Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from
his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance
from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped
the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of
the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on
October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor
arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as
a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23,
1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and petitioner. 4

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding
the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of
merit, 6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and
opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it
has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor
disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa
Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a
reassessment of that procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of
Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be
appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached
to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article
302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the
decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715,
instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the
answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is
an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties;
and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as
contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance
of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
period under Rule 65. 14

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as
follows:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under
the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March
18, 1995, to wit:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the

Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power
to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court
of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months,
unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the
following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.
7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the
Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the
section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code
of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over
which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology.
As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now
been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of
course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional
Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except,
among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ."
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has
no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned
amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and
impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases
in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may
have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the
terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the
term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently
arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No.
10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech
we reproduce the following excerpts:

19

from which

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and
powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final
judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court
by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of
Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the
"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines
and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court
are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions
enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review
of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation

Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.

(Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides
the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without
depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in
1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme
Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties
involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the
guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic
rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been
cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to
400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall
continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have
submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and
collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was
introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that
issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was
also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we
understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee
amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is
approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second
reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved
by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action
of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with
which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action ofcertiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would
subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse
from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be
circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically
emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of
Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be
reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal

to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual
in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on
this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to
this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC
for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped
for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably
an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to
labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their
hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants
who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is
available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction,
or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because
of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the
case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban
Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.