THE WORKING CLASS

IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Editorial Advisors

James R. Barrett
Alice Kessler-Harris
Nelson Lichtenstein
David Montgomery

Red Chicago
AMERICAN COMMUNISM
AT ITS GRASSROOTS,
1928-35

A list of books in the series appears

at the end of this book.

RANDISTORCH

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Urbana and Chicago

For Merrill, Merrill Anne, Henry, and

my parents, Hyman and Adrienne

Publication of this volume was supported

by the State University of New York
at Cortland.
First Illinois paperback. 2009
by the Board of Trustees
of the University of Illinois
All rights reserved
2007

Manufectured in the United States of America

1 2 3 4 5 C P 5 4 3 2 1

@ This book is printed on acid-free paper.

The Library of Congress cataloged the cloth edition
as follows:
Storch, Randi
Red Chicago : American communism at its grassroots,
/ Randi Storch.

1928-35

p. cm. (Working class in American history)

Includes bibliographical references and index.
iSBN-io -0-252-03206-3 (cloth: alk. paper)
(cloth : alk. paper)
Trade Union Unity League (U.S.) 2. CommunismIllinoisChicagoHistory. I. Tide.
iSBN-13 978-0-252-03206-6

1.

HX83.S78

2007

331.88 6097731109043dc22

2007016991

PAPERBACK ISBN 978-O-252-O7638-I

Contents

Acknowledgments
Introduction

ix

1. Sam Hammersmark's Chicago 9

2. Revolutionary Recruitment: Numbers and Experience

31

3. "True Revolutionaries": Chicagos Party Culture in

Thought and Action 64
4. Red Relief

99

5. "Abolish Capitalism": The Trade Union Unity League's

Potential and Problems 130
6. "Generals Are of No Use without an Army": How and
Why Communists Abandoned the TUUL 164
7. "Not That These Youths Are Geniuses"; Young Communists
Move from the Margins to the Mainstream 187
Epilogue

214

Notes

231

Index

289

Acknowledgments

It has taken over ten years for this project to transform from an idea
to a book. Along the way, I have had the support of key people for whom I feel
a deep sense of gratitude.
I will be forever indebted to Jim Barrett, who introduced me to the world
of working-class history and socialist politics. Despite his busy schedule, Jim
always made time to listen to a new idea, critique chapters (over and over), and
suggest ways to make my work better. Through his balanced commitments to
family, friends, history, and politics, Jim has been an incredibly important role
model for me. This book has benefited from his attention to detail and his pas
sion for good history, and I have benefited from his lessons on life.
At the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Jim led an inspiring dis
sertation committee (Mark Leff, Leslie Reagan, Diane Koenker, and Steve Rosswurm), whose members sent me off to the real world with excellent critiques
and ideas for revision. Special thanks to Steve, who opened his home and his
heart to this project; his generosity continues to be unceasing. Illinois also
provided me with lifelong friends who help keep me grounded. Thanks to the
gang (Kathy Mapes, Toby Higbie, Steve Vaughan, Lisa Gatzke, Tom Jordan, Julia
Walsh, Caroline Merrithew, Robert Merrithew, Loretta GafFney, Steve Jahn, and
Mary Vavrus) who nurtured me with their intellect, good humor, love for home
cooking, and Graduate Employees' Organization adventures. Kathy, especially,
has continued to be the backbone of my support structure, reading everything
I write, telling me what I really mean, and sharing her humanity through the
highs and lows that come with new life and tragic death.
Researching and writing this project allowed me to work with people who are
incredibly good at their professions and generous with their time. Some stand
out. The late Archie Motley and the staff at the Chicago Historical Society made

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

doing research enjoyable and easy. Jeffrey Janusch's open-door policy and love
for Chicago and its workmg-class history made research trips affordable and en
tertaining. I was particularly lucky to meet Michael Plug at the Carter Woodson
Library Michael knows just about everything about Chicago and happily shared
ideas for sources and leads. Joy Kingsolver and the staff at the Spertus Library
kept me abreast of new acquisitions and accommodated my hurried visits. Galina Khartulary and Valery Klokov helped me get past the armed guards at the
Russian archives and once inside to comb through party collections. Heather
Coleman got me out of a number of jams along the way and made excursions
outside of Moscow fiin. Eric Fensters study-abroad program made it possible
for me to live in Moscow and attend cultural and educational events with ease.
Daria Lotareva helped me locate materials once I returned to the States. The
folks at the University of lUinois Press, and especially Laurie Matheson, have
been patient, kind, and calming forces throughout this process.
Steve Rosswurms first piece of advice was to start interviewing people yes
terday. I was lucky to speak with several activists who participated in the events
described in this book.Some opened their homes; others talked over the phone.
Thanks especially to Vicky Starr, Herb and Jane March, Yolanda and the late
Chuck Hall, Les Orear, Molly West, Mimi Gilpin, Earl Durham, Gus Vavrus,
Helen Balskus, Richard Criley, the late Gil Green, and the late Jack Spiegel.
I was fortunate to have feedback from a number of scholars. Many people
read all or parts of the manuscript, listened to ideas for chapters, gave a tip on a
source, and/or offered suggestions for revisions. Special thanks to David Mont
gomery, Bryan Pahner, Ken Fones-Wolf, Maurice Isserman, Beth Bates, Kathy
Mapes, Julia Walsh, Caroline Merrithew. Heather Coleman, Toby Higbie, Mary
Mapes, Steve Vaughan, Tom Jordan, Karen Pastorello, the late Steve Sapolsky,
Paul Buhle, Glenda Gilmore, Tom Gugliemo, Rick Halpern, Roger Horowitz,
Toni Gilpin. Dan Letwin, Paul Young, Robert Cherny, Rosemary Feurer, Don
Watson, Dan Katz, and the two anonymous readers for the press.
SUNY-Cortland affords me supportive colleagues. Thanks especially to Girish
Bhat, Gigi Peterson. Sandy Gutman, Brett Troyan, Kevin Sheets, Laura Gathagan,
John Shedd, Luo Xu. Frank Burdick, Roger Sipher, Don^ Wright, and Judy Van
Buskirk for reading some or all of the chapters, sharing strategies for balancing
teaching and research, and making me proud to be a historian. Don needs to
be singled out for his incredible work ethic and willingness to help me edit line
by line he is that good. Judy took me under her wing, cheered.me along, and
came over to play with the kids just because she wanted to. I am also fortunate
to know Howard Botwinick in economics, who has shared with me his library,
stories, and progressive vision. Susan Wilson, in recreation and leisure studies,
wishes I were a presidential historian but still regularly asks about Chicago's

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xi

Communists and makes really good pretend pancakes out of our kids. Betsy
Meinz and George Manning share my passions for research methods, teach
ing strategies, politics, parenting, and cooking. Matt Lessig and Mary Patroulis
helped by sharing the magic that was Illinois and the GEO over good wine and
grown-up conversation. Through Cortland's history department, I also had
the good fortune of working with excellent research assistants. Daniel Smith,
Anthony Natale, and Michael Archambauh stand out. Martin Smith from the
University of Illinois graciously offered his time as well. David Miller, in geog
raphy, introduced me to his student Lezlie Button, who worked tirelessly on
the book's maps. Dawn Van Hall kindly digitized and cleaned up many of the
book's photos. Bella Gorelaya fine-tuned my Russian reading skills and prepared
me for my second research trip.
I was also able to fund much of my research, travel, and production costs
through SUNY-Cortlands various in-house grants as well as the generosity of
the dean of arts and sciences, provost, and president. Our faculty union, the
United University Professions, helped with grants, travel funds, and a Nuala
Drescher Fellowship. The National Endowment for the Humanities' Interna
tional Research Exchange Grant made it possible for me to return to Moscow's
archives and complete the research for the book. Other support for this project
came from the Newberry Library, the University of Illinois, and the Illinois State
Historical Society. The views expressed in this book, however, are my own.
My family has always helped me keep things in perspective. My parents,
Hyman and Adrienne, and my sister, Jenelle, have been cheerleaders and fi
nancial supporters during each stage of this long journey, even though none
of us was sure where it would lead. My in-laws and the whole Miller clan have
graciously welcomed me into their pack and their pinochle games. Merrill is my
biggest critic and most loving supporter. He has read every word I have written,
talked through the arguments, and reminded me that the glass is half full. He
has given new meaning to the notion of being on a team. That partly has to do
with the expansion of our own team. In the time I have been working on this
book, Merrill Anne and Henry have become their own people with incredible
hearts and minds. I only hope that by the time they come of age, they will inherit
a spirit of struggle and in their own ways work to make a better tomorrow.

Introduction

On a January evening in 1934, approximately six thousand Chicagoans

gathered in the cit/s large .Coliseum Hall to celebrate and remember Lenin. It
was the kind of evening that brought out the complexities of Communism in the
city. "In behalf of the American Communist Party," the main speaker declared,
"I say that the one program which will bring unity to the American people is the
program of Lenin."' The audience included a contingent of five himdred children
among the thousands of grown women and men, half of whom were African
American and the other half of whom were a mixture of native-born whites
and first- or second-generation immigrants from various ethnic communities.
They represented a number of occupations, including skilled and unskilled
industrial workers, artists, intellectuals, and students. In a sense, this occasion
honoring Lenin's memory had already begun the work of unifying American
people across the lines of age, sex, ethnicity, and occupation.
And yet Communists clearly had their work cut out for them. American
Federation of Labor leaders, the speaker warned the crowd, equated Lenin's
program with "'a Russian programnot one for the United States'" And even
though the hall was decked out in Soviet-styled pageantry, complete vrith red
flags of all sizes and banners displaying such slogans as "Down with Imperialist
War," "Defend the USSR and the Chinese People," and "Hail DimitroffLenin
ist Fighter for the Working Class," the night's speaker triumphantly reported to
a sea of applause and cheer, "We say that the program of Lenin is the program
of the working class."^ What did this diverse grouping of Chicagoans find rel
evant about Lenin and the Communist party? How are students of American
history supposed to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory images: one
of an organization that celebrated Soviet leaders, co-opted Soviet symbols, and
embraced revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the other a somewhat

INTRODUCTION

popular American social movement comprised of a wide array of otherwise

ordmary people? This book closely examines American Communism in a local
context and explains how this radical movement was experienced in the United
States. I argue that by the mid-igsos, Soviet control remained incomplete, and
local cultures still shaped the movement.
Red Chicago focuses on the years between 1928 and 1935, thought to be the
most sectarian period in party history. The scholars Irving Howe and Lewis
Coser, for example, argue that these years represent a time of unified thought
and action throughout the party. "Year by year," they claim, "the totalitarian
symptoms gfew more distinct."^ Their conclusion is supported by the general
outline of Communist teaching during these years. Beginnmg in 1928, Commumst theorists predicted, postwar development was entering its "Third Pe
riod a time when capitalism's collapse and imperialisms end were certain.^
Once the Depression hit and unemployment mounted, these predictions seemed
prophetic, and Communists embraced their calHng to lead workers in what they
thought was bound to be a second American revolution. To speed the system's
ruin, they exposed what theysaw as capitalism's contradictions, focusing on the
conflicts of interest between America's workers and its capitalist class and expos
ing non-Communist liberal and leftist groups as "social fascist" betrayers to the
workers' cause. Using direct and confrontational tactics. Communists promoted
welfare, civil rights, inclusive and militant unions, and anti-imperialism.^
Some scholars argue that these Soviet-inspired tactics lent themselves to
ultra-revolutionary rhetoric and behavior that alienated American workers
and made the American Communist party irrelevant, but it was during these
years that Chicago's party experienced its first substantial growth in member
ship, when tens of thousands turned out for Communist rallies and the city's
Communists developed lasting structures in its neighborhoods and factories.
One of the themes carried throughout the following chapters is that some of
the character that historians identify with the period of the Popular Front (the
years between 1935 and 1939) existed in Chicago durmg the Third Period. It
was in these years that Communists learned how to work with liberals and
non-Communists; they developed successful organizing tactics and fought for
workers rights, racial equality, and unemployment relief and against imperial
ism. Chicago Communists appealed to an assortment of followers-African
Americans, ethnics, students, artists, writers, workers, and womenand began
to move away from sectarianism in all of their major campaigns, before any
orders to do these things arrived from Moscow. Party leaders in Moscow and
New York decided on and disseminated party policy. In Chicago, a great diver
sity of people lived it, but not always by the book.
Until now, a lack of local Communist party sources has encouraged some
scholars to assume that the priorities of international Communist leaders were

INTRODUCTION

those of the ranks and that whatever party leaders ordered, local activists served.
Those in this school interpret all aspects of the party's organization and structure
as determined by Moscow and therefore not relevant to people and politics in
the United States. They remove Communists from their neighborhoods, work
places, and networks in order to show, with condescension and disdain, that
Communists in the United States acted as Soviet puppets.^ Theodore Draper,
writing in 1960, determined that by 1929, "nothing and no one could alter the
fact that the American Communist Party had become an instrument of the
Russian Communist Party."' Such beliefs led him to the conclusion that "a his
tory of the Communist Party is chiefly a history of its top leadership." Echoing
Draper nearly four decades later, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill
M. Anderson argue that "the dictates of the Comintern almost invariably su
perseded policies offered on the basis of local conditions."
Revisionist scholars in the 1980s and 1990s collected oral histories, combed
published party records, and studied party-influenced organizations' archives
to create a more nuanced approach to the study of American Communism.
These scholars contextualized the American party and wrote some excellent
studies that used social-history methods, fleshing out how individuals and
groups experienced Communism in places as disparate as the midwestern shop
floor, southern farm, and eastern city; but in their enthusiasm they tended to
romanticize the Communist movement, understate the party's bureaucratic
structure, and downplay the movement's sectarianism. They also emphasized
the party's Popular Front heyday, when the culture of the movement supported
their broader arguments.^
Lurking behind these various methodologies and interpretations are assump
tions about StaUnism and how it operated in the United States. Revisionist
scholars downplay Stalinism's effect and depict Communists as idealized, or
ganic radicals. Draper and those writing in his tradition see Soviet Russia's
domination over the American Communist project as the only relevant piece
of the story and the fact of Soviet control as a foregone conclusion. More re
cently, Bryan Palmer, a socialist historian, has challenged Draper's teleological
argument and yet agrees that, in the end, foreign domination fundamentally
shaped the American party. To him, Stalin's brutal control of the Soviet party
and the international movement destroyed revolutionary socialism, narrowed
the Communist project to revolution in one country, and dominated the priori
ties of the Comintern and its international parties. "Only if we are capable of
seeing Stalinism's degenerations, and how they registered in the transformation
of Soviet politics and the role of the Coniintern over the course of the 1920s,"
Palmer argues, "can we appreciate what was the foundational premise of the
American revolutionary left."^
Of course, Stalinism did matter to the American Communist movement;

INTRODUCTION

Communists followed the Marxist-Leninist hierarchical style of organization,

and they required members to follow party policy For these reasons, this study
pays careful attention to political and institutional matters. Ihe party line shaped
the activity, language, and structure of Chicago's local party These lines and
policies that leaders in Moscow and New York sent down damaged the party
(when it went on purging campaigns against its own members) and the Left
more generally (when Communists taught that all non-Communist leftists were
the enemies ofworkingpeople everywhere). Such other lines as class revolution
and racial equality brought on the wrath of the state and its police force but were
more in line with a leftist movement and revolutionary thought. And yet, Red
Chicago argues that to fully understand American Communism, one must move
beyond these Stalinist policies to more concrete questions. Who were Chicagos
Communists? How, when, and why did they implement Third Period policy?
What did they actually do in the city s neighborhoods and industries? How did
they understand the party line? When and why did they reinterpret it? Many
in Chicagos party were proud Communists. They believed in the Soviet Union,
the Comintern, and party policy. But they did not always follow the rules. Some
of these rule breakers were newcomers, others werelongtime party leaders, and
still others ethnic leaders, African Americans, professional lawyers, elected
union officials, and student activistshad their own bases of power that party
leaders had to share. Each had their own reasons for stepping out of line: out
right defiance, willfiil ignorance, traditions of their radical past, sensitivity to
the particular people they organized, or the politics of party subcultures. Even
though some were not compliant, they were party members. American Com
munism embracedStalinist stalwarts and their less-disciplined troops. This mix
best explains the experience of Communism in the United States.'^
To reorient the story of American Communism and provide an alternate per
spective, Red Chicago reHes on previously classified local American Communist
records in Moscow open to Western scholars only since the 1990s. The Russian
State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI) includes more than four
thousand files on the Communist Party of the United States for 1919 through
the early 1940s, with its richest materials relating to the period between 1928
and 1935. It also houses thousands of other files that pertain to the Profintern,
which coordinated industrial organizing, and the Comintern, which oversaw the'
entire international operation. These formerly untapped documents (includmg
membership statistics, disciplinary hearings, field organizers' reports, neighbor
hood meeting minutes, pamphlets, newsletters, shop papers, and leaflets) pro
duced by rank-and-file members as well as party officials detail Chicago party
activities and reveal local Communist cultures and decision-making processes.
These sources place activists in particular workplaces, neighborhoods, schools,
and clubs, fleshing out Communists' social networks and political trajectories.

INTRODUCTION

They put a human face on American Communism and thus allow scholars to
tell a detailed story that places the personal and political choices Communist
activists made into the social and political context in which they lived.'^ Many of
the recent studies that use Soviet records emphasize Communist espionage and
intrigue with an eye toward rehabilitating the tactics of red hunters, like Joseph
McCarthy.'^ And while spying did occupy some party members between the
years 1935 and 1945, and mfl>' have during the Third Period, Chicago's local re
cords do not reveal espionage. Instead, they record Communists' daily struggles
facing police repression, mobilizing mass organizations, and raising workers'
political consciousness. Instead of intrigue, local sources reveal the efforts of this
revolutionary party to make itself relevant and provide a clearer understanding
of the way the majority in its orbit experienced American Communism.
While Moscow's sources provide a uniquely candid view of party life, they
are best interpreted when supplemented with newspapers, published records,
and Chicago's own archival sources. The combination helps explain the period's
broader social and political context and calls attention to the social, political,
economic, and cultural forces that shaped American working-class life from the
1920S through the mid-1930s. It also helps explain another central theme of this
book; why and how ordinary people became radicalized. On the one hand, these
questions are essential to understanding the local character of American Com
munism; they draw attention to the ways individuals understood Communism,
the circumstances that brought them to the movement, and how they lived it.
On the other hand, they go beyond party history and place Communism in the
broader context of working-class history. How people make a living, their social
ties, their neighborhood politics, their workplace cultures, and their political
outlets shape their ability and desire to create social change. Between 1928 and
1935, the nation underwent significant shifts between Herbert Hoover's laissezfaire administration and Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, between prosperity
and Depression, between balanced budgets and deficit spending, and between
individualist, private solutions and collective, national ones. The effects of these
changes made their way into homes, worlq)laces, and street corners throughout
the nation. Excellent studies examine how America's workers responded to these
changes but often dismiss as less viable their most radical choices.^^
A community study allows for a more comprehensive understanding of
American Communism than is possible using other methodologies.*^ The inclusiveness of a community study allows one to compare experiences across the
sexes, industries, neighborhoods, and ethnic groups that inhabit the city and
to recognize local quirks, personalities, and cultures in ways that are difficult
to see from a national perspective or by studying one group of people. It also
allows one to consider how (in)completely national and international policies,
structures, cultures, and institutions made their way down to the ranks.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

If a community study is best suited to study working people's encounter with

American Communism, Chicago is an ideal environment. The city was the
second largest industrial area in the nation during the interwar years. In 1930,
thirty-eight railroads and twenty-three trunk lines terminated there, contrib
uting to the city's distinction as the world's leader in the production and distri
bution of food staples and in the manufacture and distribution of meat, meat
products, agricultural implements, dry goods, railroad supplies, and foundry
products. The union stockyards, steel plants, railroad yards, garment facto
ries, and farm-equipment industries gave Chicago its working-class cast and
appealed to Communists, who were especially interested in organizing massproduction workers, who they judged would be more inclined to support a
socialist-styled revolution. Chicago was also one of the most heavily unionized
cities m the country, yet these mass-production workers had been unable to
build lasting unions, a problem Communists hoped to fix. The Chicago Fed
eration of Labor (CFL) held together an assortment of mostly craft workers. In
the aftermath of failed industrial organizing campaigns in meatpacking and
steel, CFL leaders stiU supported a fairly radical agenda, including third-party
politics and anti-imperialist movements. But almost a decade of employer-led
open-shop drives depleted its member unions' enthusiasm to build industrial
unions. Communists believed the time had come for the city's mass-production
workersfirst- and second-generation Eastern European immigrants, black
migrants, Mexicans, and Mexican Americansto create interracial and multi
ethnic unions. Stretching their reach into distinct neighborhoods. Communists
set up, used, and/or co-opted ethnic clubhouses, restaurants, newspapers, and
theaters to get their message out.
Ahhough gaining adherents was a struggle. Communists found supporters
who agreed to rethink segregated and divisive relationships in their workplaces
and communities and who were willing to move toward a newly gendered, inter
racial, and interethnic strategy of organizing and relating to others. Whether in
community organizations, workplace settings, or street-corner meetings, many
laboring people in Chicago listened to, debated, thought about, and occasionaUy acted in support of Communist campaigns. Such behavior suggests how a
diverse mix of Americans imagined a new world should be. Why they did not
see their ends realized is as important to examine as it is to understand why they
believed a revolution was possible and what they were willing to do to accom
plish it. The methods of social history help us achieve such an understanding.
Looking down Chicago's streets and into its schools and factories makes it easier
to see that the connections various groups made to radicalism were dependent
on personal experiences, which in turn were shaped by America's Depressionera political, social, and economic conditions. Chicago's Communists were most
successful m the densest industrial areas and working-class neighborhoods in

Chicagos West Side, the Black Belt, Packing Town, the North Side, and South
Chicago, where the Depression's effects hit with devastating force.
Chicago's Communists were heir to the city's radical traditions. The city was
the site of the 1886 Haymarket tragedy, the eight-hour movement, and the 1894
Pullman Boycott, as well as the birthplace of the Industrial Workers of the World
and the American Communist party. In what ways did Chicagos party represent
continuity with radical movements of the past? What challenges did Chicago's
radical past present? Chicago's Communists built on local, leftist cultures and
developed their own enclaves that dotted the city's working-class neighborhoods.
In some important cases, individuals followed the historical trajectory of radical
ism in America and moved to the party after stints in other leftist organizations.
They brought with them a commitment to a workers' revolution and lots of other
political baggage. Rather than a unified and completely Stalinized movement,

INTRODUCTION

the following chapters show how difficult it was for disciplined party members
to get others to followeven, and sometimes especially, when the others were
seasoned radicals. In these early Depression years, Chicagos party successfully
held together and built upon a group of otherwise loosely affiliated acti\dsts,
and did so with a limited ability to micromanage, decide, and direct.
Red Chicago argues that at the local level, a wide variety of Communists
coexisted in Chicago. Some, even among the lowest-ranking members, were
Stalinized, but they organized, socialized with, and married Communists who
were not. Working in a community with as many neighborhoods, industries,
and ethnic groups as Chicago, the party encountered all kinds of people, with
various priorities and interests. The Soviet Union and party policy mattered a
great deal to these people, but neither precluded their acting in ways that also
made sense in their local union, community, or club meetii^s. The international
Communist movement was centered in Moscow, ruled over byStalin, and gov
erned by Leninist principles. But these facts leave much of the story of the Com
munist experience in a place like Chicago untold. Red Chicago is an attempt to
explain how Communism came to matter to a wide assortment of people and
how they experienced this particular version of American radicalism.

1
Sam Hammersmark's Chicago

It was 1938 when Michael Gold, the veteran Communist newspaper

columnist, referred to Sam Hammersmark as that old Rock of Ages ... the
original model of Jimmie Higgins, the rank-and filer who keeps plugging and
plugging until the battle is won."* Hammersmark's determination placed him
on the front lines of the nations leftist and labor movements. Given his predi
lection to fight for working people, it was fitting that his path of radical activity
originated in Chicago. By 1882, the year he arrived, the city already had some
of the nations strongest labor, socialist, and anarchist movements, and it would
serve as a harbinger of workers' radical sentiments into the twentieth century.
Raised in this worker-oriented environment by his Norwegian father, a skilled
carpenter, and Norwegian mother, a rug weaver, Hammersmark found him
self in the center of the city's and the nations major leftist movements. Mov
ing in and out of anarchist, labor, and socialist organizations, Hammersmark
developed contacts and friendships with an array of activists struggling to find
their own answers to the problems they saw inherent in the capitalist system.
These people taught lessons that caused many to rethink their ideologies, switch
organizational camps, and join new movements. So it is not surprising that
when a Communist party formed in the United States in 1919.
of its first
members were from Chicago. The party proved to be an organization to which
many, including Hammersmark, would remain loyal for the rest of their lives
and one that would become the dominant leftist organization in the city and
the nation into the 1950s.
Chicago's radical past provided members of its nascent Communist move
ment a context full of hope and a history of working-class militancy. It also
held lessons of state and employer repression and organizational challenges.
Heady and emboldened, Chicago's newly minted Communists had great hopes

LO

RED CHICAGO

of overcoming the hurdles that stymied radical movements of the city's past and
worked to unify Chicago's labor militants and working-class ethnics under the
Communist party's banner. They would find, however, that in the initial pro
cess of affiliating themselves to the international Communist movement, Soviet
leadersand the policies they setalienated Chicago's Communists from their
non-p^rty labor allies and encouraged an inwardly focused, factional feud.
Chicago's Early Growth and the Development
of RadicalTraditions

Chicago's rich labor and radical traditions that greeted Hammersmark and
thousands of others like him were inexorably tied to the city's heritage. In the
short time between 1774, when Jean Baptiste Point DuSable, a Haitian trader,
became the first non-Indian settler to the city, and Hammersmark's arrival in
1882, Chicago had grown into a thriving industrial center. Opened to the Erie
Canal in 1825 by mostly Irish hands, Chicago developed into a center for trade,
slowly at first and then with increasing speed when railroads arrived. Its access
to the West made Chicago the nation's railroad center in 1856: its nearly one
hundred daily train arrivals helped attract all manner of industry to this rapidly
growing city. The 1871 fire caused havoc, homelessness, and destruction but also
stimulated a wave of industrial development. By the time Hammersmark arrived,
Chicago had become not only the Midwest's commercial and transportation
center but also one of the nations leading manufacturing centers, dominating
the agricultural-implement, livestock, lumberyard, and sawmill industries. In
terms of number of employees, total wages, capital invested, gross value of
products, and value added in manufacturing, only New York and Philadelphia
had Chicago beat.^
Employers' insatiable need for labor attracted a fast-growing population of
working people to this once swampy tradingoutpost. When it was incorporated
in 1843, the city housed under five thousand people, but by 1860, it had 109,260
residents and would multiply to 503,185 in 1880, only to double again in the
next ten years, making it the third largest city in the nation. Such immigrants
as Hammersmark and his family caused the city to brim with foreign-speaking
newcomers, many of whom arrived with little but the willingness to work. By
1890,78 percent of the city's residents were either immigrants or their children.
From the 1880s through the early 1920s, newer arrivals from Italy, Greece,
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and the American South joined older settlements of
Germans, Irish, Scandinavians, and Czechs, distinguishing Chicago as a work
ing-class city of immigrants and black migrants.^
Such diversity made unified activity among these working-class ethnics dif
ficult. In fact, from the earliest days of settlement, immigrants nestled into fa

SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

11

miliar ethnic enclaves, insulating themselves from native-born Chicagoans and

people hailing from different lands. Whether it was the North Side Germans
who congregated east of the river among Diversey, Devon, and Lincoln Avenues;
the Southwest Side Bohemians who claimed Pilsen; the Irish of Bridgeport
and Canaryville; or the Swedes who developed Swede Town between Erie and
Wells on the Chicago River, ethnic Chicagoans' particular language differences,
churches, schools, newspapers, restaurants, and cultural institutions segregated
one group from another. Ethnically identified parishes and neighborhood in
stitutions provided comfort and support to newly arrived peoples but also pro
moted insularity and at times intolerance.^
Chicago's government policies further exacerbated ethnic tension and divi
sion in the city. In the 1850s, for example, Germans fought local laws to close
their beer gardens and to raise licensing fees on liquor stores. At one point,
a vigilante committee used firearms provided by the mayor to stop German
socialists from getting to city hall. The force Chicago's police used in putting
down worker-related protests would become notorious the world over. In the
meantime, anti-immigrant policies regulating alcohol and foreign-language
instruction in the schools would keep Chicago's ethnics on the defensive.^
Because particular jobs, crafts, and trades werelinked to certain ethnic groups,
shop-floor divisions between skilled and unskilled positions translated into eth
nic resentment. Older, more settled groups like German cigar makers, Swedish
wood workers, and Irish butchers saw the mechanization and reorganization
of their work between the 1870s and the early 1900s as a threat to their work
culture and livelihood. Even if the mfore established skilled workers had wanted
to unite with unskilled workers newly arrived to the city who took jobs for
whatever pay employers offered, working-class unity across skill, gender, and
language barriers would have been difficult to accomplish.
Employers relished and exacerbated these divisions. This was particularly
true in large industries, like meatpacking, where workers were already divided
along skill, gender, and ethnic lines. Philip Armour, the leading packinghouse
industrialist, was aware of how Eastern Europeans held off unionization. He
openly explained that they did so "'by displacing experienced and perhaps dis
illusioned employees ... who might have been contaminated by contacts with
union organizers'" Swift's employment office antagonized ethnic differences
among their workers by hiring and firing entire groups of ethnics in front of
one another. One employment officer explained, "'We change among different
nationalities and languages. It prevents them from getting together. We have
the thing systematized.'"' Employers' ability to play different ethnicities off one
another would make such future ethnic migrations as the Great Migration of
African Americans during World War 1a particular organizational challenge
for labor and the Left. Given ethnic groups' residential insularity, the state's

12

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

Willingness to repress organized protest, and employers' determination to divide

employees along ethnic lines, workers found it difficult to see past their own
ethnic differences, unite along class lines, and demonstrate against political and
economic forces threatening their work cuhures.
But such a tradition began to show in the city as early as the railroad strike
of 1877. When employers for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Pennsylvania
and West Virginia announced a 10-percent wage cut, a strike wave developed
^ong the railroad lines. When it finaUy reached Chicago, ethnic and nativeborn laborers jomed raihoad workers in laying down their tools and walking off
tor jobs. Workers refused to run streetcars, left ships idle, and walked out of
toiture, cabinet, and tailor shops and lumber yards. Soon ironworkers, brass
finishers, carpenters, brick makers, stonemasons, glaziers, and painters joined
in. At one point, five hundred stockyard butchers marched-sporting cleav
ers, bloody aprons, and a banner that read "Workingmens Rights." Although
ultimately suppressed by excessive government force. Chicago's workers dem
onstrated their ability to act in solidarity against capitalist forces encroaching
on their established work cultures.
The willingness of Chicago's organized workers to flex their muscle appealed
to a smaU but influential group of Socialists in the city who had their own roots
in Chicagos past. A group of German Socialists who fled Germany after its 1848
ailed revolution put out Chicago's first Socialist newspaper, Der Proletarier, in
1854. but not until the post-Civil War period could a core of agitators and work
ers develop a coherent Socialist movement. This movement created organiza
tions between the 1870s and i88os-induding the workingmen's associations
^d parties of the early 1870s, the Socialist Labor party (SLP) of 1877. and the
International Working People's Association (IWPA) in 1883-that had strik
ingly simflar compositions. Rather than membership, what changed for these
organizations was the structure of modern industry and the questions each
addressed, such as the role of politics in fomenting revolution and whether
revolutionaries should promote worker militias.^
By the 1880S, one of the most pressing issues feeing Chicago's radicals was the
relationship between trade unions and revolution. In Chicago, a trade-unionfocused group of anarchists pushed for dynamic and mUitant unionism as the
ey to revolutionary change and gained more influence among workers than in
any other city. Their concept, later known as the "Chicago idea," represented a
unique blending of anarchist and revolutionary trade-union ideology that would
resurface m slightly altered form as members of different radical organizations
came to appreciate trade unions' potential to make revolutionary change At its
height between 1885 and 1886, the IWPA had three to five thousand members
and fifteen thousand supporters throughout the country'" Chicago, the heart
of the movement, was home to fifteen different language groups, representing

I3

English, German, French, and Czech workers. Chicago anarchists, the largest
such concentration in the country (roughly a thousand, with five or six thou
sand sympathizers), supported a vibrant social life of picnics, parades, dances,
and concerts. Most members were either skilled or unskilled workers and were
led by craftsmen and independent artisans.*^
As new arrivals filled the city and competed for work, anarchists' lively culture,
disdain for the ballot, and encouragement of direct action attracted a growing
number of people, including Sam Hammersmark In Europe and America, it was
men like Hammersmark's father, a skilled tradesman, who populated anarchist
movements. They saw the aggregation of wealth and power created through
industrial capital, the use of mechanization benefiting^employers while exploit
ing workers, and the dehumanization associated with the deskilling of trades
and crafts. Professions being modernized by factories and machines had strong
representation among Chicago's anarchists. The Pulhnan railroad-car fectory
and McCormick and Deering agricultural-machinery plants were sites where
anarchists regularly set up soapboxes and drew crowds.*^
As members of local unions, Chicago's anarchists and Socialists nurtured the
indigenous militants in the ranks of the city's labor movement. In 1884, that
labor movement was divided into three organizations: the Knights of Labor, the
Trade and Labor Assembly, and the Central Labor Union. Reflecting workers'
fragmentation by ethnicity, skill, and ideology, each represented various work
and ethnic cuhures. Generally speaking, skilled Anglo-American workers sup
ported the Trades and Labor Assembly, while Irish Americans dominated the
Knights. Other semiskilled and unskilled European immigrants with connec
tions to socialist and anarchist groups formed the Central Labor Union. De
spite this organizational division, over time the membership ofthese groups
overlapped, and they occasionally cooperated openly In 1886, there were 307
strikes in the city, a ninefold increase from each of the prior five years, showing
that Chicago's workers were more organized and militant than they had ever
been.*'
Instead of 1886 inaugurating a new era of labor activism, however, the radi
cal potential of the year's militancy was squashedin light of labor's demand for
an eight-hour day. What began as a powerful and united labor movement of
about eighty thousand demonstrating publicly in Chicago for an eight-hour day
ended two days later when an unknown person threw a bomb into a crowd of
protesters and police in Haymarket Square, killing seven police officers and four
workers. In the bomb's aftermath, tremors of fear and hysteria rocked the nation,
shaking Chicago with particular force. Police rounded up labor and anarchist
leaders, shut down labor and radical presses, and arrested eight suspects for
what would become an internationally followed trial resulting in the suicide of
one, the acquittal of three, and the hangings of Adolph Fischer, George Engel,

14

RED CHICAGO

Albert Parsons, and August Spies, a group who became honored in Left circles
as the Haymarket martyrs."
People such as Hammersmark were deeply affected by the state killings of
these labor radicals and joined with thousands of the city's labor boosters, in
cluding singing societies; members of die carpenter, baker,saddler, wagon maker,
cooper, brewer, and furniture-worker unions; unorganized groups of workers;
sections of the citys Central Labor Union; and bands, in a march to protest
their hanging, but such a display of sympathy for radicals was to become unique
during the repressive months that followed. Quickly and with force, the city's
clergy, newspapers, and public opinion turned against labor agitation of all kinds.
Meanwhile, the Knights of Labor and Trades and Labor Assembly took strong
stands against anarchism, driving a wedge between Chicago's more traditional
labor unionists and those who hoped to spark militancy. For a time, radical
movements and their adherents in the city seemed defeated.*^
Hammersmark was one among several who spent the following years look
ing for answers outside of organized labor and radical movements. From 1889
through 1893, he studied in a seminary. As it turned out, though, religion was
not for him: just before becoming ordained as a minister, he did an about-face
and joined a generation of Chicago's working-class radicals in declaring himself
an atheist. In his continuing search for answers, Hammersmark began mingling
with Chicago's progressive literary world. Hie written word and its distribution
would become the focus of his activism for years to come, joining him to those
throughout the country who maintained this labor and leftist tradition.'
In the midst of Hammersmark's soul searching, the 1894 Pullman strike
again focused the nations attention on Chicago's labor movement. This time
Hammersmark joined anarchists and Socialists, who watched from the sidelines
as skilled and unskilled workers united against Chicago's industrial magnate
George Pullman. Thousands of Chicago workers in and around the railroads
ensured that at least between June 29 and July 8 no trains left the city As in the
railroad strike of 1877. the power of the government through the military even
tually subdued their efforts, but this time workers had managed a greater feat,
as the thousands of skilled and unskilled workers represented a broader ethnic
mix. The potential of workers from different ethnic and skill backgrounds to
join and challenge industrial capital would carry into the imagination of labor
radicals of the next century.
Before then, strength returned to the Socialist movement when workers began
to rally behind such new leaders as Eugene V. Debs, who, fresh from the Pull
man conflict, directed militant workers toward the revived Socialist Party of
America. With such activity, Chicago remained at the center of radical gather
ings, and new labor movements formed. Hammersmark made his contribu-

SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

15

Samuel Hammersmark, early 1930s.

(Chicago Historical Society, ICHi39208, photographer unknown)

tion to the rebirth of the Socialist movement through his creation in 1904 of
the Hammersmark Publishing Company. He printed and distributed works by
Clarence Darrow, Edgar Lee Masters, and John Altgeld, the governor of Illinois
who pardoned the last of Haymarket's victims. And he eventually made his way
to Washington State to help Lucy Parsons, the widow of the Haymarket martyr
Albert Parsons, put out Why? from Tacoma. In the few years he spent in Tacoma
before returning to Chicago, Hammersmark extended his activities and inter
ests, like the Haymarket anarchists before him, to include the labor movement.
He helped organize retail clerks in Seattle and Tacoma and eventually became
head of Tacoma's trade council.'
In 1905, Hammersmark reinforced his interest in labor by attending the
founding convention, in Chicago, of a new anarcho-syndicalist organization, the
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). This convention brought together the
nation's leading labor radicals: Bill Haywood, secretary of the Western Federa
tion of Miners; Eugene V. Debs, leader of the American Socialist party; Mother
Jones, the fighter for miners' rights; Daniel De Leon, the leader of the Social
ist Labor party; Lucy Parsons; and hundreds of others from various Socialist
and anarchist organizations. The IWW's purpose was to launch a dual form of
revolutionary unionism that would challenge the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), the main labor federation dedicated to the organization of skilled craft
workers. That radical workers were frustrated with the AFL was not surprising.
Even though some AFL locals had a Socialist presence, the AFL as an organiza

L6

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

tion lacked interest in the unskiUed, unorganized, and nonwhite. These IWW
members hoped to build a separate, competitive, militant labor organization
open to workers of all backgrounds and skill levels.'
the IWW s dual-miionism strategy. These activists believed that the IWWs tac
tic of creating militant unions in opposition to AFL unions isolated militant,.
con&sed rank-and-file workers, and hampered the ability of activists to inspireteW RVA CTadvocates
of the need to work within es
tablished AFL unions was William Z. Foster, a future leader of the American
Communist party. Unable to convince the IWWs leadership of dual unionism's
mllTn T
^
organization
modeled after a revolutionary syndicalist organization he had seen at work in
Syndicahst League of ^^orth America (SLNA) in Chicago, where the heart of its
embership was based. SLNA members, about two thousand of whom were
drawn from the IWW and fledgling anarchist organizations, joined local AFL
unions and focused on organizing the unorganized.
Meeting WiUiam^ Foster made an imprint on Hammersmark and affected
^th h
Hammersmark quickly joined Foster and became friendly
th his SLNA group, a core of whom, like Hammersmark. had connections to
brl^MZ Vh
M
'he city
tW , I
prominent among Haymarket anarchists, with
tnem into the new organization.
The SLNA only survived two years before its overly decentralized structure
tionTxrad t J
organization, the Interna
tional Trade Union Educational League (ITUEL). Although small and ineffec
tual, these organizations succeeded in important ways. They brought together
a core of activists who had experience in Chicago's distinct radical labor milieu
and were committed to making established unions mihtant centers of revolulonary activity They found themselves in the center of what would be some
of the nations biggest wartime labor conflicts. When they finally joined the
Communist party fteir leadership, contacts, and experience in Chicago's labor

In the meantime, these activists' poor record in the SLNA and the ITUEL in
no w^ readied them for what was to come, first in the packing industry and
then through the nations steel miUs. Part of their success was certainly due [o the
economic and political context of the wartime period, but credit for Chicago's
w^ime labor activity also needs to extend to the support ofthe CFL andfhe
rs ip 0 John Fitzpatnck. In his writings. Foster credits ITUEL militants
with making the CFL the most progressive labor council in the United States."

17

Certainly people like Johnstone and Hammersmark helped. At various times,

the CFL assigned Hammersmark as an organizer to the rubber workers, candy
workers, and bakery and confectionery workers. But leaders in the federation
established their own path of progressive labor leadership even before the ITUEL
militants came on board.^
Fitzpatrick had joined with Edward Nockels in taking control of the CFL
from "Skinny" Madden and grafters from the building trades.^^ Once in charge,
Fitzpatrick joined other progressives in helping organize the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers and the International Ladies' Garment Workers. From 1917
through 1919, CFL activists under Fitzpatrick's leadership filled the Chicago
Coliseum for a rally protesting the frame-up and imprisonment of California
Federation of Labor's left-wing leader, Tom Mooney They started their own local
labor party, helped create a national one, fought against imperialism, and began
an effort to bring unions within the railway industry into a single organization.
Fitzpatrick was even willing to challenge the entrenched AFL leader Samuel
Gompers, which resulted in the CFL losing its charter from time to time. That
Fitzpatrick and his federation were willing to fight for Chicago's workers was
not in question. What was unknown was whether he and the CFL were willing
to cooperate fully with Foster and his group.^
In the summer of 1917 such questions began to dissipate when Fitzpatrick
and the CFL supported Foster and about a dozen local unions with jurisdiction
over packing workers, rail workers, and machinists to join a Stockyards Labor
Council (SLC) and hash out a strategy to organize the city's packinghouses.
Foster brought militants from his SLNA and ITUEL, including Hammersmark,
to work tirelessly to bring workers to union organizations. The campaign ini
tially focused on Chicago's five biggest packing plants and eventually grew to
embrace cooperating packinghouse unions across the country into a national
organization with Fitzpatrick as chairman and Foster as secretary. The threat
of a national strike brought thousands of workers into previously moribund
unions and attracted the attention of President WoodrowWilson and his Federal
Mediation Commission, whose members stepped in and provided arbitration
for packinghouse workers throughout the country. By early 1918, the govern
ment agreed that packers needed to grant their workers an eight-hour day with
ten hours' pay, overtime, wage increases, a guaranteed five-day workweek, and
time off with pay for lunch for workers laboring in eight-hour shifts.^
With such a huge victory for packinghouse workers, Foster turned to the
steel industry, where again he introduced a resolution to organize an industry of
workers. This time his resolution called for a nationwide AFL joint campaign of
unions with jurisdiction in the steel industry. CFL delegates unanimously sup
ported the effort, only this time, organizers would not be as successful. Bucked
by AFL leaders from its onset, the campaign to organize steel had a slow start,

L8

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

beginning only in Chicago and the Calumet region rather than in the fifty or
so steel towns in which Foster had hoped to organize. In Chicago and Calumet,
steel workers turned out to mass meetings, signed union cards, and showed'
the promise of a winning campaign. But its slow start, the end ofthe war, and
steel industrialists' determination to keep their industry largely unorganized
resulted m a stunning defeat. Despite the fact that the 1919 steel strike resulted
in over 365,000 steel workers striking in fifty cities around the country, state
violence and employer intimidation resulted in the strike being called ofl'with
few victories.^^
The ability ofthe steel industry to stave off union organization hinted at the
successes industriaHsts were to enjoy in the 1920s. Corporate welfare policies
and company unions put a damper on the ability of militant unionists to make
^ange through labor organizations. The Palmer Raids, named for Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer, were government attacks on Socialist and union
offices and homes and resulted in the deportation of suspected foreign-laneuage2>eaking threats. These federally mastered events, like the repression following
Haymarket. quieted militant voices in political movements and union organi
zations alike and provided the context for the underground orientation ofthe
Communist party in the early 19205.^
Eniployer and government efforts to stomp out militancy and unionism
were furthered by conflicts among workers themselves. In the summer of 1919.
Jack Johnstone, on behalf of the SLC, organized an interracial march fi-om the'
neighborhood adjacent to the stockyards, the Back ofthe Yards, through to the
neighborhood populated predominately by African Americans, the Black Belt.
Unfortunately for labor militants, this event's success was short-lived. Three
weeks later, a race riot exploded on the city's South Side. Even though the riot
started m response to violence on a beach rather than in a factory, racial tensions
spilled over with devastating effects on interracial militancy in the labor movement. At the same time, patriotic fervor and nativism tore at the progressive CFL
leadership, quieting any hopes of new, ambitious campaigns.^^So defeated and
divided for a time they might be, but Chicago's labor radicals, symbolic ofthe
tradition of labor militancy that characterized the city, were not obliterated.
The Birth of Chicago's Communist Party

Just as Hammersmark spent the years between the Pullman strike and the birth
ofthe IW rethinking and operating in new political circles, a core of Chicago's
hbor militants spent the 1920s regrouping and readying for upcoming battles.
Ihey would do this through a new organization that many of them helped build
Like many ofthe radical organizations before it. the Communist Party ofthe

19

United States was born in Chicago. Inspired by the triumph of the Bolshevik
Revolution, members of the Socialist party's left wing organized an American
Communist party. These left-wing Socialists, dominated by semi-autonomous
foreign-language federations, came to American Communism with their own
newspapers, cultural groups, institutions, and willingnessto quarrel. Their early
enthusiasm to create an American Communist party quickly disintegrated,
however, into wrangling over the timing of the new organizations birth. One
group, which included most of the foreign-language federations, argued that
an American Communist party must be established immediately in June 1919.
The other, which included more native-born radicals, wanted to wait ten weeks
until the Socialist party's convention, in hopes of gaining its support. Resent
ment, hubris, and personality conflict resulted in the formation of two parties in
1919: a Communist party and a Communist Labor party Through 1923. their
members seemed to do little else but disagree over internal questions facing
their organizations. Moving from the issue of unification between the groups to
the feasibility of maintaining an underground organization, those interested in
creating an American Communist party remained a small, internally focused
bunch. By 1923, with the aid of Communist leaders in the Soviet Union, Ameri
can Communists settled on an above-ground organization called the Workers
(Communist) Party of America, a name they would use until 1929, when they
switched to the Communist Party of the USA.'
Once in the party, recruits foimd an elaborate, hierarchical structure awaiting
them, which fit them in at its bottom while connecting them to a leadership in
the Soviet Union, who sat at its top. There stood the Communist International,
or Comintern. Founded by Lenin in 1919, the Comintern was the international
headquarters of the Communist movement, the place where party leaders the
world over met to make strategy, solve problems, and receive orders. Stalin's
rise to power in the 1920s consolidated Soviet government control over the Co
mintern and the policies of Communist parties around the world.'' The Ameri
can party, with its offices in New York, was always one of the smallest and less
significant ofthe international movements. Regardless, its leaders maintained
the same organizational structure found in other party headquarters. A Central
Executive Committee (CEC, known as the Central Committee from 1929 on)
represented the party's top national leaders. A smaller committee, the Political
Committee (or Polcom), oversaw party policy between CEC meetings, and an
even smaller secretariat ran the party's daily activities. Small departments in
the national office oversaw such specific activity as women's work, propaganda,
and organizational efforts. Jay Lovestone led Americas Communists as the gen
eral secretary from 1927 through 1929, when he was expelled and replaced by
Earl Browder, who served in that capacity through the Popular Front period.

^
20

RED CHICAGO

Lovestone's expulsion dramatizes James R. Barrett's observation that "until the

mid-i93os, power on the Central Committee derived not from the authority
of one individual but from a series of shifting alliances."'^
Directly under the national party's command were eighteen districts, each
representing cities. Chicago was the headquarters of the party's Eighth Dis
trict. second in size to New York. In addition to Chicago, the district included
industrial areas in Indiana, Wisconsin, and southern Illinois. Delegates voted
at district conferences for anywhere from fifteen to nineteen party members
to lead them. Once picked, the district committee elected an executive com
mittee of three to seven leaders, whom they called the secretariat or buro. The
secretariat then divided various office responsibilities among themselves.'^
Under the district leaders were leaders of city sections, regions of a city that
in turn were organized by neighborhood and'-shop groups, known as nuclei
or units. Delegates to section conventions, picked from among their best unit
leaders, chose a section organizer and an executive committee of nine to eleven,
who in turn were supposed to elect a buro of three to four. Representing the
most capable organizers coming out of the rank and file, section leaders partici
pated in the activities carried on by their nuclei as well as the work oi^anized
by leaders at the district level. From 1928 through 1935, the number of sections
increased from five to thirteen, reflecting the party's increase from an organiza
tion with just over six hundred members to one with over three thousand.'^
The nucleus or unit was at the structure's lowest level. Shop and street nu
clei, units of ten to fifteen people, were to bring Communist ideals to fectories.
schools, and residential areas throughout the city Members in good standing
elected three to five leaders from the active, capable, and willingthe number
depended on the unit's size. The leaders then met and selected which of them
would be their agitation and propaganda director (in charge of explaining party
campaigns to the masses and raising members' political awareness through
readings and discussion), their financial secretary, and their lead organizer. As
such different issues as women's rights and black equality pressed on the party,
national leaders would send word all the way down to unit leaders, directing
them to elect one of their own to take charge of these initiatives. In addition
to providing opportunities to lead, units were responsible for educating each
other about Marxism and their movement; selling party literature; circulating
petitions; doing face-to-face organizing; and reporting to section leaders, higher
in the party's hierarchy'^
When Communism came to Chicago, Hammersmark had been experiment
ing with Foster's Trade Union Educational League (TUEL).''' Its purpose was
similar to the SLNA and the ITUEL, but TUEL activists had the advantage of
international support. As it turned out, Lenin's writings confirmed the TUEI^
tactics of working to radicalize established unions from the inside, as mem-

SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

21

(iEKEML- STRUCTURE ^ PAR.Tr

/ /
'

1
I

x , - " /
/

1
:

/ ; 1
-'-J I

secnoH

STCTIOH
EOMMITTU
/

/ I

I '
'

COHMITRC
\

General structure
of the American
Communist party as
illustrated in the April
1931 issue ofthe
Party Organizer.

bers of these unionsCommunists referred to this activity as "boring from

within"and the Communist International's Red Internationalof Labor Unions
(RILU) supported the strategy at its first congress. These encouragements gave
Foster and his TUEL more auAority in radical circles than they previously could
muster on their own. They also made Foster and his cohort of labor militants
more disposed to Communism. Still, before they joined, each activist had to be
convinced that the party's focus on revolutionary political action was correct.
Coming from a syndicalist framework that valued economic action above any
other kind, Foster and his fellow labor militants needed time to reconsider their
political assumptions.'^
Even before attending the RILU conference in Moscow, Foster had begun to
rethink the value of political action. He remembered, "As a result of my own

e
22

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

experience, especially in the meat-packing and steel campaigns, the need for
political action had been gradually dawning upon me and I began more and
more to feel that it was not a wise policy that tried to restrict the struggle ofthe
workers solely to the economic field."^ Before leaving for Moscow, Foster joined
the Chicago-centered movement for a Labor party. Watching the weakening
of syndicalism in Europe; the collapse of the London Triple Alliance among
miners, railroaders, and transport workers; the success of the Russian Revolu
tion; and syndicalists' and anarchists' attacks on the Soviet government and the
RILU when he was in Moscow, Foster secretly joined the party in the summer
of 1921 and waited until the spring of 1923 to make public his move.^^
Back in Chicago, Hammersmark was also unsure of Soviet Communism.
Moving in CFL circles and having also served as the secretary of the Cook
County organization of the Farmer-Labor party when Fitzpatrick ran for mayor
as a Farmer-Labor candidate, Hammersmark, like Foster, had already begun to
question his purely syndicalist attitudes and had tested the waters of political
activism by the time the American Communist party was founded. In FarmerLabor party circles, Hammersmark befriended Charles Krumbein, a product of
the Socialist party's left wing, who joined the Communist Labor party in 1919
and worked with radical Chicago unionists to build the Farmer-Labor party.
A future delegate to the CFL from the Plumbers' Union, it was Krumbein who
most effectively made Hammersmark "see the need for political action."'^'' Dis
cussions like this and observations like Foster's resulted in most ofthe labor
TUEL mUitants joining Chicago's Communist party, where they would continue
their project, which was undermined in the aftermath of World War I, of bring
ing a multiethnic workforce into multiethnic unions.
Initially. American Communism represented a conglomeration of leftist culmres, traditions, and experiences not too different from those that came before
it. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia of November 1917," writes Theodore
Drapef, did not immediately displace these older traditions.'"^^ This was the
case in Chicago, where TUEL militants mingled with an assortment of ethnic
and native-born radicals. Alfred Wagenknecht, the son of a German shoe
maker, fled from Germany with his family to avoid antisocialist laws. Joining
the left wing ofthe Socialist party, Wagenknecht played a crucial role in form
ing the Communist Labor party, the United Communist party, and finally the
Workers (Communist) party. Nicholas Dozenberg, an immigrant from Riga,
Latvia, and a member ofthe International Association of Machinists, became'
business manager for the Communist paper The Voice of Labor in 1921. They
were joined in the party by Joseph Podulski, a former member of the Socialist
party in Poland and the United States, who was also a member ofthe Inter
national Ladies Garment Workers Union. Ellis Chryssos, born in Turkey to a
family whose members became refugees in Greece, edited Empros, a weekly

23

organ of the Workers party's Greek Federation, and acted as the federations
secretary Arne Swabeck, a Danish immigrant and former IWW and Socialist
party member, became a leader in Seattle's 1919 general strike before coming to
Chicago. Swabeck served as head of Chicago's Workers party at the same time
that he acted as a CFL delegate from the Painters' Union. Vittorio Vidali came
to Chicago in the early 1920s fresh from antifascist batdes in Italy and eager to
become involved in the Italian American Communist movement.^^
Vidali commented on the diversity of experience he found in Chicago. One
cold and snowy morning, he made his way into the party's main office on North
State Street: "The desks were scattered around the room without any definite
plan. The Yugoslavs, the Greeks and the Latin-Americans were next to us Ital
ians. The richer sections which had their own headquarters in Chicago or in
New York, daily paper and periodicals, such as the Russians, the Jews, the.Finns,
the Poles and others, had their own desk also in this big room where all the
nationalities were represented. In one corner sat the general secretary of the
Party, C. E. Ruthenberg with his secretary. There was a constant buzz of voices
in all the languages of the world, sometimes interrupted by a laugh, exclama
tions and the clicking of the typewriters."'*^
The international buzz among the city's national leaders hinted at the clamor
audible whenever Communists assembled at their citywide social gatherings.
Communist events, like the one organized in Wicker Park for about fourteen
hundred Scandinavian and Jewish people in 1923, represented the international
unity and cultural dynamism that Soviet Communism represented to many of
its adherents and sympathizers. Here, in the words of a Scandia reporter, "a
string orchestra, consisting mostly of mandolins, played revolutionary music."
Next, the Freiheit singing society, a group of one hundred, sang classical Jewish
songs. These musical numbers culminated in the reading of "The Last Revolu
tion," a text written by Michael Gold that was musically accompanied by a Jose
Ramirez score.**^
By the time of Vidali's visit in 1923, the party's national headquarters had
moved from New York to Chicago, where it would remain until 1927. In Chicago,
working-class ethnics with their own cultural connections to leftist movements
were joined by a core of veteran American trade unionists, some of whom had
made their way from labor struggles m the West. Earl Browder had been active
in Kansas City's labor and socialist organizations since 1907 and had recently
served a prison sentence for resisting the draft. William Dunne worked as a
union organizer for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers on
the West Coast before becoming involved in a strike near Helena, Montana,
where he was a leader on a strike committee and editor of the Montana State
Federation of Labor's newspaper. After the strike's defeat, Dunne was elected
as a state legislator on the Democratic ticket. He also served as vice president

24

RED CHICAGO

ofthe Montana Federation of Labor and in 1919 became a charter member of

the Communist Labor party.^^
With party lieadquarters in the city and leaders' focus on trade-union mili
tancy, Chicagos party attracted radicals from far and wide. Manuel Gomez,
an experienced representative of the RILU from the Latin American Bureau,'
arrived in Chicago in 1922 with a desire to be known among Chicagos party
members as a rank-and-file worker rather than a party leader. After securing
a job at Sears Roebuck as a mail-order correspondent, he sought out the city's
Communists. Doing a bit of probing," he came upon a newsstand on West
Madison that sold the Voice of Labor, a once-independent paper that was now
under the paxtfs aegis, immediately putting him on the trail. Making his way
to the papers office, he met the editor Jack Carney and the columnist Tom
O Flaherty and was brought by these two Irish immigrants to his first Chicago
meeting. After answering questions about his background. Andrew Overgaard,
whom Gomez remembered as "a scrawny Scandinavian," invited him to a meet
ing of the "real Party."^
Chicago's proletarian reputation and trade-union orientation overshadowed
the intellectual character of its members. It was common for members of New
York's largely college-educated leadership to describe Chicago's activists as "tradeunion idolaters and inferior Marxists.""^ And while most of Chicago's leaders
were self-educated, blue-collar workers active in trade-union movements, they
were also intellectuals. Foster was a prolific writer who was well versed in Marx
ist theory Hammersmark mixed labor organizing with intellectual endeavors
as he mingled with progressive literary types and published and distributed
socialist writings. The milieu in which Chicago's worker-radicals operated made '
this combination fairly common. In the early 1920s, this was especially true
on Chicagos Near North Side, where an eclectic mix of pickpockets, literary
figures, labor leaders, radicals, intellectuals, and prostitutes mingled in Jack
Jones's Dil Pickle Club while they read poetry, watched dramas, and debated
political questions ofthe day. Foster and other Communists were regulars at the
club. They also participated in the lively intellectual banter that carried on just
outside ofthe club at Bughouse Square, a public site where debaters, soapbox
ers, and eclectic thinkers harangued hecklers, onlookers, and ideologues.''^
Hammersmark straddled this proletarian/intellectual divide by helping found
the party's official English-language newspaper, the Daily Worker. Gil Green, a
fiiture national party leader, remembered the excitement that met the paper's
birth: several thousand supporters packed the Ashland Auditorium for the
Daily Worker's inaugural rally and proudly walked across the stage dropping
money into a barrel to raise operating funds. Eventually, the paper's offices
would move to New York, leaving Hammersmark behind to establish Chicago's
Modern Bookstore, which became a party hangout and center for the distri

SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

25

bution of Communist literature. Until then, Hammersmark helped the Daily

Worker publish party documents and theses, establishing it as the official voice
of American Communism."*'
The creation of an English-language paper occurred on the heels of the party's
1925 reorganization, when Communist leaders attempted to change its struc
ture from one based on the Socialist party's foreign-language units into one
organized by neighborhoods and factories. Party leader Steve Nelson recalled,
"[O]f a membership of some seventeen thousand, fewer than two thousand were
involved in English-speaking groups, and it was seen as imperative to get beyond
the language barrier."^'' Leaders hoped that by grouping members where they
lived and worked rather than by the language they spoke, they would nudge
them closer to Americanization and the American labor movement. At least
initially, it looked like Chicago's party was experiencing success. A 1925 report
indicated that out of 930 registered members, 340 were in trade unions. The
unions most represented by the factory groups included clothing, machinists,
printing, railroad, and steel industries. Other lesser Communist trade-union
outposts included building trades, the teachers' federation. United Wallpaper
trades, egg inspectors, laundry workers, musicians, watch- and clockmakers,
cigar makers, milk drivers, IWW window washers, janitors, leather workers,
newspaper drivers, butchers, and coopers. Regardless of union, party leaders
were interested in creating a connection to the cit/s workers. Even when re
porting on the street nuclei, party leaders were concerned with their potential
to reach out to workers. Chicago's head of party organization made this point
well: "We are by no means underestimating the importance of the street nuclei,
but we are at the same time emphasizing to them that the street nuclei must be
transformed or developed into a shop nuclei."^'
Martin Abern, Chicago's organizational secretary during restructuring, ini
tially reported that reorganization enlivened Chicago's Communists and better
prepared them to connect to fellow American workers. Nine out of ten former
dues-paying members re-registered in Chicago as Communists following the
reorganization, a significantly higher proportion than the national average of 50
percent." Foreign-language-speaking Communists reported satisfaction with
the "change which makes it possible for them to learn the English language and
really participate in the American labor movement." In the street nuclei. Com
munists reported that they "cannot be so lax as they have been in the former
language branches. Work is being demanded of them."^'
Even in his enthusiasm, however, Abern hinted at the problems reorganiza
tion created. Members of this heavily foreign-born organization did not mingle
easily outside their ethnic enclaves. Communists in the steel industry had the
greatest difficulty because no English-speaking comrades worked there, bring
ing Communists to exist in "very much mixed national units" and complicat-

26

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

mg the ability of activists to communicate and act together. In addition Abern

dmttted Aat not all ofthe language federations supported the reoSanizaUon
the Fmmsh and Lettish groups opposed openly^"
i^ganization.
Party leaders also found that despite their attempts to Americanize their
rink
branches .ncf

f^ded to group Communists according

different street

SrnH
who also mamtained seven neighborhood branches The
Karl
including a former Socialist club known as their
Karl Marx branch, one in Lakeview, and one on the South Side TVo
anches met, one on the North Side and one on the South Side. The Ukraini
spe'atrs ^dH.

Rumanians, Spanish

low VomT"' T'

''P"''
enthusiasm proved hollow Communis party leaders, who worked dUigently to keep these formerly
Socialist nationality-based groups within the party, recognized their persistent
that Czecrnltr"""''^eparty, and records show
t Czech number 3 was not extremely convinced but foUow[ing] along" At
twns, but by the years end, the situation had improved. In the Eleventh Ward

Thirtv fir W H
Communists. Others in the
Thirty-first Ward and m Cicero still had to be contacted individuaUy
Establishing strong connections between this heavily ethnic and foreien-born
community and the American labor movement became a central concern of
party leaders and one that overshadowed the fluctuation of women in the partv.
was not that women were inactive at the dawning of Chicago's Commrakt'
HS TM Oa' SidT' f
LWia Beidel, Dora Lifshitz. Clara Rodin,
^d ktt if^l" r. ' :
P^" of party reports, minutes,
and letters. In these early days of party organization, however, women's oar
tapation was not a central concern ofthe male leaders. Most p oleTwomen
Com^numsts, such as Lifshitz and Rodin, were active in garLnt or ne^^e
es. ome, such as Lydia Gibson, were married to partyleaders Others such
as Fl^el, continued the work they had done in SociL federations onty now
under the Communist partys banner.^

Heten Kaoir"

"dudingTom O'Flaherty, Harrison George, and

2/

dropped away from the movement during the party's reorganization, leaders
were not overly concerned. One report indicated that in 1925 about 50 percent
of the members from two Chicago Finnish branches had come into the newly
reorganized party. The report's author indicated that 50 percent is "what we
can expect at best... since these two branches had a far greater share than did
any other branches, of housewives members, who were merely attached to the
former language units because their husbands were."^
Equally marginal to the central concerns of this early party were the hand
ful of African Americans who attended its meetings. The majority came out
of the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), an organization whose members
expressed national revolutionary ideas and rallied in opposition to Marcus
Garvey and his pro-capitalist United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).
Those twenty-five or so in the ABB who gravitated to Communism had a strong
presence among black building tradesmen, plumbers, electricians, bricklayers,
and stockyard workers. Edward Doty, a plumber, led Chicago's ABB and had
already organized the American Consolidated Trades Council, a federation of
black unions in the building trades that collaborated widi Foster's TUEL. He
was joined by Herman Dorsey, an electrician; Alexander Dunlap, a plumber;
Norval Allen, Gordon Owens, and H. V. Phillips from the stockyards; and Otto
Hall, a railroad porter. Some had spent time in the Garvey movement; others
were associated with the Free Thought Society, an organization that held forums
and participated in a political challenge to the old-guard Republicans in the city.
Harry Haywood remembered first seeing these black Communists at open-air
forums and at the Dil Pickle Club. According to Haywood, African Americans
who joined the party "were the types who ... kept abreast of the issues in the
Southside community and participated in local struggles."^^
When they got to the party, however, blacks found that its members did
not recognize their problems as being any different than those of white work
ers. Public support won by the UNIA and prodding by members of the ABB
encouraged white Communists to rethink the connection between capitalism
and race. But it was leaders in Moscow who really gave the American party a
push. With support from the Soviet Union, American Communists focused on
the building of the American Negro Labor Congress (ANLC), an organization
dedicated to organizing black workers. American party leaders hoped to build
an organization led by black workers and open to whites with connections to
civil rights groups throughout the black community The organization hobbled
along into the early 1930s but never reached a level of stabilization or success.
From the onset, organized labor and conservative black leaders attacked the
ANLC as Communist and therefore duplicitous. Black Communists did not
help matters. At the ANLC's opening meeting in the heart of Chicago's black
neighborhood, a Russian drama group performed a play in Russian. There

28

RED CHICAGO
SAM HAMMERSMARK'S CHICAGO

were no black performers on the program. Robert Minor and his wife, Lydia
ibson, kept the ideal of interracial organization alive by opening their South
Side apartment to serve as what Harry Haywood remembered as a "virtual
J
gather to discuss the issues ofthe
day But as for the ANLC. its Chicago membership, one ofthe largest in the
country, hovered around fifty members.'
Thus the diversity of opinion and culture that grew from its members comphcated efforts to build a Communist movement in Chicago. Compounding the
problem was ^e Soviet party and its leaders' authority in settling conflicts and
setting priorities. In its earliest days, the Comintern did not have much effect on
American Communists. "Except for references to 'Soviets' and 'dictatorship of
the proletariat, writes Theodore Draper, the American party's programs "still
reflected more ofthe movements of the past-socialism and syndicalism-than
ofthe movement ofthe ftiture, Communism." But by the summer of 1920, the
Commtern established itself as the ultimate authority on political questions and
beg^ issuing orders to the American party to unify its members and begin
working wiAm the AFL. The increasing role ofthe Comintern in settling dif
ferences and setting priorities distinguished American Communism from the
radical movements that preceded it. In the early 1920s, the American party's
relationship to the Commtern resulted m systematic consideration ofthe"Ne^o
Question in the United States, but it also fanned factional flames among party
leaders and isolated Chicago's trade unionists from their former allies.
Wilham Z. Foster and Chicago's group of trade-union activists were at the
center ofthese early factional fights. From Foster's earliest days as the leader
ot the partys trade-union efforts, a major split developed, pitting Foster and
his proletarian supporters against Charles Ruthenberg, Jay Lovestone, Bertram
Wolfe and other mtellectuals based largely in New York. In the decade to come
party leaders understood all manner of differences of opinion between members'
to be a result of one's aHgnment with the "majority" or "minority" groups. One
Chicap party member explained."Charlatans have a hold of our Party. All mat
ters ofthe Party are considered by them from the point of whether or not the
present majority will benefit." Viewing each political assignment and leadership
appointment througli the perspective of factionalism, one Communist pleaded
with Lovestone to "find some way of settling down this district. This transition
penod IS not very healthy and should not be prolonged minecessarily."
These factional struggles complicated Communists' relationship to Chicago's
labor movement The main debacle centeredonthe formation ofaFarmer-LaLr
party Successful unions throughout the country developed the idea for a na^ November 1919 Chicago conference. By 1922. John Fitzpatrick.
who had become a leader in the Farmer-Labor party movement, invited Foster
and his trade-union activists to participate. Alongwith Foster, the Communists

29

Jack Johnstone, Arne Swabeck, Charles Krumbein, and Earl Browder responded
positively. But what began as a unified effort between party and non-party labor
activists quickly broke down due to Communist tactics and pressures from an
increasingly repressive environment. The formal split occurred when Fitzpatrick
asked for a delay in a 1923 Farmer-Labor party convention in order to better
organize a following. While Foster and his supporters understood the need for
mass support, the Communist party's New York leadership saw no reason to
wait. With Comintern backing, they engmeered a split between Chicago's Com
munists and Fitzpatrick. The convention, which initially seemed to be a success,
resulting in the formation of a nationally federated Farmer-Labor party with
Communists in control of most positions, ended as a fiasco with little support
outside of party circles. Without Fitzpatrick's support, Chicago's Communist
trade unionists became exposed to conservative attacks from Gompers and AFL
unionists who shared their leader's disdain for Communists. Foster and James
Cannon wrote, "In Chicago, which was once our chief stronghold, our alliance
with the progressives has been broken
[0]ur comrades are largely isolated
and face a united front of all other elements against them."^
The Bolshevik Revolution sparked the imagination of liberals and radicals
throughout the United States. Immediate postwar uprisings across the country
suggested the possibility that the revolutionary fervor that swept Russia might
enliven American workers. Militants rooted in Chicago's Socialist, anarchist,
and militant trade-union traditions were swept into the American Communist
movement and believed that their activity had a new urgency. This new radical
organization, peopled by militants of older movements, quickly became the tar
get of government attack and AFL animus. To most party members, this was the
stuff of radical political undertakings. What was new, however, was the depths
to which their leaders were now entangled in the realities of a centralized orga
nization where priorities were set and disputes settled in Moscow. The willing
ness and enthusiasm of American Communists to hitch their movement to the
Soviet Union might seem nonsensical to the twenty-first-century observer, but
to many Chicago labor radicals it seemed the only rational course. The Soviet
Union was the site ofthe only successful workers' revolution in the world and
the only country predicting a continuation of their revolution in other nations.
It was the home ofthe Comintern, an international arena for revolutionaries to
meet and plan, and the only nation willing to support revolutionary education
and training of its party's ranks. And for Hammersmark and his close allies in
the party. Communist leaders in the Soviet Union were the only ones on the
left who supported the kind of militant labor activism they believed most likely
to lead workers to revolution.
In December 1927, five thousand people packed Chicago's Ashland Audito
rium, listened to Communist speeches, and celebrated the ten years of struggle

30

RED CHICAGO

that had ensued since the Russian Revolution No revolution had so far developed m the United States, and yet the core of Chicago's Communists who
stuck with the party, such as Hammersmark, had been raised in an environ
ment where radical movements had their highs and lows. As members ofthe
American Communist party, heirs to the workers' revolution that transformed
the Soviet Union, and protectors of Chicago's militant labor traditions, they
believed that revolutionary change was surely right around the corner As it
turned out, the party's current fiink that kept its members at odds with one an
other and isolated from American workers was about to be challenged While
no sociahst revolution ensued, the years 1928 through 1935 witnessed a rebirth
of Chicagos party, inundating its roUs with newcomers and sparking militant
activity among workers. To veterans such as Hammersmark, it would be worth
the wait.

2
Revolutionary Recruitment:
Numbers and Experience

On September 6,1931, Bill Gebert, Chicagos leading Communist party

official, stood before the city's most active party members and in his heavy
Polish accent outlined his vision of a mass Communist movement in Chicago.
By 1931, leaders such as Gebert believed that the city's Communist party was
on the verge of a mass influx of members that would mark the beginning of a
second American revolution. Although in hindsight this vision seems overly
ambitious, at the time his prediction had some basis. That August, party activ
ists successfully organized a demonstration where one hundred thousand black
and white workers protested against Chicago's police, whose officers had shot
and killed three African American, unemployed activists. Proudly recalling
the attendance at the event, Gebert hinted at the local appeal of Chicago's party.
Those at the demonstration were not all unemployed, he remembered. Instead,
"Many of them are employed and many of them probably never came to any
of our meetings before. They came as a result not only of our protest against
shooting but as a protest against evictions, unemployment, wage cuts, because
this demonstration signaled all this."'
Gebert found inspiration in the fact that employed people, with what he
imagined were broad political interests, had found their way to a party dem
onstration. He hoped that improvements in the party's structure would result
in increased recruitment among these employed workers, a category who party
leaders in New York and Moscow believed, once radicalized, would serve as the
vanguard in the upcoming workers' revolution. Gebert's observations reveal his
preoccupation with the party's appeal among the employed and hint at party
leaders' obsession with categorizing people. "Employed" and "unemployed" rep
resent only two of these groupings; such others as "Negro," "unionist," "women,"

32

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

33

groups, traditions, workplaces, neighborhoods, and causes. They were a di

verse bunch. Held together by party structures, Chicago's Communists were
anything but monolithic. Their varied interests, backgrounds, temperaments,
and (un)willingness to devote themselves to party demands would result in
large membership turnover and frustration among leaders, who pushed for re
cruitment but also wanted retention, particularly of employed and native-born
workers. Chicagos leaders found that many roads led to Communism and that
many different kinds of people traveled them.

Communist Recruitment: Goals and Reality

j
j
BiU Gebert, ca. 1936. (Chicago Historical
Society, ICHi-39210. photographer unknown)

erchtLhtr""'
people figured prominently in
eaA party plenum, recrmtmg buUetin. and organizational outline
The way Communists categorized people offers a sense of whom they fa
vored and attracted. Local records make clear that Chicago's Communists were
isproportionately unemployed, foreign-born or African American, and male
The party wanted to bring in women, youth, and employed workers but never
succeeded to the extent they believed possible. Occasionally they attracted unincernelrT''
T
intellectuals, Jewish recruits conerned them because Jews and intellectuals were not generaUy thought to work
m industry, where party leaders hoped to recruit their highest numbers ^
Party cataloging tells something of leaders' priorities and Commmiism's allure
ong certam groups but the party's statistics and categories do not provide
oLof T
? members. What appeal did Communism have for
people who were unemployed and ethnic, for example? Where were the party's
To^nn^ K '
implement statistics and gain insight into
not only who became a member but also, occasionally, why
Between 1928 and 1935, numbers of Chicagoans who Joined the Commu
ms party jumped from hundreds to thousands' Their compositeSe never
leadjs mandates, but it did reflect the demography of the city, its tradi
tions, and the struggles of its activists. Chicago recruits were rooted in ethnic

In Chicago, John Williamson assumed the main responsibility for Communist

recruitment. He had immigrated to the United States from Scotland in 1913
at the age of ten after losing his father to a workplace injury. Leaving school
after the eighth grade to help support his mother, Williamson worked as a
press feeder, an apprentice shop's draftsman, and by the age of fifteen, as an
apprentice pattern maker. The English and Scottish craftsmen he worked with
took Williamson under their wing and taught him about "life,... trade unions,
politics, and socialism." Williamson's initial foray into radical politics brought
him to De Leonism and the Socialist Labor party, but once the Russian Revolu
tion succeeded and Williamson began reading Lenin, Nicolai Bukharin, Karl
Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg, his loyalty waned. Through his activity at
the Seatde Labor College, Williamson came in contact with numerous speakers,
including William Z. Foster, whose new ideas about socialism and the revolu
tion caused Williamson, at age nineteen, to leave the Socialist Labor party for
the Communist party. Finding his way to Chicago, Williamson rose to be the
Chicago party's second in command and its organizational secretary, and from
1930 through 1933, he worked closely with Gebert.^
Part of Williamson's job was to relate economic trends to organizing possibili
ties. The worsening Depression eased that task. From October 1932 to March
1933, when the economic crisis reached its greatest depths, between twelve and
seventeen million workers found themselves unemployed, and another thirteen
to seventeen million workers could only find part-time jobs. As business activ
ity continued to decrease, industrialists threw thousands more out of work. By
i933> nearly one-third of the American labor force was unemployed, and by
i934> two and half million people had been unemployed for two or more years,
and six million more had been jobless for one year. Even those who had jobs
saw their pay decrease 20 to 30 percent.^
Chicago, with its broad industrial base, felt this crisis acutely. Company pay
rolls shrank one-quarter from 1927 to 1933, and only half of the people em
ployed in manufacturing in 1927 still had a job in 1933. Employers fired black

34

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

John Williamson, 1960s.

From Dangerous Scot, by John
Williamson. (Used with permission
by Imernational Publishers)

workers so disproportionately at the Depression-sstart that by the end ofi932 40

to 50 percent of workers concentrated in Chicago's Black Belt were unemployed
Otoer neighborhoods were hit hard as well. In the Back ofthe Yards, Polish,
ithuanian. and Mexican neighbors saw their local banks fail, businesses go'
under and small stores close. The Polish local soup kitchen, run by the St. foL
of God Church could not keep up with the hungry. A 1931 study by officials
at the Chica^ Commons settlement, located on the West Side in a Polish and
manufacturing plants, showed
hat half of the 472 unemployed famUies from the neighborhood were headed
by men m their prime work age, below forty The experience of unemploy
ment was new for many of these families; most had never received any form of
c arity before_School administrators' findings also raised concerns about the
subcommittee, Chicago's education officials
reported that throughout the city children came to school without breakfast
and were anemic through "lack of proper nourishment."'
WMamson believed that Depression conditions would double Chicago's party
membership easily, so he pushed recruitment activity and included quotaTta
atymde organizational newsletters, plans of work, and recruitment bulletins
The Lemn recruiting drive," a name given to an effort in 1931 and others like it

35

over the years, emphasized recruiting new members as part of all party activity.
"What is necessary now" Williamson directed,"is to intensify the recruiting drive
and keep it in the forefront of aU activities." Leaders assigned each city section
a quota of new members and reminded all low-level leaders that recruitment
numbers "must be checked up at every nucleus meeting."''
To Williamsons dismay, in the early 1930s, Chicagos party never approached
his recruitment goals. In an August 1932 organization letter, he warned that
early results of a recruiting drive "don't show the slightest sign of an intensive
drive for members." If they were going to double their numbers, everyone
had to act. But quotas were hard to fill because the extraordinary expectations
of party leaders were based on the unrealistic assumption that an economic
Depression would turn workers into revolutionaries. Workers' need for em
ployment during the early Depression years discouraged many from publicly
protesting their conditions, and even those willing to protest were not neces
sarily proto-Communists.
And yet, compared to previous years, enormous growth in membership char
acterized Chicago's Third Period. In 1928, Chicago had 650 members. In 1930,
the number grew only slightly, to 683, despite increased recruiting. By 1931, the
Lenin recruiting drive and small successes organizing among the unemployed
brought the party its first leap, to 1,963 members. This total made Chicago
home to almost one-quarter of the nation's Communists, second only to New
York.^ In 1932, membership in the party's neighborhood and shop organizations
grew again, this time reaching 2,513 members and causing national leaders to
recognize Chicago as the party's "most important district."'^ By 1934, the city's
membership had increased five times from its 1928 size, and the number of
sections in the city grew from six to thirteen. In November 1934,3,303 people
paid party dues in Chicago."
National and city membership statistics obscure the actual number of people
who joined the Communist party over time, since turnover was great.'^ Chi
cago felt this acutely. In 1930, the district issued nearly two thousand member
ship books from January through September but only received a third of that
amount in dues sales in September.'^ In 1930, half of all new party applicants
remained members less than a year. From July 4,1931, through November 28,
1931, monthly turnover ranged from a low of 30 to a high of 97 percent. The
greatest number of those leaving were new recruits; a good number of them
would become vocally anti-Communist, but the majority would serve as allies
and, ironically, even future recruits.'^ Party leaders took turnover seriously. Wil
liamson called the city's high fluctuation rates "the most scandalous situation
that could exist in the Party."'^
Recruitment methods sometimes caused such high turnover. Nathan Glazer
found on a national level that "when the Party made the strongest efforts to get

36

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

Table2.l. Communist Party Membership, 1928-35

Date

National

Chicago

1928

1930

7,500

683

1^32

12-14.000

1,963
2 513

^^33

16-20,000

1935

31,000

2417
3:303
_

1.This table is intended to give a general overview of party growth.

For Chicagosiigures, I have used dues payers from 1928 through 1935
For national figures. I used Nathan Glazer's table in The Social Basis of
A^^rican^mmmism (New York: Harcourt. Brace, and World, 1961),
U ^""^3gos numbers, I consulted "Letter to the CEC," n d 119281
the Rus^an Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of
^
(d.) 1334, listki (11.)
43 45, Letter to Hathaway, 2 September 1930, d. 1956,1. 48: Partv
Re^stration1931, n.d.. d. 2464,11. 93-104; Organizational Status
f
'
Recruiting and Dues
tor the Month of November 1934. n.d., d. 3591, L 39.

members, the members it got were the least satisfactory,"" Chicago's recruit
ment drives reflected this phenomenon. One Chicago bulletin complained,
[CJomrades approached recruiting merely to make a record, regardless of
whether the worker was the best type for the Party or not. Others handed in
application c^ds which had never been written by the worker whose name ap
peared on It but by a friend.... The entire atmosphere was a hectic one, with
everyone working to make records-with the result that we recruited application cards but not class conscious workers."'^
Even when class-conscious workers were legitimately recruited, they were
sometimes lost m the party's bureaucratic shuffle. Chicago's leaders pointed to
e bad experience of one city section, where out of 178 applications received
over a few months of 1932, the party made members out of only twenty No
report existed for 101 ofthe applicants; four could not be located; twenty-three
moved; and flve changed their mmds. The remainder were "no good for the
nfher party section, or. oddly "too

Those who did join sometimes quickly reversed their decision for the same
reasons found in party districts throughout the country According to Wil. i^son, unsatisfactory political life within party units plus poor recruitment
methods added up to 90 percent of their problem. Units where new recruits
were supposed to have their first formal contacts with the party were not yet
oriented toward the neophyte. They were notorious for not stLing on time aid

37

for running well after n P.M. They were also known for not engaging members
on concrete daily issues but instead for focusing on technical work that needed
to be accomplished. Williamson complained: "[I]n one unit, a sincere and well
meaning new member, only a few months in the Party, is made organizer, but the
Section Committee never gave the nucleus personal attention
The meeting
is called for 8 but there are only three members plus the District Representative
present at 8 P.M. Gradually others come and the meeting opens at 9 P.M. The
Section Representative finally arrives at 9:30 and another leader,' the District
Woman's Director, also does the nucleus a 'favor' by coming in at 9:30. A fine
example. The nucleus organizer brings in an agenda of 15 pointsall dry rou
tine. No political content to the proposalsjust a mere presentation that such
and such must be done."^ Unit members were also known to talk about party
issues and campaigns in shorthand, using partylingo, and did not, according to
Williamson, discuss "the content and basis of [a] campaign as well as all various
aspects and also the political questions connected with it."^'^
If 90 percent of the problem had to do with recruiting methods and the life of
the unit, perhaps the remaining 10 percent involved joiners talked out of party
membership by what leaders referred to as "hostile influences." Certainly there
might have existed any number of these influences discouraging new members
from keeping their membership active. One organizational bulletin instructed
Chicago's members to "[f]ind out what hostile influences he has around him
which might drive him away from Party. Carefully help him overcome this."^^
And while instructions in the bulletin emphasized helping "him" overcome these
influences, female recruits also had pressures from family and friends to spend
less time with the party. A letter from a member of Chicago's ranks explained
how a combination of these internal and external problems made itself felt: "I
will be criticized next Tuesday night at the organizers' meeting because the
unit is not larger; because I have not done more; because I did not attend some
meeting or other. I work hard every day in a building as a painter.... I have a
few there who read the Daily Worker and subscribe to it. I cannot break down
the Catholic faith there and start a shop unit. I do the best I can. However no
matter how much I do, I always hate to show my face because there are things I
do not do that I was told to do. Directives, directives, directives
I am getting
tired. I am just as much a Communist as ever, but I am not 10 Communists
I must sleep sometimes
My wife won't stand for it either."^^ In dealing with
these frustrations, those who stayed had to be particularly committed. In 1931,
73 percent of the party's members had joined within the past year, 12 percent
between 1925 and 1929, and 15 percent between 1919 and 1924.^^ With only
27 percent of its membership base stable in this early period, many more Chi
cago workers shuffled through the Communist party than simple membership
statistics suggest.

