be explained through the existence of free cash flow problem. On the
slow growth companies, which are particularly mature, debt or leverage is used as a bonding
to investors that free cash flow will extend the amount of dividend paid. This argument
directly indicates the simultaneous relationship between leverage and dividend decision.
The third factor to explain the simultaneity between leverage and dividend decision is
signaling effect. This effect appears because of the existence of asymmetric information
between managers and investors. In this case, different investors have different views on both,
the level of future dividend payments and the uncertainty inherent in those payments, and
managers have better information about future prospects than public stockholders. This
difference of view, will affect the stock market, indicated by stock price changing around
dividend announcement. Smith (1986), Venkatesh (1989), Koch and Shenoy (1999), and Kale
and Noe (1990) examine the effect of signaling on leverage and dividend decision.
Using the argument about tax, investment opportunity set and, signaling effect, this
study develops a model to examine the simultaneity between leverage and dividend. The two
stage least square (2SLS) method is used to find the existence of the simultaneity. Two
models of equations will be developed: first, the leverage equation, with leverage as an
endogenous variable, and second, the dividend decision, with dividend also as an endogenous
variable. The three factors proposed by Barclay et.al. (1995), which are: tax position,
investment opportunity set (IOS) and signaling effect then, will be use as control variable in
both equations. Another two variables will also be use in the model, to meet the identification
of equation, require in the 2SLS method. They are: assets tangibility that will be added on the
leverage equation and liquidity position that will be added on the dividend equation.
II. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Tax Position
According to the irrelevance theory, companys value will only be determined by
investment decision. This decision will only affects the left hand side of the balance sheet that
is companys assets. In this case, the tangibility of assets being used will determine that value.
2.1.1. Leverage and Tax Position
By considering the existence of tax, Modigliani and Miller (1963) revise their
argument in the irrelevance theory. On their revised proposition, they find that using a certain
amount of leverage can reduce corporate tax. Further, the interests payment inherent in that
leverage can be used as a tax shield. They conclude, this interest tax shield is the
explanation for higher leverage decision.
Besides the advantage of interest tax shield, some companies also have the benefit
from another form of debt tax shield, that is non-debt tax shield. This form of tax shield
usually provided by the government, concerning the risk inherent in the companys business.
The non-debt tax shield can be classified into two forms: tax loss carryforward and
investment tax credit. However, on the studies generated by Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984)
and also by Noronha et.al (1996), another non-debt tax shield can also be found in the form of
depreciation. These studies argue that, the level of depreciation reflects the amount of
companys tangible assets, which can be use as collateral assets; hence companies
characterized by high depreciation cost tend to use high leverage.
Many studies have been conducted to examine the effect of non-debt tax shield on
leverage decision; however the results are still ambiguous. Scott (1976), find positive
relationship between non-debt tax shield, which is proxies by the level of depreciation, and
leverage decision. He concludes that, the level of depreciation reflects the amount of tangible
assets, which can be use as collateral assets. Thus, company with high level of depreciation
should have more debt in its capital structure. This result is consistent with Bradley, Jarrel and

