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Personalidentityandmemory

- Memories are not an accurate basis for personal identity because memories can be false, incorrectly remembered, or forgotten. Our identities are shaped more by the experiences we have than our exact memories of those experiences. - Several philosophical theories of personal identity are discussed, including the memory theory, river of selves theory, and Aristotle's theory of identity through change. However, the essay argues that personal identity is too complex to be fully explained by any single theory. - While personal identity cannot be proven, the experience of consciousness provides grounds to believe in a distinct self. The essay concludes by taking a "logical leap-of-faith" in the existence of personal identity rather than assuming solipsism.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
45 views5 pages

Personalidentityandmemory

- Memories are not an accurate basis for personal identity because memories can be false, incorrectly remembered, or forgotten. Our identities are shaped more by the experiences we have than our exact memories of those experiences. - Several philosophical theories of personal identity are discussed, including the memory theory, river of selves theory, and Aristotle's theory of identity through change. However, the essay argues that personal identity is too complex to be fully explained by any single theory. - While personal identity cannot be proven, the experience of consciousness provides grounds to believe in a distinct self. The essay concludes by taking a "logical leap-of-faith" in the existence of personal identity rather than assuming solipsism.

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CameronHowlett

5/4/15
PHIL1000
Drexler
PersonalIdentityandMemory
Yourexperiencesmakeyouwhoyouare.Thenaturevs.nurtureargumenthasbeena
majorthemeinpsychologysinceitsconception,andtheyalwaysendinadeadlock,onenomore
importantthantheotheroratleasteachimportantinitsownway.Sothatmeansthatour
memoriesmakewhatwewerebornasintowhatwearenow,right?NowIamsurethisseems
likeIamadvocatingforthememorytheorybutIassureyouthatIamnot.
NotonlyhasPsychologicalscienceshownthatmemoriescanbecreatedfromnothing,
rememberedincorrectly,andbetotallyforgotten,ithasshownthatwereallydonotevenhave
memoryofourpast.Theonlywayinwhichmemoriesareencodedinourbrainsisinlittle
tidbits,importantdetails,thissavesthebrainspaceandenergyasitdoesnothavetomakeas
manyconnections,whichentailscellgrowthandthereforemorecellmassandmorenutrientsare
necessary,soveryseldomdoesourbrainfullysaveaneventinourmemory,justlittlebitsand
piecesthatweputtogetherdifferentlyeverytimeweremembersomething.Sointhissensethe
memorytheoryholdsnogroundandcannotbethebasisofidentity,atleastnotinthesenseof
thememoriesthemselvesmakewhoweare.Itistheexperienceofthosememoriesthatmakesus
whoweare,wedoholdtheeffectthateventshaveonus,justnottheexacteventitself.
Whenyouthinkaboutwhyyouarewhoyouarethereusuallyisnotsomeclearcut
answerthatcomestoyourmind,thesamewithlikingsomething,theanswertothequestion
whydoyoulikethatsomuch?isusuallysomewherebetween,Ijustdoand,becauseits
greatnot,wellbecause22yearsagoYouexperiencedtheeventanditchangedyou,thereis

noneedforyoutokeepthememoryinyourmindtokeepthatchange.Ifthememoryisneeded
toconstantlymotivateyouthenthatisnotpartofyouridentity,youarejustlyingtoyourself,the
onlythingaboutthatthatispartofyouridentityisyourtendencytoconvinceyourselfofthat
motivation,notthatthatisnecessarilyabadthing.
Everyonehasreasonsfordoingthingsandtheirreasonsarebasedontheirtrue
motivationsthatarepartoftheiridentity,thealtruismofthosemotivationshasitsownscalethat
doesnotevenhavetopertaintothealtruismoftheaction.Suchas,asociopathwithnocarefor
othersmaysaveanotherlife,forthereasonthatthatpersoncouldhelptheminthefuture,the
actionwasaltruistic,butthereasonwasselfish.Sojustbecauseyouhavetoconvinceyourself
constantlyofamotivationdoesnotmakeitanylessusefulofamotivationtosociety,maybeyou
startsomethinglikethepeacecorpsthathelpsmillionsofpeoplearoundtheworld,isitbadif
youonlydidallthatforthefameorgloryratherthanthealtruismoftheaction?Eitherwayyou
helpedmillionsofpeople,andmaybeyoudiditbettersinceyourownselfinterestswerein
mind,youcoulddevotemoreofyourlifetoitmaybe,soisitwrong?
Inthissensememoriescandefinitelyinfluencewhatyoudowithwhoyouare,butthey
stilldonotchangewhoyouare,ifthesociopathwouldhaveforgottenwhatthatpersonthathe
couldhavesavedwasorcoulddo,hewouldnothavesavedtheperson,buthewouldstillbe
himself.Ifthefounderofthecharitywouldforgetwhatitfeltliketobeheldonahighpedestal
hewouldstillbeoutlookingforhisattentionfix,hejustwouldnotshootsohighforit,not
knowingthetasteofthatspecifickindofattentionwellenoughtoworkforit.
Ofcoursethereareotherestablishedtheoriesonidentityaswell,andIwilltalkabout
thembriefly,themostlikelyoftheestablishedtheoriesbeingthesoultheoryandtheriverof