38

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

Uese high turnover rates troubled party leaders, especially when they re
flected the loss of American-born workers. After all, if the American Communist
party was suposed to be the vanguard of the American working class, then
the peop e who joined and stayed should have been American working people.
ationally though, scholars have determined that the organization failed to
meet these goals and that during the Third Period, the party was overwhehningly composed of the unemployed and foreign-born.^^
The Chicago party's own records show that its membership matched these
national trends and also reflected some of the city's unique population. William
son and Gebert kept tabulations of what they believed to be Chicago Commu
nists most important characteristics. Such records obfuscate certain identities
Jews were the only religious group mentioned, even if it was done to identify a
particular ethnicity rather than religious behef. InteUectuals were not ofiicially
recorded because they were not particularly valued for their creativity. Despite
0)mmm?sts^'

categories help identify Chicago's

Looking over recruitment reports, WiUiamson was disgruntled to find that

Communist recruitment was most successful among the city's unemployed If
national unemployment in 1932 and 1933, the worst years of the DeprLon
was running as high as 25 percent, Chicago's figures were significantly higher!
and those m its black community higher still. In 1931, Chicago's overall unem
ployment rate reached 30 percent. One year later, the city's black workers faced
an unemployment rate of 40 to 50 percem. But m a two-month period in 1931
the party brought m unemployed people at a rate of four unemployed to one em
ployed person. In 1931, half of those in Chicago's party were unemployed. The
efl^ects were even greater on Chicago's black South Side, where unemployment
was more concentrated. There, in 1933. 79 percent of party members, mostly
African Americans, were without work. This trend of recruiting the jobless at
a much greater rate than the employed continued even after WiUiamson left
the district, through 1934. In October of that year, 72 percent of Communist
recruits were miemployed. In part a reflection ofthe economic crisis and in part
caused by the ensuing organizing initiated by Communists, the unemployed
nlled party ranks in Chicago throughout the period.^^
In the earlyyears ofthe Depression, Chicago's Communists were also largely
proletarians. According to the 1931 district registration of its 1.963 members,
only seventy-eight people described themselves as professionals or small busi
nessmen, and 103 as housewives. The rest identified themselves with a varietv
of wage-earnmg occupations.^' Most were from metalworking, building, and
needle trades. These figures show that party members identified with particuar occupations even though many were unemployed and therefore removed
from the culture ofthe workplace, where they might be able to recruit fdlow

39

Unemployment also probably prevented many from keeping up dues pay

ments to their individual unions. Ihe sketchy figures available suggest that
Chicagos members belonged to unions at a higher rate than the national party
average, even though most of them did not belong to unions. Of those who
listed occupations in the 1931 registration, 189 belonged to the partys "revo
lutionary" trade unions, and 207 joined other "reformist" trade unions. The
national party average was only 15.9 percent, compared to Chicagos 23 percent.
Contrary to national trends, however, more Chicago party unionists joined the
reformist AFL than the party-sponsored Trade Union Unity League (TUUL).
Party leaders were unhappy with low TUUL figures, but in fact, Communists'
participation in the AFL provided them with wider contacts among Chicago's
workers and more chances to influence the Chicago Federation of Labor, an
important power base in the city.^^
A minority of proletarian and union activists was American-born, but a high
number ofthese were African American. The disproportionate number of Afri
can Americans in Chicago's party always helped soothe leaders' fears that their
recruitment efforts among American-born workers were failing, even if they
agreed that party organizers should be doing even better among "Negroes." Of
all the cities in the United States with a large concentration of African Ameri
cans, Chicago was most successful recruiting blacks into the party.^ In 1930,
233.903 African Americans lived in Chicago, 6.9 percent of the city's population,
dominating a small region on the South Side. In 1932, however, 24.3 percent
of party members were African American. These 412 black Communists rep
resented the highest number of black party members concentrated in any city
in the United States, including New York, where in 1932 seventy-four party
members were African American.^'
To the party's dismay, though, Chicago's black members followed national
trends by drifting in and out of the party.^" In 1932, the South Side section
with the most concentrated black membership had over half its members join
in the past year. By 1933, 58 percent of members in the section had joined in
1932, and only 10 percent before 1930.^' Nathan Glazer suspects that this high
turnover was because blacks "entered with the lowest degree of indoctrination,
with the least commitment, with the least knowledge."^^ Certainly some African
Americans fit these characterizations, but many who left were informed and
committed but incensed over racial conflicts within the party.^^
Immigrant Communist leaders regularly expressed disappointment at the
party's ethnic composition. Organizing in Chicago's working-class neighbor
hoods and around its industries. Communists recruited from those areas with
a disproportionate number of foreign-born workers, many of whom had con
nections to radical traditions. Chicago was an immigrant city, and its party
reflected that character. The 1930 census shows that of 3,376,438 Chicagoans,

40

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

24.9 percent had been born in another country, while 52,3 percent of Chicago's
party members were foreign-born.^^
From available figures, it is clear that Russians, South Slavs. Lithuanians,
Hungarians, and Finns were overrepresented. whUe Poles, Germans, Italians,
and Me^acans were underrepresented.- Activities and traditions among some
groups of ethnic workers made their membership in the Communist party more
hkely than others. Charles Karenic, for example, a Slovak machinist, had been
a member of the citys Socialist party. Already a politicized worker, Karenic
became a Communist in June 1925. Knowing he had worked in industry since
Was twelve, party leaders encouraged Karenic to help them organize there,
mile Karenic wiUingly extended his party activism out of his ethnic workersclubs to mdustry others were less eager to do so. Karenic also worked with felow fraction members within his Slovak Workers Society to bring new recruits
to the party. Lhese fractions, consisting of members who worked together in
mass organizations to voice party policies and positions, were the party's lifehne
to all ot Its mass organizations.^^
Table 2.2. Nationality Breakdown of Chicago's ForeignBorn Population and Foreign-Born Communist
Membership, 1930-31'
.
,
Nationality
Russian
South Slavic
Lithuanian
Polish
Hungarian
German
Italian
Finnish
Mexican
Jewish
Misc.

Chicagos
Foreign-Born
1,9
3.5
173
i.g
12.9
gg
03

2.2

N/A^
42.4

Chicago's CP
^reign-Born
14.5%
10.4
9.9
6.5
6.5
5.5
5.3
1.8
0.6
22.0

17.0

1. This table looks at each nationality's percentage ofthe total foreign-born population listed in the party's 1931 membership registra
tion and comparesit to the corresponding percentageof foreign-born
n Chicagos population Usted in the 1930 U.S. Population Census
rll?
identified in the part/s registration and were
Med within the party as a nationality rather than as a religious
2. The category "Jewish" doesnot appear in the 1930 Census. However according to Irving Cuder, in 1931 approximately 16 percent
ot ChiMgos population was composed of foreign-born Jews. He esf
population of three hundred
thous^d ^s foreign-born. See Irving Cutler. The Jews of Chicago:
lS-2?
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996).

41

Leaders praised Karenic's willingness to organize in industry more than they

did his essential foreign-language work among working people for whom English
was asecond language. The Communist activist Steve Nelson recalled,"[W]e had
a lot of autonomy in our work in the [ethnic] lodges, for the main attention of
both the district and national leadership of the Party was toward the trade union
work."^^ And yet, despite the attention party leaders extended to industrial work,
they still relied on these members of m^ss organizations at the partys fringes to
mobilize people for rallies, demonstrations, and mass meetings.
Members of mass organizations, always more numerous than party members,
were often sympathetic to Communist activities. These organizations provided
rich recruiting grounds and allowed Chicago's workers to support particular
pieces of the party's agenda without the same commitments required of party
members. Some of the organizations that became known as Communist mass
organizations, like the foreign-language groups involved in cultural, sport, and
fraternal activities, predated Communism, while others were new. The Inter
national Workers Order (IWO), founded in 1930, provided insurance as well
as a social outlet for ethnic working people and offered an additional arena for
party activists to raise political questions and organize. In 1931,1,444 party
and non-party workers belonged to the IWO's branches (of which thirteen were
Jewish, six youth, five Polish, four Ukrainian, one Greek, one German, and one
Rumanian).^
In addition to those mass organizations related to ethnic groups. Communists
joined civil rights groups and educational organizations that supported their
general agenda. Once they became members of these groups, Communists,
through their fractions, were supposed to nudge each organization's priorities
toward those of the party. Such conformity was never perfect, but generally
speaking, these organizations did not need much prodding. For example, the
International Labor Defense (ILD) provided legal support to causes related to
social justice. According to one party leader, Communists believed that "every
worker on trial for radical or labor activity was a political prisoner." So party
members participated in this organization to "teach the public a well as to pre
serve our valuable organizers," activities that were in line with the ILD's overall
mission.^ The Friends ofthe Soviet Union (FSU) was an organization designed
to promote the country and defend it against slander in the United States. "V^ile
the focus of the organization fit well with party loyalists, at times the lack of
proletarians in the group's membership frustrated Communist leaders and gave
party members in the FSU goals to work on.*" Importantly, Communists did
not numerically dominate these organizations. For example, in the FSU, only
twenty of its 250 members were in the party, and only 150 of the ILD's 2,520
crossed membership rolls.'" Such auxiliary organizations suggest a much wider
support base than membership numbers allow.

42

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

r
Communists were expected to engage in politicd work. No doubt. Communists in the party's John Reed Clubs believed they
were domg just that. Thirty dubs around the United States beckoned proletariat
writers and artists to gather, read, and publidy discuss and display their work
artick frorch
^roughout the nation rose to the call." One'
Tmtnt ff
newspaper explained how these activities were ftind^entally dilTerent than one could expect from mainstream writers and artistsAt the bourgeois Art Fair, the artist is forced to become a petty shopkeeper At
the revolutionary exhibit, he becomes an active propagLS, revolutfolry
painter, and mass pedagogue."^^
iusUouStf^f
Michigan Avenue,
S coltfl
J''""
dgarette butts and decorated
mele reach t'h
S-'eeted about a hundred
members each Tuesday evening for discussions and each Saturday night for
tJks by invited speakers, some by such established writers as James T. FarreU
kftkt
''r w t
Pront. and sold the national
leftist journal New Masses in the dub office. Over time, the Chicago dub would
boast of Its own accomphshed leftist literary and visual artists, induding Richard
right, who at fte time was beginning to publish in New Masses and another
leftist journal, ae Anvtl: Nelson Algren, whose gritty depictions of Chicago's
oMe
on the pages
of 4e NewRepubbc; Howard Nutt, a poet and future editor ofDireaion-MeriLl
Le Sueur, a writer of short stories, poems, a novel, and essays that appe^
mencan Mercury Dial. The Anvil. New Masses. New Republic, Scribmr's. and
SwZ Ch
described a'a
painter with a Chnst-like air whose work exalted the unity of the proletariat
and appeared regularly in Left Front.
The John Reed Club provided a space for leftist writers and artists to support
"d

Tf - r

^hare these tals3h a

be a writer. The left was very severe on you. It had its own orthodoxy.
rt also summoned us forth.... We wouldn't have tried without them

But
' the

aneTaTd d'
f
^"^ht. who later left the party
rid
Chicago's club as his "first contact with
the modern world. It also served as the vehide to bring out his ideas Wrieht
-ote, "Indeed, we fdt that we were lucky. Why cowerl toweL ontoS
squeeze out private words when we had only to speak and miUions listened?
mT

.S p a n i s h .

Wright was "impressed by the scope and seriousness" ofthe dub's activity."

43

The pages of Left Front reflect this ambitious agenda. Club members wrote es
says and poems dealing with proletarian life and revolutionary hope. They also
reported on political events of interest to revolutionary intellectuals, such as
the French author Henri Barbuss's visit and speech in downtown Chicago on
fighting war and fascism, and the Midwest John Reed Club conference held
in Chicago's office.^ Articles also departed into journalism, covering unem
ployment rallies and campaigns for racial equality in the city Reports, poems,
and articles reflected the political struggles in which Chicago's club members
engaged. In its May-June issue of 1934, Chicago's club reported that members
Mitchell Siporin and Ray Breinm created Public Works art murals, Henry Simon
designed and painted scenery for a Chicago Workers' Theater production, Mor
ris Topshevsky's drawings appeared in Farmer's National Weekly, and Jan Wittenber traveled around southern Illinois with the ILD.^ Like club members in
cities around the country, Chicago's members examined questions of justice and
humanity as they set up art exhibits, wrote strike pamphlets, and participated
in union pickets, party rallies, and neighborhood protests.^^
Chicago's Communists organized as a fraction within the club and pushed
party policy. Occasionally conflicts emerged between those with party con
nections and those without. Wright recalled that the painters in Chicago's club
dominated the leadership and club policies; they were also the ones with party
connections. The non-party group, dominated primarily by writers, thought
the party made too many demands. Not only did the club have to sell the Daily
Worker and the New Masses at each meeting, but the party taxed the clubs' re
sources for money, speakers, and people to paint posters. According to Wright,
non-Communist club members learned how to use the party's lines against
Communist club members. One time they successfully ran Wrighta nonCommunist at the timeto lead the club, knowing that Communists would
not vote against an African American. There were some things, however, that
non-party members could not influence; even though club members preferred
putting their energies into building Left Front, the party did not support it and
eventually insisted that it be dissolved. Under Wright's protection, it continued
through 1934, longer than most other cities' pubKcations."
Club members knew that party leaders valued industrial organizing more than
the work of painters and writers. A Chicago club member, Abe Aaron, wrote to
the writer Jack Conroy "'that the J.R.C. is regarded disdainfully and with toler
ant amusement by a great number of comrades.'"^ And while a few party club
members, like Jan Wittenber, enjoyed time on the front line of class struggle,
most were reluctant to participate in the party's work among the masses and
were happier keeping their energies focused and contained in the artistic world.
Algren, for example, never seemed comfortable at party meetings. "'Going to
a meeting seemed to be painful for him,'" Meridel Le Sueur commented. '"He

44

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

would be hanging around in back as if about to disappear."'^" Those who felt

like Algren were more comfortable at the smaU weekly gatherings of party and
non-party activists m the poet Larry Liptons Near North Side house, where a
much more 'bohemian, emotive atmosphere than at the John Reed Club" prevailed^Lipton explained, ""Those who came to the house were brought under
the influence of this more tender, artistic kind of love attitude... and some of
the'PaTy^ile
It was likely this tendency that drove most working-class Communists to
look down on these mtellectuals as what one scholar describes as "effete, nambypamby types who read 'bourgeois books' and who were therefore 'class trai
tors. Abe Aaron made the difficult decision to abandon writing to become a
a or organizer. In a letter to Conroy, Aaron expressed his ambivalence; "'Will I
write, or wfll I continue as an active section functionary? When I told the com
mittee how I felt, saying, was it a question of writing or ofthe section committee
1 must choose writing, I was accused of individualistic tendencies. Hell, I tried
to explain. It's not a question of giving up Party work but, rather, of giving up
one type of Party work. It didn't go over so well.'""
Such suspicion of purely intellectual types had a long tradition in Chicago. '
dating back to the party's earliest days. According to Harvey Klehr, this disdain
was matched by national party leaders. Even though an unprecedented number
ot prommern non-Communist inteUectuals supported William 2. Foster's 1932
bid for the presidency, ideological differences foUowing the campaign between
key non-party supporters and national party leaders ended the initiative and
confirmed at least to partyleaders, that intellectuals were simply not sufficiently

committed to Communism. One of Chicago's party members told Wright as

much: Intellectuals don't fit well into the Party.'"
More consistently active and aspiring Communists were members ofthe
oung Communist League (YCL), a training ground for youth, the key to the
part/s flittire. Yet the ages of Chicago's members made clear that youth did
not dominate. Ofthe 1,078 party members who reported their age in 1931
11 percent were over fifty, 28 percent were between forty and fifty, 39 percent
were between thirty and forty, 15 percent were between twenty-five and thirty,
and 7 percent were twenty-five or younger. Only 22 percent of the party was'
under thirty, alarming leaders who understood the importance of bringing in
young members to replenish the part/s forces and who witnessed firsthand the
militancy of young recruits they could claim.'
Problems with recruiting youth were matched by the difficulty in attracting
women to the party. Communist teachings explained that women were op
pressed as low-wage laborers and used by capitalists to undermine the male
wage worker. Party leaders were supposed to view women as an important

45

component of their organization and recruit them through shop work and
neighborhood organizing." Working Woman addressed specific problems of
women, and Chicago'sleaders encouraged their members to use it as a recruiting
tool.* In neighborhoods, the party also set up the Working Women's Federa
tion, an organization designed to mobilize working women from a-variety of
women's organizations, and had some success building on the federation's work.
On March 8,1930, for example, a thousand women showed up for the party's
International Women's Day rally. Women organizers also brought thirty-nine
women together for the Trade Union Unity League's first conference of work
ing women. Half of them non-party, these women came from Western Electric,
Majestic Radio, and various clothing, food, and chemical plants.^^
These supportive showings turned out to be one-time events, though, because
Chicagos party never put its resources into women's organizing, nor did the
momentum to organize women ever build in this period. A 1931 city mem
bership tally showed that only 262, or 15.5 percent, were women. Of these,
126, or 48 percent, identified themselves as working women. Williamson and
others desired a better representation among working women, but the sup
port women felt in the party, as women, varied. Often men participated in the
women's department and on women's committees, but women found that they
themselves were the only ones with enough interest to keep projects going.^
Women like Anna Schultz criticized district leaders. She thought that as far as
they were concerned, women could stay in the "toilet and play with the baby."
Consistent placement of women's articles and reports next to youth pages and
reports in newspapers and at meetings confirmed the secondary role women
played in Chicago's party Their representation in party iconography as hardedged, industrial, masculine fighters betrayed the realities of the majority of
them. And the fact that older and more respected men, like Alfred Wagknecht,
were known in certain circles as womanizers made clear the reality of women's
second-place status in the party.^
Not that organizing women was an easy task. Most working women lived out
side early 1930s union culture.^ AFL unions organized relatively small pockets
of them, and Communist membership, heavily male, did not have many con
nections with women's departments in industrial workplaces. Party membership,
moreover, became superfluous to women involved with Unemployed Councils
or other party-affiliated groups because their spare time was already spent. Re
gardless, the party's male presence and style, through its language, iconography,
and agenda, left a legacy that women activists would fight against through the
next period of the Popular Front.
Surprisingly, in their categorization schemes, party leaders did not distin
guish ethnic or racial characteristics among their female recruits. Certainly,
Chicago's African American women, for example, participated in Third Period

46

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

erslearnedthatHucklberrywasa militant Negro woman. Arrested many times

for her partapation m struggles against discrimination and unemployment A
filter for Negro rights." The Negro Champion advertised the Commrst"
didate for congressman-at-large. Elizabeth Griffin Doty as a "militant fighter
F
the city. In
off, ^
Ferguson ran for superintendem of public instruction Nothing
of her background is offered in the campaign literlre, but Ferguson was af
important leading Communist activist. In 1929. city leaders added her to the
Negro department. One year later, she was doing so well that she was released
fromaUworkexceptthedistricfsNegrodepartmL,hersection'^^^^^^^^
the Soviet Union m time for the 1932 elections, for which Chicago's secretariat
^igned her to speak on behalf of the party's electoral campai|rardTvM
gamzations m its name; they also brought her into meetings ofthe district
buro and involved her m its members' political discussions.' Marie Houston
even harder to knowfrom party materials, even though thepTZlnZto
Moscow to study at the Lenin School, and upon her refurn sheTan dales on
toxist economics in Washington Park, where "hundreds of Negroes attended
ch day, listening intently for two hours [at a time]Hie Dark a hro
space that bordered the Black Belt, Packingtown and H^de'p^tS
central organizing grounds for Chicago's Communists during the Depression
was here that the unemployed, homeless, and curious gathered to hear aU
manner of speakers riff on political and social topics of the day NII mil"
veyites Wobbhes, and Communists take center stage, but preachers a
demics, and local pohtidans were known to climb on soapboxes d^Ite an^
arangue. Occasionally, talks turned to rallies and ralhes to demonstrations "
"rTndTe T''t""'tT ?"
her a valuable
asset. And yet, despite party leaders' cultural and political inclinations to sun
__port black women hke her, they continually compartmentalized "Negroes" and
women, rarely talking about blade women as such.

Chicago's Neighborhoods and

Representative Individuals

47

variety was a hallmark of those who joined the Communist party or traveled in
circles with its members, and reasons why it appealed to one or another differed
with the individual. Examination of the Chicago neighborhoods where most
Communists lived in the late 1920s and early 1930s and of a few individuals
from these regions who were involved with the party suggests the messy and
complex story of who Chicagos Communists were and what attracted them to
Communist ranks.
The greatest number of recruits came from the section on Chicagos South
Side that embraced the Black Belt and Packingtown. In 1931, this section re
corded 342 members.^" At hunger marches in the stockyards, hundreds of dem
onstrators turned out to support efforts against unemployment and for food
rations from the packers. In the 1932 pfesidential election, the Communist vote
was most concentrated (at 7 percent or higher) in the area directly north of
Washington Park, and from Forty-third to Pershing between Wentworth and
State. In these areas, votes for the Communist party not only reflected peoples
support for its black vice-presidential candidate, James Ford, but also recognized
work the party did in these neighborhoods.'"'
This work centered on organizing employed workers and extended into un
employed organizing, campaigns for racial equality, and Marxist education.
Black Belt shop work included Ben Sopkins and Sons clothing factories, the
community's Capitol Dairy plant, and local laundries, whereas Packingtown
activity centered on the stockyards and was only secondarily channeled into
the Crane Company, just west of the Back of the Yards. The two neighborhoods
were racially divided, but many blacks populated the stockyards workforce,
encouraging Communists to push for interracial activity in both communi
ties. They advocated that whites travel mto black neighborhoods in the South
Side and march with blacks during hunger marches, funeral processions, and
Labor Day demonstrations. They also embraced local community institutions
by calling their meetings in both the Odd Fellows and Forum halls and holding
their public protests at local parks, such as Washington Park, where traditions
of open-air political discussion and debate ran deep. For diose stimulated by
Communist speeches and activism, a Workers' Book Store on Indiana and Fortythird, at the heart of the black community, provided supporting literature/^
The party was also successful in these areas because they were two of the
poorest and most segregated communities in Chicago. The Black Belt had some
of the most unhealthy conditions. Located three miles from many of their co
workers in the Back of the Yards, blacks, who made up 30 percent ofthe pack
inghouse workers in 1930, lived in a world separate from white Back ofthe
Yards. By 1930,90 percent ofaU of Chicago's blacks lived in census tracts where
more than 50 percent of the inhabitants were black. Bordered by Thirty-ninth
Street on the north and Sixty-fifth Street on the south, Wabash on the west

REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITJVIENT

Party Schools ^
28.

Factories
3918.
22.

Sopkins and Sons 42nd. St. Plant

Omaha Packing

24-

Sopkins and Sons 39th St. Plant

Capitol Dairy

30.

26.

35-

Union Stockyards
Crane Company
Packing Plants
Alfred Decker and Co.

Meeting Halls Cl

7-

II.
15-

Lithuanian Auditorium
South Side Community Center
Pythian Hall

20.

Forum Hall

36.

Royal Circle Hall

37-

Odd Fellows Hall

Party and Mass Organization Offices and MeetingSites

4-

Section Meeting Site

56.
12.

Section Meeting Site

VHnis Office
Karl Marx Hof

13-

Section Meeting Site

14-

League of Struggle for Negro Rights

Headquarters

16,

Section Meeting Site

Section Meeting Site

17-

21.

Bi
ss
au41.

Section Meeting Site

Trade Union Unity League Section Office
South Side Metal Workers' Industrial Union
hternational Labor Defense Office
Party Bookstore

Sites of Interest/Party Events

8.
10.
1923252729.

Site of Antilynching Conference

Open Air Meeting
100th Anniversary of Nat Turner Rebellion

Site of Daily Worker Sales

Site of Daily Worker Sales
Polonia Grove, Site of Party Picnics
Open Air Meetings

32.

3438.

James Ford Dance

Tag Days
Post Office

40-

UniversftyofChicago

42.

Mock Trial of Mayor Cermak

Washington Park Forums

43-

Communis, party sites of activity. South Side neighborhoods. (Created by Lezlie Button)

49

and white, middle-class communities such as Hyde Park on the east, the Black
Beh housed an astonishing thirty-five thousand people per square mile. Allan
Spear explains that in the core of the Black Belt, between State and Wentworth,
"two-story frame houses, devoid of paint, stood close together in drab, dingy
rows, surrounded by litters of garbage and ashes." Here, residents living in run
down and overcrowded apartments and kitchenettes paid exorbitant rents. Spear
found that "ordinary conveniences were often non-existent: toilets were broken
or leaked; electricity was rare; heating and hot water facilities failed to function."
In the more affluent section of the Black Belt, east of State, housing was better,
but Spear explains that many homes "had begun to deteriorate and frequently
were in need of repair or lacked necessary sanitary facilities." Residents of sur
rounding neighborhoods violently enforced segregation. With separate and
unequal facilities, blacks struggled to maintain their own segregated schools,
hospitals, recreation facilities, movie theaters, restaurants, and taverns.^^
The Back of the Yards also had poor housing and environmental conditions,
but here, white ethnics and Mexicans peopled the dilapidated area, bordered
on the north by the Belt Line Tracks and on the east by the stockyards. As part
of an industrial belt that ran through the city's southern edge, the Back ofthe
Yards offered residents poor living conditions. The pungent odor ofthe stock
yards, pollution, and congested housing led to high rates of infant death, and
tuberculosis. Unskilled Slavs and Mexicans lived in decaying and bug-infested
two-story wood homes where loud noises and the stench-filled air continually
reminded them of their proximity to cattle arriving daily for slaughter. Only
skilled and semiskilled Slavic workers could afford to live in brick or better
wood-constructed homes south of Forty-seventh Street, just below the neigh
borhood's worst area. Scott Hearing found in 1928 that little had changed in
the twenty-two years since Upton Sinclair exposed these poor conditions in
The Jungle: "the same stench," dirt, and dilapidated housing still existed.^''
In addition to sharing poor living conditions, both neighborhoods had their
own subcultures of activism that the party tapped. In the black community,
spontaneous, direct-action mobilization; a Garveyite movement; and such in
dependent community institutions as the National Association for the Ad
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Urban League, churches, and the
Chicago Defender provided experience and structures that the party built on
and organized through. Here, antilynching meetings and Scottsboro rallies
drew on a large activist population. In the Back of the Yards, Mexicans and
Mexican Americans identified with radical movements in Mexico and brought
these traditions into the party. Whereas most Polish skilled workers attended
Catholic church rather than join the party, a small group actively responded to
the party's actions against unemployment in the Yards.^

REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT
50

5^

RED CHICAGO

With such a mix of woricplaces, ethnic groups, and poHtical traditions, it is

no wonder that one section would turn up such different kinds of people. Party
records place Harry Haywood, Richard Wright, David Poindexter, and Claude
Lightfoot all in the category "Negro." But who they were beyond that descriptor
and how they came to Communism reveal different stories.
Haywood, the youngest of three sibhngs, was born in Nebraska on Febru
ary 4,1898, to former slaves. As a youth, he worked a number of jobs, includ
ing as a dining-car waiter on the Chicago and Northwestern Railway and as a
waiter at the Tip Top Inn. In 1917 he joined the Eighth Illinois Black National
Guard Regiment and developed a sense of racial pride. Having read about the
existence of greater racial fairness in places like France, Haywood admits that
patriotism was the least of his motivations for enlisting. Sailing to Europe in
1918, Haywood and his regiment were integrated into the French army and
found that "the French treated blacks wellthat is, as human beings. There
was no Jim Crow."^
On his return from battle, the force of racism in America hit him head-on.
July 28,1919, Haywood and ten other black workers stepped warily out of the
dining car on which they worked and onto Chicagos Twelfth Street Station. The
previous night they received word that a race riot had broken out in the city
On the platform, a white trainman told them not to leave by Michigan Avenue
but to take the tracks by the lake because some black soldiers had been killed,
and the riots were taking place on the avenue. Hurrying home, the twenty-oneyear-old Haywood started to think he had been "fighting the wrong war. The
Germans weren't the enemythe enemy was right here at home."^^
What sparked the riot were white youths throwing rocks that killed the black
seventeen-year-old Eugene Williams, who was swimming off the city's Twentysixth Street beach. Apparently he had swum too close to the imaginary line
separating white waters from black. Police refused to arrest any of the whites
involved. Fighting that began on the beach spread across the city and lasted over
six days. In the end, thirty-eight people were dead, over five hundred injured,
and over one thousand homeless. This event was "the great turning point" in
Haywood's life.'
Shortly after the riot, Harry's brother Otto joined the Garvey movement, the
IWW, and the African Blood Brotherhood. By 1921, he found his way to the
Communist party. Otto introduced Haywood to Marx and Engels, Henry Lewis
Morgan's Ancient Society, and lohn Reed's Ten Days That Shook the World. In
the meantime, Harry secured employment at Chicago's post office, where he
met other young blacks who were also questioning American society's racism.
A discussion group formed with a dozen or so vocal members, including, Hay
wood remembers, "aspirant intellectuals,... students of education,... and some
intellectually oriented workers."^'' For three months the group held bimonthly

meetings at peoples homes and apartments. They picked a topic, such as ways
rrir white racism with scientific truth, and then gave volunteers a week
STfew months, talk was not enough. Leading members of the group,
including Haywood, wanted to get more involved m broader political activity.
After attending open forums in Washington Park, Haywood wanted to connect
SmoveL'nts.Healsokeptreading-7Ji.ComstM.^^^^^^^
Oril ofthe Family, and Marxs Value. Price, and Profit. He recalled The first
Smy political search was near an end. In the years since I had mu^ered
out of the Army, I had come from being a disgruntled Black ^-soldier to being
a self-conscious revolutionary looking for an organization with which to make
TnlTplg of 1922, Harry decided to join the
^y
the black Communists he knew, such as the Owens brothers and Edward Doty
in addition to his brother Otto, and was impressed by such white leaders as Jim
Early, Sam Hammersmark, and Robert Minor. But what sold ""'y
on the party was its relationship to the Bolshevik Revolution. Even though the
party was mosUy white in its composition, Harry believed that it comF^sed
L best and most sincerely revolutionary and internationally minded element
amongwhite radicals and therefore formed the basis for the revolutionary unity
of Blacks and whites.... Hit was a part of a world revolutionary
uniting Chinese, Africans, and Latin Americans with Europeans and North
Americans through the Third Communist International.

Harry Haywood sketched by

Bob Brown. From Black Bolshevik,
by Harry Haywood. (Used with
permission by Bob Brown)

52

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

n
'hat the Bolshevik Revolution received in the white
press further convinced Haywood that it "couldn't be aU bad." Ham was first
accepted mto the African Blood Brotherhood, the YCL, and then finally the
ommunist party, where he was groomed for leadership and sem to study in
Moscow. Spending four and a half years in the Soviet Lon an"tSre"
had
policy and theory. Harry found that he
had httle experience with the masses. His itch for face-to-face organizing led
him to return to Chicago in 1934. He became the leader ofthe city's South Side
where new recruits found his political approach, in a word, irritating
who d

Haywood as much as Richard Wright

wood h f'1
Nealson/Haywoodhada ft'rtivemanner."greasy,sweatylook,with"thicklips.Haywoodl
thma caused him to snort at unexpected intervals." Such a characteristic
terlred-'n"''

""y^oods own depiction of his personality as "hot-

th7wriBh,d
Haywood's insistence
Aa Wright do community organizing for the party rather than spend his time
tmg exacerbated Wright's dislike. But Haywood was simply applying partv
wood and Wright concerning what it meant to be a Communist was represen
tative of those that occurred throughout Chicago's ranks.
its JolS ReeTciub Iff
keott^st At
f
'^g^'^'ed the club with
skeptici m. At open forums m Washington Park, he had greater affinity for the
G^eytoand &eir racial pride than for the Communists, whose professed
throuTh
working tth T"

black people. Rather than come to the party

entered through an alternative route. While

Side
I Sll
r
^^e South
in a small coal
Communist who grew up in the only Jewish family
m small coal-mmmg town m Pennsylvania, was an aspiring writer who had
1-dypubhshedinproletarianpublications.AsamemLoftheS^^^^^^^
WifhTd to
Chicago's John Reed Club.ght s desire for inteUectual mteraction with writers overcame his concern
abom party control over the dubs. Besides. Aaron assured him he would not
ave to;oin the party to be a member of the dub. Skeptically climbing the club's
A"-. Wright wondere'd. "Wat on earth oftsourer^
that racism would
perience. Instead, he found whites interested in blacks' experiences
Readmg poetry and short stories from such leftist journals as New Masses In
mterested m the problems of common people. Through his mteractions at the

53

club with the likes of Nelson Algren, he discovered that many of the writers
were also poor. Hooked by his creative drive and the intellectual energy of the
club, Wright became one of its most avid members. Only when he was elected
to the position of executive secretary was he taken aside and told that as a leader
of the club he would have to join the party. Convinced that his leadership in
the club would serve as his party duty, Wright signed on and found out that he
was expected to do more.
The anguish Wright experienced at his first Communist party meeting dem
onstrates a strain of anti-intellectualism that persisted through the party's ranks
and speaks to the alienation he and other writers and artists experienced. In
his suit and tie, Wright sent awkward ripples through the room of a few working-class whites and approximately twenty southern blacks with less then three
years of education among them. When Wright pulled notes out of his pocket
and read them, snickering and giggling became audible. As if his suit were not
enough, VVright introduced himself as the executive secretary of the John Reed
Club and as a writer who was published in a number of proletarian literary
magazines. Wright did not realize that many in the ranks thought of the club
as a "playground for white artists."' So even as one of its members, Wright
remained skeptical of the party.
One member whom Wright and others found inspiring was David Poin
dexter, a southerner who brought with him to Chicago the chilling experience
of having witnessed a lynch mob in Nashville, Tennessee. Poindexter hoped
one day to take revenge on whites, but working with them on odd jobs in
Chicago and Detroit, he began to see white workers as his "'class brothers."'
This vision took time to develop. Like Wright, Poindexter first gravitated to the
Garveyites, but, listening to debates in Washington Park, he eventually found
Communists more convincing. William Patterson, an African American party
leader, recalled that the party's belief that blacks and whites needed to work
together ultimately caused Poindexter to leave the Garvey movement. Once
there, Pomdexter proved "fearless," even "reckless." Harold Gosnell explained,
"His face was scarred as a result of rough handling by the police, but his spirit
was unbroken. He was clearly a masochist type seeking martyrdom, since most
of the injuries which he received might have been avoided if he had been less
hot headed."^" Claude Lightfoot, a fellow African American party leader, re
membered Poindexter as "'a frustrated preacher.'" As it turned out, Poindexter
grew up in the Baptist church, "'could talk pretty well,'" and led a protest at a
National Baptist convention before becpming a party member. Spoken before
unemployed crowds, Poindexter's words took on a life of their own. Lightfoot
recalled,"' [W]hen he got through preachin' everbody'd be ready to go on into
the lake with him. That's how much power he had over people.'"^'
Poindexter's charisma almost overwhelmed Lightfoot. A young African

54

R E D CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

American I3emocratic party activist, Lightfoot joined the Communist party

when Pomdexter convinced him that a socialist revolution was imminent. As
a foot soldier for the Democrats, Lightfoot had witnessed the power of direct
actionJn September ipo, hmidreds of blacks, Lightfoot among them, marched
from Washington Park to a city transportation work site and successftiUy demanded jobs. Now the Conimmiists promised they could deliver a revolution on
Chicagos South Side." Lightfoot reflected that if anybody asked why he joined
the Commimist party, he would have said it was "for idealistic reasons, to help
e poor, the downtrodden and oppressed people all over the world." Hiese
actors were partly true. But in retrospect, he admitted, "Aiter having gotten up
Ae soapbox and cursing out the police and then march away triumphantly
^
day on I was a man. I was no longer that timid
ittle boy that used to go to an aU-white school and the white kids used to beat
he devJ out of me, and then I weM to the aU-black school, the blacks beat me,
too. So I was one of those little kids, scared of his shadow, so to speak. Now
I m somebody There goes Claude Lightfoot. He's the one that cursed out the
pohce the other day over there, you know.'""
littfe

United by the party's organization on the South Side, these new black recruits
represented diverse bacl^rounds, political leanings, interests, personalities, and
kvds of commitment. They lived the unemployment, racism, and oppression
white Communists discussed and debated. For a time they would agree to join
the party and overcome their differences.
^
Rivaling the South Side's 342 members were the West Side units.'which
Hnmh
T r
^ "^ighboAood bordered by
H^boldt Park on the west, the north branch ofthe Chicago River on the east.
West Kmzie Street on the south, and Bloomingdale on the north, unemployed
organizing received widespread attention and support. Here the party used
community institutions as the settings for their meetings, such as the Labor
ftis
hh T 1
People's Auditorium. Relying on the fact that
this neighborhood was home to the largest Polish community in the city, party
org caUed meetings of the Polish antifascist committee in this neighbZ
hood. They also drew heavily on the large Jewish community and org^ized
relef(22.88 percent) Communists successfiillyrecruited many to their protests

a t

rUnemployedCouncilmeetings

Levels of Communist support in West Side neighborhoods can best be under

stood by recognizing the varying levels of poverty there. These neighborhoods
Nortr
'ind "dustry. induding the Chicago and
orthwestern RaJroad. a few dairies, and machine shops. During the Depres

55

sion, jobs were hard to come by, and destitution was widespread. West Town
housed unskilled laborers, a majority of whom were Poles, Italians, Jews, and
Norwegians. They shared frame cottages, shanties, and dilapidated apartment
buildings. In 1935, 302 buildings needed repair, and 502 were recommended
for demolition. In 1934, 22.88 percent of the families in this neighborhood
were on relief. Near West Side workers of Italian, Russian, Greek, Polish, and
German descent lived in multifamily units. This neighborhood included a large
Jewish population that supported eleven synagogues. Hit hard by the Depression,
43-74 percent in the Near West Side were on relief in 1934; A less run-down
and poor area, the Lower West Side was composed mostly of Czechs and Yu
goslavs. Poles, Lithuanians, Italians, and some Germans also lived in the area.
Only 18.54 percent of the Lower West Sides residents collected relief in 1934,
but the residential area was congested.'^
In addition to living conditions, leftist traditions in several of these ethnic
communities help explain party successes. Ukrainians and Poles brought so
cialist traditions to Chicago, and for both the plight of thpir homeland figured
prominently in their activities. Rather than join community churches, these
Socialists and Communists identified with the secular and ethnic culturesleftist
movements offered. The West Side Ukrainian People's Auditorium, one ofthe
Chicago party's most important meeting halls, competed with the Ukrainian
churches and fraternal organizations for activists. Polish Communists had an
even tougher battle against the Polish church, which had considerable sway
over Chicago's Poles. In 1929, the party held a counterdemonstration in Wicker
Park's Schoenhaffer Hall to protest what party leaders called the "fascist Pulaski
day celebration." With sixty thousand attending the official Pulaski Day event,
the party's four hundred protesters demonstrated the challenges Communists
faced in the Polish community.'
Like Ukrainian and Polish Socialists, Jewish Socialists brought their beliefs
and culture with them on their journey to the United States, developing a rich
leftist enclave complete with newspapers, theaters, and restaurants. Building on
Jewish interests and populations on Chicago's West Side, Communists, begin
ning in 1929, held meetings on the question of Palestine, the issue on which
much of the party's antifascist work began in 1933. Whereas many West Side
religious Jews responded to calls from philanthropic organizations, workingclass Jews often responded to socialists' and Communists' pleas:196 registered
with the Communist party in 1931.''
Mollie West, a Polish-born Jewish immigrant from the town of Soklov, settled
with her family on Chicago's West Side and was taken by the modern luxuries
available in the United States. In Poland, about twenty of Mollie's family mem
bers plus a boarding watchmaker and violin player occupied a small three-story
house with no running water or central heating. Her father was an Orthodox

REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

Party Schools

38.

29-

53-

33.

aty Schools^
12, Tuley High School
34. Marshall High School

40. Crane Prep School

62. Harrison High School

International Harvester. McCormick Reaper

Factories 3

60.

30. Capitol Dairy

31. Bowman Dairy
32. Northwestern Railroad Yards

63. Tractor Works

Mctins Halls O
6. Northwest Hall
7. Labor Lyceum
9. Workers' Lyceum/Folkets Hus
10. )ewish workers'Club
17. Schoenhoffen Hall
22. Mirror Hall
23. Hungarian Hall
25. Ukrainian People's Home

37. Workers' Center

42. West End Women's Club
43.
44.
45.
49.

Temple Hall
Carmen's Hall
West End Club
Musicians' Hall

58. National Hall

59. Coliseum

26. People's Auditorium

*0.

Ptrt, and Mass Orp-te."""

1. Scandia Press
2. Young Communist League Office
3. Unemployed Council of Cook County
4. Hungarian Workers'Club
5. nnancial Meeting Site
13. Antifascist Polish Committee
14. District Office, 1930
15. Northwestern Shop Nekvs
i6 Unemployed Council Meeting Site

Low e t

South Lawndale

West ,
Side

18. Trade Union Unity League Offices

36. Freiheit
39 Party Section Meeting
47. Daily Worker Publishing Company
51. Unit Meeting Site
52. District Office, 193^
54. Ludowy Renrtik
Jugoslav Labor Defense
II. Slovak Workers' Society and Rowstt udo
57. language Office
61. lugoslav Buro Office

19. Workers' Bookstore

20. Agitprop Meeting Site
24. AFL Machinists Fraction Meeting Site
28. Young Communist League Office

Sites of Interest/Party Events ^

8. Needle Trades' Bazaar

41. Dance Site

46. Union Park, Rally Site

11. Blue inn

21. Russian Cooperative Restaurant

48. Haymarket Square

50. lefferson Park, Rally Site

27. House Party

35.
35 Open Air Meetings

64. Dance Site

Open ftir iweeui'S'

the Depression hit, and she was enroUed m a school wne

57

58

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

years, she graduated from the lowpr"^^h^ f ^

^ pamful Imip. After two
schools, Marshall, which was 95 percLt'T '"X
city's largest high
Mollie's radicali^tion ^r^rd^
^
that
demic record, talented sports teams Id othpr^!? ^
also had radical students anH
h
racurncular activities, they
and teachers were complemented
Wessons from feUow students
in her neighborhood on Roosevelt Road'vr^ir ^

fights between the Communists the Socill^D

^
still naive about it all but I w. l
all kinds of s: aS
just walk and go in and hTvelTce c!
andiist.Wetouid,.tS:Twrd^~^^
you don t see today It gave meaning to my life-.
life, that street. Our recreation was fnh

occurred
"It changed my
turmoil,
the Trotskyists. I was

^mmrniity like

Mourc:^lrdi:t:nttiy!^^^^^^
promptly removed from class and threatened'v^ra^feil"'' "T"''
several teachers came to hpr Hpf
^ j i.
^^^^8 grade. Only after
the school's budget was tight andTh ' I,
^934.
and physical eS lom th. " ,
'
player, JVIollie decided to call a sti^rshe""'
French-horn
making banners, but the night before the stri"w t""
began
arrested the committee. As the pvp t' i j t>
Chicago police
detention center, where her father refoL^to^^'
taken to a juvenile
was anti-Communist to the cnrp lu n
Zionist, he
picked her up. These early oreanmother and a neighbor
membership in the YCL.

experiences prepared IWollie for active

2:;sr-"r

behind the South and West SidesTtel f

u'". '
outnumbered the West Side's 240 members ^th
Communists usually rated first in the amn, t fA
the number of their high-wage skilled workers"r
organizing focused on the Stewart War
i
"^mumsts North Side labor
ingplant, L amongS'TI? T"^ghborhood's Deerdemonstrations at Washington SquareXk'w ^s^^T'

also held meetings in the Finnish Hall Ld ViwJftmJ ifd partS^fed

59

in the numerous ethnic social organizations of the Scandinavians and Ukrai

nians living in the area. A few were even known to pass some time at the Dil
Pickle.'^
Varying levels of wealth and employment again help explain the mixed re
sponse to the party in the North Side, which included the most economically
diverse neighborhoods in the city, encompassing affluent blocks as well as the
tenements in "Little Hell." Extending northward, this section included Lincoln
Park, which was wealthier than the Lower North Side and had only 18.65 per
cent of its residents on relief, compared to 26.08 percent on the Near North
Side. Lincoln Park housed Germans, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Rumanians, Irish,
Italians, Poles, Russians, English, and Swedish. Above Lincoln Park was Lake
View, a mostly German enclave where Scandinavians played a particularly im
portant role in the building trades, which were hit hard by the Depression.^
Wealthy neighborhoods exaggerated the miserable experience of povertyand
unemployment in this region and fed its residents' political traditions, especially
those with connections to radical Scandinavian culture. The Denmark native
Nels Kjar was one of these. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Kjar was
active in the Norwegian-Danish Karl Marx Club. Linked to the American So
cialist party, the club fijnctioned as a social and political outlet for Scandinavian
workers, sponsoring a library, dances, bazaars, and concerts. The prominent
Scandinavian Socialist Charles Sand hailed from this region. Sand arrived in
the United States from Sweden in 1895 and became an active unionist, Socialist
party leader, and newspaper editor.
Kjar left Sand and Socialism behind for the promises of the Communist
party By July 1920, Kjar and other club members successfully gathered funds to
purchase their own meeting hall, Folkets Hus (People's House), a later meetmg
place of the Unemployed Councils. After World War I and the Russian Revolu
tion, Chicago police cautioned all hall owners not to rent space to radicals, but
the Fulkets Hus's management proudly rented to "whoever [they] wanted."^'
A carpenter by training, Kjar found his niche in the partys industrial work
and became a leader in Chicagos Trade Union Educational League, a militant
trade-union group that coordinated activities among its sympathizers in AFL
unions. Although never formally affiliated with the party, the TUEL generally
followed the party's industrial policies, and in Chicago, Kjar and his fellow TUEL
members comprised the most important radical opposition in the city's labor
movement. As the party's emphasis shifted from organizing within the AFL to
working through separate revolutionary unions, the TUEL was abandoned and
a new set of revolutionary unions founded and affiliated with the partys new '
industrial arm, the Trade Union Unity League. Through the TUUL, Kjar got
mvolved in organizing unemployed workers and found his sphere of activity
broadened. By 1932 he had become a leader of the party^s unemployed orga-

REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

Party Schools X
a.

6l

26.

9fkctories 2
3. Stewart Warner Plant
4. Oeering Plant

22.
25.

Hart, Schaffner, and Marx

Alfred Decker and Company

MMtIn; Halls [23

5. Imperial Hall

17.

Sons of Israel Hall

Nirty and Mass Organization Offices and Meeting Sites

6.

North Side Trade Union Unity League and

Offices
Radnik

20.
21.

Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born

and Unemployed Council
Armour Young Worker

23.
24.
27.

District Office, 1935

American Youth Congress
lohn Reed Club

18.

Adria Printing Co
German Speakers'Fraction Meeting
John Reed Club
American LeagueAgainstWarand Fascism

19.

National Counter-Olympic Organizational Committee

6.

to.
11.
12.

Sites of Interest/Party Events

1.

Play Performance, "Steel Strike"

7.

House Party
Shoe Strike Headquarters
Dil Pickle Club

13.
14.

15.
16.
28.

Washington Square Park, Open Air Meetings

Chicago Tribune Tower
Open Air Meetings

Communist party sites of activity, North Side neighborhoods and the Loop. (Created by
Lezlie Button)

nization. Military intelligence records report "Kjar had the reputation of being
one of the most rabid of the radical leaders."'^
Kjar and other first-generation ethnic radicals mingled in the party with
those of the second generation, including sons like Jack Spiegel. The child of
Jewish immigrants from Poland, Spiegel's hopes of attending the University of
Chicago's law school were dashed when the Depression hit in 1929. Taken by
North Side neighborhood discussions of Marxism and the depiction of workers'
equality and socialist justice in the Soviet Union, Spiegel soon disappointed his
parents' wishes for him to become a lawyer. Instead he joined the Communist
party.'^
With the nation's economy seeming on the brink of collapse, Spiegel became
convinced that Communists had the answers to society's problems. This belief
and party education led him, as he recalled, to become "overzealous," "mili
tant," and a bit "too sectarian," as he was swept up in the fight to bring justice
to unemployed Chicagoans. A regular sight at relief offices on the city's North
and Northwest Sides, Spiegel was the target of many a swung police club and
a regular occupant in Chicago's jails. As he recalled, some party members did
not mind spending the night in jail because that meant they would at least get
one free meal. Since he received no pay from the party for his efforts, Spiegel's

62

RED CHICAGO
REVOLUTIONARY RECRUITMENT

63

wife, a garment worker and feUow party activist, supported his work as a revoutionary wiA her own wages. Such dedication resulted in Spiegel's becoming
the kader of the party's unemployed organization, the Unemployed Councils
on Chicagos North and Northwest Sides.^"
But not aU Jews had the same path to Communism through educational disap
pointment. Instead of youthfol hopes of attending law school, Jack Kling had to
woA. Born Jack Bainghoffer in 19 u on the Lower East Side of New York Kling
was raised among Jewish working people. The oldest of five children, he grew up
m an Orthodox home, the son of a fur worker who was a strong unionist and
re^arly voted for SodaUst candidates but did not identify himself as a politi
cal person. Lacking interest in school, Kling got involved with the Pineapple
Gang, a group of Jewish youth who fought Polish gangs, raided peddlers, and
eventually mugged and stole from people. Kling believed that the YCL helped
him get [his] head on straight."'5
^
Hing was introduced to the YCL at a 1928 May Day parade in New York. He
ad landed a job as a sewmg-machine operator, joined the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, and held die union's banner as part of the large contingent
that showed up for the march. Kling recaUed. "Young Communists were in the
line of march, speaking to young people on the sidewalks and inviting them to
pm the Young Communist League. I was impressed, and decided to iom So I
signed a card on that Day-May ist. 19.8. right at the demonstration-for me.
M historic day John WUhamson, the presiding party official in New York at
the tme. signed off on Kling's card and marched next to Kling in the parade
Believing Klmg to be a natural leader, partysuperiors eventually sent him to
a national YCL school m Cleveland. After a short stint organizing in New York.
Klmg was asked to go to Chicago to work with the YCL. Arriving with no money
or place to stay Kling slept in Grant Park with other homeless people. When
party leaders learned of Kling's accommodation, they arranged for him to stay
with a party family the Boyers. For several years he shared a room with their
son who was also active in the YCL. He ate at a Russian cooperative restaurant
on ivision near Ashland run by party sympathizers who offered party activists
one free meal a day- In 1931. at age twenty. Kling was elected YCL organizer
Irtwen'^r
of Chicago's partymembers listed
as toenty-five or younger, Kling had his work cut out for him.
These individual narratives show that other stories lay beyond party statistics
strongly rooted in time, place, and experience. Some of ChLgo's Comn^rtl'

wereinfluencedbytheirfamil/spolitics.othersbythebooks they read. Orators

and teachers drew m some members. Others shuffled in when leftist groups
were folded mto the party or when clubs started. Some were true believers in
the Communist revolution and the Soviet Union, while others cared more
abou racial equality or reading. Chicago's Communists came from different
countries, states, and locales. Rooted in various progressive struggles, ethnic

Jack Kling and Claude Lightfoot.

(Chicago Historical Society, ICHi39210, photographer unknown)

clubs, and political and social groups, they offered their varied temperaments,
dispositions, and personalities to the party. Held together by the party's struc
ture and the culture it exuded, Chicago's Communists were able to look out at
a striking assortment of people in any given party demonstration, picnic, and
mass meeting. Some marveled at the diversity and solidarity among its follow
ers. And yet, the various ways they lived Communism chafed those in charge.
On the one hand, throughout the Third Period, questionable recruitment
techniques, stifling party bureaucracy, and overwhelming demands proved too
challenging to all but the most committed of Chicago's Communists. A vast
majority who signed up quit after the first year. Those who stayed were over
whelmingly male, unemployed, proletarian, and ethnic. Even though leaders
hoped for native-born, employed industrial workers, they took what they could
get and instructed their newly minted members to bring party policies to the
masses within the city's ethnic, unemployed, labor, cultural, and leftist organi
zations. Those who stayed, some assume, must have been the most hardened
and committed Communist revolutionaries.
The problem for party leaders, however, was that Communism meant dif
ferent things to those who came through its ranks. Just because someone was
"unemployed," "native-born," or "ethnic" did not mean that they would under
stand the party and its policies in the ways that its leaders expected. People's life
histories, experiences, and cultural connections shaped the reasons they came
and stayed and the way they lived Communism.

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

3
"True Revolutionaries":
Chicago's Party Culture in Thought
and Action

ployed

ft. toi.
schiSb.*S"3'r jt >
the charges After aU Poi'nH t ,

Most f f a l v p Ih " r
'*
counts. Since HaywooVdroppeTthT

) ~ " " i .
Haywood rescinded

"self-critical."
combination of the two ac-

some guUt. Given his predUection to calTfartyleatesToSS^^^^

transgressions, though. Poindexter likely L p^oint out h" ot ^TcZ-

65

mitment to Communist causes while Haywood either studied abroad or led

from New York, far away from "the masses," a point about which Haywood
was particularly sensitive.^
Regardless of the version, the fact that party trials existed, the expectation that
comrades would submit to criticism, the beUef that justice was being carried out,
and the way accusers and accused confirmed Communist principles all reveal
a unifying culture of beliefs and behaviors. Trials were only one place where
Communists* convictions and conduct became apparent. Attitudes toward the
Soviet Union, education, and gender also revealed a dominant party culture
that some embraced and others policed. Daily activism further reinforced the
party's dominant culture. Through party activity. Communists were to learn
how to relate to the masses, deal with police, accept party discipline, and think
about race and the non-Communist Left. Drawing on symbols, practices, and
policies of the American Left and international Communism, Chicago's Com
munists created a party culture that shaped members' clothing and language as
well as their ideology and behavior. Some scholars have viewed this cultural cooptation as evidence that American Communists were isolated from America's
workers. In Chicago, these political and cultural practices did alienate large
groups of people; they also connected Chicago's party to the world's only suc
cessful Socialist revolution, convincing others of its legitimacy.
As the spontaneous outbursts at Poindexter's trial suggest, Chicago's party
culture also reflected the behaviors, understandings, attitudes, and beliefs of its
individual members and was therefore rarely lived in any uniform way. High
turnover was one response to leaders' revolutionary expectations, but even those
who stayed did not practice Communism in a uniform fashion and still found
ways to blend their beliefs and dispositions with party expectations and remain
loyal, even if the mixture proved unsavory to those in charge. In Chicago's parks,
neighborhoods, and worlq)laces, people identified themselves as Communists,
many enthusiastically. Yet they lived within the party on terms different from
those laid out in New York and Moscow. Chicago's leaders regularly battled the
reality that their members came to Communism for various reasons. Through
the Third Period, they were unable to build a uniform entity. Instead, Chicago's
leaders ruled over a loose amalgamation of individuals and subcultures. Which
activities and ideas united Chicago's Commimists? Which policies created cleav
ages in the movement? How did rank-and-file party members experience Com
munist culture, and to what extent was it a product of their own creation?
A Singular Vision
The relationship of the CPUSA to the Soviet Union made Communism in the
United States different from other American social and political movements.
Beliefs about and behaviors determined by the Soviet Union provided one defin

66

RED CHICAGO

ing feature of party culture at all levels of the party. A letter to John Mackovich,
the head of Chicago's Czech buro, from party member Fero Bury conveyed the
sentiments of other Slovak immigrants. "Russia is OURS," Bury wrote. "[W]e
Slovaks have always looked upon Russia as to our savior, as to our strong broth
erly protector." Now Bury was writing to inquire about sending a delegation of
Slovaks to Russia because he beUeved that "newborn Russia in its progress, in
its famous ability of action will bring regeneration to the whole world so that
all antagonism of the enemies of poor people will be in vain.""*
Carl Hirsch, a writer born and raised on Chicagos West Side, remembered
the importance of the Soviet Union to him as a young party recruit. Com
munist friends gave him books that described Russia as a country without
unemployment. He recalled reading that "[i]t was a planned society and all
of these things could be planned out." With their economic problems solved,
Hirsch read, Russia's citizens shared better mental health than was possible in
capitalist societies. Through the Depression's early years, Hirsch watched his
half-dressed and unemployed father sit in the family's living room day after day
rather then dress and head out to find employment. His mother regularly was
in tears. This was a stark contrast to the Russia of his readinga more perfect,
planned society, where human relations were on a higher plane.^
Bury and Hirsch were not alone. Communist memoirs and internal party
records allude to members admiration of the Soviet state, its leaders, and its
people. Some admirers even took to mimicking Russian dress and speech. Rich
ard Wright, for example, recalled his frustration with some of Chicago's black
Communists, who "in order to resemble Lenin,... turned their shirt collars in
to make a V at the front, and turned the visors of their caps backward, tilted
upward at the nape of the neck." "When engaged in conversation," Wright reciled, "they stuck their thumbs in their suspenders or put their left hands into
their shirt bosoms or hooked their thumbs into their back pockets as they had
seen Lenin or Stalin do in photographs." Lovett Fort Whiteman was probably
one of these who so annoyed Wright. Tuskegee-schooled and trained in the
rWW and in Harlem's Socialist party, Whiteman by 1924 was a leading black
member of the American Communist party, confidently writing angry protests
to Soviet party leaders from Moscow's Lux Hotel because they had not yet con
vened a World Negro Congress. As a delegate to the Fifth Congress, Whiteman
established himself as a rising star in American party leadership. His enthusiasm
for the Soviet Union was apparent in his dress. In August 1932, the Chicago
Tribune featured a photo of him walking Chicago's streets in tall, tight boots,
riding pants, and a Russian-styled coat and hat.
Wright remembered that a few black party members even "rolled their r's
and mispronounced some words, like... they heard in the Party."' Black com
rades were not the only ones to use Russian speech patterns. All party members

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

67

"nils photo of Lovett Fort

Whiteman appeared in the
Chicago Tribune, August
4,1932. While it is not
credited, the picture was
likely taken by a member
of the city's Red Squad.

borrowed from Russia when they referred to such organizational units and
functions as W "nucleus,- and
^''P''7,"tXlr'.eos e"
their comfort with such jargon as "proletarian, vangu^d, and bourgeo .
to the discomfort of newcomers. Carl Hirsch recalled when he first heard this
last term at a party meeting when a leader from another P;"
"a good part of the evening ... about something he called
^
Jy "talked and talked about the BoorGois and." accordmg to Hirsch, nobody
in the room knew what the hell he was talking about.

John WiUiamson was concerned about such confusion, so at a g^^hermg of

city leaders, he offered pointers in the use of Soviet termmolo^. He was di tuTbed that in one case party ranks called their nucleus meetmgs shock troops
a loose reference to Russian troops trained for
,
another members called every Sunday organizing activity a Red Sunday,

68

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

Wma^slftoW h
of concentrated work
rnuiamson told his peers that in the first case the term confused those who
S^nd!!"
I
the use of "Red
Sunday" was simply incorrect.' He assured his comrades. "[TJhere is nothing
-ongwith [tran^orting terms from the Soviet Union)." He sim^iy wanJL
that thrsovi^n
belief
Aat the Soviet Umon was worth modeling. In fact, emulation of thmgs Soviet
tho sTw
r'^
who saw such a connection as strange and foreign.'"

'* 'i^ttirbed those

Em^ation of the Soviet Union was not enough for some party loyalists who
anted desperately to visit. Party offices became so inundated with requests
to transfer to the Soviet Union that American leaders developed arekborat
^plication process. After compiling a detailed biography and accounting for
fteir labor and partyactivities. applicants were required to findpeople to vouch
for them m front of the district committee, whose members would mX a
recommendation to New York's Central Committee." City and national party
aders hoped that such barriers would discourage applicants One mandat^
_fom Chicagos leaders, which was to be read at all nuclei meetings, explained
mile the Soviet Union needs a few skiUed mechanics, they are not indeed of
mu~en V 7
"ifT
^ Com
munist, then you stay m the USA. The Soviet Union needs the mechanics but
indWduTh

Regardless, Chicagoans contacted Soviet

their belongings
Chi
'T J T
A few followed the rules and applied'
Clwa Rodm explained that her mother was in Russia and ill. J. Podgomy wLed'

More common than those applying to leave were those wanting to remain
n the United States where they could defend the Soviet Unionlen Z7a
Ukrainian Jewish immigrant, believed the Soviet Union had to be defended
because,twastheonlysocialistcountryinexistenceatthetimeand. because
[of] the constant danger that the Soviet Union was in of bemg attacked bv the
ome Sot Union as a countermodel to American capitalism. Gray and others
remembered. [I]n some cases it was really tragic because we did it in a verv

TO"*,

SJLT

' J"'"'"'"

""s- " -""i

69

at any moment. In the context of massive unemployment and mobilization

of workers, the belief inspired Communists to continue their struggle. When
David Pomdexter recruited Claude Lightfoot out of the Democratic party, he
could honestly believe what he stated: "A revolutionary change will take place
in the next five years. The country can't go on five more years the way it is now.
In fact, it could change this year, this winter."'^ Carl Hirsch actually postponed
personal decisions due to the impending revolution. "It was as though any day
now life was going to change so drastically ... So don't plan ... what you're
going to do 10 years from now or 20 years from now.... There were few ...
committed Party people who had insuranceor who bought homes or anything
of that nature.With such dedication, people like Ben Gray admitted that they
were "completely and totally sold on the idea that the Communist Party ha[d]
the answer.""
Chicago's Communists' connection to the revolutionary Soviet Union cre
ated a sense of superiority among Communist recruits as they prepared to lead
Americas workers to socialism. Their mission created a loyalty to and confidence
in the Soviet Union that was unrivaled by other groups in the city.
Another aspect of party culturereading and educationfiirther defined
how people felt about the Soviet Union. Chicago's leaders outlined an educa
tional mission for members in order to instill a Marxist perspective. Williamson
believed that "[i]n early days of the life of a new member, he must devote less
time to practical work and more time to study." The reason, he argued, was
that "if he gets a general theoretical idea of what the Communist Party stands
for, then our problem of involving him into work is much easier."^" To this end,
books, newspapers, journals, and pamphlets in twenty-one languages rolled off
party presses around the city and country and made their way into the hands
of Chicago's workers through bookstores, street meetings, and factory-gate
sales. In October 1930, reports indicated that 5,789 copies of the Daily Worker
circulated in the district.^'
In addition to readings, there were classes for new members, leaders, and
interested folk. As early as 1929, Chicago's leaders taught classes out of party
headquarters. This district "school" allowed new members to share their im
pressions of the party and its functions with veteran members. Current-events
classes and sessions for full-tkne party leaders could be found here as well.^
By 1932, Communists' emphasis on formal education resulted in the district
school changing its name to the Chicago Workers' School, widening its appeal,
and broadening its offerings." Internal party memos indicate that all workers
were encouraged to participate in the school, but "workers in important indus
tries and factories were recommended."^^ The Workers' Voice, a newspaper for
Chicago's unemployed, advertised the school to the non-Communist public. In
addition to more specialized classes on Marxism-Leninism, leaflet and shop-

70

RED CHICAGO

paper writing, strike strategy, and "fundamentals of class struggle," workers

could take "elementary education for foreign born workers," or elementary
or advanced English. For fifteen cents, workers could attend weekly forimis
to complement their other classes.^^ Such classes and party forums reveal the
importance Communists placed on Americanization, workplace struggles, and
alternative educational models as correctives to state-supported curricula that
prepared workers to accept their lot in life vnthout question.
Beginning in 1932, new party members no longer had their introductory
sessions at the Chicago Workers' School. Instead, within each city region, Com
munists operated schools on a smaller basis to integrate new members and in
troduce them to basic skills necessary to Communist activity. A neighborhood
in South Chicago, for example, offered four courses: workers' correspondence,
elements of Communism, trade unionism, and public speaking. On the West
Side, Communist leaders offered similar classes and a course on the fundamen
tals of class conflict. Italian Communists in the city also held beginning and
advanced classes for organizers.^ By January 1933, military intelligence turned
up over eighty-six workers' schools in Chicago.^'
Educational opportunities in Communist party meetings complemented
neighborhood schools. In January 1930, city leaders instructed each neighbor
hood gathering to discuss Lenin, Leninism, and current conflicts in Ulinois's
coal mines.^ Ihey hoped to sharpen members political understanding in order
to create more effective Communists. Neighborhood meetings also held occa
sional speakers' conferences and study circles with hopes of enabling members
to understand and speak about the workings of capitalism.
Not surprisingly, workers' schools and neighborhood meetings did not always
go as planned. Chicago party leaders complained that while the schools filled a
"definite need in the Partyr they tended to attract "a large number of intellectual
elements." Most agreed that school organizers should emphasize "getting more
workers."^ A West Side party group, facing problems filling its classes, worried
openly that "we will not be able to supply speakers to open forums."^
Despite such problems, many recruits who would ^entually find themselves
in leadership positions could remember the specific pamphlet, book, or other
writing by Lenin, Marx, or William Z. Foster that confirmed their suspicion
that the Communist party was the answer to most problems. Formal classes, as
signed readings, and informal political discussions helped workers understand
that they were not to blame for their economic position and that workers had
played important roles in the history of other societies. In addition to providing
a theoretical base. Communist education developed organizing skills: how to
collect signatures, or how to become an open-air speaker. The party expected
members to participate in these practical classes and then use their skills in the
city's streets, parks, and union halls.^'

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

7^

Educational opportunities were also important to Chicago's party because

through these experiences, teachers identified students with potential and
marked them for further training in schools across the Midwest. The niost tal
ented spent three weeks at the party's national school in New York, and some
even went on to Moscow's Lenin School. With such training in the science of
Marxism-Leninism, Communists believed revolution was possible. And wh e
those like the Moscow-trained Haywood might have believed m the possibility
more fervently than others, the idea permeated even the party's lowest levels.
Besides providing formal education, party classes, newspapers, and maga
zines also reveal an internal struggle in the Depression's early years to define the
party s position on femininity.^^ Lenin. Engels, and Marx supported womens
emancipation; and during the Depression, Communists stood for womens
rights to equal pay. fewer hours, sanitary work conditions, and birth control.
Yet despite the part/s formal advocacy ofwomen's emancipation, its self-image
andprioritiesweredecidedlymasculine,mirroring the hypermale construction
Eric D. Weitz finds in his study of German Communists, among whom street
battles, competition with Nazis, the presence of paramilitary groups, and the
historic connection labor and socialist movements made between work and
masculinity translated into images of skillful, strong, and armed male workers.
In the United States, Communist gender construction focused less on a romance
with militarism and weaponry and instead emphasized male workers as the
source of Americas great wealth; they were usually drawn as muscula^brawny,
and confident, symbolic of the party's strength and fortitude. Like Germans.
American Communists borrowed from their country's labor and socialist tradi
tion of imagining the idealized worker as a strong male.^^
Despite plans and resolutions on behalf of womens issues, the pity's rniagery of women paralleled Weitz's findings in Germany; "notably diffiise, even
contradictory."^ On the one hand. Communists imagined women's struggle m
purely class terms, presenting them as workers in their own right challenging
low wages, unsafe work conditions, long hours, unemployment, and racism.
They also emphasized women's supportive roles during men's labor struggles,
taking blows from police, walking picket lines, and feeding striking and unem
ployed workers. In hand-drawn sketches, these women look more like men m
dragsporting broad shoulders, muscular arms, short hair, shirts, and-occa
sionally heels.This depiction fit with the party's understanding of class m male
terms and identified women's struggles with those of their male, working-class
comrades. And yet despite these overly masculine and generally unrepresenta
tive visions of women workers, the part/s support of women's wage work oc
curred at a time when US. politicians and unionists advocated laws intended
to push women out of the workplace and into the home. Communists were
among a minority who advocated for women wage workers.^

72

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

Alongside its image of women workers as strong, determined industrial

^rking-dass women as passive, dethetrfl^f
K
fhistorian Van Gosse argues that
from irld
on the crisis of unemployment allowed its rhetoric to shift
from mdustrial struggles (coded as male) to household and neighborhood
th~on of the
"
^hift broadened
the notion of the spaces women could legitimately occupy, and yet the press's
treatment of women as mothers, housewives, and consumers remained diffuse
Phlnr

'""'hers, women could be downright helpless. Above a

fhe W 1 r'"
of
April 1931 issue of
the Working Woman appears the caption, "Fathers Deported; Children Starve"
suggestmgthatthewomanishelplesstodoanythingabouth;^^^^^^^
kev imr"^V.''"'"
'
'heir chUdren's vuhierability were
key images the party-ironically-used to appeal to women Orleck IreueTT
A^nelise
Orleck argues, the party increasingly politicized women's roles as mothers
housewives, and consumers in the 1930s.- Mothers occasionally1^^^
women and children in the fight for lower bread prices and ren and ir^as
such mothers as those of the young African AmLan men accused 'frj
Zt^rs to o
who appealed to other
m^ers to organize against racism and state brutality.'"'
The party's varied image of femininity speaks to the Communists' difficulty
Sranf

hias with the formal positions set by party the^

U
strongly believed that working
women would be best served by its brand of socialism rather, than by
^d upper-class feminist groups. The party's press distanced worEfss
the h"
m'ddle- and upper-class counterparts while emphasizing
the shared interests of working women and men. The part of its p~ Zf
emphasized women's issues-the fight for a seven-hour day. the deLnd for
equal pay for equal work, the protest against night work and wage cuts and
^
1
T"''
"fl-straddled positions offered
by midde-dass feminists, who pushed for women's equality, and Progressive
coL^fof
i

protection. In the
language and behavior, however Com-

InraTtaageTand 7T" from

joining others on this issue ;r that,
stead, images and articles m the press emphasized class differences between
working women and those portrayed as fatter, more comfortabrand fazfer
Identified with progressive and feminist movements.^
'
Gendered notions of propriety also shaped the way the party disciplined
Communist women. Chicago's leaders never told a man he spent too muS
dances and social affairs, but they cautioned Edith Miller not to do so and

73

"not to bring the movement into her personal affairs." Hanging out with a new
recruit, whom some had deemed a bad character, caused a stir in her family
as well as in her local unit. When her party-member stepfather objected, her
fling became party business. And while Chicago's leaders found it necessary to
admonish Miller, there is no record of their calling any man to task for being
promiscuous or spending too much time at socials. Party leaders also felt free
to charge women for being "gossips." Men simply spread rumors.^'
Yet despite women's differential treatment and the difficulty the party had in
constructing a unified feminine ideal, Communists created one of the few public
spaces for working women to lead, learn, and advocate a radical agenda. While
their numbers were small, the women who participated bravely challenged
the place that mainstream society had created for them. Dora Lifshitz led the
party's fight in Chicago's International Ladies Garment Workers' Union against
David Dubinsky and other anti-Communist union leaders. She was one of the
few women elected to Chicago's district committee and its secretariat. John
Williamson remembered that not only did "many a policeman's truncheon hit
her head," but she often directed her "sharp tongue for fellow leaders if she felt
they were wrong, and especially if they appeared to be swellheaded."^^ Katherine Erlich was a similarly feisty woman who, like Lifshitz, organized women
workers, suffered police beatings, and challenged male party leaders. In an
interview, Erlich revealed what drew her and most likely the cohort of women
who joined with her: "The thing that impressed me the most was the stress on
education, culture, respect for others, devotion to a movement that would by
its' example win the masses to the cause of Communism."'*^ Such women were
not motivated by feminism. And yet, by becoming active in the .party and its
campaigns, they would begin to develop a feminist critique of Communism, its
leaders, and its program, bringing them to build a network of women's activists
that would sustain them in the years to come.^
In addition to the lessons Communists learned about gender, socialism, and
class through reading, discussion, and schooling, they also picked up party
beliefs and behaviors through participation in Communist activities. Watch
ing veteran members, new recruits got tips on organizing, socializing, and
discipline.
With the belief that each party event might be the one to tip the scales, Bill
Gebert and John Williamson encouraged others to think big every time they
planned a demonstration, and they were regularly planned. Williamson in
structed members to stencil sidewalks; to sell special-edition newspapers, but
tons, pamphlets, and leaflets; and to talk about each event's political significance
at neighborhood and mass meetings. For example, Gebert reported that prepara
tion for 1930's May Day demonstration, while not as thorough as it might have
been, resulted in the distribution of more than two hundred thousand leaflets

74

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

and shop papers and ten thousand Daily Worker newspapers. He was dad to
report thatparty members also held a nmnber of shop and street meetings May

Day was an mternaUonally celebrated holiday begun in Chicago and. in theory,

famito to Chicagos workers. But Chicago's Commmrists pulled out the stops
regardless of the occasion's obscurity. The sociologists Harold Lasswell and Dory Blumenstock found that m the first five years of the Depression, Chicago's
pay led organized, or participated" in 2,088 mass demonstrations."
On fte day of this typical May Day demonstration, rank-and-file Communists
learned how to reach the masses. Marchers moved in what Gebert reported to
se'lectlJ!)^
7
o
f b a n n e r s " a n d g u a r d e d b ya s p e c i a l l y
selected defense corps, entrusted with keeping the lines in order. Gebert estl
mated that there were thirty-five thousand marchers. It ended inside Ashland
Auditorium, where Gebert gave a speech, followed by those by party leaders in
T
n f
and the International
Labor Defense. One non-party speaker was Lucy Parsons, the widow of Albert
Parsons, who had been executed by the state for his alleged participation in the

Under this May 2, X910. Chicago Tribune plioto read tlie following caption: "Chicago Reds'

75

Haymarket affair of 1886. Connecting their movement to Chicagos traditions

of labor struggle, Communists like Gebert pushed Chicago's workers to see the
party as the natural heir to lead workers forward.^
Unfortunately for party leaders, Chicago's police were more interested in
the comings and goings of party activists than were most workers. While this
uninvited state interest convinced some that the party was on the right track,
police raids and harassment proved a nuisance for leaders. Police intervention
punctuated Communists' daily work, creating confusion, disruption, and a
defensiveness about shortfalls in party recruitment. It also convinced some
members of the need to have an underground, or at least secretive, arm of the
movement.
A special police force, the Red Squad, had its origins in Chicago as early as
the Haymarket incident. The squad constantly surveyed party offices, leaders,
and members and kept detailed records. Undercover agents attended party
meetings, took notes, and arranged for taps on phones and at gatherings. Before
big events, officers raided party offices and destroyed furniture and records."*'
To compensate for such intrusions, leaders organized an "illegal" or "semi
legal" apparatus based on the Bolshevik model and comprised of leaders who
agreed to take control of party operations during periods when police took
to arresting leaders. During these times, substitute leaders directed the party
through an underground structure that controlled the interaction between them,
leaders who stayed public, and their rank-and-file members. In the case of the
1930 May Day raid, Gebert assured national party leaders that organizational
results were so low because a police raid occurred in the days leading to the
demonstration, and the "shadow apparatus" was unable to make "sufficient
contact with the lower ranks of the Party and district leadership." As May Day
approached, the functioning of the underground organization improved, but
Gebert admitted that the party was not prepared when they met five hundred
Chicago police officers armed with machine guns. Underground leaders sent
instructions to defend the parade, and the defense corps had been chosen, but
Gebert conceded that if the police wanted them dispersed, they easily could
have done so.
Despite the existence of underground structures, party leaders taught their
members that illegality was a final resort. Throughout the period, Chicagos lead
ers desperately wanted a public party whose members could shepherd workers
to the impending revolution. To that end, they worked to develop organized,
legal resistance to police repression. Williamson announced a "monster meet
ing against activities of police and [the] Red Squad" held under ILD auspices
that would occur at the Coliseum in October 1931. In a letter to partymembers,
Williamson emphasized the importance of having an overflow crowd to show
"working class resistance to police terror."^

76

RED CHICAGO

In addition to such gatherings. Communists tried to curry workers* support in

the midst of party activity One example involved Herbert Newton. An African
American leader sent to Moscow for training, Newton was the only black mem
ber of the Atlanta Six, 3 group of Communists charged under Georgia's Insur
rection Act. The group faced the death penalty for involvement in an antilynching and unemployed demonstration. By 1932, Newton had become a member
of the national party's Central Committee and an organizer on Chicago's South
Side. One afternoon Newton was speaking at a black forum in Ellis Park when
Chicago police arrived and tried to stop him. By all accounts, Newton scampered
up a nearby oak tree, and no police were able to follow him. With the aid of a
megaphone, Newton kept talking to the crowd until the fire department arrived.
Even though he was eventually arrested, the police did not physically harm him.
and the park remained open to speakers, becoming,in party parlance, "Newton
Forum Park. Perhaps this story is often retold because it portrays what party
leaders predicted would occur with worker support. Rather than having to go
underground, leaders believed that workers, in witness to party activity, would
protect them from police. Even though Newton's arrest technically silenced him,
police beat no one and allowed the forum to continue.
During times of police suppression and public demonstration, Commu
nists did not overlook the importance of social activity. As an alternative to
company picnics and sporting events or church dances and bazaars, Chicago's
Communists created a social world intended to foster solidarity and emphasize
party values. Commimist symphonies, picnics, chorus performances, socials,
and dances carried political significance. A "symphony conference" for min
ers relief promised struggle and good music"; workers could witness a mock
trial at a red singing competition." Dances and picnics were also ways to raise
money for the Daily Worker and ethnic presses. Socials to raise funds for the
Soviet Union's defense promised tea from a Russian samovar; and parties to
raise money so that unemployed, working students, and party hopefuls could
attend workers' schools were complete with choruses, music, refreshments,
games, and, in at least one case, a popularity contest. Party games played on
Communist themes, like the one celebrating revolution that was enjoyed at
socials in the 1930s: "The comrades are seated in a circle. They are furnished
(secretly) with names of various countries, one for each comrade. A comrade
stands at the center of the circle and calls for revolutions in two countries. The
comrades with the name of these countries try to exchange seats, the comrade
at the center of the circle attempting to take one of the seats. Sometimes world
revolution is called for and everybody tries to get a new seat. It was explained
at one game that Russia was not given because 'there can be no revolution in
Soviet Russia.'""
Whether they organized or played. Communists were to follow Third Pe-

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

77

riod teachings, particularly about race. Communist leaders in Moscow, with

the aid of such American blacks as Haywood, formulated the official position
on race, and local party leaders enforced it. The policyknown as the ri^t to
self-determinationwas based on the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union.
Southern African Americans, the argument went, composed a dispossessed
nation with unfulfilled rights to land and self-government. The fight for selfdetermination in the region was seen as a fight for black nationhood, thus tying
the anticolonial freedom struggle of southern African Americans to the work
of making working-class revolution. In the North, African Americans would
not push for a separate nation but would work toward interracial solidarity.
With this mandate on race issues, Chicago's white Communists were sup
posed to bring blacks into the fold. Compared to any other progressive group
in the city, Chicago's Communists stood alone in their efforts to include African
Americans.
The Scottsboro Boys' defense was the most visible campaign the party
launched among blacks. The 1931 case resulted from two young white women
accusing nine young black men of rape in a boxcar in Alabama. After two weeks
and questionable testimony, an Alabama court sentenced the young men to
death. Communists rallied in their defense and promoted their case ^ a symbol
of the terror carried on in the South against blacks. Some of Chicago's members,
like Newton and a Jewish man named Herb March, who would make a name
for himself as a union leader in Chicago's stockyards, were active in campaigns
against lynching in other cities. But the Scottsboro case would galvanize the
entire party as news spread of the trial and sentence. Chicago party leaders mstructed members, "[Oln us [Communists], first of all, rests the responsibihty
for the lives of the Scottsboro Boys.
In typical Third Period fashion, Chicago Communists made elaborate prepa
rations for a Scottsboro demonstration in 1933- Leaders held three predemonstration street meetings in the Black Belt, and on four separate nights they sem
members house to house with leaflets. Through street meetings, speeches at
churches, and door-to-door mobilization, the party spread the word of the
injustices against the young men in Scottsboro and received a warm reception
from the city's black community. In Chicago, according to St. Clair Drake and
Horace Cayton, "[T]housands of Negro preachers and doctors and lawyers, as
well as quiet housewives, gave their money and verbal support to the struggle
for freeing the Scottsboro Boys.
In addition to campaigns that focused on racial injustice. Communist leaders
organized interracial picnics, dances, and social events where black and white
Communists learned from one another and occasionally developed strong re
lationships, a rarity in 1930s segregated Chicago. In December 1933. the YCL
in Englewood held a dance with some new black recruits in attendance. One

78

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

came interracial couples David Poind vt

were both married

opportunities
--Ple.

a stir. Her wealthy father Col John C Erne

actuaIl,forcedhrrtou.deSt;cM^^^^^^^^

editorial page of the Chicam Def "T ^

Communism on the

MyknowLtofts23nf
fit in there thLIril ^iZd

ianswhoappreciarusoS;whentrinS
Dempsey Travis brounht tLc. i,
^
South Side, Travis believed that
was a Comm"

wherever that may be."