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

Kim (1984) and also by Noronha et.al (1996). However, Mc-Kie Mason (1990) find negative
relationship between leverage decision and non-debt tax shield. He argues that, for high-risk
companies (such as mining and exploration companies), which always have to face the
possibility of negative earning, tax shield is very important. Therefore in some countries, the
government gives a number of tax facilities, through some tax regulations such as: zero-tax
status and tax loss carryforward. These facilities subsequently, affect companys leverage
decision, which always tend to be low. This conclusion is consistent with the proposition
stated by DeAngelo et.al (1980) in which, the higher the benefit from non-debt tax shield, the
lower the leverage will be used.
2.1.2. Tax Position and Dividend Decision
On the level of individual income there is no tax shield. Miller (1977) argues that, for
an individual income such as dividend, investors have to pay income tax, which is remarkably
higher than those on capital gain. Therefore, investors will prefer to obtain low than high
dividend, or reinvest their earning to capture the capital gain. Chang and Rhee (1990) find
that tax on individual income affect leverage and dividend decision simultaneously. In this
case, investors preference on capital gain, insists the company to pay low dividend and use
high retained earning. Consequently, company will use low leverage.
2.2. Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)
According to the concept of investment opportunity set (IOS), the mix between
companys assets in place and investment opportunity or growth option, will determine
companys growth level. Moreover the choice to execute the investment opportunity that
consists of positive NPV projects will increase companys growth if the projects being chosen
give some benefit in the future.
2.2.1. Investment Opportunity and Leverage Decision
Facing several investment opportunity, financing decision usually perform as a
tradeoff between underinvestment and overinvestment problem. These problems are related
with companys level of assets in place and investment opportunity. High growth companies,
which are characterized with high investment opportunity usually, face an underinvestment
problem. This problem appears when companies have to operate the positive NPV projects
that require more debt financing. However, these companies generally dont have sufficiency
on both, assets in place and cash flow to cover up their debt. If equity financing - by issuing
new common stock - is chosen, then some risks will emerge such as, the existence of
asymmetric information and the raise of conflict between shareholders (particularly new
shareholder) and creditors. Therefore issuing new equity will costly. For some companies, this
situation will lead to run off those investment opportunities, however some are prefer to
continue those projects using retained earning than to leave them.
On the contrary, slow growth or mature companies, which are characterized with high
free cash flow, high assets in place, but small number of investment opportunity, have to deal
with overinvestment problem. Jensen (1986) argues that, overinvestment problem is a conflict
between managers and shareholder, which is generally, arises due to the difference view of
free cash flow. Managers, who always seek for optimal size of the company, tend to see this
free cash flow as a non-profit fund, when it has to be reinvested to the companys main
business. Thus for some managers, they have a tendency to plow this fund into another
project, which is different with companys core business. However, investors see this free
cash flow as an additional amount for dividend paid. In order to lessen the conflict, managers
then use leverage to fund any investment opportunity. This leverage is also used as a bonding
mechanism to the investors that free cash flow will be paid as an increasing dividend.
Another study to provide evidence about the effect of investment opportunity and
assets in place is generated by Long et.al (1995). This study found that company with high
investment opportunity reflected in high R&D and high advertising cost, have lower leverage
compare to those with low R&D and low advertising cost.

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2.2.2. Investment Opportunity and Dividend Decision


Investment opportunity is also affecting dividend decision. Fast growing companies,
with high investment opportunity, usually need large account to support their growth. Holder,
Langrehr and Hexter (1998), find that high growth companies usually use internal financing
that is retained earning to support their growth and also to avoid transaction cost when
external fund is used. This view is consistent with pecking order theory proposed by Myers
and Majluf (1984) which is argue that, companies prefer to use internal fund than external
fund to support their investment. The similar view is also used in the study generated by
Adedeji (1998).
Moreover, Gaver and Gaver (1993) have examined the simultaneous relationship
between leverage and dividend decision affected by investment opportunity. They find that
investment opportunity affects three decisions simultaneously; they are leverage decision,
dividend decision and managerial compensation decision. Reflect on the investment
opportunity examination, Barclay et.al. (1995), propose the concept of IOS called
investment opportunity spectrum. However, this concept is merely the summary of IOSs
cost and benefit on leverage and dividend decision, as shown on table 2.1. bellow:
Table 2.1.
The Cost and Benefit of IOS on Leverage and Dividend Decision
Investment Opportunity Spectrum
Assets in Place
Growth Option
Cost of Debt (Underinvestment)
Low
High
Benefit of Debt (Free Cash Flow)
High
Low
Predicted Leverage
High
Low
Cost of Dividends (Flotation Cost)
Low
High
Benefit of Dividends (Free Cash Flow)
High
Low
Predicted Dividend Yield
High
Low
Source: Barclay, M.J., Smith, C.W., and Watts, R.L.1995. The determinant of corporate
leverage and dividend policies. The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice,
214-229.
2.3. Signaling Effect
Principally signaling effect occurs due to the existence of asymmetric information
between managers and investors. In this case, managers have better information about the
companys future earning rather than investors. As a consequence, investors have a tendency
to make different perception about companys earning announcement. In that case stock price
will change around this announcement, as a reflection of the difference.
2.3.1. Signaling Effect and Leverage Decision
Announcement on using higher leverage is a reflection of companys optimism about
their increasing future earning. It also reflects managerial optimism about companys ability
to pay those debts. Barclay et.al. (1995), use the term high quality firm or undervalued
firm, for company whose earnings have the tendency to increase in the future. For those
companies, the stock market subsequently reacts positively showed by stock price increasing.
Further Barclay et.al. (1995), argue that likewise the optimism view on increasing
income, the insensitive characteristic of leverage on mispricing and thus prevent stock price
volatility, become the main rationalism on using higher leverage. This view is also similar
with Smith (1986).
2.3.2. Signaling and Dividend Decision
Dividend decision can also be explain by means of signaling effect. In this case,
dividend performs as an instrument to convey positive information from managers to
investors that is increasing future earning. This increasing earning will reflect on rising