selvesconceptionfromRowlands.Thesoultheory,whichIwouldreplacesoulwith
consciousnessorintelligence,simplystatesthateachpersonhasasoul,andthatsoulistheir
identity,thisaddsthatthesoulisconstant,eternal,andunchanging.Themainproblemhereis
thatitdoesnotanswerthequestion,asyoucannotseeasoul,soyoucanstillnotlabelanidentity
soidentityisstillamysteryandcannotbeshowntobeconstantitself.
TheriverofselvesisthetheorythatIwouldmostagreewith,althoughIdisagreewithits
implicationofsinceyouaredifferentyouareadifferentperson.Basicallytheriverofselves
statesthatthereisnoconstantyouwhatyouareisasurvivorofyourpastselves,andyouarea
differentsurvivoreveryday,hour,minute,andsecond,simplybecauseyouhavethatextra
experienceofthattime,everythingyouexperiencechangesyou,andanewsurvivorarisesto
becomeyou.Thereisnorealproblemwiththistheory,itanswersthequestionjustfine,asany
skepticstheorydoes,bysimplystatingyourearguingaboutstupidthingsbecause[blank]isnt
evenactuallyrealitsjustyoupresupposingnonsense,itsactually[speakersownpresupposed
nonsensethatsaysconceptisfalse].
Whilethistheoryissounditsimplyisnotafairargumentasitskirtsaroundthequestion,
wewillmostlikelyneveractuallysolveanyoftheseissuesthatiswhytheyhavebeenaround
forhundredsorthousandsofyears.Positingideastowidenourhorizonsistheonlythingwecan
accomplishwithmostofthesequestions,soskepticstheoriesthatshootdowntheconceptjust
kindofruinsthingsbyendingthedebates.
Then,tonameafewmore,thereisAristotlestheoryofidentitywhichstatesthataslong
asnoessentialchangehasoccurredanobjectisthesame,histheoryaccountsforthingssuchas
cellularreplacementinthebody,meaningthatthebodystaysthesameevenwithnewcells

replacingtheold,andminorpersonalitychanges,buthealsoputshisfourcausesintoeffect,as
longasnoneofthesearechangedtheobjectorpersonmustbethesameasbefore,aslongasthe
wholeexistsinaconstantstateandgoesthroughonlyaccidentalchanges,itisthesame.Iagree
withthistheorymostly,butthedefinitionofanaccidentalandessentialchangeseemsmalleable.
Soyoucouldeasilysaythatcertaineventschangeapersonenoughforittobeconsidered
essential,butmajorlifeeventsdonotchangewhoyouare,theymaychangeyou,butyouare
stillyou.
Humestheoryisofcourseaskepticstheory,sayingthereisnoidentityandweareonly
abundleofperceptions,whichisreallyonlygivinganewnametothesamethingandsayingitis
different.Humesideaisthatofacommonexistence,asoulthatweallshare,thatisonlyone,
andthatallweareisabundlelooselytiedtogetherbyexperience,whichisallthatcanseparate
individuals,whichisawordIuseforsimplicityasindividualsdonottrulyexistinthistheory.
Humescriticshavebroughtupthatinorderfortheseperceptionstobetiedtogethersomething
wouldhavetobeexperiencingthattogetherness,andthatthingwouldbeaboutthesameasan
identity,Iagree,somethinghastoholdourperceptionsintothisbundle,andifnotaconscious
identity,thenwhat?
TheMemoryTheorystatesthatknowledgeofsimplepiecesofinformationmakea
personwhotheyare,butitisalltoocomplexforthat,apersonisemotions,thoughts,habits,
tendencies,motives,experiences,andtalents.Apersoncannotbededucedtosimplebitsof
informationthatcanbestoredinacomputer.Sure,ifwedelvedeepenoughallwemightbeis
chemicalreactionsandelectricity,butwhatiscreatedfromthatsimplicityisfarmorecomplex,
greaterthanthesumofitspartsassomemightsay.AllwereallyareislumpsofCarbon,

Hydrogen,Nitrogen,Oxygen,andtracesofsomeotherbasicmaterial,butlookaroundyou
whereveryouarerightnowfor30secondsandyouwillseewhatsimplelumpsofCarboncan
reallydo.
Memoryissimplynotveryimportanttoidentity,youarewhoyouarewhetheryou
rememberspecificsornot,itistheimpactofthoseeventsthatmakesyouyou,falsememories
willnotchangethat,forgettingthingswillnotchangethat.Consciousness,ontheotherhand,is
veryimportant,asthoughyoucannotproveittoanyoneelse,youhaveexperiencedyour
consciousness,youarerightnow,andthatinitselfprovesyouridentity.Somaybewewillnever
beabletoprovethatwehaveanidentitytoanyoneotherthanourselves,thereisnowaythatyou
couldbefullyconvincedthatanyotherpersonisanythingmorethanaconstructofyourown
mind,anautomaton,oracomputerprograminaMatrixesqueworld.Allwecandotoremedy
thisistakealogicalleapoffaith,thereisnoupsidetolivingthroughlifeassumingeveryone
elseisfake.Unlessyoufindawaytobreakthroughthedeceptionitwouldbefruitless,butthen
thereisachancethatthedeceptionissogoodthatyoucouldneverbesure,andthenyouhaveto
livewiththatdoubtthatwhateveryoumaychoosetotryisactuallyhurtingpeople.
Inlightofallofthisinformation,thoughIcannotproveit,andIprobablyneverwillbe
ableto,IchoosetobelievethatIamme,youareyou,thisisallworthsomethingbecauseitis
real,andjustbecauseIcanIwillalsochoosetobelieveinsomeSartreanFreedom.MaybeIam
notthesamepersonasyesterday,norareyou,maybeyouarenotevenreal,andjustmaybeI
havenochoiceinanything,butwhatdoIgainfromanyofthatbeingtrue?SoIwillstickwith
theiroppositesandifIamwrongIwilldoeverythingIpossiblycantomakemyselfright,thatis
allwereallycandoisitnot?

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