Growing up on Chicagos
to a blackperfon

disciplfne. V^etheTdtthSr"rno^ce''
leader or follower thmncrli
Aj Atrican American or immigrant,

criticism. Party members werp tn

i i
they were living up to the Dartv' .
''
to call each other to task A lead'
'''
essaryforthet^^^

^
themselves to
their roles to make sure
'deals, and they were expected

Ihis application of Leninism to party work ocnirr^-rl ot ii i

member of Chicago's YCL, recalled th^t even ranHnd fik r

supposedtobepartof"ahifThlv/l,-c^:i-

in
"

^^^munists were

of people who considered themselvesTevoteior A r''

8"P
an action, partymembers would a th
u l
participating in
or shop group to review what ocS^d^f
b
"^'Sl'borhood
maybe was provocative in their d^,l
If somebody stepped out of line or
unnecessary actions which only hurtX movOTenr G
would be severely criticized nnd K T
Gray remembered, "they
Through evaluation crZue and
^
come Ler Co^^M
cess. Minutes of one meeting of the polftM
P'^'ieipated in the proenng ot the political committee record that "comrades

79

got Up and showed the weakness of the comrades, their defects, their strong
points." Bill Gebert proudly announced at a cityvride meeting, "Today it is a
living example that Party comrades understand what self-criticism means, and
they fully and completely exercise it. We must make self criticism the instru
ment for cleansing the Party."^
The idea of such strict party discipline originated in the Soviet Union with
Lenin's emphasis on verifying whether comrades followed instructions. Mos
cow's party heads assigned these responsibilities to an international Control
Commission. Communist leaders in cities throughout the United States estab
lished local Control Commissions and directed their members to enforce not
only party ideology but also the keeping of sound financial records and ethical
operations. Members'suspected of wrongdoing in any of these areas were called
before their cit/s Control Commission and subjected to disciplinary action.^"*
Individuals or groups could bring charges from anywhere within the party's
structure, and Chicago's Control Commission listened even when non-party
members brought charges. Units in neighborhoods and factories lodged the
most common complaints, and section leaders usually supported them. When
not emanating from an individual's unit, complaints sometimes came from
his or her fraction. Discipline in the local context meant that close friends and
political allies were responsible for keeping one another in line.^
That such duties would get mired in personality conflict as well as ideologi
cal difference is no surprise. Once someone brought charges, it was up to the
various party units to make a recommendation on which discipline to enforce.
The most common rulings involved dropping members from party rolls or
expelling them. A member might be dropped from the rolls for inactivity, not
paying dues for more than three months, or not showing up at unit meetings.
Once dropped, this individual might still be considered a "good sympathizer and
left winger" and still be relied upon in trade-union work and mass organizing.
If their former units approved, these people might even be readmitted when
prepared to invest more time. Acts of expulsion were more severe and implied
that party members had done more than shirk activity, payment, and attendance.
Some of the expelled were considered "anti-party elements" and became pariahs
who were forced to sever former friendships, social networks, and political ties.
Others jnight still be useful to the movement if they came around on.this or
that point. Like rehabilitated criminals, they might be encouraged to reapply
after a period during which they would have to show they were redeemed and
worthy.^ Sections and units were not allowed to expel members on their own.
This serious gesture needed the support of the city's Control Commission."
Through their Control Commissions, local party leaders had the responsibil
ity and power to see that their members pushed priorities and followed policies
articulated by higher-ranking Communist officials. It is no wonder that during

8o

RED CHICAGO

the Third Period, Control Commissions were occasionally used for factional
purposes. The roots of Third Period factionalism originated in the aftermath of
the 1923-24 Farmer-Labor party debacle. John Pepper, a Hungarian Comintern
representative, won the body's support and forced William Z. Foster, against
his better judgment, to lead a Communist takeover of the Farmer-Labor party,
causing a rift between Communist party trade unionists and mainstream, pro
gressive labor activists. The ensuing battle to win control over the part/s future
direction pitted Foster and James P. Cannon against Charles Ruthenberg and
Jay Lovestone, two leading American supporters of Pepper's positions. While
different visions of Communist policy drove the leaders and some members
of the two factions apart, some of Chicago's Communists aligned themselves
with personalities. Al Glotzer, a youth organizer in the city, remembered siding
with the Foster-Cannon group. His reasoning was "perhaps because of proxim
ity ... I tended to lean to groups that were more American and more Chicagoan, people who were midwesterners." Portraying the Ruthenberg-Lovestone
group as smart New Yorkers, big college New Yorkers, not working-class types,"
Glotzer aligned with Foster. Glotzer was joined by entire language fractions in
the factional bitterness. According to city leaders, "instead of making them
selves instruments of the Party to mobilize for Party work." foreign-language
fractions also "made themselves instruments of a faction to mobilize against
the Party leadership."
The Comintern finally stepped in when antagonism between factions esca
lated to a fevered pitch. In 1925, the Comintern established a Parity Commission
to settle questions of party control. Even though Foster's faction had a majority
of the delegates at the convention and hoped to consolidate their control of the
party, the Comintern ruled for Ruthenberg. Foster and his supporters could
either submit to the decision or leave the party. They submitted. Ruthenberg
took control and began to install his supporters on key committees throughout
the party's hierarchy, but divisions persisted at the local level. Chicago's party
leaders continued to identify as members of "majority" and "minority" groups
and to interpret committee appointments and policies as factional acts.
These divisions simply worsened in 1928 when the Communist party expelled
Leon Trotsky, and the American leader James P. Cannon rose to his support. In
The Draft Program of the Comintern International: A Criticism of Fundamentals,
Trotsky had leveled a fundamental critique of the Comintern's Stalinist direc
tion and its effect on the party's European and Far Eastern policies. "It was the
document." Cannon recalled, "that hit us like a thunderbolt."'The details of his
attack focused on theory and international concerns, but the visceral appeal of
Trotskyism to people like Cannon was the belief that Trotskynot Stalmwas
right and by following Stalin's lead. Communists were actually betraying the
revolution and Lenins wishes. What to Cannon was a revelation screamed of

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

8l

heresy to the unconverted. Turning on his former ally, Foster brought charges
against Cannon, whom the party expelled in October 1928. Fewer than one
hundred members left with Cannon, but Chicago lost about a dozen, includ
ing such key union and party activists as Arne Swabeck, the former district
organizer, and Martin Abern, a Rumanian Communist active among youth, the
city's leadership, and the ILD.^ These defections exacerbated older divisions
between those identified as "majority" and those identified as "minority." As the
national party attacked Cannon, the majority faction within Chicago's Political
buro pointed to "a dangerous manifestation of Trotskyism" among its minor
ity members. In response, minority leaders banded together and denied these
"wild accusations," arguing that it was members of the majority who needed to
be self-critical and better follow Comintern policies.^ In this battie, neither side
wanted to be painted as a follower of Trotsky, and both asserted their loyalty to
the Comintern.
When they were not pointing fingers at one another, Chicago's leaders sent
word to members at the nuclei level to fight against Trotskyism and Cannons
followers. Joe Giganti, a barber by trade and head of the city's ILD, remembered
attending a North Side nuclei meeting during the party's purge of Trotsky
ists. It was one of many meetings held to spread the word that the party stood
against Trotskyism. Giganti remembered the speakers railing "against the dire
criminality of the Trots and their collusion with the bourgeois and the counter
revolution." He was not sure what to think. A few weeks later, his indecision
brought him expulsion. Denying his support for Trotsky and his American
followers, Giganti sent a protest to the city's leadership, which he hoped they
would publish in the party's press to clear his name. It was one thing in 1929
to be expelled for not having issue with Trotskyists and another to be a known
Trotskyist."
Citywide meetings continued in February 1929. That month, the city's leader
ship pledged to combat all "Trotskyist manifestations" in the district. Holding
more meetings, especially in Jewish and Russian neighborhoods, where interest
in the issue was strongest, party leaders instructed members to be firm with
"Trots": no fraternizing, no audience, no contacts.'^
Chicago's Communists continued to scorn followers of Trotsky even as Co
mintern politics began to shift battle lines. Stalin turned his attention away
from the Trotsky issue in 1929 and toward a "right danger" in the Soviet party.
Nicolai Bukharin became associated with this danger, and in America, national
party leaders found their "right danger" in the person of Jay Lovestone, who
took charge of the majority faction after Charles Ruthenberg's death in 1927.
Lovestone made the mistake of aligning himself with Bukharin. The two sup
ported the notion of American exceptionalismthe idea that class relations
in the United States were unique and that revolution was less likely because of

82

RED CHICAGO

the Stable nature of American capitalism. With the official Third Period line
being that capitalism was in crisis and that revolution was imminent, Lovestone,
Bukharin, and American exceptionalism became party pariahs.
Gebert enforced these policies ruthlessly and was joined by the other districtlevel leaders Sam Don and Clarence Hathaway, who supported Foster's caucus.
They used expulsions and their threat to remove Lovestone's and Trotsky's sym
pathizers from the party's ranks to move against anyone who was not prepared
to move to the left in their thinking and actions.^^ In the city's political commit
tee, Hathaway, Don, and Gebert exposed die "right" mistakes of fellow leaders
Cline, Held, and Feingold and pointed out others who lurked at lower levels
of the hierarchy Ensuring distance between themselves and Trotsky, Cannon,
and now Lovestone, Chicago's Communist leaders hoped to make it clear to
America's workers that the Communist party was the only leftist group capable
of providing revolutionary leaderships^
For this reason, Communists quickly broadened their attack outward, from
the deviants in their midst to those reformist and Social-Democratic forces
outside the party. These groups were called "social fascist" because Commu
nists believed them to be "socialist in words and fascist in deeds."^ American
Communists modeled their social-fascist campaign on Comintern teachings
that directlylinked Germany's turn to fascism with Social-Democrats' counter
revolutionary nature. In the early years of the Third Period, Chicago's Commu
nists scorned any non-Communist leftist and liberal organization that spoke
on behalf of American workers because, they argued, these groups distracted
workers from the real class fight, just as Social-Democrats had in Germany A
"class versus class" slogan became popular during the period and left no room
for any non-Communist group in the struggle between the working class, led
by Communists, and the bourgeoisie, led by capitalists.^'
Instead of making alliances with social fascists, party leaders promoted a
deceptive tactic that they called "the united front from below." It required party
members to create coalitions with workers in Socialist and other non-party
organizations in an attempt to win them over to the party and to turn them
against those in charge of their group. The leadership of other organizations
was bankrupt, Chicago Communists argued; the Communist party alone pos
sessed solutions to workers' problems.'
The party loyalist Jack Spiegel took this task to heart. Successfully disrupting
non-party meetings of the unemployed, Spiegel heckled Socialist and reformist
leaders and "exposed" the fact, as he believed, that "when the chips are down
and we [workers] have a confrontation with the enemy, they won't be on our
side." To Spiegel, the leaders of other "lesser" parties were not "genuine," not
"true revolutionaries," and as a Communist he needed to reveal their ulterior
motives to workers everywhere.'^

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

83

Party newspapers furthered the fight. One issue of the Northwestern Shop
News railed against the Socialist party, arguing that it was not a workers' party
but one of "petty shopkeepers, longhaired intellectuals, and wealthy morons."
The paper exposed one machinist, John Collins, as a Socialist and a person to be
disregarded. Like others in the Socialist party, the paper argued, Collins "never
comes to the front when there is a fight against railroad bosses for better wages
or working conditions." It was the Communists, the writer insisted, who stood
up against "police clubs and blackjacks" to lead workers."
Foreign-language Communist papers also carried the fight against social
fascists. Radnik exposed the "Jugoslav Educational Association leadership as
one that supports the Republican Party and is counterrevolutionary." Its editors
offered proof that the association was not a worker's organization but "the tail
end of the most corrupt bourgeois Party in America." A later edition discred
ited Hrvatski Radisa and Srbski Privrednik, two organizations established to
raise money to care for orphans of the First World War m Serbia and Croatia
that, Radnik accused, "corrupted" their initial mission. Including quotes from
students in Serbia, the paper accused the organizations of forcing children to
slave for masters in an unquestioning and brutal fashion.'
Occasionally, non-party foreign-language papers turned the tables on Com
munists and exposed party tactics to their non-party readers. A Hungarian
paper, Otthon, revealed Communist attempts to take over the Rakoczy Sick
Benefit Society. "They [Communist members] started a whispering campaign
against the officers of the Rakoczy with the intention of getting them suspended
from office and enabling them to put their satellites in place." In another case,
a Russian paper belittled Communists' "revolutionary spirit" when about two
hundred party members stood on the platform of an elevated train and waited
for columns of Ukrainians demonstrating against "Soviet terror" in their home
country to pass below them. As they did, theyfelt "a sudden hail of rocks, bricks,
and pieces of iron... fall upon their heads." Rassviet applauded the Ukrainian
counterattack that ensued and successfully gave the Communists "a good whip
ping." Just imagine, the paper asked, "how many victims there would have
been among innocent people if the Communist hooligans had been superior
in number?"^ Such thoughts and tactics convinced many that the Communist
party was not for them and bolstered anti-Communist sentiments throughout
the city. Communists justified such actions because they were convinced that it
was their duty to lead workers away from such organizations and their leaders
and toward the Communist party, the only party actively defending the Soviet
Union.
Ideas about the Soviet Union, education, activism, race, party discipline, fac
tionalism, and social fascism sat at the intellectual center of Chicago's party
culture. They reveal positions of party leaders that were occasionally embraced

84

RED CHICAGO
TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES

by those lower ua the ranks and make left-wing anti-Commtmism during this
period untoandable. Viewed together, they help create a picture ofparty ac
tivists m the Third Period as idealistic, committed, militant, serious, and ambi
tious. Of course, they also show Communists to have been sectarian, pompous
and overeager to please Comintern and national leaders. At the neighborhood"
evel. party culture embraced all of these tendencies and encouraged others
In park forums, neighborhood meetings, language fractions, and shop groups
where most Communists experienced the party, an even more diverse set of
behaviors and attitudes coexisted and sometimes contradicted those modeled
and envisioned at the highest levels, revealing Chicago's party's quirks and particularities and the inabihty of its leaders ever to stamp them out.
True Revolutionaries

Communist leaders imported Soviet-styled organizational structures, hoping

to organize Americas ranks in a disciplined manner, but on American soU
their structure never worked exactly as the Soviets intended. During the Thu-d '
Period, Gebert and Wilhamson, and those sent to Chicago to replace them, did not impose the level of disdplme on their members that they were supposed
to. Directions from above structured their work and coordmated their activity,
but mundane problems were forever interfering with the most reasonable and
seemingly rational party directives. Individual Commmiists, moreover. d.HHH
which piece ofparty ideology they would followr sometimes quietly ignoring
Ae rest and at other times drawingleaders' attention their way Whether caused
by orgamzational problems, the independent stance of various national groups
or individual resistance, Chicago's leaders oversaw an organization with a lively'
contentious, and varied local partyculture where individuals and groups empha
sized, Ignored, or resisted different aspects of the party's dommarn culture
Communists received weeklyletters fi-om WUliamson's department that laid
out weekly and monthly work and emphasized party directives that sections and
units were to adapt to their neighborhoods and factories. But section and unit
members did not always read the letters. Some did not even pick them up at the
district office In September 1930, Williamson caUed attention to the one nucleus
whose members did not read his past letters: "This particular nucleus did not
even know that the nuclei meetings had been changed to Thursdays
As a backup measure to ensure the passing of information, personal contacts
happened intermittently Section leaders assigned themselves to nuclei to guide
and encourage their work but often seM decisions on paper instead of attending
ftemselves. Leaders insisted that the more personal contacts they made, the
tendT T!
members and increase meetingatdance, but throughout the period, district leaders complained that too little

85

contact occurred among the party's tiers. A 1930 organization department let
ter argued that district leaders had made mistakes in coming "in touch mainly
with the section committees" while ignoring the nuclei.^" With little personal
contact, district and section leaders consistently lacked basic information about
the neighborhoods. In the party registration of 1931, 90 percent of the city's
section leaders were unable to tell the district which revolutionary trade union
or AFL local existed in their section and which fractions "worked."^
Williamson, in vain, reminded section and unit leaders to carry through or
ganizational directives. For over a month, district leaders tried to collect money
for the national office from section members. Rather than responding, one
frustrated section leader wrote, "[I]f you want the assessment in a hurry, send
someone to collect them
This attitude was carried over into other areas
of activity, including sending reports, mobilizing for party functions, selling
literature, and attending meetings. In October 1930, the party's section that in
cluded part of the West Side was in a bad state. Even though its minutes showed
that its leaders addressed party issues, its members neglected at least half of the
section's decisions. The section buro rarely met to plan the work of the section
committee, and the committee meeting started about an hour late and lasted
until midnight, by which time all workers had left.' In the summer of 1931, 50
percent of the citf s unit members disregarded district leaders' warning agamst
taking more than two weeks' simimer vacation, nor did they find replacements
to take over their responsibilities or pay their dues in advance as instructed.
Throughout this period of revolutionary hope, leaders and members at all levels
were pulled between expectations of revolutionary responsibility and everyday
economic and social realities, which sometimes caused them to falter.
Inefficient departments and changing leadership added to the confusion.
Department leaders among youth and women at the section level sometimes
called meetings only to find that their counterparts did not exist at the unit level.
City leaders of the anti-imperialist committee refused to meet, causing district
leaders to replace them. Confronted with the lack of work at the lowest levels,
some section leaders would just "shrug [their] shoulders and say what can I
do?"' Even when leaders were in place, individuals moved around and some
times dropped out. In 1932 the district complained that one section changed
its unit functionaries without explanation. In 1933 the secretariat criticized
another section for changing its functionaries and committee members without
holding elections, and when another section did not produce results in 1930,
district leaders called a section conference to elect a new committee."'
Rookie and veteran leaders struggled with the amount of work that party
responsibilities required. Often unit members faced too many meetings and
obligations. The district constantly demanded a reduction of meetings, but
the problem continued.'' The district hoped that each person would hold only

86

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

one leadership post, but this was seldom the case. One nucleus member held
six job titles in 1930." Not surprisingly, these overloaded people ignored some
work. In 1934. the leaders in one section focused so heavily on their union work
that they neglected their section duties, and the district leadership eventually
replaced them." Instead of balancing study groups with activism, some units
cut out political discussion entirely and concentrated on action.'"'
WhUe the party's internal problems generated conflict, negligence, and conf\ision, they also created opportunities for members to circumvent party or
thodoxy. One member held unit meetings in his home that were continuaUy
mterrupted as he sold bootleg liquor to supplement his income. In 1934, a sec
tion committee voted down a motion that Herbert Newton, a leader from the
Political buro. act as its section organizer.'^ One member lied about another
members famUy finances so that the family could pay reduced dues; he did
not thmk that they should have to pay the ful! amount. When district leaders
held an internal investigation of one of their sections, they found that section
leaders hid information that the district wanted. Other section leaders, who
had to fill newspaper sales quotas set by the district, ordered larger bundles
of reading materials than they could sell in an effort to show the district that
they could reach their goals, then failed to pick them up. Some sections inde
pendently dropped members who did not pay dues in order to convince the
district they were doingwell with collections. These actions show that Chicagos
Communists resisted party hegemony and hint at a local culture cultivated bv
the party's ranks.'^
At times this local culture of resistance extended from basic organizational
issues to those related to policy. Ethnic Communists were some of the worst
offenders. The diversity of people in the party confirmed to some that it was a
truly international organization with the right answers for the world's work
ers But the Internationa] and diverse nature of the party also created strains
and stresses for party leaders. In the sense that people from all over the world
came together under the banner of Soviet Communism, internationalism made
Chicagos leaders proud. Statements of support to the revolutionary movement
m Lithuania during a Lithuanian buro meeting, or plans of Chicagos Yugosla
vian buro to correspond with Yugoslavian Communists in Vienna, confirmed
such mternaUonal ties." But white ethnics' lack of party discipline, particular
mternational loyalties, and prejudices violated party policies and suggest that
ethnic subcultures existed in Chicago's party.
The party's own structure supported these subcultures. Beginning in 1925.
national Communist leaders created a campaign of "bolshevization" in part
to move their organization away from the foreign-language-federation model
of the Socialist party and toward the streets and shops of America's workers,
in 1929, party leaders decided to modify the organization once again and this

Sj

time organized each language group into its own buro, with representation at
the national, city, and neighborhood levels. Language-buro leaders at the city
level assigned rank-and-file ethnic counterparts to work in fractions. As editor
of Radnik and leader of the city's language groups, S. Zinich liked to remind
Chicago's Communist ethnics, "Fractions are organs of the Party \vithin non
Party organizations. They are not independent, fully authorized organizations
but are subordinate to the competent local Party committee." As fraction mem
bers, ethnic Communists were to gear these mass organizations toward the
issues and activities Communists supported, like union building, protection
of foreign-born activists against deportation, and unemployment campaigns,
while fighting social-fascist tendencies among their leaders and all the while
bringing foreign-language masses "closer to the American revolutionary labor
movement."^
One of the problems in seeing these tasks through was that many of Chi
cago's ethnic Communists came to the party from the Socialist party's foreignlanguage federations, organizations that functioned autonomously from the
Socialist party's English-language organization. Within their federations, foreign-language-speaking Socialists talked about their own concerns, handled
their problems internally, and became involved in whatever activity they chose.
"Federationalism" frustrated Communist party leaders. They regularly tried to
rid their ranks of its tendencies and to bring foreign-language members closer
to party discipline, party activity, and self-criticism.
But federationalist tendencies persisted. Party records reveal leaders' frus
tration with the Greeks for being "hard to control" and with the Czechs, who
were unable to shift from a federationalist way of organizing themselves. "I
doubt if [the Czechs] have re[a]d the instruction sent to them from here," one
party leader complained." In one case, the leader of the Finnish buro got into
a battie with a worker who was new to the Communist party, but who had been
a member of the Socialist Finnish federation. Each blamed the other for deviat
ing from the party line and causing disruption in the federation.The battle had
its roots in a struggle back when they were members of the Socialist federation.
Such internal debate carried on in the Jewish buro as well, particularly around
the question of Palestine.
As late as 1931, groups of Lithuanians were violating party policies. Before
a meeting of party and non-party shareholders of the party's Lithuanian paper,
Vitnis, a group of Communists tried to convince those assembled that the party
had wrongfully expelled one of their fellow ethnic comrades and that accusa
tions made concerning the danger of racism at the paper and among Lithuanian
Communists were exaggerated. Lithuanian-language leaders saw this airing of
dirty laundry among non-party members as a "gross violation of Party discipline."
Differences among loyalists escalated to such a degree that national leaders

88

RED CHICAGO

agreed to send a delegation of Lithuanians to Moscow, where they would have

their positions heard and decided upon by a Comintern commission.'"'
Historic divisions and conflicts between Communist ethnics were also known
to turn Communists against one another. In an attempt to create united com
mittees against fascism, for example, Chicagos party ran up against a wall when
it came to its Yugoslav and Balkan comrades. Historic prejudice between these
ethnic workers kept them from wanting to join together for any cause. In this
case, party leaders were unwilling to reprimand individuals. A letter from the
national language committee to a leader in Chicago stated. "It is impossible to
draw in aU the mass organizations that are building a united front on jugo slav
issues also into the Balkan committees,... because the problem is to some
extent new for them because of the national prejudices." Understanding the
historic hatred that existed between certain groups, party leaders encouraged
starting slowly with a few individuals who showed leadership on the issue.'"^
While historic hatred among white ethnics might be tolerated, white-on-black
prejudice was usually taken more seriously. When a group of Lithuanian Com
munists proved unwilling to get in line with the party's campaign to expose and
eliminate racist tendencies (its white chauvinism campaign), they learned the
consequences. Party leaders understood black and white unity as a precondition
for black liberation and socialist revolution. If they wanted to usher in the revo
lution, then Communists had to publicly and actively promote black liberation
and bring up those who refused on white-chauvinist charges.'"' Meanwhile, a
small group with Strazdas, a member of Vilnis's editorial staff, as their leader,
reflised to take a stance against the fight to keep blacks out of the white-eth
nic neighborhood of Bridgeport. They also thought that an editorial against
racism in Detroit was too harsh, and they defended the Lithuanian workers'
cooperative against accusations that it supported racist policies. Strazdas was
annoyed that the party so openly questioned him and his Lithuanian comrades
and believed that such questions "should have been settled among ourselves
[the Lithuanians]." Party leaders formally expelled Strazdas, an action which
he largely ignored as he continued doing party work.'"''
Party leaders removed highly visible racist ethnic leaders such as Strazdas
from their membership rolls, but other examples of racist attitudes among lan
guage-group members persisted within party ranks. A letter to the DaUy Worker
from P. Camel, a concerned black party member, dealt with racism among the
party's white ethnics. Russian comrades in the city canceled an affair because,
according to the author, a few black Communists planned to attend. The Rus
sians knew better than to use black attendance as the reason for the cancellation
and mstead claimed that they feared a police shutdown of their Mutual Aid
Society buUding, where they held a school for Russian children.'o^ Such action
resulted in the party losing six new black recruits. Sam Ptasek, a Russian party

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

89

veteran of ten years, became the scapegoat, and after appearing before an open
trial, arguing that his bad English was the cause of the mishap, he was expelled
in the M of 1933 "with the right for readmission after six months." By May1934,
Ptasek was reinstated. His fellow comrades unanimously supported his appli
cation. While it is possible that Ptasek rid himself of racist beliefs, he probably
did not. More likely others in his group shared his racist views and supported
canceling the dance but were never brought up on charges.'
In the context of a rigidly segregated city where race relations were gener
ally bad, white ethnics who challenged racial mores had their work cut out for
them.'' Party leaders hoped that their white ethnic members would rise to this
challenge, and they did make examples of people, such as Ptasek, when cases
became public. But sometimes lower-ranking leaders refused to report viola
tions, allowing some of Chicagos Communists to keep their racist attitudes
below higher-ranking leaders' radar.
Details of Camel's experiences support this observation. At a YCL dance, a
leading white member of the YCL, according to Camel, accused a white boy
of "falling" for '"crow jam" when he danced with a young black female member.
This comment shocked Camel and the other black attendees. Leaving the event,
the YCL leader gathered "every hoodlum she could get and had them line up"
outside the dance hall. When black members came out of the hall and walked
down the street, "[T]hey were call all kind of names and some of owrold Party
member had to guard these negro home [sic]'' While such racist behavior dis
turbed Camel and the other black recruits at the dance, more upsetting was the
fact that the incident was never reported to city leaders. Even when the issue
"was taken up with some of the leading YCL members" in the neighborhood.
Camel reported in anger, "they suggested we forget about it."
Camel believed in the party's racial program and wanted it and the YCL
to "be clean of hiding white chauvinism," but a lack-of reporting and leniency
meant that such a cleansing was impossible. Camel wrote about a man who
would "walk up to you and put his arm around you and pat you on your back
andsaycom[rade]. Yb know we Communists must stick to^ef/ier. Ybw know
there arent any different in me and you [51c]." But when this man's daughter fell
in love with a black man, married him, and had a baby, the man had a change
of heart. Camel wrote, "I know not any of her family ever come to see her. And
the Bad Part of it is that her dad and brother are Party members [5ic]."'
Racism endured among some Communist groups because leaders largely fo
cused their attention away from them. It was not that Williamson, Gebert, and
other partyleaders did not care about the character of their ethnic members, but
they were even more concerned with recruiting native-born industrial workers,
which meant that language work, in particular, got short shrift. With Chicago's
party leaders offering more lip service than actual supervision and oversight, it

90

RED CHICAGO

was up to S. Zinich and others on the city's language buro to oversee the daily
checking up on and supervising of ethnic work. But three to five people could
not handle the work alone, especially when, in Zinichs estimation, "many Party
officials are not considering this [language] work as important
Ihe result was
that subcultures were allowed to coexist within Chicago's Communist party.
As party leaders diverted ethnic ranks into general party work, more isolated
and independent language groups were left behind. In July 1934, members of
the Scandinavian fraction complained about the way Chicago's party leaders
raided their fraction, assigning their members to work among the unemployed
and unions and perform other nonlanguage party work, leaving nobody to carry
out fraction work in the Danish-Norwegian Karl Marx Club. "The anarchistic
method now exercised by sections, units, etc., in the appointments of comrades
to other duties must stop for the good of the movement." The authors noted
that the few Communists who remained active in language work had party re
sponsibilities heaped on them. Many became overwhelmed, inactive, and the
subject of talk among non-party club members who began to question Com
munists' leadership skills."
Such realities meant that leadership was a general problem for ethnic Com
munists. Gebert himself had been plucked from the Polish buro, leavmg a glaring
hole that leaders found impossible to fill. One report from the language buro
stated that the Yugoslav buro was "politically clear" but had "little forces left."
John Mackovich, the leader of the party's Czechoslovaks in Chicago, had more
troubling problems; his small number of leaders were politically unclear at best,
and yet he counseled caution when disciplining them; "I advise the greatest'
tact with dealing with their unCommunist stand. They are loyal workers of the
Communist Party.... At present would be very hard to fill the place of anyone.
The lack of leadership is a very burning issue in our fraction. The two speakers
what we have, are not much closer to the line of our Party than the socialist.
The worst thing is that they have a real following m the mass organization. The
workers naturally believe them to be the best Communists."'"
With a scarcity of trustworthy leaders. Communists expressed independence.
When city buro and language leaders demanded that Comrade Hohol, the busi
ness manager of the Ukrainian Labor Home and manager of its soda-fountain
store, stay in his positions, Hohol refused and resigned. Another competent
party manager took over the home, but the store, a party headquarters of sorts
where Communists left literature and made phone calls, was sold to a non-party
member. Cityleaders agreed that Hohol did not "understand discipline," yet his
blatant disregard of party leaders' direction only resulted in his being "severely
criticized and "warned" that he must "become subject to Party discipline at
all times. In another case, J. Semashko, a member of a Polish fraction and Un
employed Council, found that his fellow comrades filed numerous complaints

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

9I

against him. A report reads that Semashko ignores his unit leaders, "styles
himself as an 'Old Bolshevik,'" and thinks himself "above" them. In one case
he led a group of unemployed workers to an eviction without any plan. City
leaders agreed that his actions created a problem, but not one big enough for
expulsion or even suspension. In the end, Semashko was simply "criticized for
the attitude and action he has taken.""^ In these cases, the decision not to expel
left behind individuals who willfully defied the rules.
In addition to individual resistance, entire foreign-language fractions marched
to their own tune. In 1930, John Williamson counted approximately sixty lan
guage fractions in the city. He labeled their functioning "still insufficient and
in some cases weak"''' His negativity was justified. The South Slavic fraction
faced a wide field of possibility, with more than two hundred thousand work
ers in ethnic organizations and a majority of those employed in mass industry,
but party fractions were disorganized, did notsupport party campaigns among
South Slavic workers, and did not promote the party paper, Radnik}^* The Yugo
slavs, in particular, did not understand fraction work and had to be reminded
that Communists "are not in these mass organizations to take up the inner
questions but to connect them up with the problems of the class struggle."'^ The
South Slavs were not alone. The Lettish buro reported that its fractions were
"functioning very weakly; are not taking a real hold of Party campaign, and
are losing membership instead of gaining it."" Lithuanian Communists were
not active in general party work, and in Gebert's words, they refused to "carry
on real Communist work in the mass organizations.""^ As late as 1935, Polish
fractions also were reported to be "functioning very badly, meeting irregularly,"
and not providing "real political leadership.""
Chicago's ethnic party members shared problems with those elsewhere.
Harvey Klehr found that across the country, "foreign-language groups, which
monopolized many members' time and energy, were insular and inward-looking." In a 1930 Organization Conference, leaders in Michigan, New York, and
Pennsylvania lamented the exclusiveness of their language groups. Some were
afraid of outsiders, while others were simply more comfortable working with
their own. Regardless, party leaders had a hard time getting their foreign-lan
guage-speaking members to extend their interests into nonlanguage work."'
In general, Zinich reported, Chicago's foreign-language-speaking Commu
nists were active in language organizations but violated the Third Period's revo
lutionary spirit. He saw these tendencies as part of larger "right wing" problems
that language members needed to "liquidate." Examples included fractions that
were "afraid to come openly as a fraction but hid themselves and in that way
lose the respect of the progressive workers who have much confidence in the
Party." They also included ethnic Communists who were "afraid to insult the
feelings of non-progressive workers [in mass organizations] with Communist

92

RED CHICAGO

speeches, motions, literature, press, or with poUtics." Some foreign-language

Communists even argued that "fraternal societies usually are nonpolitical."'^
Perhaps these "right wing" behaviors were why some foreign-language-speakmg Communists were so well respected in non-party groups. Regardless, they
signaled to party leaders that their ethnic comrades did not accept Third Period
policies.
Not only were foreign-language-speaking Communists occasionally unwill
ing to carry out party campaigns in non-party organizations, they also were
unwilling to participate in section committees or unit meetings. This compartmentalization concerned city and national leaders, especially when it came
to financial matters. City and national leaders hoped for loans and financial
support from foreign-language buros for party campaigns. Chicago's foreignlanguage leaders assigned a person from each language buro to attend ethnic
affairs and bring back lo percent of the earnings for the party. This person was
also assigned to "[g]et a list of sympathizers and... well-to-do people who can
be approached for donations."'^' Language groups were also expected to sup
port the party nationally. When the Czechoslovakian buro had lapsed in their
support, the district suggested that John Mackovich "take off part of the pay
ofparty members who are employed by our organizations and give that to the
center, as many other buros had done."'^ More often than not, city and national
leaders found themselves scolding language groups for their refusal to support
campaigns and comply with financial directives.
The party leaned on language groups for money in part because finances
were strained throughout the city's organization. Beginning in 1929. Chicago's
Readers complained that the local party organization could no longer exist on a
shoestring as it had in the past. Paid functionaries often did not receive their
paltry salaries, and the city s party could not pay for the number of organizers
it needed. On a more practical level, money was often unavailable for basic ne
cessities. Unable to afford mimeograph machines for their units, Communists
fought over workspace in the party's trade-union office.'^^
Party leaders hoped that the sale of ethnic newspapers would raise aware
ness among workers about party causes and potentially lead to their support.
But they found that ethnic editors, like foreign-language Communists more
generally, were not always willing to follow the line set out for. them. In one
^of his examinations of foreign-language papers in the city, Zinich found that
most... are not conducting Party campaigns especially against the right dan
ger in the language fractions, as they should." He reported to Alpi, the national
language leader, that some fractions, like the Armenian. Greek, and Spanish,
did not even know about language directives. He reported that others were of
the opinion that "they can passively reject such articles because they are afraid

"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

93

of'undermining' the paper," or more simply because "the editors do not agree
with them."'^
Instead of party directives, the contents of party papers reflected the interests
of foreign-language-speaking members. The Ukrainian newspaper printed a
thesis that did not mention the TUUL of the Worker's International Relief orga
nization but did include a discussion of comrades concerning an international
Ukrainian Emigration Congress. Zinich doubted "whether the CEC knows
anything about this thesis."'^ While the Ukrainian comrades debated an inter
national congress, Polish Communists printed advertisements from religious
publications and for "capitalist candidates for mayor in the city of Hamtranck."
When called on this lapse of good Communist acumen, Kowalski, the paper's
editor, stated that he simply disagreed.'^ Ethnic papers also balked when asked
to lend money to the party. In one case, members associated with Rovnost Ludu
agreed that they could not give the party money while their paper was in such
a bad condition.'^^
This incident and others like it suggest that party control was never unilat
eral and always had to be negotiated with particular personalities. Even when
leaders had the power to relieve editors like Kowalski, which they did when
he continually proved politically unreliable, they still decided to keep them on
the membership roles. Gebert always believed that Kowalski, for one, could be
"saved."'^ In this case, Kowalski's independent behavior was not enough to cause
him to be expelled, suggesting that there was a place in the party for people
who strayed.
In addition to recalcitrant ethnics, there was room in Chicago's party for those
who were ambivalent about the social-fascism policy. Communists' social-fascist line taught that Communists were the only true revolutionaries capable of
leading workers to revolution. But non-party papers pointed out that occasion
allylike the time that party members attacked Ukrainians from the elevated
tracksCommunist activity involved "assaults upon workers."*^ If Communists
were supposed to be the leaders of these workers and not their assailants, such
assaults probably made some Communists uncomfortable. Evidence exists that
Communists, even at the highest level in the district, were conflicted about this
policy. They sometimes left it out of their relationships with other workers and
their organizations, and their behavior was reflected in the ranks.
Albert Goldman explained to party leaders that he agreed that members
should act in accordance with Communist decisions, but he wrote, "[I]t does
not demand the Party members believe in accordance."''^ Some did neither.
In 1933 the Communist leader of the party's antifascist committee refused to
retreat from his position that when in coalition with non-party groups, Com
munists should not expose social fascists. Party leaders removed him as the

94

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

committees lead organizer but allowed him to remain m its larger leadership
circle Goldman scorned a fellow comrade for railing agamst leaders of the
Socialist party at a mass rally against a relief cut. Goldman was later expelled,
ut only after one whole year of haranguing against the party's position in the
ommunist classes he taught. The decision to expel him probably satisfied
pwty leaders, but the fact that it took so long meant that classrooms of activ
ists met at least one party representative who disagreed with the social-fascist
me. Another was Alfred Loge. a Communist and president of the Maywood
branch of the Nature Friends, an eco-friendly group with roots in nineteenthcentury Vienna. He would not let the party use his organization to promote
activity among German workers in the fight against social fascism
Rank-and-file Communists regularly saw their leaders resist party policy. In
1928, Carl Sklar, a young district leader, was sent to Milwaukee to organize an
elector^ canipaign under the Communist banner. He refused these orders, or
ganized for the Socialist party and opened Communist headquarters to a "capitahst candidate for office, whose flyers party members distributed. His feUow
district leaders found him to be "tactless" and "incompetent," but factional fight
ing m the city s leadership allowed even these kinds of blunders to be protected
by those m Sklar's faction at the city's highest levels. By 1930, he was reassigned
to anoAer part of the country, and his Chicago comrades reported that he was
doing good work
In another case, a debate between a party leader and a
Trotskyist resulted m the leader making "serious" ideological mistakes. Instead
of shomng how entirely opposite" the Trotskyist's "bourgeois pacifism" was,
the leader made the point of showing how simUar the two positions were In
1931. party leaders were setting counterexamples once again. Gebert reported
that m the old traditional way in spite of the definite decisions of the district
tero comrades Browder and Hammersmark" rounded up ten "typical liberals"
an brought them as spokesmen to a party protest at city hall. Arthur Maki a
carpenter and member of the district Control Commission and the Commu
nist party smce its fomiding and the Socialist party before that, made the same
blunder. At a state convention of the unemployed. Maki was responsible for
allowing George Voyzey, a Trotskyist, to speak openly.'^s
Party leaders' wavering actions affected the kinds ofpeople aUowed to remain
m the party In i928 William Kruse sent Lovestone a hst of Cannon's supportand five others who "lean in that di
rection. Yet that year, only five members were expeUed. Party leaders did not
go on an expiUsion spree; they only picked ofi^the most vocal, or least hopeful
membjs of the opposition. Leaders' inconsistent enforcement of this policy
allowed members to continue identifying as Communists even if they were not
completely convinced of social fascism. For example, four party members atended a functionary meeting and "publicly protested" expulsions of Trotskyists.

95

calling for "full freedom" in the expression of Trotskyist views in the party. At
first, the four were not even called before the city's Control Commission but
instead were invited to a meeting with a few party leaders. Only when leaders
learned that three of the four were circulating an anti-party petition did they
agree to suspend (and not expel) them. The fourth agreed to make a statement
against Trotsky in his nucleus meeting. For this reason and the fact that he was
a "rank and filer," no action ensued.'^ Another rank and filer, however, was
expelled for selling the Trotskyite paper The Militant. Party leaders admitted
that no one objected to that expulsion for the arbitrary reason that "everyone
knows he is a nut."*^^
Relations between Communists and social fascists continued informally. At
a Communist New Year's party in 1929, a recently expelled Trotskyist sold
drink tickets in the place of the unit's financial secretary because the party
members "didn't think her Trotskyist view would hurt anyone."'^ Trotskyists
were also known to hang around the party's bookstore and various headquar
ters throughout the city. Local party leaders insisted that Communists needed
to crack down on these contacts."^' The ranks needed reminding.
Despite the priority put on party discipline and the fight against social fas
cists, there were surprisingly few expulsions for this behavior in Chicago. David
Bentall, in charge of expulsions in the city, carefully monitored members who
were brought up on charges but only expelled those he believed could not
be won back to the party. Bentall's Control Commission examined each case
separately and considered personal factors in making its decisions. In 1930, the
party expeUed eleven for following either Lovestone or Trotsky, but by 1932 the
fervor had died down: only one Trotskyist sympathizer was expelled in 1932 and
two in 1933.''' Once expelled, people were not forever severed from the party,
and a few were readmitted. When the Political buro readmitted one former
renegade, it agreed to do so based on his trade-union work and swallowed the
fact that he had not completely fallen back in line.'*" Some complained about
the weak actions of the Control Commission, but party leaders did not want
to lose promising members. It was not that leaders did not apply Third Period
formulations, but they did so selectively and were ineffective in r-ooting out all
the shades of noncompliance in their ranks.
This was particularly true among African Americans, who were recruited
from such race-based organizations as Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improve
ment Association. In the early 1920s, Communist leaders were impressed with
Garvey and the lower working-class composition of his following. There is even
evidence that Garvey's notion of black nationalism influenced party leaders'
conception ofblack self-determination.'^^ But in the context of the Third Period
and Communists' open competition with Garvey for an African American fol
lowing, party leaders threw Garvey and Garveyites into the same scorned group

96

RED CHICAGO
"TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES"

as Trotsky and Lovestone. Whereas the latter two had come out of Communist
traditions, Garvey was easily seen as an evil capitalist and outright betrayer of
the black masses. His Black Star line was the essence of capitalist enterprise,
and his Back to Africa program, however vague, was particularly troubling to
party leaders, who encouraged an interracial struggle for black freedom within
the United States.'^
The bitterness that characterized American Communist leaders' feeling to
ward Garvey did not penetrate to Chicagos ranks. This was particularly true
among Chicagos African American Communists, who were recruited from
Garvey's UNL\. Once in the party, Garveyites came into conflict with its leaders.
Sol Harper, a leading member dealing with "Negro issues" and an ex-Garveyite,
argued that Garvey had duped black workers and stolen from them. A debate
ensued within Chicago's party over the meaning of Garveyism in the party
The Communist members Anna Schuhz and Marie Houston argued that the
movement may have wronged blacks, but they were still fond of Marcus Gar
vey the man. These ex-Garveyites and newly made Communists believed that
the party would help them achieve racial equality, but they were not willing to
betray Garvey, a man who theyfelt had awakened their political cbnsciousness.
The feud resulted in one section losing several former Garveyites. Interestingly,
though, those Garveyites who left remained neutral to the party, and relations
between the groups continued. In fact, relations were so good between some
Communists and members of other groups that the party leaders had to contmually remind members to distinguish between those in the party and those
who were not when passing on confidential information."^
While those who were offended by the party's treatment of Garvey left, the
party never ridded its black units of African American religious culture. Within
one of their organizations, the American Negro Labor Congress, party mem
bers and sympathizers prayed and sang hymns. And on the South Side, Michael
Gold described the experiences ofblack cadre: "At mass meetings their religious
past becomes transmuted into a Communist present. They follow every word
of the speaker with real emotion; they encourage him, as at a prayer meeting
with cries of'Yes, yes comrade' and often there is an involuntary and heartfelt
'Amen!'""
Beginning in the early 1930s, Chicago's Communists organized in black
churches around the Scottsboro case and against unemployment. One section,
composed mostly ofblack members, called a meeting for those who attended
church. Thelma Wheaton taught and trained women workers out of Chicago's
South Parkway branch of the YWCA. In an interview with Beth Bates, she re
called, I never knew a Communist who was not also a Christian. I'll bet over
a third of my church was Communist." While perhaps an exaggeration on both
accounts, Wheaton's memory is revealing of Communists' efforts in black Chi

97

cago. The district's political committee was so concerned about members' church
activity that it ordered the agitprop department to organize special classes to
make black comrades "clear on the question of religion.""
As religious influences became part ofblack party gatherings, the party's
own formulation of self-determination shielded those who pushed less for in
terracial action than for a black nationalist perspective. Rallies for Nat Turner
were held on the South Side, alluding to an armed rebellion with nationalist
overtones. Rank-and-file Commimists like Henry Ray, who joined the party
in 1930, were attracted to these displays of nationalism. According to David
Bentall, the leader of the city's Control Commission, Ray professed nationalist
ideas and "fostered distrust of Negro workers against white workers." He also
accused an entire section of the party leadership of being white chauvinists
without providing evidence. Yet, typically regardless of such transgressions,
Bentall and others viewed Ray as a "capable comrade," and rather than expel
ling him, they simply encouraged him to "overcome his weaknesses." The party
member Oscar Hunter had a similar experience when he referred to blacks as
"my people" when appealing to white party leaders on the South Side. A black
party member came to reprimand him. "So he comes right out and says what is
this shit MY PEOPLE
There's no such a goddamn thing.""^ Hunter believed
that there was a difference between the interests of white and black workers
and that he represented the black ones. According to party mandates, he was
wrong. He took his scolding but did not change his mind.
Another telling display of a black party subculture occurred in 1932, when
members in a mosdy African American section rejected the district's ruling
on interracial leadership and insisted on all-black leadership. Because white
party members wanted blacks in the party and in leadership roles and actively
sought to rid their ranks of prejudices, district leaders explained to their secre
tariat why they overruled them and agreed with their black members. A lead
ing comrade explained that "from the formal point of view this was incorrect,
but this question cannot be looked upon formally, but from the point of view
of the realities of the situation." And in 1932 the realities were that interracial
leadership would not always work in majority black sections."
Not all black Communists were overeager to identify as "Negro," however.
Some, in fact, resisted the party's insistence on seeing all blacks as "Negroes"
rather than as simply native-born Americans. It is no wonder that when asked
to fill out a registration survey in 1931, some blacks registered as "American" in
stead of "Negro." Others resented whites' use of the term "Negro." One black unit
voted unanimously to use the word "colored" instead, demonstrating that some
challenged the part/s homogeneous idea of Negroes as an oppressed nation."^
Chicago's Communists brought with them shades of commitment and vari
eties of experiences, attitudes, and behaviors. Instead of acting as a small army,

98

RED CHICAGO

whose members followed orders without question, Chicagos party operated on

a more contingent basis, with its leaders having to take account of their mem
bers' varied backgrounds, experiences, and beliefs. Party leaders believed that
to bring about socialism, they needed both a disciplined membership prepared
to lead workers and a high level of commitment to the revolution. Segments of
Chicagos party bought into this vision and carried out party policy as best they
could. Other large segmentsincluding white ethnics, African Americans, and
leaders at various levelsbought in and yet experienced the party on their own
terms. In Chicago, from 1928 through 1935, things did not run as smoothly as
planned. Despite this fact, or more likely because of it, Communists managed
to develop effective community and labor organizers, and their numbers grew
to over three thousand by the end of the period.
And still, from 1928 through 1935, Chicago's Communists were unable to
lead their members in a complete turn toward the revolutionary agenda envi
sioned by the Comintern. The difficult task they set for themselves was beset
by the attitudes and beliefs of their members, who failed to spark a socialist
revolution among Chicago's workers but who managed to make headway in
their work among unemployed and unionized workers.

4
Red Relief

In Left Front,the publication of Chicago's John Reed Club, Edith Margo

reiterated the sequence of events in 1931 that led Chicago's police officers to
kiU three eviction protesters. On August 1. 1931. Oscar DePriest a congress
man and -millionaire Negro landlord," and other white and black landlords
and politicians met at the W. H. Riley real estate office and resolved to demand
that Chicago's chief of police take more severe measures to stop
anti-ewtion activity of the city's Communist-party created Unemployed Councils. On
'^''Srl/tto Lrning, police arrested a leader of the Unemployed Councils,
Charles Banks, at the site of an eviction and warned others, If any of you go
out on any moreeviction, today you're goin' to get filled. But
councU members took this as "an invitation to battle, accordmg to Marga Ih
Unemployed Councils, as the mUitant leaders of jobless workers, could not
'^'couicil members discussed Banks's arrest and future actions they might take
in Washington Park, a half-square-mile recreational area where aU manner of
people had traditionally gathered to talk, listen, protest, sleep, and occasionally
act, Washington Park forums promoted lively discussion and debate am^ong
radical, liberal, and conservative employed and unemployed blacks, whose
cacophony of voices and ideas sometimes inspired
^
day, the group decided to march together to the 5000 block "f SouA Dearbo
Street, the heart of Chicago's African American neighborhood, and replace the
furniture of an evicted seventy-two-year-old woman, Diana Gross, A counci
leader Joseph Gardner, led between five hundred and four thousand people
Cestimates vary) out of the park and down Fifty-first Street to Dearborm Abe
Grey, "one of the best Negro organizers in the Party, was among the crowd a

RED RELIEF
100

101

RED CHICAGO

found himself geared up for what he beUeved was going to be the start of the
revolution on Chicago's South Side. "If there is shooting," Grey reportedly said,
"I expect to be killed, because I shall be on the front rank."
After the procession reached Gross's residence, police arrested council lead
ers, including Gardner. Just as the police car he was in turned a corner, Gardner
heard gunshots. In a letter to the national party leader Earl Browder, Bill Gebert
explained that Grey and others had disarmed and beaten three policemen, caus
ing other police to attack and fatally shoot Grey in the arm. After being shot,
Grey threw a police revolver into the crowd, calling on the people to continue
fighting. An eyewitness Margo interviewed told a less heroic story: Police tried
to arrest Grey, but he escaped and began to lead the group after Gardner and
other leaders were arrested. At one point, Grey had his hand in his pocket, which
caused the police to jump to the "conclusion that he had a gun and [they] shot
him five times."
Two other deaths soon followed. In response to Grey's murder, John O'Neil,
an unknown African American man who had joined the group at the park,
took a gun from a police officer or picked one up that was dropped (as several
were) and tried to shoot. If not for the safety, he would have fired. Instead, a
policeman shot him. Frank Armstrong, Grey's dose friend, was also killed, but
witnesses do not recall his being slain at the demonstration. Late that night,
some neighbors found his body in Washington Park, "shot through the head
and badly mutilated." To party members, the conclusion was clear: "[Q]uite
evidently he had been taken for a ride by the police."'
Within twenty minutes, word of the first two murders reached downtown
party headquarters, where Gebert and a few others were working. Eight of them
hurried to the South Side to learn details while the rest stayed to plan a meeting
for top party leaders. While leaders planned, neighborhood organizers acted. The
South Side party members David Poindexter, Squire Brown, Claude Lightfoot,
and Marie Houston joined at least fifty-three council sympathizers, organized a
neighborhood meeting, and turned out seven to ten thousand people that night
in Washington Park. The following week, Washington Park forums ran every
evening with between five and ten thousand sympathizers listening, questioning,
and cheering as Communists and others struck verbal blows against the capitalist
state, racism, and police violence. By the following Tuesday, Communists and
sympathizers set up a committee to arrange a mass funeral.
With council support, the group made the slain workers* funeral a huge
demonstration that brought Communists' critique of the city's administration
(and capitalist state power more generally) together with their advocacy of
such issues as civil rights and racial equality. Party members distributed fifty
thousand party leaflets, seventy-five thousand funeral leaflets, twenty thousand
League of Struggle for Negro Rights leaflets, and twenty thousand Unemployed

council leailets. For three d.ys leadmg to the ftineral, the

f Gr^ and
O'Neil lay in state at the Odd Fellows Hall to, as organizers explained, give the
ou^aseLasses an opportunity to view the bodies," Party members guarded
them in twelve-hour shifts. Behind the corpses, a spotlight drew
eyes to apicture of Lenin, paintings ofwhite and black han^ clasped togeA .
aid murals of upraised fists. Twenty-five thousand came
davs of the viewing and thousands more on the next three. On the day of the
r ^rrlerTexolained "[Tlhe loo.ooo workers kit power and took possess'ion'of the street." Behind a red flag, sixty thousand
(40 percent of them white) paraded carrying sheets on which forty thousand
onlookers (90 percent of them black) threw coins to help defray the families
^ Uete^ommts enhanced Communists conviction that they would successft.i?Lad the impending revolution. In their view, the capitalist system would

View down S,.te Street of .he funeral procession for ^ee men Mid

(Used with permission from AP/Wide World Photos.)

RED RELIEF
102

IO3

RED CHICAGO

not be able to sustain itself while granting the kinds of socialist remedies they
demanded. This overriding idea pro\dded a rationale for Communists through
out the country to put to work Third Period beliefs about capitalism, race, and
fascism. Throughout the Depression they did so by connecting their convic
tions about capitalisms imminent decUne, the system's racist tendencies, and the
threat of fascism to the problems of the unemployed. In work through a group
of their own making, the Unemployed Councils, Communists perfected the
fight to improve conditions for the unemployed and their families by tailoring
their tactics to the problem at hand. This meant that from city to city, council
activity varied. In Detroit, councils organized unemployed autoworkers and
built an organization within the auto unions, while in Birmingham, councils
focused on womens activism and blacks' rights.^ Chicago's councils responded
to the unemployed neighborhood by neighborhood, causing their structure and
solutions to reflect the variety of the city's population and their problems.
Although such events as those that occurred in early August show the consid
erable support that Unemployed Councils and the Communist party received
in Chicago, to party leaders, the results from their unemployment campaigns
were decidedly mixed. Most people who participated in Unemployed Council
activity shuffled in and out of the movement and never joined the party. To
these people, reforms won at the flophouse, relief station, and in city government
were sufficient, undermining party leaders' Third Period assumptions. Women
did not participate in Unemployed Council activity as much as leaders pushed,
and leaders were unable to translate their sense of widespread support into elec
toral victory. Lizabeth Cohen's study found that in the early Depression years,
Chicagos working people changed their views concerning government's role.^
Their shift from relying on private institutions in periods of crisis to expecting
government assistance was revolutionary. It was not the kind of revolution that
Communists envisioned, however. And yet Communists were a part of the force
that brought about these changes.
If this situation was not grim enough for party leaders, new members' po
litical bent caused them further concern. As the events of August 3 suggest.
Communists and their councils brought people into the party's orbit who were
not born and bred on socialist politics. How much were Unemployed Councils
creatures of Communism, and how much did they represent an indigenous
movement? How did Communists affect the activity and character of the coun
cils, and how did council activity affect the character of the party? During the
Third Period, Unemployed Councils become the main arena for recruitment,
and overall Communist membership numbers followed the pattern of unem
ployed-campaign successes. As a result, Communists found it easier to recruit
in the hardest-hit areas of the city than in other neighborhoods, but such trends
concerned leaders who wanted stronger recruitment among the employed. Un-

,nloved CouncUs won specific victories as members returned furniture to an

joined more veteran members who sometimes defied party

Building a Structure

iiBESspis
ci^de ~nist gatherings suggest optimistic direct.ves ordermg Ch.

104

RED CHICAGO
RED RELIEF

cago Communists to join the TUUL through their former or present places of
" w Z c M e
"' " ' ' " f t b e l i e v e d ,
ch wUl become one of the most important means of dosing the gap between
the growmg political influence of the Party and its organizational isolation"'"
The limited nature of the TUUL dashed these inflated hopes, however In
ad of working to build a mass movement uniting the city's employed and
thTmemh T
T'''
workplace issues and
Ae menabership of small, revolutionary unions. Occasionally delegates from
fraternal groups homeless workers, and residents of flophouses joined elected
delegates from fte TUUL to discuss the unemploymentLation, butlncre
T^co^ds Wf

Communists were supposed to work in

totLZu^miX'o.^"^
^e one exception was the first national Communist-organized response
of the unemployed on March 6,1930. initiated by the Comintern and dubbed
International Unemployment Day "The economic crisis in tlie u'ted SMes
res'^vJt of it 0TC7 00""''
one party paper explained, "and as a
taTln
f
unemployed in the capitalist countries"
n a call to action the TUUL and its affiliates called on "American worw2
class employed and unemployed to demonstrate in solidarity with the worker^
in dl capitalist and colonial countries."'^ Local conferences of delegates from
Sroups culminated in a regional meeting in Chi
irty to fifty thousand marchers participated in the demonstration and that
sideWks^'mik w
windows or
sidewalks, mile city papers estimated marchers in the hundreds rather than
city got^nme""'Chicago's
Due to party members' organizing inexperience, the TUUL's preoccuoation
with industry, and most workers' lack of interest in becoming members how
ba e for tie TrnT^Tr" t''
^ '^">bership
ase tor the councils, let alone the party. A report of the event reveals other
weateesses from the perspective of Third Period expectations. Party members
potm! ftr^
"P
''t different
points in the demonstration; and instead of convincing people on the sidewalk
o ,om the marchers, they called them "scabs" and "yellow." Most dishearten
ng was the low turnout of the party's own numbers: only three hundred Com'
Zf a
r
"
P
P
e
a
r
.a n dt h o s ew h o
dd faded to hold together their groups of eight. CommunL in charge ofte
demonstration got separated from one another, and a few ignored Z uai^

members whoassembledfortherallyThisdemonstrationreiledieneedfc

IO5

new organizing structures and tactics if the party was going to lead Chicagos
unemployed workers.^^
Despite the problems this march uncovered, Chicago could boast that it had
twelve councils with one thousand members, the largest outside of New York.
Coimcils in Milwaukee, Duluth, and Indianapolis were only beginning to grow
and already differing from those organized by the TUUL. Instead of working
on an industrial basis, they organized members around neighborhood issues.
In Chicago, some early councils were based in existing ethnic and fraternal
organizations rather than the workplace. Steve Nelson, a national party leader
sent to organize in Chicago, attended his first Unemployed Council meeting
at a Greek workers' club on Halsted Street, with Greek furriers, garment and
stockyard workers, waiters, cooks, and busboys in attendance. According to
Nelson, "[A]lmost all were single and very militant. Actually, they knew what
to do better than 1."^
Similar experiences in seventeen other states led to preliminary talks among
party leaders, members, and sympathizers concerning the formation of a na
tional organization. The result of these talks brought 1,320 delegates to Chicago
in luly 1930 to organize the Unemployed Councils of the USA. The convention
adopted a program that highlighted the councils' demand that federal relief and
unemployment insurance come from funds appropriated for the military and
that representatives of the unemployed administer relief. At the convention,
delegates declared their opposition to racism and pushed for black and white
organizers to work within black neighborhoods. As a final act, the convention
created a new council structure.''^ From this point forward, the Unemployed
Councils' structure would be separate from the TUUL and the Communist
party. From the Comintern in Moscow to the party's district office in Chicago,
leaders agreed that unemployed activity had more potential to reach a wider
audience through neighborhood councils than through Communist trade
unions.^^ Within Chicago, the new councils first organized the unemployed
within branches, covering areas of the city similar to the ones organized by party
sections. By1931, council members were building block committees within each
branch to mobilize around neighborhood issues. Block committees covered
residents in neighborhoods hardest hit by the Depression. Chicago^s Hunger
Fighter, a biweekly publication of the city's Unemployed Councils, explained: "A
block committee is composed of three or more workers who canvass the block,
going from house to house to get the support of the workers, employed and un
employed, for the relief of the desperate cases in the block The block committee
calls the neighbors together to decide what action to take when some family in
the block is to be evicted or is starving
If the committee needs assistance
or the advice of more experienced workers, they can go to the neighborhood
council to which the block committee sends delegates."' The Hunger Fighter

106

RED CHrCAGO

RED RELIEF

highlighted the ease with which these committees could be buUt, reporting on
such successful cases as the one in April 1932, when a woman organized twentyone men and women on her block in one day.'^
Even though the Unemployed CouncUs had a separate structure and localized
executive committee of the Unemployed Councils comrepi^resentation. Steve Nelson was put in charge of organizing at its first meeting
trict
Vd Councils.^" Difct leaders worked with Communist council leaders to pick fiiture represen
tatives from the partys ranks. They handed down decisions that changed the
ouncils structure, creating a city center responsible for coordinating fcfivS
andbloAcouncUsthatwould increase neighborhood concentration.-Iheyorgl
nized cit^de ralhes and conferences, staffed councils with unpaid CommLsts
cSn for'

^
insurance in the councils' name But ci^de leaders were not always able to implement their decisions be
cause only rarely were they involved in the councils' day-to-day work Most
Tmro^r r'
unhappy with their leaders' hands-off
approach and encouraged them to become more direcdy involved. OccasionaUv
wor^Tpeh
l^^ders' commitment to unemployed
Kiar f
"'''^^ders responded to Such criticism by hiring Nels
Kjar to oversee council work and report to them on it They paid him when
y CO
with funds raised jointly by the party and the TUUL
Kjar proved to be an effective, if short-lived, organizer. Jack Spiegel, a loweron1
Kjar struggling with police and rehef ofEdals
n the third floor of a MUwaukee Avenue relief station. During the skirmish
Kjar and his wife held tightly to the railing as unemployed delegates and supporters occupied the stairway "The police had a hell of a time dislodging u^
Spiegd recalled. As a result of Kjar's militant action, he was arrested Lid for
eighteen months, and then deported to Denmark
t h e n T w t T r ' '' " f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,
^en It was Communist section leaders and unit fraction members who were
r"nk 'anT ffle r"
fctionig. Section leaders assigned
rank-and-file Communists to work within the councils; and when they noticed
that council work had fallen off in their area, they asked their respect"
loseTt
Unemployed Council fraction members, who were supposed to meet re^larly to discuss the political education of unemployed worL
ers. Of^ course, although section leaders were supposed to keep closi tabs on
council fi-action members, contact frequently broke down."At the end of 19, i
75percentofaUcouncilshadanactivepartyfractionworkinginthem providing"
many rank-and-file Communists their first experience of mass organizing

10/

Communists involved in unemployed work blurred the lines between coun

cil and party organizations. The party section organizer Katherine Erlich went
to the partys city leadership for bail money after the arrest of an entire block
committee of a council within her section. In another case, an announcement
for the Roseland Unemployed Council to send delegates to a city unemployed
meeting appeared in a Communist section newsletter. Sometimes lower-level
Communists working in councils did not focus enough on party recruitment,
causing leaders to send directives, like the ones circulated on the South Side,
ordering members to make more of a "distinction" between party work and the
councils. Other times, like during socials, picnics, and films cosponsored by a
particular party unit and Unemployed Council branch, party members were
purposely melding the two groups for potential socializing and recruiting.^
Communists within Unemployed Councils were supposed to raise party
directives during council discussions, talk about them with council members,
and then have them adopted through a vote. Sometimes Communist leaders
themselves would attend council meetings to push through party decisions,
but fraction members did not always accommodate them. When party leaders
came to one of Erlichs council meetings and tried to get their demands passed,
the members unanimously voted them down. At an enlarged district com
mittee meeting, Erlich explained. If any decision is to be made the comrades
should come and have some discussion with the Party fraction and executive
committee."^^
While party leaders did not appreciate this lack of support, they did encour
age councils to create their own campaigns and understood that to organize a
mass movement, councils had to have various approaches to the city's problems
and people. Signing off as G. P., one North Side activist explained, "[I]n order
to build Unemployed Councils and to speed up the organization of the unem
ployed, it is necessary for us to be flexible and adopt proper demands that will
fit m for the territory in which we build."^ Nelson pushed the cit/s Communist
leadership to ensure that councils "take up everyday problems of the workers."^'
In early 1931, the district resolved that there would be "no general plans for all
Unemployed Councils because in the different localities... there are different
problems confronting us and therefore various tactics and methods must be
adopted."^" The party's ability to adapt its structure to address the variety of
problems facing Chicagos unemployed eventually made the councils popular
and difficult to control.
Organizing the Unorganized
This pliant structure also allowed lower-level Communist activists and jobless
workers to use them for shelter protests, relief-station rallies, anti-eviction work,
interracial activity, and centers of antifascist propaganda. Tied together by a

108

RED CHICAGO

national organization and Communists*determination to expose the futility of

the American welfare system, Chicago's councils carried through party direction
in various ways, while developing their own character and bringing new faces,
personalities, and inclinations into Chicago's Communist party.
ORGANIZING IN FLOPHOUSES

Ben Gray was six years old in June 1914 when he, his mother, and three sibUngs landed on Ellis Island. Born to an Orthodox Jewish family in Kiev, Gray
retained his religious practices in the United States. When his father died in
1925, Gray attended synagogue three times a day for an entire year. It was not
until Bens brother Dave went into business with a "fast operator" who was also
"philosophically... a Communist" that Ben encountered any political thinking.
This partner shared his ideas with Dave and Ben, and soon Ben found himself
connecting these teachings with his own work experiences. Before long he was
radicalized."
By the tune the Depression hit, Ben Gray had surrounded himself with friends
who were "attuned to what was going on." So when he heard that nine black
young men had been sentenced to death in Alabama for raping two white
women and that it might be a frame-up. Gray attended a protest meeting in
Grant Park. Reading the protest signs and listening to speakers, Gray got caught
up in the rally, and "all of a sudden [he] had the sign {he was holding] framed
over a policeman's head." In jail. Gray met YCL and Communist party members.
He "made up [his] mind that this is what it means to ... not having liberty to
express yourself or declaring your protest against what you thought was wrong,
that there really must be something wrong with things in this country and per
haps these Communists were right [sic]" Somebody gave Gray a YCL card, and
he signed on the spot."
As an unemployed worker in Depression-era Chicago, Gray found himself
looking for shelter in Chicago's municipal lodging houses. Within a half-mile
west of the Loop, they dotted the streets along with pawnshops, secondhand
clothing stores, taverns, and poolrooms. Twenty-three percent of shelter resi
dents were casual workers, migratory laborers, and homeless who claimed this
area of the city as their permanent residence. What stuck out most in Gray's
memory, however, was that "those flophouses which ordinarily housed the
'bowery bums' and those people, found people with college degrees, former en
gineers, college professors, people like that who were really down and out."^'
It was among these people that Gray and others like him began an intense
eifort to organize. Timing was important. Lawrence Moen, a council organizer
in one flophouse, reported, "We don't give a damn for a man after he has spent
six months in the flophouse. It does things to him. He loses his guts. He doesn't
care. He forgets who he used to be. His scrap is gone."^* Before their inhabitants

RED RELIEF

IO9

lost their spirit, Gray, Moen, and other council members hoped to channel their
eneipes into protest.
One recruit, Car Kolins, a former steam-shovel operator, was the kind of per
son they sought. He had only been in a city shelter for four weeks and already
had a "great hobby" in following party activity. Repeatedly offering "Communis
tic principles... gleaned from the Daily Worker, which... he always carried a
copy of," Kolins was convinced that Chicago's mainstream papers had it wrong.
"To read the Tribune," he argued, "you would think Communism was a kind
of deadly poisoning
They've got ail the money they wantthat's why they
don't want Communism or a liberal government. They want to keep us on the
bum." A University of Chicago student deemed Kolins "not a type to mix well
with people," but fellow council members likely thought differently^^
Flophouses provided lodging, meals, facilities for recreation, and ample cause
for complaint. According to one war veteran, at his flophouse "you are handed
a circular tray caked with rust on top and covered with a black smudgy smear
on the bottom." The cornbread hash, he claimed, was made from bread brushed
off tables with a broom that was also used to sweep the floors.^ At 1210 South
Morgan Street, all beds touched one another. Thirty-seven men had to be re
moved from a Salvation Army flophouse on Union Street due to an influenza
outbreak. In June 1932, the city forced flophouse residents to work on county
roads if they wanted to stay in the shelters.^^
According to Gray, these concerns made it "very easy to organize a demon
stration because all you had to do was send word through the flophouses that
something is taking place and inside of a half hour you had ten thousand people
out in the streets."" While probably an overstatement, large demonstrations did
flow from the city's shelters. On one occasion in January1932, five thousand men
left their flophouses and marched to the Clearing House for Men at Monroe and
Grant Streets to present demands.^' Not all demonstrations were so dramatic.
Most often, Unemployed Council committees won official recognition from
a shelter's staff, who would then listen to council members' demands. While
such a hearing may not seem like much, it often resulted in concessions. In one
case, an unemployed committee was given the right to hold daily meetings, to
have three meals a day, to get free medical attention, and to use tobacco twice
a week.*
Sometimes the stakes were higher. In May 1932, a Morgan Street shelter was
closed, shutting out four hundred homeless people. Organized by the Unem
ployed Councils, they sent delegations to the Central Clearing House for Men
and to emergency relief offices. A writer for the Hunger Fighter reported that
Robert Beasley, in chaise of men's shelters, realized that workers would not be
"bulldozed" so easily and offered to take them all back,*'
Unemployed workers should not be punished, council members explained,

liO

RED RELIEF

RED CHICAGO

for problems created by capitalism. When the city threatened to dose another
shelter, a delegation of council members drawn from the city's shelters met be
hind a closed door with state representatives and Beasley. "They were not going
to sleep in the streets," the Hunger Fighter reported. "They had nothing to do
with the Depression. ... [Bjosses, like (Samuel] Insuil and [Ogden] Armour,
would have to come across and provide for the homeless and unemployed.""^
Insuil and Armour had no intention of providing for the needy as council rep
resentatives intended,and this meeting did not change their views. Still, council
members succeeded in articulating the view that Chicago's wealthy owed their
fortune to the citys workers, who were not lazy, as these state representatives
believed, but simply victims of a failing economic system.
The party and its council members wanted ^vorkers to embrace the notion
that they had created the wealth of the rich, and therefore taxes on the wealthy
were rightfuUy due to the unemployed. While this logic attracted some, the draw
for most councils was the specific benefits won. When trucks from the county
highway department carted men from shelters to work for their keep, Unem
ployed Council members tried to sabotage the effort. They believed it unjust
to make victims of the Depression work for shelter, and to them, forced labor
seemed ludicrous at a time when so many needed a paycheck. Two thousand
congregated at one protest, but only five hundred willingly rushed the crews. A
few threw projectiles at what they viewed as misguided workers who boarded
the trucks, but in the end their efforts were unsuccessfiil. As one report indi
cated, "[F]rom that day there was definitive diminution in the council's activi
ties within the shelters."'" Former council members admitted that their recent
failure in winning concessions was the reason they lost interest and let their
memberships lapse, but certainly the physical attack on those willing to work
alienated groups of workers from the councils and the party, making enemies
among those who were only doing what shelter officials instructed them to
do. To Communists, they were betraying their class. But at least some of those
willing to work must have been relieved at the idea that they would be allowed
to be productive.
Council activity in and around shelters brought Communist ideals to home
less people gathered in facilities scattered throughout Chicago's downtown. In
April 1932, party leaders reported that 1,700 homeless people held memberships
in flophouse committees.^'' Questions ranging in importance from whether
residents could smoke to whether the city should support a shelter's existence
became the fodder that fed council activity. Council and party activists did not
always win, and occasionally their aggressive tactics gained them new enemies.
Most often their encounters created a supportive following among shelter resi
dents, who could then becounted on to demonstrate at relief stations throughout

'

111

the city. One unemployed demonstration in Union Park brought ten thousand
workers, gathering flophouse residents with workers leaving their jobs in the
neighborhood."*^
ANTI-EVICTION WORK, BLACK ACTIVISM,
AND INTERRACIAL ORGANIZING

Whereas shelter activity was concentrated downtown, anti-eviction activity

spread in neighborhoods throughout the city, notably on Chicago's South Side,
where the spiraling economic downturn caused relentless suffering. Accord
ing to the 1931 Unemployment Census, in one area of the South Side over 85
percent of the people ten years and older who were employed in 1930 were
unemployed in 1931. By comparison, the average rate of unemployment in
Chicago's 147 districts excluding its African American communities was 28
percent. Between August 11 and October 31,1931. 38 percent of cases before
the renters' court were filed against African Americans. A quarter of aU relief
cases in the city involved African Americans, who made up only 6.9 percent
of the city's population.''^
In Chicago's black community, councils built on African Americans' institu
tions and history of resistance to establish trust in the community. To do this,
they began meeting at Washington Park, where African Americans had tra
ditionally mobilized. When word came there in September 1930 that the city
council had given a streetcar company the right to expand its lines to the edge
of the black community and that the company employed white immigrants for
the job instead ofblack workers, anger burst into a spontaneous protest. Dur
ing these "streetcar riots," hundreds of blacks marched from Washington Park
to a city transportation work site and demanded jobs.*'
By 1932, Communists were speaking daily at the park to crowds that some
times reached between two and five thousand. Describing an encounter at a
Washington Park forum, Michael Gold observed, "Fathers, mothers, grand
mothers from the deep south, and scores of childrenall the generations were
at the forum, this Communism has become a folk thing. They have taken Com
munism and translated it into their own idiom.""'
According to Claude Lightfoot, by the time the councils came on the scene,
"black people were in a stage of transition from old methods of struggle for their
rights." Beth Bates refers to this cohort of Chicago's African Americans who
increasingly embraced a militant protest style as "a new crowd." Unconvinced by
the NAACP's focus on legal avenues to fight for civil rights or the Democratic
party's promise of leadership, party and non-party blacks who participated
in Washington Park activities provided the basis for this new crowd and for
Unemployed Council membership. Lightfoot, a former member of the Garvey

112

RED CHICAGO

movement whom local Democratic and Republican politicians tried to recruit

to help with their campaigns, converted to Communism through his Unem
ployed Council activity, which began in Washington Park/'
At this juncture, when black activists were looking for leadership, Commu
nists reached out to the African American community through their campaign
to support the Scottsboro Boys, which converted Ben Gray. When Communists
went into churches and met with large gatherings, they connected the trial of the
"Scottsboro Nine" to discrimmation against blacks in Chicago. Through meet
ing with ministers and church congregations and speaking before large groups,
party members recruited and began to develop a trusting relationship with the
community. James Samuel and Richard Tate first learned about Unemployed
Coimcils through a church meeting, where they decided to get involved. Both
later became active unionists in Chicago's meatpacking industry.^"
Building on these community contacts and the spontaneous actions that made
Washington Park an activist center, by the summer of 1931. council members
joined park regulars in working to prevent evictions in the black community.
Black militants, many of whom were party members or would later join the party,
led groups from the park to the homes of evicted families to put them and their
furniture back in their houses or apartments. Jane Newton remembered peeing
David Poindexter in demonstrations of Unemployed Councils on the South
Side. Newton recalled that "Dex" had a "Volatile disposition'" and "'a ready flow
of speech."' He often put himself in dangerous situations, and in one meeting,
Newton recalled, he did not stop talking '"until a policeman took him by the
collar and cracked his head as if it were an egg.'"'
When Washington Parks council members and supporters did not leave from
the park, council organizers acted on tips left at Unemployed Council meeting
halls. Harold Lasswell, a contemporary sociologist, described the sequence of
events that followed. A person would show up at the hall and announce that a
few blocks away a landlord was evicting a family. "Their indignation aroused,
the men would march in a group down the street, adding the sympathetic and
the curious to their number as they marched, until by the time they reached the
scene of the eviction, the crowd would have grown in size and temper. The furni
ture of the unfortunate family would be replaced and the crowd, delighted with
its success, would disperse gradually, in small groups."^ In African American
neighborhoods, jobless workers were so disgusted with their predicament that
within a few weeks of establishing councils, organizers reportedly could mobi
lize as many as five thousand workers in half an hour to stop an eviction.'
Although evictions consumed organizers' time in black neighborhoods, the
councils also turned on gas, electric, and water in apartments where unem
ployment prevented their occupants from paying the bills. The signs they left,

RED RELIEF

113

reading "Restored by the Unemployed Councils," helped councils' popularity

grow in the black community. By August 1931, council membership on the
South Side numbered one thousand, 90 percent of whom were black^"
Within councils, African Americans became leaders. One party report in
1931 announced,"' [T]he only mass organization where the Negro workers have
been organized and feel at home is the Unemployed Councils. Approximately
40 percent of the workers in the unemployed movement in Chicago are Negro
workers, and they are in the leadership."* Lizabeth Cohen estimated that by1934
Chicago's blacks provided 21 percent of the Unemployed Councils' leadership
and 25 percent of their membership.^^
This high rate of African American participation stood in contrast to Socialist
organizations, where blacks made up only 6 percent of their leadership and 5
percent of their membership. Harold Gosnell, a University of Chicago scholar,
explained that there was no one in Chicago's Socialist circles who "could keep
hammering away steadily on the Socialist objectives [of racial equality]." The
national Socialist party platform condemned racial inequality, but Socialist
unemployed organizations neither tackled race as an issue nor took their ac
tion to the streets. They focused on discussion groups, especially in the early
Depression years. Their efforts to reach black members were stymied by their
lack of African American leaders and their inability to formulate a solution to
the black community's crisis that addressed racism, the problem that explained
the disproportionate amount of suffering in the black community.^
Not surprisingly, blacks began to trust the councils and, through them, the
Communist party. Marxist-Leninist ideology may not have appealed to the ma
jority of African Americans in Chicago, but it did not prevent their supporting
particular aims of the party and the councils." Black newspapers supported
Communists' goals of bettering living conditions and ending segregation. Even
the conservative Whip recognized the inroads the party had made in the Afri
can American community; "'The Communists have framed a program of social
remedies which cannot fail to appeal to the hungering, jobless millions, who live
in barren want, while everywhere about them is evidence of restricted plenty in
the greedy hands of the few.'" Such attitudes made their way to the grassroots.
The sociologists Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake write that it was not unusual,
when parents feared an eviction, for them to tell their children to "run quick and
find the Reds!" Cayton writes that one woman cried and thanked God "loudly
and dramatically"for the presence of council members.' James Yates, an African
American member of the Unemployed Councils on the South Side, expressed
the party's significance to him: "I was a part of their hopes, their dreams, and
they were a part of mine. And we were a part of an even larger world of march
ing poor people. By now I understand that the Depression was worldwide and

114

RED RELIEF

RED CHICAGO

that the unemployed and the poor were demonstrating and agitating for jobs
and food all over the globe. We were millions. We couldn't lose."^
City authorities expressed concern that Communists were gaining influ
ence in the black community and that "fundamental institutions of the coun
try" were in jeopardy. Examining these accusations firsthand, Cayton joined
an "unkempt"-looking group that was marching in a "serious and determined
fashion" through the heart of the Black Belt. "Instead of trying to destroy our
splendid and glorious institutions," Cayton reported, "these poor black folks
were simply going over to put a fellow race member back into the house he had
been unceremoniously kicked out of This was indeed a come-down for one who
had expected to witness the destruction of constitutional American principles,
such as, for example, 'due process of law.*After the group returned a woman's
"miserable belongings," Cayton observed another black woman speaking to the
group from a soapbox. Rather than offering empty phrases or Marxist theory,
he reported, she talked the "talk of a person who had awakened from a pleasant
dream to find that reality was hard, cold, and cruel." Before the woman could
finish, Chicagos Industrial Squad arrived and began beating the observers, who
ran in fear for their lives. Such an experience made Cayton wonder if American
institutions were not in trouble, but for different reasons than he had when he
began his investigation. He also wondered if this incident, like many others,
would be billed as a "red riot."^
The black community's response to the councils* activities heartened Com
munists, who did not let public attacks bother them too much. Instead, they
worried about the predominately black composition of the Black Belt's coun
cils.^' An unemployment demonstration on February lo, 1931, where councils
mobilized four thousand white workers to march down South State Street from
Thirty-third to Forty-third Street, was encouraging. What began with twenty
whites to one black ended in a mass rally, half white and half black. Party
leaders pushed councils to organize future interracial demonstrations in other
communities.^
They had particular success in the Back of the Yards, where men, women, and
children lived in some of the city's worst conditions. Stockyard pollution fouled
local creeks, and wafting odors filled the air in the congested streets. The Yards'
business cycles gave an ebb and flow to employment of the resident Lithuanians,
Poles, and Mexicans.^ In the Back of the Yards, interracial councils combined
anti-eviction work with demands to help unemployed packinghouse workers.
The council that began meeting regularly in the neighborhood toward the end
of 1930 organized a march on the stockyards to demand jobs, the abolition
of labor spies in the plants, and weekly supplies of meat for unemployed yard
workers. In April 193 2, the Hunger Fighter reported that some twenty thousand
black and white workers participated in a "mighty hunger march*' where over

II5

six thousand marched for three miles, the first interracial rally in the area since
the pre-race riot "checkerboard crowd" that had gathered in 1919 when Com
munists worked to organize stockyard workers. The party proudly recognized
that this was the first time that black workers had marched into the white ter
ritory around the Yards in such large numbers.^
This emphasis on interracial work brought blacks and whites together in Chi
cago's councils, often for the first time. Lowell Washington, an African Ameri
can member of the Unemployed Councils, remembered,[I] never really even
talked to a white man before, and I certainly hadn't said more than two words
to a white lady, and here I was being treated with respect and speakin my mind
and not having to worry about saying something that might rile 'em up Let
me tell you it changed the way I thought about things.*"^'
The frequent, unprecedented displays of interracial solidarity on Chicago's
streets sparked the city's administration into action. After the shootings and
arrests of August 3,1931, the municipal court bailiff temporarily stopped serv
ing eviction warrants. City officials seemed to begin to recognize the high rate
of evictions that had been carried out for some time. After meeting with
business leaders and welfare officials, city officials arranged for three hundred
people to work in the city's parks. Mayor Cermak, who had told workers that
demonstrators would be arrested, now acquiesced to a "moratorium" on rents.
Tenants began hanging signs reading, "We Do Not Pay Rents" and "Please Do
Not Ask Us to Pay Rent."
These were temporary measures, and the desperate situation accelerated
throughout the city in 1932 as landlords began turning oflf gas, water, and elec
tricity to evict tenants in arrears. Jobless workers found it increasingly difficult
to find housing because landlords refused tenants on relief State funds released
in March 1932 loosened relief agencies' purse strings and even specified shelter
as an acceptable form of relief, but charities continued to delay rent payments
until eviction was "imminent," and even then, fund distribution remained at the
agent's discretion.^ Regardless, the Communist party and their Unemployed
Councils succeeded in raising peoples expectations regarding government sup
port, and they made an inroad into Chicago's African American community.
Ben Gray remembered that if you walked on the South Side and wanted to
hand out a leaflet at someone's home, all you had to do was say "'hello comrade'
when you never saw the person before... that was the 'open sesame,* you said
you were from the Unemployment Council or the Communist Party. 'Hello
comrade,' that was the password."'*
RELIEF-STATION PROTESTS AND POLICE VIOLENCE

Anti-eviction and shelter activity gave council members a record of victories,

but with welfare payments threatened, they did not have time to rest and praise

Il6

RED CHICAGO

themselves. By 193 2. public-relief stations were the places Chicago's unemployed

were expected to go if in need of rent, food, clothing, coal, or utility money.
Outside ofthe South Side, they became the main focus of council activity.
Relief stations were an easy target because the hastily created welfare system
they supported was unnecessarily complex and unnervingfor its clients. A1932
letter to Chicagos social-welfare agents makes clear how time-consuming and
frustrating was the process of obtaining welfare. No fewer than fifteen district
offices across the city deah with unemployment relief (and these, therefore, pro
vided the stage for much Unemployed Council activity). Fourteen other offices
dealt with public welfare (but not for disabled veterans, who were rerouted to the
American Red Cross). Jewish families were expected to go to Chicago's Jewish
Social Servic? bureau, unless they lived in the area between Fullerton, Chicago,
Ashland, and Washtenaw Avenues, which had its own special office. Fourteen
different district offices of the United Charities accepted all families with one
member under twenty-one as long as other agencies had no responsibility over
them; and the Catholic Charities of Chicago referred aU Catholic families to their
parish priests, while the Salvation Army dispensed family welfare at five loca
tions. More specialized offices like those for the aged and "non-family women"
also were available. That Chicago's Council of Social Agencies prohibited the
letters public circulation, that the letter reminded its restricted group of readers
that all offices were completely fiill, and that it contained instructions to offer
carfare for those who were sent from office to office and to tell people that it
may take time to get to the right office suggest how overwhelmed the system
was and how ill treated were Chicago's needy through the heat of the Great
Depression.^
With this as a backdrop, Unemployed Councils built a following at relief
stations. Through block committees, council members represented clients at
these stations, demanding money for rent, food, clothing, and utilities. One
demonstration planned by the North Side Neighborhood CouncU called for a
demonstration at the Ravenswood and Montrose Avenue relief station, where
a committee of ten planned to present "minimum demands" to the agents. In
terested folk were to march with council members from the corner of Belmont
and Wilton, increasing their numbers as they proceeded to the station. North
Side council leaders also promised demonstrations at the neighborhood's two
United Charities and one Joint Emmerson relief station.^^
Once at the relief stations, council representatives found that not all station
agents were willing to deal with them. But the councUs had an ally, at least initiaUy, in Joseph Moss, the county's director of public welfare. Moss agreed that
councU members brought his agents more work, but he believed that the con
tact with councU representatives had "made it possible... to anticipate certain
criticisms and also keep on our toes."^^

RED RELIEF

117

Moss was so committed to gathering constructive criticism that he set up neigh

borhood conferences to find ways to improve the city's welfare system. Wicker
Park conferences,held in the Chicago Commons settlement house, were attended
by "aU workers' committees in this district," mcluding the neighborhood's Unem
ployed CouncU. From July 1932 through the beginning of 1933, councU members
met with the head of the Wicker Park relief station, Moss, representatives of the
district's settlement houses, and other representatives from workers' committees
to suggest ways to improve the system. Rather than have an open confrontation
at a demonstration, councU members sat and worked through the bureaucratic
minutia necessary to get welfare clients their due. Party leaders raised concerns
in September 1932 about this "disastrous tendency of substituting legal 'gentlemenl/ methods in our relation with relief station for form of mass struggle, mass
delegations, etc." But the conferences continued into 1933.'
For a time, Moss was open to hearing from councU leaders, but conflict was
not long in coming. At the Union Park relief station, where agents would only
see councU representatives on Fridays, neighborhood leaders wanted more open
access. A South Side branch demanded abolition of special times set aside for
receiving councU members (and their having to wait outside untU admitted), as
weU as immediate relief for aU the committee's cUents. Moss agreed that agents
must accept written complaints at all times and report in writing within twentyfour hours. He authorized weekly conferences of grievance committees also,
but the specifics of relief would always vary among cases. These bureaucratic
layers, intended to control councU activity, simply frustrated council leaders,
who continued to demand immediate attention.^^
Over time, councU members became effective in shepherding dients through
red tape and getting results. In addition to sitting in conferences with welfare
officials and staging relief demonstrations, members searched out the most
needy cases from their block committees and organized the rest to join them at
a relief station, where they would demand the kind of relief their client needed.
Sometimes at these gatherings, council leaders put relief agents, agencies, and
city officials on trial for the inadequate provisions and poor treatment they of
fered, and these brought results. In the March 12,1932, edition of Hunger Fighter,
a West Side councU representative reported that the council had 396.members
and a number of block committees. In one month, they successfully attained
relief in thirty cases taken to the Humboldt Park relief station. The branches'
eviction cases, taken to United Charities and the Jewish Charity, were also
successful. The councU also succeeded in keeping an elderly man from being
sent to a flophouse by convincing social-service agents to send him to an "old
folks' home" instead. Relief workers' records also show effective councU work.
In at least two cases, councU leaders brought uncooperative caseworkers to
management's attention, with satisfactory results/

Il8

RED CHICAGO
RED RELIEF

II9

Sometimes Communists saw victories merely in exposing racism. In March

1932, the council called a protest at Fourteenth and Loomis against the station's
practice of discriminating between black and white box rations. Later in the year,
after workers at the Emmerson relief station refused to pay unemployed workers rent and an official at the station slapped a black client, council members
called for a large demonstration. They brought together demands to stop relief
cuts and to start rent payments with demands for the removal of the offending
officml. Collecting demonstrators from local shehers and pool haUs, councils
mobilized a thousand blacks and whites, including a number of youths. When
station officials refused the demands of an elected committee, an unemployed
crowd pushed its way into the station, facing the clubs of twenty-eight police.
When she tried to speak, police knocked down and arrested Edith Miller, a YCL
member. After the police arrested theleaders, council members mobilized other
block captains and branches to march to the courthouse. Meeting them on ar
rival, police began making mass arrests. The YCL leader Jack Kling explained
to national party leader Gil Green that the events interracial character caused
police to roam black neighborhoods, making the streets appear as an "armed
camp.'^^
Whether they won concessions or not, counci] members always had to pre
pare for violence. Even before the August 1931 killings, city officials brought
in farehoses to break up a crowd of eviction protestors on the South Side, and
then police repression escalated.^" In November 1932, councils secured a per
mit to protest "administrative abuses and inadequacy of relief distribution." The
demonstrators wanted a hundred of their ranks (about one-third of the crowd)
to enter the station. After the police allowed two dozen to enter, they began
beating people in the crowd. A Chicago Civil Liberties Committee member
reported that sixty-year-old Martina Knutsen, partiaUy paralyzed, "was given
so severe a blow on the chest that she fell to the sidewalk The police beat her
and dragged her on her knees across the car track to the patrol wagon, refUsing
to pick up a shoe that she lost on the way." Police also struck a twelve-year-old
girl who tried to protect the woman. When a Mrs. Gold yelled for an officer to
stop hitting a young boy she believed to be her son, police struck her over the
head. Another observer recalled seeing a police officer "strike down a woman
who was pushing a baby carriage, die carriage was overturned, and the baby fell
out. A man was then hit by an officer and carried to a wagon, where another
officer yelled, You God-damned red, you're one of theleaders,' and struck him
on the leg with a baseball bat." Testimony from sixteen witnesses corroborated
the protestors' stories, but the police denied diat any violence had occurred.^'
Upset about the overwhehning brutality of the incident. Joseph Moss wrote to
the police commissioner. James Allman, complaining about his officers' un
necessary brutality.^

Chicago police attack Unemployed Council protestors at the Humboldt

Park relief station, March 11.1932. (From World Revolutionary Propa
ganda: A Chicago Study, by Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock,
copyright 1939 by Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock. Used by
permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.)