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

dividend. As a consequence if companies fail to sustain this increasing earning, the stock
price will fall. In summary, high quality companies pay high dividend.
The effect of signaling on dividend decision is proven by Kale et.al. (1990). Their
study finds that companies which characterized with stable cash flow and high earning, have a
tendency to pay high dividend. Another study on signaling effect is also generated by Koch
et.al. (1999). Their study finds significant effect of signaling on leverage and dividend
decision simultaneity. Further, they also find that, the strong effect of signaling is occurs both
on underinvestment and overinvestment companies.

III. Research Methodology


3.1.

Population and Sample


All JSX firms within the manufacturing sector are chosen to be the population for this
study. Then 100 samples is selected using purposive sampling method through three criteria,
first they must be listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998. The time period on
choosing those companies is preferred with the concern of the activating period of several tax
facilities in Indonesia. Second, these firms must be continuing listed in the JSX from the time
period being chosen. Finally, they are maintaining paying dividend. Bellow is the detail of the
sample:
Table 3.1.
The Number of Manufacturing Companies
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Total Number

The Number of The


Companies
29 companies
29 companies
16 companies
11 companies
15 companies
100 companies

Three main sources are used to obtain the samples: a) Indonesian Capital Market
Directory published from 1994 to 1998, b) records about tax regulation especially tax
facilities published by Indonesian Tax Department and c) other publication which is
relevant with this study.
3.2. Variables Measurement
3.2.1. Leverage
From the first equation, that is leverage equation, leverage decision performs as
dependent variable. This study will use market ratio of leverage, that is, the comparison
between total book value of leverage and market value of the firm, as a proxy for leverage.
This market ratio is used with the consideration on its capability to identify the future value of
tangible asset, which can be used as collateral for leverage (Barclay, et.al., 1995). Another
reason on using this ratio is because market value of leverage is capable on predicting the
cash flow stability and future debt service ability (Brigham, Gapenski and Daves, 1999). The
formula for market ratio of leverage is shown bellow:
book value of total debt

Leverage = market value of the firm


(3)
The companys market value will be calculated using the formula, as shown bellow:

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

EAT

closing price
Market value of the firm = total debt
EPS

(4)
The term LEVERAGE then will be used to determine this variable.
3.2.2. Dividend
Similar with leverage decision, dividend decision also performs as a dependent
variable in the dividend equation. The dividend payout ratio (DPR) that is dividend per share
(DPR) divided by earning per share (EPS) will be used as a proxy for dividend decision. The
formula for dividend payout ratio is:
dividend per share

Dividend = earning per share


(5)
We will use the term DIVIDEND to represent this variable in the model.
3.2.3. Non-Debt Tax Shield
The dummy variable will be used to assess non-debt tax shield. A criterion 1 is
given for companies which have the benefit from tax facility given by the government. This
tax facility including: tax deducting, tax-delaying and tax-releasing. Another criterion that is
0 is given for companies, which have no tax benefit. Five tax facility regulations will be
used as a guide to conduct the dummy variables, they are:
a. PP No. 45 Year 1996 and KEPPES No. 7 Year 1999
b. The tax regulation letter No. 272 Year 1998
c. KMK No. 19/KMK. 04/1994, followed by SE-31/PJ. 52/July 1995, SE-58/PJ. 52/
December 1995, and SE-72/PJ. 52/April 1996
d. KMK No.855/KMK.01/1993 and KMK No.293/KMK.01/1994
e. PP No.3 Year 1996 and KMK No.291/KMK.05/1997
Then, the term NDTS will be use to represent the variable.
3.2.4. Investment Opportunity
The level of investment opportunity or growth option is projected by market to-book
value of equity ratio, which has proposed by Kallapur and Trombley (1999). They have
conducted a research to find the best ratio to proxy the investment opportunity. From the 12
ratios being observed, they have found that only market to-book value ratio is capable to
disclose companys future growth. Therefore this ratio is the finest proxy for investment
opportunity. The formula for market to-book value of equity is:
EAT

closing price
Market-to-book value of equity = EPS
common equity

(6)

The term MTBEQ will be used to determine this variable in the model.
3.2.5. Signaling Effect
The theory of signaling pronounces that signaling effect portrays companys future
quality, either low or high. Since the quality can be explained by the tendency of companys
future earning to change, Barclay et.al (1995), argue that future abnormal earning can be
employ to asses the signaling effect. The formula for future abnormal earning is:
Future abnormal earning =

EPS ( t 1 ) EPS ( t )
closing price(t)

(7)

The term FAE will be use to point out this variable in the model.
3.2.6. Asset Tangibility

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

The amount of tangible assets reflects on its book value employed by companies, will
affect the amount of leverage. The collateral feature innate in those tangible assets, produce
more leverage (Titman et.al, 1984). With this view, this research will use the assets tangibility
ratio that is book value of tangible or fixed assets divided by total assets. The formula is:
Assets tangibility =

book value of total fixed assets


total assets

(8)

The term TANG will be used to determine this variable.


3.2.7. Liquidity Position
Liquidity position is another independent variable that will be added to the dividend
equation. This variable shows the amount of cash on hand that will be used to pay cash
dividend. The higher the liquidity position, the higher the dividend will be paid. This research
will use the current ratio to represent companys liquidity position. Other liquidity ratios are
eliminated because they cannot show the actual companys liquidity position. The formula for
the current ratio is:
current assets
Current ratio =
(9)
current liabilities
We will use the term CRATIO to point out this variable.
3.3. Research Design
This study develop a research design based on the explanation about tax position,
investment opportunity, and signaling effect and their effect on leverage and dividend
decision, as shown bellow:
Figure 3.1
The Simultaneous Relationship Between Leverage and Dividend Decision
Exogenous Variables

Endogenous Variables

Non-debt tax shield

NDTS

Market-to-book value

MTBEQ

Leverage

Future abnormal earning FAE


Assets tangibility

TANG

Current ratio

CRATIO
Dividend

3.4. Equation Model


The effect of tax position that is non-debt tax shield, investment opportunity and
signaling effect on the leverage and dividend decision will be modeled in the equation as
shown bellow:
Leverage = 10 + 11(Tax Position) + 12(IOS) + 13(Signaling Effect) + 14Dividend (1)
Dividend = 20 + 21(Tax Position) + 22(IOS) + 23(Signaling Effect) + 24Leverage (2)
Derived from the equation model, we can see that if 11 and 21 have positive
associations with leverage and dividend decision, and if 12 and 22 also have positive
associations with leverage and dividend decision, and if 12 and 22 have the same positive

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effect with leverage and dividend decision, therefore the associations between 14 and 24 will
be positive.
3.5. Hypotheses Development
In keeping with the explanation about tax position, investment opportunity and
signaling effect, and also with the concept of IOS spectrum on leverage and dividend
decision, this research predicted the effect of those three factors as shown bellow:
Table 3.2.
The Hypotheses
Hypotheses