Communists tried to avoid violent altercations by regularlyapplying for police

permits. Make Mills, the head of the Industrial (or Red) Squad, was respon
sible for deciding whether these permits should be issued or denied, normally
denying them only when the location or issue seemed volatile. One example
was the case of an October 1932 demonstration on String Street, where protest
had recently led to violence. At the October event, police shot and killed Joseph
Sposob, a homeless man from a nearby shelter protesting relief conditions. Mills
permitted no warrants in the area for the next year.'
The ability of demonstrations to be "legal" encouraged Communists to hold
them more often, increasing from 408 in 1931 to 566 in 1932, but while they
were technically legal gatherings, police regularly arrested demonstrators and
took out their aggression on the crowds. In most cases, the Communist-inspired
ILD came to their rescue. Irving Meyers was one of the ILD lawyers assigned
to council cases. Growing up in the Jewish neighborhood of Lawndale, Meyers
remembered listening to Socialists and Communists speak on street corners.
After graduating from law school and passing the bar in 1930, Meyers met the
ILD activist BiU Browder, Earl Browder's brother, who inspired him to work
for the ILD even though Meyers was not sure what it was.** His first case was

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RED CHICAGO

to defend twenty demonstrators arrested at Elmwood Park's relief station. His

legal partner, David Bentali, an old-time Swiss Communist who ran a farm in
Mmnesota during the growing season and otherwise led the Chicago party's
Contro! Commission, chewed tobacco and spit liberally in court when he did
not like what the judge was saying, in the Elmwood Park case, Bentall con
vinced the judge to throw out the case by delaying proceedings long enough
to gather community support. Meyers's time with the ILD taught him that
the organization's work went beyond iegal assistance. When police shot into a
demonstration in Melrose Park, nine demonstrators, including John Jacob Ja
cobsen, the editor of Hunger Fighter, were seriously injured. After the shooting
Jacobsen was nowhere to be found. Bental! and Meyers later found him in a
hospital ward suffering from gangrene. Through the ILD, Bentall got Jacobsen
m touch with a party-friendly surgeon who saved his leg,
Through his work, Meyers found out that Communists ran the ILD. He
remembered bemg asked if he would have a problem representing them in
court. He did not. but he also was not interested in becoming a member him
self because, he later claimed, he feared it would keep him from doing other
busmess. As it turned out, he never had other business anyway. A devoted
Marxist and regular reader of the Daily Worker, Meyers preferred to participate
m party activity as an outsider, as did the majority of those involved in relief
demonstrations.^
ROADBIOCKS, SHIFTING TACTICS,
AND REVOLUTIONARY APPEAL

Just as council members used the ILD to protect them from police prosecution.
J^oseph Moss, thedirector of public welfare, increasingly felt that he and his weliare agents needed protection from councU members. After Sposob's murder in
1932. council demands became increasingly difficult to answer. Within relief
stations, council members were resisting local agents' talk and demanding words
with Moss. In one case. James Allen threatened relief workers and "obstructed
office routine by entering case workers' offices." In another, a Mr. Huszar ofthe
council refused to wait in line and had to be removed by police. When council
representatives did meet with Moss, they were, in his words, "no longer satis6ed
wjth my statement that certain matters are beyond my jurisdiction."^
In December 1932, Moss received a report from an Unemployed Coun
cil member who was upset with the character of his fellow council members
Louis McCann, the author, insisted that ofthe seven hundred members in his
branch, 70 percent were not radical and only went to the council when they
had grievances. Communists exploited the situation, according to McCann,
and hooked people on the party once they solved their problem. Three dif
ferent Communists approached McCann and asked him to join. He refused

RED RELIEF

121

and then asked Moss for support in the creation of an alternate organization,
which McCann thought at least four hundred would immediately join. There
is no evidence that Moss endorsed such an organization, and it is impossible to
verify McCann's claims. His letter does suggest, however, that in his neighbor
hood organization, Communists worked with hundreds of non-Communists
in building their local council and attempted to recruit party members from its
leadership. If his numbers are correct, it would mean that over two hundred of
them were "radicai." Placed on its head, McCann's plea hints at a local Depres
sion-era phenomenon whereby his neighbors were becoming politicized.Their
local Unemployed Council was the main organization in that neighborhood
competing for their attention and loyalty.
By January 1933, Moss had had enough ofthe council's tactics and admitted
it was no longer possible to deal with them effectively because their members
were "one hundred percent obstructive." As a result, district offices no longer
fielded complaints. Instead, all activity was centralized into a single office in
the citj?. Communists were particularly upset with this changed policy, and in
Elmwood Park one hundred people rushed the relief station, refusing to let
relief workers leave. One of the workers fainted, and another clerk deserted
the office and refused to return. At the Lawndale relief station, demonstrators
fought against police ^vith rocks and stones.Buckshot from one officer's shotgun
seriously hurt four demonstrators.'
The centralizing of the procedure was a hard blow for council activists, since
they would no longer be able to assist such a varied population in a public man
ner. Also, for a time, the police would not let council members hold as many
public demonstrations as they would have liked. Relief-station activit)' attracted
thousands of Chicagoans to the councils as rent, utilities, and food bills got paid.
Communists not only began to prove their ability to lead and stand up against
racism but also succeeded in providing humanitarian assistance. If some took
advantage of their newfound power by charging for their services or threaten
ing relief workers, the majority were happy simply to point to the holes in the
system that they could begin to fill
Communists were pleased with the attention they received in shelters, among
renters, and at relief-station rallies, but as the Depression wore on, they looked
for new ways to organize the unorganized. In neighborhoods like Cicero, little
council activity had taken place as late as September 1931.' In this neighbor
hood, where families tended to own small bungalows, party organizers needed
a new hook if they were going to raise any interest. By the end of the year, they
found it and began advocating an end to mortgage payments for small home
owners who suffered from the Depression.
The campaign to organize small homeowners was small and largely ineffec
tive, but it did have some successes. Communist papers asked homeowners to

122

RED CHICAGO

"think it over." After all, workers were "asked to borrow, or in plain words, to
jeopardize the homes they have saved and scrimped to get." Councils asked
homeowners to organize to "force the city and state to grant a moratorium on
tax and mortgage payments! No Foreclosures!" To a group of revolutionaries
who largely did not own homes themselves, this appeal was a stretch. Not much
effort went into the campaign, and yet, according to police files, at least one
branch formed in Berwyn to deal with foreclosures, and the Back of the Yards
group took on the issue as well. In both cases, little resulted, short of increased
education and membership numbers.
Despite such setbacks, council membership throughout the city confirmed
in many Communists' minds that their party was the true leader of Chicagos
workers. A party registration in 1931 showed that the city had seventy-eight
branches and 104 block committees, representing 11,234 council members, 442
of them Communists. No strict accounting appeared again, but council activity
strengthened throughout early 1933, bringing thousands more into its mem
bership. This large representation meshed with Third Period expectations and
encouraged council members onto soapboxes, into apartments of the evicted,
and through relief-station doors.
Large membership numbers also reinforced party activists' Third Period
belief that Communist-backed organizations were the only organizations that
represented workers' interests. When other organizations tried to speak for the
unemployed, Communists' Third Period teachings prepared them to attack. The
most important Chicago group the party faced was the Chicago Workers' Com
mittee on Unemployment (CWC), led by Karl Borders until 1934 and then by
Frank McCulloch. About twenty-five members from the League for Industrial
Democracy, a Socialist party offshoot, began this group in 1931.'' At first mainly
meeting to talk about issues, the CWC later formed locals in settlement houses,
organized an advisory committee of professionals, and began holding meet
ings in 1932 on living conditions of the unemployed, advising relief stations,
and calling conferences of relief workers. If the Unemployed Councils were
displeased with the encroachment, the CWC's leadership found the councils
equally irksome.^
As their locals grew. Communist party and CWC leaders developed a tense
working relationship. At times it was not clear whether the groups were more
upset with each other or the paltry system of welfare. But events like the Octo
ber 1932 march against the 50-percent rehef cut suggest they could overcome
group rivalry.^ As soon as Cook County announced a 50-percent cut in relief
payments, all representatives of the unemployed realized a great organizing
potential, and they worked together. In what even military intelligence marked
as an "unusual feature" of the planned demonstration, the CWC and Unem

RED RELIEF

123

ployed Councils joined forces and marched with an estimated fifty thousand
demonstrators through the Loop, stopping traffic for an hour."*
Not that all contact between the groups was easy. In typical Third Period
fashion, Communist leaders felt determined to discredit the CWC and win the
loyalty of its members. In a session with seven hundred party and non-party
delegates, John Williamson read from a prepared speech that denounced the
AFL and Karl Borders as betrayers of the working class. WiUiamson and other
Communists in attendance also insisted that councils be allowed to carry politi
cal banners in the march, and even though conference attendees voted down
the banners, Communists showed up to the march with signs.
Despite such impolitic behavior, the union between the two organizations
proved to be a success, and the groups' leaders planned future united actions.
Although the party encouraged attacks on Socialists and liberal reformers, Com
munists found that they sometimes needed to work with these other groups.
In addition to such party veterans as Bill Browder, Sam Hammersmark, and
Arthur Maki working publicly with liberals and Trotskyites, even sectarians
such as Jack Spiegel remembered at times reaching out to Borders and leaders
of other groups because he needed their support.'^

Protestors gather downtown for the Hunger March of October 31,193 a, cosponsored by the
Communist party's Unemployed Councils and the Chicago Workers' Committee on Unem
ployment. (Chicago Historical Society, ICHi-20955, photographer unknown)

RED RELIEF
124

'

125

RED CHICAGO

Throughout their ranks. Communist leaders found that their members were
not consistently following their line against working with liberals and Social
ists. In South Chicago, council members burst into a meeting of the CWC,
denounced the leadership as "misleaders, hypocrites, capitalists in disguise,
liberals, socialists, etc.," and urged spectators to join the councils and find out
the "truth about everything."^ But council members often turned up working
with these same "misleaders." On the South Side, party members recruited in
churches and met with leaders of reformist groups. This was especially true in
places like Washington Park, where relations with community leaders ran hot
and cold. On the North Side, when a council tried to present the alderman and
vice president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, Oscar Nelson, with a list of
demands, police stymied the action. Leaders of the Swedish National Society
responded by agreeing to work with the council on issues involving meal tick
ets and housing, and the council accepted the offer. While Communist party
leaders castigated the offer as a "demagogic trick," council leaders saw things
differently.' Liberal supporters also helped to obtain parade permits for the
party and helped get people out of jail. These institutions and leaders were
important gateways to masses of workers, and rank-and-file Communists were
not always willing to scorn them. Party leaders recognized that the Depression
brought them a "new" party and that they could not expect the same discipline
from these new members as from older ones.'" But they were continually ag
gravated by their members' willingness to work with people whom party leaders
viewed as social fascists.
Mingling with liberals was only part of party leaders' problem. New recruits
simply demonstrated less commitment to party discipline. Expulsion records
reveal cases of individuals who lived as Communists on their own terms.Some
were expelled; others were permitted to remain. Through most of the Depres
sion years, such independent thinkers represented the face of Communism to
Chicago's unemployed workers and demonstrated its shades of red. One report
for October and November 1932 tells of Charles Banks, an Unemployed Coun
cil leader and party member who for a year was the subject of his-comrades'
complaints of carrying on "activities on his own hool^ and remaining "isolated
from the Section." Banks even disagreed publicly with his section leader and
made the leaders' decisions "matters of debate amongst individual Party mem
bers and in his unit." Since Banks was "sincere, devoted, and [a] fearless fighter,"
party leaders agreed not to suspend or expel him.''
In South Chicago, L. Reuter, a machinist and former member of the SocialDemocratic party in Germany and current Communist party member in Chi
cago who rose to leadership in the South Chicago Unemployed Council, con
tinually questioned party decisions and exposed party weaknesses in public.
While his campaign against the party began in September 1932, he was not

brought before the discipline committee until April 1933- Disciplinary committee members gave him three weeks to shape up. He decided not to and was
finally expeUed. In March 1933. another councU/party member, an electrician,
used the "prestige of being a Party member amongst the masses" to develop
an individual racket, charging two dollars for each light he Ulegally turned on.
Six months after this behavior began, the party expeUed him."^ Whether they
were "isolated." combative, or crooked, individuals joined the party and acted
in the councils in ways that did not fit party notions of discipline. This was
especiaUy true on Chicago's South Side, where Unemployed CouncU recrmtment was the highest. Chicago's Control Commission warned these members
that their numerous acts of "financial irresponsibility and drunkenness, loose
talk and general Party irresponsibility" caused a surge in disciplinary cases.''"
While leaders were not happy with the political level of these new recruits or
their lack of discipUne, they were pleased that they were the first interracial
organization to reach into and mobUize the city's black community.
Communists also made limited inroads into mobilizing women. Through a
maternalist model that argued for women's political demands on the basis of
their roles as mothers, leaders encouraged women to join the protest.'" In this
capacity, women existed in the twenty or so women's committees, which were
established in 1933 and coordinated by an executive committee that included
three party women borrowed from Cook County's Unemployed CouncU execu
tive committee. They varied their struggles between demanding pots and pans,
bed linen, and clothing from relief agencies for famUies with schoolchildren
and organizing neighborhoods for strikes against rising prices.
^
As a rule, the Comintern and national party did not permit separate womens
councUs. but in Chicago, some councils did not draw women into leadership and
instead used them for technical work or for house-to-house canvassing, causing
groups of women to organize separately. In the October 1932 demonstration
against the government's proposed 50-percent cut in-relief, nine womens com
mittees ofthe unemployed sent delegates to the conference that planned the
demonstration to convince other organizations "to help in the fight around the
schools for the bettering of the conditions of our chUdren." Yet. whUe breaking
party rules in terms of their wUUngness to organize separate women's commit
tees, these women's committees followed party policy when it came to Third
Period ideas against social fascism. "Karl Borders' [socialist] movement, reads
a letter from a women's committee leader, "[has]... proven to be nothing more
nor less than a faker, in the United Front for the fight against hunger." Theletter
urged "aU women in the City of Chicago as weU as in the whole ofthe United
States, to affiliate with the Unemployed CouncUs, and help carry on the fight
against hunger."'"
In addition to populating the enclaves ofwomen's committees,some women

126

RED CHICAGO

in the South and West Sides worked arm-in-arm with their male comrades.
Kate Eriich, Marie Houston, Romania Ferguson, and Dora Hucklberry appear
m police or party reports as "militant" participants in eviction protests, and
other reports suggest women's participation at relief-station rallies. For some
women, coimcil work provided a place to learn the basics of mass organizingj
and women's participation, attitudes, and beliefs began slowly to change the
character of Chicago's party.
The historian Van Gosse argues that Unemployed Councils rhetorically
opened a new space for women activists. Yet while Chicago party leaders prod
ded Communists in councils to "embrace" women, young workers, and children,
a July 1932 report recognized that Chicago's unemployed movement was "pri
marily based on adult men workers."'"^ While the movement's language may have
been more woman-friendly, in Chicago, council activity never took this turn as
sharply as it might have, and the party was not able to translate what women's
unemployment activity there was into an increase in female membership to the
same degree that they were in black and white male unemployed communities.
Margaret Keller, the party's director ofwomen's work in 1933, complained, "[I]t
is terrible difficult work among the women, they are very narrow, due to the
majority being housewives and can't see anything else but the relief, we hope
through education to convince them this is a political struggle. It is slow but
we will get there. The interesting part is that we have very few Party members
among these women and yet I am sure they will.eventually be very loyal to our
movement, provided they are handled carefully."'* Chicago's party and council
members were keen to involve women in children's relief, but they were unable
to offer these women, whose primary concern was household issues, a role to
play with issues of the employed. Women with children, moreover, could not
devote time to party work, and time was what party activists needed.
These were not the concerns of Chicago's male party leaders, who largely
ignored the councils' problems reaching women and instead focused on their
belief that unemployed activity would result in support for Communists at the
polls. Beginning in 1932. the party increased the number of their candidates
run in elections. Whereas Freeman Thompson, running for U.S. Senate, was
the only candidate in 1930, Communists in 1932 ran candidates for president
and vice president, senator, governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
auditor of accounts, state treasurer, attorney general, and representative in Con
gress. Thompson polled only 1,325 votes in the city in 1930, but Communist
candidates in 1932 polled between 11,879 and 8,359, with most receiving over
nine thousand votes. And while most Communist candidates did not fall too
far behind Socialist candidates, who averaged about fifteen thousand votes, the
Communist candidates for president and vice president fell behind the Social
ist vote for Norman Thomas's ticket by almost twenty thousand votes. In any

RED RELIEF

127

case. Communist candidates failed miserably in comparison to Democrats and

Republicans and fell short in terms of party leaders' expectations.'"
Chicago's workers wanted a better welfare system, but this sentiment did not
translate into political backing for Communist candidates. Yet 1932 returns
show that in the neighborhoods where unemployment activity was most in
tense, on Chicago's South Side, Communist party votes were most concentrated.
Whereas Communist candidates averaged nine hundred votes each in the city's
second ward, Claude Lightfoot, the African American Communist party can
didate for Congress, won thirty-two thousand votes in this district. In West
Side neighborhoods, returns varied from six hundred in the Thirty-first Ward
to over three hundred in the Thirty-second. In the Near North and North Side
neighborhoods, candidates polled just over two hundred votes per candidate,
and in South Chicago between three and four hundred."
A New Era
By 1934, the sharp edge of hard times had dulled as state welfare programs
were lessening individual suffering. The Illinois Emergency Relief committee
approved rent payment as an integral part of relief budgets, which resulted in a
decrease in the number of Writs of Restitution from their 1932 height of 63,152
to their 1934 low of 8,876. Although this was twice the number served in 1929,
relatively speaking, workers felt less under attack. They also had a newly inspired
hope in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. His inauguration in 1933 marked
the beginning of the New Deal and a sense of optimism. By the summer of 1933,
the New Deal's Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) was providing additional
money, and by 1934 a slight economic recovery took the edge off workers' crises.
By the end of 1935, FERA had allocated $3 billion to relief."'
Moreover, by i935> fewer welfare decisions were being made at the local
level, leading Communists to rethink their approach to unemployment. Many
in Chicago thought Unemployed Council work was at a dead end, with the
city's grievance offices centralized and many in their ranks finding new jobs
in industrial work and on WPA work sites. So instead of community work,
national party leaders encouraged more political organization and citywide
mobilization. Since the Socialists' unemployed program included lobbying,
meeting with relief administrators, and putting pressure on national leaders.
Communist leaders realized that the more organized and focused agenda they
were now pursuing would duplicate Socialists' activities unless there was unity.
Pushing for council members to merge with other unemployed organizations,
leaders hoped to create a powerful force that could require the government to
stay in the business of offering relief."^
In addition to working locally on government projects, the Communist party

128

RED CHICAGO

RED RELIEF

hoped to work with non-party groups to get support for its unemployment
and social-insurance bill, introduced to Congress on February 2,1934."^ Even
though non-party leaders were hesitant to act in unity, their local branches
were less inhibited. Several former CWC locals participated with the Unem
ployed Councils in a 1934 May Day rally, and others agreed to work with the
Unemployed Councils afterward. Joint pickets tried to prevent the closings of
a River Grove relief station and North Side WPA project. And a year later, a
joint committee on relief action, created by members of both organizations,
unanimously authorized a letter to the Illinois Workers' Alliance and the Illi
nois Unemployed Councils urging a united-front demonstration in Springfield.
Communists were determined to smooth over past problems and create a pow
erful, united movement."^ Work like this led the way to an eventual merging of
the two organizations in 1936 to form the Workers' Alliance of America.
*

The party and council member Lydia Bennett, speaking before a labor council
gathering in 1932, reported the party's intention of showing the inability of the
system to support its citizens. She apparently believed that such exposure would
result in its collapse. But ironically, in their daily work Communists helped
Chicago's unemployed navigate the shaky welfare system, and their individual
victories for the needy diminished any resolve these people might have had to
launch a revolution. Instead of a revolutionary movement, then. Communists
and council members, working closely with needy people as they experienced
personal devastation, developed organizingskills and widened the Communist
movement. More than a few party council members would eventually build
on their organizing skills in the labor movement: the council leader Joe Weber
would find his way into steel. Jack Spiegel would work with the boot and shoe
union, and James Samuel and Richard Tate organized packinghouse workers.
Herb March recalled borrowing tactics from unemployed organizers when he
and others built the packinghouse workers' union in Chicago. One evening
a week, employees forced their employer to set aside time to deal with their
grievances. "Beginning at 4 or 4:30 P.M., one by One a hundred or so aggrieved
workers would take their turn confronting the plant bosses with their problems."
Hieir focus was now on employers rather than relief workers, but their line was
the same: "Nobody's'getting out until we settle all these cases. These guys have
all been waiting here all this time and you can't treat us this way."^
Unemployed Council activity occurred in multiple venues, called for various
measures, and incorporated a wide array of people with different backgrounds
and dispositions. Some, like Louis McCann, who worked with Communists,
were repelled by party tactics and alerted authorities to their activity. Others,
like Irving Meyers, also remained outside the party while working with councils

129

but, unlike McCann, developed a strong admiration for Communists' bravado

and their network. StiU others, like Ben Gray and Claude Lightfoot, found their
commitments to Communism confirmed by their council activity. And a few
women, both black and white, like Marie Houston and Katherine Erlich, had
the unique opportunity to speak in public to audiences of men and women, to
stand up to Chicago's police, and to rail, with others in support, against relief
agents who treated them poorly.
Party teachings had varied effects. Militant positions on race attracted skill
ful and dedicated black organizers and increased sympathy withm the black
community. The party also provided one of the only places in the city where
black and white activists could discuss, socialize, and protest together. But ideas
about social fascism generally proved divisive, alienating leaders at settlement
houses and workers loyal to non-party organizations and leaders and delaying
the unification of unemployed organizations. Council success occurred despite
these social-fascist teachings and because some Communists were willing to
bend the rules.
The structure of Unemployed Councils made them easier for Communists to
influence, and yet the relationship between the councils and the party did not
preclude council activity from reflecting the diversity of Chicago's neighbor
hoods; nor did it prevent lower-ranking Communists from shaping activities
that were pertinent to particular communities and individuals. Council work
proved an important training ground for new activists, who shifted their at
tention once the momentum of council work had slowed from unemployed to
union work.

"ABOLISH CAPITALISM"

5
"Abolish Capitalism":
The Trade Union Unity League's
Potential and Problems

On August 30,1929, a convoy of automobiles left Chicago for Cleveland,

draped with signs and filled with trade-union delegates en route to a conven
tion where Communist party officials would announce the formation of a new
labor federation, the Trade Union Unity League. Party leaders imagined that
the system of capitalism would soon collapse and that workers would enthusi
astically support an organization dedicated to building revolutionary unions in
industries where established unions neglected vast groups of workers.'
Communist leaders also realized that some industries, such as garment, trans
portation, and construction, had entrenched unions, so they instructed Com
munist trade unionists in these industrieswhether they carried independent
or AFL union cardsto continue agitating from within against their leaders
and when possible to promote unemployment insurance, militancy, and demo
cratic union policies. In other words, they were to win away craft workers from
reformist leaders for the program of the TUUL, while remaining members of
their particular AFL or independent union.
From the time of the TUUL's launch, Bill Gebert was convinced that Chicago's
workers were ready for revolutionary unions. At a 1931 gathering of the city's
Communist leaders, Gebert stated, "[Tlhis is the most important district in the
country from the point of view of industry." Like others in the city's party lead
ership, he believed that if TUUL organizing was going to work anywhere, it was
going to be in Chicago. "Surely," he pleaded, "we can carry this campaign."^
From Communists' perspective, the potential for radical union growth in Chi
cago was great. Syndicalist impulses within Chicago's party survived the 1920s
anti-union backlash, and union militants remembered, rehashed, and waited
to relive the 1919 mass-production organizing drives in steel and meatpack
ing. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, they looked at AFL leaders' resistance

131

to rebuilding Chicago locals and to starting new organizing drives as both a

crime and an opportunity. Employers' open-shop drives through the 1920s
devastated many of the city's unions, but the percentage of unionized workers
in Chicago22 percent in 1929was twice that of the nation.^ The majority of
the city's unionists were clustered among construction trades, transportation,
and public-service workers. Semiskilled and unskilled factory workers had al
most no organization. The most important manufacturing industry in Chicago,
metal products, showed only 8,900 union members out of 142,000 workers, a
miserly 6 percent.^ A majority of black men were employed in packing, steel,
and the building industry. Racially exclusive AFL unions in packing and steel
and only small pockets of mixed-race AFL locals in a few building trades meant
that as a group, African American men were largely untouched by unions. Black
and white women in domestic work and manufacturing also suffered from a
lack of representation. Women in the garment industry did have some union
representation, but from the party's perspective, the International Ladies' Gar
ment Workers' Union (ILGWU) left much to be desired.^ With such a largely
open field, party leaders predicted that their organization would spark a radical
resurgence among workers.
Despite party leaders' resolve and their belief that the TUUL would domi
nate Chicago's labor scene, the TUUL faced an uphill battle. Only two months
after it formed, the stock market crash hinted at hard times to come. The city's
construction industry had been in decline since 1927, but the rapid closing of
mortgage banking houses hastened the slowdown. In 1930, only 23 percent
of the 8,500 carpenters who replied to a union survey were employed in the
trade. An arbitration award reduced their union scale from a high of 97.5 cents
an hour to the low that year of 62.5 cents. A few strong voices among contrac
tors wanted it even lower, at 40 cents. Unemployment and assaults on pay hurt
union morale. In such bad economic times, some thought it wrongheaded to
fight back.^
Party leaders like Gebert could not disagree more. The crisis was exactly the
sign Communists looked for as the beginning of capitalism's end. They believed
there was no better time to organize workers into militant unions and to pro
mote revolutionary agendas in established AFL and independent unions. Com
munists believed they would simply need to explain how the TUUL differed
from the more mainstream labor organizations, and Depression conditions
would ensure that workers would flock to the revolutionary unions. Through
the TUUL, Communists were to "organize the widest masses of workers on
the basis of struggle to improve their conditions and to resist the attacks of the
bosses on their wages, hours, conditions, etc."^
Year after year, party trade-union strategy sessions pushed the same goal
of getting out the message, but results were not what party leaders had hoped.

132

RED CHICAGO

One problem was that rank-and-file Communists were not unified behind the
TUUL's goal of organizing unorganized workers into revolutionary unions:
some opposed dual unions, others preferred working with Unemployed Coun
cils rather than with revolutionary unions, and still others were unwilling to
do the difficult, daily work of union organizing. Chicago's party leaders would
also eventually confront another issue: even when Communists were enthusi
astic, focused, and committed, they had a very difficult time gaining the trust
of Chicago's workers, whose interests in union militancy and Communist lead
ership waxed and waned in relation to their own personal, political, and ecoilomic calculations, the culture and climate of their particular workplace, and
the historical and political context in which their grievances arose. In 1933,
when Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggested his support for union organiza
tion, more workers in Chicago's large and small industries joined unions. They
did not, however, choose the TUUL as the organization to represent them as
often as they turned to the AFL. By that year, some of Chicago's Communists
already had begun reconsidering the TUUL as the most effective tactic; within
two years, the Comintern abandoned it altogether.
In the context of a raging economic depression and an injured union move
ment, plans to build the TUUL seem quixotic. And yet. Communists' unyieldmg
belief in revolutionary unions and persistent plans to see them through resulted
in several breakthroughs for the party and industrial trade imionism. They made
inroads into unorganized sectors of Chicago's workforce, pushed for interra
cial, industrial organization, and reached out to women workers. The TUUL
became a training ground for union activists, who learned practical lessons
about how to organize workers; and through it. Communists laid groundwork
in several of Chicago's major industries by listening to workers' grievances and
promoting racial equality. Through TUUL newspapers, Communists shared
shop news, grievances, and shop-committee successes with wide audiences,
preparing workers to expect responsive and democratic unions, and in these
ways laid important groundwork for the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) and industrial unionism. That the party officially disbanded the TUUL
only five years after they founded it can divert attention from the concrete and
successful work that was accomplished in the face of such dispiriting odds.
Some historians have described the TUUL as purely an expression of party
policy and there can be no doubt that party directives mattered a great deal in
the life of the TUUL. Yet other historians argue that following party policy did
not preclude TUUL union members from being effective and legitimate trade
unionists.^ In Chicago, party policy encouraged a more militant and democratic
form of union organization than existed in most AFL locals. When workers
supported TUUL organizations, they found willing and active party union
ists who were often veterans of labor struggles informed by Marxist teachings

"ABOLISH CAPITALISM"

I33

offered at party schools designed for union organizers. Non-party workers in

the TUUL also learned about Communist issues at work and in their union
meetingssupport for the unemployed, the Scottsboro case, the Soviet Union,
and impending capitalist war. For that matter, individual TUUL activists did
not always follow party policy or directives. Tensions between leaders* revo
lutionary expectations and the daily realities of the rank and filerepression
by employers, the state, and groups within Chicago's organized labor; fellow
workers' lack of interest and occasional hostility; and tactics that varied from the
practical to the idealisticpulled rank-and-file comrades against their leaders.
Communist trade unionists were based in different industries with different
work cultures. Like their fellow comrades who organized the unemployed in
Chicago's neighborhoods, they did not simply follow orders from above.
There is also more to the story of the TUUL than whether or not its mem
bers followed party policy. The story of the TUUL's birth, its structure, and the
challenges its organizers faced through the period of Roosevelt's policy change
exposes the dramatic political, social, and economic changes rank-and-file
Communists and Chicago's workers faced in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
TUUL successes and feilures provide a window onto the state of Chicago's labor
movement; theviolent nature of labor politics in the city; and workers' attempts
to come to terms with welfare capitalism and state and employer repression,
AFL complacency and defensiveness, and race and gender relationships at the
workplace.
This chapter's examination of the TUUL in the context of the "lean" 1920s
and the early Depression years reveals the difficulties inherent in organizing the
unorganized. It also demonstrates TUUL activists' ability to bridge the militant
period of the post-World War I years with those of the CIO's formation and
growth. Activists tried to encourage workers with the notion that the TUUL
offered the possibility of a revolutionary recentering of power at the point of
production into the hands of traditionally underrepresented groups of unskilled
workers, women, and minorities. In the process. Communist trade unionists
revealed their own shortcomings, the fear and trepidation of Chicago's indus
trial workers, and the heavy-handed tactics of employers, established unions,
and the state.
The TUUIi creation made sense to leftists soured on, and scorned by, the AFL.
But carrying out the Communist party's revolutionary trade-union policy was
difficult. In the process, mistakes and small victories taught much about politics
and possibilities inherent in organizing in Chicago, lessons that would serve
the party in the period of the CIO's formation and growth. In the meantime.
Communist trade unionists faced a disjuncture between partyleaders' expecta
tions and rank-and-file experience, differences that revealed the importance of
local knowledge and creative organizing tactics on the part of Chicago's Com-

134

RED CHICAGO

munists. In the context of trade-union conservatism and employer and state

repression against labor, Communists found ways to pressure foremen, bring
workers together, and extract small concessions from employers. They were not
able to move large numbers of workers into their organization, however. Local
party activists reassessed their tactics through the early 1930s, changed their
organizing strategies, and eventually created the conditions for the TUUL to
dissolve.
From theTUELto the TUUL
Like other skilled craftsmen, Nels Kjar, a carpenter, held an AFL member
ship card. Unlike the majority, however, Kjar was a Communist, and unlike
many Communists he supported the party's 1920s trade-union organization,
the Trade Union Education League, as late as 1928 by following its policy of
"boring from within" his union. Somehow he and a few others had managed to
avoid expulsion from their local union for Communist beliefs and behaviors,
but for Kjar this good fortune was about to run out. In 1928, from within his
carpenters' Local 181, Kjar agitated against the union leaders Thomas Flynn
and Charles Sands by encouraging members to reduce their "fat" salaries. For
this and similar activities, Kjar was expelled. In June 1929, he wrote a "personal
appeal" to the brothers of his local not to vote for Elmer Larson or Phillip Pleger
in the local's upcoming election because they had worked with "socialist ren
egades" in expelling him and others. That August, the union's executive board
brought up Kjar's friend, Nicolai Bull, on charges of distributing Kjar's appeal
during voting at Wicker Park Hall. Deciding that expulsion was too severe a
punishment, union leaders agreed to a suspended sentence for Bull, as long as
he continued to have good behavior. For Kjar and Bull, TUEL work within AFL
unions would not be easy, but they agreed it was important.'
Kjar and Bull's dedication to agitate through the TUEL after local unions
expelled leading Communists for such behavior stood in contrast to most Com
munist trade unionists in organized industries, who decided they simply could
not raise Communist issues inside AFL unions, a decision that would lead them
to support the TUUL, a revolutionary alternative. .In the building trades, gen
eral party activity suffered after non-party union leaders expelled a number of
Communist unionists in addition to Kjar in the fall of 1928. In a Communist
party meeting of industrial leaders, Kjar agreed with Nathan Held that since
that time, "[0]ur members have fallen down on their work in the unions.""
In the needle trades, party forces working through the TUEL also suffered. As
late as 1927, Chicago's party leaders complained that they had never established
strong leadership in the trades, nor had their members established much of a
cooperative relationship with progressives in the Amalgamated, International

"ABOLISH CAPITALISM"

I35

Ladies Garment Workers, or Cap Makers' unions.'^ This sentiment was not
entirely accurate: in the early 1920s, Communists provided important leader
ship in these unions. But at the end of 1923, trouble began. Mayer Perlstein,
the ILGWU vice president, arrived in Chicago with the single mission to rid
its locals of Communists. Eleven old-time party union activists were expelled,
including the city party leader Dora Lifshitz. Refusing to go quietly, the group
gathered two thousand ILGWU members at Ashland Auditorium to protest
their expulsion. They braved gunfire aimed at the speakers' platform, where
the TUEL and party leader William Z. Foster stood, but had to wait until 1925
to be readmitted.*^ One year later, party members took over the union's joint
board and bucked the wishes of its international leaders by supporting NewYork
cloakmakers' Communist-led strike. The result, according to the union's histo
rian, Wilfred Carsel, was "a virtual state of war between the Chicago Joint Board
and the International." Fights broke out at local union meetings and spilled
onto the streets. A new election that year secured the right-wing leader's posi
tion back on the board. The CFL's support of the right and an injunction from
the Superior Court of Cook County sealed the left wing's fate. By 1927, a small
group still organized in the dress trade, but they had lost their momentum.'^
Within the Cap Makers' Union, internal political fighting came to a head in
1927 during a lockout of the union. Communists won workers' support to lead
the union but antagonized other political factions within it. When party mem
bers walked picket lines, a group of thugs, locally known as the Miller street
gang, attacked them. In response, the party fraction issued a leaflet on the role
of the right wing in the strike and called a meeting of all cap makers, which
attracted 250 gangsters. Clarence Hathaway believed some of these gangsters
were responsible for breaking windows in the building where the Jewish Com
munist daily Freiheit was published and for stabbing and beating "dozens" of
comrades. In the wake of these attacks, anti-Communist unionists succeeded
in breaking up the left-wing strike committee and initiating what Max Bedacht
referred to as "bitter warfare" against the left wing.'^ These attacks led to a de
cline in the willingness of Communists in the needle trades to speak out and
organize. Dora Lifshitz, at a meeting of the party's industrial committee in April
1929, observed that TUEL forces in the needle trades were "weak."'
In such large industries as the stockyards, where organization lagged, party
members succeeded by the late 1920s in agitating through the TUEL in and
around factories, but they were not so successful in one-on-one organizing or
recruiting established union members into the TUEL. In 1928, party organiz
ers held twenty neighborhood meetings around the stockyards and formed
one nucleus of five members, who sent out a leaflet announcing a meeting
to which 250 workers, sixty of them non-union, turned out. That same year,
though, party leaders complained that the nucleus was "systematically killed"

136

RED CHICAGO

from lack of attention.'^ In March 1929, the nucleus was rebuilt when a call for
a mass meeting resulted in sixty-two workers offering their names to the TUEL.
At its peak, only two months later, 175 workers signed up with the TUEL, but
a plan of work never got off the ground.'
TUEL reports were not always so grim. Between late 1921 and 1923, organiz
ers advanced on several fronts. TUEL members published an impressive radical
labor magazine, Labor Herald; supported a labor party based on unions; and
developed a wide network of labor militants who pushed for the amalgamation
of craft workers in the same industry into the same union. According to James
R. Barrett, between 1922 and 1923 the TUEL succeeded in getting their amal
gamation resolution adopted by "perhaps half of organized labor in the United
States."" TUEL organizers also made inroads into the ILGWU, Amalgamated
Clothmg Workers', Cap Makers', Furriers', and Miners' unions. And they suc
cessfully sponsored a national amalgamation conference for railroad workers
out of ie ashes of the failed 1922 shop-crafts strike. This conference, held in
Chicago, resultedin the gathering of 425 machinist and railroad delegates com
mitted in some way to amalgamation.^"
But in the immediate aftermath of Communists' domination of the FarmerLabor party and their isolation from John Fitzpatrick and other labor progres
sives, such victories gave way to an unrelenting tide of conservative unionism. At
its 1923 convention in Portland, Oregon, AFL leaders expelled William Dunne,
a Communist organizer and credential-carrying union member. Such action,
David Montgomery observes, represented the first time a person was expelled
from an AFL convention based solely on their political beliefs.^' Throughout the
country, city central bodies and individual AFL unions followed suit, purging
Communists from their membership rolls. Those who were not expelled often
behaved like Chicago Communist machinists, who "simply dropped out of the
union without telling anybody, forgetting to pay their dues.""If the point of the
TUEL was to use the AFL to reach working people, the purges and attacks on
party members rendered this strategy useless. Instead of focusing on working
within established unions, the TUUL would allow Communist trade unionists
an independent and wholly revolutionary organization from which to work,
while still permitting activity in independent and AFL unions where the local
context warranted it.
In 1928, the leader of the Comintern's industrial organization, Alexander Lozovsky, announced the Communist party's new trade-union policy in Moscow
at the fourth congress of the party's international trade-union organization, the
Red Internationd of Labor Unions. While it took such leaders as Foster some
time to get in line with Moscow's leadership, Edward Johanningsmeier's work
shows that significant support for the new policy came from Communist trade
unionists who were stymied by the AFL and those who came from an "indig-

"ABOLISH CAPITALISM"

I37

enous tradition of radical industrial unionism." As early as 1924, Joseph Manley,

Foster's son-in-law, an organizer of the 1919 steel strike and a participant in the
1923 Farmer-Labor party movement, criticized the TUEL poUcy of working
within the AFL. Manley suggested the party reach out to the IWW and their
dual unions, a plan Lozovsky had considered. Joseph Zack and Earl Browder
also offered early critiques of the TUEIIs boring-from-within strategy, as did
the IWW activist Bill Haywood. Johanningsmeier rightfully suggests that the
willingness of party leaders to debate new forms of radical imion structures
during the Third Period and Haywood's willingness to offer critiques to party
officials puts the Communist partyat the center of the leftist debate of how best
to radicalize workers. Johanningsmeier concludes that Third Period Commu
nist trade-union discussions linked the "tradition and outlool^' of the prewar
IWW with the Communist industrial movement of the 1930s more firmly than
scholars have thought.^
In addition to the individuals Johanningsmeier traces, many of whom spent
parts of their political careers in Chicago, the city's Communist trade-union
leaders also agreed with the new policy. By 1928, purges from local AFL unions
encouraged them to take a new turn in their work. Even though the TUEL had
its start in the city, they were frustrated with their inability to work within the
AFL and hoped that the TUUL would help them counter the attack that antiCommunist unionists had launched. RILU leaders changed party policy, and
based on their day-to-day organizing, Chicago's trade unionists could under
stand why.
For this reason, at least initially, enthusiasm for the TUUL ran high. On Sep
tember 19,1929, four hundred "enthusiastic" trade unionists gathered to hear
Chicago's TUUL delegates report on the Cleveland Convention. Brother Kease
from the Railroad Amalgamated Committee declared that the immediate task
for railroad workers was to "organize shop committees as the basis for a pow
erful industrial union." A food worker, Alma Polkoff, declared that "Chicago
culinary workers are ready to join this movement. The... program ... for the
food workers is aheady being put into effect and every indication point[s] in
the direction of success." Delegate Feingold from the needle trades reported on
the "immediate application of the decisions of the convention in Chicago," and
delegate Rubicki from the machinists explained that Chicago metal workers
were "putting into motion the program adopted at the Cleveland convention."
Herman Dorsey, an African American electrician, announced, "The building
of an industrial union in the building trades with full equality for all workers
regardless of race is the objective of the Trade Union Unity League and the
Negro workers are going to support this movement."^ Less than one month later,
Chicago's organizers could report that fifty steel and metal workers in the city
had agreed to join the TUUCs Metal Workers Industrial League.^ Otto Wan-

138

red chicago

gerin, the party leader in charge of organizing railroad workers, reported that
party organizers had distributed a railroad paper with TUUL union application
blanks and "expected to take in many members shortiy"^ Wayne Adamson
helped call a conference among food workers attended by a small number of
party members but "quite a few outsiders." A few months later, Alma PolkofF
reported on "great progress" made among Chinese food workers, "who must toil
from 10 to 16 hours a day for 7 days a week for the small wages of $20 to $30
per month." TUUL organizers signed up over a hundred Chinese members.^^
Not all groups were doing well, however. In November 1929, the party's in
dustrial committee lamented small numbers at International Harvester's McCormick and Tractor plants, Western Electric, and the stockyards; the legacy of
1920s anti-Unionism, segmented labor markets, and labor defeat plagued their
effort. In response to Rubicki's comment that he had a hard time reaching the
party's shop committee at Harvester, other industrial committee members heck
led, "[TJhere... [is] no such animal as the Harvester shop committee."^ In the
stockyards, party leaders placed a Spanish-speaking member, "Jiminez," to assist
with the committee of mostly Spanish-speaking workers. These laborers came
out of a small Mexican community in the Back of the Yards, largely composed
of single men who had been in the city less than five years. Most had worked
in the packinghouses of Omaha and Kansas City in the 1920s before settling in
Chicago, so even though the city's South Side steel mills had offered Mexicans
their first opportunity in the city to work in heavy-industry, and a small Mexican
community settled there, by the mid-i920s, their packinghouse numbers were
on the rise: Mexicans were 5 percent of Swift and Armour's workforce and 3
percent of Wilsons. Rick Halpern found that within these plants, "they held the
least desirable jobs, working m the hide cellars, freezers, glue houses, and fertil
izer departments." He also found that as a group, Mexicans tended to be "more
left-leaning and politicized than other workers." Some remembered the Mexican
Revolution, were influenced by the radical campaigns of Zapata and Villa, and
held membership in the Chicago affiliate of the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores.
And yet the party could not hold on to them. By mid-November, Communist
organizers reported that only one and a half members belonged to the league.^'
It was clear that party trade unionists had hard work ahead of them.
How to Build the TUUL

In response to these disappointing reports, John Williamson and his organi

zation department began writing directives for Chicago's organizers on how
to build revolutionary unions. Similar to party work in Unemployed Coun
cils, union activity was supposed to be connected to party members' everyday
political activity Talking about unions was not enough; the TUUL would be

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built on struggle. Such direction helped organizers establish committees and

plan actions within unions and factories and allowed them to build on party
resources outside factory gates.
To make up for their limited resources in Chicago and throughout the country,
national Communist leaders pushed their trade unionists to develop a policy of
"concentration"a focused drive to recruit members in "the most decisive in
dustries. Nationally, these included mine, steel, textile, marine, and auto. Once
they selected particular factories for concentration. Communists were supposed
to hold gate meetings, pass out literature, provide aid to striking workers, and
develop a group of supportive union activists "that are genuine." In the face of
a strike, the party was to offer legal assistance through the ILD and strategic
help through its leading trade unionists.^"
In Chicago, party leaders agreed to narrow their union concentration to the
steel, meatpacking, and railroad industries. It was no wonder. In South Chicago
and northern Indiana, a number of steel mills grew up on Lake Michigan and
the Calumet River, including the world's largest, Gary Works. This Calumet
region stretched over 196 square miles and included Chicago's steel commu
nities of South Chicago, South Deering, the East Side, and Hegewish, where
waves of immigrants and a small group of black migrants lived and worked
for such employers as Crane Company, Republic Steel, Illinois Steel, and Wis
consin Steel. This region would lead the nation in the production of steel and
iron.^' The Union Stockyards were similarly impressive, filling one square mile,
five miles southwest of the city's downtown Loop. Forming one of the largest
industrial concentrations in the nation, the stockyards were home not only to
the "big three" packers of Armour, Swift, and Wilson, each employing five to
seven thousand men and women, but also to smaller houses such as P. D. Brennan, Roberts and Oake, Miller and Hart, Agar, Reliable, and Illinois Meat, each
employing between one and five hundred workers. By the late 1940s, around
thirty thousand workers labored in the Union Stockyards' slaughterhouses,
processing mills, and livestock pens.^^ While not as concentrated, the city's
railroad lines were also strategically important centers that had proven pivotal
in building the city's labor and radical traditions.
Work would continue in the AFL unions of the milk drivers, printers, building
trades, and laundry and among garment workers, but for the time being, city
leaders focused on the formation of new TUUL unions.^' To do this, city leaders
called on section leaders to bring together Communists who worked in their
territory's industry with those who worked in street nuclei to decide on which
plants in their neighborhoods to concentrate their efforts. Each neighborhood
was to pick from concentration industries if they existed, but otherwise the
choice was theirs. In Chicago, the main companies Communists chose were
the steel and metal plants of International Harvester, Deering, Crane, Stewart

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Warner, Western Electric, and Illinois Steel; the meatpacking plants of Swift,
Armour, and Omaha; the Northwestern Railroad; and the apron and dress shops
of Sopkins and Sons. With the exception of Sopkins', a majority of the workforce
chosen was male.^''
Williamson's organization department outlined steps for organizing these
factories. In theory, at least some party members would already be working
within the chosen plants. They were the shop nuclei. Once they got non-party
members to join them, party members became known as the party fraction,
which one party union leader referred to as the "effective cells for the carry
ing on of Communist activity within the trade unions." In theory, nucleus and
fraction members did not make policy but carried out plans created in counsel
with section, district, and national fraction leaders. Work in these fractions was
so central to Communist organizing that one Chicago resolution explained,
"Without Party fractions, the TUUL cannot be built."^^
Once organized into fractions and/or nuclei, party members were to bring
workers together around concrete issues in the plant: Within factories, an "el
ementary" stage of organizing was the grievance committee, which was to be
composed of as many workers as organizers could gather to present grievances
to management. By acting on problems in the plant with broad worker support,
these committees would provide a challenge to management and any AFL or
independent organization already estabUshed in the plant. Party fraction mem
bers in successfiil grievance committees were directed to push these committees
to a higher level of organization, the shop committee, which brought together
delegates from throughout the factory and was intended to lay the basis for a
strong TUUL. Once a shop committee formed. Communist leaders could be
assured that the TUUL organization had the support of workers in the plant and
that strikes would develop. To party leaders they represented "the ftill fighting
force of the workers in a given factory and form a basis for the revolutionary
industrial unions."^*^ While trying to get other workers to join, shop committee
members were to pay dues and affiliate with the TUUL.^'
An article by a packinghouse worker in the Communist journal Party Orga
nizer demonstrated how these structures worked in practice. A worker in one
of the larger packinghouses attended a meeting of the Packinghouse Workers
Industrial Union (PHWIU) and shared his grievances with the group. For the
next meeting, he brought fifteen fellow workers from his department. Out of
this group a committee was selected.to issue a leaflet that would express their
grievances. The committee also decided to write slogans on factory walls that
denounced a cut in work hours and wages. Superintendents scurried around
the plant washing the walls clean, but it was too late. Once workers read the
slogans, they began to talk about union and the need to settle their grievances.

"abolish capitalism"

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At the next meeting of the PHWIU, a number of workers from departments

throughout the plant came together. A shop committee was in the making.^
In addition to organizing structures within plants. Communists drew on
the social culture of ethnic workers and organized TUUL balls and dances,
continuing traditions many had experienced as members of earlier progressive
movements. In December 1929, Chicago's TUUL hosted a masquerade ball at
the Ukrainian Workers' Home, offering "radical prizes" for the best revolution
ary masks. Advertisements reported that workers who attended could expect
to hear "one of the best orchestras in Chicago." Organizers in Chicago's pack
inghouses also hosted masquerade balls and pushed party section members
to sell tickets for twenty cents apiece.' These gatherings provided an alterna
tive to company-sponsored events and allowed party members to help talk up
the TUUL, socialize interracially, and make contacts in a relaxed atmosphere
with workers from various shops. Communist trade unionists knew that it was
through these informal contacts made at dances, socials, and house parties that
unions are built.
As important as union building was among Third Period priorities, it was
not to impede Communists' larger project of party building. All party mem
bers learned through directives from Williamsons organizational department
that if they worked in a shop, they needed to join a party nucleus and build
grievance and shop committees while continually recruiting the "best elements"
of the workers into the party.^" Party leaders pushed women's recruitment at
Western Electric, Majestic Radio, the stockyards, and "other important factories
that employ large numbers of women and Negro women."^' Not only would
Communists be sparking a revolutionary union movement, they would also
be increasing the party's own numbers of industrial workers.
Just as they would have liked for industrial workers to make their way to
the party, Chicago's leaders insisted that all party members needed to join the
TUUL, a warning that permeated down to the section level.'*^ Leaders around
the stockyards informed their members that "stockyards work is the most im
portant of the sectionevery member must be mvolved in bringingworkers into
the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union or the Party mass organizations
canvassed for stockyard workers."^' Party leaders also encouraged assistance
from party fractions in auxiliary organizations and told activists in Unemployed
Councils to use connections they might still have with workers in shops where
they previously worked."*"*
Williamson also encouraged using the International Workers Order (IWO),
a party-influenced mutual-aid society, to build the TUUL. The IWO, founded
in 1930, built its membership around ethnic people who were unhappy with
the health and life insurance policies that their national societies provided. Its

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organization ran as a nonprofit, providing an alternative to commercial insur

ance companies; and it supported party initiatives through social events, public
statements, and letters to its members, at times taking positions that its mem
bers would not uniformly support. In 1931, Chicago's IWO organized its four
hundred members into Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian, Greek, German, Rumanian,
and youth branches. Williamson saw these groups as natural targets for his
campaign. He explained that about four hundred IWO members were in the
needle trades, for example, but the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union
only had 165 members. Williamson instructed, "[T]hru proper work in the
IWO the fraction should become the means of utilizing the IWO in order to
popularize the NTWIU [Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union] in order to
get the four hundred workers into the NTWIU." The railroad organizer Otto
Wangerin also saw the importance of the IWO, especially when local IWO of
ficers agreed to give back to railroad organizers one dollar for each member
they recruited to the IWO. Even though railroad brotherhoods were required to
carry insurance, in the early Depression years their funds were nearly depleted,
and insurance costs for workers were rapidly rising. An IWO flyer distribution
in the city had quickly resulted in a number of inquiries. Wangerin thought
it good to put unemployed members to work in the railroad yards as IWO
organizers. In this way, he would be using the IWO to help build local TUUL
resources and would be recruiting workers into the IWO.^'
In addition to targetting work with auxiliary groups, Williamson directed
section leaders to assign comrades from street nuclei around chosen factories
whose "MAJOR" work would be to assist organizing workers in the factories
of concentration. Once chosen, these street nuclei were to have weekly tasks,
which the section committee would check on monthly" To rally workers and
solicit grievances, party members inside and outside the plants were directed
to work together in their launching of "energetic propaganda": gate meetings,
mass meetings, door-to-door canvassing, and leafleting.
Even though party leaders focused on building revolutionary unions, they
sent directives concerning oppositional activity in the AFL through the entire
period of the TUUL. In a 1930 article in the Party Organizer, Communist trade
unionists learned that "concentration on building the TUUL does not mean '
deserting fraction work in AFL unions." Party members in AFL unions were
expected to attend local meetings, where they would actively build opposition
groups and raise party campaigns and issues, such as unemployment insurance,
with the hope of getting union locals' support."*^
The historian Bert Cochran finds that Communists in the auto industry did
not begin to move into AFL locals and the independent union Mechanics Edu
cational Society of America until 1933, when the RILU favored such a move.
With this evidence, Cochran argues that "Moscow soothsayers" predetermined

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Communists' decision. In Chicago, however, the ranks did not wait for support
from Moscow's leaders to work within AFL and independent unions. To do so
would have been folly in a city where the AFL and independent railroad brother
hoods had a strong presence, even in the late 1920s and early 1930s.'' In fact, in
1931 more Chicago party unionists were members of reformist and AFL unions
than of the TUUL. A report by a leading member of America's Political buro in
November 1931, two years before international Communist policy encouraged
AFL work, confirms that organizing m the AFL and independent unions was
a focus of Third Period union work in Chicago. In addition to organizations
formed under the auspices of the TUULthe 167 members of the Metal Work
ers Industrial League, twenty-four members of the Food and Slaughterhouse
Workers Union, eighty-four members of the Building Trades Industrial Union,
165 members of the Railway Workers Industrial League, and 450 Needle Trades
Workers' Industrial UnionistsChicago's Communists built a strong opposition
movement in the printers' union and in a few needle locals. They had also built
smaller groups in two painters' locals, six carpenters' locals, five metal workers'
unions, and two food workers' unions. In the milk drivers' union, fifteen party
members and eight non-party members succeeded in building a broad move
ment and putting five thousand milk drivers "into motion" against established
union leaders."^'
The structures party leaders established and industries they focused on put
men at the center of their drive. Women workers were always an important
part of party rhetoric during this period, but inadequate follow-up and separate
organizational structures usually marginalized women activists, who neverthe
less persisted within the party to push the need to organize women workers.
Despite insuring they had lesser power, the party provided these women a base
where they honed their organizing skills and fought battles in the labor move
menta significant accomplishment in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when
political and cultural pressures pushed against women in the workplace and
undermined their fight for rights as workers. In this way, the party offered an
unusual space for the Woman Question to be hashed out and for women ac
tivists to be trained. Still, even in Communist circles, women found that their
victories were usually of their own making.^
TUUL structures and strategies did not preclude women's involvement, but
party organizers did. As early as 1926, the Comintern insisted that party work
among women shift from a focus on housewives to one on female industrial
workers, but as late as 1930, Chicago's mostly male leadership still had not
made efforts to follow this directive. One Chicago women's leader berated local
party officials at a district plenum for their notion that the "work of organizing
women into revolutionary movement [is] a joke." She observed, "No serious
discussion [of organizing women] even [occurs] in leading committees." Hop-

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CHICAGO

ing that TUUL leaders would place a capable person in charge of women's work,
she found instead that they suggested someone "loaded down with other work'
and thus unable to direct attention to the work needed among women.'
Too often party leaders treated women's issues as a separate and not integral
part of the activity in which all party activists participated. At one citywide
meeting of section and unit womens-work directors, a member moved that
women's work appear on every unit meeting agenda to show its importance.
Katherine Erlich argued against such an approach, suggesting it was too "me
chanical" and created the erroneous impression that "work among women was
a separate struggle that the Party had to carry out, something apart from the
daily work of the unit." Instead of isolating and generalizing women's work,
Erlich argued for a niore concrete approach: "When taking up recruiting, the
unit should take up how all comrades will help in getting working women for
the Party, from the shop of concentration and the mass organizations in the
territory, how individual comrades in the shops where women are employed
will recruit women for the Party^^^ Erlich's suggestions were practical but ahead
of her time. Not enough party people thought this way, and it proved easier
to simply make gestures. Few were willing to take the time to develop strate
gies focused on women. One woman leader complained to the national party
leadership, "Until last week I ran around like a chicken without a head trying
to get someone to work on the department with me that would work not just
have their name on it."^
A resolution that came out of the 1930 plenum described the place of women's
industrial work in Chicago's party. "The entire burden of bringing the masses of
women of the working class into the Party falls on the shoulders of the womens
committee which is often composed entirely of women comrades who are not
trained organizationally or politically for the carrying on of Party work and
who receive very little if any political guidance from the Party in its work.""
Instead of members of TUUL shop nuclei, Communist contacts in women's
organizations were responsible for the thirty-nine delegates, half of them nonCommunist, who attended Chicago's TUUL Conference for Working Women.
Reports on the conference sent to the women's department resulted in warm
replies, whereas those sent to the TUUL went without any response."
Erlich recalled similar problems relating to organizing women in industry
when she explained how section leaders appointed women to women's work
and then neglected them. In her section, the woman appointed to lead the area's
women's work called a meeting with other women's-work directors elected from
each nuclei in her section. Together they waited in vain for a citywide or section
leader to'come and tell them what they needed to do. The sections women'swork appointee had no idea what tasks to take up with her fellow unit directors.
Erlich hoped the party would have "overcome our old rhethods (the bad ones)

"abolish capitalism"

i45

of work so that at the next plenimi we will [not] have to say again that we are
still working in the same old bureaucratic ways."
Despite the party's neglect of women. Communist women activists argued
that women workers were a vital part of the working class and needed to be
organized. On behalf of the Central Committee, Pauline Rogers toured the
nation and met with party leaders concerning women's work in their districts.
She commented on the willingness of Communists to see the importance of
organizing working-class women in terms of the effect they would have on their
husbands, sons, and brothers, but she encouraged them also to see organizing
women as an important goal on its own terms. Industries across the country
were hiring women and paying them half the wages of men for the same work.
It was true, Rogers conceded, that women did not work in some basic sectors
of industries such as steel, but they did work in tin mills and aluminum plants
for low wages. Rogers agreed that women's auxiliaries were important structures
for organizing women, but they operated as support for male workers and did
not reach into the plants where women worked.^
Women organizers like Rogers believed there was great potential in wom
en's industrial work, particularly in Chicago. As early as 1930, Ukrainian and
Swedish women's organizations participated in the party's call for May Day
demonstrators. Several women showed their bravery and commitment when
they were arrested and beaten for handing out literature in front of the gates at
Majestic Radio. The TUUUs 1930 conference for Chicago's working women
succeeded in bringing together thirty-nine women, many of whom had never
attended a meeting, to take up shop-floor questions. Even though women lead
ers reported that many attendees were "shy" when asked to give reports, they
were encouraged by women's participation. Still, most Chicago Communists
joined comrades in cities like Pittsburgh and Cleveland in viewing women's
work as an aid to organizing men and not as inherently valuable.
Part of the problem was that existing structures for organizing women largely
focused on housewives, not factory women. The Working Women's Federation
(WWF), for example, was the party's umbrella organization intended to unite
women from mass organizations behind various Communist campaigns. By
1931, one report indicated that it lacked a "definite program of action," was
"merely being used as agency for bazaars and selling tickets," and was largely
composed of party members from various language and mass organizations
where Communists already had support. Women's Councils of Housewives
and Mothers' Leagues also existed in the city, but these tended to get bogged
down in internal squabbles over leadership rather than working together against
"high rents, food prices, and bad conditions in the schools." The eight to ten
Housewives' Councils in Chicago had no centralized program and did not
coordinate their activities, as did those Analise Orleck described in New York.

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Chicago's party work among women resisted turning to factory workers. It was
no wonder, then, that Rogers reported: "In Chicago, the idea still prevails, even
among some of the leading section functionaries, that womens work consists
of building housewives' councils [instead of TUUL groups]."^
Thus, by 1930, some were arguing that the TUUL did not take enough inter
est in women or in retooling the WWF to more effectively organize industrial
women. But others disagreed. In the midst of the confusion, the Central Com
mittee handed down "Directives for Work among Women," which offered a nod
to women's auxiliaries in steel and coal mining but emphasized the delegate
meeting, a new form of organization in other industries. Whereas in many
ways, women's auxiliaries were a natural extension of the party's success orga
nizing housewives and women, they did not offer a means to reach women in
the workplace. The Central Committee believed that delegate meetings could
offer Communist women an opportunity to mobilize women workers in a sepa
rate space from their male comrades (and housewife gatherings) and provide
them an opportunity to recruit among women workers. Proponents of women's
delegate meetings voiced their hope that "[t]he development of delegate meet
ings around the factories will gradually dissolve the [working women's] federa
tion and will orientate women's work in Chicago to shops and not to women's
organizations."'
The delegate system brought together women from a particular department
in a particular factory. In Chicago, women's efforts centered on Western Electric
and the stockyards. Communist organizers were to contact sympathizers and
then talk with them about shop issues and the need for "united work." Once
enough contacts were made, the organizer set a date for a meeting, in a private
house "to guard against exposure." If a number of these contacts came to the
meeting, then they would elect delegates. Ideally, the same delegates would
meet regularly, report to the women who elected them, and build increasingly
large groups of supporters in their workplaces. Party leaders hoped that "[t]he
delegate meetings will... draw all the women in the given factory into active
social and political life." They believed that these meetings could serve as "the
school for developing cadres and drawing women into the party and into the
revolutionary mass organizations and trade unions."^
Beginning in 1932, though Chicago's male party leaders had begun speaking
more to the need of organizing women, the delegate system was not operating
well. One report indicated that successful organizing among black women work
ing in dress shops had been accomplished and that a number of shop nuclei did
exist, but "OUR PARTY SECTIONS DID NOT MOBILIZE THE CONNEC
TIONS THAT WE HAVE FOR THE DELEGATE MEETINGS." According to
the author of the report, party leaders' better attitude toward organizing women
resulted in an unprecedented number of women's organizations joining with

"abolish capitalism"

147

the party's Unemployed Councils during a February 4, 1932, demonstration.

But such work did not translate into organization in the factories. Party mem
bers were in shops, but "no one gives a damn whether they are doing any work
among the women." "No one thinks that delegate meetings are of immediate
importance.""
When delegate organization was not neglected, it sometimes involved more
community contacts than shop-floor relations, despite party leaders' warnings.
Helen Kaplan reminded Chicago party activists that when this happened the
meetings were too general, did not focus on department grievances, and lost the
interest of working women in attendance." But women found that their com
munity contacts sometimes paid off. In 1934, women YCL organizers reached
out to Polish women through a settlement house, elected a delegate, and made
connections with a group of older women workers. These contacts also helped
them when male party members would not. When the one male comrade at
Stewart Warner was "not energetic," women relied on their own contacts and
organized a meeting with women from the shop.^ Aside from small successes
such as this. Communists slowly faced the fact that Chicago's workers, men
and women, were reluctant to join the party's revolutionary unions. It did not
matter what form they took.
The Trials of Revolutionary Union Building

Communist leaders believed that proper guidance and leadership would re

sult in high TUUL and party recruitment numbers and militant union activity.
Chicago's workers saw things differently. Between 1929 and 1933, Chicago's po
litical, social, and cultural character, exacerbated by the nation's economic woes,
created poor conditions for the building of revolutionary unions. Communist
leaders' inflated sense of what was possible, confusion, sectarianism, and vary
ing levels of commitment among the ranks compounded difficulties created by
the Depression-era atmosphere, employer policies, and workers' fears.
Communists learned quickly that the depression that devastated industrial
America did not necessarily signal a revolutionary drive in the workforce. Part
of the problem was workers' support of their employers' 1920s welfare capital
ist plans. Employees at Crane made valves and plumbing fixtures on Chicago's
southwest side under the management of its founder's son, who offered them
low-priced car insurance, inexpensive land for house building, company stock,
and a company counselor who helped when problems with the police or the
courts threatened. Wisconsin Steel workers had access to one thousand acres of
land their company opened up for crop cultivation as well as to seed kits, plants,
fertilizer, and tractors provided by International Haryester. And employees
at U.S. Steel enjoyed pension plans, company athletic leagues, and employee

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Stock plans. In the packinghouses of Armour, Swift, and Wilson, employers

e:^anded earlier schemes that targeted specific populations to include all hourly
workers. While their companies' programs were not identical, they tended to
include company unions, foreman training, wage incentives, expanded benefits,
and recreational activities.^
Rick Halpern and Lizabeth Cohen argue that even though these programs
were intended to keep workers loyal and productive, they had unintended con
sequences. Halpern finds that company unions served as "schools" for workers,
preparing them for the CIO; foreman trainingdid not diminish their hegemony
on the shop floor; wage incentives at times promoted cooperation among work
ers; and limited benefits caused frustration. Cohen argues that employer-spon
sored events promoted collective worker identity. Both historians argue that the
1930s labor movement was rooted, in part, in lived experiences of these 1920s
programs. And while their arguments are strong. Communist organizers in the
1920s had a more difficult time being optimistic. At Western Electric, one party
organizer argued that the party would never be able to organize the workers to
strike because "every worker there is a share holder." Workers* investment in
their jobs and the fringe benefits their companies offered may have prepared
them to organize when their benefits were later taken away, but in the begin
ning of the Depression, job security trumped union militancy.
As factoryconditions worsened. Communists readied themselves for a worker
revolt. Employers at Northwestern Railroad cut workers' hours and wages and
required them to be at their benches by certain times, trimming opportunities
for workers to socialize.' A new machine in Cranes blacksmith shop replaced
a number of molders and increased production, resulting in decreased wages
for those who remained. Harvester workers also experienced a speedup of their
work, wage cuts, and layoffs. At Illinois Steel, employers forced their employees
to begin work before the official starting time without extra pay. Meanwhile,
rumors that a number of mills would close throughout Chicago and the Calu
met region created difficult organizing conditions. Already several mills were
operating only two or three days a week. One party member complained that
in the mills, each of the party's half-dozen contacts eventually moved or was
laid off, once again isolating the party from the shops.^
Communists continued to hold to the idea that as Depression conditions
wore away the illusion of company paternalism, workers would rally to the
TUUL. But hard times did not automatically result in union militancy. Work
ers in Chicago industries clung to the hope that in the thick of the economic
crisis they would not lose their jobs. Those who were able to keep their jobs
were not willing to muddy company waters by complaining. A steel organizer
lamented that the "wage cut has not brought about an organizing sentiment,
just dissatisfaction among workers." Even Communist railroad workers bucked

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149

party directives and refused to offer union motions against wage cuts, accord
ing to Otto Wangerin, because they felt that railroad workers would not sup
port them; organizers insisted that these workers took the cuts as a "matter
of course."^' Les Orear, a young Communist employed at the Armour plant,
remembered thinking, "You had to break down this belief that the company
was God and you did it by revealing all the faults and hypocrisy You did it by
convincing the people that together they were just as strong, maybe stronger,
than the bosses." Cohen demonstrates that in the late 1920s and early 1930s,
Chicago's workers did resist their employers through quitting, being absent,
turning to family resources, and enacting what she describes as "subtle forms
of collective action," but Depression conditions made them skittish about mili
tant action. Herb March, a Communist organizer in Armour who grew up in
the YCL and organized unemployed workers in Kansas City before coming to
Chicago, optimistically remembered that "people ... had gone through a real
period of suffering and oppression and they were ready to revolt," but it was
clear that, in part, fear held them back and overpowered sustained, organized
solidarity in the early i930s.^^
Physical segregation of workers along ethnic and racial lines inside and out
side the plant bolstered the power of employer paternalism to quell solidarity.
Chicago workplaces and trades employed different mixes of ethnicities, races,
and genders. Asking party organizers to use their local knowledge about these
conditions, John WiUiamson reminded section leaders that when assigning
rank-and-file members to industry they should take into account "the compo
sition of the workers employed in the shopAmerican, foreign born. Women,
Negro, and young workers ... so that they can have a better approach.""
Fitting in with workers in a given plant was one thing, but getting men to
overcome their fear of women or blacks replacing them for lower wages or rally
ing black and white workers to fight against racial segregation was quite another.
Wayne Adamson, an mdustrial organizer among food workers, experienced this
difficulty firsthand. Calling together workers on the TUUL's behalf, he found
that nearly all supported segregation and openly opposed the league's stand on
racial equality. After he condemned them for their position and promoted the
party's position of black and white solidarity, the food workers still "seemed to
stick with us and many of them joined our group. They did not however say
whether they were convinced or not" on the race question.^"
Racial segregation was perhaps most pronounced in the building trades,
where white AFL unionists refused to organize African Americans.^ The prob
lem predated the party and provides a good example of a historic local union
struggle that the Communist party incorporated into its trade-union efforts. The
way this was done also reveals Communist tactics and the independence indi
vidual Communists often had organizing outside of the party's main campaigns.

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In 1914, Edward Doty, an African American pipe fitter's assistant working in

Armour, watched in vain as the AFL organized the plants white pipe fitters. In
response, he and a number of African Americans approached the organization,
but as he recalled, "[T]hey looked out and saw our faces, and they slammed the
door in our faces"'
Unable to advance in the packinghouse. Doty and other of Chicago's black
technicians tried to find work independently but frequently found themselves
arrested for working without a state license, which only a few blacks could
acquire. Born in Mobile, Alabama, Doty came to Chicago in 1912 at the age
of seventeen. When he was twenty-five, he and friends began holding training
classes for fellow blacks who had been refused apprenticeships by white teach
ers, which resulted in the licensing of the first group of black plumbers in the
city. Doty and his allies soon learned that licensing was one step, but union
recognition was another. White unions still gave them the runaround, so Doty
and his associates took further action."
In 1926, Doty and a few fellow minority plumbers began forming organiza
tions. By this time. Doty had been a member of the Communist party for four
years. In 1926, he joined with non-party plumbers and set up the Chicago
Colored Plumbers Protective Association, which they soon renamed the Cook
County Plumbers Union, representing minority plumbers in their relationship
with black employers (since white contractors did not provide them with any
work). In 1928, he also organized the American Consolidated Trades Council
(ACTC), an organization for black plumbers, steamfitters, electricians, brick
layers, lathers, plasterers, and building laborers. Although Doty was a leader
in the organization and a member of the Communist party, the party did not
have a dear affiliation to the ACTC at its origin. Doty was a talented local or
ganizer who saw a problem and created a solution. While his Marxist training
informed his work, the shape it took emanated from the segregated conditions
black building-trades workers faced in the city. According to Doty, the organi
zation gave black building-trades workers the ability to use "pressure against
the major white unions which were discriminating against Negroes, denying
them membership, denying them the right to the job, denying them the right
to all privileges that all workers were entitled to."'
The ACTC did not come under the aegis of Chicago's Communist party until
1934- By then, Doty's tenuous relationship with the city's party had come to a
breaking point. In 1928, Chicago'sleaders included Doty's name among a group
of black leaders Who would participate in the party's Sixth World Congress
in Moscow. National party leader Max Bedacht opposed the proposal, argu
ing that Doty did not pay dues and was not active in party work. In Septem
ber 1930, Chicago's leaders once again dragged Doty's name through the mud,
despite the fact that in February of that year he had organized a TUUL mass

"abolish capitalism"

i 5 i

demonstration against unemployment among building-trades workers and the

corruption of their "fascist" union officials. In September, however, a conflict
emerged between some black Communists and Chicago's party leadership over
how to organize black workers. Many black Communists argued that the party's
American Negro Labor Congress (ANLC) was ineffective. Formed in 1925, the
ANLC hoped to create African American unions where white unions excluded
blacks. Eventually, the party envisioned, ANLC councils would join with local
labor groups and form interracial labor councils. The ANLC ran forums in the
city, but few members joined. Then, with the creation of the TUUL and integra
tion of racial issues into general party and ILD work, the ANLC lost its reason
for existing.'^ Several Chicago black party activists, like Sol Harper, argued
that the party should focus on integrating established unions. By refusing to
dismantle the ANLC, it was clear to Harper that the party "does not understand
Negro work in any of its phases." As a result of his belief. Harper refused to take
action against such lower-ranking members as Doty, who, like Harper and a
few others, disagreed with the party's policy of continuing with the ANLC and
"jim-crowing" black workers. In October 1930, Chicago's Communist Control
Commission expelled Doty because he was "inactive," had a "petty bourgeois
ideology," and put "financial condition above Party duties.""
Regardless of the conflict and expulsion, Doty hung on as secretary of the
ACTC through 1932 and pushed the Illinois Federation of Labor to rule that its
member unions accept black workers. On May 8,1932, letters from H. Dorsey,
chair of the ACTC and a veteran party member, and Doty arrived on the desk
of Victor Olander, secretary of the Illinois Federation of Labor. Dorsey and
Doty described mounting tensions in the black community. Local conferences
between the white unions of plumbers and steamfitters and the ACTC over the
possibility of the white unions admitting black workers resulted in white local
leaders' deferring authority to their international presidents. Dorsey and Doty
appealed to Olander to "use your influence in our behalf/' They also asked him
to attend a mass meeting at the A.M.E. Zionist church where eight hundred
workers would meet to protest discrimination in the building trades. Olander
responded that the federation was unwilling to interfere in the autonomy of
its member unions, meaning the ACTC would have to fight alone. On May 27,
three hundred workers protested the AFL and the hospital board when they
refused to permit subcontractors to employ licensed, skilled, black mechanics
in the building of the new Provident Hospital and Training School.'
By 1934, the party had clarified its relationship with the ACTC. In a meeting
of the party's city leadership, Communist ACTC organizers agreed to transfer
ACTC members into TUUL unions in packing, steel, metal, needle, and food;
to allow fraternal delegates at both the TUUL executive board and the ACTC;
and to focus more fully on the blacks' right to join the AFL on the "basis of

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red chicago

complete equality."^ With formal support from the party, the ACTC turned
its attention to integrating building-trades employees on federal housing and
South Side school projects. It also worked on relief for blacks, continuing to
work within black churches and community organizations. By this time, though,
ACTC leaders were apparently excluding Doty. Claude Lightfoot agreed to work
with two other ACTC leaders until they were able to find "one comrade to take
over the job."^
Despite its commitment to interracial activism in other areas, it took until
1934 for the party formally to become a part of the struggle for interracial
unions in the building trades. Communist leaders' preoccupation with the
ANLC prevented them from attacking racially exclusive AFL unions sooner
and in different ways."* It did not, however, preclude their members from doing
so. Chicago party leaders initially had no control over the ACTC, even though
party members were m leadership positions. When Doty fell away from party
circles, he remained active m the ACTC. His work and continued relations with
such party leaders as Lightfoot speaks to Communists' willingness to work with
non-party activists and their ability to overcome party politics. But even more
than internal party developments, the story of the ACTC reveals black workers'
difficulty in creating interracial unions, a situation that the AFL and Illinois
Federation of Labor's own leaders exacerbated.^
White unionists were not solely to blame for this segmentation of the work
force. At home, workers also segregated themselves. Life in the Back of the Yards,
. Bronzeville, South Chicago, Cicero, and on the North and West Sides provided
workers rich cultural lives. But in the 1920s and early 1930s strict lines divided
racial and ethnic enclaves, and in the case of Chicago's race relations, violence
backed the divisions. The bloodiest battie before the Depression occurred dur
ing the summer of 1919, but tensions surrounding this conflict persisted into
the 1930s. Jack BCling, a YCL leader in Chicago, recalled the fights and arrests
that surrounded YCL attempts to integrate the city's beaches and the violence
that ensued when two YCL families bought homes on Peoria Street and invited
"blacks and other friends" to visit them.
In addition to enforcing segregation, violence prevented new forms of union
organization in Chicago. When Communists tried to form a TUUL opposi
tion in the milk drivers' AFL union among "militant milkmen," union "thugs"
watched closely. Nate Schaffher, a loyal party member from 1925, was often their
target. Schaffher became interested in the Communist party as a young man
witnessing open-air debates on the street corners of his West Side neighborhood.
As a milk-truck driver and party activist, he wanted to help build the union, but
union hit men, attending meetings with guns, helped ensure the status quo.'
Milkmen were not alone. Thugs also terrorized Communist newspaper pub-

"abolish capitalism"

i53

Ushers so much that some feared printing Communist papers. Nathan Green,
a party member in the needle trades, reported that three Amalgamated shop
committees set up before the TUUL convention were not functioning because
"in the Amalgamated everybody seems to be afraid of the terror." Police beat
ings intimidated Communist organizers around Western Electric, and a fear of
spies prevented work elsewhere because employers simply fired employees who
openly pushed for new union alternatives. Even when violence was not used,
union bureaucracies were often so firmly established and worked so closely
with employers that it seemed impossible to get around them.'
In Chicagohome to Al Capone's underworldlabor politics turned to vio
lence frequently. Union corruption and labor violence were accentuated from
1919 through 1933, during the Prohibition period. By the late 1920s, gangsters
had made their way into a number of trade unions, making racketeering a
profitable and violent characteristic of the city's labor scene. Beyond the milk
drivers' union, where one Communist observed "machine guns on the table
when the meeting is called to order" and where in 1932 a bomb shook the
union headquarters, syndicate influence permeated the Motion Picture Opera
tors' Union, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance, and
Bartenders' International League. While these were the unions best known for
connections to gangs, violence for hirewhether acid, bombs, shootings, or
hijackingswas, according to Barbara Newell, "tailored to various industries."'''
A North Side mob organization even offered its services to party leaders who
rented offices in the same Division Street building as the mob. Steve Nelson
remembered that at least one party leader thought it a good idea to befriend
them, but others believed that they had enough problems without attaching
themselves to gangsters. "No thanks," replied Clarence Hathaway, a city leader.
"That's not our style." Communists were careful not to alienate such powerful
friends, and "every once in a while an irate immigrant woman would get the
floors mixed up and begin banging on the door, of the loft, yelling in Polish
about eviction and police brutality. The gangsters had a little peephole that they
would slide open, saying, 'The Reds are one floor down.'"'*
Of course, corrupt unions and syndicates were not the only organizations
responsible for Chicago's tumultuous scene. If Chicago's Employers' Associa
tion stressed union gangsterism to smear the overall union movement, at the
same time it participated in labor violence and corruption. Edward Nockels
explained how this worked: members of the association met with employers
who honored union contracts and offered "to supply such employers with strike
breakers, detectives, and other racketeers" to break the unions. According to
Nockels, when an open-shop drive was hatched, Employers' Association mem
bers brought the state's attorney, the chief of police, and city judges into their

154

red chicago

racket and in this way ensured "the cooperation of the city authorities." Such
collusion meant that Communists worked in the context of shootings, beatings,
and death threats.'^
Communist trade unionists struggled to find an adequate way of dealing
with labor spies, police violence, thugs, and entrenched union bureaucracy. The
main question was whether or not to openly organize as Communists. Aflier
all, they were supposed to lead workers to the revolution. How would workers
know who they were if they kept their politics a secret? As early as 1930, the
Party Organizer laid out the party's formal position on the issue, which allowed
room for (mis)interpretation. "It is necessary for every Party member to be a
Communist all the time, but it is not necessary for a Party member always to
advertise that he is a Communist." "When organizing in a shop," members were
told, "a Party member may tell a sympathetic worker that he is a Communist, but
when the boss or the foreman is around, he keeps that information to himselfT' If
Communists wanted to keep their jobs to be able to organize workers, then they
had to consider the realities of labor spies. Red Squads, and anti-Communist
workers who reported names and caused Communists and their supporters to
be fired. Directives to rank-and-file party unionists to let sympathetic workers
know their identity and to keep bosses in the dark could be tricky business.
More often than not, party activists simply denied or hid their Communist
affiliation. A national party leader, Harry Shaw, admitted he could not come out
as an open leader of a union movement because "leaders would have enough
material to discredit me as a red, not a railroad man." That, according to Shaw,
was the problem with Otto Wangerin, who directed the party's national and
Chicago-based railroad campaigns from "behind the scenes." Such distance
from the workers affected union work. When directed to bring together five to
seven railroad workers to form a local rail committee to push for unity among
the various railroad trades, Chicago's party activists had to admit they did not
have enough comrades for the committee.'^
Railroad organizers seemed paralyzed over how to lead from behind the
scenes, and they were not alone. Those in the building trades were so afraid of
violating their union's constitution that they avoided openly building the party
and its fractions within the AFL.^ One former Illinois Steel employee and
party organizer argued, "If you want to do some work in the mill, you are not
able to keep still inside. In my department I kept quiet but was fired anyway."
Four leading members of the YCL in packing also learned a lesson for being
too "loose" in organizing. The superintendent called each one into his office
and told them they were known Communists. This time only one lost their
job. Vicky Starr recalled that when organizing. Communists had to be "very
underground because if you even talked union you were fired.... You didn't
have the law which guaranteed people the right to organize. So we actually

"abolish capitalism"

155

had secret meetings. Everybody had to vouch for anyone that they brought to
the meeting, that they were people that we could trust, because as soon as the
company found out that people were trying to organize, they would try to send
in stool pigeons." Despite aU this, Joe Weber, an organizer in the TUUL's Steel
and Metal Workers' Industrial Union (SMWIU), remembered, "We had small
underground unions" that operated through "very close-knit departmental
groups." According to Weber, an organization in "department A" had "no con
nection" with "department B groups, except with the heads of each of these
groups, so that the company stooges would not fire our people."'^
By 1933, Communist leaders began to change opinion on their private ver
sus public nature. In November of that year, the national leadership met and
concluded that hiding the party's face in industry was a way to stab the' party
in the back, "creating the feeUng that Communism is something to be afraid of."
To one organizer at Western Electric, it also caused confusion. Putting together
a secret organization meant that "half the time we didn't know what was going
on in the shop."' But the reality of the organizers' situation still prevented many
from being too public. The decision to hide party ties would later encourage
anti-Communists to be suspicious of anyone who supported progressive issues,
driving a wedge between the Left and Right in the city's unions. In the context
of the early 1930s, however, some party members felt they had little choice.
In addition to fear of dismissal, fellow Communists' resistance, inconsistency,
and apathy also contributed to the slow growth of Communist unions. National
leaders complained that even though Communists worked in concentration
industries, they resisted actively building TUUL unions. The problem did not
stop there. Across the country, they argued, "capable comrades... [were] totally
inactive in the unions, [and]... many Party functionaries do not even belong
to the TUUL."''
Chicago's leaders warned, "If our comrades cannot get connections in the
shops after working there months and years they are not yet Bolsheviks." But
threats did not improve the situation. At a district convention in 1930, leaders
complained that "TUUL and shop committees are practically nonexistent" and
noted "resistance among Party members toward building TUUL." Party leaders
berated Communists in unions who saw themselves as privilegedthinking
that all party work must be done for them as opposed to by themand who
waited for party leaders to act. In a 1932 district letter, leaders' frustration was
apparent. "Although we have some connections, and here and there shop nuclei,
our work is not proceeding in building up shop committees, grievance com
mittees, etc."'
Problem solving was difficult when party leaders could not get organizers to
attend meetings. For a meeting on why Western Electric workers were inactive
in the union, only one of the ten Communists concentrating there showed up.

15^

red chicago
"abolish capitalism"

Others did not attend a meeting for planning concentraUon work in the stock
yards. The International Harvester section organizer S. Yandrich wrote that
even though a nucleus had been in place in Harvester since 1925, its members
seldom met. When they did, "there was no life in the nucleus, no perspective
whatsoever and as a result the unit was losing members" More embarrassing
than missed meetings were missed public gatherings. Leaders learned that they
could not depend on party activists in stockyards and steel plants to show for
mass meetings that they themselves had called.^ Communists in metal unions
had similar problems. Of the fifteen who belonged to the metal league, only
three organized. Ironically, a metal organizer reported, this metal league was
the only one in the TUUL that was growing.
When Communists did decide to work on unions, inconsistent practices
exacerbated their inability to build the TUUL. Such tendencies can be seen
through the use of shop bulletins, the primary way Communists communi
cated with workers inside a factory. Occasionally shop bulletins served their
purpose, educating workers and bringing grievance committees to life. George
Patterson, a non-Communist steel worker, remembered becoming "engrossed"
with Communist party leaflets. In trying to talk about the issues raised with
feUow workers. Patterson found himself labeled a Communist. Regardless, he
remembered that workers read party literature to keep current on labor issues.
Though a few men talked openly with Patterson about these things, he quickly
made friends with them because, he recalled, he "learned from them." Leaflets
like the one Patterson read could get small grievances solved and bring clout to
organizations. Communists learned that whether involving dirty toilets or an
overbearing foreman, leaflets about shop-floor problems could have positive
effects.'"'
Shop papers were problematic in part because they appeared erratically The
organization department berated section leaders because in the four months
since January 1931, only one section had issued any shop bulletins. Section
leaders had difficulty finding members to make stencils and run mimeograph
machines, but organizers had little sympathy'"^
Even before the TUULs formation, shop papers had problems. According
to Jack Stachel, they initially looked like trade-union papers without political
content. They also claimed to be created by "workers in the plant" rather than
the Communist party nucleus.'"^ By 1928, leaders had corrected these circum
stances. Now the problem was that the papers were going too far in the other
direction. They were too theoretical and. according to party leaders, "appear[edl
completely divorced from the problems of the workers in the factories where
die shop bulletin is published." Beatrice Shields, a Chicago Communist leader
in workers education, argued, "Our bulletins only speak of the Soviet Union
during the time of anniversaries. The achievements of the workers in the USSR

i57

must be utilized as a constant contrast to the conditions of the shops, and as

the best weapon to rally the workers to struggle for the revolutionary way out
of the crisis." Shields was a sharp, dedicated political activist, but she failed to
see why Communist union militants complained that union papei^ were too
political and not practical.''*
By the early 1930s, party leaders were again raising questions about the au
thorship and messages of the papers. The official position was to issue shop
papers in the name of a particular Communist party nucleus in the shop. Party
leaders argued, "[Tlhe Communist aim and identity of the paper shall not be
concealed from the workers." But others believed workers would be more open
to the papers if they hid the party members' authorship. A recently expelled
party member, Sam Cohen, argued that the TUUL should issue the paper. At a
gathering of party leaders, Dora Lifshitz explained the problem clearly: Party
bulletins "are issued in the name of the CP unit, the TUUL and a lot of other
things. In one bulletin you tell them to join the CP, join the union, and every
thing else and they don't know the difference between one and the other."'
Problems of tone also hurt the papers. One organization letter warned that
shop papers reveal *^00 much of a Party approach." In 1930, Northwestern
Railroad authors told workers to "abolish capitalism," and in 1932, Harvester
authors instructed workers to "build department committees," but neither
provided specifics. One entitled Hart, Schaffner. and Marx Worker, sprinkled
with drawings of sickles and broken chains, called on workers to unite "against
their common enemy the bosses['l class.""^ In a review of shop papers, leaders
complained that the Illinois Steel Worker did not advertise the Steel and Metal
Workers' Industrial Union but simply dealt with building a grievance commit
tee. The bulletins included articles on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution
but did not connect this event to conditions in the plant, nor did they contrast
the plant's conditions to those in the Soviet Union. Revolutionary party leaders'
priorities could not be those of indigenous union radicals if these rank-and-file
Communist trade unionists were to win workers' support. Communist trade
unionists complained about the predicament they found themselves in: "We
issue a bulletin and are told to put in all the campaigns ... [or else] you gel a
bawling out from the center." But when they included party campaigns, they
were not safe from scolding. While occasional issues of some bulletins did a
good job reporting on shop-floor problems, most found it difficult to strike a
balance.'"^
In the same way that their bulletins fluctuated in tone, party members' par
ticipation in union meetings varied between those who resisted going against
the tide and others who were outspoken. In one AFL painter's local, party
members decided they would not push too fast, and at the reading of a resolu
tion to attend a Communist-supported May Day rally, they did not speak up.

158

RED CHICAGO

Even though the party's leadership warned against such behavior, it recurred.
Five months later, in 1930, when the AFL and the TUUL ran opposing dem
onstrations, twice as many workers attended the AFL's, even though the TUUL
demonstration was free and the AFL charged admission. Party leaders scorned
their members who did not raise the differences between the two organizations
at union meetings.'"
In other situations, Communists went overboard in their revolutionary rheto
ric and Third Period tactics. Some Chicago leaders worried that Communists
had the "illusion of fighting police in battle and forgetting to organize." Occa
sionally when they connected with non-party members, Communists' control
of bulletins, resolutions, and meeting agendas stifled non-party participation.
In some industries with AFL locals. Communists refiised to work because they
saw the AFL as a fascist organization.'
As TUUL organizations grew, however, so did the tendency of Communist
trade unionists to focus less on the party's political ends and more on the con
crete demands of the workers. But even then, there were problems. Party leaders
were concerned that by focusing too much on economic issues, Communists
would lose their revolutionary appeal and fall away from the movement. In
fact, once small groups formed inside the plants, Communist activists in them
tended to avoid party leaders and Communist groups outside of the plant. Such
neglect left city leaders uninformed about union activities and prevented Com
munist neighborhood organizations from supporting the TUUL in the plant.
By demanding that Communist union leaders not separate trade-union work
from party work, leaders hoped to check local autonomy.
These tensions pulled at Communists working in unions. They were to focus
on the issues that concerned workers but not get too lost in business unionism.
They also were to agitate and raise these demands to a higher level while building
fighting organizations. And all the while, they were to maintain relationships
with the party's district leaders."
Communists' public actions revealed the strain of these tensions. At first,
Communist leaders hoped that agitating would build the movement, and on
May Day 1930, they organized a demonstration that would result in a citywide
strike and the beginning of a strong TUUL organization. Not a single shop
nucleus organized a May Day committee in its plant. Communists neglected
to organize a conference to raise the strike question, and rank-and-file Com
munists even raised doubts about the strike strategy. Instead of a citywide stop
page and TUUL growth, some party members held noontime meetings, and
one brought a small group of fellow workers to the demonstration. To party
functionaries, this was a "sad picture."'"
In 1932, after three years of organizing, TUUL leaders had little to show. That
year, the Yards' TUUL still lacked leadership and active cadres. When news

CBANEliJoRKER,

ss-

mi

wasuhumma-ll*.

Assortment of shop papers

circulated by the Com
munist party. (From World
Revolutionary Propaganda:
A Chicago Study, by Harold
D. Lasswell and Dorothy
Blumenstock, copyright
1939 by Harold D. Lasswell
and Dorothy Blumenstock.
Used by permission of Alfi^d A. Knopf, a division of
Random House, Inc.)

l60

RED CHICAGO

spread of a lo-percent cut in wages, Communists in the neighborhood section

got wind and created and distributed leaflets on behalf of the TUUL without
informing TUUL members. Max Eastman argued that he acted without the
TUUL because he "had no confidence in the TUUL" since Communists failed
to build it. When the TUUL group in the stockyards called fraction meetings
and invited neighborhood unit members to join, they rarely attended. Accord
ing to the party's head stockyard organizer, stockyard unit meetings covered
"the actual activity which must be carried on in the yards, such as visiting of
contacts, discussion of conditions inside the yards." The problem, however, was
that "the comrades who work in the yards do not always feel this necessity of
discussing these conditions.""^ One meeting after another did not motivate
party trade unionists to talk shop, nor did they encourage members to make
contacts with non-party recruits.
In addition to those who were willing to organize, however, were those less
interested in building a TUUL in the Yards. In one party registration, "many
comrades who are working in the stockyards were discovered who were not
members of the Stockyards unit but of the street units in the sections." Some
Communists directed their energies away from TUUL activity even when their
own workplace was being organized. The most common reason these members
gave for not participating in the union drive was that they "can't afford to belong
to two organizations"; paying party dues was enough. During economic hard
times, union dues may have been difficult to pay^ but more likely these Com
munist workers did not view themselves as union organizers. From the 1929
TUUL convention, when the industrial committee reported that the stockyards
unit had "about I'A members," to the end of 1932, the TUUL organization in
the Yards had grown to twenty-six, including fifteen Communists. Most non
party members worked in small shops outside the party's concentration. Only
two were in Armour, one in its killing department. Growth was slow and not
in line with party successes in its unemployed activities."'
The situation among railroad workers was similar. Party activists tried to build
on railroad workers' reaction to a wage cut announced at the end of January
1932. Workers did not like how lodge officials dealt with the negotiations, and
many refused to pay a negotiating assessment passed on to them for the talks.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen lost seven and eight thousand members, respectively, based on this
issue. In response. Communists buiU an opposition movement m a few of the
old unions under the auspices of a rank-and-file committee, consisting of party
and non-party workers. One non-party member had participated in a railroadunion amalgamation meeting that Communists had planned back in the period
of the national railroad shopmen's strike of 1922, but others who joined with
him were more conservative. They were unhappy with the wage cut and the

"ABOLISH CAPITALISM"

l6l

tactics of their lodge officials but, as one party official explained, were "deathly
afraid of becoming connected up with any red' movement." Suspicious of the
league's leadership, they refused to turn over leaflet funds and bulletin control
to league officials. Party leaders, in turn, agreed that they would support the
publishing of a few leaflets but would discourage permanent publication plans
until they were able to "secure more control over it.""^
Such tactics speak to the lack of growth of this rank-and-file group. At one of
its meetings, forty-one workers showed up and passed a resolution that party
members had prepared beforehand against the wage cut and for a referendum
on the issue. This meeting was repeated on four other occasions in the city, each
with the same result. Turnout was small, workers were unwilling to discuss,
and, according to Wangerin, "little militancy [was] displayed when they were
called upon to express themselves." Communist unionists' expectations and
behavior likely exacerbated non-party league members' skepticism. Despite
railroad workers' disgruntled state, the TUUL organization remained small. A
Northwestern shop boasted eight members, and one in Burnside, six."
Steel workers were also suspicious of TUUL organizers. One party organizer,
Morton, had spent time organizing in Chicago's steel region and was known
as a Communist among steel workers, which, according to reports, gave him
a "bad reputation." Party leaders agreed that they would need new blood. The
problem was that even though the SMWIU reported two hundred members in
South Chicago, not a single Communist organized for the union. When they
did union work, league members held mass meetings and issued leaflets. The
problem with these strategies was that workers did not like coming to small
public meetings. An organizer explained that one Friday night the league orga
nized a meeting, and three workers went home "because there were not enough
there." Focus on spectacular gatherings also meant less concentration on work
within the mills."
Meanwhile, opposition work in the AFL slogged along. An industrial report
on Chicago's activity suggested that work was limited to building trades, milk
drivers, needle workers, and laundry workers but that none of it was coordi
nated or centralized. Approximately 350 Communists worked in AfL unions,
of an estimated three hundred thousand in the city. Party leaders agreed that
they would have to "give a lot of attention to Chicago because it is one of the
most important trade union center[s]." But the effect of purges and attacks on
union activists stifled rank-and-file enthusiasm."^
For workers in the early years of the Depression, fear of unemployment was
more tangible than revolutionary unions, and unemployed workers were more
willing to act militantly than those in tenuous jobs. The party's numbers show
that members were more interested in working in Unemployed Councils, where
their revolutionary activities matched the party's rhetoric. One party organizer

i62

red chicago

admitted that even though he was assigned to organize Western Electric work
ers, "I did not do anything in that factory because I was impressed like every
one else with the importance of unemployed work. I devoted all my time to
unemployed work. Factory work is more difRcuh."" Another Western Electric
organizer reported that workers from International Harvester and Crane would
say to party members, "You fellows go down and fight for relief, you have an
organization. You get relief. But if we have a fight in the shop, how much are
we going to gain?" He had to admit, "Direcdy we have got more relief by our
fight of the unemployed than with the employed workers.""' The huge funeral
for workers slain in the August 1931 eviction riot drew thousands, yet Com
munists working the next neighborhood, where the stockyards operated, were
not able to build their organization from such successes. To Communist leaders,
the overlap between the population in the Yards and those at the funeral and
demonstrations should have eased this work, but it did not. Through the period,
Communists recruited more unemployed than employed. Between January and
May 1932, Chicago's Communists brought in 2,009 new members; 71 percent
were unemployed.'^
And yet even though Chicago's TUUL never sparked the revolution party
leaders envisioned, nor did it maintain strict party discipline, it accomplished
a great deal. In spite of high levels of unemployment, employer-driven openshop drives, gangster attacks, police assaults, and sectarian party policy, effec
tive trade-union organizers emerged. Working against the conservative and
exclusive traditions of AFL and independent unionists in the city, these Com
munist trade unionists got their first taste of what would be involved in building
industrial unions and made important inroadssettling grievances, making
contacts, creating a common voice of dissentin several factories. Some, like
Nate Schaffner, stood up against gunmen and built a broad movement of re
formers in the milk-drivers' union. Others, like Ed Doty, took the first steps
toward integrating the city's building-trades unions. Such women as Katherine
Erlich sparked the first serious internal party conversations about the best way
to bring women workers into union organizations. There were also bright spots
in the life of Chicagos TUUL. Its leaders successfully represented women gar
ment workers in a 1933 strike against Sopkins and Sons' apron and dress plants
in the city.'^'
And still, by the end of 1933, party leaders faced a predicament. Conditions
for working people were bad and getting worse, yet Communists' union move
ment was not able to convince workers of alternative solutions to their problems.
Organizing against the grain, Communists tested a number of strategies. Their
belief that their organizations had the right answers for Chicago's workers en
abled them to persist in this uphill batde from 1929 through 1933. Such work
positioned them to take advantage of changes about to occur.

abolish capitalism

163

In 1933, Roosevelt's New Deal program changed the field of labor organizing,
but not in favor of the TUUL. Party trade-union organizers began shifting tac
tics, abandoning the TUUL to work solely within independent unions and the
AFL. In the short term, it seemed as though they abandoned their revolutionary
hopes, and while they did indeed forsake any aspiration of a revolution sparked
by Communist unions, in the long term it became clear that such actions laid
the groundwork for future industrial union drives, with their own potential
to bring about change. In any case, radical trade unionists had few options in
the TUUL if they wanted to have an effect on the city's labor movement. To
some, the appearance of the TUUL was an example of Communist folly. But
for Communist activists interested in mobilizing America's workers, the TUUL
offered real possibilities. Communists' inability to grow their alternative labor
federation speaks to the state of industrial relations in the late Hoover and early
Roosevelt years and to workers' social and economic state, as well as to mistaken
assumptions within Chicago's local Communist organization. When the New
Deal changed the political landscape and workers looked optimistically to AFL
unions, Communists joined them, taking lessons learned from the TUUL with
them and showing their ability to learn from their failures.

"generals are of no use without an army"

6
"Generals Are of No Use
without an Army":
How and Why Communists
Abandoned theTUUL

Though the law had no teeth. Section 7A of the Natioi^ial Industrial

Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 created the appearance of government support
for union organization and thoughts among workers of minimum wages, maxi
mum hours, and contractual protections against speedups and work hazards.
AU of this encouraged imion-minded workers to organize. But union enthusi
asts found they would have to do so against the wishes of their employers, who
fought Section 7A's provisions in subtle and open ways. The resulting clash
resulted in a spate of strike activity. "Man-days lost due to strikes, which had
not exceeded 603,000 in any month in the first half of 1933 " writes the histo
rian Irving Bernstein, "spurted to 1,375.000 in July and to 2,378,000 in August,"
From heavy industry to garment workers and even the movie industry, work
ers demanded the right to coUectrve bargaining. Come 1934, Bernstein notes,
"anybody struck. It was not just auto parts workers in Toledo, truck drivers in
Minneapolis, longshoremen in San Francisco, or mill hands in the Sotith. It
was the fashion."'
Chicago's Communist leaders observed workers' changed temperament as
the spirit came to the city. Strikes and organizational activity were particularly
strong among leather, neckwear, cleaning, upholstery, restaurant, and rubber
workers, as well as metal polishers and pattern makers. The Chicago Tribune
reported that pickets ringed 250 of Chicago's businesses in November i933Marshall Field, a strongly anti-union employer, relented to its skilled mainte
nance workers after they protested for forty weeks. A successful 1933 stockyard-handler strike revived labor organizing among stockyard workers. Such
activities signaled a shift in workers' expectations: by protecting their right to
form unions, a strong federal government should work for them rather than
for their employers.^

165

Lizabeth Cohen's depiction of workers' search for "moral capitalism" best

describes the motivation in the early Depression years that drove Chicago's
workers toward the CIO, yet the city's Communist leaders viewed workers* stir
rings in more revolutionary terms.' Communists participation in a shoe work
ers' strike resulted in the building of a union and the organization of three new
shop nuclei. Chicago's Communists also led 1,500 African American women
out of Ben Sopkins and Sons' six apron and dress plants. In the Englewood
neighborhood, a non-party worker agreed so strongly with TUUL principles
that he built a TUUL group, resulting in new carpenters and painters' locals.
Communist steel activists believed that the industrial recovery bill increased
their organizing potential, since, they noticed, steel workers were more free
to talk than... previously." Party activists in meatpacking also noted changes:
stockyards workers organized departmental actions, and non-party workers
wrote letters to the party shop paper linking their problems to the National
Recovery Administration (NRA) and political change.^
Communists working in International Harvester's McCormick and Tractor
works, once considered by party leaders as "no good, an element that is dead,
began usingshop papers effectively In one case, they exposed a foreman's abuses
and placed the paper on his desk. Encouraging this tactic elsewhere, the writers
explained. "The foremen go up in steam when they read these exposures, and
although they are raging with anger, they are afraid to attack anybody. Other
tactics included focusing on such annoying work-rules as having to attend
management meetings on their own time or having to pay fines for lost safety
cards. At McCormick. the organizing efforts were successful in both cases. Re
porting on these small victories and others like them caused at least a handful
of the forty SMWIU members from these plants to join by fiUing out applica
tion forms they found inside the party's shop paper. While forty represents a
modest success, party organizers reported that they overheard workers bragging
about many more: "Some would say well about one thousand. Others say every
second worker is a Communist." In the context of smallvictories won in various
departments, this hearsay seemed to bode weU for fixture party activity.^ Within
metal shops more broadly, Communists were winning workers' support. One
leader reported six metal shops on strike; and in most struggles. Communists
won leadership positions.^
Revolutionary union activity encouraged party leaders, but they did not
abandon AFL work. In fact, attention there intensified once Congress passed
the NIRA and workers joined AFL unions at unprecedented rates. At an AFL
Communist fraction meeting. Jack Stachel reminded party members that while
members should work in the TUUL, "at the same time more attention than
ever, many times more, [needed to be given] to work among the workers in
the AFL." A quick check of Communist unionists indicated that the party

l66

RED CHICAGO

claimed over one hundred AFL delegates to the federations 1933 convention,
70 percent from the building trades (90 percent of whom were painters). The
growth of these numbers over previous tallies among AFL workers presented
future-organizing possibilities.
In response to city leaders' AFL push, a Communist machinist named Jurich
reported his own changed attitude. After early failed struggles in the Interna
tional Association of Machinists, he and others "simply forgot that there is a
machinists union and we simply let them do whatever they pleased." But since
party leaders paid new attention to the AFL, Jurich reconsidered his activity
and started attending union meetings and speaking out. "The first question I
raised in the AFL," he recalled, "was the question of relief My idea was that we
should elect a committee in the local and demand relief for the [unemployed]
workers there."^ In response, AFL unionists started a fund to help these workers
out. Such efforts made Chicago party leaders believe it was possible to revive
their oppositional work in established AFL unions.
Communists' opposition also surfaced within established railroad ^nions. The
Communist activist Reva Weinstein boasted of a newly formed concentration
unit on the rails. In addition to unit members making door-to-door visits and
holding open forums, section leaders established study classes. In a short time,
organizers recruited two railroad workers into the party and sold one hundred
copies of the Daily Worker at railroad gates.'''
Workers' mcreased willingness to support Communists extended from Chi
cago's factories out into the communities that surrounded them. In the steel
region. Communist speakers received "the greatest support and applause" in a
debate between the Communist party and representatives from the Republican
and Liberty parties. Chicago's Communists were also involved with non-party
groups in a "united front" conference on unemployment in South Chicago in
which 119 organizations participated, even though Communists controlled
only seventeen. Still more thrilling to Communists was that the Communist
nominee for chair, though disputed because of his Communist connection, in
the end "carried it" and was allowed to lead."
From their belief in impending revolution in 1933, leaders found workers'
increased acceptance of Communist party activists a heady shift, and yet the
limits of even this surge of support quickly became apparent. After three 1933 '
strikes, a core of Chicagos Communist trade unionists organizing the city's
most important industries became convinced of dual unions' limits. Even after
Communists led or supported strikes, won grievances, rallied workers, and
activated members, they still remained organizationally and philosophically
isolated from the majority of Chicago's workers.
Comintern leaders revealed their Popular Front strategy of working with
leftist groups to defeat fascism in August 1935, but in Chicago, as in their

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

167

unemployed organizations. Communist trade unionists in rail, meatpacking,

and steel did not wait this long. They followed patterns similar to many other
Communist trade unionists across America's urban landscape. Chicago's Com
munist trade unionists anticipated the dissolution of the TUUL and the move
ment toward a Popular Front strategy in trade-union work as early as 1932 in
railroad unions and throughout 1934 in meatpacking and steel.'^
Sources from Moscow's Comintern archive make it clear that national party
leaders closely watched regional developments. Robert Cherny shows that party
work in the San Francisco maritime strike served as a primary example of why
Communist trade-union policy should change. Party sources also suggest that
Chicago Communists' work in meatpacking moved national party leaders away
from their dual-union strategy and closer to one they would perfect during the
Popular Front. In any event, the dissolution of the TUUL occurred in reaction
to the daily experiences of rank-and-file Communists in their organizing in
factories across the country. These were realities with which Chicago's Com
munists were all too familiar.
Proof of Isolation

The 1933 strikes of Chicago needle workers, stock handlers, and steel workers
offered Communists examples that their dual-union strategy did not widely
attract pro-union workers. Whether building their own union, as in the Sop
kins and steel strikes, or supporting another, as in the livestock handlers' strike,
Communists could not translate their successes into effective union building,
let alone party recruitment. Communists in one industry after another became
convinced that to succeed, they would have to rethink their dual unions.
Claude Lightfoot led the party section that included Ben Sopkins and Sons'
apron and dress plants, where women, mostly black, worked. An organizer of
the unemployed, Lightfoot found that after one year of working on Chicago's
South Side, Communists' Unemployed Council contacts began to pay off. Sup
plied with a list of potential supporters, the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial
Union began a union drive there and in June 1933 took the six Sopkins plants
out on strike, including its largest, which housed the company's offices. With
the support of women in the plants, the NTWIU fought for increased wages,
better hours, and a union contract. On the strike's third day, police attacked
the striking women, pushing the Chicago Defender onto the strikers' side and
convincing civic leaders to get involved..Strikers' support meetings brought
together community leaders, politicians, and Communists to discuss the situa
tion. At one conference, black strikers convinced Chicago Urban League leaders
to allow James Ford, the Communist party's 1932 vice presidential candidate,
to speak for them. Support for Ford continued into strike negotiations, when

i68

RED CHICAGO

he joined the league and representatives of the Defender in a parley with the
company on the strikers' behalf. When the company pushed Ford out of the
negotiations, the strikers insisted he participate."
The strike was a victory in that the women workers received wage increases,
shorter hours, and the rehiring of strikers, among other concessions; yet Cpmmunists were unable to build on these successes. Party leaders insisted that
members involved in the strike build the party at the same time they built the
union, but Communist union activists hid their political identity in the plants
as they built the union. The Chicago Defender, whose editors criticized Chicago
police for attempting to draw attention from strikers' demands by painting
them all as Communists, supported Communists' downplaying of their role:
"The police are attempting to smoke-screen the issue by calling these women
Communists. Suppose they are! Take some of these same policemen off of the
pay roll for six months and they will be Communists too. This nation is dedi
cated to the principle of free speech, and it is not up to the police to change the
Constitution."'^
Communists' popularity did not translate into increased party or union
membership. Strikers accepted and defended party leaders, but by the strike's
end, Commimists had recruited only eighteen workers. Once the strike ended,
it became harder to convince workers that the party offered them much. The
nine hundred women who joined the union during the strike quickly fell away.
Three months afterward, party organizers called their work at Sopkins "fruit
less" and tried to revive it by turning to a few female party members who had
assisted during the strike, but they were unable to rebuild the NTWIU.'^
Unlike the Sopkins strike, where Communists were in the limelight, in the
stockyards Communists were isolated from skilled Irish workers' strike actions
and from the bulk of white ethnic and black workers in the plants. Their isola
tion was due in part to the nature of the union organizations in the Yards. In
1933, three different groupsthe independent Stoc^ards Labor Council (SLC),
the AFL-afRliated Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America (AMC), and the TUUL-member Packinghouse Workers Industrial
Union (PHWIU)vied for labor's loyalty; and each succeeded in representing
different types of workers.
As a result of the NIRA, non-Communist veterans of the 1917 to 1921 stock
yard organizing drive rejuvenated the SLC, even installing their former president,
Martin Murphy, at the union's helm. In its earlier days, the SLC was a militant
organization that was unable to break from its craft-based structures. Thus,
in 1933, veterans in the organization had little following among black work
ers. Also, activists in the SLC worked mostly in the half-dozen small packing,
plants where the World War I-era union militants were able to find work after
being blacklisted from the larger plants. The SLC's strength lay in plants that

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

169

employed white, ethnic workers. In early1934, the union claimed five thousand
members.'
'
Unlike the SLC's tradition of militancy, the AMC was a craft-based organi
zation strong among the Yards' predominately Irish livestock handlers. Even
though such AMC leaders as Dennis Lane had undermined members' interests
in the past, workers looked to the AMC for leadership because it was the only
union with an international organization and access to the CFL's resources. Yet
after a decade of inaction, the AMC was poorly positioned to take advantage
of workers' militancy generated by the New Deal.'^
Rather than speaking for veteran union builders or craft-based meatpacking
workers, the PHWIU represented more recent arrivals to the Chicago stock
yards. After the NRA decreased the number of hours people could work and
companies began to rehire, young Communists were able to get their first jobs
in Chicago's plants. One of these was Herb March. Born in Brooklyn in 1913,
March grew up in a Socialist environment and joined the YCL at sixteen. After
his involvement in the 1929 silk strike near Paterson, New Jersey, he agreed
to organize the YCL in the Southwest and then worked against lynching and
unemployment in Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. Moving to Kansas City,
he organized workers in meatpacking plants and assisted Unemployed Council
drives. But after meeting Jane Grbac at a party gathering, he agreed in the 'Spring
of 1933 to move to her home in Chicago and begin working in the Yards.'
March's timing was impeccable,and his commitment and energy helped spark
a movement. With March on board, a small group of YCL members, several of
whom were younger women, began an intensive drive to create revolutionary
industrial unions. Their experiences rallying behind the Scottsboro defendants
and Angelo Herndon as well as their commitment to interracial union organiz
ing allowed them to reach black workers, and in a short time they had some
strength among African Americans in Armour's sheep and hog kills. Thus,
while they did not have the numbers of the SLC, they did have a foothold in
the larger Armour plant. In addition, Communists had community contacts,
resources, and support beyond the plants."
From the beginning of their effort, although Communists cooperated with
the SLC in the smaller plants, their major interest was the larger Armour factory.
But there, the AMC kept them isolated to few departments where they were in
effective. Throughout 1933, as companies found loopholes in NRA agreements
and work conditions deteriorated. Communists watched plant executives step
up their attacks on activists. Similar trends occurred at smaller plants. At the
end of 1933, employers at the small packers Hammond and Agar fired union
leaders and activists and at Robert and Oakes closed the plant and laid off their
workforce.^"
' Party leaders were unwilling to accept these defeats. Calling the stockyards

170

red chicago
"generals are of

section the most important area of the city. Bill Gebert argued that stockyards
workers not only shared a tradition of militancy and a composition that re
flected the citys proietariat, but that the dominance of the industry in the city
meant that Communist success there would lead to broader positive political
and economic change,^' Work in the Yards had to be revived.
In their despair. Communists found hope in a spontaneous and unsanctioned
livestock handlers strike. Unhappy over wage cuts, the exclusionary and typi
cally conservative livestock handlers walked o/Tthe job in November 1933. The
mostly Irish composition of the handlers' union meant that Communists had
few contacts among the group, so Communists were able to show support only
by having the PHWIU agree to walk off the job.^^ But the strategic position of
the handlers, who supplied the rest of the plants with livestock, helped make
their strike a success in only two days without Communists' assistance. The
handlers won a lo-percent wage increase, and Communists regretted not hav
ing better relations with AFL unionists."
The second time the AMC livestock handlers struck, this time over a reclas
sification system in the summer of i934> Communists began to consider the
consequences of their isolation. During this second strike. Communist union
ists took a more active role working with the AFL. They sent a "rank-and-file
commiuee of the AFL" to extend greetings and to offer support to win the strike,
and they worked to get strike-endorsing resolutions passed in AFL unions
across the city. They also sought support from the CFL. Party leaders directed
Unemployed CouncUs to send delegations to the livestock handlers and to offer
unemployed picketers to join their picket lines. Within the plants, the PHWIU
raised the question of mass picketing and spreading the strike and organized
department actions. A unit organizer reported that in one department two
hundred workers struck for higher wages. In another, workers refused to extend
their day by half an hour.^*'
Once again, party activity had a limited impact Communists desperately
wanted to spread the strike sentiment, but according to a unit organizer, they
"didn't have an organized opposition in the livestock or butchers' unions."" In
this situation, no leaflets, mass meetings, and department actions could change
the strike's character.
This event represented the ctilmination of a series of experiences in the Yards
that exposed Communists' isolation from workers. Across the Yards, Com
munists led successful actions against speedups, safety hazards, and the lack
of rest periods, but not many workers joined their union. Rank-and-file party
members began to argue that to gain members they would have to play a larger
role in the reformist unions. A unit organizer wrote of learning that "it isn't
enough to have a PHWIU which is weak, we need to have organized opposition
movements with a concrete program of action and demands inside of existing

no use without an army"

171

locals of the AFL." The unit member articulated what many already realized:
"[T)he largest single number of workers in the yards are members of the AFL:
butchers, livestock handlers, electricians, metal men and truck drivers."^^
Communists in steel similarly concluded that the SMWIU did not adequately
allow them to reach the masses. In 1933, SMWIU party members at the Stan
dard Steel Forging plant in Indiana Harbor led workers out on strike. The event
lasted six weeks, and steel workers in the region showed them support, but
party members were unable to consolidate the union. In fact, over the strikes
six weeks, Communists were unable even to fiilly mobilize their own forces be
hind the effort Language organizations failed to respond, and party members
found themselves "isolated from movements in the shops." Without Commu
nists' input, workers in Standard Forging advocated accepting partial demands.
Party leaders agreed that their members needed to be politically reoriented.^'
In addition to their problems at Standard Forging. Communists faced compe
tition in the broader steel industry The most serious contender was the Amal
gamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers (AA), formed in 1876 and
best known among steel workers for its unsuccessful union drive in 19x9. This
failure convinced its leader, Mike Tighe, of the futility of mass recruiting work
ers, and as a result, the AA represented only a small number of the most skilled
craft workers in the industry, leaving the majority of steel workers without
union representation. While certainly a ghost of its postwar self, the A A of the
early 1930s had the advantage of legitimacy in the eyes of the organized labor
movement and among some steel workers who hoped an AA-led organizing
drive could be revived.^
In addition to the AA, the passage of Section 7A of the NIRA led some anti
union employers in the industry to promote their own solution to the union
"problem." Management in Republic, U.S. Steel, and smaller mills promoted and
cooperated with company unions or Employee Representation Programs (ERPs),
which, they claimed, would result in shared power between the company and
its employees. Rarely did such democracy prevail.^
The weakness of the A A and ERPs gave inspiration to party organizers, who
looked to the mills in hopes of building their union. Joe Weber was one party
hopeful. A veteran of Unemployed Council struggles, in 1933 Weber was in
charge of work in steel. In the summer of that year, he called a meeting at
Calumet Park, and a large number of steel workers gathered. Joe Germano, a
^ future leader of the CIO in steel and a vehement anti-Communist, remembered,
"Weber was quite an orator. You had to really know the guy If you didn't know
him or felt you knew him, he could convince you; he was a very persuasive guy.
He spoke to these peoplehe spoke to ail of usmaybe half an hour or fort)'
minutes. Everybody listened, and there was quite a bit of applause."^" Weber's
message was similar to one that appeared in a leaflet circulated among steel

172

red chicago

workers, encouraging them to join theSMWIU, a union dedicated to "organizing

ail workers, Negro and white, young and old, foreign born and native, skilled
and unskilled on an equal basis." In suggesting that workers "remember how
we fought in 1919, only to be sold out by the American Federation of Labor
leaders," authors of the leaflet hoped to connect the SMWIU to the campaign of
William Z. Foster and other labor radicals a generation earlier. This time, Com
munists hoped that built-up resentment toward the AA would payoff under the
SMWIU, a union "organized and controlled by the workers from the mills''^'
Reiterating these sentiments, Weber took the opportunity to attack Germano,
standing in the crowd, for his role as an ERP representative. These were fight
ing words, equivalent to calling a person a company man, but Germano abiy
defended himself. He argued that he and other ERP followers in steel were
not dupes of their employers but members of the AA in addition to the ERP
who were waiting for the AA to take initiative, charter their plants, and revive
a union drive. Germano insisted that the AA was his union and the union of
their fathers, the only union recognized by the government since it was an AFL
affiliate. Weber may have tapped into steel workers' desire for a strong union
drive in steel, but Germano's words reflected most steel workers' instincts. Com
munists wanted their SMWIU to become an organization of the workers, but in
i933> Chicagos most union-friendly steel workers were wary of Communists
and their proposals.^^
After the ratification of the NIRA, AA leaders made little effort 0 organize
steel workers, but it did not matter. In the first three months after the bill's
ratification, sixty-eight new lodges formed. Communists watched these devel
opments and worried. In December 1933, Chicago party leaders reported that
the SMWIU was inoperative in steel and that the AFL was stronger than the
TUUL."
The party did see a few bright spots, however. In September 1933, organizers
in Standard Forging succeeded in organizing shift meetings and bringing out
almost a hundred workers to an open-air meeting. When AFL organizers tried
to red-bait SMWIU organizers, workers booed them. When company men or
dered workers to perform tasks they previously did not have to do, the workers
participated in a four-hour stoppage. Such action forced the company to back
down, inspiring a few who reportedly came "right up to the secretary of the
[SMWIUJ union in the shop and asked for application cards." Steel organizers
also reported that in a short time, twenty-four steel workers joined the SMIU,
and twenty others filed applications from various mills. The African American
Communist and trade unionist Jack Reese successfully organized a work stop
page in the pickling and rolled steel departments of Youngstown Sheet and Tube,
and other party activists stabilized a small SMWIU local in the American sheet
and tin company." Yet Com munists still could not compete with the twelve new

"generals are of no use without an army"

173

AA lodges of four thousand members in the Chicago-Gary area. One report

noted that the largest group of steel workers in South Chicago, representing 38
percent, were American-born, but only twenty American-born steel workers
were party members. Even party schools set up in Gary and South Chicago
around steel workers' shifts and according to topics they might find interesting
could not turn around the low SMWIU numbers.^^
By 1934, Communists recognized that good work came in small packages.
In two instances, non-party workers at International Harvester used physical
force to protect Communist speakers from police arrest, and workers supported
party shop papers, contributing over thirty dollars for one issue at Western
Electric and twenty-five for one at Harvester. Non-party workers also supported
the Communist railroad paper, helping with writing and fundraising. While
convincing party leaders of the potential worker support they could win, these
examples did not result in union growth.^
Small successes sometimes feded quickly, which is what happened to Com
munist efforts within the AFL painter's union. Thousands of painters and pa
perhangers were suspended or expelled because they were unable to pay AFL
dues. With the Depression decreasing the amount of work available to any
painter in the city, the AFL's official policy of policing worksites and chasing
away suspended and expelled unionists made a bad situation worse. TUUL
activists began organizing around the right to work as members of the TUUL
and readmission to the AFL without having to pay back-dues or initiation fees.
In 1932, painters and paperhangers formed a TUUL local on the West Side,
made union cards, and voted on demands. But this enthusiastic group, after
an initial period of excitement and activity, ended up doing more talking than
acting. One "veteran painter" remembered the group as "more like a club than
a union."^^
Shifting Gears

In 1934, the party listed only 2,010 TUUL members in Chicago. This was espe
cially embarrassing when compared to the AFL^ membership of between fiftythree and sixty-one thousand. In the stockyards alone, one independent union
numbered over 2.500.^ Rank-and-file Communist support for the TUUL drive
did not look better. The twenty-two trade-union nuclei of 124 party members
that the party claimed in 1933 jumped to thirty-seven nuclei and 253 members
in 1934, but this still represented only a small fraction of the 3,303 members in
the city.^ In January 1935, Chicago's leaders reported on the status of the city's
trade-union participation before enacting the shift away from the TUUL. The
report indicated that 41.1 percent of members were active in unions, a signifi
cant leap from the 1930 numbers, but even at this late date only 17.7 percent

174

RED CHICAGO

were in TUUL unions, while 20.1 percent were in AFL unions and 3.3 percent
in independent unions.^"
Despite Communists' work and agitation, the AFL received a much bigger in
flux than the TUUL following the 1933 labor legislation. Chicago's Communists
found that their isolation in steel, meatpacking, and needle work reflected a na
tional trend. By 1934, the AFL had added five hundred thousand to its national
rolls, giving it a membership of over 2.5 million workers, whereas the TUUL
added only one hundred thousand, bringing its membership to 125,000.^'
Ihese disappointing numbers, combined with Communists' frustrating expe
riences, convinced party trade unionists that if they wanted to havp input into
mass union drives, they would have to change their strategies. Early in 1934,
Communist unionists in two TUUL industries of concentration, packing and
steel, began new tactics. Those in the railroad industry had been moving away
from the TUUL beginning in 1932 and continued to reevaluate their strategies
through the party's Popular Front shift in policy. The staggered timing of these
changes demonstrates the need to consider local conditions when discussing
Communist trade unionism and suggests that issues emanating from rankand-file work were as important as party policy in determining Communist
trade-union activity. National party leaders officially disbanded the TUUL in
March 1935 and did not announce their shift to a Popular Front strategy until
August. In the months preceding these events, Chicago's Communists learned
from their experiences that to be effective trade unionists, they would have to
work closely with established, recognized unions and the reformers who led
them. Their mistakes, plentiful and varied as they were, provided important
lessons for the period that was to follow, which would include the tune of the
building of the CIO.
The earliest shifts in organizing strategy occurred in the railroad industry Ini
tially, Communists interested in organizing railroad workers promoted a sepa
rate revolutionary union, the Railroad Industrial League. By 1932, enthusiasm
for this organization had begun to wane. Party members in California explained
that since most of their active organizers belonged to established craft unions,
it did not make sense for them to emphasize a separate organization.^^
That year in Chicago, a similar sentiment became apparent when railroad
organizers began to build the unity movement, which was the party's attempt
to bring together rank-and-file workers from twenty-one different crafts into
one opposition movement. The purpose was not to destroy existing unions or
to build a dual union but to welcome delegates from established unions into
unity groups where.unionists from all parts of the industry could join together
around specific issues facing railroad workers. Leaders hoped this would also
provide an opportunity to unite white and black railroad workers, a move not
yet attempted in the industry. The fact that it was a separate organization that

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USEWITHOUTAN ARMY"

I75

individuals and groups from established unions had to join, however, raised
loyal union members' suspicion; they thought that this was going to be a divi
sive organization. The movement's paper. Unity News, worked hard to dispel
such notions."*'
One of Chicago's Communist trade unionists explained how he connected
his shop to the unity movement. First, he organized workers into the AFL. Next,
he formed a grievance committee and began circulating a shop paper. By the
summer of 1934, he began working with the city's unity committee, bringing
issues raised there back to the group."*^
The biggest issue the unity committee faced was the consequence of railroad
consolidation. Overwhelmed by huge economic losses, railroad executives ap
pealed to the federal government for assistance. The Roosevelt administration's
answer was to consolidate railroad facilities by merging lines and decreasing
routes. Once services were slimmed, railroad workers would have to reorganize
seniority lists and watch as thousands of co-workers received pink slips. At first,
chiefs of the railroad brotherhoods seemed content to push for a dismissal wage
to compensate their laid-off members. To Communists, this was not enough.
They wanted to organize workers so effectively that they would be willing to
strike to keep their jobs.^^
To that end, J. E. McDonald, the national chairman of the unity movement,
working in Chicago, wrote and distributed flyers explaining how essential it
was for railroad workers to fight this challenge together. Chicago's workers, he
believed, needed to be particularly concerned since Roosevelt's advisors had
specific plans to merge facilities in the city. As soon as enough lodges supported
the movement's call for a national conference on the issue, the pamphlet an
nounced, a committee would work out the final plans.^ In June 1935, Chicago's
railroad activists reported on a number of smaller conferences of individu
als representing "most [of the city's railroad] unions" (with the exception of
engineers and switchmen, in whose unions battle raged over participation).
Individuals participating in these conferences brought back to their lodges the
question of united action against consolidation and the demand that railroad
executives return employment conditions to 1931 terms, before wage cuts and
speedups degraded their work. On most occasions, the lodges approved the
program for united action and appointed committees to continue the work."*'
The unity movement continued in the railroad industry even after the party
shifted to Popular Front organizing strategies. In the early months of the Popular
Front, leaders of the unity strategy reached out to the Railroad Employees Na
tional Pension Association, which formed as an independent opposition among
railroad workers against established union leaders. The Railroad Employees
National Pension Association was interested in winning a federal pension sys
tem, as opposed to the privately operated one that forced workers to be loyal

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RED CHICAGO

to particular companies for long periods of time, gave workers no recourse to

funds if they were fired prematurely, and undermined strike activity. When the
Supreme Court struck down a national pension system in May 1935, Commu
nists worked closely with lefl;-leaning members on the Pension Association's
national board and encouraged them to abandon the legalistic route they had
been taking. Party members agreed that they needed to "call for a united front
to force thru a national retirement system by economic or strike threat and at
the same time [to] turn attention to the possibility of securing a national retire
ment system without legislation by direct agreement with the carriers."'* The
more conservative members of the Pension Association's board, however, were
content with working through the courts and drafted what William Z. Foster
referred to as "a much inferior bill" to the one the court originally turned down.
Through their unity movement, party members hoped to work with the leftwing members of the Pension Association and prevail over more conservative
forces.^^
Chicago's Communists had reason to think that railroad workers would sup
port their unity movement. Railroad workers, who tended to be cynical about
the outcome of joining across craft lines, seemed to be doing just that in Chicago
in 1933. Not only had Chicago railroad workers formed the National Pension
Association, but they had organized a federation of thirteen crafts to fight against
company unions. Party organizers also had word that stockyard switchmen were
seen "running up and down waving the [Communist] pamphlet" on the issue
of unity. If workers were willing to join across craft. Communists speculated,
they likely would do so through the unity movement.
They were wrong. It was true that trainmen's and carmen's unions passed
Communist-supported resolutions. They also went on record against fascism,
and the trainmen passed a resolution against war.^ But participation of these
groups' members in the unity movement remained lunited: in November 1935,
only 124 people were willing to work and finance the movement. Of the thirtyfive party members in the group, a handful went back to the days of the Na
tional Railroad Industrial League, suggesting that not many more were picked
up along the way No important terminal had a mass circulation of Unity News,
and only 794 people subscribed.^^
The entrenched personal and political differences that brought tension to
the Chicago office of the Communist party made working in the unity move
ment even more difficult. Grace King and J. E. McDonald simply did not like,
agree with, or find it easy to work with Art Handle, Harry Shaw, and Otto
Wangerin, party loyalty notwithstanding. When fraction meetings overturned
McDonald's proposals, he simply continued to push them among workers. Shaw
complained, "Other comrades, including myself, have at times failed to carry
through fraction decisions but never when it related to basic political questions,

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

I77

and never in an effort to superimpose our opinions and ideas on a decision of

a majority of the leading comrades." Interestingly, party leaders had no interest
in suspending or expelling McDonald; they simply wanted him to stop work
ing against them. Shaw recommended that McDonald leave work in Chicago
to him. Handle, and Wangerin and that he move to St. Louis, where his talents
might be appreciated.'
At the same time, leaders of established railroad unions were able to win back
a wage cut and succeeded in passing the 1935 Raikoad Retirement Pension Act.
They also began to oppose consolidation and the dismissal wage they initially
supported. Such actions increased their unions' memberships while decimating
opposition movements, like the unity movement.^
In response to these challenges and the changed political context of the Popu
lar Front, Communists decided that instead of continuing their organization,
which required individuals and groups from craft unions to affiliate with the
unity movement, they would liquidate the unity movement and work officially
through railroad unions. "Because the broadest United Front can be built out
side the unity movement," Shaw wrote, "and because United Front activity is
the main source of establishing the broadest possible connections for our Party,
this [unity] movement becomes more or less superfluous and should be abol
ished." Coming months after the launching of the Popular Front, this decision
finally put railroad organizers m line with the new party attitude that promoted
harmony and discretion among the ranks.^
Even before this Popular Front shift and change in railroad organizing tactics,
some Communists already had abandoned Third Period sectarian styles. One
railroad worker explained in early 1934 about his fellow unionists who simply
would not second his union motions. Finally, after Communist self-examination,
he decided he had the wrong approach. It was "no use waving a red flag in front
of a bull," he acknowledged. When he and comrades took to "broadcasting our
Party material in streaming headlines on the first page of... [a shop bulletin]
hundreds of these bulletins were lying on the ground." When they highlighted
shop news, however, only a few were tossed. His message was clear: "Gener
als are of no use without an army and we will work with the army, bringing
the message of the class struggle before them." To keep party forces strong, he
counseled. Communists would need to stay on the job without exposing their
identity, since "bosses are organized" and ready to undermine any plans party
members make.^ Party leaders outside of the railroad industry agreed that to
engage in mass work they would have to break through the "shell of sectarian
ism." So in the months before Communist leaders dissolved the TUUL and well
before they announced the party's official shift to the Popular Front, organizers
in railroad unions had already begun to pave the way.
Communists' activity in meatpacking also resulted in their leaving behind

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RED CHICAGO

revolutionary dual unions, but again the timing and reasoning emanated from
their daily work on the local level. The strength of SLC locals in small shops
caused Communists to form unity groups at the end of 1933. Since joint work
proved more successful than acting alone, in April 1934, party organizers began
planning a joint conference of the three unions to strengthen organizing in the
stockyards and to make better contacts in the different unions." The following
month. Communists increased their work in the reformist unions and divided
thirty Commimists who worked in the Yards among the SLC, the AMC, and the
PHWIU. A Communist leader in meatpacking reported that "some comrades
akeady did join the unions." Two had been members of the SLC, and two oth
ers joined the AMC. Once in the AMC, the small Communist group was still
isolated from most stockyard workers, but Communists made headway in the
SLC with Polish workers. Their penetration seemed so successful that Chicagos
party leaders predicted, "In a period of a few weeks the SLC will be one of our
organizations."^ By November, two YCL members were elected to the SLC s
executive board.'
Given the failures within their independent revolutionary union. Communist
trade unionists began to develop new strategies to work within the reformist
organizations while maintaining their own organization.This was a far cry from
where they stood in early 1933. Before the NIRA, Chicagos Communist lead
ers ordered comrades in meatpacking to use Washington Park's open forums
and party leaflets to "expose" AFL and SLC leaders who hoped to "line up the
packinghouse workers in their ranks." These Communist trade unionists were
to win members out of the reformist organizations and over to the Commu
nists' union. But sentiment the NIRA raised in workers and the activities of
AFL unionists in the Yards caused Communists to rethink their position."
Also, Communists' ability to organize workers, especially women, only exac
erbated their isolation and did not bring them the power and influence they de
sired. YCL officials reported that Communist "girls" built a local of the PHWIU
in a department and won demands. The problem they found was that the "girls"
who "basically composed" party units were "not always the decisive people in
the plants." Even if they did successfully organize a work stoppage, they could
not shut down the entire plant.' Since.women did not directly influence other
more powerful segments of Yards workers, the fact that Communists were able
to organize them did not seem of particular importance to their leaders.
In the case of meatpacking, national party leaders discussed and supported
local trade-union actions after they occurred. At a national Communist lead
ership meeting in August 1934, Jack Stachel explained why he supported trade
unionists' move toward oppositional work within meatpacking unions. In meat
packing, he reported, "we have not a single member in the AFL." Therefore,
he continued, "we had to make a decision that in the skilled departments we

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

179

shall not even try to build our union, but to send them into the AFL."" Stachel
hoped that by changing the strategies in meatpacking, the "united front would
really mean something."' A few months later, the PHWIU completed its merger
with the SLC, retaining the SLC's name and keeping a fraternal affiliation to
the national PHWIU. No longer would Communists maintain a separate union
for stockyard workers. Rather than remain divided and isolated, they made the
first move to unite the Yards' organizations, hoping to win workers away from
reformist leaders in the SLC and the AMC and to begin a real drive to organize
the industry. If AMC and SLC members would not join the PHWIU, they left
Communists little choice but to sign up as members of the respective unions.
For Communists in Chicago's stockyards, the decision seemed inevitable.
After all, party forces were too weak to push forward alone; even the leaders
could not romanticize their two small shop nuclei, which by 1934 had grown
to only thirty members.^ Communists in the industry recognized that while
divisions in the three imion groups caused weaknesses overall, the weakest link
in the chain was the PHWIU. Party leaders speculated that the SLC had about
fourteen hundred members, with a solid organization in the smaller shops and
a showing in Armour's, especially among the plants hog butchers. And while
the SLC had more influence than the PHWIU, both paled in comparison to
the AMC, which according to Gebert was developing such a militant campaign
that groups of SLC workers were already abandoning their organization for it.
The AMC had the stock handlers, butchers, electricians, and truck drivers, an
increasing number of SLC members, two party members, and one member of
the YCL. By joining the reformist organizations. Communists began to move
away from separate structures and toward a strategy that would allow them
greater influence over workers' union activities.
Communists were not the only ones to support these developments. Begin
ning in 1934, workers supported radicals in the SLC's leadership positions. Herb
March joined Martin Murphy, Frank McCarty, and Arthur Kampfert on the
executive committee of the SLC. March and other Communist fraction mem
bers raised African Americans' concerns and considered the problems of the
unemployed, moving the council toward a more inclusive model. While business
unionists like Murphy were concerned about the direction that March and the
others were taking the council, such other leaders as Kampfert and McCarty
supported Communists, suggesting that their leftist strategies made sense to a
growing audience. In fact, McCarty eventually joined the party. Thus Murphy
was clearly overstating his case when he told a settlement-house worker that
Communists had no influence in the council and that he "makes them come
right up and kiss the flag every once in a while, just to make sure of them."
Communists, in part, were shaping the council's direction.
In the SLC Communists quickly realized, though, that in order to be "com-

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RED CHICAGO

prehensive," they needed the support of the AMC. Official ties to the AMC
would also allow them to built on its increasing militancy. Thus, sometime after
June 1934, Commimists convinced other SLC leaders to approach the AMC to
push for a united organizing drive in the Yards. YCL leaders reported in No
vember that this unity movement "found a very good response on the part of
the workers. In the AFL some people expressed agreement with the proposed
unity." AFL leaders were not interested in unity or broadening their member
ship, however.^ With their belief in the need to unify their movements, the
AFL left Chicago party leaders no choice but to dissolve the SLC and direct its
members into the AMC unions. One way or another, Communists would see
to it that a drive was started in the Yards.
The case of meatpacjdng suggests that local conditions played an essential
role in determining how Communist unionists organized. Before party leaders
dissolved theTUUL, rank-and-file organizers began leaving their dual union for
more established, reform organizations in the stockyards. Such national leaders
as Jack Stachel noted the local situation and agreed with the tactic. After the
TUUL dissolved but before the Popular Front began, Chicago's Communists
in meatpacking changed their strategies once again and joined forces with the
AFL union they had once viewed as anathema to their cause. Party policy mat
tered, but so did local realities.
As did meatpackers, Communist steel workers gradually united with other
unions based on common experiences. The SMWIU boasted fifteen thousand
members at its height, but at its 1934 national conference in Pittsburgh, with
about half that number on its rolls, its delegates argued about what to do next.
They wanted desperately to mobilize workers at the bigger steel plants but found
that their strength lay mostly in light industry. In 1931, party organizers in steel
predicted a general steel strike. By 1934, such a stoppage had not materialized,
and Communist organizers had to focus on the few mills where organizing
conditions seemed favorable. The problem, of course, was that steel companies
and anti-Communist workers succeeded in branding the SMWIU as a Com
munist outfit.'
These pressures help explain Chicago Communists* decision at the beginning
of 1934 to join company and AFL unions in an attempt to convert them into
"genuine shop committees." Partyleaders counseled discretion when taking over
these organizations, but they were encouraged by the possibilities.'" George
Patterson's shop was one in which this policy took effect. When the company
union at South Works held its 1934 election, a number of militants were elected,
including Patterson. Through the ERP, Patterson and his committee brought five
issues to G. C. Thorpe, the president of the Illinois Steel Company, including
a wage increase, an end to foremen's favoritism, a monthly instead of biweekly
paycheck, time-and-a-half for overtime and Sunday work, and paid vacations

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

l8l

for hourly workers. Thorpe refused these demands and the committee's call for
an outside arbitrator. A few more rounds with management convinced Patterson
and his fellow committeemen that they had pushed the company-union format
as far as it would go. They needed a real union.''
What Communists referred to as a "real mass" of workers from South Works
met outside the mill in August 1935 and agreed to form their own indepen
dent union, the Associated Employees (AE), which proved to be a short but
successful venture. Communists numbered only fifteen in the mill but worked
closely with Patterson and others in crafting the union's constitution, which
directed a democratic structure, giving power to members instead of officers
and opening membership to all workers at South Works. The AE held weekly
meetings that featured Spanish, Polish, and Serbo-Croatian speakers, and its
leaders were impressed with their success among Mexican workers, whom they
assisted with work and immigration problems. Party members also encouraged
the building of a womens auxiliary to help organize the men. Patterson's wife
Dorothy visited workers at their homes and women at local churches to build
union support. In November 1935, the AE claimed 1,300 members and by June
1936, over three thousand. That month, the AE nominated a slate to run in the
ERP election, and twenty-one of those nominated won.'^
Along the lines of the Popular Front, Communists inside and outside the
plant encouraged AE members to affiliate with the AA to unify steel workers
in the region and support the struggle within steel to take over its leadership,
but AE members, still grousing about the union's failure in 1919, remained
uninterested. Communists had a hard time convincing the AA to take an in
terest in the alienated AE workers in the plant. One organizer explained that
AA officials were "afraid of the Communists who have applied for membership
in the local union." One of the AA's leaders, a former party member who was
since expelled, worked to keep his union Communist-free. Not until the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) came to Chicago and contacted local
organizers did AE members vote to join the SWOC, beginning a new chapter
in its workers' struggle."
South Works was unusual in that while it had an ERP and an independent
union, the AA stayed away. For those mills with an AA in place. Communists
began to consider the possibility of working within the AA even before the
dissolution of the TUUL. Everywhere it existed, the AA was stronger than the
SMWIU; even in such anti-union companies as Republic Steel, it succeeded in
building locals. Frustration over their lack ofsuccess motivated a minority group
within the SMWIU to push for a new organizing policy that would allow them
to work within the plants' AFL and independent unions. "If laborers thought
the SMWIU was the only good union," one report argued, "they wouldn't flock
to the AFL or independent unions." Dutiful party organizers like Jack Reese

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RED CHICAGO

Sheet and Tube. Party activists also worked with a group of one hundred at
Illinois Steel, where the new steel code reduced their hours, forcing them to
take home less pay Party leaders insisted that these union activists bring the
SMWIU forward as an option for the workers, but party organizers were "still
hesitant... knowing it has a reputation of being a red union." Ignoring leaders'
prodding, Communists working at Illinois Steel decided that it would be better
not to alienate their fellow workers.'"*
An unsigned Communist report on steel, dated October 1934, discussed new
directions Communists were taking in the industry At that time, Chicagos
Communists met with five leaders from Chicago's AA. Once there, Communists
proposed a left-wing alliance inside the AA diat would build toward a strike
the following spring, the first step of a rank-and-file takeover. Communists
hoped these leaders would use their positions in the AA to provide "official
auspices" for the rank-and-file movement, which would eventually issue a leftwing newspaper.'
These left-leaning AA leaders agreed to consider the proposal, but Com
munists loyal to Third Period teachings were still not convinced they should
join forces with non-Communists. "How deep can we afford to go into the
movement with these people at the present time?" a Communist Chicago steel
worker wondered. "Some of them are Republicans, some Democrats, some have
, some sort of connections with the Muste movement, not organizationally but
ideologically." Such questioning reveals the pressures Communists felt during
the Third Period. If they were to lead workers, then an alliance with reformist
types was surely a "gamble." But how many choices did they have? Given the
context, reality set in. The reports author wrote, "I think, however, that we can
afford to try this out
I think there is an opportunity to do something seri
ous and there is a possibility some of these people are good types and we may
really win them over in the course of the movement and make real leaders out
of them." Again, the local situation forced a reevaluation of party policy.'
For the alliance to work. Communists had to pull members out of the SMWIU
and have them work inside the AA. Even though Jack Stachel indicated that
Chicago was the weakest center in terms of carrying through a merger, the city's
Communists finally changed their approach." Chicago's steel workers found that
they were not alone. Stachel explained that frustration in dealing with the AA
from the outside resulted in the "same trend among the rank and file" around
the country. In district after district. Communists dissolved the steel sections of
their SMWIU, transferred the union's steel members into AA locals, and began
battling with the AA's national leader, Mike Tighe.'
Pushed by Communist steel workers, district organizations of the AA in
December 1934 planned a drive to organize steel workers and agreed to hold a

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

183

conference of all the country's district lodges in February Tighe was noticeably
absent from this December meeting, and just before the February conference
he sent a letter threatening to expel members in all lodges that participated. Re
gardless, the conference went on with seventy-eight lodges represented. Tighe
retaliated by expelling eighteen of them. Lodges that protested in support of
the expelled found themselves in the same boat.
In response, delegations of steel workers appealed to the AAs executive board
and the AFL's executive council in Washington, D.C. The AFL leader William
Green listened but was unwilling to step into the fray. Reports from inside the
AFL indicated there was a "hot fight" in the council on the question of steel and
that John L. Lewis threatened to lead a movement of industrial unions out of
the AFL and into a new federation." Party leaders did not oppose new unions
without question, but they feared that a dual union in steel would run into
the same problems they encountered in their TUUL unions, and that workers
would not support it."Such developments within the AFL leadership, however,
caused Communists to conclude that they would not get the AFLs help and
that "steel workers must fight their own battle with whatever support they can
organize from their own committees, lodges, and the rest of the working-class
movement."'
Communists were convinced that unorganized steel workers were ready to be
unionized, but they did not want to create the impression that they were push
ing for this through a dual organization. Instead, a group of expelled delegates
got together and, with Communist prodding, agreed to declare an emergency
in the union, establish an emergency committee of the expelled, and continue
to, fight for their readmission through established lodges. While not formally
readmitted to the AA, the emergency committee of steel workers would coordi
nate work of the expelled lodges. Stachel wanted rank-and-file Communists to
understand, "and this is no small point," that the organizing work would have
to be "carried on thru the lodges and districts," not independent and separate
organizations. Already by the end of February 1935, Stachel reported, member
ship increased at meetings called by these rank-and-file committees.^
While the hope was that these rank-and-file committees would channel the
energy of steel workers nationally, in Chicago, workers, including party mem
bers, stood by and waited to see what would happen between Tighe and the
rank-and-file movement. City leaders proposed picking one department to
popularize the rank-and-file movement, sending a delegation to the CFL for
support against the expulsions, creating a leaflet to clarify issues as they arose,
and placing a comrade in language organizations to organize the members. But
little follow-up occurred.'
A summer federal district court decision helped speed the readmission of
expelled lodges into the AA, but Communists' inflated Third Period hopes still

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RED CHICAGO

allowed them to downplay the decision in favor of the argument that the rankand-file struggle, the strength of the expelled lodges, and the feeling among the
AA's own ranks resuhed in the executive board taking them back."* When they
returned. Communist leaders recognized that what they had was a "temporary
truce" that could end at any moment. Tighe still fought an organizational drive
and imposed heavy fines and dues payments on the newly admitted lodges.
Such terms made workers feel that their reinstatement was not such a victory
after all. Communists agreed but feh that the time was not right to lead a fight
within the AA. They first had to regroup their forces. In any case, party organiz
ers announced that for the time being they did not sense a "mass sentiment for
union" among steel workers.^ They agreed to lie low. Besides, a battle within
the AFL was brewing. The creation of the SWOC would provide them with a
new set of options.
Experiences in different industries brought Communist trade unionists to the
same conclusion. The revolutionary call for separate unions would not resuh
in a wide working-class following. They needed to work within established and
trusted organizations within each industry.
Back on the Inside

Once inside the AFL, party leaders encouraged Communist ranks to take ad
vantage of new opportunities to push for unemployment relief and champion
labor militancy Communists needed to reach out to their newest members and
teach them proper methods for party work. They also needed to convince each
other to attend union meetings. Work that had been largely neglected under
the revolutionary union model in central and state labor councils also needed
to be restarted. Most importantly, AFL union work could not remove members
from their unit responsibilities. "The comrades in the trade unions cannot bring
the Party and the daily issues to the membership unless they participate in the
work of the units and the sections."
In Chicago, Communist trade unionists quickly shifted gears. In a June 1935
report, leaders indicated that even though comrades found it difficuh to rally
AFL workers behind them on many party issues, on the question of unemploy
ment insurance "they... attract a large number of AFL locals and keep them"
through official local committees of their own unions.^
Party activists also agitated for support of an organizing campaign in the
stockyards. Chicago's Communist trade-union commission discussed the pros
pects and agreed that even though international officers of the AMC supported
a union drive, they did not take it seriously and instead "expect[ed] it to die out."
Chicago's Communist language and trade-union leaders hoped their strategies
to broaden and strengthen the drive woiJd forestall its early death. Using con-

"GENERALS ARE OF NO USE WITHOUT AN ARMY"

185

tacts in the Yards' railroad unions, the commimit/s churches, and the party's
language clubs, Communists hoped to launch a real drive in meatpacking.
Herb March and Frank McCarty's election as delegates to the CFL in July
1935 pushed the possibilities further, as they asked the CFL to support a drive.
Frustrated with the inaction of the AMC and bitter over past political maneu
vering of its leaders, Fitzpatrick allowed the body to discuss the drive, and del
egates agreed to support it.' But AMC leaders had no intention of watching
Communists force their hand, and at the drive's kickoff at a Labor Day rally
at Soldier Field, union officials invited Chicago's Red Squad, whose members
proceeded to arrest a number of party members and to raise fears of a Com
munist takeover among union members.'"
Communists also tried to mobilize their forces within the IFL, but work was
slow. The party had only five delegates to work with and a few others with whom
they were "able to influence and work." Ignoring their small numbers, they put
forth resolutions and looked for support wherever they could find it."
Morris Childs, a leading Chicago party member, reported the success of the
party's "limited forces" in getting support from "many unions" for their resolu
tions. In fact, he reported, "A number of these resolutions received the majority^'
These included a resolution against the sales tax, for trade-union unity, against
the expulsion of union militants, and for the Lundeen Bill for unemployment
insurance. The IFL president Reuben Soderstrom and secretary Victor Olander,
however, did not want them aired and ruled these Communist motionis and
resolutions "defeated." Communist delegates reported that IFL leaders took
voice votes, and called them as they liked.'^
The central issue raised through the party's resolutions was the one on indus
trial unionism, which resulted in hours of heated debate. Victor Olander led a
"passionate" offensive against it by raising the threat of Communist subversion
within the unions. Dropping the name of WiUiam Z. Foster and the Com
munists' earlier TUEL poHcy of boring from within, Olander exclaimed that
Communists were expelled back in the 1920s because they were destructive to
the AFL. Industrial unionism would pave the way to their active participation
once again. Olander accused the delegates who introduced the resolution of
being "Reds." The votes for the resolution were not even counted, and instead
the IFL chair announced "what he thought carried" and ruled all appeals out
of order."
Olander was right. Communists were drawn to industrial unionism and
would fight to spark drives based on this model where they could. For the time
being, the most logical place for this fight was within the AFL, where even the
Communists knew a battle was brewing at its highest levels. In November 1935,
a Committee of Industrial Organizations would form within the AFL and take
the labor movement on a new path. Once again, Communists would have to

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RED CHICAGO

consider their options and plan their next move. A new chapter of labor history
and radical trade unionism was to be written, and Communists' Third Period
activism positioned them to play an important role in both. The TUUL taught
them organizing strategies, built wide networks of supporters, and pushed in
dustrial, interracial unionism before its time. Such experiences would result in
CIO leaders offering full-time organizing positions in the city's most important
industries to Chicago's Communist trade unionists. Joe Weber, a party trade
unionist in steel, remembered that the party's Third Period organizing resulted
in "skeleton organizations in the major industriesin steel, of course, in packing,
Crane company, and other places.'^ With such structures in place, CIO organiz
ers such as Weber swiftly moved to organize. This time, they found, Chicago's
workers were eager to work with them. A revolutionary shift was under way in
Chicago's labor movement. Communists were not the cause, and yet they were
a crucial element.^

"Not That These Youths Are Geniuses":

Young Communists Move from
the Margins to the Mainstream

S. Kirson Weinberg, a student of the prominent University of Chicago

sociologist Ernest Burgess, headed into the Jewish neighborhood of Lawndale to study its generation of youth drawn to the political Left in response to
government's and business's inabilit}' to solve the problems caused by the De
pression. Weinberg came across oneyoung man who explained:"T lost myjob
two years ago. Since then I've only worked a few days. I need money for clothes,
to see a show, to help my family, to go to school
The first year I hoped for
the better. But no more. It's useless to hope
Then someone told me about
Communism. It was what I looked for. I went to a meeting. I began to think.
There was no more righteous thing in the world. Why shouldn't a worker ^vho
produces an object have a share in the profits? The bosses get it all.... They
caused the Depression and they're causing their own doom.'"'
Of course, not ail respondents made such an easy connection between the
Depression and Communism. One young high-school graduate explained that
when he could not find work, his parents supported his enrollment in Crane
College, where, introduced to young Socialist and Communist groups on cam
pus, he became "'social minded.'" He found Socialists more akin to his interests
because Communists were "'too rigid and too extreme; they suppressed one's
individuality too much by stressing loyalty to the Party. I wanted more freedom.
Besides, I didn't want to give up my religion, my family, my individual expres
sion. Besides, I heard that upon being admitted to the bar, a morals committee
could discharge one if he professed Communism. Of course, I immediately
gave up that notion. I sought something milder, not as binding, looser. The
only alternative was Socialism.'"^
While Communists' appeal was their "righteousness," Socialists attracted
those who still believed in the system's viability. Weinberg's study shows a con-

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trast between adherents of these two groups while tapping into a larger phe
nomenon of Depression-era youth who increasingly questioned and challenged
1920s assumptions of capitalisms stability, the ease of upward mobility, and a
vapid youth culture. As across the nation, in Chicago the typical young person
did not profess Communism or Socialism. Yet the messages these young radicals
articulated or acted upon resonated among young people who only a few years
earlier were notorious for exerting their energies on sports and fraternity and
sorority gossip. Depression conditions shook young people out of their 1920s
apolitical state, allowing young radicals to move out of their small, alternative
enclaves into the mainstream.
The seeming collapse of capitalism and, after 1932, the increasing threat of
war and fascism caused a generation of young people to question the assump
tions of those who came before them. A vocal segment of the under-twentyfive-year-old demographic became uncertain that adults in leadership roles,
whether school administrators, foremen, police, or politicians, had their best
interests in mind and the answers to society's problems. Robert Cohen's study
of the 1930s youth movement follows this ferment among college students
nationally. In Chicago, youth activism spilled out of universities into factories
and onto the streets. Whether students in the nations leading universities or
workers on the assembly line, these young people assessed their place in 1930s
America and decided to leave the "roaring twenties" behind them.^
They increasingly joined in political coalitions that brought together labor,
religious, and political groups to articulate the voice of young America. Work
ing more flexibly than their adult counterparts, young activists in the 1930s
found their greatest success in mobilizing against war and fascism, rallying
students to question their role in universities, and organizing an American
Youth Congress.
Communist youth were at the center of this ferment, at times questioning
the leadership and authority of their own Communist leaders. Their flexible
approach and liberal/reformist impulse became hallmarks of Popular Front co
alitions and activism, but during the early years of the Depression, YCL activity,
regardless of its success, remained at odds with Stalinist forces and mainstream
Third Period ways.
Communist youth were willing to buck party leaders when creating coalitions,
but theystill strongly admired older Communists' confidence and commitment.
Initially, such admiration caused young Communists to hang around their older
counterparts and participate in party-sponsored initiatives of unemployed work
and union building rather than develop specific youth-oriented ones. The one
YCL-controlled event they did put on, a 1932 coimter-Olympics, was innova
tive but impotent. In time, conditions of the 1930s and the YCL's student-heavy
composition pushed young Communists to get creative. Beginning in 1932,

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

189

they became active in a momentous antiwar movement, particularly strong at

the University of Chicago, which launched the YCL into a national movement
of students beginning to challenge the university and rethink their role within
its walls. The challenge would result in a state-senate inquiry on Communism
and, ironically, a boost in YCL activity and interest.
Unemployed, union, sport, and antiwar activity broadened the horizons of
Chicago's youth, pushed them to join with people who saw the world differ
ently than they did, and reflected a new impulse among young people to take
a stand on the big questions with which Americans of all stripes were dealing,
lessons that would influence adults on the Left and set the next decade's politi
cal tone.
The Depression and the YCL

Charles Hall's family moved to Chicago's North Side in 1929 and supported his
older brother and, a year later, Chuck as theyattended the University of Chicago.
But the Depression's reality quickly set in, and economics forced Chuck and
his brother to drop out because they "didn't have enough money to keep on
going." Les Orear faced a similar change in his life plan. First attending college
in Wisconsin, Orear was forced to leave school and get a job in Chicago to help
support his family." Hall and Orear represent a much larger segment of youth
who by 1932 were no longer able to shield themselves from the Depression by
attending university. As economic conditions worsened, young people were
forced to reshape their outlooks. Some found their way to the youth branch of
the Communist party, the YCL.
As a young student and leader of his Presbyterian church's youth group. Hall
heard radical words his brother brought home from work. Returning home on
FuUerton, HaU's older brother came upon Bughouse Square, where there was
"a free-for-aU where everybody who had a soapbox could get up and spout his
piece." To Hall's brother, the Communists made the most sense, and he signed
with the YCL, which had a branch working around the Finnish Workers' HaU
on FuUerton and Halsted. After a few years working with the YCL, he got his
younger brother interested; Chuck HaU joined the YCL in 1934.^
Orear's path to the party was different. He left college, landing a job in the
plant at Armour's meatpacking company, where he came into contact with such
young Communists as Herb March. Through March, Orear met young people
who shared his way of thinking about the world. As he recalls, "It was the kind
of people who shared an attitude, a broader vision, and so we hung around with
each other." Before long, Orear became a YCL activist, with the task of crafting
the group's shop paper in the Yards.
During the Depression, HaU and Orear foimd themselves in the company of a

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growing and increasingly active group of people. Nationwide, the YCL claimed
2,300 in 1929, 3,000 in 1931, 3,750 in 1932,6,000 in 1934, and 8>ooo in 1935.'
Chicago's YCL grew as well, but at a slower rate. Even though its numbers more
than doubled between 1931 and 1935, YCL membership never reached the ex
pectations of party leaders; and yet through the YCL, the party trained many
of its most important future leaders and trade-union organizers.
The young and daring Jack Kling was responsible for Chicago's YCL during
much of the Third Period. Party leaders plucked him from New Yorks YCL ranks
because of his leadership potential and sent him to the national party school in
Cleveland. Led by Israel Amter, the Ohio district organizer; Betty Gannett, the
national YCL director; and Sam Don, a youth leader, Kling immersed himself in
political economy. "In a short time," Kling recalled, "the school made me aware
of how little I knew about our philosophy^'' A quick study, Kling returned to New
York and organized youth sections in needle-trade unions, among unemployed
groups, and in antiwar groups and demonstrations. AFL "goons" beat him, and
city police clubbed him and put him in jail. By 1930, these experiences qualified
him for Chicago's leading YCL post, a position he accepted grudgingly, lacking
confidence in his leadership skills.'"
In Chicago, Kling met the party activists Bill Gebert and John Williamson as
well as the Chicago YCL leaders Gil Green, John Marks, and Ben Gray. Growing
up in the Jewish ghetto on Chicago's West Side, where he and his family experi
enced the degradation of public assistance, Green was politicized on Roosevelt
Road, his "universityr where "one joined friends, scanned store-window displays,
marveled at the glittering marquee above the new movie house, and reveled
in the oratory of soapboxers." Finding himself inclined toward socialist ideas,
Green accepted an invitation to a Young Communist meeting when asked by
a friend's radical piano instructor. By the mid-i930s he would emerge from
Chicago's ranks as a national YCL leader." Marks came to Chicago from Mil
waukee, where he had been a unit fimctionary Twenty years old in 1931, Marks
worked in a machine shop for two years before becoming a YCL organizer.'^
Like Kling, Gray was uprooted from New York, but his move was of his own
doing rather than the party's. Job insecurity drove him to Chicago, where he
eventually landed work as an assistant pickle-truck helper and where he came
into contact with YCL activists. Jailed for his protest at a Scottsboro demonstra
tion, Gray remembers signing his YCL membership card while locked up.'^
As YCL leaders, Kling, Gray, and Marks were responsible for planning and
overseeing Communist youth activity, recruitment, and educ-ation. They were
the conduits between the party and its youth. Their leadership positions some
times put them in difficult straits, needing to answer the demands of party lead
ers and of their own members, which were sometimes at odds. Through their
personalities and activism, these men took on the smoothing over of rough

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

I9I

edges, a large responsibility made even more significant by the YCIi relationship
to the party. As Marks reminded party activists, "The YCL [is] not an ancillary
organizationit is a section of the CP and must be regarded as such."'"
As a section, of course, the YCL ran into the same problems that hindered
other sections of the party. The most persistent one, in leaders' eyes, was its
composition. In May 1930, only fifteen of the city's members were eligible for
membership in the TUUL. Reporting in July that no shop nuclei existed in the
YCL, Marks critically stated that the league's ten units were primarily comprised
of students.' Not until 1932 could the YCL declare any activity in the shops,
and even then it was minuscule. The small number of its 357 members who
were not students or unemployed were divided in small shops and stores, the
only exceptions in the city's large factories being four stockyards workers.' By
1935. twenty-two of the YCL's six hundred members worked in meatpacking,
and while no shop nuclei existed in South Chicago's steel mills, fifty YCLers
organized there through street nuclei. The YCL also had one unit in a radio
department of Stewart Warner, but it had been closed down. Five of the seven
activists stayed with the YCL, and the other two remained sympathizers.'^ By all
accounts, union activity among young workers was not the YCL's strong suit.
Neither was work among African Americans. Even though two of the city's
most charismatic African American activists, David Poindexter and Herbert
Newton, worked among youth, they could not turn the tide. The YCL increased
its black membership to fifty by 1932, but its organizational structure tended to
isolate whites from blacks. As early as 1932, the YCL planned to build a separate
youth organization for African Americans "as a bridge to the league," but they
quickly found that separation of the groups did not need formal recognition:
YCLers simply segregated themselves. Four of the sue groups were either com
posed of all white members or all black members, most likely as a by-product
of where members lived.'
Yet the fact of segregation did not prevent YCL members from taking on is
sues of civil rights and racial equality. YCL members showcased their antiracist
position at a public trial they held at People's Auditorium in August 1932, which
mirrored those held in party units throughout the country between 1930 and
1933 in an attempt to rid the party of racism and publicize its commitment to
racial equality." In this case, the YCL already had expelled Harry Hankin when
about four hundred gathered to watch him be tried for racism. The meeting
opened with the YCL's section leader explaining the importance of the fight
against segregation and the need for "unity of all workers." Then the judge
called for the election of a "workers' jury," before defending and prosecuting
attorneys presented their cases. Was Hankin simply a product of the capitalist
environment? Could he overcome his position in support of segregation? The
trial reached its climax when Hankin took the stand and argued that he was

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" n o t t h a t t h e s e y o u t h s a r e geniuses"

completely cleared up." But when asked if he would be ready to give his "life in
the struggle for Negro rights" he was unsure. After deliberating for half an hour,
the jury "endorsed the expulsion of Harry Hankin and all white chauvanism'
from our ranks. YCL leaders hoped this trial would have "great significance"
throughout Chicago by showing white workers who "preach segregation for
colored workers" that they are "enemies of the working class."^'' And while the
party press made much of the trial, civil rights work never became the YCI^
major emphasis. Instead, the YCL recruited most of its black members as a by
product of the party's campaign against unemployment rather than through
specific work amdng black youth.
No record exists of women YCL members throughout the Third Period. The
only groups receiving special note were trade unionists and African Americans,
without indication of gender. It is not that women did not distinguish themselves'
among YCL activists. Vicky Starr, Jane March, and Edith Miller stood out for
their bravery and leadership skills. But the party's male culture trickled into the
YCL, so men became its leaders, and male party members failed to recognize
the quality and quantity of female participation, practices that prepared women
for the challenges they faced once they became ftill-fledged members.
With a membership of white students and nonworkers, YCL leaders found
that their culture also chafed party leaders. In the early 1930s, leaders were
perturbed at young Communists' willingness to shield political deviants in
their midst. By 1931, the party and the YCL had already been through a purge
of Trotskyists. Party leaders did not want to repeat it and for some time re
frained from calling the rebeUious and outspoken YCL leaders in their midst
"Trotskyites," but eventually they did. Kling recalled, "It soon became apparent
that the YCL leadership was bucking the Party on almost aU policy questions.
I felt that the diiferences were more than simply minor or mistaken views, but
that the main leadership was Trotskyist in outlook, left over from the time the
Trotskyites had been expelled from the Party and the YCL a few years earlier."^'
High-level meetings among Chicago's leaders confirm the independence of the
YCLs leadership and their willingness to "take up action contrary to the decision
that had just been made by the Party secretariat."^ But a purge of these leading
YCL activists, which resulted in their leaving the party for a national Trotskyist
youth group, simply left a vacuum without changing the YCL's culture. Regular
complaints of "bad attitudes," "right-wing leaders," and "bad tendencies" con
tinued to be heard in party meetings.^^
Upon purging themselves of supposed followers of Trotsky, YCL members
mcreasingly reached out to young Socialists. One party member commented
that the young Cornmunists were not "oriented toward anything except the
YPSL [Young Peoples Socialist League]." Commimist leaders would have liked
to interpret this orientation as subversive, but YCL members developed close

193

and trusting relationships with young Socialists. One YCL member wrote, "their
[YPSL] people here are on our side.... I believe the fellows are sincere." In
his thinking, these good connections "lay the basis for a national congress of
youth," which could focus on issues of war, homelessness, and unemployment
among youth, a congress that eventually materialized in 1934 in the form of
the American Youth Congress (AYC).^"
Yet even before the AYC, Kling recalled close relations between the YCL and
YPSL. YPSL leaders invited Kling to teach a class to their members on Marxism,
which he did at a borrowed cottage in the Indiana Dunes on Lake Michigan.
Once the school concluded, weekly classes continued in Chicago. These ami
cable interactions led to YPSL members refusing to follow their Socialist party
leaders when they broke with Communists in the planning stage of a "Free Tom
Mooney" congress that the groups were working on in a United Front fashion.
The national secretary of the YPSL, George Smerkin, spoke at the congress
despite the Socialist party's refusal to support it, causing his expulsion. By No
vember 1933, the entire national leadership of the YPSL found itself in the same
boat and joined the YCL. The YPSL may have been responsible for reaching out,
yet it is significant that during the Third Period, the YCL was willing to work
with them.^^
Such amiable relations with Socialist leaders flew in the face of Third Period
orthodoxy but were out of the party's control, since those in charge of the YCL
were themselves tolerant of such relations and uninterested in factional struggle.
Ben Gray was particularly opposed to factionalism. Instructed to attend party
meetings as a YCL representative. Gray witnessed factional attitudes and behav
iors that he felt distracted from the party's main activity. "The faction became
the important thing," he remembered, "whether they would make a victory at
this meeting or at that meeting, or they would isolate this guy or the other, and
I could never understand it and really didn't appreciate it."^ In one of the few
district buro meetings where Gray's words are recorded, he is trying to stop
early factionalism within the YCL and the party.^^
Kling also opposed sectarianism within the YCL. In addition to his tutelageof
YPSL students, he challenged Comintern leaders who accused Chicago's group
as having "a rotten liberal attitude" when it came to differing political views.
In 1932, he, Marks, and Green, who was already a national YCL leader, went
to Moscow to "consult" and "exchange experiences" with others. Working on
a resolution that deah with the American YCL, Kling and his fellow delegates
learned that Comintern leaders did not appreciate the openness Chicago's YCL
showed toward Trotskyists. Kling and the others agreed that they had a liberal
attitude, especially when it came to "shielding" Trotskyite members. But when
told that their liberal attitude was rotten, Kling and his delegation appealed to
the Comintern leader Otto Kuusinen (the former Finnish Communist party

194

" n o t t h a t t h e s e y o u t h s a r e geniuses"

red chicago

leader), to no avail.^ Such a scolding from Comintern leaders had little effect
on the activity of these YCL leaders, however, and Gil Green came before the
Comintern leadership once again in October 1934 to defend the YCL's partici
pation in the AYC. In Moscow, he found himself in the company of Raymond
Guyot, a leader of the French Communist youth who had also been involved
in broad-based youth movements. After three weeks of discussion, Comintern
leaders decided that Green and Guyot had been right in their work all along.
In this case, local activism predated international policy.^
Before the "correctness" of Chicago's YCL's attitude became the day's order,
the proper cultivation of its members was a regular concern of party leaders.
Their concern did not always translate into specific direction, however. In fact,
Chicago's YCL carried on in its unorthodox manner in large part because the
party paid them little daily attention. In 1931, a YCL representative scorned
party leaders by reminding them that "there was no representative in the league
from the Party, no daily guidance, no actual coordination between Party and
league."^" Bill Gebert admitted in private correspondence, "We did not give any
attention to the league and the league membership did not rise to the height of
the developments."^' By 1932, it seemed as though relations between the YCL
and party members had improved at the lower levels of the city's bureaucracy,
but as one leader commented, "[T]he same can not be said of the district lead
ership."'^ A local activist reported in 1933 that the "league is in a serious situa
tion
Party here seems to be rather contemptuous rather than helping Jack."^'
Lack of party assistance was so well known by 1935 that R Brown, critiquing
the party's inability to grow its YCL, commented, "I am sure that if the Chicago
district had assisted the YCL in all its work... today we would have different
picture."''^
Certainly, party and YCL forces worked on plans to institutionalize a close
relationship between the groups. A series of directives outlined their theoretical
working relationship. Nuclei leaders were to turn names of twenty-three-yearolds in their midst over to party leaders for YCL assignment. At the same time,
leaders from all levels were to be released for full-time work guiding the YCL.
Like party leaders, young Communists had the opportunity to be educated in
a YCL school. Party members were to supervise student recruitment to ensure
representation from "decisive factories." To show that YCL recruitment was
taken seriously, leaders agreed in 1934 to print its recruitment numbers along
with the party's own. For their part, YCL members were expected to attend
party meetings as a way to learn procedures, policies, and plans.'
Yet, however well-intended these proposals, party assistance was not forth
coming. Despite plenum decisions to assign people to supervise YCL work, only
one section turned in names of volunteers, and no section turned in names of
younger members, even though they existed.' By 1934, leaders removed YCL

195

functionaries borrowed from the party's ranks rather than bolster them and
declined to support YCL members attending party schools.'^ And financial ne
glect of the YCL went further. When approached for any percentage of money
raised from party bazaars or celebrations, the party flatly refused the YCL. Even
the five-dollar weekly subsidy the party had been paying to the YCL stopped.
Leaders did not want the YCL to fail, but the YCL was not its priority. Doling
out their meager resources with care, party leaders left litde for the YCL.'
Tense relations between the YCL and the party did not deter YCL members
from jumping headlong into party-initiated drives. In fact, leaders regularly
criticized those in the YCL for not charting their own course. Making the break
was difficult for them. With little financial backing, a student-heavy base, and
Third Period priorities, YCL members spent a great deal of their time meeting
with one another and working on party-organized activities of Unemployed
Councils and union building. When they did branch out in 1932 to organize a
counter-Olympics in the city, they received little party support, and their efforts
passed with little notice. Not until student activity at the University of Chicago
began to take on a life of its own did the student-heavy base of the YCL begin
to pay off and the liberal attitudes of its members result in new and sustainable
coalitions.
The YCL in Action

Thinking back on their time as YCLers, Chuck Hall and Les Orear remembered
the insularity of their groups. Hall recalled, "We put out a lot of leaflets, we did
a lot of going around to [party] demonstrations. I would say we were rather a
sectarian group. We were not really a part of the flow of life in the community."'^
Orear simply labeled his group "pretty inbred.""*^ Their memories fit with com
ments of league leaders from the period. In May 1930, John Marks told party
leaders, "While the YCL in the district has recently made ideological progress
in its struggle against the right danger, left sectarianism, student ideology, etc.,
the league organizationally is completely isolated from young workers.""^ Two
years later another league leader added, "The activity and life of YCL is internal.
There are no specific youth activities, no development of mass struggles around
youth issues
Comrades don't try to take on youth features from Commu
nist working-class point of view but bourgeois youth ideology is reflected in
the ranks
The YCL tries to copy too much the Party activities and Party
campaigns
They are trying with a weak apparatus to conduct a dozen cam
paigns, instead of concentrating on one or two.""^
If in the early 1930s league members did stick closely to party activity and
their numbers did not grow significantly, they nevertheless gained experience
for future alliances with non-party youth where adult Communists were ab-

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red chicago

sent. Fighting alongside party activists, young Communists were supported in

their militancy, encouraged to seek and challenge breaches of civil rights, and
nurtured with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in hopes of countering the
education they received through the public schools. Their experiences with Un
employed Councils and unions revealed the underside of capitalism, reinforcing
their party education and committing a solid core to a future as full-fledged
activists. Gradually pulling away from the party in 1932 and after, YCL activ
ists found their own niche challenging war and fascism. Through the auxiliary
organization, the National Student League (NSL), young Communists began to
break out of their isolation and into a broader scene where young people like
themselves questioned the world they were about to inherit."^
When it came to unemployed activity, league members usually followed
the lead of their elders in Unemployed Councils. Their contribution consisted
largely of passing out leaflets and demonstrating. Harry Haywood recalled
being joined in his arrest in front of a relief station by the YCL organizer for
the Hyde Park neighborhood and a University of Chicago student who was
also a YCL member."" Occasionally their bravery stood out. During the March
6> 1930, mass rally against unemployment, Chicago's police arrested Fred Fine,
a fourteen-year-old demonstrator party leaders called "the kid." In front of a
group of party leaders, police twice slapped Fine's face, called him a "dirty Jew,"
and asked if he would try to shoot if he had access to the officer's gun. When
Fine replied, "Yes, I would," he earned the respect of leaders who sat defenseless
on the bench behind him."
Because YCL participation in unemployed activity did not always have a dis
tinguishing character, Kling made sure to point out cases to party leaders when
it did. One of these moments occurred in 1932 after cuts in relief resulted in a
demonstration where a relief worker at the Emmerson relief station slapped a
black applicant. YCL activists planned a follow-up demonstration demanding
no relief cut, payment of rent, removal of the offending official, and no dis
crimination against youth, even though the party had not articulated offenses
against young people. YCL members worked flophouses and poolrooms to turn
out young people for the demonstration.
According to Kling, one thousand people, most of them African American,
gathered and elected a small committee to enter the office. Once inside, relief
officials refused them a hearing, and police officers prevented their leaving. In
response, "a royal battle took place," writes Kling, where demonstrators smashed
doors and threw rocks and bottles to counter police clubs and blackjacks. Police
knocked the YCL unit organizer Edith Miller unconscious. Five of the many
arrested were YCL members."
After the arrests, a smaller group proceeded to the Unemployed Council
office at Fortieth and Federal, where police and Red Squad officials, in Kling's

" n o t t h a t t h e s e y o u t h s a r e geniuses"

197

words, "marched in at the point of guns." After asking women to leave, the of
ficials, Kling recalled, "lined up the men against the walls, with hands lifted over
their heads and beat hell out of them. Then they arrested die bunch. About 50
were arrested." YCL members were among the group. Before the police had
control of the situation, however, a small number of activists were able to escape
through a back window. They gathered block captains from councils in other
territories for a late-night meeting where they organized a demonstration at
the court the following morning. About four hundred showed up to the dem
onstration, but police were mobilized for twelve blocks around the courthouse,
arresting "every worl^r that walked" past. Kling reported, "[Q]uite a number
of YCL comrades and young workers were also arrested.""^ It was Kling's hope
that such active YCL participation would build YCL numbers, and he happily
reported that directly following the incident, youth attending three South Side
YCL meetings showed a "splendid spirit." In one case, five new young workers
showed up, having only been active in worker sport clubs, but on the whole,
neither this incident nor any single Unemployed Council event resulted in a
surge of membership."
The same can be said of the YCL's union work, although YCL activists distin
guished themselves in the packinghouse campaign in ways party activists had
not. As in their worksupporting Unemployed Councils, YCL activists served as
resources for party unionists. Their influence is evident in shop papers, such as
the piece that appeared in the May 1928 edition of the Northwestern Railroad
paper, which expressed apprentices' complaint that "older workers took a posi
tion against aid to youth in the shop." The article calls on the apprentices to
overcome divisions with older workers: "Employers are united and we should
be." Military intelligence reports also note young Communist support of union
drives. In one case, a University of Chicago student and member of the NSL,
Stella Winn, opened her Hyde Park apartment to the TUUL's office workers'
union for a "studio party," which included portrait sketches, entertainment, and
dancing.'^ Similar attention and support was given in steel, metal, and meat
packing, but it was not until 1934 that the YCL could actually speak of units
within industry, and even then they were concentrated in meatpacking.
YCL activists did participate in the large 1933 strike at Sopkins and Sons, and
while they did not take on a role different than party leaders', their participation
sometimes made strike activity a family affair.' One family, the Holmans, was
both a party and YCL family whose members opened their home to discuss
the strike. One time the police interrupted and began to separate whites from
blacks, placing one Jewish leader with the blacks and a light-skinned African
American with the whites. Both YCL and party members learned an important
lesson on how easUy race could be used to divide workers. Each group got a
lecture attacking the other race. Police bungling foiled the plan to create suspi-

i p s

red chicago

cion between the groups, but the experience confirmed lessons youth learned
through party readings, lectures, classes, and family discussions.^
By all accounts, meatpacking was the industry the YCL best served. Minutes
from the party section that incorporated the stockyards indicate that as late as
September 1933, party members felt a paternal urge to guide the work of YCL
activists in the Yards: "Party member... unable to impress youth in unit with
need for work and not all play. Unit to try to send additional older comrade there
to guide."^^ It is unclear, however, whether this comment reflected conditions
among youth in the Yards or party members' sense of self-importance, because
beginning in 1933 it was members of the YCL who put in gear the packinghouse
union drive. Prior to that time, party members only experienced brief moments
of glory in a demonstration, rally, or organizational meeting. The arrival of
Herb March and the activism of women YCLers in departments in Armour's
plant began to turn the tide. Of course, March and these young women were
not solely to credit. They worked hand in hand with older members scattered
throughout the Yards and had Roosevelt's New Deal momentum working for
them. But youth connections and attitudes made a difference.
March himself was used to a certain amount of independence in his work.
Growing up in Brooklyn, he was exposed to community organizing and leftist
politics at a young age. Watching neighbors come together for rent strikes and
listening to street-corner meetings of radical groups, March made up his mind
to become a Communist because he "didn't think it was right for some people
to be poor and some people to be so damn rich." He signed up with the YCL
at the age of sixteen and supported strikers in Paterson, New Jersey, where he
was arrested during a silk strike. He also worked for civil rights and against
unemployment in Kansas City Quickly making his mark, March became a YCL
organizer for a seven-state region in the Southwest, gaining his reputation of
being "a maverick" and "hard to control." But through his direction, YCL mem
bers got jobs in Kansas City's packinghouses and began to organize workers.
In the early 1930s, he married Jane Grbac from Chicago, who would organize
at the University of Chicago settlement and oversee the YCL in the Back of
the Yards neighborhood. Wanting to start a family with his new wife, March
moved to Chicago, where he was able to land a job working in the stockyards.
His experiences in Kansas City and his independent spirit served him well as
he drew on party and YCL resources that had been largely stagnant before his
arrival.^
March stands out because his energy and determination ultimately resulted
in a successful meatpacking drive and because of his his promotion to director
of the union's districtan indication of the importance that one highly skilled
party organizer could makebut he was not alone among YCL members mak
ing a significant contribution to the drive. A core of YCLwomen working within

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199

the plants made headway, winning small demands and signing up members to
the PHWIU. In interviews given later in his life, March emphasized the strength
the PHWIU had on the sheep and hog kill in the Armour plant, decisive de
partments with a large number of African American workers. And while the
union might have had its strongest representation in these areas, reports from
the party indicate that party "units [were] basically composed of girls."
One of these young women was Vicky Starr. On her family's farm, Starr be
came friendly with a woman who had spent time with the family for her health
and now needed to return to Chicago to get an operation. Seventeen and needing
work to help relieve her family's financial strain, Starr left with her for Chicago
and boarded with her family in the city. Two of its members were Herb and
Jane March. Through the Marches, Vicky became radicalized. "The Marches
would have meetings of the YCL in the attic and they'd ask me to sit in
They
pointed out things to me that, in my very unsophisticated and farm-like way,
I saw.... [YCLers] thought that instead of just thinking about ourselves we
should be thinking about other people and try to get them together in a union
and organize and then maybe we would have socialism where there would not
be hunger, war, etc. They initiated me into a lot of political ideas and gave me
material to read. We had classes and we would discuss industrial unionism, the
craft unions and the history of the labor movement in this country"^
Politicized and ready to make change, Starr obtained a job at Armour, where
she began to organize women workers. One floor below her department, a
woman lost her fingers in a meat chopper that lacked safety guards. Starr and
two other women organized a stoppage. Six floors participated in the sit-down,
which resulted in the company adding safety equipment and women gaining
an interest in the union.'
The YCL also made a difference in the ability of its organizers to get shop
papers into the hands of stockyard workers. Drawing on their student strength,
YCL organizers contacted a group from the University of Chicago to help edit
and raise funds to publish the Yards' Worker. They also helped write other leaflets,
and they distributed them at the stockyard gates before the 7 a.m. shift. Vicky
Starr recalled, "They did this because we could not do so, for if we were caught
giving out leaflets we would be fired." Rather than publicly handing out party
materials, Starr snuck papers into the plant on her person and spread them out
in the washroom. "I really think we had a lot of guts," she recalled. Such antics
occasionally paid off. At least two workers turned in YCL applications found
inside the Yards' paper.'
In 1934, YCL leaders announced that they were able to "initiate a move
ment for united action on part of various unions in packing." According to the
report, workers in the PHWIU and the Stockyards Labor Council responded
well to the suggestion of unity. Some individual AFL members agreed to unity.