Predicted Effects

H1: Leverage

Dividend

Positive

H2a: Tax Position

Leverage

Negative

H2b: IOS

Leverage

Negative

H2c: Signaling Effect

Leverage

Positive

H2d: Assets Tangibility

Leverage

Positive

H3a: Tax Position

Dividend

Negative

H3b: IOS

Dividend

Negative

H3c: Signaling Effect

Dividend

Positive

H3d: Liquidity Position

Dividend

Positive

IV. Result and Discussion


4.1. Summary Statistics
The descriptive statistics summarizes the characteristics of the samples being used.
Table 4.1. shows the total number of the samples used, the maximum and minimum value, the
mean value, the standard deviation and the summation of each variables.
Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistic
DIVIDEND
LEVERAGE
NDTS
MTBEQ
FAE
TANG
CRATIO
Valid N
(listwise)

N
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Minimum
0.003
0.027
0
0.127
-1.269
0.111
0.413

Maximum
4.258
0.951
1
16.498
2.780
0.765
7.786

Sum
55.831
43.968
35
223.057
2.720
39.683
165.825

Mean
0.55831
0.43968
0.35
2.23057
2.72E-02
0.39683
1.65825

Std. Deviation
0.63097
0.24624
0.48
2.57728
0.44369
0.16107
1.06050

100

As observed, total valid number of samples is 100 firm-years. The endogenous variable or
dependent variable, that is, dividend decision has 0.003 of minimum value and 4.258 of
maximum value. The total value, that is the summation of total number of the dividend
sample, is 55.831, with 0.63097 of standard deviation. Another endogenous variable that is
leverage decision has minimum and maximum value that is 0.027 and 0.0951, with 43.968 of
total value, and 0.43968 of mean value.
From the summary statistics we can also see the characteristics of the exogenous
variables. For the non-debt tax-shield, the maximum and minimum value is 1 and 0. The total
value of this variable is 35, results in the mean value of 0.35. It also has 0.35 of mean value
and 0.48 of standard deviation. The second exogenous variable, that is, market-to-book value
of equity, the maximum and minimum value is 16.498 and 0.127. The total number of this

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SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

variable is 223.057, with the mean and standard deviation is 2.23057 and 2.57728. Future
abnormal return has 1.269 minimum value and 2.780 maximum value. This variable also has
0.4439 of standard deviation and 2.72E-2 mean value.
4.2. Discussion
4.2.1. Leverage Equation
The data collected is analyzed, with the help of SPSS program. The result for
leverage equation is shown on table 4.2 bellow:
Table 4.2
2SLS Result for Leverage Equation
2SLS Results
Equation 1
Dependent Variable = Leverage
T
Sig T
Independent Variables Coefficients
(Constant)
-1.495175
-9.052
0.0000
DIVIDEND
4.611197
12.552
0.0000
NDTS
-1.454518 -11.170
0.0000
MTBEQ
-0.098155 -14.885
0.0000
FAE
0.651639
11.720
0.0000
TANG
0.178100
2.201
0.0302
F = 58.62866
Signif F = 0.0000
R Square = 0.75720
Derived from table 4.2, the join effect of the exogenous variables, which are, dividend, nondebt tax shield, market-to-book value of equity, future abnormal earning and tangibility, on
leverage decision is 75.72%, significant at the level of 0.05. The positive coefficient of
endogenous variable, that is, dividend, is consistent with the hypothesis 1 which predicts the
positive simultaneous relationship between leverage and dividend decision. Similar with the
result on the endogenous variable, the negative coefficients on non-debt tax shield and
market-to-book value of equity and positives coefficients on future abnormal earning and
assets tangibility are also consistent with the hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d.
4.2.2. Dividend Equation
Using the same statistical tools, the result for structural equation 2, that is, dividend
equation is presented in the table 4.3 bellow:
Table 4.3
2SLS Result for Dividend Equation
2SLS Results
Equation 2
Dependent Variable = Dividend
Independent Variables Coefficients
T
Sig T
(Constant)
-7.831348
-5.415
0.0000
LEVERAGE
17.318832
5.709
0.0000
NDTS
-2.216659
-4.767
0.0000
MTBEQ
0.760253
5.728
0.0000
FAE
-1.016480
-5.132
0.0000
CRATIO
-0.070800
-1.305
0.1950
F = 8.67238
Signif F = 0.0000
R Square = 0.31568