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but for a time their leaders "sabotaged" the effort. Regardless, members of the
YCL persisted assigning each shop nuclei member to a particular union. Two
YCL members were elected to the executive board of the SLC.*^ Despite their
small numbers, YCL members made a difference in the Yards drive, gave young
people union-building experience, and placed youth in leadership positions.
Their work organizing a counter-Olympics protest was not as successful. The
organization that planned the protest had its beginnings in 1927, when a United
Front group of Communists, Socialists, and members of the IWW founded the
Labor Sports Union to encourage athletics among workers while winning them
away from boss-controlled athletic organizations, where anti-union propaganda
persisted. By 1929, the party purged Socialists and IWW members from the
organization and affiliated it to Moscow's Red Sports International.^' Put under
the YCLs control, its members held fraction meetings to plan the organization's
leadership and activities. In October 1930, the national executive board fraction
of the LSU put forward Jack Kling, then living in New York, as a member of
the LSU's national council. Three YCL members from Chicago and one party
member were also on the slate.^
The idea of organizing an International Workers' Athletic Meet, or a counterOlympics, built on a European tradition of the worker-sport movement. The
historian William Baker points out how European trade unionists, long tired
of the capitalist exploitation of sports, formed working-class athletic clubs and
sporting events throughout the interwar era. In 1928, four million people be
longed to either the Socialist Workers' Sport International or the Red Sports
International. Between 1921 and 1937, these worker-sport groups participated
in Olympiads and sporting events in Germany, France, Austria, Russia, Norway,
and Czechoslovakia. One year before the Chicago event, over 1,400 athletes
competed before more than a quarter of a million people in Vienna.*^'
The YCL and the LSU had a rich tradition of sport protest upon which to
draw."* The problem was that the party itself did not take an interest in the
campaign, and Chicago's YCL followed its lead. When counter-Olympic com
mittee members approached Detroit's party organizer, he dismissed the national
representative and told them simply to "go to the youth." Chicago's leadership
similarly marginalized the campaign. Its secretariat assigned two party mem
bers to work on the campaign, but one flatly refused, and the other was only
"partially active." Meanwhile, Chicago's leadership"forgot" to invite the national
representatives of the counter-Olympic committee to a gathering so they could
familiarize members with and encourage support for the event.^
Chicago's language and fraternal groups also did not provide much support.
Offering lip service only, none of the groups carried out directives passed on to
them by the national counter-Olympic committee. In a letter from the national

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201

committee to Earl Browder, committee members explained, "We requested ap

pointments with the respective language bureaus for the purposes of discussing
the building of the Labor Sports Union in these language organizations, but
to date not a single bureau has notified us regarding their meeting dates." The
committee also asked that these groups discuss workers' sports, endorse the
counter-Olympics, and print the national committee's publicity in their presses,
but the requests were "almost entirely ignored."^
The organization that should have been most engaged in this campaign, the
YCL, was similarly disengaged. National leaders reported that the YCL in De
troit and Chicago had done almost no work to support the counter-Olympics.
Chicago's group, in particular, ignored specific directives. In January 1932, only
five YCL members were reported among the membership of the city's LSU of
450.*^' It was no wonder that national counter-Olympic organizers asked the
party's Central Committee to send out a sharp letter on their behalf, assign
representatives to direct the campaign, and "take the leadership of the sports'
movement out of the hands of the YCL."
In addition to party indifference, the LSU had problems with city officials,
publicity, weather, and threats from athletic organizations. As Baker outlines, na
tional news agencies ignored counter-Olympic news releases, and even the Daily
Worker offered only occasional reporting. "Free Tom Mooney Runs," swimming,
basketball, and soccer tournaments that were to occur in cities throughout the
country as preliminary heats leading up to the Olympics met with obstacles.
Boston's city officials refused permission to host a run through its city streets;
Buffalo and Detroit would not allow the use of school gyms for athletes' training;
a downpour stopped the race in Cleveland; and the Amateur Athletic Union
threatened a lifetime ban on any athlete participating in the r^ns. As the date for
the opening of the games approached, LSU officials learned that two German
worker-athletes and five Russians, hoping to participate in the games, would
not be permitted visas.'
These botched meets culminated at the University of Chicago's Stagg Field,
the site for a poorly attended International Workers' Athletic Meet. Numbers
of spectators and athletes vary in each report, but regardless they do not add up
to much. While the DailyWorker reported that five thousand watched from the
stands, at least one participant insists that numbers did not reach two thousand,
despite a low, twenty-five-cent admission fee.'
While the number of athletesbetween two and four hundred, compared to
the approximately 1,500 who attended the Los Angeles Olympic gameswas
disappointing, their composition speaks to the significance of the event. While
a large percentage were ethnic, anywhere from one-quarter to one-third were
African Americana significant fact, considering that only four blacks were

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red chicago

represented on the American track and field team in Los Angeles. As Mark
Naison has shown, this commitment to black athletes became a hallmark of
Communist party race work.''
Despite the working-class flavor of the event, and maybe because of it, Chi
cagos counter-Olympics did not serve as a serious alternative to the Olympic
games as the LSU intended. Nor did the games do much toward freeing Tom
Mooney One indoor meeting held on the games' opening night to protest
Mooney's arrest was all the organizers had to show. If William Baker is correct
that the games underscored the weakness of the workers' sport movement," he
is less insightful when he suggests that they also demonstrated the "marginal
position of the Communist Party."^^ In many ways the counter-Olympic dem
onstration was a remnant of 1920s ethnic-based activism and did not reflect the
changes that were occurring within the party's base. Party members' and youth
activists' lack of interest suggests that they were more invested in the campaigns
that were drawing Communist activists out of the margins and into the center
of political activity. Their involvement with a broad antiwar movement proved
Communists were anything but marginal.
Chicagos antiwar movement blossomed overnight. Young Communists' in
terest in organizing on college campuses and in Chicago's communities against
capitalism, war, and fascism set them apart from young people before them.
Using politics and personal networks to bridge town and gown, young Com
munists would eventually play a leading role in the city's antiwar movement.
In mobilizing this movement, they made lasting connections with youth of all
political stripes and found these peers increasingly receptive to related issues
of academic freedom, free speech, and civil rights.
Scholars writing on youth antiwar work tend to focus on college students'
activities. Certainly such actions on campuses in the city, and especially at the
University of Chicago, represented a high-water mark of party outreach and
influence. But in Chicago, nonstudent youth also participated in antiwar work.
One party report indicated that the YCL was building an antiwar united front
in the Back of the Yards, in the Gross settlement house, among workers at the
National Malleable plant, and within churches and community organizations.'^
Herb March remembered recruiting the YCL member Mary Shukshick, a Polish
woman, and some Ukrainian members direcdy through the peace movement.
Members of the YCL in the stockyards were particularly active in the antiwar
movement. One attended a peace conference in Paris and agreed to report
on it at a local conference on war and fascism.''' Others served as delegates to
the national antiwar organization, the American Congress against War and
Fascism, where they met YCL members from the YMCA and various shops
throughout the city. These YCL members also worked on building community
organizations against war. One report indicated that there were "steps to build

" n o t t h a t t h e s e y o u t h s a r e geniuses"

20$

sixty-seven neighborhood committees" in such places as Albany Park, Rogers

Park, the lower West Side, the West Side, the South Side, and around the uni
versity campus. In November 1934, four committees already fimctioned. Albany
Park's organization brought together ten community groups; the one on the
South Side included representatives from churches, factories, sport clubs, and
mass organizations; Rogers Park's group included six churches; and one com
munity group had representatives from the Presbyterian church, sports clubs,
and revolutionary organizations.'
Party leaders were most interested in the antiwar work that occurred in the
shops. It was the Third Period, after all, and party activists were to focus on
workers and class conflict, not privileged students training to enter the middle
class. Leaders' desires, however, were undermined by the attention received and
activity initiated by YCL members at the University of Chicago and at other
schools in the city.
A headline of the April 1932 Daily Maroon announced,"Communism Comes
to Campus! Form Chapter of League." The league in question was the National
Student League, an organization that appealed to a core of the nation's most radi
cal students due to its disdain for liberalism, its critique of America's economic
and political system, its willingness to uphold the Soviet model for emulation,
and its implicit tie to the American Communist party, with its commitment
to labor and unemployed struggles and its relationship to Soviet Russia. Wal
ter Quinn, one of the University of Chicago NSL's graduate-student members,
confirmed this commitment to reporters for the Daily Maroon, stating that the
NSL was building a movement "'against the present narrow confines of the
capitalistic order.'" To do this, NSL members pledged to "take the part of the
worker at all opportunities, and to participate in strikes and picketing about
the city."' It was with workers that NSL members felt a common bond, "for
the holder of the Ph.D. is as unlikely to find work under the present regime of
economic exploitation and capitalistic rule as is the laborer.""
Revolutionary rhetoric and class ideology ensured that the NSL never be
came a mass movement, and yet the size of its membership and the numbers
who attended its open meetings reveal a larger interest in leftist politics among
college students than had existed up to that time.' According to the Daily Ma
roon, the NSL counted seventy-five members within a few weeks of its birth.
One open meeting brought in five hundred, and weekly discussion and study
groups attracted thirty to fortystudents a session. In April 1933, the University
of Chicago's NSL began publishing its own newspaper. Vie Upsurge. Its first
edition sold over 450 copies, and it was selling 650 by the end of 1934."
In no way did all of these members identify as Communists. In a Daily
Maroon interview, the chairman of Chicago's NSL and YCL member Julius
Hauser stated that the league was "overwhelmingly non-Communist" and that

204

red chicago

his Communist viewpoint was "but a minority here." Hauser emphasized that
"RepubUcan, Democrat, Socialist, Communist, in short any political brand of
student, is invited to become a member." The only hitch was that members had
to be committed to work toward a "changed social order.""
Of course, the party had an interest in shaping the tone and activity of the
group, but its hands-off approach toward the YCL and the character of YCL
members meant that YCL actions within the NSL were fairly free from direct
party control. One report from 1934 indicated that the YCL had started with a
campus unit of fourteen members that grew to twenty-one, but even in that unit
ideological conformity was ephemeral. After all, at the University of Chicago
YCL members came from different walks of life than those in the stockyards.
A YCL leader explained, "There were all sorts of people in the YCL, daughters
of corporation lawyers, army generals, etc., with such people in a unit, I thmk
it is obvious that it was a difficult thing to fight for a real clear cut line on the
University campus."'
That the- NSL found any appeal at the University of Chicago speaks to the
changes that college students underwent in the early Depression years. As Rob
ert Cohen describes, 1932 was a pivotal year in the attitudes of college students
across the nation. It was the first peacetime year that college enrollments fell,
causing a spiral effect on campus budgets and erosion of the optimistic tenor
on campuses. Cohen notes that faculty found students more interested in un
derstanding the world around them, particularly concerned about why the De
pression started and how it could be stopped. Such concerns extended beyond
campus to working people and low-income students. Student confidence of the
1920s was slowly wearing away as the nation entered its third and fourth years
of economic turmoil. Young peoples futures were uncertain; upward mobility
was not a guarantee.^
These national trends were reflected at the University of Chicago. Drawing
on Chicago-area high schools for its student body, the university served as one
road to opportunity for the city's white youth.^ The entering class of 1932 had
more fathers in middle-class occupations than classes of the 1920s, and far fewer
students were self-supporting. Mary Dzuback argues that the increasingly mid
dle-class character of Chicago's students indicates that they "expected to support
themselves after they finished formal schooling, and it is hi^ly unlikely that
they perceived their higher education in isolation from these ftiture plans."'*
With an increased concern for the world around them, NSL students found
themselves at a campus ripe for organizing. One student commented in the cam
pus newspaper, "There seems to be no question that there is a rapidly growing
radical group on this campus. And it seems to be a group willing to get out and
demonstrate its beliefs
We hail this group of students who are sufficiently
wide-awake and interested in current affairs to organize these movements, be

"not that these youths are geniuses"

2o5

their political afiiliations what they may. They are at least sincere enough in their
convictions to get out and win supporters. They are at least doing something.
Undergraduates are too frequently not to be found in that category when social
concerns are at stake."
The University of Chicago had emerged in its earliest days as a model mod
ern university with strong research traditions among its faculty, ties to the city's
neighborhood and cultural institutions, and a liberal undergraduate education.
Even before its students became more receptive to leftist ideas, a small core of
its faculty delivered public lectures on Marx and Lenin, brought local leftists in
for talks, and reported on their own observations of Soviet Russia. The Socialist
club, the Cosmos club, a political science club, and the debate club sponsored
lectures and discussions on social, economic, and political questions, but 1932
began a new era on campus where young people acted more than they talked,
and they initiated their own activity rather than relying on faculty or party
leaders.
Signs that students were willing to back words with action began to emerge
in the spring of 1932, when the Communist party and the YCL planned an an
tiwar demonstration outside of the Japanese consulate in the middle of the city.
Arguing against Japanese militarism and aggression in China, NSL students
distributed leaflets at the University of Chicago and Northwestern University,
with "several groups of students" from each campus attending. Mingling with
a group of five thousand, including fifty Chinese observers, students watched
as "hundreds of police on foot, horse, and motorcycle as well as squad car"
batded to disperse the crowd. Police gunfire resulted in a few injuries; police
arrested twenty-seven demonstrators, a few of whom were University of Chi
cago students.
Shortly after this antiwar protest. University of Chicago students joined with
other college and high-school students in a march on Samuel Insull's home,
protesting his stake in the oppressive conditions in Kentucky's Harlan County
coal mines. Promptly arrested by Chicago's police, these young radicals were
joining in a cause with young activists on the East Coast. Students there desired
to bring attention to the oppressive conditions of the striking Harlan County
miners. Eighty delegates from the East headed out with supplies to aid the
striking miners and witness their conditions. Stopped at the Kentucky border
by a district attorney and armed deputies, the students were accused of being
"revolutionists." Appeals to governors and officials in Washington did not change
the outcome. Concluding that coal operators were able to "keep from the outside
world the knowledge of living and working conditions of thousands of miners,
citizens of the United States," one young activist spoke for a growing pool of
young people who were learning lessons in corporate and state power.'
Shortly after the Kentucky rides and the InsuU picketing, students in Chicago

206

RED CHICAGO

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

20/

decided they would survey conditions in lUinoiss coalfields. Some 150 Chicago

Connections between college and high-school students proved to be impor

students and teachers convened at the University of Chicago and began their

tant recruitment tools for the student movement. Quentin Young, a former YCL

journey to southern Illinois, but as the students experienced in Kentucky, au

member, remembered living "in the shadow of the University of Chicago" as a

thorities held them off. The sheriff of Browning County gripped a shotgun and

student at Hyde Park High School, where students from the university would

declared that "no agitation is needed in Franklin County just now." This reac

organize. Young recalls looking up to these who "stood the test of courage and

tion was all that most of the delegation needed to turn back, but five members

dedication and leadership. Made me want to be that way."'^ Sometimes the

managed to avoid the sheriff. They were eventually arrested and, according to

connection between the university and the high-school activists was familial.

an NSL leader, "learned, for the first

Julius Hauser, an NSL leader and YCL member, was a former student at Hyde

time in their lives, what the inside of a

backwoods jail is like."

Park High; his sister Lillian, still attending high school, worked with Julius in

Connections with a larger student movement and a concern for changes

across society continued with the calling of the first Student Congress against

recruiting for the Student Congress against War.'^

Another important factor in bringing students to the antiwar cause was the

War, held in Chicago in December 1932. According to military intelligence

nation's experience in World War 1. As Robert Cohen points out, activists used

reports, two hundred elected student delegates from Chicago's high schools,

lessons from the war as a message that citizens needed to prevent the country's

colleges, and universities attended the conference. Crane Junior College sent

entry into what they saw as another mistaken Armageddon. With their futures

about one hundred students and fifty teachers. Crane's night school was respon

hanging in the balance, student activists increasingly questioned the values of

sible for sixty-one of the student delegates. Tuley High School held a student

business leaders and argued that the United States had entered the war for eco

assembly and elected thirty-five delegates, with almost as many teachers from

nomic rather than moral reasons. The contemporary historian James Shotwell

that school attending.Teachers at Hyde Park High let some female students take

noted, "The tendency to find in economics the chief if not the sole cause of war

ten minutes in classes to promote the conference. Roosevelt, Marshall, Harrison,

has grown in the United States in recent years and has almost become an axiom

and Lane high schools also provided delegates, along with the YMCA College,

in the thinking of the younger generation."'^ According to Cohen, students who

the Lewis Institute, Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago.'

grew up hearing stories of the war "felt threatened by the deterioration of in

Joining their?hvo hundred with five hundred students from around the coun
try, Chicago'^delegates listened to Joseph Cohen of Brooklyn College, who four

ternational relations and the prospects of a wara war which they knew could
be even more devastating to their lives than had the Depression itself."'"*

months earlier had attended the Amsterdam World Congress against War as

Activism in high schools continued throughout 1933 and 1934, proving that

the NSL d^egate. He warned that "during the war years college laboratories

heightened political interest was not confined to the college set. According to

were used for gas production; colleges were army training camps." Capitalism,

Chicago police arrest records, ten high-school students were arrested on the

he instructed, was the cause of all wars. They also heard a message sent from

West Side on September 20,1933, for distributing leaflets at Englewood High

Theodore Dreiser and read by Henry Sloan Coffin of the Union Theological

School, posting leaflets at Marshall High, and general "disorderly conduct." Such

Seminary. Earl Browder and Upton Close debated the merits of pacifism, and

activity led to a demonstration organized by party and YCL groups against the

Jane Addams and Scott Nearing lectured on how to ensure peace. At night,

German consulate the following day on Michigan Avenue, where seven people

delegates broke into study groups and worked on militarism on campus and

under the age of twenty were arrested.'^

student and worker opposition to war.

Such events provided the backdrop to a growing antiwar movement on Chi

That jeers and shouts poured forth when Jane Addams and Upton Close

cago's college campuses, spurred to action in part by Oxford University under

promoted a pacifist perspective rather than a Communist one is less intrigu

graduates who, in February 1933, resolved that they "will in no circumstances

ing than the fact that the congress, with its large non-Communist participation,

fight for King and Country." In May 1933, editors of the University of Chicago's

went off at all. Despite their prejudice against broad movements, Chicago's

student newspaper took a poll to determine student opinions on the war. Of

Communist students were willing participants. Even Make Mills, the head of

I>64O students responding, only 346 declared an interest in fighting

Chicago's Red Squad, commented on how readily Communists accepted non

in which the United States participated. Over twice as many, 746, were not

party participants. Mills chalked up Communist self-control to the fact that

"the Communist group was too yellow to make a fight on the floor."
the Communist group was unwilling to alienate its new allies.'"

More likely,

interested in fighting

in any war

a war unless invaded, and 548 stood for peace no mat

ter how provoked. Sentiment at the university differed from national student
opinion. Nationally, more students refused to support war even in the event of

208

RED CHICAGO

an invasion than did at the University of Chicago. Still, a vibrant antiwar group
coalesced at the university under the NSL's leadership.^
In January 1934, the University of Chicago's NSL announced its formal par

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

209

The momentum from the strike resulted in wider contacts between leftist
groups and antiwar groups on campus and in the community. The Student
Union against War and Fascism was opened to anyone on campus who was

ticipation in a national student strike against war, which would occur on April

interested in participating in demonstrations and discussions against war. On

6, the anniversary of the U.S. entry into World War 1. By March, the Daily Ma

the University of Chicago's campus, the group reached out to fraternities and

roon announced that the strike would occur under a broad coalition called the

the general student body as well as such politically engaged groups as the So

United Antiwar Association, of which the NSL would be only one of the sup

cialist club, a seminary group, the NSL, and the Cosmos club.'"

porting groups.The united group welcomed aU campus clubs and organizations

Meanwhile, the campus's NSL affiliated with the American League against War

and drafted a program that lent itself to inclusiveness among those opposed to

and Fascism, where they made connections to antiwar groups in the city. Locally,

war.^

these antiwar groups operated like the national American League against War

On April 6,1934, the United Antiwar Association called for students to leave

and Fascism in bringing together Communist groups and prominent non-Com-

their classes at eleven o'clock to join a parade, which would proceed around

munists opposed to war. Chicago's branch of the league included such prominent

campus and stop at the Hutchins Circle. At noon, leaders would burn in ef

Communists as Bill Gebert but also an impressive array of non-party activists,

figy William Randolph Hearst for vigorously fanning the flames of war in his

including the University of Chicago professor Robert Morss Lovett, the Chicago

newspapers. Student speeches would follow the parade. In the weeks following,

Urban League's Arthur Falk, and the Socialist Ministerial Alliance's Rev. W. B.

the committee planned a symposium on war and a two-day antiwar confer

Waltmire. The organizing conference for the Chicago branch included twelve

ence.' Campus newspaper reporters commented on the historic nature of this

trade-union delegates, thirteen unemployed-organization delegates, fourteen

protest when they wrote, "A demonstration of this kind has not been held on

labor-defense delegates, sixteen from political groups, twenty-nine from cultural

the campus in recent years."''

organizations, eleven from fraternal organizations, three from church groups,

and thirty-nine from youth organizations.^'" In this way, the antiwar movement
at the University of Chicago fit within a national context of antiwar activity and
antifascist movements, providing its students with information, resources, and
credibility. Swept up in these movements, several of Chicago's youth activists
would later risk their lives fighting against fascism in Spain.^^
As antiwar momentum grew, the University of Chicago's administration tried
to contain its student activists. When it denied permission to hold a protest in
November 1934, Student Union activists proceeded anyway, resulting in the
loss of their group's charter. Rather than quieting the students, however, the
university's actions extended the issues. In this case, according to one Commu
nist activist, students considered the "campaign against war and fascism more
important than the trivial objections put forward by the Dean's office." Now, in
the eyes of student activists, the campus was not only a place that nurtured mili
tarism through its ROTC and research programs, but it also willingly stepped
on "the most elementary rights of free speech and free assemblage."^' Support
for the Student Union quickly gathered from such groups as the debate union
and the Fellowship of Socialist Christians of the Chicago Theological Seminary.
Balking at the suggestion that their tuition dollars paid for "nothing more than
a formal education," Chicago's student body began to discuss the need for "stu
dent rights," a new and poignant critique of the university's relationship to its

Antiwar demonstration at the University of Chicago, April 13,1935. (Chicago Historical

Society, ICHi-2i48i, photograph: Herald Examiner)

students. Perhaps in an attempt to undermine the movement they saw build

210

RED CHICAGO

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

ing, the university administration did a quick turnaround and reinstated the
Student Union.^"'*

211

Walgreen himself testified that Norton's reading of the Communist Manifesto for
her social science course convinced her that the "family as an institution was dis

In the aftermath of the Student Unions fight for existence, the movement on

appearing." She began questioning the values of business leaders in the country,

campus against war grew and broadened. In January 1935, twelve student groups

thinking them greedy and wondering if the American system of government

came together to discuss world peace at a campus symposium. In addition to

was the best model, inquiries that suggested critical thinking and reflected the

the usual political characters, there were representatives from fraternities, the

sentiments of a growing number of people living through the Depression rather

divinity school, and the campus band. The diversity of their backgrounds did

than any particular indoctrination. A few days before the hearings, Norton told

not preclude a united position against war. The Daily Maroon reporter Wells

a reporter that she had not been indoctrinated but had changed her mind. In

Burnette observed,"[T]he most convincing peace poU conclusion reached by the

response to a committee member's question about why she changed her mind,

meeting was that one hundred percent of the speakers who gave opinions on the

she replied that when asked she did not know what indoctrination meant and

matter would not bear arms for the United States in time of war!"'^ That April,

feared that it had to do with immoral sexuality. As a contemporary commented,

a second national strike against war took place. This time, on the University of

"'The pathetic ignorance in her voice could not arouse even the hero-worship

Chicago's campus an even broader committee, including the International "Rela

ping DAR. There were badly-concealed snickers in the room.'""''

tions club. Social Problems club, YWCA, Socialist club, NSL, Research Union,

Adding to the show was a "Mrs. Albert Dilling," an unabashed anti-Com

Kappa Alpha Psi, and the Student League for Industrial Democracy, organized

munist who saw Soviet intrigue everywhere. Dilling testified, "'Yes, they are

the event.'"^

aU affiliated with the Communists. Professor Robert Morss Lovett, Professor

And while student activism against war united the campus's small core of

Schumann, Dean Gilkey. The whole university is filled

with them.'" She also

Communists with a broad group of the student body in a single cause, the cam

went on to accuse Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Senator William

pus and its alumni's response to an IllinoisSenate investigation of Communists

Borah of being Communists."'

even more effectively speaks to the widespread acceptance of various political

ideas in a college community. Although the investigation focused on professors

,/

It was not hard for the university's president, Robert Hutchins, and profes
sors Frederick Schuman, Robert Morss Lovett, and Harr)^<jideonse, faculty

and their teachings, the fact that Charles Walgreens accusations of Communist

members fingered

influence at the university appeared only a few days after the student antiwar

doctrination. First of all, none of them was a Communist, although Schuman

strike implied a broader attack on the university's politics as a whole.^"'

and Lovett sympathized and participated in Left-supported events. Second,

Ellen Schrecker and other scholars have traced back the cold-war repression
of leftists in public schools and higher education to such investigations as the
one instigated by the pharmacy mogul Walgreen.^" The fact that the inquiry
did not result in any firings

does not lessen its oppressive tenor. Yet the over

as the main agitators, to make a compelling case against in

they ably made the argument that the university is a place where people should
"discuss important problems critically, objectively, and scientifically^"^
Support for academic freedom expanded beyond the halls of the county build
ing. As soon as Walgreen announced his charges, students. President Hutchins,

whelming campus response to underplay his attack and to support teachings

alumni, politicians, and faculty rallied to the university's cause. One Daily Ma

of altvarieties sets this period apart from that of the 1950s and suggests some

roon column mocked Walgreen for his exaggerated perspective. In a fictionalized

level of acceptance of the idea that the university is a place for the sharing of

telephone conversation, Walgreen inquires about the number of Communists

ideas.
Walgreen withdrew his niece, Lucille Norton, from the University of Chicago,

registered at the university. When the university administrator replies "fifteen,"

Walgreen shouts back, "Ah! Fifteen hundred! Full of 'em." When told that his

convinced it was a hotbed of Communism. Committed to ridding the state's

niece was enrolled in a course in the social sciences, Walgreen replies, "Aha!

schools of Communist teachers, ideas, readings, and values, state senators fol

Socialism!""^

lowed Walgreen's action and launched an investigation into its schools. Led by

Hutchins expressed his more serious approach in a radio broadcast a few days

five state senators, a committee assembled at the county commissioners' office in

after Walgreen's initial accusation, making clear that he did not believe that the

downtown Chicago, where Senator Charles Baker promised that his committee

university made Communists by permitting students to "study and talk as they

would "go the limit in its efforts to expose the subversive influences undermin

please." To him. Reds were created out of a revolt against "being treated like

ing student belief in our present form of government."'"'

children." Students needed to understand differences in political theory. After

Testimony at the hearings proved how overblown were Walgreen's accusations.

all, Hutchins emphasized, the Communist Party of Illinois was on the state

212

RED CHICAGO

"NOT THAT THESE YOUTHS ARE GENIUSES"

213

ballot. Should not students learn about political parties running in local and

that grew out of a United Front movement to address youth issues. Eventually

national elections?"^

winning influence in the organization, Communist and Socialist youth joined

Taking the probe a bit less seriously, alumni planned their own version of a

with Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, young Zionists, and religious groups and estab

Red hunt. Together with the football team, alumni agreed to carry their own

lished contacts with youth movements that were growing around the world.

"clues, tear gas, bloodhoimds, red bait, and traps" to the field house, where the

Through these contacts, the YCL helped create a national youth conference and

football team would give a preview. Following the game, a Daily Maroon article

the AYC, which in 1936 participated in the first World Youth Congress in Ge

reported, dinner would be served and the alumni chided, "Vodka, caviar, and

neva, Switzerland. The organization claimed 1.7 million members; maintained

black bread will be conspicuously absent from the menu." The evening promised

the support of Eleanor Roosevelt, state senators, and members of Roosevelt's

to wrap up with a report of the "red hunt investigation" and a presentation from

cabinet; and backed such Communist-friendly measures as the Workers' Un

the "professors of Moscow" in the form of the strolling friars."^ In addition, the

employment Insurance Bill, an antiwar resolution, and an attack on the Civilian

friars joined the fray, inviting the investigating committee to a performance of

Conservation Corps.'^

the farce "In Brains We Trust," which satirized the Walgreen accusation as well
as other campus and national issues."
Support from off-campus sources poured in. In one case, General Assembly

By July 1935, the YCL was no longer an embarrassment to party leaders. In

stead, Earl Browder highlighted YCL achievements in an article for the party's
theoretical journal, The Communist. Browder asked, "How is it that the youth

man James Monroe publicly reproached Walgreen for withdrawing his niece

are making greater success than the Party with one-fourth the strength of the

from the university. Arguing that he wanted his five children to "learn all there

Party? They make twice or three times the advances in the united front that the

is to know about Communism, and all it leads to," Monroe called Walgreen a

Party generally does." According to Browder, it was "not that these youths are

"foolish uncle.""' Letters of support for the university's liberal stand and "intelli

geniuses"; rather, it was young Communists' ability to "quickly adjust them

gent exploration of all subjects" arrived from the Rosenwald Family Association,

selves to the tasks of the united front."'^' In fact, their adjustment had not been

and testimony from Swift and Company's vice president and director and Uni

as quick as it was about to be for the rest of the party. Youth ha:d been adjusting

versity of Chicago trustee Harold H. Swift showed the broad-based resistance

throughout the Third Period. The righteousness of their -v^ay was only begin

to Walgreen's accusations."

ning to be recognized as a model for the new order of the day.

Since the point of the inquiry was to'ferret out those who indoctrinated
students and promoted violent overthrow of the system, testimony support
ing academic freedom and critical inquiry were appropriate. Some leftists still
criticized those who testified that no Communists taught at the university or
promoted the overthrow of the system, arguing that denial seemed to justify^ the
question. But that a significant core of faculty, administrators, students, and offcampus supporters expressed the value of a liberal education, the importance
of learning about different systems of thought, and the right of faculty to hold
their own political beliefs as long as they did not indoctrinate students with such
beliefs speaks to the fact that the context in which student activists operated in
the 1930s was more open than in the post-World War II period. In response
to accusations of indoctrination, administrators were forced to articulate the
belief that students were able to think for themselves and that suppression of
student activism only led to more of it. This lesson came in handy in the weeks
following the hearings, when the NSL lost its campus charter for displaying its
banner in an off-campus rally. A few weeks later, after campus protest coalesced,
the dean reinstated the group."'
Outside the university, antiwar work grew among the city's nonstudent youth.
The success of such work culminated in the building of the AYC, an organization

EPILOGUE

215

their membership base, and any sense that they acted independently of the
Soviet Union. Yet while criticism against Communists increased from all po
litical directions, Chicago's party lost relatively few members. One and a half
years later, Hitler broke the pact, and the Soviet Union became America's ally
in a popular war. On the surface, the conditions of the Popular Front had been

Epilogue

restored, but the fact of the pact and its startling consequencesGerman and
Soviet occupation of Poland; Russian annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu
ania; and the Russian invasion of Finlandremained. How did Communists
understand these shifts, and how did these policy changes affect their local
activism? In what ways did the Third Period prepare Chicago Communists for
the Popular Front, what happened to them once they got there, and what does
their experience say about Communism in the United States? The purpose of
this epilogue is to project, in broad strokes, the themes raised throughout this
book into the Popular Front.
Soviet ties challenged Communist claims to democratic and patriotic im

In July 1935, Georgi Dimitrolf, an antifascist Bulgarian revered by the

Communist party for his role in a conspiracy to burn down the German Reich

pulses. An international gathering in Moscow planned the shift to a more Ameri

can party, and throughout the Popular Front, the American party leaders Earl

stag, stood before 513 delegates from sixty-five countries gathered in Moscow

Browder and William Z. Foster battled before Moscow's leaders, each seeking

for the Comintern's Seventh World Congress. Dimitroff heralded the turn from

support for their domestic and foreign policies. Stalinist purgesjtast a further

the ultrasectarian Third Period to the Popular Front. In reaction to Hitler's

shadow on Communists' outward appearance of openness an^'progressivism.

consolidation of power in Germany, the congress agreed that Communists the

And democratic centralism still ruled with a strong hand, so^that when Soviet

world over should seek broad, cross-class alliances to unite progressive forces

leaders agreed to a nonaggression pact with Hitler, local party members made

against fascism. As for Roosevelt, Dimitroff suggested, U.S. Communists should

it make sense.^

make distinctions between him and "the most reactionary circles of American
finance

In important ways, the Popular Front unleashed practical politics and tactics

capital" who were "stimulating and organizing the fascist movement

even when Communists acted within Marxist-Leninist confines. The party's

in the United States."' For the first time in their history, Communists officially

call for a Popular Front sanctioned activities that some Chicago Communists

welcomed Socialists and middle-class reformers into their coalitions; they put

had begun in the Third Period and created new opportunities to further an

their goal of class revolution to bed; and they busied themselves with campaigns

agenda the party increasingly shared with liberals: racial equality, progressive

to undermine fascism. With more room to determine their daily operations,

coalition building, advocacy for the Soviet Union, and a belief that industrial

party leaders in the United States encouraged patriotic themes and American

union building through the CIO and the New Deal were important agents of

culture in party work. Between 1935 and 1938, American Communists rein

social change.

terpreted the precise meaning of the Popular Front as it related to third parties,

In the United States, the Popular Front became more than a Communist party

Roosevelt's New Deal, and organizing strategies.^ And yet their overall emphasis

strategy; it was a social movement created out of the political realities of the day.

on antifascism resulted in successful local coalition building in antifascist cam

By 1935, the battles that urged the National Labor Relations Act and created the

paigns, unemployed organizing, industrial union drives, civil rights activism,

CIO and that rallied groups m solidarity with Spain, Ethiopia, and China con

and a surge in party membership. As Mark Naison argues, "The Popular Front

vinced liberals to look past their troubled history with Communists and use party

developed into a unique U.S. chemistry, a vision of a nation repudiating ethnic

members' organizational skills and energy for progressive causes. The second

prejudice and class privilege and employing the strength and resilience of its

generation of immigrants who straddled the post-World War I and post-World

common people to prevent a fascist triumph."^

War II Red Scares created successful coalitions and industrial drives by uniting

Four years later, however, news that Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with
German leaders threatened American Communists' place in these coalitions.

with Communists. Welcoming their invitation into these liberal and at times
middle-class circles. Communists downplayed their affiliations and got to work.

2l6

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

217

Existing local party records for the Popular Front era, published records, and

can form of organization. Instead of a district structure headed by secretariats

firsthand accounts indicate that Communists' pragmatism and flexibility

and buros, the party functioned through state organizations led by secretaries

char

acterized these broad alliances.^ Moscow's position was only one factor shaping

and executive committees. Sections became county committees; street units

the experience of rank-and-file Communists during the Popular Front.

became branches. The party deemphasized shop fractions, semi-secret small

Communists' newfound popularity made the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and

groups concerned with the problems of the shop floor, and eventually dissolved

its consequences particularly difficult for local activists. The agreement devas

them, creating in their place industrial units with a broader focus on issues that

tated Communists* allies, especially those who were Jews, intellectuals, and/or

faced workers as a whole. Geographical areas, previously units and sections,

middle-class sympathizers. Yet even with the loss of some fellow travelers, the

now followed U.S. electoral-district lines, such as wards and counties, allow

party's own forces were not seriously depleted during this year-and-a-half-long

ing the Communist party to increase the size of their local units and to more

hiatus in the Popular Front. Local party experiences explain their persistence

closely resemble other parties in the country. With larger branches positioned

in Chicago; the Soviet Union's about-face in 1939 did no^seriously affect the

within electoral districts, Communists would look more respectable to poten

work of most local Communists who pushed for civil rights, fought for the un

tial recruits than they had appeared in small unit gatherings. Larger branches,

employed, and organized industrial unions. As Claude Lightfoot stated, "From

moreover, would allow for more leadership to develop and for more work to

1935 onward, the Black and labor movements became the main spark plugs

be accomplished.'

igniting the engines of the struggle."^ Ties Communists had forged in the black

In addition to making changes within their own internal organization, party

community, in unemployed organizing, and within the labor movement offered

leaders encouraged the work that had been occurring within a number of mass-

them local networks and concrete issues that overshadowed unpopular inter

based organizations. Browder explained that Communists should get involved

national twists.

in "Negro organizations, church organizations of all kinds, neighbofhood clubs,

And yet local Communist support of the nonaggression pact, the Soviet

Parent-Teachers Associations, every kind of organization, inclining Republi

invasion of Poland, and war against Finland show that Chicago's Communists

can and Democratic neighborhood clubs, Townsend organizations, EPIC and

were not too different from those around the country in what Maurice Isserman

Utopian and all the rest of that-type of grouping." And rather ^^an Third Period

characterizes as their "determination to carry on despite isolation and persecu

behavior, where Communists were to "try immediately to ^and up and let ev

tion, and their utter inability to admit to and act on their own doubts."^ As a

erybody know 'here is a Communist coming to give us leadership,'" Browder

result, the period of the pact widened the circle of those who saw the tragedy

informed them that they should "modestly become part of the organization,

in American Communists' determination to hitch their fate to Stalin and the

speaking to the members from the point of view of helping to solve the prob

Soviet Union and exposed one of the ironies of the supposedly ultrademocratic

lems for which they come together."'*'

Popular Front: the Communist party itself was probably less democratic than

Chicago's party schools reflected the Popular Front's culture. Branch class

in the period before. To be sure, in the months between the signing of the pact

rooms changed their curriculum and, instead of Third Period offerings on Marx-

and U.S. entry into World War 11, reverence for the Soviet Union and its Social

ism-Leninism, ran such topical classes as "The Problems and Issues in 1936,

ist experiment carried new ethical dimensions. Chicago's Communists faced

"Current Events," and "Who Rules the U.S.?" School organizers reported good

them locally.

attendance and planned summer classes for neighborhood schools on other

"popular subjects."" Question-and-answer methods replaced formal lecture style,

Becoming a More American Party

The turn-to the Popular Front required a reworking of the party's organization

reportedly enhancing students' enjoyment and participation. A South Side

school reported that "80 or 90 per cent of the students participated actively
in the discussion."'^ Of the 347 students registered in the spring term in 1935,

to make it more accessible to the masses while strengthening Communists' ties

three-quarters were proletarian and reflected an "overwhelming majorit/ of

to Americas political traditions. The Communist leader F. Brown explained, "In

young people, a significant change from Third Period student profiles. More

brief, we must Americanize the Party in its form and structure, in its simplicity,

over, since only six or seven of the.students were party members and another

in its practicality. In the place of its Bolshevik-styled apparatus, the Chicago

forty-seven were YCL members, the schools provided the party with a means

party, under directives from above, switched to a more moderate and Ameri

of outreach.'^

218

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

Party leaders' more encouraging attitudes towards members' families and

219

44 percent of the Party was reported as professional and white-collar." The 1937

friends reflected other Popular Front changes. Brown encouraged fellow Com

through 1938 recruiting drive showed, moreover, that a majority of recruits

munists that "[o]ne of the good qualities of a Communist is his keeping close

now were native-born. By the party's Tenth Convention in 1939, 80 percent

to his dear ones and to his friends, bringing them closer to the revolutionary

of the delegates were born in the United States. Among those, the party saw

movement and into the Party" He argued that Communists had to learn how to

increases in its numbers of women and youth. Rosalyn Baxandall noted that

become "patient and persistent" with fellow workers, friends, and family mem

female membership increased from 10 percent of the membership in 1930 to 50

bers. They had to learn how to be modest and how to "avoid breaking relations

percent by 1943. Meanwhile, the YCL increased from eight thousand in 1935 to

with fellow-workers and friends because of disagreements on insignificant and

approximately twenty thousand in 1938. Ethnic workers continued in the party's

petty questions."" Thus when Relford, a Communist on Chicago's South Side,

orbit through mass organizations such as the IWO, which supported the party

recruited his wife, daughter, and two sons, party leaders proudly reported the

through donations to its causes, speakers at its forums, and participation at its

event.'^ By avoiding sectarianism, long meeting hours, and antifamily attitudes,

rallies. In 1934 the IWO numbered sixty-two thousand members and grew to

leaders wanted outsiders to get close to the party. To that end, their new struc
tures, style, and attitude made it easier for members like Relford to be "good"

141,364 by 1938.''
Chicago's party experienced a similar pattern of growth: 3,303 members in

Communists.

1934 became 5,750 in 1938.^ And in 1936, Chicago's leaders reported that 70

Communists drew upon the culture of American democracy in their fight

against fascism. The "Star-Spangled Banner" and the American flag

became

percent of their new recruits were born in the United States.^' Like the national
party, increases among white-collar workers and intellectuals provided Chica

new additions to large Communist gatherings. Party leaders praised Thomas

go's Communists with connections to a broad base of supporters. Dr. Maurice

Jefferson and portrayed their struggle as carrying on that of Abraham Lincoln

Simpkin, a surgeon and IWO member, for example, often lent Ijis home to

and John Brown. Earl Browder coined the phrase "Communism is twentieth-

party leaders for meetings. And a growing group of doctors a^d lawyers of

century Americanism," and Chicago's party paper, the Midwest Daily Record,

fered Communists their services at a discount. But perhaps morelmportant was

declared itself "of the people, by the people, for the people." The Daily Worker

an extended network of middle-class support. Blanche Lowehthal, a "wealthy

also underwent significant changes, adding a daily sports page, popular-culture

widow," for example, offered money to Communist causes^'and her home for

coverage, and a Sunday magazine that blended popular culture with American

functionary gatherings. An increasingly large number of writers also weaved in

revolutionary traditions. Chicago's statewide Communist convention report

and out of party circles. Chicago's leftist writers and artists maintained a fluid

edly opened in a "blaze of color" with "America's revolutionary traditions ...

community, joining Chicago's Repertory Group, working for the Illinois Writers'

pictorially represented." Michael Gold summed up party thinking: "When you

Project, and contributing to leftist publications such as the New Anvil. Douglas

run the news of a strike alongside the news of a baseball game, you are making

Wixson wrote of one "commune" of party supporters, Karl Marx Hof, where

American workers feel at home.... Let's loosen up. Let's begin to prove that

"cheap ... beer was bought in quantities and sold for ten cents a glass to raise

one can be a human being as well as a Communist. It isn't a little special sect

money for various causes such as the CP's workers' school." Dixon found that

of bookworms and soapboxers."'

Such changes boosted party membership. In the period from 1936 through

many of these intellectual leftists "felt themselves to be part of the movement

without participating directly in Party activities."^'

1938, the number of Communist districts increased from twenty-seven to al

Chicago's party, like the national party, also witnessed an influx of women,

most forty, and Communists organized in forty-eight states. Membership grew

yet local critics rightly charged that "we could have more women in the Party, if

from 23,760 members in October 1934 to 55,000 members by May 1938. Even

the men comrades did not adopt the attitude that the Party is not for women.""

smaller districts, such as those in Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas, witnessed

Chicago's leaders noted that women had become more active in party schools

monumental increases.''

and were increasingly numerous among their recruits, but leaders' continued

Party leaders, moreover, could boast that the social composition of their ranks

emphasis on male trade unionists had its effect. Of the 171 people recruited in

had improved. By 1936, a majority was employed, and a large proportion was

February 1936, forty-nine were women. This ratio, running between 25 and

trade unionists.' A1938 breakdown of recruits showed that 22 percent were in

30 percent of new recruits, continued at least through 1938, when out of 240

white-collar occupations, such as teachers, doctors, social workers, psycholo

South Side Recruits, sixty-one were women.^

gists, and lawyers; and Nathan Glazer estimated that by 1941, "[N]o less than

Party leaders still believed that women should wait for Socialism before fight

220

EPILOGUE.

EPILOGUE

221

ing for equality, and they opposed the Equal Rights Amendment because they

the youthful desires of these peoplesports, amusements, classes, dramatics,

believed it to be anti-working class. Although their opposition had some basis,

handicrafts, etc., and by taking as a starting point the particular interest of the

and other liberal groups also challenged the amendment, the party's attacks

youth, they in turn can build a large organization."^

were indicative of its larger attitudes concerning women's roles. Its papers tied
women to beauty and housekeeping, encouraging party women to maintain

During the Popular Front, they did just that. Reports of YCL social activi
ties appear throughout the Midwest Daily Record. In April 1938, they held a

societal norms of fashion and beauty. Chicago's Midwestern Daily Record taught

Sweet Sixteen dance at the Free Sons of Israel Hall, celebrating sixteen years of

women how to make the home more livable. Writers told women how to open

YCL growth. And on October 26,1938, the YCL announced that it would hold

stubborn jars, make hard sauce, and remove white spots on dark furniture. Jean

a Halloween Ball in the Majestic Hotel's ballroom, featuring swing music and

Lyon wrote an article entitled "There's More than One Way to Nag." In fact, there

costumes. But YCLers did more than throw parties. The Chicago YCL was also

were three ways, according to Lyon: the whining nag, the weeping nag, and the

an important vehicle for organizing industry, with its own shop-floor organiza

shouting nag. Each posed serious problems for their husbands. Women were

tions. The YCL group in meatpacking, for example, effectively aided the party

advised to change their ways and make it easier for men, for example, to put their

group in the stockyards. This combination of socializing and political work in

feet up on furniture. After all, Lyons consoled, women could comfort themselves

creased the YCL's membership. In 1934, Chicago had only 325 YCL members,
but by 1938 it had over two thousand.^'

"with the thought that at least he doesn't spit tobacco on the wall.'"^
While these attitudes persisted within the party, women began a dialogue on

Leaders were especially proud of their work among African American youth

their role that challenged the notion that they were subordinate. Drawn into

and women. In 1939, a Harriet Tubman club on the South Side affiliated with

campaigns against the high cost of living and into union drives through women's

the YCL, and another YCL affiliate, the Oliver Law club, published a leaflet

auxiliaries, they found the Communist party receptive to their issues. Joining

hailing the Soviet Union's twenty-second anniversary. In the party branch that

with such wide-ranging groups as the Parent Teachers' Association and the

covered Washington Park and the University of Chicago, leaders announced

Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, Communist women began to

that in 1938 they recruited 336 men and women. "The most important thing in

challenge their place in the party and society at large. On March 23,1939, the

our recruiting drive," the section organizer wrote, "was thi^: up until last year,

Communist activist Jane March wrote to the Midwest Daily Record:

it was almost impossible for us to recruit Negro women on the South Side of

[Fjillers'

... don't mean a thing to the average woman.... [Ijnthe issue of March 10, the

Chicago, with the exception of old women. Well, we have not stopped recruiting

whole column on 'how to win husbands and influence lights'... who has time

older women, but during the campaign we have gone out and brought into the

to remove all the chandeliers and sit under certain lights? ... I would suggest

Party many of the young women of the South Side." Of the 145 women brought

a reader's column ask the women to write in on such subjects as problems in

in during this particular campaign, none was over forty-five years old.^

child care, home, food, style, trade union, club, PTA

Yours for a real wom

While party directives reframed inner party life, easing Communists' reach

en's page."^ Other women called for the paper's editors to give more space to

to broader networks of supporters, their success was not simply a result of a

women's biographies and argued with party leaders that too little attention was

shift engineered in Moscow and followed by the rank and file mechanically.

paid to women's activities in Chicago. Meanwhile, women like Jane March and

Chicago's Communists created strong precedents for this shift in their own

Beatrice Shields, who led women's work and guided educational activity in the

work, and the success and breadth of the Popular Front depended on workers

city, served as role models for younger party women who were having their first

themselves. Throughout this period, workers were increasingly willing to join

political experiences organizing their communities. The YCL member Yolanda

across ethnic and gender lines to promote class-based causes.

Hall remembered women like Shields pushing for women's rights within the
party, providing Hall a new sort of model for women's activism.^'

The Depression exposed the inability of community-based institutions to

support workers who suffered in a broken economy. Slowly, Chicago's white

The YCL provided a structure to organize and educate young radicals. Henry

ethnics and African Americans looked beyond their segregated communi

Winston explained that education within the league should "bring the youth to

ties to the government and new union structures of the CIO. Lizabeth Cohen

the point of understanding the need for a new societyf This meant participat

has argued that this shift was possible because a "culture of unity" permeated

ing in "practical activity... a service organization, first, to the labor movement

Chicago's neighborhoods and workplaces. Throughout the 1920s, workers' eth

and, second, to all mankind." Winston explained that Communists needed to

nic institutions began to reflect more mainstream commercial ones. National

model themselves on Christian organizations, which "take into consideration

chains made their way into Chicago's ethnic enclaves, integrating its workers

222

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

223

into a national mass culture. No longer local and ethnic, movie theaters, grocery

rhetoric of class, by a new moral economy, and by the emergence of a working-

stores, and radio reinforced the decline of ethnic institutions and the rise of a

class ethnic Americanism." Immigrants learned throughout the 1920s how to

shared cultural community. Organizations such as the CIO allowed workers

become American within their individual ethnic neighborhoods and by the

to focus on their commonalities with fellow workers. The timing of such an

1930s created a second-generation ethnic, working-class culture that formed

organization allowed organizers to succeed when they placed special attention

a stronghold of the Popular Front. Denning argued that "under the sign of the

on creating a militant alliance of black and white workers. Observers noted

'people,' the Popular Front public culture sought to forge ethnic and racial al

that the "'arguments of the CIO were taking effect on the men " because "'the

liances, mediating between Anglo-American culture, the culture of the ethnic

presence of Negro organizers and the reputation of the UMW are tending to

workers, and African-American culture, in part by reclaiming the figure of

allay the old ideas as to discrimination by labor unions against [Negroes]

'America' itself, imagining an Americanism that would provide a usable past

Women and families also played an important role in the CIO's bid to unite

for ethnic workers, who were thought of as foreigners, in terms of a series of

workers. And although they mostly strengthened industrial unions through

ethnic slurs."^^

their place within women's auxiliaries, the new attitude toward unity proved

With its growing membership and reconstructed organization, Chicago's

powerful to many women who joined unions and walked picket lines for the

Communist party was well positioned to participate in this new vitality Com

first tihie in their lives.

munists successfully worked with non-party members in the Workers' Alliance,

Reaching into racial and ethnic communities, the CIO pulled together a co
alition based on workers' unity symbolized on CIO union buttons and lived in

brought welfare issues before the nation, and won several battles in Chicago.
They stood in support of Spain; and through their brigades, parades, and fund

spaces such as bars, CIO corners, and meeting halls. Broadening their scope

raisers, Communists' support for the Spanish Republic won them liberals' praise.

from one workplace to working people in general, CIO organizers developed

On the South Side, party members protested Italy's invasion into Ethiopia and

campaigns in support of workers in other industries and on different worksites.

explained African American oppression in terms of expanding f^ism, pointing

Picketing, picnics, and solidarity statements sealed this workers' front. Cohen

out that blacks in particular encountered fascism through their lack of hous

argued that "workers in different industries in Chicago similarly had come to

ing, high rents and costs of living, denials of civil rights, wage"differentials, and

understand that their fates were intertwined." They spoke of being a member

impaired cultural development. They also tapped ethnic and racial community

of the CIO rather than of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee,

organizations to build on the unity represented by the CIO. Their participation

the United Electric, Radio, and Machine Workers Union, or the Steel Work

in the city's major CIO drives, moreover, made Communists' commitment was

ers Organizing Committee. And while Cohen does not credit Communists

central to the growth of industrial unionism.'^

with this development, they were central figures, furthering union workers'
unity-consciousness.^^
The culture of the Popular Front, moreover, embraced the imagination of

The party's own culture during the Popular Front, then, fit with that of Chica
go's workforce. No longer an animal of clandestine meetings, the party adapted
to the mass media and culture of the mid-to-late 1930s and 1940s. Broadcasting

these working people and their liberal allies. Using the phrase "laboring of

from local radio stations. Communists used modern technology to unite work

American culture," Michael Denning's work explains the Popular Front phenom

ers behind its programs and encouraged peoj^e to meet in groups to listen to

enon whereby workers themselves increasingly created and received American

scheduled shows. Communists in many ways were becoming the best examples

culture, a culture that seriously dealt with questions of fascism, war, work, and

of the new mid-i930s Popular Front Americanism.'

civil rights. Denning argues that "the phrase reminds us that the culture and

The Popular Front not only increased Communist membership among cer

politics of the Popular Front were not simply New Deal liberalism and popu

tain groups of Chicago's population, it increased the party's general prestige and

lism. It was a social democratic culture, a culture of'industrial democracy' and

support. Communist leaders noted that people began to identify themselves

'industrial unionism.'" Chicago workers' renditions of "Steel Strike" reinforced

as Communists without actually joining the party In 1938, Brown recognized

their common proletarian bond with their audience.'^

A new generation of people created this workers' culture in the 1930s, and

that "tens of thousands of workers, professionals, and farmers" had "sympa

thetically followed our Party for the last few years," and he acknowledged that

in turn, these processes reshaped their attitudes towards uniting across racial,

"[t]housands of these would like to be part of our family. They even call them

ethnic, and political barriers. Denning argued that the culture of this work

selves Communists and act as Communists." Further acceptance of Commu

ing class "was marked by a sustained sense of class consciousness and a new

nists was demonstrated in the 1938 Chicago Defender Bud Biliken parade. A

224

EPJLOGUE

EPILOGUE

225

Student following the YCI^ float, with its "Black and White Unite" and "Free the

actively work in a union and belong to an organization with ties to non-party

Scottsboro Boys" slogans, reported that a "wave of applause followed the float

members, not all Communists had the same aspirations.'

along the whole route. Old women shouted, *Yes, free the boys!' People noted:

Those who were enthusiastic about union building, antifascism, and civil rights

"Thems the Cominmiists.They don't believe in no differences. All's alike to them.'"

work created other problems as they abandoned older projects for positions in

From this student's report, Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake concluded that

the CIO and in broad-based coalitions. While union leadership and mass orga

"BronzeviUe demonstrated that it approved of whatever the Communists stood

for in its mind."'^
Thus, the party's heyday was framed by several factors. Rank-and-file Com

nizations were ideal ways to reach working people. Communist involvement left
such other party projects as Unemployed Councils barren and disorganized. As
the Ninth Party Conference restructured the party into branches and industrial

munists, who already began courting non-Communist progressives during the

units, party leaders found that they did not have enough lower leaders to see

Third Period, set the stage for a more coordinated drive during the Popular Front.

the changes through; they were preoccupied with new activities.^" Acting within

International directives shaping party structures allowed Communists to create

unions and mass organizations, moreover, party members did not necessar

an organization that more easily fit into the American landscape. And workers,

ily promote Communist initiatives. Instead, leaders continually criticized their

forced by the Depression into new solutions, were more willing to unite across

fellow Communist unionists for focusing too much on trade-union issues and

political and cultural boundaries.

for not raising political ones. While many Communist CIO organizers became
known for their fighting spirit, those in the AFL were a mixed bag. Party reports

Roots of the Popular Front's Decline

Coalitions formed during the Popular Front were built on somewhat unstable
foundations that were eventually eroded by international and local forces. De
spite the reformist nature of the Popular Front, Communists faced problems

explained that their three AFL representatives on the Chicago Federation of

Labor's central body could not get specific programs passed because they were
lax in their responsibilities and did not win non-party delegates' respect.^'
On the one hand, party leaders were concerned with membei;/who blended
into the mass population only too well; but on the other hand, they had to re

that lingered from the Third Period. How would they continue to spread their

peatedly remind members, especially older ones, that the popular Front was

revolutionary ideology and at the same time build the party?' The Soviet Union

a period in which to rid themselves of their sectarian ways. Browder warned

handed them new problems. What effect did the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact have

Communists that their behavior that substituted "revolutionary impatience and

on Chicago's Communists? Local experience showed that while some party

desire for overthrow of capitalism for the hard work of winning the masses for

members enforced Communist mandates and were unwilling to acknowledge

the struggle to overthrow capitalism" had to end. Party leaders did not want a

contradictions, inconsistencies, or moral dilemmas, others wavered. Chicago's

few good cadres but instead hoped to use the new structure and networks to

Communists remained a mixed bag even as international events brought them

closer to one another and, for a time, farther from everyone else.
Communist ethnics maintained their independent streak into the Popular

"be among the millions."^^

The party's organizational problems proved a real nuisance for leaders and
consumed their energies throughout the period. But more serious problems

Front. During a Daily Worker drjve, Chicago's leadership found that its language

would plague them. When the Soviet Union and Germany entered into a nonag

groups were not doing their part to raise money. When the Ny Tid needed money,

gression treaty in 1939, the wheels of the Popular Front screeched to a grinding

the Scandinavian buro raised $250 in one week; but in the eight-week drive for

halt. Antifescism had become such an integral part of the party's program that its

the Daily Worker, they barely raised $80. The South Slav buro acted similarly

members and leaders could not imagine the Soviet Union moving away from its

A bigger concern, however, was the way the language members separated their

no-nonsense antifascist stand, but it did. Communists all over the United States

activities from the shop floor. Lawson complained, "We do not find the Polish

were shocked by the news and photos of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German

Buro in packing. South Slav Buro in steel, nor the Slovaks and Lithuanians in

foreign minister, and Stalin shaking hands. British and French appeasement was

the coal fields." Chicago party leaders wondered why such buros as the Bulgar

one thing, but Soviet appeasement was quite another. The term "Communazi,"

ian did not have steel organizing on their agendas; and they discovered that

coined by a reporter in September 1939, filled mainstream newspapers, taunt

among the Croatian fraction, there was much quarreling about how to work in

ing the party faithful.*"

clubs and lodges, no political discussion, and no orientation to "concentration"

work. Although the party's leadership would have liked all of their members to

Whereas before the signing of the nonaggression pact. Communists could

argue that they acted on the behalf of America's workers and in the interest of

226

EPiLOGUE

EPILOGUE

227

society as a whole, their about-face on alliances against Nazi Germany raised

porters, Gebert must have seemed like quite a traitor. Certainly Polish and South

ethnical and political questions in intellectual and progressive communities.

Slav workers in the city's stockyards and steel mills thought so. In these places.

Communists lost their moral authority and found themselves having to explain

Communist organizers worked furiously to put down "embittered" opposition

that in fact "Communism" and "fascism" were different systems and political

groups that linked them to the CIO as a whole and threatened to destroy their

forces. The nonaggression pact betrayal, moreover, confirmed more conserva

union drives. One Communist organizer reported on his difficulties holding

tive activists' suspicions that Communists would betray America's workers at

Ukrainian and South Slav steel workers in line, "notwithstanding the fact that

any cost for the Soviet Union.

they were CP members or sympathizers of long standing." Work in the pack

The Daily Worker tried to rationalize the pact as a blow to Nazi Germany. "By

inghouses was no better. Members of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing

compelling Germany to sign a non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union not only

Committee's Polish American Committee had been raising money for Polish

tremendously limited the direction of Nazi war aims, but thereby bolstered the

people and were understandably reeling from the recent turn of events.^'

possibilities for peace in the world." Articles and editorials tried to convince

Chicago's progressive Jewish community, which had supported the party in

readers that the party had not moved away from its antifascist stand but still

the past, seethed with anger. Even though the party press hailed the Soviet Union

stood for peace, freedom, and democracy. Browder himself argued that the

as liberators of Eastern European Jews, Chicago's community understood that

pact "should strengthen Popular Front movements everywhere." And when war

endorsing the pact meant turning their backs on Germany's and Poland's Jews,

broke out in Europe, and Germany announced its intention to annex Poland,

who were suffering a horrible fate. Party leaders noted that the circulation of

the American party went into full gear in support of Poland and the policies of

their paper declined exclusively in Jewish neighborhoods, where Communists

Roosevelt, and against Germany.^''

faced off against rabbis who delivered anti-Soviet messages to their congrega

Like their counterparts on the national scene, Chicago's party leaders were

tions. One rabbi canceled a Communist speaker at his synagogue, ahd reports

eager to follow Soviet policies. They simply did not know how to interpret them,

indicated that in the city's temples Jewish leaders distributed anti-Si?viet articles

exactly. They did, however, know that they needed to defend the Soviet Union.

by James Waterman Wise, the son of the noted New York rabblStephen Wise,

When the staff of the Socialist Jewish Daily Forward organized an anti-Soviet

who had been a party member until the pact.^

meeting, Communists showed up to "expose speakers." At their own open-air

meeting on St. Louis and Roosevelt Road, in the heart of a Jewish community, a

For many in and around the party, the Soviet Union's ne'W policies and ac
tions were indefensible. Members of the League for Peace and Democracy and

Jewish Communist newspaper editor reportedly spoke to two thousand people

the ILD, not to mention those in Jewish locals of the IWO, gave Chicago party

who applauded as the speaker explained "how the Soviet German Pact was

leaders "particular difficulty," according to reports. Ben Gold, the international

an aid to peace.'"* At least publicly, the party minimized the hypocrisy of the

president of the Furriers Union, came to assist the Chicago union officials Abe

new Soviet policy, and for a short time they sought comfort in their Popular

Feinglass and Lewis Goldstein with what an informant described as a "crack up

Front-type campaign to "Save Poland." In their grand style, Chicago's party

in that union due to the revolt of the radical Jewish members, who are threaten

organized a rally in defense of Polish independence which included Catholic

ing to secede on account of the Nazi-Soviet pact." An FBI agent reported, "The

priests, Jewish rabbis, and Chicago's civic and trade-union Polish leaders.^

radical Jews apparently cannot stomach the implications of Stalin's cooperation

On September 11, however, word reached national partyleaders that Moscow

with Hitler.""' Soviet policies had backed the city's leaders into a corner. An FBI

was critical of the Polish government, insisted that the war was imperialist, and

informant reported: "Among themselves, many of the American Communist

prohibited the American party from taking a side. American leaders quickly

leaders deplore the Non-Aggression pact entered into between Hider and Stalin,

made an embarrassing about-face on the whole situation. Chicago leaders fol

as it has created considerable discontent in the American Party membership.

lowed suit. On September 15, two days before the Soviets invaded Poland, Chi

However, they are doing their best to justify the Pact.""

cago's party paper announced a talk by Gebert, billed for "Chicago Poles who

Harvey Klehr argues that the Comintern helped the American party through

want to get the lowdown on the Nazi invasion of Poland." The party seemed

the crisis of the period, but national and Chicago leaders also relied on their in

unwilling to let go of its antifascist appeal, yet there were new developments in

stincts and political realities.' While the Comintern sent word on how it wanted

need of clarification: the role of Britain, France, and the Polish government in

the American party to speak about the war and capitalism. Earl Browder balked

the situation. One can only imagine the response that Bill Gebert faced in his

when it came to immediately breaking with Roosevelt." On the local level,

September 15 talk at Koscuisko Hall. Speaking in Polish to former party sup

Chicago leaders' dislike of Soviet policy caused some to advise their members

228

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

to downplay unpopular policies and focus on local issues. William Patterson

suggested that Communists would improve their influence among African

229

But generally speaking, despite such embarrassing shifts, ethical dilem

mas, and ensuing attacks, party members remained loyal. Maurice Isserman

Americans "if they would at least temporarily concentrate on other than war

explained that "[t]hose who stayed may not have been happy, and may have

issuessuch as relief, WPA, housing, equal rights, anti-lynching bills."" Con

looked back wistfully on the golden days of Popular Front respectability. But

crete popular campaigns were where most party members felt comfortable.

they stayed." They felt, Isserman argued, that "this was a testing period in which

Herb March, the packinghouse union organizer, recalled how practical work

they would have to prove their mettle." Chuck Hall remembered the period

overshadowed the ugly reality of Soviet foreign policy: "[The Nazi-Soviet pact]

of the pact as "very confusing." Yet he believed that "it was a necessity for the

was difficult to defendof course ... these things didn't become... big... in

Soviet Union to make that pact.... It was a self-defense to try and stop the

the union because we were busygetting full recognition."'' A letter from national

invasion of the Soviet Union." Appeasement at Munich convinced him and

party leaders showed that these impulses to downplay unpopular Soviet poli

other Communists that Western powers could not be relied upon for support

cies were not unique to Chicago. In general, party members were "too hesitant"

against fascist aggression. While aligning their own interests with the safety of

when it came to "defending the peace policy of Soviet Russia." National leaders

the Soviet Union, many Communists rationalized Soviet realpolitik, making

lamented that "in many instances comrades have remained silent even in the

themselves anathema to those committed to fascism's defeat. FBI estimates

face of savage attacks against Soviet Russia by fion-Party elements."

of party membership indicate that approximately five thousand remained on

'

The international turn of events unleashed terror at home against Com

Chicago's rolls during the period of the pact. Out of its 1938 membership of

munists at all levels. When Browder was arrested on false passport charges,

5,750, only 13 percent of Chicago's members left, just under national 'rates of

Chicago's party leaders who had also traveled on fake passports suffered from

desertion. To the majority of Chicago's party members, Communism,was more

what one informant described as a "serious case of the nerves." Meanwhile,

than any particular policy; it was a way of life, not easily disregar^'cl.^

the Dies Committee, the precursor to the House Committee on Un-American

As time passed, state leaders began to reorganize the party forfmore public

Activities established in May 1938 and chaired by Martin Dies, began to harass

attacks and anti-Communist purges. Because they feared that the./might have to

Communists and their former supporters from the League for Peace and De

go underground, they required state leaders to strengthen theipsecret apparatus

mocracy, the American Student Union, and other such organizations. State and

and prepare for the party's illegality. Work would remain in a few trusted hands.

local governments also participated in the attack, indicting Communists under

Only one party member would be responsible for the organization, and only

criminal syndicalist laws. An FBI informant reported on the mood of Chicago's

two or three leading members would know who that person was. Fred Brown

party leaders: There is no doubt that the CP leadership is greatly frightened

and J. Peters prepared the secret work nationally, while Jack Parker trained

at the turn of events. The leadership of today does not seem to have half the

Chicago's leaders on how to safeguard their members. Branches were to be led

courage and energy of the leaders of twenty years ago, who openly fought every

by members who were not in any immediate danger of prosecution and who

effort... to force them out of business or underground."

Certainly, there was now more tolose than ever before, and Communist trade
unionists understood this all too well. CIO momentum was building throughout

worked outside of industry. Group meetings would occur early in the evening
and away from union halls, and then the information would be transferred to
the people working in industry.^

the city, and party trade unionists were at its center. It is no wonder that John L.

The party's position was morally and politically damaging, yet the new po

Lewis sent a surge of fear through party ranks when he made anti-Communist

litical context created an opening for Communists to tap into a popular peace

remarks at a CIO convention in Detroit. Word of Lewis's attack spread through

sentiment. Among youth, Communists directed attention to the unfair draft

Chicago's steel and packinghouse locals, and rumors surfaced that Sam Levin,

and raised the possibility of increasing relief agencies' resources by cutting war

vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, was "conducting

spending. At the University of Chicago, Communists facilitated a coalition of

a whispering campaign against CIO leaders suspected of being Party members

eleven student groups into a Keep America Out of War Congress.' Communists

or sympathizers." Feverishly, William Z. Foster worked at the national level to

also reenergized their campaign against the high cost of living to fight against

keep CIO leaders from kicking Communists out of their union positions, ^d

war profiteers. By the summer of 1940, Chicago's Communists focused on or

local Chicago Commumsts made their roimds to party unionists trying to lessen

ganizing a nationwide peace mobilization and found some support in unions,

their panic. Regardless, key union activists began distancing themselves from
the party.^

fraternal benefit organizations, ethnic churches, and among students. To help

popularize their effort, fur-shop representatives and a significant number of

230

EPILOGUE

National Maritime Union folks showed up to rally at the Chicago Stadium on

Labor Day in 1940. The Communist Rev. John R. Thompson chaired the rally
and led a committee that formed in its aftermath to carry national antiwar ac
tivity to Washington.^^ The new American Peace Mobilization (APM) worked
for a national peace policy. With the slogan "For a Peoples Peace," the APM
confronted those involved in war preparations with leaflets, pamphlets, and

Notes

posters in opposition to war and organized a speakers' bureau with members

who addressed trade-imion meetings. In February the Illinois Communist party
printed 250,000 leaflets in opposition to the Lend Lease Bill Branches through
out Chicago issued their own leaflets. Mary Gordon, the leader of the APM
work in Chicago, stated that more than seventy new groups were organized in
February and that finally Communist party branches were working on these
projects. Harry Haywood estimated that the APM "consisted of over 6,000 del
egates representing the 12,000,000 people in trade unions, youth organizations,
women's clubs, and Black groups." While Jewish neighborhoods were difficult
to approach for obvious reasons, Italian and black neighborhoods proved more
receptive. And by early 1941, state leaders were again talking about the improved
work in the Midwest.'
Even as international shifts threatened local coalition activity and forced local
leaders to pour their energies into the APM, many Popular Front projects stayed
alive throughout this period. Although the symbolism of the Nazi-Soviet pact
decimated Communists' contacts in middle-class and intellectual circles, by

Introduction
1. Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, World Revolutionary^^ropaganda:
A Chicago Study (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 212-14 (quote 011/13).
2. Ibid., 214.
3. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party:

A Critical History

(New York: Praeger Books, 1962), 217, 226.

4. Third Period theory taught that the first period of postwar development was revo

1939 the momentiun of the Popular Front and rank-and-file Communist activity

lutionary, lasting until 1923. It was followed by one of capitalist stabilization, which

focused on the CIO, welfare rights, and combating racial discrimination. The

ended in 1928. See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast Trotsky: 1929-1940 (London:

new membership brought into the party during the early years of the Popular

Oxford University Press, 1963), 38-40; and R. Pahne Dutt, Fascism and Social Revolu

Front carried their dedication to these causes across the period of the pact, and

tion: A Study of the Economics and Politics of the Extreme Stages of Capitalism in Decay

the war would bring eventually bring them back into the mainstream.
Local party activity thrived during the Popular Front, party membership
grew to its highest numbers, and a new composite of Communists succeeded
in initiating strong local movements. But the organization's dependency on
Soviet shifts exposed its vulnerability. After 1939, Communists would have

(1934; reprint, San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1974).

5. Howe and Coser, American Communist Party, 175-235. Works that discuss the
Third Period from a national perspective include Theodore Draper, American Com
munism and Soviet Russia (i960; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 405-41;
Howe and Coser, American Communist Party, 175-272; Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of
American Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 28-166;

an increasingly difficult time convincing a new generation of activists of their

and Mark Solomon, The Cry Was Unity: Communists and African Americans, 1917-1936

ideals. And yet the ability of party members to sustain their leadership in local

(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998), 95-230.

movements suggests that, regardless of the historic period, the story of America's
Communists is best understood when it is framed in a local context.

6. This interpretation was originally advanced by ten studies sponsored by the Fund for
the Republic, beginning in 1953, on various aspects of "Communism in American Life."
The published works include Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left: Episodes in American
Literary Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961); Clinton Lawrence
Rossiter, Marxism: The View from America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1960); Frank S. Meyer, The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist
Cadre (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961); Ralph Lord Roy, Communism
and the Churches (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, i960); David A. Shannon,

232

NOTES TO PAGE 3

NOTES TO PAGES 3 - 5

The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United
States since 1945 (New York; Harcourt, Brace, and World. 1959); Nathan Glazer. The
Social Basis of American Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961);
Robert W. Iversen, The Commumsts and the Schools (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
World, 1959); and Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (1957: reprint,
Chicago: Ivan Dee Inc., 1985). See also Klehr, Heyday of American Communism; Bert
Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions (Prince
ton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Howe and Coser, American Communist
Party; and Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, The American Communist Movement:
Storming Heaven Itself (New York: Twayne Press, 1992), This perspective recently has
been pursued in a Yale University Press series, which includes Harvey Klehr, John Earl
Haynes. and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); and Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and
Kyrill M. Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1998). See also Vernon Pedersen, The Communist Party in Maryland,
m9-57 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001); and John Earl Haynes and Harvey
Klehr, "The Historiography of American Communism: An Unsettled Field," Labour His
tory Review 68.1 (April 2003); 61-78. A similar interpretation from a different political
perspective has been expressed by Bryan D. Palmer, "Rethinking the Historiography of
United States Communism," American Communist History 2.2 (2003): 139-73.
7. Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 440.
8. Ibid., 4 (first quote); Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, Soviet World of American Com
munism, 5 (second quote); Haynes and Klehr, "Historiography of American Commu
nism," 6.1-78.
9. Historical autobiographies reflecting this perspective include Steve Nelson, James
R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1981); Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrative ofHosea Hudson (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); Dorothy Ray Healey and Maurice Isserman,
California Red: A Life in the American Communist Party (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1990); A1 Richmond, A Long View from the Left: Memoirs of an American Revo
lutionist (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); George Charney, A Long Journey (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1968); and Junius Scales and Richard Nickson, Cause at Heart: A
Former Communist Remembers (Afliens: University of Georgia Press, 1987). Important
national studies include Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On? The American
Communist Party during the Second World War (1982; reprint, Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1993); Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States: From
the Depression to World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991);
and Paul Buhle, Marxism in the USA from

1870 to the Present Day (London: Verso,

1987), 121-220. The best local and industry studies include Mark Naison, Communists
in Harlem during the Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1983); Robin
Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Depression (Chapel HillUniversity of North Carolina Press, 1990); Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and
the Auto Workers Unions (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); and Joshua
Freeman, In Transit: The Transport Workers Union in New York City, 1933-1966 (New

233

York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Paul Lyons, Philadelphia Communists, 1936-1956
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), is less successful. For a critique of these
interpretations, see Theodore Draper, "American Communism Revisited," New York
Review of Books, 9 May 1985, 32-37; and Theodore Draper, "The Popular Front Revis
ited," New York Review of Books, 30 May 1985, 79-81.
10. Palmer, "Rethinking the Historiography" 171.
11. Randi Storch, "'The Realities of the Situation: Revolutionary Discipline and Ev
eryday Political Life in Chicago's Communist Party, i92S~i93^"Labor: Studies in Work
ing-Class History in the Americas 1.3 (2004): 19-44.
12. When I did my research in Moscow, the archive was called the Russian Center
for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhlDNI). It has
since changed its name to the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History
(RGASPI). U.S. Communist party sources continue until the Comintern's dissolution
in 1943. but local records become almost nonexistent after 1935. The CPUSA's collec
tion (fond 515) is now available to researchers on microfilm at the Library of Congress.
See Randi Storch, "Moscow's Archives and the New History of the Communist Party
of the United States," Perspectives (October 2600): 44-50; and John Earl Haynes, "The
American Communist Party Records on Ivlicrofilm," Continuity 26 (Spring 2003): 21-26.
When I refer to sources from this archive throughout the study, I abbreviate the archive
to RTsKhlDNI. I then list the source by fond (f.), opis (op.), delo (d.), aKd listok (I.).
13. Scholarly studies include Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, T^e Amerasia Spy
Case: Prelude to McCarthyism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996);
John Earl Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov,
Secret World of American Communism; Klehr, Haynes, and Anderson, Soviet World of
American Communism; John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet
Espionage in America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999); Pedersen, Com
munist Party in Maryland; and Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted
Wood (New York: Modern Library, 2000). James G. Ryan, "Socialist Triumph as a Fam
ily Value: Earl Browder and Soviet Espionage," American Communist History 2 (2002):
125-42, does not appear to be purposely sensationalist, but without contextualizing
espionage activity, Ryan furthers these ends. Important exceptions of recent works that
do not fall into this category include James R. Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Trag
edy of American Radicalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); and Solomon,
Cry Was Unity. Sensationalized popular press stories include James Sherr, "How Stalin
Infiltrated America," New York Times, 27 April 1997; George Will, "The Discrediting
of the U.S. Left," (New Orleans) Times-Picayune, 21 April 1995, B7; and Cal Thomas,
"Who Was Right?" (New Orleans) Times-Picayune, 14 April 1995, B7.
14. Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Robert McElvaine, The Great Depres
sion: America, 1929-1941 (New York: Times Books, 1984); Irving Bernstein, The Lean
Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960);
Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933-1941
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).

234

NOTES TO PAGES I I - I 5

NOTES TO PAGES 5 - I I

15. Ihe most problematic methodology is found in works published in the Yale series

235

Catholic Dimension," in The Irish in Chicago, ed. Lav-ence J. McCaffrey, Elen Skerrett,

listed in n.6 above. Relying on particular episodes taken out of context, these schol

Michael F. Funchion, and Charles Farming (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

ars provoke rather than explain. Other methods with less serious flaws that still have
limited explanatory power include such single-industry studies as Keeran, Communist

22-60.
6. Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 21-23; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 12-52; Barrett,

Party and the Auto Workers Union; Freeman, In Transit; Howard Kimeldorf, Reds or

Work and Community in the Jungle, 36-58; Eric L. Hirsch, Urban Revolt: Ethnic Politics

Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (Berkeley:

in the Nineteenth-Century Chicago Labor Movement (Berkeley: University of California

University of California Press, 1988); and Max Gordon, "The Communists and the
Drive to Organize Steel, 1936," Labor History 23.2 (Spring 1982): 254-65; such historical

Press, 1990), 5-10.

7. Quoted in Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in

autobiographies as Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson; Painter, Narrative ofHosea

Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1997). 24-

Hudson; and Healey and Isserman, California Red; such national studies as Isserman,

8. Richard Schneirov, "Chicago's Great Upheaval of 1877," Chicago History 9.1 (1980):

Which Side Were You On?; and Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States; such

3-17; Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle, 121; Paul Avrich, The Haymarket

single-group studies as Kate Weigand, Red Feminism: American Communism and the

Tragedy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 28-33; Hirsch, Urban Revolt,

Making of American Feminism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); and

23-319. Richard Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics: Class Conflict and the Origins of

Solomon, Cry Whs Unity. While a community-study method provides the best model
for looking at this movement, it does not always succeed. Two excellent community

Modern Liberalism in Chicago, 1864-1897 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998),

studies include Naison, Communists in Harlem; and Kelley, Hammer and Hoe. A more

53-63,81-86,173-79; Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 24-26; Avrich, Haymarket Tragedy,

problematic one is Pedersen, Communist Party in Maryland.

39-52; Hirsch, Urban Revolt, 44.

10. Avrich, Haymarket Tragedy, 85; Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 80.

Chapter 1: Sam Hammersmark's Chicago

11. Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 80-152; Hartmut Keil and John B. Jentz, eds., German
Workers in Chicago: A Documentary History ofWorking-Class Culturefrorn'1850 to World

1. Daily Worker, 7 June 1938, 6.

2. Harold M. Mayer and Richard Wade, Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 3-192; William Cronon.Nflfwrei Metropolis: Chicago
and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); Bessie Louise Pierce, A History of
Chicago: The Rise of a Modern City vol. 3 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957), 64-233.
3. Melvin G. Holli and Peter Jones, eds., Ethnic Chicago (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1981); Victor Greene "'Becoming American': The Role of Ethnic
LeadersSwedes, Poles, Italians, Jews," and Edward R. Kantowicz, "Polish Chicago: Sur
vival through Solidarity," in The Ethnic Frontier: Essays in the History of Group Survival
in Chicago and the Midwest, ed. Peter d'A. Jones and Melvin G. Holli (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Wm. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), 143-75 and 180-209; Youngsoo Bae, Labor
in Retreat: Class and Community among Men's Clothing Workers of Chicago, 1871-1929
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 23-32; Mayer and Wade, Chicago,
62-70,117-92.
4. John T. McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the
Twentieth-Century Urban North (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); James R.
Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1922
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 73-90; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New
Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

War I (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 258-59; Bruce Nelso^^ "Dancing and
Picnicking Anarchists? The Movement below the Martyred Leadership," in Haymarket
Scrapbook, ed. Dave Roediger and Franklin Rosemont (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1986),
76-79; Avrich, Haymarket Tragedy, 86.
12. Avrich, Haymarket Tragedy, 90; Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 82-98; Roediger and
Rosemont, Haymarket Scrapbook, 11-110.
13. Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 27-51; Hirsch, Urban Revolt, 54-62; Schneirov, Labor
and Urban Politics, 76-81, 87-94,110-15,145-52.; Richard Schneirov, "'An Injury to
One Is the Concern of All': The Knights of Labor in the Haymarket Era," in Roediger
and Rosemont, Haymarket Scrapbook, 81-83.
14. Adelman, Haymarket Revisited, 14-17; Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 177-200;
Hirsch, Urban Revolt, 43-85; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 32-40, 204-5.
15. Daily Worker, 30 September 1957,5,7; Keil and Jentz, German Workers in Chicago,
193-94; Hirsch, Urban Revolt, 73-78; Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs, 177-200; Schneirov,
Labor and Urban Politics, 248-55.
16. Daily Worker, 30 September 1957, 5, 7; Bruce C. Nelson, "Revival and Upheaval:
Religion, Irrehgion, and Chicago's Working Class in 1886," Journal of Social History 25.2
(1991): 233-53.
17. Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 335-43; Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs:

Press, 1990), 21-52; Robert Slayton, BacA: o/f/ie Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy

Citizen and Socialist (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 127-46; Ralph Chaplin,

(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), 147; Bae, Labor in Retreat, 32-45.

Wobbly: The Rough and Tumble Story of an American Radical (Chicago: University of

5. William Adelman, Haymarket Revisited (Chicago: Illinois Labor History Society,

1976), 3; Bruce C. Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs: A Social History of Chicago's Anarchists,

Chicago Press, 1948), 3-14.

18. Daily Worker, 30 September 1957,5,7; Carolyn Ashbaugh, Lucy Parsons, American

1870-1900 (NewBrunsvrick.N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 21; Ellen Skerrett, "The

Revolutionary (Chicago: Charles Kerr Publishing Company, 1976), 234; James Weinstein.

236

NOTES TO PAGES 1 9 - 2 3

NOTES TO PAGES I 6 - I 9
31.

Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics (New York: New View Points, 1975),

237

Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International

Communism from Lenin to Stalin (New York: St. Martins Press, i997)> 41-80.

1-8; Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs, 183-219.

19.

32.

James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925 (New York:

Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform

Monthly Review Press,1967), 9-12; Ssivatoie, Eugene V. Debs, 205-12;Melvyn Dubofsky,

(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). 21-24. See also McDermott and Agnew, Co

We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago: Quadrangle

mintern; Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade

Books,

(New York: Basic Books, 1984),

1969); Joyce

Kornbluth, ed.. Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology (Ann Arbor: Uni

versity of Michigan Press,

20.

33.

1964).

Weinstein, Decline of Socialism in America,

13-14;

James R. Barrett, William Z.

5-27;

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 111 (quote).

"Party Structure," Party Organizer (hereafter PO)

mittee

Meeting, 27-28 January 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f.

4 (May 1931): 6-7; District

515, op.

Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,

Leadership and Guidance," PO

1999)> 43-70; William Z. Foster, From Bryan to Stalin (New York: International Pub

PO

lishers,

Party, U.S.A., 1931-1938" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959),

1937), 58-72.

21.

Daily Worker,

22.

William Z. Foster, American Trade Unionism: Principles, Organization, Strategy,

30

September 1957,

5, 7;

Tactics (New York: International Publishers,

Foster, From Bryan to Stalin,
23.

1947), 18;

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 58-66;

1915-1925"

82; John

Keiser, "John Fitzpatrick and Progressive Union

(Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University,

1965), 1-34;

Barrett,

Chicago teachers were among Fitzpatrick's most important allies in this coup.See

Robert L Reid, ed. Battleground: The Autobiography of Margaret A. Haley (Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1982),
25.

Keiser, "John Fitzpatrick,"

22-35;

Elizabeth McKillen, Chicago, Labor, and the

46-48;

188-231;

98-99; Barrett,

Work and Community in the Jungle,

Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 44-72; David Brody, Butcher Workmen:

A Study of Unionization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1964), 81-83,

75-127.
27.

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 83-101; William Z. Foster, Great Steel Strike and Its

Lessons (New York: B. W. Huebsch,

1920);

Keiser, "John Fitzpatrick,"

42-64;

Robert K.

Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (Minneapolis: Minnesota

University Press,
28.

Murray, Red Scare, 211-81; Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility
218-53.

Barrett, Work and Community in the Jungle,98; William Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago

in the Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Atheneum Books,

1970); Halpern,

Down on the

Killing Floor, 65-72; McKillen, Chicago, Labor, and the Rush for a Democratic Diplomacy,
86-96;
30.

Keiser, "John Fitzpatrick," 95-105.

1985),153-73; Weinstein,

(1957;

reprint, Chicago:

Decline of Socialism in America, 234-57; James

P. Cannon, The First Ten Years of American Communism (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962),
16-17,41-46; Arne Swabeck, "When Theory Collides

Progressive Labor (May

n.d.
14

[1933],

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op.

1,

d.

3264,11.12-13;

1969): 25-38.

with Facts Let's Re-Write History^

District Secretariat Minutes,

February 1933, d. 3258, L 106; Organization Department Letter, n.d., d.

1930,1. 69;

2113,1.100;

Tasks of Section Organiza

tional Secretary, n.d. [1932], d. 2466,1.147J

35. "District Leadership and Guidance: How the District Buro Should Function," PO
(February

1931): 6;

Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Pahyr esp.

70-150;

Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 5-7; District Organizationpepartment Letters,

3

October

March
d.

1931,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515. op. 1,

[1930], d. 2113,1.101; 5

1931,

d. 2466,1. 36; Section

3590,1. 22;

d.

2466,

L 107;

September 1930,1. 33;

2

22

September 1931, d.

(April

1931): 28-32; "How

2466,

29 August 1930,11. 50-52; ii

Organization Department Letter, 15 March

"Functioning Unit Buros," PO

Structure Classes," PO 4 (April

1931): 5-7; "Material

1934,

for Party

to Organize Agitprop Work in the

Party Unit," PO 3 (February 1930): 3-536. Chicago's first TUEL meeting turned out four hundred workers, strongest among
those working in the railroad, needle, metal, building, and printing trades. J. W. John
stone, "The League in Chicago," Labor Herald (April

1922): 29.

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 103-14; Draper, Roots of American Communism,

320-

22.
38.

Foster, From Bryan to Stalin, 160.

39.

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 102-10; Foster, From Bryan to Stalin, 156-63.

40.

Midwest Daily Record, 9 May

1938;

Solon De Leon, The American Labor Who's

Who (New York: Hanford Press, 1925). 12941.

Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism

Ivan Dee Inc.,

nizer took over that work. Directives on Future Handling of Party Records and Statistics,

37.

1955), 135-52.

and the LiberalState (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1991),

29.

70-150;

Pubhshers, 1935)34. The largest sections only began to have organizational secretaries beginning

1.100; n.d.

Barrett, William Z. Foster, 74.