52

SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

The table shows that, jointly, the exogenous variables, which are, leverage, non-debt tax
shield, market-to-book value of equity, future abnormal earning and current ratio, affects the
dividend decision for about 31.568%. The positive sign and statistical significance of leverage
indicate that leverage and dividend decision are positively interdependent. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis 1. Unlike with the endogenous variable, the exogenous
variables show conflicting result with the hypotheses. Non-debt tax shield is related
negatively to dividend that is meaning consistent with the hypothesis 3a. However, the other
exogenous variables, that is, market-to-book value of equity, future abnormal earning and
current ratio show different sign with the hypotheses 3b, 3c, and 3d, even though they are still
statistically significant.
V.
5.1.

Summary and Conclusion


Summary
The results of the analysis support the main hypothesis that leverage decisions and
dividend decisions are interdependent. Specifically, leverage decision has a positive influence
on dividend decision and also dividend on leverage. This result can be shown on the
significant r-squared on both leverage equation and dividend equation. These observations
suggest that companies set their leverage and dividend decision due to their tax position,
investment opportunity and signaling effect.
The significant result on non-debt tax shield and its consistency with the hypothesis,
on both equation indicates that the tax facilities given by the government has a large impact
on the amount of leverage used. However the market-to-book value of equity shows
inconsistent result with the hypothesis on dividend equation. The positive sign of this variable
indicates that, even though high growth companies generate high cash flow, they usually do
not have enough internal funds to deal with their investment opportunities. Therefore they
will use high leverage. This result is also consistent with Baskin (1989) and Gaver et.al
(1993).
The other inconsistent result on dividend equation is occurred on future abnormal
earning. However the negative sign of this variable support the study generated by Woolridge
and Gosh (1995). On that study, they argue that, the increasing of investors rationality makes
dividend announcement is perceive as positive signal on companys future earnings indicated
by high investment opportunity. In that case, high investment opportunity will require
companies to use internal fund, which means pay low dividend. However, this argument
cannot be directly generated for Indonesian stock market. Soetjipto (1997) and
Giyartiningrum (2000) argue that, Indonesian investor have the tendency to discard the
information content inherent on dividend announcement. Consequently, there will be no
abnormal return and stock price changing around dividend announcement. However, they
predict that the negative influence is caused by the existence of insider and institutional
ownership. On that case, managers who always also act as an owner, will be very
conservative on using leverage, thus they prefer use internal funds.
On the leverage equation additional exogenous variable, that is, asset tangibility has
positive influence on leverage. This result is consistent with the hypothesis, which
pronounces that high collateral assets, that is, tangible assets will lead to high leverage. The
other additional variable, that is, current ratio, shows inconsistent result. The negative sign for
that variable indicates that cash flow is preferred to fund another projects than paid as cash
dividend.
5.2. Suggestion for Future Research
This study, however has many obstacles, therefore need some improvements. First, for
the better result, it is feasible to consider another variable in the model, which may enhance
the simultaneity effect. Second, the inconsistency of some variable such as market-to-book
value of equity and future abnormal earning may need another proxy to represent these
variables precisely. Third, the prediction that insider and institutional ownership are also
affecting the simultaneous relationship between leverage and dividend decision, can also be
considered for future research. Forth, even though the dummy variable shows better proxy for

53

SNA VII DENPASAR BALI, 2-3 DESEMBER 2004

non-debt tax shield, it is possible to apply another proxy, such as depreciation. The time
differences are also possible to analyze, by considering the economic crisis begin in 1998. For
this reason, the analysis can be divided into two periods, before and after the crisis. Last, the
better result may emerge, if the maturity of leverage also considered.

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