Foster, From Bryan to Stalin,

the Party Apparatus,"

Robert Jay Alperin, "Organization in the Communist

J. Peters, The Communist Party, a Manual on Organization (New York: Workers Library

90-93.

Rush for a Democratic Diplomacy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995),
26.

4 (February 1931): 6-8; "Building

1928): 11-13;

Organization Department-Letter, 11 November

William Z. Foster, 74.

24.

(May-June

around 1932 to cope with party growth. Where no secretary existed, the section orga

58-85.

Untitled newspaper clipping in Jack Kling Papers, Chicago Historical Society.

Foster, From Bryan to Stalin,

ism,

Midwest Daily Record, 9 May 1938.

Com

i,d. 3581,11. 2-4; District

42.

Draper, Roofs of American Communism, 14De Leon, American Labor Who's Who, 237, 62,185,41,

Vittorio "Vidali, n.d.

[1984],

225,64; Interview

with

Oral History of the American Left, 17, Tamiment Institute

Library. New York University; Paul Buhle, Marxism in the USA: From 1870 to the Present
Day (New York: Verso Press, 1987), 127-30; Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American
Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,

1961), 13-46.

238

NOTES TO PAGES 2 3 - 2 8

NOTES TO PAGES 2 8 - 3 4

239

43. Interview with Vittorio Vidali, 17.

Foner and James S. Allen, eds., American Communism and Black Americans: -A Docu

44. Foreign Language Press Survey, Scandia, 21 April 1923.

mentary History, 1919-1929 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 109-29.

45. Barrett, William Z. Foster, 111-13; De Leon, American Labor Who's Who, 64.
46. Charles Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution: Memoirs of an American Radical (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 134-36.

62. Draper, American Communism, 24-28 (quote on 20); David Kirby, "Zimmerwald and the Origins of the Third International," and Kevin McDermott, "The History
of the Comintern in Light of New Documents," in International Communism and the

47. Ibid., 139.

Communist International, 1919-1943, ed. Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (Manchester:

48. Michael Gold describes a "proletarian intellectual" in "The Communists Meet,"

Manchester University Press, 1998), 15-30 and 31-40; Kevin McDermott and Jeremy

New Republic, 15 June 1932,117. See also Barrett, William Z. Foster. ii5;Rober A. Bruns,

Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin

The Damndest Radical: The Life and World of Ben Reitman, Chicago's Celebrated Social

(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 1-80.

Refornier, Hobo King and Whorehouse Physician (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
i987)> 230-51; Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American
Communist (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 115,129.
49. Daily Worker, 30 September 1957, 5, 7; newsclipping, n.d.. Jack Kling Papers,

63. Communication Number 11, 2 March 1925, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 556
(first quote); Letter to Jay from Shannon, n.d., RtsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. x, d. 1036,1.122
(second quote); Cannon, First Ten Years of American Communism, 117-27; Barrett,
William Z. Foster, 148-62.

Chicago Historical Society; Peter Filado interview with Gil Green, 23 January 1991,

64. WUliam Z. Foster and James Cannon, "Statements on Our Labor Party Policy,"

Tamiment Institute Library, New York University; John Williamson, Dangerous Scot:

n.d.,f. 534, op. 7, d. 464,1. 54 (quote); Cannon, pjVsf Ten Years of American Communism,

The Life and Work of an American "Undesirable" (New York: International Publishers,

129-31; Barrett, William Z. Foster, 123-25 and 136-39; McKillen, Chicago, Labor, and

1969), 92.

the Rush for a Democratic Diplomacy,193-213; Dxsper, American Communism, 29-51;

50. Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 66 (quote).
51. Martin Abern to Jay Lovestone, 9 December 1925, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
556,1.61 (quote); see also 11.60 and 62; Draper,

o/Amenc:a Communism, 154-57,

190-92; Buhle, Marxism in the USA, 135-37; Glazer, Social Basis of American Commu

William Z. Foster, "An Open Letter to John Fitzpatrick," Labor Herald (January 1924):
6-8, 26; William Dunne, "Workers and Farmers on the March," Labor Herald (April
1924): 38-40; Earl Browder, "Chicago, St. Paul, Cleveland," Labor Heralc^Aug\ist 1924):
166-68.
65. Party Building, December 1927, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. I159,11. 9-16.

nism, 46-58.
52. Martin Abern to Jay Lovestone, 9 December 1925, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
556,1. 58; Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 52; Draper, Roots of American
Communism, 186-88.
53. Martin Abern to Jay Lovestone, 9 December 1925, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
556,1. 58.
54. Ibid.
55- "Situation in Chicago," n.d. [1925], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 556, U. 7-76.
56. Ibid.; Martin Abern to Jay Lovestone, 14 November 1925, RTsKhlDNI, d. 556,1.

4357. Minutes, 25 October 1925, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op., 1, d. 556,1. 33; Kate Weigand,
Red Feminism: American Communism and the Makingof Women's Liberation (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 16-20.
58.9 December 1926, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 671,1. 50; Women's Work Report,
1926, d. 1157,1.12; Martin Abern to Jay Lovestone, 9 December 1925, RTsKhlNDI, d.
556,1. 58 (quote).
59. Haywood, Black Bobhevik, 129 (quote); Paul Young, "Race, Class and Radicalism
in Chicago, 1914-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 2001), 155-73; Mark
Solomon, The Cry Was Unity: Communists and African Americans,1917-1936 (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 1998), 3-21.
60. Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 139.
61. Draper, AwmcflM Communism, 331-32; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 52-67; Philip S.

Chapter 2: Revolutionary Recruitment

1. Report of Bill Gebert on 13th CC Plenum and Tasks, 6 September 1931, RTsKh
lDNI, f. 515 op. 1, d. 2455,1. 96.
2. On Jews and middle-class groups in the party, see Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis
of American Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), 130-68.
3. The Communist party underwent a number of name changes in its early years, in
cluding Workers Party of America, Workers (Communist Party), and Communist Party
of the USA. I refer to it throughout as the Communist party. John Williamson, Dan
gerous Scot: The Life and Work of an American "Undesirable" (New York: International
Publishers, 1969), 29 (quote); Bernard Johnpoll and Harvey Klehr, eds., Biographical
Dictionary of the American Left (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), 418.
4. Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America 1929-1941 (New York: Times
Books, 1984); Maury Klein, Rainbow's End: The Crash of 1929 (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 2001); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The
Functioning of Public Welfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 58; Albert Prago, "The
Organization of the Unemployed and the Role of Radicals, 1929-1935" (Ph.D. disserta
tion, Union Graduate School, 1976), 30 and 174; Frank Folsom, America before Welfare
(New York: New York University Press, 1991), 231-37.
5. These figures are from Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal Industrial Workers in
Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 217 and 241.
6. Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's

240

NOTES TO PAGES 3 7 - 3 9

NOTES TO PAGES 3 5 - 3 7

Packinghouses, 1904-1954 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 98-112; Cohen,

24I

22. "Give More Personal Guidance," PO 5 (November-December 1932): 21-23.

Making a New Deal, 213-50; Claude Lightfoot, From Chicago's Slums to World Politics:

23. Minutes of the District Buro, 26 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,

Autobiography of Claude M. Lightfoot (N^w York: Outlook Publishers, 1987), 38-54;

L 26; 15 May 1931,1. 51; Report of Commission Investigating Sections 5-11-12, n.d.,

Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern

d. 3853,1. 48; Party Registration1931, n.d., d. 2464,11.93-104.

City, 2 vols., 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Report of the Head Resident on
the Neighborhood and Unemployment Emergency, 1930-1931, folder 1930, Graham
Taylor Papers, Newberry Library (quote); Lester V. Chandler, America's Greatest Depres

24. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism,161-62; Glazer, Social Basis of American

Communism, 38-89,100-101.
25. National unemployment figures can be found in Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years:
A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 316-17.

sion, 1929-1941 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 45.

7. District Eight Org. Letter, 7 February 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1.

Louis Wirth and Margaret Furez, eds., Local Community Fact Book, 1938 (Chicago: Chi
cago Recreation Commission, 1938), indicate that 14.02 percent of Chicagoans were on

14.
8. District Eight Org. Letter, 11 August 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2870,1 84

relief in 1934. For national party trends, see Klehr, Heyday of American Communism,
161; and Robert J. Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Party, U.S.A., 1931-1938"

(quote).
9. In 1928, there were 1,100 in the district, which included Milwaukee, St. Louis,

(Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 1959), 58. For Chicago, see Party Regis

southern Illinois, and Indianapolis. In 1931, New Yorkfs district reported 2,346 members.

tration1931, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464, L 93; "Notes on the Recruiting

That year, only 1,692 of Chicago's members filled out complete registrations, but party

Drive in District Eight," PO 4 (December 1931): 11-13; "Party Recruitment Drive," PO

records indicate that membership reached 1,963. Organizational Status of the CPUSA,

5 (January 1932): 13-15.

26. This registration covered the district, which includes an area larger than Chicago.

1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2618,1.95.

Although the registration has statistical inconsistencies, it provides the best reflection

10. Ibid., 98.

11. Analysis for Recruiting and Dues for the Month of November 1934, n.d., RTsKh
12. Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New
York: Basic Books, 1984), 153; Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 101.
13. In July only 611 members paid their dues. Letter to Comrades from Frankfeld, 2
September 1930, RTsKhlDNI,

of Chicago's membership currently available for this period. The part/s Reparation of
"housewives" from "workers" reveals their bias and does not mean that these housewives

lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3591,1. 39.

were not members of the working class, although the party treated theni as though they
were the bourgeoisie. On housewives as an ambiguous category of ^alysis, see Chris
tine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-186Q.(New York-. Knopf,
1986); Eric Olin Wright, "Rethinldng, Once Again, the Concept ot Class Structure," in

515. op. 1, d. 1956, L 48.

14. Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 212-13 n.28; "Build the Party thru

The Debate on Classes, ed. E. O. Wright (London: Verso, 1989). 269-348.

Recruiting New Members," n.d. [1930], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2113,1. 48; Dis

27. For the percentage of Chicago's Communist trade-union membership, I divided

trict Organization Department Letter, 12 October 1930,1. 55; 3 April 1931, d. 2466,11.

the total number of Chicago's Communists who claimed union membership (396) by

39-40.
15. J. Williamson, "The Party NucleusA Factor in the Class Struggle," speech at

the total number of Chicago's Commimists who provided information to party leaders

Plenum of District Committee, 29-30 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2455,

Alperin's research, which indicated that the party had a total of 14,475 members. Of

during their 1931 registration (1,692). I based my national party statistics on Robert
these Commimists, 2,300 belonged to unions. Of union members in the national party,

L 17.
16. Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 122.

28 percent were in the AFL and 72 percent in the TUUL, whereas Chicago's party had

17. "Build the Party thru Recruiting New Members," n.d. [1930], RTsKhlDNI, f 515,

52 percent in the reformist unions and 48 percent in the TUUL. Alperin, "Organization

op. i,d. 2113,1.48. See also Report on Recruiting Drive in Chicago District, Williamson

in the Communist Part)^' 49,57; Party Registration1931, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

to District Buro, 5 April 1932, d. 2874,1. 209.

18. Ibid.

1, d. 2464,1. 95.
28. Chicago's party culture and the particular campaigns that explain these high

19. Organization Department Letter, 28 October 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

proportions are discussed in chapters 3-5 and 7.

2113, L 59. For national trends, see Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 156-60.
The Party Organizer regularly reported on national fluctuation

problems as well.

29. U.S. Bureau of the Census,

Census of the United States: 1930, Population,

voL3,pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932), 656; Party Registra

20. Report on Recruiting Drive in Chicago District, Williamson to District Buro, 5

tion1931, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464,11. 93-104; Organizational Status

April 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2874,11. 208-10 (quote on 209); Monthly Re

of CPUSA, d. 2618,11. 95-96. New York's black Communists represented 3.1 percent

cruiting Bulletin, August 1934, d. 3591,11.24-26.

21. Organization Department Letter, 3 April 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,
11. 39-40.

of their membership, whereas Chicago's black members represented 24.3 percent. See
Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression (Urbana: University of Il
linois Press, 1983), 68. See also Robin Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists

242

NOTES TO PAGES 3 9 - 4 2

NOTES TO PAGES 4 2 - 4 5

243

during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990),

44. Bettina Drew, Nelson Algren: A Life on the Wild Side (Austin: Texas University Press,

17, 33. Thanks to Glenda Gilmore for sharing her research on Birmingham's African

1989), 50-52; "Midwest Club NotesChicago," Left Front (May-June 1934): 21; Richard

American membership.

Wright, Black Boy: American Hunger (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993), 372.

30. Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 169-84.

45. Drew, Nelson Algren, 76.

31. Section 2 Organization Letter, 29 March 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2882,

46. Quoted in ibid., 77.

I.38; "New Tasks Brought Out by Membership Study," PO 6 (January 1933): 24; J. Peters,
"A Study of Fluctuation in the Chicago District," PO 7 (October 1934): 20-25.
32. Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 176.
33. These conflicts will be discussed in the next chapter.
34. Party Registrationi93i,n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464,11.93-104; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 636, 638,640.
35. The largest groups in Chicago missingfrom party categories were the Irish and the

47. Wright, Black Boy, 381,406.

48. Denning, Cultural Front, 210.
49. "Henri Barbusse to Visit Chicago" and "The Midwest John Reed Conference," Left
Front (September-October 1933): 11.
50. "Midwest Club NotesChicago," Left Front (May-June 1934): 21.
51. On clubs throughout the country, see Denning, Cultural Front, 205-11.
52. Wright, Black Boy, 379-86; Denning, Cultural Front, 210.

Swedes. Given the Swedes' importance to Chicago's party, most likely a large percentage

53. Quoted in Douglas Wixson, Worker-Writer in America: Jack Conroy and the Tradi

of the miscellaneous category included them. The lack of Irish participation is more

tion of Midwestern Literary Radicalism, 1898-1990 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,

difficult to explain, since party records are silent on the issue. Of those party members

1994). 287.
54. Quoted in Drew, Nelson Algren, 77.

born in another country, 64 percent were citizens of the United States. See Party Regis
tration1931, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464, L 93. Klehr states that the 1931
registration of the party showed that half of the immigrant members were citizens, and
two-thirds of the party was foreign-born. In Chicago, less were foreign-born, compara

55. Quoted in ibid., 77.

56. Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life and Times (New York: Henry Holt, 2001),
80-81 (quote); Wright, B/acA: Boy, 387-90.

tively, and more, 66 percent, were citizens. See BClehr, Heyday of American Communism,

57. Quoted in Rowley, Richard Wright, 287.

162. Also see Glazer, Social Basis of American Communism, 38-89, for comparative

58. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 81-83; Wright, Black Boy, 391 (quote).

national party figures.

36. Data Cards, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 4129; Klehr, Heyday of American
Communism, 6. For a time, Charles Karenic edited RovnostL'udu (Equality of the people),
an ethnic newspaper begun in 1906, which ran until 1935, when it changed its name to
Ludovy Dennik (The people's daily).
37. Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 46.

59. Party Registration, n.d. [1931], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2_464,11. 93-104.
60. District Organization Department Letter, 17 November 1930,'RTsKhlDNI, f 515,
op. 1, d. 2113,1.72.
61. Minutes of the Women's Committee, 15 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2115, U. 24-25. See also Christine Ellis interview in Rank and File: Personal Histories by
Working-Class Organizers, ed. Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd (Boston: Beacon Press,

38. Membership Report, 13 November 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464,1. 58;

1973). 10-3362. Report of Chicago District on Work among Women, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op.

Party Registration1931, n.d., U. 93-104; Roger Keeran, "The International Workers

1, d. 2110, U. 12-17. On the organization of a federation of working women's organiza

Order and the Origins of the CIO" Labor History 30.3 (1989): 385-408; Roger Keeran,

tions, see Anna David to Jack Stachel, 29 February 1928, d. 1334,1.11.

"National Groups and the Popular Front: The Case of the IWO," Journal of American
Ethnic History 14.3 (Spring 1995): 23-29.
39. Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 85 (quote). The November 1929 edition

63. Report of Chicago District on Work among Women, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 2110, IL 12-17. On the party's inability to find a head for the district women's
department, see Minutes of District Political Committee,

23

May

1929.

d.

1773,1.1;

of the ILD's Labor Defender lists greetings from twenty-eight ILD branches in Chicago

Report of the District Organizer, n.d., d. 1416,1. 83. On Chicago women's role in the

(244-45).

Gastonia drive, see The Activizer, October 1929, d. 1777,11. 28-30.

40. District Buro Minutes, 16 October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. i,d 2457,1.108.

64. Letter from Section 7 Organizer, 19 May 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3587,

41. "Stu4y of Fluctuation in the Chicago District," PO 7 (October 1934): 20-25; "How

1-139 (quote); Randi Storch, "'They Could Stay in the Toilet and Play with the Babies':

Are the Convention Decisions Being Carried into Life?" PO 7 (Jxily 1934): 4-6. See also

Women's Personnel and Political Struggles within the CPUSA," paper presented at the

Minutes of Org. Department, 26 December 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464,

Social Science History Association Conference, 20 November 2004, Chicago; Sharon

II. 77-78; Party Registration1931, n.d., U. 93-104.

42. Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the
Twentieth Century (London: Verso Books, 1996), 205.
43. "Paintings against War," Leji Front (September-October 1933): 10.

Hartman Strom, "ChaUenging 'Woman's Place': Feminism, the Left, and Industrial
Unionism in the 19305," Feminist Studies 9.2 (1983): 359-86; Elizabeth Faue, "'Dynamo
of Change': Gender and Solidarity in the American Labour Movement of the 1930s."
Gender and History 1.2 (1989): 138-58.

244

NOTES TO PAGES 4 5 - 4 7

NOTES TO PAGES 4 7 - 5 3

245

65. Elizabeth Faue, "Paths of Unionization: Community, Bureaucracy, and Gender

72. Organization Department Letter, 4 June 1931, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,

in the Minnesota Labor Movement of the 1930s" and Patricia Cooper, "Hie Faces of

U. 75-76; Section 7 Organization Letter, 11 October 1933, d. 3267> 1- 122; Minutes of

Gender: Sex Segregation and Work Relations at Philco, 1928-1938," in Work Engendered:

PolBuro Meeting, 17 August 1930, d. 2109,11.45-46; Report on Labor Day Demonstra

Toward a New History of American Labor, ed. Ava Baron (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer

tion, 2 September 1930, d. 2110,11.59-63.

Pursuit of Equity: Men,

73. Allan H.Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago:

Women, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Oxford:

University of Chicago Press, 1967), 148-49. See also Wright, B/acA: Boy, 331-32; Cayton

sity Press, 1991), 296-319 and 320-50; Alice Kessler-Harris,

Oxford University Press, 2001).

66. Lydia Sargent, ed.. Women and Revolution (Boston: South End Press. 1981), ix-

and Drake, Black Metropolis; Haywood, Black Bobhevik, 86-88; Roger Horowitz, "Negro
and White, Unite and Fight!": A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking,

xxxi; Van Gosse, "'To Organize in Every Neighborhood, in Every Home: The Gender

1930-1990 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 61-67; Rick Halpern, Down on the

Politics of American Communists between the Wars," Radical History Review 50 (Spring

Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-1954 (Urbana:

1991): 109-42; Robert Schaffer, "Women and the Communist Party USA, 1930-1940,"

University of Illinois Press, 1997), 105-12; James R. Barrett, Work and Community in

Socialist Review 45 (May 1979): 73-118; Rosalyn Baxandall, "The Question Seldom

the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers, 1894-1922 (Urbana: University of Illinois

Asked: Women and the CPUSA," in New Studies in the Politics and Culture of U.S. Com

Press, 1987), 208; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 33-38.

munism, ed. Michael Brown (New York: Monthly Review,1993), 141-62; Kate Weigand,

74. For good descriptions of the Back of the Yards in the 1920s and 1930s, see Robert

Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women's Liberation (Baltimore:

Slayton, Back of the Yards: The Making of a Local Democracy (Chicago: University of

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 28-64. For a discussion of the Communist party's

Chicago Press, 1986), 3-15; Thomas J. Jablonsky, Pride in the Jungle: Community and

construction of gender, see chapter 3 of this volume.

67. Election Flyer, Illinois Communist Party folder, vertical files, Tamiment Institute

Everyday Life in Back of the Yards Chicago (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993)> 1-25; Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and Fight!" 61-63, 67-68; Halpern,

Library, New York University; Minutes of Secretariat Meeting, 3 February 1939, RTsKh

Down on the Killing Floor, 10-12, 21-22, 66-67, 81-82, 155-58; Scott Nearing, "The

lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109.1. 102; Minutes of District Secretariat, 24 August 1932, d.

Jungle," Labor Defender (September 1928): 188 (quote). See also Negro Champion, 27

2866,1.105; Workers'Voice,15 October 1932,2; U.S. Military Intelligence Department

Reports, Surveillance of Radicals in the United States, Microfilm, reel 29, frame 468

October 1928, 5.
/
75. Christopher Reed, The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional Lead

(hereafter USMI-SRUS); Minutes of the Polcom, 9 November 1929, d.1773,1.29; Negro

ership, 1910-1966 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 72-89; Beth Bates,

Champion, 3 November 1928,1 (quote).

Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America-'i925~i945 (Chapel

68. Edith Margo, "The South Side Sees Red," LeJi Front (January-February 1934):

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); District Organization Department Let

4; Haryy Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist

ter, 11 November 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515 op. 1, d. 2113,1.67; Section 7 Organization

(Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 300, 312-14.

Letter, 7 December 1933, d. 3267,1.129; M. Childs to Wolfe, 17 March 1928, d. 1334. L

69. Wright, Black Boy, 346-51; Haywood, Black Bolshe-vik, 101, 115,129; Horace

24; Browder to Secretariat, 15 January 1929, d. 1652,11. 59-60.

Cayton and St. Clair Drake, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City

76. Haywood, Black Bobhevijc, 55.

(1945; reprint. New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 603; Roger Bruns, The Damndest

77. Ibid., 1,3.

78. Ibid., 5; William Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919 (New York:

Radical: The Life and Times of Ben Reitmann (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987),
246-48; Harold Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967), 328-31, 337.
70. District Plenum, 19-20 December 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2464,11.
70-74; n.d., d. 2115,1. 26.
71. See map; Minutes of the District Secretariat, 20 September 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f
515, op. 1, d. 2866,11.115-16; Resolution on the Results of the Elections and the Next
Tasks, n.d., d. 2869,11. 23-25; Conference Discussion, 6 September 1931, d. 2455,1. 54.

Atheneum Books, 1970).

79. Haywood, Black Bobhevik, 99.
80. Ibid., 100,117.
81. Ibid., 117-18.
82. Ibid., 83; Wright, Black Boy, 415-16.
83. Wright, Black Boy, 419-22; Rowley, Nebon Algren, 98.
84. Wright, Black Boy, 371-72; Rowley, Ne/soKA/^reM, 74. On 24 June 1933, the editor

See precinct map indicating Communist support in box 50, folder 3, Ernest Burgess

of the Chicago Defender asked whether Communists had it right concerning religion.

Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago; thanks to James R. Barrett for bring

The responses from its non-party readers were decidedly mixed.

ing this source to my attention. For a general discussion of black voting patterns, see

85. Wjight, Black Boy, 372.

William J. Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991

86. Ibid., 372-90; Rowley, Nebon Algren, 79-80.

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

87. Wright, Black Boy, 387-89; Rowley, Nebon Algren, 80-81.

246

NOTES TO PAGES 5 3 - 5 9

88. Quoted in Rowley, Nelson Algren, 97.

89. William Patterson, The Man Who Cried Genocide: An Autobiography (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), 148.
90. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 345.
91. David Poindexter quoted in ibid., 345-46; Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview
with Claude Lightfoot for Seeing Red, 9 October 1978, 11 (second quote), Tamiment
Institute Library, New York University.
92. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Claude Lightfoot, 11, Tamiment
Institute Library, New York University; Claude Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Poli tics: Autobiography of Claude M. Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1980),
33-3493. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Claude Lightfoot, 11, Tamiment
Institute Library, New York University.

NOTES TO PAGES 5 9 - 6 8

247

101. Ten Year Anniversary Festival with Bazaar, 1918-1928, Workers Lyceum, in pos
session of author, translated from Swedish by Janne Hereitis. Thanks to the late Steve
Sapolsky for lending this source.
102. Report, 10 November 1932, reel 29, frame 464, USMI-SRUS; Henry Bengston,
On the Left in America: Memoirs of the Scandinavian-American Labor Movement (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 202.
103. Jack Spiegel, interviews with the author, 28 May 1994 and 4 May 1996; Robert
McClory, "The Incurable Radical," The (Chicago) Reader 13.2 (14 October 1983): 8, 9,
34, and 36.
104. Jack Spiegel, interviews with the author, 28 May 1994 and 4 May 1996; McClory,
"Incurable Radical," 8, 9, 34, and 36.
105. Jack Kling, Where the Action Is: Memoirs of a U.S. Communist (New York: New
Outlook Publishers, 1985), 6. The title of Kling's ging is telling; the term "pineapple"

94. Wirth and Furez, Local Community Fact Book, 24, 28, 31; District Organization

was a euphemism for homemade bombs. See Barbara Newell, Chicago and the Labor

Department Letter, 15 September 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2113,1. 41; 15

Movement: Metropolitan Unionism in the 1930s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,

December 1930, d. 2113,1. 82; 13 September 1932, d. 2882,1.144.

1961), 80.

95. Wirth and Furez, Local Community Fact Book, 24, 28, 31.

106. Kling, Where the Action Is, 6-7.

96. District Organization Letter, 15 September 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.1, d. 2113,

107. Ibid., 17.

1. 41; Clarence Hathaway to Max Bedacht, 17 October 1929, d. 1652,11.121-23; Mary

108. Party Registration1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2464,1. 93.

Cygan, "Ihe Polish-American Left," and Maria Woroby, "The Ukrainian Immigrant Left
in the United States," in The Immigrant Left in the United States, ed. Paul Buhle and Dan
Georgakas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 148-84 and 185-206.
For voting patterns among Chicago's Polish groups, see Edward R. Kantowicz, PolishAmerican Politics in Chicago, 1888-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
97. Party Registration1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2464,1. 93; District Or
ganization Department Meeting, 9 November 1932, d. 2882, L169; Minutes of District
Secretariat, 12 April 1933, d. 3258,1.131, and 29 June 1933,1.141. See also Paul Buhle,
"Themes in American Jewish Radicalism," in The Immigrant Left in the United States,
ed. Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996),
77-118; Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1976); Paul Buhle, "Jews and American Communism: The Cultural Question," Radical
History Review 23 (Spring 1980): 9-36; Irving Cutler, The Jews of Chicago: From Shtetl
to Suburb (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 233-38; Glazer, Social Basis of
American Communism, 130-44.
98. "A Radical Woman: The Life and Labors of Mollie West," The (Chicago) Reader
22.28 (16 April 1993): 20.
99. Section 4 Organization Letter, 1 August 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2882,
1.128; Letter from District Organizer, 25 July 1930, d. 1956,1. 46; Minytes of PolBuro,
17 August 1930, d. 2109,11.45-46; Report on Labor Day Demonstration, 2 September
1930, d. 2110,1. 61. On the Dil Pickle, see Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 115, 129; and
James R. Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1999), 73.
100. Wirth and Furez, Local Community Fact Book, 6, 7, 8; Edith Abott, The Tene
ments of Chicago, 1908-1935 (New York: Arno Press, 1970), 106-10.

Chapter 3: "True Revolutionaries"

1. The specific charges are not documented but most likely have to do with Poindex
ter's reluctance to publicly attack "Negro reformists" as party lead,ers directed. See Con
ference Notes, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,1. 87.
2. The first account can be found in Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life and Times
(New York: Henry Holt, 2001), 100-101. The second is in Mark Solomon, The Cry Was
Unity: Communists and African Americans, 1917-1936 (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1998), 161. Solomon dates the trial to 1932 based on an interview with
Claude Lightfoot, but Haywood did not get to Chicago until two years later.
3. Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist
(Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 441-42.
4. F. Bury to J. Mackovich, trans. J. F. SchifFel, 23 March [n.y.], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
1, d. 3052, L 53.
5. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview vrith Carl Hirsch for Seeing Red, 13 October
1978, 6-8, Tamiment Institute Library, New York University
6. Richard Wright, Black Boy: American Hunger (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993),
346-47; Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 46-47; Chicago Tribune, 4 August 1932, 34.
7. Rowley, Richard Wright, 65; Wright, Black Boy, 346.
8. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Carl Hirsch, 15 October 1978,11.
9. J. Williamson, "The Party NucleusA Factor in the Class Struggle," 29-30 March
1931, RTsKhlDNI,

(.

515, op. i,d. 2455,1. 21.

10. Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New
York: Basic Books, 1984), 156-57, suggests that Communist leaders clung to their eso

248

NOTES TO PAGES 6 9 - 7 2

NOTES TO PAGES 6 8 - 6 9

teric language because they believed it was the only way to express the science of Marx
ism-Leninism, but the pervasive use of Russian symbols in dress as well as language
suggests more of a cultural affinity and desire to directly connect themselves to Russia's
successful revolution than his explanation implies.
11. Organization Letter, 14 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2466, L 33.
12. Weekly Organization Letter, 26-30 December 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2113,1. 89.
13. Ibid.; Organization Letter, 7 February 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op., 1, d. 2466,1.

249

23. DC Secretariat to Agitprop CC, 1 December 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

2876,1.137.
24. District 8 Letter, 1 July 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2870,1. 72.
25. Section 7 Letter, 7 December 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267,1.130.
26. DC Secretariat to Agitprop CC, 1 December 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2876,1.137; Italian Buro Report, n.d., d. 2337,1.132.
27.10 January 1933, USMI-SRUS; Section 6 Organization Letter, 7 December 1932,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2882, L 222; Section 5 Organizational Directives, 17 No
vember through 24 November 1932, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2870,1.118.

6.
14. Applications in RTsKhlDNI, f 515, d. 4143 and 4144. Andrea Graziosi found

28. Organization Letter, 21 December 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1777. L

that in 1931 the American party received over a himdred thousand appeals to emigrate

38.
29. District Buro Minutes, 8 December 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2866,1.

to the Soviet Union. See Andrea Graziosi, A New Peculiar State: Explorations in Soviet
History, 1917-1937 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), 228.
15. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Ben Gray for Seeing Red, 8-9, Tami
ment Institute Library, New York University.
16. Ibid., 13. See, for example, "Workers! Don't Let Bosses Attack the Soviet Union!"

85.
30. Section 5 Organization Directives, 17 November through 24 November 1932,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2870,1.118.
31. "How to Get Signatures for Nominating Petitions," n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1,

Labor Unity, 29 November 1930, 2. In the December 1934 issue of Labor Unity, Steve

d. 2112,11.65-66; AgitProp Conference, 19 April 1929, d.1775,1.8; Minutes of AgitProp,

Rubicki, the TUUL leader in Chicago, criticized the paper's editors for sending him "a

20 April 1929,1. 5-6.

Soviet Pictoral" instead of a paper that "gives us guidance and the line for our work.
... The Secretaries of our Local Unions," he complained, "refuse to take this magazine

32. Minutes Secretariat Meeting, 27 January 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 1775,
1. 47; District Organization Department Letter, 4 June 1931, d. 2466,1. jp\ Minutes of

and I'll be damned if I can convince them to do so." The paper's editors responded that

District Buro, 26 November 1932, d. 2866,11.83-84; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 155-65,

they "do not apologize" for the issue and that it is the job of Labor Unity to "discuss the

200-206.

achievements and victories of the workers of the Soviet Union."

17. Claude Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Politics: Autobiography of Claude M.
Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1980), 11.

33. Mary Templin, "Revolutionary Girl, Militant Housewife, Antifascist Mother, and
More: The Representation of Women in American Communist Women's Journals of
the 19305," Centennial Review 41.3 (1997): 625-33.

18. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Carl Hirsch, 3; see also Jack Kling,

34. EricD. Weitz, Creating German Communism: 1590-1990 (Princeton, N.J.: Prince

Where the Action Is: Memoirs of a U.S. Communist (New York New Outlook Publishers,

ton University Press, 1997), 188-232; Joyce Kornbluth, ed., Rebel Voices: An IWW An

1985). 17-

thology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964).

19. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Ben Gray, 11.
20. Report at District Plenum, 29-30 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1 d. 2455,
I. 20.

35. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 189.

36. Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering and Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor
Movement in Minneapolis,1915-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,

21. From 1928 through 1935, anywhere from ten to thirty Communist periodicals

1991), 69-125; Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women. Men, and the Quest

were published in Chicago. See Harold D. Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, World

for Economic Citizenship in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study (New York: Alfi-ed A. Knopf, 1939), 58-71;

2001).

Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 166; Org. Department Questionnaire for Dis

37. Van Gosse, "'To Organize in Every Neighborhood, in Every Home': The Gender

trict 8,10 October 1930, section 2, box 8, file 35, Earl Browder Papers, Syracuse Univer

Politics of American Communists between the Wars," Radical History Review 50 (1991):

sity Library, Special Collections, Research Center, Syracuse, N.Y. See also Labor Unity,

108-41.

31 January 1931, 1, which describes a Chicago meeting where twenty-five literature

agents pledged to hook ten thousand new readers on the paper.
22. "The District School," in The Activizer: Official Organ of Section Three, October
1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1777,1.28; Org. Letter, 7 April 1932, d. 2870.1.35. In
the summer of 1931, the district school was held at the Finnish Workers camp outside
Waukegan; see Organization Letter, 4 June 1931, d. 2466,1. 76.

38. These images appear in each issue of Working Woman.

39. Annelise Orleck, Common Sense and a Little Fire: Women and Working-Class
Politics in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995)40. See Working Woman, July 1931,1; June 1931,1; August 1931,1.
41. Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Linda Gordon, The Moral Property of Women:
A History of Birth Control Politics in America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002);

250

NOTES TO PAGES 7 7 - 8 1

NOTES TO PAGES 7 2 - 7 7

251

Nancy Woloch, Muller v. Oregon: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford

For party involvement with the Scottsboro case in Harlem, see Mark Naison, Commu

Press, 1996).

nists in Harlem during the Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, i983)> 57-89-

42. They also argued that Republican and Democratic platforms and policies did not
support women. Working Woman, June 1931, 4; August 1931, 7; June 1940, 4; Rob

For Birmingham, see Robin Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the
Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 78-9156. St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a

ert Shaffer, "Women and the Communist Party, USA, 1930-1940," Socialist Review 45
(May-June 1979): 84.
43. District Disciplinary Decisions, March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3264,
1.18. See also District Disciplinary Decisions, July 1933, d. 3264.
44. John Williamson, Dangerous Scot: The Life and Work of an American "Undesirable"
(New York: International Publishers, 1969), 92.
45. Christine Ellis interview in Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class

Northern City (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 86, 736 (quote), 737; Section 2 Or
ganization Letter, 7 November 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267,1- 70; Section
1 Organization Letter, 5 April 1932, d. 2870,1. 31; Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World
Politics, 42-44.
57. Letter from P. Camel to the Daily Worker. 18 January 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f 515,

Organizers, ed. Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 24 (in

op. 1, d. 3587,1. 62.

58. Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 173; Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Politics, 53-54;

Chicago, Christine Ellis was known as Katherine Erlich).

Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 129-73.

59. Chicago Defender,1 July 1933,15 (quote); Demsey J. Travis, An Autobiography of

46. Kate Weigand, Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women's
Liberation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 15-27.

Black Chicago (Chicago: Urban Research Institute, 1981), 48.

60. For a fuller discussion of expulsions during the Third Period, see Randi Storch,

47. Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 44.

48. Report on May Day Demonstration, 5 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

"'The Realities of the Situation': Revolutionary Discipline and Everyday Political Life in

2110,1. 2; Carolyn Ashbaugh, Lucy Parsons: American Revolutionary (Chicago: Charles

Chicago's Communist Party, 192^-1935" Labor: Studies in Working-Class History in the

Kerr, 1976), 253.

Americas 1.3 (Fall 2004): 19-4461. Minutes of District Convention, 7-8 June 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 5i5;op. 1, d. 2107,

49. For a detailed history of Red Squads, see Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege:
Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990). For examples of police attacks at party offices, see M. C. to PolBuro, 6

1.5.
62. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Ben Gray.

63. Minutes of District Plenum, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, .f. 515, op. 1, d. 2108,1.

September 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3859,11. 68-69; Johnny to Browder,-i6

November 1931, d. 2460,1.112; Report of Labor Day Demonstration, 5 May 1930, d.
2110,1.63; Letter from K. E. Heikkine, 26 October 1929, d. 1652,1.126.
50. Organizational Department Letter, 25 September 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,
d. 2466,1.106.
51. Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 444; Daily Worker, 29 September 1932; Rowley, Richard
Wright, 96; "The Atlanta Six," Labor Defender (August 1930): 154.
52. Lasswell and Bluenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 47; Chicago Needle
Worker, March 1928. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 1526,1. 3; Organizational Department
Letter, 28 February 1931, d. 2466,1.23; Section 4 Organization letter, 15 December 1931,
d. 2472,1.90.
53. The Soviet policy is explained in Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Ques

/
/

2.
64. "Control of How Party Instructions Are Carried Out," PO 3 (1930):14-15; "Regu
lar Party Work," PO 3 (March 1930): 13.
65. District Disciplinary Decisions, March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3264,
1.19; District Disciplinary Decisions, October-November 1932, d. 2870,1.123.
66. Organization Letter, 4 November 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. i,d. 2113,11.64-65;
Directives on Future Handling of Party Records and Statistics, n.d. [i933]> d. 3264,1.
12.
67. District Disciplinary Decisions, March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op-1>

3264.

68. A1 Glotzer interviewed by Jon Bloom, 13-21 December 1983, Oral History of the
American Left, Tamiment Institute Library, New York University.

tion: Selected Writings and Speeches (New York: International Publishers, 1942). Good

69. Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York: Vintage

discussions of how this policy was understood in the American context can be found

Books, 1986), 357-76,374 (quote).

70. James P Cannon, The First Ten Years of American Communism: Report of a Par

in Solomon, Cry Was Unity, 68-89; and Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 218-35.
54. "Outline for Discussion on the Right to Self Determination," n.d., RTsKhlDNI,

ticipant (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962), 222-26; Draper, American Communism and

f. 515 op. 1, d. 3269,11. 84-85; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 552-54; Philip S. Foner and

Soviet Russia, 357-76; James R. Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American

Herbert Shapiro, eds., American Communism and Black Americans: A Documentary

Radicalism (Urbana: University of lUinois Press, 1999)> 153-55-

History, 1930-1934 (Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1991), 14-16,41-42,63-70,

85-86.
55. Section 7 Organization Letter, 7 December 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267,
1.129 (quote); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (New York: Random House, 1994).

71. Appeal to the CEC against the "Resolution on Organization" Adopted by the
Chicago District Polburo Appeal by M. Childs, N. Green, Wm. Simmons, Leo Fisher,
Nels Kjar, Dora Lifshitz, Steve Rubicki, 29 September 1928, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1,
d. 1334. L 99.

252

NOTES TO PAGES 8 I - 8 5

NOTES TO PAGES 8 5 - 8 8

253

72. Joe Giganti to Polcom, 24 January 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1640,1. 5;

88. District Organization Letter, 16 July 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466, L

Tom O'Flaherty, the Communist editor of the Voice of Labor, city editor of the Daily
Worker, and journalist and founder of Labor Defender, was also expelled for "refusing

91; 31 July 1931.1- 8789. District Organization Department Letter, 19 June 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

to join in the hue and cry against Trotsky." See Tom O'Flaherty to Jack Conroy, 9 June

1, d. 2466,1. 80.

1931, Jack Conroy Papers, Newberry Library, Chicago.

90. Weekly Organization Letter, 26-30 December 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

73. Minutes of District PolCom, 10 February 1929, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1773,1. 20.

2113,1.89; Minutes of the District Secretariat,14 February1933, d. 3258,1.106; District

74. District Political Committee Minutes, 10 February 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

8 Letter, 9 September 1932, d. 2870,1. 93; District Organization Department Letter, 21

1, d. 1773,11.120-21; To CEC Plenum, 13 December 1928,1.144; To CEC Plenum, 24

May 1931, d. 2466,1. 71.

91. Minutes of Organization Department, 17 October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

December 1928,1. 146; Appeal to CEC, 29 September 1928,1. 99; Draper, American
Communism and Soviet Russia, 357-76; Klehi, Heyday of American Communism, 7-10.

1, d. 2464,1. 42; Minutes of Section Committee Meeting, 5 October 1931, d. 2472,11.

Party leaders also noted that Jews were more sympathetic to these splinter groups than

13-1492. District Organization Department Letter, 31 July 1933J RTsKhlDNI, f. 515 op. 1,

were any other racial or ethnic group. See Hathaway to Lovestone, 12 August 1929, d.
1652,11.100-109.
75. Minutes of the District Convention, 7-8 June 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d.
2107,11. 2-12; Minutes of the PolCom Meeting, 15 March 1930, d. 2109,1.14.
76. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast Trotsky: 1929-1940 (London: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1963), 39. For a detailed party analysis of social fescism, see R. Palme Dutt,

d. 3267,1. 234; District Organization Department Letter, 15 September 1930, d. 2113,1.

42; Letter to Potkin from Section Organization Department, 29 January 1932. d. 2874,
1. 27.
93. Minutes of the Secretariat, 23 October 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,1.

Fascism and Social Revolution: A Study of the Economics and Politics of the Extreme Stages

61.
94. Resolution on First Half of Three Months Plan of Work, 30 May 1931, RTsKh

of Capitalism Decay (1934; reprint, San Fransicso: Proletarian Publishers, 1974).

lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,1. 59. Out of ninety-three units in the first half pf 1931, ten

77. Deutscher, Prophet Outcast Trotsky, 38. For a good discussion of Third Period
terms, see Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Interna
tional Communism from Lenin to Stalin (New York:St. Martins Press, 1997), 68-73 and
81-119.

had study groups.

95. Minutes of Section 11, 7 February 1934. RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. x f A . 3587,1. 30;
Letter to Organization Committee from Section 7,19 May i934> d- 35-87,1.13996. Report of Commission Investigating Sections 5-11-12, n.d., I^TsKhlDNI, f. 515,

78. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism,13; Harvey Klehr and John Haynes, The

op. 1, d. 3853,1. 50; Plan of Action for Building the TUUL in Chicago, n.d. [i93o]> d.

American Communist Movement: Storming Heaven Itself (NewYork: Twayne Press, 1992),

2113, L 99; District Organization Department Letter, 12 October 1930, 11. 53-55; Let

69-73.
79. Jack Spiegel, interview with the author, Chicago, 4 August 1996.

ter to Central Committee from Organization Department of the District, 12 February

So. Northwestern Shop News, April 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2474,1. 7.

1932, d. 2874,1. 79.

97. Minutes of the Lithuanian Central Buro, 16 October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,

81. Chicago Foreign Language Press Survey, Radnik, 31 October 1928 and 26 Febru

op. 1, d. 2532,1. 25; F. Borich to Jugoslav Buro, n.d., f. 515, op. 1, d. 2021,1. 64.

ary 1929.
82. Chicago Foreign Language Press Survey, Otthon, 29 March 1931; Rassviet, 19
December 1933.
83. District Organization Department Letter, 5 September 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 2113,1. 33.
84. District Organization Department Letter, 29 November 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515
op. 1, d. 2113,1.76.
85. District Organization Letter, 7 February 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,
1.15; 2 December 1931,1.132; 19 June 1931,1. 80.
86. District Organization Department Letter, 26 June 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
1, d. 2466,1. 85.
87. District Organization Department Letter, 26 January 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 2466,1. 8; District Organization Department Letter, 22 October 1931, d. 2466,
1.119; Resolution Adopted at the Section 5 Conference, 19 December 1930. d. 2110,11..
78-82; District Organization Letter, 28 October 1930,11. 59-60.

98. S. Zinich, "The Right Wing Danger in Foreign Language Organizations and Our
Tasks," RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1816, II. 11-16.
99. Letter to Hathaway, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1683,1. 73.
100. Letter to Finnish Buro, 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3265, L 273; Clarence
Hathaway to William Kruse, 12 August 1929, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1652. U. 100-109.
101. Minutes of the Conference on the Lithuanian Question, 3 March 1931, RTsKh
lDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2532.1.12.
102. Language Commission to Comrade Loyen, 14 March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 3176,1. 36.
103. "On Fighting White Chauvinism," PO 5 (May 1931): 14-16; "Resolution of the
Central Committee, USA, on Negro Work," Daily Worker, 23 March 1931; Solomon,
Cry Was Unity, 129-46; Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression, 46-48;
Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 327-30.
104. Statement and Decision on the Situation in the Editorial Staff of Vilnis, n.d.,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2532, L 57; On the Fight against the Opportunists in the

254

NOTES TO PAGES 9 2 - 9 6

NOTES TO PAGES 8 8 - 9 2

Lithuanian Fraction, f. 5i5>op. i, d. 2532,1 71; Minutes of the Lithuanian Fraction, 19

255

123.1. Garelickto Lovestone, ii January 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1652, 1 1 .

53-55; District Organization Department Letter, 21 May 1931, d. 2466,1. 71-

June 1931. f- 515. op. 1, d. 2532.

105. P. Camel, Letter to the editor, DaiTy Worker, 18 January 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 3587, n. 60-65.
106. Decisions of DCC, August-October 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3264,1.
24; Decisions for April and May 1934, d. 3052,1. 21.
107. On race relations in Chicago, see Jim Grossman. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black

124. Zinich to Alpi, 7 January 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 2021,1. 7; Zinich to
Alpi, 2 January 1930, d. 2021,1. 3125. Zinich to Alpi, 7 January 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 2021, L 7.
126. Gebert to Alpi, 8 February 1931, d. 2021,1. 51; Zinich to Alpi, 7 January 1930,

Southerners and the Great Migration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989),161-

d. 2021,1. 7.
127. John Mackovich to Central Control Committee, 13 April 1929, RTsBChlDNI, f.

80 and 259-65; St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro

515,

Life in a Northern City (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 65-76, 129-73; Allan H.

op. i,d. 1712,1. 25.

128. Gebert to Kovis, 11 December 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2112,1. 63.

Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of

129. Chicago Foreign Language Press Survey, Rassviet, 19 December 1933.

130. Verblin Speech at District Buro, 24 February 1933. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d.

Chicago Press, 1967), 201-29.

108. R Camel, Letter to the editor,

Wbr^rer, 18 January1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,

op. 1, d. 3587,11. 60-65.

109. S. Zinich to P Smith, 6 December 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1683,11.

3258,11. 40-45> 42 (quote).

131. To Earl from Bill, 5 August 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1. 208.
132. District Buro Minutes, 24 February i933> RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3258,1.
38; Decisions on Disciphnary Cases for April and May 1933, d. 3264,1. 23; Decisions

56-57Members of the Scandinavian Fraction, 24 July

on Disciplinary Cases of January 1934, d. 3586,1. 2; see also Bill to Earl, 5 August 1933,

111. John Mackovich to the Central Committee, 13 April 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,

L 208.
133. Appeal to the CEC against the "Resolution on Organization" Adopted by the

110. Letter to District Eight from

1934> f- 515. op. i,d. 3587, U. 207-11.
op. 1, d. 1712, IL 25-26.

112. On the Ukrainian Labor Home, 10 October 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2047,11.62-64.
113. Organization Depai-tment Questionnaire for District Eight, 10 October 1930,
series 2, box 8, file 35, Earl Browder Papers, Syracuse University Library, Special Col
lections, Research Center, Syracuse, N.Y.
114. South Slavic Fraction to Language Department, 17 April 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 2021,1. 84.
115. Language Department of the Central Committee to Loyen, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 2021,11. 88-89.

Chicago District Polburo Appeal by M. Childs, N. Green, Wm.Simons, Led Fisher, Nels
Kjar, Dora Lifshitz, Steve Rubicki, 29 September 1928, RTsKhlDNI, f 5i^op. i,d. 1334,
1.99; District Plenum, 11 May 1930, d. 2108.

134. Letter, 22 March 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1652,1. 7J.

135. Gebert letter, n.d., 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 246or,M. 57; Gebert sum
mary, 6 September 1931, f. 515. op. 1, d. 2455.1.96; 17 June 193ij d- 2457,1.73.
136. Wm. Mausethto Lovestone, 11 January 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 1652,
1.51.
137. Ibid.
138. Nels Kjar to Lovestone, 18 January 1929. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1652, L

116. Minutes of Lettish Bureau, 7 October 1930, RTsIChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2160,1.

65.
139. Wm. Mauseth to Lovestone, 11 January 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 1652,1.

117. Gebert to Browder, 6 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2277,1.11.

51; Paul Buhle, interview with Joseph Giganti, 26 July 1983, Oral History of the Ameri

118. Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Work of Language Buros, June

can Left, Tamiment Institute Library, New York University.

3-

i935> RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3858,1. 229; Minutes of District Eight Convention,
7-8 June 1930, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2107, L 9.
119- Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 163 (quote); Nathan Glazer, The Social
Basis of American Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), 62-63.
120. S. Zinich, '"The Right Wing Danger in Foreign Language Groups and Our Tasks,"
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1816, U. 11-16.
121. Minutes of the Language Buro, December 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2109,1.117.
122. Central Committee, Language Department, to John Mackovich, 8 January 1930,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2021,1.9.

140. The two in 1933 had only joined the party four months earlier.
141. Minutes of Polburo, 1 February 1931. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,11.
10-11. For other readmissions, see Secretariat Minutes, 29 December 1932, d. 2866,1.
44; District Committee Decisions, October-November 1932, d. 2870,1.123.
142. Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus
Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Westport, Conn: Greenwood
Press, 1976), 221-72; Wilson Record, The Negro and the Communist Party (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1951), 39-43143. Record, Negro and the Communist Party, 39-43; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 338-

39-

256

NOTES TO PAGES 9 6 - 1 0 1

144. Statement of Sol Harper on the Letter of A. Schultz and Marie Houston, n.d,

NOTEST6 PAGES 1 0 2 - 5

^5/

Chicago Slums to World Politics, 42; Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2047, IL 85-94; Sol Harper to Max Bedacht, 20 September

Propaganda, 201-4; Harold Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chi

1930, d. 1956,1. 60; Minutes of District Convention, 7-8 June 1930, d. 2107,11. 8; Min

cago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 330-31.

utes of the PolBuro, 17 August 1930, d. 2109,1.46.

6. James Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in the

145. Michael Gold, "The Negro Reds of Chicago," part 1, Daily Worker, 9 September

Industrial.Heartland (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Robin Kel

1932; Robin Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New

ley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression (Chapel Hill:

York: Free Press, 1994), 117.

University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Robin Kelley, "A New War in Dixie: Com

146. Beth Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America,

munists and the Unemployed in Birmingham, Alabama, 1930-1933," Labor History 30.3

1925-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 214-15 (first quote);

(Summer 1989): 367-84; Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression

District Political Committee Minutes, 17 August 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 1773,

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 31-57. See also Roy Rosenzweig, "Orga

U. 22-23 (second quote); Section 4 Minutes, 25 May 1931, d. 2472,1. 62; Letter from

nizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, 1929-1933," Radical

Section 4 leadership to Units, 24 June 1931,1.76; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 337-38.

America 10 (July-August 1976): 47-60; and Daniel Leab, "United We Eat:The Creation

147. District Discipline Committee, February and March 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. i,d. 3860,1. 5 (first quote); Danny Duncan Collum, ed., "This Ain't Ethiopia, but It'll
Do": African Americans in the Spanish Civil War (New York: G. K. Hall and Co., 1992),
14 (second quote); Minutes of the Negro Committee, 8 November 1929, d. 1775,1. 39;
Gosnell, Ne^o Po/if/crfls, 342.
148. District Organization Department to Secretariat Central Committee, 12 Febru
ary 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2874,11.79-80; District Buro Minutes, 4 February
1932, d. 2866,1. 29 (quote).
149. Section 2 Organization Letter, 14 February 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930," Labor History 8.3 (Fall 1967):
300-315.
7. Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
8. Steve Nelson, James Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical (Pitts
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 76.
9. Helen Seymour, "The Organized Unemployed" (M.A. thesis. University of Chicago,
1937)> 9-11; Albert Prago, "The Organization of the Unemployed andjjie Role of the
Radicals, 1929-1935" (Ph.D. dissertation, Union Graduate School, 1/76), 56-62, 71;

3267,1. 9; Minutes District PolCom, 10 February 1929, d. 1773,1. 23; Statement of Sol

Franklin Folsom, America before Welfare (New York: New York University Press, 1991),

Harper on the Letter of A. Schultz and Marie Houston, d. 2047,11. 85-87.

232-44; Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 74.

10. District Resolution on TUUL, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op."'i, d. 2109,11. 83-85.

Chapter 4: Red Relief

1. Edith Margo, "The South Side Sees Red," Left Front (January-February 1934):
4-6.
2. Ibid., 5.
3. Accounts of this event are taken from ibid.; Gebert to Browder, 11 August 1931,
RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2460,1. 52; Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiogra
phy of an Afro-American Communist (New York: Liberator Press, 1978), 442-43; Har
old Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago
Study (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 196-204; Michael Gold, "The Negro Reds of
Chicago," part 2, Daily Worker, 15 September 1932; Paul Clinton Young, "Race, Class,
and Radicalism in Chicago, 1914-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Iowa, 2001),
212-14; Claude Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Politics: Autobiography of Claude M.
Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1980), 41-42.
4. People were able to view the guarded bodies of O'Neil and Grey for a week. Estell
Armstrong, Frank Armstrong s wife, refused to aUow her husband's body to be used by
the Unemployed Council in this way. See Young, "Race, Class, and,Radicalism in Chi
cago," 215-16; Chicago Defender, 15 August 1931; Lasswell and Blumenstock, World
Revolutionary Propaganda, 201-4 (quote on 201).
5. Report of Bill Gebert at the 13th Central Committee Plenum, 6 September 1931,
RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2455, L 96; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 442-43, Lightfoot,

11. Prago, "Organization of the Unemployed," 56-57 and 71. For the TUUL as a guide
to Unemployed Councils, see Sergei Malyshev, Unemployed Councils in St. Petersburg
in 1906 (New York: Workers' Library Publishers. 1931). See also Seymour, "Organized
Unemployed," 10-11; Rosenzweig, "Organizing the Unemployed," 52; Minutes of Dis
trict Plenum, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2106,1. 6; District Resolution
on TUUL, n.d., d. 2109, L 83.
12. "Organize for the Fight against Unemployment and Starvation!" Labor Unity (22
February 1930): 1.
13. Statement on the March 6th Demonstration, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1., d.
2109; Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 81-85; William Z. Foster, History of the
Communist Party of the United States (NewYork: International Publishers, 1952), 281-82.
The Herald Examiner, 7 March 1930, reported a mere seven hundred marchers, while
the Chicago Tribune, 7 March 1930, did not offer a specific number. The staggering
inconsistency between Commimist estimates and non-party reports is typical of Com
munist overestimation and anti-Communist underestimation.
14. Leab, "United We Eat," 300-315. Leab argues that this demonstration was the
high point of party influence, but in Chicago, this is clearly only the beginning. District
Buro Minutes, 29 June 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1775, L 13; Statement on the
March 6th Demonstration, d. 2109. For descriptions of other March 6 demonstrations,
see Prago, "Organization of the Unemployed," 71-88.

258

NOTES TO PAGES 1 0 8 - 1 2

NOTES TO PAGES 1 0 5 - 8

15. Prago, "Organization of the Unemployed," 99-100; Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck,
Steve Nelson, 75-76 (quote on 76).
16. Prago, "Organization of the Unemployed,"99-102; Folsom, America before Welfare,

259

Men: A Study of Unemployed Men in r/ie C/iicago S/ie/fers (New York: Arno Press, 1971):
24-3434. Quoted in Robert W. Beasley,"Care of Destitute Unattached Men in Chicago with

256-66; Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade

Special Reference to the Depression Period Beginning in 1930" (M.A. thesis, University

(New York: Basic Books, 1984), 49-51; Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed.
17. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 54-55.

of Chicago, 1933). 7435. Car Kolins, interview with researcher, box 132, folder 2, Ernest Burgess Papers,

18. Hunger Fighter, 27 February 1932, 4.

University of Chicago Special Collections.

19. Hunger Fighter, 23 April 1932, 2.

36. Hunger Fighter, 23 January 1932-

20. Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck, Steve Nelson, 75.

37. Hunger Fighter, 26 December 1931 and 18 June 1932.

21. Unemployed Insurance Campaign, 29 November 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1,

38. Interview with Ben Gray.

d. 2113,11.77-80; Organization Department Letter, 28 February 1931 and 7 March 1931,

d. 2466,1. 25 and 1. 28, respectively; Minutes of Polburo Meeting, 9 November 1930,
d. 2109,1. 65; Section 6 Newsletter, 27 June 1932, d. 2870,1. 69; Secretariat Minutes, 2
August 1932, d. 2866,1. 97; Secretariat Minutes, 7 September 1932, d. 2866,1.107, and
29 September 1932,1.115; Secretariat Minutes, 22 November 1932 and 29 December
1932,11.134-35 and 1.145, respectively; Section 1 Organization Letter, 29 March 1932,
d. 2882,1.4.
22. Minutes of the District Committee, 3 October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d.

39. Hunger Fighter, 13 February 1932, 2.

40. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor Peoples Movements: Why They
Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977). 5941. Hunger Fighter, 7 May 1932,2; District Buro Minutes,1 April 1932, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 2866,1.47.
42. Hunger Fighter, 21 May 1932, 2.
43. Beasley, "Care of Destitute Unattached Men," 73.
44. District Buro Minutes, 1 April 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 286611- 47-

2460,1.119; Minutes of the Political Buro, 9 January 1931, d. 2457,1.1; Minutes of the

45. Gebert Report on February 25th Demonstration, 27 February 1931, RTsKhlDNI,

District Committee, 6 April 1931, d. 2457,1. 36; Minutes of Political Buro, 1 February

f. 2460, U. 1-2.
>
46. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 321 and 329.
47. The streetcar riot activity resulted in blacks getting about twenty^five jobs in their

1931, d. 2457,1.11.
23. Jack Spiegel, interview with the author, Chicago, 4 August 1996; Hunger Fighter,
18 June 1932,4.
24. District Buro Minutes, 1 April 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2866, L 47; Or
ganization Letter, 1 July 1932, d. 2870,1. 71.
25. Party Registration1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2464,1. 93; fractions in
Section 4 consisted of three comrades in each council. See Section 4's Organization
Letter, 5 May 1931, d. 2472,1. 52.
26. District Plenum, 6 September 1931, d. 2455,1. 77; Section 6 Organization Let
ter, 27 June 1932, d. 2870,1.69; Organization Letter, 25 September 1931, d. 2457,1.96;
Hunger Fighter, 26 March 1932.
27. Enlarged District Committee Meeting, 6 September 1931, RTsKhlDNI, (. 515, op.
1, d. 2455,1. 77.
28. District Convention Minutes, 7-8 June 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.1, d. 2107,11.

first action on September 16 and fifty in their second action in October. See Christopher
Reed, The Chicago NAACP and the Rise of Black Professional Leadership, 1910-1966
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 73-74.81-84; Lightfoot, Chicago's Slums
to World Politics, 33-35; Young, "Race, Class, and Radicalism in Chicago," 191-92.
48. Letter from District Organizer to Comrades, 25 July 1930. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op1, d. 1956, II. 45-46; District Organization Letter, 14 September 1933. d. 3267,1- 112;
Michael Gold, "The Negro Reds of Chicago," part 1, Daily Worker, 9 September 193249. Lightfoot, Chicago's Slums to World Politics, 38-42 (quote on 31); Beth Bates,
"A New Crowd Challenges the Agenda of the Old Guard in the NAACP, 1933-1941."
American Historical Review 102.2 (1997): 340-77; Gosnell, Ne^o

328; Gold,

"Negro Reds of Chicago," part 1.

50. Section 4 Minutes, 25 May 1931. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2472,1. 62; Letter

2-12; G. P., "Local Struggles and the Building of Unemployed Councils in Preparation

from Section 4 leadership to units, 24 June 1931,1. 76; Minutes of the District Politi

for the Hunger March," PO 5 (January 1932): 9-10.

cal Committee, 17 August 1929, d. 1773. U- 22-23; Interviews with Todd Tate, 1 and 2

29. District Convention, 7-8 June 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2107,1. 4
(quote).

Workers Oral History Project, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison (hereafter

30. Resolution ofDistrict Eight Buro, adopted 4 March 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
1, d. 2457,1.19.
31. Interview with Ben Gray, Oral History of the American Left, Tamiment Institute
Library, New York University.

October 1985, and with Richard Saunders, 13 September 1985, United Packinghouse
UPWAOHP); Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor: Black'and White Workers in
Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997). 111-12.
51. Quoted in Hazel Rowley, Richard Wright: The Life and Times (New York: Henry

32. Ibid.

Holt, 2001), 96.

52. Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 170-71; Lightfoot,

33. Ibid.; Edwin H. Sutherland and Harvey J. Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless

Chicago's Slums to World Politics, 38-39-

26O

NOTES TO PAGES 112-14

NOTES TO PAGES 114-17

261

53. Gebert to Browder, 11 August 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2460,1. 52.

were to blame. See Lawrence Lipton to Freeman, 1 May 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

54. Ibid.; MaxNaiman interview, in Studs Terkel, Hard Times (New York: Avon Boolcs,

1, d. 3265,11.130-33.

1971), 468-72.
55. Quoted in Halpern, Dowrt on the Killing Floor, no; "We Must Draw Negro Work
ers into the Mass Organizations and the Party^ PO 9 (November 1931): 27-28; Cohen,
Making a New Deal, 266.
56. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 266. Also see Robert Asher, "The Influence of the
Chicago Workers' Committee on Unemployment upon the Administration of Relief,
1931-1934" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1934), 41; and Gosnell, Negro Politi
cians, 322.
57. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 336-42; Michael Goldfield, "Race and the CIO: Reply
to Critics," International Labor and Working-Class History 46 (Fall 1994): 142-60.
58. Chicago Whip, i August 1931, and Chicago Defender, 14 January 1933, quoted

63. See the council's first platform in Folsom, America before Welfare, 263; and in
John Williamson, Dangerous Scot The Life and Work of an American "Undesirable" (New
York: International Publishers, 1969), 80-93.
64. Minutes of the Polburo, 1 February 1931 and 13 February 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 2457, L 9 andl. 13.
65. Louis Wirth and Margaret Furez, eds., Local Community Fact Booh 1938 (Chicago:
Chicago Recreation Commission, 1938), 61.
66. Section 2 Organization Letter, 11 November 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i, d.
2113,1. 69; Minutes of Section 2 Committee, 20 February 1933', f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267, L
11; Section 2 Newsletter, 20 March 1933,1.19; 20 April 1932, d. 2882,1. 46.
67. Quoted in Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 110.

in Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 321 and 341. See also Stephen Tallackson, "The Chicago

68. Gebert to Browder,11 August 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2460, 1 . 57; Edith

Defender and Its Reaction to the Communist Movement in the Depression Era" (M.A.

Abbott, The Tenements of Chicago, 1908-1935 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

thesis. University of Chicago, 1967), 62-63.

1936), 442.

59. Horace R. Cayton, "The Black Bugs," The Nation, 9 September 1931, 255.
60. Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a

69. Gebert quotes Cermak as saying that "'Chicago is ready and willing to feed the
hungry and lodge the homeless who are orderly and gentlemanly. For the disrespective

Northern City (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 86-87; Yates quoted in Danny Dun

and riotous we have built jafls and penitentiaries'" After the demonstrations, Gebert

can Collum, ed., "This Ain't Ethiopia, but It'll Do": African Americans in the Spanish

claimed that Cermak "didn't dare to make this statement, he made a ^atement that

Civil V/flr (New York: G. K. Hall, 1992), iy,Dempsey Travis, An Autobiography of Black

evictions will be stopped and that there are funds to feed the unemployed, because at

Chicago (Chicago: Urban Research Institute, 1981), 48. In 1934, Reverend Austin invited

that time we were at the height of a broad mass movement that they would not dare to

Angelo Herndon to speak to his South Side congregation at the Pilgrim Baptist Church.

evoke." Gebert's Report on 13th GC Plenum and Tasks, 6 Septembe^^*i93i, RTsKhlDNI,

Herndon was on a national tour, newly released from a Georgia prison. Over three thou

f. 515, op. 1, d. 2455,1 35; To Committee of Unemployed from A."j. Cermak, Mayor, 1

sand people turned out and cheered Herndon on. In addition to support for Herndon,

November 1932, d. 2876,1. 86; Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 55; and

however, was the loud applause and cheers the crowd gave to Reverend Austin when he

Abbott, Tenements of Chicago, 442,444,458-64. Abbott also describes unfilled pron;ises

proclaimed that "any man who does not want freedom is either a fool or an idiot, and

that city officials had been making before the "riot."

if to want freedom is to be a Communist, then I am a Communist, and will be till I die."

70. Charity organizations paid rent for one month not to exceed fifteen dollars (al

Communism, he added, "means simply the brotherhood of man and as far as I can see

though the median rent paid by repeaters to renter's court was $18.88), usually given

Jesus Christ was the greatest Communist of them all." According to the Defender, "For

after evictions occurred and the famfly had found a new place to live. Abbott, Tenements

fully five minutes the crowd stood and cheered." See Chicago Defender, 22 September
1934, i; and Beth Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America,
1925-1^45 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 124.

of Chicago, 426-76; Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 54; and Seymour,
"Organized Unemployed," 2.
71. Interview with Ben Gray.

61. Cayton, "The Black Bugs," 255-56.

72. Cohtn, Making a New Deal, 213-50.

62. A good example of mainstream anti-Communist propaganda occurred on 1 May

73. Letter to Member Agencies from the Council of Social Agencies of Chicago, 15

i933> when five bombs exploded in the city. The papers immediately pinned the event

October 1932, General Papers 1923-35, University of Chicago Settiement Collection,

on "the Reds," even though a conflict with the Teamsters was later revealed as the cause.

Chicago Historical Society.

A front-page article in the Chicago Daily Tribune on 1 May 1933, "May Day Bombs

74. Hunger Fighter, 23 Aprfl 1932,1.

Jar City," reported that "the five bombings were part of a May Day red demonstration."

75. Moss to Johnson, i6 August 1932, Folder August-November 1932, Raymond

Deputy Chief of Detectives William Blaul ordered detective-bureau squads to arrest

Hilliard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.

"aU known reds and other agitators." One day later, the Tribune reported that union

76. "Wicker Park Conference," 21July 1932 through 19 January 1933, box 1932, Gra

racketeers were to blame. Commimists expressed their frustration with such false ac

ham Taylor Papers, Newberry Library, Chicago; District Organization Letter, 15 Sep

cusations but were pleased that most Chicagoans in 1933 did not ever believe the Reds

tember 1932, RTsKhlDNI, d. 2870, L 94.

262

NOTES TO PAGES 1 2 2 - 2 6

NOTES TO PAGES 117-22

77. Hunger Fighter, 4 July 1932; Moss to Johnson,16 August 1932, Folder August-No
vember 1932, Raymond HiUiard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
78. Hunger Fighter, 12 March 1932.
79. Jack Kling to Gil Green [ca. 1932], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2876,11.192-94;
Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 59.

263

93. Section 4 Organization Letters, 7 February 1933 and 20 February 1933, RTsKh
lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267, L 78 andl. 82; Williamson, Dangerous Scot, 83-85.
94. Agent's Report, 10 November 1932, reel 29, frame 464, USMI-SRUS; Williamson,
Dangerous Scot, 83-85.
95. The protest, incidentally, resulted in a $6.3 million loan from the federal govern

80. District Organization Letter, 31 July 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1.

ment's Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the city. Rally organizers claimed victory.

9581. Chicago Civil Liberties Committee Special Bulletin, Report on Police Brutality

Trolander, Settlement Houses, 97; Asher, "Influence of the Chicago Workers' Commit
tee," 20-22; Cohen, Making a New Deal 264-65. They also took credit for increases in

at Humboldt Park Demonstration, 22 November 1932, Section 2, no folder number,

unemployment funds in November 1931 after their staged county hunger march. The

Raymond Milliard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.

1932 march was organized by the Unemployed Councils and the CWC.

82. Moss to AUman, 28 November 1932, Folder August-November 1932, Raymond

Hilliard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
83. Vernon Pedersen argues that "Communists normally refused to apply for parade

96. Browder to Gebert, 11 August 1931, RTsKhlDNLf. 515. op. i,d. 2460,1. 57; Dis
trict Buro Minutes, 17 June 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2457,1.73; Jack Spiegel,
interview with the author, Chicago, 4 August 1996.

permits during the Third Period, partially as a matter of principle but mainly to pro

97. Annie Gosenpud, "The History of the Chicago Worker's Committee on Unemploy

voke confrontations with the authorities." Evidence shows that this was not the case in

ment, Local #24," 1932, box 144, folder 7, Ernest Burgess Papers, University of Chicago

Chicago. Regardless, the city's police provoked confrontation. Vernon Pedersen, The

Special Collections.

Communist Party in Maryland, 1919-1957 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001),

48; Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 172.
84. Steve Rosen, interviewwith Irving Meyers, Radical Jewish Elders Project,Spertus
Library, Chicago.

98. G. P., "Local Struggles and the Building of Unemployed Councils," 9-10.
99. Bill Gebert, "United Front from Below" n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2873,11.
53-67; John WiUiamson, "Defeat the 50 Percent Relief Cut in Chicago," p.d., U. 72-71;
District Organization Department Letter, 13 September 1930, d. 2109^. 52-54-

85.Ibid.

100. Enlarged District Committee Meeting, 6 September 1931, RT^hlDNI, f. 515,

86. Ibid.

op. i,d. 2455,1. 53.

/
101. District Control Decisions, October-November 1932, Rts^hlDNI, f 5i5> op. 1,

87. Director to Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, 8 October 1932, Folder Au

gust-November 1932, Raymond Hilliard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
88. Louis McCann to Moss, 9 December 1932, Folder December i932-November
1933, Raymond Hilliard Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
89. Meeting of Subcommittee on Relief and Service of Advisory Board of Cook County
Bureau of Pubhc Welfere, 11 January 1933 (quote); Jennie Greenspan to Moss, 13 January

d. 2870,11.123-25.
102. District Disciplinary Decisions, March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, 515, op. 1, d. 3264,
L 18.
103. Ibid.
104. Van Gosse, "'To Organize in Every Neighborhood, in Every Home': The Gender

1933. Folder December 1932-January 1933, Raymond Hilliard Papers, Chic^o Histori

Politics of American Communists between the Wars," Radical History Review 50 (Spring

cal Society; Beth Schulman, "The Workers Are Finding a Voice: The Chicago Workers'

1991): 109-41; Robert Shaffer, "Women and the Communist Party, USA, 1930-1940,"

Committee and the Relief Struggles of 1932," unpublished paper, box 6, folder 12, Frank

Socialist Review 45 (May 1979): 73-118; Rosalyn Baxandall, "The Question Seldom

McCuIlough Papers, Chicago Historical Society; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 264-65.

Asked: Women and the CPUSA," in New Studies in the Politics and Culture of U.S. Com

90. District Convention Discussion, 6 September 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

2455.1- 73-

munism, ed. Michael E. Brown, Randy Martin, Frank Rosengarten, and George Snedeker
(New York: Monthly Press Review, 1993). 141-62.

91. Borders was a resident of the Chicago Commons settlement house and would later

105. Report on Women's Work in District Buro Meeting, 3 November 1931, RTsBCh

become a chief of the Bureau of Supply of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation

lDNI, f 515, op. i,d. 2457,1.132; Margaret Keller, Women's Work Director, to Damon,

Administration in 1944. Frank McCulloch, born to a family from the reform tradition,
eventually became chairman of the National Labor Relations Board in 1961. These two

11 February 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3265,11. 39-40.

106. Draft Letter to the American Party on the Work among Women, 10 October

men guided the organization that eventually joined with the Communist Councils into

1932, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. i,d. 2618,1.164; Letter to Comrades, 10 November 1932,

the Workers' Alliance. See Judith Ann Trolander, Settlement Houses and the Great De

1.160.

pression (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 92-93. See also Asher, "Influence
of the Chicago Workers' Committee," 9-14.
92. Trolander, Settlement Houses, 95; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 264. Bymid-1932,
the CWC had about sixty locals.

107. Organization Letter, 1 July 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2870,1. 71.
108. Margaret Keller to Damon, 11 February 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3265,
H. 39-40; District Buro Minutes, 10 December 1931, f. 5i5> op. 1, d. 2457,1.152; "Or
ganize the Work among Women!" PO 5 (March 1932): 26-27.

264

NOTES TO PAGES 131-35

NOTES TO PAGES 127-31

109. Chicago Board of Elections,1930 and 193 2 election ledger, recap sheets, Chicago.

265

percentof its manufacturing and mechanical industries had xmion representation. See

Michael Gold offers a description of the party's 1932 nominating convention in "The

C. Lawrence Christenson, Collective Bargaining in Chicago, 1929-1930: A Study of the

Communists Meet" New Republic, 15 June 1932,117-19.

Economic Significance of the Industrial Location of Trade Unionism (Chicago: University

110. For election returns, see election-return books, Election Board Office, Chicago.
In a city of over three million, eleven thousand votes points to the fact that the party was

of Chicago Press, 1933), 2; Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American
Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton MifBin, i960), 84.

thousand votes for a presidential candidate and over thirty thousand for a congressional

4. Bernstein, Lean Years, 86-87.

5. Oscar D. Hutton Jr., "The Negro Worker and the Labor Unions in Chicago" (M.A.

candidate suggests that they had an increasingly strong basewhat sociologists refer to

thesis. University of Chicago, 1939). 2-60; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Indus

a fairly marginalized political organization. And yet their ability to'garner over eleven

as a "mobilization potential," or the group of individuals "predisposed to participate in

trial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

a social movement." Their ability to grow their mobilization potential throughout the

42,45; Earl Browder, "Reactionaries Smashing Ladies Garment Workers," Labor Herald

Third Period would lead to a large spike in their membership rolls and in their ability to

(November 1923): 13-16; J. W. Johnstone, "Reaction in Needle Trades," Labor Herald

move large groups into action. See Bert Klandermans, "The.Social Construction of Pro

(February 1924): 25-27; Barbara Warne Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement: Met

test and Multiorganizational Fields," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon

ropolitan Unionism in the 1930s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 239-40.

Morris and Carol McClurg (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 77-103

6. Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 29-30; Richard Schneirov and Thomas

(quote on 80); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Social Movement: Social Movements, Collective

J. Suhrbur, Union Brotherhood, Union Town: The History of the Carpenters' Union of

Action, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Thanks to Herb
Haines for introducing me to this literature.

Chicago, 1863-1987 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 114-15;

"Jobless Carpenters Fight Union Fakers," Hunger Fighter, 26 December 1931-

111. Cohen,Making a New Deal, 265; Abbott, Tenements of Chicago, 434. There were

7. Plan of Action for Building the TUUL in Chicago, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f.'5i5> op. 1,

3,993 Writs of Restitution in 1929. Asher, "Influence of the Chicago Workers' Commit

d. 2113,1. 96.
8. Some examples of this approach can be found in Bert Cochran, Lab^ and Commu

tee," 23; Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, 66.

112. Folsom, America before Welfare, 416; Herbert Benjamin, "Unity on the Unem
ployed Field," The Communist (April 1936): 327-36.
113.1. Amter,"The National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insuranceand

nism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1977); Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York:
Vintage Books, 1986); and Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The Arnerican Communist

114. "Minutes of the District Buro," 14 May 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3855,

Pflr/7 (New York: Praeger, 1962).

9. Roger Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union (Bloomington:

11.17-19; "To the Central Committee," 15 May 1934, d. 3858,1. 174; "Report of K. L.

Indiana University Press, 1980); Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United

on Relief Situation," 4 May 1935, d. 3855,1. 21; "Report on Unemployed Work," n.d.

States: From the Depression to World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University

[December 1935], d. 3859, U. 235-41; "Minutes of District Buro," 18 May1935, d. 3855,

1. 26.

Press, 1991), 20-28.

10. A personal appeal from Nels Kjar, expelled member of Local 181, June 1929; Trial

After," The Communist (January 1935): 33-44.

115. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 3 20.

Boards, CDC expulsions of Cpers, 1929-31. research notes from Steven Sapolsky, in
the author's possession. On the popularity of the TUEL position in Chicago's building

Chapter 5: "Abolish Capitalism"

1. Minutes of the PolBuro, 28 August 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1773,1.16.
Chicago leaders predicted that they would send seventy-five delegates, but a convention
report indicates that Illinois sent sixty-six. See "Chic Sends 75 Delegates to Cleveland,"
Labor Unity, 24 August 1929, 1; and "Composition of Convention," Labor Unity, 14
September 1929, 4.
2. Gebert's Speech on the 13th Central Committee Plenum and Tasks, 6 September
1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2455,1. 47.
3. Nationwide union membership reached a peak of 5,047,800, or 19.4 percent, in
1920. By 1929 there were 3,442,600 members, or 10.2 percent. At a low point of union
ization in the country, Chicago's percentage of unionized members was still higher than
the national average was when it was at its peak. And while 22 percent of Chicago's
overall workforce was unionized, one study showed that an even higher percentage32

trades in the early 1920s, see Arne Swabeck, "The Building Trades Problem," and Joe
Peterson, "Towards Unity in the Building Trades," Labor Herald (June 1922): 1-5 and
7-9. On opposition to Chicago's Carpenters' District Council leadership, see Schneirov
and Suhrbur, Union Brotherhood, 111-12.
11. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,
f 515, op. 1, d. 1775,11-33-3412. Max Bedacht to Lovestone, 12 October 1927, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 1036,
1. 58.
13. Browder, "Reactionaries Smashing Ladies Garment Workers," 13-16; James R.
Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1999). 126-2714. Carsel gives a detailed description of the struggle between the Left and the Right
in Chicago's Ladies' Garment Workers Union. See Wilfred Carsel, A History of the Chi

266

NOTES TO PAGES 135-39

cago Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (Chicago: Random House, 1940), 174-92 (quote
on 184).

NOTES TO'PAGES 1 3 9 - 4 1

267

32. "General Statistics for Standard Metropolitan Areas, by Industry" Census of Manu
factures: 1947, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 183; Rick

15. Max Bedacht to CEC, 30 July 1928, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1334,1. 82.

Halpern and Roger Horowitz, Meatpackers: An Oral History of Black Packinghouse

16. Minutes Meeting ofDistrict Industrial Committee, 6 April 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f.

Workers and Their Struggle for Racial and Economic Equality (New York: Monthly Re
view Press, 1999), 27; Theodore Purcell, The Worker Speaks His Mind on Company and

515, op. 1, d. 1775,1.3.

17. The CEC Answer to Appeal Made to the CEC by Childs, Lifshitz, Rubicki, Fisher,
and Swabeck against Election of Sklar as Org Sec, n.d. {1928], RTsKhlDNI, 515, op.

Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 3-4; Halpern, Down on the
Killing Floor, 7-43.
33. Within steel, a minority group formed and pushed to "organize the workers into

1, d. 1334,11. 43-4518. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 March 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,

the organizations they want to organize into." In other words, they opposed the dual

op. 1, d. 1775,1. 2; "Preparations for the TUEL Convention in the Various Districts,"

unionism of the Steel and Metal Workers' Industrial Union and applied pressure on
party leaders to continue organizing within the AFL. They argued, "There are a great

Labor Unity, 4 May 1929.

19. Barrett, William Z. Foster, 126.

manyworkers who will fight even tho they are in the AFL

20. Ibid., 126-31; David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace,

the [AFL] workers can't organize." Minority Group of Steel and Metal Workers Confer

the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

[IJtis suicide to say that

ence, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 508, II. 100-101.

34. Smaller drives were organized in Hart, Schaffner, and Marx; Majestic; Jones

Press, 1987), 434.

21. Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 433-34; Barrett, William Z. Foster, 140-

Foundry and Rubber Factory; and Oppenheimer. See Organization Letter, 30 April
1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2466,1.55; Organization Letter, 7 April 1932, d. 2870,

4222. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,

f 5i5>op-1. d. 1775.1- 34; Montgomeiy, Fall of the House of Labor, 433-34.
23. Edward Johanningsmeier, "The Trade Union Unity League; American Commu

1. 34; Section 4 Organization Letter, 29 October 1931 and 25 May 1931, d. 2472,11. 83
and 63; Section 1 Organization Letter, 19 May 1931, 3 June 1931, and 15 July 1931, d.
2472.11.1, 2, and 4; Section 2 Minutes, 19 October 1931, d. 2472,11.

Section 5

nists and the Transition to Industrial Unionism, 1928-1934," Labor History 42.2 (2001):

Organization Letter, 22 December 1931, d. 2472, L 107; Organizaticm Chart, n.d., d.

159-7724. "Hear Reports on Convention in Chicago," Labor Unity, 28 September 1929,2.

Work for Stock Yards Section, n.d. [1933], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op^i, d. 3267,1. 242.

25. Report on Metal Workers, 15 October 1929, Earl Browder Papers, Syracuse Uni
versity Library, Special Collections, Research Center, Syracuse, N.Y.
26. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,

2460,1.123, Report on Chicago, 22 November 1933, f 534, op. 7, d.407,1. 251; Plan of
35. Jack Johnstone, "Problems of the Trade Union Fractionsf PO 1 (April 1927):
11-12; "The Party Fractions in the Trade Unions," PO 3 (February 1930): 5-7; O. Piatnitsky, "Trade Union Fractions," PO 2 (July-August 1928): 10-11; Harvey Levenstein,
Communism, Anti-Communism, and the CIO (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981),

f. 515. op. i,d. 1775.1-3427. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 1775,1. 35. See also "Food Workers League Going Full Speed," Labor
Unity, 5 October 1929,1; and "Chicago Food Workers League Making Good Gains in
Stockyards," Labor Unity, 4 January 1930,1.
28. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,

18; District Resolution on TUUL, n.d. [1930], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109, IL
81-86.
36. "Organizing Shop Committees," PO 3 (February 1930): 7-9;"What Are Shop Com
mittees?" Labor Unity, 19 April 1930. The shop committee harkens to the 1917-22 shopfloor struggles of labor discussed in Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, 411-64.
37. "The Basic Units of the Party," PO 3 (February 1930): 10-11.

f 515, op. 1, d. 1775.1- 3429. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 16 November 1929, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. i,d. 1775,1.43; Rick Halpern, Dowtt on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers
in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 81-82.
30. Section 4 Organization Letter, RTsKhlDNI, 17 June 1931, d. 2472,1. 71 (quote);

38. "Experiences in Building a Department Committee in a Large Plant," PO 6 (MarchApril 1933): 4-6.
39. Bruce Nelson, "Dancing and Picnicking Anarchists? The Movement below the
Martyred Leadership" in Haymarket Scrapbook, ed. Dave Roediger and Franklin Rose

District Eight Organization Letter, 3 April 1931, d. 2466,1.3 2; "ConcentrationA Means

mont (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1986), 76-79; "Chicago TUUL Ball," Labor Unity, 21

of Winning the Workers in the Key Industries," PO 2 (February 1933), 5; "The ShopA

December 1929, 2; Section 2 Organization Letter, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3590,

Center of Mass Activity^ PO 2 (February 1933), 1-4; Keeran, Communist Party and the

1. 21.

Auto Workers Union, 80-81; Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States, 24.
31. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 21-27; Janies Carl Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers

40. "Methods of Work in Factory," n.d. [1931], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1.

Union in the Calumet Region, 1933 to 1945" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois

4941. Directives for Work among Women, to the Chicago District from CC Rep., n.d.,

at Chicago, 1998), 22-33.

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op., 1, d. 2345,11.145-46.

268

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 6 - 5 0

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 1 - 4 6

42. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,

f. 515. op. 1, d. 1775.1- 34- 43. Calendar Plan of Work for District 8,3-7 December 1930, RTsKhlDNI, d. 2108,
II. 19-28; Section 2 Organization Letter, 2 December 1932, d. 2882,1. 57.

269

2244,11. 83-88 (quote on 84). On the New York Housewives' Councils, see Orleck, Com
mon Sense and a Little Fire, 215-49; Minutes ofDistrict Women's Committee, 15 May
1930, d. 2115, L 24.
60. Helen Kaplan, Report of Chicago District on Work among Women, n.d., RTsKh

44. "Announce a Big Conference for Chicago Sunday^ Labor Unity,9 November 1929,

lDNI, f. 515, op., d. 2110, U. 12-17.

61. Directives for Work among Women, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 2345,11.

45. William Discussion at Plenum, 6 September 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

145-46; Pauline Rogers, Report on Tour, 7 October-13 December 1931. d. 2244,11.

2455.1- 67; Otto Wangerin to Bill, 17 February 1932, d. 2999,1. 5; Roger Keeran, "The

83-88.
62. Unsigned letter to Comrades, 10 October 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2618,

3-

International Workers Order and the Origins of the CIO," Labor History 30.3 (1989):
385-408.
46. Methods of Work in the Factory, Outline Created by Organization Department,
1931, RTs^IDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1. 50.
47- "The Party Fractions in the Trade Unions," PO 3 (February 1930): 5-7.
48. Cochran,Labor and Communism, 71 (quote); Christenson, Collective Bargaining
in Chicago, 1-29; Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 24-32.
49. Cochran, Labor and Communism, 71-77; Smith to Browder and other members of

IL 160-63.
63. To Department for Work among Women, CC, 16 February 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 2874,1. 87.
64. Helen Kaplan comments, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3256,1.45.
65. Letter to Organization Department of CC from Unsigned, marked Chicago, 18
June 1934, RTsKhlDNL f 515, op. i,d. 3587.1-16766. Kollros. "Creating a Steel Workers Union," 66-67. 72-73; Cohen, Making a New

the Polburo, 11 November 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2548,11. 84-85; Minority

Deal, 237-38; James Mclntyre, "History of Wisconsin Steel Works,' typescript, 1951.

Groups in AFL, 11 November 1931, d. 2464,1. 60; MC and Block comments, district

51, Southeast Chicago Historical Society.

67. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 162-83; Halpern, DOWM on the Killing Floor, 85-95-

conference, n.d., d. 3256,11.155,217-21; Three Month Review of Plenum Tasks, 1931,

d. 2455,1. 27. U.S. party leaders were not of one mind about what to do with the AFL.
See Barrett, William Z. Foster, 176,192-93.
50. Robert Shaffer, "Women and the Communist Party, USA, 1930-1940," Social
ist Review 9.3 (May-June 1979): 73-ii8; Analise Orleck, Common Sense and a Little

68. Cohen, Making a New Deal,183-211; Halpern, Down on theKilli^ Floor, 85-95;
"Shop Nuclei at Work on May Day Demonstration," PO 3.4 (June-July^93o): 8-10.
69. CandNW Worker, April and May-June 1931. RTsKhlDNI, f.pS. op. 1, d. 2474.

Fire: Women and Working-Class Politics in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of

11. 5, 8-10.
^
70. Minutes of the District Buro, 11 April 1931, RTsKhlDNI, fr'5i5> op. 1, d. 2457,1.

North Carolina Press, 1995). 215-49; Rosalyn Baxandall, "The Question Seldom Asked:

32; Crane Organizer, July 1931, d. 2474,11.11-12; Harvester Worker, April 1931, d. 2474,

Women and the CPUSA," in New Studies in the Politics and Culture of U.S. Communism,

11.24-26; Morton Report on Steel, 22 January 1932, d. 2866,1.19; "Shop Paper Reviews,

ed. Michael E. Brown, Randy Martin, Frank Rosengarten, and George Snedeker (New

PO 5 (November-December 1932): 42-44; Sotos Section 6 Discussion, 6 September

York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 144-48.

1931, d. 2455, 1 . 70.

71. Otto Wangerin to Bill, 17 February 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2999,1. 2.

51. Smith comments at District Plenum, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2108,1. 6.
52. "Experiences in Work among Women," n.d. [1932], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2876,1. 212.
53. Keller to Damon, 26 September 1932, RTsKhlDNI, {. 515, op. 1, d. 2875,11.104-

72. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 196-201 (quote on 201); District Buro Minutes, 23
October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,1. 112; Interviews with Vicky Starr
and Herb March, UPWAOHP.
73. "Methods of Work in FactoryOutline Prepared by Organization Department
1931," RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1,2466,1.150. See also Gebert's Speech on the 13th Cen

6.

54. District Plenum Resolution, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2108,1.
1355. Helen Kaplan, Report of Chicago District on Work among Women, n.d., RTsKh
lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2110,11.12-17.
56. "Experiences in Work among Women," n.d. [1932], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
2876,11. 212-14.
5 7. Pauline Rogers, Report on Tour, 7 October-13 December, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
1, d. 2244,11. 83-88.
58. Minutes of Polburo, 3 May 1930, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109,11. 31, 33.
59. Pauline Rogers, Report on Tour, 7 October-13 December 1931, f. 515, op. 1, d.

tral Committee Plenum and Tasks, 6 September i9'3i. d. 2455, L 45.

74. Minutes of the District Industrial, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNLf. 515, op. 1,
d. 1775.1- 3575. Hutton, "Negro Worker and the Labor Unions in Chicago," 16-24; Paul Young,
"Race, Class, and Radicalism in Chicago, 1914-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Iowa, 2001), 1-49.
76. Herbert Hill, interview with Edward Doty, 2 November 1967, in the author's pos
session. Thanks to Steve Sapolsky for sharing this source.
77. Ibid. According to Doty, a police order ruled that only the licensed plumbers of
Local 130 could work in the city. They were all white. See also Harry Haywood, Black

270

NOTES TO PAGES 153-57

NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 0 - 5 3

Bolshevik: Autobiography of art Afro-American Communist (Chicago: Liberator Press,

1978), 129-30.

'

271

90. Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 79-88; Witwer, Corruption and Reform
in the Teamsters Union, 84-93; MC comments, district conference, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f

78. Herbert Hill, interview with Edward Doty.

515, op. 1, d. 3256,1.155; Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the Ameri

79. The ANLC had one near success in Chicago in 1926 when one hundred black

can Worker, 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969). 123-24.

women walked olf their jobs at a stufFed-date factory protesting pay cuts and assemblyline speedups. Fitzpatrick of the Chicago Federation invited the strike leader, Jannie
Warnettas, and Fort-Whiteman of the ANLC-to a meeting, but strikebreakers and vio
lence broke the strike, and the CFL never chartered a union for the women. See Daily

91. Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson: American Radical
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 73.
92. Ibid.; Barbara Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 79-88; Witwer, Corrup
tion and Reform in the Teamsters Union, 84-93; John Williamson, Dangerous Scot: The

Worker, 5, 9,18, and 23 October 1926. On the ANLC, see Young, "Race, Class, and

Life and Work of an American "Undesirable" (New York: International Publishers, 1969),

Radicalism in Chicago," 174-79; Mark Solomon, The Cry Was Unity: Communists and

8i.

African Americans, 1917-36 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998), 52-67.

80. Minutes of the Polburo, 26 September 1930, RTsKhlDNI, d. 2109,1. 59; Minutes
of Control Committee, 30 October 1930, d. 2116,1.16.
81. Letters from American Consolidated Trades Council to Victor Olander, 8 May
1932,12 May 1932, 30 August 1932, Victor Olander Papers, box "Negroes and Rights,"
Chicago Historical Society; Protest Statement of the American Consolidated Trades

93. Report of Tour by Shaw, 1933, RTsKklDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 509,1. 46; Report on
Railroad by Shaw, 9 March i933>d. 507.
94. Ed Starr's comments, n.d. [1933]. d. 3256,1. 85; Report ofStachel to AFL Fraction
Meeting, 9 September 1933. RTsKhlDNI, f. 534. op. 7, d. 515,11.1-23.
95. Report of M. F. to Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934. RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. i,d.
3655,11. 51-62; Joe Webber, interview with Toni Gilpin, 3 January 1981, in the author's

Council, 27 May 1932, Victor Olander Papers, box "Negroes and Rights," Chicago His

possession; Stella Nowicki interview in Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd, eds.. Rank and

torical Society. Thanks to Steve Sapolsky for identifying these materials.

File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 75-

82. Minutes ofDistrict Buro, 16 February 1834, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3581,1.
10.

96. Tucker at District Conference, n.d. [1933], RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3256,1.

83. Minutes of Buro Meeting, 27 April 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,11.

94.
/
97. "Building the Trade Union Unity League," PO 3 (May 1930): 10-/1; "The Work

26-27; Minutes of PolBuro, 26 September 1930, d. 2109,1. 59; Letter to CEC, 6 July

of Our Trade Union Fractions," PO 3 (June-July 1930): 21-22; "Rooming the Party in

1928, d. 1334,1.48; Jack Kling, Where the Action Is: Memoirs of a U.S. Communist {Nevi

the Shops," PO 4 (November 1931): 11; "Every Factory a Fortress of Communism" PO

York: New Outlook Publishers, 1985), 22. Claude Lightfoot claims that Doty asked him

4 (September-October 1931): 1-6.

to take over responsibilities of the organization and that Doty remained active in the
organization. See Claude Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Politics: Autobiography of
Claude M. Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1980), 49.
84. The ANLC dissolved in 1930, only to be replaced by the League of Struggle for
Negro Rights, which was plagued with many of the same problems that hindered the
ANLC. See Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 439.

98. Organization Department Letter, 9 June 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2870,
U. 57-61; District Buro Minutes, 22 January 1932, d. 2866,1.19.
99. AgitProp Letter, 13 April i93i> RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,11. 46-48; Pol
Com Minutes, 26 April 1930, d. 2109,1. 24-29, and 3 May 1930,11. 30-35100. District 8 Convention, 7-8 June 1930, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. i, d. 2107,1. 4;
District Buro Minutes, 19 March 1932, d. 2866,11. 40-42; PolCom Minutes, 19 April

85. In 1938 the electricians finally admitted African Americans, and in 1947 the

1930, d. 2109,1. 22; District Plenum Minutes, 11 May 1930, d. 2108,1.4; Plan of Ac

plumbers followed suit. Doty became the first black officer in the plumbers' imion in

tion for Building the TUUL, n.d. [December 1930], d. 2113,11. 96-100; Organization

the early 1950s. See Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 131.

Department Letter, 9 Jxme 1932, d. 2870,11. 57-61; District Buro Minutes, 22 January

86. William Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Ath
eneum Books, 1970); Kling, Where the Action Is, 24.

1932, d. 2866,1.19; Discussion at District Conference, n.d. [1933], d. 3256,11.89-92; S.

Yandrich, "Open Letter an Instrument for Penetration into Basic Industries," PO 11-12

87. Video recording of Schaffner's ninetieth birthday celebration in Chicago, Chicago

(March 1934): 22-23; Organization Department Letter, 4 November 1930, d. 2113,1.

Radical Elders Project, Spertus Library and Museum; Newell, Chicago and the Labor
Movement, 79-88; David Scott Witwer, Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union

64.
101. George Patterson Autobiography, Chicago Historical Society; Tucker at District

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 84-93; MC comments, district conference,

Plenum, n.d., RTsKHIDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 3256,1. 89.

n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3256,1.155.

88. Minutes of the District Industrial Committee, 30 September 1929, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 1775,1.35; Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 80.
89. Discussion at District Convention, n.d. [1933], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3256,
11. 217-26; Otto Wangerin to Bill, 17 February 1932, d. 2999,1.2.

102. Agit Prop to all Section and Unit Agit Prop Directors, 13 April1931, RTsKhlDNI,
f 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1. 46.
103. A good example of this is the Deering Worker (November 1926).
104. Beatrice Shields, "Training Forces in the Chicago District," PO 7 (February 1934):
24-28; Jack Stachel, "Our Factory Nuclei," PO 2 (May-June 1928): 5-10. For party re

272

NOTES TO PAGES I 5 7 - 6 1

views of Chicago shop papers, see PO 5 (April 1933); Shop Paper Reviews, PO 5 (September-October 1932) and (November-December 1932).
105. Report on Shop Papers, n.d. [1930], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2115,11. 2-7;
Lifshitz Discussion at District Plenum, n.d., d. 3256,1.48.
106. Hart, Schaffner, and Marx Worker, March 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
3270,11. 4-5; Stockyarcb Worker, March 1933,11. 6-7 back; NWShop News, May 1928,
d. 1418,1.17; Kahn Worker, December 1932, d. 2730,1. 59; Decker Worker, December
1932,1. 61.
107. PO 5 (November-December 1932); District Buro Minutes, 22 January 1932,

NOTES TO PAGES 161-67

273

117. Report on Chicago, 22 November 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3337, L

43118. Morton Discussion, 6 September 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. i, d. 2455, L
73119. Tucker Discussion at District Conference, n.d. [1933], RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op.
1, d. 3256,1. 93.
120. Organizational Status of the CP of the USA, 20 August 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 2618,1.99.
121. See chapter 6 for details on this strike.

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2866,1.19; "Shop Paper Editor," PO 5 (November-Decem

ber 1932): 42-44; PolCom Minutes, 19 April 1930, d. 2109,1.22; Letter to the Editor in
Section 4 of Stewart Warner Worker from B. Shields, 24 January 1934, d. 3587,1.221-22;
PolBuro Meeting, 9 January 1931, d. 2457,1. 7.
108. PolCom Minutes, 26 April 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109, L 24; Labor
Day Report, 2 September 1930, d. 2110,11. 59-63.
109. Otto Wangerin to Bill, 17 February 1932, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2999,11. 2-5.
110. "The Party Fractions in the Trade Unions," PO 3 (February 1930): 5-7; "On
Building Shop Nuclei," PO 4 (December 1931): 16-17; "On the Functioning of Trade
Union Fractions," PO 5 (February 1932): 18-19; "AgitProp Worl^ PO 5 (February 1932):
25-27; District 8 Convention, 7-8 June1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2107, U. 2-12;
Calendar Plan of Work for Districts, Adopted 3-7 December 1930, d. 2108,1.26; Orga
nization Letter, n.d. [1930], d. 2113,11.47-49; District Buro Minutes, 28 October 1932,
d. 2866,11.75-78.
111. "Shop Nuclei at Work on May Day Demonstration," PO 3 (June-July 1930):
8-10.
112. Sam Economo to E. Browder, 20 September 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d.
2875,11.63-64.
113. Eastman to Comrades, 27 July 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2875, 1 1 . 56-57
(first quote); Report from Sam Economo, 20 September 1932, d. 2875,11. 63-64 (sec
ond, third, and fourth quotes); Industrial Committee Minutes, 16 November 1929, d.
1775,1.43 (fifth quote); District Organization Department to Section 2s Committee, 4
November 1931, d. 2466,11.121-22; J. W. of the District Secretariat to Secretariat of the
CC, 10 December 1932, d. 2876,1.162; District Buro Minutes, 25 March 1932, d. 2866,
11. 43-45; Secretariat Minutes, 8 October 1932, d. 2866,1. 122; District Organization
Department Minutes, 10 September 1932, d. 2875,1.161; Samuels Report on Yards, 2
September 1932, d. 2866,1.65; District Buro Minutes, 2 September 1932, d. 2875, L 161;
Lifshitz Discussion on Stockyards, n.d., d. 3256,11.47-50; Halpern, Down on the Killing
Floor, 111-16; Cohen, Making a New Deal, 296.
114. Otto Wangerin to Bill, 2 February 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2999,11.
2-5.
115.Ibid.
116. District Buro Minutes, 2 October 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. i,d. 2457,1.100;
District Buro Minutes, 28 October 1932, d. 2866,11.75-77; Morton Report on Steel, 22
January 1932, d. 2866,1.19; Brown Report at District Plenum, n.d., d. 3256,1.193.

Chapter 6: "Generals Are of No Use without an Army"

1. Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 19^^-1941
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 172-74, 316; Robert Zeiger, The CIO: 1935-1955
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 15-16.
2. Barbara Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1961), 44-53; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chi
cago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 293-301; James Carl
Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers Union in the Calumet Region, 1933 to 1945" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1998), 119-24.
3. Cohen, Making a New Deal

4. "Developing New Cadres in Concentration Industries in Chicago,"'PO 5 (July1933):

23; Section 7 Committee Minutes, 14 August, 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f $15, op. i, d. 3267,
1.111.

5. Section 7 Committee Minutes, 14 August, 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3267,

1. 111.
6. A McCormick Worker, "Actual Experiences in Building the Party in International
Harvester Co." PO 7 (September 1934): 9-12.
7. Bill to Earl, 5 August 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1. 211.
8. Stachel Report to AFL Fraction Meeting, 9 September 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 534,
op. 7, d. 515,11.1-23; Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped
American Unions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 71-77; James R.
Barrett, Wtlliam Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1999), 176-77; Robert Cherny, "Prelude to the Popular Front: The
Communist Party in California, 1931-35," American Communist History 1.1 (2002):
5-42.
9. Jurich at District Plenum, n.d. [1933], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3256,1.16.
10. Reva Weinstein, "Chicago Section Learns about Railroad Concentration," PO 7
(April 1934): 6-7.
11. J. Williams, "Change Methods of Work," PO 6 (August-September 1933): 8-9.
12. Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States: From the Depression
to World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 49-80; Bruce
Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s
(Urbana: University of lUinois Press, 1988), 103-26; Cherny, "Prelude to the Popular

274

FronC

NOTES TO PAGES 1 6 8 - 7 1
5-42; Roger

Keeran, The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union (Bloom

ington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 121-47.

13. "The Sopkins Case," Chicago Defender, 1 July 1933; Harold Gosnell, Negro Poli

NOTES TO PAGES 171-74

275

27. Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers Union," 137; B. Gebert, "Mass Struggle in the
Chicago District and Tasks of the Party," Communist 12 (December 1933), 1190; D. M.,
"How Two Units Were Established in theSteel Mills," PO 6 (December 1933): 9; "Change

ticians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

Methods of Work," PO 6 (August-September 1933): 32-34; Steel Report, 19 October

1967), 334-36; Mark Solomon, The Cry Was Unity: Communists and African Americans,

1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 507,1.187; District Buro Minutes, 26 December 1933,

1927-1935 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998), 251; Beth Bates, Pullman

f. 515, op. 1, d. 3258,1.91 (quote).

Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America, 1925-1945 (Chapel Hill: Uni

28. Cohen, Making a New Deal, 294; Minority Group of Steel and Metal Workers

versity of North Carolina Press, 2001), 120-21. In addition to Lightfoot and Ford, the

Conference, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 508,11. 100-101; Kollros, "Creating a

party's leading YCL organizer, Gil Green, helped organize Sopkins (and was arrested for

Steel Workers Union," 124-26.

his activity). See Gil Green, Cold War Fugitive: A Personal Story of the McCarthy Years
(New York: International Publishers, 1984), 43.

29. Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers Union," 119-23; Cohen, Making a New Deal,
172-73,190-91.

14. Chicago Defender, 24 June,1 July (quote), 8 July, and 24 July 1933; Thyra Edwards,

30. Joseph Germano Autobiography, Southeast Chicago Historical Society; Kollros,

"Let Us Have More Like Mr. Sopkins," Crisis 42.3 (March 1935): 72; Daily Worker, 15

"Creating a Steel Workers Union," 138; Joe Weber, interview with Toni Gilpin, 3 January

August 1933.
15. J. Williams, "Change Methods ofWork," PO 6 (August-September 1933): 32-35;
"Party Concentration Lays Basis of NTWIU Lead in Strike," PO 6 (August-September

1981, in the author's possession.

31. Leaflet, "Steel Workers!" n.d. [1933], RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 508,1. 89.
32. Joseph Germano Autobiography.

1933): 47- The National Textile Codes, implemented after the strike, likely improved

33. District Buro Minutes, 26 December 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3258,

work conditions and lessened workers' support for the NTWIU and the Communist

1. 91; Steel Report, 19 October 1933, f. 534, op. 7, d. 507.1.187; "Williamson's Report

party. See Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 334-36.

16. Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's

on Extent to Which District Plan of Concentration in Steel Industry Accomplished," 1

September 1933, d. 3258,11. 70-75.

Packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 112-19; Roger

34. "Williamson's Report on Extent to Which District Plan of Concentration in Steel

Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and Fight!": A Social History of Industrial Unionism

Industry Accomplished," 1 September 1933, d. 3258,11. 70-75; JacJc Reese interview

and Meatpacking, 1930-1990 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 69-70; David

in Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers,^ed. Alice Lynd and

Brody, The Butcher Workmen: A Study of Unionization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

Staughton Lynd (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 98-100.

University Press, 1964), 153,161-62.

35. Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers Union," 125-26; B. S., "Developing New Cadres

17. Brody, Butcher Workmen, 153-57; Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 114-15.

in Concentration Industries," PO 6 (December 1933): 23-25;Staughton Lynd, "The Pos

18. Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 1x3-14; Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite

sibility of Radicalism in the Early 1930s: The Case of Steel," Radical America 5.6 (1972):

and Fight!" 68-69; Interviews with Herb March, 15 July 1985 and 21 October 1986,
UPWAOHP; Herb March, interview with the author, Madison, Wis., 5 October 1995;
Cohen, Making a New Deal, -3 20.
19. Interviews with Herb March, 15 July 1985 and 21 October 1986, UPWAOHP;

38.
36. Bill to Earl, 5 August 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1. 211; Report of
Section 7, n.d., d. 3267, L 114; A McCormick Worker, "Actual Experiences in Build
ing the Party in International Harvester Co." PO 7 (September 1934): 9-12; Minutes,

Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 113-14; Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and

National Committee Meeting, 19 September 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 509,11.

Fight!" 68-69.
20. Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor, 116-19.

1-337. A Veteran Painter, "Chicago Painters Win a Victor)^' Labor Unity (March 1934):

21. Bill Gebert, "The Party in the Chicago Stockyards," PO 7 (April 1934): 1-4.

13-15-

22. See breakdown of party composition in chapter 1.

23. Letter to Stachel, 7 December 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1. 313;
Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 333-34.
24. A Unit Organizer, "How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in the
Strike," PO 7 (September 1934): 7-9: District Buro Minutes, 27 July 1934, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,1.34.
25. A Unit Organizer, "How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in
the Strike," PO 7 (September 1934): 7-9.
26. District Buro Minutes, 27 July 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,1. 34.

38. Draft Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Chicago District Committee of
the CPUSA on the Economic and Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party, n.d.,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2108,11. 29-41; Organization Letter, 22 February 1932, d.
2882,1. 73; Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement, 198.
39. P. Frankfeld, "Organization Department Questionnaire for District 8," 10 October
1930, series 2, box 8, file 35, Earl Browder Papers, Syracuse University Library, Special
Collections, Research Center, Syracuse, N.Y.
40. John Lawson to CC, 8 January 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3858,1.4.
41. Harvey Levenstein, Communism, Anti-Communism, and the CIO (Westport,

NOTES TO'PAGES 1 7 8 - 8 2

NOTES TO PAGES I 7 4 - 7 8

276

Conn.: Greenwood Press,

24; Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Commu

1981),

nism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books,

42.

"Shop Paper Reviews," PO 5 (July

1932): 20.

43.

National Committee Meeting,

September

19

1933,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

537,

op.

7,

d.

d.

44.

"Report of Work on the

45.

Bernstein, Turbulent Years, 207; Report on RR, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f.

3855,11. 42-46; Summary

6-8.

46.

op.

1,

1935, d. 3917,

1935, d. 3917,11.18-19.

J. E. McDonald, "Railroad Brotherhoods Unity Movement Monthly Newsletter,"

March

1935,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op.

1,

d.

3917,1. 3;

Letter from J. E. McDonald, Jas.

Miller, L. Metzl, J. E. Waddell, for the Committee, 1 March

47.

515,

of Proceedings of Conference of Railroad Fractions with

Representatives from Northern States East of Mississippi River, 30 June

I. 5; Shaw Speech on RR, 19 November

1935,

d. 3917,1.1.

Summary of Conference Proceeding of Fractions with Reps from Northern States

East of Mississippi in Cleveland,

30

June

1935,

Report of M. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

3917,

IL

515,

op. 1, d.

48.

Ibid.,

49.

Report on RR, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d., 3855,11.42-46; Art Handle dis

5.

RTsKhlDNI, f.
[1933],

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.

65.

District Buro Minutes,

515, op.

RTsKhlDNI, f.

25

1, d.

515, op. 1,

May 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f

515.

op.

515,

op.

3449-

d.

3581,11.12-13.

1, d. 3581,11.12-13;

"How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in the Strike," PO 7 (September
1934): 7-966. Interview with Martin Murphy, 10 May 1934. folder

15,

Mary McDowell Papers.

Chicago Historical Society.

Report by M. E to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f.

515.

op.

i.d. 3655,1.52.
68. The exact date of the dissolution is unclear. Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor,
District Buro Minutes, 19 October 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f.

1
2
3
;

43-44;

Z. Foster, American Trade Unionism: Principles,

1934,

64.

15-34; Reed

Richardson, The Locomotive Engineer, 1863-1963 (Ann Arbor: University of

277

(both quotes); J. Rubin, "Ihe Struggles in the Packinghouses,"

Ibid.
District Buro Minutes, 13 May 1934, RTsKhlDNI,

63.

cussion on RR Question, n.d., L 49; Shaw Speech on RR, 19 November 1935, d. 3917,11.
392-97; William

3267,1.242

1, d. 3655, L 52.
62. PolBuro Minutes, 16 August

67.

5-6.

Ivlichigan Press, 1963),

1934,

Labor Unity (January 1934): 29-30.

61. Report of M. E to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934. RTsKhlDNI, f.

509, U. 1-3.

Railroad," PO 8 (February 1935):

59.

i,d. 3655. 1 . 5 i 60. Plan of Work for Stockyards Section for Six Months, n.d.

1984), 123-25.

5
1
5
,

op.^1, d.

3581,11.

A Woman Packinghouse Worker, "Concentration in the Chic^o Stockyards,"

PO 7 (May-June

1934): 55-57;

Stella Nowicki interview in Lynd anc^ynd. Rank and

On earlier work within the pension association, see J. O'Neil, "Railroad Pensions," Labor

File, 75.
/
69. "Ed Wieck's Report on the National Convention of the Steel and Metal Workers

Unity (May

1932): 20-21;

Industrial Convention,"

(December

1933): 20-21.

Organization, Strate^, Tactics (New York: International Publishers, 1947),

50.

264 (quote).

H. Shaw, "Railroad Reformists and Pensions," Labor Unity

District Buro Minutes,

18

June

1935,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op.

1,

d.

3855,11. 41-

Report by Shaw,

19

November

1935,

RtsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op.

1,

d.

3917,11. 15-

Ibid.

53.

Report on Railroad, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f.

515, op.

i,d. 3855,11.41-46; Grace King,

"Discussion on RR Question," n.d.,11.47-48; Art Handle, "Discussion on RR Question,"

Summary of Proceedings of Conference of Railroad Fractions with Representa

tives from Northern States East of Mississippi River, 30 June

Shaw Report on R.R.,

19

November

1935,

1935, d. 3917,11. 5-6.

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op. 1, d.

3917,11.

5 March 1934,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

1930s," 48.
534, op. 7, d. 520,1.7; Max

Gordon,

23.2 (1982): 258;

1934): 13-1571.

Kollros, "Creating a Steel Workers Union,"

165-77;

George Patterson interview

72.

George Patterson interview in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and File, 91-97; KoUros,

73.

Situation in Steel,

18

October

1935,

RTsKhlDNI, f.

515,

op.

1,

d.

3855,11. 96-

101.

"Report of Work on the

Railroad," PO 8 (February

Organization Letter to Stockyards Section, 1 August

74.

1935): 6-8.

1933, RTsKhlDNI, f 515,

i,d. 3267,1.235; Bill Gebert, "The Party in the Chicago Stockyards," PO7 (April

op.

1934):

op.

Minority Group of Steel and Metal Workers Conference, n.d., RTsKhlDNI, f. 534.

7, d. 508,1.100-101 (quote); Jack

97-105. Reese's

Reese interview in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and File,

organizing style is described in Ruth Needleman, Black Freedom Fighters

in Steel: The Struggle for Democratic Unionism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1-4.
58.

Lynd, "Possibility of Radicalism in the Early

TUUL Minutes,

"Creating a Steel Workers Union," 165-77.

15-34 (quote on 23).

57.

70.

in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and File, 9i-97-

II.49; "Motions and Proposals on RR Report," 1. 50.

56.

Ed Wieck Papers, W^ter Reuther Library,

Bill Gebert, "Growth of Company Unionismand Our Tasks," Labor Unity (October

52.

55.

1934.

"The Communists and the Drive to Organize Steel, 1936," Labor History

34-

54.

August

Steel Industry Accomplished," 1 September 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3258,11.

70-75;

50.
51.

3-5

Detroit; "Williamsons Report on Extent to Which District Plan of Concentration in

District Buro Minutes,

25

May 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f

515,

op. i,d. 3581,11.12-13;

A Unit Organizer, "How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in the Strike,"
PO 7 (September 1934):

7-9.

2003), 190-92.
75.

Report on Steel, 4 October

1934, RTsKhlDNI,

f. 515. op. 1. d. 3449,1.110; Minority

Group of Steel and Metal Workers Conference, n.d., f.

534.

op.

7, d. 508,11.100-101.

278

NOTES TO.PAGES 1 8 8 - 9 2

NOTES TO PAGES 1 8 2 - 8 7

76. Report on Steel, 4 October 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3449,1.110.

77. Steel and Metal Report, 3 December 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 534, op. 7, d. 520,1. 53;
Report, 5 March 1934, d. 520,1. 6; Report by M. E to Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 3655,11. 51-62; Report on Steel, 4 October 1934, d. 3449,1.110.
78. Jack Stachel, "The Fight of the Steel Workers for Their Union," The Communist
(June 1935): 489; Jack Reese interview in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and File, 97-105.
79. Jack Stachel, "Reorganization of the TUUL," 26 February 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 3910,1.14.
80. Stachel, "Fight of the Steel Workers," 495.
81. JackStachel, "Steel Report," 25 February 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3910,
L 12.
82. Stachel, "Fight of the Steel Workers," 483-99.
83. District Buro Meeting, 18 May 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3885, 1 . 28.
84. The case, Riverside Lodge 164, Ohio, Joseph Clair, President, V5. Amalgamated As
sociation of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of North America, and the events surrounding

279

3. Robert Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young: Student Radicab and America's First
Mass Student Movement, 1929-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)4. Chuck Hall, interview with the author, Chicago, 11 January 2000; Les Orear, in
terview with the author, Chicago, 13 January 2000.
5. Chuck Hall, interview with the author.
6. Les Orear, interview with the author.
7. Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New
York: Basic Books, 1984), 307.
8. Minutes ofDistrict Buro Meeting, 26 June 1931, RTsKhlDNLf. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,
1. 76; Taylor Report on YCL at District Buro Meeting, 8 January 1932, d. 2866,11.14-16;
J. Lawson to Org. Central Committee, 8 January 1935, d. 3858,11. 3-7.
9. Jack Kling, Where the Action Is: Memoirs of a U.S. Communist (New York: New
Outlook Publishers, 1985), 11.
10. Ibid., 11-16.
11. This piano instructor, Rudolph Leibich, performed at party affairs. He also ar

it are deftly explained in Carroll Daugherty, Melvin G. De Chazeau, and Samuel Strat-

ranged music for workers' choruses and performances. Green attended his friend's piano

ton. The Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1937),

lessons at Leibich's house and voraciously read from his library, which was filled with

959-69.
85. Stueben, "The Present Situation in Steel and Our Tasks," 2 August 1935, RTsKh

(New York: International Publishers, 1984), 7-17.

lDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3914,1. 32; Report on Steel, n.d., d. 3921,1. 28; Report to John
Lawson to District Committee, 21 September 1935,d. 3854,11.15-19; Kollros, "Creating
a Steel Workers Union," 127.
86. L Toth, "Build the Party in the Trade Unions," PO 8 (May 1935): 4-7.
87. Report on AFL National Committee Meeting, 17 June 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 534,
op. 7, d. 525,1. 5.
88. Report by Comrade Smith for Trade Union Commission on Packing, n.d., RTsKh
lDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 3855,1. 57; Stella Nowicki interview in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and
File, 74-78; Brody, Butcher Workmen, 159-62.
89. Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor,123-25.
90. Report of John Lawson to District Committee, 21 September 1935, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 3854,11.15-23.
91. M. C. [Morris Childs] to Political Buro, 17 September 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 3859,1. 89.

socialist works. Gil Green, Cold War Fugitive: A Personal Story of the McCarthy Years
12. Data Card, 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 4129.
/
13. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Ben Gray for SeeinfRed, Tamiment
Institute Library, New York University.

14. Minutes of the District Plenum, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2108,
L4.
15. Ibid.; Minutes of Buro, 10 July 1930, d. 2109,11. 43-4416. YCL District Buro Meeting, 8 January 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2866,11.
14-16.
17. J. Lawson to the Org. Central Committee, 8 January 1935. RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op.
1, d. 3858; Report of M. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, d. 3584,11. 68-7918. Minutes of the Buro, 10 July 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109, II. 43-44i
Section 2 Committee Minutes, 6 March 1933, d. 3267,1.16.
19. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 328-30; Mark Solomon, The Cry Was
Unity: Communists and African Americans, 1917-1936 (Jackson: University Press of

92. Ibid.

Mississippi, 1998), 139-44; Mark Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression

93. Morris Childs to P. Buro, 17 September 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3859,

(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 46-48. For more on this trial in Chicago, see

1. 89.
94. Joe Weber, interview with Toni Gilpin, in the author's possession; Cohen, Making
a New Deal, 310-13; Bernstein, Turbulent Years, 123-24.

Randi Storch, "'The Realities of the Situation': Revolutionary Discipline and Everyday
Political Life in Chicago's Communist Party, 1928-1935," Labor: Studies in WorkingClass History in the Americas 1.3 (Fall 2004): 19-44.
20. Hunger Fighter, 6 August 1932, 4-

Chapter 7: "Not That These Youths Are Geniuses"

1. Quoted in S. Kirson Weinberg, "Jewish Youth in the Lawndale Community: A
Sociological Study," Paper for Sociology 269, box 139, folder 4, Ernest Burgess Papers,
Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.
2. Ibid.

21. Kling, Where the Action Is, 16-17.

22. Minutes of Secretariat, 3 March 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2109,1.105.
23. Minutes of District Buro, 20 September 1931, RTsBChlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2457,
1. 153; Minutes ofDistrict Buro, 8 January 1932, d. 2866,11.14-16; Charlie to Johnny,
5 May 1933. d. 3265,1.143.

280

NOTES TO PAGES 1 9 3 - 9 7

24. Charlie to Johnny, 5 May 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1.143.

25. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 101-2; Kling, Where the Action Is, 19;
Letter to Organizational Department from District, 10 November 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 3265,1. 285.
26. Jim Klein and Julia Reichart, interview with Ben Gray.
27. Minutes of the District Buro, 26 June 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2457,1.
76.
28. Kling, Where the Action Is, 30; Green, Cold War Fugitive, 49-50.
29. Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States: From the Depression
to World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 62-63.
30. Minutes of the District Buro, 26 June 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2457,1.
76. See also Minutes of the District Plenum, 6 September 1931, d. 2455,11. 32-47.
31. Gebert to Browder, 11 August 1931, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2460,11. 51-

5732. Taylor Report on YCL at District Buro Meeting, 8 January 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 2866,11.14-16.

NOTES TO PAGES I97-2OI

28l

50. Memo on the Office Workers Union as an Affiliate of the Trade Union Unity
League, 17 January 1934, reel 29, frames 1025-26, USMI-SRUS.
51. This family support was not the case for many party members with children or for
the parents of YCL members. In feet, complaints from leaders suggested that a signfficant
number of members kept their children away from party activity. On the importance
of family networks in supporting the Left, see Elizabeth Faue and Kathleen A. Brown,
"Social Bonds, Sexual Politics, and Political Community on the U.S. Left, 1920s to 1940s,"
Left History 7.1 (2000): 9-45.
52. Kling, Where the Action Is, 27-28.
53. Minutes of Section 2 Meeting, 10 September 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.
3267,1. 46.
54. Interview with Herb March, 21 October 1986, UPWAOHP.
55. Ibid.; Report ofM". F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsBChlDNI, f 5i5>
op. 1, d. 3584,11.68-79.
56. Stella Nowicki interview in Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class
Organizers, ed. Alice Lynd and Staughton Lynd (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 70-71. .

33. Charlie to Dave, 5 May 1933, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3265,1.143.

57. Ibid., 72.

34. F. Brown, "Check Up on Organization," PO 8 (March 1935): 13.

58. Stella Nowicki interview in Lynd and Lynd, Rank and File, 76.

35. Minutes of the Secretariat, 3 February 1930, RTsBChlDNI, f 515, op. i,d. 2109,11.

59. Ibid.; Ann Doubilet, "The Young Communist League and Women Wprkers in the

101-5; Organization Department Letter, 14 February 1931, d. 2466, L 20; Organization

Packinghouse Unions in Chicago, 1933-1937, a Study in Tactics," Labor I^torySeminar

Letter, 25 April 1931, d. 2466,1. 54; Organization Letter, 25 September 1931, d. 2466,

Paper for Dr. J. Carrol Moody, 1972,11, in the author's possession; Report of M. F. to

U. 105-6; Tom Johnson to Pol Buro, 3 October 1931, d. 2460,11.93-98;"Minutes of the

the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op. 1, d. 3^^4,11. 68-79.

District Buro, 13 July 1934, d. 3581, L 31.

36. Organization Letter, 15 May 1931, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2466,1. 65.
37. Minutes of the District Buro, 26 January 1934, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3581,
L 7; Jack Kling to the Central Committee, 27 December 1932, d. 2974,1.17.
38. Jack BQing to the Organization Department of the CEC, 7 December 1931, RTsKh
lDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2314, L 100.

60. Report of M. E to the Buro on the YCL, 30 November 1934, ^ITsKhlDNI, f. 515,
op. 1, d. 3584,11.68-79.
61. Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia (New York: Vintage
Press, 1986), 179-80; William Baker, "Muscular Marxism and the Chicago CounterOlympics of 1932," in The New American Sport History, ed. S. W. Pope (Urbana: Uni
versity of Illinois Press, 1997), 284-99; Si Gerson, "The Workers Sport Movement: Six

39. Chuck Blall, interview with the author.

Years of Workers Sport in the USA," International Press Correspondence, 19 January

40. Les Orear, interview with the author.

1933. 60.
62. Minutes of LSU National Executive Board Fraction, 23 October 1930, RTsKhlDNI,

41. Minutes ofDistrict Plenum, 11 May 1930, RTsKhlDNI, f 515, op. 1, d. 2108,1.

f. 515, op. 1, d. 2208,11.40-41.

4.
42. Taylor Report on YCL at District Buro Meeting, 8 January 1932, RTsBChlDNI, f.
515, op. 1, d. 2866, U. 14-16.
43. Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young, 39-41.
44. Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist
(Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 445.
45. Steve Nelson, James R. Barrett, and Rob Ruck, Steve Nelson, American Radical
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 82-83.
46. Jack BCling to GU Green, n.d. [1932], RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2876; 11. 1929347. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. NWRR Shop News, May 1928, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 1418,11.17-18.

63. William Baker, "Muscular Marxism and the Chicago Counter-Olympics of 1932,"
285.
64. Chicago's YCL organized "vote Communist street runs" and marathon races to
draw attention to various political causes. See, for example. Workers' Voice, 15 October
1932.
65. A. Harris, S. Siporin, and E. Becker, Counter-Olympic Fraction, to Earl Browder,
20 May 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3053,11.40-4166.Ibid.
67. Taylor Report on the YCL at District Buro Meeting, 8 January 1932, RTsKhlDNI,
f. 515, op. 1, d. 2866,11.14-16.
68. A. Harris, S. Siporin, and E. Becker, Counter-Olympic Fraction, to Earl Browder,
20 May 1932, RTsBChlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d, 3053,11.40-41.

282

NOTES TO PAGES 2 0 8 - 1 4

NOTES TO PAGES 201-7

69. Baker, "Muscular Marxism and the Chicago Counter-Olympics of 1932," 2899170. Ibid., 292.
71. Ibid., 294; Mark Naison, "Lefties and Righties: The Communist Party and Sports
during the Great Depression," Radical America 13 (July-August 1979): 47-59.
72. Baker, "Muscular Marxism and the Chicago Counter-Olympics of 1932," 2939473. Report of M. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
i,d. 3655,11. 55-56.
74.Ibid.
75.Ibid.
76. Quoted in Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young, 39-41.

'

283

96. Daily Maroon, 9 May 1933.

97. Daily Maroon, 25 January 1934 and 7 March 1934.
98. Daily Maroon, 6 April 1934.
99. Daily Maroon, 4 April 1934.
100. Daily Maroon, 17 October 1934.
101. Memo, 2 October 1934, reel 30, frames 82-87, USMI-SRUS.
102. See, for example. Daily Maroon, 19 April 1934. On Chicago's Spanish Civil War
recruits, see Randi Storch, "Shades of Red: The Communist Party and Chicago's Work
ers, 1928-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998),
207-12.
103. Upsurge, 20 November 1934.
104. Upsurge, 5 December 1934. These arguments predate Berkeley's1960s free-speech

77. Daily Maroon, 15 April 1932.

movement by thirty years yet make the same connection between students' rights to

78. Cohen, When the Old Leji Was Young, xiii-xx.

political activism and free speech.

79. Daily Maroon, 27 April 1933; Report ofM. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November
1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3655,11. 51-62.
80. Daily Maroon, 24 May 1933.
81. Report ofM. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
i,d. 3655.1. 5982. Cohen, When the Old Leji Was Young, 15-21.
83. In 1932, only 1.4 percent of the entering class was African American, compared to
26 percent Jewish students and 72.3 percent gentile students; .3 percent were described
as "other." Mary Ann Dzuback, Robert M. Hutchins: Portrait of an Educator (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 286.
84. Ibid., 146.

10^. Daily Maroon, 31 January 1935.

106. Daily Maroon, 12 April 1935.
107. Robert Coven, "Red Maroons," Chicago History 21 (Spring-Summer 1992):
20-37108. Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 70.

110. Quoted in Wechsler, Revo/f orj the Campus, 263. See also Nelspn E. Hewitt, Hoiv
"Red" Is the University of Chicago? (Chicago: Advisory Associates, 1935).
111. Quoted in Wechsler, Revolt on the Campus, 263; Schrecke^, No Ivory Tower, 70;
Coven, "Red Maroons," 37; Daily Maroon, 29 May 1934.

85. Daily Maroon, 17 May 1932.

112. Daily Maroon, 14 May 1935.

86. J. WiUiamson to Secretariat CC, 15 March 1932, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 2874,

113. Daily Maroon, 16 April 1935.

11.164-65.
87. James Wechsler, Revolt on the Campus (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1973). 105.
88. Ibid., 108.
89. Report of Student Congress against War Held at Mandel Hall, University of Chi
cago, 28-29 December 1932, reel 29, frame 572, USMI-SRUS.
90. Report of M. F. to the Buro on YCL, 30 November 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op.
i,d. 3655,11. 51-62.
91. Interview with Quentin Young, Radical Elders Project, Spertus Jewish Museum,
Chicago.

109. Daily Maroon, 2 May 1935; Chicago Daily Tribune, 14 May 19^, 1.

114. Daily Maroon, 19 April 1935.

115. Daily Maroon, 1 May 1935.
116. Daily Maroon, 16 May 1935.
117. Daily Maroon, 25 April 1935.
i i S . D a i l y M a r o o n , 14 May 1935 and 24 May 1935; Chicago Daily Tribune, 14 May
1935.1119. Daily Maroon, 5 June 1935.
120. Kling, Where the Action Is, 26; Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 320.
121. Earl Browder, "Recent Political Developments and Some Problems of the United
Front," The Communist (July 1935): 617-18.

92. Memo, 10 March 1933, reel 29, frame 17, USMI-SRUS.

93. Quoted in Cohen, When the Old Left Was Young, 82; see also "Program and
Resolutions of the Student Congress against War," in Publications Relating to Student
Congress against War (Chicago: Student Congress against War, 1932).
94. Cohen, When the Old Leji Was Young, 85.
95. Communists Arrests in Chicago, September 1933, reel 29, frame 906, USMISRUS.

Epilogue
1. Georgi Dimitroff, The United Front: The Struggle against War and Fascism (New
York: International Publishers, 1938), 99-100 (quote on 99).
2. Ibid., 9-93,169-71, and 197-216; Fraser Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the
United States: From the Depression to World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni
versity Press, 1991), 83-135.

284

NOTES TO PAGES 217-19

NOTES TO PAGES 214-17

285

3. Mark Naison, "Remaking America:Communists and Liberals in the Popular Front,"

Old Age Revolving Pension plan, and EPIC was Upton Sinclair's political organization

in New Studies in the Politics and Culture of U.S. Communism, ed. Michael E. Brown,

dedicated to Ending Poverty in California. Earl Browder, "Win the Masses in Their

Randy Martin, Frank Rosengarten, and George Snedeker (New York: Monthly Review

Organizations," PO 9 (December 1935): 16-18.

Press, 1993), 45-73 (quote on 47). Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Labor-,
ing of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (New York: Verso, 1997), develops

11. District Buro Minutes, 17 April 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3855, L 5; 2
February 1934,1. 8; B. Shields to Bittleman, n.d. [1935], d. 3859, L 1. On the location

'this argument more folly. For insights into the conflicts and contradictions within the

of the school and bookstore, see G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War De

congress, see Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of Inter

partment, 4 September 1940, reel 31, frames 251-54, USMI-SRUS; Beatrice Shields,

national Communism from Lenin to Stalin (New York: St. Martin's Press, i997)> i20-57Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 174-82, argues that the burden of the shift lay with

"Develop Party Cadres in Chicago," The Communist (February 1936): 165.

12. Frank Meyer, "Section Schools in Chicago," PO 9 (October 1936): 29. See also
Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Party^ 217-3 U and-Monthly Recruiting Bul

Soviet foreign-policy requirements. Jane Degras, ed.. The Communist International,

letin, August 1934, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3591,11.24-26. For the low attendance

ipip-1943: Documents, vol 3 (London: Frank Cass, 1971), reprints documents from

at section schools throughout the city before the change in curriculum, see Minutes of

the congress. Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States, 83-105, discusses how

AgitProp Directors, 19 October 1935, d. 3857,11. 7-10.

the shift affected the American party.

4. James G. Ryan, Earl Browder: The Failure of American Communism (Tusfcaloosa:

13. Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Party," 221. See also Frank Meyer, "Sec
tion Schools in Chicago," PO 9 (October 1936): 29. Work with non-party members in

University of Alabama Press, 1997), 159-69, 235-36; Edward Johanningsmeier, Forg

the school also made Communists vulnerable to government spies. G. R. Carpenter to

ing American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 4 September 1940, reel 31, frames 251-52,

University Press, 1994), 272-313; James R. Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedy

USMI-SRUS; Agitprop Director's Meeting, 25 May 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d.

of American Communism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), chap. 10.

3857,11.4-6.
14. Fred Brown, "The Importance of the Recruiting Drive," The Communist (October

5. See examples in Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor

in a Textile City, 1914-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Naison,

1937):

915-24 (quote on

921-22).

"Remaking America," 45-73; Randi Storch, "Shades of Red: The Communist Party and

15. WiUiam Carter and Ann Nowell, "Chicago's South Side Advances," PO 11 (Janu

Chicago's Workers, 1928-1939" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, 1998), 196-311; Rick Halperin, Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White

ary 1938): 31.

16. Gold quoted in Naison, "Remaking America," 48; Midwest t)aily Record, 12 Feb

Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997),

ruary 1938 and 13 May 1938; Alexander Bittleman, "Historic View of the Struggle

179-82.
6. Claude Lightfoot, Chicago Slums to World Politics: Autobiography of Claude M.
Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1980), 69.
7. Maurice Isserman, Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party during
the Second World War (1982; reprint, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 54.

for Democracy," The Communist (August 1938): 711-21; Earl Browder, "Concerning
America's Revolutionary Traditions," The Communist (December 1938): 1079-85; Earl
Browder, "America and the CIRelationship and History," The Communist (March
1939): 209; F. Brown, "Let the Masses Know Our Party/" PO 11 (October 1937): 15-18;
S. L., "Bringing Forward C.P. Literature," PO 11 (September 1937): 37-38.

8. Robert Jay Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Party, USA, 1931-1938" (Ph.

17. Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Party^ 49; Isserman, Which Side Were

D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959), 45, 74-75; F. Brown, "New Forms of

You On? 18-19, 205;'Fred Brown, "The Importance of the Present Recruiting Drive

Party Organization Help Us Win the Masses," PO 10 (July-August 1936): 6-11 (quote

for the Future of Our Party," The Communist (October 1937): 915-24 (quote on 920);

on 11); E. Brown, "Ward Branches in Chicago District," PO 10 (June 1936): 18-21;

Nathan Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (New York: Harcourt, Brace,

"The Party Branch and Its Relationship to the Community," issued by the Educational

and World, 1961), 92. Some estimate the 1938 membership of the party at seventy-five

Department of the Communist Party, n.d. [1943], CP of USA (IL), Tamiment Institute

thousand. This is probably due to the addition of YCL members to the total. See Klehr,

Library, New York University.

Heyday of American Communism, 378. It may also be due to the party's own overestima

9. Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New

tion. See "The January 1938 RegistrationAn Analysis and Conclusion," PO 12 (June

York: Basic Books, 1984), 369-70; Alperin, "Organization in the Communist Part)^

1938): 1-6.
18. Nathan Glazer makes the point, though, that "even in industries where the Party

109,119,129-34; Max Steinberg, "Organize to Strengthen and Build the Party" PO 11

(January 1937): 11-14; Fred Brown, "Essential Problems of Organization," PO12 (May

had a powerful base, it did not have what might be called a mass membership." Glazer,

1938): 3-10; M. Gordon, "Experiences in a Chicago Party Ward Branch," PO 10 (May

Social Basis of American Communism, 114.

1936): 26-28.
10. Townsend organizations formed to support the physician Francis Townsend's

19. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 378-85; Glazer, Social Basis of Ameri
can Communism, 117; Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States, 128; F. Brown,

286

NOTES TO PAGES 2 1 9 - 2 3

NOTES TO PAGES 2 2 3 - 2 8

287

"Check-Up on Organization" PO9 (March 1935): 14; Rosalyn Baxandall, "The Question

Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of

Seldom Asked: Women and the CPUSA" in New Studies in the Politics and Culture of

North CaroUna Press, 1990), 107,123. On support and activism in Harlem, see Mark

U.S. Communism, ed. Michael E. Brown, Randy Martin, Fr^k Rosengarten, and George

Naison, Communists in Harlem during the Depression (Urbana: University of Illinois

Snedeker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 156.'

Press, 1983), 138-40,155-58.

20. Chicago's membership statistics become more difficult to access in this period.
These are from "Comparative Status of Membership on July i, 1935," 13-14 July 1935,

36. "Let's Get on the Radio," PO 10 (February 1936): 31-32; "The RadioThe Voice
of Mass Agitation," PO lo (April 1936): 31; "Utilize the Radio," PO 10 (June 1936): 1.

RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3859,1.14; "The January RegistrationAn Analysis and

37. Brown, "Importance of the Present Recruiting Drive," 915-924 (quote on 920);

Conclusion," PO 12 (June 1938): 1-6; Captain G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of

Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern

Staff, War Department, 22 October 1940, reel 31, frame 292, USMI-SRUS. For trends

City (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1945), 737.

of party growth, see table 2.1 in chapter 2 of this volume.

21. Morris Childs, "Forging Unity against Reaction in Illinois," The Communist (Au
gust 1936): 78322. Captain G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 16 Novem

38. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 10 September 1940,

reel 31, frames 264-67, USMI-SRUS; "Organization LetterSection 2," 15 March 1934,
RTsKhlDNI, f. 515. op- 1. d. 3590,1. 22; "Monthly Recruiting Bulletin," October 1934,
d. 3591,11. 32-34; "Monthly Recruiting Bulletin," November 1934,11. 36-37.

ber 1939, reel 31, frames 26-29; 26 April 1940, reel 31, frames 121-22, USMI-SRUS;

39. Report of John Lawson, 21 September 1935, RTsKhlDNI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 3854,

Douglas Wixson, Worker-Writer in America: Jack Conroy and the Tradition of Midwestern

11. 15-23; Report of Investigation Commission, Street Unit 405, n.d. [1935], d. 3853,

Literary Radicalism, 1898-1990 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 451.

11. 24-25; Report for Investigation CommissionStreet Unit 106,11. 45-50; Report of

23. H. Pollack, "The Recruiting Drive in the Columbus Section," PO 8 (February

1935): 1424. Major H. E. Maguire to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 7 April 1937,
reel 30, frame 398, USMI-SRUS; Lt. Col. A. L Hamblen to Assistant Chief of Staff, War
Department, 15 October 1938, reel 30, frame 663.
25. Jean Lyon, "There's More than One Way to Nag," Woman Today (April 1937): 19;

Commission Investigating Sections 5,11,12,11.45-50. In several neighborhoods. Com

munist party members resisted joining organizations such as the Italian Citizens club
and the Negro Citizens club, even though leaders insisted that connections to mass
organizations were essential during this period.

40. Brown, "Importance of the Present Recruiting Drive," 915-24. ?

41. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 18 June 1940, reel 31,

Ruth Garvin, "Face and Figure," Midwest Daily Record, 12 August 1939, 8; 7 October

frames i53-55> USMI-SRUS; Report of John Lawson, 21 Septerabera935, RTsKhlDNI,

1939> 8; and 14 August 1939, 8.

f. 515. op. 1, d. 3854, IL 15-23.

26. Midwest Daily Record, 23 March 1939,3.

27. Midwest Daily Record, 18 September 1939, 4; Yolanda Hall, interview with the
author, Chicago, 13 March 1998.
28. Harry Winston, "An Understanding of the YCL Convention," PO 10 (July 1937):
1729. Midwest Daily Record, 30 April 1938, 26 October 1938, and 7 December 1938;
"The January RegistrationAn Analysis and Conclusion," PO 12 (June 1938): 1-6; G. R.

42. Earl Browder, "United Front: The Key to Our New Tactical Orientation," The
Communist (December 1935): 1075-1129 (quote on 1122).
43. Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States, 159-189; Isserman, Which Side
Were You On? 32-54.
44. Midwest Daily Record, 5, 9, and 15 September 1939.
45. Midwest Daily Record, 2 September 1939.
46. Midwest Daily Record, 5, 9, and 12 September 1939.

Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 22 October 1940, reel 31, frame

47. Midwest Daily Record, 15 September 1939, 2; Memo, 29 September 1939. reel 30,

292, USMI-SRUS. Morris Childs claimed that over 70 percent of the Chicago district's

frame 931; and 25 October 1939, reel 31, frame 16, USMI-SRUS; Herb March interview

recruits were under thirty-five years of age in 1936. See Morris Childs, "Forging Unity

with Roger Horowitz, 15 July 1974, UPWAOHP.

against Reaction in Illinois," 783.

30. Midwest Daily Record, 26 October 1939,5; 2 November 1939,4; Bill Carter, "Plan
ning and Organization Brought Results." PO 12 (April 1938): 33.
31. Quoted in Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago,
1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 336.
32. Ibid., 345. Many of the central CIO figures pushing for workers' unity discussed
in Cohen's book were party members or close sympathizers.
33. Denning, Cultural Front, xvi-xvii.

48. Midwest Daily Record, 3 October 1939; Memo, 30 September 1939, reel 30, frame
931, USMI-SRUS.
49- G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 7 November 1939,
reel 31, frames 14-19. and 30 November 1939, reel 31, frames 31-33, USMI-SRUS.
50. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 12 November 1940,
reel 31, frames 301-3. and 11 October 1939, reel 30, frame 941, USMI-SRUS.
51. Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New
York: Basic Books, 1984), 386-409.

34. Ibid., 9.

52. Ottanelli, Communist Party of the United States, 191-94.

35. For a more detailed discussion of these activities, see Storch, "Shades of Red,"

53. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 7 November 1939,

155-311. On party support for Ethiopia in Alabama, see Robin Kelley, Hammer and

288

NOTES TO PAGES 2 2 8 - 3 0

reel 31, frames 14T19, 30 November 1939, reel 31, frames 31-33, and 26 March 1940,
reel 31, frame 100 (quote), USMI-SRUS.
54. Herb March, interview with Roger Horowitz, 15 July 1974, UPWAOHR On the
independent tendencies of party trade unionists during the Popular Front generally,
see Harvey Levenstein, Communism, Anti-Communism, and the CIO (Westport Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1981), 40-46; Ottanelli, Communist Party in the United States, 146-48;
James R. Barrett, William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Communism (Urbana:

Index

University of Illinois Press, 1999), 207-8.

55. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 12 November 1940,
reel,3i; frames 301-3, USMI-SRUS.
56. Memo, 18 December 1939, reel 31, frame 52, USMI-SRUS.
57. Memo, 19 October 1939, reel 31, frame 13, and 2 November 1939, reel 31, frame
16, USMI-SRUS.
58. Isserman, Which Side Were You On? 37 (first quote); Chuck Hall, interview with
the author, 11 January 2000, Chicago (second quote); Dorothy Ray Healey and Maurice
Isserman, California Red: A Life in the American Communist Party (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1990), 82. See also Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of
an Afro-American Communist (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 496.
59. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of StaflF, War Department, 22 October 1940,
reel 31, frame 292, USMI-SRUS.
60. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 16 November 1939,
reel 31, frames 26-29. On secret work, see 21 December 1939, reel 31, frames 60-62,
and 9 January 1940, reel 31, frames 69-72, USMI-SRUS.
61. Daily Maroon, 2 November 1939. On national student activism in this period, see
Robert Cohen, When the Old Lefr Was Young: Student Radicals and America's First Mass
Student Movement, 1929-1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 278-307.
62. Midwest Daily Reader, 25 August, 28 October, 7 November, and 11 November
1939; G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 7 November 1939,
reel 31, frames 9-16; 8 January 1941, reel 31, frame 410; 21 February 1941, reel 31,
frames 465-66; 12 November 1940, reel 31, frames 301-3; 1 November 1940, reel 31,
frames 295-98; 10 September 1940, reel 31, frames

264-67; "Confidential War Memo,"

30 July 1940, reel 31, frame 327, USMI-SRUS.

63. G. R. Carpenter to Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, 18 January 1941,
reel 31, frames 428-31; 26 January 1941, reel 31, frames 434-37; 8 February 1941, reel
31, frames 455-58; 14 February 1941, reel 31, frames 461-63, USMI-SRUS; Haywood,
Black Bolshevik, 496. While the party made inroads into the peace movement, the right
wing had them beat. Philip Jenkins, Hoods and Shirts: The Extreme Right in Pennsylva
nia, 1925-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), has excellent
descriptions of the various right-wing movements and how they coalesced during the
1940-41 period.

Aaron, Abe, 43, 44, 52

Abern, Martin, 25, 26, 81
Adamson, Wayne. 138,149
AFL. See American Federation of Labor
African American communists (Chicago):
and American Negro Labor Congress.
27-28,96, 151; and Communist Party, 39.
50-54,77,111-12,24in29; and counterOlympics protest, 201-2; and Garveyism,
96; and nationality policy, 77,97; and po
litical origins, 27; and relations with white
comrades, 77-78,89-90,97; and religion,
96-97; and trade union policy, 150-52;
and Unemployed Councils, 111-14; and
women, 45-46; and Young Communist
League, 191
African Americans (Chicago): and American
Consolidated Trades Council, 150-51; and
labor, 131; and support for CP, 77,113-14
African Blood Brotherhood (ABB), 27, 50,
52
African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME),
151
Albany Park, 203
Algren, Nelson, 42,53
Allen Norval, 27
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and
Tin Workers (AA), 171-73,181-84
Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW), 17,
134,136
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America (AMC), 16869,170,178,179,180,184-85

American Congress against War and Fas

cism, 202
American Consolidated Trades Council
(ACTC), 27,150-52
a
American Federation of L^or (AFL), 132;
and anti-Communism,-1,29,136,137;
and Chicago stockya/ds, 170-71,180,
184-85; and Conujmnists, 130,139,
142-43,161,165-66,173-74,184-85;
and Trade Union Educational League, 59.
134-37: and Trade Union Unity League,
131-32,142-43,158,161; and women, 45
American League against War and Fascism,
209
American Negro Labor Congress (ANLC),
27-28,96, 151, 152, 27on79, 270n84
American Peace Mobilization, 230
American Youth Congress (AYC), 212-13
Amter, Israel, 190
anarchism, 12-13,14
Anderson, Kyrill M., 3
Angelo Herndon campaign, 169. See also
Herndon, Angelo
anti-Communism, 120-21,135,155,185,
26on62; and American Federation of
Labor, 1,29,136,137
anti-unionism, 138,147-48
anti-war movement (Chicago), 189; and
"community organizing, 202-3; and High
school and college student activism,
203-10
Anvil, The, 42
Armenian Communists (Chicago), 26,92

290

INDEX

Armour and Company, 139,140,148,169,

179
Armstrong, Frank, 100
Ashland Auditorium, 29,74,135
"Back of the Yards," 7,18, 34,46,47, 49,114,
122, 202. See abo South Side
Baker, WiUiam, 200
Banks, Charles, 99
Barrett, James R., 20,136
Bates, Beth, 96,111
Beasley, Robert, 109
Bedacht, Max, 135,150
Beidel, Lydia, 26
Bennett, Lydia, 128
Ben Sopkins and Sons: and Communists, 47,
140; and strike (1933), 162,165,167-68;
and Young Communist League. 197
Bentail, David, 95,97,120
Black Belt, 7.18, 34,46. 47, 49, 77,114. See
abo South Side
Bloch, Elsa, 26
Blumenstock, Dorothy, 74
Bolshevik Revolution, 29, 51
Borders, Karl, 122
Breinin, Ray, 43
Browder, Bill, 119,123
Browder, Earl, 19,23, 28-29,-94, ^00,137,
201,206,213,225,227, 228
Brown, Squire, 100
Bud Biliken parade, 223
Bughouse Square, 24, 58
building trades, 137,149-52,166
Building Trades' Industrial Union, 143
Bukharin, Nicolai, 33, 81-82
Bulgarian Communists (Chicago), 26; and
buro, 224
Bull, Nicolai, 134
Bury, Fero, 66
Calumet Park, 171
Cannon, James. 29, 80,94
Capitol Dairy, 47
Cap Makers'Union, 135,136
Carney, Jack, 24
Carpenter's Union, 134
Catholic church, 49
Cayton, Horace, 77,113,114, 224
Cermak, Anton, 115, 26in69
chauvinism campaign (Communist), 88-89
Cherny, Robert, 167
Chicago: and Communism, 26on6o; and
effects of Great Depression on workers,

INDEX

33-34,116,164; and industrial character,

6,10,11; and labor violence, 152-54; and
neighborhoods of Communist Party con
centration (map), 7; and race relations, 50,
152; and radical traditions, 7. 9.12-18, 23;
and working-class and ethnic character, 6,
10,11,131, 264n3
Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, 50, 54,
148
Chicago Coliseum, 1,17, 75
Chicago Commons, 34,117
Chicago Defender, 49,78,167,168, 223-24
Chicago Employers' Association, 153-54
Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL). 6,1618,135,170.183,185
Chicago Federation of Working-Class
Women, 26
"Chicago Idea," 12
Chicago police, 4, 5,13, 31, 58, 75-76,
99-100,118; and attack on Unemployed
Council demo (photo), 119,153,167-68,
262n83; and Red Squad. 75.114,119,185,
196-98
Chicago Stadium, 230
Chicago Tribune, 109,164-65
Chicago Workers' Committee on Unemploy
ment. 122-25
Chicago Workers' School, 69-70. See abo
education (Marxist)
Childs, Morris, 185
Chinese workers, 138
Chryssos, ElUs, 22
Cicero (111.), 121
Cline, Paul, 82,103
Cochran, Bert, 142
Cohen, Joseph, 206
Cohen, Lizabeth, 113,148,149,165, 221-22
Cohen, Robert, 188, 204
Cohen, Sam, 157
Comintern; and American Negro Labor
Congress. 27; and Communist Party
(USA), 19, 28, 84; and Farmer-Labor
party, 29; and nationaUties policy, 77; and
Seventh World Congress, 214; and trade
union policy. 132,136-37,167; and Un
employed Councils, 105; and women, 143;
and Young Communist League, 193-94
Communist Labor Party, 19. 22,24
Communist Party (Chicago): and African
Americans, 39,45-46,50-54,77.111-12,
24in29; and American Federation of
Labor, 130,139,142-43, i6i, 165-66,
173-74.184-85; and Chicago police,

75,114,119, 185,196-98, 262n83: and

composition, 24,32. 38-40,44-46,53:
and discipline, 72-73.78-79,94-95; and
education (Marxist), 69-71, 248n22; and
electoral politics, 126-27, 264niio; and
family relations, 37, 28in5i; and finances,
92, 24oni3; and foreign-born members.
233 38,39-40, (table) 40, 61-62, 242n35;
and foreign language federations, 19, 23,
25-26, 86-93; and Garveyism, 95-96; and
mass organizations, 41-44: and mem
bership numbers, 20, 35, (table) 36, 37;
and party literature, 248n2i; proletar
ian character, 16, 38; and race relations,
78,88,89-90,97; and recruitment, 6-7,
31-32, 34-35.36,63; and religion, 96-97.
245n84; and Soviet Union, 1, 27-28, 37,
76. 228, 247nio; and Stalinism, 3-4, 8;
and structure, 20,25-26, 75, 237n34; and
subcultures, 83-84,96-97; and Trade
Union Educational League, 22,134-35;
and trade union membership, 24in27;
and Trade Union Unity League, 132-33,
141,154: and Unemployed Councils,
102-3,106-7,128,129; and units, 36-37,
76; and women, 26, 38, 45, 71-73, 24in26;
and youth, 44
Communist Party (Germany), 71
Communist Party (New York): and member
ship. 24on9. 249n29
Communist Party (USA), 9; and Comin
tern. 19, 28,84; and counter-Olympics
protest, 201; and Farmer-Labor party, 29;
and membership, 36; and national head
quarters in Chicago, 23; and nationalities
policy, 77; and origins, 9,19; and Soviet
Union, 65-66; and structure (illustration),
19; and trade union policy, 178-79
Communist, The, 213
Communists (Chicago): and African Ameri
cans, 27,50-54; and American Federation
of Labor, 130,139,142-43,161,165-66,
173-74.184-85; and Garveyism, 95-96:
and lack of discipline (foreign-language
members), 86-93;
nationalities policy,
97-98; and Painters' Union, 23; and re
ligion. 96-97; and social-fascism policy,
93-94.123-24; and Soviet Union, 1,
27-28,66-69, 248ni4: and trade union
membership, 25; and Trade Union Edu
cational League, 22,134-35; and Trade
Union Unity League, 132-33,141,154;
and Trotskyites, 94-95

291

Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO),

185-86, 221-22, 223, 228
Conroy, Jack, 43,44
Control Commission, 79-80,94, 95,97.125.
151
counter-Olympics protest, 188, 200-202
Crane company, 47,139,147,148
Crane Junior College, 206
Croatians (Communist), 224
Czechoslovakian Communists (Chicago); 26.
87, 90; and buro, 92
Daily Maroon, 203, 208,210,211-12
Daily Worker, 37,43,69,74,76,88,109,120.
166,201,218,226; and founding, 24
Dallet, Joe, 103
Debs. Eugene V., 15
Deering plant, 13, 58,139
DeLeon. Daniel, 15
Denning, Michael, 222-23
Der Proletarier, 12
Dies committee, 228
Dil Pickle Club, 24, 59
District Eight. See Communj^t Party (Chi
cago)
Don, Sam. 82,190
/
Dorsey, Herman, 27,137,151
Doty, Edward, 27. 5i.i'$o-52,162, 27on83,
270n85
Dozenberg, Nicholas, 22
Drake. St. Clair, 77,113, 224
Draper, Theodore, 3, 22, 28
Dunne, William, 23-24,136
Early. Jim, 51
Eastman, Max, 160
Education (Marxist), 46,69-71; and Popular
Front. 217
ElUs Park, 76
Empros, 22-23
Engels, Fredrick. 50, 71; and Origins of the
Family, 51
Englewood High School, 207
Eriich, Katherine, 73,107,126,129,144-45
espionage, 5
factionalism, 80-82
Farmer-Labor Party, 21,28-29,80,136: and
Cook County, 22
Federal Emergency Relief Act, 127. See abo
New Deal
Ferguson, Romania, 46,126
Fiegel, Ethel, 26

292

INDEX

Fine, Fred. 196

Finnish Communists (Chicago), 40, 87; and
federation, 26
Finnish Workers' Hall, 58,189
Fitzpatrick, John, 16-17,28-29,136
Flynn, Thomas, 134
Folkets Has. 59
Ford. James, 47,167-68
foreign-language Communists (Chicago),
2di; and Armenians, 26; and Croatians,
224; and Czechoslovakians, 66, 92; and
discipline (lack oO> 25-26,86-93; and
finances, 92; and Finns, 26,40,87; and
Germans, 40; and Greeks, 87,92; and
Hungarians, 40; and Italians, 26,40,70;
and Jews, 38, 40, 252n74; and Latvians,
26,91; and Lithuanians, 26,40,87,88,91.
224; and Mexicans, 26,40,92; and nation
ality breakdown (chart), 40; and Poles, 26,
40.91.93; and presses, 92,93; and Ro
manians, 26; and Russians, 26,40,88-89;
and Scandinavians, 90; and Socialist Party
origins, 19; and South Slavs, 40, 224; and
Ukrainians, 26; and Yugoslavs, 88,90
Forum Hall, 47
Foster, William Z., 16, 21, 24, 28-29, 33> 4470, 80,135,136,172, 228
Freiheit, 135; and singing society, 23
Friends of the Soviet Union, 41
Gannett, Betty, 190
Gardner, Joseph, 99,100
Garvey, Marcus, 49
Garveyism, 27, 50, 95-96
Gebert, Bill, 33,90,93,94,100,101,170,
179,194, 209; and leadership style, 31, 73,
75, 79, 82; and May Day, 74,75; and NaziSoviet pact, 226; and photo, 32; and Trade
Union Unity League, 130
George, Harrison, 26
German Communists (Chicago), 40
Germano, Joe. 171-72
Gersh, Irving, 103
Gibson, Lydia, 26, 28
Giganti, Joe, 81
Glazer, Nathan, 35, 39
Glotzer, AI, 80
Gold, Michael, 9,23,96,111,218,227
Goldman, Albert, 93-94
Gomez, Manuel (Charles Shipman), 24
Gordon, Mary, 230
Gosnell, Harold, 113
Gosse, Van, 72,126

INDEX

Grant Park, 108

Gray, Ben: and discipline, 78; and radicalization, 108,112; and Unemployed Councils.
108,109,115,129; and Young Communist
League, 190; and Soviet Union, 68, 69
Grbac, Jane, 169,198. See abo March, Jane
Great Depression: and Chicago's workers, 5;
and organized labor, 131,142; and South
Side, 111; and strikes, 164; and unemploy
ment, 33; and welfere system (Chicago),
116, 26in7o; and West Side, 54-55; and
worker militancy, 148-49; and youth,
187-90, 204
Greek Communists (Chicago), 87,92; and
federation, 23
Green. Gil, 24,118,190,194, 274ni3,
279nii
Green, Nathan, 153
Green, William, 183
Grey, Abe, 99-101
Hall, Charles, 189,195, 229
Hall, Otto, 27
Hall, Yolanda, 220
Halperin, Rick, 138,148
Hammersmark, Sam, 51,94,123; and anar
chism, 13,14; and Communist Party. 21;
and labor activism, 16,17,20; and literary
work, 15, 24-25; and photo, 15
Handle, Art, 176-77
Harper, Sol, 151
Harriet Tubman Club, 221
Harrison High School, 206
Hart, Schaffner, Marx, 267n34; shop paper,
157
Hathaway, Clarence, 82,135,153
Hauser, Julius, 203, 207
Haymarket incident, 13-14,75; and anar
chists, 16
Haynes, John Earl, 3
Haywood, Bill, 15,137
Haywood, Harry, 27,28,71, 230; and photo,
51; and Poindexter trial, 64-65; and radicalization, 50-52; and nationalities policy,
77; and Young Communist League, 196
Haywood, Otto, 50, 51
Held, Nathan, 82,134
Herndon, Angelo, 26on6o. See also Angelo
Herndon campaign
Hirsch, Carl, 66, 67,69
Holloway, Bill, 103
Houston, Marie, 46, 96,100,126,129
Hucklberry, Dora, 46,126

Humboldt Park relief station, 54

Hungarian Communists (Chicago), 40
Hunger Fighter. 105,109,110.114,117,120
Hunger march (1932), 125; and photo, 123
Hunter, Oscar, 97
Hutchins, Robert. 211
Hyde Park, 46,196
Hyde Park High School, 206. 207

293

Kling, Jack, 118, 200; and photo, 63; and

radicalization, 62; and Young Communist
League, 190,192.196-97
Krumbein, Charles, 21,28-29
Kruse, William, 94

Jacobsen, John Jacob, 120

Jewish Daily Forward, 226
Jewish Socialists (Chicago), 55
Jews: and Communist Party, 38.40,61-62;
and Nazi-Soviet pact, 226-; and Trotsky
ism, 8127; and West Side. 54
Johaningsmeier, Edward, 136
John Reed Club (JRC), 42-44, 52-53
Johnstone, Jack, 17,18, 28-29

Labor Herald, 136

Labor Lyceum Hall. 54
Labor Party, 17, 21
Labor Sports Union, 200,201
labor violence (Chicago), 133,152-54
Lake View, 26,59
Lane High School, 206
Lasswell, Harold, 74,112
LeSueur, Meridel, 42, 43
League for Peace and Democracy, 227
League of Struggle for Negro Rights, 27on84
Left Front, 42,43,52,99
Lenin School. See education (Marxist)
Lenin, V. L, 19, 20-21, 33, 70. 71, 79,161
Lettish buro (Chicago), 91; and federation,
26
Levin, Sam, 228
Lewis, John L., 183, 228
/
Liebknecht, Karl, 33

Lifshitz, Dora, 261, 73,103,135,157

Lightfoot, Claude, 100, 27,129,216; and
labor organizing,
167, 27on83: and
photo, 63; and radicalization, 53-54, 69;
and Unemployed Councils, 111-12
Lipton, Larry, 44
Lithuanian Communists (Chicago), 26,40,
87, 88, 91, 224
Lithuanian workers, 34,114
Livestock Handlers' strike, 170
Loge, Alfred, 94
Loop, 108
Lovestone, Jay, 19, 20, 28, 80, 81-82, 94,95
Lovett, Robert Mors, 209, 211
Lowenthal, Blanche, 219
Lozovsky, Alexander, 136-37
Ludovy Dennik. See Rovnost L'udu

Kampfert, Arthur, 179

Kaplan, Helen, 26
Karenic, Charles, 40
Karl Marx Club, 59, 90
Karl Marx Hof, 219
Keep America Out of War Congress, 229
Keller, Margaret, 126
King, Grace, 176
I^ar, Nels. 59, 61,103,106,134
Klehr, Harvey, 3, 44, 91, 227

Mackovich, John, 66,90, 92

Majestic Radio, 45,141.145, 267n34
Maki, Arthur, 94,123
Manley, Joseph, 137
March, Herb, 77,149.169,179,189, 202,
228; and meatpacking, 185,198-99
March, Jane, 192,220. See also Grzbac, Jane
Margo, Edith, 99
Marks, John. 190,195
Marshall High School, 206,207

Illinois Federation of Labor (IFL), 151.185

Illinois Steel, 139,140,148,182
Illinois Steel Worker, 157
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),
15-16,50,137
International Harvester, 138,139,148,162,
165.173
International Labor Defense (ILD), 74,
75> 139. i5ii 227; and membership, 41,
242n39
International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union (ILGWU), 17, 22, 73,131,134-35,
136
International Literature, 52
International Trade Union Educational
League (ITUEL), 16-17
International Women's Day, 45
International Workers' Order (IWO). 41,
141-42,219. 227
International Working Peoples' Association,
12-13
Isserman, Maurice, 216,229
Italian Communists (Chicago), 26,40

294

'

INDEX

Marx, Karl, 50, 70, 71; and Communist Man

ifesto, 211: and Value, Price and Profit, 51
May Day (1930). 73-75,145,157,158; and
demonstration (photo), 74
McCarty, Frank, 179,185
McCormick Works, 13
McCulloch, Frank, 262n9i
McDonald, J. E., 175,176-77
meatpacking industry, 17,170; and ethnic
workforce, 11,138; and Trade Union Edu
cational League, 135-36; and Trade Union
Unity League, 139,154-55,156,158,160,
167,169-71,174.177-80; and Young
Communist League, 198-221
Meldon, John, 103
Metal Workers' Industrial League, 137,143
Mexican Communists (Chicago), 40
Mexican workers (Chicago), 34,49,114,
138,181
Meyers, Irving, 119
Midwest Daily Record, 218,220
Miller, Edith, 72-73,118,192,196
Miller Street gang, 135
Mills, Make, 119, 206
Minor, Robert, 28, 51
Modern Bookstore, 24
Moen, Lawrence, 108
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. See Nazi-Soviet
Pact
Mooney, Tom, 17
Morgan, Henry Lewis: and Ancient Society,
50
Moss. Joseph, 116-17,120-21
Mother Jones, 15
Murphy, Martin, 168,179
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, 49
National Industrial Recovery Act, 164,165,
i68,171,172,178. See also New Deal
National Malleable, 202
National Railroad Industrial League, 174,
176
National Student League, 196,203-5, 208,
209
Nazi-Soviet pact, 214-15,216,224-29
Near North Side, 24
Near West Side, 55
needle trades, 134-35,137
Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union,
142,143,167,168,274ni5
Negro Champion. 46
Nelson, Oscar, 124

INDEX

Nelson, Steve, 25,41, io6,107,153

New Anvil, 219
New Deal 163,198. See also Federal Emer
gency Recovery Act; National Industrial
Recovery Act; Reconstruction Finance
Corporation
New Masses, 42,43, 52
Newton, Herbert, 76,77,78,86,191
Nockels, Edward, 17,153
North Side, 7, 44, 58-59, 81,116; map,
60-61
Northwestern railroad. See Chicago and
Northwestern Railroad
Northwestern Shop News, 83.157,197
Northwestern University, 206
Nutt, Howard, 42
Ny Tid, 224
Odd Fellows Hall, 47,101
O'Flaherty, Tom, 24, 26, 252n72
Olander, Victor, 151,185
Omaha packing, 140
O'Neil, John, 100,101
Orear, Les, 149,189,195
Orleck, Annelise, 72,145
Otthon. 83
Overgaard, Andrew, 24
Owens, Gordon, 27
Packinghouse Workers' Industrial Union,
140-41,168-69,170,178,179,199
Fackingtown. See Back of the Yards
Falmer, Bryan, 3
Palmer Raids, 18
Parsons, Lucy, 15, 74
Party Organizer, 140,142,154
Patterson. George, 156,180-81
Patterson, William, 53, 228
People's Auditorium. See Ukrainian People's
Auditorium
Pepper, John, 80
Perlstein, Mayer, 135
Peters, J., 229
Phillips, H.V., 27
Pineapple Gang, 62
Podulski, Joseph, 22
Poindexter, David, 78,100,112,191: and
radicalization, 53, 54,69: and trial, 64-65
Polish buro (Chicago), 90: and Communists
26,40,90-91,93
Polish Socialists (Chicago), 55
Polish workers (Chicago), 34,49,114,178,
226,227; and women. 147

Popular Front: and Chicago, 216-18; and

culture, 222-23; ^d foreign-language
groups, 224-25; and mass support,
223-24; and membership, 218-19; and
party composition, 221, 218-19; and
party structures, 216-17; and Soviet ties,
214-15; and Third Period antecedents, 2,
166-67; and trade unions, 175-76, 225:
and women, 219-20; and Young Commu
nist League, 221
Profintern. See Red International of Labor
Unions
Pullman fectory, 13: and strike, 14
Quinn, Walter, 203
race riot (Chicago), 18
Radnik. 83,91
Railroad Amalgamation Committee, 137
railroad industry, 139,174-77; and strike of
1877.12
railroad workers, 137-38,148-49,160-61;
and brotherhoods, 143,160
Railway Workers' Industrial League, 143
Ramirez, Jose, 23
Rassviet, 83
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
263n95
Red International of Labor Unions (RILU),
4, 21,24,75,136,142-43
Red Squad. See Chicago police
Reed, John: and Ten Days that Shook the
World. 50
Reese, Jack, 172,181-82
Republic Steel, 139,181
Rodin, Clara, 26
Rogers, Pauline, 145
Rogers Park, 203
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 132,227
Roosevelt High School, 206
Roosevelt Road. 58.190.226
Rovrtosf L'udu. 93
Rubicki, Steve, 103
Rumanian Communists (Chicago), 26
Russian Communists (Chicago), 26,40,
88-89
Russian Cooperative Restaurant, 62
Russian workers (Chicago), 81
Ruthenberg, Charles, 23,28,80,81
Samuel, James, 112,128
Sands, Charles, 134
Scandia, 23

295

Scandinavian Communists (Chicago), 90

Schaffner, Nate, 152,162
Schultz, Anna, 45,96
Scottsboro campaign, 72, 77,96,108,112,
169,190
Seattle general strike, 23
Seattle Labor College, 33
Shaw, Harry, 154,176-77
Shields, Beatrice, 156, 220
shop papers, 156-57, 248ni6; and photo, 159
Shukshick, Mary, 202
Simon, Henry, 43
Simpkin, Maurice, 219
Siporin, Mitchell, 43
Sklar, Carl, 94
Slovak Workers Society, 40
Smerkin, George, 193
social fascism policy (Communist), 82-83,
93-95
Socialist Labor Party, 12,33
Socialist Party of America, 14,19, 87; and
appeal to youth, 187-88; apd Chicago,
12,13; and electoral politics, 126-27; and
left wing members join^tommunist Party,
22-23,26
Soderstrom, Reuben, 18^5
Soldier Field, 185
^
South Chicago, 7,70^139
South Side, 26, 39, 58,76,124,97,100,152,
203, and anti-eviction activity, 111-14;
and Communist Party recruitment, 47-49;
and map, 48: and Unemployment Coun
cils, 117,125. See also "Back of the Yards";
Black Belt
South Slav Communists (Chicago), 40; and
buro, 224
South Slav workers (Chicago), 227
South Works, i8o-8i
Soviet Union, 1, 27-28, 66-69, 76, 228
Spanish Communists (Chicago), 26. 92
Spiegel, Jack, 61-62, 82.106,123,128
Stachel, Jack, 156,165.178,180,182,183
Stalin, Joseph, 3,19,214, 215
Stalinism, 3-4,7-8,80,188
Starr, Vicky, 192,199
Steel and Metal Workers' Industrial League,
155.161,165,171-73.180,181,267n33
steel industry, 17-18,139,148,161
Steel Workers' Organizing Committee, 181
Stewart Warner, 58,139-40,147,191
Stockyard Handlers' Strike, 164
Stockyard Labor Council, 17,168-69,17880,199

296

INDEX

stockyards. See Union Stock Yards

streetcar riot, iii, 259n47
Strike against War, 208-9
strikes: and Ben Sopkins and Sons (1933),
162,165, X67-68; and Chicago (1933),
in, 164; and Livestock Handlers', 164,
170; and Pullman strike, 14: and railroad
strike of 1877,12; and Seattle general
strike, 23
Student Congress against War, 206
Student Union against War and Fascism, 209
Swabeck, Arne, 23, 28-29, 81
Swift and Company, xi, 139,140,148
Syndicalist Lea^e of North America
(SLNA), 16,17
Tate, Richard, 112,128
Third Period, 2, 82.101-2. 23in4
Thompson. Freeman, 126
Thompson, Rev. John R., 230
Tighe, Mike, 171,182,183,184
Topshevsky, Morris, 43
Trade Union Educational League (TUEL),
20-21, 27, 59,137; and American Federa
tion of Labor. 59,134-37: and composi
tion, 237n36; and Communist Party, 22;
and meatpacking, 135-36: and railroad
workers, 136
Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), 45,130,
132; and American Consolidated Trades
Council, 151-52; and AFL, 131-32,14243,158,161; and building trades, 154; and
challenges, 133-34. i49.152-54.155-58,
166,168; and concentration industries,
139-40; and Communist Party, 132-33,
141,154; and International Workers'
Order, 141-42; and meatpacking, 154-55,
156,158,160,167,170-71,174.177-80;
and membership, 173-74; ^d Popular
Front antecedents, 166-67; and railroad
industry, 154,160-61,166,167,174-77:
and social life, 141; and steel industry,
i54-55> 167,172-73,174,180-84; and
structure, 140-41,174: and successes, 132.
162: and Unemployed Councils. 103-5;
and women, 141-47
trials (Communist), 64-65,191-92
Trotsky, Leon, 95; and The Draft Program of
the Comintern, 80
Trotskyism. 81, 82; and Trotskyists, 58,

94-95
'fuley High School, 206

INDEX

Ukrainian Communists (Chicago), 26

Ukrainian Labor Home, 90
Ukrainian People's Auditorium, 54, 55,191
Ukrainian Socialists (Chicago), 55
Ukrainian workers, 202; and women, 145
Ukrainian Workers' Home, 141
Unemployed Councils, 59, 62,105,170; and
anti-Communism, 120-21; and anti-eviction work, 111-14; and Chicago police at
tack (photo), 119; and Communist Party,
102-3,106-7: and Communist work with
non-Communists, 103,127-28,129; and
demonstrations, 99-101,104-5,196,
257ni3: and flophouses, 108-11: and ho
meowners, 121-22: and loose discipline,
113-25; and membership, 122; photo,
101; and race, 114-15,129; and relief sta
tions, 115-20; and structure, 103-4. i05>
127,129; and Trade Union Unity League,
161-62,167; and U.S. cities, 102,105;
and Washington Park, 102,111,112; and
women, 45,102,125-26; and Young Com
munist League, 196
Union Park, 111
Union Stock Yards, 138,146,165,168-70,
184; and Trade Union Educational League,
135-36; and Trade Union Unity League,
139,140-41,158,, 160,168-71.177-80
United Communist Party. 22. See also Com
munist Party (USA)
Unity News, 175,176
University of Chicago, 189. 205, 229; and
anti-war movement 203, 207-9, 210; free
speech, 209-10; and student activism,
205-6: and student composition, 204,
282n83: Walgreen incident, 210-12
Upsurge, The, 203
Urban League, 49,167
U.S. Steel, 147-48
Vidali, Vittorio, 23
Viking Temple, 58
Vilnis, 87. 88
Voice of Labor. 22,24
Voyzey, George, 94
Wagknecht, Alfred, 22,45
Walgreen incident, 210-12; and Charles
Walgreen, 210
Waltmire, Rev. W. B.. 209
Wangerin, Otto, 137-38,142,149,154,176
Washington, Lowell, 115

Washington Park, 46,47, 51, 53,54,99,100,

124: and forums, 100.111,178
Washington Square Park, See Bughouse
Square
Weber, Joe, 128,171-72,186
Weinstein, Reva, 166
Weitz, Eric D., 71
West, Mollie, 55,57-58
West Side, 7, 58,117,152,190, 203; and con
ditions, 54-58; and map, 56-57
Western Electric, 45,138.140,141,146,148,
153.155.162.173
Wheaton, Thelma, 96
Whip, The, 113
Whiteman, Lovett Fort, 66-67, 2.7on79; and
photo, 67
Wicker Park Hall, 134
Williamson, John, 62,73, 75, 84,123,148,
149; and education (Marxist), 69; and
leadership style, 34,35,73; and party
jargon, 67-68; photo, 34; and radicaliza
tion, 33
Wilson and Company, 148
Winn, Stella, 197
Winston, Henry, 220
Wisconsin Steel, 139,147
Wittenber, Jan, 42,43
Wolfe, Bertram, 28
women: and Communist Party, 26.44-46,
71-73; and housewives, 26,38. 24in26:
and Popular Front, 219-20; and Trade
Union Unity League, 141-47; and
Unemployed Councils. 45.102,12526
Women's Trade Union League, 26

297

Workers' Alliance of America, 128, 223,

262n9i
Workers (Communist) Party of America. See
Communist Party (USA)
Workers' Voice, 69
Working Woman, 45. 72
Working Women's Federation, 45,145-46
World Youth Congress, 213
Wright, Richard, 42,43, 52, 53, 66
Yandrich, S., 156
Yards' Worker, 199
Yates, James, 113-14
YMCA College, 206
Young, Quentin, 207
Young Communist League (YCL). 52, 58,
62,108,180,192: and African Americans,
191-92; and anti-war movement, 202-13;
and Chicago leaders, 190-91; and Comin
tern, 193-94; and Communist Party, 44,
194-200: and counter-Olympics protest,
200-202; and membership (Chicago),
190-91,192; and Popular ^ront, 219,221;
and race relations. 77-7^89; and Stalin
ism, 188,193; and stud&t activism, 2056; and unemployed a^ivism, 196-97; and
union work, 178,179,180,197-200
Young People's SocidiSt League, 192-93
Youngstown Sheet and Tube, 172,182
youth (Chicago): and antiwar attitudes, 207
Yugoslav Communists (Chicago), 88,91; and
buro, 90
Zack, Joseph, 137
Zinich, S., 87, 90,91,92

R A N D I S T O R C H is an associate professor of history at the State

University of New York at Cortland. She has pubhshed articles
in American Labor and the Cold War, The Enyclopedia of Chicago
History, and Labor: Studies in Working-Class History in the Americas.